{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10616/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10616","id":"gutenberg_10616","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10616","summary":null,"tags":["Banned Books from Anne Haight's list","Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING\n\nBY\n\nJOHN LOCKE\n\n[Based on the 2d Edition] CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME\n\n\nBOOK III. OF WORDS.\n\nCHAP.\n\nI.    OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL\nII.   OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS\nIII.  OF GENERAL TERMS\nIV.   OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS\nV.    OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS\nVI.   OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES\nVII.  OF PARTICLES\nVIII. OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS\nIX.   OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS\nX.    OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS\nXI.   OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTION AND ABUSES\n\n\nBOOK IV.  OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.\n\nCHAP.\n\nI.    OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL\nII.   OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE\nIII.  OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE\nIV.   OF THE REALITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE\nV.    OF TRUTH IN GENERAL\nVI.    OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY\nVII.   OF MAXIMS\nVIII.  OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS\nIX.    OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE\nX.     OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD\nXI.    OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS\nXII.   OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE\nXIII.  SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE\nXIV.   OF JUDGMENT\nXV.    OF PROBABILITY\nXVI.   OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT\nXVII.  OF REASON [AND SYLLOGISM]\nXVIII. OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES\nXIX.   [OF ENTHUSIASM]\nXX.    OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR\nXXI.   OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nOF WORDS\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nOF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.\n\n\n1. Man fitted to form articulated Sounds.\n\nGod, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with\nan inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of\nhis own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be\nthe great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by\nnature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds,\nwhich we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for\nparrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate\nsounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language.\n\n\n2. To use these sounds as Signs of Ideas.\n\nBesides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that he\nshould be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and\nto make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby\nthey might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be\nconveyed from one to another.\n\n\n3. To make them general Signs.\n\nBut neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to\nbe. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can\nbe made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to\ncomprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words\nwould have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of\na distinct name to be signified by. [To remedy this inconvenience,\nlanguage had yet a further improvement in the use of GENERAL TERMS,\nwhereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences:\nwhich advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of\nthe ideas they were made signs of: those names becoming general, which\nare made to stand for GENERAL IDEAS, and those remaining particular,\nwhere the IDEAS they are used for are PARTICULAR.]\n\n\n4. To make them signify the absence of positive Ideas.\n\nBesides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which\nmen make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of\nsome ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are NIHIL\nin Latin, and in English, IGNORANCE and BARRENNESS. All which negative\nor privative words cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no\nideas: for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they\nrelate to positive ideas, and signify their absence.\n\n\n5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.\n\nIt may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and\nknowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common\nsensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions\nand notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and\nfrom obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse\nsignifications, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the\ncognizance of our senses; v.g. to IMAGINE, APPREHEND, COMPREHEND,\nADHERE, CONCEIVE, INSTIL, DISGUST, DISTURBANCE, TRANQUILLITY, &c., are\nall words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to\ncertain modes of thinking. SPIRIT, in its primary signification, is\nbreath; ANGEL, a messenger: and I doubt not but, if we could trace them\nto their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which\nstand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first\nrise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess what\nkind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds\nwho were the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in the\nnaming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles\nof all their knowledge: whilst, to give names that might make known to\nothers any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that\ncame not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from\nordinary known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the more\neasily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves,\nwhich made no outward sensible appearances; and then, when they had got\nknown and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their own\nminds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their\nother ideas; since they could consist of nothing but either of outward\nsensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about\nthem; we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what\noriginally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feel\nwithin ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which\nwe are conscious to ourselves within.\n\n\n6. Distribution of subjects to be treated of.\n\nBut to understand better the use and force of Language, as subservient\nto instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider:\n\nFirst, TO WHAT IT IS THAT NAMES, IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE, ARE IMMEDIATELY\nAPPLIED.\n\nSecondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not\nparticularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of\nthings, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the\nsorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, WHAT THE\nSPECIES AND GENERA OF THINGS ARE, WHEREIN THEY CONSIST, AND HOW THEY\nCOME TO BE MADE. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall\nthe better come to find the right use of words; the natural advantages\nand defects of language; and the remedies that ought to be used,\nto avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the\nsignification of words: without which it is impossible to discourse with\nany clearness or order concerning knowledge: which, being conversant\nabout propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater\nconnexion with words than perhaps is suspected. These considerations,\ntherefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.\n\n\n1. Words are sensible Signs, necessary for Communication of Ideas.\n\nMan, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which\nothers as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are\nall within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of\nthemselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society not\nbeing to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary\nthat man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those\ninvisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known\nto others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or\nquickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and\nvariety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how WORDS,\nwhich were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made\nuse of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion\nthat there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas,\nfor then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a\nvoluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark\nof such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of\nideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate\nsignification.\n\n\n2. Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs of\nhis Ideas who uses them.\n\nThe use men have of these marks being either to record their own\nthoughts, for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to\nbring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words,\nin their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but THE\nIDEAS IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT USES THEM, how imperfectly soever or\ncarelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are\nsupposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may\nbe understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks,\nmay make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the\nmarks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as\nmarks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:\nfor this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet\napply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not\nsigns of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no\nsignification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be\nvoluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to\nmake them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man\ncannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of\nconceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till\nhe has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with\nthe conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for\nthus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to\nbe the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men's\nideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that\nother men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and\nnot to ideas that he has not.\n\n\n3. Examples of this.\n\nThis is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the\nknowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the words\nthey speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth,\nstand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A child\nhaving taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called GOLD, but\nthe bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his\nown idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same\ncolour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds\nto shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses\nit, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty\nsubstance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the word\ngold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy.\nAnother adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold,\nwhen they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it\nto: but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor\ncan he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.\n\n\n4. Words are often secretly referred, First to the Ideas supposed to be\nin other men's minds.\n\nBut though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately\nsignify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet\nthey in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.\n\nFirst, THEY SUPPOSE THEIR WORDS TO BE MARKS OF THE IDEAS IN THE MINDS\nALSO OF OTHER MEN, WITH WHOM THEY COMMUNICATE; for else they should talk\nin vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one\nidea were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to\nspeak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine,\nwhether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in their\nminds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they\nimagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they\nsuppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to\nwhich the understanding men of that country apply that name.\n\n\n5. Secondly, to the Reality of Things.\n\nSecondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own\nimagination, but of things as really they are; therefore they often\nsuppose the WORDS TO STAND ALSO FOR THE REALITY OF THINGS. But this\nrelating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps\nthe former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two\ndifferent ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of\nthe names of mixed modes and substances in particular: though give me\nleave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings\nunavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever\nwe make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own\nminds.\n\n\n6. Words by Use readily excite Ideas of their objects.\n\nConcerning words, also, it is further to be considered:\n\nFirst, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that\nmeans the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and\nexpress to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within\ntheir own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion\nbetween certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names\nheard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects\nthemselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the\nsenses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in\nall substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.\n\n\n7. Words are often used without Signification, and Why.\n\nSecondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words\nare ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from\nour cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly,\nand have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our\nmemories, but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their\nsignifications perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they\nwould apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their\nthoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them\nlearned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some,\nnot only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots\ndo, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to\nthose sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far\nis there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea, and a\ndesignation that the one stands for the other; without which application\nof them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.\n\n\n8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a\nnatural connexion.\n\nWords, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men\ncertain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose\na natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's\npeculiar ideas, and that BY A PERFECT ARBITRARY IMPOSITION, is evident,\nin that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same\nlanguage) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every man has\nso inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases,\nthat no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their\nminds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And\ntherefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power\nwhich ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word:\nwhich was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what\nidea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of\nhis subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates\ncertain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits\nthe signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the\nsame idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a\nman's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them\nstand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be\nthe consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from\ntheir general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom\nhe addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use of\nthem, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOF GENERAL TERMS.\n\n\n\n\n1. The greatest Part of Words are general terms.\n\nAll things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought\nreasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should\nbe so too,--I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the\ncontrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are\ngeneral terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but\nof reason and necessity.\n\n\n2. That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is\nimpossible.\n\nFirst, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a\ndistinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words\ndepending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and\nthe sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application\nof names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the\nthings, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one,\nwith its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the\npower of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the\nparticular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree\nand plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the\nmost capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a\nprodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every\nsoldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason\nwhy men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock,\nor crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of\nplants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.\n\n\n3. And would be useless, if it were possible.\n\nSecondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would\nnot serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names\nof particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their\nthoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that\nthey may be understood: which is then only done when, by use or consent,\nthe sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind\nwho hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This\ncannot be done by names applied to particular things; whereof I alone\nhaving the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant\nor intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very\nparticular things which had fallen under my notice.\n\n\n4. A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement\nof knowledge.\n\nThirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not,)\nyet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any\ngreat use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in\nparticular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things\nreduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient.\nThese, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and\ndo not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain,\nor use requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most part\nstopped: but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing\nparticular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it.\nAnd therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and\nwherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they\nmake use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct\ndenominations.\n\n\n5. What things have proper Names, and why.\n\nBesides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other\nthe like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names, and\nthat for the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasion\nto mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their\ndiscourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mention\nparticular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men,\nwe should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other,\nand Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. And\ntherefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names\nto be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:\nbecause, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that\nparticular horse when he is out of sight.\n\n\n6. How general Words are made.\n\nThe next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to be made.\nFor, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by\ngeneral terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed\nto stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of\ngeneral ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the\ncircumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine\nthem to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction\nthey are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of\nwhich having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call\nit) of that sort.\n\n\n7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.\n\nBut, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be\namiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe\nby what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from\nour first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of\nthe persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are, like\nthe persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the\nmother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there,\nrepresent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are\nconfined to these individuals; and the names of NURSE and MAMMA, the\nchild uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time\nand a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great\nmany other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape,\nand several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those\npersons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find\nthose many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with\nothers, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a general\nname, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leave\nout of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that\nwhich is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.\n\n\n8. And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving out\nproperties contained in them.\n\nBy the same way that they come by the general name and idea of MAN, they\neasily advance to more general names and notions. For, observing that\nseveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore\nbe comprehended out under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein\nthey agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them\ninto one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which\nhaving given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension:\nwhich new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only as before, by\nleaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the name\nman, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous\nmotion, comprehended under the name animal.\n\n\n9. General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more\ncomplex ones.\n\nThat this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general\nnames to them, I think is so evident, that there needs no other proof\nof it but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary\nproceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks GENERAL\nNATURES or NOTIONS are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas\nof more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I\nfear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one effect, and then\ntell me, wherein does his idea of MAN differ from that of PETER and\nPAUL, or his idea of HORSE from that of BUCEPHALUS, but in the leaving\nout something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much\nof those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as\nthey are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names\nMAN and HORSE, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ,\nand retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new\ndistinct complex idea, and giving the name ANIMAL to it, one has a more\ngeneral term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave\nout of the idea of ANIMAL, sense and spontaneous motion, and the\nremaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body,\nlife, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more\ncomprehensive term, VIVENS. And, not to dwell longer upon this\nparticular, so evident in itself; by the same way the mind proceeds to\nBODY, SUBSTANCE, and at last to BEING, THING, and such universal terms,\nwhich stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude: this whole\nmystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools,\nand are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but\nABSTRACT IDEAS, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them.\nIn all which this is constant and unvariable, That every more general\nterm stands for such an idea, and is but a part of any of those\ncontained under it.\n\n\n10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made Use of in Definitions.\n\nThis may show us the reason why, in the defining of words, which is\nnothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the GENUS, or\nnext general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity,\nbut only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas\nwhich the next general word or GENUS stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes\nthe shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by GENUS and\nDIFFERENTIA (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally\nLatin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to),\nI say, though defining by the GENUS be the shortest way, yet I think it\nmay be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the\nonly, and so not absolutely necessary. For, definition being nothing but\nmaking another understand by words what idea the term defined stands\nfor, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that\nare combined in the signification of the term defined: and if, instead\nof such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the\nnext general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater\nclearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For I think that, to one\nwho desired to know what idea the word MAN stood for; if it should be\nsaid, that man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense,\nspontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt not but the\nmeaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea it\nstands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined\nto be a rational animal: which, by the several definitions of ANIMAL,\nVIVENS, and CORPUS, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have,\nin explaining the term MAN, followed here the ordinary definition of\nthe schools; which, though perhaps not the most, exact, yet serves well\nenough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what\ngave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of GENUS and\nDIFFERENTIA; and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is\nof such a rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For,\ndefinitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one word\nby several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be\ncertainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rules\nof logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly\nexpressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the\ncontrary; or else those who have made this rule have done ill, that they\nhave given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions\nmore in the next chapter.\n\n\n11. General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding, and belong\nnot to the Real Existence of things.\n\nTo return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that\nGENERAL and UNIVERSAL belong not to the real existence of things; but\nare the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for\nits own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are\ngeneral, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so\nare applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are\ngeneral when they are set up as the representatives of many particular\nthings: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all\nof them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which\nin their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars,\nthe generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their\ngeneral nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the\nunderstanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the\nsignification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of\nman, is added to them.\n\n\n12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of Genera and Species.\n\nThe next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of signification\nit is that general words have. For, as it is evident that they do not\nsignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general\nterms, but proper names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they do\nnot signify a plurality; for MAN and MEN would then signify the same;\nand the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be\nsuperfluous and useless. That then which general words signify is a SORT\nof things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract\nidea in the mind; to which idea, as things existing are found to agree,\nso they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of\nthat sort. Whereby it is evident that the ESSENCES of the sorts, or, if\nthe Latin word pleases better, SPECIES of things, are nothing else but\nthese abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being\nthat which makes anything to be of that species; and the conformity to\nthe idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right to\nthat name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must\nneeds be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right\nto the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, to be a MAN,\nor of the SPECIES man, and to have right to the NAME man, is the same\nthing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the ESSENCE\nof a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a\nright to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea\nthe name man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have a right to the\nspecies man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that\nthe abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the\nspecies, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that\nthe essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently, the sorting of\nthings, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes\nthose general ideas.\n\n\n13. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their\nFoundation in the Similitude of Things.\n\nI would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature,\nin the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is\nnothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things\npropagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, THE SORTING OF THEM\nUNDER NAMES IS THE WORKMANSHIP OF THE UNDERSTANDING, TAKING OCCASION,\nFROM THE SIMILITUDE IT OBSERVES AMONGST THEM, TO MAKE ABSTRACT GENERAL\nIDEAS, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as\npatterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word FORM has a very proper\nsignification,) to which as particular things existing are found to\nagree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or\nare put into that CLASSIS. For when we say this is a man, that a horse;\nthis justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else\nbut rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those\nabstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what\nare the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those\nabstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between\nparticular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under?\nAnd when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these\nabstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of\nspecies, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can\nbe anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And\ntherefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from\nour abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species WE rank\nthings into. For two species may be one, as rationally as two different\nessences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the\nalterations [which] may, or may not be made in a HORSE or LEAD, without\nmaking either of them to be of another species? In determining the\nspecies of things by OUR abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if\nany one will regulate himself herein by supposed REAL essences, he will\nI suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when anything\nprecisely ceases to be of the species of a HORSE or LEAD.\n\n\n14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.\n\nNor will any one wonder that I say these essences, or abstract ideas\n(which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are\nthe workmanship of the understanding, who considers that at least the\ncomplex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple\nideas; and therefore that is COVETOUSNESS to one man, which is not so to\nanother. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be\ntaken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no,\nnot in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have\nthe most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted,\nwhether the FOETUS born of a woman were a MAN, even so far as that it\nhath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and\nbaptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence to\nwhich the name man belonged were of nature's making; and were not\nthe uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the\nunderstanding put together, and then, abstracting it, affixed a name\nto it. So that, in truth, every distinct abstract idea is a distinct\nessence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the\nnames of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially\ndifferent from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as\nessentially different from snow as water from earth: that abstract idea\nwhich is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the\nother. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one\nfrom another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two\ndistinct sorts, or, if you please, SPECIES, as essentially different as\nany two of the most remote or opposite in the world.\n\n\n15. Several significations of the word Essence.\n\nBut since the essences of things are thought by some (and not without\nreason) to be wholly unknown, it may not be amiss to consider the\nseveral significations of the word ESSENCE.\n\nReal essences.\n\nFirst, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it\nis what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances)\nunknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities\ndepend, may be called their essence. This is the proper original\nsignification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it;\nessential in its primary notation, signifying properly, being. And in\nthis sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of PARTICULAR\nthings, without giving them any name.\n\nNominal Essences.\n\nSecondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much\nbusied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its\nprimary signification: and, instead of the real constitution of things,\nhas been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of\ngenus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real\nconstitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt there must\nbe some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas\nco-existing must depend. But, it being evident that things are ranked\nunder names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain\nabstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of\neach GENUS, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which\nthe general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as\nI do general from genus,) name stands for. And this we shall find to be\nthat which the word essence imports in its most familiar use.\n\nThese two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the\none the REAL, the other NOMINAL ESSENCE.\n\n\n16. Constant Connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.\n\nBetween the NOMINAL ESSENCE and the NAME there is so near a connexion,\nthat the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any\nparticular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that\nabstract idea whereof that name is the sign.\n\n\n17. Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essences\nuseless.\n\nConcerning the REAL ESSENCES of corporeal substances (to mention these\nonly) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those\nwho, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain\nnumber of those essences, according to which all natural things are\nmade, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so\nbecome of this or that species. The other and more rational opinion is\nof those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown,\nconstitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible\nqualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according\nas we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations.\nThe former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain\nnumber of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things that exist are\ncast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the\nknowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in\nall the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues\nof human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist\nwith this hypothesis; since it is as impossible that two things\npartaking exactly of the same real essence should have different\nproperties, as that two figures partaking of the same real essence of a\ncircle should have different properties. But were there no other reason\nagainst it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known; and\nthe making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the\nspecies of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of\nour knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and\ncontent ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things\nas come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously\nconsidered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but, those\nABSTRACT complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names.\n\n\n18. Real and nominal Essence\n\nEssences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may further\nobserve, that, in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always\nthe same; but in substances always quite different. Thus, a figure\nincluding a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal\nessence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the\ngeneral name is annexed, but the very ESSENTIA or being of the thing\nitself; that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which\nthey are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning\nthat parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger; wherein these\ntwo essences are apparently different. For, it is the real constitution\nof its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour,\nweight, fusibility, fixedness, &c., which are to be found in it; which\nconstitution we know not, and so, having no particular idea of, having\nno name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight,\nfusibility, fixedness, &c., which makes it to be gold, or gives it\na right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence. Since\nnothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities to\nthat abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed. But this\ndistinction of essences, belonging particularly to substances, we shall,\nwhen we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more\nfully.\n\n\n19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.\n\nThat such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking\nof are essences, may further appear by what we are told concerning\nessences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which\ncannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin and\nperish with them. All things that exist, besides their Author, are all\nliable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and\nhave ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus, that which\nwas grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and, within a few\ndays after, becomes part of a man: in all which and the like changes,\nit is evident their real essence--i. e. that constitution whereon the\nproperties of these several things depended--is destroyed, and perishes\nwith them. But essences being taken for ideas established in the mind,\nwith names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the\nsame, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For,\nwhatever becomes of ALEXANDER and BUCEPHALUS, the ideas to which MAN and\nHORSE are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; and\nso the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed,\nwhatever changes happen to any or all of the individuals of those\nspecies. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire,\nwithout the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For,\nwere there now no circle existing anywhere in the world, (as perhaps\nthat figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out,) yet the idea\nannexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be\nas a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with\nhave or have not a right to the NAME circle, and so to show which of\nthem, by having that essence, was of that species. And though there\nneither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an UNICORN, or such\na fish as a MERMAID; yet, supposing those names to stand for complex\nabstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them, the essence of a\nmermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn\nas certain, steady, and permanent as that of a horse. From what has been\nsaid, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essences\nproves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation\nestablished between them and certain sounds as signs of them; and\nwill always be true, as long as the same name can have the same\nsignification.\n\n\n20. Recapitulation.\n\nTo conclude. This is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the\ngreat business of GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, amounts to no\nmore but this:--That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in\ntheir minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to\nconsider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the\neasier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge,\nwhich would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined\nonly to particulars.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nOF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.\n\n\n1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something\npeculiar.\n\nThough all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the\nideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall\nfind the names of SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I comprise\nRELATIONS too), and NATURAL SUBSTANCES, have each of them something\npeculiar and different from the other. For example:--\n\n\n2. First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate real\nExistence.\n\nFirst, the names of SIMPLE IDEAS and SUBSTANCES, with the abstract ideas\nin the mind which they immediately signify, intimate also some real\nexistence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names\nof MIXED MODES terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not\nthe thoughts any further; as we shall see more at large in the following\nchapter.\n\n\n3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real\nand nominal Essences.\n\nSecondly, The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real\nas well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural\nsubstances signify rarely, if ever, anything but barely the nominal\nessences of those species; as we shall show in the chapter that treats\nof the names of substances in particular.\n\n\n4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas are undefinable.\n\nThirdly, The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition;\nthe names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet\nobserved by anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of being\ndefined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the\noccasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst\nsome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others\nthink they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more\ngeneral word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of art, by a\ngenus and difference,) when, even after such definition, made according\nto rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the\nmeaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that\nthe showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions,\nand wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our\npresent purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature\nof these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular\nconsideration.\n\n\n5. If all names were definable, it would be a Process IN INFINITUM.\n\nI will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not\ndefinable, from that progress IN INFINITUM, which it will visibly lead\nus into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if the\nterms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at\nlast should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the\nsignification of our words, show WHY SOME NAMES CAN, AND OTHERS CANNOT\nBE DEFINED; and WHICH THEY ARE.\n\n\n6. What a Definition is.\n\nI think it is agreed, that a DEFINITION is nothing else but THE SHOWING\nTHE MEANING OF ONE WORD BY SEVERAL OTHER NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS. The\nmeaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him\nthat uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is\ndefined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and\nannexed to, in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or\nset before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained.\nThis is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only\nmeasure of what is, or is not a good definition.\n\n\n7. Simple Ideas, why undefinable.\n\nThis being premised, I say that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS, AND THOSE\nONLY, ARE INCAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED. The reason whereof is this, That\nthe several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can\nall together by no means represent an idea which has no composition\nat all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the\nshowing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each\nthe same thing, can in the names of simple ideas have no place.\n\n\n8. Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion.\n\nThe not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has\nproduced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be\nobserved in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple\nideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters\nof definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the\nimpossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit\nof man invent, than this definition:--'The act of a being in power, as\nfar forth as in power;' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it\nwas not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it\ncould ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully, asking a\nDutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explication\nin his own language, that it was 'actus entis in potentia quatenus in\npotentia;' I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have\nunderstood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified, or have guessed what idea\na Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another,\nwhen he used that sound?\n\n\n9. Modern definition of Motion.\n\nNor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the\njargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded\nin defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any\notherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be 'a passage from one\nplace to another,' what do they more than put one synonymous word for\nanother? For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? And if they were asked\nwhat passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is\nit not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion\nfrom one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage, &c.? This is\nto translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same\nsignification one for another; which, when one is better understood than\nthe other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but\nis very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in\nthe dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that\nmotion is a definition of MOTUS. Nor will 'the successive application of\nthe parts of the superficies of one body to those of another,' which the\nCartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well\nexamined.\n\n\n10. Definitions of Light.\n\n'The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous,' is another\nPeripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, though not more\nabsurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness and\ninsignificancy more plainly; because experience will easily convince any\none that it cannot make the meaning of the word LIGHT (which it pretends\nto define) at all understood by a blind man, but the definition of\nmotion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this\nway of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well as\nsight, it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no other\nway to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that\nname. Those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules,\nstriking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than\nthe Schools: but yet these words never so well understood would make the\nidea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands\nit not before, than if one should tell him that light was nothing but a\ncompany of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long struck with\nrackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For\ngranting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the\ncause of light, if we had it never so exact, would no more give us the\nidea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than\nthe idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give\nus the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause\nof any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of\none sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one\nfrom another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, should Des\nCartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was\nblind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light,\nor anything approaching it, though he understood never so well what\nlittle globules were, and what striking on another body was. And\ntherefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which\nis the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in\nus by it, and is that which is properly light.\n\n\n11. Simple Ideas, why undefinable, further explained.\n\nSimple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those impressions\nobjects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed\nto each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the\nworld, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never\nbe able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words being\nsounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very\nsounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which is\nknown to be between them and those simple ideas which common use has\nmade them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any\nwords can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true\nidea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he\nis told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas\nalready in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not\nstrangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his\nmind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting\nin us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still\nvery different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and\ncolours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the\nsignification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary.\nAnd no DEFINITION of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce\neither of those ideas in us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself.\nFor, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however\nformed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible;\nand to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all\none as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort\nof philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see\nDulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into\nhis mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands\nfor, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other\nwords or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of\ndefinition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper\nobject; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the\nname already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head\nabout visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and\nfriends, to understand those names of light and colours which often\ncame in his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what SCARLET\nsignified. Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? The\nblind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an\nunderstanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who\nhopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to\nexplain it.\n\n\n12. The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a Statue and\nRainbow.\n\nThe case is quite otherwise in COMPLEX IDEAS; which, consisting of\nseveral simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the\nseveral ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in\nthe mind which were never there before, and so make their names be\nunderstood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name,\ndefinition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several\nothers, has place, and may make us understand the names of things which\nnever came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable to\nthose in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that\nnone of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas,\nwhich he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his\nthought. Thus the word STATUE may be explained to a blind man by other\nwords, when PICTURE cannot; his senses having given him the idea of\nfigure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him.\nThis gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of which\ncontending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that\nhis was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those who\nhad lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painter\nagreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being\nbrought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by\nthe other; he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his\nhands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration\napplauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and\nhaving his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head,\nand then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c., as his hand moved over the\nparts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least\ndistinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a\nvery admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to\nthem all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive anything.\n\n\n13. Colours indefinable to the born-blind.\n\nHe that should use the word RAINBOW to one who knew all those colours,\nbut yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the\nfigure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well\ndefine that word that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that\ndefinition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind\nman understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make\nthat complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and\nexperience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.\n\n\n14. Complex Ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they\nconsist have been got from experience.\n\nSimple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience from\nthose objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When,\nby this means, we have our minds stored with them, and know the names\nfor them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to\nunderstand, the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But\nwhen any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in\nhis mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to\nhim. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is\nignorant that that term is the sign of it, then another name of the\nsame idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand\nits meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea\ncapable of a definition.\n\n\n15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas of less doubtful meaning than those\nof mixed modes and substances.\n\nFourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of\ndefinition to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but\nthat they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of\nmixed modes and substances; because they, standing only for one simple\nperception, men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their\nsignification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about\ntheir meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that\ncolour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that\nword, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he\nis not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it\nnot. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together,\nwhich makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a\nsupposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending\nthereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the\ndifficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple\nideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists\nnot of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied,\nand so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain.\n\n\n16. Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.\n\nFifthly, This further may be observed concerning simple Simple ideas and\ntheir names, that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali,\n(as they call it,) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The\nreason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea,\nnothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away,\nit may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both;\nwhich, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v.g. there is\nnothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make\nthem agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as\nRATIONALITY being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree\nwith brute in the more general idea and name of animal. And therefore\nwhen, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white\nand red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name,\nthey have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they\nget into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended\nunder the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas\nas are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only\nthrough the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term to\ncomprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do\nit by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one\nsense. And so the general term QUALITY, in its ordinary acceptation,\ncomprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities,\nwith distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain,\nwhich make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more\nsenses than one.\n\n\n17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly taken\nfrom the existence of things.\n\nSixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes have\nalso this difference: that those of MIXED MODES stand for ideas\nperfectly arbitrary; those of SUBSTANCES are not perfectly so, but refer\nto a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of SIMPLE IDEAS are\nperfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at\nall. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their\nnames, we shall see in the following chapters.\n\nSimple modes.\n\nThe names of SIMPLE MODES differ little from those of simple ideas.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nOF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.\n\n\n\n1. Mixed modes stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.\n\nThe names of MIXED MODES, being general, they stand, as has been shewed,\nfor sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence.\nThe essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but\nthe abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far\nthe names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to\nthem with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we\nshall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve\nour attention.\n\n\n2. First, The abstract Ideas they stand for are made by the\nUnderstanding.\n\nThe first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract\nideas, or, if you please, the essences, of the several species of mixed\nmodes, are MADE BY THE UNDERSTANDING, wherein they differ from those of\nsimple ideas: in which sort the mind has no power to make any one, but\nonly receives such as are presented to it by the real existence of\nthings operating upon it.\n\n\n3. Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.\n\nIn the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not\nonly made by the mind, but MADE VERY ARBITRARILY, MADE WITHOUT PATTERNS,\nOR REFERENCE TO ANY REAL EXISTENCE. Wherein they differ from those of\nsubstances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being,\nfrom which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But, in\nits complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to\nfollow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain\ncollections, as so many distinct specific ideas; whilst others, that as\noften occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things,\npass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the\nmind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances,\nexamine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns\ncontaining such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his\nidea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst\nthings existing? Or is it true because any one has been witness to such\nan action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a\ncollection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific\nidea; whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no.\n\n\n4. How this is done.\n\nTo understand this right, we must consider wherein this making of these\ncomplex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but\nputting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does\nthese three things: First, It chooses a certain number; Secondly, It\ngives them connexion, and makes them into one idea; Thirdly, It ties\nthem together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these,\nand what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these\nessences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind;\nand, consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.\n\n\n5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.\n\nNobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a\nvoluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent\nfrom any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this\nsort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given\nthem, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of\nthat species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of SACRILEGE or\nADULTERY might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them,\nand so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of\nthem was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned\nabout, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no\nbeing but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too\nfrequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain how much the sorts of\nmixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a\nbeing as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as\nwhen they really exist. And we cannot doubt but law-makers have often\nmade laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of\ntheir own understandings; beings that had no other existence but in\ntheir own minds. And I think nobody can deny but that the RESURRECTION\nwas a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.\n\n\n6. Instances: Murder, Incest, Stabbing.\n\nTo see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the\nmind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking\ninto them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several\nscattered independent ideas into one complex one; and, by the common\nname it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without\nregulating itself by any connexion they have in nature. For what greater\nconnexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with\nkilling, that this is made a particular species of action, signified by\nthe word MURDER, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature\nbetween the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of\na son or neighbour, that those are combined into one complex idea, and\nthereby made the essence of the distinct species PARRICIDE, whilst the\nother makes no distinct species at all? But, though they have made\nkilling a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his son\nor daughter, yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in\ntoo, as well as father and mother: and they are all equally comprehended\nin the same species, as in that of INCEST. Thus the mind in mixed modes\narbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient;\nwhilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left\nloose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of\none name. It is evident then that the mind, by its free choice, gives\na connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more\nunion with one another than others that it leaves out: why else is the\npart of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken notice\nof, to make the distinct species called STABBING, and the figure and\nmatter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason,\nas we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the\nfree choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that, therefore,\nthese species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding.\nAnd there is nothing more evident than that, for the most part, in the\nframing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor\nrefers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts such\ntogether as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a\nprecise imitation of anything that really exists.\n\n\n7. But still subservient to the End of Language, and not made at random.\n\nBut, though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on the\nmind, and are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made at\nrandom, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these\ncomplex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always\nsuited to the end for which abstract ideas are made: and though they be\ncombinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as little\nunion in themselves as several other to which the mind never gives a\nconnexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for\nthe convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language.\nThe use of language is, by short sounds, to signify with ease and\ndispatch general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars\nmay be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas\ncollected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the species\nof mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they\nhad occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into\ndistinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in\nnature have as near a union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to go\nno further than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct\nabstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them, the\nnumber must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as\nwell as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices that men make and\nname so many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find they have\noccasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs.\nIf they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother, and\nso make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it\nis because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct\npunishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different\nto what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and\ntherefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which\nis the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas of\nmother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the idea\nof killing, that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract\nidea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet, in\nrespect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under INCEST: and\nthat still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and\nreckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar\nturpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and tedious\ndescriptions.\n\n\n8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof.\n\nA moderate skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the\ntruth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of words in\none language which have not any that answer them in another. Which\nplainly shows that those of one country, by their customs and manner of\nlife, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and given names\nto them, which others never collected into specific ideas. This could\nnot have happened if these species were the steady workmanship of\nnature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order to\nnaming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law,\nwhich are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them in\nthe Spanish or Italian, no scanty languages; much less, I think, could\nany one translate them into the Caribbee or Westoe tongues: and the\nVERSURA of the Romans, or CORBAN of the Jews, have no words in other\nlanguages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has\nbeen said. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, and\nexactly compare different languages, we shall find that, though they\nhave words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer\none another, yet there is scarce one often amongst the names of complex\nideas, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise idea\nwhich the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are\nno ideas more common and less compounded than the measures of time,\nextension, and weight; and the Latin names, HORA, PES, LIBRA, are\nwithout difficulty rendered by the English names, HOUR, FOOT, and POUND:\nbut yet there is nothing more evident than that the ideas a Roman\nannexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those which\nan Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of these\nshould make use of the measures that those of the other language\ndesigned by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are\ntoo sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so\nin the names of more abstract and compounded ideas, such as are the\ngreatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, when\nmen come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in\nother languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond\nin the whole extent of their significations.\n\n\n9. This shows Species to be made for Communication.\n\nThe reason why I take so particular notice of this is, that we may not\nbe mistaken about GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, as if they\nwere things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real\nexistence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to\nbe nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier\nsignifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion to\ncommunicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far\nforth as they agreed to that abstract idea, might be comprehended. And\nif the doubtful signification of the word SPECIES may make it sound\nharsh to some, that I say the species of mixed modes are 'made by the\nunderstanding'; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied that it is the\nmind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are\ngiven. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for\nsorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes the\nboundaries of the sort or species; since with me SPECIES and SORT have\nno other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom.\n\n\n10. In mixed Modes it is the Name that ties the Combination of simple\nideas together, and makes it a Species.\n\nThe near relation that there is between SPECIES, ESSENCES, and their\nGENERAL NAME, at least in mixed modes, will further appear when we\nconsider, that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, and\ngive them their lasting duration. For, the connexion between the loose\nparts of those complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, which\nhas no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there\nnot something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts\nfrom scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the\ncollection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them\nfast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the word\nTRIUMPHUS hold together, and deliver to us as one species! Had this name\nbeen never made, or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had\ndescriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, that\nwhich holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complex\nidea, is that very word annexed to it; without which the several parts\nof that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other show,\nwhich having never been made but once, had never been united into one\ncomplex idea, under one denomination. How much, therefore, in mixed\nmodes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind; and how\nmuch the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in\ncommon use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who look\nupon essences and species as real established things in nature.\n\n\n11.\n\nSuitable to this, we find that men speaking of mixed modes, seldom\nimagine or take any other for species of them, but such as are set out\nby name: because they, being of man's making only, in order to naming,\nno such species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a name be\njoined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several\nloose ones; and by that name giving a lasting union to the parts which\nwould otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by that\nabstract idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name\nis once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have\na settled and permanent union, then is the essence, as it were,\nestablished, and the species looked on as complete. For to what purpose\nshould the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were\nby abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them\ngeneral, unless it were that they might have general names for the\nconvenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see, that killing a\nman with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of\naction; but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes\nfor a distinct species, where it has a distinct name, as in England, in\nwhose language it is called STABBING: but in another country, where it\nhas not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes not\nfor a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances,\nthough it be the mind that makes the nominal essence, yet, since those\nideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature\nwhether the mind joins them or not, therefore those are looked on as\ndistinct species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting,\nor giving a name to that complex idea.\n\n\n12. For the Originals of our mixed Modes, we look no further than the\nMind; which also shows them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.\n\nConformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of the\nspecies of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding\nrather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we find\nthat their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no further. When we\nspeak of JUSTICE, or GRATITUDE, we frame to ourselves no imagination of\nanything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate\nin the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further; as they do\nwhen we speak of a HORSE, or IRON, whose specific ideas we consider not\nas barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the\noriginal patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most\nconsiderable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the\noriginal patterns as being in the mind, and to those we refer for the\ndistinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it\nis that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more\nparticular name called NOTIONS; as, by a peculiar right, appertaining to\nthe understanding.\n\n\n13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shows the\nReason why they are so compounded.\n\nHence, likewise, we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes\nare commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural\nsubstances. Because they being the workmanship of the understanding,\npursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short\nthose ideas it would make known to another, it does with great liberty\nunite often into one abstract idea things that, in their nature, have\nno coherence; and so under one term bundle together a great variety of\ncompounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of PROCESSION: what a\ngreat mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders,\nmotions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of\nman has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas\nthe complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only\na small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two,\nviz. shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.\n\n\n14. Names of mixed Modes stand alway for their real Essences, which are\nthe workmanship of our minds.\n\nAnother thing we may observe from what has been said is, That the\nnames of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determined\nsignification) the REAL essences of their species. For, these abstract\nideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real\nexistence of things, there is no supposition of anything more signified\nby that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed;\nwhich is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all the\nproperties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow:\nand so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which, of what\nconcernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we shall\nsee hereafter.\n\n\n15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.\n\nThis also may show us the reason why for the most part the names of\nmixed modes are got before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known.\nBecause there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of but\nwhat have names, and those species, or rather their essences, being\nabstract complex ideas, made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient,\nif not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame\nthese complex ideas: unless a man will fill his head with a company\nof abstract complex ideas, which, others having no names for, he has\nnothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess that, in\nthe beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea before one\ngave it the name: and so it is still, where, making a new complex idea,\none also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns\nnot languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas\nwhich men have frequent occasion to have and communicate; and in such, I\nask whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names\nof mixed modes before they have their ideas? What one of a thousand ever\nframes the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard the\nnames of them? In simple ideas and substances I grant it is otherwise;\nwhich, being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature,\nthe ideas and names are got one before the other, as it happens.\n\n\n16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject.\n\nWhat has been said here of MIXED MODES is, with very little difference,\napplicable also to RELATIONS; which, since every man himself may\nobserve, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on: especially, since\nwhat I have here said concerning Words in this third Book, will possibly\nbe thought by some to this be much more than what so slight a subject\nrequired. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass; but I was\nwilling to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new and a\nlittle out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of when I\nbegan to write,) that, by searching it to the bottom, and turning it on\nevery side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and\ngive occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general\nmiscarriage, which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice\nof. When it is considered what a pudder is made about ESSENCES, and how\nmuch all sorts of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pestered\nand disordered by the careless and confused use and application of\nwords, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open.\nAnd I shall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I\nthink, therefore, needs to be inculcated, because the faults men are\nusually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hindrances of\ntrue knowledge, but are so well thought of as to pass for it. Men would\noften see what a small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none at\nall, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if they\nwould but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what IDEAS are or\nare not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at\nall points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall\nimagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, by\nany enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use\nof language; and give them reason to suspect, that, since it is frequent\nfor others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes very\ngood and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very\nuncertain, little, or no signification. And therefore it is not\nunreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be\nunwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore,\nI shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nOF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.