{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10591/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10591","id":"gutenberg_10591","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10591","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Truthfulness and falsehood"],"text":"A LIE NEVER JUSTIFIABLE\n\nA Study in Ethics\n\nBY\n\nH. CLAY TRUMBULL\n\n1856\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThat there was need of a book on the subject of which this treats,\nwill be evidenced to those who examine its contents. Whether this book\nmeets the need, it is for those to decide who are its readers.\n\nThe circumstances of its writing are recited in its opening chapter. I\nwas urged to the undertaking by valued friends. At every step in its\nprogress I have been helped by those friends, and others. For much\nof that which is valuable in it, they deserve credit. For its\nimperfections and lack, I alone am at fault.\n\nAlthough I make no claim to exhaustiveness of treatment in this\nwork, I do claim to have attempted a treatment that is exceptionally\ncomprehensive and thorough. My researches have included extensive and\nvaried fields of fact and of thought, even though very much in those\nfields has been left ungathered. What is here presented is at least\nsuggestive of the abundance and richness of the matter available in\nthis line.\n\nWhile not presuming to think that I have said the last word on this\nquestion of the ages, I do venture to hope that I have furnished fresh\nmaterial for its more intelligent consideration. It may be that, in\nview of the data here presented, some will settle the question finally\nfor themselves--by settling it right.\n\nIf the work tends to bring any considerable number to this practical\nissue, I shall be more than repaid for the labor expended on it; for\nI have a profound conviction that it is the question of questions in\nethics, now as always.\n\nH. CLAY TRUMBULL.\n\nPHILADELPHIA,\n\nAugust 14,1893\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nI.\n\nA QUESTION OF THE AGES.\n\nIs a Lie Ever Justifiable?--Two Proffered Answers.--Inducements\nand Temptations Influencing a Decision.--Incident in Army Prison\nLife.--Difference in Opinion.--Killing Enemy, or Lying to\nHim.--Killing, but not Lying, Possibility with God.--Beginning of this\nDiscussion.--Its Continuance.--Origin of this Book.\n\n\nII.\n\nETHNIC CONCEPTIONS.\n\nStandards and Practices of Primitive Peoples.--Sayings and Doings of\nHindoos.--Teachings of the Mahabharata.--Harischandra and\nViswamitra, the Job and Satan of Hindoo Passion-Play.--Scandinavian\nLegends.--Fridthjof and Ingeborg.--Persian Ideals.--Zoroastrian Heaven\nand Hell.--\"Home of Song,\" and \"Home of the Lie.\"--Truth the Main\nCardinal Virtue with Egyptians.--No Hope for the Liar.--Ptah, \"Lord\nof Truth.\"--Truth Fundamental to Deity.--Relatively Low Standard\nof Greeks.--Incidental Testimony of Herodotus.--Truthfulness of\nAchilles.--Plato.--Aristotle.--Theognis.--Pindar.--Tragedy of\nPhiloctetes.--Roman Standard.--Cicero.--Marcus Aurelius.--German\nIdeal.--Veracity a Primitive Conception.--Lie Abhorrent among Hill\nTribes of India.--Khonds.--Sonthals.--Todas.--Bheels.--Sowrahs.--\nTipperahs.--Arabs.--American Indians.--Patagonians.--Hottentots.--\nEast Africans.--Mandingoes.--Dyaks of Borneo,--\"Lying Heaps.\"--Veddahs\nof Ceylon.--Javanese.--Lying Incident of Civilization.--Influence of\nSpirit of Barter.--\"Punic Faith.\"--False Philosophy of Morals.\n\n\nIII.\n\nBIBLE TEACHINGS.\n\nPrinciples, not Rules, the Bible Standard.--Two Pictures of\nParadise.--Place of Liars.--God True, though Men Lie.--Hebrew\nMidwives.--Jacob and Esau.--Rahab the Lying Harlot.--Samuel at\nBethlehem.--Micaiah before Jehoshaphat and Ahab.--Character\nand Conduct.--Abraham.--Isaac.--Jacob.--David.--Ananias and\nSapphira.--Bible Injunctions and Warnings.\n\n\nIV.\n\nDEFINITIONS.\n\nImportance of a Definition.--Lie Positive, and Lie Negative.--Speech\nand Act.--Element of Intention.--Concealment Justifiable, and\nConcealment Unjustifiable.--Witness in Court.--Concealment that is\nRight.--Concealment that is Sinful.--First Duty of Fallen Man.--Brutal\nFrankness.--Indecent Exposure of Personal Opinion.--Lie Never\nTolerable as Means of Concealing.--False Leg or Eye.--Duty of\nDisclosure Conditioned on Relations to Others.--Deception Purposed,\nand Resultant Deception.--Limits of Responsibility for Results of\nAction.--Surgeon Refusing to Leave Patient.--Father with Drowning\nChild.--Mother and Wife Choosing.--Others Self-Deceived concerning\nUs.--Facial Expression.--\"A Blind Patch.\"--Broken Vase.--Closed\nShutters in Midsummer.--Opened Shutters.--Absent Man's Hat in\nFront Hall.--When Concealment is Proper.--When Concealment is\nWrong.--Contagious Diseases.--Selling a Horse or Cow.--Covering\nPit.--Wearing Wig.--God's Method with Man.--Delicate Distinction.--\nTruthful Statements Resulting in False Impressions.--Concealing\nFamily Trouble.--Physician and Inquiring Patient.--Illustrations\nExplain Principle, not Define it.\n\n\nV.\n\nTHE PLEA OF \"NECESSITY.\"\n\nQuaker and Dry-goods Salesman.--Supposed Profitableness of\nLying.--Plea for \"Lies of Necessity.\"--Lying not Justifiable between\nEnemies in War-time.--Rightfulness of Concealing Movements and Plans\nfrom Enemy.--Responsibility with Flag of Truce.--Difference\nbetween Scout and Spy.--Ethical Distinctions Recognized by\nBelligerents.--Illustration: Federal Prisoner Questioned by\nConfederate Captors.--Libby Prison Experiences.--Physicians and\nPatients.--Concealment not Necessarily Deception.--Loss of\nReputation for Truthfulness by Lying Physicians.--Loss of\nPower Thereby.--Impolicy of Lying to Insane.--Dr. Kirkbride's\nTestimony.--Life not Worth Saving by Lie.--Concealing One's Condition\nfrom Robber in Bedroom.--Questions of Would-be Murderer.--\"Do Right\nthough the Heavens Fall.\"--Duty to God not to be Counted out of\nProblem.--Deserting God's Service by Lying.--Parting Prayer.\n\n\nVI.\n\nCENTURIES OF DISCUSSION.\n\nWide Differences of Opinion.--Views of Talmudists.--Hamburger's\nTestimony.--Strictness in Principle.--Exceptions in Practice.--Isaac\nAbohab's Testimony.--Christian Fathers not Agreed.--Martyrdom Price\nof Truthtelling.--Justin Martyr's Testimony.--Temptations of\nEarly Christians.--Words of Shepherd of Hermas.--Tertullian's\nEstimate.--Origen on False Speaking.--Peter and Paul at Antioch.--\nGregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great.--Deceit in Interests of\nHarmony.--Chrysostom's Deception of Basil.--Chrysostom's Defense\nof Deceit.--Augustine's Firmness of Position.--Condemnation of\nLying.--Examination of Excuses.--Jerome's Weakness and Error.--Final\nAgreement with Augustine.--Repetition of Arguments of Augustine and\nChrysostom.--Representative Disputants.--Thomas Aquinas.--Masterly\nDiscussion.--Errors of Duns Scotus.--John Calvin.--Martin Luther.--\nIgnatius Loyola.--Position of Jesuits.--Protestants Defending Lying.\n--Jeremy Taylor.--Errors and Inconsistencies.--Wrong Definitions.--\nMisapplication of Scripture.--Richard Rothe.--Character, Ability,\nand Influence. in Definition of Lie.--Failure to Recognize.--Error\nLove to God as Only Basis of Love to Man.--Exceptions in Favor of\nLying.--Nitzsch's Claim of Wiser and Nobler Methods than Lying in\nLove.--Rothe's Claim of Responsibility of Loving Guardianship--No\nCountenance of Deception in Example of Jesus.--Prime Error of Rothe.\n--Opinions of Contemporary Critics.--Isaac Augustus Dorner.--\nCharacter and Principles.--Keen Definitions.--High Standards.--\nClearness and Consistency.--Hans Lassen Martensen.--Logic Swayed by\nFeeling.--Right Premises and Wavering Reasonings.--Lofty Ideals.--\nStory of Jeanie Deans.--Correct Conclusions.--Influence of Personal\nPeculiarities on Ethical Convictions.--Contrast of Charles Hodge and\nJames H. Thornwell.--Dr. Hodge's Correct Premises and Amiable\nInconsistencies.--Truth the Substratum of Deity.--Misconceptions of\nBible Teachings.--Suggestion of Deception by Jesus Christ.--Error as\nto General Opinion of Christians.--Dr. Hodge's Conclusions Crushed\nby his Premises.--Dr. Thornwell's Thorough Treatment of Subject.--\nRight Basis.--Sound Argument.--Correct Definitions.--Firmness for\nTruth.--Newman Smyth's Manual.--Good Beginning and Bad Ending.--\nConfusion of Terms.--Inconsistencies in Argument.--Loose Reasoning.\n--Dangerous Teachings.--James Martineau.--Fine Moral Sense.--Conflict\nbetween Feeling and Conviction.--Safe Instincts.--Thomas Fowler.--\nHigher Expediency of Veracity.--Importance to General Good.--Leslie\nStephen.--Duty of Veracity Result of Moral Progress.--Kant and\nFichte.--Jacobi Misrepresented.--False Assumptions by Advocates of Lie\nof Necessity.--Enemies in Warfare not Justified in Lying.--Testimony\nof Cicero.--Macaulay on Lord Clive's Treachery.--Woolsey on\nInternational Law.--No Place for Lying in Medical Ethics.--Opinions\nand Experiences of Physicians.--Pliny's Story of Roman Matron.--Victor\nHugo's Sister Simplice.--Words of Abb\u00e9 Sicard.--Tact and\nPrinciple.--Legal Ethics.--Whewell's View.--Opinion of Chief-Justice\nSharswood.--Mistakes of Dr. Hodge.--Lord Brougham's Claim.--False\nCharge against Charles Phillips.--Chancellor Kent on Moral\nObligations in Law and in Equity.--Clerical Profession Chiefly\nInvolved.--Clergymen for and against Lying.--Temptation to Lies of\nLove.--Supreme Importance of Sound Principle.--Duty of Veracity to\nLower Animals.--Dr. Dabney's View.--Views of Dr. Newman Smyth.--Duty\nof Truthfulness an Obligation toward God.--Lower Animals not Exempt\nfrom Principle of Universal Application.--Fishing.--Hunting.--Catching\nHorse.--Professor Bowne's Psychological View.--No Place for Lying\nin God's Universe.--Small Improvement on Chrysostom's Argument for\nLying.--Limits of Consistency in Logical Plea.--God, or Satan.\n\n\nVII.\n\nTHE GIST OF THE MATTER.\n\nOne All-Dividing Line.--Primal and Eternal Difference.--Lie Inevitably\nHostile to God.--Lying Separates from God.--Sin _per se_.--Perjury\nJustifiable if Lying be Justifiable.--Lying--Lying Defiles Liar,\napart from Questions of Gain in Lying.--Social Evils Resultant from\nLying.--Confidence Essential to Society.--Lying Destructive of\nConfidence.--Lie Never Harmless.\n\n\nINDEXES.\n\nTOPICAL INDEX. SCRIPTURAL INDEX.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nA QUESTION OF THE AGES.\n\n\nWhether a lie is ever justifiable, is a question that has been in\ndiscussion, not only in all the Christian centuries, but ever since\nquestions concerning human conduct were first a possibility. On\nthe one hand, it has been claimed that a lie is by its very nature\nirreconcilable with the eternal principles of justice and right; and,\non the other hand, it has been asserted that great emergencies may\nnecessitate a departure from all ordinary rules of human conduct, and\nthat therefore there may be, in an emergency, such a thing as the \"lie\nof necessity.\"\n\nIt is not so easy to consider fairly a question like this in the hour\nwhen vital personal interests pivot on the decision, as it is in a\nseason of rest and safety; yet, if in a time of extremest peril the\nunvarying duty of truthfulness shines clearly through an atmosphere of\nsore temptation, that light may be accepted as diviner because of its\nvery power to penetrate clouds and to dispel darkness. Being forced to\nconsider, in an emergency, the possible justification of the so-called\n\"lie of necessity,\" I was brought to a settlement of that question in\nmy own mind, and have since been led to an honest endeavor to bring\nothers to a like settlement of it. Hence this monograph.\n\nIn the summer of 1863 I was a prisoner of war in Columbia, South\nCarolina. The Federal prisoners were confined in the common jail,\nunder military guard, and with no parole binding them not to attempt\nan escape. They were subject to the ordinary laws of war. Their\ncaptors were responsible for their detention in imprisonment, and it\nwas their duty to escape from captivity, and to return to the army of\nthe government to which they owed allegiance, if they could do so by\nany right means. No obligations were on them toward their captors,\nsave those which are binding at all times, even when a state of war\nsuspends such social duties as are merely conventional.\n\nOnly he who has been a prisoner of war in a Southern prison in\nmidsummer, or in a Northern prison in the dead of winter, in time of\nactive hostilities outside, can fully realize the heart-longings of a\nsoldier prisoner to find release from his sufferings in confinement,\nand to be again at his post of duty at the front, or can understand\nhow gladly such a man would find a way, consistent with the right, to\nescape, at any involved risk. But all can believe that plans of escape\nwere in frequent discussion among the restless Federal prisoners in\nColumbia, of whom I was one.\n\nA plan proposed to me by a fellow-officer seemed to offer peculiar\nchances of success, and I gladly joined in it. But as its fuller\ndetails were considered, I found that a probable contingency would\ninvolve the telling of a lie to an enemy, or a failure of the\nwhole plan. At this my moral sense recoiled; and I expressed my\nunwillingness to tell a lie, even to regain my personal liberty or\nto advantage my government by a return to its army. This opened an\nearnest discussion of the question whether there is such a thing as a\n\"lie of necessity,\" or a justifiable lie. My friend was a pure-minded\nman of principle, ready to die for his convictions; and he looked at\nthis question with a sincere desire to know the right, and to conform\nto it. He argued that a condition of war suspended ordinary social\nrelations between the combatants, and that the obligation of\ntruth-speaking was one of the duties thus suspended. I, on the other\nhand, felt that a lie was necessarily a sin against God, and therefore\nwas never justifiable.\n\nMy friend asked me whether I would hesitate to kill an enemy who was\non guard over me, or whom I met outside, if it were essential to our\nescape. I replied that I would not hesitate to do so, any more than I\nwould hesitate at it if we were over against each other in battle.\nIn time of war the soldiers of both sides take the risks of a\nlife-and-death struggle; and now that we were unparoled prisoners it\nwas our duty to escape if we could do so, even at the risk of our\nlives or of the lives of our captors, and it was their duty to\nprevent our escape at a similar risk. My friend then asked me on what\nprinciple I could justify the taking of a man's life as an enemy, and\nyet not feel justified in telling him a lie in order to save his life\nand secure our liberty. How could it be claimed that it was more of a\nsin to tell a lie to a man who had forfeited his social rights, than\nto kill him. I confessed that I could not at that time see the reason\nfor the distinction, which my moral sense assured me was a real one,\nand I asked time to think of it. Thus it was that I came first to face\na question of the ages, Is a lie ever justifiable? under circumstances\nthat involved more than life to me, and when I had a strong inducement\nto see the force of reasons in favor of a \"lie of necessity.\"\n\nIn my careful study, at that time, of the principles involved in this\nquestion, I came upon what seemed to me the conclusion of the whole\nmatter. God is the author of life. He who gives life has the right to\ntake it again. What God can do by himself, God can authorize another\nto do. Human governments derive their just powers from God. The powers\nthat be are ordained of God. A human government acts for God in the\nadministering of justice, even to the extent of taking life. If a\nwar waged by a human government be righteous, the officers of that\ngovernment take life, in the prosecution of the war, as God's agents.\nIn the case then in question, we who were in prison as Federal\nofficers were representatives of our government, and would be\njustified in taking the lives of enemies of our government who\nhindered us as God's agents in the doing of our duty to God and to our\ngovernment.\n\nOn the other hand, God, who can justly take life, cannot lie. A lie\nis contrary to the very nature of God. \"It is impossible for God to\nlie.\"[1] And if God cannot lie, God cannot authorize another to lie.\nWhat is unjustifiable in God's sight, is without a possibility of\njustification in the universe. No personal or social emergency can\njustify a lie, whatever may be its apparent gain, or whatever harm may\nseem to be involved in a refusal to speak it. Therefore we who were\nFederal prisoners in war-time could not be justified in doing what\nwas a sin _per se_, and what God was by his very nature debarred\nfrom authorizing or approving. I could see no way of evading\nthis conclusion, and I determinedly refused to seek release from\nimprisonment at the cost of a sin against God.\n\n[Footnote 1: Heb. 6: 18]\n\nAt this time I had no special familiarity with ethics as a study, and\nI was unacquainted with the prominence of the question of the \"lie\nof necessity\" in that realm of thought. But on my return from army\nservice, with my newly awakened interest in the subject, I came to\nknow how vigorous had been its discussion, and how varied had been the\nopinions with reference to it, among philosophic thinkers in all\nthe centuries; and I sought to learn for myself what could be known\nconcerning the principles involved in this question, and their\npractical application to the affairs of human life. And now, after all\nthese years of study and thought, I venture to make my contribution\nto this phase of Christian ethics, in an exhibit of the facts and\nprinciples which have gone to confirm the conviction of my own\nmoral sense, when first I was called to consider this question as a\nquestion.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nETHNIC CONCEPTIONS.\n\n\nThe habit of lying is more or less common among primitive peoples, as\nit is among those of higher cultivation; but it is of interest to note\nthat widely, even among them, the standard of truthfulness as a duty\nis recognized as the correct standard, and lying is, in theory at\nleast, a sin. The highest conception of right observable among\nprimitive peoples, and not the average conformity to that standard in\npractice, is the true measure of right in the minds of such peoples.\nIf we were to look at the practices of such men in times of\ntemptation, we might be ready to say sweepingly with the Psalmist, in\nhis impulsiveness, \"I said in my haste, All men are liars!\"[1] But if\nwe fixed our minds on the loftiest conception of truthfulness as an\ninvariable duty, recognized by races of men who are notorious as\nliars, we should see how much easier it is to have a right standard\nthan to conform to it.\n\n[Footnote 1: Psa. 116: II.]\n\nA careful observer of the people of India, who was long a resident\namong them,[1] says: \"More systematic, more determined, liars, than\nthe people of the East, cannot, in my opinion, be found in the world.\nThey often utter falsehoods without any apparent reason; and even when\ntruth would be an advantage, they will not tell it.... Yet, strange to\nsay, some of their works and sayings represent a falsehood as almost\nthe unpardonable sin. Take the following for an example: 'The sin of\nkilling a Brahman is as great as that of killing a hundred cows; and\nthe sin of killing a hundred cows is as great as that of killing a\nwoman; the sin of killing a hundred women is as great as that of\nkilling a child in the womb; and the sin of killing a hundred\n[children] in the womb is as great as that of telling a lie.'\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Joseph Roberts, in his _Oriental Illustrations_, p. 580.]\n\nThe Mahabharata is one of the great epics of ancient India. It\ncontains a history of a war between two rival families, or peoples,\nand its text includes teachings with reference to \"everything that it\nconcerned a cultivated Hindoo to know.\" The heroes in this recorded\nwar, between the Pandavas and the Kauravas, are in the habit of lying\nwithout stint; yet there is evidence that they recognized the sin of\nlying even to an enemy in time of war, and when a decisive advantage\nmight be gained by it. At a point in the combat when Yudhishthira, a\nleader of the Pandavas, was in extremity in his battling with Drona, a\nleader of the Kauravas, the divine Krishna told Yudhishthira that, if\nhe would tell Drona (for in these mythical contests the combatants\nwere usually within speaking distance of each other) that his loved\n\"son Aswatthanea was dead, the old warrior would immediately lay down\nhis arms and become an easy prey.\" But Yudhishthira \"had never been\nknown to tell a falsehood,\" and in this instance he \"utterly refused\nto tell a lie, even to secure the death of so powerful an enemy.\" [1]\nAlthough it came about that Drona was, as a matter of fact, defeated\nby treachery, the sin of lying, even in time of war, and to an enemy,\nis clearly brought out as a recognized principle of both theory and\naction among the ancient Hindoos.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Wheeler's _History of India_, I., 321.]\n\nThere is a famous passion-play popular in Southern India and Ceylon,\nwhich illustrates the Hindoo ideal of truthfulness at every risk or\ncost. Viswamitra, the tempter and accuser as represented in the Vedas,\nappears in the council of the gods, face to face with Indra. The\nquestion is raised by Indra, who is the most virtuous sovereign on\nearth. He asks, \"What chief of mortals is there, who has never told\na lie?\" Harischandra, king of Ayodiah (Oude) is named as such a\nman. Viswamitra denies it. It is agreed (as in the testing of Job,\naccording to the Bible story) that Viswamitra may employ any means\nwhatsoever for the inducing of Harischandra to lie, unhindered by\nIndra or any other god. If he succeeds in his effort, he shall secure\nto himself all the merit of the good deeds of Harischandra; but if\nHarischandra cannot be induced to lie, Viswamitra must add half his\nmerit to that of Harischandra.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Arichandra, the Martyr of Truth: A Tamil Drama translated\ninto English by Muta Coom\u00e2ra Sw\u00e2my; cited in Conway's _Demonology and\nDevil Lore_, II., 35-43.]\n\nFirst, Viswamitra induces Harischandra to become the custodian of a\nfabulous treasure, with a promise to deliver it up when called\nfor. Then he brings him into such a strait that he must give up to\nViswamitra all his possessions, including that treasure and his\nkingdom, in order to retain his personal virtue. After this,\nViswamitra demands the return by Harischandra of the gold which\nhas been already surrendered, claiming that its surrender was not\naccording to the contract. In this emergency Viswamitra suggests, that\nif Harischandra will only deny that he owes this amount to his enemy\nthe debt shall at once be canceled. \"Such a declaration I can never\nmake,\" says Harischandra. \"I owe thee the gold, and pay it I will.\"\n\nFrom this time forward the efforts of Viswamitra are directed to\nthe inducing of Harischandra to say that he is not in debt to his\nadversary; but in every trial Harischandra refuses to tell a lie.\nHis only son dies in the desert. He and his wife are in poverty\nand sorrow; while all the time he is told that his kingdom and his\ntreasures shall be restored to him, if he will tell only one lie. At\nlast his wife is condemned to death on a false accusation, and he is\nappointed, by the sovereign of the land where she and he have been\nsold as slaves, to be her executioner. She calls on him to do his\nduty, and strike off her head. Just then Viswamitra appears to him,\nsaying: \"Wicked man, spare her! Tell a lie even now, and be restored\nto your former state!\"\n\nHarischandra's answer is: \"Even though thou didst offer to me\nthe throne of Indra, I would not tell a lie.\" And to his wife,\nChandravati, he says encouragingly: \"This keen saber will do its duty.\nThou dead, thy husband dies too--this selfsame sword shall pierce my\nbreast.... Yes, let all men perish, let all gods cease to exist, let\nthe stars that shine above grow dim, let all seas be dried up, let\nall mountains be leveled to the ground, let wars rage, blood flow in\nstreams, let millions of millions of Harischandras be thus persecuted;\nyet let truth be maintained, let truth ride victorious over all, let\ntruth be the light,--truth alone the lasting solace of mortals and\nimmortals.\"\n\nAs Harischandra strikes at the neck of Chandravati, \"the sword,\ninstead of harming her, is transformed into a necklace of pearls,\nwhich winds itself around her. The gods of heaven, all sages, and all\nkings, appear suddenly to the view of Harischandra,\" and Siva, the\nfirst of the gods, commends him for his fidelity to truth, and tells\nhim that his dead son shall be brought again to life, and his kingdom\nand treasures and honors shall be restored to him. And thus the story\nof Harischandra stands as a rebuke to the Christian philosopher who\ncould suppose that God, or the gods, would co-work with a man who\nacted on the supposition that there is such an anomaly in the universe\nas \"a lie of necessity.\"\n\nThe old Scandinavian heroes were valiant in war, but they held that\na lie was not justifiable under any pressure of an emergency. Their\nValhalla heaven was the home of those who had fought bravely; but\nthere was no place for liars in it. A fine illustration of their\nconception of the unvarying duty of truthfulness is given in the saga\nof Fridthjof. Fridthjof, heroic son of Thorstein, loved Ingeborg,\ndaughter of his father's friend, King Bele. Ingeborg's brother Helge,\nsuccessor to his father's throne, opposed the match, and shut her up\nwithin the sacred enclosure of the god Balder. Fridthjof ventured\nwithin the forbidden ground, in order to pledge to her his manly\ntroth. The lovers were pure in purpose and in act, but, if their\ninterview were known, they would both be permanently harmed in\nreputation and in standing. A rumor of their secret meeting was\ncirculated, and Fridthjof was summoned before the council of heroes to\nanswer to the charge. If ever a lie were justifiable, it would seem to\nbe when a pure woman's honor was at stake, and when a hero's happiness\nand power for good pivoted on it. Fridthjof tells to Ingeborg the\nstory of his sore temptation when, in the presence of the council,\nHelge challenges his course.\n\n    \"'Say, Fridthjof, Balder's peace hast thou not broken, Not seen my\n    sister in his house while Day Concealed himself, abashed, before\n    your meeting? Speak! yea or nay!' Then echoed from the ring Of\n    crowded warriors, 'Say but nay, say nay! Thy simple word we'll\n    trust; we'll court for thee,--Thou, Thorstein's son, art good\n    as any king's. Say nay! say nay! and thine is Ingeborg!' 'The\n    happiness,' I answered, 'of my life On one word hangs; but fear\n    not therefore, Helge! I would not lie to gain the joys of Valhal,\n    Much less this earth's delights. I've seen thy sister, Have spoken\n    with her in the temple's night, But have not therefore broken\n    Balder's peace!' More none would hear. A murmur of deep horror The\n    diet traversed; they who nearest stood Drew back, as I had with\n    the plague been smitten.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Anderson's _Viking Tales of the North_, p. 223.]\n\nAnd so, because Fridthjof would not lie, he lost his bride and became\na wanderer from his land, and Ingeborg became the wife of another;\nand this record is to this day told to the honor of Fridthjof,\nin accordance with the standard of the North in the matter of\ntruth-telling.\n\nIn ancient Persia, the same high standard prevailed. Herodotus says of\nthe Persians: \"The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think,\nis to tell a lie; the next worse, to owe a debt; because, among other\nreasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies.\"[1] \"Their sons are\ncarefully instructed, from their fifth to their twentieth year, in\nthree things alone,--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the\ntruth.\"[2] Here the one duty in the realm of morals is truth-telling.\nIn the famous inscription of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, on the Rock\nof Behistun,[3] there are repeated references to lying as the chief of\nsins, and to the evil time when lying was introduced into Persia, and\n\"the lie grew in the provinces, in Persia as well as in Media and in\nthe other provinces.\" Darius claims to have had the help of \"Ormuzd\nand the other gods that may exist,\" because he \"was not wicked, nor a\nliar;\" and he enjoins it on his successor to \"punish severely him who\nis a liar or a rebel.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Rawlinson's _Herodotus_, Bk. I., \u00a7 139.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., Bk. I., \u00a7 136.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Sayce's _Introduction to Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther_, pp.\n120-137.]\n\nThe Zoroastrian designation of heaven was the \"Home of Song;\"\nwhile hell was known as the \"Home of the Lie.\"[1] There was in the\nZoroastrian thought only two rival principles in the universe,\nrepresented by Ormuzd and Ahriman, as the God of truth, and the father\nof lies; and the lie was ever and always an offspring of Ahriman, the\nevil principle: it could not emanate from or be consistent with the\nGod of truth. The same idea was manifest in the designation of the\nsubordinate divinities of the Zoroastrian religion. Mithra was the god\nof light, and as there is no concealment in the light, Mithra was also\ngod of truth. A liar was the enemy of righteousness.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: M\u00fcller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXXI., 184.]\n\n[Footnote 2: M\u00fcller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXIII., 119 f.,\n124 f., 128, 139. See reference to Jackson's paper on \"the ancient\nPersians' abhorrence of falsehood, illustrated from the Avesta,\" in\n_Journal of Am. Oriental Soc_., Vol. XIII., p. cii.]\n\n\"Truth was the main cardinal virtue among the Egyptians,\" and\n\"falsehood was considered disgraceful among them.\"[1] Ra and Ma were\nsymbols of Light and Truth; and their representation was worn on the\nbreastplate of priest and judge, like the Urim and Thummim of the\nHebrews.[2] When the soul appeared in the Hall of Two Truths, for\nfinal judgment, it must be able to say, \"I have not told a falsehood,\"\nor fail of acquittal.[3] Ptah, the creator, a chief god of the\nEgyptians, was called \"Lord of Truth.\"[4] The Egyptian conception of\nDeity was: \"God is the truth, he lives by truth, he lives upon\nthe truth, he is the king of truth.\"[5] The Egyptians, like the\nZoroastrians, seemed to count the one all-dividing line in the\nuniverse the line between truth and falsehood, between light and\ndarkness.\n\n[Footnote 1: Wilkinson's _Ancient Egyptians_, I., 299; III., 183-185.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Exod. 39: 8-21; Lev. 8: 8.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Bunsen's _Egypt's Place in Universal History_, V., 254.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Wilkinson's _Anc. Egyp_., III., 15-17.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Budge's _The Dwellers on the Nile_, p. 131.]\n\nAmong the ancient Greeks the practice of lying was very general,\nso general that writers on the social life of the Greeks have been\naccustomed to give a low place relatively to that people in its\nestimate of truthfulness as a virtue. Professor Mahaffy says on this\npoint: \"At no period did the nation ever attain that high standard\nwhich is the great feature in Germanic civilization. Even the Romans,\nwith all their coarseness, stood higher in this respect. But neither\nin Iliad nor in Odyssey is there, except in phrases, any reprobation\nof deceit as such.\" He points to the testimony of Cicero, concerning\nthe Greeks, who \"concedes to them all the high qualities they choose\nto claim save one--that of truthfulness.\"[1] Yet the very way in which\nHerodotus tells to the credit of the Persians that they allowed\nno place for the lie in their ethics[2] seems to indicate his\napprehension of a higher standard of veracity than that which was\ngenerally observed among his own people. Moreover, in the Iliad,\nAchilles is represented as saying: \"Him I hate as I do the gates of\nHades, who hides one thing in his heart and utters another;\" and it\nis the straightforward Achilles, rather than \"the wily and shiftful\nUlysses,\" who is the admired hero of the Greeks.[3] Plato asserts, and\nargues in proof of his assertion, that \"the veritable lie ... is hated\nby all gods and men.\" He includes in the term \"veritable lie,\" or\n\"genuine lie,\" a lie in the soul as back of the spoken lie, and he\nis sure that \"the divine nature is incapable of a lie,\" and that in\nproportion as the soul of a man is conformed to the divine image,\nthe man \"will speak, act, and live in accordance with the truth.