{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10661/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10661","id":"gutenberg_10661","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10661","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical Antiquity","Philosophy -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS WITH THE ENCHEIRIDION\n\nTRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n EPICTETUS (BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE).\n A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.\n THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL.\n\n\n\n\nEPICTETUS.\n\n\nVery little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a\nnative of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a\nbranch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the\nepistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv., 13); from which\nit has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis\nin the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is\nunknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a\nslave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman\nof the Emperor Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave\u2019s\nleg by torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of\nSimplicius, the commentator on the Encheiridion, or Manual, who says\nthat Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not\nsaid how he became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times\nthat the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any\nauthority for this statement.\n\nIt may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his\nmaster sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius\nRufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a\nmaster should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher;\nbut Garnier, the author of a \u201cM\u00e9moire sur les Ouvrages d\u2019Epict\u00e8te,\u201d\nexplains this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser.\nGarnier says: \u201cEpictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor\nparents, was indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education\nto the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the\nfirst emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous\nslaves grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same\nway as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a\ngreat cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only\none which can explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus,\nhad received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of\nEpaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot\nsuspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and\nfor his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the\ndebaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave.\u201d\n\nSome writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but I\ncan find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero\nwhen he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable\ntyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton., Domit. 14), afterwards\nput Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude\nthat Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to\nteach at Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by\nDomitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by\nAugustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a\nschool or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old\nman. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as\nwe learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii., ed. Hemsterh., p.\n393). When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him\nto take a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said,\nwas a philosopher\u2019s duty, to leave in place of himself another in the\nuniverse, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then,\nEpictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment., c. 46,\np. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last\nhe took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of\nEpictetus\u2019 friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but\nEpictetus took the child and brought it up.\n\nEpictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was\nwritten\n\nPhotius (Biblioth., 58) mentions among Arrian\u2019s works \u201cConversations\nwith Epictetus,\u201d [Greek: Homiliai Epichtaeton], in twelve books. Upton\nthinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that\nPhotius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a\ndifferent work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight\nbooks of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations.\nSchweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian\non Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works\nby Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read\nthese books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books\nwhich he enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are\nnot certain that there was a work of Arrian entitled \u201cThe Conversations\nof Epictetus.\u201d\n\nUpton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that \u201cthere are\nmany passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather\nconfused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is\nnot expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.\u201d\nThe discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and\nso one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker\n(Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his\nedition) that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure\nthrough the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the\nconnection of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot\nalways understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully,\nand some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he\nwill miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this\ntrouble. Every man must judge for himself. But I should not have\ntranslated the book, if I had not thought it worth study; and I think\nthat all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth\nreading at all.\n\nG.L.\n\n\n\n\nA SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.\n\n\nOF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER.\u2014Of all the\nfaculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not\none which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not\ncapable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic\nart possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about\nwhat is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about\nmelody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But\nwhen you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you\nwhat words you should write; but whether you should write or not,\ngrammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical\nsounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the\nlute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will\ntell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And\nwhat is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only\nfaculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and\nwhat power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all\nother faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden\nthings are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it\nis the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else\njudges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses,\nand points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else.\n\nWhat then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What\nelse than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is\npermitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I\nthen die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I\nmust go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles\nand cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess.\nI will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man,\nwhat are you talking about? Me, in chains? You may fetter my leg, but\nmy will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into\nprison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then\nhave I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the\nthings which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write\ndaily, in which they should exercise themselves.\n\nWhat then did Agrippinus say? He said, \u201cI am not a hindrance to\nmyself.\u201d When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the\nSenate, he said: \u201cI hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour\nof the day\u201d\u2014this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and\nthen take the cold bath,\u2014\u201clet us go and take our exercise.\u201d After he\nhad taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, \u201cYou have been\ncondemned.\u201d \u201cTo banishment,\u201d he replies, \u201cor to death?\u201d \u201cTo\nbanishment.\u201d \u201cWhat about my property?\u201d \u201cIt is not taken from you.\u201d \u201cLet\nus go to Aricia then,\u201d he said, \u201cand dine.\u201d\n\n\nHOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER.\u2014To the\nrational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is\nrational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is\nthat? See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned\nthat whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not\nintolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go\nand hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the\nanimal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational;\nand, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is\nrational.\n\nOnly consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other\nreason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But\nthat which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such\nas are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very\ngreat number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become\nswift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then,\nsince I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I\nhope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not\ninferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I\ndo not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not\nneglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after\nanything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.\n\n\nHOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF\nALL MEN TO THE REST.\u2014If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine\nas he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and\nthat God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would\nnever have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if C\u00e6sar\n(the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and\nif you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet\nwe do not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation\nof man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in\ncommon with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable\nand mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then\nit is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the\nopinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are\nformed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no\nmean or ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is\nquite the contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man,\nwith my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess\nsomething better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that\nwhich is better, and why do you attach yourself to this?\n\nThrough this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become\nlike wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous; some become\nlike lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us\nbecome foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and\nmalignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner\nanimal? See then and take care that you do not become some one of these\nmiserable things.\n\n\nOF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT.\u2014He who is making progress, having learned\nfrom philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and\naversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that\nhappiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by\nnot failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which\nhe would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and\nconfers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are\ndependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent\nof his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something\nwhich he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue\npromises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also\nthe progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things.\nFor it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything\nleads us, progress is an approach towards this point.\n\nHow then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek\nprogress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product\nof virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has\nread many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having\nunderstood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else\nthan knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue\nproduces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is\nanother thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says\none, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you\nare making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock\nthe man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own\nmisfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may\nlearn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your\nwork lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you\nmay not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into\nthat which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you\ncommit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not\ndeceived. The first things, and the most necessary are those which I\nhave named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall\ninto that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving.\n\nDo you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking\nto an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might\nsay, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should\nreply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take\nthe treatise on the active powers ([Greek: hormea]), and see how I have\nstudied it, I reply: Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you\nexercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and\npurpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If\nconformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making\nprogress; but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your\nbooks, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do\nyou not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the\nexpounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for\nthe matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another.\nWhere then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from\nexternals, turns to his own will ([Greek: proairesis]) to exercise it\nand to improve it by labor, so as to make it conformable to nature,\nelevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he\nhas learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in\nhis power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must\nchange with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of\nnecessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure\nor prevent what lie desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in\nthe morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of\nfidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that\noccurs he works out his chief principles ([Greek: ta proaegoumena]) as\nthe runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice\nwith reference to the voice\u2014this is the man who truly makes progress,\nand this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has\nstrained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labors only\nat this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home\nimmediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which\nhe has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study\nhow a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe\nto me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and\ndisappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and\npoison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito,\nif it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to\nsay, Wretched am I, an old man: have I kept my gray hairs for this? Who\nis it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no\nrepute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus\nsay this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the\nperturbations ([Greek: pathae]) of men who value externals exhibited in\nthis kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no\nexternal things which are independent of the will concern us, for my\npart I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live\nhappily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you\nwish.\n\nWhat then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these\nthings are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity\narises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to\nnature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great\ngood fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! To\nTriptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave us\nfood by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to\nlight and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to\nlive, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an\naltar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for\nthis? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to\nthem; but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by\nwhich they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness,\nshall we not thank God for this?\n\n\nAGAINST THE ACADEMICS.\u2014If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident\ntruths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him\nchange his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man\u2019s\nstrength or the teacher\u2019s weakness; for when the man, though he has\nbeen confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to\ndeal with him by argument?\n\nNow there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the\nother of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to\nwhat is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are\nafraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to\navoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul\u2019s mortification. And\nindeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to\napprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad\ncondition; but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we\ncall even power (or strength).\n\n\nOF PROVIDENCE.\u2014From everything, which is or happens in the world, it is\neasy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities: the\nfaculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things,\nand a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities,\none man will not see the use of things which are and which happen:\nanother will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If\nGod had made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what\nwould have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if he had\nmade the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall\nunder the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of\nit? None at all. Well, suppose that he had made both, but had not made\nlight? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it\nthen who has fitted this to that and that to this?\n\nWhat, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only,\nof which the rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find many\ncommon to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is\ndone? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another;\nGod had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of\nus to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for\nthem to eat and to drink, and to copulate, and to do all the other\nthings which they severally do. But for us, to whom he has given also\nthe intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless\nwe act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature\nand constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For\nwhere the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the\nacts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose\nconstitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough; but in an\nanimal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless\nthere be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain\nhis proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be\neaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and\nanother for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to\nunderstand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has\nintroduced man to be a spectator of God and of his works; and not only\na spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful\nfor man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he\nought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us;\nand nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of\nlife conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having\nbeen spectators of these things.\n\nBut you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all\nof you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things.\nBut when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there\nhe has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and\nunderstand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you\nwere born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty\nof sight? But you may say, There are some things disagreeable and\ntroublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not\nscorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without\ncomfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you\nnot abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things? But I\nsuppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of\nthe spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received\nfaculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you\nnot received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have\nyou not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything\nthat can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my\nmind, or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for\nthe purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament\nover what happens?\n\nCome, then, do you also having observed these things look to the\nfaculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring\nnow, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given\nto me by thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which\nhappen. You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that some\nthings will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what\ndoes happen; and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence\nof such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given\nus these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that\nhappens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king\nand a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance,\nsubject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our\nown power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of\nhindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as\nyour own, use them not; you do not even see what you have received, and\nfrom whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even\nacknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit,\nbetaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God.\nYet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of\nsoul and manliness; but what powers you have for finding fault making\naccusations, do you show me.\n\n\nHOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THE\nCONSEQUENCES.\u2014I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here,\nnot to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble\ntalk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any\nyoung men of such a mind, that when they have recognized their kinship\nto God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and\nits possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to\nus for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw\noff these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and\nto depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labor that your teacher and\ninstructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should\nbe. You should come to him and say: Epictetus, we can no longer endure\nbeing bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and giving it drink and\nrest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the\nwishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent and\nnothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner\nkinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the\nplace from which we came; allow us to be released at last from these\nbonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers\nand thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and\nthink that they have some power over us by means of the body and its\npossessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any\nman. And I on my part would say: Friends, wait for God: when he shall\ngive the signal and release you from this service, then go to him; but\nfor the present endure to dwell in this place where he has put you.\nShort indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for\nthose who are so disposed; for what tyrant, or what thief, or what\ncourts of justice are formidable to those who have thus considered as\nthings of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then,\ndo not depart without a reason.\n\n\nOF CONTENTMENT.\u2014With respect to gods, there are some who say that a\ndivine being does not exist; others say that it exists, but is inactive\nand careless, and takes no forethought about anything; a third class\nsay that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about\ngreat things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a\nfourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about\nthings on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and\nnot about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and\nSocrates belong, who say:\n\nI move not without thy knowledge.\u2014Iliad, x., 278.\n\n\nBefore all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of\nthese opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there\nare no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they\nexist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be\nright to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after\nthings, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in\nfact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and\ngood man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind\nto him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the\nstate. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed\nwith this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how\nshall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I\nbecome free? For he is free to whom everything happens according to his\nwill, and whom no man can hinder. What then, is freedom madness?\nCertainly not; for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I\nwould have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I\nlike. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that\nfreedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to\nwish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be\nnot only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the\nmatter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No,\nbut I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And\nhow with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in\nevery art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of\nno value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man\u2019s\nwhim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the\nchief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will\ninconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to\nwish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen?\nAs the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and\nwinter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such\nopposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given\na body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions.\n\nWhat then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce\nwith them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit\nto them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to\nnature? But you are unwilling to endure, and are discontented; and if\nyou are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call\nthem knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and\nchildren, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are alone\nto call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to\nthink yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought\nnot to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and\nassembly, and so accept all contentedly.\n\nWhat then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be\nwhat they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? Let him be\nalone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? Let him be a bad son,\nand lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? Let him be a bad\nfather. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he\nis there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there\nhe is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there\nwillingly. Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of\none poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly\nsurrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not\ngladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and\ndiscontented with the things established by Zeus, which he, with the\nMoirae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your\ngeneration, defined and put in order? Know you not how small a part you\nare compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to\nintelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the\nmagnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height,\nbut by thoughts.\n\n\nHOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS.\u2014When some one asked,\nHow may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered: If he can eat\njustly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately, and\norderly, will it not be also acceptable to the gods? But when you have\nasked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has\nbrought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house,\nthen not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable\nto the gods? How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave?\nSlave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus\nfor his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the\nsame descent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher\nplace, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not\nremember who you are, and whom you rule? That they are kinsmen, that\nthey are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus? But I\nhave purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what\ndirection you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the\npit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? but towards\nthe laws of the gods you are not looking.\n\n\nWHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES.\u2014When a man was consulting him how he should\npersuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied:\nPhilosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If\nit did (or if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing\nsomething which is not within its province. For as the carpenter\u2019s\nmaterial is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of\nthe art of living is each man\u2019s life. When then is my brother\u2019s? That\nagain belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of\nthe external things, like a piece of land, like health, like\nreputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every\ncircumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable\nto nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.\n\nHow then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me\nand I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.\n\nWhen the man who was consulting him said, I seek to know this, How,\neven if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in\na state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is\nproduced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say\nto me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires\ntime: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is\nthen the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour,\nand would you possess the fruit of a man\u2019s mind in so short a time and\nso easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.\n\n\nTHAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS.\u2014Ought\nnot then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means\nsay so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken\nand deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the\nfaculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the\nfaculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If\nyou speak thus you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that\nit is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and\ndeaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest\nthings, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such\nas it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also\nangry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by\nthe bad things of another. Pity him rather; drop this readiness to be\noffended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: \u201cThese\naccursed and odious fellows.\u201d How have you been made so wise at once?\nand how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we\nvalue so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your\nclothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Consider this\nmatter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbor has not; you have a\nwindow; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein\nman\u2019s good consists, but he thinks that it consist in having fine\nclothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and\ntake them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it\nall yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not\nprovoke them; do not have a window; do not air your clothes. I also\nlately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods;\nhearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had\nbeen carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done\nnothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen\nlamp; for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment.\nThe reason is that you had a garment. I have a pain in my head. Have\nyou any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? For we only lose\nthose things, we have only pains about those things, which we possess.\n\nBut the tyrant will chain\u2014what? The leg. He will take away\u2014what? The\nneck. What then will he not chain and not take away? The will. This is\nwhy the ancients taught the maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought to\nexercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed\nto the greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, Alas! I have pain\nin the ear. Do not say alas! And I do not say that you are not allowed\nto groan, but do not groan inwardly; and if your slave is slow in\nbringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, Every\nbody hates me; for who would not hate such a man? For the future,\nrelying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not trusting to\nthe size of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be\ninvincible in the way that an ass is.\n\n\nHOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS.\u2014If a man possesses any superiority, or\nthinks that he does when he does not, such a man, if he is\nuninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance,\nthe tyrant says, I am master of all! And what can you do for me? Can\nyou give me desire which shall have no hindrance? How can you? Have you\nthe infallible power of avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the\npower of moving towards an object without error? And how do you possess\nthis power? Come, when you are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or\nto the helmsman? And when you are in a chariot, to whom do you trust\nbut to the driver? And how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In\nwhat, then, lies your power? All men pay respect to me. Well, I also\npay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it; and for the sake\nof my oil-flask, I drive a peg into the wall. Well, then, are these\nthings superior to me? No, but they supply some of my wants, and for\nthis reason I take care of them. Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I\nnot wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do you not know that every man\nhas regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard to his\nass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become\nlike you? Who imitates you, as he imitates Socrates? But I can cut off\nyour head. You say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to\nyou, as I would to a fever and the bile, and raise an altar to you, as\nthere is at Rome an altar to fever.\n\nWhat is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? Is it the\ntyrant and his guards? (By no means.) I hope that it is not so. It is\nnot possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything\nelse, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man\u2019s\nown opinions which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, I\nwill chain your leg, he who values his leg says, Do not; have pity. But\nhe who values his own will says, If it appears more advantageous to\nyou, chain it. Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I\nam master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free; do you think that\nhe intended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of\nmy carcase; take it. So when you approach me, you have no regard to me?\nNo, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I have\nregard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that\nI have to my pipkin.\n\nWhat then? When absurd notions about things independent of our will, as\nif they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we\nmust of necessity pay regard to tyrants: for I wish that men would pay\nregard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is it\nthat the man becomes all at once wise, when C\u00e6sar has made him\nsuperintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately,\nFelicion spoke sensibly to me? I wish he were ejected from the\nbedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool.\n\nHas a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer their\ncongratulations; one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the slaves\nkiss his hands. He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. He\nascends the Capitol; he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who\never sacrificed for having had good desires? for having acted\nconformably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods for those things\nin which we place our good.\n\nA person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus. I\nsay to him: Man, let the thing alone; you will spend much for no\npurpose. But he replies, Those who draw up agreements will write my\nname. Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such\npersons, It is I whose name is written there? And if you can now be\npresent on ail such occasions, what will you do when you are dead? My\nname will remain. Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come,\nwhat remembrance of you will there be beyond Nicopolis? But I shall\nwear a crown of gold. If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of\nroses and put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance.\n\n\nAGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.\u2014When a man holds his proper\nstation in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do\nyou wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid\nconformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object\nas I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why\nthen do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has\nalways been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who\nfollow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom\nyou wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say\nthat they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?\n\n\nON PR\u00c6COGNITIONS.\u2014Pr\u00e6cognitions are common to all men, and pr\u00e6cognition\nis not contradictory to pr\u00e6cognition. For who of us does not assume\nthat Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we\nought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that\nJustice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction\narise? It arises in the adaptation of the pr\u00e6cognitions to the\nparticular cases. When one man says, \u201cHe has done well; he is a brave\nman,\u201d and another says, \u201cNot so; but he has acted foolishly,\u201d then the\ndisputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the\nSyrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should\nbe preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but\nwhether it is holy to eat pig\u2019s flesh or not holy. You will find this\ndispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What\ndo you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and\nright? \u201cCertainly.\u201d Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit\nthat what is good ought to be done? \u201cI do most certainly.\u201d Adapt your\npr\u00e6cognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins.\nAgamemnon says, \u201cI ought not to give up Chryseis to her father.\u201d\nAchilles says, \u201cYou ought.\u201d It is certain that one of the two makes a\nwrong adaptation of the pr\u00e6cognition of \u201cought\u201d or \u201cduty.\u201d Further,\nAgamemnon says, \u201cThen if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I\ntake his prize from some of you.\u201d Achilles replies, \u201cWould you then\ntake her whom I love?\u201d \u201cYes, her whom you love.\u201d \u201cMust I then be the\nonly man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has\nno prize?\u201d Thus the dispute begins.\n\nWhat then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the\nnatural pr\u00e6cognitions to the particular things conformably to nature;\nand then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but\nothers are not. In our power are will and all acts which depend on the\nwill; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body,\npossessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, all\nwith whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To\nwhat kind of things ([Greek: ousia]) shall we adapt it? To the things\nwhich are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness\nof limb, and life, and are not children and parents and country? Who\nwill tolerate you if you deny this?\n\nLet us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it\npossible, then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good\nthings, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain\ntowards society a proper behavior? He can not. For I am naturally\nformed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an\nestate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbor. If\nit is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it\nfrom the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies,\nconspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards\nZeus? For if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me.\nAnd what is he to me if he cannot help me? And further, what is he to\nme if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to\nhate him. Why then do we build temples, why setup statues to Zeus, as\nwell as to evil demons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour,\nand how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we\nplace the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.\n\nWhat should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who\nis in labor. Now I do not see what the good is nor the bad. Am I not\nmad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things\nwhich depend on the will; all will laugh at me. There will come some\ngreyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his\nhead and say: \u201cHear, my child. It is right that you should\nphilosophize; but you ought to have some brains also; all this that you\nare doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you\nknow how to act better than philosophers do.\u201d Man why then do you blame\nme, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will\nburst. I must speak in this way: \u201cExcuse me, as you would excuse\nlovers; I am not my own master; I am mad.\u201d\n\n\nHOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES.\u2014It is circumstances\n(difficulties) which show what men are. Therefore when a difficulty\nfalls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has\nmatched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why,\nthat you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished\nwithout sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable\ndifficulty than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an\nathlete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now sending a scout\nto Rome; but no man sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a\nnoise and sees a shadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and\nreports that the enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and\ntell us: \u201cFearful is the state of affairs at Rome; terrible is death;\nterrible is exile; terrible is calumny; terrible is poverty; fly, my\nfriends, the enemy is near,\u201d we shall answer: \u201cBegone, prophesy for\nyourself; we have committed only one fault, that we sent such a scout.\u201d\n\nDiogenes, who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report\nto us. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base; he says\nthat fame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy\nsaid about pain, about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be\nnaked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground\nis the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he\naffirms his own courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy\nappearance and compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he\nsays; all is peace. How so, Diogenes? \u201cSee,\u201d he replies, \u201cif I am\nstruck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man.\u201d This is\nwhat a scout ought to be. But you come to us and tell us one thing\nafter another. Will you not go back, and you will see clearer when you\nhave laid aside fear?\n\n\nON THE SAME.\u2014If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are\nnot acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the\nwill, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us,\nwhy are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about\nwhich we have been busied are in no man\u2019s power; and the things which\nare in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have\nwe still?\n\nBut give me directions. Why should I give you directions? Has not Zeus\ngiven you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free\nfrom hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own\nsubject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of\norders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what\nis your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity)\nis your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things\nfrom you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But\nhow do you act? When you seek what is not your own, you lose that which\nis your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind\ndo you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy\nof confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others\nbesides? \u201cWell, but he has not given these orders,\u201d you will say.\nProduce your pr\u00e6cognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), produce these proofs\nof philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what\nyou have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you\nhave meditated on; and you will then see that all these things are from\nGod.\n\nIf I have set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to\nbe a slave; if on my poor possessions, I also make myself a slave. For\nI immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake\ndraws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he\nguards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard,\nthat part your master will attack. Remembering this, whom will you\nstill flatter or fear?\n\nBut I should like to sit where the Senators sit. Do you see that you\nare putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself? How then\nshall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a\nspectator at all, and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give\nyourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over,\nseat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself.\nFor remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves,\nwho put ourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put\nus in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and\nrevile it, and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone,\nwhat profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a\nstepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he\naccomplishes something. Strip him. What do you mean by him? Lay hold of\nhis garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do\nyou.\n\nThis was the practice of Socrates; this was the reason why he always\nhad one face. But we choose to practise and study anything rather than\nthe means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say:\n\u201cPhilosophers talk paradoxes.\u201d But are there no paradoxes in the other\narts? And what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man\u2019s eye in\norder that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the\nsurgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder,\nthen, if in philosophy also many things which are true appear\nparadoxical to the inexperienced?\n\n\nIN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDE\nAGAINST THEM.\u2014Appearances are to us in four ways. For either things\nappear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or\nthey are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to\nbe. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the\nmark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys\n(troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of\nPyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply\nthe remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which\nsome things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a\nremedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek\naid against habit. What aid, then, can we find against habit? The\ncontrary habit. You hear the ignorant say: \u201cThat unfortunate person is\ndead; his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off\nby an untimely death and in a foreign land.\u201d Hear the contrary way of\nspeaking. Tear yourself from these expressions; oppose to one habit the\ncontrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and\ndiscipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we\nought to have manifest pr\u00e6cognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), cleared of\nall impurities and ready to hand.\n\nWhen death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness,\nthat it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary\nthing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I\nam not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way.\nI will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give\nto another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing\nanything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something\nnoble. Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our\npower to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death; discover for me\nthe country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not\nvisit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do\nyou wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from\nthe fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the\norigin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this\nshould not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according\nto my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the\neyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to\nbe deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil.\nThen at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to\ntear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and\nabuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not\ncare for me, what are they to me? Yes, but you will be an impious man.\nIn what respect, then, will it be worse for me than it is now? To sum\nup, remember that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing,\npiety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem\nnecessary (true)?\n\n\nTHAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN; AND WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THE\nGREAT THINGS AMONG MEN.\u2014What is the cause of assenting to anything? The\nfact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to\nthat which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of\nthe understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the\nfalse, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof\nof this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night.\nIt is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not\npossible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars\nare even in number. It is impossible. When then any man assents to that\nwhich is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as\nfalse, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato\nsays; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have\nwe of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit\nand the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the\nunprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not,\nand whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful\nto him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?\n\n\u201c\u2019Tis true I know what evil I shall do,\nBut passion overpowers the better counsel.\u201d\n\n\nShe thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her\nhusband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but\nshe was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will\nnot do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow\nexcept that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why\nthen are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered\nabout the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a\nhuman creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity\nthe blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the\nfaculties which are supreme?\n\nWhoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every\nact is the appearance (the opinion), whether the thing appears good or\nbad. If good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the\npenalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one\nperson, and he who suffers another person\u2014whoever remembers this will\nnot be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not\nrevile or blame any man, nor hate, nor quarrel with any man.\n\nSo then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the\nappearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is\nnothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to\nAlexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helene to\nfollow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a\ngain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only\nwould the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a\nmatter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such\ngreat things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many\nmen and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what\ngreat matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests\nof swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then\nlike those? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of\noxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of\nstorks. What is there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the\ndifference between a man\u2019s house and a stork\u2019s nest, as far as each is\na dwelling; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles\nand bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork\nand a man then like things? What say you? In body they are very much\nalike.\n\nDoes a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don\u2019t suppose that I\nsay so; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have\nmentioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find that\nthere is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man\nthe understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social\ncommunity, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence.\nWhere then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the\ndifference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round,\nand neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then\nthe man also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and\nstormed like a city, then the man too perishes: and in this consist the\ngreat things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the\nHellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers\nperished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not\nhis own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of\nstork\u2019s nests. Now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character\nof modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was\nAchilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened\nwhen he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that\nhe was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are\nthe ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of\ncities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted.\n\n\nON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS).\u2014The being (nature) of the good is a certain\nwill; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What, then, are\nexternals? Materials for the will, about which the will being\nconversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the\ngood? If it does not admire (over-value) the materials; for the\nopinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will\ngood: but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has\nfixed this law, and says, \u201cIf you would have anything good, receive it\nfrom yourself.\u201d You say, No, but I will have it from another. Do not\nso: but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens\nand calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put you\nin chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will\ncut off your head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will\nthrow you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body.\nIf he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not\nthreaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me,\nhe does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom\nhe threatens. Whom then do I fear? the master of what? The master of\nthings which are in my own power? There is no such master. Do I fear\nthe master of things which are not in my power? And what are these\nthings to me?\n\nDo you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Who\namong us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they\npossess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take\nthose who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things,\nthey may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command your opinions\nalso. And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinion\nof another man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer\nit. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered\nby another? But nothing else can conquer will except the will itself.\nFor this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just,\nwhich is this: Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten\nare stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing,\nfor dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The\nten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In\nwhat then are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and\nthe others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How\nis it possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier\ndraw down the scale in which it is.\n\nHow strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the\nAthenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates? Speak of the thing as it is:\nhow strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off\nand dragged to prison by stronger men, and that anyone should have\ngiven hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe\nout the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you\non account of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent\nfor these things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall\nwe listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? \u201cAnytus and\nMelitus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me.\u201d And further, he says,\n\u201cIf it so pleases God, so let it be.\u201d\n\nBut show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who\nis superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near\nshowing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior\nshall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is\nsuperior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than\none: the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the\nreason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was\nsuperior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp\nhe became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This\nseemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the\ncloak, and is drawing me to the public place: then others bawl out,\nPhilosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see, you are\ndragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of\nphilosophy ([Greek: eisagogaen)] could I have made so that, if a\nstronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged\noff; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into\nprison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I\nhave learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent\nof my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you have not gained by\nthis. Why then do you seek advantage in anything else than in that in\nwhich you have learned that advantage is?\n\nWill you not leave the small arguments ([Greek: logaria]) about these\nmatters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and\nreceive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them anything;\nand will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned?\nFor it is not these small arguments that are wanted now; the writings\nof the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted?\nA man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to\nhis words. Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer\nuse in the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some\nexample of our own.\n\nTo whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical\ninquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that\nloves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as\nrunaway slaves do; we should sit, as in a theatre, free from\ndistraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another\ntime to the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave\nhas taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks\nround; then if any one calls out his master\u2019s name, the slave is\nimmediately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers\nthus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is\nnot the master of man; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain;\nfor if he comes without these things, bring C\u00e6sar to me and you will\nsee how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering\nand lightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except\nto recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have\nany respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the\ntheatre, so do I. I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with\nterror and uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters,\nthat is from those things by means of which masters are formidable,\nwhat further trouble have I, what master have I still?\n\nWhat then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we\nought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ([Greek: tois idiotais])\nand to say: \u201cThis man recommends to me that which he thinks good for\nhimself. I excuse him.\u201d For Socrates also excused the jailer who had\nthe charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to\ndrink the poison, and said, \u201cHow generously he laments over us.\u201d Does\nhe then say to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the\nwomen? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear\n(understand) it; and he treats the jailer as a child.\n\n\nTHAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.\u2014The opinion\nof the philosophers perhaps seem to some to be a paradox; but still let\nus examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do\neverything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to\nbe in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way\nconsistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter\nunder consideration in my opinion is of this kind; if we asserted that\nwe ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might\njustly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united.\nBut now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things\nare true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature\nof good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise,\nand that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature\nof evil or of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say\nthat where things are not dependent on the will, there you should\nemploy confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you\nshould employ caution? For if the bad consists in the bad exercise of\nthe will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on\nthe will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power\nare nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and\nthus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident\nbecause of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which\nare really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with\nrespect to things which are not so.\n\nWe are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the\nhuntsmen\u2019s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they\nseek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by\nconfounding things which are objects of fear with things that they\nought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In\nthings which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary\ndo we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things\ndependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or\nshamelessly, or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us\nat all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our\nwill. But where there is death or exile or pain or infamy, there we\nattempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore, as we\nmay expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we\nconvert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into\naudacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural\ncaution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear\nand confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in\nwhich the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will\nimmediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding\nwhat he chooses; but if he transfer it to the things which are not in\nhis power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the\npower of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he\nwill be disturbed; for death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of\npain or death. For this reason we commend the poet, who said:\n\n\u201cNot death is evil, but a shameful death.\u201d\n\n\nConfidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and\ncaution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and\nemploy against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it\nwe employ carelessness, rashness, and indifference. These things\nSocrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks\nappear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in\nlike manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other\nreason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What\nis a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he\nis in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and\nexamine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from\nthe spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why\nthen are you troubled if it be separated now? for if it is not\nseparated now, it will be separated afterwards. Why? That the period of\nthe universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of\nthe future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine\nit. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If\nthis does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open; if it does, bear\n(with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so\nwe have no trouble.\n\nWhat then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be\nthe most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated,\nrelease from perturbation, release from fear. Freedom. For in these\nmatters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only\nought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who\nsay that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner: Is\nfreedom anything else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing\nelse. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No\none then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do\nyou wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no\nmeans. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation\nis free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and\nperturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude.\nHow then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when\nyou say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers\nsay we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not\nallow it. When then a man has turned round before the pr\u00e6tor his own\nslave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned\nround his own slave before the pr\u00e6tor. Has he done nothing more? Yes:\nhe is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well\nthen, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No\nmore than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able\nto turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a\ngirl or a boy, or some tyrant or some friend of the tyrant? Why do you\ntrouble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind?\nIt is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness\nthese principles by which you may determine what those things are with\nreference to which you ought to be cautious, courageous in that which\ndoes not depend on your will, cautious in that which does depend on it.\n\n\nOF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION).\u2014Consider, you who are\ngoing into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to\nsucceed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature,\nyou have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if\nyou wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free,\nand if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who\nis the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to\nbe modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose\nnot to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what\nyou think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid\nwhat you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will\ndetermine against you something that appears formidable; but that you\nshould also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then\nthe pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what\nelse do you care for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative,\nthis your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this\nyour applause (or the approbation which you will receive).\n\nTherefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his\ntrial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my\nlife? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in\nmy own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my\nprivate or in my public life.\n\nBut if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little\nproperty, and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this\nmoment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of\nyour judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees,\nembrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you\nhave subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do\nnot resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes\nnot choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or\na slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well-bred cock or\na mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once;\nand let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield.\nBut if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the\nnature of evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where\nnature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where\nnature is.\n\nFor this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me\n(tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind\nso as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as\nif a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write\nwhen any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write\nDion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of\nDion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if\nyou have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do)\nanything that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For\nif circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what\nwill you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no\nsuggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity\nramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is\nthe master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain\nor try to avoid.\n\n\nHOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE.\u2014Things themselves (materials)\nare indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall\na man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be\ncareful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play\nat dice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do\nI know what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the\ncast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chief\nbusiness is this: distinguish and separate things, and say: Externals\nare not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good\nand the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does\nnot belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage\nor anything of the kind.\n\nWhat then? Should we use such things carelessly? In no way: for this on\nthe other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently\nagainst nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not\nindifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from\nperturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the\nmaterial is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me or compel me.\nWhere I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is\nnot in my power, nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad or\ngood, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to\nbring together these two things\u2014the carefulness of him who is affected\nby the matter (or things about him), and the firmness of him who has no\nregard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness is\nimpossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What\ncan I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day,\nthe opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for\nmy part is done. The business belongs to another, the master. But the\nship is sinking\u2014what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can,\nnot to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but\nknowing that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an\nimmortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of\nthe day: I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What\ndifference then does it make to me how I pass away, whether by being\nsuffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means.\n\nHow then is it said that some external things are according to nature\nand others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we\nwere separated from union (or society): for to the foot I shall say\nthat it is according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it\nas a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it\nboth to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut\noff for the good of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot.\nWe should think in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A\nman. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is\naccording to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But\nif you consider yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is\nfor the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at\nanother time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be\nin want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled?