{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/aurelmed.htm","path":"cla/aurelmed.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/aurelmed.htm","text":"167 AD\nTHE MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS\nby Marcus Aurelius Antonius\ntranslated by George Long\nBOOK ONE\nFROM my grandfather Verus I learned good morals and the government\nof my temper.\nFrom the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a\nmanly character.\nFrom my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from\nevil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my\nway of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.\nFrom my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools,\nand to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things\na man should spend liberally.\nFrom my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party\nat the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either of the Parmularius\nor the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I learned\nendurance of labour, and to want little, and to work with my own\nhands, and not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be\nready to listen to slander.\nFrom Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to\ngive credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about\nincantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and\nnot to breed quails for fighting, nor to give myself up passionately\nto such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become\nintimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of\nBacchius, then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written\ndialogues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and\nwhatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.\nFrom Rusticus I received the impression that my character required\nimprovement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led\nastray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative\nmatters, nor to delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing\nmyself off as a man who practises much discipline, or does\nbenevolent acts in order to make a display; and to abstain from\nrhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about in the\nhouse in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and\nto write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus\nwrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect to those who have\noffended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to be\npacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a readiness to\nbe reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a\nsuperficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to give my assent\nto those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for being\nacquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated\nto me out of his own collection.\nFrom Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness\nof purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except\nto reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the\noccasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see\nclearly in a living example that the same man can be both most\nresolute and yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction;\nand to have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his\nexperience and his skill in expounding philosophical principles as the\nsmallest of his merits; and from him I learned how to receive from\nfriends what are esteemed favours, without being either humbled by\nthem or letting them pass unnoticed.\nFrom Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family\ngoverned in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to\nnature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after\nthe interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and\nthose who form opinions without consideration: he had the power of\nreadily accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was\nmore agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most\nhighly venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the\nfaculty both of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and\nmethodical way, the principles necessary for life; and he never showed\nanger or any other passion, but was entirely free from passion, and\nalso most affectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy\ndisplay, and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.\nFrom Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and\nnot in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or\nsolecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to\nintroduce the very expression which ought to have been used, and in\nthe way of answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry\nabout the thing itself, not about the word, or by some other fit\nsuggestion.\nFrom Fronto I learned to observe what envy, and duplicity, and\nhypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are\ncalled Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.\nFrom Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to\nsay to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor\ncontinually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation\nto those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.\nFrom Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault,\neven if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him\nto his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers,\nas it is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children\ntruly.\nFrom my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to\nlove justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,\nCato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in\nwhich there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard\nto equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a\nkingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the\ngoverned; I learned from him also consistency and undeviating\nsteadiness in my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do\ngood, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to\nbelieve that I am loved by my friends; and in him I observed no\nconcealment of his opinions with respect to those whom he condemned,\nand that his friends had no need to conjecture what he wished or did\nnot wish, but it was quite plain.\nFrom Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by\nanything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in\nillness; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness\nand dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I\nobserved that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that\nin all that he did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed\namazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off\ndoing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh\nto disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever\npassionate or suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence,\nand was ready to forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he\npresented the appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right\nrather than of a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no\nman could ever think that he was despised by Maximus, or ever\nventure to think himself a better man. He had also the art of being\nhumorous in an agreeable way.\nIn my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable\nresolution in the things which he had determined after due\ndeliberation; and no vainglory in those things which men call honours;\nand a love of labour and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to\nthose who had anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating\nfirmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a\nknowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action\nand for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for\nboys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he\nreleased his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to\nattend him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had\nfailed to accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always\nfound him the same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all\nmatters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never\nstopped his investigation through being satisfied with appearances\nwhich first present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep\nhis friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be\nextravagant in his affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions,\nand cheerful; and to foresee things a long way off, and to provide for\nthe smallest without display; and to check immediately popular\napplause and all flattery; and to be ever watchful over the things\nwhich were necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a\ngood manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame\nwhich he got for such conduct; and he was neither superstitious with\nrespect to the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying to\nplease them, or by flattering the populace; but he showed sobriety\nin all things and firmness, and never any mean thoughts or action, nor\nlove of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way to the\ncommodity of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he\nused without arrogance and without excusing himself; so that when he\nhad them, he enjoyed them without affectation, and when he had them\nnot, he did not want them. No one could ever say of him that he was\neither a sophist or a home-bred flippant slave or a pedant; but\nevery one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above\nflattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides\nthis, he honoured those who were true philosophers, and he did not\nreproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily\nled by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself\nagreeable without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care\nof his body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor\nout of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but\nso that, through his own attention, he very seldom stood in need of\nthe physician's art or of medicine or external applications. He was\nmost ready to give way without envy to those who possessed any\nparticular faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the\nlaw or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave them his help, that\neach might enjoy reputation according to his deserts; and he always\nacted conformably to the institutions of his country, without\nshowing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of\nchange nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and to\nemploy himself about the same things; and after his paroxysms of\nheadache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual\noccupations. His secrets were not but very few and very rare, and\nthese only about public matters; and he showed prudence and economy in\nthe exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction of public\nbuildings, his donations to the people, and in such things, for he was\na man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the reputation which\nis got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath at unseasonable\nhours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious about what he\nate, nor about the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the\nbeauty of his slaves. His dress came from Lorium, his villa on the\ncoast, and from Lanuvium generally. We know how he behaved to the\ntoll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all\nhis behaviour. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor\nviolent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating\npoint; but he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of\ntime, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and\nconsistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of\nSocrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those\nthings which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy\nwithout excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be\nsober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and\ninvincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.\nTo the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good\nparents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen\nand friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods\nthat I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though\nI had a disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have\nled me to do something of this kind; but, through their favour,\nthere never was such a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the\ntrial. Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer\nbrought up with my grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the\nflower of my youth, and that I did not make proof of my virility\nbefore the proper season, but even deferred the time; that I was\nsubjected to a ruler and a father who was able to take away all\npride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that it is possible\nfor a man to live in a palace without wanting either guards or\nembroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like show; but\nthat it is in such a man's power to bring himself very near to the\nfashion of a private person, without being for this reason either\nmeaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to the\nthings which must be done for the public interest in a manner that\nbefits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a brother, who was\nable by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over myself,\nand who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect and affection;\nthat my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I did\nnot make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other\nstudies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if\nI had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to\nplace those who brought me up in the station of honour, which they\nseemed to desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it\nsome time after, because they were then still young; that I knew\nApollonius, Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent\nimpressions about living according to nature, and what kind of a\nlife that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and their\ngifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered me from\nforthwith living according to nature, though I still fall short of\nit through my own fault, and through not observing the admonitions\nof the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that my\nbody has held out so long in such a kind of life; that I never touched\neither Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into\namatory passions, I was cured; and, though I was often out of humour\nwith Rusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion to repent;\nthat, though it was my mother's fate to die young, she spent the\nlast years of her life with me; that, whenever I wished to help any\nman in his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I had\nnot the means of doing it; and that to myself the same necessity never\nhappened, to receive anything from another; that I have such a wife,\nso obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple; that I had\nabundance of good masters for my children; and that remedies have been\nshown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting and\ngiddiness...; and that, when I had an inclination to philosophy, I did\nnot fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste my\ntime on writers of histories, or in the resolution of syllogisms, or\noccupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens;\nfor all these things require the help of the gods and fortune.\nAmong the Quadi at the Granua.\nBOOK TWO\nBEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the\nbusy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All\nthese things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is\ngood and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is\nbeautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who\ndoes wrong, that it is akin to me, not only of the same blood or seed,\nbut that it participates in the same intelligence and the same portion\nof the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one\ncan fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor\nhate him, For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands,\nlike eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act\nagainst one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting\nagainst one another to be vexed and to turn away.\nWhatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the\nruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is\nnot allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is\nblood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and\narteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and\nnot always the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in.\nThe third then is the ruling part: consider thus: Thou art an old man;\nno longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like\na puppet to unsocial movements, no longer either be dissatisfied\nwith thy present lot, or shrink from the future.\nAll that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is\nfrom fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving\nand involution with the things which are ordered by Providence. From\nthence all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which\nis for the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a\npart. But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of\nthe whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the\nuniverse is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the\nchanges of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles\nbe enough for thee, let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away\nthe thirst after books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but\ncheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to the gods.\nRemember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how\noften thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost\nnot use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a\npart, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an\nefflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost\nnot use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and\nthou wilt go, and it will never return.\nEvery moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou\nhast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of\naffection, and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from\nall other thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest\nevery act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all\ncarelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of reason,\nand all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion\nwhich has been given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the\nwhich if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows\nin quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; for the gods on their\npart will require nothing more from him who observes these things.\nDo wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt\nno longer have the opportunity of honouring thyself. Every man's\nlife is sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul\nreverences not itself but places thy felicity in the souls of others.\nDo the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give\nthyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be\nwhirled around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about\nthe other way. For those too are triflers who have wearied\nthemselves in life by their activity, and yet have no object to\nwhich to direct every movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts.\nThrough not observing what is in the mind of another a man has\nseldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the\nmovements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.\nThis thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,\nand what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what\nkind of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one\nwho hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are\naccording to the nature of which thou art a part.\nTheophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts- such a comparison as\none would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind- says,\nlike a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through\ndesire are more blameable than those which are committed through\nanger. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason\nwith a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends\nthrough desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner\nmore intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then,\nand in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is\ncommitted with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed\nwith pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been\nfirst wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other\nis moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing\nsomething by desire.\nSince it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very\nmoment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away\nfrom among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for\nthe gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not\nexist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to\nme to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence? But\nin truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they\nhave put all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into\nreal evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would\nhave provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's\npower not to fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse,\nhow can it make a man's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor\nhaving the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct\nthese things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has\noverlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a\nmistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good\nand evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But\ndeath certainly, and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure,\nall these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things\nwhich make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither\ngood nor evil.\nHow quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies\nthemselves, but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of\nall sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the\nbait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury\nfame; how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and\ndead they are- all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to\nobserve. To observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give\nreputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it\nin itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into\ntheir parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination\nin it, he will then consider it to be nothing else than an operation\nof nature; and if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a\nchild. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is\nalso a thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe\ntoo how man comes near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when\nthis part of man is so disposed.\nNothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a\nround, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,\nand seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbours,\nwithout perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon\nwithin him, and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon\nconsists in keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and\ndissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the things from\nthe gods merit veneration for their excellence; and the things from\nmen should be dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in\na manner, they move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and\nbad; this defect being not less than that which deprives us of the\npower of distinguishing things that are white and black.\nThough thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as\nmany times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any\nother life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this\nwhich he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the\nsame. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes\nis not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere\nmoment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for\nwhat a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two\nthings then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from\neternity are of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it\nmakes no difference whether a man shall see the same things during a\nhundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second,\nthat the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same.\nFor the present is the only thing of which a man can be deprived, if\nit is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a man\ncannot lose a thing if he has it not.\nRemember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus\nis manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man\nreceives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.\nThe soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it\nbecomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far\nas it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation\nof ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all\nother things are contained. In the next place, the soul does\nviolence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves\ntowards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of\nthose who are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to\nitself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when\nit plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly.\nFifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be\nwithout an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without\nconsidering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things\nbe done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is\nto follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity.\nOf human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,\nand the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject\nto putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and\nfame a thing devoid of judgement. And, to say all in a word,\neverything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs\nto the soul is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a\nstranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that\nwhich is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy.\nBut this consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from\nviolence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing\nnothing without purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not\nfeeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and\nbesides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as\ncoming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came;\nand, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing\nelse than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is\ncompounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each\ncontinually changing into another, why should a man have any\napprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For\nit is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to\nnature.\nThis in Carnuntum.\nBOOK THREE\nWE OUGHT to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away\nand a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken\ninto the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite\nuncertain whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for\nthe comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation\nwhich strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human.\nFor if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition\nand imagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind,\nwill not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling\nup the measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances,\nand considering whether a man should now depart from life, and\nwhatever else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,\nall this is already extinguished. We must make haste then, not only\nbecause we are daily nearer to death, but also because the conception\nof things and the understanding of them cease first.