\"[4]\nAristotle, also, while recognizing different degrees of veracity,\ninsists that the man who is in his soul a lover of truth will be\ntruthful even when he is tempted to swerve from the truth. \"For the\nlover of truth, who is truthful where nothing is at stake [or where it\nmakes no difference], will yet more surely be truthful where there is\na stake [or where it does make a difference]; for he will [then] shun\nthe lie as shameful, since he shuns it simply because it is a lie.\"[5]\nAnd, again, \"Falsehood abstractly is bad and blamable, and truth\nhonorable and praiseworthy; and thus the truthful man being in\nthe mean is praiseworthy, while the false [in either extreme,\nof overstating or of understating] are both blamable, but the\nexaggerating man more so than the other.\"[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: Mahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, pp. 27, 123. See also\nFowler's _Principles of Morals_, II., 219-221.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Hist_., Bk. I., \u00a7139.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Professor Fowler seems to be quite forgetful of this\nfact. He speaks of Ulysses as if he had precedence of Achilles in the\nesteem of the Greeks. See his _Principles of Morals_, II., 219.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato's _Republic_, II., 382, a, b.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Aristotle's _Eth. Nic_., IV., 13, 1127, a, b.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Ibid_., IV.]\n\nTheognis recognizes this high ideal of the duty and the beauty of\ntruthfulness, when he says: \"At first there is a small attractiveness\nabout a lie, but in the end the gain it brings is both shameful and\nharmful. That man has no fair glory, in whose heart dwells a lie, and\nfrom whose mouth it has once issued.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Theognis, 607.]\n\nPindar looks toward the same standard when he says to Hiero,\n\"Forge thy tongue on the anvil of truth;\"[1] and when he declares\nemphatically, \"I will not stain speech with a lie.\"[2] So, again, when\nhis appeal to a divinity is: \"Thou that art the beginning of lofty\nvirtue, Lady Truth, forbid thou that my poem [or composition] should\nstumble against a lie, harsh rock of offense.\"[3] In his tragedy of\nthe Philoctetes, Sophocles makes the whole play pivot on the remorse\nof Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, over his having lied to Philoctetes\n(who is for the time being an enemy of the Greeks), in order to secure\nthrough him the killing of Paris and the overthrow of Troy. The lie\nwas told at the instigation of Ulysses; but Neoptolemus repents its\nutterance, and refuses to take advantage of it, even though the fate\nof Troy and the triumph of Greek arms depend on the issue. The plain\nteaching of the tragedy is that \"the purposes of heaven are not to\nbe served by a lie; and that the simplicity of the young son of\ntruth-loving Achilles is better in the sight of heaven, even when\nit seems to lead to failure, than all the cleverness of guileful\nUlysses.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Pythian Ode, I, 86.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Olympian Ode, 4, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Bergk's _Pindar_, 183 [221].]\n\n[Footnote 4: Professor Lamberton]\n\nIt is admitted on all hands that the Romans and the Germans had a high\nideal as to the duty of truthfulness and the sin of lying.[1] And so\nit was in fact with all peoples which had any considerable measure of\ncivilization in former ages. It is a noteworthy fact that the duty of\nveracity is often more prominent among primitive peoples than among\nthe more civilized, and that, correspondingly, lying is abhorred as a\nvice, or seems to be unknown as an expedient in social intercourse.\nThis is not always admitted in the theories of writers on morals, but\nit would seem to be borne out by an examination into the facts of\nthe case. Lecky, in his study of \"the natural history of morals,\"[2]\nclaims that veracity \"usually increases with civilization,\" and he\nseeks to show why it is so. But this view of Lecky's is an unfounded\nassumption, in support of which he proffers no evidence; while Herbert\nSpencer's exhibit of facts, in his \"Cyclopaedia of Descriptive\nSociology,\" seems to disprove the claim of Lecky; and he directly\nasserts that \"surviving remnants of some primitive races in India have\nnatures in which truthfulness seems to be organic; that not only to\nthe surrounding Hindoos, higher intellectually and relatively advanced\nin culture, are they in this respect far superior, but they are\nsuperior to Europeans.\"[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Fowler's _Principles of Morals_, II., 220; also\nMahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, p. 27. Note, for instance, the high\nstandard as to truthfulness indicated by Cicero, in his \"Offices,\"\nIII., 12-17, 32. \"Pretense and dissimulation ought to be banished\nfrom the whole of life.\" \"Reason ... requires that nothing be done\ninsidiously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely.\" Note, also,\nJuvenal, Satire XIII., as to the sin of a lie purposed, even if not\nspoken; and Marcus Aurelius in his \"Thoughts,\" Book IX.: \"He ... who\nlies is guilty of impiety to the same [highest] divinity.\" \"He, then,\nwho lies intentionally is guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he acts\nunjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch\nas he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he\ndisturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he\nfights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary\nto truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect\nof which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: _History of European Morals_, I., 143.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234 ff.;\nalso his _Inductions of Ethics_, p. 405 f.]\n\nAmong those Hill Tribes of India which have been most secluded, and\nwhich have retained the largest measure of primitive life and customs,\nfidelity to truth in speech and act is still the standard, and a lie\nis abhorrent to the normal instincts of the race. Of the Khonds of\nCentral India it is said that they, \"in common with many other wild\nraces, bear a singular character for truthfulness and honesty;\"[1] and\nthat especially \"the aborigine is the most truthful of beings.\"[2]\n\"The Khonds believe that truthfulness is one of the most sacred of\nduties imposed by the gods.\"[3] \"They are men of one word.\"[4] \"The\ntruth is by a Sonthals held sacred.\" [5] The Todas \"call falsehood one\nof the worst of vices.\"[6] Although it is said by one traveler that\nthe Todas \"practice dissimulation toward Europeans, yet he recognizes\nthis as a trait consequent on their intercourse with Europeans.\"[7]\nThe Bheels, which were said to be \"a race of unmitigated savages,\nwithout any sense of natural religion.\" [8] and \"which have preserved\ntheir rude habits and manners to the present day,\" are \"yet imbued\nwith a sense of truth and honor strangely at contrast with their\nexternal character.\"[9] Bishop Heber says that \"their word is more to\nbe depended on than that of their conquerors.\"[10] Of the Sowrahs it\nis said: \"A pleasing feature in their character is their complete\ntruthfulness. They do not know how to tell a lie.\"[11] Indeed, as Mr.\nSpencer sums up the case on this point, there are Hill Tribes in India\n\"originally distinguished by their veracity, but who are rendered less\nveracious by contact with the whites. 'So rare is lying among these\naboriginal races when unvitiated by the 'civilized,' that of those in\nBengal, Hunter singles out the Tipperahs as 'the only Hill Tribe in\nwhich this vice is met with.'\"[12]\n\n[Footnote 1: Glasfurd, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 32.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Forsyth, _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Macpherson, cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Sherwill, cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Harkness, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 31.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Marshman, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 31.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Wheeler, cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Shortt, cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234 ff.]\n\nThe Arabs are more truthful in their more primitive state than where\nthey are influenced by \"civilization,\" or by dealings with those from\ncivilized communities.[1] And the same would seem to be true of the\nAmerican Indians.[2] Of the Patagonians it is said: \"A lie with them\nis held in detestation.\" [3] \"The word of a Hottentot is sacred;\" and\nthe good quality of \"a rigid adherence to truth,\" \"he is master of in\nan eminent degree.\"[4] Dr. Livingstone says that lying was known to\nbe a sin by the East Africans \"before they knew aught of Europeans or\ntheir teaching.\"[5] And Mungo Park says of the Mandingoes, among the\ninland Africans, that, while they seem to be thieves by nature,\"\none of the first lessons in which the Mandingo women instruct their\nchildren is _the practice of truth_.\" The only consolation of a mother\nwhose son had been murdered, \"was the reflection that the poor boy, in\nthe course of his blameless life, _had never told a lie_.\"[6] Richard\nBurton is alone among modern travelers in considering lying natural to\nall primitive or savage peoples. Carl Bock, like other travelers,\ntestifies to the unvarying truthfulness of the Dyaks in Borneo,[7] and\nanother observant traveler tells of the disgrace that attaches to a lie\nin that land, as shown by the \"lying heaps\" of sticks or stones along\nthe roadside here and there. \"Each heap is in remembrance of some man\nwho has told a stupendous lie, or failed in carrying out an engagement;\nand every passer-by takes a stick or a stone to add to the accumulation,\nsaying at the time he does it, 'For So-and-so's lying heap.' It goes on\nfor generations, until they sometimes forget who it was that told the\nlie, but, notwithstanding that, they continue throwing the stones.\"[8]\nWhat a blocking of the paths of civilization there would be if a \"lying\nheap\" were piled up wherever a lie had been told, or a promise had\nbeen broken, by a child of civilization!\n\n[Footnote 1: Denham, and Palgrave, cited in _Cycl. of Des. Social_.,\nV., 30,31.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Morgan's _League of the Iroquois_, p. 335; also\nSchoolcraft, and Keating, on the Chippewas, cited in _Cycl. of\nDescrip. Sociol_., VI., 30.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Snow, cited in _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Kolben, and Barrow, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_.,\nIV., 25.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., IV., 26.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_., IV., 27.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Head Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209. See also Boyle, cited\nin Spencer's _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_., III., 35.]\n\n[Footnote 8: St. John's _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, I., 88\nf.]\n\nThe Veddahs of Ceylon, one of the most primitive of peoples, \"are\nproverbially truthful.\"[1] The natives of Java are peculiarly free\nfrom the vice of lying, except in those districts which have had most\nintercourse with Europeans.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Bailey, cited in Spencer's _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_.,\nIII., 32.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Earl, and Raffles, cited in _Ibid_., p. 35.]\n\nIt is found, in fact, that in all the ages, the world over, primitive\nman's highest ideal conception of deity has been that of a God who\ncould not tolerate a lie; and his loftiest standard of human action\nhas included the readiness to refuse to tell a lie under any\ninducement, or in any peril, whether it be to a friend or to an enemy.\nThis is the teaching of ethnic conceptions on the subject. The lie\nwould seem to be a product of civilization, or an outgrowth of the\nspirit of trade and barter, rather than a natural impulse of primitive\nman. It appeared in full flower and fruitage in olden time among the\ncommercial Phoenicians, so prominently that \"Punic faith\" became a\nsynonym of falsehood in social dealings.\n\nYet it is in the face of facts like these that a writer like Professor\nFowler baldly claims, in support of the same presupposed theory as\nthat of Lecky, that \"it is probably owing mainly to the development of\ncommerce, and to the consequent necessity, in many cases, of absolute\ntruthfulness, that veracity has come to take the prominent position\nwhich it now occupies among the virtues; though the keen sense of\nhonor, engendered by chivalry, may have had something to do in\nbringing about the same result.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Principles of Morality_, II., 220.]\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nBIBLE TEACHINGS.\n\n\nIn looking at the Bible for light in such an investigation as this,\nit is important to bear in mind that the Bible is not a collection of\nspecific rules of conduct, but rather a book of principles\nillustrated in historic facts, and in precepts based on those\nprinciples,--announced or presupposed. The question, therefore, is\nnot, Does the Bible authoritatively draw a line separating the truth\nfrom a lie, and making the truth to be always right, and a lie to\nbe always wrong? but it is, Does the Bible evidently recognize an\nunvarying and ever-existing distinction between a truth and a lie, and\ndoes the whole sweep of its teachings go to show that in God's sight\na lie, as by its nature opposed to the truth and the right, is always\nwrong?\n\nThe Bible opens with a picture of the first pair in Paradise, to whom\nGod tells the simple truth, and to whom the enemy of man tells a lie;\nand it shows the ruin of mankind wrought by that lie, and the author\nof the lie punished because of its telling.[1] The Bible closes with a\npicture of Paradise, into which are gathered the lovers and doers of\ntruth, and from which is excluded \"every one that loveth and doeth a\nlie;\"[2] while \"all liars\" are to have their part \"in the lake that\nburneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death.\"[3] In the\nOld Testament and in the New, God is represented as himself the Truth,\nto whom, by his very nature, the doing or the speaking of a lie is\nimpossible,[4] while Satan is represented as a liar and as the \"father\nof lies.\"[5]\n\n[Footnote 1: Gen. 2, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Rev. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Rev. 21: 5-8.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Psa. 31:5; 146:6; John 14:6; Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29;\nTitus 1:2; Heb. 6:18; 1 John 5:7.]\n\n[Footnote 5: John 8:44.]\n\nWhile the human servants of God, as represented in the Bible\nnarrative, are in many instances guilty of lying, their lies are\nclearly contrary to the great principle, in the light of which the\nBible itself is written, that a lie is always wrong, and that it\ncannot have justification in God's sight. The idea of the Bible record\nis that God is true, though every man were a liar.[1] God is uniformly\nrepresented as opposed to lies and to liars, and a lie in his sight is\nspoken of as a lie unto him, or as a lie against him. In the few cases\nwhere the Bible narrative has been thought by some to indicate an\napproval by the Lord of a lie, that was told, as it were, in his\ninterest, an examination of the facts will show that they offer no\nexception to the rule that, by the Bible standard, a lie is never\njustifiable.\n\n[Footnote 1: Rom. 3:4.]\n\nTake, for example, the case of the Hebrew midwives, who lied to the\nofficials of Pharaoh, when they were commanded to kill every Hebrew\nmale child;[1] and of whom it is said that \"God dealt well with the\nmidwives;... and ... because the midwives feared God,... he made them\nhouses.\"[2] Here it is plain that God commended their fear of him,\nnot their lying in behalf of his people, and that it was \"because\nthe midwives feared God\" not because they lied, \"that he made them\nhouses.\" It was their choice of the Lord above the gods and rulers of\nEgypt that won them the approval of the Lord, even though they were\nsinners in being liars; as in an earlier day it was the approval of\nJacob's high estimate of the birthright, and not the deceits practiced\nby him on Esau and his father Isaac, that the Lord showed in\nconfirming a blessing to Jacob.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Exod. 1: 15-19.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Exod. I: 20, 21.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Gen. 25: 27-34; 27; 1-40; 28: 1-22]\n\nSo, also, in the narrative of Rahab, the Canaanitish young woman, who\nconcealed the Israelitish spies sent into her land by Joshua, and lied\nabout them to her countrymen, and who was commended by the Lord for\nher faith in this transaction.[1] Rahab was a harlot by profession and\na liar by practice. When the Hebrew spies entered Jericho, they went\nto her house as a place of common resort. Rahab, on learning who they\nwere, expressed her readiness, sinner as she was, to trust the God of\nIsrael rather than the gods of Canaan; and because of her trust she\nput herself, with all her heathen habits of mind and conduct, at\nthe disposal of the God of Israel, and she lied, as she had been\naccustomed to lie, to her own people, as a means of securing safety\nto her Hebrew visitors. Because of her faith, which was shown in this\nway, but not necessarily because of her way of showing her faith, the\nLord approved of her spirit in choosing his service rather than the\nservice of the gods of her people. The record of her approval is, \"By\nfaith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient,\nhaving received the spies with peace.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Josh. 2: 1-21.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Heb. II: 31.]\n\nIt would be quite as fair to claim that God approved of Rahab's\nharlotry, in this case, as to claim that he approved of her lying.\nRahab was a harlot and a liar, and she was ready to practice in both\nthese lines in the service of the spies. She was not to be commended\nfor either of those vices; but she was to be commended in that, with\nall her vices, she was yet ready to give herself just as she was, and\nwith her ways as they were, to Jehovah's side, in the crisis hour of\nconflict between him and the gods of her people. It was the faith that\nprompted her to this decision that God commended; and \"by faith\" she\nwas preserved from destruction when her people perished.\n\nAnother case that has been thought to imply a divine approval of an\nuntrue statement, is that of Samuel, when he went to Bethlehem to\nanoint David as Saul's successor on the throne of Israel, and, at the\nLord's command, said he had come to offer a sacrifice to God.[1] But\nhere clearly the narrative shows no lie, nor false statement, made or\napproved. Samuel, as judge and prophet, was God's representative in\nIsrael. He was accustomed to go from place to place in the line of his\nofficial ministry, including the offering at times of sacrifices of\ncommunion.[2] When, on this occasion, the Lord told Samuel of his\npurpose of designating a son of Jesse to succeed Saul on the throne,\nand desired him to go to Bethlehem for further instructions, Samuel\nwas unnecessarily alarmed, and said, in his fear, \"How can I go? if\nSaul hear it, he will kill me.\" The Lord's simple answer was, \"Take\nan heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord. And\ncall Jesse to the sacrifice, and I will shew thee what thou shalt do:\nand thou shalt anoint unto me him whom I name unto thee.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: 1 Sam. 16: 1-3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: 1 Sam. 7: 15-17; 9: 22-24; 11: 14,15; 20:29.]\n\nIn other words, the Lord said to Samuel, I want you to go to\nBethlehem as my representative, and offer a sacrifice there. Say this\nfearlessly. In due time I will give you other directions; but do not\nborrow trouble on account of them. Do your duty step by step. Speak\nout the plain truth as to all that the authorities of Bethlehem have\nany right to know; and do not fear any harm through my subsequent\nprivate revelations to you. In these directions of the Lord there is\nno countenance of the slightest swerving from the truth by Samuel;\nnor is there an authorized concealment of any fact that those to whom\nSamuel was sent had any claim to know.\n\nStill another Bible incident that has been a cause of confusion to\nthose who did not see how God could approve lying, and a cause of\nrejoicing to those who wanted to find evidence of his justification\nof that practice, is the story of the prophet Micaiah, saying before\nJehoshaphat and Ahab that the Lord had put a lying spirit into the\nmouths of all the false prophets who were at that time before\nthose kings.[1] Herbert Spencer actually cites this incident as an\nillustration of the example set before the people of Israel, by their\nGod, of lying as a means of accomplishing a desired end.[2] But just\nlook at the story as it stands!\n\n[Footnote 1: 1 Kings 22: 1-23; 2 Chron. 18: 1-34.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _The Inductions of Ethics_, p. 158.]\n\nFour hundred of Ahab's prophets were ready to tell him that a campaign\nwhich he wanted to enter upon would be successful. Micaiah, an honest\nprophet of the Lord, was sent for at Jehoshaphat's request, and was\nurged by the messenger to prophesy to the same effect as Ahab's\nprophets. Micaiah replied that he should give the Lord's message,\nwhether it was agreeable or not to Ahab. He came, and at first he\nspoke satirically as if he agreed with the other prophets in deeming\nthe campaign a hopeful one. It was as though he said to the king, You\nwant me to aid you in your plans, not to give you counsel from the\nLord; therefore I will say, as your prophets have said, Go ahead, and\nhave success. It was evident, however, to Ahab, that the prophet's\nwords were not to be taken literally, but were a rebuke to him in\nOriental style, and therefore he told the prophet to give him the\nLord's message plainly. Then the prophet gave a parable, or a message\nin Oriental guise, showing that these four hundred prophets of Ahab\nwere speaking falsely, as if inspired by a lying spirit, and that, if\nAhab followed their counsel, he would go to his ruin.\n\nTo cite this parable as a proof of Jehovah's commendation of lying is\nan absurdity. Jehovah's prophet Micaiah was there before the\nking, telling the simple truth to the king. And, in order to meet\neffectively the claim of the false prophets that they were inspired,\nhe related, as it were, a vision, or a parable, in which he declared\nthat he had seen preparations making in heaven for their inspiring by\na lying spirit. This was, as every Oriental would understand it, a\nparliamentary way of calling the four hundred prophets a pack of\nliars; and the event proved that all of them were liars, and that\nMicaiah alone, as Jehovah's prophet, was a truth-teller. What folly\ncould be greater than the attempt to count this public charge against\nthe lying prophets as an item of evidence in proof of the Lord's\nresponsibility for their lying--which the Lord's prophet took this\nmethod of exposing and rebuking!\n\nThere are, indeed, various instances in the Bible story of lies told\nby men who were in favor with God, where there is no ground for\nclaiming that those lies had approval with God. The men of the Bible\nstory are shown as men, with the sins and follies and weaknesses of\nmen. Their conduct is to be judged by the principles enunciated in the\nBible, and their character is to be estimated by the relation which\nthey sustained toward God in spite of their human infirmities.\n\nAbraham is called the father of the faithful,[1] and he was known as\nthe friend of God.[2] But he indulged in the vice of concubinage,[3]\nin accordance with the loose morals of his day and of his\nsurroundings; and when he was down in Egypt he lied through his\ndistrust of God, apparently thinking that there was such a thing as\na \"lie of necessity,\" and he brought upon himself the rebuke of an\nEgyptian king because of his lying.[4] But it would be folly to claim\nthat God approved of concubinage or of lying, because a man whom he\nwas saving was guilty of either of these vices. Isaac also lied,[5]\nand so did Jacob;[6] but it was not because of their lies that these\nmen had favor with God. David was a man after God's own heart[7] in\nhis fidelity of spirit to God as the only true God, in contrast with\nthe gods of the nations round about Israel; but David lied,[8] as\nDavid committed adultery.[9] It would hardly be claimed, however, that\neither his adultery or his lying in itself made David a man after\nGod's own heart. So all along the Bible narrative, down to the time\nwhen Ananias and Sapphira, prominent among the early Christians, lied\nunto God concerning their very gifts into his treasury, and were\nstruck dead as a rebuke of their lying.[10]\n\n[Footnote 1: Josh. 24:3; Isa. 51: 2; Matt. 3: 9; Rom. 4:12; Gal. 3:9]\n\n[Footnote 2: 2 Chron. 20: 7; Isa. 41: 8; Jas. 2: 23.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Gen. 16: 1-6.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Gen. 12: 10-19.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Gen. 26: 6-10.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Gen. 27: 6-29.]\n\n[Footnote 7: 1 Sam. 11: 1-27]\n\n[Footnote 8: 1 Sam. 21: 1,2.]\n\n[Footnote 9: 2 Sam. 11: 1-27.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Acts 5: 1-11.]\n\nThe whole sweep of Bible teaching is opposed to lying; and the\nspecific injunctions against that sin, as well as the calls to the\nduty of truth-speaking, are illustrative of that sweep. \"Ye shall not\nsteal; neither shall ye deal falsely, nor lie one to another,\"[1] says\nthe Lord, in holding up the right standard before his children. \"A\nlying tongue\" is said to be \"an abomination\" before the Lord.[2] \"A\nfaithful witness will not lie: but a false witness breatheth out\nlies,\"[3] says Solomon, in marking the one all-dividing line of\ncharacter; and as to the results of lying he says, \"He that breatheth\nout lies shall not escape,\"[4] and \"he that breatheth out lies shall\nperish.\"[5] And he adds the conclusion of wisdom, in view of the\nsupposed profit of lying, \"A poor man is better than a liar;\"[6] that\nis, a truth-telling poor man is better than a rich liar.\n\n[Footnote 1: Lev. 19:11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Prov. 6:16, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Prov. 14:5.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Prov. 19:5.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Prov. 19:9.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Prov. 19:22.]\n\nThe inspired Psalms are full of such teachings: \"The wicked are\nestranged from the womb: they go astray as soon as they be born,\nspeaking lies.\"[1] \"They delight in lies.\"[2] \"The mouth of them that\nspeak lies shall be stopped.\"[3] \"He that speaketh falsehood shall not\nbe established before mine [the Psalmist's] eyes.\"[4] And the Psalmist\nprays, \"Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips.\"[5] In the New\nTestament it is much the same as in the Old. \"Lie not one to another;\nseeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings,\"[6] is the\napostolic injunction; and again, \"Speak ye truth each one with his\nneighbor: for we are members one of another.\"[7] There is no place for\na lie in Bible ethics, under the earlier dispensation or the later.\n\n[Footnote 1: Psa. 58:3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Psa. 62:4.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Psa. 63:11.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Psa. 101: 7.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Psa. 120: 2.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Col. 3: 9.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Eph. 4: 25.]\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nDEFINITIONS.\n\n\nIt would seem to be clear that the Bible, and also the other sacred\nbooks of the world, and the best moral sense of mankind everywhere,\nare united in deeming a lie incompatible with the idea of a holy\nGod, and consistent only with the spirit of man's arch-enemy--the\nembodiment of all evil. Therefore he who, admitting this, would find a\nplace in God's providential plan for a \"lie of necessity\" must begin\nwith claiming that there are lies which are not lies. Hence it is of\nprime importance to define a lie clearly, and to distinguish it from\nallowable and proper concealments of truth.\n\nA lie, in its stricter sense, is the affirming, by word or by action,\nof that which is not true, with a purpose of deceiving; or the\ndenying, by word or by action, of that which is true, with a purpose\nof deceiving. But the suppressing or concealing of essential facts,\nfrom one who is entitled to know them, with a purpose of deceiving,\nmay practically amount to a lie.\n\nObviously a lie may be by act, as really as by word; as when a man\nis asked to tell the right road, and he silently points in the wrong\ndirection. Obviously, also, the intention or purpose of deceiving is\nin the essence of the lie; for if a man says that which is not true,\nsupposing it to be true, he makes a misstatement, but he does not lie;\nor, again, if he speaks an untruth playfully where no deception is\nwrought or intended, as by saying, when the mercury is below zero,\nthat it is \"good summer weather,\" there is no lie in the patent\nuntruth.\n\nSo far all are likely to be agreed; but when it comes to the question\nof that concealment which is in the realm of the lie, as distinct from\nright and proper concealment, there is more difficulty in making\nthe lines of distinction clear to all minds. Yet those lines can be\ndefined, and it is important that they should be.\n\nA witness on the stand in a court of law is bound by his oath, or his\naffirmation, to tell \"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the\ntruth,\" in the testimony that he gives in response to the questions\nasked of him. If, therefore, in the course of his testimony, he\ndeclares that he received five dollars for his share in a certain\ntransaction, when in reality he received five hundred dollars, his\nconcealment of the fact that he received a hundred times as much as he\nadmits having received, is practically a lie, and is culpable as such.\nAny intentional concealment of essential facts in the matter at issue,\nin his answers to questions asked of him as a witness, is a lie in\nessence.\n\nBut a person who is not before a court of justice is not necessarily\nbound to tell all the facts involved to every person whom he\naddresses, or who desires to have him do so; and therefore, while a\nconcealment of facts which ought to be disclosed may be equivalent to\na lie, there is such a thing as the concealment of facts which is not\nonly allowable, but which is an unmistakable duty. And to know\nwhen concealment is right, and when it is wrong, is to know when\nconcealment partakes of the nature of a lie, and when it is a totally\ndifferent matter.\n\nConcealment, so far from being in itself a sin, is in itself right; it\nis only in its misuse that it becomes reprehensible in a given case.\nConcealment is a prime duty of man; as truly a duty as truth-speaking,\nor chastity, or honesty. God, who cannot lie to his creatures,\nconceals much from his creatures. \"The secret things belong unto the\nLord our God: but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to\nour children for ever,\"[1] says the author of Deuteronomy; and the\nwhole course of God's revelation to man is in accordance with this\nannounced principle of God's concealment of that which ought to be\nconcealed. He who is himself the revelation of God says to his chosen\ndisciples, even when he is speaking his latest words to them before\nhis death: \"I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear\nthem now;\"[2] and he conceals what, as yet, it is better for them\nshould remain concealed.\n\n[Footnote 1: Deut. 29: 29.]\n\n[Footnote 2: John 16:12.]\n\nThere is a profound meaning in the suggestion, in the Bible story of\nman's \"fall,\" that, when man had come to the knowledge of good and\nevil, the first practical duty which he recognized as incumbent upon\nhimself, was the duty of concealment;[1] and from that day to this\nthat duty has been incumbent on him. Man has a duty to conceal his\nbesetting impurities of thought and inclinations to sin; to conceal\nsuch of his doubts and fears as would dishearten others and weaken\nhimself by their expression; to conceal his unkindnesses of spirit and\nhis unjust prejudices of feeling; to conceal, in fact, whatever of his\ninnermost personality is liable to work harm by its disclosure, and to\na knowledge of which his fellows have no just claim. In the world as\nit is, there is more to be concealed than to be disclosed in every\nindividual life; and concealment rather than disclosure is the rule of\npersonal action.