{"collection":"Buddhism","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/bud/tib/singer.htm","path":"bud/tib/singer.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/bud/tib/singer.htm","text":"B U D D H I S T I N F O R M A T I O N N E T W O R K\n5 1 0 - 2 6 8 - 0 1 0 2\nBest In The Bay! All Uploads\nBuddhist Texts, 9000+ Files On Line Checked both\nArtwork, Translations, AND GROWING SCAN and\nAsian language programs F-PROT\nThe `No-Self' Nature of People and Things\nby Charlie Singer\nAUTHOR'S COLOPHON: This small book was completed in Kingston,\nPennsylvania on the new moon day of the first month of the Tibetan Iron\nHorse year (March 16, 1990). It was written for purposes of the author's own\nedification, with the wish that it might somehow be of benefit to other people\nwho might read it in the future.\nTRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: This edition of \"The `No-Self' Nature of People\nand Things\" has been transcribed from the RIGDEN PUBLICATIONS\nedition, which ran 308 copies. Charlie Singer has given the Tiger Team\nBuddhist Information Network express permission to transcribe this work.\n-- Gary Ray\nCopyright c. 1990 Charles M. Singer\nABOUT THE AUTHOR: Charlie Singer was born in Brussells, Belgium, in\n1952. he received a B.A. degree in General Arts and Sciences from Penn\nState University in 1973, and from 1976-1978 was a student in the Tibetan\nStudies Program at the Nyingma Institute in Berkeley, California. Since\n1980, he has been studying Tibetan Buddhism at the Yeshe Nyingpo Center\nin New York City, the seat in North America of the late H.H. Dudjom\nRinpoche, Supreme Hoead of the Nyingmapa lineage of Tibetan Buddhism.\nDedicated to:\nThe Late H.H. Dudjom Rinpoche\nH.E. Shenpen Dawa Rinpoche\nVen. Tarthang Tulku Rinpoche\nVen. Ngor Thartse Khen Rinpoche\nVen. Khenpo Paiden Sherab Rinpoche\nVen. Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal Rinpoche\nto my late Father, Samuel Singer,\nand to my Mother, Paulette;\nand Jeanine N. and Tina F.\nIn the history of ideas, there is perhaps no idea more unusual than the\nBuddhist concept of anatman, or `no-self'. This idea of anatman, or `no-self',\nwas taught by the historical Buddha, Buddha Sakyamuni, as being one of the\n\"three marks of existence\", along with duhkha, or dissatisfaction, and anitya,\nor impermanence. These \"three marks of existence\" are regarded in Buddhist\nthought as being the three fundamental conditions which pervade the human\ncondition. The latter two \"marks of existence\", of dissatisfaction and\nimpermanence, have been much written about in the Buddhist literature now\navailable in the English language, but the notion of anatman, or `no-self' has\nbeen little understood, and represents one of the most unusual, and yet\nimportant, ideas to arise in the history of ideas.\nCommon to all schools or forms of Buddhism, is the idea of anatman or\n`no-self' nature of the individual or person (or actually of all beings endowed\nwith consciousness). The Buddha was born into the Hindu religious culture,\nand one of the fundamental tenets of the Hindu religion has always been that\nall beings are endowed with the nature of (having an) atman, or `soul' or\nactually a `self', which is ultimately identical with, or actually partakes of, the\nnature of Brahman, or the creator aspect of God, in Hindu tradition.\nAlthough the Buddha never explicitly affirmed or denied the existence of\nGod, encouraging his disciples to study and practice his teachings until they\nthemselves had attained the level of a perfectly enlightened being, or a\nBuddha, at which point they would have a direct understanding of this and\nother such metaphysical questions, the Buddha made it quite clear in one of\nhis first teachings, that in regard to the notion that beings are endowed with\nan atman, or permanent `self', that this notion is ultimately erroneous, and that\nin fact, the condition of having `no-self' is an underlying \"fact-of-life\" or\nprinciple of existence.\nThis idea of there being `no-self' can be analyzed in different ways, but\nfrom one point of view, we might say that the idea of `no-self' means that\nwhen investigate the nature of the individual or person, if we investigate what\nis involved carefully enough, we would find that ultimately, there isn't\nactually a `self', or the one we refer to as `I' or `me', as a truly-existing `being'\nwho `inhabits' our body and mind, in a concrete, ongoing, and permanent\nway. In common sense thinking, and even in traditional philosophies and\nreligious and scientific thinking, there is a sense in which people have always\naccepted the belief that there is, in fact, a `self' who inhabits our body and\nmind, who is the one we refer to as `I' or `me'.