\n\n\n1. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.\n\nThe common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand\nfor SORTS: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such\ncomplex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree,\nby virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common\nconception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree: for\nthough there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it\nbeing abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might\neach agree in it, it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as\nthere are stars. They want not their reasons who think there are, and\nthat each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to\none who was placed in a due distance: which, by the way, may show us how\nmuch the sorts, or, if you please, GENERA and SPECIES of things (for\nthose Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort)\ndepend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the\nreal nature of things; since it is not impossible but that, in propriety\nof speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to another.\n\n\n2. The Essence of each Sort of substance is our abstract Idea to which\nthe name is annexed.\n\nThe measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it is\nconstituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is that\nwe call its ESSENCE, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which\nthe name is annexed; so that everything contained in that idea is\nessential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of natural\nsubstances that WE know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yet\nI call it by a peculiar name, the NOMINAL ESSENCE, to distinguish it\nfrom the real constitution of substances, upon which depends this\nnominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore,\nas has been said, may be called the REAL ESSENCE: v.g. the nominal\nessence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for, let\nit be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable,\nfusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the\ninsensible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the\nother properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though\nthey are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.\n\n\n3. The nominal and real Essence different.\n\nFor, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a\nbody of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annex\nthe name MAN, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called:\nyet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of\nall those operations which are to be found in any individual of that\nsort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients\nof our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such a\nknowledge of that constitution of man; from which his faculties of\nmoving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which\nhis so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is\ncertain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence\nthan what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what\nit will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different\nfrom what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and\nother contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg, from that\nwhich a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the\nhand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward\nappearances.\n\n\n4. Nothing essential to Individuals.\n\nThat ESSENCE, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and\nthat it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are\nranked into sorts, appears from hence: that, take but away the abstract\nideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names,\nand then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly\nvanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly\nshows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and\nnature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me.\nAn accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever\nor fall may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy\nleave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of\nmy shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties\nthan I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body\nvery different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the\nother, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some\nsort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract\nidea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his\nown thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks\nof essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea\nsignified by some general name, comes into his mind; and it is in\nreference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential.\nSo that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other\nparticular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than it\nis essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if\nthat particular being be to be counted of the sort MAN, and to have the\nname MAN given it, then reason is essential to it; supposing reason\nto be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for: as it is\nessential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it\nthe name TREATISE, and rank it under that species. So that essential and\nnot essential relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed\nto them; which amounts to no more than this, That whatever particular\nthing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract\nidea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that\nspecies, nor be called by that name; since that abstract idea is the\nvery essence of that species.\n\n\n5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those\nqualities which entitle them to receive their names.\n\nThus, if the idea of BODY with some people be bare extension or space,\nthen solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea to which\nthey give the name BODY to be solidity and extension, then solidity is\nessential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered as\nessential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort\nstands for; without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that\nsort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of\nmatter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted\nobedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receive\ndirection from it, would any one question whether it wanted anything\nessential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing\nwanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this\nmade an essential or specific difference or no, since WE have no other\nmeasure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk of\nspecific differences in NATURE, without reference to general ideas in\nnames, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is\nsufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two\nparticular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which\nis looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such\npatterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings,\nconsidered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their\nqualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be\nessential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it may\nbe reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?\nyet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be\nessential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; without\nconsidering it under the name IRON, or as being of a certain species.\nAnd if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed\nto them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but\nwhat is contained in those ideas.\n\n\n6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential\nsorts.\n\nIt is true, I have often mentioned a REAL ESSENCE, distinct in\nsubstances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their\nnominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitution\nof anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are\ncombined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal\nessence; that particular constitution which everything has within\nitself, without any relation to anything without it. But essence, even\nin this sense, RELATES TO A SORT, AND SUPPOSES A SPECIES. For, being\nthat real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily\nsupposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not\nto individuals: v. g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body\nof such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility,\nthe real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which\nthese qualities and their union depend; and is also the foundation of\nits solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying that\ncomplex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition\nof a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable;\nbut there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these\nqualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from\nit. That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it\nis of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being\nranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing\nnecessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real\nessences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely\nknowing what they are; but that which annexes them still to the species\nis the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and\ncause.\n\n\n7. The nominal Essence bounds the Species to us.\n\nThe next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences it is\nthat substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it is\nevident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name,\nwhich is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore,\nthat anything should determine the sorts of things, which WE rank under\ngeneral names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for;\nwhich is that, as has been shown, which we call nominal essence. Why\ndo we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an\nherb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, but\nbecause it has that nominal essence; or, which is all one, agrees to\nthat abstract idea, that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but\nto reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those or\nother names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.\n\n\n8. The nature of Species as formed by us.\n\nAnd that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them\nunder distinct names, according to the complex ideas in US, and not\naccording to precise, distinct, real essences in THEM, is plain from\nhence:--That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into\none sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one\nspecies, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions,\nas far different one from another as from others from which they are\naccounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed\nby all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are\noften, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain,\nseek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony, or\nvitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies of\nthe same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name,\nyet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so\ndifferent one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour\nof very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into species,\naccording to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find\ndifferent properties in any two individual substances of the same\nspecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or\ntwo equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to US, which\ndetermines every particular to this or that CLASSIS; or, which is the\nsame thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but\nthat abstract idea to which that name is annexed; and so has, in truth,\na reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their\ngeneral denominations?\n\n\n9. Not the real Essence, or texture of parts, which we know not.\n\nNor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the\nend of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences; because we know\nthem not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and\ndistinction of substances, than a collection of THOSE SENSIBLE IDEAS\nWHICH WE OBSERVE IN THEM; which, however made with the greatest\ndiligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the\ntrue internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as I\nsaid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous\nclock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions.\nThere is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound\nthe most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about\nus take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come\nto examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we\npresently find we know not their make; and can give no reason of\nthe different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal\nconstitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us: for to\ngo no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst\nthem, What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead\nand antimony fusible, wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron\nmalleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come\nshort of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of\nplants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise\nand powerful God in the great fabric of the universe, and every part\nthereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most\ninquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most\ningenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational\ncreatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and\ndispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences,\nthat are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as\nsoon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell as\nwell distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal\nconstitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish\nsheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may\nbe pleased to try his skill in those species called CASSIOWARY and\nQUERECHINCHIO; and by their internal real essences determine the\nboundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of\nsensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countries\nwhere those animals are to be found.\n\n\n10. Not the substantial Form, which know Not.\n\nThose, therefore, who have been taught that the several species of\nsubstances had their distinct internal SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and that it\nwas those FORMS which made the distinction of substances into their true\nspecies and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having their\nminds set upon fruitless inquiries after 'substantial forms'; wholly\nunintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or\nconfused conception in general.\n\n\n11. That the Nominal Essence is that only whereby we distinguish Species\nof Substances, further evident, from our ideas of finite Spirits and of\nGod.\n\nThat our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species\nconsists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real\nessences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident from\nour ideas of spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its\nown operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it\nhath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those\noperations it finds in itself to a sort of beings; without consideration\nof matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD is but\nattributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on\nwhat we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection\nin them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple\nideas to Him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting on\nourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure--each of\nwhich we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of\neach the better--joining all these together, with infinity to each of\nthem, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent,\ninfinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are\ndifferent species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct\nspecific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of\nmore species than one of spirits is impossible; but because having no\nmore simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such\nbeings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of\nour own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts\nof our bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the\nseveral species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing those\noperations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower\ndegree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except\nonly of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration and all those other\nideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor, as\nI humbly conceive, do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any\ndifference, by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not\nof the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of\nexistence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c., being ideas derived\nfrom the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts\nof spirits, with the difference only of degrees; to the utmost we can\nimagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an idea of\nthe First Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in\nthe real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of\nall created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is from\nthe most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely\nexceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of Him.\n\n\n12. Of finite Spirits there are probably numberless Species in a\ncontinuous series of gradations.\n\nIt is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there\nmay be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one\nfrom another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the\nspecies of sensible things are distinguished one from another by\nqualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be more\nspecies of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible\nand material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all the\nvisible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from\nus the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that\nin each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes\nthat have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there are\nsome birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as\nfishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed\nthem on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and\nbeasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link\nthe terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, and\nporpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to mention what\nis confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes\nthat seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called\nmen: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that,\nif you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there\nwill scarce be perceived any great difference between them: and so on,\ntill we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we\nshall find everywhere that the several species are linked together,\nand differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the\ninfinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it\nis suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great\ndesign and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of\ncreatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward\nhis infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us\ndownwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded\nthat there are far more species of creatures above us than there are\nbeneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the\ninfinite being of God than we are from the lowest state of being, and\nthat which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct\nspecies, for the reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct ideas.\n\n\n13. The Nominal Essence that of the Species, as conceived by us, proved\nfrom Water and Ice.\n\nBut to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask\nany one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I\ndoubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be\ndenied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right.\nBut if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor\nheard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put\nin his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not\nknowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask\nwhether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And I\nthink it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species,\nno more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species\nfrom the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace\nis a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And\nif this be so, it is plain that OUR DISTINCT SPECIES are NOTHING BUT\nDISTINCT COMPLEX IDEAS, WITH DISTINCT NAMES ANNEXED TO THEM. It is true\nevery substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon\ndepend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the\nranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under\nseveral titles) is done by us according to the ideas that WE have of\nthem: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we\nmay be able to discourse of them when we have them not present\nbefore us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal\nconstitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into\nspecies, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species\nby names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.\n\n\n14. Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real Essences\n\nTo distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual\nsupposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things,\nwhereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished into\nspecies, these things are necessary:--\n\n\n15. A crude supposition.\n\nFirst, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always\ndesigns them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which\nare to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude\nsense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, before\nit can fully be assented to.\n\n\n16. Monstrous births.\n\nSecondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains\nthat essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and\nmonstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed,\nwill always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.\n\n\n17. Are monsters really a distinct species?\n\nThirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be\nreally a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the\nword species; since it is certain that everything that exists has its\nparticular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrous\nproductions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to\nresult from, and accompany, the essence of that species from whence they\nderive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to\nbelong.\n\n\n18. Men can have no ideas of Real Essences.\n\nFourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into\nspecies, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we\nought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four\npoints, the supposed real essences of things stand US not in stead for\nthe distinguishing substances into species.\n\n\n19. Our Nominal Essences of Substances not perfect collections of the\nproperties that flow from the Real Essence.\n\nFifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having\nframed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from\ntheir different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into\nspecies. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the real\nessence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow\nfrom it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we\nmay certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thing\nis not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number of\nproperties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which\nfailing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be\nthere, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that\ndetermined that species. By the word GOLD here, I must be understood to\ndesign a particular piece of matter; v. g. the last guinea that was\ncoined. For, if it should stand here, in its ordinary signification, for\nthat complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i. e. for the\nnominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show the\nvarious meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but\nwords to do it by.\n\n\n20. Hence names independent of Real Essence.\n\nBy all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into\nspecies by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can\nwe pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according\nto internal essential differences.\n\n\n21. But stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made the\nName stand for.\n\nBut since, as has been remarked, we have need of GENERAL words, though\nwe know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collect\nsuch a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be united\ntogether in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea.\nWhich, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists,\nis yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is\nconvertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these\nnominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence of\nbody is EXTENSION; if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the\nessence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put\nextension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us say\nthat extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should say\nthat one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the\nbare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The\nessence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea\ncomprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the\nseveral distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of\nsubstance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always\na part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an\nextended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or\nimpels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, BODY moves\nor impels. Likewise, to say that a rational animal is capable of\nconversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say that\nrationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole\nessence to which we give the name man.\n\n22. Our Abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of the Species we make in\ninstance in that of Man.\n\nThere are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are\nhairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that\nhave perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language\ntoo. There are creatures, as it is said, (sit fides penes authorem, but\nthere appears no contradiction that there should be such,) that, with\nlanguage and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have\nhairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where\nthe females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all\nof human species? it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal\nessence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or\nthe complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other\nnot. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence;\nand whether the internal constitution and frame of these several\ncreatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us\nto answer, no part of that going into our specific idea: only we have\nreason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much\ndiffers, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what\ndifference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference\nit is in vain to inquire; whilst our measures of species be, as they\nare, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal\nconstitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair\nonly on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution\nbetween a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of\nreason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign\nto us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling\nand a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction\nof species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret\nconstitutions of things.\n\n\n23. Species in Animals not distinguished by Generation.\n\nNor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the\nmixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed\nreal species distinct and entire, For, granting this to be true, it\nwould help us in the distinction of the species of things no further\nthan the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest?\nBut in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women\nhave conceived by drills; and what real species, by that measure, such a\nproduction will be in nature will be a new question: and we have reason\nto think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from\nthe mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull\nand a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was\nthe issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it;\nwherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort\nalone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall\nadd the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in\nnature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by\nthe pedigree of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a\nloss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by\ngeneration, and has alone a right to the specific name. But further,\nif the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by\npropagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one,\nand the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other,\nto know whether this be a tiger or that tea?\n\n\n24. Not by substantial Forms.\n\nUpon the whole matter, it is evident that it is their own collections of\nsensible qualities that men make the essences of THEIR several sorts of\nsubstances; and that their real internal structures are not considered\nby the greatest part of men in the sorting them. Much less were any\nSUBSTANTIAL FORMS ever thought on by any but those who have in this one\npart of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those\nignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor\ntrouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing\nthings one from another by their sensible qualities, are often better\nacquainted with their differences; can more nicely distinguish them\nfrom their uses; and better know what they expect from each, than those\nlearned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so\nconfidently of something more hidden and essential.\n\n\n25. The specific Essences that are common made by Men.\n\nBut supposing that the REAL essences of substances were discoverable by\nthose that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry, yet we could\nnot reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was\nregulated by those internal real constitutions, or anything else but\ntheir OBVIOUS appearances; since languages, in all countries, have\nbeen established long before sciences. So that they have not been\nphilosophers or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about\nforms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use\namongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive\nterms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth\nand signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted\nand denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them;\nthereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an\noccasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.\n\n\n26. Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men.\n\nSince then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their\nnominal and not by their real essences, the next thing to be considered\nis how, and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it\nis evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they\nNature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in\nseveral men as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it,\nwe shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances\nin all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the most\nintimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstract\nidea to which the name MAN is given should be different in several men,\nif it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be animal\nrationale, and to another, animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He that\nannexes the name man to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous\nmotion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the\nspecies man; and he that, upon further examination, adds rationality,\nhas another essence of the species he calls man: by which means the same\nindividual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other.\nI think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well\nknown, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how\nfar men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than\ndescent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated,\nwhether several human foetuses should be preserved or received to\nbaptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward\nconfiguration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing\nwhether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another\nmould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of\nas much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an\nape, or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a\nrational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which\nonly was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody\ncould know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the\nhuman species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions,\nrenounce his sacred definition of animal rationale, and substitute some\nother essence of the human species. [Monsieur Menage furnishes us with\nan example worth the taking notice of on this occasion: 'When the abbot\nof Saint Martin,' says he, 'was born, he had so little of the figure of\na man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under\ndeliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was\nbaptized, and declared a man provisionally [till time should show what\nhe would prove]. Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was\ncalled all his life the Abbot Malotru; i.e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen.\n(Menagiana, 278, 430.) This child, we see, was very near being excluded\nout of the species of man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly\nas he was; and it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned had\ncast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to pass\nfor a man. And yet there can be no reason given why, if the lineaments\nof his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have\nbeen lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or\na wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill\nfigure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was,\ncapable to be a dignitary in the church.]\n\n\n27. Nominal Essences of particular substances are undetermined by\nnature, and therefore various as men vary.\n\nWherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable\nboundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no\nsuch thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst men. The real\nessence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we know\nnot; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we\nmake ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning some\noddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it\nis past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could not\nhappen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the\nspecies of substances, were not made by man with some liberty; but\nwere exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it\ndistinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake\nto resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by\nLicetus (lib. i. c. 3), with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other\nwhich to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c.\nIf any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have\nincreased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of human\nshape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or must\nthe bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be\nadmitted to the font or no? As I have been told it happened in France\nsome years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the\nboundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures\nthan the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from\ncertainly knowing what a MAN is; though perhaps it will be judged great\nignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think I may say, that\nthe certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined,\nand the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence so\nfar from being settles and perfectly known, that very material doubts\nmay still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of the\nword MAN which we yet have, nor descriptios of that sort of animal, are\nso perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person;\nmuch less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men would\neverywhere stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life\nand death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that mights happen.\n\n\n28. But not so arbitrary as Mixed Modes.\n\nBut though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind,\nthey are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the\nmaking of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideas\nwhereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea, how\ncompounded soever. Secondly, that the particular ideas so united be\nexactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex\nideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, they\nmake two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of\nthese, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows\nnature; and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in\nnature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse;\nnor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the\ncomplex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his\nhead with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men\nobserving certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein\ncopied nature; and of ideas so united made their complex ones of\nsubstances. For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, and\ngive what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood WHEN\nTHEY SPEAK OF THINGS REALLY EXISTING, they must in some degree conform\ntheir ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's language\nwill be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible\nonly to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary\naffairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering\nthe common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist.\n\n\n29. Our Nominal Essences of substances usually consist of a few obvious\nqualities observed in things.\n\nSecondly, Though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of\nsubstances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not\nsupposed to, co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature:\nyet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, or\nfancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some\nfew sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out\nothers as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Of\nsensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized bodies, which\nare propagated by seed; and in these the SHAPE is that which to us is\nthe leading quality, and most characteristical part, that determines\nthe species. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid\nsubstance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however\nsome men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale, yet should\nthere a creature be found that had language and reason, but partaked not\nof the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a man,\nhow much soever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's ass had all\nhis life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I\ndoubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or\nallowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables\nand animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by\nseed, it is the COLOUR we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus\nwhere we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other\nqualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also: and we\ncommonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. shape and colour, for so\npresumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readily\nsay, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver\ngoblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye\nby the pencil.\n\n\n30. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they serve for common converse.\n\nBut though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions,\nand inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet MEN ARE FAR ENOUGH\nFROM HAVING AGREED ON THE PRECISE NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS OR QUALITIES\nBELONGING TO ANY SORT OF THINGS, SIGNIFIED BY ITS NAME. Nor is it a\nwonder; since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry,\nand long examination to find out what, and how many, those simple ideas\nare, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are\nalways to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wanting\neither time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some\ntolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward\nappearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for\nthe common affairs of life: and so, without further examination, give\nthem names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common\nconversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious\nqualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a\nsettled signification, a precise number of simple ideas, much less all\nthose which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so\nmuch stir about genus and species, and such a deal of talk of specific\ndifferences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with\nreason imagine, that those FORMS which there hath been so much noise\nmade about are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specific\nnatures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names of\nsubstances are from having significations wherein all who use them do\nagree, will have reason to conclude that, though the nominal essences of\nsubstances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all,\nor most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex\nideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore that these\nboundaries of species are as men, and not as Nature, makes them, if at\nleast there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that many\nparticular substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreement\nand likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being\nranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of\ndeterminate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them\nunder general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that\nNature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or, if it be so,\nour boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in\nnature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not\nfor a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would BEST show us\ntheir most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide\nthem, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the\neasier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For,\nhaving no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that\nare united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with\nothers in several of those simple ideas; we make that collection our\nspecific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our\nthoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word\ndesignate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without\nenumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time\nand breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do who\nwould discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for.\n\n\n31. Essences of Species under the same Name very different in different\nminds.\n\nBut however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary\nconversation, it is plain that this complex idea wherein they observe\nseveral individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently;\nby some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea\ncontains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so\nis apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes\ngold to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and\nothers yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow\ncolour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility. For in all these and\nthe like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex\nidea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another. And\ntherefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideas\nwhich others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or\nobservation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must\ntherefore be of their own and not of nature's making.\n\n\n32. The more general our Ideas of Substances are, the more incomplete\nand partial they are.\n\nIf the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the\nlowest species, or first sorting, of individuals, depends on the mind of\nman, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so\nin the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, are\ncalled genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is\nvisible at first sight, that several of those qualities that are to\nbe found in the things themselves are purposely left out of generical\nideas. For, as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several\nparticulars, leaves out those of time and place, and such other, that\nmake them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other\nyet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves\nout those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new\ncollection only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same\nconvenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter\ncoming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon making\nof one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other\nbodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities,\nwhich are peculiar to each sort, and retaining a complex idea made up\nof those that are common to them all. To which the name METAL being\nannexed, there is a genus constituted; the essence whereof being that\nabstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with\ncertain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several\nkinds agree, leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to gold\nand silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal.\nWhereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by\nnature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there is\nno body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in\nit, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making\ntheir general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language, and quick\ndispatch by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise\nnature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract\nideas, chiefly pursued that end; which was to be furnished with store\nof general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole\nbusiness of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but\na partial conception of what is in the species; and the species but a\npartial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any\none will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c.,\nare distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature\nto be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another\nfor an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally\nbestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done\nin all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is\nno new thing made; but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we\nmay be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular\nthings, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we\nhave framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more\ngeneral term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each\ngenus is but a partial conception of; the species comprehended under it.\nSo that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, it\ncan only be in respect of a certain established relation between them\nand certain names which are made use of to signify them; and not in\nrespect of anything existing, as made by nature.\n\n\n33. This all accommodated to the end of the Speech.\n\nThis is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest\nand shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he that would\ndiscourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and\nsolidity, needed but use the word BODY to denote all such. He that\nto these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and\nspontaneous motion, needed but use the word ANIMAL to signify all which\npartaked of those ideas, and he that had made a complex idea of a body,\nwith life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a\ncertain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable MAN,\nto express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is\nthe proper business of genus and species: and this men do without any\nconsideration of real essences, or substantial forms; which come not\nwithin the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things, nor\nwithin the signification of our words when we discourse with others.\n\n\n34. Instance in Cassowaries.\n\nWere I to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St.\nJames's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of\nsomething between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without\nwings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down\nlike sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three\nclaws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so\nmay make others understand me. But when I am told that the name of it\nis CASSUARIS, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my\ncomplex idea mentioned in that description; though by that word, which\nis now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence\nor constitution of that sort of animals than I did before; and knew\nprobably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned\nthe name, as many Englishmen do of swans or herons, which are specific\nnames, very well known, of sorts of birds common in England.\n\n\n35. Men determine the Sorts of Substances, which may be sorted\nvariously.\n\nFrom what has been said, it is evident that MEN make sorts of things.\nFor, it being different essences alone that make different species, it\nis plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal\nessences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body\nfound, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, it\nwould no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not, i.e.\nwhether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that\nabstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it\nwould be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not\nmalleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; and\non the other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him\nwho included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is it\nthat makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but\nmen that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly\nof the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to\nimagine that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities of\ngold may be without malleableness; since it is certain that gold itself\nwill be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it,) that it will as little\nendure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said of the putting in,\nor leaving out of malleableness, in the complex idea the name gold is by\nany one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and\nseveral other the like qualities: for whatever is left out, or put in,\nit is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes\nthe species: and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea,\nso the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species.\nAnd thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination\nof the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making\nthis or that complex idea.\n\n\n36. Nature makes the Similitudes of Substances.\n\nThis, then, in short, is the case: Nature makes many PARTICULAR THINGS,\nwhich do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably\ntoo in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this real\nessence that distinguishes them into species; it is men who, taking\noccasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they\nobserve often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in\norder to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs;\nunder which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that\nabstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns: so that this is of\nthe blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in\nthis, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.\n\n\n37. The manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men,\nthough nature makes things alike.\n\nI do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular\nbeings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike\nand of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the\nboundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men; since\nthe essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as\nhas been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal\nnature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such\na manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.\n\n\n38. Each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a nominal Essence.\n\nOne thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine, which\nis, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstract\nidea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it,\nif truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can show\nus the species of things limited and distinguished by something else;\nand let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but\nsomething different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a hound\nare not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no\nother idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel,\nthan we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the\nessential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from\nanother, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to\nwhich we have given those different names.\n\n\n39. How Genera and Species are related to naming.\n\nHow much the making of species and genera is in order to general names;\nand how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at\nleast to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will\nappear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in\na very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one\nspecies, to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the\nname WATCH for one, and CLOCK for the other, and distinct complex ideas\nto which those names belong, to HIM they are different species. It\nwill be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is\ndifferent between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of.\nAnd yet it is plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one\nname for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make\na new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels,\nothers with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? Some\nhave strings and physics, and others none; some have the balance loose,\nand others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles.\nAre any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to\nthe workman, that knows each of these and several other different\ncontrivances in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certain\neach of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an\nessential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea\nto which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea\nwhich that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name\ncomprehend different species under it, they are not essentially nor\nspecifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions, from\ndifferences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such\nprecise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then be\nnew species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can by\nthose differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; and\nthen WATCH will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct\nspecies to men ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of\nwatches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the\nmarking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names\nwould be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more,\nnor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural\nthings. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)\nwithin, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more\nthan that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a\nCHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential or\nspecifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement\nwith the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone\ncan it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man.\n\n\n40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural.\n\nFrom what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the\nspecies of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and\nuncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a\nproduction of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well\nknows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other\nidea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be\nknown, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence of\nthe several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most part\nin nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimes\nmotion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such\nas he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to\nattain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the\nnames whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, with\nless doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we can in things natural,\nwhose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the\nreach of our discoveries.\n\n\n41. Artificial Things of distinct Species.\n\nI must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct\nspecies as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly\nranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general names\nannexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural\nsubstances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct\nspecies one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed in\nour minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?\n\n\n42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have proper\nNames.\n\nThis is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of\nall our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby\none only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes,\nand relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often\nthis or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of\nmixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable\nof a lasting duration, as substances which are the actors; and wherein\nthe simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name\nhave a lasting union.\n\n\n43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things\nstripped of those abstract ideas we give them.\n\nI must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this\nsubject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be\nconsidered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into the\nthoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we give\nthem: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them,\nI thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the\nusual abstract idea of that species; and so cross my purpose. For,\nto talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary\nsignification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexed\nto it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as he\nis really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or\nreal essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks like\ntrifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real\nessences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it\nbe but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified\nby the general names which substances are called by. But because it is\ndifficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour\nby an example to make the different consideration the mind has of\nspecific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the\ncomplex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds\nof other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the signification\nannexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no\narchetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers\nits ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the\nsignification of their names, as to the archetypes; and also to make\nplain the nature of species or sorting of things, as apprehended and\nmade use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species: which\nis perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our\nknowledge than we at first imagine.\n\n\n44. Instances of mixed Modes names KINNEAH and NIOUPH.\n\nLet us suppose Adam, in the state of a grown man, with a good\nunderstanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown\nabout him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but\nwhat one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than\nusual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah,\n(whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another\nman. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take\ncare that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve he\nmakes use of these two new words KINNEAH and NIOUPH. In time, Adam's\nmistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having\nkilled a man: but yet the two names KINNEAH and NIOUPH, (the one\nstanding for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him; and\nthe other for the act of committing disloyalty,) lost not their distinct\nsignifications. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex\nideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of\nactions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of\nthese two distinct species of actions? And it is plain it consisted in a\nprecise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I\nask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called KINNEAH,\nwere adequate or not? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination\nof simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without\nrespect to anything as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted,\nand gave the name KINNEAH to, to express in short to others, by that one\nsound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one;\nit must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. His own choice\nhaving made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should,\nand so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it being\nreferred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.\n\n\n45. These words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, by degrees grew into common use,\nand then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same\nfaculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex\nideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them,\nand make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of\nnames being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be\ndone, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would\ncommunicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore,\nof Adam's children, that found these two words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, in\nfamiliar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds, but must\nneeds conclude they stood for something; for certain ideas, abstract\nideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the essences\nof the species distinguished by those names. If therefore, they would\nuse these words as names of species already established and agreed on,\nthey were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by\nthese names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as\nto their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of\nthese complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt\n(especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas)\nnot to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using\nthe same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which\nis to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it:\nit being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and\nadultery (which I think answer [Hebrew] and [Hebrew]) stand for in\nanother man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was\nimpossible, in the beginning of language, to know what KINNEAH and\nNIOUPH stood for in another man's mind, without explication; they being\nvoluntary signs in every one.\n\n\n46. Instances of a species of Substance named ZAHAB.\n\nLet us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances\nin their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the\nmountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home\nhe carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be\nhard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight.\nThese perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it;\nand abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that\npeculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its\nbulk, he gives the name ZAHAB, to denominate and mark all substances\nthat have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that,\nin this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in\nforming those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names KINNEAH\nand NIOUPH. For there he put ideas together only by his own imagination,\nnot taken from the existence of anything; and to them he gave names to\ndenominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract\nideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or not: the\nstandard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of\nthis new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has\na standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that to\nhimself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no\nsimple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from\nthe thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this\narchetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.\n\n\n47.\n\nThis piece of matter, thus denominated ZAHAB by Adam, being quite\ndifferent from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be\na distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name\nZAHAB is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things\npartaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam made\nthe name ZAHAB stand for was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow,\nand very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the\nknowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam upon\nfurther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it\nwith flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it\nyield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will\nbend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former\nidea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands\nfor? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they\nalso, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the\ncomplex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? If not, what reason will there\nbe shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the\nother properties, which any further trials shall discover in this\nmatter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of\nthe complex idea which the name ZAHAB stands for, and so be the essence\nof the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are\nendless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion, by this\narchetype, will be always inadequate.\n\n\n48. The Abstract Ideas of Substances always imperfect and therefore\nvarious.\n\nBut this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substances\nwould not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed\nto have different significations, as used by different men, which would\nvery much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality\nthat were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a\nnecessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given\nto it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify\ndifferent things in different men: since they cannot doubt but different\nmen may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the same\ndenomination, which others know nothing of.\n\n\n49. Therefore to fix the Nominal Species Real Essence supposed.\n\nTo avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to\nevery species, from which these properties all flow, and would have\ntheir name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any idea\nof that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing\nbut the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only to\nput the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that\nreal essence, without knowing what the real essence is, and this is that\nwhich men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing them\nmade by nature, and distinguished by real essences.\n\n\n50. Which Supposition is of no Use.\n\nFor, let us consider, when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed,' either\nit means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i. e., part of the\nnominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, 'all\ngold is fixed,' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold.\nOr else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of\nthe gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it is\nplain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the\nreal essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of\nsubstitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification,\nthat, though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense an\naffirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in\nits particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For\nlet it be ever so true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real\nessence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in\nthis sense, WHAT IS OR IS NOT GOLD? For if we know not the real essence\nof gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that\nessence, and so whether IT be true gold or no.\n\n\n51. Conclusion.\n\nTo conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of\nMIXED MODES by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have\nall men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas\nof SUBSTANCES to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature,\nthat Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the\nsame are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam\nhad of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still,\n(especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such;) but\nonly with this difference, that, in places where men in society have\nalready established a language amongst them, the significations of words\nare very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnished\nalready with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated\nknown names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot\nbut be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions will perhaps venture\nsometimes on the coining of new terms to express them: but men think it\na boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them\npass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary that\nwe conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for\nto their known proper significations, (which I have explained at large\nalready,) or else to make known that new signification we apply them to.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nOF PARTICLES.\n\n\n1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.\n\nBesides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great\nmany others that are made use of to signify the CONNEXION that the mind\ngives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind, in\ncommunicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the\nideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some\nparticular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas.\nThis it does several ways; as _I_S and _I_S NOT, are the general marks,\nof the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation,\nwithout which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does,\nin declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of\npropositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several\nrelations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.\n\n\n2. In right use of Particles consists the Art of Well-speaking\n\nThe words whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several\naffirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or\nnarration, are generally called PARTICLES: and it is in the right use of\nthese that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good\nstyle. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear\nand distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or\ndisagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe\nthe dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to\nexpress well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words\nto show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis,\n&c., he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake\nin any of these, is to puzzle instead of informing his hearer: and\ntherefore it is, that those words which are not truly by themselves\nthe names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in\nlanguage, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.\n\n\n3. They say what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.\n\nThis part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others\nover-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after\nanother, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in\nthese and the like there has been great diligence used; and particles\nthemselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness,\nranked into their several orders. But though PREPOSITIONS and\nCONJUNCTIONS, &c., are names well known in grammar, and the particles\ncontained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions;\nyet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy\nand force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his\nown thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in\ndiscoursing.\n\n\n4. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind.\n\nNeither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them,\nas is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come\nnearest to their signification: for what is meant by them is commonly as\nhard to be understood in one as another language. They are all marks of\nsome action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them\nrightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and\nexceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have\neither none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of\nthese there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles\nthat most languages have to express them by: and therefore it is not\nto be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimes\nalmost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle\nconsisting of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as\nI remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty, several significations.\n\n\n5. Instance in But.\n\n'But' is a particle, none more familiar in our language: and he that\nsays it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers to sed Latin,\nor mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But yet it\nseems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several\npropositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable.\n\nFirst, 'But to say no more:' here it intimates a stop of the mind in the\ncourse it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.\n\nSecondly, 'I saw but two plants;' here it shows that the mind limits the\nsense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.\n\nThirdly,'You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true\nreligion.'\n\nFourthly, 'But that he would confirm you in your own.' The first of\nthese BUTS intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise\nthan it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct\nopposition between that and what goes before it.\n\nFifthly, 'All animals have sense, but a dog is an animal:' here it\nsignifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the\nformer, as the minor of a syllogism.\n\n\n6. This Matter of the use of Particles but lightly touched here.\n\nTo these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations\nof this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full\nlatitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if\none should do, I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of,\nit would deserve the title of DISCRETIVE, which grammarians give to it.\nBut I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The\ninstances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their\nuse and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several\nactions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to\nintimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and\nothers in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence\ncontained in them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.\n\n\n\n1. Abstract Terms predicated one on another and why.\n\nThe ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have\ngiven us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but\nconsidered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power\nto abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences,\nwhereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea\nbeing distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the\nmind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference, and\ntherefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of\nanother. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not\nany two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one\nof another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how\ncertain soever it is that man is an animal, or rational, or white,\nyet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these\npropositions: HUMANITY IS ANIMALITY, or RATIONALITY, or WHITENESS:\nand this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our\naffirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming, not\none abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to\nanother; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort; in all\nthe rest are little else but of relations; and in substances the most\nfrequent are of powers: v.g. 'a man is white,' signifies that the thing\nthat has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness,\nwhich is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one\nwhose eyes can discover ordinary objects: or, 'a man is rational,'\nsignifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also\nin it the essence of rationality, i.e. a power of reasoning.\n\n\n2. They show the Difference of our Ideas.\n\nThis distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas:\nfor if we observe them, we shall find that OUR SIMPLE IDEAS HAVE ALL\nABSTRACT AS WELL AS CONCRETE NAMES: the one whereof is (to speak the\nlanguage of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective; as\nwhiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our ideas of\nmodes and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal: only with this\ndifference, that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men\nchiefly are substantives; as, paternitas, pater; whereof it were easy to\nrender a reason. But as to our ideas of substances, we have very few\nor no abstract names at all. For though the Schools have introduced\nanimalitas, humanitas, corporietas, and some others; yet they hold no\nproportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which\nthey never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract\nones: and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the mouths\nof their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or\nobtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to\nintimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the\nreal essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas:\nwhich no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to\nthemselves of their ignorance of them kept them from so idle an attempt.\nAnd therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a\nstone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such\nterms, as aurietas and saxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or the\nlike names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those\nsubstances whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only\nthe doctrine of SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and the confidence of mistaken\npretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined and then\nintroduced animalitas and humanitas, and the like; which yet went very\nlittle further than their own Schools, and could never get to be current\namongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word in familiar use\namongst the Romans; but in a far different sense, and stood not for the\nabstract essence of any substance; but was the abstracted name of a\nmode, and its concrete humanus, not homo.