\nWe ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the\nthings which are produced according to nature contain something\npleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some\nparts are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and\nhave a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are\nbeautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for\neating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in\nthe ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to\nrottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn\nbending down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows from\nthe mouth of wild boars, and many other things- though they are far\nfrom being beautiful, if a man should examine them severally- still,\nbecause they are consequent upon the things which are formed by\nnature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man\nshould have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things\nwhich are produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which\nfollow by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a\nmanner disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the\nreal gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which\npainters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an\nold man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness;\nand the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look\non with chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves, not\npleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar\nwith nature and her works.\nHippocrates after curing many diseases himself fell sick and died.\nThe Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them\ntoo. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often\ncompletely destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces\nmany ten thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last\ndeparted from life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the\nconflagration of the universe, was filled with water internally and\ndied smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and\nother lice killed Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked,\nthou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If\nindeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there.\nBut if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by\npains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much\ninferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is\nintelligence and deity; the other is earth and corruption.\nDo not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others,\nwhen thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common\nutility. For thou losest the opportunity of doing something else\nwhen thou hast such thoughts as these, What is such a person doing,\nand why, and what is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what\nis he contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away\nfrom the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then to check\nin the series of our thoughts everything that is without a purpose and\nuseless, but most of all the over-curious feeling and the malignant;\nand a man should use himself to think of those things only about which\nif one should suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? With\nperfect openness thou mightest, immediately answer, This or That; so\nthat from thy words it should be plain that everything in thee is\nsimple and benevolent, and such as befits a social animal, and one\nthat cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at\nall, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for\nwhich thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in\nthy mind. For the man who is such and no longer delays being among the\nnumber of the best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, using\ntoo the deity which is planted within him, which makes the man\nuncontaminated by pleasure, unharmed by any pain, untouched by any\ninsult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, one who\ncannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with justice,\naccepting with all his soul everything which happens and is assigned\nto him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great\nnecessity and for the general interest, imagining what another says,\nor does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to himself that he\nmakes the matter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that\nwhich is allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he\nmakes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own portion is\ngood. For the lot which is assigned to each man is carried along\nwith him and carries him along with it. And he remembers also that\nevery rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all men\nis according to man's nature; and a man should hold on to the\nopinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly live according\nto nature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind\nwhat kind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night\nand by day, and what they are, and with what men they live an impure\nlife. Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes\nfrom such men, since they are not even satisfied with themselves.\nLabour not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest,\nnor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied\nornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many\nwords, or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which\nis in thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age,\nand engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has\ntaken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him\nfrom life, and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any\nman's testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor\nthe tranquility which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be\nkept erect by others.\nIf thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,\ntemperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own\nmind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do\naccording to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to\nthee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better\nthan this, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou\nhast found to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than\nthe deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself\nall thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as\nSocrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense,\nand has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou\nfindest everything else smaller and of less value than this, give\nplace to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to\nit, thou wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the\npreference to that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy\nown; for it is not right that anything of any other kind, such as\npraise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should\ncome into competition with that which is rationally and politically or\npractically good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt\nthemselves to the better things in a small degree, obtain the\nsuperiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply\nand freely choose the better, and hold to it.- But that which is\nuseful is the better.- Well then, if it is useful to thee as a\nrational being, keep to it; but if it is only useful to thee as an\nanimal, say so, and maintain thy judgement without arrogance: only\ntake care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method.\nNever value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel\nthee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any\nman, to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything\nwhich needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything\nintelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no\ntragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much\ncompany; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either\npursuing or flying from death; but whether for a longer or a shorter\ntime he shall have the soul inclosed in the body, he cares not at all:\nfor even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he\nwere going to do anything else which can be done with decency and\norder; taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts\nturn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and\na member of a civil community.\nIn the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no\ncorrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his\nlife incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor\nwho leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides,\nthere is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound\nto other things, nor yet detached from other things, nothing worthy of\nblame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.\nReverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it\nentirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any\nopinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the\nrational animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty\njudgement, and friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.\nThrowing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and\nbesides bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,\nwhich is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is\neither past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man\nlives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too\nthe longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a\nsuccession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who\nknow not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.\nTo the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:-\nMake for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is\npresented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing\nit is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and\ntell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which\nit has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For\nnothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine\nmethodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in\nlife, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time\nwhat kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything\nperforms in it, and what value everything has with reference to the\nwhole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen of the highest\ncity, of which all other cities are like families; what each thing is,\nand of what it is composed, and how long it is the nature of this\nthing to endure which now makes an impression on me, and what virtue I\nhave need of with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth,\nfidelity, simplicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every\noccasion a man should say: this comes from God; and this is\naccording to the apportionment and spinning of the thread of\ndestiny, and such-like coincidence and chance; and this is from one of\nthe same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows not however\nwhat is according to his nature. But I know; for this reason I\nbehave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship with\nbenevolence and justice. At the same time however in things\nindifferent I attempt to ascertain the value of each.\nIf thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason\nseriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to\ndistract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst\nbe bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this,\nexpecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present\nactivity according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word\nand sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no\nman who is able to prevent this.\nAs physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for\ncases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles\nready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for\ndoing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond\nwhich unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt\nthou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time\nhaving a reference to things divine; nor the contrary.\nNo longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own\nmemoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the\nselections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age.\nHasten then to the end which thou hast before thee, and throwing\naway idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for\nthyself, while it is in thy power.\nThey know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,\nsowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for\nthis is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.\nBody, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul\nappetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the\nimpressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to\nanimals; to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild\nbeasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a\nPhalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the\nthings which appear suitable belongs also to those who do not\nbelieve in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure\ndeeds when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is common\nto all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar\nto the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with\nthe thread which is spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which\nis planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but\nto preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither\nsaying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary\nto justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple,\nmodest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any of them,\nnor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of life, to\nwhich a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without\nany compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot.\nBOOK FOUR\nTHAT which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so\naffected with respect to the events which happen, that it always\neasily adapts itself to that which is and is presented to it. For it\nrequires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under\ncertain conditions however; and it makes a material for itself out of\nthat which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by\nwhich a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is\nstrong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on\nit, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.\nLet no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according\nto the perfect principles of art.\nMen seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,\nand mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very\nmuch. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men,\nfor it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into\nthyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from\ntrouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he\nhas within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is\nimmediately in perfect tranquility; and I affirm that tranquility is\nnothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then\ngive to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy\nprinciples be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt\nrecur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely,\nand to send thee back free from all discontent with the things to\nwhich thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? With the\nbadness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational\nanimals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of\njustice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many\nalready, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have\nbeen stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.- But\nperhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee\nout of the universe.- Recall to thy recollection this alternative;\neither there is providence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things;\nor remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world\nis a kind of political community, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps\ncorporeal things will still fasten upon thee.- Consider then further\nthat the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or\nviolently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its\nown power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented\nto about pain and pleasure, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps the\ndesire of the thing called fame will torment thee.- See how soon\neverything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on\neach side of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the\nchangeableness and want of judgement in those who pretend to give\npraise, and the narrowness of the space within which it is\ncircumscribed, and be quiet at last. For the whole earth is a point,\nand how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there\nin it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.\nThis then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory\nof thy own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be\nfree, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen,\nas a mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou\nshalt turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do\nnot touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but\nour perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The\nother is that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately\nand will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these\nchanges thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation:\nlife is opinion.\nIf our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of\nwhich we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is\nthe reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this\nis so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are\nfellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political\ncommunity; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of\nwhat other common political community will any one say that the\nwhole human race are members? And from thence, from this common\npolitical community comes also our very intellectual faculty and\nreasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come?\nFor as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth,\nand that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot\nand fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that\nwhich is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also\nthe intellectual part comes from some source.\nDeath is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; a composition\nout of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and\naltogether not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is\nnot contrary to the nature of a reasonable animal, and not contrary to\nthe reason of our constitution.\nIt is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it\nis a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will\nnot allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in\nmind, that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and\nsoon not even your names will be left behind.\nTake away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint,\n\"I have been harmed.\" Take away the complaint, \"I have been harmed,\"\nand the harm is taken away.\nThat which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make\nhis life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from\nwithin.\nThe nature of that which is universally useful has been compelled to\ndo this.\nConsider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if\nthou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say\nonly with respect to the continuity of the series of things, but\nwith respect to what is just, and as if it were done by one who\nassigns to each thing its value. Observe then as thou hast begun;\nand whatever thou doest, do it in conjunction with this, the being\ngood, and in the sense in which a man is properly understood to be\ngood. Keep to this in every action.\nDo not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong,\nor such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in\ntruth.\nA man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one, to\ndo only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty\nmay suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if\nthere is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any\nopinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain\npersuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like,\nnot because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.\nHast thou reason? I have.- Why then dost not thou use it? For if\nthis does its own work, what else dost thou wish?\nThou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which\nproduced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal\nprinciple by transmutation.\nMany grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before,\nanother falls after; but it makes no difference.\nWithin ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a\nbeast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the\nworship of reason.\nDo not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death\nhangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.\nHow much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his\nneighbour says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself,\nthat it may be just and pure; or as Agathon says, look not round at\nthe depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without\ndeviating from it.\nHe who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider\nthat every one of those who remember him will himself also die very\nsoon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole\nremembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted\nthrough men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those\nwho will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will\nbe immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to\nthe dead, but what is it to the living? What is praise except indeed\nso far as it has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest\nunseasonably the gift of nature, clinging to something else...\nEverything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and\nterminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither\nworse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm\nthis also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar,\nfor example, material things and works of art. That which is really\nbeautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than\ntruth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things\nis beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is\nsuch a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not\npraised? Or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a\nshrub?\nIf souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from\neternity?- But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who\nhave been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of\nthese bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and\ntheir dissolution make room for other dead bodies; so the souls\nwhich are removed into the air after subsisting for some time are\ntransmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received\ninto the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make\nroom for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. And this is the\nanswer which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to\nexist. But we must not only think of the number of bodies which are\nthus buried, but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten\nby us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus\nin a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed on them! And\nnevertheless this earth receives them by reason of the changes of\nthese bodies into blood, and the transformations into the aerial or\nthe fiery element.\nWhat is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The\ndivision into that which is material and that which is the cause of\nform, the formal.\nDo not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to\njustice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the\nfaculty of comprehension or understanding.\nEverything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O\nUniverse. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due\ntime for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O\nNature: from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee\nall things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not\nthou say, Dear city of Zeus?\nOccupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou\nwouldst be tranquil.- But consider if it would not be better to say,\nDo what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is\nnaturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not\nonly the tranquility which comes from doing well, but also that\nwhich comes from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we\nsay and do being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have\nmore leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every occasion a\nman should ask himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a\nman should take away not only unnecessary acts, but also,\nunnecessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts will not follow after.\nTry how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who\nis satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his\nown just acts and benevolent disposition.\nHast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb\nthyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is\nto himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee?\nWell; out of the universe from the beginning everything which\nhappens has been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life\nis short. Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason\nand justice. Be sober in thy relaxation.\nEither it is a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together,\nbut still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, and\ndisorder in the All? And this too when all things are so separated and\ndiffused and sympathetic.\nA black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character,\nbestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous,\nfraudulent, tyrannical.\nIf he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it,\nno less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it.\nHe is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who\nshuts the eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of\nanother, and has not from himself all things which are useful for\nlife. He is an abscess on the universe who withdraws and separates\nhimself from the reason of our common nature through being\ndispleased with the things which happen, for the same nature\nproduces this, and has produced thee too: he is a piece rent asunder\nfrom the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable\nanimals, which is one.\nThe one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a\nbook: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I\nabide by reason.- And I do not get the means of living out of my\nlearning, and I abide by my reason.\nLove the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be\ncontent with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has\nintrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making\nthyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.\nConsider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all\nthese things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying,\nwarring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering,\nobstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die,\ngrumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring\ncounsulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no\nlonger exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all\nis the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the\nother epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after\ngreat efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But\nchiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known\ndistracting themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in\naccordance with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to\nthis and to be content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember\nthat the attention given to everything has its proper value and\nproportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest\nthyself to smaller matters no further than is fit.\nThe words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also\nthe names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner\nantiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after\nalso Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrian and\nAntoninus. For all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and\ncomplete oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have\nshone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed\nout their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to\nconclude the matter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere\nnothing. What then is that about which we ought to employ our\nserious pains? This one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and\nwords which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all that\nhappens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a principle and\nsource of the same kind.\nWillingly give thyself up to Clotho, one of the Fates, allowing\nher to spin thy thread into whatever things she pleases.\nEverything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that\nwhich is remembered.\nObserve constantly that all things take place by change, and\naccustom thyself to consider that the nature of the Universe loves\nnothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new\nthings like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed\nof that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are\ncast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.