\n\n[Footnote 1: Gen. 3:6, 7.]\n\nAbsolute and unrestricted frankness in social intercourse would be\nbrutal. The speaking of the whole truth at all times and to everybody\ncould have neither justification nor excuse between man and man. We\nhave no right to tell our fellows all that we think of them, or\nfear for them, or suspect them of. We have no right to betray the\nconfidences of those who trust us, or to disclose to all the fact that\nwe have such confidences to conceal. We have no right to let it be\ngenerally known that there are such peculiar struggles within us as\nmake our lives a ceaseless battle with temptations and fears and\ndoubts. There is such a thing as an indecent exposure of personal\nopinions, and as a criminal disclosure of the treasures of the inner\nlife.[1] How to conceal aright that which ought to be concealed, is\none of the vital questions of upright living.\n\n[Footnote 1: See 2 Kings 20: 12-19.]\n\nThe duty of right concealment stands over against the sin of lying.\nWhatever ought to be concealed, should be concealed, if concealment\nis a possibility without sinning. But the strongest desire for\nconcealment can never justify a lie as a means of concealment; and\nconcealment at the cost of a lie becomes a sin through the means\nemployed for its securing. On the other hand, when disclosure is a\nduty, concealment is sinful, because it is made to stand in the way of\nthe performance of a duty. Concealment is not in itself wrong, but it\nmay become wrong through its misuse. Lying is in itself wrong, and it\ncannot be made right through any seeming advantage to be gained by it.\n\nConcealment which is right in one instance may be wrong in another\ninstance, the difference being in the relations of the two parties in\nthe case. A man who has lost a leg or an eye may properly conceal\nfrom others generally the fact of his loss by any legitimate means of\nconcealment. His defect is a purely personal matter. The public has\nno claim upon him for all the facts in the premises. He may have an\nartificial limb or an artificial eye, so constructed as to conceal his\nloss from the ordinary observer. There is nothing wrong in this. It\nis in the line of man's primal duty of concealment. But if a man\nthus disabled were applying for a life-insurance policy, or were an\napplicant for re-enlistment in the army, or were seeking employment\nwhere bodily wholeness is a requisite, it would be his duty to\nmake known his defect; and the concealment of it from the parties\ninterested would be in the realm of the lie.\n\nSo, again, if a man were proposing marriage, or were entering into\nconfidential relations with a partner in business, or were seeking\nfinancial aid from a bank, he would have no right to conceal from the\nparty interested many a fact which he could properly conceal from the\npublic.\n\nA man who would be justified in concealing from the general public\nhis mental troubles, or his business embarrassments, or his spiritual\nperplexities, could not properly conceal the essential facts in the\ncase from his chosen adviser in medicine, or in law, or in matters of\nreligion. It is a man's duty to disclose the whole truth to him who\nhas a right to know the whole truth. It is a man's right, and it may\nbecome his duty, to conceal a measure of the truth from one who is not\nentitled to know that portion of the truth, so far as he can properly\nmake concealment. But as a lie is never justifiable, it is never a\nproper means of concealment; and if concealment be, in any case, a\nmode of lying, it is as bad as any other form of lying.\n\nBut concealment, even when it is of facts that others have no right to\nknow, may cause others to be deceived, and deliberate deceit is one\nform of a lie. How, then, can concealment that is sure to result in\ndeception be free from the sin that invariably attaches to a lie in\nany form, or of any nature whatsoever?\n\nConcealment which is for the _purpose_ of deception, is one thing;\nconcealment which is only for the purpose of concealment, but which is\nsure to _result_ in deception, is quite another thing. The one is not\njustifiable, the other may be. In the one case it is a man's purpose\nto deceive his fellow-man; in the other case it is simply his purpose\nto conceal what his fellow-man has no right to know, and that\nfellow-man receives a false impression, or deceives himself, in\nconsequence.\n\nWe may, or we may not, be responsible for the obvious results of our\naction; and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure of\nour responsibility in the premises. A surgeon, who is engaged in an\nimportant and critical operation, is told that he is wanted elsewhere\nin a case of life and death. If he sees it to be his duty to continue\nwhere he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time, he\nobviously is not responsible for results which come because of his\nabsence from the side of the other sufferer. A man is by a river bank\nwhen a boy is sinking before his eyes. If the man were to reach out\nhis arms to him, the boy might be saved. But the man makes no movement\nin the boy's behalf, and the boy drowns. It might seem as though that\nman were responsible for that boy's death; but when it is known that\nthe man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son,\nwho is also struggling in the water, it will have to be admitted that\nthe father is not responsible for the results of his inaction in\nanother sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of his\nimperative duty.\n\nIf a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to her\nsick husband and to her sick child, and she chooses that which she\nsees to be the more important duty of the hour, she is not responsible\nfor any results that follow from her inability to be in two places at\nthe same time. A man with a limited income may know that ten families\nare in need of money, while he can give help to only two of them. Even\nthough others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he can\naid, he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision to\nlimit his ministry to his means.\n\nIn all our daily life, our decision to do the one duty of the hour\ninvolves our refusal to do what is not our duty, and we have no\nresponsibility for the results which come from such a refusal. So in\nthe matter of the duty of concealment, if a man simply purposes the\nconcealment from another of that which the other has no right to know,\nand does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is not\ntrue, nor deny by act or word that which is true, he is in no degree\nresponsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point which\nis no proper concern of that other person.\n\nOthers are self-deceived with reference to us in many things, beyond\nour responsibility or knowledge. We may be considered weaker or\nstronger, wiser or more simple, younger or older, gladder or sadder,\nthan we are; but for the self-deception on that point by the average\nobserver we are not responsible. We may not even be aware of it. It\nis really no concern of ours--or of our neighbor's. It is merely an\nincident of human life as it is. We may have an aching tooth or\nan aching heart, and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in the\nexpression of our face. In such a case we merely conceal what is our\nown possession from those who have no claim to know it. Even though\nthey deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of our\nlooks, we are not responsible for their self-deception, because they\nare not possessed of all the facts, nor have they any right to them,\nnor yet to a fixed opinion in the case.\n\nIf a man were to have a patch put on his coat, he might properly have\nit put on the under side of the coat instead of the outer side, thus\nmaking what is called \"a blind patch,\" for the purpose of concealing\nthe defect in his garment. Even though this course might result in a\nfalse impression on the mind of the casual observer, the man would not\nbe blameworthy, as he would be if he had pursued the same course with\na purpose of deceiving a purchaser of the coat. So, again, in the\ncase of a mender of bric-a-brac: it would be right for him to\ncement carefully the parts of a broken vase for the mere purpose of\nconcealing its damaged condition from the ordinary eye, but not for\nthe purpose of deceiving one who would be a purchaser.\n\nA man whose city house is closed from the public in the summer season,\nbecause of his absence in the country, has a perfect right to come\nto that house for a single night, without opening the shutters and\nlighting up the rooms in intimation of his presence. He may even keep\nthose shutters closed while his room is lighted, for the express\npurpose of concealing the fact of his presence there, and yet not be\nresponsible for any false impression on the minds of passers-by, who\nthink that the proprietor is still in the country, and that the city\nhouse is vacant. On the other hand, if the house be left lighted up\nall through the night, with the shutters open, while the inmates are\nasleep, for the very purpose of concealing from those outside the fact\nthat no one in the house is awake and on guard, the proprietor is not\nresponsible for any self-deception which results to those who have no\nright to know the facts in the case.\n\nAnd so, again, in the matter of having a man's hat or coat on the rack\nin the front hall, while there are only women in the house, the sole\npurpose of the action may be the concealment of the real condition of\naffairs from those who have no claim to know the truth, and not the\ndeliberate deception of any party in interest. In so far as the\npurpose is merely the concealment from others of the defenseless\ncondition of the house the action is obviously a proper one,\nnotwithstanding its liability to result in false impressions on the\nminds of those who have no right to an opinion in the case.\n\nWhile a man would be justified in concealing, without falsehood, the\nfact of a bodily lack or infirmity on his part which concerned himself\nalone, he would not be justified in concealing the fact that he was\nsick of a contagious disease, or that his house was infected by\na disease that might be given to a caller there. Nor would he be\njustified in concealing a defect in a horse or a cow in order to\ndeceive a man into the purchase of that animal as a sound one, any\nmore than he would be justified in slightly covering an opening in the\nground before his house, so as to deceive a disagreeable visitor into\nstumbling into that hole.\n\nIt would be altogether proper for a man with a bald head to conceal\nhis baldness from the general public by a well-constructed wig. It\nwould likewise be proper for him to wear a wig in order to guard his\nshining pate against flies while at church in July, or against danger\nfrom pneumonia in January, even though wide-awake children in the\nneighboring pews deceived themselves into thinking that he had a fine\nhead of natural hair. But if that man were to wear that wig for the\npurpose of deceiving a young woman, whom he wished to marry, as to his\nage and as to his freedom from bodily defects, it would be quite a\ndifferent matter. Concealment for the mere purpose of concealment may\nbe, not only justifiable, but a duty. Concealment for the purpose of\ndeception is never justifiable.\n\nIt would seem that this is the principle on which God acts with\nreference to both the material and the moral universe. He conceals\nfacts, with the result that many a man is self-deceived, in his\nignorance, as to the size of the stars, and the cause of eclipses, and\nthe processes of nature, and the consequences of conduct, in many an\nimportant particular. But man, and not God, is responsible for man's\nself-deception concerning points at which man can make no claim to a\nright to know all the truth.\n\nIt is true that this distinction is a delicate one, but it is a\ndistinction none the less real on that account. A moral line, like a\nmathematical line, has length, but neither breadth nor thickness.\nAnd the line that separates a justifiable concealment which causes\nself-deception on the part of those who are not entitled to know the\nwhole truth in the matter, and the deliberate concealment of truth for\nthe specific purpose of deception, is a line that runs all the way\nup from the foundations to the summit of the universe. This line of\ndistinction is vital to an understanding of the question of the duty\nof truth-speaking, and of the sin of lying.\n\nAn effort at right concealment may include truthful statements which\nare likely, or even sure, to result in false impressions on the mind\nof the one to whom they are addressed, and who in consequence deceives\nhimself as to the facts, when the purpose of those statements is\nnot the deception of the hearer. A husband may have had a serious\nmisunderstanding with his wife that causes him pain of heart, so that\nhis face gives sign of it as he comes out of the house in the morning.\nThe difficulty which has given him such mental anxiety is one which he\nought to conceal. He has no right to disclose it to others. Yet he has\nno right to speak an untruth for the purpose of concealing that which\nhe ought to conceal.\n\nIt may be that the mental trouble has already deprived him of sleep,\nand has intensified his anxiety over a special business matter that\nawaits his attention down town, and that all this shows in his face.\nIf so, these facts are secondary but very real causes of his troubled\nlook, as he meets a neighbor on leaving his house, who says to him:\n\"You look very much troubled this morning. What's the matter with\nyou?\" Now, if he were to say in reply, \"Then my looks belie me; for I\nhave no special trouble,\" he would say what was not true. But he might\nproperly say, \"I think it is very likely. I didn't sleep well last\nnight, and I am very tired this morning. And I have work before me\nto-day that I am not easy about.\" Those statements being literally\ntrue, and being made for the purpose of concealing facts which his\nquestioner has no right to know, their utterance is justifiable,\nregardless of the workings of the mind of the one who hears them. They\nare made in order to conceal what is back of them, not in order to\ndeceive one who is entitled to know those primary facts.\n\nIf, again, a physician in attendance on a patient sees that there\nis cause for grave anxiety in the patient's condition, and deems\nit important to conceal his fears, so far as he can without\nuntruthfulness, he may, in answer to direct questions from his\npatient, give truthful answers that are designed to conceal what he\nhas a right to conceal, without his desiring to deceive his patient,\nand without his being responsible for any self-deception on his\npatient's part that results from their conversation. The patient may\nask, \"Doctor, am I very sick?\" The doctor may answer truthfully, \"Not\nso sick as you might be, by a good deal.\" He may give this answer with\na cheerful look and tone, and it may result in calming the patient's\nfears.\n\nIf, however, the patient goes on to ask, \"But, doctor, do you think\nI'm going to die?\" the doctor may respond lightly, \"Well, most of us\nwill die sooner or later, and I suppose you are not to be exempt from\nthe ordinary lot of mortals.\" \"But,\" continues the patient, \"do you\nthink I am going to die of this disease?\" Then the doctor can say,\nseriously and truthfully, \"I'm sure I don't know. The future is\nconcealed from me. You may live longer than I do. I certainly hope\nyou are not going to die yet awhile, and I'm going to do all I can to\nprevent it.\" All this would be justifiable, and be within the limits\nof truthfulness. Concealment of the opinions of the physician as to\nthe patient's chances of life, and not the specific deception of the\npatient, is the object of these answers.\n\nIn no event, however, would the physician be justified in telling a\nlie, any more than he would be in committing any other sin, as a means\nof good. He is necessarily limited by the limits of right, in the\nexercise of his professional skill, and in the choice of available\nmeans. He is in no wise responsible for the consequences of his\nrefusal to go beyond those limits.\n\nConcealment may be, or may not be, of the nature of deception.\nConcealment is not right when disclosure is a duty. Concealment of\nthat which may properly be concealed is not in itself wrong. Efforts\nat concealment must, in order to be right, be kept within the limits\nof strict truthfulness of statement. Concealment for the purpose of\ndeception is in the realm of the lie. Concealment for the mere purpose\nof concealment may be in the realm of positive duty--in the sight of\nGod and for the sake of our fellows.\n\nIt is to be borne in mind that the definitions here given do not pivot\non the specific illustrations proffered for their explanation. If, in\nany instance, the illustration seems inapt or imperfect, it may\nbe thrown aside, and reference made to the definition itself. The\ndefinition represents the principle involved; the illustration is only\na suggestion of the principle.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\nTHE PLEA OF \"NECESSITY.\"\n\n\nThe story is told of an old Quaker, who, after listening for a time\nto the unstinted praises, by a dry-goods salesman, of the various\narticles he was trying to dispose of, said quietly: \"Friend, it is a\ngreat pity that lying is a sin, since it seems so necessary in thy\nbusiness.\" It has been generally supposed that this remark of the old\nQuaker was a satirical one, rather than a serious expression of regret\nover the clashing of the demands of God's nature with the practical\nnecessities of men. Yet, as a matter of fact, there are moral\nphilosophers, and writers on Christian ethics, who seem to take\nseriously the position assumed by this Quaker, and who argue\ndeliberately that there are such material advantages to be secured\nby lying, in certain emergencies, that it would be a great pity to\nrecognize any unvarying rule, with reference to lying, that would\nshut off all possibility of desired gain from this practice under\nconditions of greatest urgency.\n\nIt is claimed that lying proffers such unmistakable advantages in time\nof war, and of sickness, and in dealings with would-be criminals\nand the insane, and other classes exempt from ordinary social\nconsideration, that lying becomes a necessity when the gain from it is\nof sufficient magnitude. Looked at in this light, lying is not sinful\n_per se_, but simply becomes sinful by its misuse or untimeliness; for\nif it be sinful _per se_, no temporary or material advantage from its\nexercise could ever make it other than sinful.\n\nIf, indeed, the rightfulness of lying is contingent on the results\nto be hoped for or to be feared from it, the prime question with\nreference to it, in a moral estimate of its propriety, is the limit of\nprofit, or of gain, which will justify it as a necessity. But with all\nthat has been written on this subject in the passing centuries, the\nadvocates of the \"lie of necessity\" have had to contend with the moral\nsense of the world as to the sinfulness of lying, and with the fact\nthat lying is not merely a violation of a social duty, but is contrary\nto the demands of the very nature of God, and of the nature of man\nas formed in the image of God. And it has been the practice of such\nadvocates to ignore or to deny the testimony of this moral sense of\nthe race, and to persist in looking at lying mainly in the light of\nits social aspects.\n\nThat the moral sense of the race is against the admissibility of the\nrightfulness of lying, is shown by the estimate of this sin as a sin\nin the ethnic conceptions of it, even among peoples who indulge freely\nin its practice, as well as in the teachings of the sacred books of\nthe ages. And, moreover, it is _not_ the fact, as is often claimed,\nthat lying is generally admitted to be allowable between enemies in\nwar time, or by a physician to his patient, or by a sane man to one\nwho is insane, or in order to the prevention of crime, or for the\npurpose of securing some real or supposed advantage in any case.\n\nThe right to conceal from the enemy one's weakness, or one's plans,\nby any exhibit of \"quaker guns,\" or of mock fortifications, or of\nmovements and counter-movements, or of feints of attack, or of surplus\nwatchfires, in time of warfare, is recognized on all sides. But the\nright to lie to or to deceive the enemy by sending out a flag of\ntruce, as if in desire for a peaceful conference, and following it up\nwith an attack on his lines in an unsuspecting moment, is not admitted\nin any theory of \"civilized warfare.\" And while a scout may creep\nwithin the enemy's lines, and make observations of the enemy's\nweakness and strength of position, without being open to any charge of\ndishonorable conduct,--if he comes disguised as a soldier of the\nother side than his own, or if he claims to be a mere civilian or\nnon-combatant, he is held to be a \"spy,\" and as such he is denied a\nsoldier's death, and must yield his life on the gallows as a deceiver\nand a liar.\n\nThe distinction between justifiable concealment for the mere purpose\nof concealment, and concealment for the express purpose of deceiving,\nis recognized as clearly in warfare as in peaceful civil life; and the\nwriter on Christian ethics who appeals to the approved practices of\nwarfare in support of the \"lie of necessity\" can have only the plea of\nignorance as an excuse for his baseless argument.\n\nAn enemy in warfare has no right to know the details of his opponent's\nplans for his overcoming; but his opponent has no right to lie to\nhim, by word or action, as a means of concealment; for a lie is never\njustifiable, and therefore is never a necessity. And this is admitted\nin the customs of honorable warfare. Illustrations of this distinction\nare abundant. A Federal officer, taken prisoner in battle, was brought\nbefore a Confederate officer for examination. He was asked his name,\nhis rank, his regiment, his brigade, his division, and his corps. To\nall these questions he gave truthful answers promptly; for the enemy\nhad a right to information at these points concerning a prisoner of\nwar. But when the question came, \"What is the present strength of your\ncorps?\" he replied, \"Two and a half millions.\" \"That cannot be true,\"\nsaid the Confederate officer. \"Do you expect me to tell you the truth,\nColonel, in such a matter?\" he responded, in reminder of the fact that\nit was proper for him to conceal facts which the other had no right to\nknow; and his method of concealment was by an answer that was intended\nto conceal, but not to deceive.\n\nIn Libby Prison, during war time, the attempt to prevent written\nmessages being carried out by released prisoners was at first made by\nthe careful examination of the clothing and persons of such prisoners;\nbut this proved to be ineffectual. Then it was decided to put every\noutgoing prisoner on his word of honor as a soldier in this matter;\nand that was effectual. A true soldier would require something more\nthan the average treatise on Christian ethics to convince him that a\nlie to an enemy in war time is justifiable as a \"lie of necessity,\" on\nthe ground of its profitableness.\n\nIn dealing with the sick, however desirable it may be, in any\ninstance, to conceal from a patient his critical condition, the\ndifference must always be observed between truthful statements that\nconceal that which the physician, or other speaker, has a right to\nconceal, and statements that are not strictly true, or that are made\nfor the explicit purpose of deceiving the patient. It is a physician's\nduty to conceal from a patient his sense of the grave dangers\ndisclosed to his professional eye, and which he is endeavoring to meet\nsuccessfully. And, in wellnigh every case, it is possible for him to\ngive truthful answers that will conceal from his patient what he ought\nto conceal; for the best physician does not know the future, and his\nprofessional guesses are not to be put forward as if they were assured\ncertitudes.\n\nIf, indeed, it were generally understood, as many ethical writers are\ndisposed to claim, that physicians are ready to lie as a help to their\npatients' recovery, physicians, as a class, would thereby be deprived\nof the power of encouraging their patients by words of sincere and\nhearty confidence. There are physicians whose most hopeful assurances\nare of little or no service to their patients, because those\nphysicians are known to be willing to lie to a patient in an\nemergency; and how can a timid patient be sure that his case does not\npresent such an emergency? Therefore it is that a physician's habit of\nlying to his patients as a means of cure would cause him to lose the\npower of aiding by truthful assurances those patients who most needed\nhelp of this sort.\n\nIt is poor policy, as policy, to venture a lie in behalf of a single\npatient, at the cost of losing the power to make the truth beneficial\nto a hundred patients whose lives may be dependent on wise words of\nencouragement. And the policy is still poorer as policy, when it is in\nthe line of an unmistakable sin. And many a good physician like many\na good soldier, repudiates the idea of a \"lie of necessity\" in his\nprofession.\n\nSince lying is sinful because a lie is always a lie unto God, the fact\nthat a lie is spoken to an insane person or to a would-be criminal\ndoes not make it any the less a sin in God's sight. And it is held by\nsome of the most eminent physicians to the insane that lying to the\ninsane is as poor policy as it is bad morals, and that it is never\njustifiable, and therefore is never a \"necessity\" in that sphere.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: See, for example, the views of Dr. Thomas S. Kirkbride,\nphysician-in-chief and superintendent of the Pennsylvania Hospital\nfor the Insane, in the Report of that institution for 1883, at pages\n74-76. In speaking of the duty of avoiding deception in dealings with\nthe insane, he said: \"I never think it right to speak anything but the\ntruth.\"]\n\nSo also in dealing with the would-be criminal, a lie is not\njustifiable in order to save one's life, or one's possessions that are\ndearer than life, nor yet to prevent the commission of a crime or to\nguard the highest interests of those whom we love. Yet concealment of\nthat which ought to be concealed is as truly a duty when disclosure\nwould lead to crime, or would imperil the interests of ourselves or\nothers, as it is in all the ordinary affairs of life; but lying as a\nmeans of concealment is not to be tolerated in such a case any more\nthan in any other case.\n\nIf a robber, with a pistol in his hand, were in a man's bedroom at\nnight, it would not be wrong for the defenseless inmate to remain\nquiet in his bed, in concealment of the fact that he was awake, if\nthereby he could save his life, at the expense of his property. If a\nwould-be murderer were seeking his victim, and a man who knew this\nfact were asked to tell of his whereabouts, it would be that man's\nduty to conceal his knowledge at this point by all legitimate means.\nHe might refuse to speak, even though his own life were risked\nthereby; for it were better to die than to lie. And so in many another\nemergency.\n\nA lie being a sin _per se_, no price paid for it, nor any advantage to\nbe gained from it, would make it other than a sin. The temptation to\nlook at it as a \"necessity\" may, indeed, be increased by increasing\nthe supposed cost of its refusal; but it is a temptation to\nwrong-doing to the last. It was a heathen maxim, \"Do right though the\nheavens fall,\" and Christian ethics ought not to have a lower standard\nthan that of the best heathen morality.\n\nDuty toward God cannot be counted out of this question. God himself\ncannot lie. God cannot justify or approve a lie. Hence it follows that\nhe who deliberately lies in order to secure a gain to himself, or to\none whom he loves, must by that very act leave the service of God, and\nput himself for the time being under the rule of the \"father of\nlies.\" Thus in an emergency which seems to a man to justify a \"lie of\nnecessity\" that man's attitude toward God might be indicated in this\naddress to him: \"Lord, I should prefer to continue in your service,\nand I would do so if you were able and willing to help me. But I find\nmyself in an emergency where a lie is a 'necessity,' and so I must\navail myself of the help of 'the father of lies.' If I am carried\nthrough this crisis by his help, I shall be glad to resume my position\nin your service.\" The man whose whole moral nature recoils from this\nposition, will not be led into it by the best arguments of Christian\nphilosophers in favor of the \"lie of necessity.\"\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\nCENTURIES OF DISCUSSION.\n\n\nBecause of the obvious gain in lying in times of extremity, and\nbecause of the manifest peril or cost of truth-telling in an\nemergency, attempts have been made, by interested or prejudiced\npersons, all along the ages, to reconcile the general duty of adhering\nto an absolute standard of right, with the special inducements, or\ntemptations, to depart from that standard for the time being. It has\nbeen claimed by many that the results of a lie would, under certain\ncircumstances, justify the use of a lie,--the good end in this case\njustifying the bad means in this case. And the endeavor has also been\nmade to show that what is called a lie is not always a lie. Yet there\nhave ever been found stalwart champions of the right, ready to insist\nthat a lie is a sin _per se_, and therefore not to be justified by any\nadvantage or profit in its utterance.\n\nProminent in the earlier recorded discussions of the centuries\nconcerning the admissibility of the lie, are those of the Jewish\nTalmudists and of the Christian Fathers. As in the Bible story the\nstandard of right is recognized as unvariable, even though such Bible\ncharacters as Abraham and Jacob and David, and Ananias and Sapphira,\nfail to conform to it in personal practice; so in the records of the\nTalmud and the Fathers there are not wanting instances of godly men\nwho are ready to speak in favor of a departure from the strictest\nrequirement of the law of truth, even while the great sweep of\nsentiment is seen to be in favor of the line that separates the lie\nfrom the truth eternally.\n\nHamburger, a recognized Jewish authority in this sphere, represents\nthe teachings of the Talmud as even more comprehensive and explicit\nthan the Bible itself, in favor of the universal duty of truthfulness.\nHe says: \"Mosaism, with its fundamental law of holiness, has\nestablished the standard of truthfulness with incomparable\ndefiniteness and sharpness (see Lev. 19: 2, 12, 13, 34-37).\nTruthfulness is here presented as derived directly from the principle\nof holiness, and to be practiced without regard to resulting benefit\nor injury to foe or to friend, to foreigner or to countryman. In this\nmoral loftiness these Mosaic teachings as to truthfulness pervade the\nwhole Bible. In the Talmud they receive a profounder comprehension and\na further development. Truthfulness toward men is represented as a\nduty toward God; and, on the other hand, any departure from it is a\ndeparture from God.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hamburger's _Real-Encyclopadie f\u00fcr Bibel und Talmud_, I.,\nart. \"Truthfulness\" (_Wahrhaftigkeit_).]\n\nAs specimen illustrations of the teachings of the Talmud on this\ntheme, Hamburger quotes these utterances from its pages: \"He who\nalters his word, at the same time commits idolatry.\" \"Three are hated\nof God: he who speaks with his mouth otherwise than as he feels with\nhis heart; he who knows of evidence against any one, and does not\ndisclose it,\" etc. \"Four cannot appear before God: the scorner, the\nhypocrite, the liar, and the slanderer.\" \"'A just measure thou shalt\nkeep;' that is, we should not think one thing in our heart, and speak\nanother with our mouth.\" \"Seven commit the offense of theft: he who\nsteals [sneaks into] the good will of another; he who invites his\nfriend to visit him, and does not mean it in his heart; he who offers\nhis neighbor presents, knowing beforehand that he will not receive\nthem,\" etc.\n\nAnd Hamburger adds: \"Every lie, therefore, however excellent the\nmotive, is decidedly forbidden.... In the tract Jebamoth, 63, Raba\nblames his son for employing a 'lie of necessity' _(nothl\u00fcge)_ to\nrestore peace between his father and his mother.... It is clear that\nthe Talmud decidedly rejects the principle that 'the end justifies the\nmeans.'\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare also art. \"Falseness\" _(Falscheit)_.]