\nThis attitude, or underlying presupposition or existence, can well be\nsummed up by the statement of the French philosopher, Descartes, that \"I\nthink, therefore I am\". From the point of view of Buddhist philosophy,\nhowever, this sort of statement partakes of the nature of delusion. We might\n*assume* that there is a `self' who `inhabits' our body and mind, and is \"the\none who does our thinking\", but if we were to investigate this state of affairs,\nwe would find, according to Buddhist philosophy, that this is, in fact, not the\ncase. Our thoughts and thinking processes might *seem* as if there is an\nactual `I' who is generating or thinking our thoughts, saying and hearing the\nthoughts that arise in `our minds', but if we were to investigate what is\nactually involved, we might find that, in fact, this notion of an ongoing `self'\nor `I' is only an erroneous assumption. This idea of there being a `self' is so\ndeep-seated, that it may seem completely unquestionable, and a `given' factor\nof experience and existence, but ultimately, according to Buddhist\nphilosophy, the belief in a `self' or `I', but ultimately, there is a sense in which\n\"there may not be anybody there!\" What is involved might be said to be like a\ncase of \"the talk in our heads\" *pretending to be\" a \"somebody who is having\nthoughts\". Although the common sense belief may be that \"I am the one who\ncreates the thoughts\", it may be, in fact, that our thinking our thoughts\nactually help to create the belief that there is a `self' or an `I' who truly exists\nas `the one who does our thinking!'\nAlthough it is possible to `unravel' what is involved in regard to the\nnature of the `thinker' and the `thoughts' through practicing different kinds of\nBuddhist meditation, such as meditation in which we attend to the nature of\nour thoughts and how they arise in our mind, developing calmness, and direct\ninsight into what is actually involved, it will not be the purpose of this book to\ndiscuss the subject of formal meditation, as this is a complicated subject, and\nbecause formal meditation is best learned from a qualified meditation teacher.\nRather, we will next focus on the notion of `no-self' as it relates to our\nsense-perceptions. It is said in Buddhist tradition, that the sense of hearing is\nthe easiest of our sense-perceptions by which we can come to an\nunderstanding of the nature of `no-self', and in fact it is said that the\nBodhisattva Avalokiteshvara, the personification of the compassion of all the\nBuddhas (the reader is reminded that in Buddhist tradition, anyone who has\nattained the level of a completely enlightened being, or Buddha, is designated\nas being a Buddha, and so there have actually been many Buddhas), attained\nthe enlightenment by following the advice of Manjushri, the personification of\nthe wisdom of all the Buddhas, and attending to the true nature of the\nsensation of hearing, or sound. If we consider the nature of an ongoing\nsound, such as a waterfall, or even any sounds such as music, we can ask\nourselves - which part of this sound, or audial presentation, is the actual\nsound, and which part is the `self' or `I' who is the one who is `doing the\nhearing'? More specifically, where do we `cut-up' this audial-sensation into\nthe separate components of the one who `hears' and `that which is being\nheard'? It may be, as with our act of thinking, that we have wrongly assumed\nthe idea of a solid, permanent `self' who acts as an agent or subject,\ninteracting with our sense-perceptions, here being our perception of sound.\nThat is, we regard our `selves' as being a separate subject which interacts with\nsensations we regard as being truly-existing and separate from `us', in a way\nthat the sensation is regarded as a separate and independent object.\nAs the reader may have noticed, it is very difficult to speak of the non-\nexistent nature of a `self' without discussing the nature of our world of `things'\nand sensations. Although the idea of the ultimate non-existence of the `self' is\na central idea in all forms of Buddhism, of the divisions of Hinayana,\nMahayana, and Vajrayana Buddhism, in the latter two forms of Buddhism,\nalong with the idea of the ultimate non-existence of the `self', there is also the\nidea that in addition to the non-existence of a `self', that what we regard as\nbeing the world of `things' and sensations, also partakes of the nature of\n`anatman' or `no-self'.\nAs we have seen in the analysis of sound, such as a waterfall or of\nmusic, it is very difficult to separate the sensations into a separate subject who\nis having or experiencing the sensation, and a separate object, that is, the\nsound being heard. In the literature of the Abhidharma, rather than accepting\nthe common sense notion that there is a `self' who is a concrete, permanent,\ntruly-existing agent which acts as the subject of our sensations, such as seeing\nand hearing, sensations were analyzed or `broken-down' into their apparent\ncomponent parts. For example, rather than saying that \"I see a thing\", in the\nAbhidharma analysis, it would be stated that in the act of visual sensation, it\nis necessary to have three separate components: an agent of seeing, visual\nconsciousness, and an object of sight.