{"collection":"Classics","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/cla/plato/rep/rep0600.htm","path":"cla/plato/rep/rep0600.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/rep/rep0600.htm","text":"AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.\nI do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.\nI suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.\nAnd what is the next question? he asked.\nSurely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?\nAnd how can we rightly answer that question?\nWhichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State--let them be our guardians.\nVery good.\nNeither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?\nThere can be no question of that.\nAnd are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them--are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?\nTruly, he replied, they are much in that condition.\nAnd shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?\nThere can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.\nSuppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.\nBy all means.\nIn the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.\nWhat do you mean?\nLet us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.\nAgreed.\nAnd further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.\nTrue.\nAnd if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?\nWhat quality?\nTruthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.\nYes, that may be safely affirmed of them.\n`May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather `must be affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.\nRight, he said.\nAnd is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?\nHow can there be?\nCan the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?\nNever.\nThe true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?\nAssuredly.\nBut then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.\nHe whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure-- I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.\nThat is most certain.\nSuch an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.\nVery true.\nAnother criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.\nWhat is that?\nThere should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.\nMost true, he replied.\nThen how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?\nHe cannot.\nOr can such an one account death fearful?\nNo indeed.\nThen the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?\nCertainly not.\nOr again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward-can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?\nImpossible.\nThen you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.\nThere is another point which should be remarked.\nWhat point?\nWhether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.\nAnd again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?\nThat is certain.\nLabouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes.\nThen a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?\nCertainly.\nAnd once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?\nUndoubtedly.\nAnd do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?\nTo proportion.\nThen, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.\nWell, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?\nThey are absolutely necessary, he replied.\nAnd must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,--noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?\nThe god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.\nAnd to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.","title":"BOOK VI","type":"page"}