\nDo you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached\nfrom the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from\nother men. For what is a man? A part of a state, of that first which\nconsists of gods and of men; then of that which is called next to it,\nwhich is a small image of the universal state. What then must I be\nbrought to trial; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea,\nanother die, and another be condemned? Yes, for it is impossible in\nsuch a universe of things, among so many living together, that such\nthings should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your\nduty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange\nthese things as it is fit. Then some one says, \u201cI shall charge you with\ndoing me wrong.\u201d Much good may it do you: I have done my part; but\nwhether you also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is\nsome danger of this too, that it may escape your notice.\n\n\nOF INDIFFERENCE.\u2014The hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the\njudgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or\nopinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent.\nWhen any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do\nnot become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about\nsuch things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of\nmaterial things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation\nand power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you\nmay keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over\nyou. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over\nthem; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by\nsaying, \u201cI have learned them, and you have not.\u201d Thus also where there\nis need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need\n(of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had\npractice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind.\n\nGo and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. But I have been shut\nout, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when\nI have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through\nthe window. But still speak to him. In what way? Not meanly. But\nsuppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business,\nand not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another?\nAlways remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you\nwill not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as\nfuture things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more\nadapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature; for\nGod himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that\nit was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even\nmove towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move\nto go into the mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that\nthey may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be\nreaped? for they are not separated from communion with other things. If\nthen they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But\nthis is a curse upon ears of corn to be never reaped. So we must know\nthat in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as\nnot to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped,\nand we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither\nknow what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who\nhave studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he\nwas going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet\nsounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general\u2019s\ncommand than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses,\neven when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and\ngroaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them \u201ccircumstances.\u201d\nWhat kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances\nto the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but\nif you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying\nof that which has been produced? But that which destroys is either a\nsword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care\nabout the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you\nwill listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is\nshorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is\noften a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of\nempty names.\n\n\nHOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION.\u2014Through an unreasonable regard to\ndivination many of us omit many duties. For what more can the diviner\nsee than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind?\nIf then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my\nduty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have I\nnot within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil,\nand has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have I\nthen to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why\ndo I submit when he says, It is for your interest? For does he know\nwhat is for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has\nlearned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good\nand evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both\nof the beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do\nyou tell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me: is it\nlife or death, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my\ninterest or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don\u2019t\nyou give your opinion on matters of grammar, and why do you give it\nhere about things on which we are all in error and disputing with one\nanother?\n\nWhat then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread\nof what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners.\nPray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see:\nlet us sacrifice on the occasion. Yes, master, as fortune chooses. When\nhe has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if\nwe received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play\nupon us.\n\nWill you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for\nif it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any\nother thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals\nalso the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor\nyet parts of the gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion\nseparated from the Deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of\nhim. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you\nnot know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating who\nyou are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in social intercourse,\nwhen you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion,\nknow you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a\ngod? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it\nnot. Do you think that I mean some god of silver or of gold, and\nexternal? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you\nare polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image\nof God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which\nyou are doing; but when God himself is present within and sees all and\nhears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such\nthings, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger\nof God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the\nschool into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat\nimproperly, have improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in\nwhich he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make\nhim proud. This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God; he\nknows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure\nwhen he says, \u201cI wish I had you (God) with me.\u201d Have you not God with\nyou? and do you seek for any other when you have him? or will God tell\nyou anything else than this? If you were a statue of Phidias, either\nAthena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, and\nif you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do\nnothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to\nappear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look upon you.\nBut now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how\nyou shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the\nartist in the other? or the work in the one case like the other? And\nwhat work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties,\nwhich the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or\ngold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias, when she has once extended\nthe hand and received in it the figure of Victory, stands in that\nattitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they\nbreathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things and\nthe power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you\ndishonor him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also\nentrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you\nnot think of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardianship? But\nif God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He\nhas delivered yourself to your own care, and says: \u201cI had no one fitter\nto entrust him to than yourself; keep him for me such as he is by\nnature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and\nperturbation.\u201d And then you do not keep him such.\n\nBut some will say, Whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he\ndisplays and these supercilious looks? I have not yet so much gravity\nas befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I\nhave learned and in what I have assented to. I still fear my own\nweakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance\nsuch as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have; then I\nwill show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished.\nWhat do you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at\nOlympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is\nready to say:\n\nIrrevocable is my word and shall not fail.\u2014Iliad, i., 526.\n\n\nSuch will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from\nperturbation. What, and immortal, too, except from old age, and from\nsickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god.\nThis power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor\ncan I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What\nnerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which never\nfalls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit ([Greek:\nhormaen]), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you\nshall see.\n\n\nTHAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES,\nWE ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER.\u2014It is no common (easy) thing\nto do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man\u2019s nature. For what is a\nman? The answer is, A rational and mortal being. Then by the rational\nfaculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what\nothers? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like\na wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you\nhave not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep;\nbut if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do as\nsheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act\nrashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep.\nWhat have we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and\nharmfully and passionately and violently, to what have we declined? To\nwild beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others\nlittle beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let\nme be eaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man\nacting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex)\nproposition maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so\nthat the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a\nconjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it\nfulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog,\npreserved? (When they severally keep their promise.) What is the wonder\nthen if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is\nlost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the\ncarpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But\nif a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his\nart will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the\nmodest man, and immodest actions destroy him; and actions of fidelity\npreserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on\nthe other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters:\nshamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the\nfaithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry\ntemper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more\navaricious.\n\nFor this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with\nlearning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have\nlong been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice\nopinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also\nput in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the\nexpositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able\nto discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things\n(in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and\nsome are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which\nparticipate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the\nindifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of\nour talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of\nthose who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed.\nPhilosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence\ndid you produce and utter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why\nthen do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the\nweightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one\nthing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to\neat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become\nsinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is\nstored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you\nhave no other advantage from it except so far as to appear to possess\nit. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and\nthose of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain\naccording to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you\nwill explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus\nhimself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the\nmany? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you\nnot see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian?\nand when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say,\nThis man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the\naffects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted\nthat sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew.\n\n\nHOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES.\u2014Consider who you\nare. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing\nsuperior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to\nit; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from\nsubjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by\nreason. You have been separated from wild beasts; you have been\nseparated from domestic animals ([Greek: probaton]). Further, you are a\ncitizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient\n(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable\nof comprehending the divine administration and of considering the\nconnection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise\n(profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate\nabout nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as\nthe hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the\nconstitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion\nnor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole.\nTherefore, the philosophers say well, that if the good man had\nforeknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own\nsickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are\nassigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the\nwhole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now\nbecause we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the\nthings which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we\nwere made among other things for this.\n\nAfter this, remember that you are a son. What does this character\npromise? To consider that everything which is the son\u2019s belongs to the\nfather, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor\nto say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all\nthings and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After\nthis know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is\ndue to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your\nbrother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which\nare independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may\nhave the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a\nthing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat,\nto gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the\nadvantage.\n\nNext to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are\na senator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you\nare an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined,\nmarks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I\nsay to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In\nthe next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer,\nyou would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the\nbrother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear\nnot to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead\nof a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous\nwild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But (I\nsuppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And\ndoes the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art\nof grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if\nyou shall lose modesty, moderation ([Greek: chtastolaen]) and\ngentleness, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first\nmentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will,\nand the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have\nthem nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have\nthem and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a\nmisfortune.\n\nWhat then? shall I not hurt him who has hurt me? In the first place\nconsider what hurt ([Greek: blabae]) is, and remember what you have\nheard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will\n(purpose, intention, [Greek: proaireeis]), and the evil also in the\nwill, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has\nhurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by\ndoing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves\n(mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any\ndetriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and\nwhere the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (you\nsuppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an\nunjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip,\nnor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than\n(security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest\nand faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except\nonly in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our\nproficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not\nexist even in the slightest degree.\n\n\nWHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS.\u2014The beginning of philosophy, to\nhim at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door is a\nconsciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things;\nfor we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angled\ntriangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half-tone; but we\nlearn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art;\nand for this reason those who do not know them do not think that they\nknow them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and\nbecoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and\nimproper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever\ncame into the world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we\nall use these names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions to the\nseveral cases (things) thus: he has done well; he has not done well; he\nhas done as he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has\nbeen fortunate; he is unjust, he is just; who does not use these names?\nwho among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he\ndefers the use of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or\nsounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already\ntaught as it were by nature some things on this matter ([Greek:\ntopon]), and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit\n([Greek: oiaesin]). For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful\nand the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it\nto particulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies\nthe whole question; and conceit is added here; for beginning from these\nthings which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of\ndispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this\npower of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them\nfrom being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the\npreconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this\n(assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so to\nanother, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does\nhe not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of you\ncan properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have\ncontrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything\nbetter towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that\nyou do? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem\nto him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not\nsufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming\n([Greek: tou dochein]). What is this?\n\nObserve, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the\ndisagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of\nthe disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only\n\u201cseems,\u201d and a certain investigation of that which \u201cseems\u201d whether it\n\u201cseems\u201d rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek: chanonos]), as\nwe have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a\ncarpenter\u2019s rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked\nthings.\u2014This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all\nthings are right which seem so to all? And how is it possible that\ncontradictions can be right?\u2014Not all then, but all which seem to us to\nbe right.\u2014How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians?\nwhy more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what\nseems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then\n\u201cseems\u201d to every man is not sufficient for determining what \u201cis\u201d; for\nneither in the case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the\nbare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In\nthis matter then is there no rule superior to what \u201cseems\u201d? And how is\nit possible that the most necessary things among men should have no\nsign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some\nrule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and\nafterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the\nfinger without it? For this, I think, is that which when it is\ndiscovered cures of their madness those who use mere \u201cseeming\u201d as a\nmeasure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain\nthings (principles) known and made clear we may use in the case of\nparticular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.\n\nWhat is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring?\nPleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the\nbalance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have\nconfidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to\nbe. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then\npleasure anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the\nscale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you\nare not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring\nanother. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper\nthen to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that\nit is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of\nthe balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are\nready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules;\nand then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good\nman.\n\n\nOF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION.\u2014What things a man must learn in order to\nbe able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by\nour philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of\nthe things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us,\nwhom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot\ndiscover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a\nlittle, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat\nhim, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an\nilliterate man; it is not possible to do anything with him. Now a\nguide, when he has found a man out of the road, leads him into the\nright way; he does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you\nalso show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he\nfollows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule\nhim, but rather feel your own incapacity.\n\nNow this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be\nirritated in argument, never to utter anything abusive, anything\ninsulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the\nquarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read\nthe Symposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many quarrels he put an\nend to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most\nhighly praised:\n\nQuickly with skill he settles great disputes.\nHesiod, Theogony, v. 87.\n\n\nON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE).\u2014When I see a man anxious, I say, What does\nthis man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power,\nhow could he be anxious? For this reason a lute player when he is\nsinging by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he\nis anxious, even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for\nhe not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this\nis not in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has\nconfidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the\nmusician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows\nnothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter is\nthis? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is.\nHowever, he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest; but\nwhat the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life, he\nneither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity\ntremble and grow pale. Is any man then afraid about things which are\nnot evils? No. Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so\nfar within his power that they may not happen? Certainly he is not. If\nthen the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor\nbad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power,\nand no man can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do\nnot choose, where is room left for anxiety? But we are anxious about\nour poor body, our little property, about the will of C\u00e6sar; but not\nanxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false\nopinion? No, for this is in my power. About not exerting our movements\ncontrary to nature? No, not even about this. When then you see a man\npale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man\u2019s\nspleen is disordered, that man\u2019s liver; so also say, this man\u2019s desire\nand aversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a\nfever. For nothing else changes the color, or causes trembling or\nchattering of the teeth, or causes a man to\n\nSink in his knees and shift from foot to foot.\nIliad, xiii., 281.\n\n\nFor this reason, when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not\nanxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno\nadmired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus\nhad power. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno,\nfor he wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his\npower). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is\nskilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill.\n\nShould I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you know the measure by\nwhich one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learn\nwhat is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or\nthe other? Why then are you not good yourself? How, he replies, am I\nnot good? Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man\nis pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he\nlisten to me? Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what\nbelongs to others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what\nproceeds from you? Certainly. And is it possible that a fault should be\none man\u2019s, and the evil in another? No. Why then are you anxious about\nthat which belongs to others? Your question is reasonable; but I am\nanxious how I shall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you\nchoose? But I fear that I may be disconcerted? If you are going to\nwrite the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted?\nBy no means. Why? is it not because you have practised writing the\nname? Certainly. Well, if you were going to read the name, would you\nnot feel the same? and why? Because every art has a certain strength\nand confidence in the things which belong to it. Have you then not\npractised speaking? and what else did you learn in the school?\nSyllogisms and sophistical propositions? For what purpose? was it not\nfor the purpose of discoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing\nskilfully the same as discoursing seasonably and cautiously and with\nintelligence, and also without making mistakes and without hindrance,\nand besides all this with confidence? Yes. When then you are mounted on\na horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a\nman who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised,\nand he is not? Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has\npower to kill me. Speak the truth, then, unhappy man, and do not brag,\nnor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters,\nbut so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man\nwho is stronger than yourself. Socrates used to practice speaking, he\nwho talked as he did to the tyrants, to the dicasts (judges), he who\ntalked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as\nhe did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him.\nThese men were confident in the things which they practised. But do you\nwalk off to your own affairs and never leave them: go and sit in a\ncorner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not\nin you the man who can rule a state.\n\n\nTO NASO.\u2014When a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to one\nreading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruction; and he\nstopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every art\nwhen it is taught causes labor to him who is unacquainted with it and\nis unskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the arts\nimmediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made; and\nmost of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to\nbe present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant\nthing; but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And\nthe discipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to\none who chances to be present and is a stranger to the art: but the\nwork shows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in\nmusic; for if you are present while a person is learning, the\ndiscipline will appear most disagreeable; and yet the results of music\nare pleasing and delightful to those who know nothing of music. And\nhere we conceive the work of a philosopher to be something of this\nkind: he must adapt his wish ([Greek: boulaesin]) to what is going on,\nso that neither any of the things which are taking place shall take\nplace contrary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take\nplace shall not take place when we wish that they should. From this the\nresult is to those who have so arranged the work of philosophy, not to\nfail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which they would avoid;\nwithout uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through\nlife themselves, together with their associates maintaining the\nrelations both natural and acquired, as the relation of son, of father,\nof brother, of citizen, of man, of wife, of neighbor, of\nfellow-traveller, of ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we\nconceive to be something like this. It remains next to inquire how this\nmust be accomplished.\n\nWe see then that the carpenter ([Greek: techton]) when he has learned\ncertain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by learning certain\nthings becomes a pilot. May it not then in philosophy also not be\nsufficient to wish to be wise and good, and that there is also a\nnecessity to learn certain things? We inquire then what these things\nare. The philosophers say that we ought first to learn that there is a\nGod and that he provides for all things; also that it is not possible\nto conceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. The\nnext thing is to learn what is the nature of the gods; for such as they\nare discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with\nall his power to be like them. If the divine is faithful, man also must\nbe faithful; if it is free, man also must be free; if beneficent, man\nalso must be beneficent; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous;\nas being then an imitator of God he must do and say everything\nconsistently with this fact.\n\n\nTO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT THEY HAVE\nDETERMINED.\u2014When some persons have heard these words, that a man ought\nto be constant (firm), and that the will is naturally free and not\nsubject to compulsion, but that all other things are subject to\nhindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they suppose\nthat they ought without deviation to abide by everything which they\nhave determined. But in the first place that which has been determined\nought to be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such\nas exists in a healthy body, in an athletic body; but if it is plain to\nme that you have the tone of a frenzied man and you boast of it, I\nshall say to you, Man, seek the physician; this is not tone, but atony\n(deficiency in right tone). In a different way something of the same\nkind is felt by those who listen to these discourses in a wrong manner;\nwhich was the case with one of my companions, who for no reason\nresolved to starve himself to death. I heard of it when it was the\nthird day of his abstinence from food, and I went to inquire what had\nhappened. \u201cI have resolved,\u201d he said. \u201cBut still tell me what it was\nwhich induced you to resolve; for if you have resolved rightly, we\nshall sit with you and assist you to depart, but if you have made an\nunreasonable resolution, change your mind.\u201d \u201cWe ought to keep to our\ndeterminations.\u201d \u201cWhat are you doing, man? We ought to keep not to all\nour determinations, but to those which are right; for if you are now\npersuaded that it is right, do not change your mind, if you think fit,\nbut persist and say, We ought to abide by our determinations. Will you\nnot make the beginning and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether the\ndetermination is sound or not sound, and so then build on it firmness\nand security? But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not\nyour miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and the\nstronger are the materials which you shall lay on it? Without any\nreason would you withdraw from us out of life a man who is a friend and\na companion, a citizen of the same city, both the great and the small\ncity? Then while you are committing murder and destroying a man who has\ndone no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your\ndeterminations? And if it ever in any way came into your head to kill\nme, ought you to abide by your determinations?\u201d\n\nNow this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his mind. But it\nis impossible to convince some persons at present; so that I seem now\nto know what I did not know before, the meaning of the common saying,\nthat you can neither persuade nor break a fool. May it never be my lot\nto have a wise fool for my friend; nothing is more untractable. \u201cI am\ndetermined,\u201d the man says. Madmen are also, but the more firmly they\nform a judgment on things which do not exist, the more hellebore they\nrequire. Will you not act like a sick man and call in the physician?\u2014I\nam sick, master, help me; consider what I must do: it is my duty to\nobey you. So it is here also: I know not what I ought to do, but I am\ncome to learn.\u2014Not so; but speak to me about other things: upon this I\nhave determined.\u2014What other things? for what is greater and more useful\nthan for you to be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made\nyour determination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) of\nmadness, not of health.\u2014I will die, if you compel me to this.\u2014Why, man?\nWhat has happened?\u2014I have determined\u2014I have had a lucky escape that you\nhave not determined to kill me\u2014I take no money. Why?\u2014I have\ndetermined\u2014Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which you now\nuse in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder you at some time\nfrom inclining without reason to take money, and then saying, I have\ndetermined. As in a distempered body, subject to defluxions, the humor\ninclines sometimes to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly\nsoul knows not which way to incline; but if to this inclination and\nmovement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then the evil\nbecomes past help and cure.\n\n\nTHAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL.\u2014Where is\nthe good? In the will. Where is the evil? In the will. Where is neither\nof them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then?\nDoes any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools? Does\nany one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things as in\nthe case of questions?\u2014Is it day?\u2014Yes.\u2014Is it night?\u2014No.\u2014Well, is the\nnumber of stars even?\u2014I cannot say.\u2014When money is shown (offered) to\nyou, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not a\ngood thing? Have you practised yourself in these answers, or only\nagainst sophisms? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you have\nstudied, in those you have improved; but in those which you have not\nstudied, in those you remain the same? When the rhetorician knows that\nhe has written well, that he has committed to memory what he has\nwritten, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious?\nBecause he is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he\nwant? To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of being able\nto practise declamation he has been disciplined; but with respect to\npraise and blame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from\nany one what praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what\nkind of praise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be\nshunned? And when did he practise this discipline which follows these\nwords (things)? Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a\nman has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he\nhas not been disciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the\nlute player knows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and\nyet he trembles when he enters on the stage; for these matters he\nunderstands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a\ncrowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is,\nwhether it is our work or the work of another, whether it is possible\nto stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves\nthe theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen\nbladder has been punctured and subsides.\n\nThis is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire? Externals.\nAbout what things are we busy? Externals. And have we any doubt then\nwhy we fear or why we are anxious? What then happens when we think the\nthings, which are coming on us, to be evils? It is not in our power not\nto be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say,\nLord God, how shall I not be anxious? Fool, have you not hands, did not\nGod make them for you? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not\nrun. Wipe yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he given\nto you nothing in the present case? Has he not given to you endurance?\nHas he not given to you magnanimity? Has he not given to you manliness?\nWhen you have such hands do you still look for one who shall wipe your\nnose? But we neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a\nman who cares how he shall do anything, not for the obtaining of a\nthing, but who cares about his own energy. What man, when he is walking\nabout, cares for his own energy? Who, when he is deliberating, cares\nabout his own deliberation, and not about obtaining that about which he\ndeliberates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well we\nhave deliberated; did I not tell you, brother, that it is impossible,\nwhen we have thought about anything, that it should not turn out thus?\nBut if the thing should turn out otherwise, the wretched man is\nhumbled; he knows not even what to say about what has taken place. Who\namong us for the sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among us\nas to his actions has not slept in indifference? Who? Give (name) to me\none that I may see the man whom I have long been looking for, who is\ntruly noble and ingenuous, whether young or old; name him.\n\nWhat then are the things which are heavy on us and disturb us? What\nelse than opinions? What else than opinions lies heavy upon him who\ngoes away and leaves his companions and friends and places and habits\nof life? Now little children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse\nleaving them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a\nsmall cake. Do you choose then that we should compare you to little\nchildren? No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be pacified by a small\ncake, but by right opinions. And what are these? Such as a man ought to\nstudy all day, and not to be affected by anything that is not his own,\nneither by companion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own\nbody, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes. And what\nis the divine law? To keep a man\u2019s own, not to claim that which belongs\nto others, but to use what is given, and when it is not given, not to\ndesire it; and when a thing is taken away, to give it up readily and\nimmediately, and to be thankful for the time that a man has had the use\nof it, if you would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what matter\ndoes it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends? In\nwhat respect are you better than he who cries for a girl, if you grieve\nfor a little gymnasium, and little porticos, and young men, and such\nplaces of amusement? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer\ndrink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than that of\nDirce? But I was used to the water of Dirce. And you in turn will be\nused to the other. Then if you become attached to this also, cry for\nthis too, and try to make a verse like the verse of Euripides,\n\nThe hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water.\n\n\nSee how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men.\n\nWhen then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis? Wretch, are you\nnot content with what you see daily? Have you anything better or\ngreater to see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the\nsea? But if indeed you comprehend Him who administers the whole, and\ncarry him about in yourself, do you still desire small stones and a\nbeautiful rock?\n\n\nHOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO PARTICULAR CASES.\u2014What is the first\nbusiness of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit ([Greek:\noiaesis]). For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that which\nhe thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done and\nought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of\nus talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on these\nmatters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge and\ndetermine about principles honorable and dishonorable. But why do we go\nto the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think that\nwe know. And what is this? Theorems. For we wish to learn what\nphilosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish to\nlearn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous\nthen to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn\nanother; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which he\ndoes not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived also\nthe rhetorician Theopompus, when he blames even Plato for wishing\neverything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us before\nyou use the words good or just, or do we utter the sounds in an\nunmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severally\nsignify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions\nof each of these things and preconceptions ([Greek: prolaepseis])? But\nit is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondent\nobjects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what\nobject must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the same\ncharge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the words\nhealthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter these\nwords as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception of\nhealth, but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says,\nAbstain from food; another says, Give food; another says, Bleed; and\nanother says, Use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than\nthat a man cannot properly adapt the preconceptions of health to\nparticulars?\n\n\nHOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES.\u2014Every habit and faculty is\nmaintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit of\nwalking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be a\ngood reader, read; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read\nfor thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will\nknow the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten\ndays, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your\nlegs are weakened. Generally then if you would make anything a habit,\ndo it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom\nyourself to do something else in place of it.\n\nSo it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when you have been\nangry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that\nyou have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon\nfire.\n\nIn this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the\nmind grow up. For when you have once desired money, if reason be\napplied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and\nthe ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority.\nBut if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same\nstate, but being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is\ninflamed to desire quicker than before: and when this takes place\ncontinually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease\nof the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and\nhas been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before,\nunless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also\nin diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it,\nand unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed\non the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but\nsores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the\nhabit: throw nothing on it which will increase it: at first keep quiet,\nand count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in\npassion every day; now every second day; then every third, then every\nfourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to\nGod. For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is\ncompletely destroyed. \u201cI have not been vexed to-day, nor the day after,\nnor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months; but I took\ncare when some exciting things happened.\u201d Be assured that you are in a\ngood way.\n\nHow then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved by\nyourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity\nwith your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance\nvisits you, Plato says, Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to\nthe temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you\nresort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with\nthem, whether you find one who is living or dead.\n\nBut in the first place, be not hurried away by the rapidity of the\nappearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see who\nyou are, and what you are about; let me put you to the test. And then\ndo not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of\nthe things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off\nwherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other\nbeautiful and noble appearance, and cast out this base appearance. And\nif you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what\nshoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only\ntrifling words, and nothing more.\n\nThis is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such\nappearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat,\ndivine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for\nfreedom from perturbation. Remember God; call on him as a helper and\nprotector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri in a storm. For what is a\ngreater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent\nand drive away the reason? For the storm itself, what else is it but an\nappearance? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many\nthunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm and\nserenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been\ndefeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same\nagain, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition\nand so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doing\nwrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your\nwrong-doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true,\n\nWith constant ills the dilatory strives.\n\n\nOF INCONSISTENCY.\u2014Some things men readily confess, and other things\nthey do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or without\nunderstanding; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, I\nwish that I had fortune equal to my understanding. But men readily\nconfess that they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I\nconfess; but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A\nman will not readily confess that he is intemperate; and that he is\nunjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he\nis envious or a busybody. Most men will confess that they are\ncompassionate. What then is the reason?\n\nThe chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in\nthe things which relate to good and evil. But different men have\ndifferent reasons; and generally what they imagine to be base, they do\nnot confess at all. But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of\na good disposition, and compassion also; but silliness to be the\nabsolute characteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit\n(confess) the things which are offences against society. But in the\ncase of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess\nthem, because they imagine that there is something involuntary in them\nas in timidity and compassion; and if a man confess that he is in any\nrespect intemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what\nis involuntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all\ninvoluntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something\ninvoluntary; and for this reason they confess to jealousy also.\n\nLiving then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of what\nthey say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why they\nhave them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worth\nthe trouble for a man to watch constantly (and to ask) whether I also\nam one of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct\nmyself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct\nmyself as a temperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been\ntaught to be prepared for everything that may happen. Have I the\nconsciousness, which a man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know\nnothing? Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to obey?\nor do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn history and\nunderstand the books which I did not understand before, and, if it\nshould happen so, to explain them also to others? Man, you have had a\nfight in the house with a poor slave, you have turned the family upside\ndown, you have frightened the neighbors, and you come to me as if you\nwere a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained\nsome word, and how I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come\nfull of envy, and humbled, because you bring nothing from home; and you\nsit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how your father\nis disposed towards you and your brother. What are they saying about me\nthere? now they think that I am improving, and are saying, He will\nreturn with all knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before I\nreturn; but much labor is necessary, and no one sends me anything, and\nthe baths at Nicopolis are dirty; everything is bad at home, and bad\nhere.\n\n\nON FRIENDSHIP.\u2014What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he\nnaturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things\nwhich are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things\nwhich in no way concern themselves? Not to these either. It remains\nthen that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are\ngood; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such\nthings also. Whoever then understands what is good can also know how to\nlove; but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are\nneither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving?\nTo love, then, is only in the power of the wise.\n\nFor universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing\nso much as to its own interests. Whatever then appears to it an\nimpediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or\na child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses; for its nature\nis to love nothing so much as its own interests: this is father, and\nbrother, and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear\nto us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their\nstatues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of\nAesculapius to be burned when his dear friend died.\n\nFor this reason, if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity,\ngoodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured:\nbut if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and\nhis country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way,\nbeing borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the\nMine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines; if in\nthe flesh, there is the ruling power; if in the will, it is there; and\nif it is in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will\nis, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and\nfather; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of\nfidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active\nco-operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put\nmyself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of\nEpicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty\nor it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).\n\nIt was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians\nquarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelled\nwith Hellas, and the Macedonians with both: and the Romans with the\nGetae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons.\nAlexander was the guest of Menelaus, and if any man had seen their\nfriendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that\nthey were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between\ndogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now\nwhen you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not\nconclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they\nswear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from\none another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted;\nit is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is\noverpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine,\nnot what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and\nbrought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but examine this\nonly, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the\nwill. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them\ntrustworthy or constant, or brave or free; do not name them even men,\nif you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature\nwhich makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy\ndeserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the\ncourts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes\nthem intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes\nthem do whatever else men do against one another through this one\nopinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the\nthings which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear\nthat in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is,\nand where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble\nyourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have\nassociated a long time and are companions, but when you have\nascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as\nyou declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else\nis friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is\na communion of honest things and of nothing else.\n\nBut you may say, Such a one treated me with regard so long; and did he\nnot love me? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the\nsame way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of\nhis beast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a\nvessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this\nwoman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did\nEriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of\nmany? But a necklace came between them: and what is a necklace? It is\nthe opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was\nthe thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife,\nthat which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a\nmother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either\nto be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these\nopinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he\nwill not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he\nwill not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next\nplace, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and\ncompletely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike\nhimself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of\nhis ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the\ngreatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well\nconvinced of Plato\u2019s doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth\nunwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other\nrespects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail\ntogether, and you may be born of the same parents, for snakes also are:\nbut neither will they be friends, nor you, so long as you retain these\nbestial and cursed opinions.\n\n\nON THE POWER OF SPEAKING.\u2014Every man will read a book with more pleasure\nor even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters.\nTherefore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if\nit is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then\nthat there is no faculty of expression: for this affirmation is the\ncharacteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious\nman, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if\nhe would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or hearing, or\nof seeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose\nhas he infused into them a spirit so strong and of such skilful\ncontrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things\nwhich are seen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no\npurpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and\nelastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a\nmanner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence\nof which there would be no use in any other thing?\n\nMan, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things\nwhich are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and\nhearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which\ncontribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine\nand oil give thanks to God: but remember that he has given you\nsomething else better than all these, I mean the power of using them,\nproving them, and estimating the value of each. For what is that which\ngives information about each of these powers, what each of them is\nworth? Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of\nvision saying anything about itself? or the faculty of hearing? or\nwheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? No; but they are appointed as\nministers and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making\nuse of the appearances of things. And if you inquire what is the value\nof each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? How then can\nany other faculty be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as\nministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them? for which\nof them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them\nknows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it\nwhich opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to\nwhich it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects?\nIs it the faculty of vision? No, but it is the faculty of the will.\nWhat is that faculty which closes and opens the ears? what is that by\nwhich they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by\nwhat is said? is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than the\nfaculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amidst\nall the other faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to see\nanything else except the very acts for which they are appointed in\norder to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty\nalone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest; will\nthis faculty declare to us that anything else is the best, or that\nitself is? And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see?\nBut whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person, and in\nwhat manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whether we\nought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and if we do\nbelieve, whether we ought to be moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it\nnot the faculty of the will?\n\nBut if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, what\nmust I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the\nwill, when it is right ([Greek: orthae]). For it is this which uses the\nother (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small\nand great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is\nnot good becomes good: but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is\nthrough this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we\nblame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this\nwhich if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look\nafter it, makes happiness.\n\nWhat then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do on\nhis way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being\npleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your\npurpose: you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing\nthrough it. But this is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are\npleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing\nthrough. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to\nrelieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen,\nto marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies. For you\nare not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where\nyou were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the\nkind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the\naid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must\nadvance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty\nwhich makes use of the appearances of things; and since it is necessary\nalso for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a\ncertain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness,\nsome persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one\ncaptivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by\nsophisms, and still another by some other inn ([Greek: paudocheiou]) of\nthe kind; and there they stay and waste away as they were among sirens.\n\nMan, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using\nconformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires\nnot to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into\nthat which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor\never to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled,\nconforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well\nsatisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able\nfrom your whole soul to utter these verses:\n\nLead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny.\n\n\nTO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED\n(ESTEEMED) BY HIM.\u2014A certain person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently\nI desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any\nanswer; and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to\nme. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in anything\nelse, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art,\nwill speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?\u2014I do\nthink so.\u2014He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able\nto benefit others, will speak skilfully; but he who is rather damaged\nby speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art\nof speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others\nbenefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they\nhear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some\ndamaged? There are both among these also, he said. In this case also\nthen those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear\nunskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in\nhearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so. If you choose,\nconsider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom\ndoes it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to\nwhom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a\nstatue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art?\nThis also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly is the\nbusiness of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit\nis the business of the skilful man? Now as to speaking and hearing\nperfectly, and usefully, let us for the present, if you please, say no\nmore, for both of us are a long way from everything of the kind. But I\nthink that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear\nphilosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so?\n\nWhy then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he\nwho knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is\nthis world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the\ngood and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither\nunderstands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is\nfalse, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire\naccording to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to\nact), nor assent, nor dissent, nor suspend his judgment: to say all in\na few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is\nsomebody, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it\nnot the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and\nmisfortunes have arisen through this ignorance?\n\nThis is all that I have to say to you; and I say even this not\nwillingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to\nin order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by\ngenerous horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully.\nTo your dress? That is luxurious. To your behavior, to your look? That\nis the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not\nsay to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy of\nhearing or fit for hearing; and you will see how you will move the\nspeaker.\n\n\nTHAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY.\u2014When one of those who were present said,\nPersuade me that logic is necessary, he replied, Do you wish me to\nprove this to you? The answer was, Yes. Then I must use a demonstrative\nform of speech. This was granted. How then will you know if I am\ncheating you by my argument? The man was silent. Do you see, said\nEpictetus, that you yourself are admitting that logic is necessary, if\nwithout it you cannot know so much as this, whether logic is necessary\nor not necessary?\n\n\nOF FINERY IN DRESS.\u2014A certain young man, a rhetorician, came to see\nEpictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his\nattire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you\ndo not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of\nall other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some\nmen also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same\nreason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful\nfor something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since\nwe see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another,\nand for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally\nand not improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is\nmost excellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each is\ndifferent, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way.\nIs it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog\nbeautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful,\nmakes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It\nseems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful,\nmakes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous;\nand he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.\nIt is so, said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in\nits kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What\nthen makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog.\nAnd what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a\nhorse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the\nexcellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful,\nyoung man, labor at this, the acquisition of human excellence? But what\nis this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons\nwithout partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just.\nWhether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And\nthe temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make\nyourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself\nbeautiful; but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly\n([Greek: aischron]), even though you contrive all you can to appear\nbeautiful.\n\n\nIN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; AND THAT\nWE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS.\u2014There are three things (topics, [Greek:\ntopoi]) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and\ngood. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may\nnot fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that\nwhich he does not desire. The second concerns the movements towards an\nobject and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a\nman ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not\ncarelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and\nrashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents ([Greek:\nsugchatatheseis]). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is\nthat which relates to the affects ([Greek: ta pathae] perturbations);\nfor an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain\nthat which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to\navoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad\nfortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes\nmen envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to\nlisten to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties\nof a man; for I ought not to be free from affects ([Greek: apathae])\nlike a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations ([Greek:\nscheseis]) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father,\nas a citizen.\n\nThe third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making\nproficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that\nnot even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in\nintoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our\npower. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the\nsecond (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using\nsophistical arguments ([Greek: metapiptontas]), making conclusions from\nquestioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, it is said,\nwhen employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who\nmust? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you.\nHave you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception\nin the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl do you resist the\nappearance? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you not\nvexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable\nfirmness of mind ([Greek: ametaptosia])? Wretch, you hear these very\nthings with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with\ninquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come\nand tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was,\nWho is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain\nperson was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a\nfinger\u2019s length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is\npresent says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to a\ncertain person, for what does he know? he has only the first\nprinciples, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you\ncry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great\nphilosopher. It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show\nit by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the\nsophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger? And then when\nthe man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person: I\nhave pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a\nstone or a piece of wood; but when any person shows the man\u2019s\nprinciples, then he shows him as a man.\n\nLet us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value\nnot at all your own will ([Greek: proairesis]), but you look externally\nto things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will a\ncertain person say? and what will people think of you? Will you be\nconsidered a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater?\nfor if you have read Archedamus also, you have every thing (that you\ncan desire). Why you are still uneasy lest you should not show us who\nyou are? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us\nthat you are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow,\nquerulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with everything, blaming\neverybody, never quiet, vain: this is what you have exhibited to us. Go\naway now and read Archedamus; then if a mouse should leap down and make\na noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did\u2014what\nwas the man\u2019s name\u2014Crinis; and he too was proud, because he understood\nArchedamus. Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not\nconcern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able to\nlearn them without perturbation, to those who can say: \u201cI am not\nsubject to anger, to grief, to envy: I am not hindered, I am not\nrestrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us\nsee how we must deal with sophistical arguments; let us see how when a\nman has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing\nabsurd.\u201d To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is\nappropriate to light a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and\nto dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the\nsails.\n\n\nWHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT\nWE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTISE OURSELVES.\u2014The material for the wise and\ngood man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for\nthe physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is\nthe matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is\nto use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of\nevery soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to\nremain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature\nto be moved towards the desire for the good, and to aversion from the\nevil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels\nindifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject\nC\u00e6sar\u2019s coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin,\nwhether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin;\nso it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it\nimmediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the\nsoul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more\nthan persons will reject C\u00e6sar\u2019s coin. On this principle depends every\nmovement both of man and God.\n\nAgainst (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should\nexercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every\nman whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question,\nWhat have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this\nindependent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What\nhave you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the\nrule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the\nproconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of a thing is a\nproconsul\u2019s office? Independent of the will or dependent on it?