{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10214/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10214","id":"gutenberg_10214","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10214","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy","Plato"],"text":"INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATO\n\nBy\n\nTHOMAS TAYLOR\n\n\n\n\n\"Philosophy,\" says Hierocles, \"is the purification and perfection of human\nlife. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the\nmortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of\nour proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these\ntwo is the province of Virtue and Truth; the former exterminating the\nimmoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to\nthose who are naturally adapted to its reception.\"\n\nOf philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid,\nterminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man\nand its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,--of this philosophy, August,\nmagnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader\nand hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost\nrecesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and\nvenerable splendour.[1] It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this\nphilosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for\nif it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us\nto Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it\nis easy to collect its pre-eminence to all other philosophies; to show\nthat where they oppose it, they are erroneous; that so far as they\ncontain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they\nare but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth.\n\n------------------\n[1] In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of\nthe temple in which they were exhibited.\n------------------\n\nTo evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that\nits dignity and sublimity are unrivaled; that it is the parent of all\nthat ennobles man; and, that it is founded on principles, which neither\ntime can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of\nthis Introduction.\n\nTo effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with\nthe outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking\nis indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread\nin paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and\nto bring to light truths which for that extended period have been\nconcealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the\nsolitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him,\nor at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the\njourney: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled\nthe same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that\nthe country through which he is passing is his native land. At, least, if\nhis sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which\nhe will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his\nabsence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power\nof wisdom,\n\n  From mortal mists to purify his eyes,\n  That God and man he may distinctly see.\n\nLet us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin\nthe solitary journey.\n\nOf all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things\nas far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a\ndifferent sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends\nother causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the\nRepublic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only\nabove soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence,\nsince every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any\nthing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things,\nbut the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by\nPlato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his,\nParmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle,\nconcludes as follows: \"The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems.\nHence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be\nbeing, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is\none, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It\nappears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that,\nwhich is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it,\nnor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not\nappear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor\nconceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it\nseems.\" And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the\nhighest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and\ninconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in\nwhich not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him,\nbut even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and\nmost divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the\nphilosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped\nwith the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be\nineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this\nis nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most\nsublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and\nwaking, like Phaeacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land,\n\n  That lay before him indistinct and vast,\n  Like a broad shield amid the watr'y waste.\n\nIn short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the\nDivinity resembles that of a man, who on surveying the heavens, should\nassert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of\nthe loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this\nscientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by\nthe astronomer; for he by knowing the height of the media between us and\nit, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the\nloftiest tree; but the summits of air and aether, the moon, and even the\nsun itself.\n\nLet us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffably, and\nafter what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last\nof things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damascius as our\nleader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common\nto other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is\nlast, and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and\nknown to sense, ascend too the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in\na port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the\nfollowing axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from\nhence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior\nto the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally\nadapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent.\nBut if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of\nthe other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle.\nFor the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle.\nAnd if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the\nprinciple. It is however necessary that the principles should be this\nvery thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to\nthis, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing\nprior to it. This however, would be acknowledged if it had any connection\nwith the indigent.\n\nLet us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endued\nwith quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is, sensible.\nIs this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and\nquality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by\nnature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts; and that also\nwhich is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that\nbody itself is the principle of the first essence? But this is impossible.\nFor, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that\nwhich is posterior to itself. But body, we say is the recipient of quality.\nHence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived\nfrom body, since quality is present with body as something different. And,\nin the second place, body is every way, divisible; its several parts are\nindigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it\nis indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are\nindigent, it will not be entirely unindigent.\n\nFurther still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato\nsays, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless,\nbeing as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and\nthe possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a\ncertain particular quality; as for instance, a fiery, or earthly, body,\nand, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence\nthe things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which\naccedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in\nitself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject of which also it\nis indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a\nsubject, but one of the elements in each, as for instance, animal in\nhorses and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this\nsubject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element,\nanimal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be\nindigent. For elements are always, indigent of each other, and that which\nis composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this\nsensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body, for\nthis does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not\npossess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the\nobject of sight, is neither body nor color; but colored body, or color\ncorporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally, that\nwhich its sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of\nsense. From hence it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is\nsomething incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object\nof sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that\nwhich is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature, is not of itself\nsensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess\nprerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists\nprior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are\npresent with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void\nof interval, but the other introducing to that which is formless,\nsensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both\nthese together the principles; since they are not unindigent. For they\nstand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them\nto the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is\nof itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate\nfrom the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being.\nThe composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for\nit does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously\ndispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other\nprinciple prior to it.\n\nLet it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a\nprinciple of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest,\nessentially and not according to accident. For this is something more\nsimple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the\nthings fabricated, and does not subsist separate from nor prior to them,\nbut stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent;\nthough its possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz.\nthe power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being\ntogether with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so\nthat, when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in\nconsequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain\nthat which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and\ngenerating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is\nnot wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from\nwhich it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be\ninwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible\nimparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense.\nBut body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly\nproceeding natural energy, whether according to place only, or according\nto nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature,\nhowever, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will\nnot be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is\nsubordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle,\nit is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful if it\nwere indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed\nto be the principle.\n\nBy the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational\nsoul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has\nsomething separate, together with impulsive and Gnostic enemies, yet at\nthe same time it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it;\nsince it is notable to convert itself to itself, but its enemy is mingled\nwith its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this\nkind; since if it were liberated and in itself free, it would also evince\na certain independent enemy, and would not always be converted to body;\nbut sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always\nconverted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies,\ntherefore, of the multitude of mankind, (though they are conversant with\nexternals,) yet, at the same time they exhibit that which is separate\nabout them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe\nthat deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to\napparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses\nof other animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the\nsensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from\nsensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body\ncommunicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect\nby them, it is evident that the psychical energies, (i.e. energies\nbelonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not\npurely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the\nanimated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the\npsychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies, the\ncorporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As\nthe irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from\nitself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this\nkind will not be the principle.\n\nPrior them to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a\nsubject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our\nsoul, therefore, presides over its proper energies and corrects itself.\nThis, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself;\nand it would not be converted, to itself unless it had a separate\nessence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then\nsay that it is the most perfect principle? But, it does not at once exert\nall its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The\nprinciple, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational\nnature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may\nsay that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential\nenergies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved\nand ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent; but the principle is\nperfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies,\nwill not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there\nshould be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable,\naccording to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and\nenemies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and\nsuch as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended,\nthought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to\nthat which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (oleromata),\nand of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to\nit? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in\nitself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also\nstand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the\nsubordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are\nindigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the\nsame cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides, the one\nhere is indigent of the many, because it has its subsistence in the many.\nOr it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not\nby itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the\nindigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its\nproper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion,\nit will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of\nthat which generates, but also that which generates, of that which is\ngenerated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates\nitself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is\nintellective of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the\nintellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of\ndesire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it\nwishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either,\nsince the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same\nmanner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain\nindigence is naturally coessentiallized with intellect, so that it cannot\nbe the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place,\ndirect our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the\none being, [Greek: en on]? For as there is no separation there throughout\nthe Whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to\nitself, what indigence will there appear to me, in the perfectly united?\nAnd especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate?\nHence the great Parmenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that\nwhich is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to\nthe conception of Plato, that the united is not the one itself, but that\nwhich is passive[2] to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it\nranks after the one; for it is supposed to be the united and not the one\nitself. If also being is composed from the elements bound and infinity,\nas appears from the Philebus of Plato, where he calls it that which is\nmixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of\nbeing is different from that of being united, and that which is a whole\nis both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the\nwhole which is called one being is indigent of the two. And though the\none in this is better than being, yet this is indigent of being, in order\nto the subsistence of one being. But if being here supervenes the one, as\nit were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man\nin that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also the one\nwill be indigent of being. If, however, to speak more properly, the one\nis two-fold; this being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to\nbeing, but that conferring rectitude, on being,--if this be the case,\nneither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these,\nit may be said that the one will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is\nit indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence,\nsince the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it\nindigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there\nis nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is\none, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not\neven the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one;\nsince it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of\nall things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is\nat once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present\nwith it, it will not be the one. Or may we not say that all things\nsubsist in the one according to the one? And that both these subsist in\nit, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the\nmost simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all\nthings, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of\nthe one, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself,\naccording to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is,\nand is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the\ncause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things\narranged, posterior to it.[3]\n\n------------------\n[2] See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted.\n\n[3] For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the\nsubsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence,\nso far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the\nsubsistence of these.\n------------------\n\nFurther still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other\nthings, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects\nof it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with\nreference to things benefitted, preserved, and desiring. And if it should\nbe said to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in\nitself, it will indeed be said to be so according to the one alone, and\nwill at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will\nbe thus, and no other according to the one. So far, therefore, as it is the\none alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the\nfirst principle, and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it\nis the principle and the first cause of all things, and is pre-established\nas the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain\nrespect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has therefore, if\nit be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the\ncontrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure\nand debile impression of the one. And language indeed appears to be here\nsubverted. For so far as it is the one, it is also unindigent, since the\nprinciple has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and the\none. At the same time, however, so far as it is the one, it is also the\nprinciple; and so far as it is the one it is unindigent, but so far as the\nprinciple, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent,\nthough not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it\nis, it is undigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in\nitself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of the one; so\nthat it is both unindigent and indigent according to the one. Not indeed\nthan it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of\nit, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and\nthat which is indigent. For how is it possible, it should not be indigent\nalso so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed\nfrom it. For the indigent also is, something belonging to all things.\nSomething else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any\nkind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be\nasserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is\nmost unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all\nassertions.[4]\n\n---------------\n[4] See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third\nvolume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound\nconceptions concerning the ineffable.\n------------------\n\nFor this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do\nnot, however, think it proper to call this even the perfectly exempt; but\nthat which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about\nwhich we must be perfectly silent, will be the most, just axiom of our\nconception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering any\nthing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that\nimmense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called\nthe first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be\nconceived, or become the subject of hypothesis.\n\nThere is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before\nthe indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent\nnature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every\nwhere then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in\nenergy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain\nin capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more\nexcellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be\ndefined by us according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter\ntherefore has prior to itself material form; because all matter is form\nin capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless,\nor the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in\nother words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed\ntheir attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first\nappeared to be the only thing that had a subsistence. For the existence\nof that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that\nthere is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this\nkind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others\nexternally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to\ndirect our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities,\nand which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is, of things\nartificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear\nto possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to\ngenerate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain\ncause prior to the above-mentioned nature, viz. a vegetable power itself.\nBut it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a\nsubject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by\nthe participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said\nto be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter.\nQualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater\ndegree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since\nhowever, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to\nbeings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be\nestablished prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the\nsupplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which\nnaturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal however, is not\naccurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout they whole;\nbut a part moves and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent\nself-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that\nwhich is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself\nmoves ands is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of\nthis. And indeed the soul which moves the body must be considered as a\nmore proper self-moved essence. This, however, is twofold, the one\nrational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is\nevident: or has not every one a cosensation of himself, more clear or\nmore obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and\ninvestigations of himself, and in the vital and Gnostic animadversions of\nhimself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect\nuniversals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational\nsoul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to\nreason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to\nplace, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times\nit exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one\nimpulse to another? or it is moved by something else, as, for instance,\nby the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say\nthat the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that\nsoul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with\nmuch of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say\nthat the irrational enemies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit\nto mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not\ngenerative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a\ncertain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted\nfrom something else, but proceeding from itself. This irrational soul,\ntherefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses.\nBut if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this\nbe the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a\nsubject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being\nconverted to, it surveys itself. For when extended to things external, it\nlooks to externals, or rather it looks to colored body, but does not see\nitself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is colored.\nHence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case\nwith any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a\ntype of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of colored\nbody. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a\ncertain object of desire, such as honor, or pleasure, or riches. It does\nnot therefore move itself.\n\nBut if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should\napprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on\nthis account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be\ngranted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they\nare not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most\nobscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual\naccording to participation, as always projecting common conceptions\nwithout distortion. It must however be observed, that the extreme are\nthat which is capable of being perfectly separated, such as the rational\nform, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality,\nand that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the\ninseparable, having a small representation of the separable and the\nirrational soul, which verges to the separable; or it appears in a\ncertain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that\nit becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it\ncontains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true\nand converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from\na subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle\nsubsistence. On this account to some of the ancients it appeared to be\na certain soul, but to others, nature.\n\nAgain, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of\ninvestigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is\nmingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For\nit neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself;\nbut it requires a certain other nature, both for its subsistence and\nperfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is\ntherefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it\nindigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which\nmoves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does\nnot every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior\nto that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the\ncommingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an\nenergy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed,\nmake itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and\nmoved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this\nalone. Every form however is always alone according to its first\nsubsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being\nmoved. And indeed it would be absurd that there should be that which is\nmoved only such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved\nand that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only.\nFor it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent\nnature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more\nexcellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the\nessence which moves unmoved, should be first, as that which is moved, not\nbeing motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved,\nwhich we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive.\nIn short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and\nif it moves, it is necessary it should remain moving so far as it moves.\nWhence then does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it\nderives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time\nabiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does\nit simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply\nabides. But, this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that\nthe immovable is prior to the self moved. Let us consider then if the\nimmovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the\nimmovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably; as the self-moved\nself-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist\nprior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same\ntime one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a\nnature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that\nthe united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the\nseparated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the\ncontrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united\npure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the\nseparated, through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain\nrespect united requires that which is simply united; and that which\nsubsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and\nthat which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists\naccording to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself\nas united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to\nboth these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and\nalone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the\nuncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we\ncall the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated being,\npossessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many.\n\nHaving therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and\nconsider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of\nall things. For what will there be which does not participate of being?\nMay we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the\none, and that by participating of the one it becomes the united? But in\nshort; if we conceive the one to be something different from being, if\nbeing is prior to the one, it will not participate of the one. It will\ntherefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinite. But if the\none is with being, and being with the one, and they are either coordinate\nor divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the\nabove-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate\nof each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of\nsomething else, consisting from both. And, if this be the case, what will\nthat be which leads them to union with each other? For if the one unites\nbeing to itself (for this may be said), the one also will energize prior\nto being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. The one,\ntherefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further\nstill, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If\ntherefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles,\nor one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and\nperfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not\none; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect\nto nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify\nsomething vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be\nthat which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more\nsimple than the one. The one therefore is in every respect prior to\nbeing. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to\nthis, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the\narcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of\nreasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of\nunities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception\nand suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning\nit, but makes his negations of all other things except the one, from the\none. For that the one is he denies in the last place, but he does not\nmake a negation of the one. He also, besides this, even denies this\nnegation, but not the one. He denies, too, name and conception, and all\nknowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But\nlet there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two\nprinciples bound and the infinite. Plato, however, never in any respect\nmakes a negation of the one which is beyond all these. Hence in the\nSophista he considers it as the one prior to being, and in the Republic\nas the good beyond every essence; but at the same time the one alone is\nleft. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable?\nOr is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by\na negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again,\nby the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by\ncomposition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by\nnegation. And in short, so far as it is admitted to be one, so far it\nwill be coarranged with other things, which are the subject of position.\nFor it is the summit of things, which subsist according to position. At\nthe same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the\nuncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are\naccompanied with a representation of the Contraries: and the former are\nmore excellent, than the latter. But every where things pure subsist\nprior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the commingled.\nFor either things more excellent subsist in the one essentially, and in a\ncertain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same\ntime; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from\nthat which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to the one, therefore, is\nthat which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position,\nuncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the\nascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications,\nomitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things.\n\nSuch then is the ascent to the highest God, according to the theology of\nPlato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and\nhis transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy,\nand at the same time, unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and\nenkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined\nwith the incomprehensible one.\n\nFrom this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and\nenergy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately\nproceeds. That this must necessarily be the case, will be admitted by the\nreader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully\ndemonstrated by Plato in the Parmenides, as will be evident to the\nintelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to\nwhat I have staid on this subject, I shall further observe at present\nthat this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific\nconceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate\ndogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his\nRepublic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms,\nthat the good, or the ineffable principle of things is superessential,\nand shows by the analogy of the sun to the good, that what light and\nsight are in the visible, that truth and intelligence are in the\nintelligible world. As light therefore, immediately proceeds from the\nsun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so truth\nor the immediate progeny of the good, must subsist according to a\nsuperessential idiom. And as the good, according to Plato, is the same\nwith the one, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of\nthe one will be the same as that of the good. But, the immediate\noffspring of the one cannot be any thing else than unities. And, hence we\nnecessarily infer that according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the\nineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ\nhowever from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential\nand ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is\nparticipated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and\nproduced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with multitude\nthrough this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to the one.\n\nNo less admirably, therefore, than Platonically does Simplicius, in his\nCommentary of Epictetus, observe on this subject as follows: \"The\nfountain and principle of all things is the good: for that which all\nthings desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and\nthe end of all things. The good also produces from itself all things,\nfirst, middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate\nto itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one\nsimplicity and unity which transcends all others, many, unities, and one\nprinciple many principles. For the one, the principle, the good, and\ndeity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things.\nBut it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since\nwhatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to the one. And\nmultitude and things, which are not good desire the good as being above\nthem: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the\nprinciple.\n\nBut it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess\nthe highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in\nproducing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars,\nprior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces\nmany principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from\nitself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied\nwith their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from\nits one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things,\nwhatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are\nsuspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses\nsymmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain\nrespect, connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles\nand fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy.\nFor what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other\nprinciples is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its\nprinciple. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized\nby a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper\nprinciple, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals\nof that multitude. For the one is the leader of every multitude; and\nevery peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from the\none. All partial principles therefore are established in that principle\nwhich ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and\nmultitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in the one, and number\nin the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and\nmany principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one\ngoodness, many goodnesses are established. This too, is not a certain\nprinciple like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of\nbeauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something\nelse, but it is simply principle. Nor is it simply the principles of\nbeings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that\nthe idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not\nbegin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit,\nand which is the principle of principles.\n\nSuch things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in\nconsequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential\ngoodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally\nestablished in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of\nthe good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures\nhowever, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they\nfall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in\nthe hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good\naccording to participation.\"\n\nFrom this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that\nGod is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle,[6] as\nSimplicius in the above passage justly observes, is all things prior\nto all; i.e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most\ntranscendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, considered\nas subsisting causally in deity, are transcendently more excellent than\nthey are when considered as effects preceding from him, hence that mighty\nand all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all\nthings prior to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the\nmonad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this\ngreatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth\nto us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be\nconsidered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the\ncentre; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence.\n\n-----------------\n[6] By the first principle here, the one is to be understood for that\narcane nature which is beyond the one, since all language is subverted\nabout it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and\nvenerated in the most profound silence.\n-----------------\n\nThat this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised\nby the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from\nwhat he says in the Philebus: for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts\nthat in Jupiter a royal intellect, and a royal soul subsist according to\ncause. Pherecydes Syrus, too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher\n(in Oedip. Egyptiac.), has the following lines:\n[Greek:\n  O theos esti kuklos, tetragonos ede trigonos,\n  Keinos de gramme, kentron, kai panta pro panton.]\n\ni.e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square, centre and line, and all things\nbefore all. From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine\nis sufficiently apparent.\n\nAnd here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers: prior\nto Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius) asserted indeed, that\nthere is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential\nsubsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They\nlikewise said that there is a multitude of super-essential unities, who\nare not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity,\nimparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however,\nis not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his\nParmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself.\n(See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus, in the\nnotes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is\nself-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power\nalways comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is\nnecessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far\nas it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is\ncaused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused,\nthat which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a\nsubsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced\nby another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133,\nvol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-\nbegotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-sub-\nsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be\nnecessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows\nthat this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately\nproceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-\nsubsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not\nbe a true sufficiency in any thing.\n\nBesides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by\nnature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the\ncase with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of\nintellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if\nof life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being.\nFor the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in\nitself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If\ntherefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean\nthe subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such\nare essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does\nnot subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the\ngenus of substance, and is contra-distinguished from accident, which cannot\nexist independent of a subject.\n\nSelf-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate\nprogeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which\nought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the\nineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be\nconceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine\nself-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect\nnatures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according\nto Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the\nhuman soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order: for this\norder, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet, \"stands in the middle rank\nbetween the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links\ntogether all intelligent nature.\" And here to the reader, who has not\npenetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear\nparadoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce\nitself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The\nsolution of this difficulty is as follows:--Essential production, or that\nenergy through which any nature produces something else by its very\nbeing, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are\nseen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence,\nand snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in\nwhich the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As\nthis mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all\nothers, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first\nbelong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the\nineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of\nbeings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will\nnecessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that\nwhich subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of\nself subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be\nsecondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it\nproduces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its\ncause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in\nconsequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect;\nbut it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively;\nfor all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So\nfar therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is\nproduced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by\nitself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit\nof its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that\nsummit is its own spontaneous energy; and, through this it becomes\nself-subsistent, and self-perfect.\n\nThat the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces\nitself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:--That which is able to\nimpart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can\neasily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same\ngenus; but well being confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than\nmere being. The rational soul imparts well being to itself, when it\ncultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the\ncontagion of the body. It will therefore also impart being to itself. And\nthis with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as\npossess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others,\nnecessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the\nsun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with\nhis light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all\nsplendour. Hence, since the souls imparts life and motion to other\nthings, on which account Aristotle calls an animal antokincton, self-\nmoved, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and\nmotion to itself.\n\nFrom this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato,\nrespecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it\nfollows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the\nuniverse, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timaeus,\nnot through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power.\nAll things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but\ndivine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the\nuniverse was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably\nto what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree.\nBut as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate\nsubsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls\nJupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader\nwill readily admit that this dogmas is so far from being derogatory to the\ndignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and,\npreserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable.\nIf therefore we presume to celebrate him, for as we have already observed,\nit is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul\nwhich dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the\nprinciple of principles, and the fountain of deity, or in the reverential\nlanguage of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown.[7] Highly laudable\nindeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which\nthe great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already\nnoticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, and I shall only observe at\npresent in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious\nreverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to\nthe summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated\nintelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his Mss. Scholia on the Cratylus,\n\"Not every genus of the gods has an appellation; for with respect to the\nfirst Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is\nineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to\nthe one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For\nthat which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly\nineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should\nterminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that\nwhich is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms,\nand the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light.