\n\nOn the other hand, Hamburger cites Rabbi Ishmael, one of the\nTalmudists, as teaching that a Jew might transgress even the\nprohibition of idolatry (and lying is, according to Talmudic teaching,\nequivalent to idolatry) in order to save his life, provided the act\nwas not done in public. In support of his position, Rabbi Ishmael\ncited the declaration concerning the statutes of Moses in Leviticus\n18: 5, \"which if a man do he shall live in them,\" and added by way of\nexplanation: \"He [the Israelite] is to live through the law, but is\nnot to die through it.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Hamburger's _Real-Encyc_., II., art. \"Ismael R.\"]\n\nAnd Isaac Abohab, an eminent Spanish rabbi, in his _Menorath\nHammaor_[1] gives other illustrations from the Talmud of the advocacy\nof special exceptions to the strict law of truthfulness, with a good\npurpose in view, notwithstanding the sweeping claim to the contrary\nby Hamburger. He says: \"Only when it is the intention to bring about\npeace between men, may anything be altered in discourse; as is taught\nin the tract Jebamoth. Rabbi Ilai says, in the name of Rabbi Jehuda,\nson of Rabbi Simeon: 'One may alter something in discourse for the\nsake of establishing harmony.'... Rabbi Nathan says: 'This indeed is a\nduty.'... Rabbi Ishmael taught: 'Peace is of such importance that for\nits sake God even alters facts.'\" In each of these cases the rabbi\ncited misapplies a Bible passage in support of his position.\n\n[Footnote 1: See German translation by R.J. F\u00fcrstenthal, Discourse\nII., I.]\n\nIsaac Abohab adds: \"In like manner the rabbis say that one may praise\na bride in the presence of her bridegroom, and say that she\nis handsome and devout, when she is neither, if the intention\npredominates to make her attractive in the eyes of her bridegroom.\nNevertheless a man is not to tell lies even in trifling matters, lest\nlying should come to be a habit with him, as is warned against in the\ntract Jebamoth.\"\n\nThus it would appear that there were discussions on this subject\namong the rabbis of the Talmud, and that while there were those who\nadvocated the \"lie of necessity,\" as a matter of personal gain or as a\nmeans of good to others, there were those who stood firmly against any\nform of the lie, or any falsity, as in itself at variance with the\nvery nature of God, and with the plain duty of God's children.\n\nAmong the Christian Fathers it was much the same as among the Jewish\nrabbis, in discussions over this question. The one unvarying standard\nwas recognized, by the clearest thinkers, as binding on all for\nalways; yet there were individuals inclined to find a reason for\nexceptions in the practical application of this standard. The phase of\nthe question that immediately presented itself to the early Christians\nwas, whether it were allowable for a man to deny to a pagan enemy that\nhe was a Christian, or that one whom he held dear was a Christian,\nwhen the speaking of the truth would cost him his life, or cost the\nlife of one whom he loved.\n\nThere were those who held that the duty to speak the truth was merely\na social obligation, and that when a man showed himself as an enemy\nof God and of his fellows, he shut himself out from the pale of this\nsocial obligation; moreover, that when such a man could be deterred\nfrom crime, and at the same time a Christian's life could be\npreserved, by the telling of an untruth, a falsehood would be\njustifiable. If the lie were told in private under such circumstances,\nit was by such persons considered different from a public denial of\none's faith. But, on the other hand, the great body of Christians,\nin the apostolic age, and in the age early following, acted on the\nconviction that a lie is a sin _per se_, and that no emergency could\nmake a lie a necessity. And it was in fidelity to this conviction that\nthe roll of Christian martyrs was so gloriously extended.\n\nJustin Martyr, whose Apologies in behalf of the Christians are the\nearliest extant, speaks for the best of the class he represents when\nhe says: \"It is in our power, when we are examined, to deny that we\nare Christians; but we would not live by telling a lie.\"[1] And again:\n\"When we are examined, we make no denial, because we are not conscious\nof any evil, but count it impious not to speak the truth in all\nthings, which also we know is pleasing to God.\"[2] There was no\nthought in such a mind as Justin Martyr's, or in the minds of his\nfellow-martyrs, that any life was worth saving at the cost of a lie in\nGod's sight.\n\n[Footnote 1: First Apology, Chapter 8.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Second Apology, Chapter 4.]\n\nThere were many temptations, and great ones, to the early Christians,\nto evade the consequences of being known as refusers to worship the\ngods of the Romans; and it is not to be wondered at that many poor\nmortals yielded to those temptations. Exemption from punishment could\nbe purchased by saying that one had offered sacrifices to the gods,\nor by accepting a certificate that such sacrifice had been made, even\nwhen such was not the fact; or, again, by professing a readiness to\nsacrifice, without the intention of such compliance, or by permitting\na friend to testify falsely as to the facts; and there were those who\nthought a lie of this sort justifiable, for the saving of their lives,\nwhen they would not have openly renounced their Christian faith.[1]\nThere was much discussion over these practices in the writings of the\nFathers; but while there was recognized a difference between open\napostasy and the tolerance of a falsehood in one's behalf, it was held\nby the church authorities that a lie was always sinful, even though\nthere were degrees in modes of sinning.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Smith and Cheetham's _Dictionary of Christian\nAntiquities_, art. \"Libelli.\" See also Bingham's _Antiquities of the\nChristian Church_, Book XVI., Chap. 13, Section 5; also Book XVI.,\nChap. 3, Section 14; with citations from Tertullian, Origen, and\nCyprian.]\n\nRinging words against all forms of lying were spoken by some of the\nChristian Fathers. Says the Shepherd of Hermas: \"Love the truth, and\nlet nothing but truth proceed from your mouth, that the spirit which\nGod has placed in your flesh may be found truthful before all men; and\nthe Lord, who dwelleth in you, will be glorified, because the Lord is\ntruthful in every word, and in him is no falsehood. They, therefore,\nwho lie, deny the Lord, and rob him, not giving back to him the\ndeposit which they have received. For they received from him a spirit\nfree from falsehood. If they give him back this spirit untruthful,\nthey pollute the commandment of the Lord, and become robbers.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Book II., Commandment Third. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_\n(Am. ed.), II., 21.]\n\nTertullian names among \"sins of daily committal, to which we all\nare liable,\" the \"sin\" of \"lying, from bashfulness [or modesty], or\n'necessity.'\"[1] Origen also speaks of the frequency of \"lying, or of\nidle talking;\"[2] as if possibly its frequency were in some sense an\nexcuse for it. And Origen specifically claimed that the apostles\nPeter and Paul agreed together to deceive their hearers at Antioch by\nsimulating a dissension between themselves, when in reality they were\nagreed.[3] Origen also seemed to approve of false speaking to those\nwho were not entitled to know all the truth; as when he says of the\ncautious use of falsehood, \"a man on whom necessity imposes the\nresponsibility of lying is bound to use very great care, and to use\nfalsehood as he would a stimulant or a medicine, and strictly to\npreserve its measure, and not go beyond the bounds observed by Judith\nin her dealings with Holofernes, whom she overcame by the wisdom with\nwhich she dissembled her words.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: \"On Modesty,\" Chap. 19. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_, XIV.,\n97.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Origen's Commentaries on Matthew, Tract VI., p. 60; cited\nin Bingham's _Antiq. of Chr. Ch_., Book XVI., Chap. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Gal. 2: 11-14. A concise statement of the influence\nof this teaching of Origen on the patristic interpretations of the\npassage in Galatians, is given by Lightfoot in his commentary on\nGalatians, sixth edition, pp. 128-132.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Quoted from the sixth book of Origen's Miscellanies by\nJerome, in his Apology against Rufinus, Book I., \u00a7 18. See _The Nicene\nand Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. ed.), III., 492. See,\nalso, Neander's _Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik_, pp. 160, 167.]\n\nThere were Christian Fathers who found it convenient to lie, in their\nown behalf or in behalf of others; and it was quite natural for such\nmortals to seek to find an excuse for lies that \"seemed so necessary\"\nfor their purposes. When Gregory of Nyssa, in his laudable effort to\nbring about a reconciliation between his elder brother Basil and their\nuncle, was \"induced to practice a deceit which was as irreconcilable\nwith Christian principles as with common sense,\"[1] he was ready to\nargue in defense of such a course.\n\n[Footnote 1: Moore's _Life of S. Gregory of Nyssa. The Nicene and\nPost-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. ed.), V., 5.]\n\nSo again, when his brother Basil was charged with falsehood in a\ncomparatively \"trivial\" matter, (where, in fact, he had merely been\nin error unintentionally,) Gregory falls back upon the comforting\nsuggestion, that as to lying, in one way or another everybody is at\nfault; \"accordingly, we accept that general statement which the Holy\nSpirit uttered by the Prophet, 'Every man is a liar.'\"[1] Gregory\nprotests against the \"solemn reflections on falsehood\" by Eunomius, in\nthis connection, and his seeing equal heinousness in it whether in\ngreat or very trivial matters. \"Cease,\" he says, \"to bid us think it\nof no account to measure the guilt of a falsehood by the slightness\nor importance of the circumstances.\" Basil, on the contrary, asserts\nwithout qualification, as his conviction, that it never is permissible\nto employ a falsehood even for a good purpose. He appeals to the words\nof Christ that all lies are of the Devil.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ibid_., p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Neander's _Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik_, p. 219.]\n\nChrysostom, as a young man, evaded ordination for himself and secured\nit to his dearest friend Basil (who should not be confounded with\nBasil the Great, the brother of Gregory of Nyssa) by a course of\ndeception, which he afterwards labored to justify by the claim that\nthere were lies of necessity, and that God approved of deception as a\nmeans of good to others.[1] In the course of his exculpatory argument,\nhe said to his much aggrieved friend Basil: \"Great is the value of\ndeceit, provided it be not introduced with a mischievous intention. In\nfact, action of this sort ought not to be called deceit, but rather a\nkind of good management, cleverness, and skill, capable of finding\nout ways where resources fail, and making up for the defects of the\nmind.... That man would fairly deserve to be called a deceiver who\nmade an unrighteous use of the practice, not one who did so with a\nsalutary purpose. And often it is necessary to deceive, and to do the\ngreatest benefits by means of this device, whereas he who has gone by\na straight course has done great mischief to the person whom he has\nnot deceived.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Smith and Wace's _Dictionary of Christian Biography_,\nI., 519 f.; art. \"Chrysostom, John.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Chrysostom's \"Treatise on the Priesthood,\" in _The\nNicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series (Am. ed.), IX., 34-38.]\n\nIn fact, Chrysostom seems, in this argument, to recognize no absolute\nand unvarying standard of truthfulness as binding on all at all times;\nbut to judge lies and deceptions as wrong only when they are wrongly\nused, or when they result in evil to others. He appears to act on the\nanti-Christian theory[1] that \"the end justifies the means.\" Indeed,\nDr. Schaff, in reprobating this \"pious fraud\" of Chrysostom, as\n\"conduct which every sound Christian conscience must condemn,\" says\nof the whole matter: \"The Jesuitical maxim, 'the end justifies the\nmeans,' is much older than Jesuitism, and runs through the whole\napocryphal, pseudo-prophetic, pseudo-apostolic, pseudo-Clementine, and\npseudo-Isidorian literature of the early centuries. Several of the\nbest Fathers show a surprising want of a strict sense of veracity.\nThey introduce a sort of cheat even into their strange theory of\nredemption, by supposing that the Devil caused the crucifixion under\nthe delusion [intentionally produced by God] that Christ was a mere\nman, and thus lost his claim upon the fallen race.\" [2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Rom. 3: 7, 8.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Dr. Schaff's \"Prologemena to The Life and Works of\nSt. Chrysostom,\" in _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first Series\n(Am. ed.), IX., 8.]\n\nChrysostom, like Gregory of Nyssa, having done that which was wrong in\nitself, with a laudable end in view, naturally attempts its defense by\nthe use of arguments based on a confusion in his own mind of things\nwhich are unjustifiable, with things which are allowable. He does not\nseem to distinguish between deliberate deception as a mode of lying,\nand concealment of that which one has a right to conceal. Like many\nanother defender of the right to lie in behalf of a worthy cause, in\nall the centuries, Chrysostom essays no definition of the \"lie,\" and\nindicates no distinction between culpable concealment, and concealment\nthat is right and proper. Yet Chrysostom was a man of loving heart and\nof unwavering purpose of life. In an age of evil-doing, he stood firm\nfor the right. And in spite of any lack of logical perceptions on his\npart in a matter like this, it can be said of him with truth that\n\"perhaps few have ever exercised a more powerful influence over the\nhearts and affections of the most exalted natures.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Smith and Wace's _Dictionary of Christian Biography_, I.,\n532.]\n\nAugustine, on the other hand, looks at this question, in accordance\nwith the qualities of his logical mind, in its relation to an absolute\nstandard; and he is ready to accept the consequences of an adherence\nto that standard, whether they be in themselves desirable or\ndeplorable. He is not afraid to define a lie, and to stand by his\ndefinition in his argument. He sees and notes the difference between\njustifiable concealment, and concealment that is for the purpose of\ndeception. \"It is lawful then,\" he says on this point, \"to conceal at\nfitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed: but to tell a lie is\nnever lawful, therefore neither to conceal by telling a lie.\"[1]\nIn his treatise \"On Lying\" _(De Mendacid_),[2] and in his treatise\n\"Against Lying\" _(Contra Mendaciuni)[3]_ as well as in his treatise\non \"Faith, Hope, and Love\" _(Enchiridion)_,[4] and again in his\nLetters to Jerome,[5] Augustine states the principle involved in this\nvexed question of the ages, and goes over all the arguments for and\nagainst the so-called \"lie of necessity.\" He sees a lie to be a sin\n_per se_, and therefore never admissible for any purpose whatsoever.\nHe sees truthfulness to be a duty growing out of man's primal relation\nto God, and therefore binding on man while man is in God's sight.\nHe strikes through the specious arguments based on any temporary\nadvantages to be secured through lying, and rejects utterly the\nsuggestion that man may do evil that good may come.\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series (Am.\ned.), IX., 466.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., III., 455-477.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid_., pp. 479-500.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid_., pp. 230-276.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid_., I., \"Letters of St. Augustine.\"]\n\nThe sound words of Augustine on this question, as based on his sound\narguments, come down to us with strength and freshness through the\nintervening centuries; and they are worthy of being emphasized as the\nexpressions of unchanging truth concerning the duty of truthfulness\nand the sin of lying. \"There is a great question about lying,\" he\nsays at the start, \"which often arises in the midst of our everyday\nbusiness, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either rashly\ncall that a lie which is not such, or decide that it is sometimes\nright to tell a lie; that is, a kind of honest, well-meant, charitable\nlie.\" This question he discusses with fulness, and in view of all that\ncan be said on both sides. Even though life or salvation were to pivot\non the telling of a lie, he is sure that no good to be gained could\ncompensate for the committal of a sin.\n\nArguing that a lie is essentially opposed to God's truth--by which\nalone man can have eternal life--Augustine insists that to attempt to\nsave another's life through lying, is to set off one's eternal life\nagainst the mere bodily life of another. \"Since then by lying eternal\nlife is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told.\nAnd as to those who take it ill, and are indignant that one should\nrefuse to tell a lie, and thereby slay his own soul in order that\nanother may grow old in the flesh, what if by our committing adultery\na person might be delivered from death: are we therefore to steal, to\ncommit whoredom.... To ask whether a man ought to tell a lie for the\nsafety of another, is just the same as asking whether for another's\nsafety a man ought to commit iniquity.\"\n\n\"Good men,\" he says, \"should never tell lies.\" \"To tell a lie is never\nlawful, therefore neither to conceal [when concealment is desirable]\nby telling a lie.\" Referring to the fact that some seek to find a\njustification in the Bible teachings for lying in a good cause,--\"even\nin the midst of the very words of the divine testimonies seeking place\nfor a lie,\"--he insists, after a full examination of this claim, \"that\nthose [cited] testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than\nthat we must never at all tell a lie.\"\n\n\"A lie is not allowable, even to save another from injury.\" \"Every lie\nmust be called a sin.\" \"Nor are we to suppose that there is any lie\nthat is not a sin, because it is sometimes possible, by telling a\nlie, to do service to another.\" \"It cannot be denied that they have\nattained a very high standard of goodness who never lie except to\nsave a man from injury; but in the case of men who have reached this\nstandard, it is not the deceit, but their good intention, that is\njustly praised, and sometimes even rewarded,\"--as in the case of Rahab\nin the Bible story. \"There is no lie that is not contrary to truth.\nFor as light and darkness, piety and impiety, justice and injustice,\nsin and righteousness, health and sickness, life and death, so are\ntruth and a lie contrary the one to the other. Whence by how much we\nlove the former, by so much ought we to hate the latter.\"\n\n\"It does indeed make very much difference for what cause, with what\nend, with what intention, a thing be done: but those things which are\nclearly sins, are upon no plea of a good cause, with no seeming good\nend, no alleged good intention, to be done. Those works, namely,\nof men, which are not in themselves sins, are now good, now evil,\naccording as their causes are good or evil.... When, however, the\nworks in themselves are evil,... who is there that will say, that upon\ngood causes, they may be done, so as either to be no sins, or, what is\nmore absurd, to be just sins?\" \"He who says that some lies are just,\nmust be judged to say no other than that some sins are just, and that\ntherefore some things are just which are unjust: than which what can\nbe more absurd?\" \"Either then we are to eschew lies by right doing,\nor to confess them [when guilty of them] by repenting: but not, while\nthey unhappily abound in our living, to make them more by teaching\nalso.\"\n\nIn replying to the argument that it would be better to lie concerning\nan innocent man whose life was sought by an enemy, or by an unjust\naccuser, than to betray him to his death, Augustine said courageously:\n\"How much braver,... how much more excellent, to say, 'I will neither\nbetray nor lie.'\" \"This,\" he said, \"did a former bishop of the Church\nof Tagaste, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For when he\nwas asked by command of the emperor, through officers sent by him, for\na man who was taking refuge with him, and whom he kept in hiding with\nall possible care, he made answer to their questions, that he could\nneither tell a lie nor betray a man; and when he had suffered so many\ntorments of body (for as yet emperors were not Christians), he stood\nfirm in his purpose. Thereupon, being brought before the emperor, his\nconduct appeared so admirable that he without any difficulty obtained\na pardon for the man whom he was trying to save. What conduct could be\nmore brave and constant?\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: See _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series\n(Am. ed.), III., 408.]\n\nThe treatise \"Against Lying\" was written by Augustine with special\nreference to the practice and teaching of the sect of Priscillianists.\nThese Christians \"affirmed, with some other of the theosophic sects,\nthat falsehood was allowable for a holy end. Absolute veracity was\nonly binding between fellow-members of their sect.\"[1] Hence it was\nclaimed by some other Christians that it would be fair to shut out\nPriscillianists from a right to have only truth spoken to them, since\nthey would not admit that it is always binding between man and man.\nThis view of truthfulness as merely a social obligation Augustine\nutterly repudiated; as, indeed, must be the case with every one who\nreckons lying a sin in and of itself. Augustine considered, in this\ntreatise, various hypothetical cases, in which the telling of the\ntruth might result in death to a sick man, while the telling of a\nfalsehood might save his life. He said frankly: \"And who can bear men\ncasting up to him what a mischief it is to shun a lie that might save\nlife, and to choose truth which might murder a man? I am moved by this\nobjection exceedingly, but it were doubtful whether also wisely.\" Yet\nhe sees that it were never safe to choose sin as a means to good, in\npreference to truth and right with all their consequences.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Smith and Wace's _Dict. of Chris. Biog_., IV., 478,\nart. \"Priscillianus.\"]\n\nJerome having, like many others, adopted Origen's explanation of the\nscene between Peter and Paul at Antioch, Augustine wrote to him in\nprotest against such teaching, with its implied approval of deceit and\nfalsehood.[1] A correspondence on this subject was continued between\nthese two Fathers for years;[2] and finally Jerome was led to adopt\nAugustine's view of the matter,[3] and also to condemn Origen for his\nloose views as to the duty of veracity.[4] But however Jerome might\nvacillate in his theory, as in his practice, concerning the permanent\nobligations of truthfulness, Augustine stood firm from first to last\nin the position which is justified by the teachings of the Bible and\nby the moral sense of the human race as a whole,--that a lie is always\na lie and always a sin, and that a lie can never be justified as a\nmeans to even the best of ends.\n\n[Footnote 1: See _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series\n(Am. ed.), I., Letters XXVIII., XL.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., Letters LXVII., LXVIII., LXXII., LXXIII.,\nLXXIV., LXXV.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid_., Letter CLXXX.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am.\ned.), III., 460 ff.; _Rufinus' Apology_, Book II.; _Jerome's Apology_,\nBook I., p. 492.]\n\nFrom the days of Chrysostom and Augustine to the present time, all\ndiscussions of this question have been but a repetition of the\narguments and objections then brought forward and examined. There can\nbe, in fact, only two positions maintained with any show of logical\nconsistency. Either a lie is in its very nature antagonistic to\nthe being of God, and therefore not to be used or approved by him,\nwhatever immediate advantages might accrue from it, or whatever\nconsequences might pivot on its rejection; or a lie is not in itself\na sin, is not essentially at variance with the nature of God, but is\ngood or evil according to the spirit of its use, and the end to be\ngained by it; and therefore on occasions God could lie, or could\napprove lying on the part of those who represent him.\n\nThe first of these positions is that maintained by the Shepherd of\nHermas, by Justin Martyr, by Basil the Great, and by Augustine;\nthe second is practically that occupied by Gregory of Nyssa and\nChrysostom, even though they do not explicitly define, or even seem to\nperceive, it as their position. There are, again, those like Origen\nand Jerome, who are now on one side of the dividing line, and now on\nthe other; but they are not logically consistent with themselves in\ntheir opinions or practices. And those who are not consistent usually\nrefrain from explicit definitions of the lie and of falsehood; they\nmake no attempt at distinguishing between justifiable concealment, and\nconcealment for the very purpose of deception.\n\nWith all the arguments on this question, in all the centuries,\ncomprised within these well-defined bounds, it were useless to name\neach prominent disputant, in order merely to classify him as on the\none side or on the other, or as zigzagging along the line which he\nfails to perceive. It were sufficient to point out a few pre-eminent\nmountain peaks, in the centuries between the fifth and the nineteen of\nthe Christian era, as indicative of the perspective history of this\ndiscussion.\n\nTowering above the greatest of the Schoolmen in the later middle ages\nstands Thomas Aquinas. As a man of massive intellect, of keenness\nof perception, of consistent logical instincts, and of unquestioned\nsincerity and great personal devoutness, we might expect him to be\nfound, like Augustine, on the side of principle against policy, in\nunqualified condemnation of lying under any circumstances whatsoever,\nand in advocacy of truthfulness at all hazards. And that, as a matter\nof fact, is his position.\n\nIn his _Summa Theologies_[1] Aquinas discusses this whole question\nwith eminent fairness, and with great thoroughness. He first states\nthe claims of those who, from the days of Chrysostom, had made excuses\nfor lying with a good end in view, and then he meets those claims\nseverally. He looks upon lies as evil in themselves, and as in no\nway to be deemed good and lawful, since a right concurrence of all\nelements is essential to a thing's being good. \"Whence, every lie is a\nsin, as Augustine says in his book 'Against Lying.'\" His conclusion,\nin view of all that is to be said on both sides of the question, is:\n\"Lying is sinful not only as harmful to our neighbor, but because\nof its own disorderliness. It is no more permitted to do what is\ndisorderly [that is, contrary to the divine order of the universe] in\norder to prevent harm, than it is to steal for the purpose of giving\nalms, except indeed in case of necessity when all things are common\nproperty [when, for instance, the taking of needful food in time of a\ngreat disaster, as on a wrecked ship, is not stealing]. And therefore\nit is not allowable to utter a lie with this view, that we may deliver\none from some peril. It is allowable, however, to conceal the truth\nprudently, by a sort of dissimulation, as Augustine says.\" This\nrecognizes the correctness of Augustine's position, that concealment\nof what one has a right to conceal may be right, provided no lie is\ninvolved in the concealment. As to the relative grades of sin in\nlying, Aquinas counts lying to another's hurt as a mortal sin, and\nlying to avert harm from another as a venial sin; but he sees that\nboth are sins.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Secunda Secundae_, Quaestio CX., art. III.]\n\nIt is natural to find Aquinas, as a representative of the keen-minded\nDominicans, standing by truth as an eternal principle, regardless of\nconsequences; as it is also natural to find, on the other side, Duns\nScotus, as a representative of the easy-going Franciscans, with his\ndenial of good absolute save as manifested in the arbitrary will of\nGod. Duns Scotus accepted the \"theory of a twofold truth,\" ascribed to\nAverroes, \"that one and the same affirmation might be theologically\ntrue and philosophically false, and _vice versa_.\" In Duns Scotus's\nview, \"God does not choose a thing because it is good, but the thing\nchosen is good because God chooses it;\" \"it is good simply and solely\nbecause God has willed it precisely so; but he might just as readily\nhave willed the opposite thereof. Hence also God is not [eternally]\nbound by his commands, and he can in fact annul them.\"[1] According to\nthis view, God could forbid lying to-day and justify it to-morrow. It\nis not surprising, therefore, that \"falsehood and misrepresentation\"\nare \"under certain circumstances allowable,\" in the opinion of Duns\nScotus.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Kurtz's _Church History_ (Macpherson's Translation),\nII., 101, 167-169; Ueberweg's _History of Philosophy_, I., 416, 456\nf.; Wuttke's _Christian Ethics_ (Am. ed.), I., 218, Sec. 34.]\n\nSo, all along the centuries, the religious teacher who holds to the\nline between truth and falsehood as an eternal line must, if logically\nconsistent, refuse to admit any possible justification of lying. Only\nhe who denies an eternally absolute line between the true and the\nfalse could admit with consistency the justification by God of an act\nthat is essentially hostile to the divine nature. Any exception to\nthis rule is likely to be where a sympathetic nature inclines a\nteacher to seek for an excuse for that which seems desirable even\nthough it be theoretically wrong.\n\nWhen it comes to the days of the Protestant Reformation, we find John\nCalvin, like his prototype Augustine, and like Augustine's follower\nAquinas, standing firmly against a lie as antagonistic to the very\nnature of God, and therefore never justifiable. Martin Luther, also,\nis a fearless lover of the truth; but he is disposed to find excuses\nfor a lie told with a good end in view, although he refrains from\nasserting that even the best disposed lie lacks the element of\nsinfulness.[1] On the other hand, Ignatius Loyola, and his associates\nin the founding of the Society of Jesus as a means of checking the\nProtestant Reformation, acted on the idea that was involved in the\ntheology of Duns Scotus, that the only standard of truth and right is\nin the absolute and arbitrary will of God; and that, therefore, if\nGod, speaking through his representative in the newly formed Society,\ncommands the telling of a lie, a lie is justifiable, and its telling\nis a duty. Moreover, these Jesuit leaders in defining, or in\nexplaining away, the lie, include, under the head of justifiable\nconcealment, equivocations and falsifications that the ordinary mind\nwould see to be forms of the lie.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Martensen's _Christian Ethics_, p. 216. Compare, for\nexample, Luther's comments on Exodus I: 15-21, with Calvin's comments\non Genesis 12: 14-20.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Symonds's _Renaissance in Italy_, I., 263-267;\nCartwright's _The Jesuits_; Meyrick's _Moral Theology of the Church\nof Rome_; Pascal's _Provincial Letters_. See, also, Kurtz's _Church\nHistory_, II., 430.]\n\nIt is common to point to the arguments of the Jesuits in favor of lies\nof expediency, in their work for the Church and for souls, as though\ntheir position were exceptional, and they stood all by themselves in\nincluding falsehood as a means to be employed rightfully for a good\nend.\n\nBut in this they are simply logically consistent followers of those\nChristian Fathers, and their successors in every branch of the Church,\nwho have held that a lie for righteous purposes was admissible when\nthe results to be secured by it were of vital importance. All the\nrefinements of casuistry have their value to those who admit that a\nlie may be right under certain conceivable circumstances; but to those\nwho, like Augustine and Aquinas, insist that a lie is a sin _per se_,\nand therefore never admissible, casuistry itself has no interest as a\nmeans of showing when a sin is not sinful.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hence the casuistry of the Schoolmen and of the Jesuits,\nand the question of Mental Reservations, and of \"Probabilities,\" are\nnot treated in detail here.]