\nIndependent. Take this away also; it does not stand examination; cast\nit away; it is nothing to you.\n\nIf we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning\nto night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith\ncaught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that\nin the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a\nman lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is\nhappy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a\npoor man, we say, He is wretched; he has nothing to eat.\n\nWe ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we\nshould direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting?\nOpinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is\ndivided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety,\nwhat is trifling? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and\nopinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and\nbad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will,\nand I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be\nthe state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the\nsoul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are\nthe appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be\nmoved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with\ngiddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but\nthe spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the\nspirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are\nrestored.\n\n\nMISCELLANEOUS.\u2014When some person asked him how it happened that since\nreason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the\nprogress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he\nanswered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the\nprogress greater then? For in that in which it has now been more\ncultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it\nhas been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and\nprogress is made. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose\nof maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to\nnature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are\ndifferent, and do not expect, when you are laboring at one thing to\nmake progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent\nupon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and\nliving so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a\nman.\n\nIt is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold\n(soft) cheese with a hook. But those who have a good natural\ndisposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to\nreason.\n\n\nTO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.\u2014When the\nadministrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean,\nEpictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire\nof you who are philosophers, as those who come to a strange city\ninquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is\nthe best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go\nin quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the\nthings in cities. For that there are three things which relate to\nman\u2014soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It\nremains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we\nsay to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus\nsailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and\naccompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man\nsaid that it was not, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit\nthen, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is\ncertainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is\nbetter than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the\nbest, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things\nof the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of\nthe will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power\nof the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power\nof the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend?\nOn itself? But that cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a\ncertain substance or nature ([Greek: ousia]) of good, by obtaining\nwhich we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On\nwhat then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it\nshall depend on things of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good\nis discovered; for good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are\nrationally delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not\ngood, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing\nwhich comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But\nyou would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would\nthen say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your\ndoctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the\npleasure from things of the body; and again that those bodily things\nmust be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the\ngood.\n\nSeek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making\nthem your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have\nsuch persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the\npersuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as\nthis which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this\nend, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic art which is\nthe best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand\nis the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that\nwhich precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three:\nthose which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which\nare directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the\nchief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to\nvalue the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things,\n[Greek: ta proaegoumena]). What are these? Engaging in public business,\nmarrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents,\nand generally, having desires, aversions ([Greek: echchlinein]),\npursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do\nthese things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted\nby nature? Free, noble, modest; for what other animal blushes? what\nother is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame?\nand we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these\nthings, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our\nactivity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are\nconformable to nature.\n\n\nHOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES ([Greek:\nphantasias]).\u2014As we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions,\nso we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for these\nappearances also propose questions to us. A certain person\u2019s son is\ndead. Answer; the thing is not within the power of the will: it is not\nan evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of\nit? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. C\u00e6sar has\ncondemned a person. It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an\nevil. The man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends\non the will: it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. That\nis a thing within the power of the will: it is a good. If we train\nourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall never\nassent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being\ncomprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened? Your son is dead.\nNothing more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened? Your ship\nis lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has been\nled to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds from\nhis own opinion. But Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters.\nWhy? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made\nyou magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the\npower of being evils? because it is in your power to be happy while you\nare suffering what you suffer? because he has opened the door to you,\nwhen things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain!\n\nHear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you would like to\nknow. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once\nwhen I was present, being vexed with his own friends and as if he was\nsuffering something intolerable, said: \u201cI cannot bear it, you are\nkilling me; you will make me such as that man is,\u201d pointing to me.\n\n\nTO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON A SUIT.\u2014When a\ncertain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a\nsuit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of his\ngoing to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter.\nEpictetus replied: If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you\nwill succeed or fail, I have no rule ([Greek: theoraema]) about this.\nBut if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right\nopinions ([Greek: dogmata]), you will fare well; if they are false, you\nwill fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For\nwhat is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of the\nCnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up\nto Rome? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and\nexpense? I must go. What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions\nare the causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the\ncause may be, such also is the effect! Have we then all sound opinions,\nboth you and your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you\nsounder opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he\nthink that his opinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad\ncriterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your\nopinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are\nsailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you\nare not content to stay at home with the honors which you had, but you\ndesire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever\nmake a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and\ncasting them out, if you have any that are bad? Whom have you\napproached for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What age?\nGo over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me\n(knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did you examine your own\nopinions? and did you not then, as you do all things now, do as you did\ndo? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and\nyourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you were\ndeficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public\nmatters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who\nthen seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man\nexamining and showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you wish\nme to say to you? Help me in this matter. I have no theorem (rule) for\nthis. Nor have you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a\nphilosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what\npurpose then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that\nwhatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and continue to be\nconformable to nature. Does this seem to you a small thing? No; but the\ngreatest. What then? does it need only a short time? and is it possible\nto seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it.\n\nThen you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone\nor a statue: for you saw me and nothing more. But he meets with a man\nas a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn\nmy opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let\nus examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away; if you\nhave any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher.\nNot so (you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we are\nhiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says.\nThen you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms and\nspoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges? Well,\nbut a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I\nshall have no land as you have none; I shall have no silver cups as you\nhave none, nor fine beasts as you have none. In answer to tins it is\nperhaps sufficient to say: I have no need of such things; but if you\npossess many things you have need of others: whether you choose or not,\nyou are poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of that which you\nhave not? of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, of\nbeing free from perturbation.\n\n\nIN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS.\u2014When the need of each opinion\ncomes, we ought to have it in readiness: on the occasion of breakfast,\nsuch opinions as relate to breakfast; in the bath, those that concern\nthe bath; in bed, those that concern bed.\n\nLet sleep not come upon thy languid eyes\nBefore each daily action thou hast scann\u2019d;\nWhat\u2019s done amiss, what done, what left undone;\nFrom first to last examine all, and then\nBlame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.\n\n\nAnd we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them,\nnot that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim, \u201cPaean Apollo.\u201d\nAgain in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever;\nand we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all.\nA man who has a fever may say: If I philosophize any longer, may I be\nhanged: wherever I go, I must take care of the poor body, that a fever\nmay not come. But what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparation\nagainst events which may happen? Do you not understand that you are\nsaying something of this kind? \u201cIf I shall still prepare myself to bear\nwith patience what happens, may I be hanged.\u201d But this is just as if a\nman after receiving blows should give up the Pancratium. In the\nPancratium it is in our power to desist and not to receive blows.\n\nBut in the other matter if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain?\nWhat then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing? It\nwas for this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself.\nGod says to you: Give me a proof that you have duly practised\nathletics, that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been\nexercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber).\nThen do you show yourself weak when the time for action comes? Now is\nthe time for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for\nthirst, bear it well. Now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it\nnot in your power? Who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder you\nfrom drinking; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: and\nhe will hinder you from eating; but he cannot prevent you from bearing\nhunger well.\n\nBut I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose\ndo you follow them? Slave, is it not that you may be happy, that you\nmay be constant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to\nnature and live so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having\nyour ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the\nthing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of\nlife, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is\nfever. Do you read when you are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a\nfever. But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man\nwho walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man\nin a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame God or man;\nnot to be afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well and\nnobly, to do what must be done: when the physician comes in, not to be\nfrightened at what he says; nor if he says you are doing well, to be\noverjoyed. For what good has he told you? and when you were in health,\nwhat good was that to you? And even if he says you are in a bad way, do\nnot despond. For what is it to be ill? is it that you are near the\nseverance of the soul and the body? what harm is there in this? If you\nare not near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world going\nto be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the\nphysician? Why do you say if you please, master, I shall be well? Why\ndo you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or\nshowing his importance)? Do you not value a physician, as you do a\nshoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is\nbuilding your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is\nnot yours, but by nature dead? He who has a fever has an opportunity of\ndoing this: if he does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it\nis not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals,\nneither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling\npower. But as to externals how must he act? so far as not to be\ncareless about them. Where then is there reason for fear? where is\nthere then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to\nothers, about things which are of no value? For we ought to have these\ntwo principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor\nbad; and that we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. My\nbrother ought not to have behaved thus to me. No, but he will see to\nthat; and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself towards him as\nI ought. For this is my own business; that belongs to another: no man\ncan prevent this, the other thing can be hindered.\n\n\nABOUT EXERCISE.\u2014We ought not to make our exercises consist in means\ncontrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, we\nwho call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers.\nFor it is difficult even to walk on a rope; and not only difficult, but\nit is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on a\nrope, or setting up a palm-tree, or embracing statues? By no means.\nEvery thing which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for\npractice; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of\nthat which is proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us\nas a thing to be worked out? To live with desire and aversion\n(avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And what is this?\nNeither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into\nanything which you would avoid. Towards this object then exercise\n(practice) ought to tend. For since it is not possible to have your\ndesire not disappointed and your aversion free from falling into that\nwhich you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you must\nknow that if you allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which\nare not within the power of the will, you will neither have your desire\ncapable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power\nof avoiding that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads\n(prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to\nthings which are not within the power of our will, we ought to oppose\nto this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness\nin the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. Then at\nlast, if occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself\nat a proper time you will descend into the arena to know if appearances\noverpower you as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that\nwhich is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a\ncharming young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The earthen pitcher,\nas the saying is, and the rock do not agree.\n\n\nWHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS.\u2014Solitude\nis a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone,\nhe is not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is among\nnumbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost\neither a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to\nrepose, we say that we are left solitary, though we are often in Rome,\nthough such a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, and\nsometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is\nsolitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and\nexposed to those who wish to harm him. For this reason when we travel,\nthen especially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among\nrobbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes us\nfrom solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and\nhelpful to us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may\nsay that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration and bewails himself\nsaying, Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor\nApollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what\nsome say that he does when he is alone at the conflagration. For they\ndo not understand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because\nthey set out from a certain natural principle, from the natural desire\nof community and mutual love and from the pleasure of conversation\namong men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a manner for\nthis also (being alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to\nbe his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil\nby himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and\nis employed in thoughts suitable to himself; so ought we also to be\nable to talk with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not\nto be unprovided with the means of passing our time; to observe the\ndivine administration, and the relation of ourselves to everything\nelse; to consider how we formerly were affected towards things that\nhappened and how at present; what are still the things which give us\npain; how these also can be cured and how removed; if any things\nrequire improvement, to improve them according to reason.\n\nWell then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murder\nme? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body.\n\nWhat kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselves\nworse than children; and what do children do when they are left alone?\nThey take up shells and ashes, and they build something, then pull it\ndown, and build something else, and so they never want the means of\npassing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep,\nbecause I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I then have no\nshells, no ashes? But children do what they do through want of thought\n(or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowledge are unhappy.\n\nEvery great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners. You must then\nbear such things as you are able, but conformably to nature: but not\n... Practise sometimes a way of living like a person out of health that\nyou may at some time live like a man in health.\n\n\nCERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS.\u2014As bad tragic actors cannot sing alone,\nbut in company with many, so some persons cannot walk about alone. Man,\nif you are anything, both walk alone and talk to yourself, and do not\nhide yourself in the chorus. Examine a little at last, look around,\nstir yourself up, that you may know who you are.\n\nYou must root out of men these two things, arrogance (pride) and\ndistrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that you want nothing (are\ndeficient in nothing); but distrust is the opinion that you cannot be\nhappy when so many circumstances surround you. Arrogance is removed by\nconfutation; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (to\nknow) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek. This search\nwill do you no harm; and in a manner this is philosophizing, to seek\nhow it is possible to employ desire and aversion ([Greek: echchlisis])\nwithout impediment.\n\nI am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular rank. Another\nsays, I have been a tribune, but you have not. If we were horses, would\nyou say, My father was swifter? I have much barley and fodder, or\nelegant neck ornaments. If then you were saying this, I said, Be it so:\nlet us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man such as running in a\nhorse, by which it will be known which is superior and inferior? Is\nthere not modesty ([Greek: aidos]), fidelity, justice? Show yourself\nsuperior in these, that you may be superior as a man. If you tell me\nthat you can kick violently, I also will say to you, that you are proud\nof that which is the act of an ass.\n\n\nTHAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION TO EVERYTHING.[Footnote:\nCompare Encheiridion, 29.]\u2014In every act consider what precedes and what\nfollows, and then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you will\nat first begin with spirit, since you have not thought at all of the\nthings which follow; but afterwards when some consequences have shown\nthemselves, you will basely desist (from that which you have begun).\u2014I\nwish to conquer at the Olympic games.\u2014(And I too, by the gods; for it\nis a fine thing.) But consider here what precedes and what follows; and\nthen, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. You must act\naccording to rules, follow strict diet, abstain from delicacies,\nexercise yourself by compulsion at fixed times, in heat, in cold; drink\nno cold water, nor wine, when there is opportunity of drinking it. In a\nword, you must surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to a\nphysician. Next in the contest, you must be covered with sand,\nsometimes dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity of\ndust, be scourged with the whip; and after undergoing all this, you\nmust sometimes be conquered. After reckoning all these things, if you\nhave still an inclination, go to the athletic practice. If you do not\nreckon them, observe you will behave like children who at one time play\nas wrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a\ntragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So you also do:\nyou are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a gladiator, then a\nphilosopher, then a rhetorician; but with your whole soul you are\nnothing: like the ape you imitate all that you see; and always one\nthing after another pleases you, but that which becomes familiar\ndispleases you. For you have never undertaken anything after\nconsideration, nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to\na strict examination; but you have undertaken it at hazard and with a\ncold desire. Thus some persons having seen a philosopher and having\nheard one speak like Euphrates\u2014and yet who can speak like him?\u2014wish to\nbe philosophers themselves.\n\nMan, consider first what the matter is (which you propose to do), then\nyour own nature also, what it is able to bear. If you are a wrestler,\nlook at your shoulders, your thighs, your loins: for different men are\nnaturally formed for different things. Do you think that, if you do\n(what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that\nyou can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way be\nangry and out of humor? You must watch, labor, conquer certain desires,\nyou must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by your slaves, laughed\nat by those who meet you, in everything you must be in an inferior\ncondition, as to magisterial office, in honors, in courts of justice.\nWhen you have considered all these things completely, then, if you\nthink proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for\nthese things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquillity. If you\nhave not considered these things, do not approach philosophy: do not\nact like children, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector,\nthen a rhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of C\u00e6sar. These things\nare not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad; you must\neither labor at your own ruling faculty or at external things; you must\neither labor at things within or at external things; that is, you must\neither occupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar.\n\nA person said to Rufus when Galba was murdered: Is the world now\ngoverned by Providence? But Rufus replied: Did I ever incidentally form\nan argument from Galba that the world is governed by Providence?\n\n\nTHAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITH\nMEN.\u2014If a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or\ndrinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either\nbecome like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man\nplaces a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning,\neither the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning\ncharcoal will light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so\ngreat, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the\ncommon sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep\ncompany with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the\nsoot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators,\nabout horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men? Such a person\nis bad, such a person is good; this was well done, this was done badly.\nFurther, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition?\nIs any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute,\nso that as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which are\ndiscordant, and tunes the instrument? Such a power as Socrates had who\nin all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own\npurpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessary\nconsequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people.\n\nWhy then are they more powerful than you? Because they utter these\nuseless words from their real opinions; but you utter your elegant\nwords only from your lips; for this reason they are without strength\nand dead, and it is nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your\nmiserable virtue, which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In this\nway the vulgar have the advantage over you; for every opinion ([Greek:\ndogma]) is strong and invincible. Until then the good ([Greek:\nchompsai]) sentiments ([Greek: hupolaepseis]) are fixed in you, and you\nshall have acquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to\nbe careful in your association with common persons; if you are not,\nevery day like wax in the sun there will be melted away whatever you\ninscribe on your minds in the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from\nthe sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason\nalso philosophers advise men to leave their native country, because\nancient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be made of\na different habit; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and say: See\nsuch a one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also\nphysicians send those who have lingering diseases to a different\ncountry and a different air; and they do right. Do you also introduce\nother habits than those which you have; fix you opinions and exercise\nyourselves in them. But you do not so; you go hence to a spectacle, to\na show of gladiators, to a place of exercise ([Greek: chuston]), to a\ncircus; then you come back hither, and again from this place you go to\nthose places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing\n(good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of\nthis kind. How shall I use the appearances presented to me? according\nto nature, or contrary to nature? how do I answer to them? as I ought,\nor as I ought not? Do I say to those things which are independent of\nthe will, that they do not concern me? For if you are not yet in this\nstate, fly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you\nintend ever to begin to be something.\n\n\nON PROVIDENCE.-When you make any charge against Providence, consider,\nand you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason.\nYes, but the unjust man has the advantage. In what? In money. Yes, for\nhe is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame,\nand is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage\nover you in being faithful, in being modest; for you will not find it\nto be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you\nhave the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because\nPhilostorgus was fortunate: Would you choose to lie with Sura? May it\nnever happen, he replied, that this day should come? Why then are you\nvexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells; or\nhow can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means\nas you abominate; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better\nthings to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be\nrich? He admitted this. Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess\nthe better thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth,\nthat this is a law of nature, that the superior has an advantage over\nthe inferior in that in which he is superior; and you will never be\nvexed.\n\nBut my wife treats me badly. Well, if any man asks you what this is,\nsay, my wife treats me badly. Is there then nothing more? Nothing. My\nfather gives me nothing. (What is this? my father gives me nothing. Is\nthere nothing else then? Nothing); but to say that this is an evil is\nsomething which must be added to it externally, and falsely added. For\nthis reason we must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion about\npoverty, and then we shall be happy.\n\n\nABOUT CYNICISM.\u2014When one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he\nwas a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynicism, what kind of\nperson a Cynic ought to be, and what was the notion ([Greek:\nprolaepsis]) of the thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure;\nbut I have so much to say to you that he who without God attempts so\ngreat a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to act\nindecently in public.\n\nIn the first place, in the things which relate to yourself, you must\nnot be in any respect like what you do now; you must not blame God or\nman; you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance\n([Greek: echchlisis]) only to the things which are within the power of\nthe will; you must not feel anger nor resentment or envy nor pity; a\ngirl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little\nreputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know\nthat the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darkness\nwhen they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment.\nA man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber; if a person\ncomes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead\nof all these things must use modesty as his protection; if he does not,\nhe will be indecent in his nakedness and under the open sky. This is\nhis house, his door; this is the slave before his bedchamber; this is\nhis darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide anything that he does;\nand if he does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a\nman who lives under the open sky, of a free man; he has begun to fear\nsome external thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can\nhe get concealment when he chooses. For where shall he hide himself and\nhow? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this\np\u00e6dagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when\nthen a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with\nhis whole soul to superintend men? It cannot be: it is impossible.\n\nIn the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and\nthis mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work\non is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the\nshoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the\nbody is nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it\ncome when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you\nsay. And whither; can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. But\nwherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the\nstars, dreams, omens, and the conversation ([Greek: omilia]) with gods.\n\nThen, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with\nthis; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men\nabout good and bad things, to show them that they have wandered and are\nseeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it\nis, they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off\nto Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic\nis a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and\nit is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and\nnot to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who\nare not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances\nnor confounded.\n\nIt is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion\nshould arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates:\nMen, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches? like blind\npeople you are wandering up and down; you are going by another road,\nand have left the true road; you seek for prosperity and happiness\nwhere they are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not\nbelieve him. Why do you seek it without? In the body? It is not there.\nIf you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius. In possessions? It is\nnot there. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus: look at those\nwho are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In\npower? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been\ntwice and thrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in\nthese matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled\nby an appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them\nwhen they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very\nconsulships and glory and splendor they think that they are more\nwretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It is not: if it\nwere, Nero would have been happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was\nAgamemnon happy, though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero;\nbut while others are snoring, what is he doing?\n\nMuch from his head he tore his rooted hair:\nIliad, x., 15.\n\n\nand what does he say himself?\n\n\u201cI am perplexed,\u201d he says, \u201cand\nDisturb\u2019d I am,\u201d and \u201cmy heart out of my bosom\nIs leaping.\u201d\nIliad, x., 91.\n\n\nWretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your\nbody? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter\nwith you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you\nand is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid,\nwith which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He\nknows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the\nnature of evil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and\nwhen anything that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Woe to me,\nfor the Hellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and\nalone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die\ndestroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will\nthey not die? Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it\nmake? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they\ndie singly, it is equally an evil. Is anything else then going to\nhappen than the separation of the soul and the body? Nothing. And if\nthe Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to\ndie? It is. Why then do you lament (and say), Oh, you are a king and\nhave the sceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an\nunhappy god. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd: for you weep as\nshepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep: and these\nwho are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was\nyour desire in any danger? was your aversion ([Greek: echchlisis])? was\nyour movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No;\nbut the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great\ngain to be deprived of an adulterous wife? Shall we be despised then by\nthe Trojans? What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If\nthey are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do\nyou care about them?\n\nDo you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do\nnot know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout,\nophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of everything\nwhich is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that\nanything which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how\nis a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud?\nWell then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And\nwho is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No\nman. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true?\nNo man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally\nfree. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object\nor to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do\nanything, which of you can do this, unless he has received an\nimpression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No\nman. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered\nand is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for\ngood here.\n\n\nTHAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT\nIN OUR POWER.\u2014Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an\nevil to you; for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with\nothers nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a\nman is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault; for God\nhas made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this\npurpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his\nown, and other things not as his own; some things subject to hindrance\nand compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man\u2019s own;\nbut the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and\nthe nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes\ncare of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. But you\nsay, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. Why did he\nconsider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he looked\non you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are a mortal,\nthat it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country?\nTherefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you\nor for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not\nthought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing,\nyou have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would\nalways enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you\nsit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in\nthe same places. Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than\ncrows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and\nchanging their nests for others, and crossing the seas without\nlamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, but this happens\nto them because they are irrational creatures. Was reason then given to\nus by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may\npass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be\nimmortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go\nabroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if any of our familiar\nfriends goes abroad, must we sit and weep; and on the contrary, when he\nreturns, must we dance and clap our hands like children?\n\nBut my mother laments when she does not see me. Why has she not learned\nthese principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care\nthat she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every\nway what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another\u2019s sorrow;\nbut my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means,\nfor it is in my power; and the sorrow of another I will endeavor to\nstop as far as I can; but I will not attempt to do it by every means;\nfor if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus\nand shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the\nuniverse; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God\nand of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay,\nbut I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams,\nperturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity\ndepending on the letters of others. Some person has arrived from Rome.\nI only hope there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where\nyou are not? From Hellas (Greece) some one is come; I hope that there\nis no harm. In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to\nyou. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are,\nand must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters? Is\nthis the way in which your affairs are in a state of security? Well\nthen suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from\nme. What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of\nmortals? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age,\nand at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love?\nKnow you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds\nof things must happen; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber\nanother, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around\nus, such are those who live with us in the world; cold and heat, and\nunsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea,\nand winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one\nman, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into\nan army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting,\nunhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or\ntwo, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands.\n\nDid you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learn\nthis? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man must\nkeep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and\nit is not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better\nthat it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the\ngeneral complain when anything more hard than usual is imposed on you,\nand you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in\nyour power; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man\nwill put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger,\nbut will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a\nvessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if\nyou are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if to run to the head of the\nship, refuse; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he\nnot pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad\nexample to the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man\u2019s life\nis a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe\nthe duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general; if\nit is possible, divining what his wishes are; for there is no\nresemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in\nsuperiority of character. Know you not that a good man does nothing for\nthe sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right? What advantage\nis it then to him to have done right? And what advantage is it to a man\nwho writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought? The advantage is\nto have written it. Is there no reward then? Do you seek a reward for a\ngood man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish\nfor nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the\ngames. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good\nand happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this\ncity (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a\nman, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by\ntheir weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never\ncease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of\na child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?\n\nSo in this matter also: if you kiss your own child, or your brother or\nfriend, never give full license to the appearance ([Greek:\nphantasian]), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses;\nbut check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their\ntriumphs and remind them that they are mortal. Do you also remind\nyourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what\nyou love is nothing of your own; it has been given to you for the\npresent, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been\ngiven to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of\ngrapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these\nthings in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend\nwhen it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a\nfig in winter. For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event\nwhich happens from the universe to the things which are taken away\naccording to its nature. And further, at the times when you are\ndelighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances.\nWhat harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping\nvoice: To-morrow you will die; and to a friend also: To-morrow you will\ngo away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again? But these\nare words of bad omen\u2014and some incantations also are of bad omen; but\nbecause they are useful, I don\u2019t care for this; only let them be\nuseful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are\nsignificant of some evil? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness\nof spirit, and sorrow, and grief, and shamelessness. These words are of\nbad omen; and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to\nprotect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which\nis significant of any natural thing is of evil omen? say that even for\nthe ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the\ndestruction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of\nthe leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place\nof the green fig, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all\nthese things are changes from a former state into other states; not a\ndestruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is\ngoing away from home and a small change: such is death, a greater\nchange, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to\nthat which is not now. Shall I then no longer exist? You will not\nexist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need;\nfor you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world\nhad need of you.\n\nLet these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day; these you\nshould write, these you should read; about these you should talk to\nyourself and to others. Ask a man: Can you help me at all for this\npurpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if anything\nthat is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will\nimmediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great\nthing in all cases to say: I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. For\nso you also will say: I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave\nmy home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be led\nto prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the\nplace from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwith\nrecollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of the\npower of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is it\nto me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is it\nthat sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of the\nstate. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in everything.\nThen, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your\npower to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquer\nit: do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the\nconsequences by raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If\nyou be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how\nmany pleasures there were for him who lived there and how many there\nwould be for him who returned to Rome; but fix your mind on this\nmatter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man\nof courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the life in\nAthens is, but think only of the life in Rome.\n\nThen in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being\nconscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you\nare performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is\nfor a man to be able to say to himself: Now whatever the rest may say\nin solemn manner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way\ncontrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing; and\nthey are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring about\nme and praising me; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive\nfrom myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldier\nsuch as he ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he\nhas chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the\nthings which are independent of the will: See that you fear without\nreason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire; seek not the good\nin things external; seek it in yourselves: if you do not, you will not\nfind it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at another\ntime sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and\nsick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hates\nme\u2014far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his\nservants? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect\nany even of the smallest things; but he does this for the purpose of\nexercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Being\nappointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which I\nam, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not entirely\ndirect my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands?\n\nHaving these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them\nby yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want\nof one to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be\nwithout something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping\naway fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrow\nand fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant\u2019s\nguard, or attendants on C\u00e6sar? Or shall any appointment to offices at\ncourt cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on\nthe occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who\nhave received so great authority from Zeus? Only do not make a proud\ndisplay of it, nor boast of it; but show it by your acts; and if no man\nperceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and\nhappy.\n\n\nTO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (DESIST) FROM THEIR PURPOSE.\u2014Consider as to the\nthings which you proposed to yourself at first, which you have secured,\nand which you have not; and how you are pleased when you recall to\nmemory the one, and are pained about the other; and if it is possible,\nrecover the things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we\nare engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows. For\nthe combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancration, in which\nboth the successful and the unsuccessful may have the greatest merit,\nor may have little, and in truth may be very fortunate or very\nunfortunate; but the combat is for good fortune and happiness\nthemselves. Well then, even if we have renounced the contest in this\nmatter (for good fortune and happiness), no man hinders us from\nrenewing the combat again, and we are not compelled to wait for another\nfour years that the games at Olympia may come again; but as soon as you\nhave recovered and restored yourself, and employ the same zeal, you may\nrenew the combat again; and if again you renounce it, you may again\nrenew it; and if you once gain the victory, you are like him who has\nnever renounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing the\nsame thing (renouncing the combat), begin to do it with pleasure, and\nthen like a bad athlete go about after being conquered in all the\ncircuit of the games like quails who have run away.\n\n\nTO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT.\u2014Are you not ashamed at being more cowardly and\nmore mean than fugitive slaves? How do they when they run away leave\ntheir masters? on what estates do they depend, and what domestics do\nthey rely on? Do they not after stealing a little, which is enough for\nthe first days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea,\ncontriving one method after another for maintaining their lives? And\nwhat fugitive slave ever died of hunger? But you are afraid lest\nnecessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch,\nare you so blind, and don\u2019t you see the road to which the want of\nnecessaries leads?\u2014Well, where does it lead?\u2014to the same place to which\na fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not\noften said this yourself to your companions? have you not read much of\nthis kind, and written much? and how often have you boasted that you\nwere easy as to death?\n\nLearn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tell\nus that you are a philosopher: but at present do not, even if any other\nman calls you so, allow it.\n\nIs that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you\nare not the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a\nheadache, as a fever? If your parents were poor, and left their\nproperty to others, and if while they live, they do not help you at\nall, is this shameful to you? Is this what you learned with the\nphilosophers? Did you never hear that the thing which is shameful ought\nto be blamed, and that which is blamable is worthy of blame? Whom do\nyou blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not do himself?\nDid you then make your father such as he is, or is it in your power to\nimprove him? Is this power given to you? Well then, ought you to wish\nthe things which are not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not\nobtain them? And have you also been accustomed while you were studying\nphilosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from yourself?\nLament then and groan and eat with fear that you may not have food\nto-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaves lest they steal, lest they\nrun away, lest they die. So live, and continue to live, you who in name\nonly have approached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far\nas you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable to those who\ntake them up; you, who have never sought constancy, freedom from\nperturbation, and from passions; you who have not sought any person for\nthe sake of this object, but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who\nhave never thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself, Am\nI able to bear, or am I not able to bear? What remains for me to do?\nBut as if all your affairs were well and secure, you have been resting\non the third topic, that of things being unchanged, in order that you\nmay possess unchanged\u2014what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of\nthe rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance ([Greek:\nechchlisin]) which fails in the attempt? About security in these things\nyou have been anxious.\n\nOught you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and\nthen to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see\nbuilding a battlement all around and encircling it with a wall? And\nwhat doorkeeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in\norder to be able to prove\u2014what? You practise that you may not be tossed\nas on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Show me\nfirst what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me\nthe scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on\nmeasuring the dust? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which\nmake men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they\nwish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in\nthe administration of the universe?\n\n\nABOUT FREEDOM.\u2014He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is\nneither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose\nmovements to action ([Greek: hormai]) are not impeded, whose desires\nattain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would\navoid ([Greek: echchliseis aperiptotoi]). Who then chooses to live in\nerror? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust,\nunrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives\nas he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow,\nfear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to\navoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of\nthe bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that\nwhich he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not\none; nor then do we find any bad man free.\n\nFurther, then, answer me this question, also: does freedom seem to you\nto be something great and noble and valuable? How should it not seem\nso? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and\nvaluable and noble to be mean? It is not possible. When then you see\nany man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own\nopinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not\nonly if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a\ngovernment (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves\nwho for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so\nfor the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.\nThis is admitted also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent\nand self-governing? Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of\nanother to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not\nlook, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or\ninquire about his being bought or sold, but if you hear him saying from\nhis heart and with feeling, \u201cMaster,\u201d even if the twelve fasces precede\nhim (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, \u201cWretch\nthat I am, how much I suffer,\u201d call him a slave. If, finally, you see\nhim lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave, though he wears\na praetexta. If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind do not yet say\nthat he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to\ncompulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune, and if you\nfind him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia;\nsay that his master is from home; he will return soon, and you will\nknow what he suffers.\n\nWhat then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him\nhis own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor\nprovincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be\ndiscovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from\nhindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then\nis it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore\nin life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a\ngeneral way; but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it\npossible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others\ncan be free from hindrance? No. Is it possible for him to be unimpeded?\nNo. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then, whether we have nothing\nwhich is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or\nwhether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of\nothers. What do you mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound)\nis it in your power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to\nbe healthy? Neither is this in my power. When you wish it to be\nhandsome? Nor is this. Life or death? Neither is this in my power. Your\nbody then is another\u2019s, subject to every man who is stronger than\nyourself. It is. But your estate is it in your power to have it when\nyou please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? No. And\nyour slaves? No. And your clothes? No. And your house? No. And your\nhorses? Not one of these things. And if you wish by all means your\nchildren to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it\nin your power? This also is not in my power.\n\nWhether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends\non yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of\nthe kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is\nany man able to make you assent to that which is false? No man. In the\nmatter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.\nGranted. Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that\nto which you do not choose? He can, for when he threatens me with death\nor bonds he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then you\ndespise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him? No. Is\nthen the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours? It\nis my act.\n\nWhen you have made this preparation, and have practised this\ndiscipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that\nwhich is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those\nwhich are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern\nyourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep\nyour desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and\nturned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear\nany man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? About the things\nwhich are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and\nwho has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede\nthem? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be\nafraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not\nyours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you\nbeen studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own\nand not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your\npower, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have\nyou come to the philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be\nunfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed\nyou to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to\nyou? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is\npresent. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are\nwithin the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a\nproper and regulated desire; but of the things which are not in the\npower of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow\nany place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure\nhasty.\n\nThen after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you\nangry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who are\nyou, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God)\nintroduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you\nfellow-workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he\nintroduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and\nas one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his\nadministration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival\nfor a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been\npermitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads\nyou out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard\nand seen? No; but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too\nwould wish to be longer in the initiation; and perhaps also those at\nOlympia to see other athletes. But the solemnity is ended; go away like\na grateful and modest man; make room for others; others also must be\nborn, as you were, and, being born, they must have a place, and houses,\nand necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why\nare you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the\nworld? Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife.\nWhat, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who\nmade you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you\nnot give way to him who is superior? Why then did he introduce me into\nthe world on these conditions? And if the conditions do not suit you,\ndepart. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants\nthose who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that\nthey may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the\nsolemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly, he will\nnot unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ([Greek:\npanaeguris]) for they did not when they were present behave as they\nought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they\nlamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not\nseeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received\nfor contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind,\nmanly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom. For what\npurpose then have I received these things? To use them. How long? So\nlong as he who has lent them chooses. What if they are necessary to me?\nDo not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary; do not\nsay to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not\nnecessary.\n\nYou then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to\nbe free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my\npoor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do\nnot possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you\nmay no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not\nbecause he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free,\nbecause he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not\npossible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of\nlaying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed,\neverything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he\nwould have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed\nyou for it; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his\nleg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends,\ncountry, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from\nwhom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and\nhis real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have\nyielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would\nany man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to\ninquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of\nthe whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered\nthat everything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf\nof that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore\nsee what Diogenes himself says and writes: \u201cFor this reason,\u201d he says,\n\u201cDiogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the\nPersians and with Archidamus the King of the Lacedaemonians, as you\nplease.\u201d Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the\nAthenians and all the Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves,\ncould not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and\npaid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power?\nBecause I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want\nnothing, because law is everything to me, and nothing else is. These\nwere the things which permitted him to be free.\n\nThink of these things, these opinions, these words; look to these\nexamples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to\nits worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the\nprice of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is\ncalled liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down\nprecipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished; and will you\nnot for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give\nback to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will\nyou not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure\ntorture, and exile, and scourging, and, in a word, to give up all which\nis not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves,\neven if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up\nto the palace (C\u00e6sar\u2019s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you\nwill feel that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to\ncommon opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words\ncontrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are\ntrue, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and\neagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have\nnot yet obtained them there is an imagination ([Greek: phantasia]),\nthat when these things are come, all that is good will come with them;\nthen, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing\nto and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things, which are\nnot present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the\nthings which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may\nknow that this is true, as you have labored for those things, so\ntransfer your labor to these: be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring\nan opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead\nof to a rich old man; be seen about a philosopher\u2019s doors; you will not\ndisgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without\nprofit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you\ndo not succeed), try at least; the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.\n\n\nON FAMILIAR INTIMACY.\u2014To this matter before all you must attend, that\nyou be never so closely connected with any of your former intimates or\nfriends as to come down to the same acts as he does. If you do not\nobserve this rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises in\nyour mind, \u201cI shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have the\nsame feeling towards me,\u201d remember that nothing is done without cost,\nnor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to be\nthe same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have,\nto be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the\nsame with your former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from your\nfriends the same that you did before.\n\n\nWHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS.\u2014Keep this thought in\nreadiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place\nof it; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss; neither\nif you have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a\nsheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of\nidle talk such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk\nif you have acquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always\nmaintain your character such as it ought to be. But if you do not,\nconsider that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever\npains you take about yourself, you are going to waste them all and\noverturn them. And it needs only a few things for the loss and\noverturning of all\u2014namely, a small deviation from reason. For the\nsteerer of a ship to upset it, he has no need of the same means as he\nhas need of for saving it; but if he turns it a little to the wind, it\nis lost; and if he does not do this purposely, but has been neglecting\nhis duty a little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in\nthis case also; if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have\nup to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances\nof things, and watch over them; for that which you have to preserve is\nno small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and constancy, freedom\nfrom the affects, a state of mind undisturbed, freedom from fear,\ntranquillity, in a word liberty. For what will you sell these things?\nSee what is the value of the things which you will obtain in exchange\nfor these.\u2014But shall I not obtain any such thing for it?\u2014See, and if\nyou do in return get that, see what you receive in place of it. I\npossess decency, he possesses a tribuneship: he possesses a pr\u00e6torship,\nI possess modesty. But I do not make acclamations where it is not\nbecoming: I will not stand up where I ought not; for I am free, and a\nfriend of God. and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek)\nanything else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good\nreport, nor in fact anything. For he (God) does not allow me to claim\n(seek) them, for if he had chosen, he would have made them good for me;\nbut he has not done so, and for this reason I cannot transgress his\ncommands. Preserve that which is your own good in everything; and as to\nevery other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave\nconsistently with reason in respect to them, content with this only. If\nyou do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in all things, you\nwill be hindered, you will be impeded. These are the laws which have\nbeen sent from thence (from God); these are the orders. Of these laws a\nman ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those\nof Masurius and Cassius.\n\n\nTO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN TRANQUILLITY.\u2014Remember\nthat not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and\nsubject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure,\nand of travelling abroad, and of learning. For, to speak plainly,\nwhatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it\nplaces us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between\ndesiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the\ndifference between desiring power or being content with a private\nstation; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have\nnothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I am\nunhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power\nare things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what\npurpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your\npurpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow\nand incapable of enduring labor. But if you refer reading to the proper\nend, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ([Greek:\neusoia])? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil\nlife, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies,\nand for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.\u2014And what is\nthis tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say\nC\u00e6sar or C\u00e6sar\u2019s friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty\nthousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing\nso sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do\nsomething: I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures\n(rules) which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without\ndesire and aversion to things external; and then that I may attend to\nmen, what they say, how they are moved; and this not with any bad\ndisposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule; but\nI turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then\nshall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do\nnot: thanks to God.