{"collection":"Buddhism","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/bud/tib/view.htm","path":"bud/tib/view.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/bud/tib/view.htm","text":"Herein Lies the Very Brief Exposition of the Views of the Four\nIndian Schools\nWritten by Todd Fenner, Ph.D.\nThis paper came from a series of posts made in the Buddhist area of\nAmerica On-Line between 11/28/95 and 12/4/95. I made these posts\nunder the name of Jamyang. It was initiated by a request to teach\nthe view of dependent arising in the nine yanas. It has since been\nedited slightly.\nSubj: The View\nDate: 95-11-28 01:49:30 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nWith regard to the view in the nine yanas, the explanation of the\nNyingma is a unique one in that it connects the views of the yanas\nwith the philosophical schools so that sravakayana is connected with\nthe view of the Vaibhasika and so on. A good summary is in the\nappendix to the book 'The Life of Shabkar'. An extensive explanation\nis in Dudjom Rinpoche's magnum opus on the Nyingma Lineage.\nUnfortunately it costs over $200.\nSo I think it would be best to work through the classical tenet\nsystems of Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara and Madhyamika along\nwith some of the subdivisions. I will also address the issue of\nPrasangika and Svatantrika that Namdrol rightly raised and try and\nexplain both sides of the issue. Before doing that however, I want\nto make some comments. There are differences in Madhyamika,\nMahamudra, Dzogchen etc. however the differences lay in method not\nview. In usage, that distinction is not usually made explicit, so it\ncan sometimes be confusing. Thus each refers to certain meditation\nmethods to attain the view as well as the view itself. Sometimes\ncertain scholars, favoring certain techniques have thus rated one\nsuperior to the other but this is questionable as all of them are\nfunctional, that is they produce realization. Likewise with regard\nto tantra, the actual view in all tantra sets is identical between\nthe sets and to that of sutrayana. The difference is in the\nconsciousness cognizing the view. So I will try and go into the view\nirregardless of the consciousness cognizing it. This greatly\nsimplifies the explanations. In samadhi, the distinction between\nconsciousness and the object is like water poured into water.\nSubj: The View II\nDate: 95-11-28 10:48:55 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nTibetans generally classify tenet systems into four broad categories\nVaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamika. In reality the\nsystems are much more diverse. The source of the views of the\nVaibhasika and Sautrantika come primarily from the Abhidharmakosa by\nVasubandhu and commentaries. The Yogacara from Maitreya, Asanga and\nVasubandhu (he changed his mind) and the Madhyamika from Nagarjuna\nand Aryadeva. There is a classification of Madhyamika into Svatantra\nand Prasanga. The former stems from Bhavaviveka, Santiraksita and\nKamalashila and the latter from Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti. The\nGelug and perhaps others, place Dignaga and Dharmakirti between\nSautrantika and Yogacara. They call their writings which seem to\naffirm the true existence of external objects Sautrantika following\nreason and those writings which seem to deny the true existence of\nexternal objects Yogacara following reason.\nThe classifications are largely(not entirely by any means) Tibetan\nways of organizing the varied teachings. For instance, Tibetans use\nthe term Vaibhasika to refer to the original 18 schools which\ninclude Theravada. In reality the 18 schools often had very\ndistinctive ideas and did not consider themselves as one. It should\nbe pointed out that the Abhidharma teachings in Theravada are quite\na bit different than those in the Abhidharmakosa. The term\nVaibhasika as used by Vasubandhu is restricted to one of the 18\nschools which existed in Kasmir and produced a work called the\nMahavibhasa (Great Commentary). This work exists now in Chinese but\nwas never translated into Tibetan. For more information of this\nnature see Jeffrey Hopkin's chapter on Tibetan Doxography in\n'Tibetan Literature, Studies in Genre' newly published by Snow Lion.\nBy the way I wrote chapter 27 (little plug).\nThe Tibetans consider the study of the four systems to be like a\nprogressive meditation because the definition of 'selflessness'\nbecomes subtler and subtler and so the schools serve as a bridge or\na ladder. The notion of doing it this way is reinforced by the\nHevajra Tantra which explicitly advises one to progress in this\nfashion.