\n\nSome of the zealous defenders of the principles and methods of\nthe Jesuits affirm that, in their advocacy of dissimulation and\nprevarication in the interests of a good cause, the Jesuits do not\nintend to justify lying, but are pointing out methods of proper\nconcealment which are not within the realm of the lie. In this\n(waiving the question whether these defenders are right or not as to\nthe fact) they seem even more desirous of being counted against lying\nthan those teachers, in the Romish Church or among Protestants, who\nboldly affirm that a lie itself is sometimes justifiable. Thus it is\n_claimed_ by a Roman Catholic writer, in defense of the Jesuits, that\nLiguori, their favorite theologian, taught \"that to speak falsely\nis immutably a sin against God. It may be permitted under no\ncircumstances, not even to save life. Pope Innocent III. says, 'Not\neven to defend our life is it lawful to speak falsely;'\" therefore,\nwhen Liguori approves any actions that seem opposed to truthfulness,\n\"he allows the instances because they are not falsehood.\"[1] On the\nother hand, Jeremy Taylor squarely asserts: \"It is lawful to tell\na lie to children or to madmen, because they, having no powers of\njudging, have no right to the truth.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Meyrick's _Moral Theology of the Church of Rome_,\nAppendix, p. 256 f.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Jeremy Taylor's _Ductor Dubitantium_, in his Works, X.,\n103.]\n\nBut Jeremy Taylor's trouble is in his indefinite definition of \"a\nlie,\" and in his consequent confusion of mind and of statement with\nreference to the limitations of the duty of veracity. He writes on\nthis subject at considerable length,[1] and in alternation declares\nhimself plainly first on one side, and then on the other, of the main\nquestion, without even an attempt at logical consistency. He starts\nout with the idea that \"we are to endeavor to be like God, who is\ntruth essentially;\" that \"God speaks truth because it is his nature;\"\nthat \"the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament do indefinitely\nand severely forbid lying,\" and \"our blessed Saviour condemns it by\ndeclaring every lie to be of the Devil;\" and that \"beyond these things\nnothing can [could] be said for the condemnation of lying.\" All that\ncertainly is explicit and sound,--as sound as Basil the Great, as\nSt. Augustine, or as Thomas Aquinas!\n\n[Footnote 1: Jeremy Taylor's _Ductor Dubitantium_, in his Works, X.,\n100-132.]\n\nWhen he attempts the definition of a lie, however, Jeremy Taylor would\nseem to claim that injustice toward others and an evil motive are of\nits very essence, and that, if these be lacking, a lie is not a lie.\n\"Lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurt\nof a neighbor, which cannot be understood [by the hearer or reader]\notherwise than to differ from the mind of him that speaks.\" As\nMelanchthon says, \"To lie is to deceive our neighbor to his hurt.\" \"If\na lie be unjust, it can never become lawful; but if it can be separate\nfrom injustice, then it may be innocent.\"\n\nJeremy Taylor naturally falls back on the Bible stories of the Hebrew\nmidwives and Rahab the harlot, and assumes that God commended their\nlying, as lying, because they had a good end in view; and he asserts\nthat \"it is necessary sometimes by a lie to advantage charity by\nlosing of a truth to save a life,\" and that \"to tell a lie for\ncharity, to save a man's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of\na prince, of an useful and a public person, hath not only been done in\nall times, but commended by great and wise and good men.\" From this it\nwould appear that lying, which Jeremy Taylor sets out with denouncing\nas contrary to God's nature, and as declared by our Saviour to be\nalways of the Devil, may, under certain circumstances, be a godly sin.\nGregory of Nyssa and young Chrysostom could not have done better than\nthis in showing the sinlessness of a sin in a good cause.\n\nSeeing that concealment of that which is true is often a duty, and\nseeing also that concealment of that which ought to be disclosed\nis often practically a lie, Jeremy Taylor apparently; jumps to the\nconclusion that concealment and equivocation and lying are practically\nthe same thing, and that therefore lying is sometimes a duty, while\nagain it is a sin. He holds that the right to be spoken to in\ntruthfulness, \"though it be regularly and commonly belonging to all\nmen, yet it may be taken away by a superior right supervening; or it\nmay be lost, or it may be hindered, or it may cease upon a greater\nreason.\" As \"that which is but the half of a true proposition either\nsignifies nothing or is directly a lie,\" it must be admitted that \"in\nthe same cases in which it is lawful to tell a lie, in the same cases\nit is lawful to use a mental reservation;\" and \"where it is lawful to\nlie, it is lawful to equivocate, which may be something less than a\nplain lie.\" Moreover, \"it is lawful upon a just cause of great charity\nor necessity to use, in our answers and intercourses, words of divers\nsignification, though it does deceive him that asks.\"\n\nJeremy Taylor ingenuously confesses that, in certain cases where lying\nis allowable or is a duty, \"the prejudice which the question is like\nto have is in the meaning and evil sound of the word lying; which,\nbecause it is so hateful to God and man, casts a cloud upon anything\nthat it comes near.\" But, on the whole, Jeremy Taylor is willing to\nemploy with commendation that very word \"lying\" which is \"so hateful\nto God and man.\" And in various cases he insists that \"it is lawful to\ntell a lie,\" although \"the lie must be charitable and useful,\"--a good\nlie, and not a wicked lie; for a good lie is good, and a wicked lie\nis wicked. He does not shrink from the consequences of his false\nposition.\n\nJeremy Taylor can therefore be cited as arguing that a lie is never\nadmissible, but that it often is commendable. He does not seem to\nbe quite sure of any real difference between lying and justifiable\nconcealment, or to have in his mind an unvarying line between\ntruthfulness and lying. He admits that God and man hate lying, but\nthat a good lie, nevertheless, is a very good thing. And so he leaves\nthe subject in more of a muddle than he found it.\n\nComing down to the present century, perhaps the most prominent and\ninfluential defender of the \"lie of necessity,\" or of limitations to\nthe law of veracity, is Richard Rothe; therefore it is important to\ngive special attention to his opinions and arguments on this subject.\nRothe was a man of great ability, of lovely spirit, and of pervasive\npersonal influence; and as a consequence his opinions carry special\nweight with his numerous pupils and followers.\n\nKurtz[1] characterizes Rothe as \"one of the most profound thinkers\nof the century, equaled by none of his contemporaries in the grasp,\ndepth, and originality of his speculation,\" and his \"Theological\nEthics\" as \"a work which in depth, originality, and conclusiveness\nof reasoning, is almost unapproached.\" And in the opinion of\nLichtenberger,[2] Rothe \"is unquestionably the most distinguished\ntheologian of the School of Conciliation, and the most original\nthinker since Schleiermacher,\" while \"he also showed himself to be one\nof the humblest Christians and one of the finest formed characters of\nhis age.\" It is not to be wondered at therefore, that, when such a\nleader in thought and in influence as Rothe declares himself in favor\nof a judicious use of falsehood as a means of good, many are inclined\nto feel that there must be some sound reason for his course. Yet, on\nthe other hand, the arguments in favor of falsehood, put forward\nby even such a man, ought to be scrutinized with care, in order to\nascertain if they are anything more than the familiar arguments on the\nsame side repeated in varying phrase in all the former centuries from\nChrysostom to Jeremy Taylor.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Church History_ (Macpherson's translation), III., 201.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _History of German Theology in the 19th Century_, p.\n492.]\n\nThe trouble with Rothe in his treatment of this Matter[1] is, that he\nconsiders the duty of truthfulness merely in its personal and social\naspects, without any direct reference to the nature, and the declared\nwill, of God. Moreover, his peculiar definition of a lie is adapted\nto his view of the necessities of the case. He defines a lie as\n\"the unloving misuse of speech (or of other recognized means of\ncommunication) to the intentional deception of our neighbor.\" In his\nmind, lovelessness toward one's fellow-man is of the very essence of\nthe lie, and when one speaks falsely in expression of a spirit of love\nto others, it is not necessarily a lie.\n\n[Footnote 1: Rothe's _Theologische Ethik_, IVter Band, \u00a7\u00a7 1064, 1065.]\n\nRothe does not seem to recognize, in its application to this matter,\nthe great principle that there is no true love for man except in\nconformity to and in expression of love for God; hence that nothing\nthat is in direct violation of a primal law of God can be an\nexhibition of real love for one of God's creatures.\n\nIt is true that Rothe assumes that the subject of Theological Ethics\nis an essential branch of Speculative Theology; but in his treatment\nof Special Duties he seems to assume that Society rather than God is\ntheir background, and therefore the idea of sin as sin does not enter\ninto the discussion. His whole argument and his conclusions are an\nillustration of the folly of attempting to solve any problem in ethics\nwithout considering the relation to it of God's eternal laws, and of\nthe eternal principles which are involved in the very conception of\nGod. Ethics necessarily includes more than social duties, and must be\nconsidered in the light of duty to God as above all.\n\n\"The intentional deception of our neighbor,\" says Rothe, \"by saying\nwhat is untrue, is not invariably and unqualifiedly a lie. The\nquestion in this case is essentially one of the purpose.... It is only\nin the case where the untruth spoken with intent to deceive is at the\nsame time an act of unlovingness toward our neighbor, that it is a\nviolation of truthfulness as already defined, that is, a lie.\" In\nRothe's view, \"there are relations of men to each other in which\n[for the time being] avowedly the ethical fellowship does not exist,\nalthough the suspension of this fellowship must, of course, always\nbe regarded as temporary, and this indeed as a matter of duty for at\nleast one of the parties. Here there can be no mention of love, and\ntherefore no more of the want of it.\" Social duties being in such\ncases suspended, and the idea of any special duty toward God not being\nin consideration, it is quite proper, as Rothe sees it, for enemies in\nwar, or in private life, to speak falsely to each other. Such enemies\n\"naturally have in speech simply a weapon which one may use against\nthe other.... The duty of speaking the truth cannot even be thought of\nas existing between persons so arrayed against each other.... However\nthey may try to deceive each other, even with the help of speech, they\ndo not lie.\"\n\nBut Rothe goes even farther than this in the advocacy of such\nviolations, or abrogations, of the law of veracity, as would undermine\nthe very foundations of social life, and as would render the law\nagainst falsehood little more than a variable personal rule for\nlimited and selected applications,--after the fashion of the American\nhumorist who \"believed in universal salvation if he could pick his\nmen.\" Rothe teaches that falsehood is a duty, not only when it is\nneedful in dealing with public or personal enemies, but often, also,\nin dealing with \"children, the sick, the insane, the drunken, the\npassionately excited, and the morally weak,\"--and that takes in\na large share of the human race. He gives many illustrations of\nfalsehood supposed to be necessary (where, in fact, they would seem to\nthe keen-minded reader to be quite superfluous[1]) and having affirmed\nthe duty of false speaking in these cases, he takes it for granted\n(in a strange misconception of the moral sense of mankind) that the\ndeceived parties would, if appealed to in their better senses, justify\nthe falsehoods spoken by mothers in the nursery, by physicians in the\nsick-room, and by the clear-headed sober man in his intercourse with\nthe angry or foolish or drunken individual.\n\n[Footnote 1: Nitzsch, the most eminent dogmatic theologian among\nSchleiermacher's immediate disciples, denies the possibility of\nconceiving of a case where loving consideration for others, or any\nother dutiful regard for them, will not attain its end otherwise and\nmore truly and nobly than by lying to them, or where \"the loving liar\nor falsifier might not have acted still more lovingly and wisely\nwithout any falsification.... The lie told from supposed necessity or\nto serve another is always, even in the most favorable circumstances,\na sign either of a wisdom which is lacking in love and truth, or of a\nlove which is lacking in wisdom.\"]\n\n\"Of course,\" he says, \"such a procedure presupposes a certain relation\nof guardianship, on the part of the one who speaks untruth, over him\nwhom he deceives, and a relative irresponsibility on the part of the\nother,--an incapacity to make use of certain truths except to his\nactual moral injury. And in each case all depends on the accuracy of\nthis assumption.\" It is appalling to find a man like Rothe announcing\na principle like this as operative in social ethics! Every man to\ndecide for himself (taking the responsibility, of course, for his\npersonal decision) whether he is in any sense such a guardian of his\nfellow-man as shall make it his duty to speak falsely to him in love!\n\nRothe frankly admits that there is no evidence that Jesus Christ,\nwhile setting an example here among men, ever spoke one of these\ndutiful untruths; although it certainly would seem that Jesus might\nhave fairly claimed as good a right to a guardianship of his earthly\nfellows as the average man of nowadays.[1] But this does not restrain\nRothe from deliberately advising his fellow-men to a different course.\n\n[Footnote 1: Rothe says on this point: \"That the Saviour spoke untruth\nis a charge to whose support only a single passage, John 7:8, can be\nalleged with any show of plausibility. But even here there was no\nspeaking of untruth, even if [Greek: ank][a disputed reading] be\nregarded as the right reading.\" See on this passage Meyer in his\n_Commentary_, and Westcott in _The Bible Commentary_.]\n\nRothe names Marheineke, DeWette, von Ammon, Herbart, Hartenstein,\nSchwartz, Harless, and Reinhard, as agreeing in the main with his\nposition; while as opposed to it he mentions Kant, Fichte, Krause,\nSchleiermacher, von Hirscher, Nitzsch, Flatt, and Baumgarten-Crusius.\nBut this is by no means a question to be settled by votes; and not one\nof the writers cited by Rothe as of his mind, in this controversy,\nhas anything new to offer in defense of a position in such radical\ndisagreement with the teachings of the Bible, and with the moral sense\nof the race, on this point, as that taken by Rothe. In his ignoring\nof the nature and the will of God as the basis of an argument in this\nmatter, and in his arbitrary and unauthorized definition of a lie\n(with its inclusion of the claim that the deliberate utterance of a\nstatement known to be false, for the express purpose of deceiving the\none to whom it is spoken, is not necessarily and inevitably a lie),\nRothe stands quite pre-eminent. Wuttke says, indeed, of Rothe's\ntreatment of ethics: \"Morality [as he sees it] is an independent\nsomething alongside of piety, and rests by no means on piety,--is\nentirely co-ordinate to and independent of it.\"[1] Yet so great is the\ngeneral influence of Rothe, that various echoes of his arguments for\nfalsehoods in love are to be found in subsequent English and American\nutterances on Christian ethics.\n\n[Footnote 1: Wuttke's _Christian Ethics_ (Lacroix's transl.), \u00a7 48.]\n\nContemporaneous with Richard Rothe, and fully his peer in intellectual\nforce and Christ-likeness of spirit, stands Isaac August Dorner. Dr.\nSchaff says of him:[1] \"Dr. Dorner was one of the profoundest and\nmost learned theologians of the nineteenth century, and ranks with\nSchleiermacher, Neander, Nitzsch, Julius M\u00fcller, and Richard Rothe. He\nmastered the theology of Schleiermacher and the philosophy of Hegel,\nappropriated the best elements of both, infused into them a positive\nevangelical faith and a historic spirit;\" and as a lecturer,\nespecially \"on dogmatics and ethics ... he excelled all his\ncontemporaries.\" And to this estimate of him Professor Mead adds:[2]\n\"Even one who knows Dorner merely as the theological writer, will in\nhis writings easily detect the fine Christian tone which characterized\nthe man; but no one who did not personally know him can get a true\nimpression of the Johannean tenderness and childlike simplicity which\ndistinguished him above almost any one of equal eminence whom the\nworld has ever known.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: _Supplement to Schaff-Hertzog Encyc. of Relig. Knowl_.,\np. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Preface to Dorner's _System of Christian Ethics_ (Am.\ned.), p. vii.]\n\nWhen, therefore, it is considered that, after Rothe had given his\nviews on veracity to the world, Dorner wrote on the same subject, as\nthe very last work of his maturest life, a special interest attaches\nto his views on this mooted question. And Dorner is diametrically\nopposed to Rothe in this thing. Dorner bases the duty of truthfulness\non our common membership in Christ, and the love that grows out of\nsuch a relation.[1] \"Truth does not,\" indeed, \"demand that all that is\nin a man should be brought out, else it would be a moral duty for him\nto let also the evil that is in him come forth, whereas it is his\nduty to keep it down.\" But if an untrue statement be made with the\nintention to deceive, it is a lie.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Dorner's _System of Christian Ethics_ (Am. ed.), pp.\n487-492.]\n\n\"Are there cases,\" he asks, \"where lying is allowable? Can we make out\nthe so-called 'white lie' to be morally permissible?\" Then he takes up\nthe cases of children and the insane, who are not entitled to know all\nthe truth, and asks if it be right not only to conceal the truth but\nto falsify it, in talking with them. Concealment may be a duty, he\nadmits, but he denies that falsifying is ever a duty. \"How shall\nethics ever be brought to lay down a duty of lying [of 'white lying'],\nto recommend evil that good may come? The test for us is, whether we\ncould ever imagine Christ acting in this way, either for the sake of\nothers, or--which would be quite as justifiable, since self-love is a\nmoral duty--for his _own_ sake.\"\n\nAs to falsifying to a sick or dying man, he says, \"we overestimate the\nvalue of human life, and, besides, we in a measure usurp the place\nof Providence, when we believe we may save it by committing sin.\" In\nother words, Dorner counts falsifying with the intention of deceiving,\neven with the best of motives, a lie, and therefore a sin--never\njustifiable. Like Augustine, Dorner recognizes degrees of guilt in\nlies, according to the spirit and motive of their telling; but in any\nevent, if there be falsehood with the purpose of deceiving, it is a\nsin--to be regretted and repented of.\n\nDorner makes a fresh distinction between the stratagems of war and\nlying, which is worthy of note. He says that playful fictions, after\nthe manner of riddles to be guessed out, are clearly allowable. So \"in\nwar, too, something like a game of this kind is carried on, when by\nway of stratagem some deceptive appearance is produced, and a riddle\nis thus given to the enemy. In such cases there is no falsehood;\nfor from the conditions of the situation,--whether friendly or\nhostile,--the appearance that is given is confessedly nothing more\nthan an appearance, and is therefore honest.\"\n\nThe simplicity and clearness of Dorner, in his unsophistical treatment\nof this question, is in refreshing contrast with the course of\nRothe,--who confuses the whole matter in discussion by his arbitrary\nclaim that a lie is not a lie, if it be told with a good purpose and a\nloving spirit. And the two men are representative disputants in\nthis controversy of the centuries, as truly as were Augustine and\nChrysostom.\n\nA close friend of Dorner was Hans Lassen Martensen, \"the greatest\ntheologian of Denmark,\" and a thinker of the first class, \"with high\nspeculative endowments, and a considerable tincture of theosophical\nmysticism.\"[1] Martensen's \"Christian Ethics\" do not ignore God\nand the Bible as factors in any question of practical morals under\ndiscussion. He characterizes the result of such an omission as \"a\nreckoning of an account whose balance has been struck elsewhere; if\nwe bring out another figure, we have reckoned wrong.\" Martensen's\ntreatment of the duty of veracity is a remarkable exhibit of the\nworkings of a logical mind in full view of eternal principles, yet\nmeasurably hindered and retarded by the heart-drawings of an amiable\nsentiment. He sees the all-dividing line, and recognizes the primal\nduty of conforming to it; yet he feels that it is a pity that such\nconformity must be so expensive in certain imaginary cases, and he\nlongs to find some allowance for desirable exceptions.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Kurtz's _Church History_ (Macpherson's transl.),\nIII., 201; _Supplement to Schaff-Hertzog Encyc. of Relig. Knowl_., p.\n57; _Johnson's Univ. Cycl._., art. \"Martensen.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: Martensen's _Christian Ethics (Individual)_, (Eng.\ntrans.,) pp. 205-226.]\n\nMartensen gives as large prominence as Rothe to love for one's\nfellow-man; but he bases that love entirely, as Rothe does not, on\nlove for Christ. \"Only in Christ, and [in] the light which, proceeding\nfrom him, is poured over human nature and all human life, can we love\nmen in the central sense, and only then does philanthropy receive its\ndeepest religious and moral character, when it is rooted in the truth\nof Christ.\" And as Christ is Truth, those who are Christ's must never\nviolate the truth. \"'Thou shalt not bear false witness; thou shalt not\nlie, neither in word nor deed; thou shalt neither deny the truth, nor\ngive out anything that is not truth for truth,'--this commandment must\ndominate and penetrate all our life's relations.\" \"Truth does not\nexist for man's sake, but man for the sake of the truth, because the\ntruth would reveal itself to man, would be owned and testified\nby him.\" This would seem to be explicit enough to shut out the\npossibility of a justifiable lie!\n\n\"Yet it does not follow from this,\" says Martensen, \"that our duty to\ncommunicate the truth to others is unlimited.... 'There is a time to\nbe silent, and a time to speak.' No one is bound to say everything to\neverybody.\" Here he distinguishes between justifiable concealment and\nfalsehood. Then he comes to the question \"whether the so-called 'lie\nof exigency' can ever be justifiable.\" He runs over the arguments on\nboth sides, and recalls the centuries of discussion on the subject.\nHe thinks that adherence to the general principle which forbids lying\nwould, in certain cases where love prompted to falsehood, cause in\nmost minds an inward feeling that the letter killeth, and that to\nfollow the promptings of love were better. Hence he argues that \"as\nin other departments there are actions which, although from the\nstandpoint of the ideal they are to be rejected, yet, from the\nhardness of men's hearts, must be approved and admitted, and under\nthis restriction become relatively justifiable and dutiful actions,\nsimply because greater evils are thereby averted; so there is also an\nuntruth from exigency that must still be allowed for the sake of human\nweakness.\" And in his opinion \"it comes to this, that the question of\ncasuistry cannot be solved by general and abstract directions, but\nmust be solved in an individual, personal way, especially according to\nthe stage of moral and religious development and ripeness on which the\nperson in question is found.\"\n\nHaving made these concessions, in the realm of feeling, to the\ndefenders of the \"lie of exigency,\" which may be \"either uttered from\nlove to men, or as defense against men--a defense in which either a\njustifiable self-love or sympathy with others is operative,\" Martensen\nproceeds to show that every such falsehood is abnormal and immoral.\n\"When we thus maintain,\" he says, \"that in certain difficult cases an\n'untruth from necessity' may occur, which is to be allowed for the\nsake of human weakness, and under the given relations may be said to\nbe justified and dutiful, we cannot but allow, on the other hand, that\nin every such untruth there is something of sin, nay something that\nneeds excuse and forgiveness.... Certainly even the truth of the\nletter, the external, actual truth, even the formally correct, finds\nits right, the ground of its validity, in God's holy order of the\nworld. But by every lie of exigency the command is broken, 'Thou shalt\nnot bear false witness.'\"\n\nMartensen protests against the claim of Rothe that a falsehood spoken\nin love \"is not at all to be called a lie, but can be absolutely\ndefended as morally _normal_, and so in no respect needs pardon.\"\n\"However sharply we may distinguish between lie and untruth\n(_mendacium_ and _falsilo-quium_), the untruth in question can never\nbe resolved into the morally normal.\" And he suggests that if one had\nmore of wisdom and courage and faith, he might be true to the truth in\nan emergency without fear of the consequences.\n\n\"Let us suppose, for instance,\" he says, \"the ... case, where the\nhusband deceives his sick spouse from fear that she could not survive\nthe news of the death of her child; who dare maintain that if the man\nhad been able in the right way, that is in the power of the gospel,\nwith the wisdom and the comfort of faith, to announce the death of the\nchild, a religious crisis might not have arisen in her soul, which\nmight have a healing and quickening effect upon her bodily state? And\nsupposing that it had even led to her death, who dare maintain that\nthat death, if it was a Christian death, were an evil, whether for the\nmother herself, or for the survivors?\n\n\"Or, let us take the woman who, to save her chastity, applies the\ndefense of an untruth: who dare maintain that if she said the truth to\nher persecutors, but uttered it in womanly heroism, with a believing\nlook to God, with the courage, the elevation of soul springing from\na pure conscience, exhibiting to her persecutors the badness and\nunworthiness of their object, she might not have disarmed them by that\nmight that lies in the good, the just cause, the cause whose defense\nand shield God himself will be? And even if she had to suffer what is\nunworthy, who dare maintain that she could not in suffering preserve\nher moral worth?\"\n\nMartensen recalls the story of Jeanie Deans, in Scott's \"Heart of\nMidlothian,\" who refuses to tell a lie of exigency in order to save\nher sister's life; yet who, having uttered the truth which led to her\nsister's sentence of death, set herself, in faith in God, to secure\nthat sister's pardon, and by God's grace compassed it. \"Most people\nwould at least be disposed to excuse Jeanie Deans, and to forgive\nher, if she had here made a false oath, and thereby had afforded her\nprotection to the higher truth.\" And if a loving lie of exigency be a\nduty before God, an appeal to his knowledge of the fact is, of course,\nequally a duty. To refuse to appeal to God in witness of the truth of\na falsehood that is told from a loving sense of duty, is to show a\nlack of confidence in God's approval of such an untruth. \"But she\nwill, can, and dare, for her conscience' sake, not do this.\"\n\n\"But the best thing in this tale,\" adds Martensen, \"is that it is\nno mere fiction. The kernel of this celebrated romance is actual\nhistory.\" And Sir Walter Scott caused a monument to be erected in his\ngarden, with the following inscription, in memory of this faithful\ntruth-lover:\n\n\"This stone was placed by the Author of 'Waverley' in memory of Helen\nWalker, who fell asleep in the year of our Lord 1791. This maiden\npracticed in humility all the virtues with which fancy had adorned the\ncharacter that bears in fiction the name of Jeanie Deans. She would\nnot depart a foot's breadth from the path of truth, not even to save\nher sister's life; and yet she obtained the liberation of her sister\nfrom the severity of the law by personal sacrifices whose greatness\nwas not less than the purity of her aims. Honor to the grave where\npoverty rests in beautiful union with truthfulness and sisterly love.\"\n\n\"Who will not readily obey this request,\" adds Martensen, \"and hold\nsuch a memory in honor?... Who does not feel himself penetrated with\ninvoluntary, most hearty admiration?\"\n\nIn conclusion, in view of all that can be said on either side of the\nquestion, Martensen is sure that \"the lie of exigency itself, which we\ncall inevitable, leaves in us the feeling of something unworthy, and\nthis unworthiness should, simply in following Christ, more and more\ndisappear from our life. That is, the inevitableness of the lie\nof exigency will disappear in the same measure that an individual\ndevelops into a true personality, a true character.... A lie of\nexigency cannot occur with a personality that is found in possession\nof full courage, of perfect love and holiness, as of the enlightened,\nall-penetrating glance. Not even as against madmen and maniacs will a\nlie of exigency be required, for to the word of the truly sanctified\npersonality there belongs an imposing commanding power that casts out\ndemons. It is this that we see in Christ, in whose mouth no guile\nwas found, in whom we find nothing that even remotely belongs to the\ncategory of the exigent lie.\"\n\nSo it is evident that if one would seek excuse for the lie of\nexigency, in the concessions made by Martensen, he must do so only on\nthe score of the hardness of his heart, and the softness of his head,\nas one lacking a proper measure of wisdom, of courage, and of faith,\nto enable him to conform to the proper ideal standard of human\nconduct. And even then he must recognize the fact that in his weakness\nhe has done something to be ashamed of, and to demand repentance. Cold\ncomfort that for a decent man!\n\nIt would seem that personal temperament and individual peculiarities\nhad their part in deciding a man's attitude toward the question of the\nunvarying duty of veracity, quite as surely as the man's recognition\nof great principles. An illustration of this truth is shown in the\ntreatment of the subject by Dr. Charles Hodge on the one hand, and by\nDr. James H. Thornwell on the other, as representatives, severally, of\nCalvinistic Augustinianism in the Presbyterian Church of the United\nStates, in its Northern and Southern branches. Starting from the same\npoint of view, and agreeing as to the principles involved, these two\nthinkers are by no means together in their conclusions; and this, not\nbecause of any real difference in their processes of reasoning, but\napparently because of the larger place given by the former to the\ninfluence of personal feeling, as over against the imperative demands\nof truth.\n\nDr. Hodge begins with the recognition and asseveration of eternal\nprinciples, that can know no change or variation in their application\nto this question; and then, as he proceeds with its discussion, he is\namiably illogical and good-naturedly inconsistent, and he ends in a\nmaze, without seeming quite sure as to his own view of the case,\nor giving his readers cause to know what should be their view. Dr.\nThornwell, on the other hand, beginning in the same way, proceeds\nunwaveringly to the close, in logical consistency of reasoning;\nleaving his readers at the last as fully assured as he is as to the\napplication of unchangeable principles to man's life and duties.\n\nNo one could state the underlying principles involved in this question\nmore clearly and explicitly than does Dr. Hodge at the outset;[1] and\nit would seem from this statement that he could not be in doubt as to\nthe issue of the discussion of this question of the ages. \"The command\nto keep truth inviolate belongs to a different class [of commands]\nfrom those relating to the sabbath, to marriage, or to property. These\nare founded on the permanent relations of men in the present state of\nexistence. They are not in their own nature immutable. But truth is\nat all times sacred, because it is one of the essential attributes of\nGod, so that whatever militates against or is hostile to truth is in\nopposition to the very nature of God.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: See Hodge's _Systematic Theology_, III., 437-463.]