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nOF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.\n\n\n1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.\n\nFrom what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to\nperceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature\nof words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful\nand uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or\nimperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and\nend: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are\nmore or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourse\noften, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of words.\n\nFirst, One for the recording of our own thoughts.\n\nSecondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.\n\n\n2. Any Words will serve for recording.\n\nAs to the first of these, FOR THE RECORDING OUR OWN THOUGHTS FOR THE\nHELP OF OUR OWN MEMORIES, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves,\nany words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and\nindifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to\nsignify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no imperfection in\nthem, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then he\ncannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right\nuse and perfection of language.\n\n\n3. Communication by Words either for civil or philosophical purposes.\n\nSecondly, As to COMMUNICATION BY WORDS, that too has a double use.\n\nI. Civil.\n\nII. Philosophical. First, By, their CIVIL use, I mean such a\ncommunication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the\nupholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs\nand conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men, one amongst\nanother.\n\nSecondly, By the PHILOSOPHICAL use of words, I mean such a use of them\nas may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in\ngeneral propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may\nrest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge.\nThese two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will\nserve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.\n\n\n4. The imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness or ambiguity of their\nSignification, which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for.\n\nThe chief end of language in communication being to be understood,\nwords serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical\ndiscourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea\nwhich it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds have\nno natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their signification\nfrom the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty\nof their signification, which is the imperfection we here are speaking\nof, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in any\nincapacity there is in one sound more than in another to signify any\nidea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.\n\nThat then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification\nof some more than other words, is the difference of ideas they stand\nfor.\n\n\n5. Natural Causes of their Imperfection, especially in those that stand\nfor Mixed Modes, and for our ideas of Substances.\n\nWords having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for\nmust be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, and\nhold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is\nthe hardest to be done where,\n\nFirst, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great\nnumber of ideas put together.\n\nSecondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in\nnature; and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to\nrectify and adjust them by.\n\nThirdly, When the signification of the word is referred to a standard,\nwhich standard is not easy to be known.\n\nFourthly, Where the signification of the word and the real essence of\nthe thing are not exactly the same.\n\nThese are difficulties that attend the signification of several words\nthat are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such\nas names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs or\nfaculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds\nto a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.\n\nIn all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words; which I shall\nmore at large explain, in their particular application to our several\nsorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we shall find that the NAMES OF\n_M_IXED _M_ODES ARE MOST LIABLE TO DOUBTFULNESS AND IMPERFECTION, FOR\nTHE TWO FIRST OF THESE REASONS; and the NAMES OF _S_UBSTANCES CHIEFLY\nFOR THE TWO LATTER.\n\n\n6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful.\n\nFirst, The names of MIXED MODES are, many of them, liable to great\nuncertainty and obscurity in their signification.\n\nI. Because the Ideas they stand for are so complex.\n\nBecause of that GREAT COMPOSITION these complex ideas are often made\nup of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is\nnecessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the\nsame idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men\nfill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby\ntheir thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the\nend of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex\nidea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to form\nand retain that idea so exactly, as to make the name in common use stand\nfor the same precise idea, without any the least variation. Hence it\ncomes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for the\nmost part are moral words, have seldom in two different men the same\nprecise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with\nanother's, and often differs from his own--from that which he had\nyesterday, or will have tomorrow.\n\n\n7. Secondly because they have no Standards in Nature.\n\nBecause the names of mixed modes for the most part WANT STANDARDS\nIN NATURE, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations;\ntherefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of\nideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of\ndiscourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy\nanything really existing, but to denominate and rank things as they\ncome to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first\nbrought the word SHAM, or WHEEDLE, or BANTER, in use, put together as he\nthought fit those ideas he made it stand for; and as it is with any new\nnames of modes that are now brought into any language, so it was with\nthe old ones when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that\nstand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must\nneeds be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhere\nto be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown\nwhereby men may adjust them. What the word MURDER, or SACRILEGE, &c.,\nsignifies can never be known from things themselves: there be many of\nthe parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action\nitself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which\nmake a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with the\noutward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pulling\nthe trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed, and is all\nthe action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connexion with those\nother ideas that make up the complex one named murder. They have their\nunion and combination only from the understanding which unites them\nunder one name: but, uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot\nbe but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary\ncollections should be often various in the minds of different men, who\nhave scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions\nby, in such arbitrary ideas.\n\n\n8. Common use, or propriety not a sufficient Remedy.\n\nIt is true, common use, that is, the rule of propriety may be supposed\nhere to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and it\ncannot be denied but that in some measure it does. Common use regulates\nthe meaning of words pretty well for common conversation; but nobody\nhaving an authority to establish the precise signification of words,\nnor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use is\nnot sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses; there being\nscarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others)\nwhich, in common use, has not a great latitude, and which, keeping\nwithin the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far\ndifferent ideas. Besides, the rule and measure of propriety itself being\nnowhere established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that\nway of using a word be propriety of speech or no. From all which it is\nevident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are\nnaturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain\nsignification; and even in men that have a mind to understand one\nanother, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer.\nThough the names GLORY and GRATITUDE be the same in every man's mouth\nthrough a whole country, yet the complex collective idea which every one\nthinks on or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men\nusing the same language.\n\n\n9. The way of learning these Names contributes also to their\nDoubtfulness.\n\nThe way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned,\ndoes not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification.\nFor if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that,\nto make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances\nstand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have\nthem have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands for\nit; as WHITE, SWEET, MILK, SUGAR, CAT, DOG. But as for mixed modes,\nespecially the most material of them, MORAL WORDS, the sounds are\nusually learned first; and then, to know what complex ideas they stand\nfor, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which\nhappens for the most part) are left to their own observation and\nindustry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and\nprecise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths\nlittle more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most\npart but a very loose and undetermined, and, consequently, obscure and\nconfused signification. And even those themselves who have with more\nattention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience\nto have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other,\neven intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall\none find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse,\nconcerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c., wherein it is\nnot easy to observe the different notions men have of them? Which is\nnothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those\nwords, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make\nthem stand for, and so all the contests that follow thereupon are\nonly about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see that, in the\ninterpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end;\ncomments beget comments, and explications make new matter for\nexplications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification\nof these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are,\nby men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man\nwho was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of Scripture, or\nclause in the code, at first reading, has, by consulting commentators,\nquite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise or\nincrease to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not\nthis that I think commentaries needless; but to show how uncertain the\nnames of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had\nboth the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language\nwas capable to express their thoughts.\n\n\n10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.\n\nWhat obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who\nhave lived in remote ages, and different countries, it will be needless\nto take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing\ntheir thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough, to show what\nattention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required to find out the\ntrue meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings we have\nany great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but\nthose that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws\nwe are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or\ntransgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors;\nwho, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity\nto know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on\ntheir decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore\nin the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due\nclearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury\ndone them, resolve thus with ourselves,\n\nSi non vis intelligi, debes negligi.\n\n\n11. Names of Substances of doubtful Signification, because the ideas\nthey stand for relate to the reality of things.\n\nIf the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because\nthere be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas are\nreferred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of SUBSTANCES are\nof a doubtful signification, for a contrary reason, viz. because the\nideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things,\nand are referred to as standards made by Nature. In our ideas of\nsubstances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what\ncombinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and\ndenominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex\nideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names\nby the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them,\nand stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but\npatterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain:\nfor names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas\nthey stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot\nbe known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.\n\n\n12. Names of Substances referred, I. To real Essences that cannot be\nknown.\n\nThe names of substances have, as has been shown, a double reference in\ntheir ordinary use.\n\nFirst, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification\nis supposed to agree to, THE REAL CONSTITUTION OF THINGS, from which\nall their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real\nconstitution, or (as it is apt to be called) essence, being utterly\nunknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it must be very\nuncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know what\nthings are or ought to be called a HORSE, or ANTIMONY, when those words\nare put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore\nin this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards\nthat cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and\nestablished by those standards.\n\n\n13. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.\n\nSecondly, The simple ideas that are FOUND TO CO-EXIST IN SUBSTANCES\nbeing that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in\nthe several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their\nnames are referred, and by which their significations may be best\nrectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this\npurpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain\nsignifications. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are united\nin the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right\nto go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand\nfor, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to\nconsider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name they\nuse for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different\nsignifications. The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas,\nbeing most of them powers, in relation to changes which they are apt\nto make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that\nshall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the\nbaser metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of\nfire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive\nin the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will not\nthink it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not\neasy to be collected, and completely known, by the ways of inquiry which\nour faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many,\nthat no man can know the precise and definite number, they are\ndifferently discovered by different men, according to their various\nskill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot choose\nbut have different ideas of the same substance, and therefore make the\nsignification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the\ncomplex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as are\nsupposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his\ncomplex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For,\nthough in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with colour and\nweight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to\nbe joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does its\nfusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly\njoined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other; others\nput into it ductility or fixedness, &c., as they have been taught by\ntradition or experience. Who of all these has established the right\nsignification of the word, gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine?\nEach has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason\nthinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by\nthe word gold, those qualities, which, upon trial, he has found united;\nas another who has not so well examined has to leave them out; or a\nthird, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in\nnature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one\ncomplex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or\nleft out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow, that the\ncomplex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them,\nwill be very various, and so the significations of those names very\nuncertain.\n\n\n14. Thirdly, To co-existing Qualities which are known but imperfectly.\n\nBesides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some\nof its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others\na less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case\nwhich are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to\nbe signified by the specific name? or can with any just authority\nprescribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out;\nor which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the\nsignification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldom\nor never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in\nthe names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or\nmistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.\n\n\n15. With this imperfection, they may serve for civil, but not well for\nphilosophical Use.\n\nIt is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names of\nsubstances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious\nqualities, (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal\npropagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour,\njoined with some other sensible qualities,) do well enough to design the\nthings men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually\nconceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple, to\ndistinguish the one from the other. But in PHILOSOPHICAL inquiries and\ndebates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences\ndrawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the\nnames of substances will be found not only not to be well established\nbut also very hard to be so. For example: he that shall make\nmalleability, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex\nidea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw\nconsequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold,\ntaken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can never\nbe forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not\nmalleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complex\nidea that the name gold, in his use of it, stands for.\n\n\n16. Instance, Liquor.\n\nThis is a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the\nnames of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily\nfind when, once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to\nmore strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how\ndoubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in\nordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting\nof very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a\nquestion, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves.\nThe debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments on\nboth sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part\nof disputes were more about the signification of words than a real\ndifference in the conception of things) desired, that, before they went\nany further on in this dispute, they would first examine and establish\namongst them, what the word LIQUOR signified. They at first were a\nlittle surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons less\ningenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or\nextravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself\nto understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for; which I\nthink, too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However,\nthey were pleased to comply with my motion; and upon examination found\nthat the signification of that word was not so settled or certain\nas they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a\ndifferent complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of their\ndispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differed\nvery little in their opinions concerning SOME fluid and subtle matter,\npassing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy\nto agree whether it was to be called LIQUOR or no, a thing, which, when\nconsidered, they thought it not worth the contending about.\n\n\n17. Instance, Gold.\n\nHow much this is the case in the greatest part of disputes that men are\nengaged so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place\nto take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the\nfore-mentioned instance of the word GOLD, and we shall see how hard it\nis precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to make\nit stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour; which being the\nidea to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part\nof a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others finding fusibility\njoined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter, make of\nthat combination a complex idea to which they give the name gold, to\ndenote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being gold all such\nyellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit to\nbe of that species, or to be comprehended under that name gold, only\nsuch substances as having that shining yellow colour, will by fire be\nreduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds\nthe weight, which, being a quality as straightly joined with that colour\nas its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its\nidea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made up\nof body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on\nof all the rest: wherein no one can show a reason why some of the\ninseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put\ninto the nominal essence, and others left out, or why the word gold,\nsignifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, should\ndetermine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility,\nthan by its colour, weight, and solubility in aqua regia: since the\ndissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion\nby fire, and they are both of them nothing but the relation which\nthat substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate\ndifferently upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be\na part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but\na property of it? Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its\nmalleableness but a property? That which I mean is this, That these\nbeing all but properties, depending on its real constitution, and\nnothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other\nbodies, no one has authority to determine the signification of the\nword gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one\ncollection of ideas to be found in that body than to another: whereby\nthe signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain.\nSince, as has been said, several people observe several properties in\nthe same substance; and I think I may say nobody all. And therefore we\nhave but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very\nuncertain significations.\n\n\n18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.\n\nFrom what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before\nremarked, viz. that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS are, of all others, the\nleast liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons. First, Because the\nideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much\neasier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and\ntherefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those\ncompounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precise\nnumber of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed, so\nreadily kept in mind. And, Secondly, Because they are never referred to\nany other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify:\nwhich reference is that which renders the signification of the names\nof substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many\ndisputes. Men that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose set\nthemselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any language which they are\nacquainted with, the use and signification of the name of simple ideas.\nWHITE and SWEET, YELLOW and BITTER, carry a very obvious meaning with\nthem, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is\nignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of\nsimple ideas MODESTY or FRUGALITY stand for, in another's use, is not\nso certainly known. And however we are apt to think we well enough know\nwhat is meant by GOLD or IRON; yet the precise complex idea others make\nthem the signs of is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom\nthat, in speaker and hearer, they stand for exactly the same collection.\nWhich must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use\nof in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions,\nand would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the\nconsequences that follow from them.\n\n\n19. And next to them, simple Modes.\n\nBy the same rule, the names of SIMPLE MODES are, next to those of simple\nideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty; especially those of figure\nand number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever that\nhad a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, or\na TRIANGLE? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have\nthe least dubious names.\n\n\n20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and\nSubstances.\n\nMixed modes, therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple\nideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the\nnames of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas,\nare commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been\nshown. The names of substances, being annexed to ideas that are neither\nthe real essences, nor exact representations of the patterns they are\nreferred to, are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty,\nespecially when we come to a philosophical use of them.\n\n\n21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words.\n\nThe great disorder that happens in our names of substances, proceeding,\nfor the most part, from our want of knowledge, and inability to\npenetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered\nwhy I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than\nunderstandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I\nthink myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method.\nI must confess, then, that, when I first began this Discourse of the\nUnderstanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that\nany consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having\npassed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to\nexamine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so\nnear a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner of\nsignification were first well observed, there could be very little said\nclearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant\nabout truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it\nterminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the\nintervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our\ngeneral knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between\nour understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate and\napprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, the\nobscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and\nimpose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put\nupon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes\nand notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or\nmistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small\nobstacle in the way to knowledge; which I conclude we are the more\ncarefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken\nnotice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have\nbeen made the business of men's study, and obtained the reputation of\nlearning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But\nI am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as the\ninstrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the\ncontroversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves\ncease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal\nopener than it does.\n\n\n22. This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of old\nAuthors.\n\nSure I am that the signification of words in all languages, depending\nvery much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them,\nmust unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and\ncountry. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall\nperuse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinct\nlanguage, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in\nevery country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages,\nwherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers,\ncustoms, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c., every one of which\ninfluenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they\nare lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another\nin our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings;\nwhich, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the\nunavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of\nsimple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a\nconstant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the\nspeaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer. And\nin discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the\nhighest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.\n\n\n23. Especially of the Old and New Testament Scriptures.\n\nThe volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New\nTestament are but too manifest proofs of this. Though everything said in\nthe text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot choose\nbut be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be\nwondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable\nto that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of\nconveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to\nall the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And\nwe ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the\nworld such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all\nmankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this written\nword never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search)\neither doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him.\nSince then the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very\nintelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and\nother revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages,\nare liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties\nincident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and\ndiligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and\nimperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nOF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.\n\n\n1. Woeful abuse of Words.\n\nBesides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the\nobscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of\nwords, there are several WILFUL faults and neglects which men are guilty\nof in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less\nclear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to\nbe.\n\n\n2. First, Words are often employed without any, or without clear Ideas.\n\nFIRST, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, the using\nof words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs\nwithout anything signified. Of these there are two sorts:--\n\nI. Some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them, even in\ntheir first original.\n\nOne may observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they be\nexamined, will be found in their first original, and their appropriated\nuse, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most\npart, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For\ntheir authors or promoters, either affecting something singular, and out\nof the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions,\nor cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new\nwords, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called\nINSIGNIFICANT TERMS. For, having either had no determinate collection of\nideas annexed to them when they were first invented; or at least such\nas, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if,\nafterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty\nsounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it\nenough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing\ncharacters of their Church or School, without much troubling their heads\nto examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need\nhere to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation will\nsufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored, the\ngreat mint-masters of this kind of terms, I mean the Schoolmen and\nMetaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral\nphilosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal\nabundantly to content him.\n\n\n3. II. Other Words, to which ideas were annexed at first, used\nafterwards without distinct meanings.\n\nOthers there be who extend this abuse yet further, who take so little\ncare to lay by words, which, in their primary notation have scarce\nany clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an\nunpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words which the propriety\nof language HAS affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct\nmeaning at all. WISDOM, GLORY, GRACE, &c., are words frequent enough in\nevery man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should be\nasked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know\nwhat to answer: a plain proof, that, though they have learned those\nsounds, and have them ready at their tongues ends, yet there are no\ndetermined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to\nothers by them.\n\n\n4. This occasioned by men learning Names before they have the Ideas the\nnames belong to.\n\nMen having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are\neasily got and retained, before they knew or had framed the complex\nideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the\nthings they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so\nall their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in\ntheir minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and\nconfused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words\nother people use; as if their very sound necessarily carried with it\nconstantly the same meaning. This, though men make a shift with in\nthe ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be\nunderstood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this\ninsignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerning\neither their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with\nabundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral\nmatters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and\nnumerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in\nnature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very\nobscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words\nthey find in use amongst their neighbours; and that they may not seem\nignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much\ntroubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besides\nthe ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That, as in such discourses\nthey seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that\nthey are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men\nout of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a\nvagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode. This I guess to be\nso; and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or\nnot.\n\n\n5. Secondly Unsteady Application of them.\n\nSECONDLY, Another great abuse of words is INCONSTANCY in the use of\nthem. It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject, especially\nof controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with\nattention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in the\ndiscourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one\ncollection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a\nperfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas,\nto make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by\na voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them\nstand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the wilful\ndoing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater\ndishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another may, with as much\nfairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and\nsometimes for another collection of units: v.g. this character 3, stand\nsometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight, as\nin his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different\ncollections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, I\nwonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the\naffairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, and\nsometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have\nclapped upon him, one of the two names men are commonly disgusted with.\nAnd yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceedings\npasses commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears a greater\ndishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and\nthe cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and\nvalue than money.\n\n\n6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity, as in the Peripatetic and other sects of\nPhilosophy.\n\nTHIRDLY. Another abuse of language is an AFFECTED OBSCURITY; by either\napplying old words to new and unusual significations; or introducing new\nand ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them\nso together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the\nPeripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other\nsects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them\nthat are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection\nof human knowledge,) which they have been fain to cover with obscurity\nof terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like a\nmist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being\ndiscovered. That BODY and EXTENSION in common use, stand for two\ndistinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For\nwere their signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, and\nas intelligible to say, 'the body of an extension,' as the 'extension of\na body;' and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their\nsignification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the\nsignification of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they have\nbeen handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired Art\nof Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages,\nwhilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification\nof words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and\nhe that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the\nwords there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their\nmeaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.\n\n\n7. Logic and Dispute have much contributed to this.\n\nThis is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are\nestimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward\nshall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and\nniceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed, should\nperplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never\nto want something to say in opposing or defending any question; the\nvictory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the\nlast word in the dispute.\n\n\n8. Calling it Subtlety.\n\nThis, though a very useless skill, and that which I think the direct\nopposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the\nlaudable and esteemed names of SUBTLETY and ACUTENESS, and has had the\napplause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned\nmen of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (the\ndisputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and\nwith reason taxes,) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem,\nfor their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be\npretended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover\ntheir ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words,\nand procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible\nterms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood;\nwhilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no\nwiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small\nadvantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived; unless the\ncoining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them\nto, or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so\nbringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable\nto the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.\n\n\n9. This Learning very little benefits Society.\n\nFor, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing\ndoctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments\nof the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the\nilliterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they\nreceived the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial\nignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages,\nby the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that\npitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing\nthe men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the\ningenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and\nholding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides,\nthere is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and\nabsurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure,\ndoubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these retreats more like\nthe dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair\nwarriors; which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the\nstrength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity\nof the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable\nto the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity but\nobscurity.\n\n\n10. But destroys the instruments of Knowledge and communication.\n\nThus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping even inquisitive men\nfrom true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much\nperplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see\nthat other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not\nacquired that ACUTENESS, could intelligibly express themselves to one\nanother; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But though\nunlearned men well enough understood the words white and black; &c., and\nhad constant notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet there\nwere philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove\nthat snow was black; i.e. to prove that white was black. Whereby they\nhad the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse,\nconversation, instruction, and society; whilst, with great art and\nsubtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of\nwords, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of\nit had made it; a gift which the illiterate had not attained to.\n\n\n11. As useful as to confound the sound that the Letters of the Alphabet\nstand for.\n\nThese learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and\nprofit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known\ncharacters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the\ncapacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should in his writing show\nthat he could put A for B, and D for E, &c., to the no small admiration\nand benefit of for his reader. It being as senseless to put BLACK,\nwhich is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I\nsay, for another, or the contrary idea; i.e. to call SNOW BLACK, as\nto put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one\nmodification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech,\nfor B, which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound,\nmade by another certain mode of the organs of speech.\n\n\n12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.\n\nNor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty\nspeculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and\nsociety; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity;\nbrought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty into the affairs of\nmankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered useless,\nthese two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part\nof the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for,\nbut to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What have\nbeen the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute\nniceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more\nunintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass\nthat princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary\ncommands are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws,\nare not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen that a\nman of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, that\nhe reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by\nthat time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either\nnothing at all, or what he pleases.\n\n\n13. and ought not to pass for Learning.\n\nWhether any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, I\nwill not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would\nnot be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they\nare, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking\nabout them, or tossing words to and fro;--whether it would not be well,\nI say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and that\nlanguage, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond\nof society, should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's\nrights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and\nreligion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be\nthought learning or knowledge to do so?\n\n\n14. IV. Fourthly, by taking Words for Things.\n\nFOURTHLY, Another great abuse of words is, the TAKING THEM FOR THINGS.\nThis, though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more\nparticularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men are\nmost subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and\ngive themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received\nhypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that\nsect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly\ncorrespond with their real existence. Who is there that has been bred up\nin the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under\nwhich are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the\nnature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that\nSUBSTANTIAL FORMS, VEGETATIVE SOULS, ABHORRENCE OF A VACUUM, INTENTIONAL\nSPECIES, &c., are something real? These words men have learned from\ntheir very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and\nsystems lay great stress upon them: and therefore they cannot quit\nthe opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the\nrepresentations of something that really exists. The Platonists have\ntheir SOUL OF THE WORLD, and the Epicureans their ENDEAVOR TOWARDS\nMOTION in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in\nphilosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not.\nBut yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding,\nserves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors,\ncomes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the\nmost important part of language, and of all other the terms the most\nsignificant: and should AERIAL and OETHERIAL VEHICLES come once, by the\nprevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt\nthose terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish\nthem in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as\nPeripatetick FORMS and INTENTIONAL SPECIES have heretofore done. 15.\nInstance, in Matter.\n\nHow much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding,\nthe attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly\ndiscover; and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse.\nI shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many\nintricate disputes have there been about MATTER, as if there were some\nsuch thing really in nature, distinct from BODY; as it is evident the\nword matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if\nthe ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might\nindifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that\nthough it be proper to say, There is one matter of all bodies, one\ncannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one body\nis bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used)\nto say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz.\nfrom hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, but\nwherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand\nfor two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but\na part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figured\nsubstance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception;\nit seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body,\nwithout taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is that,\nspeaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it\nexpressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is\neverywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter,\nwe no more conceive or speak of different MATTERS in the world than\nwe do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of\ndifferent bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation.\nBut, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the\ntaking matter to be the name of something really existing under that\nprecision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible\ndiscourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of\nphilosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse,\nhow far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be\nconsidered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a\ngreat many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what\nthey are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves.\nFor, when we argue about MATTER, or any the like term, we truly argue\nonly about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea\nagree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell\nwhat ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that\nobscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.\n\n\n16. This makes Errors lasting.\n\nBut whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am\nsure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions\nfar remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to\npersuade any one that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, the\nparson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing\nthat really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes\nthat men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions\npurely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth.\nFor the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in\ntheir minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them\nshould not be removed.\n\n\n17. Fifthly, by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify.\n\nV. FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words is, THE SETTING THEM IN THE PLACE OF\nTHINGS WHICH THEY DO OR CAN BY NO MEANS SIGNIFY. We may observe that, in\nthe general names of substances, whereof the NOMINAL essences are only\nknown to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny\nanything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend, they\nshould stand for the REAL essence of a certain sort of substances.\nFor, when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate\nsomething more than this, That what I call gold is malleable, (though\ntruly it amounts to no more,) but would have this understood, viz.\nThat gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold, is malleable; which\namounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable\nfrom the real essence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that real\nessence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not\ntruly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts\nfor it. Thus, when we say that ANIMAL RATIONALE is, and animal imflume\nbipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it is plain we\nsuppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a\nspecies, and would signify that 'a rational animal' better described\nthat real essence than 'a two-legged animal with broad nails, and\nwithout feathers.' For else, why might not Plato as properly make the\nword [word in Greek], or MAN, stand for his complex idea, made up of the\nidea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other\noutward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave\nthe name [word in Greek], or MAN, of body and the faculty of reasoning\njoined together; unless the name [word in Greek], or MAN, were supposed\nto stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the\nplace of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express\nby it?\n\n\n18. VI. Putting them for the real Essences of Substances.\n\nIt is true the names of substances would be much more useful, and\npropositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of\nsubstances the ideas in our minds which those words signified. And it\nis for want of those real essences that our words convey so little\nknowledge or certainty in our discourses about them; and therefore the\nmind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a\nsecret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if\nthereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For, though the word MAN\nor GOLD signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united\ntogether in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce anybody, in the\nuse of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for\na thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Which\nis so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a\nplain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something,\nwhich, not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the\nsign of.\n\n\n19. Hence we think Change of our Complex Ideas of Substances not to\nchange their Species.\n\nThis shows us the reason why in MIXED MODES any of the ideas that make\nthe composition of the complex one being left out or changed, it is\nallowed to be another thing, i.e. to be of another species, as is plain\nin CHANCE-MEDLEY, MANSLAUGHTER, MURDER, PARRICIDE, &c. The reason\nwhereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the real\nas well as nominal essence; and there is no secret reference of that\nname to any other essence but that. But in SUBSTANCES, it is not so. For\nthough in that called GOLD, one puts into his complex idea what another\nleaves out, and vice versa: yet men do not usually think that therefore\nthe species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that\nname, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing\nexisting, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex\nidea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in AQUA REGIA, which he\nput not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but\nonly to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which\nis always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex\nidea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we\nhave not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves\nthe more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to\nthe real essence of that species of bodies, the word GOLD (which, by\nstanding for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves\nto design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes to\nhave no signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have no\nidea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself is\naway. For however it may be thought all one, yet, if well considered, it\nwill be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and\nabout a parcel in the body itself, v.g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before\nus; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the\nthing.\n\n\n20. The Cause of this Abuse, a supposition of Nature's working always\nregularly, in setting boundaries to Species.\n\nThat which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for\nthe real essences of species, is the supposition before mentioned,\nthat nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the\nboundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real\ninternal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general\nname. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardly\ndoubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in\ntheir internal constitution, as different one from another as several of\nthose which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition,\nhowever, that the same precise and internal constitution goes always\nwith the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for\nthe representatives of those real essences; though indeed they signify\nnothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use\nthem. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed\nfor, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of\nuse, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially\nin those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of SUBSTANTIAL\nFORMS, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be\ndetermined and distinguished.\n\n\n21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.\n\nBut however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for\nideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not,\nit being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is\nevident to any one who ever so little reflects on the use men make\nof their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks\nwhether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous\nfoetus, be a MAN or no; it is evident the question is not, Whether that\nparticular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man:\nbut whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things which\nhe supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using the names\nof substances, there are these false suppositions contained:--\n\nFirst, that there are certain precise essences according to which nature\nmakes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into\nspecies. That everything has a real constitution, whereby it is what it\nis, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: but I\nthink it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of species\nas WE rank them, nor the boundaries of their names.\n\nSecondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had IDEAS of these\nproposed essences. For to what purpose else is it, to inquire whether\nthis or that thing have the real essence of the species man, if we did\nnot suppose that there were such a specifick essence known? Which yet\nis utterly false. And therefore such application of names as would make\nthem stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder\nin discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in\nour communication by words.\n\n\n22. VI. Sixthly, by proceeding upon the supposition that the words we\nuse have a certain and evident Signification which other men cannot but\nunderstand.\n\nSIXTHLY, there remains yet another more general, though perhaps less\nobserved, abuse of words; and that is, that men having by a long and\nfamiliar use annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine SO\nNEAR AND NECESSARY A CONNEXION BETWEEN THE NAMES AND SIGNIFICATION THEY\nUSE THEM IN, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what\ntheir meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words\ndelivered, as if it were past doubt that, in the use of those common\nreceived sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise\nideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term,\nthey have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they\ntalked of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally\nstanding for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply\nthem to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or\nunderstand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise,\nand wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words\nto be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are\nno more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet\nmen think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely\nnecessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms:\nthough the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it\nevident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use\nfor the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which\nwill not be a clear instance of this. LIFE is a term, none more\nfamiliar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what\nhe meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant that\nlies ready formed in the seed have life; whether the embryo in an egg\nbefore incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive\nor no; it is easy to perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea does\nnot always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Some\ngross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they\napply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of their\nwords serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs.\nBut this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and\nreasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will not\nbe so importunately dull as not to understand what others say, without\ndemanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical\nas to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them:\nyet, where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not\nwhat fault it can be, to desire the explication of words whose sense\nseems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in\nwhat sense another man uses his words; since he has no other way of\ncertainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words\nupon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as\namongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes,\nwhich have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing\nmore than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed\nthat there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of\ncontroversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that\nthe contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings\none with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt\nto imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things,\nand know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps what\nthey would have be different.\n\n\n23. The Ends of Language: First, To convey our Ideas.\n\nTo conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of\nlanguage. The ends of language in our discourse with others being\nchiefly these three: First, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to\nanother; Secondly, to do so with as much ease and quickness as possible;\nand, Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things: language is\neither abused or deficient, when it fails of any of these three.\n\nFirst, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's\nideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without\nany determinate ideas in their minds whereof they are the signs: or, 2.\nWhen they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to\nwhich the common use of that language does not apply them: or 3. When\nthey apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by\nand by for another idea.\n\n\n24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness.\n\nSecondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with the quickness and\nease that may be, when they have complex ideas without having any\ndistinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language\nitself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification;\nand sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for\nthat idea he would show another.\n\n\n25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.\n\nThirdly, there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when\ntheir ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect\nthat has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the\nnature of things as attention, study and application might make them,\nyet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as\nsigns of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence.\n\n\n26. How Men's Words fail in all these: First, when used without any\nideas.\n\nFirst, He that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas in\nhis mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in\ndiscourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how\nlearned soever he may seem, by the use of hard words or learned terms,\nis not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in\nlearning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books,\nwithout possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however\nput into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical\nrules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing\nbut bare sounds, and nothing else.\n\n\n27. Secondly, when complex ideas are without names annexed to them.\n\nSecondly, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them,\nwould be in no better case than a bookseller, who had in his warehouse\nvolumes that lay there unbound, and without titles, which he could\ntherefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and\ncommunicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse,\nfor want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is\ntherefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that\ncompose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express what\nanother man signifies in one.\n\n\n28. Thirdly, when the same sign is not put for the same idea.\n\nThirdly, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea,\nbut uses the same word sometimes in one and sometimes in another\nsignification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair\na man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things\nunder the same name.\n\n\n29. Fourthly, when words are diverted from their common use.\n\nFourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different\nfrom those to which the common use of that country applies them, however\nhis own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by\nsuch words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his\nterms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and\neasily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing\nfor other ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to\nexcite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts\nof him who thus uses them.\n\n\n30. Fifthly, when they are names of fantastical imaginations.\n\nFifthly, He that imagined to himself substances such as never have been,\nand filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with\nthe real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined\nnames, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the\nfantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from\nadvancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.\n\n\n31. Summary.\n\nHe that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks\nonly empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them,\nwants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to\nuse periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will\neither be not minded or not understood. He that applies his names to\nideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language,\nand speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substances\ndisagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the\nmaterials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead\nthereof chimeras.\n\n\n32. How men's words fail when they stand for Substances.\n\nIn our notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former\ninconveniences: v. g. he that uses the word TARANTULA, without having\nany imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good\nword; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that, in a\nnewly-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals and\nvegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of\na horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he\nshall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names\nhimself. 3. He that uses the word BODY sometimes for pure extension,\nand sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very\nfallaciously. 4. He that gives the name HORSE to that idea which common\nusage calls MULE, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He\nthat thinks the name CENTAUR stands for some real being, imposes on\nhimself, and mistakes words for things.\n\n\n33. How when they stand for Modes and Relations.\n\nIn Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the four first\nof these inconveniences; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names of\nmodes, as GRATITUDE or CHARITY, and yet not have any precise ideas\nannexed in my thoughts to those names, 2. I may have ideas, and not know\nthe names that belong to them: v. g. I may have the idea of a man's\ndrinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips,\nand his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know that\nit is to be called DRUNKENNESS. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues or\nvices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v. g. when I apply the name\nFRUGALITY to that idea which others call and signify by this sound,\nCOVETOUSNESS. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But,\nin modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence\nof things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure,\nand relation being but by way of considering or comparing two things\ntogether, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarce\nbe found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in the\nmind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties\ninseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any\nsubstance; but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with names\nannexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come\nto exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my\nconceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people:\nI am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I\ngive wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or\nrelations any inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also with\nchimeras; since such ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in\nthe mind, much less any real being ever be denominated from them.\n\n\n34. Seventhly, Language is often abused by Figurative Speech.\n\nSince wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry\ntruth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in language\nwill hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in\ndiscourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information\nand improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce\npass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we\nmust allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness;\nall the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath\ninvented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the\npassions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect\ncheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render\nthem in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all\ndiscourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and\nwhere truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great\nfault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What and\nhow various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books\nof rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to\nbe informed: only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and\nimprovement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind;\nsince the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how\nmuch men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful\ninstrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is\npublicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and I\ndoubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me\nto have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too\nprevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against.\nAnd it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein\nmen find pleasure to be deceived.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nOF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES OF WORDS.\n\n\n1. Remedies are worth seeking.\n\nThe natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above\nat large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together,\nand the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are\nconveyed from one man and one generation to another, it would well\ndeserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to be\nfound for the inconveniences above mentioned.\n\n\n2. Are not easy to find.\n\nI am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the\nperfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his\nown country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men\nshould use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but\ndetermined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have\nthe same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear\nand distinct ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one who hath\nnot vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing\nor very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who\nthinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding;\nor that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only to\ntheir knowledge.\n\n\n3. But yet necessary to those who search after Truth.\n\nBut though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of\ntalking, and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege: though\nthe schools, and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have\nanything offered, to abate the length or lessen the number of their\ndisputes; yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or\nmaintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they might\ndeliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to\nwhich men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.\n\n\n4. Misuse of Words the great Cause of Errors.\n\nFor he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes\nand confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will\nfind some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has\ncontributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst\nmankind. How many are there, that, when they would think on things, fix\ntheir thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their\nminds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such\ncontemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst the\nideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady, or perhaps\nnone at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings\nend in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or\nknowledge?\n\n\n5. Has made men more conceited and obstinate.\n\nThis inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own\nprivate meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which\nfollow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others.\nFor language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their\ndiscoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that\nmakes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of\nknowledge, which are in things themselves, yet he does, as much as in\nhim lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the\npublic use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any\nclear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into\nerrors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an\nenemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the\nsciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure\nand equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable\nto make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little, or not at\nall, the more knowing or orthodox: since subtlety, in those who make\nprofession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a\nvirtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but the\nfallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit\nto make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in\ntheir errors.\n\n\n6. Addicted to Wrangling about sounds.\n\nLet us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall\nsee that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing\nbut noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering\na man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt the\nspeaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about\nthings, but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not\nascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no\nother object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that\nthey think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite\ndifferent.\n\n\n7. Instance, Bat and Bird.\n\nWhether a BAT be a BIRD or no, is not a question, Whether a bat be\nanother thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it\nhas; for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of. But the question\nis, (i) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but\nimperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these\nnames are supposed to stand. And then it is a real inquiry concerning\nthe NATURE of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of\nit more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which,\ncombined together, they both give name bird, be all to be found in\na bat: but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) who\nneither affirm nor deny, but examine: Or, (2) It is a question between\ndisputants; whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is\na bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of one\nor both these WORDS; in that they not having both the same complex ideas\nto which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that\nthese two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the\nsignification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute\nabout them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted\nbetween them,) whether all the simple ideas of the more general name\nbird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there could\nbe no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it may\nbe considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the\ndisputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification\nof words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and\nreduced in their signification (as they must be where they signify\nanything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or\nshould stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and\nimmediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning\nof disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of\nthemselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of\nsounds; i. e. those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies.\nWhen I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of\nambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he uses\nhimself,) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace,\nand not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.\n\n\n8. Remedies.\n\nTo remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree, and\nto prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the\nobservation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better\nable shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this\nmatter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.\n\n\nFirst Remedy: To use no Word without an Idea annexed to it.\n\nFirst, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, no\nname without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will\nnot seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to\nrecollect how often he has met with such words as INSTINCT, SYMPATHY,\nand ANTIPATHY, &c., in the discourse of others, so made use of as he\nmight easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their\nminds to which they applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, which\nusually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that\nthese words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they\nmay be used; but there being no natural connexion between any words and\nany ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced\nor writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have\nannexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary\nthey should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.\n\n\n9. Second Remedy: To have distinct, determinate Ideas annexed to Words,\nespecially in mixed Modes.