{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1016/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1016","id":"gutenberg_1016","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1016","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Free thought","Philosophy","Philosophy and religion"],"text":"Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. HTML\nversion by Al Haines.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn the Improvement of the Understanding\n\n(Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect)\n\n\nby\n\nBaruch Spinoza\n\n[Benedict de Spinoza]\n\n\nTranslated by R. H. M. Elwes\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS:\n\n\n   1   On the Improvement of the Understanding\n   3   Of the ordinary objects of men's desires\n  12  Of the true and final good\n  17  Certain rules of life\n  19  Of the four modes of perception\n  25  Of the best mode of perception\n  33  Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas\n  43  Answers to objections\n\n\nFirst part of method:\n\n  50  Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas\n  64  And from false ideas\n  77  Of doubt\n  81  Of memory and forgetfulness\n  86  Mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion\n      of ready imagination with distinct understanding.\n\n\nSecond part of method:\n\n  91  Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas\n  94  Its means, good definitions\n      Conditions of definition\n  107 How to define understanding\n\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[Notice to the Reader.]\n\n(This notice to the reader was written by the editors of the\nOpera Postuma in 1677.  Taken from Curley, Note 3, at end)\n\n\n*This Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we\ngive you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective]\nstate, was written by the author many years ago now. He always\nintended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and\nfinally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the\ndesired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful\nthings, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to\nanyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you\nof them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult\nto excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and\nunpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.*\n\n\n\n\n\n[1]  (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual\nsurroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none\nof the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either\ngood or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them,\nI finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real\ngood having power to communicate itself, which would affect the\nmind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there\nmight be anything of which the discovery and attainment would\nenable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.\n\n[2]  (1) I say \"I finally resolved,\" for at first sight it seemed\nunwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of\nsomething then uncertain.  (2) I could see the benefits which are\nacquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to\nabandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself\nto the search for something different and new.  (3) I perceived\nthat if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should\nnecessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so\nplaced, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail.\n\n[3]  (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to\narrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty\nconcerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual\nplan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts,\nin vain.  (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are\nesteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest\ngood, may be classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and\nthe Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed\nthat it has little power to reflect on any different good.\n\n[4]  (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent\nof quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so\nthat it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when\nsuch pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme\nmelancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed\nand dulled.  (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very\nabsorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their\nown sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the\nhighest good.\n\n[5]  (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame\nis conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end\nto which all actions are directed.  (2) Further, the attainment of\nriches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by\nrepentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and,\nconsequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the\nother; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are\nplunged into the deepest sadness.  (3) Fame has the further drawback\nthat it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the\nopinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and\nseeking what they usually seek.\n\n[6]  (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would\nbe obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay,\nthat they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would\nhave to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the\nmost useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing\nhold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain.  (6:2) However,\nafter I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the\nconclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and\nbetaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain\nby reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been\nsaid, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought\nfor a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.\n\n[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get\nto the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a\ncertain good.  (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great\nperil, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a\nremedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with\na deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him\nunless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his\nstrength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein.  (7:3) All the\nobjects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends\nto preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death\nnot seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who\nare possessed by them.\n\n[8]  (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution\neven to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit\nof wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have\npaid away their life as a penalty for their folly.  (2) Examples are\nno less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for\nthe sake of gaining or preserving their reputation.  (3) Lastly,\nare innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through\nover-indulgence in sensual pleasure.\n\n[9]  (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that\nhappiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the\nobject which we love.  (2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will\narise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if\nit is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances\nof the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of what is perishable,\nsuch as the objects already mentioned.\n\n[10]  (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the\nmind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,\nwherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our\nstrength.  (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,\n\"If I could go to the root of the matter,\" for, though what I have\nurged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay\naside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.\n\n[11]  (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was\nemployed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects\nof desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;\nthis state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived\nthat the evils were not such as to resist all remedies.  (11:2) Although\nthese intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet\nafterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,\nthey became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had\nrecognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,\nis only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;\nif they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far\nfrom being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which\nthey are sought, as I will show in due time.\n\n[12]  (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,\nand also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that\nthis may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms\ngood and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing\nmay be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,\nin the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.\n(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or\nimperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come\nto pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed\nlaws of nature.\n\n[13]  (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its\nown thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more\nstable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should\nnot himself acquire such a character.  (2) Thus he is led to seek\nfor means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and\ncalls everything which will serve as such means a true good.\n(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other\nindividuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid\ncharacter.  (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,\nnamely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being\nthe mind and the whole of nature. [c]\n\n[14]  (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to\nsuch a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to\nit with me.  (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend\na helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so\nthat their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own.\n(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as\nmuch of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character,\nand  also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the\nattainment of this character by the greatest number with the least\ndifficulty and danger.\n\n[15]  (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and\nthe Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means\nfor attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of\nMedicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered\neasy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the\nscience of Mechanics must in no way be despised.\n\n[16]  (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for\nimproving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at\nthe outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in\nthe best possible way.  (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I\nwish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may\nattain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and,\ntherefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote\nour object will have to be rejected as useless.  (3) To sum up the\nmatter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to\nthis one end.\n\n[17]  (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to\nattain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path\nwe should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay\ndown certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the\nfollowing:--\n\nI.  (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to\n    comply with every general custom that does not hinder the\n    attainment of our purpose.  (3) For we can gain from the multitude\n    no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate\n    ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,\n    we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception\n    of the truth.\n\nII. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they\n    are necessary for preserving health.\n\nIII. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other\n    commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to\n    follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.\n\n[18]  (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake\nmyself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment\nof the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding\nthings in the manner necessary for attaining our end.  (2) In order\nto bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here\nrecapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto\nemployed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that\nI may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own\npowers and the nature which I wish to perfect.\n\n[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge\nmay be reduced to four:--\n\nI. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which\n   everyone may name as he please.\n\nII. (3) Perception arising from mere experience--that is, form\n   experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called\n   because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no\n   contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains\n   unassailed in our minds.\n\nIII. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred\n   from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from some\n   effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general\n   proposition that some property is  always present.\n\nIV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is\n   perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge\n   of its proximate cause.\n\n[20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.\n(2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other\nmatters about which I have never felt any doubt.  (3) By mere\nexperience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from\nhaving seen that others like myself have died, though all did not\nlive for the same period, or die by the same disease.  (4) I know\nby mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and\nwater of extinguishing it.  (5) In the same way I know that a dog\nis a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all\nthe practical knowledge of life.\n\n[21]  (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we\nclearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we\nthence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,\nand that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but\nwe cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the\nsensation and the union.  (2) Or, after I have become acquainted\nwith the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of\nmaking one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than\nwhen near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,\nand can draw other conclusions of the same kind.\n\n[22]  (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;\nwhen, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know\nthat thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know\nthat it is united to the body.  (2) By the same kind of knowledge\nwe know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel\nto a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I\nhave been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.\n\n[23]  (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer\nlight, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.\n(2) Three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth,\nwhich shall be to the third as the second is to the first.\n(23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required\nto find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule\nwhich was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;\nothers construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple\nnumbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of\n2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be\nmultiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,\nthe quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number\nis produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,\nthey infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth\nnumber proportional.\n\n[24]  (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth\nproposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are\nproportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion\nit follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal\nto the product of the second and third: still they do not see the\nadequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,\nthey see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,\nwithout going through any process.\n\n[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may\nbe selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means\nnecessary for attaining our end.\n\nI.  (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to\n    perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.\n\nII. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the\n    oppositions of things.\n\nIII. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.\n\nIV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.\n    (4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection\n    to which man is capable of attaining.\n\n[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of\nperception we ought to choose.  (2) As to the first mode, it is\nevident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,\nand, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,\nas is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at\nknowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will\nhereafter appear.  (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that\nthe certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its\ncharacter.  (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose\nunderstanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.\n\n[27]  (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to\ngive us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.\n(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,\nfor we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its\nmeans, except accidental properties, which are never clearly\nunderstood, unless the essence of the things in question be\nknown first.  (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.\n\n[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner\nthat it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it\nus to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by\nitself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we\naim at.\n\n[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of\na thing without danger of error.  (2) This mode, therefore, must be\nthe one which we chiefly employ.  (3) How, then, should we avail\nourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with\nthe least delay concerning things previously unknown?  (4) I will\nproceed to explain.\n\n[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for\nus, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain\nthe said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known.\n(2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to\ncommit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is,\nin order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is\nno need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third\nmethod for discovering the second, and so on to infinity.  (3) By\nsuch proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the\ntruth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all.  (30:4) The matter stands\non the same footing as the making of material tools, which might\nbe argued about in a similar way.  (5) For, in order to work iron,\na hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless\nit has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need\nof another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity.\n(6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no\npower of working iron.\n\n[31]  (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied\nby nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously\nand imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other\nthings more difficult with less labour and greater perfection;\nand so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making\nof tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex\ntools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making,\ncomplicated mechanisms which they now possess.  (31:2) So, in like\nmanner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself\nintellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing\nother intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations\nagain fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations\nfurther, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit\nof wisdom.\n\n[32]  (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be\nreadily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for\nfinding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary\ncomplex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus\nproceed with my demonstration.\n\n[33]  (1) A true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something\ndifferent from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different\nfrom the idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something\nhaving a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea\nof a body that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different\nfrom its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself;\nin other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia\nformalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective\nessence (essentia objectiva).  [33note1] (4) And, again, this second\nsubjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real,\ncapable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.\n\n[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true\nidea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively,\nand is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the\nactual Peter.  (2) Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself\nsomething real, and has its own individual existence, it will\nalso be capable of being understood--that is, of being the\nsubject of another idea, which will contain by representation\n(objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually\n(formaliter).  (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter\nhas its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet\nanother idea; and so on, indefinitely.  (4) This everyone may\nmake trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what\nPeter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that\nhe knows that he knows, &c.  (34:5) Hence it is plain that, in\norder to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first\nto understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of\nthe idea of Peter.  (6) This is the same as saying that, in order\nto know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to\nknow that we know that we know.  (7) This is no more necessary\nthan to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of\na triangle. [n].  (8) But, with these ideas, the contrary is the\ncase: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know.\n\n[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than\nthe subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in\nwhich we perceive an actual reality is certainty.  (2) Further,\nit is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further\nsign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for,\nas I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that\nwe know.  (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know\nthe nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an\nadequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:\ncertainty is identical with such subjective essence.\n\n[36]  (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess\nthe subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas\nof them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows\nthat the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs\nof truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true\nmethod teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth\nitself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas,\nfor all these expressions are synonymous.\n\n[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with\nreasoning or understanding--I mean, method is not identical\nwith reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it\nthe comprehension of the causes of things: it is the\ndiscernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other\nperceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that\nwe may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard,\ncomprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down\ncertain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental\nexertion.\n\n[38]  (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else\nthan reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that\nas there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists\npreviously,--there can be no method without a pre-existent\nidea.  (2) Therefore, that will be a good method which\nshows us how the mind should be directed, according to the\nstandard of the given true idea.\n\n(38:3) Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two\nideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities\ncorresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective\nknowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is\nmore excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other\nobjects--in other words, that method will be most perfect\nwhich affords the standard of the given idea of the most\nperfect being whereby we may direct our mind.\n\n[39] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it\nacquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh\ninstruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we\nmay gather from what has been said, that a true idea must\nnecessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument;\nand that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables\nus to understand the difference existing between itself and\nall other perceptions.  (3) In this, one part of the method\nconsists.\n\n(39:4) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better\nin proportion as it understands a greater number of natural\nobjects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method\nwill be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the\ncomprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will\nbe absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the\nabsolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof.\n\n[40]  (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does\nit understand its own strength and the order of nature; by\nincreased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and\nlay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge\nof nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless.  (2) And\nthis is the sum total of method, as we have already stated.\n\n[41]  (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in\nthe same case as its correlate in the world of reality.  (2) If,\ntherefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection\nwith any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence,\nwhich would in every way correspond to the objective reality,\nthe subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any\nother ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions\nwith regard to it.  (41:3) On the other hand, those things which are\nconnected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will\nbe understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will\nmaintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that\nis to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which\nwill in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments\nfor proceeding with our investigation will increase.  (4) This is\nwhat we were endeavoring to prove.\n\n[42]  (1) Further, from what has just been said--namely, that an\nidea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the\nworld of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in\nevery respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce\nall its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source\nof the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source\nof other ideas.\n\n[43]  (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having\nsaid that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our\nmind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should\nprove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it\nis not self-evident.  (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to\nthe validity of our reasoning.  (3) If our reasoning be sound, we\nmust take as a starting-point a true idea.  (4) Now, to be certain\nthat our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof.\n(5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second,\nthe second by a third, and so on to infinity.\n\n[44]  (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone\nhad adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is,\nif he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the\nstandard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q]\nof the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown,\nmakes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were,\nspontaneously towards him.  (44:2) But as this never, or rarely,\nhappens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we\nmay acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire\nby chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for\nproving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means\nthan the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid\nreasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,\nI seek still to establish it.\n\n[45]  (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men\nin their inward meditations.  (2) The reasons for its rare employment\nin investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions,\nwhereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy.\n(3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate\ndiscernment.  (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human\nlife, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable.\n(5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into.\n\n\n[46]  (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth\nall the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is\nself-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any\nparadoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on\nthe chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then\nbe no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth.\n(2) This is why I have as above.\n\n[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our\nprimary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth\nas our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we\nmust confess that there are men in complete mental blindness\neither innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external\ninfluence.  (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves.\n(3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they\naffirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say\nthat they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing.\n(4) Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of\nconfessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing;\nin fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing\nwhich should smack of truth.\n\n[48]  (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of\nsciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are\ncompelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek\ntheir own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an\noath.  (2) If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that\nthey deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be\nregarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.\n\n[49] (1) Let us now return to our proposition.  (2) Up to the present,\nwe have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our\nthoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best\nadapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have\ndiscovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good\nbeginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in\npursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules.  (49:3) Now, in order\nthat it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a\nmeans of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and\nenabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for\nperceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea;\nthirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor.\n(49:4) When we became acquainted with this method, we saw that,\nfourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the\nabsolutely perfect Being.  (5) This is an observation which should be\nmade at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of\nsuch a being more quickly.\n\n[50] (1) Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method,\nwhich is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea\nfrom other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true\nideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful.  (2) I intend to\ndwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary\nbefore the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of\ntrue ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true\nperception and all others.  (3) Such persons are like men who, while they\nare awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as\noften happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that\nthey were in error, become doubtful even of being awake.  (4) This state\nof mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and\nwaking.\n\n[51]  (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give\nessence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate\ncause.  (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy.  (3) I shall\nconfine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of\nfictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing\nourselves therefrom.  (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of\na fictitious idea.\n\n[52]  (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered\nas existing, or solely the essence of a thing.  (2) Now \"fiction\" is\nchiefly occupied with things considered as existing.  (3) I will,\ntherefore, consider these first--I mean cases where only the existence\nof an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or\nassumed to be understood.  (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom\nI know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that\nkind.  (5) With what is such an idea concerned?  (6) It is concerned\nwith things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible.\n\n[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a\ncontradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a\ncontradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its\nnon-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or\nimpossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while\nwe feign that it exists.  (2) If the necessity or impossibility of\nits existence depending on external causes were known to us, we\ncould not form any fictitious hypotheses about it;\n\n[54] (1) Whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient\nBeing, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses.  (2) For,\nas regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, [s] I cannot\nhypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can\nhypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle;\nnor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He\nor does not exist. [t]  (54:3) The same thing must be said of the\nChimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction.  (4) From\nthese considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that\nfiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. [u]\n\n[55]  (1) But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing,\nthat the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence\nof another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality\nor existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another;\ntherefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example,\nof Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the\nsame as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the\nnature of being, so as to define Adam as a being.  (2) Thus, the more\nexistence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly\nand the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object.\n(55:3) Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more\nis it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed,\nthrough negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper\nobject.  (4) This is worthy of remark.\n\n[56]  (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly\ncalled fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not\nas we imagine it.  (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round,\nbut nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere,\nand that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or,\nthat the sun moves round the earth, and so on.  (56:3) However,\nexamination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent\nwith what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have\nmade mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we\ncan hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the\nsame mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it.  (4) We can,\nI repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility.\n(56:5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c.,\nI merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I\nmight have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person\nto whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake.\n(6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any\nimpossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the\nother I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying\nthat I had made the attempt.\n\n[57]  (1) It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems,\nwhich sometimes involve impossibilities.  (2) For instance, when we\nsay--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or,\nlet us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there\nare no physical objects.  (3) Such assumptions are freely made,\nthough the last is clearly seen to be impossible.  (4) But, though\nthis be so, there is no fiction in the case.  (57:5) For, in the first\ncase, I have merely recalled to memory, [x] another candle not\nburning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and\nthen I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out\nof the question, all that I think of the former.  (6) In the second\ncase, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects\nsurrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the\ncontemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can\nthen draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no\ncauses for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical\nobjects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable,\nand so on.  (7) Thus there is here no fiction, but, [y] true and\nbare assertions.\n\n[58] (1) Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences\nonly, or with some reality or existence simultaneously.  (2) Of\nthese we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's\nunderstanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its\npower of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding\nincreases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes\nless.  (58:3) For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while\nwe are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so,\nalso, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite\nfly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, [z] we cannot imagine\nit as square, though anything may be expressed verbally.  (4) But,\nas we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can\nthey coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly\nchanged into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors,\nsomething issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men\nand infinite other absurdities of the same kind.\n\n[59] (1) Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by\nfiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have\nformed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will\nthat it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby\nprecluded from thinking of it under any other form.  (2) For\ninstance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the\nnature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will\ndesired to convince myself that it actually exists under this\nform, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example,\nis infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul,\nI am not able to think of it as square, &c.\n\n[60] (1) But these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) First,\ntheir upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand\nanything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be\nsaid of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) If they deny\nit, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they\nmean.  (4) They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and\nperceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which\nexist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere\nelse, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power,\ncreate sensations or ideas unconnected with things.  (5) In fact,\nthey regard the soul as a sort of god.  (60:6) Further, they assert\nthat we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain\nourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom.  (7) For,\nafter it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent\nthereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is\nconstrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other\nthoughts in harmony therewith.  (8) Our opponents are thus driven\nto admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I\nhave just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational\nrefutation.\n\n[61]  (1) While leaving such persons in their error, we will take\ncare to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for\nour purpose, namely, [61a] that the mind, in paying attention to\na thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and\nunderstand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order\ntherefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing\nhypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention\nto it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are\nderivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted\nseries of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once\ndiscover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false\nhypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it.\n\n[62]  (1) We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses,\nso long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is\ninvolved.  (2) For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are\nsuddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely\ngeneral, so general that there would be no conception, that is,\nno idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind.\n(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time\nbe aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place.\n(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject\nand the predicate.\n\n[63]  (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the\nother ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas\nwill gradually subside.  (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be\nclear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion\narises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a\nthing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the\nknown and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention\npromiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making\ndistinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something\nvery simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct.  (3) For\na very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be\nknown altogether or not at all.\n\n[64]  (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by\nthought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be\nregarded separately, all confusion will disappear.  (2) Thirdly, it\nfollows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending\nof several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in\nnature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas\nat once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent.\n\n(64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct,\nand therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas\nwould be clear and distinct, and therefore true.  (4) For instance,\nwhen we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is\nimpossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to\nhypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things\nof that kind.\n\n[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat\nthat we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which\nis only a fiction.  (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which\nwe have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw\nthat if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth\nfiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the\nconceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful\nsuch existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to\nconsider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of\nfiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously\ndirecting the attention, without the assent of the intellect,\nto different confused ideas representing different things and\nactions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely\nsimple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that\na complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the\nsimple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able\nto hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we\nshall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner\nof such action.