{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/ari/ogc/ogc10.htm","path":"cla/ari/ogc/ogc10.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/ogc/ogc10.htm","text":"But we have still to explain \u2018combination\u2019, for that was the third of the subjects we originally proposed to discuss. Our explanation will proceed on the same method as before. We must inquire: What is \u2018combination\u2019, and what is that which can \u2018combine\u2019? Of what things, and under what conditions, is \u2018combination\u2019 a property? And, further, does \u2018combination\u2019 exist in fact, or is it false to assert its existence?\nFor, according to some thinkers, it is impossible for one thing to be combined with another. They argue that (i) if both the \u2018combined\u2019 constituents persist unaltered, they are no more \u2018combined\u2019 now than they were before, but are in the same condition: while (ii) if one has been destroyed, the constituents have not been \u2018combined\u2019--on the contrary, one constituent is and the other is not, whereas \u2018combination\u2019 demands uniformity of condition in them both: and on the same principle (iii) even if both the combining constituents have been destroyed as the result of their coalescence, they cannot \u2018have been combined\u2019 since they have no being at all.\nWhat we have in this argument is, it would seem, a demand for the precise distinction of \u2018combination\u2019 from coming-to-be and passing-away (for it is obvious that \u2018combination\u2019, if it exists, must differ from these processes) and for the precise distinction of the \u2018combinable\u2019 from that which is such as to come-to-be and pass-away. As soon, therefore, as these distinctions are clear, the difficulties raised by the argument would be solved.\nNow (i) we do not speak of the wood as \u2018combined\u2019 with the fire, nor of its burning as a \u2018combining\u2019 either of its particles with one another or of itself with the fire: what we say is that \u2018the fire is coming-to-be, but the wood is \u2018passing-away\u2019. Similarly, we speak neither (ii) of the food as \u2018combining\u2019 with the body, nor (iii) of the shape as \u2018combining\u2019 with the wax and thus fashioning the lump. Nor can body \u2018combine\u2019 with white, nor (to generalize) \u2018properties\u2019 and \u2018states\u2019 with \u2018things\u2019: for we see them persisting unaltered. But again (iv) white and knowledge cannot be \u2018combined\u2019 either, nor any other of the \u2018adjectivals\u2019. (Indeed, this is a blemish in the theory of those who assert that \u2018once upon a time all things were together and combined\u2019. For not everything can \u2018combine\u2019 with everything. On the contrary, both of the constituents that are combined in the compound must originally have existed in separation: but no property can have separate existence.)\nSince, however, some things are-potentially while others are-actually, the constituents combined in a compound can \u2018be\u2019 in a sense and yet \u2018not-be\u2019. The compound may he-actually other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless each of them may still he-potentially what it was before they were combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed. (For this was the difficulty that emerged in the previous argument: and it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound.) The constituents, therefore, neither (a) persist actually, as \u2018body\u2019 and \u2018white\u2019 persist: nor (b) are they destroyed (either one of them or both), for their \u2018power of action\u2019 is preserved. Hence these difficulties may be dismissed: but the problem immediately connected with them-whether combination is something relative to perception\u2019 must be set out and discussed.\nWhen the combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and have been juxtaposed in such a manner, that perception fails to discriminate them one from another, have they then \u2018been combined Or ought we to say \u2018No, not until any and every part of one constituent is juxtaposed to a part of the other\u2019? The term, no doubt, is applied in the former sense: we speak, e.g. of wheat having been \u2018combined\u2019 with barley when each grain of the one is juxtaposed to a grain of the other. But every body is divisible and therefore, since body \u2018combined\u2019 with body is uniform in texture throughout, any and every part of each constituent ought to be juxtaposed to a part of the other.