\nBut, the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known\nby intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing\ntheurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this\nis first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from\nit is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods.\"\n\n-----------------\n[7] Psalm xviii:11; xcvii:2.\n-----------------\n\nWith no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak\nconcerning the ineffable principle of things. \"Let us now if ever remove\nfrom ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life,\nand in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this\npurpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions\nalone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let\nthe air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us\nwith a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also\nstanding there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any\nthing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the\nrising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to\nbehold him,--let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible\ngods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean;\nand again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and\nfrom intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to\nourselves what the natures are from which in this progression we shall\nconsider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him,\nnot as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence\nto souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these\nindeed, but among the last of things. But prior to these, let us\ncelebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and\nintellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and\nmundane divinities as, the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities,\nand beyond the first adyta--as more ineffable than all silence, and more\nunknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed in\nthe intelligible gods.\" Such is the piety, such the sublimity, and\nmagnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of\nthat which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to\nspeak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the\nineffable cosensation of the incomprehensible one.\n\nFrom this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is\nnoticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient\ntheologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning\nit, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities\neven of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended,\nconsidering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as\nso many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the\nOdyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls\nof the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden\nlamp fills all the place with a divine light,\n[Greek:\n  . . . . . paroithe de pallas Athene\nChryseon lychnon echrusa phars perikalles epoiei.]\n\nBefore thee Pallas Athene bore a golden cresset and cast a most lovely\nlight. Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial\ngods was present,\n[Greek:\n  Emala tis deos endon, of ouranon euryn echousi.]\n\nVerily some God is within, of those that hold the wide heaven. Ulysses\nsays in reply, \"Be silent, restrain your intellect (i.e. even cease to\nenergize intellectually), and speak not.\"\n[Greek:\n  Siga, kai kata son noon ischana, med' ereeine.]\n\nHold thy peace and keep all this in thine heart and ask not hereof.\n--Book 19, Odyssey.\n\nLastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately\nobvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there\ncan be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect\nanalogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to\nPlato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from\nbeing a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated\nwith any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is\neven beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and\nhabitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge\nrefunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of\nPlato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the\nintelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts, from\nDamascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle\nof things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will,\nI doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.\n\nIn the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us\nconsider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of\ndivine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same\nmode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely\ninspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth\nconcerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable\nidioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in\nthem the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaedrus being evidently\ninspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession,\ndivine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual,\nliberated, and mundane gods. But in the Sophista dialectically contending\nabout being, and the subsistence of the one above beings, and doubting\nagainst philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are\nsuspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself\nparticipates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a\npassive,[8] one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the\none, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in\nthe Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the\none, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there\nasserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again\nin the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and\ntheir demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the\nunion of love; and in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal\nanimals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth\nconcerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his\nmind to the most genuine of his readers.\n\n-----------------\n[8] It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever\nparticipates of any thing is said to be passive to that which it\nparticipates, and the participations themselves are called by him passions.\n-----------------\n\nAgain, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the\nmathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from\nethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the\nTimaeus, many in the dialogue called Politicus, and many may be seen\nscattered in other dialogues; here likewise, to those who are desirous of\nknowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus,\nfor instance, the Politicus shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens.\nBut the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions\nin the Timaeus, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over\nthe parts of the universe. And the divisions of the essence of the soul in\nthat dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may\nalso add that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures,\nand adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains.\nAll these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns,\nexhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the\nlatter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato.\n\n\"But those,\" says Proclus, \"who treat of divine concerns in an indicative\nmanner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of\nthose who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses\naccording to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods.\nAnd he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic,\nand, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods.\nBut he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical\ndisciplines were invented by the Pythagorean in order to a reminiscence of\ndivine concerns, to which through these as images, they endeavour to\nascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to\nthe testimony of their historians. But the enthusiastic character, or he\nwho is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods\nessentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do\nnot think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their\nfamiliars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers in\nconsequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of\ndivine concerns according to science is the illustrious, prerogative of the\nPlatonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who\nare known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order\nthe regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the\ncommon idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each.\"\n\nAgain, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider\nwhence the ancients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place,\nwhat the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of\npoets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know that\nthe ancients employed fables looking to two things, viz. nature, and our\nsoul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of\nthings, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent,\nand incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of\nbodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them;\nas with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding\nmotive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer\nso after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which\nmoved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and\nunapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted,\nthat we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as,\nfor instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the\ngods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with\nthe apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the\nunapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner,\ntherefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.\n\nBut from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are\nchildren we live according to the phantasy, but the phantastic part is\nconversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the\nphantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables in\nconsequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that\na fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth:\nfor a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the\nnatures prior to herself; and hence the soul very properly rejoices in\nfables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood\nnourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And\nthus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables.\n\nIn the next place let us consider what the difference is between the\nfables of philosophers and poets. Each therefore has something in which\nit abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the\nother. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must\nnot rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult\ntruth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was\ndesirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without\nwaiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in\nconsequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the\napparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in\nthis, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects\nfable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic; because youth\non hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is\nallegorical from what is not.\n\nPhilosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no\nfurther than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that\nthere are punishments and rivers under the earth: and if we adhere to the\nliteral meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient\nin this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often\ncontent ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may\nalso say that philosophic fables look to the enemies of the soul. For if\nwe were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we\nshould not require fables, in consequence of always associating with\nintellectual natures. If again, we were entirely irrational, and lived\naccording to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be\nrequisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however,\nwe possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given\nwith a view to intellect; and hence Plato says that if you are willing to\nenergize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with\nadamantine chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony\nof renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by\nwhich it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage.\n\nPlato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the\nancient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology\nrespecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations,\nbattles and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the\ntruth about divine natures which this theology conceals;--this mode he\nrejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from\nerudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods\nas more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine\nnature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of\nall mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never\nbecoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology\nSocrates delivers in the Republic.\n\nAll the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment,\nhave not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our\nundisciplined and unperverted anticipations of divinity. But they bring\nwith them an image of the mundane composition in which both the apparent\nbeauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is\nestablished in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes.\n\nIn the next place, that the reader may see whence and from what dialogues\nprincipally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I shall\npresent him with the following translation of what Proclus has admirably\nwritten on this subject.\n\n\"The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through\nall the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first\nphilosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some\nmore obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;--conceptions which\nexcite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the\nimmaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the\nuniverse and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world\ncontains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods,\nthat all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance\nwith it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of\nPlato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves\nnothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its\noffspring a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained, and imparted\nto the genuine lovers of divine concerns.\n\n\"But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of\nmany which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods,\nI shall not err in ranking among this number the Phaedo and Phaedrus, the\nBanquet and the Philebus, and together with these the Sophista and\nPoliticus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through\nthe whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato.\nBut I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the\nGorgias, and that in the Protagoras, likewise the assertions about the\nprovidence of the gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered\nabout the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the\nuniverse, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again you may, if you\nplease, place in the third rank those Epistles through which we may be\nable to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention\nis made of the three kings; and many other divine dogmas worthy the\nPlatonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding\nthese, to explore in them each order of the gods.\n\nThus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one\ngood, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together\nwith the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these\ndistinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timaeus\nyou may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the\ndemiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the\nPhaedrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and\nthe liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above\nthe celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of\nthe fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the\nintellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn\nthe whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted\nthe sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And\nwith respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions\nfrom the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in\neach of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from\nwhich it is easy for those who are exorcised in divine concerns to discover\nby a reasoning process the idioms of each.\n\n\"It is necessary, however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with\nPlatonic principles and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the\nGrecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus;\nPythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the origins of the\ngods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of\nthe divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the\nPhilebus, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound\nand infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the\ngods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left\nfor us in writing admirable conceptions about these principles,\ncelebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate\nfabrication. Again, in the Timaeus, endeavouring to teach us about the\nsublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them\nthe sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these\ndivinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods\nproceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by\ntheologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the Cratylus he\nfollows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine\nprocessions. But in the Gorgias he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting\nthe triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where\ndiscourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists;\nrejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing\nfirst hypotheses in common with the authors of fables.\n\n\"Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a\nproper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that\nwe endeavour to heap together different particulars from different\ndialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one\nmixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For\nif this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to\ndifferent treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous\ndoctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents\nus with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and\ntheir coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who\nendeavor to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior[9]\nto parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when,\non the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its\ngeneration in the perfect. For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the\ntheory of the intelligible genera, and the Phaedrus appears to present us\nwith a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be\nthe coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the\ngeneration of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the\nprogression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all\nthings, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between the one,\nand all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince.\n\n-----------------\n[9] A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in\nitself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal\nsubsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless\ncomprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole.\n-----------------\n\n\"Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your\nboasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these\ndogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you\nacknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato;\nnor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures.\nPerhaps, indeed, they will say that certain persons, junior to Plato,\nhave delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one\nperfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one\nentire theory about nature from the Timaeus; but from the Republic, or\nLaws, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form\nof philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which\ncontains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called\nthe summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect\nknowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated as to boast on\naccount of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind\nabounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides,\nthings of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic\ndialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake\nof the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like\nmanner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and\nin the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous\nnarrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the\nfables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only\nexercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons,\nbut that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the\nknowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns.\nFor from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the\nreception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable\nmanner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic\ninformation which they contain.\n\n\"Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it fit\nthat we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of\nfables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating\nsecondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak\nwithout demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative,\nbut entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by\nthe ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not\nregarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if\nyou are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other\ntheological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the\nPlatonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of\nphysical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning\nbound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to\nintellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the\nTimaeus the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake\nof the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary\nthat images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of\nmaterial things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and of\nphysical forms, separate from nature. But in the Phaedrus, Plato\ncelebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and\nevery genus under this for the sake of amatory mania; the manner in which\nthe reminiscence of souls takes place; and the passage to these from\nhence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either\nphysical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are\nintroduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore,\ncan such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and\nworthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to\nevince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is\nprecedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is\nviolent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an\nadventitious order, as in a drama? And such are the particulars which may\nbe urged against our design.\n\n\"To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then\nthat Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient\nopinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of\nthe cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of\nthe dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates\nthe nature of the thing proposed. But some times he establishes the\ntheological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus, his subject\nrespects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading\nthence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory\norder.\n\n\"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the\nall-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete\nnumber of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will\nalone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we\nhave begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the\nParmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish\nall you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in\norder from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each\nother. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of\na primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence, characterized by\nunity, occult and simple; but such as are last are multiplied, are\ndistributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in\npower to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according\nto a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but\nmore simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of\nthe theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all\nthe divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this\nis nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the\nprocession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of\nwholes.[10] The Parmenides therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato\nthe whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this,\nthe aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline\nabout the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine\nwisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature.\n\n------------------\n[10] The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as\nthe cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first\nproduces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterward\nthose which rank as parts through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the\nartificer of the universe, is almost always called [Greek: demiourgos ton\nolon], the demiurgus of wholes. See the Timaeus, and the Introduction to it.\n------------------\n\nAnd it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to\nthese dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the\nParmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more\nimperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit\nreasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus,\nthey are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may\nbe urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the\nParmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least\ndegree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature.\"\n\nAll that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the\nreader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the\ntheology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the\nmystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently\nunfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and\nnotes to that dialogue.\n\nThe next important Platonic dogma in order, is that doctrine concerning\nideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the\nParmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however\nis as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately\nreceived his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished\nrank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible,\nintellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal\nessences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally\nsubsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in\ncoordinate genera give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and\nincorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in\nthe whole extent of beings; viz. the intelligible, the dianoetic, and the\nsensible; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the\nrespective essential properties of the natures by which they are\ncontained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed\namong divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and\nfinal causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes\nsometimes concur, and are united among themselves, (which Aristotle says\nis the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of\nnature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which\non account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all\nthings, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the\nnatures which they have generated, are the paradigms, or exemplars of all\nthings. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account\nof their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since\ntherefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so\nmuch good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though\nthey largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the\nartificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the\nintellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul\nsimilar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a\nsecondary degree.\n\nThese forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but\nwith us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the\ndefluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For,\nas Plato says in the Phaedrus, when the winged powers of the soul are\nperfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction\nwith divine natures governs the world. In the Timaeus, he manifestly\nasserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in\ngeometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his Republic (in\nthe section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of\nintelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to\ndenominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures.\nIn the Phaedo he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence;\nbecause disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle\ndianoetic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived\nand inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena.\n\nPlato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language\nabstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established\nthose principles productive of science which essentially reside in the\nsoul, as is evident from his Phaedrus and Phaedo. In the 10th book of the\nRepublic too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine\nintellect. In the Phaedrus, he asserts that souls elevated to the\nsupercelestial place, behold Justice herself, temperance herself, and\nscience herself; and lastly in the Phaedo he evinces the immortality of\nthe soul from the hypothesis of separate forms.\n\nSyrianus[11], in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's\nMetaphysics, shows in defense of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenideans,\nand Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men\naccording to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippus,\nArchedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by\nmany differences from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do\nthey subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as\nthose slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted\nfrom sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus:[12] for if that\nwhich subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect.\n\n-----------------\n[11] See my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader\nconjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with\nthe introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in\npossession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the\nancients on this subject.\n\n[12] It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the\noriginal inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was\nmerely the restorer of it.\n-----------------\n\nNor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards\nasserted them to be. Nor is idea definite reason, nor material form; for\nthese subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas\nare perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder\nis there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much\ndistant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular\nPlutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons\nperpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these\nreasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in\nsensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the\nreason of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and\nimmaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato\nsays, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a\nreasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent\nspectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction\nwith divinity. Boethus,[13] the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to\njoin Cornutus; thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible\nnatures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they\nare not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which\nthey possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of\nparticulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are\nposterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can\nthings of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are\nnothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative\nideas?\n\n-------------------\n[13] This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in\nhis Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded\nwith Boetius, the roman senator and philosopher.\n-------------------\n\nIn what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the\ncontemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically\n([Greek: noeros kai tetradikos]), in animal itself ([Greek: en to\nantozoo]), or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually\nand decadically ([Greek: noeros kai dekadikos]), in the intellect of the\nartificer of the universe; for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, \"Divine\nnumber proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives\nat the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal\nrecipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable\nand unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the\nimmortal gods and earth-born men.\"\n\n[Greek:\nProeisi gar o Theios arithmos, os phesin o Pythagoreios eis auton\numnos,\n  Monados ek keuthmonos akeralou esti'an iketai\n  Tetrada epi zatheen, he de teke metera panton,\n  Pandechea, presbeiran, oron peri pasi titheiran,\n  Atropon, akamatou, dekada kleiousi min agnen,\n  Athanatoi to theoi kai gegeneeis anthropoi.]\n\nAnd such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus,\nPythagoras and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar\nlanguage, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect\ncause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these\ngoverns all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all\nmundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it\npreserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it\nilluminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it\nilluminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of\nits essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes\nprivation of cause and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it\nimparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it\nconverts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own\nomniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it\nunderstands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any\nthing which ranks among true beings, that is not comprehended in the\nessence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which\nare not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it,\nand introduce to the whole of things, a cause which is at the same time\nproductive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and\nthe ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they\nenergize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness.\nAnd such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and\nignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute.\n\nFrom this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible\nworld, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer\nintellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as\na deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the\nessence and energy of intellect are established in eternity the sensible\nuniverse, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be\nconsubsistent with its cause, or in other words, must be a perpetual\nemanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing\nwhich is generated, is either generated by art or by nature, or according\nto power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating\naccording to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but\nthat things operating according to power should have their productions\ncoexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent\nwith itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer\nof the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be,\nbut to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence\ntherefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature,\nsince that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its\nproductions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be\nnecessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be\nincorporeal. It remains therefore, that the demiurgus produced the\nuniverse by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists\ntogether with the cause containing this power: and hence production of\nthis kind cannot be destroyed unless the producing cause is deprived of\npower. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe\ncaused it to be coexistent with himself.\n\nThis world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an\nintelligible world replete with the archetypal ideas of all things,\nconsidered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and\nperpetually advancing to being (en to gignesthai), and compared with its\nparadigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as\nanimated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the\nsupermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from\nwhom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the Timaeus to be a\nblessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a\nperpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a\nwhole with a total subsistence, on account of the perpetuity of its\nduration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence\nPlato calls it a whole of wholes; by the other wholes which are\ncomprehended in its meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire,\nthe whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the\nwhole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers parts with\na total subsistence, are considered by Plato as aggoregately perpetual.\nFor if the body of this world is perpetual, this also must be the case\nwith its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and\nin order that wholes with a partial subsistence, such as all individuals,\nmay rank in the last gradation of things.\n\nAs the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called\nby Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains is a\nworld, possessing in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding\nfrom the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a\ndivine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last\nplace, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause\nof all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be\na whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form\nwhich holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of\nsubsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its\nbeing. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are\nanimated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus\nwell observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things\neternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession\nof soul.\n\nAnd now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the\nineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the\nvestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning\nhim, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence\ndescended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through\nthe luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity,\nterminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its\nundecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and\nmagnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here\nthen we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a\nprinciple so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and\ndownwards, by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after\nthis immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all-\ncomprehending one, which as being next to that which is in every\nrespect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown.\nFrom this principle of principles, in which all things casually subsist\nabsorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we\nview a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the\nineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all\npossessing an over-flowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits,\nthese ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being,\nlife, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; monads suspended from\nunities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads\ntoo, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of\nthings, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and\nreturns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are\nfinally centred, and rooted by their summits in the first great all-\ncomprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended\nin the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all\nsouls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and\nall bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And\nlastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from\nwhich both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light.\nHence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads,\nthe principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet\none prior to all.\n\nSuch, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such\nthe August and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By\nascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul\nto deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation\nhere alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge\nloses itself in the ineffable.\n\nAnd here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute,\nbut sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this\nis very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is\nmerely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality\nor theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of\nthe meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know\nconcerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read.\nIn answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,--a cant produced by\nthe most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most\ndeplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, KNOW THYSELF, a\ntrivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one\nproperly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of\nbeing? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures\nwhich he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can\nhe know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible\nfor him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every\nman is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or\nthe mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical\narts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is\nmaster of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I\nknow of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man,\nbut axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are\nconspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted\nconceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as\nAristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is\nto be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must\nbe immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the\nmost careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of\nlearning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let\nus at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from\nher barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with\neverlasting bars.\n\nHaving thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from\nthe intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that\ngolden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which\nall things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man\ncomprehends in himself partially everything which the world contains\ndivinely and totally. Hence, according to Pluto, he is endued with an\nintellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the\nsame father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and\nsoul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to\nthe heavens, and a terrestrial body, composed from the four elements, and\nwith which also it is coordinate.\n\nWith respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man\nconsists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and\nthat it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence\nand energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of\nthis middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls\nare derived, is said by Plato in the Timaeus, to be a medium between that\nwhich is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i.e. the\nmundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of\nthat corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner, the\nhuman soul is a medium between a daemoniacal intellect proximately,\nestablished above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and\nthat corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is\nthe cause of its generation, nutrition and increase. This daemoniacal\nintellect is called by Plato, in the Phaedrus, theoretic and, the\ngovernor of the soul. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the\nsummit of the dianoetic power ([Greek: to akrotaton tes dianoias]), or\nthat power which reasons scientifically; and this summit is our intellect.\nAs, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit\nis rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union\nwith things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains\nintelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive\nnature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls\nshort of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly\nindivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate\nfrom the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first\nintelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it\nrequires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant\nand unremitted; and it's intelligibles, that they may become perfect,\nare indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles.\nAristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our\nintellect to colors, because these require the splendour of the sun, and\ndenominates an intellect of this kind, intellect in capacity, both on\naccount of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is\nfrom a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its\nnature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato, dianoia,\nand is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically,\nderiving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms from intellect.\nAnd the extremity of the rational soul is opinion, which in his Sophista\nhe defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of dianoia. This\npower also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man\nis a biped, but it knows only the oti, or that a thing is, but is ignorant\nof the dioti, or why it is: knowledge of the latter kind being the province\nof the dianoetic power.\n\nAnd such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he\nvery justly considers as the true man; the essence of every thing\nconsisting in its most excellent part.\n\nAfter this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the\nphantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with\nfigure and interval; and on this account it may be called a figured\nintelligence ([Greek: morphotike noesis]). This power, as Jamblichus\nbeautifully observes, groups upon, as it were, and fashions all the\npowers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the\nsenses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the\nimpressions which descend from intellect. Hence, slays Proclus, it folds\nitself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all\nformless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the\ndianoetic power and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all\nthings passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account\nAristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and\ndesire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed\nbeast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a\npassive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by\nPlato, to be rather passion than knowledge; since the former of these is\ncharacterized by alertness, and the latter by energy.\n\nFurther still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross\nterrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles,\naccording to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and\nthe other aerial, and of these, the ethereal vehicle is simple and\nimmaterial, but the aerial, simple and material; and this dense earthly\nbody is composite and material.\n\nThe soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible\nand such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the\nlatter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it\nproceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar,\nthe natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through\nparticipation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its\nsubsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things\nmaterial, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and extended of such as\nare distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the\nmanner of an image, and receives partibly their impartible forms, such\nas are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a\nself-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly\nsaid by Olympiodorus to be an omniform statue ([Greek: pammorphon\nagalma]): for it contains such things as are first through participation,\nbut such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar.\n\nAs, too, it is always moved; and this always is not eternal, but\ntemporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is\nperfectly stable, and has no transitive energies, hence it is necessary\nthat its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation\nfrom some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and\nmagnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an\ninfinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is\nalways moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that\nwhich is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will\nthus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true\nof every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life.\nFor, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively,\nand possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually\nand participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the\nsame to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion, and\nenergizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion and\nrestitutions to its pristine state.\n\nAgain, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of\nthose souls that sometimes follow the mundane divinities, in consequence\nof subsisting immediately after daemons and heroes, the perpetual\nattendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending\ninfinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending\nfrom generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity\nthrough an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies\nthrough the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal\nbeginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and\nthat which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains,\ntherefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from\ngeneration, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never\nfail, through an infinite time.