\nWhether we analyze `things' and sensations as being sensed or\nperceived by a central `self' who perceives all the various sensations of the\ndifferent senses, or analyze them according to the Abhidharma view,\naccording to the view of the philosophical school of Madhyamika, a\nMahayana Buddhist school founded by the second-century philosopher,\nNagarjuna, which was based upon the Prajnaparamita Sutras of the Buddha,\nthe `things' and sensations in our world also partake of the nature of `anatman'\nor `no-self', in the same way that persons or individuals partake of the `no-self'\nnature.\nAs we have said, the nature of the hearing sensation may be the easiest\nmeans by which to understand the relationship between a perceiving subject\nand the object of perception, or actually, to recognize that they are both\nequally non-existent, ultimately. Rather than being the case that a subject (or\na specific variety of sense consciousness, according to the Abhidharma)\ninteracts with and senses (or \"grasps\", as it is said in the Buddhist\nphilosophical literature) an object of perception, it may be that sensations\narise in a way that there is ultimately no subjective pole of experience\ninteracting with a separate objective pole. Because sensations arise beyond\nthe realm of an independent or separate subjective pole and an independent or\nseparate objective pole, and thus without any interaction between a subjective\nand an objective pole or dimension, all our sensations, according to the view\nof Madhyamika philosophy, partakes of the anatman or `no-self' nature. The\ntechnical term used in the Madhyamika literature, is that all our sensations,\nvisual, audial, and all others, are \"shunya\" or \"empty\", or that they partake of\nthe nature of \"shunyata\" or \"emptiness\". In the interest of being fair to the\nMadhyamika system, however, it must be pointed out that the philosophy of\nMadhyamika is so adamant in not taking any position in regard to \"the way\nthings really are\", that even the position that things and sensations partake of\nthe nature of anatman, or `no-self', is not beyond critique. Yet there is a sense\nin which in the traditional parlance of the nature of anatman, or `no-self', as\nreferring to the same truth of `things' and sensations as being \"shunya\" or\n\"empty\". What they are `empty of', is the status of being inherently or `truly-\nexisting'. We might say that although in perceptual situations we are faced\nwith some kind of an epistemological-object, or an apparent object of\nknowledge or perception, `its' status as an ontological-object, or as a `truly-\nexisting object' is that it is \"empty\" of an ontological status, or of the nature of\nhaving the nature of being an inherently and `truly-existing' object.\nThis is true of the objects of all our sensations, but it is the visual\nsensation and the `object of sight' that we need to analyze in more detail\nbecause although all the senses taken together and our thinking work together\nto enforce or create the view of a separate `self' interacting with a world of\n`truly-existing things', in a sense it is our sense of sight, among all our senses,\nwhich is perhaps the most important sense used in analyzing or understanding\nour world, along with, of course, our thinking, which in Buddhist philosophy\nis regarded as being a separate type of consciousness.\nWe are confronted with all kinds of different `objects' or `things' in our\nworld everyday. There are `objects' of all different sizes, shapes, and colors,\nin natural settings and in rooms which are in buildings, which are themselves\na type of object, and also other beings such as animals and other human\nbeings, which in a sense are another type of object which we as an apparent\nsubject or `self' can interact with.\nIt may be possible to establish through some kind of logic, the non-\nexistence of a solid, permanent `self' who acts as the agent of our visual\nsensation. For example, we can try to posit the existence of such a `self' by\nreferring to \"the one who sees\". But by further stating that \"the one who sees,\nsees\", it would be like establishing an agent with a double action, as we have\nalready `accounted for' the act of seeing in the statement of \"the one who\nsees\". And as it is not possible to have an agent with a double action, the\nstatement of \"the one who sees, sees\", would not be logically coherent. But\nthe use of some kind of logic may not be very useful in trying to understand\ndirectly the non-existence of a `self' who acts as an agent in regard to the\nvisual sensation (as well as the other sensations), as it is necessary to develop\na more experiential understanding of what may actually be involved.