{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10684/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10684","id":"gutenberg_10684","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10684","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought -- History","Rationalism -- History"],"text":"Note: Numbers enclosed in square brackets are page numbers.\n\nHOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY\nOF MODERN KNOWLEDGE\n\nNo. 69\n\nEditors:\n\nHERBERT FISHER, M.A., F.B.A.\nProf. GILBERT MURRAY, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A.\nProf. J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A.\nProf. WILLIAM T. BREWSTER, M.A.\n\n\n\nA HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT\n\nBY\n\nJ. B. BURY, M.A., F.B.A\n\nHON. D.LITT. OF OXFORD, DURHAM, AND DUBLIN, AND HON. LL.D. OF EDINBURGH,\nGLASGOW, AND ABERDEEN UNIVERSITIES; REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY,\nCAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY\n\nAUTHOR OF \u201cHISTORY OF THE LATTER ROMAN EMPIRE,\u201d \u201cHISTORY OF GREECE,\u201d\n\u201cHISTORY OF THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE,\u201d ETC.\n\n\n\n[IV]\n\n1913,\n\n\n\n[V]\nCONTENTS\n\nCHAP.\n\n   I Introductory\n  II Reason Free (Greece And Rome)\n III Reason in Prison (The Middle Ages)\n  IV Prospect of Deliverance (The Renaissance and the Reformation)\n   V Religious Toleration\n  VI The Growth of Rationalism (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)\n VII The Progress of Rationalism (Nineteenth Century)\nVIII The Justification of Liberty of Thought\n      Bibliography\n      Index\n\n\n[7] A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nFREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND THE FORCES AGAINST IT\n\n(INTRODUCTORY)\n\nIT is a common saying that thought is free. A man can never be hindered\nfrom thinking whatever he chooses so long as he conceals what he thinks.\nThe working of his mind is limited only by the bounds of his experience\nand the power of his imagination. But this natural liberty of private\nthinking is of little value. It is unsatisfactory and even painful to\nthe thinker himself, if he is not permitted to communicate his thoughts\nto others, and it is obviously of no value to his neighbours. Moreover\nit is extremely difficult to hide thoughts that have any power over the\nmind. If a man\u2019s thinking leads him to call in question ideas and\ncustoms which regulate the behaviour of those about him, to reject\nbeliefs which they hold, to see better ways of life than those they\nfollow, it is almost\n\n[8] impossible for him, if he is convinced of the truth of his own\nreasoning, not to betray by silence, chance words, or general attitude\nthat he is different from them and does not share their opinions. Some\nhave preferred, like Socrates, some would prefer to-day, to face death\nrather than conceal their thoughts. Thus freedom of thought, in any\nvaluable sense, includes freedom of speech.\n\nAt present, in the most civilized countries, freedom of speech is taken\nas a matter of course and seems a perfectly simple thing. We are so\naccustomed to it that we look on it as a natural right. But this right\nhas been acquired only in quite recent times, and the way to its\nattainment has lain through lakes of blood. It has taken centuries to\npersuade the most enlightened peoples that liberty to publish one\u2019s\nopinions and to discuss all questions is a good and not a bad thing.\nHuman societies (there are some brilliant exceptions) have been\ngenerally opposed to freedom of thought, or, in other words, to new\nideas, and it is easy to see why.\n\nThe average brain is naturally lazy and tends to take the line of least\nresistance. The mental world of the ordinary man consists of beliefs\nwhich he has accepted without questioning and to which he is firmly\nattached; he is instinctively hostile to anything which\n\n[9] would upset the established order of this familiar world. A new\nidea, inconsistent with some of the beliefs which he holds, means the\nnecessity of rearranging his mind; and this process is laborious,\nrequiring a painful expenditure of brain-energy. To him and his fellows,\nwho form the vast majority, new ideas, and opinions which cast doubt on\nestablished beliefs and institutions, seem evil because they are\ndisagreeable.\n\nThe repugnance due to mere mental laziness is increased by a positive\nfeeling of fear. The conservative instinct hardens into the conservative\ndoctrine that the foundations of society are endangered by any\nalterations in the structure. It is only recently that men have been\nabandoning the belief that the welfare of a state depends on rigid\nstability and on the preservation of its traditions and institutions\nunchanged. Wherever that belief prevails, novel opinions are felt to be\ndangerous as well as annoying, and any one who asks inconvenient\nquestions about the why and the wherefore of accepted principles is\nconsidered a pestilent person.\n\nThe conservative instinct, and the conservative doctrine which is its\nconsequence, are strengthened by superstition. If the social structure,\nincluding the whole body of customs and opinions, is associated\nintimately\n\n[10] with religious belief and is supposed to be under divine patronage,\ncriticism of the social order savours of impiety, while criticism of the\nreligious belief is a direct challenge to the wrath of supernatural\npowers.\n\nThe psychological motives which produce a conservative spirit hostile to\nnew ideas are reinforced by the active opposition of certain powerful\nsections of the community, such as a class, a caste, or a priesthood,\nwhose interests are bound up with the maintenance of the established\norder and the ideas on which it rests.\n\nLet us suppose, for instance, that a people believes that solar eclipses\nare signs employed by their Deity for the special purpose of\ncommunicating useful information to them, and that a clever man\ndiscovers the true cause of eclipses. His compatriots in the first place\ndislike his discovery because they find it very difficult to reconcile\nwith their other ideas; in the second place, it disturbs them, because\nit upsets an arrangement which they consider highly advantageous to\ntheir community; finally, it frightens them, as an offence to their\nDivinity. The priests, one of whose functions is to interpret the divine\nsigns, are alarmed and enraged at a doctrine which menaces their power.\n\nIn prehistoric days, these motives, operating\n\n[11] strongly, must have made change slow in communities which\nprogressed, and hindered some communities from progressing at all. But\nthey have continued to operate more or less throughout history,\nobstructing knowledge and progress. We can observe them at work to-day\neven in the most advanced societies, where they have no longer the power\nto arrest development or repress the publication of revolutionary\nopinions. We still meet people who consider a new idea an annoyance and\nprobably a danger. Of those to whom socialism is repugnant, how many are\nthere who have never examined the arguments for and against it, but turn\naway in disgust simply because the notion disturbs their mental universe\nand implies a drastic criticism on the order of things to which they are\naccustomed? And how many are there who would refuse to consider any\nproposals for altering our imperfect matrimonial institutions, because\nsuch an idea offends a mass of prejudice associated with religious\nsanctions? They may be right or not, but if they are, it is not their\nfault. They are actuated by the same motives which were a bar to\nprogress in primitive societies. The existence of people of this\nmentality, reared in an atmosphere of freedom, side by side with others\nwho are always looking out for new ideas and\n\n[12] regretting that there are not more about, enables us to realize\nhow, when public opinion was formed by the views of such men, thought\nwas fettered and the impediments to knowledge enormous.\n\nAlthough the liberty to publish one\u2019s opinions on any subject without\nregard to authority or the prejudices of one\u2019s neighbours is now a well-\nestablished principle, I imagine that only the minority of those who\nwould be ready to fight to the death rather than surrender it could\ndefend it on rational grounds. We are apt to take for granted that\nfreedom of speech is a natural and inalienable birthright of man, and\nperhaps to think that this is a sufficient answer to all that can be\nsaid on the other side. But it is difficult to see how such a right can\nbe established.\n\nIf a man has any \u201cnatural rights,\u201d the right to preserve his life and\nthe right to reproduce his kind are certainly such. Yet human societies\nimpose upon their members restrictions in the exercise of both these\nrights. A starving man is prohibited from taking food which belongs to\nsomebody else. Promiscuous reproduction is restricted by various laws or\ncustoms. It is admitted that society is justified in restricting these\nelementary rights, because without such restrictions an ordered society\ncould not exist. If then we\n\n[13] concede that the expression of opinion is a right of the same kind,\nit is impossible to contend that on this ground it can claim immunity\nfrom interference or that society acts unjustly in regulating it. But\nthe concession is too large. For whereas in the other cases the\nlimitations affect the conduct of every one, restrictions on freedom of\nopinion affect only the comparatively small number who have any\nopinions, revolutionary or unconventional, to express. The truth is that\nno valid argument can be founded on the conception of natural rights,\nbecause it involves an untenable theory of the relations between society\nand its members.\n\nOn the other hand, those who have the responsibility of governing a\nsociety can argue that it is as incumbent on them to prohibit the\ncirculation of pernicious opinions as to prohibit any anti-social\nactions. They can argue that a man may do far more harm by propagating\nanti-social doctrines than by stealing his neighbour\u2019s horse or making\nlove to his neighbour\u2019s wife. They are responsible for the welfare of\nthe State, and if they are convinced that an opinion is dangerous, by\nmenacing the political, religious, or moral assumptions on which the\nsociety is based, it is their duty to protect society against it, as\nagainst any other danger.\n\n[14]\n\nThe true answer to this argument for limiting freedom of thought will\nappear in due course. It was far from obvious. A long time was needed to\narrive at the conclusion that coercion of opinion is a mistake, and only\na part of the world is yet convinced. That conclusion, so far as I can\njudge, is the most important ever reached by men. It was the issue of a\ncontinuous struggle between authority and reason\u2014the subject of this\nvolume. The word authority requires some comment.\n\nIf you ask somebody how he knows something, he may say, \u201cI have it on\ngood authority,\u201d or, \u201cI read it in a book,\u201d or, \u201cIt is a matter of\ncommon knowledge,\u201d or, \u201cI learned it at school.\u201d Any of these replies\nmeans that he has accepted information from others, trusting in their\nknowledge, without verifying their statements or thinking the matter out\nfor himself. And the greater part of most men\u2019s knowledge and beliefs is\nof this kind, taken without verification from their parents, teachers,\nacquaintances, books, newspapers. When an English boy learns French, he\ntakes the conjugations and the meanings of the words on the authority of\nhis teacher or his grammar. The fact that in a certain place, marked on\nthe map, there is a populous city called Calcutta, is for most\n\n[15] people a fact accepted on authority. So is the existence of\nNapoleon or Julius Caesar. Familiar astronomical facts are known only in\nthe same way, except by those who have studied astronomy. It is obvious\nthat every one\u2019s knowledge would be very limited indeed, if we were not\njustified in accepting facts on the authority of others.\n\nBut we are justified only under one condition. The facts which we can\nsafely accept must be capable of demonstration or verification. The\nexamples I have given belong to this class. The boy can verify when he\ngoes to France or is able to read a French book that the facts which he\ntook on authority are true. I am confronted every day with evidence\nwhich proves to me that, if I took the trouble, I could verify the\nexistence of Calcutta for myself. I cannot convince myself in this way\nof the existence of Napoleon, but if I have doubts about it, a simple\nprocess of reasoning shows me that there are hosts of facts which are\nincompatible with his non-existence. I have no doubt that the earth is\nsome 93 millions of miles distant from the sun, because all astronomers\nagree that it has been demonstrated, and their agreement is only\nexplicable on the supposition that this has been demonstrated and that,\nif I took the trouble to work out the calculation, I should reach the\nsame result.\n\n[16]\n\nBut all our mental furniture is not of this kind. The thoughts of the\naverage man consist not only of facts open to verification, but also of\nmany beliefs and opinions which he has accepted on authority and cannot\nverify or prove. Belief in the Trinity depends on the authority of the\nChurch and is clearly of a different order from belief in the existence\nof Calcutta. We cannot go behind the authority and verify or prove it.\nIf we accept it, we do so because we have such implicit faith in the\nauthority that we credit its assertions though incapable of proof.\n\nThe distinction may seem so obvious as to be hardly worth making. But it\nis important to be quite clear about it. The primitive man who had\nlearned from his elders that there were bears in the hills and likewise\nevil spirits, soon verified the former statement by seeing a bear, but\nif he did not happen to meet an evil spirit, it did not occur to him,\nunless he was a prodigy, that there was a distinction between the two\nstatements; he would rather have argued, if he argued at all, that as\nhis tribesmen were right about the bears they were sure to be right also\nabout the spirits. In the Middle Ages a man who believed on authority\nthat there is a city called Constantinople and that comets are portents\nsignifying divine wrath, would not\n\n[17] distinguish the nature of the evidence in the two cases. You may\nstill sometimes hear arguments amounting to this: since I believe in\nCalcutta on authority, am I not entitled to believe in the Devil on\nauthority?\n\nNow people at all times have been commanded or expected or invited to\naccept on authority alone\u2014the authority, for instance, of public\nopinion, or a Church, or a sacred book\u2014doctrines which are not proved or\nare not capable of proof. Most beliefs about nature and man, which were\nnot founded on scientific observation, have served directly or\nindirectly religious and social interests, and hence they have been\nprotected by force against the criticisms of persons who have the\ninconvenient habit of using their reason. Nobody minds if his neighbour\ndisbelieves a demonstrable fact. If a sceptic denies that Napoleon\nexisted, or that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, he causes\namusement or ridicule. But if he denies doctrines which cannot be\ndemonstrated, such as the existence of a personal God or the immortality\nof the soul, he incurs serious disapprobation and at one time he might\nhave been put to death. Our mediaeval friend would have only been called\na fool if he doubted the existence of Constantinople, but if he had\nquestioned the significance of comets he\n\n[18] might have got into trouble. It is possible that if he had been so\nmad as to deny the existence of Jerusalem he would not have escaped with\nridicule, for Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible.\n\nIn the Middle Ages a large field was covered by beliefs which authority\nclaimed to impose as true, and reason was warned off the ground. But\nreason cannot recognize arbitrary prohibitions or barriers, without\nbeing untrue to herself. The universe of experience is her province, and\nas its parts are all linked together and interdependent, it is\nimpossible for her to recognize any territory on which she may not\ntread, or to surrender any of her rights to an authority whose\ncredentials she has not examined and approved.\n\nThe uncompromising assertion by reason of her absolute rights throughout\nthe whole domain of thought is termed rationalism, and the slight stigma\nwhich is still attached to the word reflects the bitterness of the\nstruggle between reason and the forces arrayed against her. The term is\nlimited to the field of theology, because it was in that field that the\nself-assertion of reason was most violently and pertinaciously opposed.\nIn the same way free thought, the refusal of thought to be controlled by\nany authority but its own, has a definitely theological reference.\nThroughout\n\n[19] the conflict, authority has had great advantages. At any time the\npeople who really care about reason have been a small minority, and\nprobably will be so for a long time to come. Reason\u2019s only weapon has\nbeen argument. Authority has employed physical and moral violence, legal\ncoercion and social displeasure. Sometimes she has attempted to use the\nsword of her adversary, thereby wounding herself. Indeed the weakest\npoint in the strategical position of authority was that her champions,\nbeing human, could not help making use of reasoning processes and the\nresult was that they were divided among themselves. This gave reason her\nchance. Operating, as it were, in the enemy\u2019s camp and professedly in\nthe enemy\u2019s cause, she was preparing her own victory.\n\nIt may be objected that there is a legitimate domain for authority,\nconsisting of doctrines which lie outside human experience and therefore\ncannot be proved or verified, but at the same time cannot be disproved.\nOf course, any number of propositions can be invented which cannot be\ndisproved, and it is open to any one who possesses exuberant faith to\nbelieve them; but no one will maintain that they all deserve credence so\nlong as their falsehood is not demonstrated. And if only some deserve\ncredence, who, except reason,\n\n[20] is to decide which? If the reply is, Authority, we are confronted\nby the difficulty that many beliefs backed by authority have been\nfinally disproved and are universally abandoned. Yet some people speak\nas if we were not justified in rejecting a theological doctrine unless\nwe can prove it false. But the burden of proof does not lie upon the\nrejecter. I remember a conversation in which, when some disrespectful\nremark was made about hell, a loyal friend of that establishment said\ntriumphantly, \u201cBut, absurd as it may seem, you cannot disprove it.\u201d If\nyou were told that in a certain planet revolving round Sirius there is a\nrace of donkeys who talk the English language and spend their time in\ndiscussing eugenics, you could not disprove the statement, but would it,\non that account, have any claim to be believed? Some minds would be\nprepared to accept it, if it were reiterated often enough, through the\npotent force of suggestion. This force, exercised largely by emphatic\nrepetition (the theoretical basis, as has been observed, of the modern\npractice of advertising), has played a great part in establishing\nauthoritative opinions and propagating religious creeds. Reason\nfortunately is able to avail herself of the same help.\n\nThe following sketch is confined to Western\n\n[21] civilization. It begins with Greece and attempts to indicate the\nchief phases. It is the merest introduction to a vast and intricate\nsubject, which, treated adequately, would involve not only the history\nof religion, of the Churches, of heresies, of persecution, but also the\nhistory of philosophy, of the natural sciences and of political\ntheories. From the sixteenth century to the French Revolution nearly all\nimportant historical events bore in some way on the struggle for freedom\nof thought. It would require a lifetime to calculate, and many books to\ndescribe, all the directions and interactions of the intellectual and\nsocial forces which, since the fall of ancient civilization, have\nhindered and helped the emancipation of reason. All one can do, all one\ncould do even in a much bigger volume than this, is to indicate the\ngeneral course of the struggle and dwell on some particular aspects\nwhich the writer may happen to have specially studied.\n\n\n\n[21] CHAPTER II\n\nREASON FREE\n\n(GREECE AND ROME)\n\nWHEN we are asked to specify the debt which civilization owes to the\nGreeks, their\n\n[22] achievements in literature and art naturally occur to us first of\nall. But a truer answer may be that our deepest gratitude is due to them\nas the originators of liberty of thought and discussion. For this\nfreedom of spirit was not only the condition of their speculations in\nphilosophy, their progress in science, their experiments in political\ninstitutions; it was also a condition of their literary and artistic\nexcellence. Their literature, for instance, could not have been what it\nis if they had been debarred from free criticism of life. But apart from\nwhat they actually accomplished, even if they had not achieved the\nwonderful things they did in most of the realms of human activity, their\nassertion of the principle of liberty would place them in the highest\nrank among the benefactors of the race; for it was one of the greatest\nsteps in human progress.\n\nWe do not know enough about the earliest history of the Greeks to\nexplain how it was that they attained their free outlook upon the world\nand came to possess the will and courage to set no bounds to the range\nof their criticism and curiosity. We have to take this character as a\nfact. But it must be remembered that the Greeks consisted of a large\nnumber of separate peoples, who varied largely in temper, customs and\ntraditions,\n\n[23] though they had important features common to all. Some were\nconservative, or backward, or unintellectual compared with others. In\nthis chapter \u201cthe Greeks\u201d does not mean all the Greeks, but only those\nwho count most in the history of civilization, especially the Ionians\nand Athenians.\n\nIonia in Asia Minor was the cradle of free speculation. The history of\nEuropean science and European philosophy begins in Ionia. Here (in the\nsixth and fifth centuries B.C.) the early philosophers by using their\nreason sought to penetrate into the origin and structure of the world.\nThey could not of course free their minds entirely from received\nnotions, but they began the work of destroying orthodox views and\nreligious faiths. Xenophanes may specially be named among these pioneers\nof thought (though he was not the most important or the ablest), because\nthe toleration of his teaching illustrates the freedom of the atmosphere\nin which these men lived. He went about from city to city, calling in\nquestion on moral grounds the popular beliefs about the gods and\ngoddesses, and ridiculing the anthropomorphic conceptions which the\nGreeks had formed of their divinities. \u201cIf oxen had hands and the\ncapacities of men, they would make gods in the shape of oxen.\u201d This\nattack on received\n\n[24] theology was an attack on the veracity of the old poets, especially\nHomer, who was considered the highest authority on mythology. Xenophanes\ncriticized him severely for ascribing to the gods acts which, committed\nby men, would be considered highly disgraceful. We do not hear that any\nattempt was made to restrain him from thus assailing traditional beliefs\nand branding Homer as immoral. We must remember that the Homeric poems\nwere never supposed to be the word of God. It has been said that Homer\nwas the Bible of the Greeks. The remark exactly misses the truth. The\nGreeks fortunately had no Bible, and this fact was both an expression\nand an important condition of their freedom. Homer\u2019s poems were secular,\nnot religious, and it may be noted that they are freer from immorality\nand savagery than sacred books that one could mention. Their authority\nwas immense; but it was not binding like the authority of a sacred book,\nand so Homeric criticism was never hampered like Biblical criticism.\n\nIn this connexion, notice may be taken of another expression and\ncondition of freedom, the absence of sacerdotalism. The priests of the\ntemples never became powerful castes, tyrannizing over the community in\ntheir own interests and able to silence voices raised against religious\nbeliefs. The civil authorities\n\n[25] kept the general control of public worship in their own hands, and,\nif some priestly families might have considerable influence, yet as a\nrule the priests were virtually State servants whose voice carried no\nweight except concerning the technical details of ritual.\n\nTo return to the early philosophers, who were mostly materialists, the\nrecord of their speculations is an interesting chapter in the history of\nrationalism. Two great names may be selected, Heraclitus and Democritus,\nbecause they did more perhaps than any of the others, by sheer hard\nthinking, to train reason to look upon the universe in new ways and to\nshock the unreasoned conceptions of common sense. It was startling to be\ntaught, for the first time, by Heraclitus, that the appearance of\nstability and permanence which material things present to our senses is\na false appearance, and that the world and everything in it are changing\nevery instant. Democritus performed the amazing feat of working out an\natomic theory of the universe, which was revived in the seventeenth\ncentury and is connected, in the history of speculation, with the most\nmodern physical and chemical theories of matter. No fantastic tales of\ncreation, imposed by sacred authority, hampered these powerful brains.\n\nAll this philosophical speculation prepared\n\n[26] the way for the educationalists who were known as the Sophists.\nThey begin to appear after the middle of the fifth century. They worked\nhere and there throughout Greece, constantly travelling, training young\nmen for public life, and teaching them to use their reason. As educators\nthey had practical ends in view. They turned away from the problems of\nthe physical universe to the problems of human life\u2014morality and\npolities. Here they were confronted with the difficulty of\ndistinguishing between truth and error, and the ablest of them\ninvestigated the nature of knowledge, the method of reason\u2014logic\u2014 and\nthe instrument of reason\u2014speech. Whatever their particular theories\nmight be, their general spirit was that of free inquiry and discussion.\nThey sought to test everything by reason. The second half of the fifth\ncentury might be called the age of Illumination.\n\nIt may be remarked that the knowledge of foreign countries which the\nGreeks had acquired had a considerable effect in promoting a sceptical\nattitude towards authority. When a man is acquainted only with the\nhabits of his own country, they seem so much a matter of course that he\nascribes them to nature, but when he travels abroad and finds totally\ndifferent habits and standards of conduct prevailing, he begins to\nunderstand\n\n[27] the power of custom; and learns that morality and religion are\nmatters of latitude. This discovery tends to weaken authority, and to\nraise disquieting reflections, as in the case of one who, brought up as\na Christian, comes to realize that, if he had been born on the Ganges or\nthe Euphrates, he would have firmly believed in entirely different\ndogmas.\n\nOf course these movements of intellectual freedom were, as in all ages,\nconfined to the minority. Everywhere the masses were exceedingly\nsuperstitious. They believed that the safety of their cities depended on\nthe good-will of their gods. If this superstitious spirit were alarmed,\nthere was always a danger that philosophical speculations might be\npersecuted. And this occurred in Athens. About the middle of the fifth\ncentury Athens had not only become the most powerful State in Greece,\nbut was also taking the highest place in literature and art. She was a\nfull-fledged democracy. Political discussion was perfectly free. At this\ntime she was guided by the statesman Pericles, who was personally a\nfreethinker, or at least was in touch with all the subversive\nspeculations of the day. He was especially intimate with the philosopher\nAnaxagoras who had come from Ionia to teach at Athens. In regard to the\npopular gods Anaxagoras was a thorough-going\n\n[28] unbeliever. The political enemies of Pericles struck at him by\nattacking his friend. They introduced and carried a blasphemy law, to\nthe effect that unbelievers and those who taught theories about the\ncelestial world might be impeached. It was easy to prove that Anaxagoras\nwas a blasphemer who taught that the gods were abstractions and that the\nsun, to which the ordinary Athenian said prayers morning and evening,\nwas a mass of flaming matter. The influence of Pericles saved him from\ndeath; he was heavily fined and left Athens for Lampsacus, where he was\ntreated with consideration and honour.\n\nOther cases are recorded which show that anti-religious thought was\nliable to be persecuted. Protagoras, one of the greatest of the\nSophists, published a book On the Gods, the object of which seems to\nhave been to prove that one cannot know the gods by reason. The first\nwords ran: \u201cConcerning the gods, I cannot say that they exist nor yet\nthat they do not exist. There are more reasons than one why we cannot\nknow. There is the obscurity of the subject and there is the brevity of\nhuman life.\u201d A charge of blasphemy was lodged against him and he fled\nfrom Athens. But there was no systematic policy of suppressing free\nthought. Copies of the work of Protagoras were collected and\n\n[29] burned, but the book of Anaxagoras setting forth the views for\nwhich he had been condemned was for sale on the Athenian book-stalls at\na popular price. Rationalistic ideas moreover were venturing to appear\non the stage, though the dramatic performances, at the feasts of the god\nDionysus, were religious solemnities. The poet Euripides was saturated\nwith modern speculation, and, while different opinions may be held as to\nthe tendencies of some of his tragedies, he often allows his characters\nto express highly unorthodox views. He was prosecuted for impiety by a\npopular politician. We may suspect that during the last thirty years of\nthe fifth century unorthodoxy spread considerably among the educated\nclasses. There was a large enough section of influential rationalists to\nrender impossible any organized repression of liberty, and the chief\nevil of the blasphemy law was that it could be used for personal or\nparty reasons. Some of the prosecutions, about which we know, were\ncertainly due to such motives, others may have been prompted by genuine\nbigotry and by the fear lest sceptical thought should extend beyond the\nhighly educated and leisured class. It was a generally accepted\nprinciple among the Greeks, and afterwards among the Romans, that\nreligion was a good and necessary thing\n\n[30] for the common people. Men who did not believe in its truth\nbelieved in its usefulness as a political institution, and as a rule\nphilosophers did not seek to diffuse disturbing \u201ctruth\u201d among the\nmasses. It was the custom, much more than at the present day, for those\nwho did not believe in the established cults to conform to them\nexternally. Popular higher education was not an article in the programme\nof Greek statesmen or thinkers. And perhaps it may be argued that in the\ncircumstances of the ancient world it would have been hardly\npracticable.\n\nThere was, however, one illustrious Athenian, who thought\ndifferently\u2014Socrates, the philosopher. Socrates was the greatest of the\neducationalists, but unlike the others he taught gratuitously, though he\nwas a poor man. His teaching always took the form of discussion; the\ndiscussion often ended in no positive result, but had the effect of\nshowing that some received opinion was untenable and that truth is\ndifficult to ascertain. He had indeed certain definite views about\nknowledge and virtue, which are of the highest importance in the history\nof philosophy, but for our present purpose his significance lies in his\nenthusiasm for discussion and criticism. He taught those with whom he\nconversed\u2014and he conversed indiscriminately\n\n[31] with all who would listen to him\u2014to bring all popular beliefs\nbefore the bar of reason, to approach every inquiry with an open mind,\nand not to judge by the opinion of majorities or the dictate of\nauthority; in short to seek for other tests of the truth of an opinion\nthan the fact that it is held by a great many people. Among his\ndisciples were all the young men who were to become the leading\nphilosophers of the next generation and some who played prominent parts\nin Athenian history.\n\nIf the Athenians had had a daily press, Socrates would have been\ndenounced by the journalists as a dangerous person. They had a comic\ndrama, which constantly held up to ridicule philosophers and sophists\nand their vain doctrines. We possess one play (the Clouds of\nAristophanes) in which Socrates is pilloried as a typical representative\nof impious and destructive speculations. Apart from annoyances of this\nkind, Socrates reached old age, pursuing the task of instructing his\nfellow-citizens, without any evil befalling him. Then, at the age of\nseventy, he was prosecuted as an atheist and corrupter of youth and was\nput to death (399 B.C.). It is strange that if the Athenians really\nthought him dangerous they should have suffered him so long. There can,\nI think, be\n\n[32] little doubt that the motives of the accusation were political. [1]\nSocrates, looking at things as he did, could not be sympathetic with\nunlimited democracy, or approve of the principle that the will of the\nignorant majority was a good guide. He was probably known to sympathize\nwith those who wished to limit the franchise. When, after a struggle in\nwhich the constitution had been more than once overthrown, democracy\nemerged triumphant (403 B.C.), there was a bitter feeling against those\nwho had not been its friends, and of these disloyal persons Socrates was\nchosen as a victim. If he had wished, he could easily have escaped. If\nhe had given an undertaking to teach no more, he would almost certainly\nhave been acquitted. As it was, of the 501 ordinary Athenians who were\nhis judges, a very large minority voted for his acquittal. Even then, if\nhe had adopted a different tone, he would not have been condemned to\ndeath.\n\nHe rose to the great occasion and vindicated freedom of discussion in a\nwonderful unconventional speech. The Apology of Socrates, which was\ncomposed by his most brilliant pupil, Plato the philosopher, reproduces\n\n[33] the general tenor of his defence. It is clear that he was not able\nto meet satisfactorily the charge that he did not acknowledge the gods\nworshipped by the city, and his explanations on this point are the weak\npart of his speech. But he met the accusation that he corrupted the\nminds of the young by a splendid plea for free discussion. This is the\nmost valuable section of the Apology; it is as impressive to-day as\never. I think the two principal points which he makes are these\u2014\n\n(1) He maintains that the individual should at any cost refuse to be\ncoerced by any human authority or tribunal into a course which his own\nmind condemns as wrong. That is, he asserts the supremacy of the\nindividual conscience, as we should say, over human law. He represents\nhis own life-work as a sort of religious quest; he feels convinced that\nin devoting himself to philosophical discussion he has done the bidding\nof a super-human guide; and he goes to death rather than be untrue to\nthis personal conviction. \u201cIf you propose to acquit me,\u201d he says, \u201con\ncondition that I abandon my search for truth, I will say: I thank you, O\nAthenians, but I will obey God, who, as I believe, set me this task,\nrather than you, and so long as I have breath and strength I will never\n\n[34] cease from my occupation with philosophy. I will continue the\npractice of accosting whomever I meet and saying to him, \u2018Are you not\nashamed of setting your heart on wealth and honours while you have no\ncare for wisdom and truth and making your soul better?\u2019 I know not what\ndeath is\u2014it may be a good thing, and I am not afraid of it. But I do\nknow that it is a bad thing to desert one\u2019s post and I prefer what may\nbe good to what I know to be bad.\u201d\n\n(2) He insists on the public value of free discussion. \u201cIn me you have a\nstimulating critic, persistently urging you with persuasion and\nreproaches, persistently testing your opinions and trying to show you\nthat you are really ignorant of what you suppose you know. Daily\ndiscussion of the matters about which you hear me conversing is the\nhighest good for man. Life that is not tested by such discussion is not\nworth living.