{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/ari/ogc/ogc19.htm","path":"cla/ari/ogc/ogc19.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/ogc/ogc19.htm","text":"Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, and since coming-to-be in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the number and the nature of the \u2018originative sources\u2019 of all coming-to-be alike: for a grasp of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms.\nThe \u2018originative sources\u2019, then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of \u2018matter\u2019, and a second in the sense of \u2018form\u2019: and, in addition, the third \u2018originative source\u2019 must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.\nNow cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is \u2018that which can be-and-not-be\u2019: and this is identical with \u2018that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away\u2019, since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not. (For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, since they cannot diverge from the necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to he and impossible for the second to he. Other things, however, can both be and not he.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of \u2018that which can be-and not-be\u2019. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their \u2018end\u2019, is their \u2018figure\u2019 or \u2018form\u2019-and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.\nBut the third \u2018originative source\u2019 must be present as well--the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought the nature of \u2018the Forms\u2019 was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation; and then lays it down; that \u2018some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms\u2019, and that \u2018while a thing is said to \u201cbe\u201d in virtue of the Form, it is said to \u201ccome-to-be\u201d qua sharing in,\u201d to \u201cpass-away\u201d qua \u201closing,\u201d the \u2018Form\u2019. Hence he thinks that \u2018assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away\u2019. On the other hand (b) there were others who thought \u2018the matter\u2019 was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since \u2018the movement originates from the matter\u2019.\nNeither of these theories, however, is sound. For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous-since there always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although \u2018Health itself\u2019 and \u2018Science itself\u2019 are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. On the other hand (b) to say that \u2018matter generates owing to its movement\u2019 would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what \u2018alters\u2019 and transfigures plays a greater part in bringing, things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either.\nFor, to begin with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved: but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different \u2018power\u2019. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. Nor is this their only error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause: for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the \u2018form\u2019. And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the \u2018simple\u2019 bodies-the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being-with too instrumental a character. For \u2018since\u2019 (as they say) \u2018it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining contrary either to act or to suffer action\u2019, it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet (a) it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. Moreover (b) their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of carpentry) as \u2018the cause\u2019 of the things that come-to-be: for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe--viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.","title":"Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption: Book II: Chapter 9","type":"page"}