\nThou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, not free from\nperturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things,\nnor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only\nin acting justly.\nExamine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind\nof things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.\nWhat is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of\nanother; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal\ncovering. Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which\nsubsists the power of forming opinions about evils. Let this power\nthen not form such opinions, and all is well. And if that which is\nnearest to it, the poor body, is burnt, filled with matter and\nrottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these\nthings be quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or\ngood which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that\nwhich happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him\nwho lives according to nature, is neither according to nature nor\ncontrary to nature.\nConstantly regard the universe as one living being, having one\nsubstance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to\none perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all\nthings act with one movement; and how all things are the cooperating\ncauses of all things which exist; observe too the continuous\nspinning of the thread and the contexture of the web.\nThou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used\nto say.\nIt is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things\nto subsist in consequence of change.\nTime is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a\nviolent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried\naway, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away\ntoo.\nEverything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose\nin spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and\ncalumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes\nthem.\nIn the series of things those which follow are always aptly fitted\nto those which have gone before; for this series is not like a mere\nenumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,\nbut it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are\narranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into\nexistence exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful\nrelationship.\nAlways remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is\nto become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the\ndeath of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him\nwho forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with\nwhich they are most constantly in communion, the reason which\ngoverns the universe; and the things which daily meet with seem to\nthem strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we\nwere asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we\nought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act\nand speak as we have been taught.\nIf any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly\non the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was\non the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest\ndegree mean-spirited- for how small is the difference?- So think it\nno great thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather\nthan to-morrow.\nThink continually how many physicians are dead after often\ncontracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers\nafter predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and\nhow many philosophers after endless discourses on death or\nimmortality; how many heroes after killing thousands; and how many\ntyrants who have used their power over men's lives with terrible\ninsolence as if they were immortal; and how many cities are entirely\ndead, so to speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others\ninnumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one\nafter another. One man after burying another has been laid out dead,\nand another buries him: and all this in a short time. To conclude,\nalways observe how ephemeral and worthless human things are, and\nwhat was yesterday a little mucus to-morrow will be a mummy or\nashes. Pass then through this little space of time conformably to\nnature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off\nwhen it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the\ntree on which it grew.\nBe like the promontory against which the waves continually break,\nbut it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.\nUnhappy am I because this has happened to me.- Not so, but happy am\nI, though this has happened to me, because I continue free from\npain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For\nsuch a thing as this might have happened to every man; but every man\nwould not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why\nthen is that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost\nthou in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a\ndeviation from man's nature? And does a thing seem to thee to be a\ndeviation from man's nature, when it is not contrary to the will of\nman's nature? Well, thou knowest the will of nature. Will then this\nwhich has happened prevent thee from being just, magnanimous,\ntemperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and\nfalsehood; will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and\neverything else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains all\nthat is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads thee to\nvexation to apply this principle: not that this is a misfortune, but\nthat to bear it nobly is good fortune.\nIt is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,\nto pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What\nmore then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly\nthey lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius,\nJulianus, Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out\nmany to be buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether\nthe interval is small between birth and death; and consider with how\nmuch trouble, and in company with what sort of people and in what a\nfeeble body this interval is laboriously passed. Do not then\nconsider life a thing of any value. For look to the immensity of\ntime behind thee, and to the time which is before thee, another\nboundless space. In this infinity then what is the difference\nbetween him who lives three days and him who lives three generations?\nAlways run to the short way; and the short way is the natural:\naccordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest\nreason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare,\nand all artifice and ostentatious display.\nBOOK FIVE\nIN THE morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be\npresent- I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I\ndissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for\nwhich I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to\nlie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?- But this is more\npleasant.- Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all\nfor action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the\nlittle birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put\nin order their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling\nto do the work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do\nthat which is according to thy nature?- But it is necessary to take\nrest also.- It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to this\ntoo: she has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou\ngoest beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts\nit is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou\nlovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature\nand her will. But those who love their several arts exhaust themselves\nin working at them unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thy own\nown nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer\nthe dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the\nvainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when they have a\nviolent affection to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep\nrather than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the\nacts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of\nthy labour?\nHow easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is\ntroublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquility.\nJudge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit\nfor thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any\npeople nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or\nsaid, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have\ntheir peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement;\nwhich things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own\nnature and the common nature; and the way of both is one.\nI go through the things which happen according to nature until I\nshall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out\nof which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of\nwhich my father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my\nnurse the milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied\nwith food and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it\nfor so many purposes.\nThou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.- Be it\nso: but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I\nam not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which\nare altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of\nlabour, aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with\nfew things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom\nfrom trifling magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou\nart immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of\nnatural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest\nvoluntarily below the mark? Or art thou compelled through being\ndefectively furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to\nflatter, and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try to please\nmen, and to make great display, and to be so restless in thy mind? No,\nby the gods: but thou mightest have been delivered from these things\nlong ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being rather\nslow and dull of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this\nalso, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dulness.\nOne man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it\ndown to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to\ndo this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,\nand he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even\nknow what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced\ngrapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its\nproper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked\nthe game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done\na good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes\non to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in\nseason.- Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus\nwithout observing it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary,\nthe observation of what a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is\ncharacteristic of the social animal to perceive that he is working\nin a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also\nshould perceive it.- It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not\nrightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt\nbecome one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled\nby a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the\nmeaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt\nomit any social act.\nA prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the\nploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we\nought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble\nfashion.\nJust as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius\nprescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or\ngoing without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That\nthe nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease or\nmutilation or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case\nPrescribed means something like this: he prescribed this for this\nman as a thing adapted to procure health; and in the second case it\nmeans: That which happens to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a\nmanner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean\nwhen we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen say of\nsquared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable,\nwhen they fit them to one another in some kind of connexion. For there\nis altogether one fitness, harmony. And as the universe is made up out\nof all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing\ncauses necessity (destiny) is made up to be such a cause as it is. And\neven those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for\nthey say, It (necessity, destiny) brought this to such a\nperson.- This then was brought and this was precribed to him. Let us\nthen receive these things, as well as those which Aesculapius\nprescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his prescriptions\nare disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the\nperfecting and accomplishment of the things, which the common nature\njudges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy\nhealth. And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem\ndisagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the\nuniverse and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).\nFor he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it\nwere not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything,\nwhatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which\nis directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with\nthat which happens to thee; the one, because it was done for thee\nand prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee,\noriginally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the\nother, because even that which comes severally to every man is to\nthe power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and\nperfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the\nwhole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the\nconjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes.\nAnd thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art\ndissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.\nBe not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost\nnot succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but\nwhen thou bast failed, return back again, and be content if the\ngreater part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and\nlove this to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy\nas if she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and\napply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or\ndrenching with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason,\nand thou wilt repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only\nthe things which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have\nsomething else which is not according to nature.- It may be objected,\nWhy what is more agreeable than this which I am doing?- But is not\nthis the very reason why pleasure deceives us? And consider if\nmagnanimity, freedom, simplicity, equanimity, piety, are not more\nagreeable. For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou\nthinkest of the security and the happy course of all things which\ndepend on the faculty of understanding and knowledge?\nThings are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to\nphilosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether\nunintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult\nto understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man\nwho never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,\nand consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they\nmay be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber.\nThen turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly\npossible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of\na man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and\ndirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of\nmotion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized\nor even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the\ncontrary it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the\nnatural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in\nthese principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which\nis not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that\nit is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for\nthere is no man who will compel me to this.\nAbout what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I\nmust ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this\npart of me which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I\nnow? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a\ntyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?\nWhat kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we\nmay learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain\nthings as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice,\nfortitude, he would not after having first conceived these endure to\nlisten to anything which should not be in harmony with what is\nreally good. But if a man has first conceived as good the things which\nappear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as\nvery applicable that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the\nmany perceive the difference. For were it not so, this saying would\nnot offend and would not be rejected in the first case, while we\nreceive it when it is said of wealth, and of the means which further\nluxury and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we\nshould value and think those things to be good, to which after their\nfirst conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be\naptly applied- that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a\nplace to ease himself in.\nI am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them\nwill perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence\nout of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by\nchange into some part of the universe, and that again will change into\nanother part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence\nof such a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for\never in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so,\neven if the universe is administered according to definite periods\nof revolution.\nReason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are powers which are\nsufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from\na first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the\nend which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts\nare named catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they\nproceed by the right road.\nNone of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong\nto a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's\nnature promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature\nattaining its end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these\nthings, nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and\nthat which aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if\nany of these things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man\nto despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be\nworthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor\nwould he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these\nthings were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives\nhimself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is\ndeprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss,\njust in the same degree he is a better man.\nSuch as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character\nof thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with\na continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that\nwhere a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in\na palace;- well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,\nconsider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted,\nfor this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;\nand its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the\nend is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now\nthe good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made\nfor society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior\nexist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life are\nsuperior to those which have not life, and of those which have life\nthe superior are those which have reason.\nTo seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the\nbad should not do something of this kind.\nNothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.\nThe same things happen to another, and either because he does not\nsee that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit he\nis firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and\nconceit should be stronger than wisdom.\nThings themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor\nhave they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:\nbut the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements\nit may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which\npresent themselves to it.\nIn one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do\ngood to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves\nobstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which\nare indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now\nit is true that these may impede my action, but they are no\nimpediments to my affects and disposition, which have the power of\nacting conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes\nevery hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a\nhindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an\nobstacle on the road helps us on this road.\nReverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which\nmakes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner\nalso reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the\nsame kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of\neverything else, is this, and thy life is directed by this.\nThat which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.\nIn the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the\nstate is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state\nis harmed, thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state.\nShow him where his error is.\nOften think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear,\nboth the things which are and the things which are produced. For\nsubstance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of\nthings are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite\nvarieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And\nconsider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the\npast and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he\nnot a fool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and\nmakes himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short\ntime.\nThink of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small\nportion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible\ninterval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by\ndestiny, and how small a part of it thou art.\nDoes another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own\ndisposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature\nwills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.\nLet the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by\nthe movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it\nnot unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those\naffects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind\nby virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which\nis all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for\nit is natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the\nsensation the opinion that it is either good or bad.\nLive with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly\nshows to them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned\nto him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath\ngiven to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself.\nAnd this is every man's understanding and reason.\nArt thou angry with him whose armpits stink? Art thou angry with him\nwhose mouth smells foul? What good will this danger do thee? He has\nsuch a mouth, he has such arm-pits: it is necessary that such an\nemanation must come from such things- but the man has reason, it will\nbe said, and he is able, if he takes pain, to discover wherein he\noffends- I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast\nreason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him\nhis error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and\nthere is no need of anger. Neither tragic actor nor whore...\nAs thou intendest to live when thou art gone out,...so it is in\nthy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away\nout of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is\nsmoky, and I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble?\nBut so long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free,\nand no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to\ndo what is according to the nature of the rational and social animal.\nThe intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has\nmade the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has\nfitted the superior to one another. Thou seest how it has\nsubordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to everything its proper\nportion, and has brought together into concord with one another the\nthings which are the best.\nHow hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,\nchildren, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy\nfriends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto\nbehaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee:\nNever has wronged a man in deed or word.\nAnd call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed\nthrough, and how many things thou hast been able to endure: and that\nthe history of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended:\nand how many beautiful things thou hast seen: and how many pleasures\nand pains thou hast despised; and how many things called honourable\nthou hast spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown\na kind disposition.\nWhy do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and\nknowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows\nbeginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance\nand through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the\nuniverse.\nSoon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a\nname or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things\nwhich are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and\nlike little dogs biting one another, and little children\nquarrelling, laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity\nand modesty and justice and truth are fled\nUp to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.\nWhat then is there which still detains thee here? If the objects of\nsense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of\nperception are dull and easily receive false impressions; and the poor\nsoul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute\namidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou\nnot wait in tranquility for thy end, whether it is extinction or\nremoval to another state? And until that time comes, what is\nsufficient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them,\nand to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and self-restraint;\nbut as to everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh\nand breath, to remember that this is neither thine nor in thy power.\nThou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou\ncanst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These\ntwo things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of\nman, and to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by\nanother; and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and\nthe practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its\ntermination.\nIf this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own\nbadness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about\nit? And what is the harm to the common weal?\nDo not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things,\nbut give help to all according to thy ability and their fitness; and\nif they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent,\ndo not imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as\nthe old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's top,\nremembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.\nWhen thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man,\nwhat these things are?- Yes; but they are objects of great concern to\nthese people- wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things?- I\nwas once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.- But\nfortunate means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune:\nand a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions,\ngood actions.