\n\n[66]  (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to\nconsider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is\nconcerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into\nfalse perceptions.  (2) Neither of these tasks will present much\ndifficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas.\n(3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the\nfact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already\nremarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no\ncauses present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude\nthat such representations do not arise from external objects:\nin fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open,\nor while awake.  (67:4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or\n(to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of\na thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in\nthe same way as a fictitious idea.\n\n[67]  (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is\ncorrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar\ncircumstances.  (2) If attributable to the essence, it is\nlikewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea.\n(67:3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary\nexistence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its\nexistence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal\ntruth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or\nimpossibility of its existence depends on external causes,\nthen we must follow the same course as we adopted in the\nof fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner.\n\n[68]  (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even\nwith actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused,\nbeing compounded of different confused perceptions of things\nexisting in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded\nthat deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts,\nand the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition\nalone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about,\nand speak; that God is deceived, and so on.  (68:2) But ideas which\nare clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things\nclearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple\nthemselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is,\nare deduced therefrom.  (3) The impossibility of a very simple\nidea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature\nof truth or understanding and of falsehood.\n\n[69]  (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth,\nit is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one,\nnot so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature.\n(2) If an architect conceives a building properly constructed,\nthough such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist,\nnevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same,\nwhether it be put into execution or not.  (69:3) On the other hand,\nif anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without\nknowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far\nas its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though\nPeter actually does exist.  (4) The assertion that Peter exists is\ntrue only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does\nexist.\n\n[70]  (1) Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real,\nwhereby the true are distinguished from the false.  (2) This reality\nmust be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth\n(we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given\nstandard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge),\nand to know the properties of our understanding.  (70:3) Neither must\nwe say that the difference between true and false arises from the\nfact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their\nprimary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge,\nas I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if\nit involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no\ncause, and is known through itself and in itself.\n\n[71]  (1) Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist\nin the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does\nnot acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the\nactual power and nature of the understanding.  (2) For, if we\nsuppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which\nhas never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before\nHe created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise\nany object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said\nperception, all such thoughts would be true, without being\ndetermined by any external object; they would depend solely on the\npower and nature of the understanding.  (71:3) Thus, that which\nconstitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the\nthought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding.\n\n[72]  (1) In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront\nourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for\ncertain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have\nnothing corresponding to it in nature.  (2) With an idea of this\nkind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said,\nbe more easily able to carry on the research we have in view.\n(72:3) For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere,\nI invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving\nround its center, and thus producing a sphere.  (4) This is\nindisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in\nnature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains\ntrue, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere.\n(72:5) We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation\nof a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not\nassociated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause\ndetermining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion\nwere isolated.  (6) The mind would then only tend to the\naffirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not\ncontained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise\nfrom the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion.\n\n(72:7) Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is\naffirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception\nwe have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle.\n(8) Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than\ntrue--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest,\nof quantity, &c.\n\n(72:9) Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the\nconcept formed, and does not extend further.  (10) Wherefore we\nform as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error.\n\n[73]  (1) It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind\ncan form true ideas, and how far such power extends.  (2) It is\ncertain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely.  (3) For\nwhen we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the\nconcept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a\ndefect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or\nmutilated ideas.  (4) Thus we have seen that the notion of a\nsemicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when\nit is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause\ndetermining such a motion.  (73:5) But if it be the nature of a\nthinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true\nor adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us\nonly because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some\nin their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind.\n\n[74]  (1) But there is another point to be considered, which was not\nworth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete\ndeception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination\nalso exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived\nclearly and distinctly.  (2) Hence, so long as we do not separate that\nwhich is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true\nidea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas.  (3) For instance, certain\nStoics heard, perhaps, the term \"soul,\" and also that the soul is\nimmortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and\nunderstood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are\npenetrated by none.  (74:4) By combining these ideas, and being at the\nsame time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became\nconvinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these\nvery subtle bodies cannot be divided &c.\n\n[75]  (1) But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we\nendeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given\ntrue idea.  (2) We must take care, as has been said, to separate such\nperceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified\nexperience.  (3) Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being\nconceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident\nthat what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything\nelse.  (75:4) Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the\nprimary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due\norder, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they\nbe true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound\nthemselves, and pervert the order of nature.  (5) However, if we\nproceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary\nelements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back\nas we can reach,--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind.\n\n[76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned,\nthere is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions.  (2) For\nwhen a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal\nnotions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the\nmind than the number of individuals forming their contents really\nexisting in nature.  (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the\ndifference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to\nthe understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are\nconfounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly.  (4) But since\nthe first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be\nconceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in\nthe understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to\nmutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of\nit, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth.\n(5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z]; in other\nwords, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being\nfound. [76a]\n\n[77]  (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now\nto investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can\ncause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed.  (2) I speak of\nreal doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see\nexemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does\nnot really hesitate.  (77:3) The cure of the latter does not fall\nwithin the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries\nconcerning obstinacy and its cure.\n\n[78]  (1) Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing\ndoubted of.  (2) In other words, if there were only one idea in\nthe mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no\ndoubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation.  (3) For an\nidea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) But\ndoubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct\nenough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with\nregard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which\ncauses us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) To take an example.