\nIt should also be pointed out that there are a number of differences\nin the systems regarding the path, the idea of a final vehicle etc.\nbesides the view concerning selflessness and ultimate truth. For a\nrun down on all these see Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins 'Cutting\nThrough Appearances'.\nSubj: View III\nDate: 95-11-29 11:09:38 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nThe argument for selflessness is simple in structure and can be\nfound in all the tenet systems. It is that if something truly exists\nor inherently exists it must be findable either through direct\nperception or by inference. The process is like the search in\nchemistry and physics for the basic units of matter. If something\ncan be demonstrated to be capable of being broken down it isn't the\nbasic unit. The tenet systems in regard to the analysis of self, all\nfollow this basic approach. What sets them apart (other than a\nnumber of other issues) is the degree to which it is claimed that a\nbasic unit is or is not established.\nThe purpose in performing this exercise is not the winning of\ndebates or of playing intellectual games. That point is reiterated\ncountless times by the Masters. Tsongkapa, whose reputation as a\nscholar is agreed by all, including opponents as being of the first\norder, said that if his work was taken in that way (being a game),\nhe would have failed.\nRather, the exercise is meant to explore the minds way of grasping\nto the unreal as real. This grasping takes place at a level much\ndeeper than that of verbalization and discursive thought. However we\ncan use such thought nonetheless to gain a better insight. This is\ndone by all systems and whether the system is very elaborate or\nrather simple it is still done. Even the instruction to 'just sit'\nsays something and it used to get to something deeper.\nVaibhasika and Sautrantika:\nThat being said -- the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika will be classed\ntogether since their views on self and selflessness are essentially\nthe same.\nBoth tenet systems assert a selflessness of person but not of\ndharmas. The self, they say is a mere designation imputed upon the\nskandhas. Vasubandhu says:\n'How do we know that the word 'soul' is only a designation for a\nseries of skandhas, and that no soul exists in and of itself?\nWe know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul\napart from the skandhas, no proof by direct perception, nor any\nproof from inference. If the soul were a real entity, separate like\nother entities, it would be known.'\nBasically, when we look for a self at any given time we only find\nsomething else, a part of the skandhas such as a feeling, or an\nindividual thought or whatever. We do not find something totally\napart from these units (dharmas) that constitutes what we generally\ncall the self. If the self were different that the skandhas, we\nshould be able to remove all the skandhas and find it. That hasn't\nhappened. If the self were equivalent to the skandhas, then as soon\nas the skandhas changed a bit it would disappear but it doesn't.\nErgo the self is imputed on the skandhas.\nNote that it is not said that the self doesn't exist at all, but\nrather that its mode of existence is not basic unit we generally\ntake it to be.\nAn example: Take a pot (a favorite Buddhist example), there is a pot\nperceived sitting on a table. If we smash it to pieces, the pot no\nlonger appears. What we had thought of as 'pot' was merely a\ndesignation imputed upon a collection of multiple units of matter.\nIf we think of the terms 'general' and 'particular', in Sautrantika\nphilosophy, 'generals', 'universals' etc. are like conventional\ntruth and the 'particular', the ultimate truth. In Vaibhasika and\nSautrantika, the particulars are the basic units called dharmas. The\nVaibhasikas divided the five skandhas into 72 such dharmas. Eleven\nmade up the physical world, matter(rupa), one for feeling(vedana),\none for ideation(samjna), one for pure consciousness(without\ncontent)(vijnana), and 58 for all the other mental elements not\npreviously mentioned(samskara). There are different ways to further\ncategorize these so one could argue that there were more or less\nthan 72 and indeed many did so argue.\n(The book Ways of Enlightenment put out by Dharma Publishing has a\ndescription of these dharmas plus much much more. I have used the\nbook heavily in classes I've taught on Abhidharma. You could get the\nAbhidharmakosabhasyam by Vasubandhu and get the extensive\nexplanation as well, it is now in English, however it costs $300.)