\n\n\"Truth is, so to speak, the very substratum of Deity. It is in such a\nsense the foundation of all the moral perfections of God, that without\nit they cannot be conceived of as existing. Unless God really is what\nhe declares himself to be; unless he means what he declares himself to\nmean; unless he will do what he promises,--the whole idea of God is\nlost. As there is no God but the true God, so without truth there is\nand can be no God. As this attribute is the foundation, so to speak,\nof the divine, so it is the foundation of the physical and moral order\nof the universe.... There is, therefore, something awfully sacred in\nthe obligations of truth. A man who violates the truth, sins against\nthe very foundation of his moral being. As a false god is no god, so a\nfalse man is no man; he can never be what man was designed to be; he\ncan never answer the end of his being. There can be in him nothing\nthat is stable, trustworthy, or good.\"\n\nHere is a platform that would seem to be the right standing-place for\nall and for always. Dr. Hodge apparently recognizes its well-defined\nlimits and bounds; yet when he comes to discuss the question whether a\ncertain person is, in a supposable case, on it, or off it, he does not\nseem so sure as to its precise boundary lines. He begins to waver\nwhen he cites Bible incidents. Recognizing the fact that fables\nand parables, and works of fiction, even though untrue, are not\nfalsehoods, he strangely jumps to the conclusion that the \"intention\nto deceive\" is \"not always culpable.\" He immediately follows this\nnon-sequitur with a reference to the lying Hebrew midwives,[1] and he\nquotes the declaration of God's blessing on them, as if it were an\napproval of their lying, or their false speaking with an intention to\ndeceive, instead of an approval of their spirit of devotion to God's\npeople.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Exod. I: 19, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Comp. p. 35 f., _supra_.]\n\nFrom the midwives he passes to Samuel, sent of God to Bethlehem; [1]\nand under cover of the expressed opinions of others, Dr. Hodge says\nvaguely: \"Here, it is said, is a case of intentional deception\ncommanded. Saul was to be deceived as to the object of Samuel's\njourney to Bethlehem.\" Yet, whoever \"said\" this was guilty of a\ngratuitous charge of intentional deception, against the Almighty.\nSamuel was directed of God to speak the truth, so far as he spoke at\nall, while he concealed from others that which others had no right to\nknow.[2] It would appear, however, throughout this discussion, that\nDr. Hodge does not perceive the clear and important distinction\nbetween justifiable concealment from those who have no right to a\nknowledge of the facts, and concealment, or even false speaking, with\nthe deliberate intention of deceiving those interested. In fact, Dr.\nHodge does not even mention \"concealment,\" as apart from its use for\nthe specific purpose of deception.\n\n[Footnote 1: I Sam. 16: i, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Comp. pp. 38-40, _supra_.]\n\nAgain Dr. Hodge cites the incident of Elisha at Dothan[1] as if\nin illustration of the rightfulness of deception under certain\ncircumstances. But in this case it was concealment of facts that might\nproperly be concealed, and not the deception of enemies as enemies,\nthat Elisha compassed. The Syrians wanted to find Elisha. Their eyes\nwere blinded, so that they did not recognize him when in his presence.\nIn order to teach them a lesson, Elisha told the Syrians that they\ncould not find him, or the city which was his home, by their own\nseeking; but if they would follow him he would bring them to the man\nwhom they sought. They followed him, and he showed himself to them.\nWhen their eyes were opened in Samaria he would not suffer them to be\nharmed, but had them treated as guests, and sent back safely to their\nking.\n\n[Footnote 1: Kings 6: 14-20.]\n\nHaving cited these three cases, no one of which can fairly be made to\napply to the argument he is pursuing, Dr. Hodge complacently remarks:\n\"Examples of this kind of deception are numerous in the Old Testament.\nSome of them are simply recorded facts, without anything to indicate\nhow they were regarded in the sight of God; but others, as in the\ncases above cited, received either directly or by implication the\ndivine sanction.\"\n\nBut Dr. Hodge goes even farther than this. He ventures to suggest that\nJesus Christ deceived his disciples by intimating what was not true\nas to his purpose, in more than one instance. \"Of our blessed\nLord himself it is said in Luke 24:28, 'He made as though [Greek:\nprosepoieito]--he made a show of: he would have gone further.' He so\nacted as to make the impression on the two disciples that it was\nhis purpose to continue his journey. (Comp. Mark 6: 48.)\"[1] This\nsuggestion of Dr. Hodge's would have been rebuked by even Richard\nRothe, and would have shocked August Dorner. Would Dr. Hodge deny that\nJesus _could_ have had it in his mind to \"go further,\" or to have\n\"passed by\" his disciples, if they would not ask him to stop? And if\nthis were a possibility, is it fair to intimate that a purpose of\ndeception was in his mind, when there is nothing in the text that\nmakes that a necessary conclusion? Dr. Hodge, indeed, adds the\nsuggestion that \"many theologians do not admit that the fact recorded\nin Luke 24:28 [which he cites as an illustration of justifiable\ndeception by our Lord] involved any intentional deception;\" but this\nfact does not deter him from putting it forward in this light.\n\n[Footnote 1: When Jesus came walking on the sea, toward his disciples\nin their tempest-tossed boat, \"he would have passed them by;\" but\ntheir cry of fear drew him toward them.]\n\nIn the discussion of the application to emergencies, in practical\nlife, of the eternal principle which he points out at the beginning,\nDr. Hodge is as far from consistency as in his treatment of Bible\nnarratives. \"It is generally admitted,\" he says, \"that in criminal\nfalsehoods there must be not only the enunciation or signification of\nwhat is false, and an intention to deceive, but also a violation of\nsome obligation.\" What obligation can be stronger than the obligation\nto be true to God and true to one's self? If, as Dr. Hodge declares,\n\"a man who violates the truth, sins against the very foundation of his\nmoral being,\" a man would seem to be always under an obligation not to\nviolate the truth by speaking that which is false with an intention to\ndeceive. But Dr. Hodge seems to lose sight of his premises, in all his\nprogress toward his conclusions on this subject.\n\n\"There will always be cases,\" he continues, \"in which the rule of duty\nis a matter of doubt. It is often said that the rule above stated\napplies when a robber demands your purse. It is said to be right to\ndeny that you have anything of value about you. You are not bound to\naid him in committing a crime; and he has no right to assume that\nyou will facilitate the accomplishment of his object. This is not so\nclear. The obligation to speak the truth is a very solemn one; and\nwhen the choice is left a man to tell a lie or lose his money, he\nhad better let his money go. On the other hand, if a mother sees a\nmurderer in pursuit of her child, she has a perfect right to mislead\nhim by any means in her power [including lying?]; because the general\nobligation to speak the truth is merged or lost, for the time\nbeing, in the higher obligation.\" Yet Dr. Hodge starts out with the\ndeclaration that the obligation \"to keep truth inviolate,\" is highest\nof all; that \"truth is at all times sacred, because it is one of the\nessential attributes of God;\" that God himself cannot \"suspend or\nmodify\" this obligation; and that man is always under its force. And\nnow, strangely enough, he claims that in various emergencies \"the\ngeneral obligation to speak the truth is merged, or lost, for the time\nbeing, in the higher obligation.\" The completest and most crushing\nanswer to the vicious conclusions of Dr. Hodge as to the varying\nclaims of veracity, is to be found in the explicit terms of his\nunvaryingly correct premises in the discussion.\n\nDr. Hodge appears to be conscious of his confusion of mind in this\ndiscussion, but not to be quite sure of the cause of it. As to his\nclaim that the general obligation to speak the truth may be merged for\nthe time being in a \"higher obligation,\" he says: \"This principle is\nnot invalidated by its possible or actual abuse. It has been greatly\nabused.\" And he adds, farther on, in the course of the discussion:\n\n\"The question now under consideration is not whether it is ever right\nto do wrong, which is a solecism; nor is the question whether it is\never right to lie; but rather what constitutes a lie.\"\n\nHaving claimed that a lie necessarily includes falsity of statement,\nan intention to deceive, and \"a violation of some obligation,\" Dr.\nHodge goes on to show that \"every lie is a violation of a promise,\"\nas growing out of the nature of human society, where \"every man is\nexpected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promise\nnot to deceive his neighbor by word or act.\" And, after all this, he\nis inclined to admit that there are cases in which falsehoods with\nthe intention of deceiving are not lying, and are justifiable. \"This,\nhowever,\" he goes on to say, \"is not always admitted. Augustine, for\nexample, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the object\nor what the circumstances, to be sinful.\" And then, in artless\nsimplicity, Dr. Hodge concludes: \"This would be the simplest ground\nfor the moralist to take. But as shown above, and as generally\nadmitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are not\ncriminal.\"\n\nAccording to the principles laid down at the start by Dr. Hodge,\nthere is no place for a lie in God's service; but according to the\ninferences of Dr. Hodge, in the discussion of this question, there are\nplaces where falsehoods spoken with intent to deceive are admissible\nin God's sight and service. His whole treatment of this subject\nreminds me of an incident in my army-prison life, where this question\nas a question was first forced upon my attention. The Union prisoners,\nin Columbia at that time, received their rations from the Confederate\nauthorities, and had them cooked in their own way, and at their own\nexpense, by an old colored woman whom they employed for the purpose.\nTwo of us had a dislike for onions in our stew, while the others were\nwell pleased with them. So we two agreed with old \"Maggie,\" for a\nsmall consideration, to prepare us a separate mess without onions. The\nnext day our mess came by itself. We took it, and began our meal with\npeculiar satisfaction; but the first taste showed us an unmistakable\nonion flavor in our stew. When old Maggie came again, we remonstrated\nwith her on her breach of engagement. \"Bless your hearts, honeys,\" she\nreplied, \"you must have _some_ onions in your stew!\" She could not\ncomprehend the possibility of a beef stew without onions, even though\nshe had formally agreed to make it.\n\nDr. Hodge's premises in the discussion of the duty of truthfulness\nrule out onions; but his inferences and conclusions have the odor and\nthe taste of onions. He stands on a safe platform to begin with; but\nhe is an unsafe guide when he walks away from it. His arguments in\nthis case are an illustration of his own declaration: \"An adept in\nlogic may be a very poor reasoner.\"\n\nDr. Thornwell's \"Discourses on Truth\"[1] are a thorough treatment of\nthe obligation of veracity and the sin of lying. He is clear in his\ndefinitions, marking the distinction between rightful concealment as\nconcealment, and concealment for the purpose of deception. \"There are\nthings which men have a right to keep secret,\" he says, \"and if a\nprurient curiosity prompts others officiously to pry into them, there\nis nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such\na spirit. Our silence or evasive answers may have the effect of\nmisleading. That is not our fault, as it was not our design. Our\npurpose was simply to leave the inquirer as nearly as possible in the\nstate of ignorance in which we found him: it was not to misinform him,\nbut not to inform him at all.\n\n[Footnote 1: In Thornwell's _Collected Writings_, II., 451-613.]\n\n\"'Every man,' says Dr. Dick, 'has not a right to hear the truth when\nhe chooses to demand it. We are not bound to answer every question\nwhich may be proposed to us. In such cases we may be silent, or we may\ngive as much information as we please, and suppress the rest. If the\nperson afterward discover that the information was partial, he has no\ntitle to complain, because he had no right even to what he obtained;\nand we are not guilty of a falsehood unless we made him believe, by\nsomething which we said, that the information was complete.'\" \"The\n_intention_ of the speaker, and the _effect_ consequent upon it, are\nvery different things.\"\n\nDr. Thornwell recognizes the fact that the moral sense of humanity\ndiscerns the invariable superiority of truth over falsehood. \"If we\nplace virtue in sentiment,\" he says, \"there is nothing, according to\nthe confession of all mankind, more beautiful and lovely than truth,\nmore ugly and hateful than a lie. If we place it in calculations of\nexpediency, nothing, on the one hand, is more conspicuously useful\nthan truth and the confidence it inspires; nothing, on the other, more\ndisastrous than falsehood, treachery, and distrust. If there be then a\nmoral principle to which, in every form, humanity has given utterance,\nit is the obligation of veracity.\" \"No man ever tells a lie without a\ncertain degree of violence to his nature.\"\n\nDr. Thornwell bases this obligation of veracity on the nature of God,\nand on the duty of man to conform to the image of God in which he was\ncreated. \"Jesus Christ commends himself to our confidence and love,\"\nhe says, \"on the ground of his being the truth;... and makes it the\nglory of the Father that he is the God of truth, and the shame and\neverlasting infamy of the prince of darkness that he is the father\nof lies;\" and he adds: \"The mind cannot move in charity, nor rest in\nProvidence, unless it turn upon the poles of truth.\" \"Every man is as\ndistinctly organized in reference to truth, as in reference to any\nother purpose.\"\n\nIn Dr. Thornwell's view, it is not, as Dr. Paley would have it, that\n\"a lie is a breach of promise,\" because as between man and man \"the\ntruth is expected,\" according to a tacit understanding. As Dr.\nThornwell sees it, \"we are not bound by any other expectations of man\nbut those which we have authorized;\" and he deems it \"surprising\nto what an extent this superficial theory of 'contract' has found\nadvocates among divines and moralists,\" as, for example, Dr. Robert\nSouth, whom he quotes.[1] \"If Dr. Paley had pushed his inquiries a\nlittle farther,\" adds Thornwell, \"he might have accounted for this\nexpectation [of truthfulness] which certainly exists, independently of\na promise, upon principles firmer and surer than any he has admitted\nin the structure of his philosophy. He might have seen it in the\nlanguage of our nature proclaiming the will of our nature's God.\" The\nmoral sense of mankind demands veracity, and abhors falsehood.\n\n[Footnote 1: Smith's _Sermon, on Falsehood and Lying_.]\n\nDr. Thornwell is clear as to the teachings of the Bible, in its\nprinciples, and in the illustration of those principles in the sacred\nnarrative. The Bible as he sees it teaches the unvarying duty of\nveracity, and the essential sinfulness of falsehood and deception. He\nrepudiates the idea that God, in any instance, approved deception, or\nthat Jesus Christ practiced it. \"When our Saviour 'made as though he\nwould have gone farther,' he effectually questioned his disciples\nas to the condition of their hearts in relation to the duties of\nhospitality. The angels, in pretending that it was their purpose to\nabide in the street all night, made the same experiment on Lot. This\nspecies of simulation involves no falsehood; its design is not to\ndeceive, but to catechize and instruct. The whole action is to be\nregarded as a sign by which a question is proposed, or the mind\nexcited to such a degree of curiosity and attention that lessons of\ntruth can be successfully imparted.\"\n\nAnd so on through other Bible incidents. Dr. Thornwell has no\nhesitation in distinguishing when concealment is right concealment,\nand when concealment is wrong because intended to deceive.\n\nExposing the incorrectness of the claim, made by Dr. Paley, as by\nothers, that certain specific falsehoods are not lies, Dr. Thornwell\nshows himself familiar with the discussion of this question of\nthe ages in all the centuries; and he moves on with his eye fixed\nunerringly on the polar star of truth, in refreshing contrast with the\namiable wavering of Dr. Hodge's footsteps.\n\n\"Paley's law,\" he concludes, \"would obviously be the destruction of\nall confidence. How much nobler and safer is the doctrine of the\nScriptures, and of the unsophisticated language of man's moral\nconstitution, that truth is obligatory on its own account, and that he\nwho undertakes to signify to another, no matter in what form, and no\nmatter what may be the right in the case to know the truth, is bound\nto signify according to the convictions of his own mind! He is not\nalways bound to speak, but whenever he does speak he is solemnly bound\nto speak nothing but the truth. The universal application of this\nprinciple would be the diffusion of universal confidence. It would\nbanish deceit and suspicion from the world, and restrict the use of\nsigns to their legitimate offices.\"\n\nA later work on Christian Ethics, which acquires special prominence\nthrough its place in \"The International Theological Library,\" edited\nby Drs. Briggs and Salmond, is by Dr. Newman Smyth. It shows signs of\nstrength in the premises assumed by the writer, in accordance with the\nteachings of Scripture and of the best moral sense of mankind; and\nsigns of weakness in his processes of reasoning, and in his final\nconclusion, according to the mental methods of those who have wavered\non this subject, from John Chrysostom to Richard Rothe and Charles\nHodge.\n\nDr. Smyth rightly bases Christian ethics on the nature and will of\nGod, as illustrated in the life and teachings of the divine-human Son\nof God. \"A thoroughly scientific ethics must not only be adequate\nto the common moral sense of men, but prove true also to the moral\nconsciousness of the Son of man. No ethics has right to claim to be\nthoroughly scientific, or to offer itself as the only science of\nethics possible to us in our present experience, until it has sought\nto enter into the spirit of Christ, and has brought all its, analysis\nand theories of man's moral life to the light of the luminous ethical\npersonality of Jesus Christ.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 6.]\n\nIn his general statement of \"the duty of speaking the truth,\" Dr.\nSmyth is also clear, sound, and emphatic.[1] \"The law of truthfulness\nis,\" he says, \"a supreme inward law of thought.\" \"The obligation of\nveracity ... is an obligation which every man owes to himself. It is a\nprimal personal obligation. Kant was profoundly right when he regarded\nfalsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth, a destruction of personal\nintegrity.... Truthfulness is the self-consistency of character;\nfalsehood is a breaking up of the moral integrity. Inward truthfulness\nis essential to moral growth and personal vigor, as it is necessary\nto the live oak that it should be of one fiber and grain from root to\nbranch. What a flaw is in steel, what a foreign substance is in any\ntexture, that a falsehood is to the character,--a source of weakness,\na point where under strain it may break.... Truthfulness, then, is\ndue, first by the individual to himself as the obligation of personal\nintegrity. The unity of the personal life consists in it.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ibid_., pp. 386-389.]\n\nAnd in addition to the obligation of veracity as a duty to one's self,\nDr. Smyth recognizes it as a duty to others. He says: \"Truthfulness is\nowed to society as essential to its integrity. It is the indispensable\nbond of social life. Men can be members, one of another in a social\norganism only as they live together in truth. Society would fall, to\npieces without credit; but credit rests on the general social virtue\nof truthfulness.... The liar is rightly regarded as an enemy to\nmankind. A lie is not only an affront against the person to whom it is\ntold, but it is an offense against humanity.\"\n\nIf Dr. Smyth had been content to leave this matter with the explicit\nstatement of the principles that are unvaryingly operative, he would\nhave done good service to the world, and his work could have been\ncommended as sound and trustworthy in this department of ethics; but\nas soon as he begins to question and reason on the subject, he\nbegins to waver and grow confused; and in the end his inconclusive\nconclusions are pitiably defective and reprehensible.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, pp. 392-403]\n\nIn considering \"the so-called lies of necessity,\" Dr. Smyth declares\nwith frankness: \"Some moralists in their supreme regard for truth will\nnot admit that under any conceivable circumstances a lie can be\ndeemed necessary, not even to save life or to prevent a murderer from\naccomplishing his fiendish purpose.\" And then over against this he\nindicates his fatal confusion of mind and weakness of reasoning in\nthe suggestion: \"But the sound human understanding, in spite of the\nmoralists, will prevaricate, and often with great vigor and success,\nin such cases. Who is right,--Kant, or the common moral sense? Which\nshould be followed,--the philosophic morality, or the practice of\notherwise most truthful men?\"\n\nIt is to be noted that, in these two declarations, Dr. Smyth puts\nlying as if it were synonymous with prevarication; else there is no\nreason for his giving the one as over against the other. And this\nindicates a peculiar difficulty in the whole course of Dr. Smyth's\nargument concerning the \"so-called lie of necessity.\" He essays no\ndefinition of the \"lie.\" He draws no clear line of distinction between\na lie, a falsehood, a deceit, and a prevarication, or between a\njustifiable concealment and an unjustifiable concealment; and in\nhis various illustrations of his position he uses these terms\nindiscriminately, in such a way as to indicate that he knows no\nessential difference between them, or that he does not care to\nemphasize any difference.\n\nIf, in the instance given above, Dr. Smyth means that \"the sound human\nunderstanding, in spite of the moralists,\" will approve lying, or\nfalsifying with the intention to deceive, he ought to know that the\nsound human understanding will not justify such a course, and that it\nis unfair to intimate such a thing.[1] And when he asks, in connection\nwith this suggestion, \"Who is right,--Kant, or the common moral sense?\nWhich should be followed, the philosophic morality, or the practice of\notherwise most truthful men?\" his own preliminary assertions are his\nconclusive answer. He says specifically, \"Kant was profoundly right\nwhen he regarded falsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth, a\ndestruction of personal integrity;\" and the \"common moral sense\" of\nhumanity is with Kant in this thing, in accordance with Dr. Smyth's\nprimary view of the case, as over against the intimation of Dr.\nSmyth's question. As to the suggested \"practice of otherwise most\ntruthful men\" in this thing,--if men who generally tell the truth,\nlie, or speak falsely, or deceive, under certain circumstances, they\nare much like men who are generally decent, but who occasionally,\nunder temptation, are unchaste or dishonest; they are better examples\nin their uprightness than in their sinning.\n\n[Footnote 1: See pp. 9-32, _supra_.]\n\nIt would seem, indeed, that, notwithstanding his sound basis of\nprinciples, which recognizes the incompatibility of falsehood with\ntrue manhood and with man's duty to his fellows, Dr. Smyth does not\ncarry with him in his argument the idea of the essential sinfulness of\na lie, and therefore he is continually inconsistent with himself. He\nsays, for example, in speaking of the suspension of social duties in\nwar time: \"If the war is justifiable, the ethics of warfare come at\nonce into play. It would be absurd to say that it is right to kill\nan enemy, but not to deceive him. Falsehood, it may be admitted, as\nmilitary strategy, is justifiable, if the war is righteous.\"\n\nHere, again, is the interchange of the terms \"deception\" and\n\"falsehood.\" But unless this is an intentional jugglery of words,\nwhich is not to be supposed, this means that it would be absurd to\nsay that it is right to kill an enemy, but not right to tell him a\nfalsehood. And nothing could more clearly show Dr. Smyth's error of\nmind on this whole subject than this declaration. \"Absurd\" to claim\nthat while it is right to take a man's life in open warfare, in a just\ncause, it would not be right to forfeit one's personal worth, and to\ndestroy one's personal integrity, which Dr. Smyth says are involved\nin a falsehood! \"Absurd\" to claim that while God who is the author\nof life can justify the taking of life, he cannot justify the sin of\nlying! No, no, the absurdity of the case is not on _that_ side of the\nline.\n\nThere is no consistency of argument on this subject in Dr. Smyth's\nwork. His premises are sound. His reasoning is confused and\ninconsistent. \"Not only in some cases of necessity is falsehood\npermissible, but we may recognize a positive obligation of love to\nthe concealment of the truth,\" he says. Here again is that apparent\nconfounding of unjustifiable \"falsehood\" with perfectly proper\n\"concealment of truth.\" He continues: \"Other duties which under such\ncircumstances have become paramount, may require the preservation of\none's own or another's life through a falsehood. Not only ought one\nnot to tell the truth under the supposed conditions, but, if the\nprinciple assumed be sound, a good conscience may proceed to enforce a\npositive obligation of untruthfulness.... There are occasions when the\ninterests of society and the highest motives of Christian love may\nrender it much more preferable to discharge the duty of self-defense\nthrough the humanity of a successful falsehood, than by the barbarity\nof a stunning blow or a pistol-shot. General benevolence demands that\nthe lesser evil, if possible, rather than the greater, should be\ninflicted on another.\"\n\nJust compare these conclusions of Dr. Smyth with his own premises.\n\"Truthfulness ... is an obligation which every man owes to himself.\nIt is a primal personal obligation.... Truthfulness is the\nself-consistency of character; falsehood is a breaking up of the moral\nintegrity.\" \"The liar is rightly regarded as an enemy to mankind. A\nlie is not only an affront against the person to whom it is told, but\nit is an offense against humanity.\" But what of all that? \"There are\noccasions when the interests of society and the highest motives of\nChristian love may render it much more preferable to discharge the\nduty of self-defense through the humanity of a successful falsehood,\nthan by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a pistol-shot. General\nbenevolence demands that the lesser evil, if possible, rather than the\ngreater, should be inflicted on another.\" Better break up one's\nmoral integrity, and fail in one's primal personal obligation to\nhimself,--better become an enemy of mankind, and commit an offense\nagainst humanity,--than defend one's self against an outlaw by the\nbarbarity of a stunning blow or a bullet!\n\nWould any one suppose from his premises that Dr. Smyth looked upon\npersonal truthfulness as a minor virtue, and upon falsehood as a\nlesser vice? Does he seem in those premises to put veracity below\nchastity, and falsehood below personal impurity? Yet is he to be\nunderstood as intimating, in this phase of his argument, that\nunchastity, or dishonesty, or any other vice than falsehood, is to be\npreferred, in practice, over a stunning blow or a fatal bullet against\na would-be murderer?[1] The looseness of Dr. Smyth's logic, as\nindicated in this reasoning on the subject of veracity, would in its\ntendency be destructive to the safeguards of personal virtue and of\nsocial purity; and his arguments for the lie of exigency are similar\nto those which are put forward in excuse for common sins against\nchastity, by the free-and-easy defenders of a lax standard in such\nmatters. \"Some moralists,\" says the average young man of the world,\n\"in their extreme regard for personal purity, will not admit that any\nact of unchastity is necessary, even to protect one's health, or as an\nact of love. But the men of virility and strong feeling will let down\noccasionally at this point, in spite of the moralists. Which should be\nfollowed,--the philosophic morality, or the practice of many otherwise\ndecent and very respectable men?\"\n\n[Footnote 1: See Augustine's words on this point, quoted at p. 100,\n_supra_.]\n\nConfounding, as always, a wise and right concealment of truth with\nactual falsehood, Dr. Smyth says of the duty of a teacher in the\nmatter of imparting truth to a pupil according to the measure of the\npupil's ability to receive it: \"An occasional friendly use of truth\nas a crash towel may be wholesome; but ordinarily there is a more\nexcellent way.\" _That_ is a counting of truth precious, with a\nvengeance!\n\nDr. Smyth seems inclined to accept in the main the conclusions,\non this whole subject, of Rothe, but without Rothe's measure of\nconsistency in the argument. Rothe starts wrong, and of course ends\nwrong. Dr. Smyth, like Dr. Hodge, starts right and ends wrong. No\nsorer condemnation of Dr. Smyth's position can be made, than by the\nsimple presentation of his own review of his own argument, when he\nsays: \"To sum up, then, what has been said concerning the so-called\nlies of necessity, the principle to be applied with wisdom is simply\nthis: give the truth always to those who in the bonds of humanity\nhave the right to the truth; conceal it or falsify it only when it is\nunmistakably evident that the human right to the truth from others\nhas been forfeited, or temporarily is held in abeyance by sickness,\nweakness, or some criminal intent: do not in any case prevaricate,\nunless you can tell the necessary falsehood deliberately and\npositively, from principle, with a good conscience void of offense\ntoward men, and sincere in the sight of God.\" What says the moral\nsense of humanity to such a position as that?\n\nAs over against the erroneous claim, made by Richard Rothe, and Newman\nSmyth, and others, that the \"moral sense\" of mankind is at\nvariance with the demands of \"rigid moralists,\" in regard to the\nunjustifiableness of falsehood, it is of interest to note the\ntestimony of strong thinkers, who have written on this subject with\nthe fullest freedom, from the standpoint of speculative philosophy,\nrather than of exclusively Christian ethics. For example, James\nMartineau, while a Christian philosopher, discusses the question of\nveracity as a philosopher, rather than as a Christian, in his \"Types\nof Ethical Theory;\"[1] and he insists that \"veracity is strictly\nnatural, that is, it is implied in the very nature which leads us to\nintercommunion in speech.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Martineau's _Types of Ethical Theory_, II., 255-265.]\n\nAs he sees it, a man is treacherous to himself who speaks falsely at\nany time to any one, and the man's moral sense recoils from his\naction accordingly. Dr. Martineau says: \"It is perhaps, the peculiar\n_treachery_ of this process which fixes upon falsehood a stamp of\n_meanness_ quite exceptional; and renders it impossible, I think, to\nyield to its inducements, even in cases supposed to be venial, without\na disgust little distinguishable from compunction. This must have been\nKant's feeling when he said: 'A lie is the abandonment, or, as it\nwere, the annihilation of the dignity of man.'\"\n\nDr. Martineau is not so rigid a moralist but that he is ready to agree\nwith those easy-going theologians who find a place for exceptional\nfalsehoods in their reasoning; yet he is so true a man in his moral\ninstincts that his nature recoils from the results of such reasoning.\n\"After all,\" he says, \"there is something in this problem which\nrefuses to be thus laid to rest; and in treating it, it is hardly\npossible to escape the uneasiness of a certain moral inconsequence. If\nwe consult the casuist of Common Sense he usually tells us that, in\ntheory, Veracity can have no exceptions; but that, in practice, he is\nbrought face to face with at least a few; and he cheerfully accepts a\ndispensation, when required, at the hands of Necessity.