\nBOOK SIX\nTHE substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the\nreason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for\nit has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything\nharmed by it. But all things are made and perfected according to\nthis reason.\nLet it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm,\nif thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied\nwith sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or\ndoing something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by\nwhich we die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what\nwe have in hand.\nLook within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its\nvalue escape thee.\nAll existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced\nto vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.\nThe reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what\nit does, and on what material it works.\nThe best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong\ndoer.\nTake pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one\nsocial act to another social act, thinking of God.\nThe ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and\nwhile it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it\nalso makes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as\nit wills.\nIn conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is\naccomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other\nnature that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which\nexternally comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended\nwithin this nature, or a nature external and independent of this.\nThe universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of\nthings, and a dispersion; or it is unity and order and providence.\nIf then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous\ncombination of things and such a disorder? And why do I care about\nanything else than how I shall at last become earth? And why am I\ndisturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I\ndo. But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm,\nand I trust in him who governs.\nWhen thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in\na manner, quickly return to thyself and do not continue out of tune\nlonger than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over\nthe harmony by continually recurring to it.\nIf thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou\nwouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst\nconstantly return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be\nto thee step-mother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and\nrepose in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court\nappears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.\nWhen we have meat before us and such eatables we receive the\nimpression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead\nbody of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a\nlittle grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with\nthe blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they\nreach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what\nkind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all\nthrough life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of\nour approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their\nworthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are\nexalted. For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason,\nand when thou art most sure that thou art employed about things\nworth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Consider then\nwhat Crates says of Xenocrates himself.\nMost of the things which the multitude admire are referred to\nobjects of the most general kind, those which are held together by\ncohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees,\nvines, olives. But those which are admired by men who are a little\nmore reasonable are referred to the things which are held together\nby a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by\nmen who are still more instructed are the things which are held\ntogether by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but\nrational so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some\nother way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number of\nslaves. But he who values rational soul, a soul universal and fitted\nfor political life, regards nothing else except this; and above all\nthings he keeps his soul in a condition and in an activity conformable\nto reason and social life, and he co-operates to this end with those\nwho are of the same kind as himself.\nSome things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out\nof it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already\nextinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the\nworld, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the\ninfinite duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there\nis no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a\nman would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall\nin love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already\npassed out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of\nevery man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the\nair. For such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given\nit back, which we do every moment, just the same is it with the\nwhole respiratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth\nyesterday and the day before, to give it back to the element from\nwhich thou didst first draw it.\nNeither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor\nrespiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the\nreceiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved\nby desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being\nnourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and\nparting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being\nvalued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we\nvalue the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the\nmany is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up\nthis worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth\nvaluing? This in my opinion, to move thyself and to restrain thyself\nin conformity to thy proper constitution, to which end both all\nemployments and arts lead. For every art aims at this, that the\nthing which has been made should be adapted to the work for which it\nhas been made; and both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and\nthe horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the\neducation and the teaching of youth aim at something. In this then\nis the value of the education and the teaching. And if this is well,\nthou wilt not seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many\nother things too? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for\nthy own happiness, nor without passion. For of necessity thou must\nbe envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away those\nthings, and plot against those who have that which is valued by\nthee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of perturbation\nwho wants any of these things; and besides, he must often find fault\nwith the gods. But to reverence and honour thy own mind will make thee\ncontent with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in agreement\nwith the gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered.\nAbove, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But\nthe motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine,\nand advancing by a way hardly observed it goes happily on its road.\nHow strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living\nat the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves\npraised by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever\nwill see, this they set much value on. But this is very much the\nsame as if thou shouldst be grieved because those who have lived\nbefore thee did not praise thee.\nIf a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not\nthink that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for\nman and conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained\nby thyself too.\nIn the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his\nnails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we\nneither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we\nsuspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on\nour guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with\nsuspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like this\nlet thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life; let us overlook\nmany things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it\nis in our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no\nsuspicion nor hatred.\nIf any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or\nact right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which no\nman was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and\nignorance.\nI do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either\nthings without life, or things without reason, or things that have\nrambled and know not the way.\nAs to the animals which have no reason and generally all things\nand objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none,\nmake use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human\nbeings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all\noccasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the\nlength of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so\nspent are sufficient.\nAlexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to\nthe same state; for either they were received among the same seminal\nprinciples of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the\natoms.\nConsider how many things in the same indivisible time take place\nin each of us, things which concern the body and things which\nconcern the soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things,\nor rather all things which come into existence in that which is the\none and all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.\nIf any man should propose to thee the question, how the name\nAntoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter\neach letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too?\nWilt thou not go on with composure and number every letter? just so\nthen in this life also remember that every duty is made up of\ncertain parts. These it is thy duty to observe and without being\ndisturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry with thee to go\non thy way and finish that which is set before thee.\nHow cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which\nappear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And\nyet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art\nvexed because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards\nthings because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and\nprofitable to them.- But it is not so.- Teach them then, and show\nthem without being angry.\nDeath is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of\nthe pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the\ndiscursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh.\nIt is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life,\nwhen thy body does not give way.\nTake care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not\ndyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then\nsimple, good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of\njustice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in\nall proper acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to\nmake thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is\nonly one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition and social\nacts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy\nin every act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in\nall things, and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and\nhis sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to\nunderstand things; and how he would never let anything pass without\nhaving first most carefully examined it and clearly understood it; and\nhow he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in\nreturn; how he did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to\ncalumnies, and how exact an examiner of manners and actions he was;\nand not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a\nsophist; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed,\ndress, food, servants; and how laborious and patient; and how he was\nable on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not\neven requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the\nusual hour; and his firmness and uniformity in his friendships; and\nhow he tolerated freedom of speech in those who opposed his\nopinions; and the pleasure that he had when any man showed him\nanything better; and how religious he was without superstition.\nImitate all this that thou mayest have as good a conscience, when\nthy last hour comes, as he had.\nReturn to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast\nroused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only\ndreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these (the\nthings about thee) as thou didst look at those (the dreams).\nI consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all\nthings are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences.\nBut to the understanding those things only are indifferent, which\nare not the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the\nworks of its own activity, all these are in its power. And of these\nhowever only those which are done with reference to the present; for\nas to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are\nfor the present indifferent.\nNeither the labour which the hand does nor that of the foot is\ncontrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the\nhand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labour\ncontrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the\nlabour is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.\nHow many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides,\ntyrants.\nDost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up\nto a certain point to those who are not skilled in their\ncraft- nevertheless they cling to the reason (the principles) of\ntheir art and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if\nthe architect and the physician shall have more respect to the\nreason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own\nreason, which is common to him and the gods?\nAsia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in\nthe universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present\ntime is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable,\nperishable. All things come from thence, from that universal ruling\npower either directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And\naccordingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and\nevery harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the\ngrand and beautiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind\nfrom that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the\nsource of all.\nHe who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which\nhas taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for\ntime without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.\nFrequently consider the connexion of all things in the universe\nand their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are\nimplicated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one\nanother; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by\nvirtue of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of\nthe substance.\nAdapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and\nthe men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do\nit truly, sincerely.\nEvery instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has\nbeen made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the\nthings which are held together by nature there is within and there\nabides in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit\nto reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act\naccording to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to\nintelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to\nit are in conformity to intelligence.\nWhatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt\nsuppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that,\nif such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou\nwilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of\nthe misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely\nto be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a\ndifference between these things. But if we judge only those things\nwhich are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason\neither for finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to\nman.\nWe are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and\ndesign, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they\nare asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they\nare labourers and co-operators in the things which take place in the\nuniverse. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even\nthose co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and\nthose who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need\neven of such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand\namong what kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules\nall things will certainly make a right use of thee, and he will\nreceive thee among some part of the co-operators and of those whose\nlabours conduce to one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean\nand ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.\nDoes the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius\nthe work of the Fruit-bearer (the earth)? And how is it with respect\nto each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work\ntogether to the same end?\nIf the gods have determined about me and about the things which must\nhappen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to\nimagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why\nshould they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would\nresult to them from this or to the whole, which is the special\nobject of their providence? But if they have not determined about me\nindividually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least,\nand the things which happen by way of sequence in this general\narrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with\nthem. But if they determine about nothing- which it is wicked to\nbelieve, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor\nswear by them nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were\npresent and lived with us- but if however the gods determine about\nnone of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about\nmyself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is\nuseful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and\nnature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country,\nso far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is\nthe world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone\nuseful to me. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest\nof the universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt\nobserve this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that\nwhatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But\nlet the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of\nthings of the middle kind, neither good nor bad.\nAs it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that\nthe continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the\nspectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things\nabove, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?\nThink continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits\nand of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to\nPhilistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the\nother kinds of men. To that place then we must remove, where there are\nso many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus,\nPythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many\ngenerals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus,\nHipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents,\ngreat minds, lovers of labour, versatile, confident, mockers even of\nthe perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as\nare like him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the\ndust. What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names\nare altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to\npass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even\nto liars and unjust men.\nWhen thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of\nthose who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the\nmodesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good\nquality of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of\nthe virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live\nwith us and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible.\nWherefore we must keep them before us.\nThou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only\nso many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that\nthou must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art\nsatisfied with the amount of substance which has been assigned to\nthee, so be content with the time.\nLet us try to persuade them (men). But act even against their\nwill, when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man\nby using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and\ntranquility, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the\nexercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was\nwith a reservation, that thou didst not desire to do\nimpossibilities. What then didst thou desire?- Some such effort as\nthis.- But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou\nwast moved are accomplished.\nHe who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own\ngood; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has\nunderstanding, considers his own acts to be his own good.\nIt is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be\ndisturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power\nto form our judgements.\nAccustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and\nas much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind.\nThat which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the\nbee.\nIf sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they\nlisten to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of\nthose in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?\nHow many together with whom I came into the world are already gone\nout of it.\nTo the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad\ndogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine\nthing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has\nless power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who\nis bitten by a mad dog?\nNo man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy\nown nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of\nthe universal nature.\nWhat kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for\nwhat objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all\nthings, and how many it has covered already.\nBOOK SEVEN\nWHAT is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the\noccasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is\nthat which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find\nthe same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the\nmiddle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are\nfilled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and\nshort-lived.\nHow can our principles become dead, unless the impressions\n(thoughts) which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy\npower continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that\nopinion about anything, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I\ndisturbed? The things which are external to my mind have no relation\nat all to my mind.- Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou\nstandest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things\nagain as thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the\nrecovery of thy life.\nThe idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep,\nherds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of\nbread into fish-ponds, labourings of ants and burden-carrying,\nrunnings about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings-\nall alike. It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show\ngood humour and not a proud air; to understand however that every man\nis worth just so much as the things are worth about which he busies\nhimself.\nIn discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement\nthou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see\nimmediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully\nwhat is the thing signified.\nIs my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,\nI use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal\nnature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the\nwork and give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there\nbe some reason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I\ncan, taking to help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle\ncan do what is now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever\neither by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to\nthis only, to that which is useful and well suited to society.\nHow many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to\noblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have\nlong been dead.\nBe not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty\nlike a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame\nthou canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of\nanother it is possible?\nLet not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if\nit shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou\nusest for present things.\nAll things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy;\nand there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For\nthings have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same\nuniverse (order). For there is one universe made up of all things, and\none God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one\ncommon reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed\nthere is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same\nstock and participate in the same reason.\nEverything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;\nand everything formal (causal) is very soon taken back into the\nuniversal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon\noverwhelmed in time.\nTo the rational animal the same act is according to nature and\naccording to reason.\nBe thou erect, or be made erect.\nJust as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in\none, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have\nbeen constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will\nbe more apparent to thee, if thou often sayest to thyself that I am\na member (melos) of the system of rational beings. But if (using the\nletter r) thou sayest that thou art a part (meros) thou dost not yet\nlove men from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its\nown sake; thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and\nnot yet as doing good to thyself.\nLet there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel\nthe effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will\ncomplain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened\nis an evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.\nWhatever any one does or says, I must be good, just as if the\ngold, or the emerald, or the purple were always saying this,\nWhatever any one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.\nThe ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not\nfrighten itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten\nor pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its\nown opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care,\nif it can, that is suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers.\nBut the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has\ncompletely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will\nsuffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgement. The\nleading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want\nfor itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and\nunimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself.\nEudaemonia (happiness) is a good daemon, or a good thing. What\nthen art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by\nthe gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come\naccording to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.\nIs any man afraid of change? Why what can take place without change?\nWhat then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature?\nAnd canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? And\ncanst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can\nanything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost thou\nnot see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and\nequally necessary for the universal nature?\nThrough the universal substance as through a furious torrent all\nbodies are carried, being by their nature united with and\ncooperating with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another.