\nSubj: View IV\nDate: 95-12-01 00:49:08 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nBefore passing to Yogacara, a few words: Vaibhasika and Sautrantika\nare referred to as Hinayana schools, Yogacara and Madhyamika as\nMahayana. However on examination, this is true mainly from the point\nof view of their main expositors. Vai/Sau recognized the path of the\nbodhisattva as does Theravada as a perfectly legitimate one and they\noutlined the path a bodhisattva would take to become a Buddha.\nHowever to them, a bodhisattva's wisdom took/takes the view of the\nrespective philosophies. A bodhisattva basically just puts off\nnirvana and works for the benefit of beings and through merit\nacquires the 10 powers of a Buddha not held by Sravakas and\nPratyekas. Similarly, within Yogacara and Madhyamika, there are\nArhats and Pratyeka Buddhas who have the Yogacara and Madhyamika\nviewpoints but simply meditate on emptiness to the point where they\ndo not cultivate the perfections and work up to Buddhahood i.e. they\nstop short. The Gelug call this a Mahayanist holding Hinayana tenets\nand vice versa. I think it might be better to say simply that tenet\nsystems have a certain independence from the vehicle. That is, they\nare not the defining characteristic. It is of course a little more\ncomplex than that but this is the short version.\nYogacara:\nThere are a number of different subgroups like the true aspectarians\nand false aspectarians. There is also a spectrum as to the degree of\nidealism asserted. Also, although the alaya vijnana is held by many\nto be a key Yogacara tenet, there are those who are considered\nYogacara who assert only the six conscioussnesses, denying the alaya\nand klista vijnana. For instance, Dharmakirti is held by the Gelug\nto be an example of the latter. (See 'Cutting Through Appearances'\nby Sopa and Hopkins for a run down on the different groupings for\nYogacara as well as the other tenet systems.)\nFor scope purposes, I am going to limit myself primarily to Asanga,\nusing the Tatvartha chapter of his Bodhisattvabhumi and his\nMahayana Sangraha.\nSubj: View V\nDate: 95-12-02 11:20:24 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nHistory\nMadhyamika and Yogacara are said to be Mahayana tenet systems. The\nsystems arose historically with the discovery of the Mahayana sutras\nof the second and third turning of the wheel. Nagarjuna is said to\nhave discovered the Prajnaparamita texts on a visit to the naga\nrealm. These texts are the main ones of the second turning. As most\nknow, the texts are filled with descriptions of the ultimate which\nare negative in tone. The 100,000 versed version tones the rhetoric\ndown a little by saying that things are ultimately empty, not just\nempty. Nagarjuna states in many places that emptiness was not\nnothingness but dependent origination/arising. Nonetheless many took\nit to be nihilistic.\nIt is said that the third turning of the wheel is meant to correct\nthis notion of nihilism. The main example of a sutra of this class\nis the Sandhinirmocana, (The Unraveling of the Intent).\n(In Tibet, there are a number of views concerning the three turnings\nand what is definitive v. interpretive. The issue however is beyond\nmy present scope.)\nAsanga made use of the schema presented in the third turning to\ndelineate what they consider to be the correct interpretation of the\nPrajnaparamita. They felt that the view of there being no basis at\nall was too extreme and that the correct view was a non-dual one\nwherein one did not hold that designations, names, constructs etc.\nwere truly existent and that the support or basis of the names etc.\nwere not truly absent.\nThis particular point is made strongly by Asanga in the\nBodhisattvabhumi in the chapter on reality. To Asanga, correct view\nmeant knowing exactly how something existed and did not exist. The\nordinary person, he says, just goes on and says 'this is that is'\nwithout thinking or analyzing. To discover the truth, he said one\nhad to analyze and investigate.\nThere are designations, expressions, etc. which are imaginary, and a\nreal basis for the imputation of those designations. This basis had\nto be of necessity 'beyond expression and concepts'. This idea is\npresented by Asanga both directly as I just did, but most often,\nusing the schema of the 3 natures so elaborately explained in the\nSandhinirmocana.\nThe 3 are:\n1. Parikalpita, imaginary nature\n2. Paratantra, other-powered/dependent nature\n3. Parinispana, perfected/reality\nThere is a classic metaphor used to understand this.