\nIn regard to the so-called subjective-pole, or the `self' dimension in\nvisual sensation, we might say that there is a deep seated tendency to believe\nthat there is `someone inside us' looking out onto the world of `things' and\nappearances from a stable vantage point `in our head' and `behind our\neyeballs'. We believe that there is an ongoing-individual or `self' who `looks-\nout' from the stable vantage point, such that there is a concrete and solid\nsubject who looks out at all the various appearances, or `things' or `objects' in\nour world. But this is regarded in Buddhist philosophy to be an erroneous\npresupposition, or a deluded view.\nThrough developing insight into what may actually be involved, we may\nfind that this notion of `someone on the inside looking out' is in fact a\nmistaken belief, based upon the belief in a `truly-existing self', and that in\nfact, the visual sensation has nothing to do with a dimension of a `self' or even\nconsciousness or mind `going out' to interact with or `grasp' an object of\nperception.\nAs for the objective pole of these `things' or `objects', although there\nappear to be very many types of `things' or `objects', there is a sense in which\nall of these `objects' are alike in being a mere appearance before us.\nWherever we are, there is always some type of appearance before us, and\npeople and the appearances before them always arise together in an\ninseparable manner.\nIn common-sense thinking, we regard the appearance before us as\nbeing truly-existing `things'. That is, that they are things which really `exist'\nin a `really-out-there' kind of way. We regard them as solid `things' that are\nso real that we think that \"they would look like that even if we were not\nlooking at them\". We regard the world as being like some sort of container\nfor a collection of spread-out `things' that we can interact with here and there,\nand that these things are `solid things' `out-there' from which we are separated\nby space, and that there `things' have insides which are also `solid' and `real'.\nThe Madhyamika philosophy is a very unusual system of philosophy, in\nthat, rather than taking any position in regard to what is actually the case with\nthis world of `things', it takes the approach of refuting other positions that\nmight be taken in analyzing `the world'.\nStill, it may be possible to `hint-at' what may be involved in an accurate\nanalysis of the nature of appearances, the so-called `world of things'. As we\nhave said, people (and other beings, of course) and the appearances before\nthem, always `arise together' inseparably. The key to understanding the true\nnature of these appearances seems to be to be aware of the dimension in\nwhich the so-called form or appearance before us and the *awareness* of this\nform or appearance, are completely inseparable. It is as if the awareness of\nconsciousness and the form-aspect are `completely intermingling at every\npoint' and as if the consciousness and form aspects are completely and totally\nintegrated to create an apparitional-like appearance. Although we might say\nthat ultimately there is no interaction between a subjective pole of\nconsciousness, or mind, and an objective pole of separately-existing form, it\nmay still be useful to *point-to* the way that `things' might really be, using\nterms like `awareness' and `form' being `completely-integrated' `beyond\nduality'.\nAlso, we might say that the `mind' or `consciousness' does not `go-out'\nto a so-called `object', but that it is as if the appearance before us has a `built-\nin' dimension of awareness. It is not that the so-called `appearance before us'\nis doing the `knowing' rather than the person. But we might say that\nappearance bears `a knowing dimension' beyond the realm of a subject\nsensing an object. All appearances are, in fact, non-dual (advaya). That is,\nthey are present in the manner of an apparition, having nothing to do with any\nkind of truly-existing (as a separate dimension) subjective pole, or `self' or\n`consciousness' interacting with an `acutally-out-there' objective pole or\n`truly-existing-thing'.\nIt is because of this dimension of awareness and form being so\ncompletely integrated *beyond the realm of a subject interacting with a truly\nexisting object*, that we can say that these appearances or so-called `things'\nare `shunya' or `empty' of self-nature, or of the nature of being `truly-existing'.