\n\nWhat then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read\nfor this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we\nmay in our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearances\npresented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said,\nand in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism,\nand in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our\nstudy (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by\nall means the things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be\nhindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about\naction (efforts, [Greek: hormae]), not that we may see what is said\nabout action, but that we may act well; if we read what is said about\ndesire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither\nfail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we\nread what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the\nrelations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor\ncontrary to these relations; we should not be vexed, in being hindered\nas to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts\nwhich are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning\nnot what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read\nso many verses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I\nhave employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have not\nemployed my desire; I have used avoidance ([Greek: echchlisei]) only\nwith respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have\nnot been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the\nentreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my\nco-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we ought\nto thank him.\n\nThere is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in\nthe morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to look\ntowards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that\nnothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune;\nto make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has\nmade so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which\ncannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this\nonly, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call\nthe man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and\neven if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he\nknows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say\nthat a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl, nor do I. But\nif he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a\nlover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a\nlover of money, not a lover of labor; and if he does it through love of\nlearning, I say that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his\nlabor to his own ruling power that he may keep it in a state\nconformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I\nsay that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these\nthings which are common to all, but on account of his opinions\n(principles); for these are the things which belong to each man, which\nmake his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that\nwhich is present, and be content with the things which come in season.\nIf you see anything which you have learned and inquired about occurring\nto you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the\nacts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have\nlessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so\nwith rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are\nnot moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you\nonce were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have\nbehaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in\nanother. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a\nconsulship or the government of a province? These things come to you\nfrom yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things\nand to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these\nthoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you\nshall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally\ndistant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that\nwhich is going on?\n\n\nAGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS.\u2014The wise and good man neither\nhimself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he\ncan prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things\nis proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all\noccasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to\nquarrel. See in Xenophon\u2019s Symposium how many quarrels he settled, how\nfurther he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he\ntolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to\nconfute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man\nhas in his power another man\u2019s ruling principle. He wished therefore\nfor nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not\nthat this or that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing\nwhich belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own\nacts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable\nto nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that\nothers also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the\nobject always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be\ncommander (a pr\u00e6tor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his\nobject is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to\nmarry? No; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object\nis to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he\nwould have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what\nbelongs to another not to belong to another: and to be instructed is\nthis, to learn what things are a man\u2019s own and what belongs to another.\n\nHow then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man\nwho has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any\nthing which happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect\nthat which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than that\nwhat actually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever\nthey (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a\nperson has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you.\nBut he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But\nhe wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did\nhe learn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love one\nanother, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it.\nSince then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why\nshall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your\nneighbor has thrown stones. Have you then done anything wrong? But the\nthings in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a\nfree power of will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to\nthis? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more\nstones. But, if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your\nstorehouse, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you\nthe disposition of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge\nfor an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of his\nnatural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he\ncannot run. When is a dog wretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he\ncannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not\nbecause he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues, for he did not\ncome into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for\nthis purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity?\nPeople ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into\nwhich he has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been born\nor has died, but because it has happened to him in his lifetime to have\nlost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his\nfather, not his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves; for not\none of these things is a man\u2019s own, but all belong to others, are\nservile, and subject to account ([Greek: hupeithuna]), at different\ntimes given to different persons by those who have them in their power:\nbut I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps)\nin his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on\ncoins, and if we find them we approve of the coins, and if we do not\nfind the marks we reject them. What is the stamp on this sestertius?\nThe stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it\naway; it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case:\nWhat is the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable\ndisposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affections.\nProduce these qualities. I accept them: I consider this man a citizen,\nI accept him as a neighbor, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he\nhas not Nero\u2019s stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he\nfault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those\nwho come in his way? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man? Is\neverything judged (determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say\nthat the form in wax is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an\napple. But the external figure is not enough: neither then is the nose\nenough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a\nman. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know\nwhen he is refuted: he is an ass; in another man the sense of shame is\nbecome dead: he is good for nothing, he is anything rather than a man.\nThis man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not\neven a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.\n\nWhat then? would you have me to be despised?\u2014By whom? by those who know\nyou? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and\nmodest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to\nyou? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not\nhis art. But they will be more hostile to me for this reason. Why do\nyou say \u201cme\u201d? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using\nin a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way\ncan he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show\nyourself afraid? And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you\nare at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those\nchiefly who think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say,\nknow not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because\nthey have no access to the things which are mine.\n\nIn this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers (and\nsay): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing; our wall is\nsecure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources.\nThese are the things which make a city strong and impregnable; but\nnothing else than his opinions makes a man\u2019s soul impregnable. For what\nwall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so\nsafe, or what honor (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man\u2019s\nopinions)? All (other) things everywhere are perishable, easily taken\nby assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be\ndisturbed, except what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires\ndisappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not\nchoose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us,\nand do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is\nperishable and servile and to labor at the things which are\nimperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man\neither hurts another or does good to another, but that a man\u2019s opinions\nabout each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him;\nthis is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made\nEteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which\nthey had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is\nthe extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the\nnature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him\nwho deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and\ntreacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. For\nnothing is more akin to us than the good; therefore, if these things\n(externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons,\nnor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of\nenemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will ([Greek:\nproairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is\nthe only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the\nonly evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about\nwhat? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom?\nwith the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the\nchief things?\n\nRemembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very\nill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son.\n\n\nAGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED.\u2014I am grieved, a man says,\nat being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing\nwhich concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to\nstop this pity? It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require\npity. And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving\n(requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition? I think that I am\nnot; but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if\nthey ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but\nthey pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honorable offices, for\ndiseases and deaths and other such things. Whether then are you\nprepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil,\nbut that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office\n([Greek: anarchonti)] and enjoys no honor to be happy; or to show\nyourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of these things\nbelong to a man who is boastful, silly, and good for nothing. And\nconsider by what means the pretence must be supported. It will be\nnecessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels,\nand to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often\nthe same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same,\nand to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to\nshow that you are a man honored by the great, and to try to sup at\ntheir houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to\nemploy some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and\nnobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to\ngo by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is\nboth impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has\nnot been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad.\nIs this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince\nyourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you\nattempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as\nyou with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you\nhave of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to\nyou than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced\nyourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is\nthis what you have been earnest about doing, to learn to be free from\ngrief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to\nbe free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads\nto this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the\nwill, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others?\nFor another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it?\nIt is a thing independent of the will\u2014Then is it nothing to you? It is\nnothing. When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you\nthink that you are convinced about good and evil?\n\n\nON FREEDOM FROM FEAR.\u2014What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you\nsay, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber, and those who\nexclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to\nthe tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it\nbecause the child does not understand these things? If then any man\ndoes understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to\nthe tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of\nsome circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he\nafraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the\nguards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live\nby all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant\nwhat hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If\nthen a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I\nhave instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his\nwife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he\ncares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are\nplaying with shells (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble\nthemselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the\nmaterials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and\nthe occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him, or what guards\nor what swords?\n\nWhat hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these\nthings, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins,\nquietly expecting everything which can happen, and enduring that which\nhas already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you\nwill know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the\npart of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have\npower, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall\ngo, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not\nbecause of the place that it was well with me, but because of my\nopinions which I shall carry off with me, for neither can any man\ndeprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be\ntaken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be\nand whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to\ndie? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is. It is\nnow time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things\nout of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here?\nwhat is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what\nnew thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a\ntyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to\nhave swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have\nconsidered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have\nbeen made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave.\nI have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I\nsay) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are\nyou not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not\nthe master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and\nall the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please.\nMake trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches.\n\nWhom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest\nthey should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter,\nlet them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think\nit befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are\nyou not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not\nchoose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I\nthink that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach\nmyself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements\n(pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the\nsame will ([Greek: sunthelo]). There is no shutting out for me, but for\nthose who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in?\nBecause I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who\nenter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honored\nby C\u00e6sar, I say what does he happen to get? A province (the government\nof a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The\noffice of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office\nwell? Why do I still strive to enter (C\u00e6sar\u2019s chamber)? A man scatters\ndried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one\nanother; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a\nman should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them.\nProvinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is\ndistributed; let children look to that. Pr\u00e6torships, consulships, are\ndistributed; let children scramble for them, let them be shut out,\nbeaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are\nonly dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while\nC\u00e6sar is scattering them about, do not be troubled; if a dried fig come\ninto your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig.\nBut if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by\nanother, and shall flatter those who have got into (C\u00e6sar\u2019s) chamber,\nneither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor anything else of the\nthings which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not\nto think good.\n\n\nTO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER OF SHAMELESSNESS.\u2014When\nyou see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set\nagainst this the fact that you have not the want (desire) of power;\nwhen you see another rich, see what you possess in place of riches: for\nif you possess nothing in place of them, you are miserable; but if you\nhave not the want of riches, know that you possess more than this man\npossesses and what is worth much more.\n\n\nWHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE AND WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO VALUE.\u2014The\ndifficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness\nis about external. What shall I do? how will it be? how will it turn\nout? will this happen? will that? All these are the words of those who\nare turning themselves to things which are not within the power of the\nwill. For who says, How shall I not assent to that which is false? how\nshall I not turn away from the truth? If a man be of such a good\ndisposition as to be anxious about these things I will remind him of\nthis: Why are you anxious? The thing is in your own power, be assured;\ndo not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the natural rule.\nOn the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy) about desire, lest it\nfail in its purpose and miss its end, and with respect to the avoidance\nof things, lest he should fall into that which he would avoid, I will\nfirst kiss (love) him, because he throws away the things about which\nothers are in a flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs\nhis thoughts about his own affairs and his own condition. Then I shall\nsay to him: If you do not choose to desire that which you will fail to\nobtain nor to attempt to avoid that into which you will fall, desire\nnothing which belongs to (which is in the power of) others, nor try to\navoid any of the things which are not in your power. If you do not\nobserve this rule, you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall\ninto that which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here? where is\nthere room for the words How will it be? and How will it turn out? and\nWill this happen or that?\n\nNow is not that which will happen independent of the will? Yes. And the\nnature of good and of evil, is it not in the things which are within\nthe power of the will? Yes. Is it in your power then to treat according\nto nature everything which happens? Can any person hinder you? No man.\nNo longer then say to me, How will it be? For, however it may be, you\nwill dispose of it well, and the result to you will be a fortunate one.\nWhat would Hercules have been if he said: How shall a great lion not\nappear to me, or a great boar, or savage men? And what do you care for\nthat? If a great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight; if bad\nmen appear, you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I\nlose my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble act.\nFor since he must certainly die, of necessity a man must be found doing\nsomething, either following the employment of a husbandman, or digging,\nor trading, or serving in a consulship, or suffering from indigestion\nor from diarrhoea. What then do you wish to be doing when you are found\nby death? I, for my part, would wish to be found doing something which\nbelongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the general interest, noble.\nBut if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would be found doing\nat least that which I cannot be hindered from doing, that which is\npermitted me to do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty which\nmakes use of appearances, laboring at freedom from the affects\n(laboring at tranquillity of mind); rendering to the relations of life\ntheir due. If I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touching on\n(advancing to) the third topic (or head) safety in forming judgments\nabout things. If death surprises me when I am busy about these things,\nit is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God and say: The\nmeans which I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of\nthe world) and following it I have not neglected; I have not dishonored\nthee by my acts; see how I have used my perceptions, see how I have\nused my preconceptions; have I ever blamed thee? have I been\ndiscontented with anything that happens, or wished it to be otherwise?\nhave I wished to transgress the (established) relations (of things)?\nThat thou hast given me life, I thank thee for what thou hast given. So\nlong as I have used the things which are thine I am content. Take them\nback and place them wherever thou mayest choose, for thine were all\nthings, thou gavest them to me. Is it not enough to depart in this\nstate of mind? and what life is better and more becoming than that of a\nman who is in this state of mind? and what end is more happy?\n\n\nABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS).\u2014Some persons raise a question whether the\nsocial feeling is contained in the nature of man; and yet I think that\nthese same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainly\ncontained in it, and that if man is distinguished from other animals by\nanything, he is distinguished by this. When then we see any other\nanimal cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with\nsurprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man; and on the\nother hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway, as\nif we were making an excuse for it, we say that of course the animal is\nnot a human creature. So we suppose that there is something superior in\nman, and that we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by\ntheir nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men approach\nthem by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to a love (habit) of\npurity. But since it is impossible that man\u2019s nature ([Greek: ousia])\ncan be altogether pure, being mixed (composed) of such materials,\nreason is applied, as far as it is possible, and reason endeavors to\nmake human nature love purity.\n\nThe first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul; and we\nsay the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of\nthe soul as you could discover that of the body; but as to the soul,\nwhat else could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in\nrespect to the acts which are her own? Now the acts of the soul are\nmovement towards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion,\npreparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these\nacts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing else than her own bad\njudgments ([Greek: chrimata]). Consequently the impurity of the soul is\nthe soul\u2019s bad opinions; and the purification of the soul is the\nplanting in it of proper opinions; and the soul is pure which has\nproper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from\nperturbation and pollution.\n\nFor we ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter the\nmultitude from philosophy; but as in other things, a philosopher should\nshow himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the things\nthat relate to the body. See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want\nnothing; see how I am without a house, and without a city, and an\nexile, if it happens to be so, and without a hearth I live more free\nfrom trouble and more happily than all of noble birth and than the\nrich. But look at my poor body also and observe that it is not injured\nby my hard way of living. But if a man says this to me, who has the\nappearance (dress) and face of a condemned man, what god shall persuade\nme to approach philosophy, if it makes men such persons? Far from it; I\nwould not choose to do so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I\nindeed would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements\ntowards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed\nthan with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain notion\n(appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt at) that which is\nbecoming; and where he supposes it to be, there also he strives that it\nshall be. It is only necessary to show him (what it is), and to say:\nYoung man, you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then that it\n(is produced) grows in that part of you where you have the rational\nfaculty; seek it there where you have the movements towards and\nmovements from things, where you have the desires towards and the\naversion from things; for this is what you have in yourself of a\nsuperior kind; but the poor body is naturally only earth; why do you\nlabor about it to no purpose? if you shall learn nothing else, you will\nlearn from time that the body is nothing. But if a man comes to me\ndaubed with filth, dirty, with a moustache down to his knees, what can\nI say to him, by what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For about\nwhat has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I may be able\nto change him and say, Beauty is not in this, but in that? Would you\nhave me to tell him, that beauty consists not in being daubed with\nmuck, but that it lies in the rational part? Has he any desire of\nbeauty? has he any form of it in his mind? Go and talk to a hog, and\ntell him not to roll in the mud.\n\n\nON ATTENTION.\u2014When you have remitted your attention for a short time,\ndo not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose; but let\nthis thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault\ncommitted today your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that\nfollows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not\nattending is formed in you; then a habit of deferring your attention.\nAnd continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the\nhappiness of life, proper behavior, the being and living conformably to\nnature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the\ncomplete omission of attention is more profitable; but if it is not\nprofitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant? Today I\nchoose to play. Well then, ought you not to play with attention? I\nchoose to sing. What then hinders you from doing so with attention? Is\nthere any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend?\nFor will you do it (anything in life) worse by using attention, and\nbetter by not attending at all? And what else of the things in life is\ndone better by those who do not use attention? Does he who works in\nwood work better by not attending to it? Does the captain of a ship\nmanage it better by not attending? and are any of the smaller acts done\nbetter by inattention? Do you not see that when you have let your mind\nloose, it is no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety,\nor to modesty, or to moderation; but you do everything that comes into\nyour mind in obedience to your inclinations.\n\nFirst then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do\nnothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this\nmark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others\n(or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who has\nthe power; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the\npower of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to\nthis we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to\nendeavor to direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our\nseveral relations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for\nsinging, what is the season for play, and in whose presence; what will\nbe the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us,\nwhether we shall despise them; when to jeer ([Greek: schopsai]), and\nwhom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and\nfinally, in complying how to maintain our own character. But wherever\nyou have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately,\nnot from anything external, but from the action itself.\n\nWhat then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you do all this)?\nIt is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts\nincessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never\nremitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now\nwhen you have said, Tomorrow I will begin to attend, you must be told\nthat you are saying this, Today I will be shameless, disregardful of\ntime and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to give me\npain; today I will be passionate and envious. See how many evil things\nyou are permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use attention\ntomorrow, how much better is it to do so today? if tomorrow it is in\nyour interest to attend, much more is it today, that you may be able to\ndo so tomorrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.\n\n\nAGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.\u2014When a man has\nseemed to us to have talked with simplicity (candor) about his own\naffairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to\ndiscover to him our own secrets and we think this to be candid\nbehavior? In the first place, because it seems unfair for a man to have\nlistened to the affairs of his neighbor, and not to communicate to him\nalso in turn our own affairs; next, because we think that we shall not\npresent to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about\nour own affairs. Indeed, men are often accustomed to say, I have told\nyou all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this\ndone? Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him\nwho has already told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our\nmind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be\ncautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way also the\nincautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in\na common dress and begins to speak ill of C\u00e6sar; then you, as if you\nhad received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse,\nutter yourself also what you think, and then you are carried off in\nchains.\n\nSomething of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man\nhas confidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any\nman whom I meet? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am\nof such a disposition; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has\nheard. Then, if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I\nresolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturb\nothers, and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does\nnot injure another, and that every man\u2019s acts injure and profit him, I\nsecure this, that I do not anything like him, but still I suffer what I\ndo suffer through my own silly talk.\n\nTrue, but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor\nfor you in your turn to communicate nothing to him. Did I ask you for\nyour secrets, my man? did you communicate your affairs on certain\nterms, that you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler\nand think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be\nlike you? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me,\nand it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be\nso rash? It is just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight,\nand you one with a hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me\nyour wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain\nthat I also did not intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a\nhole in it. How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your\naffairs to a man who is faithful and modest, to a man who thinks that\nhis own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing\nexternal is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has\ndishonored his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small\nbit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor\u2019s\npalace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like\nMedea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself\nto me to be faithful, modest, and steady; show me that you have\nfriendly opinions; show that your cask has no hole in it; and you will\nsee how I shall not wait for you to trust me with your own affairs, but\nI myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not\nchoose to make use of a good vessel? Who does not value a benevolent\nand faithful adviser? Who will not willingly receive a man who is ready\nto bear a share, as we may say, of the difficulty of his circumstances,\nand by this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL.\n\n\nI.\n\nOf things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are\nopinion ([Greek: hupolaepsis]), movement towards a thing ([Greek:\nhormae]), desire, aversion ([Greek: echchlisis]), turning from a thing;\nand in a word, whatever are our acts. Not in our power are the body,\nproperty, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word,\nwhatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by\nnature free, not subject to restraint or hindrance; but the things not\nin our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of\nothers. Remember then, that if you think the things which are by nature\nslavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to\nbe your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be\ndisturbed, you will blame both gods and men; but if you think that only\nwhich is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is\nanother\u2019s, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel\nyou, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will\naccuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will),\nno man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer\nany harm.\n\nIf then you desire (aim at) such great things remember that you must\nnot (attempt to) lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must\nleave alone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present.\nBut if you wish for these things also (such great things), and power\n(office) and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things\n(power and wealth) because you aim also at those former things (such\ngreat things); certainly you will fail in those things through which\nalone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then practise\nsaying to every harsh appearance: You are an appearance, and in no\nmanner what you appear to be. Then examine it by the rules which you\npossess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the\nthings which are in our power or to things which are not in our power;\nand if it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to\nsay that it does not concern you.\n\nII.\n\nRemember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtaining\nthat which you desire; and the profession (hope) in aversion (turning\nfrom a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt to\navoid; and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate; and he who falls\ninto that which he would avoid is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoid\nonly the things contrary to nature which are within your power you will\nnot be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you\nattempt to avoid disease, or death, or poverty, you will be unhappy.\nTake away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, and\ntransfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power.\nBut destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire\nanything which is not in our power, you must be unfortunate; but of the\nthings in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet\nis before you. But employ only the power of moving towards an object\nand retiring from it; and these powers indeed only slightly and with\nexceptions and with remission.\n\nIII.