\nHow many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus\nhas time already swallowed up? And let the same thought occur to\nthee with reference to every man and thing.\nOne thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the\nconstitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not\nallow, or what it does not allow now.\nNear is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the\nforgetfulness of thee by all.\nIt is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this\nhappens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are\nkinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally,\nand that soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer\nhas done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse\nthan it was before.\nThe universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were\nwax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the\nmaterial for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each\nof these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no\nhardship for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its\nbeing fastened together.\nA scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed,\nthe result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so\ncompletely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all. Try\nto conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For\nif even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is\nthere for living any longer?\nNature which governs the whole will soon change all things which\nthou seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and\nagain other things from the substance of them, in order that the world\nmay be ever new.\nWhen a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what\nopinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast\nseen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry.\nFor either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he\ndoes or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to\npardon him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil,\nthou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is in error.\nThink not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of\nthe things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how\neagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the\nsame time however take care that thou dost not through being so\npleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be\ndisturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.\nRetire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this\nnature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just,\nand so secures tranquility.\nWipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine\nthyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or\nto another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal\n(formal) and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which\nis done by a man stay there where the wrong was done.\nDirect thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter\ninto the things that are doing and the things which do them.\nAdorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with indifference\ntowards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind.\nFollow God. The poet says that Law rules all.- And it is enough to\nremember that Law rules all.\nAbout death: Whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms,\nor annihilation, it is either extinction or change.\nAbout pain: The pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that\nwhich lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own\ntranquility by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not\nmade worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if\nthey can, give their opinion about it.\nAbout fame: Look at the minds of those who seek fame, observe what\nthey are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of\nthings they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on\none another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go\nbefore are soon covered by those which come after.\nFrom Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all\ntime and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to\nthink that human life is anything great? it is not possible, he said.-\nSuch a man then will think that death also is no evil.- Certainly not.\nFrom Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.\nIt is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to\nregulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not\nto be regulated and composed by itself.\nIt is not right to vex ourselves at things,\nFor they care nought about it.\nTo the immortal gods and us give joy.\nLife must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn:\nOne man is born; another dies.\nIf gods care not for me and for my children,\nThere is a reason for it.\nFor the good is with me, and the just.\nNo joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.\nFrom Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which\nis this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good\nfor anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death,\nand should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether\nhe is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad\nman.\nFor thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed\nhimself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a\ncommander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the\nhazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything\nelse, before the baseness of deserting his post.\nBut, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is\nnot something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man\nliving such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider\nif this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there\nmust be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust\nthem to the deity and believe what the women say, that no man can\nescape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the\ntime that he has to live.\nLook round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going\nalong with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements\ninto one another; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the\nterrene life.\nThis is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about men\nshould look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some\nhigher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,\nagricultural labours, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of\nthe courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians,\nfeasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an\norderly combination of contraries.\nConsider the past; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou\nmayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will\ncertainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should\ndeviate from the order of the things which take place now: accordingly\nto have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have\ncontemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?\nThat which has grown from the earth to the earth,\nBut that which has sprung from heavenly seed,\nBack to the heavenly realms returns.\nThis is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or\na similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.\nWith food and drinks and cunning magic arts\nTurning the channel's course to 'scape from death.\nThe breeze which heaven has sent\nWe must endure, and toil without complaining.\nAnother may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not\nmore social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all\nthat happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his\nneighbours.\nWhere any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common\nto gods and men, there we have nothing to fear: for where we are\nable to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and\nproceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be\nsuspected.\nEverywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to\nacquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those\nwho are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present\nthoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without being well\nexamined.\nDo not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles,\nbut look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the\nuniversal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy\nown nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every\nbeing ought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all\nother things have been constituted for the sake of rational beings,\njust as among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the\nsuperior, but the rational for the sake of one another.\nThe prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And\nthe second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, for it is\nthe peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to\ncircumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered either by the\nmotion of the senses or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the\nintelligent motion claims superiority and does not permit itself to be\noverpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by\nnature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational\nconstitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let then the\nruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on, and it\nhas what is its own.\nConsider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to\nthe present time; and live according to nature the remainder which\nis allowed thee.\nLove that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread\nof thy destiny. For what is more suitable?\nIn everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the\nsame things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as\nstrange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?\nNowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? And why\ndost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature, to\nthose who cause them and those who are moved by them? And why art thou\nnot altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things\nwhich happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they\nwill be a material for thee to work on. Only attend to thyself, and\nresolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest: and\nremember...\nLook within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble\nup, if thou wilt ever dig.\nThe body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either\nin motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by\nmaintaining in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that\nought to be required also in the whole body. But all of these things\nshould be observed without affectation.\nThe art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's,\nin respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets\nwhich are sudden and unexpected.\nConstantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to\nhave, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt\nneither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their\napprobation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and\nappetites.\nEvery soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of\ntruth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and\ntemperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most\nnecessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be\nmore gentle towards all.\nIn every pain let this thought be present, that there is no\ndishonour in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse,\nfor it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the\nintelligence is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case\nof most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is\nneither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it\nhas its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and\nremember this too, that we do not perceive that many things which\nare disagreeable to us are the same as pain, such as excessive\ndrowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and the having no\nappetite. When then thou art discontented about any of these things,\nsay to thyself, that thou art yielding to pain.\nTake care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel towards men.\nHow do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to\nSocrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble\ndeath, and disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the\nnight in the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to\narrest Leon of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and\nthat he walked in a swaggering way in the streets- though as to this\nfact one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to\ninquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he\nwas able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards\nthe gods, neither idly vexed on account of men's villainy, nor yet\nmaking himself a slave to any man's ignorance, nor receiving as\nstrange anything that fell to his share out of the universal, nor\nenduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his understanding to\nsympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.\nNature has not so mingled the intelligence with the composition of\nthe body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing\nthyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy\nown; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognised\nas such by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too,\nthat very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And\nbecause thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled\nin the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope\nof being both free and modest and social and obedient to God.\nIt is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the\ngreatest tranquility of mind, even if all the world cry out against\nthee as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces\nthe members of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For\nwhat hinders the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself\nin tranquility and in a just judgement of all surrounding things and\nin a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the\njudgement may say to the thing which falls under its observation: This\nthou art in substance (reality), though in men's opinion thou mayest\nappear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that\nwhich falls under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for\nto me that which presents itself is always a material for virtue\nboth rational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art,\nwhich belongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a\nrelationship either to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to\nhandle, but usual and apt matter to work on.\nThe perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every\nday as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor\nplaying the hypocrite.\nThe gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a\ntime they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many\nof them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all\nways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of\nenduring the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?\nIt is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own\nbadness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's\nbadness, which is impossible.\nWhatever the rational and political (social) faculty finds to be\nneither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to\nitself.\nWhen thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost\nthou look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have\nthe reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?\nNo man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act\naccording to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is\nuseful by doing it to others.\nThe nature of the An moved to make the universe. But now either\neverything that takes place comes by way of consequence or continuity;\nor even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the\nuniverse directs its own movement are governed by no rational\nprinciple. If this is remembered it will make thee more tranquil in\nmany things.\nBOOK EIGHT\nTHIS reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty\nfame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy\nlife, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher;\nbut both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far\nfrom philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no\nlonger easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy\nplan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the\nmatter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others,\nand be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as\nthy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else\ndistract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without\nhaving found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor\nin reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In\ndoing what man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If\nhe has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What\nprinciples? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that\nthere is nothing good for man, which does not make him just,\ntemperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does\nnot do the contrary to what has been mentioned.\nOn the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect\nto me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is\ngone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is work of an\nintelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the\nsame law with God?\nAlexander and Gaius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with\nDiogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with\nthings, and their causes (forms), and their matter, and the ruling\nprinciples of these men were the same. But as to the others, how many\nthings had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves?\nConsider that men will do the same things nevertheless, even\nthough thou shouldst burst.\nThis is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are\naccording to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou\nwilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrian and Augustus. In the next\nplace having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and\nat the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and\nwhat man's nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as\nit seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and\nwith modesty and without hypocrisy.\nThe nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove to that\nplace the things which are in this, to change them, to take them\naway hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we\nneed not fear anything new. All things are familiar to us; but the\ndistribution of them still remains the same.\nEvery nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way\nwell; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts\nit assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its\nmovements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and\naversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is\nsatisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature.\nFor of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the\nnature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that\nin the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has\nnot perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature\nof man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is\nintelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions\nand according to its worth, times, substance, cause (form),\nactivity, and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one\nthing compared with any other single thing is equal in all respects,\nbut by taking all the parts together of one thing and comparing them\nwith all the parts together of another.\nThou hast not leisure or ability to read. But thou hast leisure or\nability to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to\npleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame,\nand not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to\ncare for them.\nLet no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or\nwith thy own.\nRepentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected\nsomething useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and\nthe perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would\never repent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is\nneither good nor useful.\nThis thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is\nits substance and material? And what its causal nature (or form)?\nAnd what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?\nWhen thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is\naccording to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform\nsocial acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But\nthat which is according to each individual's nature is also more\npeculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also\nmore agreeable.\nConstantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every\nimpression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of\nEthic, and of Dialectic.\nWhatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What\nopinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to\npleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and\nignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will\nseem nothing wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and such\nthings; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.\nRemember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree\nproduces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and\nsuch things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the\nhelmsman it is a shame to be surprised, if a man has a fever, or if\nthe wind is unfavourable.\nRemember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects\nthy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy\nerror. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to\nthy own movement and judgement, and indeed according to thy own\nunderstanding too.\nIf a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? But if it is in\nthe power of another, whom dost thou blame? The atoms (chance) or\nthe gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst,\ncorrect that which is the cause; but if thou canst not do this,\ncorrect at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,\nof what use is it to thee to find fault? For nothing should be done\nwithout a purpose.\nThat which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here,\nit also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which\nare elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and\nthey murmur not.\nEverything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou\nwonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest\nof the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou? to\nenjoy pleasure? See if common sense allows this.\nNature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the\nbeginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.\nWhat good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to\ncome down, or even to have fallen? And what good is it to the bubble\nwhile it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may\nbe said of a light also.\nTurn it (the body) inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and\nwhen it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is\ndiseased.\nShort-lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer\nand the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the\nworld; and not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself:\nand the whole earth too is a point.\nAttend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an\nopinion or an act or a word.\nThou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become\ngood to-morrow than to be good to-day.\nAm I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of\nmankind. Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to\nthe gods, and the source of all things, from which all that happens is\nderived.\nSuch as bathing appears to thee- oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water,\nall things disgusting- so is every part of life and everything.\nLucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus\ndie, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and\nEpitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus\ndied. Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrian die, and then Celer\ndied. And those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with\npride, where are they? For instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and\nDemetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them.\nAll ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered\neven for a short time, and others have become the heroes of fables,\nand again others have disappeared even from fables. Remember this\nthen, that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or\nthy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and placed\nelsewhere.\nIt is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now\nit is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to\ndespise the movements of the senses, to form a just judgement of\nplausible appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the\nuniverse and of the things which happen in it.\nThere are three relations between thee and other things: the one\nto the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause\nfrom which all things come to all; and the third to those who live\nwith thee.\nPain is either an evil to the body- then let the body say what it\nthinks of it- or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to\nmaintain its own serenity and tranquility, and not to think that\npain is an evil. For every judgement and movement and desire and\naversion is within, and no evil ascends so high.\nWipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: now it is in\nmy power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire nor any\nperturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their\nnature, and I use each according to its value.- Remember this power\nwhich thou hast from nature.\nSpeak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be,\nappropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.\nAugustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister,\nAgrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians and\nsacrificing priests- the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest,\nnot considering the death of a single man, but of a whole race, as\nof the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs- The last of\nhis race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that\nthey might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one\nmust be the last. Again here consider the death of a whole race.\nIt is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if\nevery act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no one\nis able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.- But\nsomething external will stand in the way.- Nothing will stand in the\nway of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.- But perhaps\nsome other active power will be hindered.- Well, but by acquiescing\nin the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to\nthat which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately\nput before thee in place of that which was hindered, and one which\nwill adapt itself to this ordering of which we are speaking.\nReceive wealth or prosperity without arrogance; and be ready to\nlet it go.\nIf thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying\nanywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make\nhimself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and\nseparates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that\nthou hast detached thyself from the natural unity- for thou wast made\nby nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off- yet here there\nis this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite\nthyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been\nseparated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the\nkindness by which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his\npower not to be separated at all from the universal; and when he has\nbeen separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to\nresume his place as a part.\nAs the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all\nthe other powers that it has, so we have received from it this power\nalso. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its\npredestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it,\nand makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is\nable to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for\nsuch purposes as it may have designed.\nDo not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not\nthy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou\nmayest expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself,\nWhat is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? For\nthou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that\nneither the future nor the past pains thee, but only the present.\nBut this is reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest\nit, and chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even\nthis.