\u201d\n\nThus in what we may call the earliest justification of liberty of\nthought we have two significant claims affirmed: the indefeasible right\nof the conscience of the individual \u2014a claim on which later struggles\nfor liberty were to turn; and the social importance of discussion and\ncriticism. The former claim is not based on argument but on intuition;\nit rests in fact on the assumption\n\n[35] of some sort of superhuman moral principle, and to those who, not\nhaving the same personal experience as Socrates, reject this assumption,\nhis pleading does not carry weight. The second claim, after the\nexperience of more than 2,000 years, can be formulated more\ncomprehensively now with bearings of which he did not dream.\n\nThe circumstances of the trial of Socrates illustrate both the tolerance\nand the intolerance which prevailed at Athens. His long immunity, the\nfact that he was at last indicted from political motives and perhaps\npersonal also, the large minority in his favour, all show that thought\nwas normally free, and that the mass of intolerance which existed was\nonly fitfully invoked, and perhaps most often to serve other purposes. I\nmay mention the case of the philosopher Aristotle, who some seventy\nyears later left Athens because he was menaced by a prosecution for\nblasphemy, the charge being a pretext for attacking one who belonged to\na certain political party. The persecution of opinion was never\norganized.\n\nIt may seem curious that to find the persecuting spirit in Greece we\nhave to turn to the philosophers. Plato, the most brilliant disciple of\nSocrates, constructed in his later years an ideal State. In this State\nhe instituted\n\n[36] a religion considerably different from the current religion, and\nproposed to compel all the citizens to believe in his gods on pain of\ndeath or imprisonment. All freedom of discussion was excluded under the\ncast-iron system which he conceived. But the point of interest in his\nattitude is that he did not care much whether a religion was true, but\nonly whether it was morally useful; he was prepared to promote morality\nby edifying fables; and he condemned the popular mythology not because\nit was false, but because it did not make for righteousness.\n\nThe outcome of the large freedom permitted at Athens was a series of\nphilosophies which had a common source in the conversations of Socrates.\nPlato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Sceptics\u2014it may be\nmaintained that the efforts of thought represented by these names have\nhad a deeper influence on the progress of man than any other continuous\nintellectual movement, at least until the rise of modern science in a\nnew epoch of liberty.\n\nThe doctrines of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics all aimed at\nsecuring peace and guidance for the individual soul. They were widely\npropagated throughout the Greek world from the third century B.C., and\nwe may say that from this time onward most\n\n[37] well-educated Greeks were more or less rationalists. The teaching\nof Epicurus had a distinct anti-religious tendency. He considered fear\nto be the fundamental motive of religion, and to free men\u2019s minds from\nthis fear was a principal object of his teaching. He was a Materialist,\nexplaining the world by the atomic theory of Democritus and denying any\ndivine government of the universe. [2] He did indeed hold the existence\nof gods, but, so far as men are concerned, his gods are as if they were\nnot\u2014living in some remote abode and enjoying a \u201csacred and everlasting\ncalm.\u201d They just served as an example of the realization of the ideal\nEpicurean life.\n\nThere was something in this philosophy which had the power to inspire a\npoet of singular genius to expound it in verse. The Roman Lucretius\n(first century B.C.) regarded Epicurus as the great deliverer of the\nhuman race and determined to proclaim the glad tidings of his philosophy\nin a poem On the Nature of the World. [3] With all the fervour\n\n[38] of a religious enthusiast he denounces religion, sounding every\nnote of defiance, loathing, and contempt, and branding in burning words\nthe crimes to which it had urged man on. He rides forth as a leader of\nthe hosts of atheism against the walls of heaven. He explains the\nscientific arguments as if they were the radiant revelation of a new\nworld; and the rapture of his enthusiasm is a strange accompaniment of a\ndoctrine which aimed at perfect calm. Although the Greek thinkers had\ndone all the work and the Latin poem is a hymn of triumph over prostrate\ndeities, yet in the literature of free thought it must always hold an\neminent place by the sincerity of its audacious, defiant spirit. In the\nhistory of rationalism its interest would be greater if it had exploded\nin the midst of an orthodox community. But the educated Romans in the\ndays of Lucretius were sceptical in religious matters, some of them were\nEpicureans, and we may suspect that not many of those who read it were\nshocked or influenced by the audacities of the champion of irreligion.\n\nThe Stoic philosophy made notable contributions to the cause of liberty\nand could hardly have flourished in an atmosphere where discussion was\nnot free. It asserted the rights of individuals against public\n\n[39] authority. Socrates had seen that laws may be unjust and that\npeoples may go wrong, but he had found no principle for the guidance of\nsociety. The Stoics discovered it in the law of nature, prior and\nsuperior to all the customs and written laws of peoples, and this\ndoctrine, spreading outside Stoic circles, caught hold of the Roman\nworld and affected Roman legislation.\n\nThese philosophies have carried us from Greece to Rome. In the later\nRoman Republic and the early Empire, no restrictions were imposed on\nopinion, and these philosophies, which made the individual the first\nconsideration, spread widely. Most of the leading men were unbelievers\nin the official religion of the State, but they considered it valuable\nfor the purpose of keeping the uneducated populace in order. A Greek\nhistorian expresses high approval of the Roman policy of cultivating\nsuperstition for the benefit of the masses. This was the attitude of\nCicero, and the view that a false religion is indispensable as a social\nmachine was general among ancient unbelievers. It is common, in one form\nor another, to-day; at least, religions are constantly defended on the\nground not of truth but of utility. This defence belongs to the\nstatecraft of Machiavelli, who taught that religion is necessary for\ngovernment,\n\n[40] and that it may be the duty of a ruler to support a religion which\nhe believes to be false.\n\nA word must be said of Lucian (second century A.D.), the last Greek man\nof letters whose writings appeal to everybody. He attacked the popular\nmythology with open ridicule. It is impossible to say whether his\nsatires had any effect at the time beyond affording enjoyment to\neducated infidels who read them. Zeus in a Tragedy Part is one of the\nmost effective. The situation which Lucian imagined here would be\nparalleled if a modern writer were blasphemously to represent the\nPersons of the Trinity with some eminent angels and saints discussing in\na celestial smoke-room the alarming growth of unbelief in England and\nthen by means of a telephonic apparatus overhearing a dispute between a\nfreethinker and a parson on a public platform in London. The absurdities\nof anthropomorphism have never been the subject of more brilliant\njesting than in Lucian\u2019s satires.\n\nThe general rule of Roman policy was to tolerate throughout the Empire\nall religions and all opinions. Blasphemy was not punished. The\nprinciple was expressed in the maxim of the Emperor Tiberius: \u201cIf the\ngods are insulted, let them see to it themselves.\u201d An exception to the\nrule of tolerance\n\n[41] was made in the case of the Christian sect, and the treatment of\nthis Oriental religion may be said to have inaugurated religious\npersecution in Europe. It is a matter of interest to understand why\nEmperors who were able, humane, and not in the least fanatical, adopted\nthis exceptional policy.\n\nFor a long time the Christians were only known to those Romans who\nhappened to hear of them, as a sect of the Jews. The Jewish was the one\nreligion which, on account of its exclusiveness and intolerance, was\nregarded by the tolerant pagans with disfavour and suspicion. But though\nit sometimes came into collision with the Roman authorities and some\nill-advised attacks upon it were made, it was the constant policy of the\nEmperors to let it alone and to protect the Jews against the hatred\nwhich their own fanaticism aroused. But while the Jewish religion was\nendured so long as it was confined to those who were born into it, the\nprospect of its dissemination raised a new question. Grave misgivings\nmight arise in the mind of a ruler at seeing a creed spreading which was\naggressively hostile to all the other creeds of the world\u2014creeds which\nlived together in amity\u2014and had earned for its adherents the reputation\nof being the enemies of the human race. Might not its expansion\n\n[42] beyond the Israelites involve ultimately a danger to the Empire?\nFor its spirit was incompatible with the traditions and basis of Roman\nsociety. The Emperor Domitian seems to have seen the question in this\nlight, and he took severe measures to hinder the proselytizing of Roman\ncitizens. Some of those whom he struck may have been Christians, but if\nhe was aware of the distinction, there was from his point of view no\ndifference. Christianity resembled Judaism, from which it sprang, in\nintolerance and in hostility towards Roman society, but it differed by\nthe fact that it made many proselytes while Judaism made few.\n\nUnder Trajan we find that the principle has been laid down that to be a\nChristian is an offence punishable by death. Henceforward Christianity\nremained an illegal religion. But in practice the law was not applied\nrigorously or logically. The Emperors desired, if possible, to extirpate\nChristianity without shedding blood. Trajan laid down that Christians\nwere not to be sought out, that no anonymous charges were to be noticed,\nand that an informer who failed to make good his charge should be liable\nto be punished under the laws against calumny. Christians themselves\nrecognized that this edict practically protected them. There were\n\n[43] some executions in the second century\u2014not many that are well\nattested\u2014and Christians courted the pain and glory of martyrdom. There\nis evidence to show that when they were arrested their escape was often\nconnived at. In general, the persecution of the Christians was rather\nprovoked by the populace than desired by the authorities. The populace\nfelt a horror of this mysterious Oriental sect which openly hated all\nthe gods and prayed for the destruction of the world. When floods,\nfamines, and especially fires occurred they were apt to be attributed to\nthe black magic of the Christians.\n\nWhen any one was accused of Christianity, he was required, as a means of\ntesting the truth of the charge, to offer incense to the gods or to the\nstatues of deified Emperors. His compliance at once exonerated him. The\nobjection of the Christians\u2014they and the Jews were the only objectors\u2014to\nthe worship of the Emperors was, in the eyes of the Romans, one of the\nmost sinister signs that their religion was dangerous. The purpose of\nthis worship was to symbolize the unity and solidarity of an Empire\nwhich embraced so many peoples of different beliefs and different gods;\nits intention was political, to promote union and loyalty; and it is not\nsurprising that those who denounced it should\n\n[44] be suspected of a disloyal spirit. But it must be noted that there\nwas no necessity for any citizen to take part in this worship. No\nconformity was required from any inhabitants of the Empire who were not\nserving the State as soldiers or civil functionaries. Thus the effect\nwas to debar Christians from military and official careers.\n\nThe Apologies for Christianity which appeared at this period (second\ncentury) might have helped, if the Emperors (to whom some of them were\naddressed) had read them, to confirm the view that it was a political\ndanger. It would have been easy to read between the lines that, if the\nChristians ever got the upper hand, they would not spare the cults of\nthe State. The contemporary work of Tatian (A Discourse to the Greeks)\nreveals what the Apologists more or less sought to disguise, invincible\nhatred towards the civilization in which they lived. Any reader of the\nChristian literature of the time could not fail to see that in a State\nwhere Christians had the power there would be no tolerance of other\nreligious practices. [4] If the Emperors made an exception to their\ntolerant policy in the case of Christianity, their purpose was to\nsafeguard tolerance.\n\n[45]\n\nIn the third century the religion, though still forbidden, was quite\nopenly tolerated; the Church organized itself without concealment;\necclesiastical councils assembled without interference. There were some\nbrief and local attempts at repression, there was only one grave\npersecution (begun by Decius, A.D. 250, and continued by Valerian). In\nfact, throughout this century, there were not many victims, though\nafterwards the Christians invented a whole mythology of martyrdoms. Many\ncruelties were imputed to Emperors under whom we know that the Church\nenjoyed perfect peace.\n\nA long period of civil confusion, in which the Empire seemed to be\ntottering to its fall, had been terminated by the Emperor Diocletian,\nwho, by his radical administrative reforms, helped to preserve the Roman\npower in its integrity for another century. He desired to support his\nwork of political consolidation by reviving the Roman spirit, and he\nattempted to infuse new life into the official religion. To this end he\ndetermined to suppress the growing influence of the Christians, who,\nthough a minority, were very numerous, and he organized a persecution.\nIt was long, cruel and bloody; it was the most whole-hearted, general\nand systematic effort to crush the forbidden faith. It was a\n\n[46] failure, the Christians were now too numerous to be crushed. After\nthe abdication of Diocletian, the Emperors who reigned in different\nparts of the realm did not agree as to the expediency of his policy, and\nthe persecution ended by edicts of toleration (A.D. 311 and 313). These\ndocuments have an interest for the history of religious liberty.\n\nThe first, issued in the eastern provinces, ran as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe were particularly desirous of reclaiming into the way of reason and\nnature the deluded Christians, who had renounced the religion and\nceremonies instituted by their fathers and, presumptuously despising the\npractice of antiquity, had invented extravagant laws and opinions\naccording to the dictates of their fancy, and had collected a various\nsociety from the different provinces of our Empire. The edicts which we\nhave published to enforce the worship of the gods, having exposed many\nof the Christians to danger and distress, many having suffered death and\nmany more, who still persist in their impious folly, being left\ndestitute of any public exercise of religion, we are disposed to extend\nto those unhappy men the effects of our wonted clemency. We permit them,\ntherefore, freely to profess their private opinions, and to assemble in\ntheir conventicles\n\n[47] without fear or molestation, provided always that they preserve a\ndue respect to the established laws and government.\u201d [5]\n\nThe second, of which Constantine was the author, known as the Edict of\nMilan, was to a similar effect, and based toleration on the Emperor\u2019s\ncare for the peace and happiness of his subjects and on the hope of\nappeasing the Deity whose seat is in heaven.\n\nThe relations between the Roman government and the Christians raised the\ngeneral question of persecution and freedom of conscience. A State, with\nan official religion, but perfectly tolerant of all creeds and cults,\nfinds that a society had arisen in its midst which is uncompromisingly\nhostile to all creeds but its own and which, if it had the power, would\nsuppress all but its own. The government, in self-defence, decides to\ncheck the dissemination of these subversive ideas and makes the\nprofession of that creed a crime, not on account of its particular\ntenets, but on account of the social consequences of those tenets. The\nmembers of the society cannot without violating their consciences and\nincurring damnation abandon their exclusive doctrine. The principle of\nfreedom of conscience is asserted as superior to all obligations to the\nState, and the State, confronted\n\n[48] by this new claim, is unable to admit it. Persecution is the\nresult.\n\nEven from the standpoint of an orthodox and loyal pagan the persecution\nof the Christians is indefensible, because blood was shed uselessly. In\nother words, it was a great mistake because it was unsuccessful. For\npersecution is a choice between two evils. The alternatives are violence\n(which no reasonable defender of persecution would deny to be an evil in\nitself) and the spread of dangerous opinions. The first is chosen simply\nto avoid the second, on the ground that the second is the greater evil.\nBut if the persecution is not so devised and carried out as to\naccomplish its end, then you have two evils instead of one, and nothing\ncan justify this. From their point of view, the Emperors had good\nreasons for regarding Christianity as dangerous and anti-social, but\nthey should either have let it alone or taken systematic measures to\ndestroy it. If at an early stage they had established a drastic and\nsystematic inquisition, they might possibly have exterminated it. This\nat least would have been statesmanlike. But they had no conception of\nextreme measures, and they did not understand \u2014they had no experience to\nguide them \u2014the sort of problem they had to deal with. They hoped to\nsucceed by intimidation.\n\n[49] Their attempts at suppression were vacillating, fitful, and\nridiculously ineffectual. The later persecutions (of A.D. 250 and 303)\nhad no prospect of success. It is particularly to be observed that no\neffort was made to suppress Christian literature.\n\nThe higher problem whether persecution, even if it attains the desired\nend, is justifiable, was not considered. The struggle hinged on\nantagonism between the conscience of the individual and the authority\nand supposed interests of the State. It was the question which had been\nraised by Socrates, raised now on a wider platform in a more pressing\nand formidable shape: what is to happen when obedience to the law is\ninconsistent with obedience to an invisible master? Is it incumbent on\nthe State to respect the conscience of the individual at all costs, or\nwithin what limits? The Christians did not attempt a solution, the\ngeneral problem did not interest them. They claimed the right of freedom\nexclusively for themselves from a non-Christian government; and it is\nhardly going too far to suspect that they would have applauded the\ngovernment if it had suppressed the Gnostic sects whom they hated and\ncalumniated. In any case, when a Christian State was established, they\nwould completely forget the principle which they\n\n[50] had invoked. The martyrs died for conscience, but not for liberty.\nTo-day the greatest of the Churches demands freedom of conscience in the\nmodern States which she does not control, but refuses to admit that,\nwhere she had the power, it would be incumbent on her to concede it.\n\nIf we review the history of classical antiquity as a whole, we may\nalmost say that freedom of thought was like the air men breathed. It was\ntaken for granted and nobody thought about it. If seven or eight\nthinkers at Athens were penalized for heterodoxy, in some and perhaps in\nmost of these cases heterodoxy was only a pretext. They do not\ninvalidate the general facts that the advance of knowledge was not\nimpeded by prejudice, or science retarded by the weight of unscientific\nauthority. The educated Greeks were tolerant because they were friends\nof reason and did not set up any authority to overrule reason. Opinions\nwere not imposed except by argument; you were not expected to receive\nsome \u201ckingdom of heaven\u201d like a little child, or to prostrate your\nintellect before an authority claiming to be infallible.\n\nBut this liberty was not the result of a conscious policy or deliberate\nconviction, and therefore it was precarious. The problems\n\n[51] of freedom of thought, religious liberty, toleration, had not been\nforced upon society and were never seriously considered. When\nChristianity confronted the Roman government, no one saw that in the\ntreatment of a small, obscure, and, to pagan thinkers, uninteresting or\nrepugnant sect, a principle of the deepest social importance was\ninvolved. A long experience of the theory and practice of persecution\nwas required to base securely the theory of freedom of thought. The\nlurid policy of coercion which the Christian Church adopted, and its\nconsequences, would at last compel reason to wrestle with the problem\nand discover the justification of intellectual liberty. The spirit of\nthe Greeks and Romans, alive in their works, would, after a long period\nof obscuration, again enlighten the world and aid in re-establishing the\nreign of reason, which they had carelessly enjoyed without assuring its\nfoundations.\n\n[1] This has been shown very clearly by Professor Jackson in the article\non \u201cSocrates\u201d in the Encyclopoedia Britannica, last edition.\n\n[2] He stated the theological difficulty as to the origin of evil in\nthis form: God either wishes to abolish evil and cannot, or can and will\nnot, or neither can nor will, or both can and will. The first three are\nunthinkable, if he is a God worthy of the name; therefore the last\nalternative must be true. Why then does evil exist? The inference is\nthat there is no God, in the sense of a governor of the world.\n\n[3] An admirable appreciation of the poem will be found in R. V.\nTyrrell\u2019s Lectures on Latin Poetry.\n\n[4] For the evidence of the Apologists see A. Bouch\u00e9-Leclercq, Religious\nIntolerance and Politics (French, 1911) \u2014a valuable review of the whole\nsubject.\n\n[5] This is Gibbon\u2019s translation.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nREASON IN PRISON\n\n(THE MIDDLE AGES)\n\nABOUT ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great\nadopted Christianity. This momentous decision inaugurated\n\n[52] a millennium in which reason was enchained, thought was enslaved,\nand knowledge made no progress.\n\nDuring the two centuries in which they had been a forbidden sect the\nChristians had claimed toleration on the ground that religious belief is\nvoluntary and not a thing which can be enforced. When their faith became\nthe predominant creed and had the power of the State behind it, they\nabandoned this view. They embarked on the hopeful enterprise of bringing\nabout a complete uniformity in men\u2019s opinions on the mysteries of the\nuniverse, and began a more or less definite policy of coercing thought.\nThis policy was adopted by Emperors and Governments partly on political\ngrounds; religious divisions, bitter as they were, seemed dangerous to\nthe unity of the State. But the fundamental principle lay in the\ndoctrine that salvation is to be found exclusively in the Christian\nChurch. The profound conviction that those who did not believe in its\ndoctrines would be damned eternally, and that God punishes theological\nerror as if it were the most heinous of crimes, led naturally to\npersecution. It was a duty to impose on men the only true doctrine,\nseeing that their own eternal interests were at stake, and to hinder\nerrors from spreading. Heretics were more\n\n[53] than ordinary criminals and the pains that man could inflict on\nthem were as nothing to the tortures awaiting them in hell. To rid the\nearth of men who, however virtuous, were, through their religious\nerrors, enemies of the Almighty, was a plain duty. Their virtues were no\nexcuse. We must remember that, according to the humane doctrine of the\nChristians, pagan, that is, merely human, virtues were vices, and\ninfants who died unbaptized passed the rest of time in creeping on the\nfloor of hell. The intolerance arising from such views could not but\ndiffer in kind and intensity from anything that the world had yet\nwitnessed.\n\nBesides the logic of its doctrines, the character of its Sacred Book\nmust also be held partly accountable for the intolerant principles of\nthe Christian Church. It was unfortunate that the early Christians had\nincluded in their Scripture the Jewish writings which reflect the ideas\nof a low stage of civilization and are full of savagery. It would be\ndifficult to say how much harm has been done, in corrupting the morals\nof men, by the precepts and examples of inhumanity, violence, and\nbigotry which the reverent reader of the Old Testament, implicitly\nbelieving in its inspiration, is bound to approve. It furnished an\narmoury for the theory of\n\n[54] persecution. The truth is that Sacred Books are an obstacle to\nmoral and intellectual progress, because they consecrate the ideas of a\ngiven epoch, and its customs, as divinely appointed. Christianity, by\nadopting books of a long past age, placed in the path of human\ndevelopment a particularly nasty stumbling-block. It may occur to one to\nwonder how history might have been altered \u2014altered it surely would have\nbeen\u2014if the Christians had cut Jehovah out of their programme and,\ncontent with the New Testament, had rejected the inspiration of the Old.\n\nUnder Constantine the Great and his successors, edict after edict\nfulminated against the worship of the old pagan gods and against\nheretical Christian sects. Julian the Apostate, who in his brief reign\n(A.D. 361\u20133) sought to revive the old order of things, proclaimed\nuniversal toleration, but he placed Christians at a disadvantage by\nforbidding them to teach in schools. This was only a momentary check.\nPaganism was finally shattered by the severe laws of Theodosius I (end\nof fourth century). It lingered on here and there for more than another\ncentury, especially at Rome and Athens, but had little importance. The\nChristians were more concerned in striving among themselves than in\n\n[55] crushing the prostrate spirit of antiquity. The execution of the\nheretic Priscillian in Spain (fourth century) inaugurated the punishment\nof heresy by death. It is interesting to see a non-Christian of this age\nteaching the Christian sects that they should suffer one another.\nThemistius in an address to the Emperor Valens urged him to repeal his\nedicts against the Christians with whom he did not agree, and expounded\na theory of toleration. \u201cThe religious beliefs of individuals are a\nfield in which the authority of a government cannot be effective;\ncompliance can only lead to hypocritical professions. Every faith should\nbe allowed; the civil government should govern orthodox and heterodox to\nthe common good. God himself plainly shows that he wishes various forms\nof worship; there are many roads by which one can reach him.\u201d\n\nNo father of the Church has been more esteemed or enjoyed higher\nauthority than St. Augustine (died A.D. 410). He formulated the\nprinciple of persecution for the guidance of future generations, basing\nit on the firm foundation of Scripture\u2014on words used by Jesus Christ in\none of his parables, \u201cCompel them to come in.\u201d Till the end of the\ntwelfth century the Church worked hard to suppress heterodoxies. There\nwas much\n\n[56] persecution, but it was not systematic. There is reason to think\nthat in the pursuit of heresy the Church was mainly guided by\nconsiderations of its temporal interest, and was roused to severe action\nonly when the spread of false doctrine threatened to reduce its revenues\nor seemed a menace to society. At the end of the twelfth century\nInnocent III became Pope and under him the Church of Western Europe\nreached the height of its power. He and his immediate successors are\nresponsible for imagining and beginning an organized movement to sweep\nheretics out of Christendom. Languedoc in Southwestern France was\nlargely populated by heretics, whose opinions were considered\nparticularly offensive, known as the Albigeois. They were the subjects\nof the Count of Toulouse, and were an industrious and respectable\npeople. But the Church got far too little money out of this anti-\nclerical population, and Innocent called upon the Count to extirpate\nheresy from his dominion. As he would not obey, the Pope announced a\nCrusade against the Albigeois, and offered to all who would bear a hand\nthe usual rewards granted to Crusaders, including absolution from all\ntheir sins. A series of sanguinary wars followed in which the\nEnglishman, Simon de Montfort, took part. There were\n\n[57] wholesale burnings and hangings of men, women and children. The\nresistance of the people was broken down, though the heresy was not\neradicated, and the struggle ended in 1229 with the complete humiliation\nof the Count of Toulouse. The important point of the episode is this:\nthe Church introduced into the public law of Europe the new principle\nthat a sovran held his crown on the condition that he should extirpate\nheresy. If he hesitated to persecute at the command of the Pope, he must\nbe coerced; his lands were forfeited; and his dominions were thrown open\nto be seized by any one whom the Church could induce to attack him. The\nPopes thus established a theocratic system in which all other interests\nwere to be subordinated to the grand duty of maintaining the purity of\nthe Faith.\n\nBut in order to root out heresy it was necessary to discover it in its\nmost secret retreats. The Albigeois had been crushed, but the poison of\ntheir doctrine was not yet destroyed. The organized system of searching\nout heretics known as the Inquisition was founded by Pope Gregory IX\nabout A.D. 1233, and fully established by a Bull of Innocent IV (A.D.\n1252) which regulated the machinery of persecution \u201cas an integral part\nof the social edifice in every city and every\n\n[58] State.\u201d This powerful engine for the suppression of the freedom of\nmen\u2019s religious opinions is unique in history.\n\nThe bishops were not equal to the new talk undertaken by the Church, and\nin every ecclesiastical province suitable monks were selected and to\nthem was delegated the authority of the Pope for discovering heretics.\nThese inquisitors had unlimited authority, they were subject to no\nsupervision and responsible to no man. It would not have been easy to\nestablish this system but for the fact that contemporary secular rulers\nhad inaugurated independently a merciless legislation against heresy.\nThe Emperor Frederick II, who was himself undoubtedly a freethinker,\nmade laws for his extensive dominions in Italy and Germany (between 1220\nand 1235), enacting that all heretics should be outlawed, that those who\ndid not recant should be burned, those who recanted should be\nimprisoned, but if they relapsed should be executed; that their property\nshould be confiscated, their houses destroyed, and their children, to\nthe second generation, ineligible to positions of emolument unless they\nhad betrayed their father or some other heretic.\n\nFrederick\u2019s legislation consecrated the stake as the proper punishment\nfor heresy. This\n\n[59] cruel form of death for that crime seems to have been first\ninflicted on heretics by a French king (1017). We must remember that in\nthe Middle Ages, and much later, crimes of all kinds were punished with\nthe utmost cruelty. In England in the reign of Henry VIII there is a\ncase of prisoners being boiled to death. Heresy was the foulest of all\ncrimes; and to prevail against it was to prevail against the legions of\nhell. The cruel enactments against heretics were strongly supported by\nthe public opinion of the masses.\n\nWhen the Inquisition was fully developed it covered Western Christendom\nwith a net from the meshes of which it was difficult for a heretic to\nescape. The inquisitors in the various kingdoms co-operated, and\ncommunicated information; there was \u201ca chain of tribunals throughout\ncontinental Europe.\u201d England stood outside the system, but from the age\nof Henry IV and Henry V the government repressed heresy by the stake\nunder a special statute (A.D. 1400; repealed 1533; revived under Mary;\nfinally repealed in 1676).\n\nIn its task of imposing unity of belief the Inquisition was most\nsuccessful in Spain. Here towards the end of the fifteenth century a\nsystem was instituted which had peculiarities of its own and was very\njealous of\n\n[60] Roman interference. One of the achievements of the Spanish\nInquisition (which was not abolished till the nineteenth century) was to\nexpel the Moriscos or converted Moors, who retained many of their old\nMohammedan opinions and customs. It is also said to have eradicated\nJudaism and to have preserved the country from the zeal of Protestant\nmissionaries. But it cannot be proved that it deserves the credit of\nhaving protected Spain against Protestantism, for it is quite possible\nthat if the seeds of Protestant opinion had been sown they would, in any\ncase, have fallen dead on an uncongenial soil. Freedom of thought\nhowever was entirely suppressed.\n\nOne of the most efficacious means for hunting down heresy was the \u201cEdict\nof Faith,\u201d which enlisted the people in the service of the Inquisition\nand required every man to be an informer. From time to time a certain\ndistrict was visited and an edict issued commanding those who knew\nanything of any heresy to come forward and reveal it, under fearful\npenalties temporal and spiritual. In consequence, no one was free from\nthe suspicion of his neighbours or even of his own family. \u201cNo more\ningenious device has been invented to subjugate a whole population, to\nparalyze its intellect, and to reduce it\n\n[61] to blind obedience. It elevated delation to the rank of high\nreligious duty.\u201d\n\nThe process employed in the trials of those accused of heresy in Spain\nrejected every reasonable means for the ascertainment of truth. The\nprisoner was assumed to be guilty, the burden of proving his innocence\nrested on him; his judge was virtually his prosecutor. All witnesses\nagainst him, however infamous, were admitted. The rules for allowing\nwitnesses for the prosecution were lax; those for rejecting witnesses\nfor the defence were rigid. Jews, Moriscos, and servants could give\nevidence against the prisoner but not for him, and the same rule applied\nto kinsmen to the fourth degree. The principle on which the Inquisition\nproceeded was that better a hundred innocent should suffer than one\nguilty person escape. Indulgences were granted to any one who\ncontributed wood to the pile. But the tribunal of the Inquisition did\nnot itself condemn to the stake, for the Church must not be guilty of\nthe shedding of blood. The ecclesiastical judge pronounced the prisoner\nto be a heretic of whose conversion there was no hope, and handed him\nover (\u201crelaxed\u201d him was the official term) to the secular authority,\nasking and charging the magistrate \u201cto treat him benignantly and\nmercifully.\u201d But this\n\n[62] formal plea for mercy could not be entertained by the civil power;\nit had no choice but to inflict death; if it did otherwise, it was a\npromoter of heresy. All princes and officials, according to the Canon\nLaw, must punish duly and promptly heretics handed over to them by the\nInquisition, under pain of excommunication. It is to be noted that the\nnumber of deaths at the stake has been much over-estimated by popular\nimagination; but the sum of suffering caused by the methods of the\nsystem and the punishments that fell short of death can hardly be\nexaggerated.\n\nThe legal processes employed by the Church in these persecutions\nexercised a corrupting influence on the criminal jurisprudence of the\nContinent. Lea, the historian of the Inquisition, observes: \u201cOf all the\ncurses which the Inquisition brought in its train, this perhaps was the\ngreatest\u2014that, until the closing years of the eighteenth century,\nthroughout the greater part of Europe, the inquisitorial process, as\ndeveloped for the destruction of heresy, became the customary method of\ndealing with all who were under any accusation.\u201d\n\nThe Inquisitors who, as Gibbon says, \u201cdefended nonsense by cruelties,\u201d\nare often regarded as monsters. It may be said for them and for the\nkings who did their will that\n\n[63] they were not a bit worse than the priests and monarchs of\nprimitive ages who sacrificed human beings to their deities. The Greek\nking, Agamemnon, who immolated his daughter Iphigenia to obtain\nfavourable winds from the gods, was perhaps a most affectionate father,\nand the seer who advised him to do so may have been a man of high\nintegrity. They acted according to their beliefs. And so in the Middle\nAges and afterwards men of kindly temper and the purest zeal for\nmorality were absolutely devoid of mercy where heresy was suspected.