\nNo body, however, can be divided into its \u2018least\u2019 parts: and \u2018composition\u2019 is not identical with \u2018combination\u2019, but other than it. From these premises it clearly follows (i) that so long as the constituents are preserved in small particles, we must not speak of them as \u2018combined\u2019. (For this will be a \u2018composition\u2019 instead of a \u2018blending\u2019 or \u2018combination\u2019: nor will every portion of the resultant exhibit the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. But we maintain that, if \u2018combination\u2019 has taken place, the compound must be uniform in texture throughout-any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water: whereas, if \u2018combination\u2019 is \u2018composition of the small particles\u2019, nothing of the kind will happen. On the contrary, the constituents will only be \u2018combined\u2019 relatively to perception: and the same thing will be \u2018combined\u2019 to one percipient, if his sight is not sharp, (but not to another,) while to the eye of Lynceus nothing will be \u2018combined\u2019.) It clearly follows (ii) that we must not speak of the constituents as \u2018combined in virtue of a division such that any and every part of each is juxtaposed to a part of the other: for it is impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no \u2018combination\u2019, or we have still to explain the manner in which it can take place.\nNow, as we maintain, some things are such as to act and others such as to suffer action from them. Moreover, some things-viz. those Which have the same matter-\u2019reciprocate\u2019, i.e. are such as to act upon one another and to suffer action from one another; while other things, viz. agents which have not the same matter as their patients, act without themselves suffering action. Such agents cannot \u2018combine\u2019-that is why neither the art of healing nor health produces health by \u2018combining\u2019 with the bodies of the patients. Amongst those things, however, which are reciprocally active and passive, some are easily-divisible. Now (i) if a great quantity (or a large bulk) of one of these easily-divisible \u2018reciprocating\u2019 materials be brought together with a little (or with a small piece) of another, the effect produced is not \u2018combination\u2019, but increase of the dominant: for the other material is transformed into the dominant. (That is why a drop of wine does not \u2018combine\u2019 with ten thousand gallons of water: for its form is dissolved, and it is changed so as to merge in the total volume of water.) On the other hand (ii) when there is a certain equilibrium between their \u2018powers of action\u2019, then each of them changes out of its own nature towards the dominant: yet neither becomes the other, but both become an intermediate with properties common to both.\nThus it is clear that only those agents are \u2018combinable\u2019 which involve a contrariety-for these are such as to suffer action reciprocally. And, further, they combine more freely if small pieces of each of them are juxtaposed. For in that condition they change one another more easily and more quickly; whereas this effect takes a long time when agent and patient are present in bulk.\nHence, amongst the divisible susceptible materials, those whose shape is readily adaptable have a tendency to combine: for they are easily divided into small particles, since that is precisely what \u2018being readily adaptable in shape\u2019 implies. For instance, liquids are the most \u2018combinable\u2019 of all bodies-because, of all divisible materials, the liquid is most readily adaptable in shape, unless it be viscous. Viscous liquids, it is true, produce no effect except to increase the volume and bulk. But when one of the constituents is alone susceptible-or superlatively susceptible, the other being susceptible in a very slight degree-the compound resulting from their combination is either no greater in volume or only a little greater. This is what happens when tin is combined with bronze. For some things display a hesitating and ambiguous attitude towards one another-showing a slight tendency to combine and also an inclination to behave as \u2018receptive matter\u2019 and \u2018form\u2019 respectively. The behaviour of these metals is a case in point. For the tin almost vanishes, behaving as if it were an immaterial property of the bronze: having been combined, it disappears, leaving no trace except the colour it has imparted to the bronze. The same phenomenon occurs in other instances too.\nIt is clear, then, from the foregoing account, that \u2018combination\u2019 occurs, what it is, to what it is due, and what kind of thing is \u2018combinable\u2019. The phenomenon depends upon the fact that some things are such as to be (a) reciprocally susceptible and (b) readily adaptable in shape, i.e. easily divisible. For such things can be \u2018combined\u2019 without its being necessary either that they should have been destroyed or that they should survive absolutely unaltered: and their \u2018combination\u2019 need not be a \u2018composition\u2019, nor merely \u2018relative to perception\u2019. On the contrary: anything is \u2018combinable\u2019 which, being readily adaptable in shape, is such as to suffer action and to act; and it is \u2018combinable with\u2019 another thing similarly characterized (for the \u2018combinable\u2019 is relative to the \u2018combinable\u2019); and \u2018combination\u2019 is unification of the \u2018combinables\u2019, resulting from their \u2018alteration\u2019.","title":"Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption: Book I: Chapter 10","type":"page"}