\n(78:6) Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience\nor by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will\nnever doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears.\n(7) Thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the\nsun is much larger than the earth. (8) But from reflection on the\ndeceitfulness of the senses [78a] doubt arises, and if, after\ndoubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things\nat a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt\nis again removed.\n\n[79]  (1) Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition\nthat there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is\nmost certain.  (2) We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we\nhave no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect\nthe knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and\nfind that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we\nknow this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the\nare equal to two right angles.  (3) But if we have a knowledge of God\nequal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed.\n(79:4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a\ntriangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some\narch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge\nof God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it,\nit is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can\npossess concerning clear and distinct ideas.\n\n[80]  (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due\norder, inquiring first into those things which should first be\ninquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association,\nand with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to\nanswer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very\ncertain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a\nsuspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation\nwhich it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in\nignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in\nhand must needs be imperfect.  (2) We may, therefore, conclude that\ndoubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.\n\n[81]  (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part\nof my treatise on method.  (2) However, in order not to omit anything\nwhich can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its\nfaculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and\nforgetfulness.\n\n(81:3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is\nstrengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding.\n(4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it\nremembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we\nforget it.  (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much\nmore difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a\nnarration.\n\n[82]  (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the\nunderstanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or\nthe sense called common, is affected by some particular physical\nobject.  (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected\nby particular objects.  (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic\ncomedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read\nmany others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory\n(4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall\nthink of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another.\n(82:5) I say also, physical.  (6) For the imagination is only\naffected by physical objects.  (7) As, then, the memory is\nstrengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding,\nwe may conclude that it is different from the understanding,\nand that in the latter considered in itself there is neither\nmemory nor forgetfulness.\n\n[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the\nactual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the\nthought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation.  (3) This\nis also shown by reminiscence.  (4) For then we think of the\nsensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the\nidea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation\nor actual memory.  (83:5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to\ncorruption will be seen in philosophy.  (6) If this seems too\nabsurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he\nreflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in\nproportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of\nthe comedy just cited.  (83:7) Further, a thing is remembered more\neasily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot\nhelp remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently\nintelligible.\n\n\n[84]  (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and\nother perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the\nrest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations\nfortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power\nof the mind, but from external causes, according as the body,\nsleeping or waking, receives various motions.\n\n(2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long\nas one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and\nthat the soul is passive with regard to it.  (3) The view taken is\nimmaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite,\nwith regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some\nmeans or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the\nunderstanding.  (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving\nthe existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of\nimagination of body, and of its composition.  (5) The view taken is,\nI repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something\nindefinite, &c.\n\n[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple\nor compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something\nis or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul\ncorrespond to the actual reality of its object.  (2) This conclusion\nis identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds\nfrom cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know,\nnever formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts\naccording to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton.\n\n[86]  (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have\nacquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of\na true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with\nfalsehood and fiction.  (2) Neither shall we wonder why we\nunderstand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of\nthe imagination, while other things are in the imagination but\nwholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which\nagree therewith.  (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the\neffects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws\nquite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the\nmind is entirely passive with regard to them.\n\n[87]  (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave\nerrors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination\nand the understanding; such as believing that extension must be\nlocalized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct\none from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of\nall things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another\nand other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we\nshall duly show.\n\n[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is,\nsince we form many conceptions in accordance with confused\narrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily\nconditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the\nimagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we\nstrictly on our guard.\n\n[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and\nintelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the\nimagination, not as existing in the understanding.  (2) This is\nevident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the\nunderstanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often\ngiven, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c.  (3) So, also, many\nconceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice\nversa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c.,\ninasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and,\ntherefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names.\n(89:4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words\nallows us to do so, though the nature of things does not.  (5) While\nwe remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for\ntruth.\n\n[90] (1) Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion,\nwhich prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself.\n(2) Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination\nand the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is\nclearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand.\n(3) Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of\nprogression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.\n\n[91]  [91e] (1) Now, in order at length to pass on to the second\npart of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at,\nand next the means for its attainment.  (2) The object aimed at\nis the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are\nproduced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions.\n(3) In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall\nendeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far\nas possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as\na whole and as parts.\n\n[92] (1) As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said)\nfor our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely\nthrough its essence, or through its proximate cause.  (2) If the\nthing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of\nitself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be\nnot self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must\nbe understood through its proximate cause.  (3) For, in reality,\nthe knowledge, [92f] of an effect is nothing else than the\nacquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause.\n\n[93] (1) Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with\ninquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from\nabstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that\nwhich is only in the understanding with that which is in the\nthing itself. (2) The best basis for drawing a conclusion will\nbe either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and\nlegitimate definition.  (93:3) For the understanding cannot descend\nfrom universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since\naxioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the\nunderstanding to contemplate one particular thing more than\nanother.\n\n[94] (1) Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts\nfrom some given definition.  (2) This process will be the\nmore fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be\nbetter defined.  (3) Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this\nsecond part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions\nof good definition, and the means of finding them.  (4) I will\nfirst treat of the conditions of definition.\n\n[95]  (1) A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must\nexplain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not\nto substitute for this any of its properties.  (2) In order\nto illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which\nwould seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors,\nI will choose the case of something abstract, the definition\nof which is of little moment.  (95:3) Such is a circle.  (4) If\na circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines\ndrawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every\none can see that such a definition does not in the least\nexplain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its\nproperties.  (5) Though, as I have said, this is of no\nimportance in the case of figures and other abstractions,\nit is of great importance in the case of physical beings\nand realities: for the properties of things are not understood\nso long as their essences are unknown. (6) If the latter be\npassed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the\nsuccession of ideas which should reflect the succession of\nnature, and we go far astray from our object.\n\n[96]  In order to be free from this fault, the following rules\nshould be observed in definition:--\n\nI.  (1) If the thing in question be created, the definition\n   must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause.\n   (2) For instance, a circle should, according to this rule,\n   be defined as follows: the figure described by any line\n   whereof one end is fixed and the other free.  (3) This\n   definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.\n\nII.  (4) A conception or definition of a thing should be such\n   that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is\n   considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other\n   things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the\n   definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows\n   that all straight lines drawn from the center to the\n   circumference are equal.  (5) That this is a necessary\n   characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who\n   reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time\n   in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second\n   condition, every definition should be affirmative.  (6) I\n   speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to\n   verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language,\n   must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though\n   the idea contained is affirmative.\n\n[97]  The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing\nare as follows:--\n\nI.  The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing\n   must not need explanation by Anything outside itself.\n\nII. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must\n   be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.\n\nIII. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no\n   substantives which could be put into an adjectival form;\n   in other words, the object defined must not be explained\n   through abstractions.\n\nIV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should\n   be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties\n   of the thing defined.\n\nAll these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict\nattention to the matter.\n\n[98]  (1) I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a\nconclusion is a particular affirmative essence.  (2) The more\nspecialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore\nclear.  (3) Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should\nbe sought for as diligently as possible.\n\n[99]  (1) As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner\nin which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that,\nas soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether\nthere be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause\nof all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may\nbe the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the\nutmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) For it will possess,\nsubjectively, nature's essence, order, and union.  (3) Thus we\ncan see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce\nall our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities,\nproceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes,\nfrom one real entity to another real entity, never passing to\nuniversals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing\nsome real entity from them, or deducing them from some real\nentity.  (4) Either of these processes interrupts the true\nprogress of the understanding.\n\n[100]  (1) But it must be observed that, by the series of causes\nand real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular\nand mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal\nthings. (2) It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow\nup the series of particular mutable things, both on account\ntheir multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of\nthe infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same\nthing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or\nnon-existence.  (3) Indeed, their existence has no connection\nwith their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an\neternal truth.\n\n[101] (1) Neither is there any need that we should understand\ntheir series, for the essences of particular mutable things are\nnot to be gathered from their series or order of existence,\nwhich would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic\ndenominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances,\nall of which are very different from their inmost essence.\n(101:2) This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and\neternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in\nthose things as in their true codes, according to which all\nparticular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable\nparticular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to\nphrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be\nconceived without them.\n\n[102]  (1) But, though this be so, there seems to be no small\ndifficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things,\nfor to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of\nthe human understanding.  (2) The arrangement whereby one thing is\nunderstood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought\nfrom their series of existence, nor from eternal things.  (3) For\nthe latter are all by nature simultaneous.  (4) Other aids are\ntherefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal\nthings and their laws.  (5) However, this is not the place to recount\nsuch aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a\nsufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws,\nand until the nature of our senses has become plain to us.\n\n[103]  (1) Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular\nthings, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to\nteach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain\nexperiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to\ndetermine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer\nwhat laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain\nan insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show.  (2) Here,\nto return to my purpose, I will only endeavor to set forth what seems\nnecessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things,\nand to define them under the conditions laid down above.\n\n[104]  (1) With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been\nstated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so\nas to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the\nlegitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the\nthought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will\nreadily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it.\n(104:2) This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts\nmay be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation.\n\n[105]  (1) If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of\nall, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct\nour thoughts thither.  (2) Further, since method is reflective\nknowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be\nnothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality\nof truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and\npowers.  (3) When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation\nwherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect,\naccording to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things,\nallowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers.\n\n[106]  (1) If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature\nof thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by\nthe faculties and power of the understanding.  (2) The chief part of\nour method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the\nintellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the\nconsiderations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily\nto draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and\nunderstanding.\n\n[107]  (1) But, so far as we have not got any rules for finding\ndefinitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a\nprevious knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the\nunderstanding and its power, it follows either that the definition\nof the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can\nunderstand nothing.  (2) Nevertheless this definition is not\nabsolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like\nall things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be\nknown clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously,\nunderstanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its\nproperties, which we know clearly and distinctly.  (3) Let us,\nthen, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us\nexamine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research\nwhich we find innate in us. See [31]\n\n[108]  (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly\nremarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:--\n\nI. (2) It involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing\n   exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively.\n\nII. (108:3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas\n   absolutely, some ideas from others.  (4) Thus it forms the\n   idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other\n   thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into\n   consideration the idea of quantity.\n\nIII. (108:5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely\n   express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other\n   ideas.  (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means\n   of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is\n   perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by\n   the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a\n   point.  (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve\n   towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining\n   it.  (108:8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them\n   as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived\n   unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the\n   motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do\n   unless we had an idea of infinite quantity.\n\nIV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming\n   negative ideas.\n\nV. (108:10) It perceives things not so much under the condition\n   of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an\n   infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not\n   consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining\n   them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and\n   quantity.\n\nVI. (108:11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem\n   to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they\n   appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused\n   ideas the contrary is the case.  (12) They are often formed\n   against our will.