\nHatred of heresy was a sort of infectious germ, generated by the\ndoctrine of exclusive salvation.\n\nIt has been observed that this dogma also injured the sense of truth. As\nman\u2019s eternal fate was at stake, it seemed plainly legitimate or rather\nimperative to use any means to enforce the true belief\u2014even falsehood\nand imposture. There was no scruple about the invention of miracles or\nany fictions that were edifying. A disinterested appreciation of truth\nwill not begin to prevail till the seventeenth century.\n\nWhile this principle, with the associated doctrines of sin, hell, and\nthe last judgment, led to such consequences, there were other doctrines\nand implications in Christianity which, forming a solid rampart against\nthe\n\n[64] advance of knowledge, blocked the paths of science in the Middle\nAges, and obstructed its progress till the latter half of the nineteenth\ncentury. In every important field of scientific research, the ground was\noccupied by false views which the Church declared to be true on the\ninfallible authority of the Bible. The Jewish account of Creation and\nthe Fall of Man, inextricably bound up with the Christian theory of\nRedemption, excluded from free inquiry geology, zoology, and\nanthropology. The literal interpretation of the Bible involved the truth\nthat the sun revolves round the earth. The Church condemned the theory\nof the antipodes. One of the charges against Servetus (who was burned in\nthe sixteenth century; see below, p. 79) was that he believed the\nstatement of a Greek geographer that Judea is a wretched barren country\nin spite of the fact that the Bible describes it as a land flowing with\nmilk and honey. The Greek physician Hippocrates had based the study of\nmedicine and disease on experience and methodical research. In the\nMiddle Ages men relapsed to the primitive notions of a barbarous age.\nBodily ailments were ascribed to occult agencies\u2014the malice of the Devil\nor the wrath of God. St. Augustine said that the diseases of Christians\nwere caused by demons,\n\n[65] and Luther in the same way attributed them to Satan. It was only\nlogical that supernatural remedies should be sought to counteract the\neffects of supernatural causes. There was an immense traffic in relics\nwith miraculous virtues, and this had the advantage of bringing in a\nlarge revenue to the Church. Physicians were often exposed to suspicions\nof sorcery and unbelief. Anatomy was forbidden, partly perhaps on\naccount of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The opposition\nof ecclesiastics to inoculation in the eighteenth century was a survival\nof the mediaeval view of disease. Chemistry (alchemy) was considered a\ndiabolical art and in 1317 was condemned by the Pope. The long\nimprisonment of Roger Bacon (thirteenth century) who, while he professed\nzeal for orthodoxy, had an inconvenient instinct for scientific\nresearch, illustrates the mediaeval distrust of science.\n\nIt is possible that the knowledge of nature would have progressed\nlittle, even if this distrust of science on theological grounds had not\nprevailed. For Greek science had ceased to advance five hundred years\nbefore Christianity became powerful. After about 200 B.C. no important\ndiscoveries were made. The explanation of this decay is not easy, but we\nmay be sure that it is to be sought in the\n\n[66] social conditions of the Greek and Roman world. And we may suspect\nthat the social conditions of the Middle Ages would have proved\nunfavourable to the scientific spirit\u2014 the disinterested quest of\nfacts\u2014even if the controlling beliefs had not been hostile. We may\nsuspect that the rebirth of science would in any case have been\npostponed till new social conditions, which began to appear in the\nthirteenth century (see next Chapter), had reached a certain maturity.\nTheological prejudice may have injured knowledge principally by its\nsurvival after the Middle Ages had passed away. In other words, the harm\ndone by Christian doctrines, in this respect, may lie less in the\nobscurantism of the dark interval between ancient and modern\ncivilization, than in the obstructions which they offered when science\nhad revived in spite of them and could no longer be crushed.\n\nThe firm belief in witchcraft, magic, and demons was inherited by the\nMiddle Ages from antiquity, but it became far more lurid and made the\nworld terrible. Men believed that they were surrounded by fiends\nwatching for every opportunity to harm them, that pestilences, storms,\neclipses, and famines were the work of the Devil; but they believed as\nfirmly that ecclesiastical rites were capable of coping with these\nenemies. Some of the\n\n[67] early Christian Emperors legislated against magic, but till the\nfourteenth century there was no systematic attempt to root out\nwitchcraft. The fearful epidemic, known as the Black Death, which\ndevastated Europe in that century, seems to have aggravated the haunting\nterror of the invisible world of demons. Trials for witchcraft\nmultiplied, and for three hundred years the discovery of witchcraft and\nthe destruction of those who were accused of practising it, chiefly\nwomen, was a standing feature of European civilization. Both the theory\nand the persecution were supported by Holy Scripture. \u201cThou shalt not\nsuffer a witch to live\u201d was the clear injunction of the highest\nauthority. Pope Innocent VIII issued a Bull on the matter (1484) in\nwhich he asserted that plagues and storms are the work of witches, and\nthe ablest minds believed in the reality of their devilish powers.\n\nNo story is more painful than the persecution of witches, and nowhere\nwas it more atrocious than in England and Scotland. I mention it because\nit was the direct result of theological doctrines, and because, as we\nshall see, it was rationalism which brought the long chapter of horrors\nto an end.\n\nIn the period, then, in which the Church exercised its greatest\ninfluence, reason was\n\n[68] enchained in the prison which Christianity had built around the\nhuman mind. It was not indeed inactive, but its activity took the form\nof heresy; or, to pursue the metaphor, those who broke chains were\nunable for the most part to scale the walls of the prison; their freedom\nextended only so far as to arrive at beliefs, which, like orthodoxy\nitself, were based on Christian mythology. There were some exceptions to\nthe rule. At the end of the twelfth century a stimulus from another\nworld began to make itself felt. The philosophy of Aristotle became\nknown to learned men in Western Christendom; their teachers were Jews\nand Mohammedans. Among the Mohammedans there was a certain amount of\nfree thought, provoked by their knowledge of ancient Greek speculation.\nThe works of the freethinker Averroes (twelfth century) which were based\non Aristotle\u2019s philosophy, propagated a small wave of rationalism in\nChristian countries. Averroes held the eternity of matter and denied the\nimmortality of the soul; his general view may be described as pantheism.\nBut he sought to avoid difficulties with the orthodox authorities of\nIslam by laying down the doctrine of double truth, that is the\ncoexistence of two independent and contradictory truths, the one\nphilosophical, and the other religious. This\n\n[69] did not save him from being banished from the court of the Spanish\ncaliph. In the University of Paris his teaching produced a school of\nfreethinkers who held that the Creation, the resurrection of the body,\nand other essential dogmas, might be true from the standpoint of\nreligion but are false from the standpoint of reason. To a plain mind\nthis seems much as if one said that the doctrine of immortality is true\non Sundays but not on week-days, or that the Apostles\u2019 Creed is false in\nthe drawing-room and true in the kitchen. This dangerous movement was\ncrushed, and the saving principle of double truth condemned, by Pope\nJohn XXI. The spread of Averroistic and similar speculations called\nforth the Theology of Thomas, of Aquino in South Italy (died 1274), a\nmost subtle thinker, whose mind had a natural turn for scepticism. He\nenlisted Aristotle, hitherto the guide of infidelity, on the side of\northodoxy, and constructed an ingenious Christian philosophy which is\nstill authoritative in the Roman Church. But Aristotle and reason are\ndangerous allies for faith, and the treatise of Thomas is perhaps more\ncalculated to unsettle a believing mind by the doubts which it\npowerfully states than to quiet the scruples of a doubter by its\nsolutions.\n\nThere must always have been some private\n\n[70] and underground unbelief here and there, which did not lead to any\nserious consequences. The blasphemous statement that the world had been\ndeceived by three impostors, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, was current in\nthe thirteenth century. It was attributed to the freethinking Emperor\nFrederick II (died 1250), who has been described as \u201cthe first modern\nman.\u201d The same idea, in a milder form, was expressed in the story of the\nThree Rings, which is at least as old. A Mohammedan ruler, desiring to\nextort money from a rich Jew, summoned him to his court and laid a snare\nfor him. \u201cMy friend,\u201d he said, \u201cI have often heard it reported that thou\nart a very wise man. Tell me therefore which of the three religions,\nthat of the Jews, that of the Mohammedans, and that of the Christians,\nthou believest to be the truest.\u201d The Jew saw that a trap was laid for\nhim and answered as follows: \u201cMy lord, there was once a rich man who\namong his treasures had a ring of such great value that he wished to\nleave it as a perpetual heirloom to his successors. So he made a will\nthat whichever of his sons should be found in possession of this ring\nafter his death should be considered his heir. The son to whom he gave\nthe ring acted in the same way as his father, and so the ring passed\nfrom hand to\n\n[71] hand. At last it came into the possession of a man who had three\nsons whom he loved equally. Unable to make up his mind to which of them\nhe should leave the ring, he promised it to each of them privately, and\nthen in order to satisfy them all caused a goldsmith to make two other\nrings so closely resembling the true ring that he was unable to\ndistinguish them himself. On his death-bed he gave each of them a ring,\nand each claimed to be his heir, but no one could prove his title\nbecause the rings were indistinguishable, and the suit at law lasts till\nthis day. It is even so, my lord, with the three religions, given by God\nto the three peoples. They each think they have the true religion, but\nwhich of them really has it, is a question, like that of the rings,\nstill undecided.\u201d This sceptical story became famous in the eighteenth\ncentury, when the German poet, Lessing, built upon it his drama Nathan\nthe Sage, which was intended to show the unreasonableness of\nintolerance.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPROSPECT OF DELIVERANCE\n\n(THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION)\n\nTHE intellectual and social movement which was to dispel the darkness of\nthe\n\n[72] Middle Ages and prepare the way for those who would ultimately\ndeliver reason from her prison, began in Italy in the thirteenth\ncentury. The misty veil woven of credulity and infantile na\u00efvet\u00e9 which\nhad hung over men\u2019s souls and protected them from understanding either\nthemselves or their relation to the world began to lift. The individual\nbegan to feel his separate individuality, to be conscious of his own\nvalue as a person apart from his race or country (as in the later ages\nof Greece and Rome); and the world around him began to emerge from the\nmists of mediaeval dreams. The change was due to the political and\nsocial conditions of the little Italian States, of which some were\nrepublics and others governed by tyrants.\n\nTo the human world, thus unveiling itself, the individual who sought to\nmake it serve his purposes required a guide; and the guide was found in\nthe ancient literature of Greece and Rome. Hence the whole\ntransformation, which presently extended from Italy to Northern Europe,\nis known as the Renaissance, or rebirth of classical antiquity. But the\nawakened interest in classical literature while it coloured the\ncharacter and stimulated the growth of the movement, supplying new\nideals and suggesting new points of view, was only the form in which the\nchange of spirit\n\n[73] began to express itself in the fourteenth century. The change might\nconceivably have taken some other shape. Its true name is Humanism.\n\nAt the time men hardly felt that they were passing into a new age of\ncivilization, nor did the culture of the Renaissance immediately produce\nany open or general intellectual rebellion against orthodox beliefs. The\nworld was gradually assuming an aspect decidedly unfriendly to the\nteaching of mediaeval orthodoxy; but there was no explosion of\nhostility; it was not till the seventeenth century that war between\nreligion and authority was systematically waged. The humanists were not\nhostile to theological authority or to the claims of religious dogma;\nbut they had discovered a purely human curiosity about this world and it\nabsorbed their interest. They idolized pagan literature which abounded\nin poisonous germs; the secular side of education became all-important;\nreligion and theology were kept in a separate compartment. Some\nspeculative minds, which were sensitive to the contradiction, might seek\nto reconcile the old religion with new ideas; but the general tendency\nof thinkers in the Renaissance period was to keep the two worlds\ndistinct, and to practise outward conformity to the creed without any\nreal intellectual submission.\n\n[74]\n\nI may illustrate this double-facedness of the Renaissance by Montaigne\n(second half of sixteenth century). His Essays make for rationalism, but\ncontain frequent professions of orthodox Catholicism, in which he was\nperfectly sincere. There is no attempt to reconcile the two points of\nview; in fact, he takes the sceptical position that there is no bridge\nbetween reason and religion. The human intellect is incapable in the\ndomain of theology, and religion must be placed aloft, out of reach and\nbeyond the interference of reason; to be humbly accepted. But while he\nhumbly accepted it, on sceptical grounds which would have induced him to\naccept Mohammadanism if he had been born in Cairo, his soul was not in\nits dominion. It was the philosophers and wise men of antiquity, Cicero,\nand Seneca, and Plutarch, who moulded and possessed his mind. It is to\nthem, and not to the consolations of Christianity, that he turns when he\ndiscusses the problem of death. The religious wars in France which he\nwitnessed and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew\u2019s Day (1572) were\ncalculated to confirm him in his scepticism. His attitude to persecution\nis expressed in the remark that \u201cit is setting a high value on one\u2019s\nopinions to roast men on account of them.\u201d\n\nThe logical results of Montaigne\u2019s scepticism\n\n[75] were made visible by his friend Charron, who published a book On\nWisdom in 1601. Here it is taught that true morality is not founded on\nreligion, and the author surveys the history of Christianity to show the\nevils which it had produced. He says of immortality that it is the most\ngenerally received doctrine, the most usefully believed, and the most\nweakly established by human reasons; but he modified this and some other\npassages in a second edition. A contemporary Jesuit placed Charron in\nthe catalogue of the most dangerous and wicked atheists. He was really a\ndeist; but in those days, and long after, no one scrupled to call a non-\nChristian deist an atheist. His book would doubtless have been\nsuppressed and he would have suffered but for the support of King Henry\nIV. It has a particular interest because it transports us directly from\nthe atmosphere of the Renaissance, represented by Montaigne, into the\nnew age of more or less aggressive rationalism.\n\nWhat Humanism did in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries,\nat first in Italy, then in other countries, was to create an\nintellectual atmosphere in which the emancipation of reason could begin\nand knowledge could resume its progress. The period saw the invention of\nprinting and\n\n[76] the discovery of new parts of the globe, and these things were to\naid powerfully in the future defeat of authority.\n\nBut the triumph of freedom depended on other causes also; it was not to\nbe brought about by the intellect alone. The chief political facts of\nthe period were the decline of the power of the Pope in Europe, the\ndecay of the Holy Roman Empire, and the growth of strong monarchies, in\nwhich worldly interests determined and dictated ecclesiastical policy,\nand from which the modern State was to develop. The success of the\nReformation was made possible by these conditions. Its victory in North\nGermany was due to the secular interest of the princes, who profited by\nthe confiscation of Church lands. In England there was no popular\nmovement; the change was carried through by the government for its own\npurposes.\n\nThe principal cause of the Reformation was the general corruption of the\nChurch and the flagrancy of its oppression. For a long time the Papacy\nhad had no higher aim than to be a secular power exploiting its\nspiritual authority for the purpose of promoting its worldly interests,\nby which it was exclusively governed. All the European States based\ntheir diplomacy on this assumption. Since the fourteenth century every\none acknowledged\n\n[77] the need of reforming the Church, and reform had been promised, but\nthings went from bad to worse, and there was no resource but rebellion.\nThe rebellion led by Luther was the result not of a revolt of reason\nagainst dogmas, but of widely spread anti-clerical feeling due to the\necclesiastical methods of extorting money, particularly by the sale of\nIndulgences, the most glaring abuse of the time. It was his study of the\ntheory of Papal Indulgences that led Luther on to his theological\nheresies.\n\nIt is an elementary error, but one which is still shared by many people\nwho have read history superficially, that the Reformation established\nreligious liberty and the right of private judgment. What it did was to\nbring about a new set of political and social conditions, under which\nreligious liberty could ultimately be secured, and, by virtue of its\ninherent inconsistencies, to lead to results at which its leaders would\nhave shuddered. But nothing was further from the minds of the leading\nReformers than the toleration of doctrines differing from their own.\nThey replaced one authority by another. They set up the authority of the\nBible instead of that of the Church, but it was the Bible according to\nLuther or the Bible according to Calvin. So far as the spirit of\nintolerance went, there\n\n[78] was nothing to choose between the new and the old Churches. The\nreligious wars were not for the cause of freedom, but for particular\nsets of doctrines; and in France, if the Protestants had been\nvictorious, it is certain that they would not have given more liberal\nterms to the Catholics than the Catholics gave to them.\n\nLuther was quite opposed to liberty of conscience and worship, a\ndoctrine which was inconsistent with Scripture as he read it. He might\nprotest against coercion and condemn the burning of heretics, when he\nwas in fear that he and his party might be victims, but when he was safe\nand in power, he asserted his real view that it was the duty of the\nState to impose the true doctrine and exterminate heresy, which was an\nabomination, that unlimited obedience to their prince in religious as in\nother matters was the duty of subjects, and that the end of the State\nwas to defend the faith. He held that Anabaptists should be put to the\nsword. With Protestants and Catholics alike the dogma of exclusive\nsalvation led to the same place.\n\nCalvin\u2019s fame for intolerance is blackest. He did not, like Luther,\nadvocate the absolute power of the civil ruler; he stood for the control\nof the State by the Church\u2014a form of government which is commonly called\ntheocracy;\n\n[79] and he established a theocracy at Geneva. Here liberty was\ncompletely crushed; false doctrines were put down by imprisonment,\nexile, and death. The punishment of Servetus is the most famous exploit\nof Calvin\u2019s warfare against heresy. The Spaniard Servetus, who had\nwritten against the dogma of the Trinity, was imprisoned at Lyons\n(partly through the machinations of Calvin) and having escaped came\nrashly to Geneva. He was tried for heresy and committed to the flames\n(1553), though Geneva had no jurisdiction over him. Melanchthon, who\nformulated the principles of persecution, praised this act as a\nmemorable example to posterity. Posterity however was one day to be\nashamed of that example. In 1903 the Calvinists of Geneva felt impelled\nto erect an expiatory monument, in which Calvin \u201cour great Reformer\u201d is\nexcused as guilty of an error \u201cwhich was that of his century.\u201d\n\nThus the Reformers, like the Church from which they parted, cared\nnothing for freedom, they only cared for \u201ctruth.\u201d If the mediaeval ideal\nwas to purge the world of heretics, the object of the Protestant was to\nexclude all dissidents from his own land. The people at large were to be\ndriven into a fold, to accept their faith at the command of their\nsovran. This was the principle laid down in the\n\n[80] religious peace which (1555) composed the struggle between the\nCatholic Emperor and the Protestant German princes. It was recognized by\nCatherine de\u2019 Medici when she massacred the French Protestants and\nsignified to Queen Elizabeth that she might do likewise with English\nCatholics.\n\nNor did the Protestant creeds represent enlightenment. The Reformation\non the Continent was as hostile to enlightenment as it was to liberty;\nand science, if it seemed to contradict the Bible, has as little chance\nwith Luther as with the Pope. The Bible, interpreted by the Protestants\nor the Roman Church, was equally fatal to witches. In Germany the\ndevelopment of learning received a long set-back.\n\nYet the Reformation involuntarily helped the cause of liberty. The\nresult was contrary to the intentions of its leaders, was indirect, and\nlong delayed. In the first place, the great rent in Western\nChristianity, substituting a number of theological authorities instead\nof one\u2014several gods, we may say, instead of one God\u2014produced a weakening\nof ecclesiastical authority in general. The religious tradition was\nbroken. In the second place, in the Protestant States, the supreme\necclesiastical power was vested in the sovran; the sovran had other\ninterests besides those of\n\n[81] the Church to consider; and political reasons would compel him\nsooner or later to modify the principle of ecclesiastical intolerance.\nCatholic States in the same way were forced to depart from the duty of\nnot suffering heretics. The religious wars in France ended in a limited\ntoleration of Protestants. The policy of Cardinal Richelieu, who\nsupported the Protestant cause in Germany, illustrates how secular\ninterests obstructed the cause of faith.\n\nAgain, the intellectual justification of the Protestant rebellion\nagainst the Church had been the right of private judgment, that is, the\nprinciple of religious liberty. But the Reformers had asserted it only\nfor themselves, and as soon as they had framed their own articles of\nfaith, they had practically repudiated it. This was the most glaring\ninconsistency in the Protestant position; and the claim which they had\nthrust aside could not be permanently suppressed. Once more, the\nProtestant doctrines rested on an insecure foundation which no logic\ncould defend, and inevitably led from one untenable position to another.\nIf we are to believe on authority, why should we prefer the upstart\ndictation of the Lutheran Confession of Augsburg or the English Thirty-\nnine Articles to the venerable authority of the Church of Rome? If we\ndecide against Rome, we must do so by means\n\n[82] of reason; but once we exercise reason in the matter, why should we\nstop where Luther or Calvin or any of the other rebels stopped, unless\nwe assume that one of them was inspired? If we reject superstitions\nwhich they rejected, there is nothing except their authority to prevent\nus from rejecting all or some of the superstitions which they retained.\nMoreover, their Bible-worship promoted results which they did not\nforesee. [1] The inspired record on which the creeds depend became an\nopen book. Public attention was directed to it as never before, though\nit cannot be said to have been universally read before the nineteenth\ncentury. Study led to criticism, the difficulties of the dogma of\ninspiration were appreciated, and the Bible was ultimately to be\nsubmitted to a remorseless dissection which has altered at least the\nquality of its authority in the eyes of intelligent believers. This\nprocess of Biblical criticism has been conducted mainly in a Protestant\natmosphere and the new position in which the Bible was placed by the\nReformation must be held partly accountable. In these ways,\nProtestantism was adapted to be a stepping-stone to rationalism, and\nthus served the cause of freedom.\n\n[83]\n\nThat cause however was powerfully and directly promoted by one sect of\nReformers, who in the eyes of all the others were blasphemers and of\nwhom most people never think when they talk of the Reformation. I mean\nthe Socinians. Of their far-reaching influence something will be said in\nthe next chapter.\n\nAnother result of the Reformation has still to be mentioned, its\nrenovating effect on the Roman Church, which had now to fight for its\nexistence. A new series of Popes who were in earnest about religion\nbegan with Paul III (1534) and reorganized the Papacy and its resources\nfor a struggle of centuries. [2] The institution of the Jesuit order,\nthe establishment of the Inquisition at Rome, the Council of Trent, the\ncensorship of the Press (Index of Forbidden Books) were the expression\nof the new spirit and the means to cope with the new situation. The\nreformed Papacy was good fortune for believing children of the Church,\nbut what here concerns us is that one of its chief objects was to\nrepress freedom more effectually. Savonarola who preached right living\nat Florence had been executed (1498) under Pope Alexander VI who was a\nnotorious profligate. If Savonarola had lived\n\n[84] in the new era he might have been canonized, but Giordano Bruno was\nburned.\n\nGiordano Bruno had constructed a religious philosophy, based partly upon\nEpicurus, from whom he took the theory of the infinity of the universe.\nBut Epicurean materialism was transformed into a pantheistic mysticism\nby the doctrine that God is the soul of matter. Accepting the recent\ndiscovery of Copernicus, which Catholics and Protestants alike rejected,\nthat the earth revolves round the sun, Bruno took the further step of\nregarding the fixed stars as suns, each with its invisible satellites.\nHe sought to come to an understanding with the Bible, which (he held)\nbeing intended for the vulgar had to accommodate itself to their\nprejudices. Leaving Italy, because he was suspected of heresy, he lived\nsuccessively in Switzerland, France, England, and Germany, and in 1592,\ninduced by a false friend to return to Venice he was seized by order of\nthe Inquisition. Finally condemned in Rome, he was burned (1600) in the\nCampo de\u2019 Fiori, where a monument now stands in his honour, erected some\nyears ago, to the great chagrin of the Roman Church.\n\nMuch is made of the fate of Bruno because he is one of the world\u2019s\nfamous men. No country has so illustrious a victim of that era to\ncommemorate as Italy, but in other lands\n\n[85] blood just as innocent was shed for heterodox opinions. In France\nthere was rather more freedom than elsewhere under the relatively\ntolerant government of Henry IV and of the Cardinals Richelieu and\nMazarin, till about 1660. But at Toulouse (1619) Lucilio Vanini, a\nlearned Italian who like Bruno wandered about Europe, was convicted as\nan atheist and blasphemer; his tongue was torn out and he was burned.\nProtestant England, under Elizabeth and James I, did not lag behind the\nRoman Inquisition, but on account of the obscurity of the victims her\nzeal for faith has been unduly forgotten. Yet, but for an accident, she\nmight have covered herself with the glory of having done to death a\nheretic not less famous than Giordano Bruno. The poet Marlowe was\naccused of atheism, but while the prosecution was hanging over him he\nwas killed in a sordid quarrel in a tavern (1593). Another dramatist\n(Kyd) who was implicated in the charge was put to the torture. At the\nsame time Sir Walter Raleigh was prosecuted for unbelief but not\nconvicted. Others were not so fortunate. Three or four persons were\nburned at Norwich in the reign of Elizabeth for unchristian doctrines,\namong them Francis Kett who had been a Fellow of Corpus Christi,\nCambridge. Under James I, who\n\n[86] interested himself personally in such matters, Bartholomew Legate\nwas charged with holding various pestilent opinions. The king summoned\nhim to his presence and asked him whether he did not pray daily to Jesus\nChrist. Legate replied he had prayed to Christ in the days of his\nignorance, but not for the last seven years. \u201cAway, base fellow,\u201d said\nJames, spurning him with his foot, \u201cit shall never be said that one\nstayeth in my palace that hath never prayed to our Saviour for seven\nyears together.\u201d Legate, having been imprisoned for some time in\nNewgate, was declared an incorrigible heretic and burned at Smithfield\n(1611). Just a month later, one Wightman was burned at Lichfield, by the\nBishop of Coventry, for heterodox doctrines. It is possible that public\nopinion was shocked by these two burnings. They were the last cases in\nEngland of death for unbelief. Puritan intolerance, indeed, passed an\nordinance in 1648, by which all who denied the Trinity, Christ\u2019s\ndivinity, the inspiration of Scripture, or a future state, were liable\nto death, and persons guilty of other heresies, to imprisonment. But\nthis did not lead to any executions.\n\nThe Renaissance age saw the first signs of the beginning of modern\nscience, but the mediaeval prejudices against the investigation\n\n[87] of nature were not dissipated till the seventeenth century, and in\nItaly they continued to a much later period. The history of modern\nastronomy begins in 1543, with the publication of the work of Copernicus\nrevealing the truth about the motions of the earth. The appearance of\nthis work is important in the history of free thought, because it raised\na clear and definite issue between science and Scripture; and Osiander,\nwho edited it (Copernicus was dying), forseeing the outcry it would\nraise, stated untruly in the preface that the earth\u2019s motion was put\nforward only as a hypothesis. The theory was denounced by Catholics and\nReformers, and it did not convince some men (e.g. Bacon) who were not\ninfluenced by theological prejudice. The observations of the Italian\nastronomer Galileo de\u2019 Galilei demonstrated the Copernican theory beyond\nquestion. His telescope discovered the moons of Jupiter, and his\nobservation of the spots in the sun confirmed the earth\u2019s rotation. In\nthe pulpits of Florence, where he lived under the protection of the\nGrand Duke, his sensational discoveries were condemned. \u201cMen of Galilee,\nwhy stand ye gazing up into heaven?\u201d He was then denounced to the Holy\nOffice of the Inquisition by two Dominican monks. Learning that his\ninvestigations were being considered\n\n[88] at Rome, Galileo went thither, confident that he would be able to\nconvince the ecclesiastical authorities of the manifest truth of\nCopernicanism. He did not realize what theology was capable of. In\nFebruary 1616 the Holy Office decided that the Copernican system was in\nitself absurd, and, in respect of Scripture, heretical. Cardinal\nBellarmin, by the Pope\u2019s direction, summoned Galileo and officially\nadmonished him to abandon his opinion and cease to teach it, otherwise\nthe Inquisition would proceed against him. Galileo promised to obey. The\nbook of Copernicus was placed on the Index. It has been remarked that\nGalileo\u2019s book on Solar Spots contains no mention of Scripture, and thus\nthe Holy Office, in its decree which related to that book, passed\njudgment on a scientific, not a theological, question.\n\nGalileo was silenced for a while, but it was impossible for him to be\nmute for ever. Under a new Pope (Urban VIII) he looked for greater\nliberty, and there were many in the Papal circle who were well disposed\nto him. He hoped to avoid difficulties by the device of placing the\narguments for the old and the new theories side by side, and pretending\nnot to judge between them. He wrote a treatise on the two systems (the\nPtolemaic and the Copernican) in the form\n\n[89] of Dialogues, of which the preface declares that the purpose is to\nexplain the pros and cons of the two views. But the spirit of the work\nis Copernican. He received permission, quite definite as he thought,\nfrom Father Riccardi (master of the Sacred Palace) to print it, and it\nappeared in 1632. The Pope however disapproved of it, the book was\nexamined by a commission, and Galileo was summoned before the\nInquisition. He was old and ill, and the humiliations which he had to\nendure are a painful story. He would probably have been more severely\ntreated, if one of the members of the tribunal had not been a man of\nscientific training (Macolano, a Dominican), who was able to appreciate\nhis ability. Under examination, Galileo denied that he had upheld the\nmotion of the earth in the Dialogues, and asserted that he had shown the\nreasons of Copernicus to be inconclusive. This defence was in accordance\nwith the statement in his preface, but contradicted his deepest\nconviction. In struggling with such a tribunal, it was the only line\nwhich a man who was not a hero could take. At a later session, he forced\nhimself ignominiously to confess that some of the arguments on the\nCopernican side had been put too strongly and to declare himself ready\nto confute the\n\n[90] theory. In the final examination, he was threatened with torture.\nHe said that before the decree of 1616 he had held the truth of the\nCopernican system to be arguable, but since then he had held the\nPtolemaic to be true. Next day, he publicly abjured the scientific truth\nwhich he had demonstrated. He was allowed to retire to the country, on\ncondition that he saw no one. In the last months of his life he wrote to\na friend to this effect: \u201cThe falsity of the Copernican system cannot be\ndoubted, especially by us Catholics. It is refuted by the irrefragable\nauthority of Scripture. The conjectures of Copernicus and his disciples\nwere all disposed of by the one solid argument: God\u2019s omnipotence can\noperate in infinitely various ways. If something appears to our\nobservation to happen in one particular way, we must not curtail God\u2019s\narm, and sustain a thing in which we may be deceived.\u201d The irony is\nevident.\n\nRome did not permit the truth about the solar system to be taught till\nafter the middle of the eighteenth century, and Galileo\u2019s books remained\non the Index till 1835. The prohibition was fatal to the study of\nnatural science in Italy.\n\nThe Roman Index reminds us of the significance of the invention of\nprinting in the struggle for freedom of thought, by making\n\n[91] it easy to propagate new ideas far and wide. Authority speedily\nrealized the danger, and took measures to place its yoke on the new\ncontrivance, which promised to be such a powerful ally of reason. Pope\nAlexander VI inaugurated censorship of the Press by his Bull against\nunlicensed printing (1501). In France King Henry II made printing\nwithout official permission punishable by death. In Germany, censorship\nwas introduced in 1529. In England, under Elizabeth, books could not be\nprinted without a license, and printing presses were not allowed except\nin London, Oxford, and Cambridge; the regulation of the Press was under\nthe authority of the Star Chamber. Nowhere did the Press become really\nfree till the nineteenth century.