\nDoes Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does Chaurias\nor Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrian? That would be ridiculous.\nWell, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it?\nAnd if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased? And if they\nwere pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in the order\nof destiny that these persons too should first become old women and\nold men and then die? What then would those do after these were\ndead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.\nIf thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the\nphilosopher.\nIn the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which\nis opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love\nof pleasure, and that is temperance.\nIf thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give\nthee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.- Who is this\nself?- The reason.- But I am not reason.- Be it so. Let then the\nreason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee\nsuffers, let it have its own opinion about itself.\nHindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal\nnature. Hindrance to the movements (desires) is equally an evil to the\nanimal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an\nevil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a\nhindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature.\nApply all these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure\naffect thee? The senses will look to that.- Has any obstacle opposed\nthee in thy efforts towards an object? if indeed thou wast making this\neffort absolutely (unconditionally, or without any reservation),\ncertainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational\nanimal. But if thou takest into consideration the usual course of\nthings, thou hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things\nhowever which are proper to the understanding no other man is used\nto impede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse,\ntouches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues\na sphere.\nIt is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never\nintentionally given pain even to another.\nDifferent things delight different people. But it is my delight to\nkeep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man\nor from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and\nreceiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to\nits value.\nSee that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who\nrather pursue posthumous fame do consider that the men of after time\nwill be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both\nare mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after\ntime utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about\nthee?\nTake me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my\ndivine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act\nconformably to its proper constitution. Is this change of place\nsufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was,\ndepressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? And what wilt thou find\nwhich is sufficient reason for this?\nNothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor\nto an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a\nvine which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone\nwhich is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing\nboth what is usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the\ncommon nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.\nIf thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing\nthat disturbs thee, but thy own judgement about it. And it is in thy\npower to wipe out this judgement now. But if anything in thy own\ndisposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy\nopinion? And even if thou art pained because thou art not doing some\nparticular thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not\nrather act than complain?- But some insuperable obstacle is in the\nway?- Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done\ndepends not on thee.- But it is not worth while to live if this\ncannot be done.- Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just\nas he dies who is in full activity, and well pleased too with the\nthings which are obstacles.\nRemember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when\nself-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which\nit does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy.\nWhat then will it be when it forms a judgement about anything aided by\nreason and deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from\npassions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can\nfly for, refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has\nnot seen this is an ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does\nnot fly to this refuge is unhappy.\nSay nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances\nreport. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain\nperson speaks ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou\nhast been injured, that has not been reported. I see that my child\nis sick. I do see; but that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then\nalways abide by the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from\nwithin, and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something,\nlike a man who knows everything that happens in the world.\nA cucumber is bitter.- Throw it away.- There are briars in the\nroad.- Turn aside from them.- This is enough. Do not add, And why were\nsuch things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who\nis acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter\nand shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their\nworkshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And\nyet they have places into which they can throw these shavings and\ncuttings, and the universal nature has no external space; but the\nwondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself,\neverything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be\nuseless she changes into herself, and again makes other new things\nfrom these very same, so that she requires neither substance from\nwithout nor wants a place into which she may cast that which decays.\nShe is content then with her own space, and her own matter and her own\nart.\nNeither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without\nmethod, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul\ninward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as\nto have no leisure.\nSuppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What\nthen can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure,\nwise, sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid\npure spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up\npotable water; and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will\nspeedily disperse them and wash them out, and will not be at all\npolluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fountain and not a\nmere well? By forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with\ncontentment, simplicity and modesty.\nHe who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.\nAnd he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not\nknow who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any\none of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists\nhimself. What then dost thou think of him who avoids or seeks the\npraise of those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are\nor who they are?\nDost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice\nevery hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please\nhimself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything\nthat he does?\nNo longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which\nsurrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with\nthe intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent\npower is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him\nwho is willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who\nis able to respire it.\nGenerally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and\nparticularly, the wickedness of one man does no harm to another. It is\nonly harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as\nsoon as he shall choose.\nTo my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just as\nindifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made\nespecially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each\nof us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbour's wickedness\nwould be my harm, which God has not willed in order that my\nunhappiness may not depend on another.\nThe sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it\nis diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:\nAccordingly its rays are called Extensions [aktines] because they\nare extended [apo tou ekteinesthai]. But one may judge what kind of\na thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a\nnarrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right\nline, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body\nwhich stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there the\nlight remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to\nbe the out-pouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should\nin no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no\nviolent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its\nway; nor yet fall down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives\nit. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not\nadmit it.\nHe who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different\nkind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt\nthou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of\nsensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt\nnot cease to live.\nMen exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear\nwith them.\nIn one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed,\nboth when it exercises caution and when it is employed about\ninquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.\nEnter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let every other\nman enter into thine.\nBOOK NINE\nHE WHO acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal\nnature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help\none another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one\nanother, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety\ntowards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety\nto the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things\nthat are; and things that are have a relation to all things that\ncome into existence. And further, this universal nature is named\ntruth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who\nlies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly\nby deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he\nis at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he\ndisturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he\nfights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary\nto truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect\nof which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And\nindeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is\nguilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault\nwith the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad\nand the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are\nin the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure\npleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which\ncause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also\nbe afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and\neven this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain\nfrom injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the\nthings towards which the universal nature is equally affected- for it\nwould not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards\nboth- towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the\nsame mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain, then,\nand pleasure, or death and life, or honour and dishonour, which the\nuniversal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is\nmanifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature\nemploys them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to\nthose who are produced in continuous series and to those who come\nafter them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence,\naccording to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering\nof things, having conceived certain principles of the things which\nwere to be, and having determined powers productive of beings and of\nchanges and of such like successions.\nIt would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without\nhaving had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.\nHowever to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these\nthings is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined\nto abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly\nfrom this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a\npestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of\nthis atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a\npestilence of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a\npestilence of men so far as they are men.\nDo not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is\none of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be\nyoung and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to\nhave teeth and beard and grey hairs, and to beget, and to be\npregnant and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations\nwhich the seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This,\nthen, is consistent with the character of a reflecting man, to be\nneither careless nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death,\nbut to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now\nwaitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife's womb,\nso be ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this\nenvelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which\nshall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to death by\nobserving the objects from which thou art going to be removed, and the\nmorals of those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it\nis no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to care\nfor them and to bear with them gently; and yet to remember that thy\ndeparture will be not from men who have the same principles as\nthyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw\nus the contrary way and attach us to life, to be permitted to live\nwith those who have the same principles as ourselves. But now thou\nseest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those\nwho live together, so that thou mayest say, Come quick, O death,\nlest perchance I, too, should forget myself.\nHe who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly\nacts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.\nHe often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only\nhe who does a certain thing.\nThy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present\nconduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of\ncontentment with everything which happens- that is enough.\nWipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the\nruling faculty in its own power.\nAmong the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but\namong reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just\nas there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and\nwe see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the\nfaculty of vision and all that have life.\nAll things which participate in anything which is common to them all\nmove towards that which is of the same kind with themselves.\nEverything which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which\nis liquid flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind\ndoes the same, so that they require something to keep them asunder,\nand the application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account\nof the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together\nwith all the fire which is here, that even every substance which is\nsomewhat dry, is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it\nof that which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then\neverything also which participates in the common intelligent nature\nmoves in like manner towards that which is of the same kind with\nitself, or moves even more. For so much as it is superior in\ncomparison with all other things, in the same degree also is it more\nready to mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it.\nAccordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and\nherds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in a manner,\nloves; for even in animals there are souls, and that power which\nbrings them together is seen to exert itself in the superior degree,\nand in such a way as never has been observed in plants nor in stones\nnor in trees. But in rational animals there are political\ncommunities and friendships, and families and meetings of people;\nand in wars, treaties and armistices. But in the things which are\nstill superior, even though they are separated from one another, unity\nin a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher\ndegree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are\nseparated. See, then, what now takes place. For only intelligent\nanimals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and\nin them alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But\nstill though men strive to avoid this union, they are caught and\nheld by it, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see\nwhat I say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find\nanything earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing than a man\naltogether separated from other men.\nBoth man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper\nseasons each produces it. But if usage has especially fixed these\nterms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces\nfruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it\nother things of the same kind as reason itself.\nIf thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if\nthou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this\npurpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for\nsome purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation;\nso kind they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders\nthee?\nLabour not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be\npitied or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only, to put\nthyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.\nTo-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out\nall trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.\nAll things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in\ntime, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in\nthe time of those whom we have buried.\nThings stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither\nknowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgement. What is it,\nthen, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.\nNot in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the\nrational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in\npassivity, but in activity.\nFor the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,\nnor indeed any good to have been carried up.\nPenetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see\nwhat judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of\nthemselves.\nAll things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation\nand in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.\nIt is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it\nis.\nTermination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and in\na sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the\nconsideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy\nmanhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is\nthis anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy\ngrandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under\nthy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and\nterminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,\nthen, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy\nwhole life a thing to be afraid of.\nHasten to examine thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe\nand that of thy neighbour: thy own that thou mayest make it just:\nand that of the universe, that thou mayest remember of what thou art a\npart; and that of thy neighbour, that thou mayest know whether he\nhas acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayest also\nconsider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine.\nAs thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let\nevery act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of\nthine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social\nend, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and\nit is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly\na man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.\nQuarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits\ncarrying about dead bodies, such is everything; and so what is\nexhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes\nour eyes more clearly.\nExamine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it\naltogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then\ndetermine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is\nnaturally made to endure.\nThou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with\nthy ruling faculty, when it does the things which it is constituted by\nnature to do. But enough of this.\nWhen another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee\nanything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and\nsee what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no\nreason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that\nopinion about thee. However thou must be well disposed towards them,\nfor by nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways,\nby dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which\nthey set a value.\nThe periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down\nfrom age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself\nin motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou\ncontent with that which is the result of its activity; or it puts\nitself in motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in\na manner; or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.- In a\nword, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou\nalso be governed by it.\nSoon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will\nchange, and the things also which result from change will continue\nto change for ever, and these again for ever. For if a man reflects on\nthe changes and transformations which follow one another like wave\nafter wave and their rapidity, he will despise everything which is\nperishable.\nThe universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries\neverything along with it. But how worthless are all these poor\npeople who are engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are\nplaying the philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what\nnature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and\ndo not look about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet\nexpect Plato's Republic: but be content if the smallest thing goes\non well, and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can\nchange men's opinions? And without a change of opinions what else is\nthere than the slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey?\nCome now and tell me of Alexander and Philip and Demetrius of\nPhalerum. They themselves shall judge whether they discovered what the\ncommon nature required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if\nthey acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate\nthem. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside\nto indolence and pride.\nLook down from above on the countless herds of men and their\ncountless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms\nand calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live\ntogether, and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in\nolden time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the\nlife now lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy\nname, and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now\nare praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a\nposthumous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.\nLet there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things\nwhich come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the\nthings done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be\nmovement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is\naccording to thy nature.\nThou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those\nwhich disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou\nwilt then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole\nuniverse in thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and\nobserving the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the\ntime from birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before\nbirth as well as the equally boundless time after dissolution.\nAll that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been\nspectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who\ndies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same\ncondition with him who died prematurely.\nWhat are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of\nthings are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and\nhonour? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When\nthey think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise,\nwhat an idea!\nLoss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature\ndelights in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done\nwell, and from eternity have been done in like form, and will be\nsuch to time without end. What, then, dost thou say? That all things\nhave been and all things always will be bad, and that no power has\never been found in so many gods to rectify these things, but the world\nhas been condemned to be found in never ceasing evil?\nThe rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of\neverything! Water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the\ncallosities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and\ngarments, only bits of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything\nelse is of the same kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is\nalso another thing of the same kind, changing from this to that.\nEnough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art\nthou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is\nit the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it.\nBut besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now become\nat last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine\nthese things for a hundred years or three.\nIf any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has\nnot done wrong.\nEither all things proceed from one intelligent source and come\ntogether as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with\nwhat is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms,\nand nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou\ndisturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou\ncorrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast,\ndost thou herd and feed with the rest?\nEither the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they\nhave no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why\ndost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing\nany of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the\nthings which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather\nthan pray that any of these things should not happen or happen? for\ncertainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for\nthese purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods have placed them\nin thy power. Well, then, is it not better to use what is in thy power\nlike a free man than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not\nin thy power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even\nin the things which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such\nthings, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus: How shall I be able\nto lie with that woman? Do thou pray thus: How shall I not desire to\nlie with her? Another prays thus: How shall I be released from this?\nAnother prays: How shall I not desire to be released? Another thus:\nHow shall I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How shall I not be\nafraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what\ncomes.\nEpicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my\nbodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to\nthose who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of\nthings as before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while\nparticipating in such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be\nfree from perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he\nsays, give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks,\nas if they were doing something great, but my life went on well and\nhappily. Do, then, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou\nart sick, and in any other circumstances; for never to desert\nphilosophy in any events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk\neither with an ignorant man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a\nprinciple of all schools of philosophy; but to be intent only on\nthat which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which thou\ndoest it.