\n\nSecondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas:\nthose he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct;\nif complex, must be determinate, i.e. the precise collection of simple\nideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of\nthat precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary\nin names of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no settled\nobjects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their\noriginal, are apt to be very confused. JUSTICE is a word in every man's\nmouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification;\nwhich will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct\ncomprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and\nif it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still only till he at\nlast comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done,\na man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or\nany other. I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this\nanalysis at large, every time the word justice comes in his way: but\nthis at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification\nof that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that\nhe can do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea of\njustice to be, such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is\naccording to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what LAW is, which\nmakes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of\njustice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will,\nperhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think\nthey may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so\nprecisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must\nnot be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion\nin their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse\nwith others.\n\n\n10. And distinct and conformable ideas in Words that stand for\nSubstances.\n\nIn the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is\nrequired than barely DETERMINED IDEAS. In these the names must also be\nCONFORMABLE TO THINGS AS THEY EXIST; but of this I shall have occasion\nto speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary\nin inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about\ntruth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common\nconversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is\nscarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both,\nthough confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake.\nMerchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to\ndispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophers\nand disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to clearly\nunderstood.\n\n\n11. Third Remedy: To apply Words to such ideas as common use has annexed\nthem to.\n\nThirdly, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for\nwhich they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply\ntheir words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexed\nthem to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being\nno man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and\ncommunication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp\nthey are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at\nleast, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice\nof it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be\nunderstood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands,\nand other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow\ncommon use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts\nentrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage:\nand therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in\nthe names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms\nis best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses\nappear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms\nwith the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words,\naccording to the propriety of the language, though it have not always\nthe good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame\nof it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to\nunderstand it when made use of as it ought to be.\n\n\n12. Fourth Remedy: To declare the meaning in which we use them.\n\nFourthly, But, because common use has not so visibly annexed any\nsignification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they\nprecisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of their\nknowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary\nreceived ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men\nseldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or\nnovelty,) or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore,\nafter the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary,\nfor the ascertaining the signification of words, to DECLARE THEIR\nMEANING; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it\nhas in most names of very complex ideas;) or where the term, being very\nmaterial in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is\nliable to any doubtfulness or mistake.\n\n\n13. And that in three Ways.\n\nAs the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of\nmaking known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also\ndifferent. For though DEFINING be thought the proper way to make known\nthe proper signification of words; yet there are some words that will\nnot be defined, as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made\nknown but by definition: and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of\nboth the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and\nsubstances.\n\n\n14. In Simple Ideas, either by synonymous terms, or by showing examples.\n\nI. First, when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which\nhe perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is\nobliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare his\nmeaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as\nhas been shown, cannot be done by definition: and therefore, when a\nsynonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left.\nFirst, Sometimes the NAMING the subject wherein that simple idea is\nto be found, will make its name to be understood by those who are\nacquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a\ncountryman understand what FEUILLEMORTE colour signifies, it may suffice\nto tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn.\nSecondly, but the only sure way of making known the signification of the\nname of any simple idea, is BY PRESENTING TO HIS SENSES THAT SUBJECT\nWHICH MAY PRODUCE IT IN HIS MIND, and make him actually have the idea\nthat word stands for.\n\n\n15. In mixed Modes, by Definition.\n\nII. Secondly, Mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being\nmost of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its\nown choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be\nfound existing, the signification of their names cannot be made known,\nas those of simple ideas, by any showing: but, in recompense thereof,\nmay be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of\nseveral ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without\nreference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the\nideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a\ncertain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there\nis occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay\ngreat blame on those who make not their discourses about MORAL things\nvery clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the\nnames of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each\nspecies is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it\nis a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things\nwith uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of\nnatural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a\nquite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.\n\n\n16. Morality capable of Demonstration.\n\nUpon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capable\nof demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence\nof the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so\nthe congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly\ndiscovered; in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object,\nthat the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality,\nas well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For, as to\nsubstances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures\nare not so much inquired into as supposed: v.g. when we say that man\nis subject to law, we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational\ncreature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are\nin this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether a child or\nchangeling be a man, in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be\nas disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I\nmay call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, a corporeal\nrational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be\nfound that had the use of reason to such a degree, as to be able to\nunderstand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general\nideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a MAN,\nhow much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names\nof substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more\ndisturb moral than they do mathematical discourses; where, if the\nmathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body,\nhe has his clear, settled idea, which varies not, though it may by\nmistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.\n\n\n17. Definitions can make moral Discourse clear.\n\nThis I have here mentioned, by the by, to show of what consequence it is\nfor men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their\nmoral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since\nthereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and\ncertainty. And it must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no worse\nof it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way whereby\nthe precise meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way whereby\ntheir meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for\nany contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of\nmankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much\nmore clear than those in natural philosophy: since they are about ideas\nin the mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; they\nhaving no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to\nand must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their\nminds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give the\nname justice; with which pattern so made, all actions that agree shall\npass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an\nidea that shall in all things be exactly like him; who is as he is, let\nmen make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know\nthe combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds; for\nthe other, they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hidden\nconstitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.\n\n\n18. And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed Modes can be made\nknown.\n\nAnother reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary,\nespecially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz.\nthat it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them\ncan be known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being for\nthe most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together, but\nscattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects\nthem, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words\nenumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we\ncan make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance of\nthe senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible\nobjects, to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as\nit does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some\ndegree in those of substances.\n\n\n19. In Substances, both by showing and by defining.\n\nIII. Thirdly, for the explaining the signification of the names of\nsubstances, as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct\nspecies, both the forementioned ways, viz. of showing and defining, are\nrequisite, in many cases, to be made use of. For, there being ordinarily\nin each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas\nwhich make up our complex idea of that species annexed, we forwardly\ngive the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristic mark is\nfound, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species.\nThese leading or characteristical (as I may call them) ideas, in the\nsorts of animals and vegetables, are (as has been before remarked,\nch vi. Section 29 and ch. ix. Section 15) mostly figure; and in inanimate\nbodies, colour; and in some, both together. Now,\n\n\n20. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by\nshowing.\n\nThese leading sensible qualities are those which make the chief\ningredients of our specific ideas, and consequently the most observable\nand invariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as\nattributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge. For though\nthe sound MAN, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex idea\nmade up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to\nsignify any other combination; yet, used as a mark to stand for a sort\nof creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as\nnecessary to be taken into our complex idea, signified by the word man,\nas any other we find in it: and therefore, why Plato's ANIMAL IMPLUME\nBIPES LATIS UNGUIBUS should not be a good definition of the name man,\nstanding for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show: for it\nis the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that\nspecies, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in\nsome never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they\ncan be excused from murder who kill monstrous births, (as we call them,)\nbecause of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a\nrational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed\nthan ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us\nthat a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a\nsort of frontispiece; or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body,\nbut one that is just of such an outward structure?\n\n\n21. And can hardly be made known otherwise.\n\nNow these leading qualities are best made known by showing, and can\nhardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of a horse or cassowary\nwill be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words; the\nsight of the animals doth it a thousand times better. And the idea of\nthe particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it,\nbut only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about as is evident in\nthose who are used to this metal, who frequently distinguish true from\ncounterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight, where others (who have\nas good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of that\npeculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said\nof those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any substance;\nfor which precise ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular\nringing sound there is in gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies,\nhas no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow\nthat belongs to that metal.\n\n\n22. The Ideas of the Powers of Substances are best known by Definition.\n\nBut because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas of\nsubstances are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things\nas they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our names\nof substances, some part of the signification will be better made known\nby enumerating those simple ideas, than by showing the substance itself.\nFor, he that to the yellow shining colour of gold, got by sight, shall,\nfrom my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fusibility,\nfixedness, and solubility, in aqua regia, will have a perfecter idea of\ngold than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting\nin his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitution\nof this shining, heavy, ductile thing, (from whence all these its\nproperties flow,) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution or\nessence of a triangle does, the signification of the word gold might as\neasily be ascertained as that of triangle.\n\n\n23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of corporeal things possessed by\nSpirits separate from bodies.\n\nHence we may take notice, how much the foundation of all our knowledge\nof corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from\nbodies, (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much\nmore perfect than ours,) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all.\nThe whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our\nown ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be\ndoubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh may\nhave as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we have\nof a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations\nflow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds\nour conceptions.\n\n\n24. Ideas of Substances must also be conformable to Things.\n\nFourthly, But, though definitions will serve to explain the names of\nsubstances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without\ngreat imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances\nbeing not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to\nrepresent things, and so are put in their place, their signification\nmust agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And\ntherefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary\ncomplex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, but\nmust go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties of\nthe things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas\nof their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used\nto that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is\nintended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas\nas do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea\nin other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand\nfor, therefore, to define their names right, natural history is to be\ninquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to\nbe found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in\ndiscourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things,\nto have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but\nconfused, or very imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to\nkeep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquainting\nourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle\nour complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with\nothers, (if we find them mistake us,) we ought to tell what the complex\nidea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary\nto be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical\nverity, in that children, being taught words, whilst they have but\nimperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much\nthinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them.\nWhich custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary\naffairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are\nmen: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly,\nbut make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very\novertly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the language\nof their country, i.e. according to grammar rules of that language, do\nyet speak very improperly of things themselves; and, by their arguing\none with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful\ntruths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in\nthemselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much for the\nimprovement of our knowledge how they are called.\n\n\n25. Not easy to be made so.\n\nIt were therefore to be wished, That men versed in physical inquiries,\nand acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down\nthose simple ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sort\nconstantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion\nwhich comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection\nof a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as\nthey have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining,\nthe qualities of any sort of things which come under one denomination.\nBut a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural\nhistory, requires too many hands as well as too much time, cost, pains,\nand sagacity ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must\ncontent ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as\nexplain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is\noccasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done;\nbut men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not\nagreed between them, out of a mistake that the significations of common\nwords are certainly established, and the precise ideas they stand for\nperfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both\nwhich suppositions are false, no names of complex ideas having so\nsettled determined significations, that they are constantly used for\nthe same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man to have a certain\nknowledge of anything, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so\nit is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in\nanother man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than\nbarely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a\ndeclaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication\nby language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common\nwords, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary\nconversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the\nideas which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar\nto him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces\nitself at last to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a\nvery variable standard. But though such a Dictionary as I have above\nmentioned will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped for\nin this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words\nstanding for things which are known and distinguished by their outward\nshapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A\nvocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in\nless time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in\nlanguages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer ideas in men's\nminds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors,\nthan all the large and laborious comments of learned critics.\nNaturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of\nthis way: and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason\nto confess that he has a clearer idea of APIUM or IBEX, from a little\nprint of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition\nof the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of STRIGIL\nand SISTRUM, if, instead of CURRYCOMB and CYMBAL, (which are the English\nnames dictionaries render them by,) he could see stamped in the margin\nsmall pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the\nancients. TOGA, TUNICA, PALLIUM, are words easily translated by GOWN,\nCOAT, and CLOAK; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion\nof those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the\ntailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes\nby their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of\nthem, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other\nwords set for them, or made use of to define them. But this is only by\nthe bye.\n\n\n26. V. Fifth Remedy: To use the same word constantly in the same sense.\n\nFifthly, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their\nwords, and definitions of their terms are not to be had, yet this is\nthe least that can be expected, that, in all discourses wherein one man\npretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word\nconstantly in the same sense. If this were done, (which nobody can\nrefuse without great disingenuity,) many of the books extant might be\nspared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several\nof those great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used in\none sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow\ncompass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well as\npoets works, might be contained in a nutshell.\n\n\n27. When not so used, the Variation is to be explained.\n\nBut after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect to that\ninfinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their\nprecise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced\noften to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in\nthe continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there\ncan be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often\nas a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the\ndiscourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy,\nsufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning\nof it; but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it\nconcerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he\nthere uses that term.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\nOF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY SYNOPSIS OF THE FOURTH BOOK.\n\nLocke's review of the different sorts of ideas, or appearances of what\nexists, that can be entertained in a human understanding, and of their\nrelations to words, leads, in the Fourth Book, to an investigation of\nthe extent and validity of the Knowledge that our ideas bring within our\nreach; and into the nature of faith in Probability, by which assent is\nextended beyond Knowledge, for the conduct of life. He finds (ch. i, ii)\nthat Knowledge is either an intuitive, a demonstrative, or a sensuous\nperception of absolute certainty, in regard to one or other of four\nsorts of agreement or disagreement on the part of ideas:--(1) of each\nidea with itself, as identical, and different from every other; (2) in\ntheir abstract relations to one another; (3) in their necessary\nconnexions, as qualities and powers coexisting in concrete substances;\nand (4) as revelations to us of the final realities of existence. The\nunconditional certainty that constitutes Knowledge is perceptible by man\nonly in regard to the first, second, and fourth of these four sorts: in\nall general propositions only in regard to the first and second; that is\nto say, in identical propositions, and in those which express abstract\nrelations of simple or mixed modes, in which nominal and real essences\ncoincide, e. g. propositions in pure mathematics and abstract morality\n(chh. iii, v-viii). The fourth sort, which express certainty as to\nrealities of existence, refer to any of three realities. For every man\nis able to perceive with absolute certainty that he himself exists, that\nGod must exist, and that finite beings other than himself exist;--the\nfirst of these perceptions being awakened by all our ideas, the second\nas the consequence of perception of the first, and the last in the\nreception of our simple ideas of sense (chh. i. Section 7; ii. Section\n14; iii. Section 21; iv, ix-xi). Agreement of the third sort, of\nnecessary coexistence of simple ideas as qualities and powers in\nparticular substances, with which all physical inquiry is concerned,\nlies beyond human Knowledge; for here the nominal and real essences are\nnot coincident: general propositions of this sort are determined by\nanalogies of experience, in judgments that are more or less probable:\nintellectually necessary science of nature presupposes Omniscience;\nman's interpretations of nature have to turn upon presumptions of\nProbability (chh. iii. Sections 9-17; iv. SectionS 11-17; vi, xiv-xvi).\nIn forming their stock of Certainties and Probabilities men employ the\nfaculty of reason, faith in divine revelation, and enthusiasm (chh.\nxvii-xix); much misled by the last, as well as by other causes of 'wrong\nassent' (ch. xx), when they are at work in 'the three great provinces of\nthe intellectual world' (ch. xxi), concerned respectively with (1)\n'things as knowable' (physica); (2) 'actions as they depend on us in\norder to happiness' (practica); and (3) methods for interpreting the\nsigns of what is, and of what ought to be, that are presented in our\nideas and words (logica).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nOF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.\n\n\n1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only.\n\nSince the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other\nimmediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can\ncontemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about\nthem.\n\n\n2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two\nIdeas.\n\nKNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but THE PERCEPTION OF THE\nCONNEXION OF AND AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT AND REPUGNANCY OF ANY OF OUR\nIDEAS. In this alone it consists.\n\nWhere this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not,\nthere, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short\nof knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we\nelse but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess\nourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three\nangles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but\nperceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and\nis inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?\n\n\n3. This Agreement or Disagreement may be any of four sorts.\n\nBut to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or\ndisagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:\n\nI. IDENTITY, or DIVERSITY. II. RELATION. III. CO-EXISTENCE, or NECESSARY\nCONNEXION. IV. REAL EXISTENCE.\n\n\n4. First, Of Identity, or Diversity in ideas.\n\nFIRST, As to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. IDENTITY\nor DIVERSITY. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any\nsentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it\nperceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive\ntheir difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely\nnecessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no\nimagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and\ninfallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it\nis; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the\nother: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at\nfirst view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And\nthough men of art have reduced this into those general rules, WHAT IS,\nIS, and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, for\nready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect\non it: yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is\nabout particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has\nthem in his mind, that the ideas he calls WHITE and ROUND are the very\nideas they are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls RED or\nSQUARE. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it\nclearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general\nrule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mind\nperceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and\nif there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to\nbe about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and\ndiversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as the ideas\nthemselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise.\n\n\n5. Secondly, Of abstract Relations between ideas.\n\nSECONDLY, the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives\nin any of its ideas may, I think, be called RELATIVE, and is nothing\nbut the perception of the RELATION between any two ideas, of what kind\nsoever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For, since all distinct\nideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally\nand constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any\npositive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between\nour ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with\nanother, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.\n\n\n6. Thirdly, Of their necessary Co-existence in Substances.\n\nTHIRDLY, The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in\nour ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is\nCO-EXISTENCE or NON-CO-EXISTENCE in the SAME SUBJECT; and this belongs\nparticularly to substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that\nit is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this,\nthat fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea\nthat always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of\nyellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in AQUA\nREGIA, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold.\n\n\n7. Fourthly, Of real Existence agreeing to any idea.\n\nFOURTHLY, The fourth and last sort is that of ACTUAL REAL EXISTENCE\nagreeing to any idea.\n\nWithin these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose,\ncontained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all the\ninquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or\ncan affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same\nwith some other; that it does or does not always co-exist with some\nother idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation with\nsome other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus,\n'blue is not yellow,' is of identity. 'Two triangles upon equal bases\nbetween two parallels are equal,' is of relation. 'Iron is susceptible\nof magnetical impressions,' is of co-existence. 'God is,' is of real\nexistence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but\nrelations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement\nof our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads,\nand not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds\nof affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will\nbut reflect on what is said in several places of this ESSAY.\n\nI should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge,\nbut that it is necessary first, to consider the different acceptations\nof the word KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n8. Knowledge is either actual or habitual.\n\nThere are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth; each of\nwhich is called knowledge.\n\nI. There is ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, which is the present view the mind has of\nthe agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation\nthey have one to another.\n\nII. A man is said to know any proposition, which having been once\nlaid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or\ndisagreement of the ideas whereof it consists; and so lodged it in his\nmemory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on,\nhe, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to,\nand is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call HABITUAL\nKNOWLEDGE. And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are\nlodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof\nthe mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflect\non them. For our finite understandings being able to think clearly and\ndistinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more\nthan what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: and\nhe that knew most, would know but one truth, that being all he was able\nto think on at one time.\n\n\n9. Habitual Knowledge is of two degrees.\n\nOf habitual knowledge there are, also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:\n\nFirst, The one is of such truths laid up in the memory as, whenever they\noccur to the mind, it ACTUALLY PERCEIVES THE RELATION is between those\nideas. And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive\nknowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover\ntheir agreement or disagreement one with another.\n\nSecondly, The other is of such truths whereof the mind having been\nconvinced, it RETAINS THE MEMORY OF THE CONVICTION, WITHOUT THE PROOFS.\nThus, a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the\ndemonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two\nright ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt the\ntruth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration by\nwhich it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought\nrather to believe his memory than really to know, and this way of\nentertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between\nopinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief,\nfor that relies on the testimony of another;--yet upon a due examination\nI find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true\nknowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a\nmistake in this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of the\nideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual\nview of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement\nof those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other\nintermediate ideas, that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas\ncontained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example:\nin this proposition, that 'the three angles of a triangle are equal\nto two right ones,' one who has seen and clearly perceived the\ndemonstration of this truth knows it to be true, when that demonstration\nis gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view,\nand possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way\nfrom what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in that\nproposition is perceived; but it is by the intervention of other ideas\nthan those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i.e.\nhe knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge)\nthat he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the\nthree angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability\nof the same relations between the same immutable things is now the idea\nthat shows him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal\nto two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And\nhence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is\nalways true; what ideas once agreed will always agree; and consequently\nwhat he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true; as long\nas he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that\nparticular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If\nthen the perception, that the same ideas will ETERNALLY have the same\nhabitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there\ncould be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for no\nmathematical demonstration would be any other than particular: and\nwhen a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or\ncircle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If\nhe would extend it further, he must renew his demonstration in another\ninstance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle,\nand so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of\nany general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton\ncertainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his\nbook to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chain\nof intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such\na memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may\nbe well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, when the very\ndiscovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of\nideas, is found to surpass most readers' comprehension. But yet it is\nevident the author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering\nhe once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he knows such\na man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him through. But\nbecause the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does\nin all men more or less decay in length of time, this, amongst other\ndifferences, is one which shows that DEMONSTRATIVE knowledge is much\nmore imperfect than INTUITIVE, as we shall see in the following chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n1. Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge:\nI. Intuitive\n\nAll our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has\nof its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we,\nwith our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it\nmay not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The\ndifferent clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different\nway of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any\nof its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking,\nwe will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or\ndisagreement of two ideas IMMEDIATELY BY THEMSELVES, without the\nintervention of any other: and this I think we may call INTUITIVE\nKNOWLEDGE. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining,\nbut perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed\ntowards it. Thus the mind perceives that WHITE is not BLACK, that a\nCIRCLE is not a TRIANGLE, that THREE are more than TWO and equal to ONE\nAND TWO. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of\nthe ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any\nother idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most\ncertain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is\nirresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be\nperceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves\nno room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently\nfilled with the clear light of it. IT IS ON THIS INTUITION THAT DEPENDS\nALL THE CERTAINTY AND EVIDENCE OF ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE; which certainty\nevery one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore\nnot require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a\ngreater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as\nhe perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a\ndifference, are different and not precisely the same. He that demands a\ngreater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shows\nonly that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so.\nCertainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degree\nof knowledge which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in\nall the connexions of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot\nattain knowledge and certainty.\n\n\n2. II. Demonstrative.\n\nThe next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement\nor disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Though wherever the\nmind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there\nbe certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind sees\nthat agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even where\nit is discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most\ngets no further than a probable conjecture. The reason why the mind\ncannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of\ntwo ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or\ndisagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together\nas to show it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its\nideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it were\njuxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their\nagreement or disagreement, it is fain, BY THE INTERVENTION OF OTHER\nIDEAS, (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or\ndisagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call\nREASONING. Thus, the mind being willing to know the agreement or\ndisagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and\ntwo right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it:\nbecause the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be\ncompared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this the mind has\nno immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to\nfind out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have\nan equality; and, finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know\ntheir equality to two right ones.\n\n\n3. Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs.\n\nThose intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two\nothers, are called PROOFS; and where the agreement and disagreement is\nby this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called DEMONSTRATION;\nit being SHOWN to the understanding, and the mind made to see that it is\nso. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas, (that\nshall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other,) and to apply\nthem right, is, I suppose, that which is called SAGACITY.\n\n\n4. As certain, but not so easy and ready as Intuitive Knowledge.\n\nThis knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the\nevidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so\nready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though in demonstration the mind\ndoes at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it\nconsiders; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be more\nthan one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit are\nrequired to this discovery: and there must be a progression by steps and\ndegrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come\nto perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need\nproofs and the use of reason to show it.\n\n\n5. The demonstrated conclusion not without Doubt, precedent to the\ndemonstration.\n\nAnother difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge\nis, that, though in the latter all doubt be removed when, by the\nintervention of the intermediate ideas, the agreement or disagreement\nis perceived, yet before the demonstration there was a doubt; which in\nintuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of\nperception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas; no more than it\ncan be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black),\nWhether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in\nthe eyes, it will, at first glimpse, without hesitation, perceive the\nwords printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: and\nso if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive\nthe agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive\nknowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the mind of\nperceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one, or\nclearness of perception in the other.\n\n\n6. Not so clear as Intuitive Knowledge.\n\nIt is true, the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear;\nyet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full\nassurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive: like a\nface reflected by several mirrors one to another, where, as long as it\nretains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a\nknowledge; but it is still, in every successive reflection, with a\nlessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in the\nfirst; till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of\ndimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes.\nThus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof.\n\n\n7. Each Step in Demonstrated Knowledge must have Intuitive Evidence.\n\nNow, in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an\nintuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the\nnext intermediate idea which it uses as a proof: for if it were not\nso, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such\nagreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced: if it\nbe perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge: if it cannot be\nperceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common\nmeasure, to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain,\nthat every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive\ncertainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required\nbut to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas\nconcerning which we inquire visible and certain. So that to make\nanything a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate\nagreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or\ndisagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is\nalways the first, and the other the last in the account) is found.\nThis intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the\nintermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration,\nmust also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no\npart is left out: which, because in long deductions, and the use of\nmany proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain;\ntherefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive\nknowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations.\n\n\n8. Hence the Mistake, ex praecognitis, et praeconcessis.\n\nThe necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientifical\nor demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken\naxiom, That all reasoning was EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS: which,\nhow far it is a mistake, I shall have occasion to show more at\nlarge, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those\npropositions which are called maxims, and to show that it is by a\nmistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our\nknowledge and reasonings.\n\n\n9. Demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematical Quantity.\n\n[It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone are\ncapable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement or\ndisagreement as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not\nthe privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone, it\nmay possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of\nsufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to\nhave so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so\nmuch as aimed at by any but mathematicians.] For whatever ideas we have\nwherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement\nthat is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge;\nand where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two\nideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement\nthey have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of\ndemonstration: which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure,\nnumber, and their modes.\n\n\n10. Why it has been thought to be so limited.\n\nThe reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only\nin those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those\nsciences; but because, in comparing their equality or excess, the modes\nof numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable:\nand though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible,\nyet the mind has found out ways to examine, and discover\ndemonstratively, the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or\nfigures: and both these, i. e. numbers and figures, can be set down by\nvisible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are\nperfectly determined; which for the most part they are not, where they\nare marked only by names and words.\n\n\n11. Modes of Qualities not demonstrable like modes of Quantity.\n\nBut in other simple ideas, whose modes and differences are made and\ncounted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accurate\na distinction of their differences as to perceive, or find ways to\nmeasure, their just equality, or the least differences. For those other\nsimple ideas, being appearances of sensations produced in us, by the\nsize, figure, number, and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible;\ntheir different degrees also depend upon the variation of some or of all\nthose causes: which, since it cannot be observed by us, in particles of\nmatter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for\nus to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple\nideas. For, supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be\nproduced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having a\nverticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye,\nwith a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness; it\nwill hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any\nbody are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of\nlight, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce\nthis sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear,\nthat from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such\ncorpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say that the\nnature of light consists in very small round globules; nor of whiteness\nin such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules\nwhen it reflects them: for I am not now treating physically of light or\ncolours. But this I think I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad\nany one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how bodies without\nus can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the\nsensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse\nof some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing,\nand smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their\ndifferent size, figure, and motion, the variety of sensations is\nproduced in us.\n\n\n12. Particles of light and simple ideas of colour.\n\nWhether then they be globules or no; or whether they have a verticity\nabout their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us; this\nis certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body,\nfitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensation\nof whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar motion\nis,--the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are\nreflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams,\nin the shade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us\nthe idea of whiteness in far different degrees.\n\n\n13. The secondary Qualities of things not discovered by Demonstration.\n\nNot knowing, therefore, what number of particles, nor what motion of\nthem, is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannot\nDEMONSTRATE the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness;\nbecause we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to\ndistinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being\nfrom our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference\nis so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose\ndifferences can be perfectly retained, there these ideas or colours,\nas we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of\ndemonstration as ideas of number and extension. What I have here said of\nwhiteness and colours, I think holds true in all secondary qualities and\ntheir modes.\n\n\n14. III. Sensitive Knowledge of the particular Existence of finite\nbeings without us.\n\nThese two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our\nKNOWLEDGE; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance\nsoever embraced, is but FAITH or OPINION, but not knowledge, at least in\nall general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind,\nemployed about THE PARTICULAR EXISTENCE OF FINITE BEINGS WITHOUT US,\nwhich, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to\neither of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name\nof KNOWLEDGE. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we\nreceive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive\nknowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea\nin our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of\nanything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof\nsome men think there may be a question made; because men may have such\nideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects\ntheir senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that\nputs us past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly\nconscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun\nby day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or\nsmells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly\nfind the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by\nour own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we\ndo between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the\nsame thing, and all these ideas may be produced, in us without\nany external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this\nanswer:--I. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or\nno: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth\nand knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest\ndifference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in\nit. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain,\nthat what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream;\nand that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire\nactually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that\npleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us,\nwhose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses;\nthis certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we\nhave no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may add\nto the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence of\nparticular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we\nhave of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three\ndegrees of knowledge, viz. INTUITIVE, DEMONSTRATIVE, and SENSITIVE;\nin each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and\ncertainty.\n\n\n15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas that enter into it are\nclear.\n\nBut since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only,\nwill it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas; and\nthat where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused,\nour knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: for our knowledge\nconsisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two\nideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity\nof that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas\nthemselves: v. g. a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a\ntriangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the\nworld, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their AGREEMENT,\nand so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. [But ideas which, by\nreason of their obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any\nclear or distinct knowledge; because, as far as any ideas are confused,\nso far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree.\nOr to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood:\nhe that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make\npropositions of them of whose truth he can be certain.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n1. Extent of our Knowledge.\n\nKnowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or\ndisagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That,\n\n\nFirst, it extends no further than we have Ideas.\n\nFirst, we can have knowledge no further than we have IDEAS.\n\n\n2. Secondly, It extends no further than we can perceive their Agreement\nor Disagreement.\n\nSecondly, That we can have no knowledge further than we can have\nPERCEPTION of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1.\nEither by INTUITION, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2.\nBy REASON, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by\nthe intervention of some others; or, 3. By SENSATION, perceiving the\nexistence of particular things: hence it also follows:\n\n\n3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the relation\nof all our Ideas.\n\nThirdly, That we cannot have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE that shall extend\nitself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because\nwe cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to\nanother, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another.\nThus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both\ndrawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive\nknowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that\nway know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or\ndisagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate\ncomparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable\nof an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some\nintervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or\nrational knowledge.\n\n\n4. Fourthly, Nor does Demonstrative Knowledge.\n\nFourthly, It follows, also, from what is above observed, that our\nRATIONAL KNOWLEDGE cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas:\nbecause between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always\nfind such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive\nknowledge in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we\ncome short of knowledge and demonstration.\n\n\n5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.\n\nFifthly, SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE reaching no further than the existence of\nthings actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either\nof the former.\n\n\n6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge, therefore narrower than our Ideas.\n\nSixthly, From all which it is evident, that the EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE\ncomes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of\nour own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot\nexceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very\nnarrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short\nof what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings,\nnot tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received\nfrom some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our\nsenses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large\nas our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries CONCERNING\nTHE IDEAS WE HAVE, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in\nthis world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that\nhuman knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and\nconstitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if\nmen would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry\nand labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth,\nwhich they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a\nsystem, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all,\nI think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident,\nthat our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know\nconcerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the\ndifficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning\nany of them. We have the ideas of a SQUARE, a CIRCLE, and EQUALITY; and\nyet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square,\nand certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of MATTER and\nTHINKING, but possibly shall never be able to know whether [any mere\nmaterial being] thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the\ncontemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether\nOmnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed,\na power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so\ndisposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our\nnotions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that\nGOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter A FACULTY OF THINKING, than\nthat he should superadd to it ANOTHER SUBSTANCE WITH A FACULTY OF\nTHINKING; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort\nof substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which\ncannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and\nbounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first\nEternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased,\ngive to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he\nthinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as\nI think I have proved, lib. iv. ch. 10, Section 14, &c., it is no less\nthan a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own\nnature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first-thinking\nBeing. What certainty of knowledge can any one have, that some\nperceptions, such as, v. g., pleasure and pain, should not be in some\nbodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as\nthat they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the\nparts of body: Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to\nstrike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our\nideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow\nit to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are\nfain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to\nthe good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed\neffects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce,\nwhat reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to\nbe produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as\nin a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate\nupon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the\nsoul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but\nknowledge, and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of\nphilosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence\nthat can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern\nhow far our knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in,\nnot being that of vision, we must in many things content ourselves\nwith faith and probability: and in the present question, about\nthe Immateriality of the Soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at\ndemonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great\nends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without\nphilosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident,\nthat he who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible\nintelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state,\ncan and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another\nworld, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has\ndesigned to men, according to their doings in this life. [And therefore\nit is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as\nsome, over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have\nbeen forward to make the world believe. Who, either on the one side,\nindulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, can\nallow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side,\nfinding not COGITATION within the natural powers of matter, examined\nover and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence\nto conclude--That Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought\nto a substance which has the modification of solidity. He that considers\nhow hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable to extended\nmatter; or existence to anything that has no extension at all, will\nconfess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is.\nIt is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our\nknowledge: and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and\nlook into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce\nfind his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's\nmateriality. Since, on which side soever he views it, either as an\nUNEXTENDED SUBSTANCE, or as a THINKING EXTENDED MATTER, the difficulty\nto conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still\ndrive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with\nthemselves: who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find\nin one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though\naltogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. This serves\nnot only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, but\nthe insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments; which, drawn from\nour own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side\nof the question: but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running\ninto the opposite opinion; which, on examination, will be found clogged\nwith equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to any one is\nit, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable\nrubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary,\nwhich is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far\nremote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have in\nus SOMETHING that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm\nthe certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the\nignorance of what KIND of being it is: and it is in vain to go about to\nbe sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be\npositive against the being of anything, because we cannot comprehend\nits nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not\nsomething in it which manifestly baffles our understandings. Other\nspirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things,\nhow much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add larger\ncomprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexion\nand agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the\nintermediate proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poring\nin the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one\nbefore we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of the\nhappiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more\npenetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge.]\n\nBut to return to the argument in hand: our knowledge, I say, is not only\nlimited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which\nwe employ it about, but even comes short of that too: but how far it\nreaches, let us now inquire.\n\n\n7. How far our Knowledge reaches.\n\nThe affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have, may,\nas I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts,\nviz. identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall\nexamine how far our knowledge extends in each of these:\n\n\n8. Firstly, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity in ideas extends as\nfar as our Ideas themselves.\n\nFIRST, as to IDENTITY and DIVERSITY. In this way of agreement or\ndisagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended\nas our ideas themselves: and there can be no idea in the mind, which it\ndoes not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it\nis, and to be different from any other.\n\n\n9. Secondly, Of their Co-existence, extends only a very little way.\n\nSECONDLY, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement\nof our ideas in CO-EXISTENCE, in this our knowledge is very short;\nthough in this consists the greatest and most material part of our\nknowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of\nsubstances being, as I have showed, nothing but certain collections of\nsimple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together; v.g.\nour idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold,\na body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: for\nthese, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, do these two\nnames of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for. When we\nwould know anything further concerning these, or any other sort of\nsubstances, what do we inquire, but what OTHER qualities or powers these\nsubstances have or have not? Which is nothing else but to know what\nOTHER simple ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that\ncomplex idea?\n\n\n10. Because the Connexion between simple Ideas in substances is for the\nmost part unknown.\n\nThis, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, is\nyet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the\nsimple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are,\nfor the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no\nVISIBLE NECESSARY connexion or inconsistency with any other simple\nideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.\n\n\n11. Especially of the secondary Qualities of Bodies.\n\nThe ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about\nwhich our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are those of\ntheir secondary qualities; which depending all (as has been shown) upon\nthe primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or, if not\nupon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension; it is\nimpossible we should know which have a NECESSARY union or inconsistency\none with another. For, not knowing the root they spring from, not\nknowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which\ndepend, and from which result those qualities which make our complex\nidea of gold, it is impossible we should know what OTHER qualities\nresult from, or are incompatible with, the same constitution of the\ninsensible parts of gold; and so consequently must always co-exist with\nthat complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it.\n\n\n12. Because necessary Connexion between any secondary and the primary\nQualities is undiscoverable by us.\n\nBesides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts\nof bodies, on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet\nanother and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote\nfrom a certain knowledge of the co-existence or INCO-EXISTENCE (if I may\nso say) of different ideas in the same subject; and that is, that there\nis no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those\nprimary qualities which it depends on.\n\n\n13. We have no perfect knowledge of their Primary Qualities.\n\nThat the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change\nin the size, figure, and motion of another body, is not beyond our\nconception; the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion\nof another; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse; these and\nthe like seem to have SOME CONNEXION one with another. And if we knew\nthese primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might\nbe able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon\nanother: but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt\nthese primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced\nin us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted\nrules of the CONSEQUENCE or CO-EXISTENCE of any secondary qualities,\nthough we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible\nparts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing WHAT\nfigure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste,\nor a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how ANY size, figure,\nor motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any\ncolour, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connexion\nbetween the one and the other.\n\n\n14. And seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceived\nqualities in substances.\n\nIn vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the\nonly true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are\nto be found constantly joined with that of OUR complex idea of any\nsubstance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minute\nparts on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them,\ncould we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of\nthe secondary qualities: which is necessary to be done before we can\ncertainly know their necessary co-existence. So, that, let our complex\nidea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from\nthe simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary\nco-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these\ninquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Indeed some\nfew of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible\nconnexion one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension;\nreceiving or communicating motion by impulse, supposes solidity. But\nthough these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have: yet there are\nso few of them that have a visible connexion one with another, that we\ncan by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few\nof the qualities that are to be found united in substances: and we are\nleft only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what\nqualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existent\nin any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their\nideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist,\nany further than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, though we\nsee the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find the weight, malleableness,\nfusibility, and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold; yet,\nbecause no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessary\nconnexion with the other, we cannot certainly know that where any four\nof these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever\nit may be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty,\nwithout which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence can\nbe no further known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived but\neither in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or, in\ngeneral, by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves.\n\n\n15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist, our knowledge is larger.\n\nAs to the incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know\nthat any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one\nparticular at once: v.g. each particular extension, figure, number of\nparts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain\nof all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kind\nis present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort: v.g. no one\nsubject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this,\nperhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUM\nNEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time? To which I answer, that\nthese bodies, to eyes differently, placed, may at the same time afford\ndifferent colours: but I take liberty also to say, that, to eyes\ndifferently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect the\nparticles of light: and therefore it is not the same part of the object,\nand so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both\nyellow and azure. For, it is as impossible that the very same particle\nof any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the\nrays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures\nat the same time.\n\n\n16. Our Knowledge of the Co-existence of Power in Bodies extends but a\nvery little Way.\n\nBut as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of\nother bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and\nis no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt as to these,\nwhether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience; or\nwhether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be\ncertain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of those\nideas which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive\npowers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture\nand motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is\nbut in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on,\nor repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of that\nsort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis,\nas that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication\nof those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of human\nunderstanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford\nus a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and\nco-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several\nsorts of them. This at least is certain, that, whichever hypothesis be\nclearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,)\nour knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little\nadvanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and\npowers of bodies have a NECESSARY connexion or repugnancy one with\nanother; which in the present state of philosophy I think we know but to\na very small degree: and I doubt whether, with those faculties we\nhave, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not\nparticular experience) in this part much further. Experience is that\nwhich in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished that it\nwere more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains\nhave this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others,\nespecially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary\nin their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who call\nthemselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the\nbodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations\nhad been yet much greater.\n\n\n17. Of the Powers that co-exist in Spirits yet narrower.\n\nIf we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I\nthink it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in reference\nto spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from\nthat of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls\nwithin us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how\ninconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst\nthose various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how\nfar short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and\nseraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient\nhint in another place I have offered to my reader's consideration.\n\n\n18. Thirdly, Of Relations between abstracted ideas it is not easy to say\nhow far our knowledge extends.\n\nTHIRDLY, As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement or\ndisagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation: this, as it is\nthe largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine how\nfar it may extend: because the advances that are made in this part of\nknowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that\nmay show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not\nconsidered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such\ndiscoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the\nfinding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote\nideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in\nthis kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helps\nadvantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may\nyet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe,\nthat the IDEAS OF QUANTITY are not those alone that are capable of\ndemonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful,\nparts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions,\nand domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours.\n\n\nMorality capable of Demonstration\n\nThe idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom,\nwhose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of\nourselves, as understanding, rational creatures, being such as are clear\nin us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such\nfoundations of our duty and rules of action as might place MORALITY\namongst the SCIENCES CAPABLE OF DEMONSTRATION: wherein I doubt not\nbut from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as\nincontestible as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong\nmight be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same\nindifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these\nsciences. The RELATION of other MODES may certainly be perceived, as\nwell as those of number and extension: and I cannot see why they should\nnot also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to\nexamine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. 'Where there is no\nproperty there is no injustice,' is a proposition as certain as any\ndemonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to\nanything, and the idea of which the name 'injustice' is given being the\ninvasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas,\nbeing thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can as\ncertainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three\nangles equal to two right ones. Again: 'No government allows absolute\nliberty.' The idea of government being the establishment of society upon\ncertain rules or laws which require conformity to them; and the idea of\nabsolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as\ncapable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in\nthe mathematics.\n\n\n19. Two things have made moral Ideas to be thought incapable of\nDemonstration: their unfitness for sensible representation, and their\ncomplexedness.\n\nThat which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas\nof quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and\ndemonstration, is,\n\nFirst, That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks,\nwhich have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words\nor sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in\nthe mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their\nsignification. An angle, circle, or square, drawn in lines, lies open to\nthe view, and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at\nleisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised,\nand all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any\ndanger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in\nmoral ideas: we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we\ncan set them down; we have nothing but words to express them by; which,\nthough when written they remain the same, yet the ideas they stand for\nmay change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not\ndifferent in different persons.