\n\nWhile the Reformation and the renovated Roman Church meant a reaction\nagainst the Renaissance, the vital changes which the Renaissance\nsignified\u2014individualism, a new intellectual attitude to the world, the\ncultivation of secular knowledge\u2014were permanent and destined to lead,\namid the competing intolerances of Catholic and Protestant powers, to\nthe goal of liberty. We shall see how reason and the growth of knowledge\nundermined the bases of theological authority. At each step in this\nprocess, in which philosophical speculation, historical\n\n[92] criticism, natural science have all taken part, the opposition\nbetween reason and faith deepened; doubt, clear or vague, increased; and\nsecularism, derived from the Humanists, and always implying scepticism,\nwhether latent or conscious, substituted an interest in the fortunes of\nthe human race upon earth for the interest in a future world. And along\nwith this steady intellectual advance, toleration gained ground and\nfreedom won more champions. In the meantime the force of political\ncircumstances was compelling governments to mitigate their maintenance\nof one religious creed by measures of relief to other Christian sects,\nand the principle of exclusiveness was broken down for reasons of\nworldly expediency. Religious liberty was an important step towards\ncomplete freedom of opinion.\n\n[1] The danger, however, was felt in Germany, and in the seventeenth\ncentury the study of Scripture was not encouraged at German\nUniversities.\n\n[2] See Barry, Papacy and Modern Times (in this series), 113 seq.\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nRELIGIOUS TOLERATION\n\nIN the third century B.C. the Indian king Asoka, a man of religious zeal\nbut of tolerant spirit, confronted by the struggle between two hostile\nreligions (Brahmanism and Buddhism), decided that both should be equally\nprivileged and honoured in his dominions. His ordinances on the matter\nare memorable\n\n[93] as the earliest existing Edicts of toleration. In Europe, as we\nsaw, the principle of toleration was for the first time definitely\nexpressed in the Roman Imperial Edicts which terminated the persecution\nof the Christians.\n\nThe religious strife of the sixteenth century raised the question in its\nmodern form, and for many generations it was one of the chief problems\nof statesmen and the subject of endless controversial pamphlets.\nToleration means incomplete religious liberty, and there are many\ndegrees of it. It might be granted to certain Christian sects; it might\nbe granted to Christian sects, but these alone; it might be granted to\nall religions, but not to freethinkers; or to deists, but not to\natheists. It might mean the concession of some civil rights, but not of\nothers; it might mean the exclusion of those who are tolerated from\npublic offices or from certain professions. The religious liberty now\nenjoyed in Western lands has been gained through various stages of\ntoleration.\n\nWe owe the modern principle of toleration to the Italian group of\nReformers, who rejected the doctrine of the Trinity and were the fathers\nof Unitarianism. The Reformation movement had spread to Italy, but Rome\nwas successful in suppressing it, and many heretics fled to Switzerland.\nThe anti-Trinitarian\n\n[94] group were forced by the intolerance of Calvin to flee to\nTransylvania and Poland where they propagated their doctrines. The\nUnitarian creed was moulded by Fausto Sozzini, generally known as\nSocinus, and in the catechism of his sect (1574) persecution is\ncondemned. This repudiation of the use of force in the interest of\nreligion is a consequence of the Socinian doctrines. For, unlike Luther\nand Calvin, the Socinians conceded such a wide room to individual\njudgment in the interpretation of Scripture that to impose Socinianism\nwould have been inconsistent with its principles. In other words, there\nwas a strong rationalistic element which was lacking in the Trinitarian\ncreeds.\n\nIt was under the influence of the Socinian spirit that Castellion of\nSavoy sounded the trumpet of toleration in a pamphlet denouncing the\nburning of Servetus, whereby he earned the malignant hatred of Calvin.\nHe maintained the innocence of error and ridiculed the importance which\nthe Churches laid on obscure questions such as predestination and the\nTrinity. \u201cTo discuss the difference between the Law and the Gospel,\ngratuitous remission of sins or imputed righteousness, is as if a man\nwere to discuss whether a prince was to come on horseback,\n\n[95] or in a chariot, or dressed in white or in red.\u201d [1] Religion is a\ncurse if persecution is a necessary part of it.\n\nFor a long time the Socinians and those who came under their influence\nwhen, driven from Poland, they passed into Germany and Holland, were the\nonly sects which advocated toleration. It was adopted from them by the\nAnabaptists and by the Arminian section of the Reformed Church of\nHolland. And in Holland, the founder of the English Congregationalists,\nwho (under the name of Independents) played such an important part in\nthe history of the Civil War and the Commonwealth, learned the principle\nof liberty of conscience.\n\nSocinus thought that this principle could be realized without abolishing\nthe State Church. He contemplated a close union between the State and\nthe prevailing Church, combined with complete toleration for other\nsects. It is under this system (which has been called jurisdictional)\nthat religious liberty has been realized in European States. But there\nis another and simpler method, that of separating Church from State and\nplacing all religions on an equality. This was the solution which the\nAnabaptists would have preferred. They detested the State; and the\ndoctrine of religious liberty was not\n\n[96] precious to them. Their ideal system would have been an Anabaptist\ntheocracy; separation was the second best.\n\nIn Europe, public opinion was not ripe for separation, inasmuch as the\nmost powerful religious bodies were alike in regarding toleration as\nwicked indifference. But it was introduced in a small corner of the new\nworld beyond the Atlantic in the seventeenth century. The Puritans who\nfled from the intolerance of the English Church and State and founded\ncolonies in New England, were themselves equally intolerant, not only to\nAnglicans and Catholics, but to Baptists and Quakers. They set up\ntheocratical governments from which all who did not belong to their own\nsect were excluded. Roger Williams had imbibed from the Dutch Arminians\nthe idea of separation of Church from State. On account of this heresy\nhe was driven from Massachusetts, and he founded Providence to be a\nrefuge for those whom the Puritan colonists persecuted. Here he set up a\ndemocratic constitution in which the magistrates had power only in civil\nmatters and could not interfere with religion. Other towns were\npresently founded in Rhode Island, and a charter of Charles II (1663)\nconfirmed the constitution, which secured to all citizens professing\nChristianity, of whatever\n\n[97] form, the full enjoyment of political rights. Non-Christians were\ntolerated, but were not admitted to the political rights of Christians.\nSo far, the new State fell short of perfect liberty. But the fact that\nJews were soon admitted, notwithstanding, to full citizenship shows how\nfree the atmosphere was. To Roger Williams belongs the glory of having\nfounded the first modern State which was really tolerant and was based\non the principle of taking the control of religious matters entirely out\nof the hands of the civil government.\n\nToleration was also established in the Roman Catholic colony of\nMaryland, but in a different way. Through the influence of Lord\nBaltimore an Act of Toleration was passed in 1649, notable as the first\ndecree, voted by a legal assembly, granting complete freedom to all\nChristians. No one professing faith in Christ was to be molested in\nregard to his religion. But the law was heavy on all outside this pale.\nAny one who blasphemed God or attacked the Trinity or any member of the\nTrinity was threatened by the penalty of death. The tolerance of\nMaryland attracted so many Protestant settlers from Virginia that the\nProtestants became a majority, and as soon as they won political\npreponderance, they introduced an Act (1654)\n\n[98] excluding Papists and Prelatists from toleration. The rule of the\nBaltimores was restored after 1660, and the old religious freedom was\nrevived, but with the accession of William III the Protestants again\ncame into power and the toleration which the Catholics had instituted in\nMaryland came to an end.\n\nIt will be observed that in both these cases freedom was incomplete; but\nit was much larger and more fundamental in Rhode Island, where it had\nbeen ultimately derived from the doctrine of Socinus. [2] When the\ncolonies became independent of England the Federal Constitution which\nthey set up was absolutely secular, but it was left to each member of\nthe Union to adopt Separation or not (1789). If separation has become\nthe rule in the American States, it may be largely due to the fact that\non any other system the governments would have found it difficult to\nimpose mutual tolerance on the sects. It must be added that in Maryland\nand a few southern States atheists still suffer from some political\ndisabilities.\n\nIn England, the experiment of Separation would have been tried under the\nCommonwealth, if the Independents had had their way. This policy was\noverruled by Cromwell.\n\n[99] The new national Church included Presbyterians, Independents, and\nBaptists, but liberty of worship was granted to all Christian sects,\nexcept Roman Catholics and Anglicans. If the parliament had had the\npower, this toleration would have been a mere name. The Presbyterians\nregarded toleration as a work of the Devil, and would have persecuted\nthe Independents if they could. But under Cromwell\u2019s autocratic rule\neven the Anglicans lived in peace, and toleration was extended to the\nJews. In these days, voices were raised from various quarters advocating\ntoleration on general grounds. [3] The most illustrious advocate was\nMilton, the poet, who was in favour of the severance of Church from\nState.\n\nIn Milton\u2019s Areopagitica: a speech for the liberty of unlicensed\nprinting (1644), the freedom of the Press is eloquently sustained by\narguments which are valid for freedom of thought in general. It is shown\nthat the censorship will conduce \u201cto the discouragement of all learning\nand the stop of truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our\nabilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the\ndiscovery that might be yet further made, both in religious\n\n[100] and civil wisdom.\u201d For knowledge is advanced through the utterance\nof new opinions, and truth is discovered by free discussion. If the\nwaters of truth \u201cflow not in a perpetual progression they sicken into a\nmuddy pool of conformity and tradition.\u201d Books which are authorized by\nthe licensers are apt to be, as Bacon said, \u201cbut the language of the\ntimes,\u201d and do not contribute to progress. The examples of the countries\nwhere the censorship is severe do not suggest that it is useful for\nmorals: \u201clook into Italy and Spain, whether those places be one scruple\nthe better, the honester, the wiser, the chaster, since all the\ninquisitional rigour that hath been executed upon books.\u201d Spain indeed\ncould reply, \u201cWe are, what is more important, more orthodox.\u201d It is\ninteresting to notice that Milton places freedom of thought above civil\nliberty: \u201cGive me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely\naccording to conscience, above all other liberties.\u201d\n\nWith the restoration of the Monarchy and the Anglican Church, religious\nliberty was extinguished by a series of laws against Dissenters. To the\nRevolution we owe the Act of Toleration (1689) from which the religious\nfreedom which England enjoys at present is derived. It granted freedom\nof worship to Presbyterians, Congregationalists,\n\n[101] Baptists and Quakers, but only to these; Catholics and Unitarians\nwere expressly excepted and the repressive legislation of Charles II\nremained in force against them. It was a characteristically English\nmeasure, logically inconsistent and absurd, a mixture of tolerance and\nintolerance, but suitable to the circumstances and the state of public\nopinion at the time.\n\nIn the same year John Locke\u2019s famous (first) Letter concerning\nToleration appeared in Latin. Three subsequent letters developed and\nillustrated his thesis. The main argument is based on the principle that\nthe business of civil government is quite distinct from that of\nreligion, that the State is a society constituted only for preserving\nand promoting the civil interests of its members \u2014civil interests\nmeaning life, liberty, health, and the possession of property. The care\nof souls is not committed to magistrates more than to other men. For the\nmagistrate can only use outward force; but true religion means the\ninward persuasion of the mind, and the mind is so made that force cannot\ncompel it to believe. So too it is absurd for a State to make laws to\nenforce a religion, for laws are useless without penalties, and\npenalties are impertinent because they cannot convince.\n\nMoreover, even if penalties could change\n\n[102] men\u2019s beliefs, this would not conduce to the salvation of souls.\nWould more men be saved if all blindly resigned themselves to the will\nof their rulers and accepted the religion of their country? For as the\nprinces of the world are divided in religion, one country alone would be\nin the right, and all the rest of the world would have to follow their\nprinces to destruction; \u201cand that which heightens the absurdity, and\nvery ill suits the notion of a deity, men would owe their eternal\nhappiness or their eternal misery to the places of their nativity.\u201d This\nis a principle on which Locke repeatedly insists. If a State is\njustified in imposing a creed, it follows that in all the lands, except\nthe one or few in which the true faith prevails, it is the duty of the\nsubjects to embrace a false religion. If Protestantism is promoted in\nEngland, Popery by the same rule will be promoted in France. \u201cWhat is\ntrue and good in England will be true and good at Rome too, in China, or\nGeneva.\u201d Toleration is the principle which gives to the true faith the\nbest chance of prevailing.\n\nLocke would concede full liberty to idolaters, by whom he means the\nIndians of North America, and he makes some scathing remarks on the\necclesiastical zeal which forced these \u201cinnocent pagans\u201d to forsake\n\n[103] their ancient religion. But his toleration, though it extends\nbeyond the Christian pale, is not complete. He excepts in the first\nplace Roman Catholics, not on account of their theological dogmas but\nbecause they \u201cteach that faith is not to be kept with heretics,\u201d that\n\u201ckings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms,\u201d and because\nthey deliver themselves up to the protection and service of a foreign\nprince\u2014the Pope. In other words, they are politically dangerous. His\nother exception is atheists. \u201cThose are not all to be tolerated who deny\nthe being of God. Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of\nhuman society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God,\nthough but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by\ntheir atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence\nof religion to challenge the privilege of a Toleration.\u201d\n\nThus Locke is not free from the prejudices of his time. These exceptions\ncontradict his own principle that \u201cit is absurd that things should be\nenjoined by laws which are not in men\u2019s power to perform. And to believe\nthis or that to be true does not depend upon our will.\u201d This applies to\nRoman Catholics as to Protestants, to atheists as to deists. Locke,\nhowever, perhaps thought\n\n[104] that the speculative opinion of atheism, which was uncommon in his\nday, does depend on the will. He would have excluded from his State his\ngreat contemporary Spinoza.\n\nBut in spite of its limitations Locke\u2019s Toleration is a work of the\nhighest value, and its argument takes us further than its author went.\nIt asserts unrestrictedly the secular principle, and its logical issue\nis Disestablishment. A Church is merely \u201ca free and voluntary society.\u201d\nI may notice the remark that if infidels were to be converted by force,\nit was easier for God to do it \u201cwith armies of heavenly legions than for\nany son of the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.\u201d This\nis a polite way of stating a maxim analogous to that of the Emperor\nTiberius (above, p. 41). If false beliefs are an offence to God, it is,\nreally, his affair.\n\nThe toleration of Nonconformists was far from pleasing extreme\nAnglicans, and the influence of this party at the beginning of the\neighteenth century menaced the liberty of Dissenters. The situation\nprovoked Defoe, who was a zealous Nonconformist, to write his pamphlet,\nThe Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1702), an ironical attack upon the\nprinciple of toleration. It pretends to show that the Dissenters are at\nheart incorrigible rebels, that a gentle policy is useless, and suggests\n\n[105] that all preachers at conventicles should be hanged and all\npersons found attending such meetings should be banished. This\nexceedingly amusing but terribly earnest caricature of the sentiments of\nthe High Anglican party at first deceived and alarmed the Dissenters\nthemselves. But the High Churchmen were furious. Defoe was fined,\nexposed in the pillory three times, and sent to Newgate prison.\n\nBut the Tory reaction was only temporary. During the eighteenth century\na relatively tolerant spirit prevailed among the Christian sects and new\nsects were founded. The official Church became less fanatical; many of\nits leading divines were influenced by rationalistic thought. If it had\nnot been for the opposition of King George III, the Catholics might have\nbeen freed from their disabilities before the end of the century. This\nmeasure, eloquently advocated by Burke and desired by Pitt, was not\ncarried till 1829, and then under the threat of a revolution in Ireland.\nIn the meantime legal toleration had been extended to the Unitarians in\n1813, but they were not relieved from all disabilities till the forties.\nJews were not admitted to the full rights of citizenship till 1858.\n\nThe achievement of religious liberty in England in the nineteenth\ncentury has been mainly the work of Liberals. The Liberal\n\n[106] party has been moving towards the ultimate goal of complete\nsecularization and the separation of the Church from the State\u2014 the\nlogical results of Locke\u2019s theory of civil government. The\nDisestablishment of the Church in Ireland in 1869 partly realized this\nideal, and now more than forty years later the Liberal party is seeking\nto apply the principle to Wales. It is highly characteristic of English\npolitics and English psychology that the change should be carried out in\nthis piecemeal fashion. In the other countries of the British Empire the\nsystem of Separation prevails; there is no connection between the State\nand any sect; no Church is anything more than a voluntary society. But\nsecularization has advanced under the State Church system. It is enough\nto mention the Education Act of 1870 and the abolition of religious\ntests at Universities (1871). Other gains for freedom will be noticed\nwhen I come to speak in another chapter of the progress of rationalism.\n\nIf we compare the religious situation in France in the seventeenth with\nthat in the eighteenth century, it seems to be sharply contrasted with\nthe development in England. In England there was a great advance towards\nreligious liberty, in France there was a falling away. Until 1676 the\nFrench Protestants\n\n[107] (Huguenots) were tolerated; for the next hundred years they were\noutlaws. But the toleration, which their charter (the Edict of Nantes,\n1598) secured them, was of a limited kind. They were excluded, for\ninstance, from the army; they were excluded from Paris and other cities\nand districts. And the liberty which they enjoyed was confined to them;\nit was not granted to any other sect. The charter was faithfully\nmaintained by the two great Cardinals (Richelieu and Mazarin) who\ngoverned France under Louis XIII and Louis XIV, but when the latter\nassumed the active power in 1661 he began a series of laws against the\nProtestants which culminated in the revoking of the charter (1676) and\nthe beginning of a Protestant persecution.\n\nThe French clergy justified this policy by the notorious text \u201cCompel\nthem to come in,\u201d and appealed to St. Augustine. Their arguments evoked\na defence of toleration by Bayle, a French Protestant who had taken\nrefuge in Holland. It was entitled a Philosophical Commentary on the\ntext \u201cCompel them to come in\u201d (1686) and in importance stands beside\nLocke\u2019s work which was being composed at the same time. Many of the\narguments urged by the two writers are identical. They agreed, and for\nthe same reasons, in excluding Roman Catholics. The\n\n[108] most characteristic thing in Bayle\u2019s treatise is his sceptical\nargument that, even if it were a right principle to suppress error by\nforce, no truth is certain enough to justify us in applying the theory.\nWe shall see (next chapter) this eminent scholar\u2019s contribution to\nrationalism.\n\nThough there was an immense exodus of Protestants from France, Louis did\nnot succeed in his design of extirpating heresy from his lands. In the\neighteenth century, under Louis XV, the presence of Protestants was\ntolerated though they were outlaws; their marriages were not recognized\nas legal, and they were liable at any moment to persecution. About the\nmiddle of the century a literary agitation began, conducted mainly by\nrationalists, but finally supported by enlightened Catholics, to relieve\nthe affliction of the oppressed sect. It resulted at last in an Edict of\nToleration (1787), which made the position of the Protestants endurable,\nthough it excluded them from certain careers.\n\nThe most energetic and forceful leader in the campaign against\nintolerance was Voltaire (see next chapter), and his exposure of some\nglaring cases of unjust persecution did more than general arguments to\nachieve the object. The most infamous case was that of Jean Calas, a\nProtestant merchant of Toulouse, whose son committed suicide. A report\n\n[109] was set abroad that the young man had decided to join the Catholic\nChurch, and that his father, mother, and brother, filled with Protestant\nbigotry, killed him, with the help of a friend. They were all put in\nirons, tried, and condemned, though there were no arguments for their\nguilt, except the conjecture of bigotry. Jean Calas was broken on the\nwheel, his son and daughter cast into convents, his wife left to starve.\nThrough the activity of Voltaire, then living near Geneva, the widow was\ninduced to go to Paris, where she was kindly received, and assisted by\neminent lawyers; a judicial inquiry was made; the Toulouse sentence was\nreversed and the King granted pensions to those who had suffered. This\nscandal could only have happened in the provinces, according to\nVoltaire: \u201cat Paris,\u201d he says, \u201cfanaticism, powerful though it may be,\nis always controlled by reason.\u201d\n\nThe case of Sirven, though it did not end tragically, was similar, and\nthe government of Toulouse was again responsible. He was accused of\nhaving drowned his daughter in a well to hinder her from becoming a\nCatholic, and was, with his wife, sentenced to death. Fortunately he and\nhis family had escaped to Switzerland, where they persuaded Voltaire of\ntheir innocence. To get the sentence reversed was the work of nine\nyears, and this\n\n[110] time it was reversed at Toulouse. When Voltaire visited Paris in\n1778 he was acclaimed by crowds as the \u201cdefender of Calas and the\nSirvens.\u201d His disinterested practical activity against persecution was\nof far more value than the treatise on Toleration which he wrote in\nconnexion with the Calas episode. It is a poor work compared with those\nof Locke and Bayle. The tolerance which he advocates is of a limited\nkind; he would confine public offices and dignities to those who belong\nto the State religion.\n\nBut if Voltaire\u2019s system of toleration is limited, it is wide compared\nwith the religious establishment advocated by his contemporary,\nRousseau. Though of Swiss birth, Rousseau belongs to the literature and\nhistory of France; but it was not for nothing that he was brought up in\nthe traditions of Calvinistic Geneva. His ideal State would, in its way,\nhave been little better than any theocracy. He proposed to establish a\n\u201ccivil religion\u201d which was to be a sort of undogmatic Christianity. But\ncertain dogmas, which he considered essential, were to be imposed on all\ncitizens on pain of banishment. Such were the existence of a deity, the\nfuture bliss of the good and punishment of the bad, the duty of\ntolerance towards all those who accepted the fundamental\n\n[111] articles of faith. It may be said that a State founded on this\nbasis would be fairly inclusive\u2014that all Christian sects and many deists\ncould find a place in it. But by imposing indispensable beliefs, it\ndenies the principle of toleration. The importance of Rousseau\u2019s idea\nlies in the fact that it inspired one of the experiments in religious\npolicy which were made during the French Revolution.\n\nThe Revolution established religious liberty in France. Most of the\nleaders were unorthodox. Their rationalism was naturally of the\neighteenth-century type, and in the preamble to the Declaration of\nRights (1789) deism was asserted by the words \u201cin the presence and under\nthe auspices of the Supreme Being\u201d (against which only one voice\nprotested). The Declaration laid down that no one was to be vexed on\naccount of his religious opinions provided he did not thereby trouble\npublic order. Catholicism was retained as the \u201cdominant\u201d religion;\nProtestants (but not Jews) were admitted to public office. Mirabeau, the\ngreatest statesman of the day, protested strongly against the use of\nwords like \u201ctolerance\u201d and \u201cdominant.\u201d He said: \u201cThe most unlimited\nliberty of religion is in my eyes a right so sacred that to express it\nby the word \u2018toleration\u2019 seems to me itself a sort of tyranny,\n\n[112] since the authority which tolerates might also not tolerate.\u201d The\nsame protest was made in Thomas Paine\u2019s Rights of Man which appeared two\nyears later: \u201cToleration is not the opposite of Intolerance, but is the\ncounterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes itself the right\nof withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it.\u201d\nPaine was an ardent deist, and he added: \u201cWere a bill brought into any\nparliament, entitled \u2018An Act to tolerate or grant liberty to the\nAlmighty to receive the worship of a Jew or a Turk,\u2019 or \u2018to prohibit the\nAlmighty from receiving it,\u2019 all men would startle and call it\nblasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in\nreligious matters would then present itself unmasked.\u201d\n\nThe Revolution began well, but the spirit of Mirabeau was not in the\nascendant throughout its course. The vicissitudes in religious policy\nfrom 1789 to 1801 have a particular interest, because they show that the\nprinciple of liberty of conscience was far from possessing the minds of\nthe men who were proud of abolishing the intolerance of the government\nwhich they had overthrown. The State Church was reorganized by the Civil\nConstitution of the Clergy (1790), by which French citizens were\nforbidden to acknowledge the authority of the Pope and\n\n[113] the appointment of Bishops was transferred to the Electors of the\nDepartments, so that the commanding influence passed from the Crown to\nthe nation. Doctrine and worship were not touched. Under the democratic\nRepublic which succeeded the fall of the monarchy (1792\u20135) this\nConstitution was maintained, but a movement to dechristianize France was\ninaugurated, and the Commune of Paris ordered the churches of all\nreligions to be closed. The worship of Reason, with rites modelled on\nthe Catholic, was organized in Paris and the provinces. The government,\nviolently anti-Catholic, did not care to use force against the prevalent\nfaith; direct persecution would have weakened the national defence and\nscandalized Europe. They na\u00efvely hoped that the superstition would\ndisappear by degrees. Robespierre declared against the policy of\nunchristianizing France, and when he had the power (April, 1795), he\nestablished as a State religion the worship of the Supreme Being. \u201cThe\nFrench people recognizes the existence of the Supreme Being and the\nimmortality of the Soul\u201d; the liberty of other cults was maintained.\nThus, for a few months, Rousseau\u2019s idea was more or less realized. It\nmeant intolerance. Atheism was regarded as a vice, and \u201call were\natheists who did not think like Robespierre.\u201d\n\n[114]\n\nThe democratic was succeeded by the middle-class Republic (1795\u20139), and\nthe policy of its government was to hinder the preponderance of any one\nreligious group; to hold the balance among all the creeds, but with a\ncertain partiality against the strongest, the Catholic, which\nthreatened, as was thought, to destroy the others or even the Republic.\nThe plan was to favour the growth of new rationalistic cults, and to\nundermine revealed religion by a secular system of education.\nAccordingly the Church was separated from the State by the Constitution\nof 1795, which affirmed the liberty of all worship and withdrew from the\nCatholic clergy the salaries which the State had hitherto paid. The\nelementary schools were laicized. The Declaration of Rights, the\narticles of the Constitution, and republican morality were taught\ninstead of religion. An enthusiast declared that \u201cthe religion of\nSocrates, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero would soon be the religion of the\nworld.\u201d\n\nA new rationalistic religion was introduced under the name of\nTheophilanthropy. It was the \u201cnatural religion\u201d of the philosophers and\npoets of the century, of Voltaire and the English deists\u2014not the\npurified Christianity of Rousseau, but anterior and superior to\nChristianity. Its doctrines, briefly formulated,\n\n[115] were: God, immortality, fraternity, humanity; no attacks on other\nreligions, but respect and honour towards all; gatherings in a family,\nor in a temple, to encourage one another to practise morality. Protected\nby the government sometimes secretly, sometimes openly, it had a certain\nsuccess among the cultivated classes.\n\nThe idea of the lay State was popularized under this rule, and by the\nend of the century there was virtually religious peace in France. Under\nthe Consulate (from 1799) the same system continued, but Napoleon ceased\nto protect Theophilanthropy. In 1801, though there seems to have been\nlittle discontent with the existing arrangement, Napoleon decided to\nupset it and bring the Pope upon the scene. The Catholic religion, as\nthat of the majority, was again taken under the special protection of\nthe State, the salaries of the clergy again paid by the nation, and the\nPapal authority over the Church again recognized within well-defined\nlimits; while full toleration of other religions was maintained. This\nwas the effect of the Concordat between the French Republic and the\nPope. It is the judgment of a high authority that the nation, if it had\nbeen consulted, would have pronounced against the change. It may be\ndoubted whether this is true. But Napoleon\u2019s policy\n\n[116] seems to have been prompted by the calculation that, using the\nPope as an instrument, he could control the consciences of men, and more\neasily carry out his plans of empire.\n\nApart from its ecclesiastical policies and its experiments in new creeds\nbased on the principles of rationalistic thinkers, the French Revolution\nitself has an interest, in connexion with our subject, as an example of\nthe coercion of reason by an intolerant faith.\n\nThe leaders believed that, by applying certain principles, they could\nregenerate France and show the world how the lasting happiness of\nmankind can be secured. They acted in the name of reason, but their\nprinciples were articles of faith, which were accepted just as blindly\nand irrationally as the dogmas of any supernatural creed. One of these\ndogmas was the false doctrine of Rousseau that man is a being who is\nnaturally good and loves justice and order. Another was the illusion\nthat all men are equal by nature. The puerile conviction prevailed that\nlegislation could completely blot out the past and radically transform\nthe character of a society. \u201cLiberty, equality, and fraternity\u201d was as\nmuch a creed as the Creed of the Apostles; it hypnotized men\u2019s minds\nlike a revelation from on high; and reason had as little part in its\npropagation as in the spread\n\n[117] of Christianity or of Protestantism. It meant anything but\nequality, fraternity, or liberty, especially liberty, when it was\ntranslated into action by the fanatical apostles of \u201cReason,\u201d who were\nblind to the facts of human nature and defied the facts of econnomics.\nTerror, the usual instrument in propagating religions, was never more\nmercilessly applied. Any one who questioned the doctrines was a heretic\nand deserved a heretic\u2019s fate. And, as in most religious movements, the\nmilder and less unreasonable spirits succumbed to the fanatics. Never\nwas the name of reason more grievously abused than by those who believed\nthey were inaugurating her reign.\n\nReligious liberty, however, among other good things, did emerge from the\nRevolution, at first in the form of Separation, and then under the\nConcordat. The Concordat lasted for more than a century, under\nmonarchies and republics, till it was abolished in December, 1905, when\nthe system of Separation was introduced again.\n\nIn the German States the history of religious liberty differs in many\nways, but it resembles the development in France in so far as toleration\nin a limited form was at first brought about by war. The Thirty Years\u2019\nWar, which divided Germany in the first half\n\n[118] of the seventeenth century, and in which, as in the English Civil\nWar, religion and politics were mixed, was terminated by the Peace of\nWestphalia (1648). By this act, three religions, the Catholic, the\nLutheran, and the Reformed [4] were legally recognized by the Holy Roman\nEmpire, and placed on an equality; all other religious were excluded.\nBut it was left to each of the German States, of which the Empire\nconsisted, to tolerate or not any religion it pleased. That is, every\nprince could impose on his subjects whichever of the three religions he\nchose, and refuse to tolerate the others in his territory. But he might\nalso admit one or both of the others, and he might allow the followers\nof other creeds to reside in his dominion, and practise their religion\nwithin the precincts of their own houses. Thus toleration varied, from\nState to State, according to the policy of each particular prince.\n\nAs elsewhere, so in Germany, considerations of political expediency\npromoted the growth of toleration, especially in Prussia; and as\nelsewhere, theoretical advocates exercised great influence on public\nopinion. But the case for toleration was based by its German defenders\nchiefly on legal, not, as in\n\n[119] England and France, on moral and intellectual grounds. They\nregarded it as a question of law, and discussed it from the point of\nview of the legal relations between State and Church. It had been\nconsidered long ago from this standpoint by an original Italian thinker,\nMarsilius of Padua (thirteenth century), who had maintained that the\nChurch had no power to employ physical coercion, and that if the lay\nauthority punished heretics, the punishment was inflicted for the\nviolation not of divine ordinances but of the law of the State, which\nexcluded heretics from its territory.\n\nChristian Thomasius may be taken as a leading exponent of the theory\nthat religious liberty logically follows from a right conception of law.\nHe laid down in a series of pamphlets (1693\u20131697) that the prince, who\nalone has the power of coercion, has no right to interfere in spiritual\nmatters, while the clergy step beyond their province if they interfere\nin secular matters or defend their faith by any other means than\nteaching. But the secular power has no legal right to coerce heretics\nunless heresy is a crime. And heresy is not a crime, but an error; for\nit is not a matter of will. Thomasius, moreover, urges the view that the\npublic welfare has nothing to gain from unity of faith, that it makes no\n\n[120] difference what faith a man professes so long as he is loyal to\nthe State. His toleration indeed is not complete. He was much influenced\nby the writings of his contemporary Locke, and he excepts from the\nbenefit of toleration the same classes which Locke excepted.\n\nBesides the influence of the jurists, we may note that the Pietistic\nmovement\u2014a reaction of religious enthusiasm against the formal theology\nof the Lutheran divines\u2014was animated by a spirit favourable to\ntoleration; and that the cause was promoted by the leading men of\nletters, especially by Lessing, in the second half of the eighteenth\ncentury.