\nWhen thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately\nask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in\nthe world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is\nimpossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men who must\nof necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be present\nto thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of\nevery man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou\ndost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men should\nnot exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every one\nindividually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when the\noccasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to\nevery wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against\nthe stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other\npower. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching\nthe man who is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object\nand is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou\nwilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated\nhas done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that\nwhich is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind.\nAnd what harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not\nbeen instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether\nthou shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not\nexpect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given\nthee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he would\ncommit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that\nhe has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless\nor ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own,\nwhether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition would\nkeep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not\nconfer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy\nvery act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast\ndone a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done\nsomething conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for\nit? Just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet\nfor walking. For as these members are formed for a particular purpose,\nand by working according to their several constitutions obtain what is\ntheir own; so also as man is formed by nature to acts of\nbenevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in any other\nway conducive to the common interest, he has acted conformably to\nhis constitution, and he gets what is his own.\nBOOK TEN\nWILT thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and\nnaked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou\nnever enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never\nbe full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more,\nnor desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the\nenjoyment of pleasures? Nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt\nhave longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of\nmen with whom thou mayest live in harmony? But wilt thou be\nsatisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all that is\nabout thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast everything\nand that it comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee, and\nwill be well whatever shall please them, and whatever they shall\ngive for the conservation of the perfect living being, the good and\njust and beautiful, which generates and holds together all things, and\ncontains and embraces all things which are dissolved for the\nproduction of other like things? Wilt thou never be such that thou\nshalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither to find fault\nwith them at all, nor to be condemned by them?\nObserve what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by\nnature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou\nart a living being, shall not be made worse by it.\nAnd next thou must observe what thy nature requires so far as thou\nart a living being. And all this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy\nnature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not be made\nworse by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a\npolitical (social) animal. Use these rules, then, and trouble\nthyself about nothing else.\nEverything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art\nformed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to\nbear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed\nby nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art\nformed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou\nart not formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will\nperish after it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art\nformed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it\ndepends on thy own opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by\nthinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this.\nIf a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error.\nBut if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.\nWhatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all\neternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the\nthread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it.\nWhether the universe is a concourse of atoms, or nature is a system,\nlet this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which\nis governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to\nthe parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering\nthis, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of\nthe things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is\ninjurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For\nthe whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all\nnatures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the\nuniverse has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled\neven by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself.\nBy remembering, then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be\ncontent with everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner\nintimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with\nmyself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct\nmyself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I\nshall turn an my efforts to the common interest, and divert them\nfrom the contrary. Now, if these things are done so, life must flow on\nhappily, just as thou mayest observe that the life of a citizen is\nhappy, who continues a course of action which is advantageous to his\nfellow-citizens, and is content with whatever the state may assign\nto him.\nThe parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally\ncomprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this\nbe understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if\nthis is naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the\nwhole would not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being\nsubject to change and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For\nwhether did nature herself design to do evil to the things which are\nparts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity\nfall into evil, or have such results happened without her knowing\nit? Both these suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man\nshould even drop the term Nature (as an efficient power), and should\nspeak of these things as natural, even then it would be ridiculous\nto affirm at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their\nnature subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised or\nvexed as if something were happening contrary to nature, particularly\nas the dissolution of things is into those things of which each thing\nis composed. For there is either a dispersion of the elements out of\nwhich everything has been compounded, or a change from the solid to\nthe earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are\ntaken back into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods\nis consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not imagine\nthat the solid and the airy part belong to thee from the time of\ngeneration. For all this received its accretion only yesterday and\nthe day before, as one may say, from the food and the air which is\ninspired. This, then, which has received the accretion, changes, not\nthat which thy mother brought forth. But suppose that this which thy\nmother brought forth implicates thee very much with that other part,\nwhich has the peculiar quality of change, this is nothing in fact in\nthe way of objection to what is said.\nWhen thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational,\na man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not\nchange these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return\nto them. And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a\ndiscriminating attention to every several thing and freedom from\nnegligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the\nthings which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that\nMagnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the\npleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor\nthing called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou\nmaintainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring\nto be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and\nwilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast\nhitherto been, and to be tom in pieces and defiled in such a life,\nis the character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life,\nand like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who though\ncovered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the\nfollowing day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the\nsame claws and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these\nfew names: and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou\nwast removed to certain islands of the Happy. But if thou shalt\nperceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold,\ngo courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even\ndepart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and\nfreedom and modesty, after doing this one laudable thing at least in\nthy life, to have gone out of it thus. In order, however, to the\nremembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee, if thou\nrememberest the gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish\nall reasonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou\nrememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and\nthat what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work\nof a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man.\nMimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out\nthose holy principles of thine. How many things without studying\nnature dost thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is\nthy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same\ntime the power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the\ncontemplative faculty is exercised, and the confidence which comes\nfrom the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing\nit, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when\ngravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it\nis in substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long\nit is formed to exist and of what things it is compounded, and to whom\nit can belong, and who are able both to give it and take it away?\nA spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he\nhas caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in\na net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he\nhas taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not\nthese robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?\nAcquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into\none another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about\nthis part of philosophy. For nothing is so much adapted to produce\nmagnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he\nmust, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave\neverything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his\nactions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the\nuniversal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about\nhim or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself\ncontented with these two things, with acting justly in what he now\ndoes, and being satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he\nlays aside all distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else\nthan to accomplish the straight course through the law, and by\naccomplishing the straight course to follow God.\nWhat need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to\ninquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way\ncontent, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop\nand take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on\naccording to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that\nwhich appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and\nif thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who\nfollows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same\ntime, and also cheerful and collected.\nInquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it\nwill make any difference to thee, if another does what is just and\nright. It will make no difference.\nThou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant\nairs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, are such as they\nare at bed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and\nwhat they avoid and what they pursue, and how they steal and how\nthey rob, not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable\npart, by means of which there is produced, when a man chooses,\nfidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon (happiness)?\nTo her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is\ninstructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou\nwilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased\nwith her.\nShort is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a\nmountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or\nhere, if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state (political\ncommunity). Let men see, let them know a real man who lives\naccording to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For\nthat is better than to live thus as men do.\nNo longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought to\nbe, but be such.\nConstantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance,\nand consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of\na fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet.\nLook at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in\ndissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or\ndispersion, or that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.\nConsider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,\neasing themselves and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when\nthey are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their\nelevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves\nand for what things; and after a little time consider in what a\ncondition they will be.\nThat is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature\nbrings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature\nbrings it.\n\"The earth loves the shower\"; and \"the solemn aether loves\": and the\nuniverse loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the\nuniverse, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that\n\"this or that loves (is wont) to be produced\"?\nEither thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,\nor thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying\nand hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is\nnothing. Be of good cheer, then.\nLet this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like\nany other; and that all things here are the same with things on top of\na mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be.\nFor thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls\nof a city as in a shepherd's fold on a mountain.\nWhat is my ruling faculty now to me? And of what nature am I now\nmaking it? And for what purpose am I now using it? Is it void of\nunderstanding? Is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? Is it\nmelted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together\nwith it?\nHe who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,\nand he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved\nor angry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or is\nor shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all\nthings, and he is Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He then\nwho fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.\nA man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another\ncause takes it, and labours on it and makes a child. What a thing from\nsuch a material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat,\nand then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and\nin fine life and strength and other things; how many and how strange I\nObserve then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and\nsee the power just as we see the power which carries things\ndownwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly.\nConstantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time\npast also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And\nplace before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form,\nwhatever thou hast learned from thy experience or from older\nhistory; for example, the whole court of Hadrian, and the whole\ncourt of Antoninus, and the whole court of Philip, Alexander, Croesus;\nfor all those were such dramas as we see now, only with different\nactors.\nImagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be\nlike a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.\nLike this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds\nin which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is\nit given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a\nnecessity imposed on all.\nSeverally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and\nask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee\nof this.\nWhen thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith turn to thyself\nand reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in\nthinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of\nreputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly\nforget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is\ncompelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take\naway from him the compulsion.\nWhen thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches\nor Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or\nSilvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus,\nand when thou hast seen Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when\nthou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the\ncase of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy\nmind, Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For\nthus continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and\nnothing at all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that\nwhat has once changed will never exist again in the infinite\nduration of time. But thou, in what a brief space of time is thy\nexistence? And why art thou not content to pass through this short\ntime in an orderly way? What matter and opportunity for thy activity\nart thou avoiding? For what else are all these things, except\nexercises for the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by\nexamination into their nature the things which happen in life?\nPersevere then until thou shalt have made these things thy own, as the\nstomach which is strengthened makes all things its own, as the blazing\nfire makes flame and brightness out of everything that is thrown\ninto it.\nLet it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou\nart not simple or that thou are not good; but let him be a liar\nwhoever shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is\naltogether in thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from\nbeing good and simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer,\nunless thou shalt be such. For neither does reason allow thee to live,\nif thou art not such.\nWhat is that which as to this material (our life) can be done or\nsaid in the way most conformable to reason. For whatever this may\nbe, it is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make\nexcuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy\nmind is in such a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy\npleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected\nand presented to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable\nto man's constitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment\neverything which it is in his power to do according to his own nature.\nAnd it is in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a\ncylinder to move everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to\nfire, nor to anything else which is governed by nature or an\nirrational soul, for the things which check them and stand in the\nway are many. But intelligence and reason are able to go through\neverything that opposes them, and in such manner as they are formed by\nnature and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this facility with\nwhich the reason will be carried through all things, as fire\nupwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined surface,\nand seek for nothing further. For all other obstacles either affect\nthe body only which is a dead thing; or, except through opinion and\nthe yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm\nof any kind; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately\nbecome bad. Now, in the case of all things which have a certain\nconstitution, whatever harm may happen to any of them, that which is\nso affected becomes consequently worse; but in the like case, a man\nbecomes both better, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by\nmaking a right use of these accidents. And finally remember that\nnothing harms him who is really a citizen, which does not harm the\nstate; nor yet does anything harm the state, which does not harm law\n(order); and of these things which are called misfortunes not one\nharms law. What then does not harm law does not harm either state or\ncitizen.\nTo him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest\nprecept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he\nshould be free from grief and fear. For example-\nLeaves, some the wind scatters on the ground-\nSo is the race of men.\nLeaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry\nout as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on\nthe contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like\nmanner, are those who shall receive and transmit a man's fame to\naftertimes. For all such things as these \"are produced in the season\nof spring,\" as the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then\nthe forest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief\nexistence is common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and\npursuest all things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and\nthou shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy\ngrave another soon will lament.\nThe healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I\nwish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye.\nAnd the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all\nthat can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be\nwith respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things\nwhich it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding\nought to be prepared for everything which happens; but that which\nsays, Let my dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may\ndo, is an eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for\nsoft things.\nThere is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when\nhe is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose\nthat he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last some one to\nsay to himself, Let us at last breathe freely being relieved from this\nschoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I\nperceived that he tacitly condemns us.- This is what is said of a\ngood man. But in our own case how many other things are there for\nwhich there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider\nthis then when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly\nby reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my\nassociates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and\ncared, themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some\nlittle advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay\nhere? Do not however for this reason go away less kindly disposed to\nthem, but preserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent\nand mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but\nas when a man dies a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated\nfrom the body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for\nnature united thee to them and associated thee. But does she now\ndissolve the union? Well, I am separated as from kinsmen, not\nhowever dragged resisting, but without compulsion; for this too is one\nof the things according to nature.\nAccustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything\nbeing done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is\nthis man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself\nfirst.\nRemember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is\nhidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if\none may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the\nvessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached\nabout it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this that\nthey grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these\nparts without the cause which moves and checks them than in the\nweaver's shuttle, and the writer's pen and the driver's whip.\nBOOK ELEVEN\nTHESE are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself,\nanalyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which\nit bears itself enjoys- for the fruits of plants and that in animals\nwhich corresponds to fruits others enjoy- it obtains its own end,\nwherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a\nplay and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete,\nif anything cuts it short; but in every part and wherever it may be\nstopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so\nthat it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the\nwhole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form,\nand it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and\ncomprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it\ncomprehends that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor\nhave those before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is\nforty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by\nvirtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which have been and\nall that will be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of\none's neighbour, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more\nmore than itself, which is also the property of Law. Thus then right\nreason differs not at all from the reason of justice.\nThou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the\npancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its\nseveral sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by\nthis; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in\nthe matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do\nthe same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all\nthings, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to\napply thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come\nto value them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.\nWhat a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be\nseparated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or\ndispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes\nfrom a man's own judgement, not from mere obstinacy, as with the\nChristians, but considerately and with dignity and in a way to\npersuade another, without tragic show.\nHave I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had\nmy reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop\ndoing such good.\nWhat is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well\nexcept by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,\nand others about the proper constitution of man?\nAt first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding\nmen of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to\nnature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with\nwhat is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which\ntakes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be\naccomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out \"O\nCithaeron.