\n\nVII. (108:13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things,\nwhich the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance,\nin order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point\nadhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it\nconceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation\nto a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an\ninfinity of other ways.\n\nVIII. (108:14) The more ideas express perfection of any object,\nthe more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the\narchitect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who\nhas planned a splendid temple.\n\n[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred\nto thought, such as love, joy, &c.  (2) They are nothing to our\npresent purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the\nunderstanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is\nremoved, all these go with it.\n\n[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about\nthem (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called\nfalse or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the\ndefectiveness of knowledge.  (2) Therefore, false and fictitious\nideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought;\nthis must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated;\nin other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these\nproperties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the\nproperties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed,\nthey too vanish with it.\n\nThe rest of the treatise is wanting.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nSpinoza's Endnotes: Marks as per Curley, see Note 5 above.\n\n[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:\n    I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for\n    their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,\n    or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is\n    reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to\n    investigate the matter more accurately.\n\n[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely.\n\n[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.\n\n[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary\n    for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.\n\n[e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should\n    all be directed.\n\n[f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause\n    from the consideration of it in the effect.  (2) This is\n    sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only\n    spoken of in very general terms, such as--there exists then\n    something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the\n    that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not\n    or that, &c.  (3) In the second case something is ascribed\n    to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an\n    example, but only a property, never an essence.\n\n[g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just\n    drawn attention to.  (2) For through this union we understand\n    nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which\n    we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.\n\n[h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet\n    not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are\n    exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.\n    (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not\n    through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the\n    imagination.  (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine\n    to be multiplex.  (4) To those things which are conceived\n    abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are\n    apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on\n    things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are\n    imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were\n    originally given.\n\n[i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience,\n    and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics,\n    and by recent philosophers.\n\n[k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external\n    causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy.\n\n[l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature\n    in my philosophy.\n\n[m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just\n    advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly,\n    and other things needful to be known.\n\n[33note1] (1) In modern language, \"the idea may become the\n    subject of another presentation.\"  (2) Objectivus generally\n    corresponds to the modern \"subjective,\" formalis to the\n    modern \"objective.\" [Trans.- Note 1]\n\n[n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first\n    subjective essence is innate in us.  (2) This belongs to an\n    investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply\n    explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither\n    affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible.\n\n[o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy.\n\n[p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,\n    or to produce them.\n\n[q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of\n    our knowledge.\n\n[r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear\n    understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such\n    hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies.\n\n[s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself,\n    we have need only of an example without further proof.\n    (2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to\n    our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear\n    when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences.\n\n[t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God\n    exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else\n    some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in\n    harmony with God's real nature, as we will duly show.\n\n[u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal\n    truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive\n    could never become negative.  (2) Thus it is a primary and\n    eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth\n    that Adam thinks.  (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an\n    eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so.\n\n[x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is\n    concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never\n    creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things\n    as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the\n    memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all\n    at once.  (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words\n    and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly,\n    it forms the notion of a tree speaking.  (3) The same may be said\n    of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as\n    an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in\n    the memory.  (4) This is specially worthy of remark.\n\n[y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward\n    to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena;\n    but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any\n    draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this\n    last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are\n    conceivable which would account for such motions.\n\n[z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul,\n    and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two\n    representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he\n    imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name\n    with the thing itself.  (2) I here beg that my readers will not\n    be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope,\n    have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the\n    examples given and to what follows.\n\n[61a] (1) Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some\n    may deny its cogency because I have given no formal proof.\n    (2) I therefore append the following for those who may\n    desire it.  (3) As there can be nothing in nature contrary\n    to nature's laws, since all things come to pass by fixed\n    laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own\n    proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it\n    possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to\n    reproduce in thought that thing's effects.  (4) See below,\n    where I speak of the false idea.\n\n[64b] (1) Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs\n    from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the\n    external causes which we perceive through the senses while\n    awake.  (2) It has hence been inferred that representations\n    occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external\n    to us.  (3) We shall presently see that error is the dreaming\n    of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium.\n\n[76z] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence,\n    as I will show in my philosophy.\n\n[76a] (1) This has been shown already.  (2) For if such a being\n    did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind\n    would be able to understand more than nature could furnish;\n    and this has been shown above to be false.\n\n[78a] (1) That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us.\n    (2) But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how\n    they deceive us.\n\n[83d] (1) If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is\n    imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature.\n    (2) For we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something\n    we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas\n    themselves have their own duration in the mind, yet, as we\n    are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure\n    of motion which, again, takes place by aid of imagination,\n    we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect.\n\n[91e] The chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first\n    part, to review all the ideas coming to us through pure\n    intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine:\n    the distinction will be shown through the properties of each,\n    namely, of the imagination and of the understanding.\n\n[92f] Observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand\n    anything of nature without at the same time increasing our\n    knowledge of the first cause, or God.\n\n\n\n\n\nEnd of \"On the Improvement of the Understanding.\"\n\n\n\nNotes by Volunteer.\n\n1. Used, in part, with kind permission from:\n   http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/\n\n2. The text is that of the translation of the Tractatus de Intellectus\n   Emendatione by R. H. M. Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications\n   (NY):1955), ISBN 0-486-20250-X.  This text is \"an unabridged and\n   unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally\n   published by George Bell and Sons in 1883.\"\n\n3. Paragraph Numbers, shown thus [1], are from Edwin Curley's\n   translation in his \"The Collected Works of Spinoza\", Volume 1, 1985,\n   Princeton University Press; ISBN 0-691-07222-1.\n\n4. Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.\n\n5. Spinoza's endnotes are shown thus [a]. The letter is taken from\n   Curley, see Note 3.\n\n6. Search strings are enclosed in square brackets; include brackets.\n\n7. HTML versions of \"On the Improvement of the Understanding\" are\n   published in the Books On-Line Web Pages;\n   ttp://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html and they include:\n       http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/\n       http://www.erols.com/jyselman/teielwes.htm","title":"On the Improvement of the Understanding","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":16381}