\n\nBut perhaps the most important fact of all in hastening the realization\nof religious liberty in Germany was the accession of a rationalist to\nthe throne of Prussia, in the person of Frederick the Great. A few\nmonths after his accession (1740) he wrote in the margin of a State\npaper, in which a question of religious policy occurred, that every one\nshould be allowed to get to heaven in his own way. His view that\nmorality was independent of religion and therefore compatible with all\nreligions, and that thus a man could be a good citizen\u2014the only thing\nwhich the State was entitled to demand\u2014whatever faith he might profess,\nled to the logical consequence of complete religious liberty. Catholics\n\n[121] were placed on an equality with Protestants, and the Treaty of\nWestphalia was violated by the extension of full toleration to all the\nforbidden sects. Frederick even conceived the idea of introducing\nMohammedan settlers into some parts of his realm. Contrast England under\nGeorge III, France under Louis XV, Italy under the shadow of the Popes.\nIt is an important fact in history, which has hardly been duly\nemphasized, that full religious liberty was for the first time, in any\ncountry in modern Europe, realized under a free-thinking ruler, the\nfriend of the great \u201cblasphemer\u201d Voltaire.\n\nThe policy and principles of Frederick were formulated in the Prussian\nTerritorial Code of 1794, by which unrestricted liberty of conscience\nwas guaranteed, and the three chief religions, the Lutheran, the\nReformed, and the Catholic, were placed on the same footing and enjoyed\nthe same privileges. The system is \u201cjurisdictional\u201d; only, three\nChurches here occupy the position which the Anglican Church alone\noccupies in England. The rest of Germany did not begin to move in the\ndirection pointed out by Prussia until, by one of the last acts of the\nHoly Roman Empire (1803), the Westphalian settlement had been modified.\nBefore the foundation of the new Empire (1870), freedom was established\nthroughout Germany.\n\n[122]\n\nIn Austria, the Emperor Joseph II issued an Edict of Toleration in 1781,\nwhich may be considered a broad measure for a Catholic State at that\ntime. Joseph was a sincere Catholic, but he was not impervious to the\nenlightened ideas of his age; he was an admirer of Frederick, and his\nedict was prompted by a genuinely tolerant spirit, such as had not\ninspired the English Act of 1689. It extended only to the Lutheran and\nReformed sects and the communities of the Greek Church which had entered\ninto union with Rome, and it was of a limited kind. Religious liberty\nwas not established till 1867.\n\nThe measure of Joseph applied to the Austrian States in Italy, and\nhelped to prepare that country for the idea of religious freedom. It is\nnotable that in Italy in the eighteenth century toleration found its\nadvocate, not in a rationalist or a philosopher, but in a Catholic\necclesiastic, Tamburinni, who (under the name of his friend\nTrautmansdorf) published a work On Ecclesiastical and Civil Toleration\n(1783). A sharp line is drawn between the provinces of the Church and\nthe State, persecution and the Inquisition are condemned, coercion of\nconscience is declared inconsistent with the Christian spirit, and the\nprinciple is laid down that the sovran should only exercise coercion\nwhere\n\n[123] the interests of public safety are concerned. Like Locke, the\nauthor thinks that atheism is a legitimate case for such coercion.\n\nThe new States which Napoleon set up in Italy exhibited toleration in\nvarious degrees, but real liberty was first introduced in Piedmont by\nCavour (1848), a measure which prepared the way for the full liberty\nwhich was one of the first-fruits of the foundation of the Italian\nkingdom in 1870. The union of Italy, with all that it meant, is the most\nsignal and dramatic act in the triumph of the ideas of the modern State\nover the traditional principles of the Christian Church. Rome, which\npreserved those principles most faithfully, has offered a steadfast, we\nmay say a heroic, resistance to the liberal ideas which swept Europe in\nthe nineteenth century. The guides of her policy grasped thoroughly the\ndanger which liberal thought meant for an institution which, founded in\na remote past, claimed to be unchangeable and never out of date. Gregory\nXVI issued a solemn protest maintaining authority against freedom, the\nmediaeval against the modern ideal, in an Encyclical Letter (1832),\nwhich was intended as a rebuke to some young French Catholics (Lamennais\nand his friends) who had conceived the promising idea of transforming\nthe Church by the Liberal spirit\n\n[124] of the day. The Pope denounces \u201cthe absurd and erroneous maxim, or\nrather insanity, that liberty of conscience should be procured and\nguaranteed to every one. The path to this pernicious error is prepared\nby that full and unlimited liberty of thought which is spread abroad to\nthe misfortune of Church and State and which certain persons, with\nexcessive impudence, venture to represent as an advantage for religion.\nHence comes the corruption of youth, contempt for religion and for the\nmost venerable laws, and a general mental change in the world\u2014in short\nthe most deadly scourge of society; since the experience of history has\nshown that the States which have shone by their wealth and power and\nglory have perished just by this evil\u2014 immoderate freedom of opinion,\nlicence of conversation, and love of novelties. With this is connected\nthe liberty of publishing any writing of any kind. This is a deadly and\nexecrable liberty for which we cannot feel sufficient horror, though\nsome men dare to acclaim it noisily and enthusiastically.\u201d A generation\nlater Pius IX was to astonish the world by a similar manifesto\u2014his\nSyllabus of Modern Errors (1864). Yet, notwithstanding the fundamental\nantagonism between the principles of the Church and the drift of modern\ncivilization, the Papacy survives,\n\n[125] powerful and respected, in a world where the ideas which it\ncondemned have become the commonplace conditions of life.\n\nThe progress of Western nations from the system of unity which prevailed\nin the fifteenth, to the system of liberty which was the rule in the\nnineteenth century, was slow and painful, illogical and wavering,\ngenerally dictated by political necessities, seldom inspired by\ndeliberate conviction. We have seen how religious liberty has been\nrealized, so far as the law is concerned, under two distinct systems,\n\u201cJurisdiction\u201d and \u201cSeparation.\u201d But legal toleration may coexist with\nmuch practical intolerance, and liberty before the law is compatible\nwith serious disabilities of which the law cannot take account. For\ninstance, the expression of unorthodox opinions may exclude a man from\nobtaining a secular post or hinder his advancement. The question has\nbeen asked, which of the two systems is more favourable to the creation\nof a tolerant social atmosphere? Ruffini (of whose excellent work on\nReligious Liberty I have made much use in this chapter) decides in\nfavour of Jurisdiction. He points out that while Socinus, a true friend\nof liberty of thought, contemplated this system, the Anabaptists, whose\nspirit was intolerant, sought Separation. More important\n\n[126] is the observation that in Germany, England, and Italy, where the\nmost powerful Church or Churches are under the control of the State,\nthere is more freedom, more tolerance of opinion, than in many of the\nAmerican States where Separation prevails. A hundred years ago the\nAmericans showed appalling ingratitude to Thomas Paine, who had done\nthem eminent service in the War of Independence, simply because he\npublished a very unorthodox book. It is notorious that free thought is\nstill a serious hindrance and handicap to an American, even in most of\nthe Universities. This proves that Separation is not an infallible\nreceipt for producing tolerance. But I see no reason to suppose that\npublic opinion in America would be different, if either the Federal\nRepublic or the particular States had adopted Jurisdiction. Given legal\nliberty under either system, I should say that the tolerance of public\nopinion depends on social conditions and especially on the degree of\nculture among the educated classes.\n\nFrom this sketch it will be seen that toleration was the outcome of new\npolitical circumstances and necessities, brought about by the disunion\nof the Church through the Reformation. But it meant that in those States\nwhich granted toleration the opinion of\n\n[127] a sufficiently influential group of the governing class was ripe\nfor the change, and this new mental attitude was in a great measure due\nto the scepticism and rationalism which were diffused by the Renaissance\nmovement, and which subtly and unconsciously had affected the minds of\nmany who were sincerely devoted to rigidly orthodox beliefs; so\neffective is the force of suggestion. In the next two chapters the\nadvance of reason at the expense of faith will be traced through the\nseventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.\n\n[1] Translated by Lecky.\n\n[2] Complete toleration was established by Penn in the Quaker Colony of\nPennsylvania in 1682.\n\n[3] Especially Chillingworth\u2019s Religion of Protestants (1637), and\nJeremy Taylor\u2019s Liberty of Prophesying (1646).\n\n[4] The Reformed Church consists of the followers of Calvin and Zwingli.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE GROWTH OF RATIONALISM\n\n(SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES)\n\nDURING the last three hundred years reason has been slowly but steadily\ndestroying Christian mythology and exposing the pretensions of\nsupernatural revelation. The progress of rationalism falls naturally\ninto two periods. (1) In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries those\nthinkers who rejected Christian theology and the book on which it relies\nwere mainly influenced by the inconsistencies, contradictions, and\nabsurdities which they discovered in the evidence, and by the moral\n\n[128] difficulties of the creed. Some scientific facts were known which\nseemed to reflect on the accuracy of Revelation, but arguments based on\nscience were subsidiary. (2) In the nineteenth century the discoveries\nof science in many fields bore with full force upon fabrics which had\nbeen constructed in a na\u00efve and ignorant age; and historical criticism\nundermined methodically the authority of the sacred documents which had\nhitherto been exposed chiefly to the acute but unmethodical criticisms\nof common sense.\n\nA disinterested love of facts, without any regard to the bearing which\nthose facts may have on one\u2019s hopes or fears or destiny, is a rare\nquality in all ages, and it had been very rare indeed since the ancient\ndays of Greece and Rome. It means the scientific spirit. Now in the\nseventeenth century we may say (without disrespect to a few precursors)\nthat the modern study of natural science began, and in the same period\nwe have a series of famous thinkers who were guided by a disinterested\nlove of truth. Of the most acute minds some reached the conclusion that\nthe Christian scheme of the world is irrational, and according to their\ntemperament some rejected it, whilst others, like the great Frenchman\nPascal, fell back upon an unreasoning act of faith. Bacon, who professed\n\n[129] orthodoxy, was perhaps at heart a deist, but in any case the whole\nspirit of his writings was to exclude authority from the domain of\nscientific investigation which he did so much to stimulate. Descartes,\nillustrious not only as the founder of modern metaphysics but also by\nhis original contributions to science, might seek to conciliate the\necclesiastical authorities\u2014his temper was timid\u2014 but his philosophical\nmethod was a powerful incentive to rationalistic thought. The general\ntendency of superior intellects was to exalt reason at the expense of\nauthority; and in England this principle was established so firmly by\nLocke, that throughout the theological warfare of the eighteenth century\nboth parties relied on reason, and no theologian of repute assumed faith\nto be a higher faculty.\n\nA striking illustration of the gradual encroachments of reason is the\nchange which was silently wrought in public opinion on the subject of\nwitchcraft. The famous efforts of James I to carry out the Biblical\ncommand, \u201cThou shalt not suffer a witch to live,\u201d were outdone by the\nzeal of the Puritans under the Commonwealth to suppress the wicked old\nwomen who had commerce with Satan. After the Restoration, the belief in\nwitchcraft declined among educated people\u2014though\n\n[130] some able writers maintained it\u2014and there were few executions. The\nlast trial of a witch was in 1712, when some clergymen in Hertfordshire\nprosecuted Jane Wenham. The jury found her guilty, but the judge, who\nhad summed up in her favour, was able to procure the remission of her\nsentence; and the laws against witchcraft were repealed in 1735. John\nWesley said with perfect truth that to disbelieve in witchcraft is to\ndisbelieve in the Bible. In France and in Holland the decline of belief\nand interest in this particular form of Satan\u2019s activity was\nsimultaneous. In Scotland, where theology was very powerful, a woman was\nburnt in 1722. It can be no mere coincidence that the general decline of\nthis superstition belongs to the age which saw the rise of modern\nscience and modern philosophy.\n\nHobbes, who was perhaps the most brilliant English thinker of the\nseventeenth century, was a freethinker and materialist. He had come\nunder the influence of his friend the French philosopher Gassendi, who\nhad revived materialism in its Epicurean shape. Yet he was a champion\nnot of freedom of conscience but of coercion in its most uncompromising\nform. In the political theory which he expounded in Leviathan, the\nsovran has autocratic power in the domain of doctrine,\n\n[131] as in everything else, and it is the duty of subjects to conform\nto the religion which the sovran imposes. Religious persecution is thus\ndefended, but no independent power is left to the Church. But the\nprinciples on which Hobbes built up his theory were rationalistic. He\nseparated morality from religion and identified \u201cthe true moral\nphilosophy\u201d with the \u201ctrue doctrine of the laws of nature.\u201d What he\nreally thought of religion could be inferred from his remark that the\nfanciful fear of things invisible (due to ignorance) is the natural seed\nof that feeling which, in himself, a man calls religion, but, in those\nwho fear or worship the invisible power differently, superstition. In\nthe reign of Charles II Hobbes was silenced and his books were burned.\n\nSpinoza, the Jewish philosopher of Holland, owed a great deal to\nDescartes and (in political speculation) to Hobbes, but his philosophy\nmeant a far wider and more open breach with orthodox opinion than either\nof his masters had ventured on. He conceived ultimate reality, which he\ncalled God, as an absolutely perfect, impersonal Being, a substance\nwhose nature is constituted by two \u201cattributes\u201d\u2014 thought and spatial\nextension. When Spinoza speaks of love of God, in which he considered\nhappiness to consist, he means knowledge\n\n[132] and contemplation of the order of nature, including human nature,\nwhich is subject to fixed, invariable laws. He rejects free-will and the\n\u201csuperstition,\u201d as he calls it, of final causes in nature. If we want to\nlabel his philosophy, we may say that it is a form of pantheism. It has\noften been described as atheism. If atheism means, as I suppose in\nordinary use it is generally taken to mean, rejection of a personal God,\nSpinoza was an atheist. It should be observed that in the seventeenth\nand eighteenth centuries atheist was used in the wildest way as a term\nof abuse for freethinkers, and when we read of atheists (except in\ncareful writers) we may generally assume that the persons so stigmatized\nwere really deists, that is, they believed in a personal God but not in\nRevelation. [1]\n\nSpinoza\u2019s daring philosophy was not in harmony with the general trend of\nspeculation at the time, and did not exert any profound influence on\nthought till a much later period. The thinker whose writings appealed\nmost to the men of his age and were most opportune and effective was\nJohn Locke, who professed more or less orthodox Anglicanism. His great\ncontribution to philosophy is equivalent to a very powerful defence\n\n[133] of reason against the usurpations of authority. The object of his\nEssay on the Human Understanding (1690) is to show that all knowledge is\nderived from experience. He subordinated faith completely to reason.\nWhile he accepted the Christian revelation, he held that revelation if\nit contradicted the higher tribunal of reason must be rejected, and that\nrevelation cannot give us knowledge as certain as the knowledge which\nreason gives. \u201cHe that takes away reason to make room for revelation\nputs out the light of both; and does much what the same as if he would\npersuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote\nlight of an invisible star by a telescope.\u201d He wrote a book to show that\nthe Christian revelation is not contrary to reason, and its title, The\nReasonableness of Christianity, sounds the note of all religious\ncontroversy in England during the next hundred years. Both the orthodox\nand their opponents warmly agreed that reasonableness was the only test\nof the claims of revealed religion. It was under the direct influence of\nLocke that Toland, an Irishman who had been converted from Roman\nCatholicism, composed a sensational book, Christianity Not Mysterious\n(1696). He assumes that Christianity is true and argues that there can\nbe no mysteries in it, because mysteries, that\n\n[134] is, unintelligible dogmas, cannot be accepted by reason. And if a\nreasonable Deity gave a revelation, its purpose must be to enlighten,\nnot to puzzle. The assumption of the truth of Christianity was a mere\npretence, as an intelligent reader could not fail to see. The work was\nimportant because it drew the logical inference from Locke\u2019s philosophy,\nand it had a wide circulation. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu met a Turkish\nEffendi at Belgrade who asked her for news of Mr. Toland.\n\nIt is characteristic of this stage of the struggle between reason and\nauthority that (excepting the leading French thinkers in the eighteenth\ncentury) the rationalists, who attacked theology, generally feigned to\nacknowledge the truth of the ideas which they were assailing. They\npretended that their speculations did not affect religion; they could\nseparate the domains of reason and of faith; they could show that\nRevelation was superfluous without questioning it; they could do homage\nto orthodoxy and lay down views with which orthodoxy was irreconcilable.\nThe errors which they exposed in the sphere of reason were ironically\nallowed to be truths in the sphere of theology. The mediaeval principle\nof double truth and other shifts were resorted to, in self-protection\n\n[135] against the tyranny of orthodoxy\u2014though they did not always avail;\nand in reading much of the rationalistic literature of this period we\nhave to read between the lines. Bayle is an interesting instance.\n\nIf Locke\u2019s philosophy, by setting authority in its place and deriving\nall knowledge from experience, was a powerful aid to rationalism, his\ncontemporary Bayle worked in the same direction by the investigation of\nhistory. Driven from France (see above, p. 107), he lived at Amsterdam,\nwhere he published his Philosophical Dictionary. He was really a\nfreethinker, but he never dropped the disguise of orthodoxy, and this\nlends a particular piquancy to his work. He takes a delight in\nmarshalling all the objections which heretics had made to essential\nChristian dogmas. He exposed without mercy the crimes and brutalities of\nDavid, and showed that this favourite of the Almighty was a person with\nwhom one would refuse to shake hands. There was a great outcry at this\nunedifying candour. Bayle, in replying, adopted the attitude of\nMontaigne and Pascal, and opposed faith to reason.\n\nThe theological virtue of faith, he said, consists in believing revealed\ntruths simply and solely on God\u2019s authority. If you believe in the\nimmortality of the soul for\n\n[136] philosophical reasons, you are orthodox, but you have no part in\nfaith. The merit of faith becomes greater, in proportion as the revealed\ntruth surpasses all the powers of our mind; the more incomprehensible\nthe truth and the more repugnant to reason, the greater is the sacrifice\nwe make in accepting it, the deeper our submission to God. Therefore a\nmerciless inventory of the objections which reason has to urge against\nfundamental doctrines serves to exalt the merits of faith.\n\nThe Dictionary was also criticized for the justice done to the moral\nexcellencies of persons who denied the existence of God. Bayle replies\nthat if he had been able to find any atheistical thinkers who lived bad\nlives, he would have been delighted to dwell on their vices, but he knew\nof none such. As for the criminals you meet in history, whose abominable\nactions make you tremble, their impieties and blasphemies prove they\nbelieved in a Divinity. This is a natural consequence of the theological\ndoctrine that the Devil, who is incapable of atheism, is the instigator\nof all the sins of men. For man\u2019s wickedness must clearly resemble that\nof the Devil and must therefore be joined to a belief in God\u2019s\nexistence, since the Devil is not an atheist. And is it not a proof of\nthe infinite wisdom of God that the worst criminals\n\n[137] are not atheists, and that most of the atheists whose names are\nrecorded have been honest men? By this arrangement Providence sets\nbounds to the corruption of man; for if atheism and moral wickedness\nwere united in the same persons, the societies of earth would be exposed\nto a fatal inundation of sin.\n\nThere was much more in the same vein; and the upshot was, under the thin\nveil of serving faith, to show that the Christian dogmas were\nessentially unreasonable.\n\nBayle\u2019s work, marked by scholarship and extraordinary learning, had a\ngreat influence in England as well as in France. It supplied weapons to\nassailants of Christianity in both countries. At first the assault was\ncarried on with most vigour and ability by the English deists, who,\nthough their writings are little read now, did memorable work by their\npolemic against the authority of revealed religion.\n\nThe controversy between the deists and their orthodox opponents turned\non the question whether the Deity of natural religion \u2014the God whose\nexistence, as was thought, could be proved by reason\u2014can be identified\nwith the author of the Christian revelation. To the deists this seemed\nimpossible. The nature of the alleged revelation seemed inconsistent\nwith the character\n\n[138] of the God to whom reason pointed. The defenders of revelation, at\nleast all the most competent, agreed with the deists in making reason\nsupreme, and through this reliance on reason some of them fell into\nheresies. Clarke, for instance, one of the ablest, was very unsound on\nthe dogma of the Trinity. It is also to be noticed that with both\nsections the interest of morality was the principal motive. The orthodox\nheld that the revealed doctrine of future rewards and punishments is\nnecessary for morality; the deists, that morality depends on reason\nalone, and that revelation contains a great deal that is repugnant to\nmoral ideals. Throughout the eighteenth century morality was the guiding\nconsideration with Anglican Churchmen, and religious emotion, finding no\nsatisfaction within the Church, was driven, as it were, outside, and\nsought an outlet in the Methodism of Wesley and Whitefield.\n\nSpinoza had laid down the principle that Scripture must be interpreted\nlike any other book (1670), [2] and with the deists this principle was\nfundamental. In order to avoid persecution they generally veiled their\nconclusions\n\n[139] under sufficiently thin disguises. Hitherto the Press Licensing\nAct (1662) had very effectually prevented the publication of heterodox\nworks, and it is from orthodox works denouncing infidel opinions that we\nknow how rationalism was spreading. But in 1695, the Press Law was\nallowed to drop, and immediately deistic literature began to appear.\nThere was, however, the danger of prosecution under the Blasphemy laws.\nThere were three legal weapons for coercing those who attacked\nChristianity: (1) The Ecclesiastical Courts had and have the power of\nimprisoning for a maximum term of six months, for atheism, blasphemy,\nheresy, and damnable opinions. (2) The common law as interpreted by Lord\nChief Justice Hale in 1676, when a certain Taylor was charged with\nhaving said that religion was a cheat and blasphemed against Christ. The\naccused was condemned to a fine and the pillory by the Judge, who ruled\nthat the Court of King\u2019s Bench has jurisdiction in such a case, inasmuch\nas blasphemous words of the kind are an offence against the laws and the\nState, and to speak against Christianity is to speak in subversion of\nthe law, since Christianity is \u201cparcel of the laws of England.\u201d (3) The\nstatute of 1698 enacts that if any person educated in the Christian\nreligion \u201cshall by\n\n[140] writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking deny any one of\nthe persons in the Holy Trinity to be God, or shall assert or maintain\nthere are more gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be\ntrue, or shall deny the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to\nbe of divine authority,\u201d is convicted, he shall for the first offence be\nadjudged incapable to hold any public offices or employments, and on the\nsecond shall lose his civil rights and be imprisoned for three years.\nThis Statute expressly states as its motive the fact that \u201cmany persons\nhave of late years openly avowed and published many blasphemous and\nimpious opinions contrary to the doctrine and principles of the\nChristian religion.\u201d\n\nAs a matter of fact, most trials for blasphemy during the past two\nhundred years fall under the second head. But the new Statute of 1698\nwas very intimidating, and we can easily understand how it drove\nheterodox writers to ambiguous disguises. One of these disguises was\nallegorical interpretation of Scripture. They showed that literal\ninterpretation led to absurdities or to inconsistencies with the wisdom\nand justice of God, and pretended to infer that allegorical\ninterpretation must be substituted. But they meant the reader to reject\ntheir pretended\n\n[141] solution and draw a conclusion damaging to Revelation.\n\nAmong the arguments used in favour of the truth of Revelation the\nfulfilment of prophecies and the miracles of the New Testament were\nconspicuous. Anthony Collins, a country gentleman who was a disciple of\nLocke, published in 1733 his Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the\nChristian Religion, in which he drastically exposed the weakness of the\nevidence for fulfilment of prophecy, depending as it does on forced and\nunnatural figurative interpretations. Twenty years before he had written\na Discourse of Free-thinking (in which Bayle\u2019s influence is evident)\npleading for free discussion and the reference of all religious\nquestions to reason. He complained of the general intolerance which\nprevailed; but the same facts which testify to intolerance testify also\nto the spread of unbelief.\n\nCollins escaped with comparative impunity, but Thomas Woolston, a Fellow\nof Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, who wrote six aggressive Discourses\non the Miracles of our Saviour (1727\u20141730) paid the penalty for his\naudacity. Deprived of his Fellowship, he was prosecuted for libel, and\nsentenced to a fine of \u00a3100 and a year\u2019s imprisonment. Unable to pay, he\ndied in prison. He does\n\n[142] not adopt the line of arguing that miracles are incredible or\nimpossible. He examines the chief miracles related in the Gospels, and\nshows with great ability and shrewd common sense that they are absurd or\nunworthy of the performer. He pointed out, as Huxley was to point out in\na controversy with Gladstone, that the miraculous driving of devils into\na herd of swine was an unwarrantable injury to somebody\u2019s property. On\nthe story of the Divine blasting of the fig tree, he remarks: \u201cWhat if a\nyeoman of Kent should go to look for pippins in his orchard at Easter\n(the supposed time that Jesus sought for these figs) and because of a\ndisappointment cut down his trees? What then would his neighbours make\nof him? Nothing less than a laughing-stock; and if the story got into\nour Publick News, he would be the jest and ridicule of mankind.\u201d\n\nOr take his comment on the miracle of the Pool of Bethesda, where an\nangel used to trouble the waters and the man who first entered the pool\nwas cured of his infirmity. \u201cAn odd and a merry way of conferring a\nDivine mercy. And one would think that the angels of God did this for\ntheir own diversion more than to do good to mankind. Just as some throw\na bone among a kennel of hounds for the pleasure of seeing them\n\n[143] quarrel for it, or as others cast a piece of money among a company\nof boys for the sport of seeing them scramble for it, so was the pastime\nof the angels here.\u201d In dealing with the healing of the woman who\nsuffered from a bloody flux, he asks: \u201cWhat if we had been told of the\nPope\u2019s curing an haemorrhage like this before us, what would Protestants\nhave said to it? Why, \u2018that a foolish, credulous, and superstitious\nwoman had fancied herself cured of some slight indisposition, and the\ncrafty Pope and his adherents, aspiring after popular applause,\nmagnified the presumed cure into a miracle.\u2019 The application of such a\nsupposed story of a miracle wrought by the Pope is easy; and if\nInfidels, Jews, and Mahometans, who have no better opinion of Jesus than\nwe have of the Pope, should make it, there\u2019s no help for it.\u201d\n\nWoolston professed no doubts of the inspiration of Scripture. While he\nargued that it was out of the question to suppose the miracles literally\ntrue, he pretended to believe in the fantastic theory that they were\nintended allegorically as figures of Christ\u2019s mysterious operations in\nthe soul of man. Origen, a not very orthodox Christian Father, had\nemployed the allegorical method, and Woolston quotes him in his favour.\nHis\n\n[144] vigorous criticisms vary in value, but many of them hit the nail\non the head, and the fashion of some modern critics to pass over\nWoolston\u2019s productions as unimportant because they are \u201cribald\u201d or\ncoarse, is perfectly unjust. The pamphlets had an enormous sale, and\nWoolston\u2019s notoriety is illustrated by the anecdote of the \u201cjolly young\nwoman\u201d who met him walking abroad and accosted him with \u201cYou old rogue,\nare you not hanged yet?\u201d Mr. Woolston answered, \u201cGood woman, I know you\nnot; pray what have I done to offend you?\u201d \u201cYou have writ against my\nSaviour,\u201d she said; \u201cwhat would become of my poor sinful soul if it was\nnot for my dear Saviour?\u201d\n\nAbout the same time, Matthew Tindal (a Fellow of All Souls) attacked\nRevelation from a more general point of view. In his Christianity as old\nas the Creation (1730) he undertook to show that the Bible as a\nrevelation is superfluous, for it adds nothing to natural religion,\nwhich God revealed to man from the very first by the sole light of\nreason. He argues that those who defend Revealed religion by its\nagreement with Natural religion, and thus set up a double government of\nreason and authority, fall between the two. \u201cIt \u2019s an odd jumble,\u201d he\nobserves, \u201cto prove the truth of a book by the truth\n\n[145] of the doctrines it contains, and at the same time conclude those\ndoctrines to be true because contained in that book.\u201d He goes on to\ncriticize the Bible in detail. In order to maintain its infallibility,\nwithout doing violence to reason, you have, when you find irrational\nstatements, to torture them and depart from the literal sense. Would you\nthink that a Mohammedan was governed by his Koran, who on all occasions\ndeparted from the literal sense? \u201cNay, would you not tell him that his\ninspired book fell infinitely short of Cicero\u2019s uninspired writings,\nwhere there is no such occasion to recede from the letter?\u201d\n\nAs to chronological and physical errors, which seemed to endanger the\ninfallibility of the Scriptures, a bishop had met the argument by\nsaying, reasonably enough, that in the Bible God speaks according to the\nconceptions of those to whom he speaks, and that it is not the business\nof Revelation to rectify their opinions in such matters. Tindal made\nthis rejoinder:\u2014\n\n\u201cIs there no difference between God\u2019s not rectifying men\u2019s sentiments in\nthose matters and using himself such sentiments as needs be rectified;\nor between God\u2019s not mending men\u2019s logic and rhetoric where \u2019t is\ndefective and using such himself; or between God\u2019s\n\n[146] not contradicting vulgar notions and confirming them by speaking\naccording to them? Can infinite wisdom despair of gaining or keeping\npeople\u2019s affections without having recourse to such mean acts?\u201d\n\nHe exposes with considerable effect the monstrosity of the doctrine of\nexclusive salvation. Must we not consider, he asks, whether one can be\nsaid to be sent as a Saviour of mankind, if he comes to shut Heaven\u2019s\ngate against those to whom, before he came, it was open provided they\nfollowed the dictates of their reason? He criticizes the inconsistency\nof the impartial and universal goodness of God, known to us by the light\nof nature, with acts committed by Jehovah or his prophets. Take the\ncases in which the order of nature is violated to punish men for crimes\nof which they were not guilty, such as Elijah\u2019s hindering rain from\nfalling for three years and a half. If God could break in upon the\nordinary rules of his providence to punish the innocent for the guilty,\nwe have no guarantee that if he deals thus with us in this life, he will\nnot act in the same way in the life to come, \u201csince if the eternal rules\nof justice are once broken how can we imagine any stop?\u201d But the ideals\nof holiness and justice in the Old Testament are strange indeed. The\nholier men\n\n[147] are represented to be, the more cruel they seem and the more\naddicted to cursing. How surprising to find the holy prophet Elisha\ncursing in the name of the Lord little children for calling him Bald-\npate! And, what is still more surprising, two she-bears immediately\ndevoured forty-two little children.\n\nI have remarked that theologians at this time generally took the line of\nbasing Christianity on reason and not on faith. An interesting little\nbook, Christianity not founded on Argument, couched in the form of a\nletter to a young gentleman at Oxford, by Henry Dodwell (Junior),\nappeared in 1741, and pointed out the dangers of such confidence in\nreason. It is an ironical development of the principle of Bayle, working\nout the thesis that Christianity is essentially unreasonable, and that\nif you want to believe, reasoning is fatal. The cultivation of faith and\nreasoning produce contrary effects; the philosopher is disqualified for\nDivine influences by his very progress in carnal wisdom; the Gospel must\nbe received with all the obsequious submission of a babe who has no\nother disposition but to learn his lesson. Christ did not propose his\ndoctrines to investigation; he did not lay the arguments for his mission\nbefore his disciples and give them time to consider\n\n[148] calmly of their force, and liberty to determine as their reason\nshould direct them; the apostles had no qualifications for the task,\nbeing the most artless and illiterate persons living. Dodwell exposes\nthe absurdity of the Protestant position. To give all men liberty to\njudge for themselves and to expect at the same time that they shall be\nof the Preacher\u2019s mind is such a scheme for unanimity as one would\nscarcely imagine any one could be weak enough to devise in speculation\nand much less that any could ever be found hardy enough to avow and\npropose it to practice. The men of Rome \u201cshall rise up in the judgment\n(of all considering persons) against this generation and shall condemn\nit; for they invented but the one absurdity of infallibility, and behold\na greater absurdity than infallibility is here.