\n\nSecondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is,\nThat moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the\nfigures ordinarily considered in mathematics. From whence these two\ninconveniences follow:--First, that their names are of more uncertain\nsignification, the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for\nnot being so easily agreed on; and so the sign that is used for them in\ncommunication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carry\nwith it the same idea. Upon which the same disorder, confusion, and\nerror follow, as would if a man, going to demonstrate something of an\nheptagon, should, in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the\nangles, or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the\nname ordinarily imported, or he intended it should when at first\nhe thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly\navoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name being\nretained, one angle, i.e. one simple idea, is left out, or put in the\ncomplex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than\nanother. Secondly, From the complexedness of these moral ideas there\nfollows another inconvenience, viz. that the mind cannot easily retain\nthose precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in\nthe examination of the habitudes and correspondences, agreements or\ndisagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it\nis to be judged of by long deductions, and the intervention of several\nother complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote\nones.\n\nThe great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and\nfigures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent,\nand the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain\nthem so exactly, whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by\nstep to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting up\na long sum either in addition, multiplication, or division, every part\nbe only a progression of the mind taking a view of its own ideas, and\nconsidering their agreement or disagreement, and the resolution of\nthe question be nothing but the result of the whole, made up of such\nparticulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet, without\nsetting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significations\nare known, and by marks that last, and remain in view when the memory\nhad let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many\ndifferent ideas in the mind, without confounding or letting slip some\nparts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it\nuseless. In which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to\nperceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or\nproportions; that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of\nthe numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to\nthe memory, to record and retain the several ideas about which the\ndemonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive\nknowledge in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded; that so\nhe may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown; and at last have\nin one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.\n\n\n20. Remedies of our Difficulties in dealing demonstratively with moral\nideas.\n\nOne part of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them be\nthought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied\nby definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas, which\nevery term shall stand for; and then using the terms steadily and\nconstantly for that precise collection. And what methods algebra, or\nsomething of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other\ndifficulties, it is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if men\nwould in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after\nmoral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a\nstronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequence\nfrom our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect\ndemonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to\nbe expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes men\nespouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments\neither to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their\ndeformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the\nmind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as a\nlie. For though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very\nhandsome wife in his bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow that\nhe has espoused a falsehood, and received into his breast so ugly a\nthing as a lie? Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all\nmen's throats whom they can get into their power, without permitting\nthem to examine their truth or falsehood; and will not let truth have\nfair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it; what\nimprovements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be\nhoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in most\nplaces might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian\ndarkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's\nminds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to\nextinguish.\n\n\n21. Fourthly, Of the three real Existences of which we have certain\nknowledge.\n\nFOURTHLY, As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz. of the REAL\nACTUAL EXISTENCE OF THINGS, we have an intuitive knowledge of OUR OWN\nEXISTENCE, and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a GOD:\nof the existence of ANYTHING ELSE, we have no other but a sensitive\nknowledge; which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses.\n\n\n22. Our Ignorance great.\n\nOur knowledge being so narrow, as I have shown, it will perhaps give us\nsome light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into\nthe dark side, and take a view of OUR IGNORANCE; which, being infinitely\nlarger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes,\nand improvement of useful knowledge; if, discovering how far we\nhave clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the\ncontemplation of those things that are within the reach of our\nunderstandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness, (where\nwe have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything), out of\na presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be\nsatisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He that\nknows anything, knows this, in the first place, that he need not seek\nlong for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things\nthat come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot\npenetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of\nthinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of\nmatter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the\nCAUSES OF OUR IGNORANCE; which, from what has been said, I suppose will\nbe found to be these three:--\n\nFirst, Want of ideas. Its causes.\n\nSecondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have.\n\nThirdly, Want of tracing and examining our ideas.\n\n\n23. First, One Cause of our ignorance Want of Ideas.\n\nI. Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the\nuniverse may have.\n\nFIRST, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant\nof, for want of ideas.\n\nFirst, all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to\nthose we receive from corporeal objects by sensation, and from the\noperations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much\nthese few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole\nextent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so\nfoolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other\nsimple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe\nmay have, by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter\nthan we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine. But\nto say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them,\nis no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it,\nthat there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no\nmanner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to\nhimself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in\nus no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than\nthe blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of\nan eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness\nof the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all\nlaid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as he\nwill find man to be; who in all probability is one of the lowest of\nall intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of\ncreatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of\nthings; what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, we\nknow not. This we know and certainly find, that we want several other\nviews of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more\nperfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by\nour faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when\na positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the\nfoundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of\nthis kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be\ndescribed. Only this I think I may confidently say of it, That the\nintellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike: that that\npart which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see\nnot; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either\nof them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the the rest.\n\n\n24. Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having, but having\nnot,(1) Because their remoteness, or,\n\nSecondly, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are\ncapable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able\nto give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is\nreasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we\nknow nothing; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance\nof things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and\nmotion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these\nprimary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the\nparticular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies\nof the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and\nways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are produced.\nThese are hid from us, in some things by being too remote, and in others\nby being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and\nvisible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what\nlies within our ken is but a small part of the universe, we shall then\ndiscover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of\nthe great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of\ncorporeal beings; how far they are extended; what is their motion, and\nhow continued or communicated; and what influence they have one upon\nanother, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose\nthemselves in. If we narrow our contemplations, and confine our thoughts\nto this little canton--I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser\nmasses of matter that visibly move about it, What several sorts of\nvegetables, animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitely\ndifferent from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be\nin the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward\nfigures and parts, we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this\nearth; there being no natural means, either by sensation or reflection,\nto convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach\nof those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture and\ninhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess,\nmuch less have clear and distinct ideas of them.\n\n\n25. (2) Because of their Minuteness.\n\nIf a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies\nin the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others\nthat are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These INSENSIBLE\nCORPUSCLES, being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments\nof nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but\nalso most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct\nideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of\nwhat we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover\nthe figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of\nany two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations\none upon another; as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle.\nDid we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb,\nhemlock, opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch,\nwhereby it performs its operations; and of a file, which by rubbing on\nthem will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able to\ntell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make\na man sleep: as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper\nlaid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed;\nor that, some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would\nquite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of\nsilver in AQUA FORTIS, and gold in AQUA REGIA, and not VICE VERSA, would\nbe then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith to\nunderstand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the\nturning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough\nto discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of\ntheir mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their\nproperties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any\nfurther than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they\nwill succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our\ncertain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies: and our\nreason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.\n\n\n26. Hence no Science of Bodies within our reach.\n\nAnd therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry\nmay advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things,\nSCIENTIFICAL will still be out of our reach: because we want perfect and\nadequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most\nunder our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names,\nand we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect\nand incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies\nthat fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have: but\nadequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And\nthough the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse,\nyet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical\nknowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive,\nunquestionable truths concerning them. CERTAINTY and DEMONSTRATION are\nthings we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure,\ntaste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear and\ndistinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a\ntriangle: but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the\nminute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we\nwould apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor\nwhen we see those effects can we so much as guess, much less know, their\nmanner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical\naffections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and\nreach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations:\nand of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much\nas their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their\nconstitutions.\n\n\n27. Much less a science of unembodied Spirits.\n\nThis at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to\nthe whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add the\nconsideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and\nprobably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we\nhave no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of\ntheir several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance\nconceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole\nintellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than\nthe material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call\nthem, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our\nown, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all\nspirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things,\nwe have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other\nspirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our\ndiscovery; and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are\nmore orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural\nfaculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and\nthinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason,\nfrom their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his\nown mind cannot suffer a man that considers, to be ignorant that there\nis a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and\nthe great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can\ncome to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different\nnatures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions wherein\nthey agree or differ from one another and from us. And, therefore, in\nwhat concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute\nignorance.\n\n\n28. Secondly, Another cause, Want of a discoverable Connexion between\nIdeas we have.\n\nSECONDLY, What a small part of the substantial beings that are in the\nuniverse the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge, we have seen.\nIn the next place, another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, is\na want of a discoverable connection between those ideas we have. For\nwherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain\nknowledge; and are, in the former case, left only to observation and\nexperiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general\nknowledge we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this\ncause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk,\nfigure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several\nsensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure, and pain,\n&c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with\nthose ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion\nbetween any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour\nor smell which we find in our minds,) we can have no distinct knowledge\nof such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise\nabout them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely\nWise Agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas of\nsensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no\nway deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be\nfound between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows\nus) produce them in us; so, on the other side, the operation of our\nminds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should\nproduce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as\nhow any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so,\nif experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things\nthemselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These,\nand the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion in the\nordinary course of things; yet that connexion being not discoverable in\nthe ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence\none on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the\narbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be,\nand to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings\nto conceive.\n\n\n29. Instances\n\nIn some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and\nconnexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves,\nthat we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power\nwhatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal\nknowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries\nwith it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive\nthis relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly\nmutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it\nthus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of\nthe parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours\nand sounds, &c., by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules and\ncommunication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural\nconnexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the\narbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, I\nthink, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of\nthis globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one\nacknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The\nthings that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to\nproceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet\nby a law that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, and\neffects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies\nbeing not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental\nknowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness\nwe are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the things that are,\nthat we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our\nknowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far\nfrom being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all\nthe things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical\nknowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us:\nconcerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can\nhave no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the\nnotice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge: but\nthe causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two\nforegoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these\nwe can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of\nfact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon\nother trials, like to produce. But as to a PERFECT SCIENCE of natural\nbodies, (not to mention spiritual beings,) we are, I think, so far from\nbeing capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek\nafter it.\n\n\n30. Thirdly A third cause, Want of Tracing our ideas.\n\nTHIRDLY, Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and\ndiscoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for\nwant of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want of\nfinding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of\nagreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are\nignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their\nfaculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of\napplication in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those\nideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our\nideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements,\none with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is\nimpossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the\nagreement or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts\nflutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain\nsignifications. Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names,\nand accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas\nthemselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them,\nhave avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and\nconfusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of\nknowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain\nsignification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain\nfrom probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This\nhaving been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters,\nthe increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very\nlittle, in proportion to the schools disputes, and writings, the world\nhas been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of\nwords, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were\nadvanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of\nknowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as they\nhave in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity\nof uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation\nand voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and\ndisputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught\nus the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much\nunknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But\nhaving spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is\ncommonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here.\n\n\n31. Extent of Human Knowledge in respect to its Universality.\n\nHitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in respect of\nthe several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in\nrespect of UNIVERSALITY, which will also deserve to be considered; and\nin this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the\nideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our\nknowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will be\ntrue of every particular thing in whom that essence, i.e. that abstract\nidea, is to be found: and what is once known of such ideas, will be\nperpetually and for ever true. So that as to all GENERAL KNOWLEDGE we\nmust search and find it only in our minds; and it is only the examining\nof our own ideas that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to\nessences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal; and are\nto be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: as the\nexistence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more\nto say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real\nknowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge\nin general.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n1. Objection. 'Knowledge placed in our Ideas may be all unreal or\nchimerical'\n\nI DOUBT not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have\nbeen all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to\nsay to me:--\n\n'To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the\nperception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who\nknows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as the\nimaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimeras in\nit? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will\nthere be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most\nextravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive\ntheir agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any\ndifference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's\nside, as having the more ideas, and the more lively. And so, by your\nrules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge\nlies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own\nideas, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man\nwill be equally certain. It is no matter how things are: so a man\nobserve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably,\nit is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will be as\nstrongholds of truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is\nnot a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth,\nas that a square is not a circle.\n\n'But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN'S OWN IMAGINATIONS,\nto a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what\nmen's fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be\nprized: it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings, and preference\nto one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they\nreally are, and not of dreams and fancies.'\n\n\n2. Answer Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.\n\nTo which I answer, That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them,\nand reach no further, where there is something further intended, our\nmost serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of\na crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the\ndiscourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great\nassurance utters them. But I hope, before I have done, to make it\nevident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas,\ngoes a little further than bare imagination: and I believe it will\nappear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in\nnothing else.\n\n\n3. But what shall be the criterion of this agreement?\n\nIt is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the\nintervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is\nreal only so far as there is a CONFORMITY between our ideas and the\nreality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the\nmind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree\nwith things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty,\nyet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree\nwith things.\n\n\n4. As, First All Simple Ideas are really conformed to Things.\n\nFIRST, The first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been\nshowed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product\nof things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein\nthose perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are\nordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are\nnot fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of\nthings without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all\nthe conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for they\nrepresent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted\nto produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of\nparticular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take\nthem for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of\nwhiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering\nthat power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real\nconformity it can or ought to have, with things without us. And this\nconformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is\nsufficient for real knowledge.\n\n\n5. Secondly, All Complex Ideas, except ideas of Substances, are their\nown archetypes.\n\nSecondly, All our complex ideas, EXCEPT THOSE OF SUBSTANCES, being\narchetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies\nof anything, nor referred to the existence of anything, as to their\noriginals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For\nthat which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never\nbe capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true\napprehension of anything, by its dislikeness to it: and such, excepting\nthose of substances, are all our complex ideas. Which, as I have showed\nin another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free\nchoice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in\nnature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves\nare considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but\nas they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly\ncertain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is\nreal, and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts,\nreasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further\nthan as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot\nmiss of a certain and undoubted reality.\n\n\n6. Hence the reality of Mathematical Knowledge\n\nI doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of\nmathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the\nbare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: and yet,\nif we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas.\nThe mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a\nrectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is\npossible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i.e.\nprecisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths\nor properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure,\nare nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing: because\nreal things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any\nsuch propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in\nhis mind. Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three angles\nare equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever\nit REALLY EXISTS. Whatever other figure exists, that it is not exactly\nanswerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all\nconcerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his\nknowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge: because, intending\nthings no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure\nwhat he knows concerning those figures, when they have BARELY AN IDEAL\nEXISTENCE in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have A REAL\nEXISTANCE in matter: his consideration being barely of those figures,\nwhich are the same wherever or however they exist.\n\n\n7. And of Moral.\n\nAnd hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real\ncertainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the\nagreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but\nthe perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas\nor mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes\nthemselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or\ndisagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as\nwell as in mathematical figures.\n\n\n8. Existence not required to make Abstract Knowledge real.\n\n[For the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requisite that we\nhave determined ideas:] and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisite\nthat the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I\nplace the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas,\nwith so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence of\nthings: since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and\nengage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to\ninquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be\nfound to be general propositions, and notions in which existence is not\nat all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the\nsquaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics,\nconcern not the existence of any of those figures: but their\ndemonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there\nbe any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner,\nthe truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of\nmen, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat:\nnor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world\nthat exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a\nvirtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he\nwrit but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i.e. in idea, that\nmurder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action\nthat exists conformable to that idea of murder. As for other\nactions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is\nof all other species of things, which have no other essences but those\nideas which are in the minds of men.\n\n\n9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because Moral Ideas are of our\nown making and naming.\n\nBut it will here be said, that if moral knowledge be placed in the\ncontemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, be\nof our own making, What strange notions will there be of justice and\ntemperance? What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make\nwhat ideas of them he pleases? No confusion or disorder in the things\nthemselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics)\nthere would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the\nproperties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man\nshould make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right\nangles: that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and\ncall that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another.\nFor, let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles,\nwhereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, EQUILATERUM or\nTRAPEZIUM, or anything else; the properties of, and demonstrations about\nthat idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I\nconfess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at\nfirst disturb him who knows not what idea it stands for: but as soon as\nthe figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstrations are plain and\nclear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have the idea\nof taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industry\nhas possessed them of, and call this JUSTICE if he please. He that takes\nthe name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joining\nanother idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name,\nor take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will\nagree to it, as if you called it INJUSTICE. Indeed, wrong names in moral\ndiscourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily\nrectified as in mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen,\nmakes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when\nthe thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names, that\ncannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions\nthat go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for\nall this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual\nsignification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may\nhave certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and\ndisagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same\nprecise ideas, and trace THEM in their several relations one to another,\nwithout being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under\nconsideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes\nequally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds\nwe make use of.\n\n\n10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowledge\n\nOne thing more we are to take notice of, That where God or any other\nlaw-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the\nessence of that species to which that name belongs; and there it is\nnot safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases it is bare\nimpropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of\nthe country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that\nknowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing\nof those even nick-named ideas.\n\n\n11. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes\nwithout us; and here knowledge comes short.\n\nTHIRDLY, There is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referred\nto archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge\nabout them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of\nsubstances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposed\ntaken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them; by having more\nor different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the\nthings themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and\noften do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.\n\n\n12. So far as our complex ideas agree with those Archetypes without us,\nso far our Knowledge concerning Substances is real.\n\nI say, then, that to have ideas of SUBSTANCES which, by being\nconformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough,\nas in MODES, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though\nthey did never before so exist: v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or perjury,\n&c., were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of any\nsuch fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, and\nreferred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something\nthat does or has existed: they must not consist of ideas put together at\nthe pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken\nfrom, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination. The\nreason whereof is because we, knowing not what real constitution it is\nof substances whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is the\ncause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the\nexclusion of others; there are very few of them that we can be sure\nare or are not inconsistent in nature: any further than experience and\nsensible observation reach Herein, therefore, is founded the reality of\nour knowledge concerning substances--That all our complex ideas of them\nmust be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have\nbeen discovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true,\nthough not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as\nfar as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown)\nwill not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it will\nstill be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we\nfind they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas be\nabstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning\nsubstances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things.\nWhatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance,\nthese we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract\nideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may\nbe united again.\n\n\n13. In our inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not\nconfine our Thoughts to Names, or Species supposed set out by Names.\n\nThis, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstract\nideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other SORTS of things\nthan what known names had already determined, and, as it were, set out,\nwe should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than\nperhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a\nvery dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some CHANGELINGS, who\nhave lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are\nsomething between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon\nnothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and\nbeast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that\nthere can come no other species between them: whereas if we will\nabstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences\nmade by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly\nand equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain\nnumber of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast\nand formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life\nof a man without reason, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a\ndistinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape of\nan ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast,\nand be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.\n\n\n14. Objection against a Changeling being something between a Man and\nBeast, answered.\n\nHere everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed\nsomething between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer,\nCHANGELINGS; which is as good a word to signify something different from\nthe signification of MAN or BEAST, as the names man and beast are to\nhave significations different one from the other. This, well considered,\nwould resolve this matter, and show my meaning without any more ado. But\nI am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men, which enables them\nto spin consequences, and to see religion threatened, whenever any one\nventures to quit their forms of speaking, as not to foresee what names\nsuch a proposition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt\nit will be asked, If changelings are something between man and beast,\nwhat will become of them in the other world? To which I answer, I. It\nconcerns me not to know or inquire. To their own master they stand or\nfall. It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we\ndetermine anything of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful\nCreator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his creatures\naccording to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes them\naccording to names and species of our contrivance. And we that know so\nlittle of this present world we are in, may, I think, content ourselves\nwithout being peremptory in defining the different states which\ncreatures shall come into when they go off this stage. It may suffice\nus, that He hath made known to all those who are capable of instruction,\ndiscoursing, and reasoning, that they shall come to an account, and\nreceive according to what they have done in this body.\n\n\n15. What will become of Changelings in a future state?\n\nBut, Secondly, I answer, The force of these men's question (viz. Will\nyou deprive changelings of a future state?) is founded on one of these\ntwo suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all things\nthat have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily be\ndesigned to an immortal future being after this life: or, secondly, That\nwhatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, and\nsuch questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those\nwho think there is no more but an accidental difference between\nthemselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same,\nto consider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward\nshape of the body; the very proposing it is, I suppose, enough to make\nthem disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever\nimmersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the gross\nsensible outward consequence of it; or that any mass of matter\nshould, after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an\neverlasting state of sense, perception, and knowledge, only because it\nwas moulded into this or that figure, and had such a particular frame\nof its visible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a\ncertain superficial figure, turns out of doors all consideration of soul\nor spirit; upon whose account alone some corporeal beings have hitherto\nbeen concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to\nthe outside than inside of things; and to place the excellency of a man\nmore in the external shape of his body, than internal perfections of his\nsoul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable\nadvantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above other\nmaterial beings, to annex it, I say, to the cut of his beard, or the\nfashion of his coat. For this or that outward mark of our bodies no more\ncarries with it the hope of an eternal duration, than the fashion of a\nman's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear\nout, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said, that\nnobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal, but it is the\nshape that is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. I\nwonder who made it the sign of any such thing: for barely saying it,\nwill not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it.\nNo figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationally\nbe concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found\nno more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue, has yet\nnevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape; as that there\nis a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a\nrational creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason with\nthem, in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many\na beast.\n\n\n16. Monsters\n\nBut it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concluded\nto have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude.\nI am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of. For if they\ndid, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do to destroy\nill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are MONSTERS.\nLet them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable\nchangeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in\nthe mind (the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more\nessential part) not? Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make a\nmonster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason\nand understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was\nexploded just now: this is to place all in the shape, and to take the\nmeasure of a man only by his outside. To show that according to the\nordinary way of reasoning in this matter, people do lay the whole stress\non the figure, and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (as\nthey make it) into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and\nhow much soever they disown it, we need but trace their thoughts\nand practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear. The\nwell-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, though it appear\nnot: this is past doubt, say you: make the ears a little longer, and\nmore pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you\nbegin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and\nthen you are at a stand: add still more and more of the likeness of a\nbrute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal,\nthen presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that it\nhath no rational soul, and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be\nthe just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries\nwith it a rational soul? For, since there have been human foetuses\nproduced, half beast and half man; and others three parts one, and one\npart the other; and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of\napproaches to the one or the other shape, and may have several degrees\nof mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute;--I would gladly know\nwhat are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis,\nare or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What\nsort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an\ninhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of MAN: and\nshall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain\nsounds, and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, we\nknow not what. But, after all, I desire it may be considered, that those\nwho think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that a\nmis-shaped foetus is a MONSTER, run into the same fault they are arguing\nagainst; by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else,\nI pray, is their monster in the case, (if the word monster signifies\nanything at all,) but something neither man nor beast, but partaking\nsomewhat of either? And just so is the CHANGELING before mentioned. So\nnecessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if we\nwill truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what our\nfaculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless\nfancies that have been taken up about them.\n\n\n17. Words and Species.\n\nI have mentioned this here, because I think we cannot be too cautious\nthat words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been used\nto of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies one\ngreat obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially in\nreference to substances: and from thence has rose a great part of the\ndifficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to\nseparate our contemplations and reasonings from words, we might in a\ngreat measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet\nit would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as we\nretained the opinion, that SPECIES and their ESSENCES were anything else\nbut our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them, to\nbe the signs of them.\n\n\n18. Recapitulation.\n\nWherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas,\nthere is certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure those ideas agree\nwith the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which\nagreement of our ideas with the reality of things, having here given\nthe marks, I think, I have shown WHEREIN IT IS THAT CERTAINTY, REAL\nCERTAINTY, CONSISTS. Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess,\nto me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.\n\n\n1. What Truth is.\n\nWHAT is truth? was an inquiry many ages since; and it being that which\nall mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be\nworth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists; and so\nacquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind\ndistinguishes it from falsehood.\n\n\n2. A right joining or separating of signs, i.e. either Ideas or Words.\n\nTruth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify\nnothing but THE JOINING OR SEPERATING OF SIGNS, AS THE THINGS SIGNIFIED\nBY THEM DO AGREE OR DISAGREE ONE WITH ANOTHER. The joining or separating\nof signs here meant, is what by another name we call PROPOSITION. So\nthat truth properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two\nsorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonly\nmade use of, viz. ideas and words.\n\n3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.\n\nTo form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth\nof thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it\nis very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable,\nin treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then the\ninstances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely\nmental, and become verbal. For a MENTAL PROPOSITION being nothing but a\nbare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds, stripped of\nnames, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as\nthey are put into words.\n\n\n4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.\n\nAnd that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal\npropositions separately is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking\nand reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas; at\nleast when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas.\nWhich is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our\nideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for\na mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfect\nestablished ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the\nway our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose,\nthat when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about WHITE\nor BLACK, SWEET or BITTER, a TRIANGLE or a CIRCLE, we can and often\ndo frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the\nnames. But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more\ncomplex ideas, as of a MAN, VITRIOL, FORTITUDE, GLORY, we usually put\nthe name for the idea: because the ideas these names stand for, being\nfor the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect\non the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and\ndistinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and so\nwe make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when\nwe would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental\npropositions. In substances, as has been already noticed, this is\noccasioned by the imperfections of our ideas: we making the name stand\nfor the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is\noccasioned by the great number of simple ideas that go to the making\nthem up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier\nthan the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be\nrecollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who\nhave formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible\nto be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory the\ngreatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never\ntroubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas\nthe most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have served\ntheir turns; and many who talk very much of RELIGION and CONSCIENCE,\nof CHURCH and FAITH, of POWER and RIGHT, of OBSTRUCTIONS and HUMOURS,\nMELANCHOLY and CHOLER, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts\nand meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things\nthemselves, and lay by those words with which they so often confound\nothers, and not seldom themselves also.\n\n\n5. Mental and Verbal Propositions contrasted.\n\nBut to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe two\nsorts of propositions that we are capable of making:--\n\nFirst, MENTAL, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the\nuse of words put together, or separated, by the mind perceiving or\njudging of their agreement or disagreement.\n\nSecondly, VERBAL propositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas,\nput together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. By which\nway of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as it\nwere, put together or separated from another. So that proposition\nconsists in joining or separating signs; and truth consists in the\nputting together or separating those signs, according as the things\nwhich they stand for agree or disagree.\n\n\n6. When Mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when Verbal.\n\nEvery one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either by\nperceiving, or supposing, the agreement or disagreement of any of its\nideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition\naffirmative or negative; which I have endeavoured to express by the\nterms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind,\nwhich is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to\nbe conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny,\nthan to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of\ntwo lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal\nis an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line\ninto a certain number of equal parts; v.g. into five, ten, a hundred, a\nthousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch line\nbeing divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain\nnumber of them will be equal to the sideline. Now, whenever he\nperceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or\ndisagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates\nthose two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind\nof divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true or\nfalse, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into\nsuch ALIQUOT parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are\nso put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things they\nstand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, MENTAL TRUTH. But\nTRUTH OF WORDS is something more; and that is the affirming or denying\nof words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree:\nand this again is two-fold; either purely verbal and trifling, which I\nshall speak of, (chap. viii.,) or real and instructive; which is the\nobject of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already.\n\n\n7. Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.\n\nBut here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did\nabout knowledge: and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but\nthe joining and separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they\nstand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge of truth is\nnot so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and\ntime men employ in the search of it: since by this account it amounts to\nno more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains.\nWho knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and\nwhat strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here,\nwe know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in\nour own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns\nharpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may be\nideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there, as\nwell as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made\nabout them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say ALL\nCENTAURS ARE ANIMALS, as that ALL MEN ARE ANIMALS; and the certainty of\none as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are\nput together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and\nthe agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and\nvisable to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of\nman; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain.\nBut of what use is all such truth to us?\n\n\n8. Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to things.\n\nThough what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real\nfrom imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt,\nto distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barely\nnominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be\namiss here again to consider, that though our words signify things, the\ntruth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, when\nthey stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the\nreality of things. And therefore truth as well as knowledge may well\ncome under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only\nverbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or\ndisagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether our\nideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence\nin nature. But then it is they contain REAL TRUTH, when these signs are\njoined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know are\ncapable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot\nknow, but by knowing that such have existed.\n\n\n9. Truth and Falsehood in general.\n\nTruth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of\nideas as it is. Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or\ndisagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas,\nthus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the\ntruth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas\nthe words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement\nof those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.\n\n\n10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.\n\nBut because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and\nknowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in\nreasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more\nat large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in\npropositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show\nin what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain\nof their real truth or falsehood.\n\nI shall begin with GENERAL propositions, as those which most employ our\nthoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked\nafter by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their\ncomprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our\nview, and shorten our way to knowledge.\n\n\n11. Moral and Metaphysical Truth.\n\nBesides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are\nother sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things\naccording to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we\nspeak agree not to the reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which\nis nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to\nwhich we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in\nthe very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will\nappear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that\nparticular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to\nit. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken\nnotice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here\nonly to have mentioned them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.\n\n\n1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.\n\nTHOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names\nbeing quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct\nknowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas,\nI think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it\nis for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even\nwhen men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the\nideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones.\nThis makes the consideration of WORDS and PROPOSITIONS so necessary\na part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak\nintelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.\n\n\n2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.\n\nAll the knowledge we have, being only of particular or general truths,\nit is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the\nlatter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never\nbe well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived\nand expressed in words. It is not, therefore, out of our way, in the\nexamination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of\nuniversal propositions.\n\n\n3. Certainty twofold--of Truth and of Knowledge.\n\nBut that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the danger\neverywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observe\nthat certainty is twofold: CERTAINTY OF TRUTH and CERTAINTY OF\nKNOWLEDGE. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together in\npropositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the\nideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to\nperceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any\nproposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth\nof any proposition.\n\n\n4. No Proposition can be certainly known to be true, where the real\nEssence of each Species mentioned is not known.\n\nNow, because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general\nproposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species\nits terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each\nspecies, which is that which constitutes and bounds it.\n\nThis, in all simple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in these\nthe real and nominal essence being the same, or, which is all one, the\nabstract idea which the general term stands for being the sole essence\nand boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be no\ndoubt how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under\neach term; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity\nwith the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances, wherein\na real essence, distinct from the nominal, is supposed to constitute,\ndetermine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very\nuncertain; because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what\nis, or what is not of that species; and, consequently, what may or may\nnot with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus, speaking of a MAN,\nor GOLD, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed\nconstituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts\nto every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that\nspecies, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or\nnegation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, and used\nfor species of things constituted by real essences, different from the\ncomplex idea in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know not what; and\nthe extent of these species, with such boundaries, are so unknown and\nundetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm, that\nall men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal\nessence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the\napplication of any general term no further than to the particular things\nin which the complex idea it stands for is to be found, there they are\nin no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt,\non this account, whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen\nto explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, and\nhave made use of the terms of ESSENCES, and SPECIES, on purpose to show\nthe absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any\nother sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them.\nTo suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of\nthem under general names, according as they agree to several abstract\nideas of which we make those names signs, is to confound truth, and\nintroduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made\nabout them. Though therefore these things might, to people not possessed\nwith scholastic learning, be treated of in a better and clearer way\nyet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most\npeople's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which\nhas prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and\nremoved, to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty\nwith it.\n\n\n5. This more particularly concerns Substances.\n\nThe names of substances, then, whenever made to stand for species which\nare supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not, are\nnot capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth\ngeneral propositions made up of such terms we cannot be sure. [The\nreason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that\nquality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in\nthis way of speaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence,\nwhich we, not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot\nbe sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this\nsense gold; being incurably ignorant whether IT has or has not that\nwhich makes anything to be called gold; i. e. that real essence of gold\nwhereof we have no idea at all. This being as impossible for us to know\nas it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is\nor is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at\nall. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real\nessence, which we know not, is, v.g. in what parcels of matter the real\nessence of gold is, yet could we not be sure that this or that quality\ncould with truth be affirmed of gold; since it is impossible for us to\nknow that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with\na real essence of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that\nsupposed real essence may be imagined to constitute.]\n\n\n6.\n\nOn the other side, the names of substances, when made use of as they\nshould be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a\nclear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to\nmake many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain. Not\nbecause in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified\nby them, but because the complex ideas they stand for are such\ncombinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable\nconnexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.\n\n\n7.\n\nThe complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly\nstand for, are collections of such qualities as have been observed to\nco-exist in an unknown substratum, which we call substance; but what\nother qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot\ncertainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which,\nin their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in\nall their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all: for\nthe reasons mentioned, chap. iii. Viz. 1. Because we know not the\nreal constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality\nparticularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for\nexperimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no\nfurther than that bare instance: because our understandings can\ndiscover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any\nmodification whatsoever of any of the primary ones. And therefore there\nare very few general propositions to be made concerning substances,\nwhich can carry with them undoubted certainty.\n\n\n8. Instance in Gold.\n\n'All gold is fixed,' is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain\nof, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the\nuseless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold to\nstand for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essence\nbelonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular substances\nare of that species; and so cannot with certainty affirm anything\nuniversally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species determined\nby its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be the\ncomplex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible,\nand heavier than any other known;--in this proper use of the word gold,\nthere is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. But yet no other\nquality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold,\nbut what hath a DISCOVERABLE connexion or inconsistency with that\nnominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connexion\nthat we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simple\nidea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it is\nimpossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition,\nthat all gold is fixed.\n\n\n9. No discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold, and\nother simple ideas.\n\nAs there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour,\nweight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold; so,\nif we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusable, ductile,\nweighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning\nsolubility in AQUA REGIA, and for the same reason. Since we can never,\nfrom consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm or\ndeny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty,\nductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in AQUA REGIA: and so\non of the rest of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one general\naffirmation concerning any will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not\nthis an universal proposition, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE? To which I answer,\nIt is a very complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here is\nnothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in\nwhich malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty\nas this it is, to say a centaur is four-footed. But if malleableness make\nnot a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for, it is\nplain, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE, is not a certain proposition. Because,\nlet the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other\nqualities you please, malleableness will not appear to depend on that\ncomplex idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it: the\nconnexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other\nqualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its\ninsensible parts; which, since we know not, it is impossible we should\nperceive that connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them\ntogether.\n\n\n10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far Universal\nPropositions maybe certain. But this will go but a little way.\n\nThe more, indeed, of these co-existing qualities we unite into one\ncomplex idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we make\nthe signification of that word; but never yet make it thereby more\ncapable of universal certainty, IN RESPECT OF OTHER QUALITIES NOT\nCONTAINED IN OUR COMPLEX IDEA: since we perceive not their connexion or\ndependence on one another; being ignorant both of that real constitution\nin which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the\nchief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not, as in other\nthings, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately;\nbut is of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct\nideas in the same subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Could\nwe begin at the other end, and discover what it was wherein that colour\nconsisted, what made a body lighter or heavier, what texture of parts\nmade it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this\nsort of liquor, and not in another;--if, I say, we had such an idea\nas this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities\noriginally consist, and how they are produced; we might frame such\nabstract ideas of them as would furnish us with matter of more general\nknowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions, that should\ncarry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our complex\nideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal real\nconstitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made up\nof nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our\nsenses can discover, there can be few general propositions concerning\nsubstances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured; since there\nare but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existence\nwe can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the\nsecondary qualities of substances, and the powers relating to them,\nthere cannot any two be named, whose necessary co-existence, or\nrepugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known; unless in those of the\nsame sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere\nshowed. No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can\ncertainly know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has,\nnor what alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from other\nbodies. The same may be said of the sound or taste, &c. Our specific\nnames of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, it\nis not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general\npropositions of undoubted real certainty. But yet so far as any complex\nidea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea, whose\nNECESSARY co-existence with any other MAY be discovered, so far\nuniversal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it: v.g.\ncould any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and\nthe colour or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea\nsignified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition\nconcerning gold in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition,\nthat ALL GOLD IS MALLIABLE, would be as certain as of this, THE THREE\nANGLES OF ALL RIGHT-LINED TRIANGLES ARE ALL EQUAL TO TWO RIGHT ONES.\n\n\n11. The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances depend\nmostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.\n\nHad we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions\nproduce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how those\nqualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of\ntheir real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their\nproperties, and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we can\nnow by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be\nno more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make\nexperiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties\nof a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea in\nour minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so\nfar from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so\nmuch as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wont\nto consider the substances we meet with, each of them, as an entire\nthing by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent of\nother things; overlooking, for the most part, the operations of those\ninvisible fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose motions and\noperations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken\nnotice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction\nwhereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold anywhere by\nitself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies,\nit will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps\nmalleableness too; which, for aught I know, would be changed into a\nperfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential\nquality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate\nbodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them,\nthat they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that\nenviron them removed; it is yet more so in vegetables, which are\nnourished, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds, in a constant\nsuccession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals,\nwe shall find that their dependence, as to life, motion, and the\nmost considerable qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on\nextrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of\nthem, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: though yet those\nbodies on which they depend are little taken notice of, and make no part\nof the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a\nminute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presently\nlose sense, life, and motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced\ninto our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical and possibly very\nremote bodies do the springs of these admirable machines depend on,\nwhich are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many\nare there which the severest inquiry can never discover? The inhabitants\nof this spot of the universe, though removed so many millions of\nmiles from the sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of\nparticles coming from or agitated by it, that were this earth removed\nbut a small part of the distance out of its present situation, and\nplaced a little further or nearer that source of heat, it is more than\nprobable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediately\nperish: since we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect of\nthe sun's warmth, which an accidental position in some parts of this our\nlittle globe exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone must\nneeds have their source far beyond the confines of that body; and the\nravage made often on several sorts of animals by invisible causes, the\ncertain death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing\nthe line, or, as it is certain of other, by being removed into a\nneighbouring country; evidently show that the concurrence and operations\nof several bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have anything\nto do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us,\nand to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them.\nWe are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain\nWITHIN THEMSELVES the qualities that appear to us in them; and we\nin vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an\nelephant, upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in\nthem. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look\nnot only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun\nor remotest star our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the being\nand operation of particular substances in this our globe depends on\ncauses utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We\nsee and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things\nhere about us; but whence the streams come that keep all these curious\nmachines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our\nnotice and apprehension: and the great parts and wheels, as I may so\nsay, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for aught we\nknow, have such a connexion and dependence in their influences and\noperations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansion\nwould put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some\none of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us,\nshould cease to be or move as it does. This is certain: things, however\nabsolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other\nparts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us.\nTheir observable qualities, actions, and powers are owing to something\nwithout them; and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we\nknow of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellences\nof it, to its neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts within\nthe surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to comprehend\nperfectly those qualities that are in it.\n\n\n12. Our nominal essences of Substances furnish few universal\npropositions about them that are certain.\n\nIf this be so, it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfect\nideas of substances, and that the real essences, on which depend their\nproperties and operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much\nas that size, figure, and texture of their minute and active parts,\nwhich is really in much less the different motions and impulses made in\nand upon them by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which\nis formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we\nobserve in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up.\nThis consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of\never having the ideas of their real essences; which whilst we want, the\nnominal essences we make use of instead of them will be able to\nfurnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal\npropositions capable of real certainty.