\nImagine a rope in a dark room which is mistaken for a snake. The\nsnake is the imaginary, the rope is the basis on which the snake\ndepends and the absence of the snake in the rope is how the rope\nactually is, i.e. in its real or perfected nature.\nThe 3 natures are neither the same nor different from each other. In\nthe Mahayana Sangraha, in the chapter on the knowable, Asanga\nexplicitly says that the dependent nature is both the cause for\nimagining as well as that which is imagined. It can be considered\nreality or perfected when it is seen that it does not really exist\nas it was imagined.\nSubj: View VI\nDate: 95-12-02 12:03:31 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nAsanga said that the dependent nature consisted of all the\nconstructed differentiation's that had arose from the\nfoundation/store consciousness(alaya vijnana). the alaya consists of\nall the seeds resulting from action. To illustrate, if a person\nengages in acts of lust, that person becomes permeated (lit.\nperfumed, skt .vasana, tib. bag chag) with lust. As the mind\nrepeatedly arises and passes away in tandem with lust it becomes the\ngenerative cause for the lustful evolutions of the mind. The\nconsciousness arises as a result of these permeation's. The\ndifferentiation's arising therefrom are said to be the construct of\nthe body and the embodied, the construct of the experiencer and the\nexperience, the constructs of validity, time, number place,\nlanguage, difference and rebirth. Thus all of these have the same\ncause and the same nature.\nConstructive thought arises for beings and eventually creates the\nworlds of those beings. The creation process consists of thought and\nsupport for the thought. The two are mutually caused. A previous\nthought is the cause of a present thing which becomes the support of\nanother thought and so on. There is not independent external object\napart from this process.\nIf one thinks about it, this is like the description of karma.\nKarma to the Vaibhasikas as well as to the others was linked if not\nequated with intent (cetana). Intent causes and forms the basis of\naction, action causes all the results we experience and it is the\nsupport for our reactions which in turn cause more results.\nSometimes persons mistake the phrase non-duality of subject and\nobject for subject only. In fact, in means the two are not\nindependent and have the same nature. As Vasubandhu pointed out 'if\nthere is no object, there is no subject either'.\nSubj: View VII\nDate: 95-12-03 23:58:06 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nMadhyamika\nMadhyamika traces back to Nagarjuna who discovered the\nPrajnaparamita texts hidden in the realm of the nagas. Its prime\nmark is the attack on the extremes of existence and non-existence\nalong with the identification of emptiness with dependent arising.\nWhen Nagarjuna argued against cause and effect he argued against an\nindependent cause and an independent effect. It seems to some that\nhe totally denied cause and effect and therefore the path. In fact,\nhe considered that only with dependent arising i.e.without\ninherent/independent could there be cause and effect, the path etc.\nSometime after Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita used a form of reasoning\ncalled a prasanga to demonstrate Nagarjuna's point. A prasanga is a\nconsequence. That is, one takes the opposing thesis and demonstrate\nwhat its consequences are. Another Madhyamika, Bhavaviveka,\ncriticized this technique saying in effect that anargument to be\nsuccessful had to be a full syllogism and not just a consequence.\nBhavaviveka's method is called a svatantra.\nTo illustrate without giving a full lesson in Indian logic (I would\nlose everybody):\nThe sentence:\nSound is impermanent because of being a product.\nThe word 'product' is called a sign. It is the basis on which an\ninferential valid cognition is created. The sign has 3 modes of\nrelating to the other elements of the syllogism.\n1. The property of the subject. Here 'sound is a product' that is\nproduct is a property of sound.\n2. Forward pervasion: product is a member of the set of impairment\nphenomena\n3. Counterpervasion: the negative of the product is pervaded by the\nnegative of the sign. that is, permanent phenomena are non-products.\nA svatantra contains all three modes. A prasanga contains only the\nlast two. The argument, as the Indians saw it, was over a method\nbest suitable to persuade someone. (It is important to keep in mind\nthat in India the purpose of arguing was persuasion.)\nLater, Chandrakirti defended Buddhapalita's method quite strongly.\nThose who follow Chandra's method are called Prasangikas.