\nWhen we say that things are `appraritional' in nature, we mean that it is\nas if these `apperances before us' are ultimately present as if they were like a\nreflection in a mirror, rather than being present in a concrete, `really-out-\nthere' kind of way. What we call `things' are really more like `apparitional-\nlike appearances' which are present beyond the realm of a subject interacting\nwith an independent, `truly-existing' `object', and which are, more\nspecifically, actually like a `surface-like apparition'. By `surface-like\napparition', we mean that there is a sense in which all appearances are\n*always on the surface*.\nConsider, for example, a common object like a box of cereal. We are\npresented with what we might call \"a patch of color-form\", a mere apperance\narising within the realm of our awareness. This form is completely integrated\nwith our awarenss of `it', and is ultimately present as if it were like a\nreflection in a mirror.\nAnother dimension involves a sense in which we assume that the box is\na solid object with an inside that has true objective existence. But we need to\ndevelop an understanding in which \"all you see is all there is\" in a completely\nintegrated situation of `completeness'. of course, we can `reveal' further\ndimensions of an apperance, but the act called \"opening the box and pouring\nout the contents\", but it is important to keep in mind that this will actually be\na further or separate non-dual visual presentation `complete' in itself, and\narising beyond a subjective pole and an object interacting, which we can\nconnect in our mind to the appearance we call the `outside of the box'. But it\nis very important to recognize that this principle of `connecting' visual\npresentations over time (which also partakes ultimately of the nature of being\n`empty' of inherent or true-existence) is only applicable at the level of\nconventional common sense, and that the dimension of non-dual visual\npresentations arising in a manner of `completeness' (with a `built-in'\ndimension of `timelessness') is the ultimate manner in which appearances\narise.\nLikewise, we might assume that when looking at `the front of the box'\nthat there is a `behind' or `underneath' part of the box that is presently not\nvisible but which actually `exists' and `looks the way it does'. But as it is with\n`the inside of the box', so it is with the `behind' or `underneath parth'. We can,\nas with the `inside', `reveal' the `behind' or presently `hidden' part of `the box',\nbut the ultimate nature of the so-called `box' is the surface-like apparitional-\nlike presentation which is present in the manner of a reflection in a mirror - a\nnon-dual appearance beyond the realm of being a `truly-existing thing'.\nLet us now consider an example of the situation we might call \"a person\ngoing over to their car parked across the street\". From the common sense\npoint of view, we are `over here', and we see the car which is `over there'.\nWe are the subject and the car is the object that we see, and we are separated\nby space. At a conventional level, we think that we can get closer to `it' by\n`walking towards it', until we `get there' and then `pull the door handle' and\n`get inside the car'.\nUltimately though, the apperance we call `our car' is completely\ninseparable from our awareness in a non-dual way, like a miraculously-\nappearing apparition. `We' are completely integrated with `the appearance\nbefore us' at the so-called `first-sighting', and there is a sense in which we are\nnever separated by `space' from `the appearance before us'. And so in the\nsituation called `walking over to the car', because the appearance is\ncompletely integrated with our awareness at the so-called `first-sighting' and\nat so-called `subsequent-sightings' as `we get closer to the car'.\nSimilarly, the concept of `open-space' as separating `us' from `the\nappearance before us' is ultimately also an illusion arising from not being\naware of the sense in which `the appearance before us' is like a non-dual\napparition, completely integrated in the realm of awareness. If there is no\ndistance between our so-called `consciousness' and the so-called `object',\nthere is no such thing as `invisible space' separating `us' and `the car'. Also, in\nlight of the appearance we call `our parked car' being completely integrated\nwith non-dual awareness (keeping in mind all the different dimensions\ninvolved in the manner that has been discussed), there is a sense in which the\ncar is not a solidly existing `thing' with an `inside' and `outside' belonging to\nan `it' that can be said to `truly-exist' as \"a thing with an inside and outside of\nits own\".