{"collection":"Hinduism","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/browse/hin/sbe34/sbe34004.htm","path":"hin/sbe34/sbe34004.htm","source_url":"https://sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe34/sbe34004.htm","text":"The Vedanta Sutras, commentary by Sankaracharya (SBE34), tr. by George Thibaut [1890]\nThe first adhy\u00e2ya has proved that all the Ved\u00e2nta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Ved\u00e2nta, more especially the S\u00e2nkhya system. The task of the two first p\u00e2das of the second adhy\u00e2ya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Ved\u00e2nta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Ved\u00e2nta can be satisfactorily established.\nAdhikarana I refutes the S\u00e2nkhya objection that the acceptation of the Ved\u00e2nta system involves the rejection of the S\u00e2nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smriti, and as such has claims on consideration.--To accept the S\u00e2nkhya-smriti, the Ved\u00e2ntin replies, would compel us to reject other Smritis, such as the Manu-smriti, which are opposed to the S\u00e2nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Smritis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the S\u00e2nkhya-smriti, but rather those Smritis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.\nAdhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smriti.\nAdhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted\nand thereby become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the S\u00e2nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.\nAdhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikarana is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.\nThe one S\u00fbtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to Sankara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The Sr\u00ee-bh\u00e2shya gives a totally different interpretation of the S\u00fbtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga's view, the S\u00fbtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga puts on the S\u00fbtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears\nfrom a quotation made by R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga from the Dramidabh\u00e2shyak\u00e2ra 1.\nAdhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Ved\u00e2nta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vaiseshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of Sankara and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.\nAdhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the S\u00fbtra-k\u00e2ra remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three S\u00fbtras constituting this adhikarana are treated by Sankara on the one hand and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga on the other is characteristic. R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga throughout simply follows the words of the S\u00fbtras, of which S\u00fbtra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while S\u00fbtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. Sankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in S\u00fbtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.\nAdhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create\npalaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.\nAdhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Sankara, because the world is unreal; according to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.\nAdhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.\nAdhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.\nAdhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.\nAdhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.\nThe task of the second p\u00e2da is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Ved\u00e2nta view.--The first adhikarana (1-10) is directed against the S\u00e2nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradh\u00e2na of the S\u00e2nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikarana (11-17) refutes the\n[paragraph continues] Vaiseshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrishta.--The third and fourth adhikaranas are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarv\u00e2stitvav\u00e2dins, or b\u00e2hy\u00e2rthav\u00e2dins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vig\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last S\u00fbtra of this adhikarana is treated by R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga as a separate adhikarana refuting the view of the M\u00e2dhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Gainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.\nThe last adhikarana of the p\u00e2da (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bh\u00e2gavatas or P\u00e2\u00f1kar\u00e2tras. But Sankara and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga totally disagree as to the drift of the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--S\u00fbtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; S\u00fbtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called V\u00e2sudeva, there is originated Sankarshana, i.e. the g\u00eeva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and S\u00fbtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarshana there springs Pradyumna, i. e. the manas.--The S\u00fbtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to Sankara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarshana, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in S\u00fbtra 42 against the Bh\u00e2gavata doctrine).'--\n[paragraph continues] According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, on the other hand, the S\u00fbtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is non-contradiction of that (i.e. the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sankarshana and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the P\u00e2\u00f1kar\u00e2tra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the S\u00fbtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'v\u00e2' and of the 'tat,' implied in R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Sankara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical p\u00e2da with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.