\n\nIn everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved,\nremember to add this to the (description, notion): What is the nature\nof each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen\nvessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has\nbeen broken you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or\nwife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the\nwife or child dies you will not be disturbed.\n\nIV.\n\nWhen you are going to take in hand any act remind yourself what kind of\nan act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what\nhappens in the bath; some splashing the water, others pushing against\none another, others abusing one another, and some stealing; and thus\nwith more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself,\nI now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable\nto nature. And so you will do in every act; for thus if any hindrance\nto bathing shall happen let this thought be ready. It was not this only\nthat I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way\nconformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so if I am vexed at\nwhat happens.\n\nV.\n\nMen are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions\nabout the things; for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it\nwere it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death\nthat it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded,\nor disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves\u2014that\nis, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame\nothers for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to\nbe instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose\ninstruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself.\n\nVI.\n\nBe not elated at any advantage (excellence) which belongs to another.\nIf a horse when he is elated should say, I am beautiful, one might\nendure it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse,\nyou must know that you are elated at having a good horse. What then is\nyour own? The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of\nappearances you are conformable to nature, then be elated, for then you\nwill be elated at something good which is your own.\n\nVII.\n\nAs on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to get\nwater it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shellfish or some\nbulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought\nto be constantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must\nthrow away all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into\nthe ship like sheep. So in life also, if there be given to you instead\nof a little bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing to\nprevent (you from taking them). But if the captain should call, run to\nthe ship and leave all those things without regard to them. But if you\nare old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called you\nmake default.\n\nVIII.\n\nSeek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but\nwish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a\ntranquil flow of life.\n\nIX.\n\nDisease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the\nwill itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to\nthe will. And add this reflection on the occasion of everything that\nhappens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not\nto yourself.\n\nX.\n\nOn the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember to\nturn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use.\nIf you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to\nresist is temperance (continence). If labor (pain) be presented to you,\nyou will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will\nfind it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the\n(proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them.\n\nXI.\n\nNever say about anything, I have lost it, but say I have restored it.\nIs your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has\nbeen restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this\nalso been restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But\nwhat is it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long\nas he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to\nanother, as travellers do with their inn.\n\nXII.\n\nIf you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these: if I\nneglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living: unless I\nchastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger\nand so to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance\nwith perturbation; and it is better for your slave to be bad than for\nyou to be unhappy. Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled?\nIs a little wine stolen? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold\nfreedom from perturbation; at such price is sold tranquillity, but\nnothing is got for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that\nit is possible that he does not hear; and if he does hear, that he will\ndo nothing which you wish. But matters are not so well with him, but\naltogether well with you, that it should be in his power for you to be\nnot disturbed.\n\nXIII.\n\nIf you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolish\nwith respect to externals. Wish to be considered to know nothing; and\nif you shall seem to some to be a person of importance, distrust\nyourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your\nwill in a condition conformable to nature and (to secure) external\nthings: but if a man is careful about the one, it is an absolute\nnecessity that he will neglect the other.\n\nXIV.\n\nIf you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live\nfor ever, you are silly; for you would have the things which are not in\nyour power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others\nto be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults,\nyou are a fool; for you would have badness not to be badness, but\nsomething else. But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are\nable to do that. Practise then this which you are able to do. He is the\nmaster of every man who has the power over the things which another\nperson wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to\ntake them away. Whoever then wishes to be free let him neither wish for\nanything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not\nobserve this rule, he must be a slave.\n\nXV.\n\nRemember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that\nsomething is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your\nhand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do\nnot detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your\ndesire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with\nrespect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to\nmagisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some\ntime a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none\nof the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you\nwill be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partner\nwith them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus and\nthose like them were deservedly divine, and were so called.\n\nXVI.\n\nWhen you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroad\nor when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take care\nthat the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if he were\nsuffering in external things. But straightway make a distinction in\nyour own mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has\nhappened that afflicts this man, for it does not afflict another, but\nit is the opinion about this thing which afflicts the man. So far as\nwords then do not be unwilling to show him sympathy, and even if it\nhappens so, to lament with him. But take care that you do not lament\ninternally also.\n\nXVII.\n\nRemember that thou art an actor in a play, of such a kind as the\nteacher (author) may choose; if short, of a short one; if long, of a\nlong one: if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you\nact the part naturally; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of\na private person, (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the\npart that is given to you; but to select the part, belongs to another.\n\nXVIII.\n\nWhen a raven has croaked inauspiciously, let not the appearance hurry\nyou away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind and\nsay, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poor\nbody, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my children,\nor to my wife: but to me all significations are auspicious if I choose.\nFor whatever of these things results, it is in my power to derive\nbenefit from it.\n\nXIX.\n\nYou can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not\nin your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honored\nbefore others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any\nreason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the\nappearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy\nnor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to\nbe a general or senator ([Greek: prutanis]) or consul, but a free man:\nand there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the things\nwhich are not in our power.\n\nXX.\n\nRemember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults\nyou, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When\nthen a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion\nwhich has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried\naway by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will\nmore easily master yourself.\n\nXXI.\n\nLet death and exile and every other thing which appears dreadful be\ndaily before your eyes; but most of all death: and you will never think\nof anything mean nor will you desire anything extravagantly.\n\nXXII.\n\nIf you desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the beginning to be\nridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say, He has all\nat once returned to us as a philosopher; and whence does he get this\nsupercilious look for us? Do you not show a supercilious look; but hold\non to the things which seem to you best as one appointed by God to this\nstation. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, these\nmen who first ridiculed will afterwards admire you; but if you shall\nhave been overpowered by them, you will bring on yourself double\nridicule.\n\nXXIII.\n\nIf it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order to\nplease some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose in\nlife. Be satisfied then in everything with being a philosopher; and if\nyou wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so to\nyourself, and you will be able to do this.\n\nXXIV.\n\nLet not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live unhonored and be\nnobody nowhere. For if want of honor ([Greek: atimia]) is an evil, you\ncannot be in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than\nyou can be involved in anything base. Is it then your business to\nobtain the rank of a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet? By no\nmeans. How then can this be want of honor (dishonor)? And how will you\nbe nobody nowhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only\nwhich are in your power, in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a\nman of the greatest worth? But your friends will be without assistance!\nWhat do you mean by being without assistance? They will not receive\nmoney from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who then told\nyou that these are among the things which are in our power, and not in\nthe power of others? And who can give to another what he has not\nhimself? Acquire money then, your friends say, that we also may have\nsomething. If I can acquire money and also keep myself modest and\nfaithful and magnanimous, point out the way, and I will acquire it. But\nif you ask me to lose the things which are good and my own, in order\nthat you may gain the things which are not good, see how unfair and\nsilly you are. Besides, which would you rather have, money or a\nfaithful and modest friend? For this end then rather help me to be such\na man, and do not ask me to do this by which I shall lose that\ncharacter. But my country, you say, as far as it depends on me, will be\nwithout my help. I ask again, what help do you mean? It will not have\nporticos or baths through you. And what does this mean? For it is not\nfurnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means of a\nshoemaker. But it is enough if every man fully discharges the work that\nis his own: and if you provided it with another citizen faithful and\nmodest, would you not be useful to it? Yes. Then you also cannot be\nuseless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in the city?\nWhatever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity and\nmodesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shall lose\nthese qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were made\nshameless and faithless?\n\nXXV.\n\nHas any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being\nsaluted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are\ngood, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them; but if bad, be\nnot grieved because you have not obtained them. And remember that you\ncannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in\nour own power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how\ncan a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a\nman\u2019s doors as that other man does; when he does not attend him when he\ngoes abroad, as the other man does; when he does not praise (flatter)\nhim as another does? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do\nnot part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and\nif you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of\nlettuces? An obolus perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and\nreceives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not\nobtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive less than he who\nhas got the lettuces; for as he has the lettuces, so you have the\nobolus which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter\nalso you have not been invited to a man\u2019s feast, for you did not give\nto the host the price at which the supper is sold; but he sells it for\npraise (flattery), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the\nprice, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you\nwish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are\ninsatiable and silly. Have you nothing then in place of the supper? You\nhave indeed, you have the not flattering of him, whom you did not\nchoose to flatter; you have the not enduring of the man when he enters\nthe room.\n\nXXVI.\n\nWe may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we do\nnot differ from one another: for instance, when your neighbor\u2019s slave\nhas broken his cup, or anything else, we are ready to say forthwith,\nthat it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when\nyour cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your\nneighbor\u2019s cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater things\nalso. Is another man\u2019s child or wife dead? There is no one who would\nnot say, This is an event incident to man. But when a man\u2019s own child\nor wife is dead, forthwith he calls out, Woe to me, how wretched I am!\nBut we ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened\nto others.\n\nXXVII.\n\nAs a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither\ndoes the nature of evil exist in the world.\n\nXXVIII.\n\nIf any person was intending to put your body in the power of any man\nwhom you fell in with on the way, you would be vexed; but that you put\nyour understanding in the power of any man whom you meet, so that if he\nshould revile you, it is disturbed and troubled, are you not ashamed at\nthis?\n\nXXIX.\n\nIn every act observe the things which come first, and those which\nfollow it; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will\napproach it with alacrity, without having thought of the things which\nwill follow; but afterwards, when certain base (ugly) things have shown\nthemselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympic\ngames. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine thing. But observe both the\nthings which come first, and the things which follow; and then begin\nthe act. You must do everything according to rule, eat according to\nstrict orders, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are\nbid at appointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold\nwater, nor wine as you choose; in a word, you must deliver yourself up\nto the exercise master as you do to the physician, and then proceed to\nthe contest. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out\nof joint, swallow much dust, sometimes be flogged, and after all this\nbe defeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go\nto the contest: if you do not you will behave like children, who at one\ntime play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again as\ngladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actors. So you also will\nbe at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, then a rhetorician,\nthen a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at\nall; but like an ape you imitate everything that you see, and one thing\nafter another pleases you. For you have not undertaken anything with\nconsideration, nor have you surveyed it well; but carelessly and with\ncold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard one\nspeak, as Euphrates speaks\u2014and who can speak as he does?\u2014they wish to\nbe philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what\nkind of thing it is; and then examine your own nature, if you are able\nto sustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a\nwrestler? Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For\ndifferent men are formed by nature for different things. Do you think\nthat if you do these things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in\nthe same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things? You must\npass sleepless nights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be\ndespised by a slave, in everything have the inferior part, in honor, in\noffice, in the courts of justice, in every little matter. Consider\nthese things, if you would exchange for them, freedom from passions,\nliberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children,\nyou be not now a philosopher, then a servant of the publicani, then a\nrhetorician, then a procurator (manager) for C\u00e6sar. These things are\nnot consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must\neither cultivate your own ruling faculty, or external things. You must\neither exercise your skill on internal things or on external things;\nthat is you must either maintain the position of a philosopher or that\nof a common person.\n\nXXX.\n\nDuties are universally measured by relations ([Greek: tais schsesi]).\nIs a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him\nin all things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts\nblows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature\nmade akin to a good father? No; but to a father. Does a brother wrong\nyou? Maintain then your own position towards him, and do not examine\nwhat he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be\nconformable to nature. For another will not damage you, unless you\nchoose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are\ndamaged. In this way then you will discover your duty from the relation\nof a neighbor, from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you\nare accustomed to contemplate the relations.\n\nXXXI.\n\nAs to piety towards the gods you must know that this is the chief\nthing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and\nthat they administer the All well and justly; and you must fix yourself\nin this principle (duty), to obey them, and to yield to them in\neverything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being\naccomplished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will\nnever either blame the gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting\nyou. And it is not possible for this to be done in any other way than\nby withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by\nplacing the good and the evil only in those things which are in our\npower. For if you think that any of the things which are not in our\npower is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary that, when you do not\nobtain what you wish, and when you fall into those things which you do\nnot wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the cause of them;\nfor every animal is formed by nature to this, to fly from and to turn\nfrom the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause\nof the harm, but to follow and admire the things which are useful and\nthe causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks\nthat he is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the\ncause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm\nitself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he\ngives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good;\nand it was this which made Polynices and Eteocles enemies, the opinion\nthat royal power was a good. It is for this reason that the cultivator\nof the earth reviles the gods, for this reason the sailor does, and the\nmerchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their\nchildren. For where the useful (your interest) is, there also piety is.\nConsequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid\n([Greek: echchlinein]) as he ought, at the same time also cares after\npiety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits\naccording to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor\ncarelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs\nto all to do.\n\nXXXII.\n\nWhen you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know how\nit will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner.\nBut of what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are a\nphilosopher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power,\nit is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do not\nthen bring to the diviner desire or aversion ([Greek: echchlinein]): if\nyou do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your\nmind that everything which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and\ndoes not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your\npower to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with\nconfidence to the gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shall\nhave been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you\nwill have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as\nSocrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the\ninquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given\neither by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is\nthe subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend\u2019s\ndanger, or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner\nwhether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you\nthat the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a\ntoken of death, or mutilation of part of the body, or of exile. But\nreason prevails, that even with these risks, we should share the\ndangers of our friend, and of our country. Therefore attend to the\ngreater diviner, the Pythian god, who ejected from the temple him who\ndid not assist his friend, when he was being murdered.\n\nXXXIII.\n\nImmediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, which\nyou shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men.\n\nAnd let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be\nsaid, and in few words. And rarely, and when the occasion calls, we\nshall say something; but about none of the common subjects, not about\ngladiators, nor horse-races, nor about athletes, nor about eating or\ndrinking, which are the usual subjects; and especially not about men,\nas blaming them or praising them, or comparing them. If then you are\nable, bring over by your conversation, the conversation of your\nassociates, to that which is proper; but if you should happen to be\nconfined to the company of strangers, be silent.\n\nLet not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive.\n\nRefuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible; if it is not,\nrefuse as far as you are able.\n\nAvoid banquets which are given by strangers and by ignorant persons.\nBut if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be\ncarefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the\nuninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, he\nalso who keeps company with him must become impure, though he should\nhappen to be pure.\n\nTake (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare\nuse, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves; but exclude\neverything which is for show or luxury.\n\nAs to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage;\nbut if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to\ncustom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these\npleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do not\nindulge in them yourself.\n\nIf a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you,\ndo not make any defence (answer) to what has been told you; but reply,\nThe man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have\nmentioned these only.\n\nIt is not necessary to go to the theatres often: but if there is ever a\nproper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan of\nany man except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done which is\ndone, and for him only to gain the prize who gains the prize; for in\nthis way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from\nshouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or violent emotions. And\nwhen you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on the\nstage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For it\nis plain, if you do talk much, that you admired the spectacle (more\nthan you ought).\n\nDo not go to the hearing of certain persons\u2019 recitations, nor visit\nthem readily. But if you do attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and\nalso avoid making yourself disagreeable.\n\nWhen you are going to meet with any person, and particularly one of\nthose who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before\nyourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances,\nand you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion.\n\nWhen you are going to any of those who are in great power, place before\nyourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will be\nexcluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will\nnot care about you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him,\nbear what happens, and never say to yourself that it was not worth the\ntrouble. For this is silly, and marks the character of a man who is\noffended by externals.\n\nIn company take care not to speak much and excessively about your own\nacts or dangers; for as it is pleasant to you to make mention of your\nown dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened\nto you. Take care also not to provoke laughter; for this is a slippery\nway towards vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respect\nof your neighbors. It is a dangerous habit also to approach obscene\ntalk. When then, anything of this kind happens, if there is a good\nopportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk; but if\nthere is not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing and\nexpression of dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly that\nyou are displeased at such talk.\n\nXXXIV.\n\nIf you have received the impression ([Greek: phantasion]) of any\npleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it; but let the\nthing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own\npart. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the\npleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure, when you\nwill repent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things\nhow you will rejoice, if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how\nyou will commend yourself. But if it seem to you seasonable to\nundertake (do) the thing, take care that the charm of it, and the\npleasure, and the attraction of it shall not conquer you; but set on\nthe other side the consideration, how much better it is to be conscious\nthat you have gained this victory.\n\nXXXV.\n\nWhen you have decided that a thing ought to be done, and are doing it,\nnever avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an\nunfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid\ndoing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who\nshall find fault wrongly?\n\nXXXVI.\n\nAs the proposition, it is either day, or it is night, is of great\nimportance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive, is of\nno value, so in a symposium (entertainment) to select the larger share\nis of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the social\nfeeling is worth nothing. When, then, you are eating with another,\nremember, to look not only to the value for the body of the things set\nbefore you, but also to the value of the behavior towards the host\nwhich ought to be observed.\n\nXXXVII.\n\nIf you have assumed a character above your strength, you have both\nacted in this manner in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that\nwhich you might have fulfilled.\n\nXXXVIII.\n\nIn walking about, as you take care not to step on a nail, or to sprain\nyour foot, so take care not to damage your own ruling faculty; and if\nwe observe this rule in every act, we shall undertake this act with\nmore security.\n\nXXXIX.\n\nThe measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as the\nfoot is of the shoe. If then you stand on this rule (the demands of the\nbody), you will maintain the measure; but if you pass beyond it, you\nmust then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As also\nin the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessities of the)\nfoot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple color, then embroidered; for\nthere is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure.\n\nXL.\n\nWomen forthwith from the age of fourteen are called by the men\nmistresses ([Greek: churiai], domin\u00e6). Therefore, since they see that\nthere is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lying\nwith men, they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all their\nhopes in this. It is worth our while then to take care that they may\nknow that they are valued (by men) for nothing else than appearing\n(being) decent and modest and discreet.\n\nXLI.\n\nIt is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which\nconcern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking,\nmuch easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should be\ndone as subordinate things; and let all your care be directed to the\nmind.\n\nXLII.\n\nWhen any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he\ndoes this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not\npossible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but that\nwhich seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his\nopinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has\nbeen deceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction to be\nfalse, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has\nbeen deceived about it. If you proceed then from these opinions, you\nwill be mild in temper to him who reviles you; for say on each\noccasion, It seemed so to him.\n\nXLIII.\n\nEverything has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other\nby which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold of\nthe act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handle\nwhich cannot be borne; but lay hold of the other, that he is your\nbrother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the\nthing by that handle by which it can be borne.\n\nXLIV.\n\nThese reasonings do not cohere: I am richer than you, therefore I am\nbetter than you; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better\nthan you. On the contrary, these rather cohere: I am richer than you,\ntherefore my possessions are greater than yours; I am more eloquent\nthan you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither\npossession nor speech.\n\nXLV.\n\nDoes a man bathe quickly (early)? do not say that he bathes badly, but\nthat he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine? do not say that he\ndoes this badly, but say that he drinks much. For before you shall have\ndetermined the opinion how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thus\nit will not happen to you to comprehend some appearances which are\ncapable of being comprehended, but to assent to others.\n\nXLVI.\n\nOn no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much among\nthe uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts); but do\nthat which follows from them. For example, at a banquet do not say how\na man ought to eat, but eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in\nthis way Socrates also altogether avoided ostentation. Persons used to\ncome to him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he\nused to take them to philosophers, so easily did he submit to being\noverlooked. Accordingly, if any conversation should arise among\nuninstructed persons about any theorem, generally be silent; for there\nis great danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not\ndigested. And when a man shall say to you that you know nothing, and\nyou are not vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work (of\nphilosophy). For even sheep do not vomit up their grass and show to the\nshepherds how much they have eaten; but when they have internally\ndigested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. Do you\nalso show not your theorems to the uninstructed, but show the acts\nwhich come from their digestion.\n\nXLVII.\n\nWhen at a small cost you are supplied with everything for the body, do\nnot be proud of this; nor, if you drink water, say on every occasion, I\ndrink water. But consider first how much more frugal the poor are than\nwe, and how much more enduring of labor. And if you ever wish to\nexercise yourself in labor and endurance, do it for yourself, and not\nfor others. Do not embrace statues; but if you are ever very thirsty,\ntake a draught of cold water and spit it out, and tell no man.\n\nXLVIII.\n\nThe condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is this: he\nnever expects from himself profit (advantage) nor harm, but from\nexternals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this:\nhe expects all advantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks)\nof one who is making progress are these: he censures no man, he praises\nno man, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about\nhimself as if he were somebody or knew something; when he is impeded at\nall or hindered, he blames himself; if a man praises him he ridicules\nthe praiser to himself; if a man censures him he makes no defence; he\ngoes about like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the\nthings which are placed, before they are firmly fixed; he removes all\ndesire from himself, and he transfers aversion ([Greek: echchlisin]) to\nthose things only of the things within our power which are contrary to\nnature; he employs a moderate movement towards everything; whether he\nis considered foolish or ignorant he cares not; and in a word he\nwatches himself as if he were an enemy and lying in ambush.\n\nXLIX.\n\nWhen a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writings\nof Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written\nobscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is\nit that I wish? To understand nature and to follow it. I inquire\ntherefore who is the interpreter? and when I have heard that it is\nChrysippus, I come to him (the interpreter). But I do not understand\nwhat is written, and therefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there\nis yet nothing to be proud of. But when I shall have found the\ninterpreter, the thing that remains is to use the precepts (the\nlessons). This itself is the only thing to be proud of. But if I shall\nadmire the exposition, what else have I been made unless a grammarian\ninstead of a philosopher? except in one thing, that I am explaining\nChrysippus instead of Homer. When, then, any man says to me, Read\nChrysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to\nand consistent with his words.\n\nL.\n\nWhatever things (rules) are proposed to you (for the conduct of life)\nabide by them, as if they were laws, as if you would be guilty of\nimpiety if you transgressed any of them. And whatever any man shall say\nabout you, do not attend to it; for this is no affair of yours. How\nlong will you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the best\nthings, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason? Have you\naccepted the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and\nhave you agreed to them? what teacher then do you still expect that you\ndefer to him the correction of yourself? You are no longer a youth, but\nalready a full-grown man. If, then, you are negligent and slothful, and\nare continually making procrastination after procrastination, and\nproposal (intention) after proposal, and fixing day after day, after\nwhich you will attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not\nmaking improvement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both\nwhile you live and till you die. Immediately then think it right to\nlive as a full-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let\neverything which appears to you to be the best be to you a law which\nmust not be transgressed. And if anything laborious or pleasant or\nglorious or inglorious be presented to you, remember that now is the\ncontest, now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred; and\nthat it depends on one defeat and one giving way that progress is\neither lost or maintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all\nthings improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But\nyou, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes\nto be a Socrates.\n\nLI.\n\nThe first and most necessary place (part, [Greek: topos]) in philosophy\nis the use of theorems (precepts, [Greek: theoraemata]), for instance,\nthat we must not lie; the second part is that of demonstrations, for\ninstance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie? The third is that\nwhich is confirmatory of these two, and explanatory, for example, How\nis this a demonstration? For what is demonstration, what is\nconsequence, what is contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood?\nThe third part (topic) is necessary on account of the second, and the\nsecond on account of the first; but the most necessary and that on\nwhich we ought to rest is the first. But we do the contrary. For we\nspend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it;\nbut we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie; but the\ndemonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready to hand.\n\nLII.\n\nIn every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to\nhand:\n\nLead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,\nThe way that I am bid by you to go:\nTo follow I am ready. If I choose not,\nI make myself a wretch, and still must follow.\n\nBut whoso nobly yields unto necessity,\nWe hold him wise, and skill\u2019d in things divine.\n\n\nAnd the third also: O Crito, if so it pleases the gods, so let it be;\nAnytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me.","title":"A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":61838}