\u201d\n\nI have still to speak of the (Third) Earl of Shaftesbury, whose style\nhas rescued his writings from entire neglect. His special interest was\nethics. While the valuable work of most of the heterodox writers of this\nperiod lay in their destructive criticism of supernatural religion, they\nclung, as we have seen, to what was called natural religion\u2014 the belief\nin a kind and wise personal God, who created the world, governs it by\nnatural laws, and desires our happiness. The idea\n\n[149] was derived from ancient philosophers and had been revived by Lord\nHerbert of Cherbury in his Latin treatise On Truth (in the reign of\nJames I). The deists contended that this was a sufficient basis for\nmorality and that the Christian inducements to good behaviour were\nunnecessary. Shaftesbury in his Inquiry concerning Virtue (1699) debated\nthe question and argued that the scheme of heaven and hell, with the\nselfish hopes and fears which they inspire, corrupts morality and that\nthe only worthy motive for conduct is the beauty of virtue in itself. He\ndoes not even consider deism a necessary assumption for a moral code; he\nadmits that the opinion of atheists does not undermine ethics. But he\nthinks that the belief in a good governor of the universe is a powerful\nsupport to the practice of virtue. He is a thorough optimist, and is\nperfectly satisfied with the admirable adaptation of means to ends,\nwhereby it is the function of one animal to be food for another. He\nmakes no attempt to reconcile the red claws and teeth of nature with the\nbeneficence of its powerful artist. \u201cIn the main all things are kindly\nand well disposed.\u201d The atheist might have said that he preferred to be\nat the mercy of blind chance than in the hands of an autocrat who, if he\npleased Lord Shaftesbury\u2019s sense\n\n[150] of order, had created flies to be devoured by spiders. But this\nwas an aspect of the universe which did not much trouble thinkers in the\neighteenth century. On the other hand, the character of the God of the\nOld Testament roused Shaftesbury\u2019s aversion. He attacks Scripture not\ndirectly, but by allusion or with irony. He hints that if there is a\nGod, he would be less displeased with atheists than with those who\naccepted him in the guise of Jehovah. As Plutarch said, \u201cI had rather\nmen should say of me that there neither is nor ever was such a one as\nPlutarch, than they should say \u2018There was a Plutarch, an unsteady,\nchangeable, easily provokable and revengeful man.\u2019 \u201d Shaftesbury\u2019s\nsignificance is that he built up a positive theory of morals, and\nalthough it had no philosophical depth, his influence on French and\nGerman thinkers of the eighteenth century was immense.\n\nIn some ways perhaps the ablest of the deists, and certainly the most\nscholarly, was Rev. Conyers Middleton, who remained within the Church.\nHe supported Christianity on grounds of utility. Even if it is an\nimposture, he said, it would be wrong to destroy it. For it is\nestablished by law and it has a long tradition behind it. Some\ntraditional religion is necessary and it would\n\n[151] be hopeless to supplant Christianity by reason. But his writings\ncontain effective arguments which go to undermine Revelation. The most\nimportant was his Free Inquiry into Christian miracles (1748), which put\nin a new and dangerous light an old question: At what time did the\nChurch cease to have the power of performing miracles? We shall see\npresently how Gibbon applied Middleton\u2019s method.\n\nThe leading adversaries of the deists appealed, like them, to reason,\nand, in appealing to reason, did much to undermine authority. The ablest\ndefence of the faith, Bishop Butler\u2019s Analogy (1736), is suspected of\nhaving raised more doubts than it appeased. This was the experience of\nWilliam Pitt the Younger, and the Analogy made James Mill (the\nutilitarian) an unbeliever. The deists, argued that the unjust and cruel\nGod of Revelation could not be the God of nature; Butler pointed to\nnature and said, There you behold cruelty and injustice. The argument\nwas perfectly good against the optimism of Shaftesbury, but it plainly\nadmitted of the conclusion\u2014opposite to that which Butler wished to\nestablish\u2014that a just and beneficent God does not exist. Butler is\ndriven to fall back on the sceptical argument that we are extremely\nignorant; that all things\n\n[152] are possible, even eternal hell fire; and that therefore the safe\nand prudent course is to accept the Christian doctrine. It may be\nremarked that this reasoning, with a few modifications, could be used in\nfavour of other religions, at Mecca or at Timbuctoo. He has, in effect,\nrevived the argument used by Pascal that if there is one chance in any\nvery large number that Christianity is true, it is a man\u2019s interest to\nbe a Christian; for, if it prove false, it will do him no harm to have\nbelieved it; if it prove true, he will be infinitely the gainer. Butler\nseeks indeed to show that the chances in favour amount to a probability,\nbut his argument is essentially of the same intellectual and moral value\nas Pascal\u2019s. It has been pointed out that it leads by an easy logical\nstep from the Anglican to the Roman Church. Catholics and Protestants\n(as King Henry IV of France argued) agree that a Catholic may be saved;\nthe Catholics assert that a Protestant will be damned; therefore the\nsafe course is to embrace Catholicism. [3]\n\nI have dwelt at some length upon some of the English deists, because,\nwhile they occupy an important place in the history of\n\n[153] rationalism in England, they also supplied, along with Bayle, a\ngreat deal of the thought which, manipulated by brilliant writers on the\nother side of the Channel, captured the educated classes in France. We\nare now in the age of Voltaire. He was a convinced deist. He considered\nthat the nature of the universe proved that it was made by a conscious\narchitect, he held that God was required in the interests of conduct,\nand he ardently combated atheism. His great achievements were his\nefficacious labour in the cause of toleration, and his systematic\nwarfare against superstitions. He was profoundly influenced by English\nthinkers, especially Locke and Bolingbroke. This statesman had concealed\nhis infidelity during his lifetime except from his intimates; he had\nlived long as an exile in France; and his rationalistic essays were\npublished (1754) after his death. Voltaire, whose literary genius\nconverted the work of the English thinkers into a world-force, did not\nbegin his campaign against Christianity till after the middle of the\ncentury, when superstitious practices and religious persecutions were\nbecoming a scandal in his country. He assailed the Catholic Church in\nevery field with ridicule and satire. In a little work called The Tomb\nof Fanaticism (written 1736,\n\n[154] published 1767), he begins by observing that a man who accepts his\nreligion (as most people do) without examining it is like an ox which\nallows itself to be harnessed, and proceeds to review the difficulties\nin the Bible, the rise of Christianity, and the course of Church\nhistory; from which he concludes that every sensible man should hold the\nChristian sect in horror. \u201cMen are blind to prefer an absurd and\nsanguinary creed, supported by executioners and surrounded by fiery\nfaggots, a creed which can only be approved by those to whom it gives\npower and riches, a particular creed only accepted in a small part of\nthe world\u2014to a simple and universal religion.\u201d In the Sermon of the\nFifty and the Questions of Zapata we can see what he owed to Bayle and\nEnglish critics, but his touch is lighter and his irony more telling.\nHis comment on geographical mistakes in the Old Testament is: \u201cGod was\nevidently not strong in geography.\u201d Having called attention to the\n\u201chorrible crime\u201d of Lot\u2019s wife in looking backward, and her conversion\ninto a pillar of salt, he hopes that the stories of Scripture will make\nus better, if they do not make us more enlightened. One of his favourite\nmethods is to approach Christian doctrines as a person who had just\nheard of the existence of Christians or Jews for the first time in his\nlife.\n\n[155]\n\nHis drama, Saul (1763), which the police tried to suppress, presents the\ncareer of David, the man after God\u2019s own heart, in all its naked horror.\nThe scene in which Samuel reproves Saul for not having slain Agag will\ngive an idea of the spirit of the piece. SAMUEL: God commands me to tell\nyou that he repents of having made you king. SAUL: God repents! Only\nthey who commit errors repent. His eternal wisdom cannot be unwise. God\ncannot commit errors. SAMUEL: He can repent of having set on the throne\nthose who do. SAUL: Well, who does not? Tell me, what is my fault?\nSAMUEL: You have pardoned a king. AGAG: What! Is the fairest of virtues\nconsidered a crime in Judea? SAMUEL (to Agag): Silence! do not\nblaspheme. (To Saul). Saul, formerly king of the Jews, did not God\ncommand you by my mouth to destroy all the Amalekites, without sparing\nwomen, or maidens, or children at the breast? AGAG: Your god\u2014gave such a\ncommand! You are mistaken, you meant to say, your devil. SAMUEL: Saul,\ndid you obey God? SAUL: I did not suppose such a command\n\n[156] was positive. I thought that goodness was the first attribute of\nthe Supreme Being, and that a compassionate heart could not displease\nhim. SAMUEL: You are mistaken, unbeliever. God reproves you, your\nsceptre will pass into other hands.\n\nPerhaps no writer has ever roused more hatred in Christendom than\nVoltaire. He was looked on as a sort of anti-Christ. That was natural;\nhis attacks were so tremendously effective at the time. But he has been\nsometimes decried on the ground that he only demolished and made no\neffort to build up where he had pulled down. This is a narrow complaint.\nIt might be replied that when a sewer is spreading plague in a town, we\ncannot wait to remove it till we have a new system of drains, and it may\nfairly be said that religion as practised in contemporary France was a\npoisonous sewer. But the true answer is that knowledge, and therefore\ncivilization, are advanced by criticism and negation, as well as by\nconstruction and positive discovery. When a man has the talent to attack\nwith effect falsehood, prejudice, and imposture, it is his duty, if\nthere are any social duties, to use it.\n\nFor constructive thinking we must go to the other great leader of French\nthought,\n\n[157] Rousseau, who contributed to the growth of freedom in a different\nway. He was a deist, but his deism, unlike that of Voltaire, was\nreligious and emotional. He regarded Christianity with a sort of\nreverent scepticism. But his thought was revolutionary and repugnant to\northodoxy; it made against authority in every sphere; and it had an\nenormous influence. The clergy perhaps dreaded his theories more than\nthe scoffs and negations of Voltaire. For some years he was a fugitive\non the face of the earth. \u00c9mile, his brilliant contribution to the\ntheory of education, appeared in 1762. It contains some remarkable pages\non religion, \u201cthe profession of faith of a Savoyard vicar,\u201d in which the\nauthor\u2019s deistic faith is strongly affirmed and revelation and theology\nrejected. The book was publicly burned in Paris and an order issued for\nRousseau\u2019s arrest. Forced by his friends to flee, he was debarred from\nreturning to Geneva, for the government of that canton followed the\nexample of Paris. He sought refuge in the canton of Bern and was ordered\nto quit. He then fled to the principality of Neufch\u00e2tel which belonged\nto Prussia. Frederick the Great, the one really tolerant ruler of the\nage, gave him protection, but he was persecuted and calumniated by the\nlocal clergy, who but for Frederick would\n\n[158] have expelled him, and he went to England for a few months (1766),\nthen returning to France, where he was left unmolested till his death.\nThe religious views of Rousseau are only a minor point in his heretical\nspeculations. It was by his daring social and political theories that he\nset the world on fire. His Social Contract in which these theories were\nset forth was burned at Geneva. Though his principles will not stand\ncriticism for a moment, and though his doctrine worked mischief by its\nextraordinary power of turning men into fanatics, yet it contributed to\nprogress, by helping to discredit privilege and to establish the view\nthat the object of a State is to secure the wellbeing of all its\nmembers.\n\nDeism\u2014whether in the semi-Christian form of Rousseau or the anti-\nChristian form of Voltaire\u2014was a house built on the sand, and thinkers\narose in France, England, and Germany to shatter its foundations. In\nFrance, it proved to be only a half-way inn to atheism. In 1770, French\nreaders were startled by the appearance of Baron D\u2019Holbach\u2019s System of\nNature, in which God\u2019s existence and the immortality of the soul were\ndenied and the world declared to be matter spontaneously moving.\n\nHolbach was a friend of Diderot, who had also come to reject deism. All\nthe leading\n\n[159] ideas in the revolt against the Church had a place in Diderot\u2019s\ngreat work, the Encyclopedia, in which a number of leading thinkers\ncollaborated with him. It was not merely a scientific book of reference.\nIt was representative of the whole movement of the enemies of faith. It\nwas intended to lead men from Christianity with its original sin to a\nnew conception of the world as a place which can be made agreeable and\nin which the actual evils are due not to radical faults of human nature\nbut to perverse institutions and perverse education. To divert interest\nfrom the dogmas of religion to the improvement of society, to persuade\nthe world that man\u2019s felicity depends not on Revelation but on social\ntransformation\u2014this was what Diderot and Rousseau in their different\nways did so much to effect. And their work influenced those who did not\nabandon orthodoxy; it affected the spirit of the Church itself. Contrast\nthe Catholic Church in France in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth\ncentury. Without the work of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and their\nfellow-combatants, would it have been reformed? \u201cThe Christian Churches\u201d\n(I quote Lord Morley) \u201care assimilating as rapidly as their formulae\nwill permit, the new light and the more generous moral ideas and the\nhigher spirituality of\n\n[160] teachers who have abandoned all churches and who are\nsystematically denounced as enemies of the souls of men.\u201d\n\nIn England the prevalent deistic thought did not lead to the same\nintellectual consequences as in France; yet Hume, the greatest English\nphilosopher of the century, showed that the arguments commonly adduced\nfor a personal God were untenable. I may first speak of his discussion\non miracles in his Essay on Miracles and in his philosophical Inquiry\nconcerning Human Understanding (1748). Hitherto the credibility of\nmiracles had not been submitted to a general examination independent of\ntheological assumptions. Hume, pointing out that there must be a uniform\nexperience against every miraculous event (otherwise it would not merit\nthe name of miracle), and that it will require stronger testimony to\nestablish a miracle than an event which is not contrary to experience,\nlays down the general maxim that \u201cno testimony is sufficient to\nestablish a miracle unless the testimony is of such a kind that its\nfalsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to\nestablish.\u201d But, as a matter of fact, no testimony exists of which the\nfalsehood would be a prodigy. We cannot find in history any miracle\nattested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestionable good\n\n[161] sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all\ndelusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them\nbeyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit in\nthe eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of their\nbeing detected in any falsehood, and at the same time attesting facts\nperformed in such a public manner as to render detection unavoidable\n\u2014all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in\nthe testimony of men.\n\nIn the Dialogues on Natural Religion which were not published till after\nhis death (1776), Hume made an attack on the \u201cargument from design,\u201d on\nwhich deists and Christians alike relied to prove the existence of a\nDeity. The argument is that the world presents clear marks of design,\nendless adaptation of means to ends, which can only be explained as due\nto the deliberate plan of a powerful intelligence. Hume disputes the\ninference on the ground that a mere intelligent being is not a\nsufficient cause to explain the effect. For the argument must be that\nthe system of the material world demands as a cause a corresponding\nsystem of interconnected ideas; but such a mental system would demand an\nexplanation of its existence just as much as the material world; and\nthus we find ourselves\n\n[162] committed to an endless series of causes. But in any case, even if\nthe argument held, it would prove only the existence of a Deity whose\npowers, though superior to man\u2019s, might be very limited and whose\nworkmanship might be very imperfect. For this world may be very faulty,\ncompared to a superior standard. It may be the first rude experiment \u201cof\nsome infant Deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame\nperformance\u201d; or the work of some inferior Deity at which his superior\nwould scoff; or the production of some old superannuated Deity which\nsince his death has pursued an adventurous career from the first impulse\nwhich he gave it. An argument which leaves such deities in the running\nis worse than useless for the purposes of Deism or of Christianity.\n\nThe sceptical philosophy of Hume had less influence on the general\npublic than Gibbon\u2019s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Of the\nnumerous freethinking books that appeared in England in the eighteenth\ncentury, this is the only one which is still a widely read classic. In\nwhat a lady friend of Dr. Johnson called \u201cthe two offensive chapters\u201d\n(XV and XVI) the causes of the rise and success of Christianity are for\nthe first time critically investigated as a simple historical\nphenomenon. Like most freethinkers of the\n\n[163] time Gibbon thought it well to protect himself and his work\nagainst the possibility of prosecution by paying ironical lip-homage to\nthe orthodox creed. But even if there had been no such danger, he could\nnot have chosen a more incisive weapon for his merciless criticism of\northodox opinion than the irony which he wielded with superb ease.\nHaving pointed out that the victory of Christianity is obviously and\nsatisfactorily explained by the convincing evidence of the doctrine and\nby the ruling providence of its great Author, he proceeds \u201cwith becoming\nsubmission\u201d to inquire into the secondary causes. He traces the history\nof the faith up to the time of Constantine in such a way as clearly to\nsuggest that the hypothesis of divine interposition is superfluous and\nthat we have to do with a purely human development. He marshals, with\nironical protests, the obvious objections to the alleged evidence for\nsupernatural control. He does not himself criticize Moses and the\nprophets, but he reproduces the objections which were made against their\nauthority by \u201cthe vain science of the gnostics.\u201d He notes that the\ndoctrine of immortality is omitted in the law of Moses, but this\ndoubtless was a mysterious dispensation of Providence. We cannot\nentirely remove \u201cthe imputation of ignorance and\n\n[164] obscurity which has been so arrogantly cast on the first\nproselytes of Christianity,\u201d but we must \u201cconvert the occasion of\nscandal into a subject of edification\u201d and remember that \u201cthe lower we\ndepress the temporal condition of the first Christians, the more reason\nwe shall find to admire their merit and success.\u201d\n\nGibbon\u2019s treatment of miracles from the purely historical point of view\n(he owed a great deal to Middleton, see above, p. 150) was particularly\ndisconcerting. In the early age of Christianity \u201cthe laws of nature were\nfrequently suspended for the benefit of the Church. But the sages of\nGreece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and, pursuing the\nordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any\nalterations in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the\nreign of Tiberius the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of\nthe Roman Empire, was involved in a praeternatural darkness of three\nhours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the\nwonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without\nnotice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime\nof Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate\neffects, or received the earliest intelligence, of the prodigy. Each of\nthese\n\n[165] philosophers in a laborious work has recorded all the great\nphenomena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which\nhis indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other\nhave omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye\nhas been witness since the creation of the globe.\u201d How \u201cshall we excuse\nthe supine inattention of the pagan and philosophic world to those\nevidences which were presented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their\nreason, but to their senses?\u201d\n\nAgain, if every believer is convinced of the reality of miracles, every\nreasonable man is convinced of their cessation. Yet every age bears\ntestimony to miracles, and the testimony seems no less respectable than\nthat of the preceding generation. When did they cease? How was it that\nthe generation which saw the last genuine miracles performed could not\ndistinguish them from the impostures which followed? Had men so soon\nforgotten \u201cthe style of the divine artist\u201d? The inference is that\ngenuine and spurious miracles are indistinguishable. But the credulity\nor \u201csoftness of temper\u201d among early believers was beneficial to the\ncause of truth and religion. \u201cIn modern times, a latent and even\ninvoluntary scepticism adheres to the most pious dispositions. Their\n\n[166] admission of supernatural truths is much less an active consent\nthan a cold and passive acquiescence. Accustomed long since to observe\nand to respect the invariable order of nature, our reason, or at least\nour imagination, is not sufficiently prepared to sustain the visible\naction of the Deity.\u201d\n\nGibbon had not the advantage of the minute critical labours which in the\nfollowing century were expended on his sources of information, but his\nmasterly exposure of the conventional history of the early Church\nremains in many of its most important points perfectly valid to-day. I\nsuspect that his artillery has produced more effect on intelligent minds\nin subsequent generations than the archery of Voltaire. For his book\nbecame indispensable as the great history of the Middle Ages; the most\northodox could not do without it; and the poison must have often worked.\n\nWe have seen how theological controversy in the first half of the\neighteenth century had turned on the question whether the revealed\nreligion was consistent and compatible with natural religion. The\ndeistic attacks, on this line, were almost exhausted by the middle of\nthe century, and the orthodox thought that they had been satisfactorily\nanswered. But it was not enough to show that the revelation\n\n[167] is reasonable; it was necessary to prove that it is real and rests\non a solid historical basis. This was the question raised in an acute\nform by the criticisms of Hume and Middleton (1748) on miracles. The\nablest answer was given by Paley in his Evidences of Christianity\n(1794), the only one of the apologies of that age which is still read,\nthough it has ceased to have any value. Paley\u2019s theology illustrates how\northodox opinions are coloured, unconsciously, by the spirit of the\ntime. He proved (in his Natural Theology) the existence of God by the\nargument from design \u2014without taking any account of the criticisms of\nHume on that argument. Just as a watchmaker is inferred from a watch, so\na divine workman is inferred from contrivances in nature. Paley takes\nhis instances of such contrivance largely from the organs and\nconstitution of the human body. His idea of God is that of an ingenious\ncontriver dealing with rather obstinate material. Paley\u2019s \u201cGod\u201d (Mr.\nLeslie Stephen remarked) \u201chas been civilized like man; he has become\nscientific and ingenious; he is superior to Watt or Priestley in\ndevising mechanical and chemical contrivances, and is therefore made in\nthe image of that generation of which Watt and Priestley were\nconspicuous lights.\u201d When a God of this kind\n\n[168] is established there is no difficulty about miracles, and it is on\nmiracles that Paley bases the case for Christianity\u2014all other arguments\nare subsidiary. And his proof of the New Testament miracles is that the\napostles who were eye-witnesses believed in them, for otherwise they\nwould not have acted and suffered in the cause of their new religion.\nPaley\u2019s defence is the performance of an able legal adviser to the\nAlmighty.\n\nThe list of the English deistic writers of the eighteenth century closes\nwith one whose name is more familiar than any of his predecessors,\nThomas Paine. A Norfolk man, he migrated to America and played a leading\npart in the Revolution. Then he returned to England and in 1791\npublished his Rights of Man in two parts. I have been considering,\nalmost exclusively, freedom of thought in religion, because it may be\ntaken as the thermometer for freedom of thought in general. At this\nperiod it was as dangerous to publish revolutionary opinions in politics\nas in theology. Paine was an enthusiastic admirer of the American\nConstitution and a supporter of the French Revolution (in which also he\nwas to play a part). His Rights of Man is an indictment of the\nmonarchical form of government, and a plea for representative democracy.\nIt had an enormous\n\n[169] sale, a cheap edition was issued, and the government, finding that\nit was accessible to the poorer classes, decided to prosecute. Paine\nescaped to France, and received a brilliant ovation at Calais, which\nreturned him as deputy to the National Convention. His trial for high\ntreason came on at the end of 1792. Among the passages in his book, on\nwhich the charge was founded, were these: \u201cAll hereditary government is\nin its nature tyranny.\u201d \u201cThe time is not very distant when England will\nlaugh at itself for sending to Holland, Hanover, Zell, or Brunswick for\nmen\u201d [meaning King William III and King George I] \u201cat the expense of a\nmillion a year who understood neither her laws, her language, nor her\ninterest, and whose capacities would scarcely have fitted them for the\noffice of a parish constable. If government could be trusted to such\nhands, it must be some easy and simple thing indeed, and materials fit\nfor all the purposes may be found in every town and village in England.\u201d\nErskine was Paine\u2019s counsel, and he made a fine oration in defence of\nfreedom of speech.\n\n\u201cConstraint,\u201d he said, \u201cis the natural parent of resistance, and a\npregnant proof that reason is not on the side of those who use it. You\nmust all remember, gentlemen, Lucian\u2019s pleasant story: Jupiter and a\ncountryman\n\n[170] were walking together, conversing with great freedom and\nfamiliarity upon the subject of heaven and earth. The countryman\nlistened with attention and acquiescence while Jupiter strove only to\nconvince him; but happening to hint a doubt, Jupiter turned hastily\naround and threatened him with his thunder. \u2018Ah, ha!\u2019 says the\ncountryman, \u2018now, Jupiter, I know that you are wrong; you are always\nwrong when you appeal to your thunder.\u2019 This is the case with me. I can\nreason with the people of England, but I cannot fight against the\nthunder of authority.\u201d\n\nPaine was found guilty and outlawed. He soon committed a new offence by\nthe publication of an anti-Christian work, The Age of Reason (1794 and\n1796), which he began to write in the Paris prison into which he had\nbeen thrown by Robespierre. This book is remarkable as the first\nimportant English publication in which the Christian scheme of salvation\nand the Bible are assailed in plain language without any disguise or\nreserve. In the second place it was written in such a way as to reach\nthe masses. And, thirdly, while the criticisms on the Bible are in the\nsame vein as those of the earlier deists, Paine is the first to present\nwith force the incongruity of the Christian scheme with the conception\nof the universe attained by astronomical science.\n\n[171]\n\n\u201cThough it is not a direct article of the Christian system that this\nworld that we inhabit is the whole of the inhabitable globe, yet it is\nso worked up therewith\u2014from what is called the Mosaic account of the\ncreation, the story of Eve and the apple, and the counterpart of that\nstory, the death of the Son of God\u2014that to believe otherwise (that is,\nto believe that God created a plurality of worlds at least as numerous\nas what we call stars) renders the Christian system of faith at once\nlittle and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the\nair. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind; and he\nwho thinks that he believes both has thought but little of either.\u201d\n\nAs an ardent deist, who regarded nature as God\u2019s revelation, Paine was\nable to press this argument with particular force. Referring to some of\nthe tales in the Old Testament, he says: \u201cWhen we contemplate the\nimmensity of that Being who directs and governs the incomprehensible\nWhole, of which the utmost ken of human sight can discover but a part,\nwe ought to feel shame at calling such paltry stories the Word of God.\u201d\n\nThe book drew a reply from Bishop Watson, one of those admirable\neighteenth-century divines, who admitted the right of private judgment\nand thought that argument\n\n[172] should be met by argument and not by force. His reply had the\nrather significant title, An Apology for the Bible. George III remarked\nthat he was not aware that any apology was needed for that book. It is a\nweak defence, but is remarkable for the concessions which it makes to\nseveral of Paine\u2019s criticisms of Scripture\u2014admissions which were\ncalculated to damage the doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible.\n\nIt was doubtless in consequence of the enormous circulation of the Age\nof Reason that a Society for the Suppression of Vice decided to\nprosecute the publisher. Unbelief was common among the ruling class, but\nthe view was firmly held that religion was necessary for the populace\nand that any attempt to disseminate unbelief among the lower classes\nmust be suppressed. Religion was regarded as a valuable instrument to\nkeep the poor in order. It is notable that of the earlier rationalists\n(apart from the case of Woolston) the only one who was punished was\nPeter Annet, a schoolmaster, who tried to popularize freethought and was\nsentenced for diffusing \u201cdiabolical\u201d opinions to the pillory and hard\nlabour (1763). Paine held that the people at large had the right of\naccess to all new ideas, and he wrote so as to reach the people. Hence\nhis book must be suppressed.\n\n[173] At the trial (1797) the judge placed every obstacle in the way of\nthe defence. The publisher was sentenced to a year\u2019s imprisonment.\n\nThis was not the end of Paine prosecutions. In 1811 a Third Part of the\nAge of Reason appeared, and Eaton the publisher was condemned to\neighteen months\u2019 imprisonment and to stand in the pillory once a month.\nThe judge, Lord Ellenborough, said in his charge, that \u201cto deny the\ntruths of the book which is the foundation of our faith has never been\npermitted.\u201d The poet Shelley addressed to Lord Ellenborough a scathing\nletter. \u201cDo you think to convert Mr. Eaton to your religion by\nembittering his existence? You might force him by torture to profess\nyour tenets, but he could not believe them except you should make them\ncredible, which perhaps exceeds your power. Do you think to please the\nGod you worship by this exhibition of your zeal? If so, the demon to\nwhom some nations offer human hecatombs is less barbarous than the deity\nof civilized society!\u201d In 1819 Richard Carlisle was prosecuted for\npublishing the Age of Reason and sentenced to a large fine and three\nyears\u2019 imprisonment. Unable to pay the fine he was kept in prison for\nthree years. His wife and sister, who carried on the business\n\n[174] and continued to sell the book, were fined and imprisoned soon\nafterwards and a whole host of shop assistants.\n\nIf his publishers suffered in England, the author himself suffered in\nAmerica where bigotry did all it could to make the last years of his\nlife bitter.\n\nThe age of enlightenment began in Germany in the middle of the\neighteenth century. In most of the German States, thought was\nconsiderably less free than in England. Under Frederick the Great\u2019s\nfather, the philosopher Wolff was banished from Prussia for according to\nthe moral teachings of the Chinese sage Confucius a praise which, it was\nthought, ought to be reserved for Christianity. He returned after the\naccession of Frederick, under whose tolerant rule Prussia was an asylum\nfor those writers who suffered for their opinions in neighbouring\nStates. Frederick, indeed, held the view which was held by so many\nEnglish rationalists of the time, and is still held widely enough, that\nfreethought is not desirable for the multitude, because they are\nincapable of understanding philosophy. Germany felt the influence of the\nEnglish Deists, of the French freethinkers, and of Spinoza; but in the\nGerman rationalistic propaganda of this period there is nothing very\noriginal or interesting.\n\n[175] The names of Edelmann and Bahrdt may be mentioned. The works of\nEdelmann, who attacked the inspiration of the Bible, were burned in\nvarious cities, and he was forced to seek Frederick\u2019s protection at\nBerlin. Bahrdt was more aggressive than any other writer of the time.\nOriginally a preacher, it was by slow degrees that he moved away from\nthe orthodox faith. His translation of the New Testament cut short his\necclesiastical career. His last years were spent as an inn-keeper. His\nwritings, for instance his popular Letters on the Bible, must have had a\nconsiderable effect, if we may judge by the hatred which he excited\namong theologians.\n\nIt was not, however, in direct rationalistic propaganda, but in\nliterature and philosophy, that the German enlightenment of this century\nexpressed itself. The most illustrious men of letters, Goethe (who was\nprofoundly influenced by Spinoza) and Schiller, stood outside the\nChurches, and the effect of their writings and of the whole literary\nmovement of the time made for the freest treatment of human experience.\n\nOne German thinker shook the world\u2014the philosopher Kant. His Critic of\nPure Reason demonstrated that when we attempt to prove by the fight of\nthe intellect the existence of\n\n[176] God and the immortality of the Soul, we fall helplessly into\ncontradictions. His destructive criticism of the argument from design\nand all natural theology was more complete than that of Hume; and his\nphilosophy, different though his system was, issued in the same\npractical result as that of Locke, to confine knowledge to experience.\nIt is true that afterwards, in the interest of ethics, he tried to\nsmuggle in by a back-door the Deity whom he had turned out by the front\ngate, but the attempt was not a success. His philosophy\u2014while it led to\nnew speculative systems in which the name of God was used to mean\nsomething very different from the Deistic conception\u2014was a significant\nstep further in the deliverance of reason from the yoke of authority.\n\n[1] For the sake of simplicity I use \u201cdeist\u201d in this sense throughout,\nthough \u201ctheist\u201d is now the usual term.\n\n[2] Spinoza\u2019s Theological Political Treatise, which deals with the\ninterpretation of Scripture, was translated into English in 1689.\n\n[3] See Benn, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, vol. i, p. 138\nseq., for a good exposure of the fallacies and sophistries of Butler.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE PROGRESS OF RATIONALISM\n\n(NINETEENTH CENTURY)\n\nMODERN science, heralded by the researches of Copernicus, was founded in\nthe seventeenth century, which saw the demonstration of the Copernican\ntheory, the discovery of gravitation, the discovery of the circulation\nof the blood, and the foundation\n\n[177] of modern chemistry and physics. The true nature of comets was\nascertained, and they ceased to be regarded as signs of heavenly wrath.