\nThe third p\u00e2da discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i. e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.\nThe first seven adhikaranas treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.\nAdhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.\nAdhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.\nAdhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which\nthe emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.\nThe remainder of the p\u00e2da is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the g\u00eeva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.\nAdhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This S\u00fbtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by Sankara on the one hand and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga on the other. According to the former, the g\u00eeva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, the g\u00eeva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prak\u00e2ra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vik\u00e2sa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sankoka)\nwhich characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svar\u00fbp\u00e2nyath\u00e2bh\u00e2va) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.\nAdhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The S\u00fbtra declares that the soul is 'g\u00f1a.' This means, according to Sankara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vaiseshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, on the other hand, explains 'g\u00f1a' by 'g\u00f1atri,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the S\u00fbtra to be directed not only against the Vaiseshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the S\u00e2nkhyas and the Ved\u00e2ntins of Sankara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure kaitanya.--The wording of the S\u00fbtra certainly seems to favour R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term g\u00f1a of which the most obvious interpretation g\u00f1\u00e2tri, not g\u00f1\u00e2nam.\nAdhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is anu, i. e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy\u00e2pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In Sankara's opinion the S\u00fbtras 19-38 represent the p\u00fbrvapaksha view, according to which the g\u00eeva is anu, while S\u00fbtra 29 formulates the siddh\u00e2nta, viz. that the g\u00eeva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as anu in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is anu--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sams\u00e2ra.--According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, on the other hand, the first S\u00fbtra of the adhikarana gives utterance to the siddh\u00e2nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the S\u00fbtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the\n[paragraph continues] S\u00fbtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under S\u00fbtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (g\u00f1\u00e2tri) stands to knowledge (g\u00f1\u00e2na).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--Sankara maintains that S\u00fbtras 19-28 state and enforce a p\u00fbrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prim\u00e2 facie view is carried; in no other place the S\u00fbtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bon\u00e2 fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the p\u00fbrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with Sankara, look upon S\u00fbtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the p\u00fbrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Sankara's interpretation of the S\u00fbtra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'pr\u00e2g\u00f1avat') the S\u00fbtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or \"those qualities;\" or else \"on account of the quality--or qualities--of that\") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or \"the designation of that\").' This Sankara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sams\u00e2ra state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as anu.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Sankara's own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sams\u00e2ra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its\nassociation with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.\nThere are no similar difficulties in the way of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga's interpretation of the adhikarana. He agrees with Sankara in the explanation of S\u00fbtras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the p\u00fbrvapaksha, but the siddh\u00e2nta. S\u00fbtras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Sankara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vig\u00f1\u00e2na when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in S\u00fbtra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the S\u00fbtra which, according to Sankara, is meant to discard the p\u00fbrvapaksha, serves on R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.\nOf the three remaining S\u00fbtras of the adhikarana (30-32), 30 explains, according to Sankara, that the soul may be called anu, since, as long as it exists in the sams\u00e2ra condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga the S\u00fbtra teaches that the soul may be called vig\u00f1\u00e2na because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.--S\u00fbtra 31 intimates, according to Sankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same S\u00fbtra, according to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, teaches that g\u00f1\u00e2tritva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.--In S\u00fbtra 32, finally, Sankara sees a statement of the\ndoctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, the S\u00fbtra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being g\u00f1\u00e2tri and anu, as it is in reality).--The three S\u00fbtras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.\nAdhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kartritva of the g\u00eeva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. S\u00fbtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to Sankara's system, this cannot be the final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of up\u00e2dhis,--he looks upon the next following S\u00fbtra (40) as constituting an adhikarana by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.--R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga, perhaps more naturally, does not separate S\u00fbtra 40 from the preceding S\u00fbtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.\nAdhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.\nAdhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. S\u00fbtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (amsa) of Brahman, and the following S\u00fbtras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely\ndifferent views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga the souls are in reality parts of Brahman 1; according to Sankara the 'amsa' of the S\u00fbtra must be understood to mean 'amsa iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.--One S\u00fbtra (50) in this adhikarana calls for special notice. According to Sankara the words '\u00e2bh\u00e2sa eva ka.' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbav\u00e2da, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while S\u00fbtra 43 had propounded the so-called avakkhedav\u00e2da, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.--According to R\u00e2m\u00e2nuga the \u00e2bh\u00e2sa of the S\u00fbtra has to be taken in the\nsense of hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa, a fallacious argument, and the S\u00fbtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Ved\u00e2ntins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts 1.\nAdhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pr\u00e2nas (by which generic name are denoted the buddh\u00eendriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (anu).\nAdhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pr\u00e2na, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pr\u00e2nas discussed above; and that it is minute (anu).\nAdhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pr\u00e2nas are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya pr\u00e2na.\nAdhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the n\u00e2mar\u00fbpavy\u00e2karana) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord\nxlix:1 Lokavat, Yath\u00e2 loke r\u00e2gas\u00e2san\u00e2nuvartin\u00e2m ka r\u00e2g\u00e2nugrahanigrahakritasukhadukhayoge # pi na sasar\u00eera\u00eevam\u00e2trena s\u00e2sake r\u00e2gany api s\u00e2san\u00e2nuvrittyativrittinimittasukhadukhayor bhoktrivaprasangah. Yath\u00e2ha Dramidabh\u00e2shyak\u00e2rah yath\u00e2 loke r\u00e2g\u00e2 prakuradandas\u00fbke ghore # narthasamkate # pi pradese vartam\u00e2no # pi vyagan\u00e2dyavadh\u00fbtadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipret\u00e2ms ka lok\u00e2n paripip\u00e2layishati bhog\u00e2ms ka gandh\u00e2d\u00een avisvaganopabhogy\u00e2n dh\u00e2rayati tath\u00e2sau lokesvaro bhramatsvas\u00e2maithyak\u00e2maro doshair na sprisyate rakshati ka lok\u00e2n brahmalok\u00e2dims k\u00e2visvaganopabhogy\u00e2n dh\u00e2rayat\u00eeti.\nlviii:1 G\u00eevasya kartritvam paramapurush\u00e2yattam ity uktam. Id\u00e2n\u00eem kim ayam g\u00eevah parasm\u00e2d atyantabhinnah uta param eva brahma bhr\u00e2ntam uta brahmaivop\u00e2dhyavakkhinnam atha brahm\u00e2msa iti samsayyate srutivipratipatteh samsayah. Nanu tadananyam \u00e2rambhanasabd\u00e2dibhyah adhikam tu bhedanirdes\u00e2d ity atraiv\u00e2yam artho nirn\u00eetah Satyam sa eva n\u00e2n\u00e2tvaikatvasrutivipratipatty\u00e2 #kshipya g\u00eevasya brahm\u00e2msatvopap\u00e2danena viseshato nirn\u00eeyate. Y\u00e2vad dhi g\u00eevasya brahm\u00e2msatvam na nirn\u00eetam t\u00e2vag g\u00eevasya brahmano#nanyatvam brahmanas tasm\u00e2d adhikatv\u00e2m ka na pratitishthati. Kim t\u00e2vat pr\u00e2ptam. Atyantam bhinna iti. Kutah. G\u00f1\u00e2g\u00f1nau dv\u00e2v ity\u00e2dibhedanirdes\u00e2t. G\u00f1\u00e2g\u00f1ayor abhedasrutayas tv agnin\u00e2 si\u00f1ked itivad viruddh\u00e2rthapratip\u00e2dan\u00e2d aupak\u00e2rikyah, Brahmano#mso g\u00eeva ity api na s\u00e2dh\u00eeyah, ekavastvekadesav\u00e2k\u00ee hy amsassabdah, g\u00eevasya brahmaikadesatve tadgat\u00e2 dosh\u00e2 brahmani bhaveyuh. Na ka brahmakhando g\u00eeva ity amsatvopapattih khandan\u00e2narhatv\u00e2d brahmanah pr\u00e2guktadoshaprasang\u00e2k ka, tasm\u00e2d atyantabhinnasya tadamsatvam durupap\u00e2dam. Yadv\u00e2 bhr\u00e2ntam brahmaiva g\u00eevah. Kutah. Tat tvam asi ayam \u00e2tm\u00e2 brahmety\u00e2dibrahm\u00e2tmabh\u00e2vopades\u00e2t, n\u00e2n\u00e2tmatvav\u00e2dinyas tu pratyaksh\u00e2disiddh\u00e2rth\u00e2nuv\u00e2ditv\u00e2d ananyath\u00e2siddh\u00e2dvaitopadesapar\u00e2bhih srutibhih pratyaksh\u00e2dayas ka avidy\u00e2ntargat\u00e2h khy\u00e2pyante.--Athav\u00e2 brahmaiv\u00e2n\u00e2dyup\u00e2dhyavakkhinnam g\u00eevah. Kutah. Tata eva brahm\u00e2tmabh\u00e2vopades\u00e2t. Na k\u00e2yam up\u00e2dhir bhr\u00e2ntiparikalpita ita vaktum sakyam bandhamoksh\u00e2divyavasth\u00e2nupapatter. Ity evam pr\u00e2tpte#bhidh\u00eeyate. Brahm\u00e2msa iti. Kutah. N\u00e2n\u00e2vyapades\u00e2d anyath\u00e2 kaikatvena vyapades\u00e2d ubhayath\u00e2 hi vyapadeso drisyate. N\u00e2v\u00e2vyapadesas t\u00e2vat srashtritvasrigyatva--niyantritvaniy\u00e2myatva--sarvag\u00f1atv\u00e2g\u00f1atva--sv\u00e2dh\u00eenatvapar\u00e2dh\u00eenatva--suddhatv\u00e2suddhatva--kaly\u00e2nagun\u00e2karatvavipar\u00eetatva--patitvaseshatv\u00e2dibhir drisyate. Anyath\u00e2 k\u00e2bhedena vyapadeso # pi tat tvam asi ayam \u00e2tm\u00e2 brahmety\u00e2dibhir drisyate. Api d\u00e2sakitav\u00e2ditvam apy adh\u00eeyate eke, brahma d\u00e2s\u00e2 brahma d\u00e2s\u00e2 brahmeme kitav\u00e2 ity \u00e2tharvanik\u00e2 brahmano d\u00e2sakitav\u00e2ditvam apy adh\u00eeyate, tatas ka sarvag\u00eevavy\u00e2pitvena abhedo vyapadisyata ity arthah. Evam ubhayavyapadesamukhyatvasiddhaye g\u00eevo#yam brahmano#msa ity abhyupagantavyah.","title":"The Vedanta Sutras, Sankaracharya, comm.: Introduction: Second Adhy\u00e2ya","type":"page"}