\" And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic\nwriters, of which kind is the following especially:-\nMe and my children if the gods neglect,\nThis has its reason too.\nAnd again-\nWe must not chale and fret at that which happens.\nAnd\nLife's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear.\nAnd other things of the same kind.\nAfter tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial\nfreedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in\nreminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too\nDiogenes used to take from these writers.\nBut as to the middle comedy which came next, observe what it was,\nand again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which\ngradually sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good\nthings are said even by these writers, everybody knows: but the\nwhole plan of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look!\nHow plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life\nso well suited for philosophising as this in which thou now\nhappenest to be.\nA branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut\noff from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from\nanother man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as\nto a branch, another cuts it off, but a man by his own act separates\nhimself from his neighbour when he hates him and turns away from\nhim, and he does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off\nfrom the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from\nZeus who framed society, for it is in our power to grow again to\nthat which is near to us, and be to come a part which helps to make up\nthe whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it\nmakes it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to\nunity and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch,\nwhich from the first grew together with the tree, and has continued to\nhave one life with it, is not like that which after being cut off is\nthen ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean\nwhen they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has\nnot the same mind with it.\nAs those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding\naccording to right reason, will not be able to turn thee aside from\nthy proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy\nbenevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in\nboth matters, not only in the matter of steady judgement and action,\nbut also in the matter of gentleness towards those who try to hinder\nor otherwise trouble thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at\nthem, as well as to be diverted from thy course of action and to\ngive way through fear; for both are equally deserters from their post,\nthe man who does it through fear, and the man who is alienated from\nhim who is by nature a kinsman and a friend.\nThere is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate\nthe nature of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most\nperfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short\nof the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the\nsake of the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And,\nindeed, hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other\nvirtues have their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we\neither care for middle things (things indifferent), or are easily\ndeceived and careless and changeable.\nIf the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of\nwhich disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy\njudgement about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and\nthou wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.\nThe spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, when it is\nneither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor\ndispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it\nsees the truth, the truth of all things and the truth that is in\nitself.\nSuppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself.\nBut I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying\nanything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to\nit. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready\nto show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a\ndisplay of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great\nPhocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior parts\nought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither\ndissatisfied with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to\nthee, if thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and\nart satisfied with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature\nof the universe, since thou art a human being placed at thy post in\norder that what is for the common advantage may be done in some way?\nMen despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to\nraise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.\nHow unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to\ndeal with thee in a fair way.- What art thou doing, man? There is no\noccasion to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The\nvoice ought to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's\ncharacter is, he immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is\nbeloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man\nwho is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells\nstrong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him must\nsmell whether he choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is\nlike a crooked stick. Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish\nfriendship (false friendship). Avoid this most of all. The good and\nsimple and benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and there\nis no mistaking.\nAs to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be\nindifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be\nindifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all\ntogether, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an\nopinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain\nimmovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgements about\nthem, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our\npower not to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these\njudgements have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them\nout; and if we remember also that such attention will only be for a\nshort time, and then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble\nis there at all in doing this? For if these things are according to\nnature, rejoice in them, and they will be easy to thee: but if\ncontrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and\nstrive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for every man\nis allowed to seek his own good.\nConsider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and\ninto what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it\nhas changed, and that it will sustain no harm.\nIf any have offended against thee, consider first: What is my\nrelation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in\nanother respect, I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the\nflock or a bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first\nprinciples, from this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is\nnature which orders all things: if this is so, the inferior things\nexist for the sake of the superior, and these for the sake of one\nanother.\nSecond, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and\nso forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of\nopinions they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they\ndo what they do.\nThird, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be\ndispleased; but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so\ninvoluntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly\ndeprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power\nof behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men\nare pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in\na word wrong-doers to their neighbours.\nFourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that\nthou art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain\nfaults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though\neither through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such\nmean motive, thou dost abstain from such faults.\nFifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are\ndoing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain\nreference to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great\ndeal to enable him to pass a correct judgement on another man's acts.\nSixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life\nis only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead.\nSeventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those\nacts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our\nown opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and\nresolve to dismiss thy judgement about an act as if it were\nsomething grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take\naway these opinions? By reflecting that no wrongful act of another\nbrings shame on thee: for unless that which is shameful is alone\nbad, thou also must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a\nrobber and everything else.\nEighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger\nand vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which\nwe are angry and vexed.\nNinth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it be\ngenuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will\nthe most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind\ndisposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently\nadmonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when\nhe is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are\nconstituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not be\ninjured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.- And show him with\ngentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that even\nbees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by\nnature to be gregarious. And thou must do this neither with any double\nmeaning nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any\nrancour in thy soul; and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet\nthat any bystander may admire, but either when he is alone, and if\nothers are present...\nRemember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a\ngift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou\nlivest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and being veied\nat them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be\npresent to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by\npassion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are\nmore agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he\nwho possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves and\ncourage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and\ndiscontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is nearer\nto freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer to\nstrength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness, so\nalso is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger,\nboth are wounded and both submit.\nBut if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of\nthe Muses (Apollo), and it is this- that to expect bad men not to do\nwrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility.\nBut to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to\ndo thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.\nThere are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against\nwhich thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast\ndetected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion\nthus: this thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social\nunion: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real\nthoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of\nthings for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth\nis when thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an\nevidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and\nyielding to the less honourable and to the perishable part, the\nbody, and to its gross pleasures.\nThy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,\nthough by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to\nthe disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the\ncompound mass (the body). And also the whole of the earthy part in\nthee and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are\nraised up and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In\nthis manner then the elemental parts obey the universal, for when they\nhave been fixed in any place perforce they remain there until again\nthe universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then\nstrange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and\ndiscontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it,\nbut only those things which are conformable to its nature: still it\ndoes not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the\nmovement towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and\nfear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And\nalso when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that\nhappens, then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety\nand reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these\nqualities also are comprehended under the generic term of\ncontentment with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior\nto acts of justice.\nHe who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one\nand the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough,\nunless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as\nthere is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way\nor other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about\nsome certain things, that is, things which concern the common\ninterest; so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which\nshall be of a common kind (social) and political. For he who directs\nall his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike,\nand thus will always be the same.\nThink of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm\nand trepidation of the town mouse.\nSocrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of\nLamiae, bugbears to frighten children.\nThe Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in\nthe shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.\nSocrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him,\nsaying, It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends,\nthat is, I would not receive a favour and then be unable to return it.\nIn the writings of the Ephesians there was this precept,\nconstantly to think of some one of the men of former times who\npractised virtue.\nThe Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we\nmay be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things\nand in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of\ntheir purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.\nConsider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a\nskin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what\nSocrates said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back\nfrom him when they saw him dressed thus.\nNeither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down\nrules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules\nthyself. Much more is this so in life.\nA slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.\nAnd my heart laughed within.\nAnd virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.\nTo look for the fig in winter is a madman's act: such is he who\nlooks for his child when it is no longer allowed.\nWhen a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to\nhimself, \"To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.\"- But those are words of\nbad omen.- \"No word is a word of bad omen,\" said Epictetus, \"which\nexpresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad\nomen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped.\"\nThe unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, all are\nchanges, not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet.\nNo man can rob us of our free will.\nEpictetus also said, A man must discover an art (or rules) with\nrespect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he\nmust be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that\nthey be consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the\nvalue of the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether\nkeep away from it; and as to avoidance (aversion) he should not show\nit with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.\nThe dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about\nbeing mad or not.\nSocrates used to say, What do you want? Souls of rational men or\nirrational?- Souls of rational men.- Of what rational men? Sound or\nunsound?- Sound.- Why then do you not seek for them?- Because we have\nthem.- Why then do you fight and quarrel?\nBOOK TWELVE\nALL those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous\nroad, thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself.\nAnd this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust\nthe future to providence, and direct the present only conformably to\npiety and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content\nwith the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for\nthee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always\nspeak the truth freely and without disguise, and do the things which\nare agreeable to law and according to the worth of each. And let\nneither another man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice,\nnor yet the sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee;\nfor the passive part will look to this. If then, whatever the time may\nbe when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neglecting everything\nelse thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the divinity\nwithin thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must some\ntime cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live\naccording to nature- then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe\nwhich has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy\nnative land, and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they\nwere something unexpected, and to be dependent on this or that.\nGod sees the minds (ruling principles) of all men bared of the\nmaterial vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual\npart alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and\nbeen derived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest\nthyself to do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For\nhe who regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will\nnot trouble himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and\nsuch like externals and show.\nThe things are three of which thou art composed, a little body, a\nlittle breath (life), intelligence. Of these the first two are\nthine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third\nalone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from\nthyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say,\nand whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future\nthings trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the\nbody which envelops thee or in the breath (life), which is by nature\nassociated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will,\nand whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that\nthe intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure\nand free by itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens\nand saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling\nfaculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of\nsense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, and\nwilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere,\nAll round, and in its joyous rest reposing;\nand if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that\nis, the present- then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life\nwhich remains for thee up to the time of thy death, free from\nperturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon (to the god\nthat is within thee).\nI have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more\nthan all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion\nof himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise\nteacher should present himself to a man and bid him to think of\nnothing and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he\nconceived it, he could not endure it even for a single day. So much\nmore respect have we to what our neighbours shall think of us than\nto what we shall think of ourselves.\nHow can it be that the gods after having arranged all things well\nand benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some\nmen and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most\ncommunion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious\nobservances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they\nhave once died should never exist again, but should be completely\nextinguished?\nBut if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been\notherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it\nwould also be possible; and if it were according to nature, nature\nwould have had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not\nso, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so:- for thou\nseest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the\ndiety; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they\nwere most excellent and most just;- but if this is so, they would not\nhave allowed anything in the ordering of the universe to be\nneglected unjustly and irrationally.\nPractise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of\naccomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all\nother things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously\nthan the right hand; for it has been practised in this.\nConsider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be\nwhen he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the\nboundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.\nContemplate the formative principles (forms) of things bare of their\ncoverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what\npleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his\nuneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is\nopinion.\nIn the application of thy principles thou must be like the\npancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the\nsword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his\nhand, and needs to do nothing else than use it.\nSee what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form\nand purpose.\nWhat a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and\nto accept all that God may give him.\nWith respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought\nto blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or\ninvoluntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except\ninvoluntarily. Consequently we should blame nobody.\nHow ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at\nanything which happens in life.\nEither there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind\nProvidence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director\n(Book IV). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou\nresist? But if there is a Providence which allows itself to be\npropitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if\nthere is a confusion without governor, be content that in such a\ntempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even\nif the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh,\nthe poor breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it\nwill not carry away.\nDoes the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendour\nuntil it is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and\njustice and temperance be extinguished before thy death?\nWhen a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong, say,\nHow then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has\ndone wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? and so\nthis is like tearing his own face. Consider that he, who would not\nhave the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the\nfig-tree to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to\nneigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man\ndo who has such a character? If then thou art irritable, cure this\nman's disposition.\nIf it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say\nit. For let thy efforts be-\nIn everything always observe what the thing is which produces for\nthee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the\nmaterial, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.\nPerceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more\ndivine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were\npull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind? Is it fear, or\nsuspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind?\nFirst, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,\nmake thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.\nConsider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor\nwill any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those\nwho are now living. For all things are formed by nature to change\nand be turned and to perish in order that other things in continuous\nsuccession may exist.\nConsider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.\nTake away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner,\nwho has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything\nstable, and a waveless bay.\nAny one activity whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its\nproper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has\ndone this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act\nhas ceased. In like manner then the whole which consists of all the\nacts, which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no\nevil for this reason that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated\nthis series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the\nproper time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the\npeculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by the change\nof whose parts the whole universe continues ever young and perfect.\nAnd everything which is useful to the universal is always good and\nin season. Therefore the termination of life for every man is no evil,\nbecause neither is it shameful, since it is both independent of the\nwill and not opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it\nis seasonable and profitable to and congruent with the universal.\nFor thus too he is moved by the deity who is moved in the same\nmanner with the deity and moved towards the same things in his mind.\nThese three principles thou must have in readiness. In the things\nwhich thou doest do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than\nas justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to\nthee from without, consider that it happens either by chance or\naccording to Providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse\nProvidence. Second, consider what every being is from the seed to\nthe time of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul\nto the giving back of the same, and of what things every being is\ncompounded and into what things it is resolved. Third, if thou\nshouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look down\non human things, and observe the variety of them how great it is,\nand at the same time also shouldst see at a glance how great is the\nnumber of beings who dwell around in the air and the aether,\nconsider that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see\nthe same things, sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these\nthings to be proud of?\nCast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from\ncasting it away?\nWhen thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,\nthat all things happen according to the universal nature; and\nforgotten this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and\nfurther thou hast forgotten this, that everything which happens,\nalways happened so and will happen so, and now happens so\neverywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the kinship between a man\nand the whole human race, for it is a community, not of a little blood\nor seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that\nevery man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the deity;\nand forgotten this, that nothing is a man's own, but that his child\nand his body and his very soul came from the deity; forgotten this,\nthat everything is opinion; and lastly thou hast forgotten that\nevery man lives the present time only, and loses only this.\nConstantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained\ngreatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the\ngreatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then\nthink where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even\na tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this\nsort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus\nin his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae and\nVelius Rufus (or Rufus at Velia); and in fine think of the eager\npursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything\nis after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical\nit is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show.","title":"THE MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS","type":"page"}