\nThere is also a sense in which, by not recognizing the dimension of the\nnon-dual awareness which is aware of the `empty' - `no-self' - nature of\n`ourselves' and `things', that by thinking that `we' and `our car' are separately\nexisting `things' or `objects' (the word \"object\" can be broken-down\netymologically to mean \"thrown-against\") and not being aware of non-dual\nawareness, known as vidya in Sanskrit Buddhist terminology, we actually\ncreate or enforce the illusion that we are a separate, truly-existing `thing',\nbound by skin, walking around and regarding the world as a collection of\n`things' to interact with. By believing that we are \"walking over to our car\nand getting inside this thing\", it is as if we solidify or actually create the belief\nthat we are a truly existing `thing' which exists as `just another thing' which is\nseparated from the appearance before us.\nUltimately, the scientific notion of people (and other beigns with\nconsciousness, such as animals) as being *organisms* which interact with an\nenvironment which is separated from them, is completely erroneous,\naccording to Buddhist philosophy. It is true that, in a sense, as people, we are\nan \"embodiment of mind\". But this mind is a completely open-ended\ncontinuum which is so open-ended, that in a sense, it is as if the mind has the\nability to `take on the form' of `whatever happens to appear before it', that is,\nthe appearances which we regard as being `truly-existing things'. Although\nfrom the ultimate point of view, this `mind' is as `empty' of true or inherent\nexistence as is the `self' or `things', it may still be useful to talk about our\nbeing an \"embodiment of a mind\" which becomes `terminated' by\nappearances in a non-dual way, beyond the realm of a subject interacting with\nan object, in order to `point-to' the way things may be ultimately.\nAlso, the idea of the environment of `the world of things' as being a\nrealm separate from the `beings in the world', as if `the world of things' was\n`standing around' separately, `waiting to be interacted with', needs to be\nanalyzed more carefully. Consider, for example, the idea of famous\nlandmarks such as the White House and the Kremlin. We might say that\nthere are, in conventional thinking, regarded as actually `taking up space in a\ncertain place' and having the status of \"really being there and `standing\naround' looking like they look\" and having the status of a `truly-existing thing\nin a truly existing place'. It may be possible to undermine this notion of\n`things' and `places' `waiting for us' in a separate manner. We might be able\nto end up with a more sophisticated understanding of how it is with these\n`people', `places', and `things' in a manner that goes beyond the realm of\norganisms interacting with a solid world of things that `stand around' as a\nseparate environment. From the point of view of what may actually be\ninvolved in the situation called \"an American looking at the Kremlin\" or \"a\nRussian looking at the White House\", if we understand this idea of ourselves\nas an `embodiment of mind' which becomes `terminated' by an appearance in\na completely non-dual way, beyond the realm of a subject and object, it may\nbe necessary to completely rething our ideas of analyzing the world as being\nmade up of separate `categories' or `people', `places,' and `things', which\nwould also have far-reaching ramifications in the socio-political realm. And\nif, in this light of our being an \"embodiment of a mind\" which becomes\nterminated by an appearance in a non-dual way beyond the realm of subject\nand object, we consider that, for example, in a subject such as the history of\nwarfare or aggression, we are dealing with soldies of different nations who, as\nembodiments of mind whose minds, from a higher point of view, become\n`terminated' in a non-dual way by the appearance referred to at a common-\nsense conventional level, as \"other soldiers who are the enemy,\" the\nimplications are shocking, in a manner that goes beyond, and yet\nencompasses, the realm of moral considerations.\nAs for the active aspects of this non-dual awareness which is beyond\nthe realm of subject and object, or vidya, this is termed jnana, and as opposed\nto vijnana, or ordinary dualistic consciousness, in which the subjective and\nobjective poles are regarded as being actually inherently existing, with jnana,\none is aware of the non-dual nature of people and appearances. If we use an\nexample of \"two people and their parked car\", we might say that the person\nusing vijnana regards the car as a truly-existing thing that he or she can `walk\nover to and get inside of', while the person jnana is aware of the non-dual\ndimension in which the `individual' and the `thing' are both `empty' of being\nactually-existing things which are interacting with each other. From the point\nof view of the person whose awareness is characterized by vijnana (which can\nbe broken down etymologically to mean \"knowing-apart\"), there are three\nseparate things involved in this example: that is, two people, plus one car.