{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/plato/rep/rep0110.htm","path":"cla/plato/rep/rep0110.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/rep/rep0110.htm","text":"Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.\nAnd what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?\nCertainly.\nI suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?\nWhat a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.\nWhat else then would you say?\nThe opposite, he replied.\nAnd would you call justice vice?\nNo, I would rather say sublime simplicity.\nThen would you call injustice malignity?\nNo; I would rather say discretion.\nAnd do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?\nYes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses.\nEven this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.\nI do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.\nCertainly I do so class them.\nNow, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.\nYou have guessed most infallibly, he replied.\nThen I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.\nI may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?--to refute the argument is your business.\nVery true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?\nFar otherwise; if he did would not be the simple, amusing creature which he is.\nAnd would he try to go beyond just action?\nHe would not.\nAnd how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?\nHe would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.\nWhether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?\nYes, he would.\nAnd what of the unjust--does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just\nOf course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.\nAnd the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?\nTrue.\nWe may put the matter thus, I said--the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?\nNothing, he said, can be better than that statement.\nAnd the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?\nGood again, he said.\nAnd is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?\nOf course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.\nEach of them, I said, is such as his like is?\nCertainly, he replied.\nVery good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?\nYes.\nAnd which is wise and which is foolish?\nClearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.\nAnd he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?\nAnd you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?\nAnd do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?\nI do not think that he would.\nBut he would claim to exceed the non-musician?\nOf course.\nAnd what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?\nBut he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?\nAnd about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?\nThat, I suppose, can hardly be denied.\nAnd what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?\nI dare say.\nAnd the knowing is wise?\nAnd the wise is good?\nThen the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?\nI suppose so.\nWhereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?\nBut did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words? They were.\nThey were.\nAnd you also said that the lust will not go beyond his like but his unlike?\nThen the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?\nThat is the inference.\nAnd each of them is such as his like is?\nThat was admitted.\nThen the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.\nThrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:\nWell, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?\nYes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer `Very good,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod `Yes' and `No.'\nCertainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.\nYes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?\nNothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.\nProceed.\nThen I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?\nTrue, he replied; and I will add the best and perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.\nI know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice.\nIf you are right in you view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.\nI am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.\nThat is out of civility to you, he replied.\nYou are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?\nNo indeed, he said, they could not.\nBut if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?\nAnd this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?\nI agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.\nHow good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?\nAnd even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just\nThey will.\nAnd suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?\nLet us assume that she retains her power.\nYet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?\nYes, certainly.\nAnd is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?\nAnd O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?\nGranted that they are.\nBut if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friend?\nFeast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.\nWell then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay ing at more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half--villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which to have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.\nI will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?\nI should.\nAnd the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\nI do not understand, he said.\nLet me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?\nCertainly not.\nOr hear, except with the ear?\nNo.\nThese then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?\nThey may.\nBut you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?\nAnd yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?\nMay we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?\nWe may.\nThen now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\nI understand your meaning, he said, and assent.\nAnd that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?\nIt has.\nAnd has not the eye an excellence?\nAnd the ear has an end and an excellence also?\nAnd the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?\nThat is so.\nWell, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?\nHow can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?\nYou mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fall of fulfilling them by their own defect?\nI might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?\nAnd the same observation will apply to all other things?\nI agree.\nWell; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?\nTo no other.\nAnd is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?\nAssuredly, he said.\nAnd has not the soul an excellence also?\nAnd can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?\nShe cannot.\nThen an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?\nYes, necessarily.\nAnd we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?\nThat has been admitted.\nThen the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?\nThat is what your argument proves.\nAnd he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?\nThen the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?\nSo be it.\nBut happiness and not misery is profitable.\nThen, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.\nLet this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.\nFor which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.","title":"SOCRATES - GLAUCON - THRASYMACHUS","type":"page"}