\n\n\n13. Judgment of Probability concerning Substances may reach further: but\nthat is not Knowledge.\n\nWe are not therefore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few\ngeneral propositions made concerning substances: our knowledge of their\nqualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reach\nand inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength\nof judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary\nobservation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what\nexperience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing\nstill; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which is\nrequisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own\nthoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract\nideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them,\nthere we have general knowledge; and by putting the names of those ideas\ntogether accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce\ngeneral truths. But because the abstract ideas of substances, for\nwhich their specific names stand, whenever they have any distinct\nand determinate signification, have a discoverable connexion or\ninconsistency with but a very few other ideas, the certainty of\nuniversal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty,\nin that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them; and there\nare scarce any of the names of substances, let the idea it is applied\nto be what it will, of which we can generally, and with certainty,\npronounce, that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging\nto it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea,\nwherever it is to be found.\n\n\n14. What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.\n\nBefore we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must First\nknow what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce\nin the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, We must know\nwhat primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas\nin us. This is in truth no less than to know ALL the effects of matter,\nunder its divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts,\nmotion and rest. Which, I think every body will allow, is utterly\nimpossible to be known by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealed\nto us what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of corpuscles would produce\nin us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk,\nand texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give\nsuch corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour; would that be\nenough to make universal propositions with certainty, concerning the\nseveral sorts of them; unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive\nthe precise bulk, figure, texture, and motion of bodies, in those minute\nparts, by which they operate on our senses, so that we might by those\nframe our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only\ncorporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to our\nunderstandings. For as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking\nand moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; though\nperhaps, when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the\nconsideration of bodies and their operations, and examined how far our\nnotions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter\nof fact, we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too, our\ndiscoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and\nincapacity.\n\n\n15. Whilst our complex Ideas of Substances contain not ideas of their\nreal Constitutions, we can make but few general Propositions concerning\nthem.\n\nThis is evident, the abstract complex ideas of substances, for which\ntheir general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions,\ncan afford us very little universal certainty. Because our ideas of them\nare not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, and\nwould inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any\ncertain connexion: v.g. let the ideas to which we give the name MAN be,\nas it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary\nmotion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and\nconsequently the essence of OUR species, man, we can make but very few\ngeneral certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea.\nBecause, not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of\nmotion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and whereby\nthey are united together in the same subject, there are very few other\nqualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion:\nand therefore we cannot with certainty affirm: That all men sleep by\nintervals; That no man can be nourished by wood or stones; That all men\nwill be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion nor\nrepugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea\nthat name stands for. We must, in these and the like, appeal to trial in\nparticular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content\nourselves with probability in the rest: but can have no general\ncertainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real\nconstitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are\nunited, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word MAN stands\nfor is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and\npowers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between\nour specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or\nstones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock,\nand others that are nourished by wood and stones: but as long as we want\nideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereon\nthese and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to\nreach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few\nideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence,\nor any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so\nfew, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain\ngeneral knowledge of substances as almost none at all.\n\n\n16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.\n\nTo conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are then only\ncapable of certainty, when the terms used in them stand for such ideas,\nwhose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be\ndiscovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood,\nwhen we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree,\naccording as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may\ntake notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in\nour ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment or\nobservations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It\nis the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to\nafford us general knowledge.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS\n\n\n1. Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions.\n\nTHERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS and\nAXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they are\nSELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that\nI know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their\nclearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into\nthe reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them\nalone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other\nknowledge.\n\n\n2. Where in that Self-evidence consists.\n\nKnowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the\nagreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreement\nor disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the\nintervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident.\nThis will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those\npropositions which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for\nin all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that\nagreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing\nthem, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the\nproposition.\n\n\n3. Self evidence not peculiar to received Axioms.\n\nThis being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this\nself-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass\nunder the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them.\nAnd here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be\naxioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall\nsee, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement\nof ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation,\nco-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not\nonly those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are\nself-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other\npropositions are such.\n\n\n4. As to Identity and Diversity all Propositions are equally\nself-evident.\n\nI. For, FIRST, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement\nof IDENTITY being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, this\naffords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas.\nEvery one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it,\nvarious and distinct ideas: and it is the first act of the mind (without\nwhich it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of\nits ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in\nhimself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any\none is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one\nare there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another;\nwhich always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive\nwhat he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his\nmind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct\nideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the\nsame idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made\nwithout any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must\nnecessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we\nhave in our minds [determined ideas,] which the terms in the proposition\nstand for. [And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers\nany proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms,\nand affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different; it\nis presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition;\nand this equally whether these propositions be in terms standing for\nmore general ideas, or such as are less so: v.g. whether the general\nidea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, 'whatsoever\nis, is'; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as 'a man is a\nman'; or, 'whatsoever is white is white'; or whether the idea of being\nin general be denied of not-Being, which is the only (if I may so\ncall it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, 'it is\nimpossible for the same thing to be and not to be': or any idea of any\nparticular being be denied of another different from it, as 'a man is\nnot a horse'; 'red is not blue.' The difference of the ideas, as soon as\nthe terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently\nvisible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as\nwell as the more general propositions; and all for the same reason, viz.\nbecause the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to\nbe the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and\nnot the same; and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas\nbe more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive.] It is not,\ntherefore, alone to these two general propositions--'whatsoever is, is';\nand 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'--that this\nsort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of\nbeing, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by\nthe terms WHATSOEVER, and THING, than it does to any other ideas. [These\ntwo general maxims, amounting to no more, in short, but this, that THE\nSAME IS THE SAME, and THE SAME IS NOT DIFFERENT, are truths known in\nmore particular instances, as well as in those general maxims; and known\nalso in particular instances, before these general maxims are ever\nthought on; and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind\nemployed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible than\nthat] the mind, without the help of any proof, [or reflection on either\nof these general propositions,] perceives so clearly, and knows so\ncertainly, that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea\nof blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there,\nand is not absent; [that the consideration of these axioms can add\nnothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge.] [Just so it is\n(as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in\nhis mind: he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be\nin his mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannot\nbe greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition can be\nknown with a greater certainty, nor add anything to this.] So that,\nin respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our\nideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions,\nas we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own\nmind, whether this proposition, 'a circle is a circle,' be not as\nself-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms,\n'whatsoever is, is'; and again, whether this proposition, 'blue is not\nred,' be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of, as\nsoon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, 'it is\nimpossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And so of all the\nlike.\n\n\n5. In Co-existance we have few self-evident Propositions.\n\nII. SECONDLY, as to CO-EXISTANCE, or such a necessary connexion between\ntwo ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed, there the\nother must necessarily be also: of such agreement or disagreement as\nthis, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And\ntherefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge: nor\nare there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident,\nthough some there are: v.g. the idea of filling a place equal to the\ncontents of its superficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think\nit is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot be in the same\nplace.\n\n\n6. III. In other Relations we may have many.\n\nTHIRDLY, As to the RELATIONS OF MODES, mathematicians have framed many\naxioms concerning that one relation of equality. As, 'equals taken from\nequals, the remainder will be equal'; which, with the rest of that kind,\nhowever they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are\nunquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them\nwill not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these,--that\n'one and one are equal to two', that 'if you take from the five fingers\nof one hand two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two,\nthe remaining numbers will be equal.' These and a thousand other such\npropositions may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing,\nforce the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness,\nthan those mathematical axioms.\n\n\n7. IV. Concerning real Existence, we have none.\n\nFOURTHLY, as to REAL EXISTANCE, since that has no connexion with any\nother of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being, we have\nin that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much\nas demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore,\nconcerning those, there are no maxims.\n\n\n8. These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.\n\nIn the next place let us consider, what influence these received maxims\nhave upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the\nschools, that all reasonings are EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS, seem\nto lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to\nsuppose them to be PRAECOGNITA. Whereby, I think, are meant these two\nthings: first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known\nto the mind; and, secondly, that upon them the other parts of our\nknowledge depend.\n\n\n9. Because Maxims or Axioms are not the Truths we first knew.\n\nFIRST, That they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident\nto experience, as we have shown in another place. (Book I. chap, 1.) Who\nperceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its\nmother; that its sucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knows\nthat 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And how\nmany truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to observe that\nthe mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it\never thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their\narguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain: for\nthat which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing\nelse but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its\nideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in\nwords it understands; and every idea being known to be what it is,\nand every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same; it must\nnecessarily follow that such self-evident truths must be first known\nwhich consist of ideas that are first in the mind. And the ideas first\nin the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whence\nby slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones;\nwhich being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are\nsettled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus PARTICULAR IDEAS\nare first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them;\nand next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to\nparticular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children,\nor the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to\ngrown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made\nso. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that GENERAL\nIDEAS are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty\nwith them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to\nimagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form\nthe general idea of a triangle,(which is yet none of the more abstract,\ncomprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique nor\nrectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalinon; but all and\nnone of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot\nexist; an idea wherein some part of several different and inconsistant\nideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state,\nhas need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the\nconveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which\nit is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect\nsuch ideas are marks of our imperfection; at least, this is enough to\nshow that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the\nmind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest\nknowledge is conversant about.\n\n\n10. Because on perception of them the other Parts of our Knowledge do\nnot depend.\n\nSecondly, from what has been said it plainly follows, that these\nmagnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other\nknowledge. For if there be a great many other truths, which have as much\nself-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is\nimpossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all other\ntruths. Is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three,\nbut by virtue of this, or some such axiom, viz. 'the whole is equal to\nall its parts taken together?' Many a one knows that one and two are\nequal to three, without having heard, or thought on, that or any other\naxiom by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly as any\nother man knows, that 'the whole is equal to all its parts,' or any\nother maxim; and all from the same reason of self-evidence: the equality\nof those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any\nother axiom as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor\nafter the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he\nknow that one and two are equal to three, better or more certainly than\nhe did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and\nparts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the\nmind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may ask\nthese men, who will needs have all knowledge, besides those general\nprinciples themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident\nprinciples. What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are\ntwo, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? Which\nbeing known without any proof, do evince, That either all knowledge does\nnot depend on certain PRAECOGNITA or general maxims, called principles;\nor else that these are principles: and if these are to be counted\nprinciples, a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if we\nadd all the self-evident propositions which may be made about all\nour distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least\ninnumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages;\nand a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all\ntheir lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later,\nthis is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence;\nare wholly independent; receive no light, nor are capable of any proof\none from another; much less the more particular from the more general,\nor the more simple from the more compounded; the more simple and\nless abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier\napprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and\ncertainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees the same\nidea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas\nto be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideas\nof one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannot\nbut certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not the\nidea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not\nthe idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which\nhe has distinct: that would be to have them confused and distinct at the\nsame time, which is a contradiction: and to have none distinct, is\nto have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And,\ntherefore, what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two\nentire distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot\nbut assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it\nunderstands the terms, without hesitation or need of proof, or regarding\nthose made in more general terms and called maxims.\n\n\n11. What use these general Maxims or Axioms have.\n\n[What shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no\nmeans; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken\nto be. But, since doubting in the least of what hath been by some\nmen ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against, as\noverturning the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth while\nto consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and\nexamine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not.\n\n{Of no use to prove less general propositions, nor as foundations on\nconsideration of which any science has been built.}\n\n(1) It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no\nuse to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions. (2) It\nis as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon\nany science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk,\npropagated from scholastic men, of sciences and the maxims on which\nthey are built: but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any such\nsciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims, WHAT IS, IS;\nand IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE. And I would\nbe glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or any\nother general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged to any one\nwho would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on\nthese or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firm\nwithout any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general maxims\nhave not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological\nquestions, that they have in other sciences? They serve here, too, to\nsilence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobody\nwill therefore say, that the Christian religion is built upon these\nmaxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from these\nprinciples. It is from revelation we have received it, and without\nrevelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we\nfind out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two\nothers, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason:\nfor we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God\ndeclares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his\nSpirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of these\ndo we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the\nthings themselves afford it: and we see the truth in them by perceiving\ntheir agreement or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it\nimmediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring\nveracity.\n\n(3) Nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths.\n\nThey are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences,\nor new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never\nenough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which\nare so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are further\nadvances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery of these, it\nwas not the general maxims, 'what is, is;' or, 'the whole is bigger than\na part,' or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues that led\nhim into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions.\nNor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations,\nbut by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement\nor disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he\ndemonstrated. This is the greatest exercise and improvement of human\nunderstanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the\nsciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the\ncontemplation of these or the like magnified maxims. Would those who\nhave this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think\nno step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, no\nstone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim,\nbut distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of\ncommunicating it; between the method of raising any science, and that\nof teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced--they would see\nthat those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first\ndiscoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that\nunlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, when\nschools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what\nothers had found out, they often made use of maxims, i.e. laid down\ncertain propositions which were self-evident, or to be received\nfor true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars as\nunquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them\nof truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their\nminds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them,\nand carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular instances,\nwhen well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding\nthan the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in those\nparticular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without\nthe help of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who with\nattention considers them.\n\n{Maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered, and in\nsilencing obstinate wranglers.}\n\nTo come, therefore, to the use that is made of maxims. (1) They are of\nuse, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences\nas far as they are advanced: but of little or none in advancing them\nfurther. (2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate\nwranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion. Whether a\nneed of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leave\nto inquire. The Schools having made disputation the touchstone of men's\nabilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that\nkept the field: and he that had the last word was concluded to have the\nbetter of the argument, if not of the cause. But because by this means\nthere was like to be no decision between skilful combatants, whilst one\nnever failed of a MEDIUS TERMINUS to prove any proposition; and the\nother could as constantly, without or with a distinction, deny the major\nor minor; to prevent, as much as could be, running out of disputes into\nan endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions--most of\nthem, indeed, self-evident--were introduced into the Schools: which\nbeing such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general\nmeasures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the\ndisputants had not lain down any other between them) beyond which there\nwas no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And\nthus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in\ndispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and\nsources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the\nsciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to any\nof these, they stopped there, and went no further; the matter was\ndetermined. But how much this is a mistake, hath been already shown.\n\n\n{How Maxims came to be so much in vogue.}\n\nThis method of the Schools, which have been thought the fountains of\nknowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like use of these maxims into\na great part of conversation out of the Schools, to stop the mouths of\ncavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with,\nwhen they deny these general self-evident principles received by all\nreasonable men who have once thought of them: but yet their use herein\nis but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such\ncases, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideas\nmade use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the help\nof those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced,\nand the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off\na wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes they\nproposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a\ncontest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to\ntheir perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the\nmethod of the Schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and\nresist evident truth till they are baffled, i.e. till they are reduced\nto contradict themselves, or some established principles: it is no\nwonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that\nwhich in the Schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. obstinately\nto maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true or\nfalse, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way to\nattain truth and knowledge: and that which I think the rational part of\nmankind, not corrupted by education, could scare believe should ever\nbe admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion or\nnature, or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propegate\nthe truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant and\nunconvinced. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's\nminds from the sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make them\ndoubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adhering\nto, I shall not now inquire. This I think, that, bating those places,\nwhich brought the Peripatetic Philosophy into their schools, where it\ncontinued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art of\nwrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which\nthe sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of\nknowledge.]\n\n\n{Of great use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of little use to the\ndiscovery of truths.}\n\nAs to these general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, of\ngreat use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much\nuse to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in\nits search after knowledge. For who ever began to build his knowledge on\nthis general proposition, WHAT IS, IS; or, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME\nTHING TO BE AND NOT TO BE: and from either of these, as from a principle\nof science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often\ninvolving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may\nserve well to show whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open\nthe absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are of\nvery little use for enlightening the understanding: and it will not be\nfound that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in\nknowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two\ngeneral propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they\nsometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth, by showing\nthe absurdity of what he saith, [and by exposing him to the shame of\ncontradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to\nbe true.] But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, and\nanother to put him in possession of truth, and I would fain know what\ntruths these two propositions are able to teach, and by their influence\nmake us know which we did not know before, or could not know without\nthem. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only about\nidentical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such.\nEach particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as\nclearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of\nthese general ones: [only these general ones, as serving in all cases,\nare therefore more inculcated and insisted on.] As to other less general\nmaxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions, and\nteach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another.\n'The whole is equal to all its parts:' what real truth, I beseech you,\ndoes it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what the\nsignification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import?\nAnd he that knows that the WORD whole stands for what is made up of all\nits parts, knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all\nits parts. And, upon the same ground, I think that this proposition, 'A\nhill is higher than a valley', and several the like, may also pass for\nmaxims. But yet [masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of\nwhat they know, initiate others in that science do not] without reason\nplace this and some other such maxims [at the entrance of their\nsystems]; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly\nacquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such general\nterms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more general\npropositions, as formed rules and sayings, ready to apply to all\nparticular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more\nclear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to\nconfirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them\nis enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from\nour custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our\nminds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence\nof the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and\nreasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and\nthat the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better\nin that particular instance, than by this general proposition, 'The\nwhole is equal to all its parts;' and that, if one of these have need to\nbe confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let\ninto his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general.\nFor in _particulars_ our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, by\ndegrees, to _generals_ [Footnote: This is the order in time of the\nconscious acquistion of knowledge that is human. The _Essay_ might be\nregarded as a commentary on this one sentence. Our intellectual progress\nis from particulars and involuntary recipiency, through reactive doubt\nand criticism, into what is at last reasoned faith.]. Though afterwards\nthe mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge\ninto as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its\nthoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the\nstandards of truth and falsehood. [Footnote: This is the philosophic\nattitude. Therein one consciously apprehends the intellectual\nnecessities that were UNCONCIOUSLY PRESUPPOSED, its previous\nintellectual progress. In philosophy we 'draw our knowledge into as\ngeneral propositions as it can' be made to assume, and thus either learn\nto see it as an organic while in a speculative unity, or learn that it\ncannot be so seen in a finite intelligence, and that even at the last\nit must remain 'broken' and mysterious in the human understanding. ]\nBy which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of other\npropositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular\npropositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to\nthese more general ones, which, in discourse and argumentation, are so\nfrequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the\nreason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the MOST\nGENERAL ONLY have had the title of MAXIMS.\n\n\n12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may prove\nContradictions.\n\nOne thing further, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerning\nthese general maxims, That they are so far from improving or\nestablishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong,\nloose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words,\nrather than [fix them on settled, determined] ideas of things; I say\nthese general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in such\na way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove\ncontradictions: v.g. he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind\nan idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easily\ndemonstrate that there is no vacuum, i.e. no space void of body, by this\nmaxim, WHAT IS, IS. For the idea to which he annexes the name body,\nbeing bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without\nbody, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and\ndistinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea,\nthough it be called by these three names,--extension, body, space. Which\nthree words, standing for one and the same idea, may, no doubt, with\nthe same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each of\nitself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for\none and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its\nsignification, that 'space is body,' as this predication is true and\nidentical, that 'body is body,' both in signification and sound.\n\n\n13. Instance in Vacuum.\n\nBut if another should come and make to himself another idea, different\nfrom Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the\nsame name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body,\nto be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will\nas easily demonstrate, that there may be a vacuum or space without a\nbody, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to which\nhe gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and\nthe idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of\nextension and resistibility or solidity, together in the same\nsubject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the\nunderstanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black,\nor as of CORPOREITY and HUMANITY, if I may use those barbarous terms:\nand therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing\nfor them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another;\n[viz. this proposition: 'Extension or space is not body,' is] as true\nand evidently certain as this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING\nTO BE AND NOT TO BE, [can make any proposition.]\n\n\n14. But they prove not the Existance of things without us.\n\nBut yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally\ndemonstrated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be\na vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS, and THE\nSAME THING CANNOT BE AND NOT BE: yet neither of these principles will\nserve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies do exist: for that we are\nleft to our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal\nand self-evident principles being only our constant, clear, and distinct\nknowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure us\nof nothing that passes without the mind: their certainty is founded\nonly upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of its\ndistinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they\nare in our minds; though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain\nthe names without the ideas; or use them confusedly, sometimes for\none and sometimes for another idea. In which cases the force of these\naxioms, reaching only to the sound, and not the signification of the\nwords, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. [It is\nto show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of\ntruth, will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of their\nwords, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested\nconcerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, or\ndangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying\nor intending they should be laid aside; as some have been too forward\nto charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so\ncannot be laid aside. As far as their influence will reach, it is in\nvain to endeavour, nor will I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, without\nany injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use\nis not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them;\nand I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming\nthemselves in errors.]\n\n\n15. They cannot add to our knowledge of Substances, and their\nApplication to complex Ideas is dangerous.\n\nBut let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, they\ncannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of\nsubstances, as they are found and exist without us, any further than\ngrounded on experience. And though the consequence of these two\npropositions, called principles, be very clear, and their use not\ndangerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there is\nno need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves\nwithout them, viz. where our ideas are [determined] and known by the\nnames that stand for them: yet when these principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS,\nand IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, are made\nuse of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for\ncomplex ideas, v.g. man, horse, gold, virtue; there they are of infinite\ndanger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for\nmanifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which follow\nerror, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong\nreasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are less\ntrue [or of less force] in proving propositions made of terms standing\nfor complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas.\n[But because men mistake generally,--thinking that where the same terms\nare preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though the\nideas they stand for are in truth different, therefore these maxims\nare made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are\ncontradictory propositions; and is clear in the demonstrations above\nmentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things,\nas usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove\ncontradictory propositions; as shall yet be further made manifest]\n\n\n16. Instance in demonstrations about Man which can only be verbal.\n\nFor instance: let MAN be that concerning which you would by these first\nprinciples demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far as\ndemonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us\nno certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being\nexisting without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it\nis probable that his idea is just like that picture which the\npainter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a\ncomplication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single\ncomplex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour in\nEngland being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not\na man, because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the\ncomplex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by the\nprinciple, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, that\na negro is NOT a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that\nuniversal proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but\nthe clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black\nand white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake\none for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child,\nor any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you never\ndemonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no\nsuch notion or idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of WHAT\nIS, IS, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and\nobservation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.\n\n\n17. Another instance.\n\nSecondly, Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the\nidea he calls MAN, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational\ndiscourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men, by\nthis maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE; and\nI have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that\nthey are men.\n\n\n18. A third instance.\n\nThirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls MAN,\nonly out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and\nreason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstrate\nthat a man may have no hands, but be QUADRUPES, neither of those being\nincluded in his idea of man: and in whatever body or shape he found\nspeech and reason joined, that was a man; because, having a clear\nknowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that WHAT IS, IS.\n\n\n19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and\ndistinct Ideas.\n\nSo that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideas\nare determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and\nsteady names under those settled determinations, there is little need,\nor no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement\nof any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such\npropositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be\nhelped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the\ntruth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the\ntruth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon\nthis ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits\nany proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it\ndoes, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he\nthat needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this\nproposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proof\nto make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to\nconvince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that a\ntriangle is not a circle, &c., or any other two [determined] distinct\nideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to\nconvince him that IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO\nBE.\n\n\n20. Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are not determined\n\nAnd as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, so\nthey are, as I have showed, of dangerous use where [our ideas are not\ndetermined; and where] we use words that are not annexed to determined\nideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes\nstanding for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which follow\nmistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish\npropositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by\ntheir authority confirm and rivet.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.\n\n\n1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.\n\nWHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to\nreal knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered.\nThis, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal\npropositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no\nlight to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such\nare--\n\n\n2. As, First, identical Propositions.\n\nFirst, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviously and at first\nblush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm the\nsaid term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains\nany clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly\nknow before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed\nto us. Indeed, that most general one, WHAT IS, IS, may serve sometimes\nto show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or\nequivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of\nitself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as\nto affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if he\ndoes, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him.\nBut yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any\nother identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in such\nkind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the\nfoundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm\nthem, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word\nmay with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the\ntruth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real\nknowledge.\n\n\n3. Examples.\n\nFor, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a\nproposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make a\nmillion of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and\nyet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. 'what is a soul, is a\nsoul;' or, 'a soul is a soul;' 'a spirit is a spirit;' 'a fetiche is a\nfetiche,' &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. WHAT\nIS, IS; i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul,\nhath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like\na monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but\nwords, might no doubt have said, 'Oyster in right hand is subject, and\noyster in left hand is predicate:' and so might have made a self-evident\nproposition of oyster, i.e. oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this,\nnot have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of\nhandling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's\nhunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have improved in\nknowledge and bulk together.\n\n\n4. Secondly, Propositions in which a part of any complex Idea is\npredicated of the Whole.\n\nII. Another sort of trifling propositions is, WHEN A PART OF THE\nCOMPLEX IDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE NAME OF THE WHOLE; a part of the\ndefinition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the\ngenus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less\ncomprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this\nproposition in it, viz. 'Lead is a metal' to a man who knows the complex\nidea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the\ncomplex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he\nbefore comprehended and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man\nthat knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word\nlead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead,\nby saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple\nideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very\nheavy, fusible, and malleable.\n\n\n5. As part of the Definition of the Term Defined.\n\nAlike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of\nthe term defined, or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complex\none of the name of the whole complex idea; as, 'All gold is fusible.'\nFor fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up\nthe complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing\nwith sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended\nin its received signification? It would be thought little better than\nridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow;\nand I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible,\nunless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound\ngold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with\nit, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed\nto know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word\nanother uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the\nname gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible,\nmalleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in\na proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions\ncan only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the\ndefinition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry\nno knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however\ncertain they be.\n\n\n6. Instance, Man and Palfrey.\n\n'Every man is an animal, or living body,' is as certain a proposition as\ncan be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a\npalfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being\nonly about the signification of words, and make me know but this--That\nbody, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of\nthose ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: and\nwhere they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not to\nthat thing: and so of the other--That body, sense, and a certain way of\ngoing, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I\nalways comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY; and when they are not\nto be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is\njust the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any\none or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex\nidea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:--v.g. suppose a\nRoman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in one\nsubject, CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS,\nRISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally\naffirm one, more, or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did no\nmore than say that the word HOMO, in his country, comprehended in its\nsignification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by\nthe word PALFREY signified these ideas:--body of a certain figure,\nfour-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have\na woman on his back--might with the same certainty universally affirm\nalso any or all of these of the WORD palfrey: but did thereby teach no\nmore, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language, stood for\nall these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was\nwanting But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion,\nreason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of\nGod, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive\nproposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast\ninto sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word\nman, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what\nthe word MAN stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is\nmore than verbal.\n\n\n7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words.\n\nBefore a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the\nterms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise\nby imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others;\nbut not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he\nhas in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms\nas the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an\nunintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words who makes such\na proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the\nterms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle\nhath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable\nthan where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or\ndeclares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the\nsignification of that word, and the use of that sign.\n\n\n8. But adds no real Knowledge.\n\nWe can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect\ncertainty. The one is, of those trifling propositions which have\na certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not\ninstructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain\nin propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary\nconsequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as\nthat, the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the\nopposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either\nof the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea\nsignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with\nit instructive real knowledge.\n\n\n9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.\n\nWe having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple\nideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make\nany universal certain propositions concerning them, any further than our\nnominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable\ntruths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions,\nthe general propositions that are made about substances, if they are\ncertain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are\ninstructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of\ntheir real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may\nassist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may\noften meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to\nnothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as\nothers, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them,\nmay, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in\npropositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so\njoined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same\nclearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most\nreal truths: and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality\nof things existing without us. By this method one may make\ndemonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby\nadvance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v. g. he\nthat having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual\nrelative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. SUBSTANCE, MAN, ANIMAL,\nFORM, SOUL, VEGETATIVE, SENSITIVE, RATIONAL, may make several undoubted\npropositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really\nis: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions,\nreasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity,\nand some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little of\nGod, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.\n\n\n10. And why.\n\nHe that hath liberty to define, i.e. to determine the signification of\nhis names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who\nmakes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at a\nventure, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from\nan examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; may with\nlittle trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to those\nseveral respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another;\nwherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs\nmind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon\nthem: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does his\nriches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a\npound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place\na penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a\ngreat sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or\nless as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even\nknowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is\ncontained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve:\nwhich a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them,\nin respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive.\n\n\n11. Thirdly, using Words variously is trifling with them.\n\nThough yet concerning most words used in discourses, equally\nargumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of,\nwhich is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further from\nthe certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them;\nviz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and\nknowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly,\nand do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same\nsignifications make plain and clear deductions of words one from\nanother, and make their discourses coherent and clear, (how little\nsoever they were instructive); which were not difficult to do, did they\nnot find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the\nobscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps,\ninadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute.\n\n\n12. Marks of verbal Propositions. First, Predication in Abstract.\n\nTo conclude. Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following\nmarks:\n\nFirst, All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of\nanother, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no\nabstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its\nabstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but\nthis, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that these two\nnames signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say that parsimony is\nfrugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is\nnot temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may at\nfirst sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely\nwhat they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the\nsignification of those terms.\n\n\n13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.\n\nSecondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any\nterm stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say\nthat gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more\ncomprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less\ncomprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal.\n\nWhen by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up\nthe discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we\nshall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected\nare purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them\nbut the use and application of these signs.\n\nThis I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever the\ndistinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and\nsomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it,\nthere our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no\nreal truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a\ngreat deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our\ntrouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.\n\n\n1. General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence.\n\nHITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things; which being\nonly abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular\nexistence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction,\nto consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the\nunderstandings,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where,\nby the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose\ntruth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence:\nand further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would\nnot be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence;\nthey declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in\nthings existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known\nnecessary union or repugnancy.\n\n\n2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.\n\nBut, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of\npredication to be considered more at large in another place, let us\nproceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the EXISTANCE OF\nTHINGS, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the knowledge\nof OUR OWN existence by intuition; of the existence of GOD by\ndemonstration; and of OTHER THINGS by sensation.\n\n\n3. Our Knowledge of our own Existence is Intuitive.\n\nAs for OUR OWN EXISTENCE, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly,\nthat it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can be\nmore evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel\npleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own\nexistence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me\nperceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For\nif I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my\nown existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know\nI doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing\ndoubting, as of that thought which I CALL DOUBT. Experience then\nconvinces us, that we have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE of our own existence,\nand an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of\nsensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our\nown being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of\ncertainty.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.\n\n\n1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.\n\nTHOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has\nstamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his\nbeing; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are\nendowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have\nsense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as\nlong as we carry OURSELVES about us. Nor can we justly complain of our\nignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us\nwith the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the\nend of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But,\nthough this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though\nits evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet\nit requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a\nregular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge,\nor else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other\npropositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To\nshow, therefore, that we are capable of KNOWING, i.e. BEING CERTAIN that\nthere is a God, and HOW WE MAY COME BY this certainty, I think we need\ngo no further than OURSELVES, and that undoubted knowledge we have of\nour own existence.\n\n\n2. For Man knows that he himself exists.\n\nI think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own\nbeing; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that\ncan doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I\nwould argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that\nit were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his\nown existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible,) let\nhim for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or\nsome other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may\ntake for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of,\nbeyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is SOMETHING THAT ACTUALLY\nEXISTS.\n\n\n3. He knows also that Nothing cannot produce a Being; therefore\nSomething must have existed from Eternity.\n\nIn the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare\nNOTHING CAN NO MORE PRODUCE ANY REAL BEING, THAN IT CAN BE EQUAL TO TWO\nRIGHT ANGLES. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all\nbeing, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should\nknow any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some\nreal being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an\nevident demonstration, that FROM ETERNITY THERE HAS BEEN SOMETHING;\nsince what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a\nbeginning must be produced by something else.\n\n\n4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful.\n\nNext, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another,\nmust also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from\nanother too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from\nthe same source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be\nthe source and original of all power; and so THIS ETERNAL BEING MUST BE\nALSO THE MOST POWERFUL.\n\n\n5. And most knowing.\n\nAgain, a man finds in HIMSELF perception and knowledge. We have then got\none step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some\nbeing, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a\ntime, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to\nbe; or else there has been also A KNOWING BEING FROM ETERNITY. If it\nbe said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that\neternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then it\nwas impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it being as\nimpossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly,\nand without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is\nimpossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than\ntwo right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter,\nthat it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it\nis repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself\ngreater angles than two right ones.\n\n\n6. And therefore God.\n\nThus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find\nin our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this\ncertain and evident truth,--THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL, MOST POWERFUL, AND\nMOST KNOWING BEING; which whether any one will please to call God, it\nmatters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered,\nwill easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to\nascribe to this eternal Being. [If, nevertheless, any one should be\nfound so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise,\nbut yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest\nof the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with\nhim that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii. De Leg.),\nto be considered at his leisure: 'What can be more sillily arrogant\nand misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and\nunderstanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no\nsuch thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his\nreason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any\nreason at all?' QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM\nSTULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO\nMUNDOQUE NON PUTET? AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT,\nNULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]\n\nFrom what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain\nknowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything: our senses have\nnot immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more\ncertainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else\nwithout us. When I say we KNOW, I mean there is such a knowledge within\nour reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that,\nas we do to several other inquiries.\n\n\n7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a God.\n\nHow far the IDEA of a most perfect being, which a man, may frame in his\nmind, does or does not prove the EXISTENCE of a God, I will not here\nexamine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of\ntheir thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another,\nfor the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may\nsay, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing\natheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon\nthat sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God in\ntheir minds, (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than\nnone, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and\nout of an over fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least\nendeavour to invalidate all other arguments; and forbid us to hearken to\nthose proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and\nthe sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our\nthoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand\nthem. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be\ndelivered, that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the\ncreation of the world, being understood by the things that are made,\neven his eternal power and Godhead.' Though our own being furnishes us,\nas I have shown, with an evident and incontestible proof of a Deity; and\nI believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully\nattend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet this\nbeing so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion\nand genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven\nby my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge\na little more upon them.\n\n\n8. Recapitulation Something from Eternity.\n\nThere is no truth more evident than that SOMETHING must be FROM\nETERNITY. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could\nsuppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was\nperfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to\nimagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all\nbeings, should ever produce any real existence.\n\nIt being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that\nSOMETHING has existed from eternity; let us next see WHAT KIND OF THING\nthat must be.\n\n\n9. Two Sorts of Beings, cogitative and incogitative.\n\nThere are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or\nconceives.\n\nFirst, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or\nthought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.\n\nSecondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find\nourselves to be. Which, if you please, we will hereafter call COGITATIVE\nand INCOGITATIVE beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing\nelse, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.\n\n\n10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative Being.\n\nIf, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being\nit must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must\nnecessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive\nthat ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent\nbeing, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose\nany parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in\nitself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter\nof the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts\nfirmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must\nit not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to\nconceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce\nanything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so\nmuch as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else\nbe produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than\nmatter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in\nitself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, INCOGITATIVE\nmatter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk,\ncould never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the\npower of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power\nof nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own\nthoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by\nNOTHING, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there\nwas no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide\nmatter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a\nsort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the\nfigure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe, cube, cone,\nprism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a GRY,\nwill operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than\nthose of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to\nproduce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain\nfigure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the\nvery minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one\nanother, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that,\nif we will suppose NOTHING first or eternal, matter can never begin to\nbe: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never\nbegin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal,\nthought can never begin to be. [For it is impossible to conceive that\nmatter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and\nfrom itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence,\nthat then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally\ninseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that,\nthough our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it\nas one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither\nis there any such thing existing as ONE material being, or ONE single\nbody that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were\nthe eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal,\ninfinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite,\ncogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and\ndistinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and\nbeauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is\nthe first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and] whatsoever\nis first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually\nhave, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can\nit ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually\nin itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; [it necessarily follows,\nthat the first eternal being cannot be matter.]\n\n\n11. Therefore, there has been an Eternal Wisdom.\n\nIf, therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from\neternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily\nbe a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter\nshould produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of\nall being, should produce a positive being or matter.\n\n\n12. The Attributes of the Eternal Cogitative Being.\n\nThough this discovery of the NECESSARY EXISTANCE OF A ETERNAL MIND does\nsufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence\nfollow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend\non him, and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what\nHe gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made all the less\nexcellent pieces of this universe,--all inanimate beings whereby his\nomniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his\nother attributes necessarily follow yet, to clear up this a little\nfurther, we will see what doubt can be raised against it.\n\n\n13. Whether the Eternal Mind may be also material or no.\n\nFIRST, Perhaps it will be said, that, though it be as clear as\ndemonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that\nBeing must also be knowing: yet it does not follow but that thinking\nBeing may also be MATERIAL. Let it be so, it equally still follows that\nthere is a God. For there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being,\nit is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to be\nmaterial or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of\nthat supposition:--there being no way to avoid the demonstration,\nthat there is an eternal knowing Being, men devoted to matter, would\nwillingly have it granted, that that knowing Being is material;\nand then, letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, the\ndemonstration whereby an eternal KNOWING Being was proved necessarily\nto exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an\neternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing,\nthat they destroy their own hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their\nopinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they\nmanifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary\nconnexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of\nan eternal Spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already,\nthat an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if\nthinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter\nwill not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being, and\nthey suppose it to no purpose.\n\n\n14. Not material: First, because each Particle of Matter is not\ncogitative.\n\nBut now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that this\neternal thinking Being is material.\n\nI. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY\nPARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say;\nsince then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are\nparticles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will\nnot allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter, to be as\nwell cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out\nto their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles,\nas an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.\n\n\n15. II. Secondly, Because one Particle alone of Matter cannot be\ncogitative.\n\nIf all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM\nthat does so? This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this\natom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal,\nthen this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest of\nmatter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought,\nwhich is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one single\nthinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot\nascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its\nthinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other\nway which is above our conception, it must still be creation; and these\nmen must give up their great maxim, EX NIHILO NIL FIT. If it be said,\nthat all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom,\nit will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For to\nsuppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and\npower infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance\nof reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter,\nis capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I\nchallenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above\nanother.\n\n\n16. III. Thirdly, Because a System of incogitative Matter cannot be\ncogitative.\n\nIf then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking\nbeing; nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be\nit; it only remains, that it is some certain SYSTEM of matter, duly put\ntogether, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I\nimagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would\nhave him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the\nordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take\nto be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more\nnatural, is no less absurd than the other; for to suppose the eternal\nthinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of\nmatter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and\nknowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts;\nthan which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of\nmatter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them,\nbut a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give\nthought and knowledge to them.\n\n\n17. And whether this corporeal System is in Motion or at Rest.\n\nBut further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or\nit is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it\nbe perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges\nabove one atom.\n\nIf it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the\nthoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the\nparticles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself\nwithout any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be\nregulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the\ncause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without\nit,) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and all\nrational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: so\nthat such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind\nmatter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of\nblind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind\nmatter, is the same thing: not to mention the narrowness of such\nthoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But\nthere needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities\nin this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before\nmentioned; since, let this thinking system be all or a part of the\nmatter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should\neither know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole\nknow the motion of every particle; and so regulate its own thoughts or\nmotions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion.\n\n\n18. Matter not co-eternal with an Eternal Mind.\n\nSECONDLY, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that\nthey allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it\ntake not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the first\ngreat piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a\nlittle. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive\nhow it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself\neternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years\nsince, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that YOU is, which began\nthen to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made\nbegan not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it\nbegan to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your\nbody; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that\nthinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an\neternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter\neternal too;) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it\ndid never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from\neternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one\nwho is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can\nallow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that\nare not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible for a\nmaterial being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you\nhave the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though,\nwhen well considered, creation [of a spirit will be found to require\nno less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would\nemancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far\nas they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be\nable to aim at some dim and seeming conception how MATTER might at first\nbe made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being:\nbut to give beginning and being to a SPIRIT would be found a more\ninconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would\nperhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in\nthe world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from\nthem; or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the\ncommon settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the\nreceived doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves\nthis past doubt, that] the creation or beginning of any one [SUBSTANCE]\nout of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but the\nCreator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.\n\n\n19. Objection: Creation out of nothing.\n\nBut you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything\nout of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? I answer, No.\nBecause it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being,\nbecause we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other\neffects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner\nof their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body\ncan move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny\nit possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves,\nin all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the free\naction or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects\nof the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon\nour own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter\nit. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still:\nWhat causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my\nwill,--a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand\nrests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be\ndenied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step\nwill be to understand creation. [For the giving a new determination to\nthe motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain\nvoluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the\ndetermination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than\nto give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animal\nspirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put\nin their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so must\nowe ITS motion to thought: either of which leaves VOLUNTARY motion as\nunintelligible as it was before.] In the meantime, it is an over-valuing\nourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to\nconclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds\nour comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God\nfinite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it.\nIf you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that\nthinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot\ncomprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and\ngoverns all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nOF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.\n\n\n1. Knowledge of the existence of other Finite Beings is to be had only\nby actual Sensation.\n\nThe knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a\nGod, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.\n\nThe knowledge of the existence of ANY OTHER THING we can have only by\nSENSATION: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with\nany IDEA a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that\nof God with the existence of any particular man: no particular man\ncan know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual\noperating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the having\nthe idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that\nthing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or\nthe visions of a dream make thereby a true history.\n\n\n2. Instance: Whiteness of this Paper.\n\nIt is therefore the ACTUAL RECEIVING of ideas from without that gives\nus notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that\nsomething doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in\nus; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it\ntakes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by\nthem, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v.g. whilst\nI write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced\nin my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call WHITE; by which I know\nthat that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes\nalways causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me.\nAnd of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my\nfaculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper\nand sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on\nas so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I\nsee white and black, and that something really exists that causes that\nsensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty\nas great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of\nanything, but a man's self alone, and of God.\n\n\n3. This notice by our Senses, though not so certain as Demonstration,\nyet may be called Knowledge, and proves the Existence of Things without\nus.\n\nThe notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us,\nthough it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or\nthe deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas\nof our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of\nKNOWLEDGE. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform\nus right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it\ncannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in\nearnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those\nthings which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far,\n(whatever he may have with his own thoughts,) will never have any\ncontroversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary\nto his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance\nenough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different\napplication, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which\nis one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the\nconfidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest\nassurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings.\nFor we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge\nitself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend\neven what knowledge is.\n\nBut besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they\ndo not err in the information they give us of the existence of things\nwithout us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in\nthis assurance by other concurrent reasons:--\n\n\n4. I. Confirmed by concurrent reasons:--First, Because we cannot have\nideas of Sensation but by the Inlet of the Senses.\n\nIt is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes\naffecting our senses: because those that want the ORGANS of any sense,\nnever can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their\nminds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be\nassured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way.\nThe organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then the\neyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell\nroses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple,\ntill he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.\n\n\n5. II. Secondly, Because we find that an Idea from actual Sensation, and\nanother from memory, are very distinct Perceptions.\n\nBecause sometimes I find that I CANNOT AVOID THE HAVING THOSE IDEAS\nPRODUCED IN MY MIND. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast,\nI can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which\nformer sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by\nTHAT idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste\nof sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid\nthe ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a\nmanifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which,\nif they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to\ndispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force\nthemselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must\nneeds be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects\nwithout me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas\nin my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not\nperceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as\nhe hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of\nwhich two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are\nmore distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain\nknowledge that they are not BOTH memory, or the actions of his mind, and\nfancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without.\n\n\n6. III. Thirdly, Because Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual\nSensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the\nexternal Objects.\n\nAdd to this, that many of those ideas are PRODUCED IN US WITH PAIN,\nwhich afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain\nof heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us\nno disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again,\nwhen actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the external\nobject causes in our bodies when applied to them: and we remember the\npains of hunger, thirst, or the headache, without any pain at all; which\nwould either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we\nthought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds,\nand appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence\nof things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of PLEASURE,\naccompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical\ndemonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams\ngives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a\ncertainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For, it would be\nvery strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that\ntwo angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of a\ndiagram, should be bigger one than the other, and yet doubt of the\nexistence of those lines and angles, which by looking on he makes use of\nto measure that by.\n\n\n7. IV. Fourthly, Because our Senses assist one another's Testimony of\nthe Existence of outward Things, and enable us to predict.\n\nOur SENSES in many cases BEAR WITNESS TO THE TRUTH OF EACH OTHER'S\nREPORT, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that\nSEES a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare\nfancy, FEEL it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which\ncertainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or\nphantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when\nthe burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.\n\nThus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the\npaper; and by designing the letters, tell BEFOREHAND what new idea it\nshall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it:\nwhich will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands\nstand still; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut: nor, when\nthose characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards but\nsee them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I have\nmade. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the sport and play\nof my own imagination, when I find that the characters that were made at\nthe pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be,\nwhenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses constantly\nand regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will\nadd, that the sight of those shall from another man, draw such sounds as\nI beforehand design they shall stand for, there will be little reason\nleft to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me, when\nthey cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which\ncould not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain\nthem in that order.\n\n\n8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.\n\nBut yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical as to distrust\nhis senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste,\nthink and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding\nappearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore\nwill question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything:\nI must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, then he doth but\ndream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a\nwaking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that\nI make him this answer, That the certainty of things existing in RERUM\nNATURA when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as\ngreat as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For,\nour faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a\nperfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt\nand scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and\naccommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough,\nif they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are\nconvenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and\nhath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it,\nwill little doubt that this is something existing without him, which\ndoes him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance enough,\nwhen no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than\nwhat is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases\nto try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering\nimagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may\nperhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it\nis something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as\ngreat as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain,\ni.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of\nknowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without\nus is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the\nevil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have\nof being made acquainted with them.\n\n\n9. But reaches no further than actual Sensation.\n\nIn fine, then, when our senses do actually convey into our\nunderstandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth\nsomething AT THAT TIME really exist without us, which doth affect our\nsenses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties,\nand actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot\nso far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such COLLECTIONS of\nsimple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do\nreally exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present\ntestimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then\naffect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simple\nideas as is wont to be called MAN, existing together one minute since,\nand am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now,\nsince there is no NECESSARY CONNEXION of his existence a minute since\nwith his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I\nhad the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be\ncertain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less be\ncertain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I\nhave not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less can\nI be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore,\nthough it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet,\nwhilst I am alone, writing this, I have not that certainty of it which\nwe strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me\npast doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the\nconfidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with\nwhom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not\nknowledge.\n\n\n10. Folly to expect Demonstration in everything.\n\nWhereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a\nman of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of\nthe different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed\naccordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and\ncertainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very\nrational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths,\nbecause they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the\nleast (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in\nthe ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain\ndemonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing\nquickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him\nreason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do\nupon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.\n\n\n11. Past Existence of other things is known by Memory.\n\nAs WHEN OUR SENSES ARE ACTUALLY EMPLOYED ABOUT ANY OBJECT, we do know\nthat it does exist; so BY OUR MEMORY we may be assured, that heretofore\nthings that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge\nof the past existence of several things, whereof our senses having\ninformed us, our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are\npast all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this knowledge also\nreaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus,\nseeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that\nwater doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also\nbe always true, and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubted\nproposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688; as it\nwill also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did\nexist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but,\nbeing now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no\nmore certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that the\nbubbles or colours therein do so: it being no more necessary that water\nshould exist to-day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours\nor bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday, though it be\nexceedingly much more probable; because water hath been observed to\ncontinue long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours on them,\nquickly cease to be.\n\n\n12. The Existence of other finite Spirits not knowable, and rests on\nFaith.\n\nWhat ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already\nshown. But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have\nthem there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that\nany such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite\nspirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the Eternal God. We have\nground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with\nassurance that there are such creatures: but our senses not being\nable to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular\nexistences. For we can no more know that there are finite spirits really\nexisting, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the\nideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that\nthings answering those ideas do really exist.\n\nAnd therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as\nseveral other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of\nfaith; but universal, certain propositions concerning this matter\nare beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v.g., that all the\nintelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet it\ncan never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like\npropositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear,\nin this state capable of knowing. We are not, then, to put others upon\ndemonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all\nthose matters; wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but\nwhat our senses give us in this or that particular.\n\n\n13. Only particular Propositions concerning concrete Existances are\nknowable.\n\nBy which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions:--(1)\nThere is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything\nanswerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix,\nmotion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is,\nWhether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of\nparticulars. No existence of anything without us, but only of God, can\ncertainly be known further than our senses inform us, (2) There is\nanother sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement or\ndisagreement of OUR ABSTRACT IDEAS, and their dependence on one another.\nSuch propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea of\nGod and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is\nto be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain,\nconcerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a\nspecies, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how\ncertain soever, that 'men ought to fear and obey God' proves not to\nme the EXISTENCE of MEN in the world; but will be true of all such\ncreatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general\npropositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered\nin those abstract ideas.\n\n\n14. And all general Propositions that are known to be true concern\nabstract Ideas.\n\nIn the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence\nof things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses: in the latter,\nknowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that\nare in our minds, producing there general certain propositions. Many of\nthese are called AETERNAE VERITATES, and all of them indeed are so; not\nfrom being written, all or any of them, in the minds of all men; or that\nthey were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, having\ngot the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or\nnegation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is,\nendowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we\nhave, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to\nthe consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions\nthat will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will\nperceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called\nETERNAL TRUTHS, not because they are eternal propositions actually\nformed, and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them;\nnor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are\nanywhere out of the mind, and existed before: but because, being once\nmade about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they\ncan be supposed to be made again at any time, past or come, by a mind\nhaving those ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposed\nto stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having\nimmutably the same habitudes one to another, propositions concerning any\nabstract ideas that are once true must needs be ETERNAL VERITIES.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n1. Knowledge is not got from Maxims.\n\nIT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that\nMAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences\nwere each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence the\nunderstanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct\nitself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the\nbeaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or\nmore GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon to build the knowledge\nthat was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down for\nfoundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES, as the beginnings\nfrom which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our\ninquiries, as we have already observed.\n\n\n2. (The Occasion of that Opinion.)\n\nOne thing which might probably give an occasion to this way of\nproceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it\nseemed to have in MATHEMATICS, wherein men, being observed to attain a\ngreat certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre-eminence to\nbe called [word in Greek], and [word in Greek], learning, or things\nlearned, thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatest\ncertainty, clearness, and evidence in them.\n\n\n3. But from comparing clear and distinct Ideas.\n\nBut if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that the great\nadvancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in\nthese sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles, nor\nderived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three\ngeneral maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear,\ndistinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about, and the\nrelation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that they\nhad an intuitive knowledge, and by THAT a way to discover it in others;\nand this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible\nfor a young lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little\nfinger, but by virtue of this axiom, that THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN A\nPART; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot a\ncountry wench know that, having received a shilling from one that owes\nher three, and a shilling also from another that owes her three, the\nremaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this,\nI say, unless she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, that IF YOU\nTAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS, a maxim which\npossibly she never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider,\nfrom what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by\nmost people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which it\nis that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules are\nbut the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the\nworkmanship of the mind, made, and names given to them for the easier\ndispatch in its reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive terms and\nshort rules its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge began\nin the mind, and was founded on particulars; though afterwards, perhaps,\nno notice was taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forward\nstill to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general\nnotions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden the\nmemory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may be\nconsidered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that\nhis body, little finger, and all, is bigger than his little finger\nalone, after you have given to his body the name WHOLE, and to his\nlittle finger the name PART, than he could have had before; or what new\nknowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him,\nwhich he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body\nwas bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet so imperfect\nthat he had no such relative terms as whole and part? I ask, further,\nwhen he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a\nwhole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certain\nbefore he learnt those terms, that his body was bigger than his little\nfinger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little finger\nis a part of his body, as that it is less than his body. And he that can\ndoubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part.\nSo that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be made\nuse of to prove the little finger less than the body, but when it is\nuseless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows\nalready. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter,\nwith another parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of\nthem alone, will never be able to know it by the help of these two\nrelative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please.\n\n\n4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.\n\nBut be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that,\ntaking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red\nline of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal,\nor that IF YOU TAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS:\nwhich, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to\nany one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. That\nwhich I have here to do, is to inquire, whether, if it be the readiest\nway to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, it\nbe yet a safe way to take the PRINCIPLES which are laid down in any\nother science as unquestionable truths; and so receive them without\nexamination, and adhere to them, without suffering them to be doubted\nof, because mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none\nbut self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not\npass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in\nnatural philosophy.\n\nLet that principle of some of the old philosophers, That all is Matter,\nand that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable,\nand it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived\nit again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any\none, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoics, the aether, or\nthe sun; or with Anaximenes, the air, to be God; and what a divinity,\nreligion, and worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as\nPRINCIPLES thus TAKEN UP WITHOUT QUESTIONING OR EXAMINATION; especially\nif they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and\ngive a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another\nkind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure; and\nin Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity? And he who, with\nPlato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his\nthoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond\nthis spot of earth, and those perishing things which are to be had in\nit. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, that\nright and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not\nby nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and gravity, than\nthose who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent\nto all human constitutions.\n\n\n5. To do so is no certain Way to Truth.\n\nIf, therefore, those that pass for PRINCIPLES are NOT CERTAIN, (which we\nmust have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them\nfrom those that are doubtful,) but are only made so to us by our blind\nassent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided\ninto truth, we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake and\nerror.\n\n\n6. But to compare clear, complete Ideas, under steady Names.\n\nBut since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as\nof all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the\nagreement or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge\nis not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and\nswallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear,\ndistinct, and complete ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex\nto them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps, without any other\nprinciples, but BARELY CONSIDERING THOSE PERFECT IDEAS, and by COMPARING\nTHEM ONE WITH ANOTHER; finding their agreement and disagreement, and\ntheir several relations and habitudes; we shall get more true and clear\nknowledge by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles,\nand thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others.\n\n\n7. The true Method of advancing Knowledge is by considering our abstract\nIdeas.\n\nWe must, therefore, if we will proceed as reason advises, adapt our\nmethods of inquiry to THE NATURE OF THE IDEAS WE EXAMINE, and the truth\nwe search after. General and certain truths are only founded in the\nhabitudes and relations of ABSTRACT IDEAS. A sagacious and methodical\napplication of our thoughts, for the finding out these relations, is\nthe only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty\nconcerning them into general propositions. By what steps we are to\nproceed in these, is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians,\nwho, from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and\na continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery and\ndemonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond human\ncapacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have\ninvented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate\nideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of\nunapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them so far, and\nproduced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries: but whether\nsomething like this, in respect of other ideas, as well as those of\nmagnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This,\nI think, I may say, that if other ideas that are the real as well as\nnominal essences of their species, were pursued in the way familiar to\nmathematicians, they would carry our thoughts further, and with greater\nevidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine.\n\n\n8. By which Morality also may be made clearer.\n\nThis gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I suggest,\n(chap. iii.) viz. that MORALITY is capable of demonstration as well as\nmathematics. For the ideas that ethics are conversant about, being all\nreal essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and\nagreement one with another; so far as we can find their habitudes and\nrelations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general\ntruths; and I doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great part\nof morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to\na considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to\ndoubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have been\ndemonstrated to him.\n\n\n9. Our Knowledge of Substances is to be improved, not by contemplation\nof abstract ideas, but only by Experience.\n\nIn our search after the knowledge of SUBSTANCES, our want of ideas that\nare suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different\nmethod. We advance not here, as in the other, (where our abstract ideas\nare real as well as nominal essences,) by contemplating our ideas, and\nconsidering their relations and correspondences; that helps us very\nlittle for the reasons, that in another place we have at large set down.\nBy which I think it is evident, that substances afford matter of very\nlittle GENERAL knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abstract\nideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and\ncertainty. What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge\nin substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course: the\nwant of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts to\nthe things themselves as they exist. EXPERIENCE HERE MUST TEACH ME WHAT\nREASON CANNOT: and it is by TRYING alone, that I can CERTAINLY KNOW,\nwhat other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea, v.g.\nwhether that yellow heavy, fusible body I call gold, be malleable, or\nno; which experience (which way ever it prove in that particular body I\nexamine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other\nyellow, heavy, fusible bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it\nis no consequence one way or the other from my complex idea: the\nnecessity or inconsistence of malleability hath no visible connexion\nwith the combination of that colour, weight, and fusibility in any body.\nWhat I have said here of the nominal essence of gold, supposed to\nconsist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight, and fusibility,\nwill hold true, if malleableness, fixedness, and solubility in aqua\nregia be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but\na little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those\nmasses of matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the OTHER\nproperties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown\nreal essence on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the\nrest; we can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essence\nwill carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us\nbut very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful truths. For, upon\ntrial, having found that particular piece (and all others of that\ncolour, weight, and fusibility, that I ever tried) malleable, that also\nmakes now, perhaps, a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal\nessence of gold: whereby though I make my complex idea to which I affix\nthe name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before; yet still,\nit not containing the real essence of any species of bodies, it helps me\nnot certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may be to conjecture)\nthe other remaining properties of that body, further than they have a\nvisible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up my\nnominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complex\nidea, whether gold be fixed or no; because, as before, there is no\nNECESSARY connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a COMPLEX\nIDEA OF A BODY YELLOW, HEAVY, FUSIBLE, MALLEABLE; betwixt these, I say,\nand FIXEDNESS; so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever body\nthese are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here, again, for\nassurance, I must apply myself to experience; as far as that reaches,\nI may have certain knowledge, but no further.\n\n\n10. Experience may procure is Convenience, not Science.\n\nI deny not but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments,\nshall be able to see further into the nature of bodies, and guess\nrighter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a stranger to\nthem: but yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, not\nknowledge and certainty. This way of GETTING AND IMPROVING OUR KNOWLEDGE\nIN SUBSTANCES ONLY BY EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY, which is all that the\nweakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in\nthis world can attain to, makes me suspect that NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS\nNOT CAPABLE IS BEING MADE A SCIENCE. We are able, I imagine, to reach\nvery little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies, and\ntheir several properties. Experiments and historical observations we may\nhave, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby\nincrease our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fear\nour talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to\nadvance.\n\n\n11. We are fitted for moral Science, but only for probable\ninterpretations of external Nature.\n\nFrom whence is it obvious to conclude, that, since our faculties are\nnot fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of\nbodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God, and the\nknowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear\ndiscovery of our duty and great concernment; it will become us, as\nrational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what they\nare most adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it seems\nto point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper\nemployment lies in those inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which\nis most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest\ninterest, i.e. the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I may\nconclude, that MORALITY IS THE PROPER SCIENCE AND BUSINESS OF MANKIND IN\nGENERAL, (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their SUMMUM\nBONUM;) as several arts, conversant about several parts of nature, are\nthe lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use of\nhuman life, and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of what\nconsequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may\nbe to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing\ninstance: whose ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest part\nof the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded with all sorts\nof natural plenty, I think may be attributed to their ignorance of what\nwas to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone, I mean the mineral\nof IRON. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part\nof the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other;\nyet to any one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will\nappear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among us, we should\nin a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the\nancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come\nno way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So\nthat he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral, may\nbe truly styled the father of arts, and author of plenty.\n\n\n12. In the study of Nature we must beware of Hypotheses and wrong\nPrinciples.\n\nI would not, therefore, be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of\nNATURE. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion\nto admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and, if rightly directed,\nmay be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary\ncharity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of\nhospitals and almshouses. He that first invented printing, discovered\nthe use of the compass, or made public the virtue and right use of KIN\nKINA, did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and\nincrease of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than those\nwho built colleges, workhouses, and hospitals. All that I would say\nis, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or\nexpectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had, or by ways that\nwill not attain to it: that we should not take doubtful systems\nfor complete sciences; nor unintelligible notions for scientifical\ndemonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to\nglean what we can from particular experiments: since we cannot, from a\ndiscovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves, and in\nbundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together.\nWhere our inquiry is concerning co-existence, or repugnancy to\nco-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; there\nexperience, observation, and natural history, must give us, by our\nsenses and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. The\nknowledge of BODIES we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking\nnotice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we\nhope to know of SEPARATE SPIRITS in this world, we must, I think, expect\nonly from revelation. He that shall consider how little general maxims,\nprecarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at pleasure, have\npromoted true knowledge, or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational\nmen after real improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at that\nend has, for many ages together, advanced men's progress, towards the\nknowledge of natural philosophy, Will think we have reason to thank\nthose who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trod\nout to us, though not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surer\nway to profitable knowledge.\n\n\n13. The true Use of Hypotheses.\n\nNot that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any\nprobable hypothesis whatsoever: hypotheses, if they are well made,\nare at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new\ndiscoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too\nhastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of\nthings, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have\nvery well examined particulars, and made several experiments, in that\nthing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will\nagree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite through,\nand not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seem\nto accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care that\nthe name of PRINCIPLES deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us\nreceive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but a\nvery doubtful conjecture; such as are most (I had almost said all) of\nthe hypotheses in natural philosophy.\n\n\n14. Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of\nthose intermediate ideas which show their Agreement or Disagreement, are\nthe Ways to enlarge our Knowledge.\n\nBut whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways\nto enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seems to me, in\nshort, to be these two:--\n\nFirst, The first is to get and settle in our minds [determined ideas of\nthose things whereof we have general or specific names; at least, so\nmany of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or\nreason about.] [And if they be specific ideas of substances, we should\nendeavour also to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean,\nthat we should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantly\nobserved to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species; and each of\nthose simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should\nbe clear and distinct in our minds.] For it being evident that our\nknowledge cannot exceed our ideas; [as far as] they are either\nimperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain,\nperfect, or clear knowledge. Secondly, The other is the art of finding\nout those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement or\nrepugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.\n\n\n15. Mathematics an instance of this.\n\nThat these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequences\nfrom some general propositions) are the right methods of improving our\nknowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, the\nconsideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where\nfirst we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of\nthose angles or figures of which he desires to know anything, is utterly\nthereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but a man not to\nhave a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium,\nand there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any\ndemonstration about them. Further, it is evident, that it was not the\ninfluence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics,\nthat hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful\ndiscoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims\ngenerally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplate\ntheir extent and consequences as much as he pleases, he will, by their\nassistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the\nhypothenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the\ntwo other sides. The knowledge that 'the whole is equal to all its\nparts,' and 'if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be\nequal,' &c., helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration: and a man\nmay, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one\njot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the\nthoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects, other views\nbefore it, far different from those maxims, when it first got the\nknowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough\nacquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method who\nfirst made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who\nknows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science\nmay hereafter be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematics,\nwhich so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others\nby; whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or,\nperhaps, never come to know?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nSOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n1. Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary.\n\nOur knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity\nwith our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly\nvoluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's\nknowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is\nknowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or\nvalue it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that\nhave senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they\nhave memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have\nany distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or\ndisagreement of some of them one with another; as he that has eyes, if\nhe will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a\ndifference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light,\ncannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether\nhe will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing\npictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet\nhe may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.\n\n\n2. The application of our Faculties voluntary; but they being employed,\nwe know as things are, not as we please.\n\nThere is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he\nturns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he\nwill curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to\nobserve accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does see,\nhe cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see\nthat black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what\nactually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with\nflowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to\nit: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he\nwill look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding: all that is\nvoluntary in our knowledge is, the employing or withholding any of our\nFACULTIES from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accurate\nsurvey of them: but, THEY BEING EMPLOYED, OUR WILL HATH NO POWER TO\nDETERMINE THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIND ONE WAY OR ANOTHER; that is done\nonly by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.\nAnd therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about external\nobjects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by\nthem, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far as\nmen's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot\nbut in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be\nfound amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they have\nnames for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs\nbe assured of the truth of those propositions which express that\nagreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly\nconvinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and\nwhat he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.\n\n\n3. Instance in Numbers.\n\nThus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to\ncompare one, two, and three, to six, cannot choose but know that they\nare equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways\nto measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three\nangles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as\nof this truth, that, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not\nto be.\n\n\n4. Instance in Natural Religion.\n\nHe also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being,\nmade by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly\nwise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and\nobey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the\nideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that\nway, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior,\nfinite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and\ninfinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are less\nthan fifteen; if he will consider and compute those numbers: nor can he\nbe surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen; if he will but open\nhis eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so\ncertain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them,\nwho will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, to\ninform himself about them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT.\n\n\n1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.\n\nThe understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for\nspeculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a\ngreat loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of\ntrue knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen,\nhe would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his\nlife, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence\nof clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has\ndemonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he\ninfallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have\nlittle else to do but to sit still and perish.\n\n\n2. What Use to be made of this twilight State.\n\nTherefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given\nus some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison,\nprobably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to\nexcite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the\ngreatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight,\nas I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of\nmediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here;\nwherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by\nevery day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness and\nliableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to\nus, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in\nthe search and following of that way which might lead us to a state\nof greater perfection. It being highly rational to think, even were\nrevelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those talents God has\ngiven them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the\nclose of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end\nto their labours.\n\n\n3. Judgement or assent to Probability, supplies our want of Knowledge.\n\nThe faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and\ncertain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is JUDGEMENT:\nwhereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is\nthe same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a\ndemonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises\nthis judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and\ncertain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness,\nunskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs\nare to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or\ndisagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know;\nbut, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train\nof gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or\nwholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration,\ndetermine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a\nview of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or\nthe other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This\nfaculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is\ncalled JUDGEMENT; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly\ncalled ASSENT or DISSENT: which being the most usual way, wherein the\nmind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall, under these terms,\ntreat of it, as feast liable in our language to equivocation.\n\n\n4. Judgement is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiving it.\n\nThus the mind has two faculties conversant (about truth and falsehood):--\n\nFirst, KNOWLEDGE, whereby it certainly PERCEIVES, and is undoubtedly\nsatisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.\n\nSecondly, JUDGEMENT, which is the putting ideas together, or separating\nthem from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or\ndisagreement is not perceived, but PRESUMED to be so; which is, as the\nword imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it\nso unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right\njudgement.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV. OF PROBABILITY.\n\n\n1. Probability is the appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.\n\nAs DEMONSTRATION is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two\nideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant,\nimmutable, and visible connexion one with another; so PROBABILITY is\nnothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the\nintervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable,\nor at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most\npart to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition\nto be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: in the\ndemonstration of it a man perceives the certain, immutable connexion\nthere is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and those\nintermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two\nright ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or\ndisagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress,\nthe whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows the\nagreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right\nones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another\nman, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a\nmathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to\nbe equal to two right ones, assents to it, i.e. receives it for true: in\nwhich case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing;\nthe proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it: the man\non whose testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm anything\ncontrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this\nkind: so that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that the\nthree angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes\nhim take these ideas to agree, without knowings them to do so, is the\nwonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity\nin this.\n\n\n2. It is to supply our Want of Knowledge.\n\nOur knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy\nenough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to\nconsider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse--nay, act\nupon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth:\nyet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no act,\naccording to the assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly\ndemonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain.\nBut there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty\nand demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even to\nthe confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full\nassurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust:\nI shall come now, (having, as I think, found out THE BOUNDS OF HUMAN\nKNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY,) in the next place, to consider THE SEVERAL\nDEGREES AND GROUNDS OF PROBABILITY, AND ASSENT OR FAITH.\n\n\n3. Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we know\nthem to be so.\n\nProbability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word\nsignifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to\nmake it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives\nthis sort of propositions is called BELIEF, ASSENT, or OPINION, which is\nthe admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or\nproofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without\ncertain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between\nPROBABILITY and CERTAINTY, FAITH, and KNOWLEDGE, that in all the parts\nof knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has its\nvisible and certain connexion: in belief, not so. That which makes me\nbelieve, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not\nevidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the\nagreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.\n\n\n4. The Grounds of Probability are two: Conformity with our own\nExperience, or the Testimony of others.\n\nProbability then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to\nguide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions\nwhereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them\nfor true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following:--\n\nFirst, The conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation,\nand experience.\n\nSecondly, The testimony of others, vouching their observation and\nexperience. In the testimony of others is to be considered: 1. The\nnumber. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design\nof the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The\nconsistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary\ntestimonies.\n\n\n5. In this, all the Arguments pro and con ought to be examined, before\nwe come to a Judgment.\n\nProbability wanting that intuitive evidence which, infallibly determines\nthe understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it WILL\nPROCEED RATIONALLY, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and\nsee how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before\nit assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole,\nreject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to\nthe preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or\nthe other. For example:--\n\nIf I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability; it is\nknowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst\nof a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great\nconformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed\nby the natures of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some manifest\nsuspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same\nthing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor\nheard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on\ntestimony: and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit,\nand have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter\nof fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whose\nexperience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of\nanything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce\nbe able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who\nentertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which\nhe was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water\nin his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men\nwalked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. To\nwhich the king replied, HITHERTO _I_ HAVE BELIEVED THE STRANGE THINGS\nYOU HAVE TOLD ME, BECAUSE _I_ LOOK UPON YOU AS A SOBER FAIR MAN, BUT NOW\n_I_ AM SURE YOU LIE.\n\n\n6. Probable arguments capable of great Variety.\n\nUpon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition: and as\nthe conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations,\nas the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and\ncredibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so\nis any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I\nconfess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability,\nyet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate\ntheir assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything\nelse, and that is, THE OPINION OF OTHERS; though there cannot be a more\ndangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there\nis much more falsehood and error among men, than truth and knowledge.\nAnd if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think\nwell of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan,\nMahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and\nLutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have\noccasion to speak more at large in another place.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.\n\n\n1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.\n\nThe grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter:\nas they are the foundations on which our ASSENT is built, so are they\nalso the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be\nregulated: only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds of\nprobability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which\nsearches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear;\nat least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I\nconfess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world,\ntheir assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at\nfirst prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost impossible, and\nin most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to\nretain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace\nthat side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care\nand fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that they have\nsearched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any\nlight to the question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the\naccount upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on which\nside the probability appeared to THEM, after as full and exact an\ninquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories,\nas a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain\nsatisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion\nthat, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of\ntheir assent as they afford it.\n\n\n2. These can not always be actually in View; and then we must content\nourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degree\nof Assent.\n\nThis is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in\nregulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact of\nthem, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs\nconcerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, and\nregular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed\nor seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one\nsingle question: or else they must require a man, for every opinion that\nhe embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both which are impossible.\nIt is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case,\nand that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are\nnot actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able\nactually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of men must be\neither very sceptics; or change every moment, and yield themselves up\nto whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments,\nwhich, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.\n\n\n3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgments were not rightly\nmade.\n\nI cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and\nadhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of\ngreat obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they\nrely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but\nbecause they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a\ngreat number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have\nformed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason,\nbut because they never thought otherwise? that themselves to have judged\nright, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own\nopinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never\njudged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the\ngreatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in\ntheir tenets, who have least examined them. What we once KNOW, we are\ncertain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs\nundiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt.\nBut, in matters of PROBABILITY, it is not in every case we can be sure\nthat we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the\nquestion; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which\nmay cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at\npresent seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath\nthe leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs\nconcerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he\nhath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for\nhis better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on\nthe one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of\nour great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most\npart, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are\nnot capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is\nnecessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.\n\n\n4. The right Use of it, mutual Charity and Forbearance, in a necessary\ndiversity of opinions.\n\nSince, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not\nall, to have several OPINIONS, without certain and indubitable proofs\nof their truth; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance,\nlightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenets\npresently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately\nanswer, and show the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become\nall men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity, and\nfriendship, in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably\nexpect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own\nopinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority\nwhich the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may\noften mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit\nto the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your\nsentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him\nleave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what\nis out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side\nthe advantage lies: and if he will not think our arguments of weight\nenough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do\nourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others should\nprescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes\nhis opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce\nthose tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he\nthinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionably certainty; or which\nhe takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men\nsent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should\nbe given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary,\nespecially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there\nnever fails to be, where men find themselves ill-trusted? We should do\nwell to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in\nall the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat\nothers ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce\ntheir own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force\nupon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate\nin not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has\nincontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the\nfalsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to the\nbottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing\nwithout knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting\nstate of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and\ncareful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who\nhave not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must\nconfess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in\nimposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have\nnot searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which\nthey should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly\nexamined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they\nprofess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to\nrequire others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find\nso little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing\ninsolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason\nto think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be\nless imposing on others.\n\n\n5. Probability is either of sensible Matter of Fact, capable of human\ntestimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses.\n\nBut to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it,\nwe are to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon inducements\nof PROBABILITY are of TWO SORTS: either concerning some particular\nexistance, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which, falling\nunder observation, is capable of human testimony; or else concerning\nthings, which being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable\nof any such testimony.\n\n\n6. Concerning the FIRST of these, viz. PARTICULAR MATTER OF FACT.\n\nI. The concurrent Experience of ALL other Men with ours, produces\nAssurance approaching to Knowledge.\n\nWhere any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of\nourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the concurrent\nreports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as\nfirmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act\nthereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration.\nThus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm\nthat it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallows\nseen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of\nit as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and HIGHEST\nDEGREE OF PROBABILITY, is, when the general consent of all men, in all\nages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and\nnever-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any\nparticular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses: such are all\nthe stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular\nproceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This\nwe call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our\nown and other men's CONSTANT OBSERVATION has found always to be after\nthe same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect of\nsteady and regular causes; though they come not within the reach of our\nknowledge. Thus, That fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed\nthe colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in\nwater, and swam in quicksilver: these and the like propositions about\nparticular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often\nas we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when\nmentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore\nnot so much as controverted by anybody--we are put past doubt that a\nrelation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predication\nthat it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These\nPROBABILITIES rise so near to CERTAINTY, that they govern our thoughts\nas absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most\nevident demonstration; and in what concerns us we make little or\nno difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus\ngrounded, rises to ASSURANCE.\n\n\n7. II. Unquestionable Testimony, and our own Experience that a thing is\nfor the most part so, produce Confidence.\n\nThe NEXT DEGREE OF PROBABILITY is, when I find by my own experience, and\nthe agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most\npart so, and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and\nundoubted witnesses: v.g. history giving us such an account of men in\nall ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to\nobserve, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to\nthe public: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius\ndid so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has a\nsufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call\nCONFIDENCE.\n\n\n8. III. Fair Testimony, and the Nature of the Thing indifferent, produce\nunavoidable Assent.\n\nIn things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or\nthat way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c.,\nwhen any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent\ntestimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is also\nUNAVOIDABLE. Thus: that there is such a city in Italy as Rome: that\nabout one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man,\ncalled Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle\nagainst another, called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thing\nthere be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians of\ncredit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing\nit, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of\nhis own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.\n\n\n9. Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of\nProbability.\n\nThus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds\ncarries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the\njudgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a\ndemonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty\nis, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of\nhistory and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with\none another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are\nrequired, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the\ndifferent evidence and probability of the thing: which rises and\nfalls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. COMMON\nOBSERVATION IN LIKE CASES, and PARTICULAR TESTIMONIES IN THAT PARTICULAR\nINSTANCE, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great\nvariety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different\nqualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c., of the reporters,\nthat it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees\nwherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, That\nas the arguments and proofs PRO and CON, upon due examination, nicely\nweighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon\nthe whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate on\neither side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different\nentertainments, as we call BELIEF, CONJECTURE, GUESS, DOUBT, WAVERING,\nDISTRUST, DISBELIEF, &c.\n\n\n10. Traditional Testimonies, the further removed the less their Proof\nbecomes.\n\nThis is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use\nof: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a\nrule observed in the law of England; which is, That though the attested\ncopy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, ever so well\nattested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a\nproof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable,\nand suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after\nmaterial truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it.\nThis practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong,\ncarries this observation along with it, viz. THAT ANY TESTIMONY, THE\nFURTHER OFF IT IS FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUTH, THE LESS FORCE AND PROOF IT\nHAS. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the\noriginal truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good\nproof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report,\nthe testimony is weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of an\nhearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each\nremove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition\nhas successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does\nit receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of:\nbecause I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised,\nwho look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand\nyears since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first\nvoucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond\nall question, only because several have since, from him, said it one\nafter another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or\ndoubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of\nprobability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or\ndeserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are\nthought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable.\n\n\n11. Yet History is of great Use.\n\nI would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of HISTORY: it\nis all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great\npart of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think\nnothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more\nof them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say,\nThat no probability can rise higher than its first original. What has no\nother evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand\nor fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and\nthough cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so\nfar from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker.\nPassion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand\nodd reasons, or capricios, men's minds are acted by, (impossible to\nbe discovered,) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning\nwrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers,\ncannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where the\noriginals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of\nquotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was\naffirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in\nfuture ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is from\nthe original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the\nmouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom\nhe received it.\n\n\n12. Secondly, In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the\ngreat Rule of Probability.\n\n[SECONDLY], The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such\nas concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observation\nand testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which men\nentertain opinions with variety of assent, though THE THINGS BE SUCH,\nTHAT FALLING NOT UNDER THE REACH OF OUR SENSES, THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF\nTESTIMONY. Such are, 1. The existence, nature and operations of finite\nimmaterial beings without us; as spirits, angels, devils, &c. Or the\nexistence of material beings which, either for their smallness in\nthemselves or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of--as,\nwhether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in\nthe planets, and other mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerning\nthe manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature: wherein,\nthough we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we\nperceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We see animals\nare generated, nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron; and the\nparts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us\nboth light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know: but the\ncauses that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only\nguess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not within\nthe scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested\nby anybody; and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they\nmore or less agree to truths that are established in our minds, and as\nthey hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation.\nANALOGY in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from that\nalone we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus, observing that the\nbare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat,\nand very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we call\nHEAT and FIRE consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible\nminute parts of the burning matter. Observing likewise that the\ndifferent refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the\ndifferent appearances of several colours; and also, that the different\nranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies, as of\nvelvet, watered silk, &c., does the like, we think it probable that\nthe COLOUR and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different\narrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus,\nfinding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human observation,\nthat there is A GRADUAL CONNEXION OF ONE WITH ANOTHER, WITHOUT ANY GREAT\nOR DISCERNIBLE GAPS BETWEEN, IN ALL THAT GREAT VARIETY OF THINGS WE SEE\nIN THE WORLD, which are so closely linked together, that, in the several\nranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them; we\nhave reason to be persuaded that, BY SUCH GENTLE STEPS, things ascend\nupwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to say where\nsensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end:\nand who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is\nthe lowest species of living things, and which the first of those which\nhave no life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as\nthe quantity does in a regular cone; where, though there be a manifest\nodds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet the\ndifference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is\nhardly discernible. The difference is exceeding great between some men\nand some animals: but if we will compare the understanding and abilities\nof some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it\nwill be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or larger.\nObserving, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those\nparts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of analogy may make\nit probable, that it is so also in things above us and our observation;\nand that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in\nseveral degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite\nperfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences, that are\nevery one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of\nprobability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the\nrise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning\nfrom analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful\nproductions, which would otherwise lie concealed.\n\n\n13. One Case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.\n\nThough the common experience and the ordinary course of things have\njustly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or\nrefuse credit to anything proposed to their belief; yet there is one\ncase, wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to\na fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are\nsuitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the course\nof nature, there, UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, that may be the fitter to\nprocure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to\nordinary observation. This is the proper case of MIRACLES, which, well\nattested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other\ntruths, which need such confirmation.\n\n\n14. The bare Testimony of Divine Revelation is the highest Certainty.\n\nBesides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of\npropositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent, upon bare\ntestimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common\nexperience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof\nis, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be\ndeceived: and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurance\nbeyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar\nname, REVELATION, and our assent to it, FAITH, which [as absolutely\ndetermines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering,] as our\nknowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can\nwhether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and\nsure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room\nfor doubt or hesitation. ONLY WE MUST BE SURE THAT IT BE A DIVINE\nREVELATION, AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND IT RIGHT: else we shall expose\nourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of\nwrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not DIVINE\nrevelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally\nno higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is\nthe meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of\nits being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on\nprobable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or\ndiffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the\nproofs. But of FAITH, and the precedency it ought to have before other\narguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter; where I treat of\nit as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason; though in\ntruth it be nothing else but AN ASSENT FOUNDED ON THE HIGHEST REASON.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII. OF REASON\n\n\n1. Various Significations of the word Reason.\n\nTHE word REASON in the English language has different significations:\nsometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear\nand fair deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause,\nand particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of\nit here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as\nit stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed\nto be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much\nsurpasses them.\n\n\n2. Wherein Reasoning consists.\n\nIf general knowledge, as has been shown, consists in a perception of the\nagreement or disagreement of our own ideas, and the knowledge of\nthe existence of all things without us (except only of a God, whose\nexistence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from\nhis own existence), be had only by our senses, what room is there\nfor the exercise of any other faculty, but OUTWARD SENSE and INWARD\nPERCEPTION? What need is there of REASON? Very much: both for the\nenlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath to\ndo both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all\nour other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz.\nSAGACITY and ILLATION. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so\norders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there is\nin each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and\nthereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is\nthat which we call ILLATION or INFERENCE, and consists in nothing but\nthe perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in each step\nof the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain\nagreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in\nwhich it arrives at KNOWLEDGE; or their probable connexion, on which it\ngives or withholds its assent, as in OPINION. Sense and intuition reach\nbut a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon\ndeductions and intermediate ideas: and in those cases where we are fain\nto substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for\ntrue, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out,\nexamine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both these\ncases, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them,\nto discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is\nthat which we call REASON. For, as reason perceives the necessary and\nindubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in\neach step of any demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewise\nperceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to\nanother, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent\ndue. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason.\nFor where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion, where it\ndoes not discern whether there be any such connexion or no; there men's\nopinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason,\nbut the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all\nadventures, without choice and without direction.\n\n\n3. Reason in its four degrees.\n\nSo that we may in REASON consider these FOUR DEGREES: the first and\nhighest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, the\nregular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear\nand fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily\nperceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth,\na making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in\nany mathematical demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the\nconnexion of each part, as the demonstration is made by another; another\nto perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third,\nto make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something\ndifferent from all these, to have first found out these intermediate\nideas or proofs by which it is made.\n\n\n4. Whether Syllogism is the great Instrument of Reason.\n\nThere is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning\nreason; and that is, whether SYLLOGISM, as is generally thought, be\nthe proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this\nfaculty. The causes I have to doubt are these:--\n\n\nFirst Cause to doubt this.\n\nFIRST, Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the\nforementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the CONNEXION OF THE\nPROOFS in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great\nuse, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it really is, as\neasily, nay, perhaps better, without it.\n\nMen can reason well who cannot make a Syllogism.\n\nIf we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we\nreason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the\nproof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And\ntherefore we may take notice, that there are many men that reason\nexceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He\nthat will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason\nthere perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism,\nnor can reduce any one argument to those forms: [and I believe scarce\nany one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself.] Indeed syllogism\nis made use of, on occasion, to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical\nflourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping an\nabsurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its naked\ndeformity. But the mind is not taught to reason by these rules; it has a\nnative faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas,\nand can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions. Tell\na country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather\nlowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not\nsafe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: she\nclearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. south-west wind,\nand clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death,\nwithout tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters\nof several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds\nfrom one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the\nprobability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native\nstate would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and\nproposed in MODE and FIGURE. For it very often confounds the connexion;\nand, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations,\nthat the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without\nsyllogism.\n\n\nSecondly, Because though syllogism serves to show the force or fallacy\nof an argument, made use of in the usual way of discoursing, BY\nSUPPLYING THE ABSENT PROPOSITION, and so, setting it before the view\nin a clear light; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of\nobscure, equivocal, and fallacious terms, wherewith this artificial way\nof reasoning always abounds: it being adapted more to the attaining of\nvictory in dispute than the discovery and confirmation of truth in fair\nenquiries.\n\n\n5. Syllogism helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.\n\nBut however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is OF FAR\nLESS, OR NO USE AT ALL IN PROBABILITIES. For the assent there being\nto be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the\nproofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to\nassist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with one\nassumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it has\nled the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and,\nforcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled\nperhaps, and, as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without\nallowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps, requisite to\nshow on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability.\n\n\n6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but to fence with the Knowledge\nwe suppose we have.\n\nBut let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their\nerrors and mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the man that was forced\nout of his opinion by dint of syllogism,) yet still it fails our reason\nin that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its\nhardest task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is\nTHE FINDING OUT OF PROOFS, AND MAKING NEW DISCOVERIES. The rules of\nsyllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas\nthat may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning\ndiscovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the\nold ones we have already. The forty-seventh proposition of the first\nbook of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing\nto any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able to\nprove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then\na man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out\nthose ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of\nknowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced.\nSyllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge\nwe have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employ\nhis reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who,\nhaving got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it\nbeaten up all into swords, and put it into his servants' hands to fence\nwith and bang one another. Had the King of Spain employed the hands of\nhis people, and his Spanish iron so, he had brought to light but little\nof that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America.\nAnd I am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of his\nreason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of\nthat mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses\nof nature; and which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as it\nformerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common\nstock of mankind, rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict\nrules of MODE and FIGURE.\n\n\n7. Other Helps to reason than Syllogism should be sought.\n\nI doubt not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist\nour reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker\nencourages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. 1. i. Section 6, speaks\nthus: 'If there might be added the right helps of true art and learning,\n(which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying\nthe name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor generally regard,)\nthere would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of\njudgment between men therewith inured, and that which men now are, as\nbetween men that are now, and innocents.' I do not pretend to have found\nor discovered here any of those 'right helps of art,' this great man of\ndeep thought mentions: but that is plain, that syllogism, and the logic\nnow in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those\nhe means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps something\nout of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shall\nhave given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries, and\nto seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art, which will\nscarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to\nthe rules and dictates of others. For beaten tracks lead this sort of\ncattle, (as an observing Roman calls them,) whose thoughts reach only to\nimitation, NON QUO EUNDUM EST, SED QUO ITUR. But I can be bold to say,\nthat this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and\nlargeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on\nthis subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of\nknowledge.\n\n\n8. We can reason about Particulars; and the immediate object of all our\nreasonings is nothing but particular ideas.\n\nHaving here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use\nof it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit,\nbefore I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in\nthe rules of syllogism: viz. that no syllogistical reasoning can be\nright and conclusive, but what has at least one GENERAL proposition in\nit. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars:\nwhereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object\nof all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every\nman's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his\nown mind; which are truly, every one of them, particular existences: and\nour knowledge and reason about other things, is only as they correspond\nwith those our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement\nor disagreement of our particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of all\nour knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only\nin this, that the particular ideas about which it is are such as more\nthan one particular, thing can correspond with and be represented by.\nBut the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular\nideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain,\nwhether either, or both, or neither of those ideas, be capable of\nrepresenting more real beings than one, or no.\n\n\n9. Our Reason often fails us.\n\nREASON, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth,\nelevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the\nvast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric, yet it comes far\nshort of the real extent of even corporeal being. And there are many\ninstances wherein it fails us: as,\n\n\nFirst, In cases when we have no Ideas.\n\nI. It perfectly fails us, where our ideas fail. It neither does nor can\nextend itself further than they do. And therefore, wherever we have no\nideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our reckoning: and\nif at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas,\nit is only about those sounds, and nothing else.\n\n\n10. Secondly, Because our Ideas are often obscure or imperfect.\n\nII. Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss, because of the obscurity,\nconfusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there\nwe are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any\nperfect idea of the LEAST EXTENSION OF MATTER, nor of INFINITY, we are\nat a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear,\nand distinct ideas of NUMBER, our reason meets with none of those\ninextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any\ncontradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the\noperations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought how\nthe mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the\noperation of God, run into great difficulties about FREE CREATED AGENTS,\nwhich reason cannot well extricate itself out of.\n\n\n11. III. Thirdly, Because we perceive not intermediate Ideas to show\nconclusions.\n\nOur reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas,\nwhich could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or\ndisagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's faculties\nfar outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of\nhuman sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of\nthe demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear\nto think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than\nhuman.\n\n\n12. IV. Fourthly, Because we often proceed upon wrong Principles.\n\nThe mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in\nabsurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions,\nwithout knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to\nimplore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and\nreject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from\nclearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations\nbrings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more,\nand engages him deeper in perplexities.\n\n\n13. V. Fifthly, Because we often employ doubtful Terms.\n\nAs obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the\nsame ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses\nand arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and\nbring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and not\nthe fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless\nobvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are\neverywhere observable.\n\n\n14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning.\n\nSome of the ideas that are in the mind, are so there, that they can be\nby themselves immediately compared one with another: and in these the\nmind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that\nit has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is less\nthan the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and\nthis, therefore, as has been said, I call INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE; which is\ncertain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any;\nthis being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the\nevidence of all those MAXIMS which nobody has any doubt about, but every\nman (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) KNOWS to be true, as\nsoon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of\nand assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty,\nNO NEED OF REASONING, but they are known by a superior and higher degree\nof evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to\nthink that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect\nshall have, in a future state, of thousands of things which now either\nwholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short-sighted reason\nhaving got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.\n\n\n15. The next is got by Reasoning.\n\nBut though we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, some\nsparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such,\nthat we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate\ncomparing them. And in all these we have NEED OF REASONING, and must, by\ndiscourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these there are\ntwo sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again:--\n\n\nFirst, through Reasonings that are Demonstrative.\n\nFirst, Those whose agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seen\nby an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the\nintervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In this\ncase, when the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea, on\nboth sides, with those which we would compare, is PLAINLY DISCERNED:\nthere it amounts to DEMONSTRATION whereby knowledge is produced, which,\nthough it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear\nas intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple\nintuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt:\nthe truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true,\nthere is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be\na remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or\nintermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare\nit with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of\nthe mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the\nideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and\nretained in the memory, just as it is; and the mind must be sure that\nno part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or\noverlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too\nhard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive,\nand exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even\nthose who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain\nsometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one\nreview before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind\nclearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with\nanother, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c., there the\nagreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces\ncertain knowledge; which may be called RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, as the other\nis intuitive.\n\n\n16. Secondly, to supply the narrowness of Demonstrative and Intuitive\nKnowledge we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning.\n\nSecondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can no\notherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not\na certain agreement with the extremes, but an USUAL or LIKELY one:\nand in these is that the JUDGMENT is properly exercised; which is the\nacquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with\nsuch probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge,\nno, not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the\nintermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the\nprobability is so clear and strong, that ASSENT as necessarily follows\nit, as KNOWLEDGE does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the\njudgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and\nweight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together,\nchoose that side which has the overbalance.\n\n\n17. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.\n\nINTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement or\ndisagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.\n\nRATIONAL KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement or\ndisagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other\nideas.\n\nJUDGMENT is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree,\nby the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or\ndisagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be\nFREQUENT and USUAL.\n\n\n18. Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.\n\nThough the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences\nin WORDS, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually\nemployed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is THE FINDING\nTHE AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF TWO IDEAS ONE WITH ANOTHER, BY THE\nINTERVENTION OF A THIRD. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of\nthe same length, which could not be brought together to measure their\nequality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs\nof such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we\nobserve it only by our ideas.\n\n\n19. Four sorts of Arguments.\n\nBefore we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to\nreflect on FOUR SORTS OF ARGUMENTS, that men, in their reasonings with\nothers, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at\nleast so to awe them as to silence their opposition.\n\n\nFirst, Argumentum ad verecundiam.\n\nI. The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning,\neminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled\ntheir reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When\nmen are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach\nof modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the\nauthority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be\ncensured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not\nreadily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to\nbe received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon\nas insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against\nthe current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against\nthat of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs\nhis tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the\ncause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out\nagainst them. This I think may be called ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM.\n\n\n20. Secondly, Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.\n\nII. Secondly, Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and\nforce them to submit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate,\nis to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to\nassign a better. And this I call ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM.\n\n\n21. Thirdly, Argumentum ad hominem.\n\nIII. Thirdly, A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from\nhis own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name\nof ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.\n\n\n22. Fourthly, Argumentum ad justicium. The Fourth alone advances us in\nknowledge and judgment.\n\nIV. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations\nof knowledge or probability. This I call ARGUMENTUM AD JUSTICIUM. This\nalone, of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances us\nin our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to\nbe right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that\nof conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to\nbe in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because\nI know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the\nright way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be\nmodest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may be\nignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and\nanother may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the\nreception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs\nand arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves,\nand not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error.\n\n\n23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason.\n\nBy what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make some\nguess at the distinction of things, into those that are according\nto, above, and contrary to reason. 1. ACCORDING TO REASON are such\npropositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those\nideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction\nfind to be true or probable. 2. ABOVE REASON are such propositions whose\ntruth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles.\n3. CONTRARY TO REASON are such propositions as are inconsistent with or\nirreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of\none God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God,\ncontrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. ABOVE\nREASON also may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signifying\nabove probability, or above certainty: and in that large sense also,\nCONTRARY TO REASON, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.\n\n\n24. Reason and Faith not opposite, for Faith must be regulated by\nReason.\n\nThere is another use of the word REASON, wherein it is OPPOSED TO FAITH:\nwhich, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet\ncommon use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose\nor hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice,\nthat, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm\nassent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be\nafforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to\nit. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in\nlove with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays\nthe obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning\nfaculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He\nthat does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights\non truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether\nthe luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his\nproceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for\nwhatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light\nand faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth\nby those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing\nhis duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he\nwill not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and\nplaces it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes\nor disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise,\ntransgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which\nwere given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer\nevidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some\nmen opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nOF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.\n\n\n1. Necessary to know their boundaries.\n\nIt has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want\nknowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant,\nand want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want\ncertain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined\nspecific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in\nmatters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of\nother men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I\nthink we may come to lay down THE MEASURES AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAITH\nAND REASON: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of\ngreat disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes\nin the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by\nreason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to\nconvince one another in matters of religion.\n\n\n2. Faith and Reason, what, as contradistingushed.\n\nI find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it\ngladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith,\nand above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one,\nor ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without\nsetting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to\nbe the first point established in all questions where faith has anything\nto do.\n\nREASON, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to FAITH, I take to be\nthe discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or\ntruths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas,\nwhich it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation\nor reflection.\n\nFAITH, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus\nmade out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of\nthe proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of\ncommunication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call\nREVELATION.\n\n\n3. First, No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation.\n\nFIRST, Then I say, that NO MAN INSPIRED BY GOD CAN BY ANY REVELATION\nCOMMUNICATE TO OTHERS ANY NEW SIMPLE IDEAS WHICH THEY HAD NOT BEFORE\nFROM SENSATION OR REFLECTION. For, whatsoever impressions he himself may\nhave from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new\nsimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any\nother signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no\nother ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of\nusing them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent\nideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words, seen or\nheard, recal to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been\nwont to be signs of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and\nformerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs; which\ncannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea\nat all.\n\nThus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt up\ninto the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there received, all\nthe description he can make to others of that place, is only this, That\nthere are such things, 'as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath\nit entered into the heart of man to conceive.' And supposing God should\ndiscover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting,\nfor example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be\nsuch, nobody can deny,) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind\nthe ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense: he could no more, by\nwords, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that\nsixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the\nsound of words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect,\nhad always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas,\nthen, which are the foundation, and sole matter of all our notions and\nknowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural\nfaculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from\ntraditional revelation. I say, TRADITIONAL REVELATION, in distinction to\nORIGINAL REVELATION. By the one, I mean that first impression which is\nmade immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set\nany bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others\nin words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to\nanother.\n\n\n4. Secondly, Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions\nknowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reason\ndoth.\n\nSECONDLY, I say that THE SAME TRUTHS MAY BE DISCOVERED, AND CONVEYED\nDOWN FROM REVELATION, WHICH ARE DISCERNABLE TO US BY REASON, AND BY\nTHOSE IDEAS WE NATURALLY MAY HAVE. So God might, by revelation, discover\nthe truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural\nuse of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all\nthings of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God\nhaving furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the\nknowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery\nof, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always\nbe certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by TRADITIONAL\nREVELATION. For the knowledge we have that this revelation came at first\nfrom God, can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear\nand distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own\nideas: v.g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles\nof a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth\nof that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was\nrevealed: but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the\nknowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two\nright angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in\nmatter of fact knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is\nconveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and\nyet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of\nthe flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had\nhe then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than\nthat of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses\ninspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that\nbook as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its\nbeing a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.\n\n\n5. Even Original Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidence\nof Reason.\n\nIn propositions, then, whose certainty is built upon the clear\nperception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained\neither by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or\nby evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the\nassistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce\nthem into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle\nthem there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we\ncan possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals it\nto us: and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge\nis, that it IS a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can,\nunder that title, shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationally\nprevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to\nthe clear evidence of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of\nour faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if\nequal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive\nfor a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct\nknowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree,\nand the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can\nnever assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two\ndistant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of\na divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not\nourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand it\nright; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive\nknowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in\ntwo places at once. And therefore NO PROPOSITION CAN BE RECEIVED FOR\nDIVINE REVELATION, OR OBTAIN THE ASSENT DUE TO ALL SUCH, IF IT BE\nCONTRADICTORY TO OUR CLEAR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Because this would be to\nsubvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and\nassent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth\nand falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if\ndoubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what\nwe certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In\npropositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement\nor disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as\nmatters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other\ntitle whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that\ncontradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on the\ntestimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us:\nyet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine\nrevelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength of\nthe certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which,\nin this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our\nknowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz.\nthat we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful\nAuthor of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the\nprinciples and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render all\nour faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his\nworkmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he\nwill have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For\nif the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear)\nevidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the\nprinciples of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the\nclear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose\nrevelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.\n\n\n6. Traditional Revelation much less.\n\nThus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in\nimmediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to\nhimself. But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but\nare required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to\nothers, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are\nconveyed down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is that\nonly which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only\ndivine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called\ncommonly DIVINE FAITH), has to do with no propositions, but those which\nare supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who\nmake revelation alone the sole object of faith can say, That it is a\nmatter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such\na proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine\ninspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that\nbook, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation,\nthe believing, or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of\ndivine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason;\nand such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason,\nwhich can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary\nto itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to\nthat which to itself appears unreasonable.\n\nIn all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas,\nand those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the\nproper judge; and revelation, though it may, in consenting with it,\nconfirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees:\nnor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of\nreason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is\nmatter of faith: which can have no authority against the plain and clear\ndictates of reason.\n\n\n7. Thirdly, things above Reason are, when revealed, the proper matter of\nfaith.\n\nBut, THIRDLY, There being many things wherein we have very imperfect\nnotions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or\nfuture existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no\nknowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural\nfaculties, and ABOVE REASON, are, when revealed, THE PROPER MATTER OF\nFAITH. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby\nlost their first happy state: and that the dead shall rise, and live\nagain: these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are\npurely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do.\n\n\n8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are Matter of Faith; and must\ncarry it against probable conjectures of Reason.\n\nBut since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied\nup his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of\nrevelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are\nable to give a probable determination; REVELATION, where God has been\npleased to give it, MUST CARRY IT AGAINST THE PROBABLE CONJECTURES OF\nREASON. Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does\nnot evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears\nin it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is\nsatisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But\nyet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being\na revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is\ndelivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which is\ncontrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge\nthe mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be\nhearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since a man can never\nhave so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradicts\nthe clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely\nrevealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is\ndelivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to\nconsider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it,\nwithout examination, as a matter of faith.\n\n\n9. Revelation in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably,\nought to be hearkened to.\n\nFirst, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its\nnatural faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of\nfaith, and above reason.\n\nSecondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural\nfaculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired\nideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that, in those\nconcerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded\nof their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a\npossibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the\ncertain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of\nall reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation\nought to determine our assent, even against probability. For where the\nprinciples of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly\ntrue or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and\nground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, and\nbe also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being\nable to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination\nwhere reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the\ntruth lay.\n\n\n10. In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge, that is to be\nhearkened to.\n\nThus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or\nhindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and\nimproved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal fountain\nof all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt\ncan be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be\na DIVINE revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the\nmind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident,\nnor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and\ncertainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is\nof divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we\nunderstand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles of\nreason: and therefore NOTHING THAT IS CONTRARY TO, AND INCONSISTENT\nWITH, THE CLEAR AND SELF-EVIDENT DICTATES OF REASON, HAS A RIGHT TO BE\nURGED OR ASSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF FAITH, WHEREIN REASON HATH NOTHING\nTO DO. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our\nopinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with\nfull assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes\nnot away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the foundations\nof reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were\ngiven us.\n\n\n11. If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm\nor Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.\n\nIf the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these\nboundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at\nall; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found\nin the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed.\nFor, to this crying up of faith in OPPOSITION to reason, we may, I\nthink, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all\nthe religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been\nprincipled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the\nthings of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and\nthe very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies\nand natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange\nopinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man\ncannot but stand amazed, at their follies, and judge them so far from\nbeing acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid\nthinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that,\nin effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts,\nand ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above\nbrutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more\nsenseless than beasts themselves. CREDO, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE EST: I\nbelieve, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a\nsally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their\nopinions or religion by.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nOF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.\n\n\n1. Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to\nprobability.\n\nKNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR is\nnot a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving\nassent to that which is not true.\n\nBut if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive\nof our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is\nlaid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TO\nGIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBABILITY. For there is nothing more\ncommon than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that\none man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third\nsteadfastly believes and firmly adheres to.\n\nThe reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may\nall be reduced to these four:\n\nI. WANT OF PROOFS.\n\nII. WANT OF ABILITY TO USE THEM.\n\nIII. WANT OF WILL TO SEE THEM.\n\nIV. WRONG MEASURES OF PROBABILITY.\n\n\n2. First cause of Error, Want of Proofs.\n\nFIRST, By WANT OF PROOFS, I do not mean only the want of those proofs\nwhich are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want\neven of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus\nmen want proofs, who have not the convenience or opportunity to make\nexperiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any\nproposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect\nthe testimonies of others: and in this state are the greatest part of\nmankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of\ntheir mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions\nfor living. These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are\ncommonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but\nlittle instructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to\nstill the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children.\nIt is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a\nlaborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things done\nin the world than a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards and\nbackwards in a narrow lane and dirty road, only to market, should be\nskilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible,\nthat he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunity\nof conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collect\nthose testimonies and observations which are in being, and are necessary\nto make out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societies\nof men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of\nassurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them is\nthought necessary. So that a great part of mankind are, by the natural\nand unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of\nhuman affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those\nproofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those\nopinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means\nof living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and\nlaborious inquiries.\n\n\n3. Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs? Answered.\n\nWhat shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the\nnecessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance, in\nthose things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of those\nit is obvious to inquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but\naccident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or\nmisery? Are the current opinions, and licensed guides of every country\nsufficient evidence and security to every man to venture his great\nconcernments on; nay, his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can those\nbe the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which\nteach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor\ncountryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born in\nItaly; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the\nill-luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of\nthese things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men must\nallow one or other of these to be true, (let them choose which they\nplease,) or else grant that God has furnished men with faculties\nsufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but\nseriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them\nthe leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the\nmeans of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul,\nand inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this\nas they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved\nto the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might\nbe husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.\n\n\n4. People hindered from Inquiry.\n\nBesides those whose improvements and informations are straitened by\nthe narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness of\nfortune would plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites for\nclearing of doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped in\nclose, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those\nwhose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they\nshould believe the less in them. These are as far, nay further, from\nthe liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than these poor and\nwretched labourers we before spoke of: and however they may seem high\nand great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that\nwhich should be the freest part of man, their understandings. This is\ngenerally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken\nto propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a\nventure, to be of the religion of the country; and must therefore\nswallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric's pills, without\nknowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothing\nto do but believe that they will do the cure: but in this are much\nmore miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse\nswallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to choose the\nphysician, to whose conduct they would trust themselves.\n\n\n5. Second Cause of Error, Want of skill to use Proofs.\n\nSECONDLY, Those who WANT SKILL TO USE THOSE EVIDENCES THEY HAVE OF\nPROBABILITIES; who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads;\nnor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies,\nmaking every circumstance its due allowance; may be easily misled to\nassent to positions that are not probable. There are some men of one,\nsome but of two syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance\none step further. These cannot always discern that side on which the\nstrongest proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in itself is\nthe more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference between\nmen, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody, who has had any\nconversation with his neighbours, will question: though he never was at\nWestminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at Alms-houses\nor Bedlam on the other. Which great difference in men's intellectuals,\nwhether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly\nadapted to thinking; or in the dulness or untractableness of those\nfaculties for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural differences\nof men's souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters\nnot here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of\ndegrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to so\ngreat a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm,\nthat there is a greater distance between some men and others in this\nrespect, than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about\nis a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our\npresent purpose.\n\n\n6. Third cause of Error, Want of Will to use them.\n\nTHIRDLY, There are another sort of people that want proofs, not because\nthey are out of their reach, but BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT USE THEM: who,\nthough they have riches and leisure enough, and want neither parts nor\nlearning, may yet, through their hot pursuit of pleasure, or business,\nor else out of laziness or fear that the doctrines whose truth they\nwould inquire into would not suit well with their opinions, lives or\ndesigns, may never come to the knowledge of, nor give their assent to,\nthose possibilities which lie so much within their view, that, to be\nconvinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. We know some\nmen will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; and many\nmen forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their\nestates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good\nposture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve\ntheir understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I\ncannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who\nlay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of\nit to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to\nappear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves\nmiserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly\nsuffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse\npatches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their\ncountry tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed\nwith) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this\nis for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in\nit, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take\nnotice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of\nknowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to\nknow. But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call\nthemselves gentlemen, That, however they may think credit, respect,\npower, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet\nthey will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower\ncondition, who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will\nalways be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he\nis certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his\nunderstanding. In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been\nshown of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable doctrines\nare not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons\nwhich are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have\nconsidered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not\nappear to him who embraces the error.\n\n\n7. Fourth cause of Error, Wrong Measures of Probability: which are--\n\nFOURTHLY, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real\nprobabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit\nof the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either\nsuspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion. And\nto this danger are those exposed who have taken up WRONG MEASURES OF\nPROBABILITY, which are:\n\nI. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE IN THEMSELVES CERTAIN AND EVIDENT, BUT DOUBTFUL\nAND FALSE, TAKEN UP FOR PRINCIPLES.\n\nII. RECEIVED HYPOTHESES.\n\nIII. PREDOMINANT PASSIONS OR INCLINATIONS.\n\nIV. AUTHORITY.\n\n\n8. I. Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.\n\nThe first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything\nhas to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge which\nwe have embraced, and continue to look on as PRINCIPLES. These have so\ngreat an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we\njudge of truth, and measure probability; to that degree, that what is\ninconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable\nwith us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to\nthese principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all\nother, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of\nour own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything\ncontrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of INNATE\nPRINCIPLES, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has\ncontributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that\none truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to\nsay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a\nprinciple, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it\nto be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only with\nassurance believe it to be so, upon the authority of others. For he\nhath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably\nmisguide his assent, who hath imbibed WRONG PRINCIPLES, and has blindly\ngiven himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently\ntrue.\n\n\n9. Instilled in childhood.\n\nThere is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their\nminds propositions (especially about matters of religion) from their\nparents, nurses, or those about them: which being insinuated into their\nunwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are\nat last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and\neducation, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men,\nwhen they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding\nthose of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very\nmemories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means\nthey got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not\nto suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: they look on\nthem as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God\nhimself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood,\nand the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of\ncontroversies.\n\n\n10. Of irresistible efficacy.\n\nThis opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once\nestablished in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception\nany proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall\ninvalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal\noracles; whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but\nagreeable to such principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested.\nThe great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite\ncontrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various\nreligions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable\nconsequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional\nprinciples. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the\nevidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather\nthan admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an\nintelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his\nunderstanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. that\nhe must believe as the church (i.e. those of his communion) believes,\nor that the pope is infallible, and this he never so much as heard\nquestioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other\nprinciples: how is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all\nprobability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of\nTRANSUBSTANTIATION? This principle has such an influence on his mind,\nthat he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And\nwhat way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he\nholds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation\nof reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly\ncall arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let an\nenthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and acted\nby an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain\nbring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever,\ntherefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things\ninconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent\nand convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to\nthemselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles,\nwhich many never suffer themselves to do.\n\n\n11. Received Hypotheses.\n\nNext to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould, and\nfashioned just to the size of a received HYPOTHESIS. The difference\nbetween these and the former, is, that they will admit of matter of\nfact, and agree with dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning of\nreasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that\nopen defiance with their senses, with the former: they can endure to\nhearken to their information a little more patiently; but will by no\nmeans admit of their reports in the explanation of things; nor be\nprevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them that things\nare not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed\nwithin themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing\nfor a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to\nhave his authority of forty years standing, wrought out of hard rock,\nGreek and Latin, with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmed\nby general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned\nby an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to\nconfess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error\nand mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very\ndear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such\na case? And who ever, by the most cogent arguments, will be prevailed\nwith to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretences\nto knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this time\nbeen labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest afresh of\nnew notions? All the arguments that can be used will be as little able\nto prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak,\nwhich he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis may be\nreduced the errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right\nprinciples, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar\nthan this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, which\nthey all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an\nundeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the\ntext that says,[word in Greek], to carry in it the obligation to a very\nweighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of their practices\nbe, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with one\ntranslation to be, REPENTEZ-VOUS, repent; or with the other, FATIEZ\nPENITENCE, do penance.\n\n\n12. III. Predominant Passions.\n\nProbabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run\nthe same fate. Let ever so much probability hang on one side of a\ncovetous man's reasoning, and money on the other; it is easy to foresee\nwhich will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongest\nbatteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear argument\nmay make some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and keep\nout the enemy, truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a man\npassionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses of\nthe falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words\nof hers shall invalidate all their testimonies. QUOD VOLUMUS, FACILE\nCREDIMUS; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose,\nwhat every one hath more than once experimented: and though men cannot\nalways openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities that\nmake against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it\nis the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more\nprobable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its\ninquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination, as far as\nthe matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until\nthat be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the\nmost apparent probabilities:\n\n\n13. Two Means of evading Probabilities: 1. Supposed Fallacy latent in\nthe words employed.\n\nFirst, That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought\nin words, THERE MAY BE A FALLACY LATENT IN THEM: and the consequences\nbeing, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent.\nThere are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which\nmost men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this\ndoubt; and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of\ndisingenuity or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old\nreply, Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I\nwill not yield.\n\n\n14. Supposed unknown Arguments for the contrary.\n\nSecondly, Manifest probabilities maybe evaded, and the assent withheld,\nupon this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on the\ncontrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary I\nshould yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. This\nis a refuge against conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard to\ndetermine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.\n\n\n15. What Probabilities naturally determine the Assent.\n\nBut yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired\ninto all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to\ninform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on\nboth sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole\nmatter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in\nmatter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so\ncogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal,\nthat he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think we may conclude, that,\nin propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet\nthere are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in\nwords, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary\nside; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions.\nBut where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is\nnot sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words\n(which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally valid\nproofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature\nof the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man;)\nthere, I think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent\nto the side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be\nprobable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often\nfall into a method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent\ndiscourse; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by\nan understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any\nspecies of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that\nconsiders them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all\nwaver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing\nin its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony\nof witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matter\nof fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g. whether there\nwas one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at Rome as Julius\nCaesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational\nman's power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, and\ncloses with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it is\nin man's power to suspend his assent; and perhaps content himself with\nthe proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with his\ninclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that a\nman should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability\nappears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible\nas it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same\ntime.\n\n\n16. Where it is in our Power to suspend our Judgment.\n\nAs knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent\nis no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two\nideas appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of\nreason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than\nI can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on\nin daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I\ncannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our knowledge,\nwhere the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where the\nprobability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the\nmeasures of it: yet we can hinder both KNOWLEDGE and ASSENT, BY STOPPING\nOUR INQUIRY, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth.\nIf it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in any\ncase be a fault. Thus, in some cases we can prevent or suspend our\nassent: but can a man versed in modern or ancient history doubt whether\nthere is such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius\nCaesar? Indeed, there are millions of truths that a man is not, or may\nnot think himself concerned to know; as whether our king Richard the\nThird was crooked or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or\na magician. In these and such like cases, where the assent one way or\nother is of no importance to the interest of any one; no action, no\nconcernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is not\nstrange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, or\nrender itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of so\nlittle weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies\nare very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by chance,\nand the mind lets them float at liberty. But where the mind judges that\nthe proposition has concernment in it: where the assent or not assenting\nis thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and evil to\ndepend on choosing or refusing the right side, and the mind sets itself\nseriously to inquire and examine the probability: there I think it is\nnot in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear\non either. The greater probability, I think, in that case will determine\nthe assent: and a man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be\ntrue, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid\nknowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or disagreement\nof any two ideas.\n\nIf this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of\nprobability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.\n\n\n17. IV. Authority\n\nThe fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of,\nand which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other\ntogether, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I\nmean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either\nof our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no\nother ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning,\nor number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish\nmen could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the\nmultitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the\nattestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of\nformer ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: other\nmen have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is said,)\nand therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more\njustifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up\nby such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many\npoints, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but\nsee the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in\nthe world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it\nwas the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the\ndoctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is\nnot an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground.\nThere is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a\nman shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is\nin the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18.\nNot so many men in Errors as is commonly supposed.\n\nBut, notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors\nand opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, THERE ARE NOT SO\nMANY MEN IN ERRORS AND WRONG OPINIONS AS IS COMMONLY SUPPOSED. Not that\nI think they embrace the truth; but indeed, because concerning those\ndoctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion\nat all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of\nthe partizans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find,\nconcerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any\nopinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think that\nthey took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of\nprobability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or\ninterest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an\narmy, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without\never examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a\nman's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion; for what\nreason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his\nchurch, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that\ndoctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand\nand his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby\napprove himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or\nprotection in that society. Thus men become professors of, and\ncombatants for, those opinions they were never convinced of nor\nproselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads: and\nthough one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions\nin the world than there are, yet this is certain; there are fewer that\nactually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nOF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.\n\n\n1. Science may be divided into three sorts.\n\nAll that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being\neither, FIRST, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their\nrelations, and their manner of operation: or, SECONDLY, that which\nman himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the\nattainment of any end, especially happiness: or, THIRDLY, the ways and\nmeans whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is\nattained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into\nthese three sorts:--\n\n\n2. First, Physica.\n\nFIRST, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings,\nthen constitution, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only\nmatter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures,\nconstitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little more\nenlarged sense of the word, I call [word in Greek: physika], or NATURAL\nPHILOSOPHY. The end of this is bare speculative truth: and whatsoever\ncan afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it\nbe God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any of their affections, as\nnumber, and figure, &c.\n\n\n3. Secondly, Practica.\n\nSECONDLY, [word in Greek: praktika], The skill of right applying our own\npowers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The\nmost considerable under this head is ETHICS, which is the seeking out\nthose rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and\nthe means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation and\nthe knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it.\n\n\n4. Thirdly, [word in Greek: Semeiotika]\n\nTHIRDLY, the third branch may be called [word in Greek: Semeiotika], or\nTHE DOCTRINE OF SIGNS; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly\nenough termed also [word in Greek: Logika], LOGIC: the business whereof\nis to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the\nunderstanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For,\nsince the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself,\npresent to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a\nsign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to\nit: and these are IDEAS. And because the scene of ideas that makes one\nman's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor\nlaid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore\nto communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for\nour own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men\nhave found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are\nARTICULATE SOUNDS. The consideration, then, of IDEAS and WORDS as the\ngreat instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their\ncontemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole\nextent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly\nconsidered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than\nwhat we have been hitherto acquainted with.\n\n\n5. This is the first and most general Division of the Objects of our\nUnderstanding.\n\nThis seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division\nof the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts\nabout nothing, but either, the contemplation of THINGS themselves, for\nthe discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are\nhis own ACTIONS, for the attainment of his own ends; or the SIGNS the\nmind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering\nof them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. THINGS, as\nthey are in themselves knowable; ACTIONS as they depend on us, in order\nto happiness; and the right use of SIGNS in order to knowledge, being\nTOTO COELO different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces\nof the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from\nanother.\n\n\nThe End","title":"An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":124627}