\nBut several generations were to pass before science became, in\nProtestant countries, an involuntary arch-enemy of theology. Till the\nnineteenth century, it was only in minor points, such as the movement of\nthe earth, that proved scientific facts seemed to conflict with\nScripture, and it was easy enough to explain away these inconsistencies\nby a new interpretation of the sacred texts. Yet remarkable facts were\naccumulating which, though not explained by science, seemed to menace\nthe credibility of Biblical history. If the story of Noah\u2019s Ark and the\nFlood is true, how was it that beasts unable to swim or fly inhabit\nAmerica and the islands of the Ocean? And what about the new species\nwhich were constantly being found in the New World and did not exist in\nthe Old? Where did the kangaroos of Australia drop from? The only\nexplanation compatible with received theology seemed to be the\nhypothesis of innumerable new acts of creation, later than the Flood. It\nwas in the field of natural history that scientific men of the\neighteenth century suffered most from the coercion of authority.\nLinnaeus felt it in Sweden, Buffon\n\n[178] in France. Buffon was compelled to retract hypotheses which he put\nforward about the formation of the earth in his Natural History (1749),\nand to state that he believed implicitly in the Bible account of\nCreation.\n\nAt the beginning of the nineteenth century Laplace worked out the\nmechanics of the universe, on the nebular hypothesis. His results\ndispensed, as he said to Napoleon, with the hypothesis of God, and were\nduly denounced. His theory involved a long physical process before the\nearth and solar system came to be formed; but this was not fatal, for a\nlittle ingenuity might preserve the credit of the first chapter of\nGenesis. Geology was to prove a more formidable enemy to the Biblical\nstory of the Creation and the Deluge. The theory of a French naturalist\n(Cuvier) that the earth had repeatedly experienced catastrophes, each of\nwhich necessitated a new creative act, helped for a time to save the\nbelief in divine intervention, and Lyell, in his Principles of Geology\n(1830), while he undermined the assumption of catastrophes, by showing\nthat the earth\u2019s history could be explained by the ordinary processes\nwhich we still see in operation, yet held fast to successive acts of\ncreation. It was not till 1863 that he presented fully, in his Antiquity\nof Man, the\n\n[179] evidence which showed that the human race had inhabited the earth\nfor a far longer period than could be reconciled with the record of\nScripture. That record might be adapted to the results of science in\nregard not only to the earth itself but also to the plants and lower\nanimals, by explaining the word \u201cday\u201d in the Jewish story of creation to\nsignify some long period of time. But this way out was impossible in the\ncase of the creation of man, for the sacred chronology is quite\ndefinite. An English divine of the seventeenth century ingeniously\ncalculated that man was created by the Trinity on October 23, B.C. 4004,\nat 9 o\u2019clock in the morning, and no reckoning of the Bible dates could\nput the event much further back. Other evidence reinforced the\nconclusions from geology, but geology alone was sufficient to damage\nirretrievably the historical truth of the Jewish legend of Creation. The\nonly means of rescuing it was to suppose that God had created misleading\nevidence for the express purpose of deceiving man.\n\nGeology shook the infallibility of the Bible, but left the creation of\nsome prehistoric Adam and Eve a still admissible hypothesis. Here\nhowever zoology stepped in, and pronounced upon the origin of man. It\nwas an old conjecture that the higher forms of life, including\n\n[180] man, had developed out of lower forms, and advanced thinkers had\nbeen reaching the conclusion that the universe, as we find it, is the\nresult of a continuous process, unbroken by supernatural interference,\nand explicable by uniform natural laws. But while the reign of law in\nthe world of non-living matter seemed to be established, the world of\nlife could be considered a field in which the theory of divine\nintervention is perfectly valid, so long as science failed to assign\nsatisfactory causes for the origination of the various kinds of animals\nand plants. The publication of Darwin\u2019s Origin of Species in 1859 is,\ntherefore, a landmark not only in science but in the war between science\nand theology. When this book appeared, Bishop Wilberforce truly said\nthat \u201cthe principle of natural selection is incompatible with the word\nof God,\u201d and theologians in Germany and France as well as in England\ncried aloud against the threatened dethronement of the Deity. The\nappearance of the Descent of Man (1871), in which the evidence for the\npedigree of the human race from lower animals was marshalled with\nmasterly force, renewed the outcry. The Bible said that God created man\nin his own image, Darwin said that man descended from an ape. The\nfeelings of the orthodox world may be\n\n[181] expressed in the words of Mr. Gladstone: \u201cUpon the grounds of what\nis called evolution God is relieved of the labour of creation, and in\nthe name of unchangeable laws is discharged from governing the world.\u201d\nIt was a discharge which, as Spencer observed, had begun with Newton\u2019s\ndiscovery of gravitation. If Darwin did not, as is now recognized,\nsupply a complete explanation of the origin of species, his researches\nshattered the supernatural theory and confirmed the view to which many\nable thinkers had been led that development is continuous in the living\nas in the non-living world. Another nail was driven into the coffin of\nCreation and the Fall of Adam, and the doctrine of redemption could only\nbe rescued by making it independent of the Jewish fable on which it was\nfounded.\n\nDarwinism, as it is called, has had the larger effect of discrediting\nthe theory of the adaptation of means to ends in nature by an external\nand infinitely powerful intelligence. The inadequacy of the argument\nfrom design, as a proof of God\u2019s existence, had been shown by the logic\nof Hume and Kant; but the observation of the life-processes of nature\nshows that the very analogy between nature and art, on which the\nargument depends, breaks down. The impropriety of the analogy has been\n\n[182] pointed out, in a telling way, by a German writer (Lange). If a\nman wants to shoot a hare which is in a certain field, he does not\nprocure thousands of guns, surround the field, and cause them all to be\nfired off; or if he wants a house to live in, he does not build a whole\ntown and abandon to weather and decay all the houses but one. If he did\neither of these things we should say he was mad or amazingly\nunintelligent; his actions certainly would not be held to indicate a\npowerful mind, expert in adapting means to ends. But these are the sort\nof things that nature does. Her wastefulness in the propagation of life\nis reckless. For the production of one life she sacrifices innumerable\ngerms. The \u201cend\u201d is achieved in one case out of thousands; the rule is\ndestruction and failure. If intelligence had anything to do with this\nbungling process, it would be an intelligence infinitely low. And the\nfinished product, if regarded as a work of design, points to\nincompetence in the designer. Take the human eye. An illustrious man of\nscience (Helmholtz) said, \u201cIf an optician sent it to me as an\ninstrument, I should send it back with reproaches for the carelessness\nof his work and demand the return of my money. Darwin showed how the\nphenomena might be explained as events not brought about\n\n[183] intentionally, but due to exceptional concurrences of\ncircumstances.\n\nThe phenomena of nature are a system of things which co-exist and follow\neach other according to invariable laws. This deadly proposition was\nasserted early in the nineteenth century to be an axiom of science. It\nwas formulated by Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) as the foundation\non which scientific induction rests. It means that at any moment the\nstate of the whole universe is the effect of its state at the preceding\nmoment; the casual sequence between two successive states is not broken\nby any arbitrary interference suppressing or altering the relation\nbetween cause and effect. Some ancient Greek philosophers were convinced\nof this principle; the work done by modern science in every field seems\nto be a verification of it. But it need not be stated in such an\nabsolute form. Recently, scientific men have been inclined to express\nthe axiom with more reserve and less dogmatically. They are prepared to\nrecognize that it is simply a postulate without which the scientific\ncomprehension of the universe would be impossible, and they are inclined\nto state it not as a law of causation\u2014for the idea of causation leads\ninto metaphysics\u2014but rather as uniformity of experience. But they are\nnot\n\n[184] readier to admit exceptions to this uniformity than their\npredecessors were to admit exceptions to the law of causation.\n\nThe idea of development has been applied not only to nature, but to the\nmind of man and to the history of civilization, including thought and\nreligion. The first who attempted to apply this idea methodically to the\nwhole universe was not a student of natural science, but a\nmetaphysician, Hegel. His extremely difficult philosophy had such a wide\ninfluence on thought that a few words must be said about its tendency.\nHe conceived the whole of existence as what he called the Absolute Idea,\nwhich is not in space or time and is compelled by the laws of its being\nto manifest itself in the process of the world, first externalizing\nitself in nature, and then becoming conscious of itself as spirit in\nindividual minds. His system is hence called Absolute Idealism. The\nattraction which it exercised has probably been in great measure due to\nthe fact that it was in harmony with nineteenth-century thought, in so\nfar as it conceived the process of the world, both in nature and spirit,\nas a necessary development from lower to higher stages. In this respect\nindeed Hegel\u2019s vision was limited. He treats the process as if it were\npractically complete already, and does not take into account\n\n[185] the probability of further development in the future, to which\nother thinkers of his own time were turning their attention. But what\nconcerns us here is that, while Hegel\u2019s system is \u201cidealistic,\u201d finding\nthe explanation of the universe in thought and not in matter, it tended\nas powerfully as any materialistic system to subvert orthodox beliefs.\nIt is true that some have claimed it as supporting Christianity. A\ncertain colour is lent to this by Hegel\u2019s view that the Christian creed,\nas the highest religion, contains doctrines which express imperfectly\nsome of the ideas of the highest philosophy\u2014his own; along with the fact\nthat he sometimes speaks of the Absolute Idea as if it were a person,\nthough personality would be a limitation inconsistent with his\nconception of it. But it is sufficient to observe that, whatever value\nbe assigned to Christianity, he regarded it from the superior standpoint\nof a purely intellectual philosophy, not as a special revelation of\ntruth, but as a certain approximation to the truth which philosophy\nalone can reach; and it may be said with some confidence that any one\nwho comes under Hegel\u2019s spell feels that he is in possession of a theory\nof the universe which relieves him from the need or desire of any\nrevealed religion. His influence in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere has\nentirely made for highly unorthodox thought.\n\n[186]\n\nHegel was not aggressive, he was superior. His French contemporary,\nComte, who also thought out a comprehensive system, aggressively and\nexplicitly rejected theology as an obsolete way of explaining the\nuniverse. He rejected metaphysics likewise, and all that Hegel stood\nfor, as equally useless, on the ground that metaphysicians explain\nnothing, but merely describe phenomena in abstract terms, and that\nquestions about the origin of the world and why it exists are quite\nbeyond the reach of reason. Both theology and metaphysics are superseded\nby science\u2014the investigation of causes and effects and coexistences; and\nthe future progress of society will be guided by the scientific view of\nthe world which confines itself to the positive data of experience.\nComte was convinced that religion is a social necessity, and, to supply\nthe place of the theological religions which he pronounced to be doomed,\nhe invented a new religion\u2014the religion of Humanity. It differs from the\ngreat religions of the world in having no supernatural or non-rational\narticles of belief, and on that account he had few adherents. But the\n\u201cPositive Philosophy\u201d of Comte has exercised great influence, not least\nin England, where its principles have been promulgated especially by Mr.\nFrederic Harrison, who in the latter\n\n[187] half of the nineteenth century has been one of the most\nindefatigable workers in the cause of reason against authority.\n\nAnother comprehensive system was worked out by an Englishman, Herbert\nSpencer. Like Comte\u2019s, it was based on science, and attempts to show\nhow, starting with a nebular universe, the whole knowable world,\npsychical and social as well as physical, can be deduced. His Synthetic\nPhilosophy perhaps did more than anything else to make the idea of\nevolution familiar in England.\n\nI must mention one other modern explanation of the world, that of\nHaeckel, the zoologist, professor at Jena, who may be called the prophet\nof evolution. His Creation of Man (1868) covered the same ground as\nDarwin\u2019s Descent, had an enormous circulation, and was translated, I\nbelieve, into fourteen languages. His World-riddles (1899) enjoys the\nsame popularity. He has taught, like Spencer, that the principle of\nevolution applies not only to the history of nature, but also to human\ncivilization and human thought. He differs from Spencer and Comte in not\nassuming any unknowable reality behind natural phenomena. His\nadversaries commonly stigmatize his theory as materialism, but this is a\nmistake. Like Spinoza he recognizes matter and mind, body and thought,\nas\n\n[188] two inseparable sides of ultimate reality, which he calls God; in\nfact, he identifies his philosophy with that of Spinoza. And he\nlogically proceeds to conceive material atoms as thinking. His idea of\nthe physical world is based on the old mechanical conception of matter,\nwhich in recent years has been discredited. But Haeckel\u2019s Monism, [1] as\nhe called his doctrine, has lately been reshaped and in its new form\npromises to exercise wide influence on thoughtful people in Germany. I\nwill return later to this Monistic movement.\n\nIt had been a fundamental principle of Comte that human actions and\nhuman history are as strictly subject as nature is, to the law of\ncausation. Two psychological works appeared in England in 1855 (Bain\u2019s\nSenses and Intellect and Spencer\u2019s Principles of Psychology), which\ntaught that our volitions are completely determined, being the\ninevitable consequences of chains of causes and effects. But a far\ndeeper impression was produced two years later by the first volume of\nBuckle\u2019s History of Civilization in England (a work of much less\npermanent value), which attempted to apply this principle to history.\nMen act in consequence of motives; their motives are the results of\npreceding facts; so that \u201cif we were acquainted with the whole of the\nantecedents\n\n[189] and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring\ncertainty predict the whole of their immediate results.\u201d Thus history is\nan unbroken chain of causes and effects. Chance is excluded; it is a\nmere name for the defects of our knowledge. Mysterious and providential\ninterference is excluded. Buckle maintained God\u2019s existence, but\neliminated him from history; and his book dealt a resounding blow at the\ntheory that human actions are not submitted to the law of universal\ncausation.\n\nThe science of anthropology has in recent years aroused wide interest.\nInquiries into the condition of early man have shown (independently of\nDarwinism) that there is nothing to be said for the view that he fell\nfrom a higher to a lower state; the evidence points to a slow rise from\nmere animality. The origin of religious beliefs has been investigated,\nwith results disquieting for orthodoxy. The researches of students of\nanthropology and comparative religion\u2014such as Tylor, Robertson Smith,\nand Frazer\u2014have gone to show that mysterious ideas and dogma and rites\nwhich were held to be peculiar to the Christian revelation are derived\nfrom the crude ideas of primitive religions. That the mystery of the\nEucharist comes from the common savage rite of eating a dead god,\n\n[190] that the death and resurrection of a god in human form, which form\nthe central fact of Christianity, and the miraculous birth of a Saviour\nare features which it has in common with pagan religions\u2014such\nconclusions are supremely unedifying. It may be said that in themselves\nthey are not fatal to the claims of the current theology. It may be\nheld, for instance, that, as part of Christian revelation, such ideas\nacquired a new significance and that God wisely availed himself of\nfamiliar beliefs\u2014which, though false and leading to cruel practices, he\nhimself had inspired and permitted\u2014in order to construct a scheme of\nredemption which should appeal to the prejudices of man. Some minds may\nfind satisfaction in this sort of explanation, but it may be suspected\nthat most of the few who study modern researches into the origin of\nreligious beliefs will feel the lines which were supposed to mark off\nthe Christian from all other faiths dissolving before their eyes.\n\nThe general result of the advance of science, including anthropology,\nhas been to create a coherent view of the world, in which the Christian\nscheme, based on the notions of an unscientific age and on the arrogant\nassumption that the universe was made for man, has no suitable or\nreasonable place. If Paine felt this a hundred years ago, it is far\n\n[191] more apparent now. All minds however are not equally impressed\nwith this incongruity. There are many who will admit the proofs\nfurnished by science that the Biblical record as to the antiquity of man\nis false, but are not affected by the incongruity between the scientific\nand theological conceptions of the world.\n\nFor such minds science has only succeeded in carrying some\nentrenchments, which may be abandoned without much harm. It has made the\nold orthodox view of the infallibility of the Bible untenable, and upset\nthe doctrine of the Creation and Fall. But it would still be possible\nfor Christianity to maintain the supernatural claim, by modifying its\ntheory of the authority of the Bible and revising its theory of\nredemption, if the evidence of natural science were the only group of\nfacts with which it collided. It might be argued that the law of\nuniversal causation is a hypothesis inferred from experience, but that\nexperience includes the testimonies of history and must therefore take\naccount of the clear evidence of miraculous occurrences in the New\nTestament (evidence which is valid, even if that book was not inspired).\nThus, a stand could be taken against the generalization of science on\nthe firm ground of historical fact. That solid ground, however, has\ngiven\n\n[192] way, undermined by historical criticism, which has been more\ndeadly than the common-sense criticism of the eighteenth century.\n\nThe methodical examination of the records contained in the Bible,\ndealing with them as if they were purely human documents, is the work of\nthe nineteenth century. Something, indeed, had already been done.\nSpinoza, for instance (above, p. 138), and Simon, a Frenchman whose\nbooks were burnt, were pioneers; and the modern criticism of the Old\nTestament was begun by Astruc (professor of medicine at Paris), who\ndiscovered an important clue for distinguishing different documents used\nby the compiler of the Book of Genesis (1753). His German contemporary,\nReimarus, a student of the New Testament, anticipated the modern\nconclusion that Jesus had no intention of founding a new religion, and\nsaw that the Gospel of St. John presents a different figure from the\nJesus of the other evangelists.\n\nBut in the nineteenth century the methods of criticism, applied by\nGerman scholars to Homer and to the records of early Roman history, were\nextended to the investigation of the Bible. The work has been done\nprincipally in Germany. The old tradition that the Pentateuch was\nwritten by Moses has been completely discredited. It is now\n\n[193] agreed unanimously by all who have studied the facts that the\nPentateuch was put together from a number of different documents of\ndifferent ages, the earliest dating from the ninth, the last from the\nfifth, century B.C.; and there are later minor additions. An important,\nthough undesigned, contribution was made to this exposure by an\nEnglishman, Colenso, Bishop of Natal. It had been held that the oldest\nof the documents which had been distinguished was a narrative which\nbegins in Genesis, Chapter I, but there was the difficulty that this\nnarrative seemed to be closely associated with the legislation of\nLeviticus which could be proved to belong to the fifth century. In 1862\nColenso published the first part of his Pentateuch and the Book of\nJoshua Critically Examined. His doubts of the truth of Old Testament\nhistory had been awakened by a converted Zulu who asked the intelligent\nquestion whether he could really believe in the story of the Flood,\n\u201cthat all the beasts and birds and creeping things upon the earth, large\nand small, from hot countries and cold, came thus by pairs and entered\ninto the ark with Noah? And did Noah gather food for them all, for the\nbeasts and birds of prey as well as the rest?\u201d The Bishop then proceeded\nto test the accuracy of the inspired books by examining\n\n[194] the numerical statements which they contain. The results were\nfatal to them as historical records. Quite apart from miracles (the\npossibility of which he did not question), he showed that the whole\nstory of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt and the wilderness was\nfull of absurdities and impossibilities. Colenso\u2019s book raised a storm\nof indignation in England\u2014he was known as \u201cthe wicked bishop\u201d; but on\nthe Continent its reception was very different. The portions of the\nPentateuch and Joshua, which he proved to be unhistorical, belonged\nprecisely to the narrative which had caused perplexity; and critics were\nled by his results to conclude that, like the Levitical laws with which\nit was connected, it was as late as the fifth century.\n\nOne of the most striking results of the researches on the Old Testament\nhas been that the Jews themselves handled their traditions freely. Each\nof the successive documents, which were afterwards woven together, was\nwritten by men who adopted a perfectly free attitude towards the older\ntraditions, and having no suspicion that they were of divine origin did\nnot bow down before their authority. It was reserved for the Christians\nto invest with infallible authority the whole indiscriminate lump of\nthese Jewish documents, inconsistent not\n\n[195] only in their tendencies (since they reflect the spirit of\ndifferent ages), but also in some respects in substance. The examination\nof most of the other Old Testament books has led to conclusions likewise\nadverse to the orthodox view of their origin and character. New\nknowledge on many points has been derived from the Babylonian literature\nwhich has been recovered during the last half century. One of the\nearliest (1872) and most sensational discoveries was that the Jews got\ntheir story of the Flood from Babylonian mythology.\n\nModern criticism of the New Testament began with the stimulating works\nof Baur and of Strauss, whose Life of Jesus (1835), in which the\nsupernatural was entirely rejected, had an immense success and caused\nfurious controversy. Both these rationalists were influenced by Hegel.\nAt the same time a classical scholar, Lachmann, laid the foundations of\nthe criticism of the Greek text of the New Testament, by issuing the\nfirst scientific edition. Since then seventy years of work have led to\nsome certain results which are generally accepted.\n\nIn the first place, no intelligent person who has studied modern\ncriticism holds the old view that each of the four biographies of Jesus\nis an independent work and an independent\n\n[196] testimony to the facts which are related. It is acknowledged that\nthose portions which are common to more than one and are written in\nidentical language have the same origin and represent only one\ntestimony. In the second place, it is allowed that the first Gospel is\nnot the oldest and that the apostle Matthew was not its author. There is\nalso a pretty general agreement that Mark\u2019s book is the oldest. The\nauthorship of the fourth Gospel, which like the first was supposed to\nhave been written by an eye-witness, is still contested, but even those\nwho adhere to the tradition admit that it represents a theory about\nJesus which is widely different from the view of the three other\nbiographers.\n\nThe result is that it can no longer be said that for the life of Jesus\nthere is the evidence of eye-witnesses. The oldest account (Mark) was\ncomposed at the earliest some thirty years after the Crucifixion. If\nsuch evidence is considered good enough to establish the supernatural\nevents described in that document, there are few alleged supernatural\noccurrences which we shall not be equally entitled to believe. As a\nmatter of fact, an interval of thirty years makes little difference, for\nwe know that legends require little time to grow. In the East, you will\nhear of miracles which happened the day before\n\n[197] yesterday. The birth of religions is always enveloped in legend,\nand the miraculous thing would be, as M. Salomon Reinach has observed,\nif the story of the birth of Christianity were pure history.\n\nAnother disturbing result of unprejudiced examination of the first three\nGospels is that, if you take the recorded words of Jesus to be genuine\ntradition, he had no idea of founding a new religion. And he was fully\npersuaded that the end of the world was at hand. At present, the chief\nproblem of advanced criticism seems to be whether his entire teaching\nwas not determined by this delusive conviction.\n\nIt may be said that the advance of knowledge has thrown no light on one\nof the most important beliefs that we are asked to accept on authority,\nthe doctrine of immortality. Physiology and psychology have indeed\nemphasized the difficulties of conceiving a thinking mind without a\nnervous system. Some are sanguine enough to think that, by scientific\nexamination of psychical phenomena, we may possibly come to know whether\nthe \u201cspirits\u201d of dead people exist. If the existence of such a world of\nspirits were ever established, it would possibly be the greatest blow\never sustained by Christianity. For the great appeal of this and of some\nother religions\n\n[198] lies in the promise of a future life of which otherwise we should\nhave no knowledge. If existence after death were proved and became a\nscientific fact like the law of gravitation, a revealed religion might\nlose its power. For the whole point of a revealed religion is that it is\nnot based on scientific facts. So far as I know, those who are\nconvinced, by spiritualistic experiments, that they have actual converse\nwith spirits of the dead, and for whom this converse, however delusive\nthe evidence may be, is a fact proved by experience, cease to feel any\ninterest in religion. They possess knowledge and can dispense with\nfaith.\n\nThe havoc which science and historical criticism have wrought among\northodox beliefs during the last hundred years was not tamely submitted\nto, and controversy was not the only weapon employed. Strauss was\ndeprived of his professorship at T\u00fcbingen, and his career was ruined.\nRenan, whose sensational Life of Jesus also rejected the supernatural,\nlost his chair in the Coll\u00e8ge de France. B\u00fcchner was driven from\nT\u00fcbingen (1855) for his book on Force and Matter, which, appealing to\nthe general public, set forth the futility of supernatural explanations\nof the universe. An attempt was made to chase Haeckel from Jena. In\nrecent years,\n\n[199] a French Catholic, the Abb\u00e9 Loisy, has made notable contributions\nto the study of the New Testament and he was rewarded by major\nexcommunication in 1907.\n\nLoisy is the most prominent figure in a growing movement within the\nCatholic Church known as Modernism\u2014a movement which some think is the\ngravest crisis in the history of the Church since the thirteenth\ncentury. The Modernists do not form an organized party; they have no\nprogramme. They are devoted to the Church, to its traditions and\nassociations, but they look on Christianity as a religion which has\ndeveloped, and whose vitality depends upon its continuing to develop.\nThey are bent on reinterpreting the dogmas in the light of modern\nscience and criticism. The idea of development had already been applied\nby Cardinal Newman to Catholic theology. He taught that it was a\nnatural, and therefore legitimate, development of the primitive creed.\nBut he did not draw the conclusion which the Modernists draw that if\nCatholicism is not to lose its power of growth and die, it must\nassimilate some of the results of modern thought. This is what they are\nattempting to do for it.\n\nPope Pius X has made every effort to suppress the Modernists. In 1907\n(July) he\n\n[200] issued a decree denouncing various results of modern Biblical\ncriticism which are defended in Loisy\u2019s works. The two fundamental\npropositions that \u201cthe organic constitution of the Church is not\nimmutable, but that Christian society is subject, like every human\nsociety, to a perpetual evolution,\u201d and that \u201cthe dogmas which the\nChurch regards as revealed are not fallen from heaven but are an\ninterpretation of religious facts at which the human mind laboriously\narrived\u201d\u2014both of which might be deduced from Newman\u2019s writings\u2014are\ncondemned. Three months later the Pope issued a long Encyclical letter,\ncontaining an elaborate study of Modernist opinions, and ordaining\nvarious measures for stamping out the evil. No Modernist would admit\nthat this document represents his views fairly. Yet some of the remarks\nseem very much to the point. Take one of their books: \u201cone page might be\nsigned by a Catholic; turn over and you think you are reading the work\nof a rationalist. In writing history, they make no mention of Christ\u2019s\ndivinity; in the pulpit, they proclaim it loudly.\u201d\n\nA plain man may be puzzled by these attempts to retain the letter of old\ndogmas emptied of their old meaning, and may think it natural enough\nthat the head of the Catholic\n\n[201] Church should take a clear and definite stand against the new\nlearning which, seems fatal to its fundamental doctrines. For many years\npast, liberal divines in the Protestant Churches have been doing what\nthe Modernists are doing. The phrase \u201cDivinity of Christ\u201d is used, but\nis interpreted so as not to imply a miraculous birth. The Resurrection\nis preached, but is interpreted so as not to imply a miraculous bodily\nresurrection. The Bible is said to be an inspired book, but inspiration\nis used in a vague sense, much as when one says that Plato was inspired;\nand the vagueness of this new idea of inspiration is even put forward as\na merit. Between the extreme views which discard the miraculous\naltogether, and the old orthodoxy, there are many gradations of belief.\nIn the Church of England to-day it would be difficult to say what is the\nminimum belief required either from its members or from its clergy.\nProbably every leading ecclesiastic would give a different answer.\n\nThe rise of rationalism within the English Church is interesting and\nillustrates the relations between Church and State.\n\nThe pietistic movement known as Evangelicalism, which Wilberforce\u2019s\nPractical View of Christianity (1797) did much to make popular,\nintroduced the spirit of Methodism\n\n[202] within the Anglican Church, and soon put an end to the delightful\ntype of eighteenth-century divine, who, as Gibbon says, \u201csubscribed with\na sigh or a smile\u201d the articles of faith. The rigorous taboo of the\nSabbath was revived, the theatre was denounced, the corruption of human\nnature became the dominant theme, and the Bible more a fetish than ever.\nThe success of this religious \u201creaction,\u201d as it is called, was aided,\nthough not caused, by the common belief that the French Revolution had\nbeen mainly due to infidelity; the Revolution was taken for an object\nlesson showing the value of religion for keeping the people in order.\nThere was also a religious \u201creaction\u201d in France itself. But in both\ncases this means not that free thought was less prevalent, but that the\nbeliefs of the majority were more aggressive and had powerful spokesmen,\nwhile the eighteenth-century form of rationalism fell out of fashion. A\nnew form of rationalism, which sought to interpret orthodoxy in such a\nliberal way as to reconcile it with philosophy, was represented by\nColeridge, who was influenced by German philosophers. Coleridge was a\nsupporter of the Church, and he contributed to the foundation of a\nschool of liberal theology which was to make itself felt after the\nmiddle of the century.\n\n[203] Newman, the most eminent of the new High Church party, said that\nhe indulged in a liberty of speculation which no Christian could\ntolerate. The High Church movement which marked the second quarter of\nthe century was as hostile as Evangelicalism to the freedom of religious\nthought.\n\nThe change came after the middle of the century, when the effects of the\nphilosophies of Hegel and Comte, and of foreign Biblical criticism,\nbegan to make themselves felt within the English Church. Two remarkable\nfreethinking books appeared at this period which were widely read, F. W.\nNewman\u2019s Phases of Faith and W. R. Greg\u2019s Creed of Christendom (both in\n1850). Newman (brother of Cardinal Newman) entirely broke with\nChristianity, and in his book he describes the mental process by which\nhe came to abandon the beliefs he had once held. Perhaps the most\ninteresting point he makes is the deficiency of the New Testament\nteaching as a system of morals. Greg was a Unitarian. He rejected dogma\nand inspiration, but he regarded himself as a Christian. Sir J. F.\nStephen wittily described his position as that of a disciple \u201cwho had\nheard the Sermon on the Mount, whose attention had not been called to\nthe Miracles, and who died before the Resurrection.\u201d\n\n[204]\n\nThere were a few English clergymen (chiefly Oxford men) who were\ninterested in German criticism and leaned to broad views, which to the\nEvangelicals and High Churchmen seemed indistinguishable from\ninfidelity. We may call them the Broad Church\u2014though the name did not\ncome in till later. In 1855 Jowett (afterwards Master of Balliol)\npublished an edition of some of St. Paul\u2019s Epistles, in which he showed\nthe cloven hoof. It contained an annihilating criticism of the doctrine\nof the Atonement, an explicit rejection of original sin, and a\nrationalistic discussion of the question of God\u2019s existence. But this\nand some other unorthodox works of liberal theologians attracted little\npublic attention, though their authors had to endure petty persecution.\nFive years later, Jowett and some other members of the small liberal\ngroup decided to defy the \u201cabominable system of terrorism which prevents\nthe statement of the plainest fact,\u201d and issued a volume of Essays and\nReviews (1860) by seven writers of whom six were clergymen. The views\nadvocated in these essays seem mild enough to-day, and many of them\nwould be accepted by most well-educated clergymen, but at the time they\nproduced a very painful impression. The authors were called the \u201cSeven\nagainst Christ.\u201d It was\n\n[205] laid down that the Bible is to be interpreted like any other book.\n\u201cIt is not a useful lesson for the young student to apply to Scripture\nprinciples which he would hesitate to apply to other books; to make\nformal reconcilements of discrepancies which he would not think of\nreconciling in ordinary history; to divide simple words into double\nmeanings; to adopt the fancies or conjectures of Fathers and\nCommentators as real knowledge.\u201d It is suggested that the Hebrew\nprophecies do not contain the element of prediction. Contradictory\naccounts, or accounts which can only be reconciled by conjecture, cannot\npossibly have been dictated by God. The discrepancies between the\ngenealogies of Jesus in Matthew and Luke, or between the accounts of the\nResurrection, can be attributed \u201cneither to any defect in our capacities\nnor to any reasonable presumption of a hidden wise design, nor to any\npartial spiritual endowments in the narrators.