\nFrom the point of view of the person whose awareness would be\ncharacterized by jnana, however, this is not the case. But what `actually is the\ncase' may be beyond the realm of being expressed in the ordinary language of\n`people and things' as separate objects to be `added up', and of \"two people\ninteracting with the one same thing\". Of course, the person using jnana is still\naware of the sense in which things like cereal boxes and cars appear to exist\nat a conventional level, that is, the way that they seem to exist from the point\nof view of `other people using vijnana', but he/she is never separated from the\nnon-dual awareness of vidya, and this is what is said to characterise the\nawareness of the Buddhas.\nIf we mistake the appearances before us as being `truly-esisting',\n`actually out there' types of `things' with true, inherent existence, we fall into\ndeep error, according to Buddhist thought, setting up a fictitious realm of an\nindividual separated from the world of appearances (so-called `things') in a\ndeep-seated way. This is known as the realm of samsara, the world of\n\"running around and around in circles\", chasing after `things' we regard as\n`really-existing' that we would like to have, while avoiding `the things that we\ndon't like'. But these emotions or `emotional filters' of attachment, or desire,\nand aversion (combines with irritation, as a sort of `complex') as well as the\nother basic emotions of pride and jealousy, all arise from dualistic-ignorance,\nor \"not knowing how it really is with people and things\". It is said that this\nrealm of samsara and its `flip-side' of nirvana, exist nowhere else than in our\nmind: when our mind is pervaded by emotional and intellectual obscurations\nabout `the way things are', we are caught up in samsara; but when this same\nmind is completely freed from those obscurations, we attain nirvana. So\nnirvana is not some other-worldly realm in which we would see different\nthings than other people see, but our same world as seen differently, that is,\npervaded by the non-dual awareness of vidya.\nAlso, our mind in union with the ultimate nature of apperances is\nactually the Dharmakaya, the so-called \"body of Truth\" of a Buddha, which is\none of the \"three bodies of a Buddha\".\nAlthough we begin with the common sense view of `people' and things'\nas truly-existing separate entities interacting with each other, after we hear\nabout or read about the `empty' or `no-self' nature of people and things, we\nmay begin to engage in the process known as asraya paravritti, or \"the turning\nover in the mind\", by which we begin to `tune-into' the ultimate, `empty'\nnature of `people' and `appearances'. Little by little, we can deepen our\nawareness of this dimension until it becomes more and more a part of our\nnature, and eventually, it may be possible to become a true embodiment of\nthis non-dual awareness, or vidya.\nWhen the Buddhist texts were first being translated in tibet, the term\nvidya, or non-dual awareness, was translated into Tibetan as rig-pa. But\nrather than translating the negation of this non-dual awarenss of vidya\n(avidya) as rig-med, which could indicate a complete negation of rig-pa, it\nwas translated as ma-rig-pa, indicating a *qualitative* drop in the level of rig-\npa, or non-dual awareness. So we can see that from one point of view, our\nawareness of the nature of `people' and `things' is not completely confused,\nbut that it needs to be transformed so that it will be `in-tune-with' `the way\nthings really are'.\nAlthough in Hinduism, the different yogas are practiced in order to\nattain union with God, in Buddhism, we might say that `emptiness-yoga', that\nis, trying to attain union with the ultimate `empty' (-apparitional) nature of\npeople and appearances, is practiced. The teachings on the `empty' (-\napparitional) nature of `people' and appearances (so-called `things') are\nfundamental teachings of Mahayana Buddhism which are also very important\nin the offshoot of the Mahayana, Vajrayana or Tantric Buddhism. But even\nthough the teachings on the `empty' or `no-self' - nature of `people' and\n`things' are fundamental teachings of the Mahayana, at the highest level of\nVajrayana or Tantric Buddhism known as Dzogchen, or the \"Great\nPerfection\", it is in fact the continual contemplation of the non-dual\nawareness of vidya which is said to constitute the main practice of this highest\nmystical system of Dzogchen.