\nBhavaviveka and those following his method are called Svatantrikas.\nThe terms were developed later to apply to the two methods. The\npersons themselves just saw themselves as Madhyamika.\nIn Tibet, Madhyamika was first introduced by Shantiraksita who is\nconsidered a Svatantrika. He had a method which later persons called\nYogacara-Madhyamika because he recommended meditating first on all\nthings as mind using a method similar to the Yogacaras, and then\nmeditate that the mind itself was empty of inherent existence. This\nmethod became extremely popular in Tibet.\nChandra's writings were introduced at a later time. In the next and\nfinal post, I will be presenting Tsongkapa's(1357-1419)\ninterpretation of Prasangika Madhyamika as being superior to\nSvatantra while noting the arguments of those Tibetan scholars that\ndisagree.\nSubj: Final View\nDate: 95-12-04 23:06:57 EST\nFrom: Jamyang\nFirst let me explain that I am trained in this as a Gelug. Obviously\nthere is some interpretation. The lineages have some differing views\non Madhyamika as it is so important. Some think the views differ\ngreatly, some don't. I belong to the latter. I encourage with all my\nheart that persons who are stimulated and feel benefited by this\nseries to study more.\nTsongkhapa felt that the cause of being bound to samsara was a\ndeeply rooted habit that grasped to the concept of inherent\nexistence. To exist inherently means to have a basis independent of\nimputation. Tsongkhapa argued in essence, that all the tenet systems\nbelow prasangika asserted such a basis either explicitly (i.e. they\nsaid so and one can find it stated as such) or implicitly (it may be\nhard to find the passage and there is a question about it but such a\nconclusion might be drawn from other things). In the case of\nVaibhasika and Sautrantika it was the dharmas. In Yogacara, it was\nparatantra and parinispanna or mind. The Madhyamikas argued that\nthere was no such basis ultimately at all. The Svatantrikas,\nhowever, because they used syllogisms instead of consequences\nimplicitly asserted a type of independence on the conventional level\nknown as svalaksana or inherent characteristic.\nThis is extremely subtle. The argument is that if a syllogism is\nused, there is an assumption that the two parties will see the first\nmode the property of a subject in the same way, implying some sort\nof independent existence. Seeing the property in the same way\ndemands recognizing that the property has at minimum some sort of\ncharacteristic which is independent of the imputing mind. The use of\na consequence does not do this, but merely takes the assumption of\nthe opponent as a basis as opposed to making an assumption oneself.\nTherefore the Prasangika do not have the fault of asserting iherent\nexistence/characteristic even conventionally.\nOther scholars in Tibet hold that Tsongkhapa's differentiation is\nincorrect since the Sautrantikas do not assert svalaksana ultimately\nand only use it conventionally as a means to lead persons to the\ntruth and do not hold it as a view. They further argue that the\nIndians did not view the Svatantrikas and Prasangikas in the way\nTsongkhapa did and rather seemed to agree that the difference was\npedagogical. They say svatantra is for converting non-buddhists,\nprasanga for converting buddhists.\nTsongkhapa's point though, however the intent or history of the\nissue, was that even grasping at something this subtle had to be\ndone away with. Tsongkhapa agreed with Chandra that inherent\nexistence didn't exist even conventionally. In the conventional\nworld people just use words and agree on things in an unanalytic way.\nI say I am Jamyang. I don't say I am inherent Jamyang. By negating\ninherent existence, one allows convention and there is no\nincompatibility between samsara and nirvana, between form and\nemptiness. Once inherent existence is negated then what is left is\njust dependent arising. Then everything is pure. The negation of\ninherent existence is intended as an arrow to shoot the root cause\nof defilement. It cuts out the core of that which is grasped. things\nappear then as mirage, a reflection, a plantain tree, a bubble etc.\na play of stainless mind and wind.\nSarva Mangalam\nPrecious Bodhicitta, where it is not arisen, may it arise.\nWhere is has arisen, may it not decline but grow ever fuller.\nBy the merit of this presentation, may all beings obtain the state of\nVajradhara. May the dharma take solid root in the West and may no\nobstacles arise to its practice and flourishing.\n###","title":"Exposition of the Views of the Four Indian Schools","type":"page"}