{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/ari/ogc/ogc03.htm","path":"cla/ari/ogc/ogc03.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/ogc/ogc03.htm","text":"Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something and out of something-I mean, e.g. comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being big and big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance. For if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, \u2018something\u2019 must-without qualification-\u2019come-to-be out of not-being\u2019, so that it would be true to say that \u2018not-being is an attribute of some things\u2019. For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e.g. out of not-white or not-beautiful), but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being.\nNow \u2018unqualified\u2019 means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive, predication. Hence, if \u2018unqualified not-being\u2019 means the negation of \u2018being\u2019 in the sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in \u2018unqualified coming-to-be\u2019, a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a \u2018this\u2019 clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any of the other Categories either--e.g. we cannot attribute to it any quality, quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, \u2018unqualified not-being\u2019 means \u2018what is not in any sense at all\u2019, it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-be will have to come-to-be out of nothing.\nAlthough we have dealt with these problems at greater length in another work, where we have set forth the difficulties and established the distinguishing definitions, the following concise restatement of our results must here be offered: In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no \u2018being\u2019 without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of what is\u2019. For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially \u2018is\u2019, but actually \u2018is not\u2019; and this something is spoken of both as \u2018being\u2019 and as \u2018not-being\u2019.\nThese distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be \u2018unqualified coming-to-be\u2019 (whether we suppose it to occur out of what potentially \u2018is\u2019, or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination. For the question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the \u2018this\u2019) comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the \u2018such\u2019, the \u2018so great\u2019, or the \u2018somewhere\u2019, which comes-to-be? And the same question might be raised about \u2018passing-away\u2019 also. For if a substantial thing comes-to-be, it is clear that there will \u2018be\u2019 (not actually, but potentially) a substance, out of which its coming-to-be will proceed and into which the thing that is passing-away will necessarily change. Then will any predicate belonging to the remaining Categories attach actually to this presupposed substance? In other words, will that which is only potentially a \u2018this\u2019 (which only potentially is), while without the qualification \u2018potentially\u2019 it is not a \u2018this\u2019 (i.e. is not), possess, e.g. any determinate size or quality or position? For (i) if it possesses none of these determinations actually, but all of them only potentially, the result is first that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existing-a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. On the other hand (ii) if, although it is not a \u2018this somewhat\u2019 or a substance, it is to possess some of the remaining determinations quoted above, then (as we said)\u2019 properties will be separable from substances.\nWe must therefore concentrate all our powers on the discussion of these difficulties and on the solution of a further question--viz. What is the cause of the perpetuity of coming-to-be? Why is there always unqualified, as well as partial, coming-to-be? Cause\u2019 in this connexion has two senses. It means (i) the source from which, as we say, the process \u2018originates\u2019, and (ii) the matter. It is the material cause that we have here to state. For, as to the other cause, we have already explained (in our treatise on Motion that it involves (a) something immovable through all time and (b) something always being moved. And the accurate treatment of the first of these-of the immovable \u2018originative source\u2019-belongs to the province of the other, or \u2018prior\u2019, philosophy: while as regards \u2018that which sets everything else in motion by being itself continuously moved\u2019, we shall have to explain later\u2019 which amongst the so-called \u2018specific\u2019 causes exhibits this character. But at present we are to state the material cause-the cause classed under the head of matter-to which it is due that passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in Nature. For perhaps, if we succeed in clearing up this question, it will simultaneously become clear what account we ought to give of that which perplexed us just now, i.e. of unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.\nOur new question too--viz. \u2018what is the cause of the unbroken continuity of coming-to-be?\u2019-is sufficiently perplexing, if in fact what passes-away vanishes into \u2018what is not\u2019 and \u2018what is not\u2019 is nothing (since \u2018what is not\u2019 is neither a thing, nor possessed of a quality or quantity, nor in any place). If, then, some one of the things \u2018which are\u2019 constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of \u2018what is\u2019 been used up long ago and vanished away assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite? For, presumably, the unfailing continuity of coming-to-be cannot be attributed to the infinity of the material. That is impossible, for nothing is actually infinite. A thing is infinite only potentially, i.e. the dividing of it can continue indefinitely: so that we should have to suppose there is only one kind of coming-to-be in the world-viz. one which never fails, because it is such that what comes-to-be is on each successive occasion smaller than before. But in fact this is not what we see occurring.\nWhy, then, is this form of change necessarily ceaseless? Is it because the passing-away of this is a coming-to-be of something else, and the coming-to-be of this a passing-away of something else?\nThe cause implied in this solution must no doubt be considered adequate to account for coming-to-be and passing-away in their general character as they occur in all existing things alike. Yet, if the same process is a coming to-be of this but a passing-away of that, and a passing-away of this but a coming-to-be of that, why are some things said to come-to-be and pass-away without qualification, but others only with a qualification?\nThe distinction must be investigated once more, for it demands some explanation. (It is applied in a twofold manner.) For (i) we say \u2018it is now passing-away\u2019 without qualification, and not merely \u2018this is passing-away\u2019: and we call this change \u2018coming-to-be\u2019, and that \u2018passing-away\u2019, without qualification. And (ii) so-and-so \u2018comes-to-be-something\u2019, but does not \u2018come-to-be\u2019 without qualification; for we say that the student \u2018comes-to-be-learned\u2019, not \u2018comes-to-be\u2019 without qualification.