\n\nFrom all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is\nin a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of\nlight. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life\nwith reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in\na subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood,\nand so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the\nentrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through\nthe chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have\nthe light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between\nthe fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low\nwall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind,\nand statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men\nsome are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in\nthis cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is\ncarrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the\nopposite part of tho cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of\nthis prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this the fettered\nmen, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else\nthan the passing shadow.\n\nHere, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book,\nthe road above between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that\nthere is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more\nelevated life. By this ascent, therefore Plato signifies the contemplation\nof dianoetic objects in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows\nin the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible\nobjects are the immediate images of dianoetic forms, or those ideas which\nthe soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from\nwhich these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoetic.\nIt is requisite, therefore, that the dianoetic power exercising itself in\nthese, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent\nretreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in\nherself in impartible involution.\n\nIn the next place he says, \"that the man who is to be led from the cave\nwill more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens\nthemselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the\nmoon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun.\" By this\nhe signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their\nlight are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of\nthe form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are\ncharacterized by the nature of the good.\n\nAfter the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through\nthese to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the\nsun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the\nidea of the good must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He,\nlikewise divinely adds, that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only\nbe conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which\nit is beheld by the ascending soul.\n\nIn short, the cold, according to Plato, can only be restored while on\nearth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be\nable after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise\nof the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her from the\ndefilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the\nvision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the Timaeus, \"the soul\nbecoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit.\"\nThe cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues;\nsince it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation\nand tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium\nbetween intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without\nrevulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes\npure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues,\ntherefore, we become sane, in consequence of being liberated from the\npassions as diseases; but we become entire by the reassumption of\nintellect and science as of our proper parts; and this is effected by\ncontemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from\nbetter natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he\ndefines in his Theaetetus philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial\nevils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals\nalone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, \"that neither can evil\nbe abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they\nnecessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature.\" For\nthose who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be affected\nin a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in\nthe same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil\nis to be accomplished. \"It is necessary,\" says he \"to fly from hence\nthither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is\npossible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy\nin conjunction with intellectual prudence.\" For it is necessary that he\nwho wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a\nmortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it\nto avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our\nflight from divinity, and the defluction of those wings which elevate us\non high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with\nevils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the\ngermination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode\nof pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the\nessence of many subsisting as a medium between daemoniacal natures, who\nalways have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who\nare never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former\nand descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of\nintellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal\nlikeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature.\n\nWhen the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great\na degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the\nexercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death,\nas he says in the Timaeus, to her kindred star, from which she fell, and\nenjoys a blessed life. Then, too, as he says in the Phaedrus, being\nwinged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this\nindeed is the most beautiful end of her labors. This is what he calls in\nthe Phaedo, a great contest and a mighty hope. This is the most perfect\nfruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly\nbeautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain\nsubterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors,\nand place her in the islands of the blessed.\n\nFrom this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma\nnecessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge,\nand that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in\nreality nothing more than a recovery of what a he once possessed. This\nrecovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being\nattended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an\nactual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union\nwith the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which\ndiscipline evocates from its dormant retreats, Plato says in the\nSophista, \"that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant\nof them, according to vigilant perception.\" Hence too, as Proclus well\nobserves, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from\nsensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover the whole and\nthe one. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no\nrespect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to\nthe soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous,\nshould precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that\nthings which are variously mutable, should be generative of reasons which\nare established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes\nof definite intelligence. It is not fit, therefore, that the truth of\nthings eternal should be received from the many, nor the discrimination\nof universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from\nirrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within\nherself, should investigate herself the true and the good, and the\neternal reasons of things.\n\nWe have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of\nthe soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the\nmathematical discipline. Hence, he asserts of theoretic arithmetic that\nit imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it\nliberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature.\nGeometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge\nof the good, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes,\nbut as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is\nuseful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things,\nand contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its\nineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient\nto our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the\ncontemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus\nemploy the mathematical discipline, the study of them is justly\nconsidered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as\nthe true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to\ndivinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable,\nwhatever contributes to this is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has\na different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and\nconveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile.\nHence it necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to\nthose which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical\nsciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul;\nawaken its intelligence; purify its dianoetic power; call forth its\nessential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and\nignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds\narising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore\nbeautifully said by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, \"that the soul\nthrough these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is\nblinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth\nsaving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this\nalone.\"\n\nDialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences,\nas it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which\nparticularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of\nsciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the\nsame with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have\nlargely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice\nit therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from\nmathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former\nis void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals;\nthat it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and, that it\nconsiders good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical\nscience, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from\nwhich it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to\nthe principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel\nmathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to\nbe the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor\ndoes he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as\nreceiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing\nthem without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent\npropositions.\n\nHence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic,\nsays that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and\nelevates those that use it to the good itself, and the first unities;\nthat it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings,\nand, the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is\nno longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus\ngreat, and the ends of this path so mighty, it must by no means be\nconfounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for\nthe former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through\nthese, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science.\nTo which we may add, that the method of reasoning which is founded in\nopinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method\nendeavors to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose\nsteps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of the good.\nVery different therefore is it from the merely logical method, which\npresides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and\nis alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato\nfor the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and\nas imitating the progression of beings from the one, and their conversion\nto it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations,\nand prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this.\nOn the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant\nwith opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of\ndemonstration.\n\nThe following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic.\nOf analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles\nto the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things\ndemonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate\npropositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical\nprinciples. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most\nadmirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he\nascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to\nthe beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws;\nfrom the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (Greek: to polu pelagos\ntou kalou); and thus proceeding he at length arrives at the beautiful\nitself.\n\nThe second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the\nthing investigated the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as\nare prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior,\nascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing and to\nwhich we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend\nsynthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following\nis an example from the Phaedrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is\nimmortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the\nnext place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next\ninquiry is if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again\nbeing demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is\nthe principle of motion, and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten.\nThis then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what\nis begotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is\nthus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and\nincorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul\nis self-moved. Soul therefore (i.e. the rational soul) is incorruptible,\nunbegotten, and immortal.\n\nOf the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to\nthat which is unhypothetical, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen\nin the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his\nhypothesis that the one is, he proceeds through an orderly series of\nnegations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of\nthings which are as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes\naway the hypothesis that the one is. For he denies of it all discourse\nand every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it\nis, but even negation. For all things are posterior to the one; viz.\nthings known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus,\nbeginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical,\nand truly ineffable.\n\nHaving taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm\nman, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with\nthe outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a\nsubject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is\ninvolved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers.\n\nIn the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common\nconceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate\nis the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being\nadmitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of\nbeings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in\ntime. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose\nenergy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially\ntemporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be,\nthough this should take place in an infinite time. The media between\nthese two extremes are natures which, in a certain respect, have an\nessence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence,\nbut whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every\nprocession from things first to last should be effected through media.\nThe medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that\nwhich has an eternal essence, but any energy indigent of time, or, on the\ncontrary, that which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is\nimpossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for\nif this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium,\ntherefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal.\nAnd the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the\nintellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For\nfrom what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings,\nit is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity,\nboth in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in\ngeneration, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time,\nor in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in\nessence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which\nbeing distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination\nand sympathy with each other through connection? It is evident that they\nmust be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things\nwhich subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place\nand time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to\nbe entirely pure from any connection with place.\n\nHence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely\naltermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest\nthat admitting Fate to be a cause of connection, we must assert that it\npresides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look\nto that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and thorough which also\naltermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall\nfind that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish,\nand increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us, and all\nother animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much\ngreater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is\nmotive of all bodies; it follows that nature must be the cause of things\nconnected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence, Fate is\nnature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world,\npresiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and\nconnecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant\nfrom each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of\nmortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For\nthe nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body,\nof which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a\nprincipal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are\nconsequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less\nprincipal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz.\nthe sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the\ncircle of the former is the image of the latter.\n\nHence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the\nfountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted, to all things, but\nfrom divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato\nsays, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior\nto all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to\nFate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of\nProvidence; having its connection indeed from Fate, but deriving the good\nwhich it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are\nunder the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles\nare exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with\ncorporeal natures; since connection introduces time and corporeal motion.\nHence Plato, looking to this, says in the Timaeus, that the world is\nmingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter.\nFor by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other\nplaces he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is\ncompelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers; to\nheat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective\npower is unknown to a corporeal nature; so that the necessary and the\nnonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies.\n\nAs there are two genera of things, therefore, the intelligible and the\nsensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these; that of\nProvidence, upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and\nthat of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence\nlikewise differs from Fate in the same manner as deity from that which is\ndivine indeed, but participation, and not primarily. For in other things\nwe see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists\naccording to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of\nthe sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to\nparticipation; the latter being derived from the former. And life is\nprimarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according\nto Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a\ngod: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image.\nAs Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And,\nalternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles.\nBut intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive\ntheir subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of\nProvidence.\n\nIn the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when\ncorrecting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the\nsight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a\nfoot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and\nexclaims with Ulysses,\n\n  \"Endure my heart;\"\n\nor when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight.\nFor in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions,\nboth gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from\nthings foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the\nessence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies\naccording to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as\nreason, restrains the shadowy impressions of the delights of licentious\ndesire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses\nas full of deception, asserting that\n\n  \"We nothing accurate, or see, or hear:\"\n\nand if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it\nknows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident\nthat, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses,\ncontrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows\nand delights.\n\nAfter this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of\nour rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts,\nby a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it\ncontains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives\nof which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a\nrational world, the image of the prior natures, from which it proceeds,\nbut the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of\nthe soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute, for these\nremove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms\nof life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal\nperception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with\nimages, and knowing nothing subtile and unattended with material\ngarrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable\nnecessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and\nimmateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of\nsensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things\nwhich fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our\nperception of true being?\n\nAfter both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her\nhighest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the\nuniverse, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole\nof a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the\nworld. But above all souls, she sees intellectual essences and orders.\nFor a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts\nto the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees\nthose divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their\nunions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific\ncauses; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual\nnatures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants,\nimparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence,\nit must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul,\nleaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of\nintellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connection with\na corporeal nature.\n\nThe rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may\nbe moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must\nnecessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it\nbecomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is\nsuperior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that,\nwhen falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it\nfollows downward natures and lives, with them as with inebriated\nneighbors, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of\nFate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings\nof such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above Fate, but to be\nsometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings,\nand such are all intellectual natures which are eternally established\nabove the laws of Fate, and also which, according to the whole of their\nlife, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the\nmedium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and\nsometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal\nnatures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies.\n\nThe free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational\nelective, power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the\nsoul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with\nrectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which\ncharacterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine\nand mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination;\nthe one on account of its excellence being alone established in true\ngood; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect\ntoo characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as\nPlotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore\nare established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability\nof tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we\nfollow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The\npower therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the\npower which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account\nis all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But\nthe elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect\nall things; because, by it's inclinations to true and apparent good, it\nfalls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however\nbe all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone.\nFor a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according to good,\nbecause the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that\nwhich is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence\nthrough this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another\nlife, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much of the\noutlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato.\n\nIn the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these\noutlines I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths,\nsolitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the\nreign of the emperor Justinian to the present time; and novel they will\ndoubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to\nthose who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils\nof experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of\nthe earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these,\nwho have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they\nare incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so\ndrowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their\nwhole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and\nfrom dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,--to such\nas these, the road through which we have been traveling will appear to be\na delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing\nmore than fantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and\nwhen seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow.\n\nThe following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these\nwho are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable\nthem to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are\nplunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is\nanother world, of which this is nothing more than a most obscure\nresemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery.\nMy present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider\nexperiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then,\nthese men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration\nproperly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all\ndemonstrative propositions are these: that they exist as causes, are\nprimary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions.\nFor every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others,\nbut of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may\nbe demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed\nappear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the\nappellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no\ndemonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed\nthe first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were\ncalled by the ancients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the\nassumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their\nforce and efficacy from these.\n\nIn the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal\nis better than partial demonstration. For that demonstration is the more\nexcellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more\nextended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous\ninvestigation of the why in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at\nuniversals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a\ntriangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the\ntriangle is isosceles; we again ask, but why Because isosceles? And if it\nbe replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why\nbecause a triangle? To which we finally answer, because a triangle is a\nright-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea,\nwhich embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no\nother more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the\ndemonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of\nuniversals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no\nscience. That demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind\nwith the most ample knowledge; and this is, alone, the province of\nuniversals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows\nparticulars likewise in capacity; but we can not infer that he who has\nthe best knowledge of particulars, knows any thing of universals. And\nlastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason;\nbut particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense.\n\nBut here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be\ntrue, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by\nan induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this, I\nanswer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not\nby any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise\nsubservient to its existence than an exciting cause. For if scientific\nconclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary\nand eternal, this universal is truly all, and not like that gained by\nabstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus, the\nproposition that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right, if\nit is indubitably true, that is, if the term every in it really includes\nall triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however\nextended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of universal\ncomprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoetic power concludes thus\nconfidently that the Proposition is true of all triangles? For if it be\nsaid that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain\nnumber of particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the\nall; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such\noperation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this\nproposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would\nfollow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain\nwhether that which is added to complete the all is truly added; and thus\nthe conclusion will no longer be indubitably necessary.\n\nIn short, if the words all and every, with which every page of theoretic\nmathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and\nif the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science,\nsuch universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense.\nHence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to\nscience, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and\nthis by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul.\nThe particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to\nproduce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately\napprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without\nhesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind,\nand therefore never can be sources of science truly so called.\n\nOf this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant,\nand in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only\nbe truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case\nwith parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already\nobserved, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is\ncalled a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit\nthe appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the\nhuman body, without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he\nknow any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants, who has not a\nprevious knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as\na whole prior to, because the principle and cause of all partial\nvegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that\ngreater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as\nHippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of\nthe human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great\ncomprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably,\nwith all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with\nrespect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in\nthe first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of\nproceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it,\nwith much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great\ndifference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the\nmost elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning,\nfounded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of\nthe soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature\nof the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its\nsurface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts,\nblossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through\nall the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself,\nand thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to\nthat vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centred and\nrooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and\nthe fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise, is the\ndifference between the tendencies of the two pursuits, for the one\nelevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great\nineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a\nmighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression\nof Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye, the\nknowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand,\nsublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little,\ngroveling[14] and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent\npiety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in\nfine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and\nexalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing\nmolestation.\n\n-----------------\n[14] That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the\ncriterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern\nphilosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his Novum Organum, that\n\"baseless fabric of a vision.\" For he there sagely observes that wings\nare not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights;\nthat all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet\ndone, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the\nsciences. \"Itaque hominum intellectui non plumae addendae, sed plumbum\npotius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc\nfactum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare\nlicebit.\" A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added\nto the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism.\n-----------------\n\nIf such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental\ninquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily\nexperience[15] unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy\nfor this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So\nobviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its\nauthor, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally\ncelebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it\nmay be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity,\nfrom the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race,\nhave been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or\nless the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a\ncountless multitude. In the catalogue of those endued with sovereign power,\nit had for its votaries Dion of Siracusian, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes\nthe Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and\nPhocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those\nleading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes[16] and Euclid; among\nbiographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable\nGalen; among rhetoricians, those unrivaled orators Demosthenes and Cicero;\namong critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the\nmost learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious,\nyet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after\nthe fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these\ngreat ancients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from\nPlatonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments,\nsimilar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the\nmoderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy\nto retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and\ninvolving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country,\nhowever, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the\nstudy of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its\ndepths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its\nmore accessible parts.\n\n-----------------\n[15] I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I\nhave known many such, that was not atheistically inclined.\n\n[16] I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated\nthe mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of\nPlutarch in his Life of Marcellus, p. 307. For he there informs us that\nArchimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and in short, every\nart which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and\nilliberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with\nwhich the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the\nnecessary. The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid\nand Archimedes, which have not been equaled by any of our greatest modern\nmathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important\ntruth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound\nignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and\nconveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his\nsenses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it\nalgebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as\npossible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after\nconciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical\ndemonstration.\n-----------------\n\nThe instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and\nSydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by\nthese writers, like the fair dawning of same unclouded morning, that we\nhave only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat before we were\ngladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the\nwriter of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate\nthe works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with\nvigor, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually\ninvolved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for it's meridian beam.\nIn short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the\nmost friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound\ngovernment. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts\ncomprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all\nthat is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain\nin itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and\ncommunities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it\nexalts.\n\nWe have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with\nan occult and venerable splendor; and it is owing to the hidden manner in\nwhich it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many\nages after it's promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by\nsuperficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed, is not\nsingular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom\nof all the great ancients; a custom not originating from a wish to become\ntyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a\nprofound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly\nunfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow; since, as\nSocrates in Plato justly observes, \"it is not lawful for the pure to be\ntouched by the impure;\" and the multitude are neither purified from the\ndefilements of vice, nor the darkness of twofold ignorance. Hence, while\nthey are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the\nsplendors of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light\nof day.\n\nThe depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly\npenetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five\nhundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus,\nAlbinus, Galen and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common\nproficiency in Philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have\ndeveloped the profundity of Plato's conceptions; they withdrew not the\nveil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains which guarded the\nadytum of temples from the profane eye; and they saw not that all behind\nthe veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles[17] every where\npresent themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were\nborn indeed in a baser age, but, who being allotted a nature similar to\ntheir leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The\nmost conspicuous of these are the great Plotinus, the most learned\nPorphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the\nconsummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierocles, the\nconcisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these\nmen, who were truly links of the golden chain of deity, all that is\nsublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are\nreplete with both these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its\nobscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their\nlabors, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light\nwhich they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined\nphilosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some\nvenerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the\nmaster has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent\ndisciples. \"For an attempt of this kind,\" says he,[18] \"will only be\nbeneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated,\nare themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with\nrespect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no\nmeans elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall\nnow learn certain excellent things.\" Thus with respect to these admirable\nmen, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some\nfrom being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding\nthese interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to\nevery one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded\nthat such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly\nPlatonic, and that they are nothing more than streams, which, though,\noriginally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance\nfrom their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most\nexquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer\nwho lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and\nweight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction;\nor as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate\nage. So far is this from being the case, that though the style of\nPlotinus[19] and Jamblichus[20] is by no means to be compared with that\nof Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of\ntheir conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader,\nas motes in a sunbeam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the\nsolar light.\n\n--------------\n[17] See my Dissertation on the Mysteries.\n\n[18]See the 7th Epistle of Plato.\n\n[19] It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper\nto revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no\nattention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful\nman, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there\nsays, \"that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses,\nyet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density\nof his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are\ndisposed.\" And in another place he says, \"Plotinus, as it seems, has\nexplained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those\nthat were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius,\nCronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared with those of Plotinus\non this subject.\" After such a testimony as this from such a consummate\ncritic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from\nthe imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe,\nthat Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of\nhis having found any polluted streams, or corruption of the doctrines of\nPlato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of\nhis entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about\nthis most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more\nacute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown\nto the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days\npenetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid\ndefiance even to the decision of Longinus.\n\n[20] Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to\nhave been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself,\nsee the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the\nPlatonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid.\n----------------------\n\nAs to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of\nLonginus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls \"a certain living library, and\nwalking museum,\" it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some\nportion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is\nabundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly\ncommends his style for its clearness, purity, and grace. \"Hence,\" he\nsays, \"Porphyry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his\nvarious erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity, and purity.\"\nAnd in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of\ndiction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of\nhis master. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and\nelegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus; but is much more copious\nand magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly\nequals the style of the greatest ancients; that of Sallust possesses an\naccuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished\nfrom the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is\nclear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind.\n\nOthers again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading\nof commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time\nconsidered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with\nFicinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other pseudo Platonists, their\ncontemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines\nof Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted\nothers, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real\nbenefit to the other.\n\nBut who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are\nreviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the\nfierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of\nAcademus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When\n\n  The trembling grove confessed its fright,\n  The wood-nymphs started at the sight;\n  Ilissus backward urg'd his course,\n  And rush'd indignant to his source.\n\nWas it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the\npolluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of\nthe source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy\nGerman critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in mi, presumed to grunt at\nthese venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it\noriginated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is\ncertain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the\nmost artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than\nobscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these\nlatter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the\nfirst place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native\nlanguage, and must therefore, as they were confessedly, learned men, have\nunderstood that language incomparably better than any man since the time\nin which the ancient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they\nhad books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which\nhave been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric\nwritings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime\ndogmas. Hence we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Electic\nZeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of\nthe highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists or the sources\nof Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters,\nand in the third place they united the greatest purity of life to the\nmost piercing vigor of intellect. Now when it is considered that the\nphilosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was\nprofessedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself\nstudied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato\ninforms us in one of his Epistles, to find students unable to comprehend\nits sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,--when all these\ncircumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to\nsay impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth\ncenturies, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of\nmen, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to\nconsult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a\ndream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their\nlife; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of\nmistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as\nthese dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and\nwisest of the ancients, what else can be said than that they are the\nlegitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated\nlanguage of Ulysses,\n\n  Laws or divine or human fail'd to move,\n  Or shame of men, or dread of gods above:\n  Heedless alike of infamy or praise,\n  Or Fame's eternal voice in future days,[21]\n\n-----------------\n[21] Pope's Odyssey, book xxii, v. 47, &c.