\n\n\"I confess rather to an inverse experience. The theoretic reasons for\ncertain limits to the rule of veracity appear to me unanswerable; nor\ncan I condemn any one who acts in accordance with them. Yet when I\nplace myself in a like position, at one of the crises demanding a\ndeliberate lie, an unutterable repugnance returns upon me, and makes\nthe theory seem shameful. If brought to the test, I should probably\nact rather as I think than as I feel,[1] without, however, being able\nto escape the stab of an instant compunction and the secret wound of a\nlong humiliation. Is this the mere weakness of superstition? It may be\nso. But may it not also spring from an ineradicable sense of a common\nhumanity, still leaving social ties to even social aliens, and, in\nthe presence of an imperishable fraternal unity, forbidding to the\nindividual of the moment the proud right of spiritual ostracism?...\"\n\n[Footnote 1: No, a man who feels like that would be true in the hour\nof temptation. His doubt of himself is only the tremulousness of true\ncourage.]\n\n\"How could I ever face the soul I had deceived, when perhaps our\nrelations are reversed, and he meets my sins, not with self-protective\nrepulse, but with winning love? And if with thoughts like these there\nalso blends that inward reverence for reality which clings to the very\nessence of human reason, and renders it incredible, _\u00e0 priori_,\nthat falsehood should become an implement of good, it is perhaps\nintelligible how there may be an irremediable discrepancy between the\ndioptric certainty of the understanding and the immediate insight of\nthe conscience: not all the rays of spiritual truth are refrangible;\nsome there are beyond the intellectual spectrum, that wake invisible\nresponse, and tremble in the dark.\"\n\nDr. Martineau's definition of right and wrong is this:[1] \"Every\naction is right, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows\na higher: every action is wrong, which, in presence of a higher\nprinciple, follows a lower;\" and his moral sense will not admit the\npossibility of falsehood being at any time higher than truth, or of\nveracity ever being lower than a lie.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Types of Ethical Theory_, II., 270.]\n\nProfessor Thomas Fowler, of the University of Oxford, writing as a\nbeliever in the gradual evolution of morals, and basing his philosophy\non experience without any recognition of _\u00e0 priori_ principles, is\nmuch more nearly in accord, at this point,[1] with Martineau, than\nwith Rothe, Hodge, and Smyth. Although he is ready to concede that\na lie may, theoretically, be justifiable, he is sure that the moral\nsense of mankind is, at the present state of average development,\nagainst its propriety. Hence, he asserts that, even when justice\nmight deny an answer to an improper question, \"outside the limits of\njustice, and irrespectively of their duty to others, many persons are\noften restrained, and quite rightly so, from returning an untruthful\nor ambiguous answer by purely self-regarding feelings. They feel that\nto give an untruthful answer, even under such circumstances as I\nhave supposed, would be to burden themselves with the subsequent\nconsciousness of cowardice or lack of self-respect. And hence,\nwhatever inconvenience or annoyance it may cost them, they tell the\nnaked truth, rather than stand convicted to themselves of a want of\ncourage or dignity.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: _Principles of Morals_, II., 159-161.]\n\n\"Veracity, though this was by no means always the case,\" Professor\nFowler continues, \"has become the point of honor in the upper ranks of\nmodern civilized societies, and hence it is invested with a sanctity\nwhich seems to attach to no other virtue; and to the uninstructed\nconscience of the unreflective man, the duty of telling the truth\nappears, of all duties, to be the only duty which never admits of\nany exceptions, from the unavoidable conflict with other duties.\"\nHe ranges the moral sense of the \"upper ranks of modern civilized\nsocieties,\" and \"the uninstructed conscience of the unreflective man,\"\nagainst any tolerance of the \"lie of necessity,\" leaving only the\nlocality of Muhammad's coffin for those who are arrayed against the\nrigid moralists on this question.\n\nWhile he admits the theoretical possibility of the \"lie of necessity,\"\nProfessor Fowler concludes as to its practical expediency: \"Without\nmaintaining that there are no conceivable circumstances under which a\nman will be justified in committing a breach of veracity, it may at\nleast be said that, in the lives of most men, there is no case likely\nto occur in which the greater social good would not be attained by the\nobservation of the general rule to tell the truth, rather than by the\nrecognition of an exception in favor of a lie, even though that lie\nwere told for purely benevolent reasons.\" That is nearer right than\nthe conclusions of many an inconsistent intuitionist!\n\nLeslie Stephen, a consistent agnostic, and a believer in the slow\nevolution of morals, in his \"Science of Ethics,\"[1] naturally holds,\nlike Herbert Spencer, to the gradual development of the custom of\ntruthfulness, as a necessity of society.[2] The moral sense of\nprimitive man, as he sees it, might seem to justify falsehood to an\n_enemy_, rather than, as Rothe and Smyth would claim, to those who are\n_wards of love_. In illustration of this he says: \"The obligation to\ntruthfulness is [primarily] limited to relations with members of the\nsame tribe or state; and, more generally, it is curious to observe how\na kind of local or special morality is often developed in regard to\nthis virtue. The schoolboy thinks it a duty to his fellows to lie\nto his master, the merchant to his customer, and the servant to his\nemployer; and, inversely, the duty is often recognized as between\nmembers of some little clique or profession, as soon as it is seen to\nbe important for their corporate interest, even at the expense of the\nwider social organization. There is honor among thieves, both of the\nrespectable and other varieties.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Leslie Stephen's _Science of Ethics_, pp. 202-209.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See pp. 26-32, _supra_.]\n\nBut Leslie Stephen sees that, in the progress of the race, the\nimportance of veracity has come to a recognition, \"in which it differs\nfrom the other virtues.\" While the law of marriage may vary at\ndifferent periods, \"the rule of truthfulness, on the other hand, seems\nto possess the _a priori_ quality of a mathematical axiom.... Truth,\nin short, being always the same, truthfulness must be unvarying. Thus,\n'Be truthful' means, 'Speak the truth whatever the consequences,\nwhether the teller or the hearer receives benefit or injury.' And\nhence, it is inferred, truthfulness implies a quality independent of\nthe organization of the agent or of society.\" While Mr. Stephen would\nhimself find a place for the \"lie of necessity\" under conceivable\ncircumstances, he is clear-minded enough to perceive that the moral\nsense of the civilized world is opposed to this view; and in this he\nis nearer correct than those who claim the opposite.\n\nIt is true that those who seek an approbation of their defense of\nfalsehoods which they deem a necessity, assume, without proof, their\nagreement with the moral sense of the race. But it is also true that\nthere stands opposed to their theory the best moral sense of primitive\nman, as shown in a wide area of investigation, and also of thinkers\nall the way up from the lowest moral grade to the most rigorous\nmoralists, including intuitionists, utilitarians, and agnostics.\nHowever deficient may be the practice of erring mortals, the ideal\nstandard in theory, is veracity, and not falsehood.\n\nAs to the opinions of purely speculative philosophers, concerning the\nadmissibility of the \"lie of necessity,\" they have little value except\nas personal opinions. This question is one that cannot be discussed\nfairly without relation to the nature and law of God. It is of\ninterest, however, to note that a keen mind like Kant's insists that\n\"the highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself, considered\nas a moral being singly (owed to the humanity subsisting in his\nperson), is a departure from truth, or lying.\"[1] And when a man\nlike Fichte,[2] whom Carlyle characterizes as \"that cold, colossal,\nadamantine spirit, standing erect like a Cato Major among degenerate\nmen; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa, and to have discoursed\nof beauty and virtue in the groves of Academe,\" declares that no\nmeasure of evil results from truth-speaking would induce him to tell a\nlie, a certain moral weight attaches to his testimony. And so with\nall the other philosophers. No attempt at exhaustiveness in their\ntreatment is made in this work. But the fullest force of any fresh\nargument made by them in favor of occasional lying is recognized so\nfar as it is known.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Semple's _Kant's Metaphysic of Ethics_, p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Martensen's _Christian Ethics (Individual)_, \u00a7 97.]\n\nOne common misquotation from a well-known philosopher, in this line,\nis, however, sufficiently noteworthy for special mention here. Jacobi,\nin his intense theism, protests against the unqualified idealism of\nFichte, and the indefinite naturalism of Schelling; and, in his famous\nLetter to Fichte,[1] he says vehemently: \"But the Good what is it?\nI have no answer if there be no God. As to me, this world of\nphenomena--if it have all its truth in these phenomena, and no more\nprofound significance, if it have nothing beyond itself to reveal\nto me--becomes a repulsive phantom, in whose presence I curse the\nconsciousness which has called it into existence, and I invoke against\nit annihilation as a deity. Even so, also, everything that I call\ngood, beautiful, and sacred, turns to a chimera, disturbing my spirit,\nand rending the heart out of my bosom, as soon as I assume that it\nstands not in me as a relation to a higher, real Being,--not a mere\nresemblance or copy of it in me;--when, in fine, I have within me an\nempty and fictitious consciousness only. I admit also that I know\nnothing of 'the Good _per se_,' or 'the True _per se_,' that I even\nhave nothing but a vague notion of what such terms stand for. I\ndeclare that it revolts me when people seek to obtrude upon me the\nWill which wills nothing, this empty nut of independence and freedom\nin absolute indifference, and accuse me of atheism, the true and\nproper godlessness, because I show reluctance to accept it.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: F.H. Jacobi's _Werke_, IIIter Band, pp. 36-38.]\n\nInsisting thus that he must have the will of a personal God as a\nsource of obligation to conform to the law of truth and virtue, and\nthat without such a source no assumed law can be binding on him,\nJacobi adds: \"Yes I am the atheist, and the godless man who, in\nopposition to the Will that wills nothing, will lie as the lying\nDesdemona lied; will lie and deceive as did Pylades in passing himself\noff as Orestes; will commit murder as did Timoleon; break law and oath\nas did Epaminondas, as did John De Witt; will commit suicide as did\nOtho; will undertake sacrilege with David; yes and rub ears of corn on\nthe Sabbath merely because I am an hungered, and because the law is\nmade for man and not man for the law.\"\n\nJacobi's reference, in this statement, to lying and other sins, was\ntaken by itself as the motto to one of Coleridge's essays;[1] and this\nseems to have given currency to the idea that Jacobi was in favor of\nlying. Hence he is unfairly cited by ethical writers[2] as having\ndeclared himself for the lie of expediency; whereas the context shows\nthat that is not his position. He is simply stating the logical\nconsequences of a philosophy which he repudiates.\n\n[Footnote 1: Coleridge's Works: _The Friend_, Essay XV.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See, for instance, Martensen's _Christian Ethics\n(Individual)_, \u00a797.]\n\nAmong the false assumptions that are made by many of the advocates of\nthe \"lie of necessity\" is the claim that in war, in medical practice,\nand in the legal profession, the propriety of falsehood and deceit,\nin certain cases, is recognized and admitted on all sides. While the\nbaselessness of this claim has been pointed out, incidentally, in the\nprogress of the foregoing discussion,[1] it would seem desirable to\ngive particular attention to the matter in a fuller treatment of it,\nbefore closing this record of centuries of discussion.\n\n[Footnote 1: See pp. 71-75, _supra_.]\n\nIt is not true that in civilized warfare there is an entire\nabrogation, or suspension, of the duty of truthfulness toward an\nenemy. There is no material difference between war and peace in this\nrespect. Enemies, on both sides, understand that in warfare they are\nto kill each other if they can, by the use of means that are allowable\nas means; but this does not give them the privilege of doing what is\nutterly inconsistent with true manhood.\n\nEnemies are not bound to disclose their plans to each other. They have\na duty of concealing those plans from each other. Hence, as Dorner has\nsuggested, they proffer to each other's sight only appearances, not\nassurances; and it is for each to guess out, if he can, the real\npurpose of the other, below the appearance. An enemy can protect his\nborders by pitfalls, or torpedoes, or ambushes, carefully concealed\nfrom sight, in order to guard the life of his own people by destroying\nthe life of his opponents, or may make demonstrations, before the\nenemy, of possible movements, in order to conceal his purposed\nmovements; but in doing this he does only what is allowable, in\neffect, in time of peace.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Several of the illustrations of Oriental warfare in the\nBible record are to be explained in accordance with this principle.\nThus with the ambush set by Joshua before Ai (Josh. 8: 1-26):\nthe Canaanites did not read aright the riddle of the Israelitish\ncommander, and they suffered accordingly. Yet Dr. Dabney (_Theology_,\np. 424) cites this as an instance of an intentional deception which\nwas innocent in God's sight. And again, in the case recorded at 2\nKings 7: 6, where the Lord \"made the host of the Syrians to hear a\nnoise of chariots, and a noise of horses, even the noise of a great\nhost,... and they arose and ... fled for their life,\" thinking that\nHittite and Egyptian forces were approaching, it is evident that God\nsimply caused the Syrians, who were contending with his people, to\nfeel that they were fighting hopelessly against God's cause. The\nimpression God made on their minds was a correct one. He could bring\nchariots and horses as a great host against them. They did well to\nrealize this fact. But the Syrians' explanation of this impression was\nincorrect in its details.]\n\nA similar method of mystifying his opponent is adopted by the\nbase-ball pitcher in his demonstrations with the ball before letting\nit drive at the batsman. The batsman holds himself responsible for\nreading the riddle of the pitcher's motions. Yet the pitcher is\nforbidden to deceive the batsman by a feint of delivering the ball\nwithout delivering it.\n\nIf an enemy attempts any communication with his opponent, he has no\nright to lie to, or to deceive him. He must not draw him into an\nambuscade, or over concealed torpedoes, on the plea of desiring an\namicable interview with him; and his every word given to an enemy must\nbe observed sacredly as an obligation of truth.\n\nEven before the Christian era, and centuries prior to the time when\nChrysostom was confused in his mind on this point, Cicero wrote as\nto the obligations of veracity upon enemies in time of war, and in\nrepudiation of the idea that warfare included a suspension of all\nmoral relations between belligerents during active hostilities.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cicero's _De Officiis_, I., 12, 13.]\n\nHe said: \"The equities of war are prescribed most carefully by the\nheralds' law (_lex fetialis_) of the Roman people,\" and he went on to\ngive illustrations of the recognized duty of combatants to keep within\nthe bounds of mutual social obligations. \"Even where private persons,\nunder stress of circumstances, have made any promise to the enemy,\" he\nsaid, \"they should observe the exactest good faith, as did Regulus, in\nthe first Punic war, when taken prisoner and sent to Rome to treat of\nthe exchange of prisoners, having sworn that he would return. First,\nwhen he had arrived, he did not vote in the Senate for the return of\nthe prisoners. Then, when his friends and kinsmen would have detained\nhim, he preferred to go back to punishment rather than evade his faith\nplighted to the enemy.\n\n\"In the second Punic war also, after the battle of Cannae, of the ten\nRomans whom Hannibal sent to Rome bound by an oath that they would\nreturn unless they obtained an agreement for the redemption of\nprisoners, the censors kept disfranchised those who perjured\nthemselves, making no exception in favor of him who had devised a\nfraudulent evasion of his oath. For when by leave of Hannibal he had\ndeparted from the camp, he went back a little later, on pretense\nof having forgotten something. Then departing again from the camp\n[without renewing his oath], he counted himself set free from the\nobligation of his oath. And so he was free _so_ far as the words went,\nbut not so in reality; for always in a promise we must have regard to\nthe meaning of our words, rather than to the words themselves.\"\n\nIn modern times, when Lord Clive, in India, acted on the theory that\nan utter lack of veracity and good faith on the part of an enemy\njustified a suspension of all moral obligations toward him, and\npracticed deceit on a Bengalee by the name of Omichund, in order to\ngain an advantage over the Nabob of Bengal, he was condemned by the\nmoral sense of the nation for which he thus acted deceitfully; and, in\nspite of the specious arguments put forth by his partisan defenders,\nhis name is infamous because of this transaction.\n\n\"English valor and English intelligence have done less to extend\nand preserve our Oriental empire than English veracity,\" says Lord\nMacaulay. \"All that we could have gained by imitating the doublings,\nthe evasions, the fictions, the perjuries, which have been employed\nagainst us, is as nothing when compared with what we have gained by\nbeing the one power in India on whose word reliance can be placed.\nNo oath which superstition can devise, no hostage however precious,\ninspires a hundredth part of the confidence which is produced by the\n'yea, yea,' and the 'nay, nay,' of a British envoy.\" Therefore it is\nthat Lord Macaulay is sure that \"looking at the question of expediency\nin the lowest sense of the word, and using no arguments but such as\nMachiavelli might have employed in his conferences with Borgia, we\nare convinced that Clive was altogether in the wrong, and that he\ncommitted, not merely a crime but a blunder.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Macaulay's _Essay on Lord Clive_.]\n\nSo again when an English vessel of war made signals of distress,\noff the coast of France, during the war with Napoleon, and thereby\ndeceived men from the enemy into coming to its relief, and then held\nthem as prisoners, the act was condemned by the moral sense of the\nworld. As Woolsey says, in his \"International Law:\"[1] \"Breach of\nfaith between enemies has always been strongly condemned, and that\nvindication of it is worthless which maintains that, without an\nexpress or tacit promise to our enemy, we are not bound to keep faith\nwith him.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Sect. 133, p. 213.]\n\nThe theologian who assumes that the duty of veracity is suspended\nbetween enemies in war time is ignorant of the very theory of\ncivilized warfare; or else he fails to distinguish between justifiable\nconcealment, by the aid of methods of mystifying, and falsehood which\nis never justifiable. And that commander who should attempt to justify\nfalsehood and bad faith in warfare on the ground that it is held\njustifiable in certain works on Christian ethics, would incur the\nscorn of the civilized world for his credulity; and he would be told\nthat it is absurd to claim that because he is entitled to kill a man\nin warfare it must be fair to lie to him.\n\nIn the treatment of the medical profession, many writers on ethics\nhave been as unfair, as in their misrepresentation of the general\nmoral sense with reference to warfare. They have spoken as if \"the\nethics of the medical profession\" had a recognized place for falsehood\nin the treatment of the sick. But this assumption is only an\nassumption. There are physicians who will lie, and there are\nphysicians who will not lie; and in each case the individual physician\nacts in this matter on his own responsibility: he has no code of\nprofessional ethics justifying a lie on his part as a physician, when\nit would not be justifiable in a layman.\n\nConcealment of that which he has a right to conceal, is as clearly a\nduty, in many a case, on the part of a physician, as it is on the\npart of any other person; but falsehood is never a legitimate, or an\nallowable, means of concealment by physician or layman. As has been\nalready stated[1] if it be once known that a physician is ever ready\nto speak words of cheer to a patient falsely, that physician is\nmeasurably deprived of the possibility of encouraging a patient by\ntruthful words of cheer when he would gladly do so. And physicians\nwould probably be surprised to know how generally they are estimated\nin the community according to their reputation in this matter. One is\nknown as a man who will speak falsely to his patients as a means of\nencouragement, while another is known as a man who will be cautious\nabout giving his opinion concerning chances of recovery, but who will\nnever tell an untruth to a patient or to any other person. But in no\ncase can a physician claim that the ethics of his profession as a\nprofession justify him in a falsehood to any person--patient or no\npatient.\n\n[Footnote 1: See p. 75 f., _supra_.]\n\nA distinguished professor in one of the prominent medical colleges of\nthis country, in denying the claim of a writer on ethics that it may\nbecome the duty of a physician to deceive his patient as a means of\ncuring him, declares that a physician acting on this theory \"will not\nbe found in accord with the best and the highest medical teaching of\nthe present day;\" and he goes on to say:[1] \"In my profession to-day,\nthe truth properly presented, we have found, carries with it a\nconvincing and adjusting element which does not fail to bring the\nafflicted person to that condition of mind that is most conducive\nto his physical well-being, and let me add also, I believe, to his\nspiritual welfare.\" This statement was made in connection with the\ndeclaration that in the hospital which was in his charge it is not\ndeemed right or wise to deceive a patient as to any operation to be\nperformed upon him. And there are other well-known physicians who\ntestify similarly as to the ethics of their profession.\n\n[Footnote 1: In a personal communication to the author.]\n\nAn illustration of the possible good results of concealing an\nunpleasant fact from a sick person, that has been a favorite citation\nall along the centuries with writers on ethics who would justify\nemergency falsehoods, is one which is given in his correspondence by\nPliny the younger, eighteen centuries ago.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Epistles of Pliny the Younger_, Book III., Epis. 16.\nPliny to Nepos.]\n\nCaecinna Paetus and his son \"were both at the same time attacked with\nwhat seemed a mortal illness, of which the son died.... His mother\n[Arria] managed his funeral so privately that Paetus did not know of\nhis death. Whenever she came into his bedchamber, she pretended that\nher son was better, and, as often as he inquired after his health,\nwould answer that he had rested well, or had eaten with an appetite.\nWhen she found she could no longer restrain her grief, but her tears\nwere gushing out, she would leave the room, and, having given vent to\nher passion, return again with dry eyes and a serene countenance, as\nif she had dismissed every sentiment of sorrow.\"\n\nThis Roman matron also committed suicide, as an encouragement to her\nhusband whom she desired to have put an end to his own life, when he\nwas likely to have it taken from him by the executioner; and Pliny\ncommends her nobleness of conduct in both cases. It is common among\nethical writers, in citing this instance in favor of lying, to say\nnothing about the suicide, and to omit mention of the fact that the\nmother squarely lied, by saying that her dead boy had eaten a good\nbreakfast, instead of employing language that might have been the\ntruth as far as it went, while it concealed that portion of the truth\nwhich she thought it best to conceal. It is common to quote her as\nsimply saying of her son\" He is better;\"[1] quite a different version\nfrom Pliny's, and presenting a different issue.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Newman Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 395, where\nthis case is stated with vagueness of phrase, and as thus stated is\napproved.]\n\nIt was perfectly proper for that mother to conceal the signs of her\nsorrow from her sick husband, who had no right to know the truth\nconcerning matters outside of his sick-room at such a time. And if,\nindeed, she could say in all sincerity, as expressive of her feelings\nin the death of her son, by the will of the gods, \"He is better,\" it\nwould have been possible for her to feel that she was entitled to say\nthat as the truth, and not as a falsehood; and in that case she would\nnot have intended a deceit, but only a concealment. But when, on the\nother hand, she told a deliberate lie--spoke falsely in order to\ndeceive--she committed a sin in so doing, and her sin was none the\nless a sin because it resulted in apparent good to her husband. An\nillustration does not overturn a principle, but it may misrepresent\nit.\n\nAnother illustration, on the other side of the case, is worth citing\nhere. Victor Hugo pictures, in his _Les Miserables_,[1] a sister of\ncharity adroitly concealing facts from a sick person in a hospital,\nwhile refusing to tell a falsehood even for the patient's good. \"Never\nto have told a falsehood, never to have said for any advantage, or\neven indifferently, a thing which was not the truth, the holy truth,\nwas the characteristic feature of Sister Simplice.\" She had taken the\nname of Simplice through special choice. \"Simplice, of Sicily, our\nreaders will remember, is the saint who sooner let her bosom be\nplucked out than say she was a native of Segeste, as she was born at\nSyracuse, though the falsehood would have saved her. Such a patron\nsaint suited this soul.\" And in speaking of Sister Simplice, as never\nhaving told even \"a white lie,\" Victor Hugo quotes a letter from the\nAbb\u00e9 Sicard, to his deaf-mute pupil Massieu, on this point: \"Can there\nbe such a thing as a white lie, an innocent lie? Lying is the absolute\nof evil. Lying a little is not possible. The man who lies tells\nthe whole lie. Lying is the face of the fiend; and Satan has two\nnames,--he is called Satan and Lying.\" Victor Hugo the romancer would\nseem to be a safer guide, so far, for the physician or the nurse in\nthe sick-room, than Pliny the rhetorician, or Rothe the theologian.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Book VII.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Yet Victor Hugo afterwards represents even Sister\nSimplice as lying unqualifiedly, when sorely tempted--although not in\nthe sick-room.]\n\nA well-known physician, in speaking to me of this subject, said:\n\"It is not so difficult to avoid falsehood in dealing with anxious\npatients as many seem to suppose. _Tact_, as well as _principle_, will\ndo a good deal to help a physician out, in an emergency. I have never\nseen any need of lying, in my practice.\" And yet another physician,\nwho had been in a widely varied practice for forty years, said that he\nhad never found it necessary to tell a lie to a patient; although he\nthought he might have done so if he had deemed it necessary to save\na patient's life. In other words, while he admitted the possible\njustification of an \"emergency lie,\" he had never found a first-class\nopening for one in his practice. And he added, that he knew very well\nthat if he had been known to lie to his patients, his professional\nefficiency, as well as his good name, would have suffered. Medical\nmen do not always see, in their practice, the supposed advantages of\nlying, which have so large prominence in the minds of ethical writers.\n\nAnother profession, which is popularly and wrongly accused of having\na place for the lie in its system of ethics, is the legal profession.\nWhewell refers to this charge in his \"Elements of Morality\" (citing\nPaley in its support). He says: \"Some moralists have ranked with the\ncases in which convention supersedes the general rule of truth, an\nadvocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his\nclient's cause.\" But as to an advocate's right in this matter, Whewell\nsays explicitly: \"If, in pleading, he assert his belief that his cause\nis just, when he believes it unjust, he offends against truth; as any\nother man would do who, in like manner, made a like assertion.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Whewell's _Elements of Morality_, \u00a7 400.]\n\nChief-Justice Sharswood, of Pennsylvania, in his standard work on\n\"Legal Ethics,\" cites this opinion of Whewell with unqualified\napproval; and, in speaking for the legal profession, he says: \"No\ncounsel can with propriety and good conscience express to court or\njury his belief in the justice of his client's cause, contrary to the\nfact. Indeed, the occasions are very rare in which he ought to throw\nthe weight of his private opinion into the scales in favor of the side\nhe has espoused.\" Calling attention to the fact that the official\noath of an attorney, on his admission to the bar, in the state of\nPennsylvania, includes the specific promise to \"use no falsehood,\" he\nsays: \"Truth in all its simplicity--truth to the court, client,\nand adversary--should be indeed the polar star of the lawyer. The\ninfluence of only slight deviations from truth upon professional\ncharacter is very observable. A man may as well be detected in a great\nas a little lie. A single discovery, among professional brethren, of a\nfailure of truthfulness, makes a man the object of distrust, subjects\nhim to constant mortification, and soon this want of confidence\nextends itself beyond the Bar to those who employ the Bar. That\nlawyer's case is truly pitiable, upon the escutcheon of whose honesty\nor truth rests the slightest tarnish.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Sharswood's _Essay on Professional Ethics_, pp. 57,\n99,102,167 f.]\n\nAs illustrative of the carelessness with which popular charges against\nan entire profession are made the basis of reflections upon the\nethical standard of that profession, the comments of Dr. Hodge on\nthis matter are worthy of particular notice. In connection with his\nassertion that \"the principles of professional men allow of many\nthings which are clearly inconsistent with the requirements of the\nninth commandment,\" he says: \"Lord Brougham is reported to have said,\nin the House of Lords, that an advocate knows no one but his client.\nHe is bound _per fas et nefas_, if possible, to clear him. If\nnecessary for the accomplishment of that object, he is at liberty to\naccuse and defame the innocent, and even (as the report stated) to\nruin his country. It is not unusual, especially in trials for murder,\nfor the advocates of the accused to charge the crime on innocent\nparties and to exert all their ingenuity to convince the jury of their\nguilt.\" And Dr. Hodge adds the note that \"Lord Brougham, according\nto the public papers, uttered these sentiments in vindication of the\nconduct of the famous Irish advocate Phillips, who on the trial of\nCourvoisier for the murder of Lord Russell, endeavored to fasten the\nguilt on the butler and housemaid, whom he knew to be innocent, as his\nclient had confessed to him that he had committed the murder.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hodge's _Systematic Theology_, III., 439.]\n\nNow the facts, in the two very different cases thus erroneously\nintermingled by Dr. Hodge, as given by Justice Sharswood,[1] present\nquite another aspect from that in which Dr. Hodge sees them, as\nbearing on the accepted ethics of the legal profession. It would\nappear that Lord Brougham was not speaking in defense of another\nattorney's action, but in defense of his own course as attorney of\nQueen Caroline, thirty years before the Courvoisier murder trial. As\nJustice Sharswood remarks of Lord Brougham's \"extravagant\" claims: \"No\ndoubt he was led by the excitement of so great an occasion to say what\ncool reflection and sober reason certainly never can approve.