\nIt is regarded as being very important to cultivate the awareness of the\nnon-dual nature of `people' and `things' in regard all manner of appearances,\ndeepening our understanding of what this means until it becomes a part of our\nbeing at a very deep and completely integrated level. When we being trying\nto understand the meaning of shunyata or the `empty' (-apparitional) nature of\nappearances, it may seem as if it is easier to recognize this dimension of\napparitionalness in regard to some `things' in a more readily comprehensible\nway than with other `things'. We may find it easier to be aware of this\napparitional dimension of appearances in regard to `objects' which appear to\npartake of a `shiny, liminous' dimension, such as cans of food from the\nsupermarket, or perhaps magazine covers. But we should eventually tru to\nunderstand this `empty', apparitional nature of things in regard to *all*\nappearances, although we may find it useful to \"practice\" using objects where\nwe find this non-dual awareness more (potentially, if not actually) apparent.\nAlong with the idea that appearances are `shunya' (or partake of the\nnature of shunyata or `emptiness') or `empty of inherent existence', in the\nmanner that has been discussed, in the Vajyrayana or Tantric teachings, it is\nsaid that along with this dimension of so-called `things' being `shunya' or\n`empty', `they' also partake of a luminosity dimension (prabhasvara). That is,\nthat these `empty' - appearances partake of a dimension of a shiny, luminous,\nlight-like nature. Also, these appearances may be characterized as pataking\nof the nature of \"non-dividedness\". That is, that they are completely \"non-\ndivided\" in regard to the subject and object, or more precisely, \"non-divided\"\nbeyond the realm of a supposed subject and object.\nAs a footnote to these three dimensions of appearance, we might\nconsider the myth of *Lucifer* in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Lucifer\nmeans the \"light-bearer\", and if we examine this myth from the proper angle,\nwe might find that this myth of the fall of Lucifer may actually refer to the\n\"fall of man\" from being in union with the ultimate, `empty' *luminous*\ndimension of non-dual awareness, into the realm of individuals regarding\nthese appearances as being truly existing in a `real', `out-there' kind of way.\nIn Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism, although the term\ntathagatagarbha can be taken in general usage to refer to the enlightened -\nBuddha- nature inherent in all beings, existing as a potentiality that needs to\nbe activated and actualized, in another sense it refers to the process by which\nBeing itself is led back to attaining its true state. Since this level of\nattainment is beyond the level of a `self' who has attained this level of\nrealization, there is a sense in which the realization or attainment belongs to\nBeing itself, rather than to a `self' or \"I\".\nThen it may be possible to understand such notions as that what is\nbehind the nature of `people' and `appearances' is nothing more than the\nplayful nature (lila) of Being itself. It seems that Being has the ability to `set-\nup' apparitional - like appearances, but it must be understood that these\nappearances are completely `empty' of true or inherent existence, in the\nmanner that has been discussed. The nature of these appearances is the\ncompletely miraculous display or manifestation of Being, by which it `mirrors'\nor `looks-at' itself, but as regards their status of being truly-existing `things',\nthey are alike in never having come into actual existence, ultimately. Or as\nthe famous Tibetan poet-lama Milarepa expressed it: \"Things appear, but\nthey don't really exist!\"\nIf we were to attain this level of being a true embodiment or a \"holder\"\nof the non-dual awareness, or a vidyadhara, developing this awareness to ever\nincreasing levels until we embody this awareness to a level of total-\nrealization, while of course being able to act in a completely skillful and\ncompassionate manner with these apparitional-like appearances of `people'\nand `things', it is said that there is nothing further to attain or realize; nothing\nhigher that we would need to aspire to.\nAs the famous Tibetan lama of the Dzogchen tradition of Tibetan\nBuddhism, Longchen Rabjam, has said: \"Since everything is but an\napparition, perfect in being what it is, having nothing to do with good or bad,\nacceptance or rejection, one may well burst out in laughter!\"\n---\nNam kay tar tug ta yay sem chan nam\nMay all beings, whose number is as infinite as the sky,\n---\nMa bed zhin du ku sum ngon gyur te\nRealize the Three Bodies of the Buddha\n---\nPa ma dro drug sem chan ma lu pa\nMay my parents who are all the sentient beings of the Six realms of rebirth\nwithout exception\n---\nCham chig dod may sa la chin par shog\nCome together in the Primordial Original State (which is enlightenment\nitself).\n---\n(a Tibetan prayer)","title":"The `No-Self' Nature of People and Things by Charlie Singer","type":"page"}