\n-----------------\n\nBut it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works\nof Plato, and, also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of\ntheir author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the\nfirst of these, I shall avail myself of the synopsis of Mr. Sydenham,\ntaking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to\nbe erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be\ndeficient.\n\nThe dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to\nthose different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect\nof the manner also in which they are composed or framed, and of the form\nunder which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore,\nas I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by\nPlato himself in his dialogue named Phaedrus[22] and in imitation of the\nexample set us by the ancient Platonists to distinguish the several\nkinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then,\nsubdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species,\nthat particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several\ndialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective\ndenominations.\n\n----------------\n[22] Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish things into their\nseveral sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every\nparticular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general\nidea; will never understand any writings of which those things are the\nsubject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which\nthe human understanding reaches. We have thought proper, here, to\nparaphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so\nimportant a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's\ndoctrine; and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking,\nthat probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with.\n----------------\n\nThe most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the\nSceptical kind, and those of they Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing\nis expressly either proved or asserted, some philosophical question only is\nconsidered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such\nconclusions, and discover such truths as the philosopher means to\ninsinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of\ncontroversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such\ndialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly,\nby involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them;\nor directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those whose\ntendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that either by exciting\nto the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to\ninvestigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the\nsearch. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments.[23]\n\n------------------\n[23] It is necessary to observe that Plato in the Parmenides calls all\nthat part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, an\nexercise and wandering.\n------------------\n\nThe dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach\nexplicitly some point of doctrine; and this they do either by laying it\ndown in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the ways of reason and\nargument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by\nthe speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by\ntradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of\nteaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, dividing,\ndefining, demonstrating, and analysing; and the object of it consists in\nexploring truth alone. According to this division is framed the following\nscheme, or table:\n\nDIALOGUES[24]\n\nSceptical Disputative Embarrassing Confuting Inquisitive Exciting Assisting\nDogmatical Demonstrative Analytical Inductional Authoritative Magisterial\nTraditional\n\n-----------------\n[24]We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the\ncharacters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that\nexhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on\naccount of its antiquity and general reception.\n\nDialogues\n\nDiadectic Speculative Physical Logical Practical Ethical Political\nInquisitive Gymnastic Maieutic Peirastic Agonistic Endeietic Anatreptic\n\nThe learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according\nto this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art:\nthe dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude\nto that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision,\nindeed, the word maieutic is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in\nPlato's Theaetetus: the maieutic dialogues, however, were supposed to\nresemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the peirastic were, to\nrepresent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency; the endeietic were, it\nseems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the anatreptic,\nto presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing. The\nprincipal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the\ndifference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there\ncommitted in the first subdivision, of course extending itself through the\nlatter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard\nto their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided\nwith respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions\nfall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides,\na novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose,\nthat the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the\nsame manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us\ntermed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have,\nthat their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues,\nand are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions\nhere mentioned is far from being true.\n----------------\n\nThe philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his\nwritings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with\ntheir variety; not to teach, on different occasions, with more or less\nplainness and perspicuity; not yet to insinuate different degrees of\ncertainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a\nconsummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of\nwriting, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different\nelements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different\ningredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius and turn of\ntemper, as it were, in each.\n\nSocrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when\nhe falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest\nwisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident\nignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and\ncontroversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail\nof being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient,\nif there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be\nconfuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them,\nin danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true\nphilosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted\nand exposed.\n\nIn some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in\nconversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth.\nWhen these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is\noccasion given to the philosopher to call forth[25] the latent seeds of\nwisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the\naffable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the\ninquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the\nconversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that\nof the disciple is encouraged; and, by proper questions, the mind is\naided and forwarded in the search of truth.\n\n-----------------\n[25] We require exhortation, that we may be led to true good; dissuasion,\nthat we may be turned from things truly evil; obstetrication, that we may\ndraw forth our unperverted conceptions; and confutation, that we may be\npurified from two-fold ignorance.\n-----------------\n\nAt other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced\nin a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved\nunderstandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an\nopportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering\nthe reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all\ndemonstrations[26] possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues\ncomposed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or\ndemonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to\nall the dialectic methods.\n\n-----------------\n[26] The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes\nuse of demonstrative and just reasoning, ([Greek: apodeiktikou]); whereas\nto the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, ([Greek:\npithanois]); and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are\n[Greek: eristikoi]; puzzling and contentious.\n-----------------\n\nBut when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which\nkind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter\nof belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and the matter of\nobedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the\ndoctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of\nancient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the\nauthority of a legislator.[27]\n\n-----------------\n[27] It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues in which Socrates\nis indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to\nour view as a learner, and not as a teacher; and this is the case in the\nParmenides and Timaeus. For by the former of these philosophers he is\ninstructed in the most abtruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in\nthe whole of physiology.\n-----------------\n\nThus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally\ncomposed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The\nform under which they appear, or the external character that marks them,\nis of three sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy\nor comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed\nto be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of\nthe mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to\nsome person present, the story of things past.\n\nHaving thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward\nform or composition, which creates their genius; and again, with\nreference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other\nvegetables, with a certain character; we are further to make a division\nof them, with regard to their subject and their design; beginning with\ntheir design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects\nchosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of\nall true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man.\nMan therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy\nmust be to inquire what is that being called man, who is to be made happy;\nand what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness.\nAs however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavored\nto give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary\nin this place to say any thing further on that subject.\n\nThe dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be\ndivided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed\nnature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both\nthe others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subject are\neither fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy,\nhuman nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good.\nThe differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in\nwhich are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to\nhe taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in\nthe judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to\nwords, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric,\npoetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of\nmind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private\nconduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his\nduty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a\ncivil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three\nheads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general,\nsanctity, temperance, fortitude, justice, friendship, patriotism, piety;\nthe ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state,\nlaw in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public\nconduct, the civil laws.\n\nThus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is a\ncomprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Plato's writings,\nwe have attempted to exhibit to him, their just and natural distinctions;\nwhether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or\nessence, their outward form or appearance, their matter; or their end:\nthat is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis,\ntheir genius, their character, their subject, and their design.\n\nAnd here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of\nthe highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are\nbenefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or\nless aptitude to receive it; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are\nso largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are\ncalculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable\nof penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like\nThrasymachus in the Republic; humble the arrogance even of those who\nare ignorant of their ignorance; make those to become proficients in\npolitical, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue; and, in short, like\nthe illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in\ntheir recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt.\n\nAfter this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next\nplace consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound,\nand the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to\nthe first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first\nsight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the\ndesign of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the prefatory part of\nthe Timaeus unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the\ntheory of the world; and the first part of the Parmenides, or the\ndiscussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part,\nor the speculation of the one; to which however it is essentially\npreparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue\non the Atlantic island: These preambles are superb gates and magnificent\ncourts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices, that\nnothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally\nsplendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who,\nwhen he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the\nvestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen\nshould be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously\nannounce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view.\n\nWith respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also,\nwhen accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the\nleading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same\ntime that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labor of\nsevere investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art,\ncontrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth through the delightful\ngroves and valleys of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when\nattentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he\ncould conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it\nis necessary to regard not that road, which is most straight in the\nnature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most\ndirect in the progressions of human understanding.\n\nWith respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the\nmost inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all\nphilosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet\neven in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most\nrenowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the\nadmiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus,\nJupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the\nAttic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry\nand prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction\nthan the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him with\nrespect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by\nthis prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from\nthe Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalship of Homer,\nto a new antagonist who enters the lists against one that is already the\nobject of universal admiration.\n\nNotwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus\ninforms us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury\nof words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric\nmagnificence of diction. Longinus excuses this by saying that whatever\nnaturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that,\nsays he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness.\nHe adds, \"and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and\nmoderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after\nthe summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain\nin security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?\"\nIndeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic\nfury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the\ninspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he\nsometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession\nin the Phaedrus, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly\ndiscourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the\nprogeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than\nall human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause,\nimitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words,\nand thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for\nsuch are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition\nhowever, both ancient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general\ngraceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and\nrapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate[27]\nthan magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the\ngraces of the first of poets; and in short; is a river to which those\njustly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied:\n\n  Tho' deep, yet clear;  tho' gentle, yet not dull;\n  Strong without rage, without o'erfowing full.\n\n-----------------\n[27] The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and\nparticularly from the notes on the Parmenides and Timaeus, that the style\nof that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any\nmodern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are\nexactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily\npenetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word\ncould not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken\naway without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied\nto the style of Aristotle.\n-----------------\n\nHaving thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of\nhis writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now\nremains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and\ntranslation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations,\nto close this Introduction.\n\nAs no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has\nbeen transmitted to us from the ancients, I was under the necessity of\nadopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific,\nhowever inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though\nunfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my\narrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe in\nwhich, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals\nparticulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as\nwholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which\nthese systems are branch out into particulars. Thus, after the First\nAlcibiades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally\nconsidered by the ancients an introduction to the whole of Plato's\nphilosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to\ncomprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I\nhave ranked the Timaeus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and\ntogether with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timaeus.\nThe next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his\ntheology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress\nof the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge; the\nsubsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the\nParmenides then, the Sophista, Phaedrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet,\nfollow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to\nand comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a\nwhole of wholes. For in the Sophista being itself is investigated, in the\nBanquet love itself, and in the Phaedrus beauty itself; all which are\nintelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in\nwhich the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater\nHippias is classed with the Phaedrus, because in the latter the whole\nseries of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which\nsubsists in soul. After these follows the Theaetetus, in which science\nconsidered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself,\naccording to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by\nSocrates in one part of the Phaedrus. The Politicus and Minos, which\nfollow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws; and, in\nshort, all the following dialogues either consider more particularly the\ndogmas which are systematically comprehended in those already enumerated,\nor naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not\nhowever appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in\nthe same accurate order as those which we considered as whole, it was\nthought better to class them either according to their agreement in one\nparticular circumstance, as the Phaedo, Apology, and Crito, all which\nrelate to the death of Socrates, and as the Meno and Protagoras, which\nrelate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to\ntheir agreement in character, as the Lesser Hippias and Euthydemus, which\nare anatreptic, and the Theages, Laches, and Lysis, which are maieutic\ndialogues. The Cratylus is ranked in the last place, not so much because\nthe subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply\ntheological; for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the\ndivine orders and their ineffable principle in the Parmenides, and thence\ndescended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent\ndialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and\nthus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly\nreturning to the principles whence they flew.\n\nAfter the dialogues[28] follow the Epistles of Plato, which are in every\nrespect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only\nwritten with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of\ndiction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its\nsuperior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy.\nThey are likewise replete with many admirable political observations,\nand contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered\nenigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at\nthe same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in\nhis more theological dialogues.\n\n-----------------\n[28] As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works\nof Plato only, I have not translated the Axiochus, Demodoeus, Sisyphus,\n&c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues.\n-----------------\n\nWith respect, to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in\nthe first place, than the numbers of legitimate dialogues of Plato is\nfifty-five; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws\nanother, yet the former consists of ten, and the latter of twelve books,\nand each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three\ndialogues, besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have\nsaid, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following\nhave been translated by Mr. Sydenham; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades,\nthe Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of\nAlcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals.[29] I have\nalready observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though\nunfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the\nphilosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair\na beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his\nmental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly\ninjured by calamity. His life had been very stormy; his circumstances, for\nmany years preceding his death, were indigent; his patrons were by no means\nliberal; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began\nthe study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably\npassed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against\nhis best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with\nhim, and partly succeeded in the attempt; but infirmity and death prevented\nits completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he\nwould fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the\nsummit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his\nnatural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of\nPlato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if\nhe had not nourished such baneful prejudices, and if he had not neglected\nphilosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labors would\nhave been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary,\nand his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying\nrenown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the\nnecessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all\nthose parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply\nphilosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In\nthese, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him\nsometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime\ntenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favor some opinions\nof his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so\nabstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully\nwith the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes\ntoo which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just\ncriticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally\nphilosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with\nthe limits and design of the following work.