\" Yet\nLord Brougham does not appear to have suggested, in his claim, that\na lawyer had a right to falsify the facts involved, or to utter an\nuntruth. He was speaking of his supposed duty to defend his client,\nthe Queen, against the charges of the King, regardless of the\nconsequences to himself or to his country through his advocacy of her\ncause, which he deemed a just one.\n\n[Footnote 1: Sharswood's _Legal Ethics_, p. 86 f.]\n\nAnd as to the charge against the eminent advocate, Charles Phillips,\nof seeking to fasten the crime on the innocent, when he knew that his\nclient was guilty, in the trial of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord\nRussell, that charge was overwhelmingly refuted by the testimony of\nlawyers and judges present at that trial. Mr. Phillips supposed his\nclient an innocent man until the trial was nearly concluded. Then came\nthe unexpected confession from the guilty man, accompanied by the\ndemand that his counsel continue in his case to the end. At first Mr.\nPhillips proposed to retire at once from the case; but, on advising\nwith eminent counsel, he was told that it would be wrong for him to\nbetray the prisoner's confidence, and practically to testify against\nhim, by deserting him at that hour. He then continued in the case,\nbut, as is shown conclusively in his statement of the facts, with its\naccompanying proofs, without saying a word or doing a thing that might\nproperly be deemed in the realm of false assertion or intimations.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Sharswood's _Legal Ethics_, pp. 103-107, 183-196.]\n\nThe very prominence given in the public press to the charges against\nMr. Phillips, and to their refutation, are added proof that the moral\nsense of the community is against falsehood under any circumstances or\nin any profession.\n\nMembers of the legal profession are bound by the same ethical\nobligations as other men; yet the civil law, in connection with which\nthey practice their profession, is not in all points identical\nwith the moral law; although it is not in conflict with any of its\nparticulars. As Chancellor Kent says: \"Human laws are not so perfect\nas the dictates of conscience, and the sphere of morality is more\nenlarged than the limits of civil jurisdiction. There are many duties\nthat belong to the class of imperfect obligations, which are binding\non conscience, but which human laws do not and cannot undertake\ndirectly to enforce. But when the aid of a Court of Equity is sought\nto carry into execution ... a contract, then the principles of ethics\nhave a more extensive sway.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Kent's _Commentaries_, Lect. 39, p. 490 f. (4th ed.);\ncited in Story's _Equity Jurisprudence_, VI., p. 229 (13th ed.).]\n\nIn the decisions of Equity courts, while the duty of absolute\ntruthfulness between parties in interest is insisted on as vital, and\na suppression of the truth from one who had a right to its knowledge,\nor a suggestion of that which is untrue in a similar case(\"_suggestio\nfalsi aut suppressio veri_\"), is deemed an element of fraud, the\ndistinction between mere silence when one is entitled to be silent,\nand concealment with the purpose of deception, is distinctly\nrecognized, as it is not in all manuals on ethics.[1] This is\nindicated, on the one hand, in the legal maxim _Aliud est celare,\naliud tacere_,--\"It is one thing to conceal, another to be silent;\"\nsilence is not necessarily deceptive concealment;[2] and on the other\nhand in such a statement as this, in Benjamin's great work on Sales:\n\"The nondisclosure of hidden facts [to a party in interest] is the\nmore objectionable when any artifice is employed to throw the buyer\noff his guard; as by telling half the truth.\"[3] It is not in any\nprinciples which are recognized by the legal profession as binding on\nthe conscience, that loose ethics are to find defense or support.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Bispham's _Principles of Equity_, p. 261, (3d ed.);\nBroom's _Legal Maxims_, p. 781 f. (7th Am. ed.); Merrill's _American\nand English Encyclopedia of Law_, art. \"Fraud.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Anderson's _Dictionary of Law_, p. 220; Abbott's _Law\nDictionary_, I., 53.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property_, p.\n451 f.]\n\nBut the profession that has most at stake in this discussion, and\nthat, indeed, is most involved in its issue, is the ministerial, or\nclerical, profession. While it was Jewish rabbis who affirmed most\npositively, in olden time, the unwavering obligations of truthfulness,\nit was Jewish rabbis, also, who sought to find extenuation or excuse\nfor falsehoods uttered with a good intention. And while it was\nChristian Fathers, like the Shepherd of Hermas, and Justin Martyr, and\nBasil the Great, and Augustine, who insisted that no tolerance should\nbe allowed to falsehood or deceit, it was also Christian Fathers, like\nGregory of Nyssa, and Chrysostom, who having practiced deceit for\nwhat they deemed a good end, first attempted a special plea for such\nfalsities as they had found convenient in their professional labors.\nAnd it was other Christian Fathers, like Origen and Jerome, who sought\nto find arguments for laxity of practice, at this point, in the course\nof the Apostles themselves.\n\nAll the way along the centuries, while the strongest defenders of the\nlaw of truthfulness have been found among clergymen, more has been\nwritten in favor of the lie of necessity by clergymen than by men of\nany other class or profession. And if it be true, as many of these\nhave claimed, that deceit and falsehood are a duty, on the part of a\nGod-loving teacher, toward those persons who, through weakness, or\nmental incapacity, or moral obliquity, are in the relation to him of\nwards of love, or of subjects of guardianship, there is no profession\nin which there is more of a call for godly deception, and for holy\nfalsehood, than the Christian ministry. If it be true that a lie, or a\nfalsehood, is justifiable in order to the saving of the physical life\nof another, how much better were it to tell such a lie in the loving\ndesire to save a soul.\n\nIf the lie of necessity be allowable for any purpose, it would seem\nto be more important as a means of good in the exercise of the\nministerial profession, than of any other profession or occupation.\nAnd if it be understood that this is the case, what dependence can be\nput, by the average hearer, on the most earnest words of a preacher,\nwho may be declaring a truth from God, and who, on the other hand, may\nbe uttering falsehoods in love? And if it be true, also, as some of\nthese clergymen have claimed, that God specifically approved falsehood\nand deception, according to the Bible record, and that Jesus Christ\npracticed in this line, while here on earth, what measure of\nconfidence can fallible man place in the sacred text as it has come to\nhim? The statement of this view of the case, is the best refutation\nof the claim of a possible justification for the most loving lie\nimaginable.\n\nThe only other point remaining untouched, in this review of the\ncenturies of discussion concerning the possible justifiableness of a\nlie under conceivable circumstances, is in its relation to the lower\nanimals. It has been claimed that \"all admit\" that there is no\nimpropriety in using any available means for the decoying of fish or\nof beasts to their death, or in saving one's self from an enraged\nanimal; hence that a lie is not to be counted as a sin _per se_, but\ndepends for its moral value on the relation subsisting between its\nutterer and the one toward whom it is uttered.\n\nDr. Dabney, who is far less clear and sound than Dr. Thornwell in his\nreasoning on this ethical question, says: \"I presume that no man\nwould feel himself guilty for deceiving a mad dog in order to destroy\nhim;\"[1] and he argues from this assumption that when a man, through\ninsanity or malice, \"is not a rational man, but a brute,\" he may\nfairly be deemed as outside of the pale of humanity, so far as\nthe obligations of veracity, viewed only as a social virtue, are\nconcerned.\n\n[Footnote 1: Dabney's _Theology_ (second edition), p. 425 f.]\n\nDr. Newman Smyth expands this idea.[1] He says: \"We may say that\nanimals, strictly speaking, can have no immediate right to our words\nof truth, since they belong below the line of existence which marks\nthe beginning of any functions of speech.\" He adds that animals \"may\nhave direct claims upon our humanity, and so indirectly put us under\nobligations to give them straightforward and fair treatment,\" and that\n\"truthfulness to the domestic animal, to the horse or the dog, is\nto be included as a part of our general obligation of kindness to\ncreatures that are entirely dependent upon our fidelity to them and\ntheir wants.\" But he cites the driving of horses with blinders,[2] and\nthe fishing for trout with artificial flies, as evidence of the fact\nthat man recognizes no sinfulness in the deceiving of the lower\nanimals, and hence that the duty of veracity is not one of universal\nobligation.\n\n[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 398.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Here is another illustration of Dr. Smyth's strange\nconfusion of concealment with deception. It would seem as though a man\nmust have blinders before his own eyes, to render him incapable of\nperceiving the difference between concealing a possible cause of\nfright from an animal, and intentionally deceiving that animal.]\n\nIf, indeed, the duty of truthfulness were only a social obligation,\nthere might be a force in this reasoning that is lacking when we see\nthat falsehood and deceit are against the very nature of God, and\nare a violation of man's primal nature. A lie is a sin, whenever and\nhowever and to whomsoever spoken or acted. It is a sin against God\nwhen uttered in his sight.\n\nMan is given authority from God over all the lower animals;[1] and he\nis empowered to take their lives, if necessary for his protection or\nfor his sustenance. In the exercise of this right, man is entitled to\nconceal from the animals he would kill or capture the means employed\nfor the purpose; as he is entitled to conceal similarly from his\nfellow-man, when he is authorized to kill him as an enemy, in time of\nwar waged for God. Thus it is quite proper for a man to conceal the\nhook or the net from the fish, or the trap or the pitfall from the\nbeast; but it is not proper to deceive an animal by an imitation of\nthe cry of the animal's offspring in order to lure that animal to\nits destruction; and the moral sense of the human race makes this\ndistinction.\n\n[Footnote 1: Gen. 1:28; 9:1-3.]\n\nAn illustration that has been put forward, as involving a nice\nquestion in the treatment of an animal, is that of going toward a\nloose horse with a proffered tuft of grass in one hand, and a halter\nfor his capture concealed behind the back in the other hand. It is\nright to conceal the halter, and to proffer the grass, provided they\nare used severally in their proper relations. If the grass be held\nforth as an assurance of the readiness of the man to provide for the\nneeds of the horse, and it be given to him when he comes for it, there\nis no deception practiced so far; and if, when horse and man are\nthus on good terms, the man brings out the halter for its use in the\nrelation of master and servitor between the two, that also is proper,\nand the horse would so understand it. But if the man were to refuse\nthe grass to the horse, when the two had come together, and were to\nsubstitute for it the halter, the man would do wrong, and the horse\nwould recognize the fact, and not be caught again in that way.\n\nEven a writer like Professor Bowne, who is not quite sure as to the\nright in all phases of the lying question, sees this point in its\npsychological aspects to better advantage than those ethical writers\nwho would look at the duty of truthfulness as mainly a social virtue:\n\"Even in cases where we regard truth as in our own power,\" he says,\n\"there are considerations of expediency which are by no means to be\ndisregarded. There is first the psychological fact that inexactness of\nstatement, exaggeration, unreality in speech, are sure to react upon\nthe mental habit of the person himself, and upon the estimate in which\nhis statements are held by others. In dealing with children, also,\nhowever convenient a romancing statement might momentarily be, it is\nunquestionable that exact truthfulness is the only way which does not\nlead to mischief. Even in dealing with animals, it pays in the long\nrun to be truthful. The horse that is caught once by false pretenses\nwill not be long in finding out the trick. The physician also who\ndissembles, quickly comes to lose the confidence of his patient, and\nhas thereafter no way of getting himself believed.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Bowne's _Principles of Ethics_, p. 224.]\n\nThe main question is not whether it is fair toward an animal for a man\nto lie to him, but whether it is fair toward a man's self, or toward\nGod the maker of animals and of men, for a man to lie to an animal. A\nlie has no place, even theoretically, in the universe, unless it be in\nsome sphere where God has no cognizance and man has no individuality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt were useless to follow farther the ever-varying changes of the\nnever-varying reasonings for the justification of the unjustifiable\n\"lie of necessity\" in the course of the passing centuries. It is\nevident that the specious arguments put forth by young Chrysostom, in\ndefense of his inexcusable lie of love fifteen centuries ago, have\nneither been added to nor improved on by any subsequent apologist\nof lying and deception. The action of Chrysostom is declared by his\nbiographers to be \"utterly at variance with the principles of truth\nand honor,\" one which \"every sound Christian conscience must condemn;\"\nyet those modern ethical writers who find force and reasonableness in\nhis now venerable though often-refuted fallacies, are sure that the\nmoral sense of the race is with Chrysostom.\n\nEvery man who recognizes the binding force of intuitions of a primal\nlaw of truthfulness, and who gives weight to _\u00e0 priori_ arguments for\nthe unchanging opposition of truth and falsehood, either admits, in\nhis discussion of this question, that a lie is never justifiable,\nor he is obviously illogical and inconsistent in his processes of\nreasoning, and in his conclusions. Even those who deny any _\u00e0 priori_\nargument for the superiority of truthfulness over falsehood, and whose\nphilosophy rests on the experimental evidence of the good or evil of\na given course, are generally inclined to condemn any departure from\nstrict truthfulness as in its tendencies detrimental to the interests\nof society, aside from any question of its sinfulness. The only\nmen who are thoroughly consistent in their arguments in favor of\noccasional lying, are those who start with the false premise that\nthere is no higher law of ethics than that of such a love for one's\nneighbor as will make one ready to do whatever seems likely to\nadvantage him in the present life.\n\nCenturies of discussion have only brought out with added clearness the\nessential fact that a lie is eternally opposed to the truth; and that\nhe who would be a worthy child of the Father of truth must refuse to\nemploy, under any circumstances, modes of speech and action which\nbelong exclusively to the \"father of lies.\"\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\nTHE GIST OF THE MATTER.\n\n\nIt would seem that the one all-dividing line in the universe, which\nnever changes or varies, is the line between the true and the false,\nbetween the truth and a lie. All other lines of distinction, such even\nas those which separate good from evil, light from darkness, purity\nfrom impurity, love from hate, are in a sense relative and variable\nlines, taking their decisive measure from this one primal and eternal\ndividing line.\n\nThis is the one line which goes back of our very conception of a\npersonal God, or which is inherent in that conception. We cannot\nconceive of God as God, unless we conceive of him as the true God, and\nthe God of truth. If there be any falsity in him, he is not the true\nGod. Truth is of God's very nature. To admit in our thought that a lie\nis of God, is to admit that falsity is in him, or, in other words,\nthat he is a false god.\n\nA lie is the opposite of truth, and a being who will lie stands\nopposed to God, who by his very nature cannot lie. Hence he who lies\ntakes a stand, by that very act, in opposition to God. Therefore if it\nbe necessary at any time to lie, it is necessary to desert God and be\nin hostility to him so long as the necessity for lying continues.\n\nIf there be such a thing as a sin _per se_, a lie is that thing; as\na lie is, in its very nature, in hostility to the being of God.\nWhatever, therefore, be the temptation to lie, it is a temptation to\nsin by lying. Whatever be the seeming gain to result from a lie, it\nis the seeming gain from a sin. Whatever be the apparent cost or loss\nfrom refusing to lie, it is the apparent cost or loss from refusing to\nsin.\n\nMan, formed in the moral image of God, is so far a representative of\nGod. If a man lies, he misrepresents and dishonors God, and must incur\nGod's disapproval because of his course. This fact is recognized in\nthe universal habit of appealing to God in witness of the truthfulness\nof a statement, when there is room for doubt as to its correctness.\nThe feeling is general that a man who believes in God will not lie\nunto God under the solemnity of an oath. If, however, it were possible\nfor God to approve a lie on the part of one of his children, then that\nchild of God might confidently make solemn oath to the truth of his\nlie, appealing to God to bear witness to the lie--which in God's mind\nis, in this case, better than the truth. In God's sight an oath is no\nmore sacred than a yea, yea; and every child of God speaks always as\nin the sight of God. Perjury is no more of an immorality than ordinary\nlying; nor is ordinary lying any less a sin than formal perjury.\n\nThe sin of lying consists primarily and chiefly in its inconsistency\nwith the nature of God and with the nature of God's image in man. It\nis not mainly as a sin against one's neighbor, but it is as a sin\nagainst God and one's self, that a lie is ever and always a sin. If it\nwere possible to lie without harming or offending one's neighbor, or\neven if it were possible to benefit one's fellow-man by a lie, no man\ncould ever tell a lie, under any circumstances or for any purpose\nwhatsoever, without doing harm to his own nature, and offending\nagainst God's very being. If a lie comes out of a man on any\ninducement or provocation, or for any purpose of good, that man is\nthe worse for it. The lie is evil, and its coming out of the man is\nharmful to him. \"The things which proceed out of the man are those\nthat defile the man,\"[1] said our Lord; and the experience of mankind\nbears witness to the correctness of this asseveration.\n\n[Footnote 1: Mark 7:15.]\n\nYet, although the main sin and guilt and curse of a lie are ever on\nhim who utters that lie, whatever be his motive in so doing, the\nevil consequences of lying are immeasurable in the community as a\ncommunity; and whoever is guilty of a new lie adds to the burden of\nevil that weighs down society, and that tends to its disintegration\nand ruin. The bond of society is confidence. A lie is inconsistent\nwith confidence; and the knowledge that a lie is, under certain\ncircumstances, deemed proper by a man, throws doubt on all that that\nman says or does under any circumstances. No matter why or where the\none opening for an allowable lie be made in the reservoir of public\nconfidence, if it be made at all, the final emptying of that reservoir\nis merely a question of time.\n\nTo-day, as in all the days, the chief need of men, for themselves and\nfor their fellows, is a likeness to God in the impossibility of lying;\nand the chief longing of the community is for such confidence of men\nin one another as will give them assurance that they will not lie one\nto another. There was never yet a lie uttered which did not bring more\nof harm than of good; nor will there ever be a harmless lie, while God\nis Truth, and Satan is the father of lies.\n\n\n\n\nTOPICAL INDEX.\n\n\n  Abb\u00e9 Sicard: cited\n  Abbott, Benjamin V.; cited\n  Abohab, Isaac: quotation from\n  Abraham: his deceiving\n  Achilles, truthfulness of\n  Act and speech, lying in\n  Advantages of lying, supposed\n  Africans, truthfulness among\n  Ahab's false prophets\n  Ahriman, father of lies\n  American Indians, habits of\n  Ananias and Sapphira\n  Anderson, Rasmus B.: cited\n  Animals, deception of\n  Aquinas, Thomas: cited\n  Arabs, influence of civilization on\n  Aristotle: cited\n  Army prison life, incidents in\n  Augustine: cited\n  Aurelius, Marcus: cited\n\n  Bailey: cited\n  Barrow, Sir John: cited\n  Base-ball, concealment in\n  Basil, friend of Chrysostom\n  Basil the Great: cited\n  Baumgarten-Crusius: cited\n  Benjamin, Judah P.: cited\n  Bergk, Theodor: cited\n  Bethlehem, Samuel at\n  Bheels, estimate of truth by\n  Bible: principles, not rules, in\n    first record of lie in\n    story of man's \"fall\" in\n    standard of right\n    forbids lying\n  Bible teachings on lying\n  Bingham, Joseph: cited\n  Bispham, George T.: cited\n  Bock, Carl: cited\n  Bowne, B.P., quotation from\n  Boyle, F.: cited\n  Brahmans, estimate of truth by\n  Briggs and Salmond: cited\n  Broom, Dr. Herbert: cited\n  Brougham, Lord: cited\n  Budge, E.A.: cited\n  Bunsen, C.K.J,; cited\n  Burton, Richard: cited, 30.\n\n  Caecinna Paetus: cited\n  Calvin, John: cited\n  Carlyle, Thomas: cited\n  Cartwright, William C.: cited\n  Chastity, lying to save\n  Children's right to truth\n  Choosing between duties\n  Christ, example of\n  Christian ethics, basis of\n  Christian Fathers, discussion by\n  Christians, early, discussion by\n  Chrysostom: cited\n  Cicero: cited\n  Clergymen, position of\n  Clive, Lord: cited\n  Coleridge, S.T.: cited\n  Concealment, justifiable\n  Concealment, unjustifiable\n  Confidence essential to society\n  Contract, overpressing theory of\n  Conway, Moncure D.: cited\n  Court, oath in\n  Courvoisier, trial of\n  Crime, lying to prevent\n  Cyprian: cited\n\n  Dabney, Dr. R.L.: cited\n  Darius, inscription of\n  David: his deceiving\n  \"Deans, Jeanie,\" story of\n  Deception: antagonistic to nature of God\n    among Phoenicians\n    by Hebrew midwives\n    by Rahab\n    by Jacob\n    Samuel charged with\n  Micah charged with\n    by Abraham\n    by Isaac\n    by David\n    by Ananias and Sapphira\n    in speech and in act\n    concealment not necessarily\n    purposed and resultant\n    of lower animals\n    in medical profession\n    of insane\n    in flag of truce\n    teaching of Talmudists as to\n    Peter and Paul charged with\n    teaching of Jesuits\n    of the intoxicated\n    Elisha charged with\n    Joshua charged with\n    in legal profession\n    in ministerial profession,\n  Definitions of lie\n  Denham: cited\n  De Wette: cited\n  Dick, Dr., quotation from\n  Dorner, Dr. Isaac A.: cited\n  Drona, story of Yudhishthira and\n  Duns Scotus: cited\n  Duty: of truthfulness;\n    of disclosure, conditional;\n    choosing of more important;\n    of right concealment;\n    to God not to be counted out.\n  Dyaks; their truthfulness\n\n  Earl, G.W.: cited\n  Early Christians, temptations of\n  East Africans, estimate of truth by\n  Egyptian idea of deity synonymous with truth\n  Elisha and Syrians\n  Enemy, duty of truthfulness to\n  Esau, deceit practiced on\n  Eunomius: cited\n  Evil as a means of good\n  Exigency, lie of (see _Lie of Necessity_)\n\n  False impressions, limit of responsibility for\n  Falsehood: estimate of, in India;\n    in Ceylon;\n    in Persia;\n    in Egypt;\n    \"Punic faith,\" synonym of;\n    in medical profession;\n    its use as means of good;\n    spoken in love;\n    in legal profession.\n  Family troubles, concealment of\n  Fichte: cited\n  Firmus, Bishop: cited\n  Flag of truce, sending of\n  Flatt: cited\n  Forsyth, Capt. J.: cited\n  Fowler, Professor: cited\n  Frankness, brutal\n  Fridthjof and Ingeborg, story of\n  F\u00fcrstenthal, R.J.: cited\n\n  German ideal of truth\n  Glasfurd: cited\n  God: killing, but not lying, a possibility with;\n    cannot lie;\n    his concealments from man;\n    is truth;\n    called to witness lie;\n  Greeks, ancient: their estimate of truth\n  Gregory of Nyssa: cited\n  \"Hall of two truths\"\n  Hamburger, Dr. I.: cited\n  Hannibal: cited\n  Harischandra, story of\n  Harkness, Capt. Henry: cited\n  Harless: cited\n  Hartenstein: cited\n  Heber, Bishop: cited\n  Hebrew midwives\n  Hebrew spies\n  Hegel: cited\n  Heralds' law\n  Herbart: cited\n  Hennas, Shepherd of: cited\n  Herodotus: cited\n  Hill Tribes of India: their estimate of truth\n  Hindoo; estimate of truth;\n    passion-play.\n  Hodge, Dr. Charles; cited\n  \"Home of Song\"\n  \"Home of the Lie\"\n  Hottentot, estimate of truth\n  Hugo, Victor: cited\n  Hunter, W.W.: cited\n\n  Ilai, Rabbi: cited\n  Iliad, estimate of truth in\n  Indians, American, influence of civilization on\n  Ingeborg and Fridthjof of, story of\n  Innocent III.: cited\n  Insane: lying to\n    their right to truth\n  Inscription of Darius\n  Intoxicated, the: their right to truth\n  Isaac: his deceiving\n  Isaac, Jacob, and Esau\n  Ishmael, Rabbi: cited\n\n  Jackson, Prof. A.V.W.: cited\n  Jacob: his deceiving\n    his lie to Isaac\n  Jacobi, F.H.: cited\n  Javanese: their truthfulness\n  Jehoshaphat and Ahab\n  Jehuda, Rabbi: cited\n  Jerome: cited\n  Jesuits, teaching of\n  Jewish Talmudists, discussions of\n  Johnson's Cyclopaedia: cited\n  Judith and Holofernes\n  Justin Martyr: cited\n  Juvenal: cited\n\n  Kant, Immanuel: cited\n  Keating, W.H.: cited\n  Kent, Chancellor: cited\n  Khonds of Central India, truthfulness among\n  Killing an enemy or lying to him\n  Kirkbride, Dr. Thomas S., testimony of\n  Kolben, P.: cited\n  Krause: cited\n  Kurtz, Prof. J.H.: cited\n\n  Lamberton, Prof. W.A.: cited\n  Lecky, W.E.H.: cited\n  Legal profession, ethics of\n  Legends, Scandinavian\n  Liar: an enemy of righteousness\n    form of prayer for\n  Liars, place of\n  Libby Prison, incident of\n  Lichtenberger, F.: cited\n  Life, losing of truth to save\n  Life insurance, truthfulness in\n  Lightfoot, Bishop: cited\n  Liguori: cited\n  Livingstone, David: cited\n  Logic swayed by feeling\n  Loyola, Ignatius: cited\n  Luther, Martin: cited\n\n  MA, symbol of Truth\n  Macaulay, Lord, on Lord Clive's treachery\n  Macpherson, Lieutenant: cited\n  Mahabharata on lying\n  Mahaffy, Prof. J.P.: cited\n  Mandingoes: their estimate of truth\n  Marcus Aurelius, quotation from\n  Marheineke: cited\n  Marriage, duty of truthfulness in connection with\n  Marshman, Joshua: cited\n  Martensen, Hans Lassen: cited\n  Martineau, Dr. James, quotations from\n  Martyrdom price of truth-telling\n  Mead, Professor: cited\n  Medical profession, no justifiable falsehood in\n  Melanchthon: cited\n  _Menorath Hammaor_, reference to\n  Merrill, J.H.: cited\n  Meyer, Dr. H.A.W.: cited\n  Meyrick, Rev. F.: cited\n  Micaiah, story of\n  Midwives, Hebrew, lies of\n  Mithra, god of truth\n  Moore, William: cited\n  Moral sense of man against lying\n  Morgan: cited\n  M\u00fcller, Julius: cited\n  M\u00fcller, Prof. Max: cited Murderer, concealment from would-be\n  Nathan, Rabbi: cited\n  Neander: cited\n  Nitzsch: cited\n\n  Oath of witness in court\n  Omichund, deceit practiced on\n  One all-dividing line\n  Origen: cited\n  Ormuzd, Zoroastrian god of truth\n\n  Paley, Dr.: definition of lie\n  Palgrave, W.G.: cited\n  Paradise, two pictures of\n  Park, Mungo: cited\n  Pascal: cited\n  Passion-play, Hindoo\n  Patagonians: their view of lying\n  Patient, deception of, by physician\n  Paul and Peter: suggestion of their deceiving\n  Perjury justifiable, if lying be\n  Persian ideals\n  Peter and Paul: suggestion of their deceiving\n  Phillips, Charles, misrepresented\n  Philoctetes, tragedy of\n  Phoenicians: their untruthfulness\n  Physician, lying by\n  Pindar: cited\n  Place of liars\n  Plato: cited\n  Pliny the younger: cited\n  Pope Innocent III.: cited\n  Prayer, form of, for liar\n  Principles, not rules, Bible standard\n  Priscillianists, sect of\n  Prophets, lying\n  Plan, lord of truth\n  \"Punic faith,\" synonym of falsehood\n  Pylades and Orestes\n\n  Quaker and salesman\n  \"Quaker guns,\" concealment by means of\n\n  Ra, symbol of light\n  Raba: cited\n  Raffles, Sir T.S.: cited\n  Rahab the harlot, lying of\n  Rawlinson, Prof. George: cited\n  Reinhard: cited\n  Responsibility, limit of\n  Robber: concealment from\n    lying to\n  Roberts, Joseph, quotation from\n  Rock of Behistun, inscription on\n  Roman Catholic writers, views of\n  Roman matron, story of: cited by Pliny\n  Roman standard of truthfulness\n  Rothe, Richard: cited\n\n  St. John, Sir Spencer: cited\n  Samuel at Bethlehem\n  Sapphira: her deceiving\n  Satan, \"father of lies\"\n  Sayce, Prof. A.H.: cited\n  Scandinavian legends\n  Schaff, Dr. Philip: cited\n  Schaff-Hertzog: cited\n  Schleiermacher: cited\n  Schoolcraft, H.R.: cited\n  Schwartz: cited\n  Scott Sir Walter: cited\n  Self-deception in others, limit of responsibility for\n  Semple, J.W.: cited\n  Sharswood, Chief-Justice: cited\n  Shepherd of Hermas, quotation from\n  Sherwill: cited\n  Shorn, Dr. J.: cited\n  Sick: their right to truth\n  Simplice, Sister, story of\n  Sin _per se_, lying\n  Smith and Cheetham: cited\n  Smith and Wace: cited\n  Smyth, Dr. Newman: cited\n  Sonthals, truthfulness among\n  South, Dr. Robert: cited\n  Sowrahs, truthfulness among\n  Speech and act, lying in\n  Spencer, Herbert: cited\n  Spies, Hebrew, Rahab and\n  Spy denied soldier's death\n  Stephen, Leslie: cited\n  Story, Justice: cited\n  Surgeon's responsibility for his action\n    testimony as to deceiving patient\n  Symonds J.A.: cited\n  Syrians, Elisha and\n\n  Talmud, teachings of\n  Talmudists, discussion among\n  Taylor, Jeremy; cited\n  Teaching of Jesuits\n  Temptations influencing decision\n  Tertullian: cited\n  Theognis: cited\n  Thornwell, Dr. James H.: cited\n  Tipperahs: their habit of lying\n  Todas, truthfulness among\n  Tragedy of Philoctetes\n  Truce, flag of, use of\n  Truth: universal duty of telling\n    God is\n    not every one entitled to full\n    dearer than life\n    justifiable concealment of\n    unjustifiable concealment of\n  Truth, estimate of: among Hindoos\n    among Scandinavians\n    in ancient Persia\n    in ancient Egypt\n    among Romans\n    among ancient Greeks\n    among ancient Germans\n    among Hill Tribes of India\n    among Arabs\n    among American Indians\n    among Patagonians\n    among Africans\n    among Dyaks\n    among Veddahs\n    among Javanese\n\n  Ueberweg, F.: cited\n  Ulysses, reference to\n  Urim and Thummim\n\n  Veddahs of Ceylon: their truthfulness\n  Veracity: duty of\n    of Greeks\n    of Persians\n    of primitive and civilized peoples compared\n    of Hill Tribes of India\n    of Arabs\n    of American Indians\n    of Africans\n    of Dyaks\n    of Veddahs\n    of Javanese\n  Viswamitra and Indra, story of\n  Von Ammon: cited\n  Von Hirscher: cited\n\n  Walker, Helen, example of\n  War: justifiable concealment in\n    duty of veracity in\n  Westcott, Bishop: cited\n  Wheeler, J. Talboys; cited\n  Whewell, Dr. William: cited\n  \"White lie\"\n  Wig, concealment by\n  Wilkinson, Sir J.G.: cited\n  Witness, oath of, in court\n  Woolsey, President: cited\n  Wuttke, Dr. Adolf: cited\n\n  Yudhishthira and Drona, mythical story of\n\n  Zoroastrian designation of heaven and hell\n\n\n\n\n  _SCRIPTURAL INDEX_.\n\n\n  GENESIS.\n    1: 28\n    2 and 3\n    3: 6, 7\n    9: 1-3\n   12: 10-19\n   12: 14-20\n   16: 1-6\n   25: 27-34\n   26: 6-10\n   27: 1-40\n   27: 6-29\n   28: 1-22\n   39: 8-21\n\n  EXODUS.\n    1: 15-19\n    1: 15-21\n    1: 19, 20\n    1: 20, 21\n\n  LEVITICUS.\n    8: 8\n   18: 5\n   19: 2, 12, 13, 34-37\n   19: 11\n\n  NUMBERS.\n   23: 19\n\n  DEUTERONOMY.\n   29: 29\n\n  JOSHUA.\n    2: 1-21\n    8: 1-26\n   24: 3\n\n  1 SAMUEL.\n    7: 15-17\n    9: 22-24\n   11: 14, 15\n   13: 14\n   15: 29\n   16: 1, 2\n   16: 1-3\n   20: 29\n   21: 1, 2\n\n  2 SAMUEL.\n   11: 1-27\n\n  1 KINGS.\n   22: 1-23\n\n  2 KINGS.\n    6: 14-20\n    7: 6\n   20: 12-19\n\n  2 CHRONICLES.\n   18: 1-34\n   20: 7\n\n  PSALMS.\n   31: 5\n   58: 3\n   62: 4\n   63: 11\n  101: 7\n  116: 11\n  120: 2\n  146: 6\n\n  PROVERBS.\n    6: 16, 17\n   14: 5\n   19: 5, 9, 22\n\n  ISAIAH.\n   41: 8\n   51: 2\n\n  MATTHEW.\n    3: 9\n\n  MARK.\n    6: 48\n    7: 15\n\n  LUKE.\n   24: 28\n\n  JOHN.\n    7: 8\n    8: 44\n   14: 6\n   16: 12\n\n  ACTS.\n    5: 1-11\n   13: 22\n\n  ROMANS.\n    3: 4\n    3: 7, 8\n    4: 12\n\n  GALATIANS.\n    2: 11-14\n    3: 9\n\n  EPHESIANS.\n    4: 25\n\n  COLOSSIANS.\n    3: 9\n\n  TITUS.\n    1: 2\n\n  HEBREWS.\n    6: 18\n   11: 31\n\n  JAMES.\n    2: 23\n\n  1 JOHN.\n    5: 7\n\n  REVELATION.\n   21: 5-8\n   22","title":"A Lie Never Justifiable: A Study in Ethics","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":44276}