\n(i) Now we often divide terms into those which signify a \u2018this somewhat\u2019 and those which do not. And (the first form of) the distinction, which we are investigating, results from a similar division of terms: for it makes a difference into what the changing thing changes. Perhaps, e.g. the passage into Fire is \u2018coming-to-be\u2019 unqualified, but \u2018passing-away-of-something\u2019 (e.g. Earth): whilst the coming-to-be of Earth is qualified (not unqualified) \u2018coming-to-be\u2019, though unqualified \u2018passing-away\u2019 (e.g. of Fire). This would be the case on the theory set forth in Parmenides: for he says that the things into which change takes place are two, and he asserts that these two, viz. what is and what is not, are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these, or other things of a similar kind, makes no difference. For we are trying to discover not what undergoes these changes, but what is their characteristic manner. The passage, then, into what \u2018is\u2019 not except with a qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into what \u2018is\u2019 without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence whatever the contrasted \u2018poles\u2019 of the changes may be whether Fire and Earth, or some other couple-the one of them will be \u2018a being\u2019 and the other \u2018a not-being\u2019.\nWe have thus stated one characteristic manner in which unqualified will be distinguished from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away: but they are also distinguished according to the special nature of the material of the changing thing. For a material, whose constitutive differences signify more a \u2018this somewhat\u2019, is itself more \u2018substantial\u2019 or \u2018real\u2019: while a material, whose constitutive differences signify privation, is \u2018not real\u2019. (Suppose, e.g. that \u2018the hot\u2019 is a positive predication, i.e. a \u2018form\u2019, whereas \u2018cold\u2019 is a privation, and that Earth and Fire differ from one another by these constitutive differences.)\nThe opinion, however, which most people are inclined to prefer, is that the distinction depends upon the difference between \u2018the perceptible\u2019 and \u2018the imperceptible\u2019. Thus, when there is a change into perceptible material, people say there is \u2018coming-to-be\u2019; but when there is a change into invisible material, they call it \u2018passing-away\u2019. For they distinguish \u2018what is\u2019 and \u2018what is not\u2019 by their perceiving and not-perceiving, just as what is knowable \u2018is\u2019 and what is unknowable \u2018is not\u2019-perception on their view having the force of knowledge. Hence, just as they deem themselves to live and to \u2018be\u2019 in virtue of their perceiving or their capacity to perceive, so too they deem the things to \u2018be\u2019 qua perceived or perceptible-and in this they are in a sense on the track of the truth, though what they actually say is not true.\nThus unqualified coming-to-be and passingaway turn out to be different according to common opinion from what they are in truth. For Wind and Air are in truth more real more a \u2018this somewhat\u2019 or a \u2018form\u2019-than Earth. But they are less real to perception which explains why things are commonly said to \u2018pass-away\u2019 without qualification when they change into Wind and Air, and to \u2018come-to-be\u2019 when they change into what is tangible, i.e. into Earth.\nWe have now explained why there is \u2018unqualified coming-to-be\u2019 (though it is a passing-away-of-something) and \u2018unqualified passing-away (though it is a coming-to-be-of-something). For this distinction of appellation depends upon a difference in the material out of which, and into which, the changes are effected. It depends either upon whether the material is or is not \u2018substantial\u2019, or upon whether it is more or less \u2018substantial\u2019, or upon whether it is more or less perceptible.\n(ii) But why are some things said to \u2018come to-be\u2019 without qualification, and others only to \u2018come-to-be-so-and-so\u2019, in cases different from the one we have been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally out of one another? For at present we have explained no more than this:-why, when two things change reciprocally into one another, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to them both, although every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing\u2019s coming-to-be. But the question subsequently formulated involves a different problem-viz. why, although the learning thing is said to \u2018come-to-be-learned\u2019 but not to \u2018come-to-be\u2019 without qualification, yet the growing thing is said to \u2018come-to-be\u2019.\nThe distinction here turns upon the difference of the Categories. For some things signify a this somewhat, others a such, and others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify substance, are not said to \u2018come-to-be\u2019 without qualification, but only to \u2018come-to-be-so-and-so\u2019. Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of \u2018coming-to-be\u2019 when the thing comes-to-be something in one of the two Columns--e.g. in Substance, if it comes-to-be Fire but not if it comes-to-be Earth; and in Quality, if it comes-to-be learned but not when it comes-to-be ignorant.\nWe have explained why some things come to-be without qualification, but not others both in general, and also when the changing things are substances and nothing else; and we have stated that the substratum is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing is always another\u2019s coming-to-be. But there is no need even to discuss the other question we raised-viz. why coming-to-be continues though things are constantly being destroyed. For just as people speak of \u2018a passing-away\u2019 without qualification when a thing has passed into what is imperceptible and what in that sense \u2018is not\u2019, so also they speak of \u2018a coming-to-be out of a not-being\u2019 when a thing emerges from an imperceptible. Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not something, what comes-to-be emerges out of a \u2018not-being\u2019: so that a thing comes-to-be out of a not-being\u2019 just as much as it \u2018passes-away into what is not\u2019. Hence it is reasonable enough that coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a passing-away of \u2018what is not\u2019 and passing-away is a coming to-be of \u2018what is not\u2019.\nBut what about that which \u2018is\u2019 not except with a qualification? Is it one of the two contrary poles of the chang-e.g. Earth (i.e. the heavy) a \u2018not-being\u2019, but Fire (i.e. the light) a \u2018being\u2019? Or, on the contrary, does what is \u2018include Earth as well as Fire, whereas what is not\u2019 is matter-the matter of Earth and Fire alike? And again, is the matter of each different? Or is it the same, since otherwise they would not come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i.e. contraries out of contraries? For these things-Fire, Earth, Water, Air-are characterized by \u2018the contraries\u2019.\nPerhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same. So much, then, on these topics.","title":"Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption: Book I: Chapter 3","type":"page"}