\n\n-----------------\n[29] In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written\nby Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T.\n-----------------\n\nOf the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe\nthat a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the\nmore abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with\nScotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less\ndisgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it\ntherefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found\nit could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it\nwas otherwise.\n\nOf the ten dialogues translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with\naccuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language;\nbut if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a translation of it\ninto English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and\nthat he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this\ntranslation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however\nI have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating\nthe rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, form\nby far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any\ntranslation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is\nwell known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his\npossessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators\nthat have followed him, but likewise from his having made this\ntranslation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library,\nwhich is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of\nthe learned labors of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as\nthe edition of the Rivals, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, by\nForster; of the First and Second Alcibiades and Hipparchus, by Etwall; of\nthe Meno, First Alcibiades, Phaedo and Phaedrus, printed at Vienna, 1784;\nof the Cratylus and Theaetetus, by Fischer; of the Republic, by Massey;\nand of the Euthydemus and Gorgias, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen\nCollege, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two\ndialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes,\nin which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less\nacuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and\nmost modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be\nimitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text.\n\nIf my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many,\nit would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness.\nHad I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I\nshould doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original,\nhave omitted almost all connective Particles, have divided long periods\ninto a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of\nPlato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as\nthe present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefitting all, but\nwith an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have\nendeavored not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time\nhave attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal\naccuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavored to\npreserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully\npersuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are\nnot as much as possible preserved.\n\nMy principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all\nthe abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in\nhis works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the\ncomposition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning\nin every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure,\nand who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more\nextensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the\nreader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the\nfollowing manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the\nCommentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades; and of\nhis Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the\nPhaedo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermeas on the Phoedrus. To these\nare added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius,[30]\nPeri Archon, and from the published works of Proclus on the Timeus,\nRepublic, and Theology of Plato. Of the four first of these manuscripts,\nthree of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my\nown hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from\nOlympiodorus on the Gorgias were taken by me from the copy preserved in\nthe British Museum; those from the same philosopher on the Philebus, and\nthose from Hermeas on the Phaedrus, and Damascius Peri Archon, from the\ncopies in the Bodleian library.\n\n-----------------\n[30] Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been\nsensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the\nextract from the preface to his translation of Proclus's Theological\nElements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the\nwritings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish that all the\nmanuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public.\n-----------------\n\nAnd here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very\nhandsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of\nOxford, and by the principal librarian and sub-librarians of the Bodleian\nlibrary, during the time that I made the above mentioned extracts. In the\nfirst place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid\nto me by Dr. Jackson,[31] dean of Christ-church. In the second place, the\nliberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which\nwas there afforded me, by the librarians of that excellent collection,\ndemand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal\nmanner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I\nresided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian\nhospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate\nfrom my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves.\n\n-----------------\n[31] I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a\ngreat admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of\nSimplicius and Ammonius on the Categories of that philosopher, are read\nby his orders in the college of which he is the head.\n-----------------\n\nWith respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation\n(for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead\nas an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe\nendurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a\nvery considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no\ncommon magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But\nwhatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let\nit be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser\nparticulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those\ngreat truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they\nhave been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with\nthe universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended\nperiods, through all the infinite revolutions of time.\n\nIn the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications\nrequisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to\nwhich I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge\nof the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone\nsufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man\nmight as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge\nof the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the\noriginal. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to\nmeditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, \"that polymathy does\nnot teach intellect,\" ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]).\n\nBy a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one\nwho, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such\nan arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good\ndisposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent\ndesire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood\nhas been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides\nthis, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night,\nin profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging\nsea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully\nencountered an hostile multitude of doubts;--in short, who has never\nconsidered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but\nas that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe\nendurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good,\nfar more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface.\nTo such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words\ntheir sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary\nthing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two\nin a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base\nmultitude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity\nwith the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however\nabsurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as\nthese--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must\nappear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a\ndistempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.\n\nBut all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold\nignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with\nrespect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their\nignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but\nimmediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd,\nbecause it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they\neven yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of\nthe same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says\nPlato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is\nreally the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description,\nnot to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic\nphilosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment,\nthan to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied\nassiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as\nthey will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul,\nand sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always\nprecede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt.\nIt is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate\nliberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and\nconfused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a\ndeep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb\nthe mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such,\nas the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or\ncorporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first\nbe purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is,\nthrough preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason\nmust be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful\ncan be planted in these savage haunts.\n\nLet not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy.\nThe land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which\nconducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and\nstupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by\nthe effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of\nopinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and\ndifficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but\nthe most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey\nwithout the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses,\nmust be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms\nof the ocean; must suffer transmutation into a beast through the magic\npower of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso;\nand in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without\nemerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined\nby the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler,\nwho pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with\na vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with\nvirtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the\nappearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for\nwe no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end\nof our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still\nfind ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury\nof a stormy sea of doubts.\n\nAbandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with\navidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain,\nbut relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally\nunprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from\nthe royal coast? A sea,\n\n  Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails\n  The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales.\n\nAnd may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of\nCalypso,\n\n  What ships have you, what sailors to convey,\n  What oars to cut the long laborious way?\n\nI shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was\nprefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius,\nbecause the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the\nlatter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever\nanecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short\nsketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in\nhis 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars\nabout him that can be obtained at present.\n\n\n\nEXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS\n\nAs some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain\nunusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and\nsciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy,\nwhich is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of\nboth, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I\nhave not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the\nsame time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have\ntaken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been\nable to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a\npeculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.\n\nAnagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high.\n\nDemiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.\n\nDianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of\nthe soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its\nreasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction,\nthat this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary\nsense.\n\nThe Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with\nthe one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and\nintellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the\ngods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they\nalso produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many\nplaces, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of\nthe gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates\nin the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. \"For,\" says he, \"all the\nhorses and charioteers of the gods are good,\" &c. And afterwards, still\nmore clearly, he adds, \"And this is the life of the gods.\" And not only\nthis, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to\nthe gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one\nseries. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to\nessence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the\nPhaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of\ngods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all\nthis, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the\nElean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that\nwith respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is\nsimply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to\nparticipation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to\nsimilitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but\nevery intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every\ndivine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are\ngods according to contact with the gods; and the souls of men obtain this\nappellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first,\nis as we have said, rather divine than a god; for the Athenian Guest in\nthe Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is\nsecondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the\none; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated\nto soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the\nseries of beings ends in the one itself.\n\nDoxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that\nwhich is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of\nthe rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that\nevery man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a\nthing is, but only the oti, or that it is.\n\nThe Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence,\nwithout any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it,\ninfinite life at once total and full.\n\nThat which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the\nwhole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal\ndispersion.\n\nGeneration, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and\nconjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it\nis used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than\nPlato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes\n(in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), \"Fables call the ineffable unfolding into\nlight through causes, generation.\" \"Hence,\" he adds in the Orphic\nwritings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is\ngeneration, according to its proper signification, there also there\nis time.\"\n\nA Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in\nthe Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives\nanother, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following\ndialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a\nXenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to\nthe genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental\nbanquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so\nmany guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are\nexpressly spoken of as guests.\n\nHyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it\nwere, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.\n\nIdiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing.\n\nThe Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many\norders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and\nthe ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of\nthe mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in\nthe Politicus, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both\nthe being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body\nis not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself.\nBut the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and\nmore perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is\nevident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo,\nand in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial\nsouls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause\nof eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of\ndaemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with\nthe nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable,\nhowever, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the\nimmortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain\nthe fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about\nbodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And\nprior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the\nBanquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence\nsuch an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For,\ntogether with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is\nthe fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is\nperpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short,\ntherefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective\nof perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but\nas supplying divine life, and deifying life itself.\n\nImparticipable, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent\nwith an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect\nwhich is not consubsistent with soul.\n\nIntellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of\nintellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to\nits proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term\nprojection.\n\nThe Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic\nwriters has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is\nexempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to\nbe intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second\nplace, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third\nplace, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes\nintelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible;\nand this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order\nof a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy.\nBut beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according\nto divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of\ndesire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as\nthe completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that\nwhich is the hyparxis of the gods; the second, that which is true being,\nand the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life;\nand the fourth, the order belonging to soul.\n\nLogismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus,\nsignifies a distributive cause of things.\n\nOn account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to\nwhich, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath'\no, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate\nthe final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the\ndemiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by\nthe sixth, matter.\n\nOrectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appetite.\n\nParadigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which\na thing is made.\n\nThe perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through\na connection with time.\n\nA Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly\nobserves in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive\nimport as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for\nit includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and\ndemocracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested\nwith the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto\nbelonging. See the Politicus.\n\nPrudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and\nPlatonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral\nactions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual\nPerception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by\nJamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its\ngeneration from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect\nitself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most\nbeautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion\nwith the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this\nwe are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of\nsuch things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries\nto these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of\nworks proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a\ncertain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their\nnature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of\nevery one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best\nsimilitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that\nprudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud.\nStob. p. 141.\n\nPsychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul.\n\nScience. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns\nthe causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a\nperfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the\nassignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be\nthat the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this\ndefinition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as\nto the principle of things. For this science considers that which is\ntruly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and\nproduces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition,\nhe calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone,\nhe assigns to physiology the appellation of science.\n\nThe telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies.\n\nTheurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious\noperation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible\nto man.\n\nTruth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers\ntruth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth\nis characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good,\nwhich imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says\nin the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in\ndignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the\nintellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and\nwithout contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is\nsituated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is,\nthat which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes\ninto contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from\nthe intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible\nlight, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of\ntruth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and\nthe instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually\nflowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment.\n\nThe following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that\nwhich subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: \"Truth, as the name\nimplies, makest a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy;\nbut, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images,\nwanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the\nformer indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms,\nand real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the\nlatter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a\nvarious subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The\nformer contemplates that which is, but the latter assumes such a form as\nappears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and\nincreases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from\nlooking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and\ndeceives.\" Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136.\n\nThe unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity.","title":"Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":39193}