\u201d The orthodox arguments\nwhich lay stress on the assertion of witnesses as the supreme evidence\nof fact, in support of miraculous occurrences, are set aside on the\nground that testimony is a blind guide and can avail nothing against\nreason and the strong grounds we have for believing in permanent order.\nIt is argued that, under the Thirty-nine\n\n[206] Articles, it is permissible to accept as \u201cparable or poetry or\nlegend\u201d such stories as that of an ass speaking with a man\u2019s voice, of\nwaters standing in a solid heap, of witches and a variety of\napparitions, and to judge for ourselves of such questions as the\npersonality of Satan or the primeval institution of the Sabbath. The\nwhole spirit of this volume is perhaps expressed in the observation that\nif any one perceives \u201cto how great an extent the origin itself of\nChristianity rests upon probable evidence, his principle will relieve\nhim from many difficulties which might otherwise be very disturbing. For\nrelations which may repose on doubtful grounds as matters of history,\nand, as history, be incapable of being ascertained or verified, may yet\nbe equally suggestive of true ideas with facts absolutely certain\u201d\u2014that\nis, they may have a spiritual significance although they are\nhistorically false.\n\nThe most daring Essay was the Rev. Baden Powell\u2019s Study of the Evidences\nof Christianity. He was a believer in evolution, who accepted Darwinism,\nand considered miracles impossible. The volume was denounced by the\nBishops, and in 1862 two of the contributors, who were beneficed\nclergymen and thus open to a legal attack, were prosecuted and tried in\nthe Ecclesiastical Court. Condemned on\n\n[207] certain points, acquitted on others, they were sentenced to be\nsuspended for a year, and they appealed to the Privy Council. Lord\nWestbury (Lord Chancellor) pronounced the judgment of the Judicial\nCommittee of the Council, which reversed the decision of the\nEcclesiastical Court. The Committee held, among other things, that it is\nnot essential for a clergyman to believe in eternal punishment. This\nprompted the following epitaph on Lord Westbury: \u201cTowards the close of\nhis earthly career he dismissed Hell with costs and took away from\nOrthodox members of the Church of England their last hope of everlasting\ndamnation.\u201d\n\nThis was a great triumph for the Broad Church party, and it is an\ninteresting event in the history of the English State-Church. Laymen\ndecided (overruling the opinion of the Archbishops of Canterbury and\nYork) what theological doctrines are and are not binding on a clergyman,\nand granted within the Church a liberty of opinion which the majority of\nthe Church\u2019s representatives regarded as pernicious. This liberty was\nformally established in 1865 by an Act of Parliament, which altered the\nform in which clergymen were required to subscribe the Thirty-nine\nArticles. The episode of Essays and Reviews is a landmark in the history\nof religious thought in England.\n\n[208]\n\nThe liberal views of the Broad Churchmen and their attitude to the Bible\ngradually produced some effect upon those who differed most from them;\nand nowadays there is probably no one who would not admit, at least,\nthat such a passage as Genesis, Chapter XIX, might have been composed\nwithout the direct inspiration of the Deity.\n\nDuring the next few years orthodox public opinion was shocked or\ndisturbed by the appearance of several remarkable books which\ncriticized, ignored, or defied authority\u2014Lyell\u2019s Antiquity of Man,\nSeeley\u2019s Ecce Homo (which the pious Lord Shaftesbury said was \u201cvomited\nfrom the jaws of hell\u201d), Lecky\u2019s History of Rationalism. And a new poet\nof liberty arose who did not fear to sound the loudest notes of defiance\nagainst all that authority held sacred. All the great poets of the\nnineteenth century were more or less unorthodox; Wordsworth in the years\nof his highest inspiration was a pantheist; and the greatest of all,\nShelley, was a declared atheist. In fearless utterance, in unfaltering\nzeal against the tyranny of Gods and Governments, Swinburne was like\nShelley. His drama Atalanta in Calydon (1865), even though a poet is\nstrictly not answerable for what the persons in his drama say, yet with\nits denunciation of \u201cthe supreme evil, God,\u201d heralded the coming\n\n[209] of a new champion who would defy the fortresses of authority. And\nin the following year his Poems and Ballads expressed the spirit of a\npagan who flouted all the prejudices and sanctities of the Christian\nworld.\n\nBut the most intense and exciting period of literary warfare against\northodoxy in England began about 1869, and lasted for about a dozen\nyears, during which enemies of dogma, of all complexions, were less\nreticent and more aggressive than at any other time in the century. Lord\nMorley has observed that \u201cthe force of speculative literature always\nhangs on practical opportuneness,\u201d and this remark is illustrated by the\nrationalistic literature of the seventies. It was a time of hope and\nfear, of progress and danger. Secularists and rationalists were\nencouraged by the Disestablishment of the Church in Ireland (1869), by\nthe Act which allowed atheists to give evidence in a court of justice\n(1869), by the abolition of religious tests at all the universities (a\nmeasure frequently attempted in vain) in 1871. On the other hand, the\nEducation Act of 1870, progressive though it was, disappointed the\nadvocates of secular education, and was an unwelcome sign of the\nstrength of ecclesiastical influence. Then there was the general alarm\nfelt in Europe by all outside the Roman Church,\n\n[210] and by some within it, at the decree of the infallibility of the\nPope (by the Vatican Council 1869\u201370), and an Englishman (Cardinal\nManning) was one of the most active spirits in bringing about this\ndecree. It would perhaps have caused less alarm if the Pope\u2019s\ndenunciation of modern errors had not been fresh in men\u2019s memories. At\nthe end of 1864 he startled the world by issuing a Syllabus \u201cembracing\nthe principal errors of our age.\u201d Among these were the propositions,\nthat every man is free to adopt and profess the religion he considers\ntrue, according to the light of reason; that the Church has no right to\nemploy force; that metaphysics can and ought to be pursued without\nreference to divine and ecclesiastical authority; that Catholic states\nare right to allow foreign immigrants to exercise their own religion in\npublic; that the Pope ought to make terms with progress, liberalism, and\nmodern civilization. The document was taken as a declaration of war\nagainst enlightenment, and the Vatican Council as the first strategic\nmove of the hosts of darkness. It seemed that the powers of obscurantism\nwere lifting up their heads with a new menace, and there was an\ninstinctive feeling that all the forces of reason should be brought into\nthe field. The history of the last forty years shows that the theory of\n\n[211] Infallibility, since it has become a dogma, is not more harmful\nthan it was before. But the efforts of the Catholic Church in the years\nfollowing the Council to overthrow the French Republic and to rupture\nthe new German Empire were sufficiently disquieting. Against this was to\nbe set the destruction of the temporal power of the Popes and the\ncomplete freedom of Italy. This event was the sunrise of Swinburne\u2019s\nSongs before Sunrise (which appeared in 1871), a seedplot of atheism and\nrevolution, sown with implacable hatred of creeds and tyrants. The most\nwonderful poem in the volume, the Hymn of Man, was written while the\nVatican Council was sitting. It is a song of triumph over the God of the\npriests, stricken by the doom of the Pope\u2019s temporal power. The\nconcluding verses will show the spirit.\n\n\u201cBy thy name that in hellfire was written, and burned at the point of\nthy sword, Thou art smitten, thou God, thou art smitten; thy death is\nupon thee, O Lord. And the lovesong of earth as thou diest resounds\nthrough the wind of her wings\u2014 Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is\nthe master of things.\u201d\n\n[212]\n\nThe fact that such a volume could appear with impunity vividly\nillustrates the English policy of enforcing the laws for blasphemy only\nin the case of publications addressed to the masses.\n\nPolitical circumstances thus invited and stimulated rationalists to come\nforward boldly, but we must not leave out of account the influence of\nthe Broad Church movement and of Darwinism. The Descent of Man appeared\nprecisely in 1871. A new, undogmatic Christianity was being preached in\npulpits. Mr. Leslie Stephen remarked (1873) that \u201cit may be said, with\nlittle exaggeration, that there is not only no article in the creeds\nwhich may not be contradicted with impunity, but that there is none\nwhich may not be contradicted in a sermon calculated to win the\nreputation of orthodoxy and be regarded as a judicious bid for a\nbishopric. The popular state of mind seems to be typified in the well-\nknown anecdote of the cautious churchwarden, who, whilst commending the\ngeneral tendency of his incumbent\u2019s sermon, felt bound to hazard a\nprotest upon one point. \u2018You see, sir,\u2019 as he apologetically explained,\n\u2018I think there be a God.\u2019 He thought it an error of taste or perhaps of\njudgment, to hint a doubt as to the first article of the creed.\u201d\n\nThe influence exerted among the cultivated\n\n[213] classes by the aesthetic movement (Ruskin, Morris, the Pre-\nRaphaelite painters; then Pater\u2019s Lectures on the Renaissance, 1873) was\nalso a sign of the times. For the attitude of these critics, artists,\nand poets was essentially pagan. The saving truths of theology were for\nthem as if they did not exist. The ideal of happiness was found in a\nregion in which heaven was ignored.\n\nThe time then seemed opportune for speaking out. Of the unorthodox books\nand essays, [2] which influenced the young and alarmed believers, in\nthese exciting years, most were the works of men who may be most fairly\ndescribed by the comprehensive term agnostics\u2014a name which had been\nrecently invented by Professor Huxley.\n\nThe agnostic holds that there are limits to human reason, and that\ntheology lies outside those limits. Within those limits lies the world\nwith which science (including psychology) deals. Science deals entirely\nwith phenomena, and has nothing to say to the nature of the ultimate\nreality which may lie behind phenomena. There are four possible\n\n[214] attitudes to this ultimate reality. There is the attitude of the\nmetaphysician and theologian, who are convinced not only that it exists\nbut that it can be at least partly known. There is the attitude of the\nman who denies that it exists; but he must be also a metaphysician, for\nits existence can only be disproved by metaphysical arguments. Then\nthere are those who assert that it exists but deny that we can know\nanything about it. And finally there are those who say that we cannot\nknow whether it exists or not. These last are \u201cagnostics\u201d in the strict\nsense of the term, men who profess not to know. The third class go\nbeyond phenomena in so far as they assert that there is an ultimate\nthough unknowable reality beneath phenomena. But agnostic is commonly\nused in a wide sense so as to include the third as well as the fourth\nclass\u2014those who assume an unknowable, as well as those who do not know\nwhether there is an unknowable or not. Comte and Spencer, for instance,\nwho believed in an unknowable, are counted as agnostics. The difference\nbetween an agnostic and an atheist is that the atheist positively denies\nthe existence of a personal God, the agnostic does not believe in it.\n\nThe writer of this period who held agnosticism\n\n[215] in its purest form, and who turned the dry light of reason on to\ntheological opinions with the most merciless logic, was Mr. Leslie\nStephen. His best-known essay, \u201cAn Agnostic\u2019s Apology\u201d (Fortnightly\nReview, 1876), raises the question, have the dogmas of orthodox\ntheologians any meaning? Do they offer, for this is what we want, an\nintelligible reconciliation of the discords in the universe? It is shown\nin detail that the various theological explanations of the dealings of\nGod with man, when logically pressed, issue in a confession of\nignorance. And what is this but agnosticism? You may call your doubt a\nmystery, but mystery is only the theological phrase for agnosticism.\n\u201cWhy, when no honest man will deny in private that every ultimate\nproblem is wrapped in the profoundest mystery, do honest men proclaim in\npulpits that unhesitating certainty is the duty of the most foolish and\nignorant? We are a company of ignorant beings, dimly discerning light\nenough for our daily needs, but hopelessly differing whenever we attempt\nto describe the ultimate origin or end of our paths; and yet, when one\nof us ventures to declare that we don\u2019t know the map of the Universe as\nwell as the map of our infinitesimal parish, he is hooted, reviled,\n\n[216] and perhaps told that he will be damned to all eternity for his\nfaithlessness.\u201d The characteristic of Leslie Stephen\u2019s essays is that\nthey are less directed to showing that orthodox theology is untrue as\nthat there is no reality about it, and that its solutions of\ndifficulties are sham solutions. If it solved any part of the mystery,\nit would be welcome, but it does not, it only adds new difficulties. It\nis \u201ca mere edifice of moonshine.\u201d The writer makes no attempt to prove\nby logic that ultimate reality lies outside the limits of human reason.\nHe bases this conclusion on the fact that all philosophers hopelessly\ncontradict one another; if the subject-matter of philosophy were, like\nphysical science, within the reach of the intelligence, some agreement\nmust have been reached.\n\nThe Broad Church movement, the attempts to liberalize Christianity, to\npour its old wine into new bottles, to make it unsectarian and\nundogmatic, to find compromises between theology and science, found no\nfavour in Leslie Stephen\u2019s eyes, and he criticized all this with a\ncertain contempt. There was a controversy about the efficacy of prayer.\nIs it reasonable, for instance, to pray for rain? Here science and\ntheology were at issue on a practical\n\n[217] point which comes within the domain of science. Some theologians\nadopted the compromise that to pray against an eclipse would be foolish,\nbut to pray for rain might be sensible. \u201cOne phenomenon,\u201d Stephen wrote,\n\u201cis just as much the result of fixed causes as the other; but it is\neasier for the imagination to suppose the interference of a divine agent\nto be hidden away somewhere amidst the infinitely complex play of\nforces, which elude our calculations in meteorological phenomena, than\nto believe in it where the forces are simple enough to admit of\nprediction. The distinction is of course invalid in a scientific sense.\nAlmighty power can interfere as easily with the events which are, as\nwith those which are not, in the Nautical Almanac. One cannot suppose\nthat God retreats as science advances, and that he spoke in thunder and\nlightning till Franklin unravelled the laws of their phenomena.\u201d\n\nAgain, when a controversy about hell engaged public attention, and some\notherwise orthodox theologians bethought themselves that eternal\npunishment was a horrible doctrine and then found that the evidence for\nit was not quite conclusive and were bold enough to say so, Leslie\nStephen stepped in to point out that, if so, historical\n\n[218] Christianity deserves all that its most virulent enemies have said\nabout it in this respect. When the Christian creed really ruled men\u2019s\nconsciences, nobody could utter a word against the truth of the dogma of\nhell. If that dogma had not an intimate organic connection with the\ncreed, if it had been a mere unimportant accident, it could not have\nbeen so vigorous and persistent wherever Christianity was strongest. The\nattempt to eliminate it or soften it down is a sign of decline. \u201cNow, at\nlast, your creed is decaying. People have discovered that you know\nnothing about it; that heaven and hell belong to dreamland; that the\nimpertinent young curate who tells me that I shall be burnt\neverlastingly for not sharing his superstition is just as ignorant as I\nam myself, and that I know as much as my dog. And then you calmly say\nagain, \u2018It is all a mistake. Only believe in a something \u2014and we will\nmake it as easy for you as possible. Hell shall have no more than a fine\nequable temperature, really good for the constitution; there shall be\nnobody in it except Judas Iscariot and one or two others; and even the\npoor Devil shall have a chance if he will resolve to mend his ways.\u2019 \u201d\n\nMr. Matthew Arnold may, I suppose, be numbered among the agnostics, but\nhe was\n\n[219] of a very different type. He introduced a new kind of criticism of\nthe Bible\u2014literary criticism. Deeply concerned for morality and\nreligion, a supporter of the Established Church, he took the Bible under\nhis special protection, and in three works, St. Paul and Protestantism,\n1870, Literature and Dogma, 1873, and God and the Bible, 1875, he\nendeavoured to rescue that book from its orthodox exponents, whom he\nregarded as the corrupters of Christianity. It would be just, he says,\n\u201cbut hardly perhaps Christian,\u201d to fling back the word infidel at the\northodox theologians for their bad literary and scientific criticisms of\nthe Bible and to speak of \u201cthe torrent of infidelity which pours every\nSunday from our pulpits!\u201d The corruption of Christianity has been due to\ntheology \u201cwith its insane licence of affirmation about God, its insane\nlicence of affirmation about immortality\u201d; to the hypothesis of \u201ca\nmagnified and non-natural man at the head of mankind\u2019s and the world\u2019s\naffairs\u201d; and the fancy account of God \u201cmade up by putting scattered\nexpressions of the Bible together and taking them literally.\u201d He\nchastises with urbane persiflage the knowledge which the orthodox think\nthey possess about the proceedings and plans of God. \u201cTo think they know\nwhat passed in the Council of the\n\n[220] Trinity is not hard to them; they could easily think they even\nknew what were the hangings of the Trinity\u2019s council-chamber.\u201d Yet \u201cthe\nvery expression, the Trinity, jars with the whole idea and character of\nBible-religion; but, lest the Socinian should be unduly elated at\nhearing this, let us hasten to add that so too, and just as much, does\nthe expression, a great Personal First Cause.\u201d He uses God as the least\ninadequate name for that universal order which the intellect feels after\nas a law, and the heart feels after as a benefit; and defines it as \u201cthe\nstream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their\nbeing.\u201d He defined it further as a Power that makes for righteousness,\nand thus went considerably beyond the agnostic position. He was\nimpatient of the minute criticism which analyzes the Biblical documents\nand discovers inconsistencies and absurdities, and he did not appreciate\nthe importance of the comparative study of religions. But when we read\nof a dignitary in a recent Church congress laying down that the\nnarratives in the books of Jonah and Daniel must be accepted because\nJesus quoted them, we may wish that Arnold were here to reproach the\northodox for \u201cwant of intellectual seriousness.\u201d\n\nThese years also saw the appearance of\n\n[221] Mr. John Morley\u2019s sympathetic studies of the French freethinkers\nof the eighteenth century, Voltaire (1872), Rousseau (1873), and Diderot\n(1878). He edited the Fortnightly Review, and for some years this\njournal was distinguished by brilliant criticisms on the popular\nreligion, contributed by able men writing from many points of view. A\npart of the book which he afterwards published under the title\nCompromise appeared in the Fortnightly in 1874. In Compromise, \u201cthe\nwhole system of objective propositions which make up the popular belief\nof the day\u201d is condemned as mischievous, and it is urged that those who\ndisbelieve should speak out plainly. Speaking out is an intellectual\nduty. Englishmen have a strong sense of political responsibility, and a\ncorrespondingly weak sense of intellectual responsibility. Even minds\nthat are not commonplace are affected for the worse by the political\nspirit which \u201cis the great force in throwing love of truth and accurate\nreasoning into a secondary place.\u201d And the principles which have\nprevailed in politics have been adopted by theology for her own use. In\nthe one case, convenience first, truth second; in the other, emotional\ncomfort first, truth second. If the immorality is less gross in the case\nof religion,\n\n[222] there is \u201cthe stain of intellectual improbity.\u201d And this is a\ncrime against society, for \u201cthey who tamper with veracity from whatever\nmotive are tampering with the vital force of human progress.\u201d The\nintellectual insincerity which is here blamed is just as prevalent to-\nday. The English have not changed their nature, the \u201cpolitical\u201d spirit\nis still rampant, and we are ruled by the view that because compromise\nis necessary in politics it is also a good thing in the intellectual\ndomain.\n\nThe Fortnightly under Mr. Morley\u2019s guidance was an effective organ of\nenlightenment. I have no space to touch on the works of other men of\nletters and of men of science in these combative years, but it is to be\nnoted that, while denunciations of modern thought poured from the\npulpits, a popular diffusion of freethought was carried on, especially\nby Mr. Bradlaugh in public lectures and in his paper, the National\nReformer, not without collisions with the civil authorities.\n\nIf we take the cases in which the civil authorities in England have\nintervened to repress the publication of unorthodox opinions during the\nlast two centuries, we find that the object has always been to prevent\nthe spread of freethought among the masses.\n\n[223] The victims have been either poor, uneducated people, or men who\npropagated freethought in a popular form. I touched upon this before in\nspeaking of Paine, and it is borne out by the prosecutions of the\nnineteenth and twentieth centuries. The unconfessed motive has been fear\nof the people. Theology has been regarded as a good instrument for\nkeeping the poor in order, and unbelief as a cause or accompaniment of\ndangerous political opinions. The idea has not altogether disappeared\nthat free thought is peculiarly indecent in the poor, that it is highly\ndesirable to keep them superstitious in order to keep them contented,\nthat they should be duly thankful for all the theological as well as\nsocial arrangements which have been made for them by their betters. I\nmay quote from an essay of Mr. Frederic Harrison an anecdote which\nadmirably expresses the becoming attitude of the poor towards\necclesiastical institutions. \u201cThe master of a workhouse in Essex was\nonce called in to act as chaplain to a dying pauper. The poor soul\nfaintly murmured some hopes of heaven. But this the master abruptly cut\nshort and warned him to turn his last thoughts towards hell. \u2018And\nthankful you ought to be,\u2019 said he, \u2018that you have a hell to go to.\u2019 \u201d\n\n[224]\n\nThe most important English freethinkers who appealed to the masses were\nHolyoake, [3] the apostle of \u201csecularism,\u201d and Bradlaugh. The great\nachievement for which Bradlaugh will be best remembered was the securing\nof the right of unbelievers to sit in Parliament without taking an oath\n(1888). The chief work to which Holyoake (who in his early years was\nimprisoned for blasphemy) contributed was the abolition of taxes on the\nPress, which seriously hampered the popular diffusion of knowledge. [4]\nIn England, censorship of the Press had long ago disappeared (above, p.\n139); in most other European countries it was abolished in the course of\nthe nineteenth century. [5]\n\nIn the progressive countries of Europe there has been a marked growth of\ntolerance (I do not mean legal toleration, but the tolerance\n\n[225] of public opinion) during the last thirty years. A generation ago\nLord Morley wrote: \u201cThe preliminary stage has scarcely been reached\u2014the\nstage in which public opinion grants to every one the unrestricted right\nof shaping his own beliefs, independently of those of the people who\nsurround him.\u201d I think this preliminary stage has now been passed. Take\nEngland. We are now far from the days when Dr. Arnold would have sent\nthe elder Mill to Botany Bay for irreligious opinions. But we are also\nfar from the days when Darwin\u2019s Descent created an uproar. Darwin has\nbeen buried in Westminster Abbey. To-day books can appear denying the\nhistorical existence of Jesus without causing any commotion. It may be\ndoubted whether what Lord Acton wrote in 1877 would be true now: \u201cThere\nare in our day many educated men who think it right to persecute.\u201d In\n1895, Lecky was a candidate for the representation of Dublin University.\nHis rationalistic opinions were indeed brought up against him, but he\nwas successful, though the majority of the constituents were orthodox.\nIn the seventies his candidature would have been hopeless. The old\ncommonplace that a freethinker is sure to be immoral is no longer heard.\nWe may say that we have now\n\n[226] reached a stage at which it is admitted by every one who counts\n(except at the Vatican), that there is nothing in earth or heaven which\nmay not legitimately be treated without any of the assumptions which in\nold days authority used to impose.\n\nIn this brief review of the triumphs of reason in the nineteenth\ncentury, we have been considering the discoveries of science and\ncriticism which made the old orthodoxy logically untenable. But the\nadvance in freedom of thought, the marked difference in the general\nattitude of men in all lands towards theological authority to-day from\nthe attitude of a hundred years ago, cannot altogether be explained by\nthe power of logic. It is not so much criticism of old ideas as the\nappearance of new ideas and interests that changes the views of men at\nlarge. It is not logical demonstrations but new social conceptions that\nbring about a general transformation of attitude towards ultimate\nproblems. Now the idea of the progress of the human race must, I think,\nbe held largely answerable for this change of attitude. It must, I\nthink, be held to have operated powerfully as a solvent of theological\nbeliefs. I have spoken of the teaching of Diderot and his friends that\nman\u2019s energies should be devoted to making the earth pleasant. A\n\n[227] new ideal was substituted for the old ideal based on theological\npropositions. It inspired the English Utilitarian philosophers (Bentham,\nJames Mill, J. S. Mill, Grote) who preached the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number as the supreme object of action and the basis of\nmorality. This ideal was powerfully reinforced by the doctrine of\nhistorical progress, which was started in France (1750) by Turgot, who\nmade progress the organic principle of history. It was developed by\nCondorcet (1793), and put forward by Priestley in England. The idea was\nseized upon by the French socialistic philosophers, Saint-Simon and\nFourier. The optimism of Fourier went so far as to anticipate the time\nwhen the sea would be turned by man\u2019s ingenuity into lemonade, when\nthere would be 37 million poets as great as Homer, 37 million writers as\ngreat as Moli\u00e8re, 37 million men of science equal to Newton. But it was\nComte who gave the doctrine weight and power. His social philosophy and\nhis religion of Humanity are based upon it. The triumphs of science\nendorsed it; it has been associated with, though it is not necessarily\nimplied in, the scientific theory of evolution; and it is perhaps fair\nto say that it has been the guiding spiritual force of the nineteenth\ncentury. It has introduced\n\n[228] the new ethical principle of duty to posterity. We shall hardly be\nfar wrong if we say that the new interest in the future and the progress\nof the race has done a great deal to undermine unconsciously the old\ninterest in a life beyond the grave; and it has dissolved the blighting\ndoctrine of the radical corruption of man.\n\nNowhere has the theory of progress been more emphatically recognized\nthan in the Monistic movement which has been exciting great interest in\nGermany (1910\u201312). This movement is based on the ideas of Haeckel, who\nis looked up to as the master; but those ideas have been considerably\nchanged under the influence of Ostwald, the new leader. While Haeckel is\na biologist, Ostwald\u2019s brilliant work was done in chemistry and physics.\nThe new Monism differs from the old, in the first place, in being much\nless dogmatic. It declares that all that is in our experience can be the\nobject of a corresponding science. It is much more a method than a\nsystem, for its sole ultimate object is to comprehend all human\nexperience in unified knowledge. Secondly, while it maintains, with\nHaeckel, evolution as the guiding principle in the history of living\nthings, it rejects his pantheism and his theory of thinking atoms. The\nold mechanical theory of the\n\n[229] physical world has been gradually supplanted by the theory of\nenergy, and Ostwald, who was one of the foremost exponents of energy,\nhas made it a leading idea of Monism. What has been called matter is, so\nfar as we know now, simply a complex of energies, and he has sought to\nextend the \u201cenergetic\u201d principle from physical or chemical to\nbiological, psychical, and social phenomena. But it is to be observed\nthat no finality is claimed for the conception of energy; it is simply\nan hypothesis which corresponds to our present stage of knowledge, and\nmay, as knowledge advances, be superseded.\n\nMonism resembles the positive philosophy and religion of Comte in so far\nas it means an outlook on life based entirely on science and excluding\ntheology, mysticism, and metaphysics. It may be called a religion, if we\nadopt Mr. MacTaggart\u2019s definition of religion as \u201can emotion resting on\na conviction of the harmony between ourselves and the universe at\nlarge.\u201d But it is much better not to use the word religion in connexion\nwith it, and the Monists have no thought of finding a Monistic, as Comte\nfounded a Positivist, church. They insist upon the sharp opposition\nbetween the outlook of science and the outlook of religion, and find the\nmark of spiritual progress in the fact that religion is\n\n[230] gradually becoming less indispensable. The further we go back in\nthe past, the more valuable is religion as an element in civilization;\nas we advance, it retreats more and more into the background, to be\nreplaced by science. Religions have been, in principle, pessimistic, so\nfar as the present world is concerned; Monism is, in principle,\noptimistic, for it recognizes that the process of his evolution has\novercome, in increasing measure, the bad element in man, and will go on\novercoming it still more. Monism proclaims that development and progress\nare the practical principles of human conduct, while the Churches,\nespecially the Catholic Church, have been steadily conservative, and\nthough they have been unable to put a stop to progress have endeavoured\nto suppress its symptoms\u2014to bottle up the steam. [6] The Monistic\ncongress at Hamburg in 1911 had a success which surprised its promoters.\nThe movement bids fair to be a powerful influence in diffusing\nrationalistic thought. [7]\n\nIf we take the three large States of\n\n[231] Western Europe, in which the majority of Christians are Catholics,\nwe see how the ideal of progress, freedom of thought, and the decline of\necclesiastical power go together. In Spain, where the Church has\nenormous power and wealth and can still dictate to the Court and the\npoliticians, the idea of progress, which is vital in France and Italy,\nhas not yet made its influence seriously felt. Liberal thought indeed is\nwidely spread in the small educated class, but the great majority of the\nwhole population are illiterate, and it is the interest of the Church to\nkeep them so. The education of the people, as all enlightened Spaniards\nconfess, is the pressing need of the country. How formidable are the\nobstacles which will have to be overcome before modern education is\nallowed to spread was shown four years ago by the tragedy of Francisco\nFerrer, which reminded everybody that in one corner of Western Europe\nthe mediaeval spirit is still vigorous. Ferrer had devoted himself to\nthe founding of modern schools in the province of Catalonia (since\n1901). He was a rationalist, and his schools, which had a marked\nsuccess, were entirely secular. The ecclesiastical authorities execrated\nhim, and in the summer of 1909 chance gave them the means of destroying\nhim. A strike of workmen at\n\n[232] Barcelona developed into a violent revolution, Ferrer happened to\nbe in Barcelona for some days at the beginning of the movement, with\nwhich he had no connection whatever, and his enemies seized the\nopportunity to make him responsible for it. False evidence (including\nforged documents) was manufactured. Evidence which would have helped his\ncase was suppressed. The Catholic papers agitated against him, and the\nleading ecclesiastics of Barcelona urged the Government not to spare the\nman who founded the modern schools, the root of all the trouble. Ferrer\nwas condemned by a military tribunal and shot (Oct. 13). He suffered in\nthe cause of reason and freedom of thought, though, as there is no\nlonger an Inquisition, his enemies had to kill him under the false\ncharge of anarchy and treason. It is possible that the indignation which\nwas felt in Europe and was most loudly expressed in France may prevent\nthe repetition of such extreme measures, but almost anything may happen\nin a country where the Church is so powerful and so bigoted, and the\npoliticians so corrupt.\n\n[1] From Greek monos, alone.\n\n[2] Besides the works referred to in the text, may be mentioned: Winwood\nReade, Martyrdom of Man, 1871; Mill, Three Essays on Religion; W. R.\nCassels, Supernatural Religion; Tyndall, Address to British Association\nat Belfast; Huxley, Animal Automatism; W. K. Clifford, Body and Mind;\nall in 1874.\n\n[3] It may be noted that Holyoake towards the end of his life helped to\nfound the Rationalist Press Association, of which Mr. Edward Clodd has\nbeen for many years Chairman. This is the chief society in England for\npropagating rationalism, and its main object is to diffuse in a cheap\nform the works of freethinkers of mark (cp. Bibliography). I understand\nthat more than two million copies of its cheap reprints have been sold.\n\n[4] The advertisement tax was abolished in 1853, the stamp tax in 1855,\nthe paper duty in 1861, and the optional duty in 1870.\n\n[5] In Austria-Hungary the police have the power to suppress printed\nmatter provisionally. In Russia the Press was declared free in 1905 by\nan Imperial decree, which, however, has become a dead letter. The\nnewspapers are completely under the control of the police.\n\n[6] I have taken these points, illustrating the Monistic attitude to the\nChurches, from Ostwald\u2019s Monistic Sunday Sermons (German), 1911, 1912.\n\n[7] I may note here that, as this is not a history of thought, I make no\nreference to recent philosophical speculations (in America, England, and\nFrance) which are sometimes claimed as tending to bolster up theology.\nBut they are all profoundly unorthodox.\n\n\n\n[233]\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE JUSTIFICATION OF LIBERTY OF THOUGHT\n\nMOST men who have been brought up in the free atmosphere of a modern\nState sympathize with liberty in its long struggle with authority and\nmay find it difficult to see that anything can be said for the\ntyrannical, and as they think extraordinarily perverse, policy by which\ncommunities and governments persistently sought to stifle new ideas and\nsuppress free speculation. The conflict sketched in these pages appears\nas a war between light and darkness. We exclaim that altar and throne\nformed a sinister conspiracy against the progress of humanity. We look\nback with horror at the things which so many champions of reason endured\nat the hands of blind, if not malignant, bearers of authority.\n\nBut a more or less plausible case can be made out for coercion. Let us\ntake the most limited view of the lawful powers of society over its\nindividual members. Let us lay down, with Mill, that \u201cthe sole end for\nwhich mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in\ninterfering with the liberty of action of any of their members is self-\nprotection,\u201d and that coercion is only justified\n\n[234] for the prevention of harm to others. This is the minimum claim\nthe State can make, and it will be admitted that it is not only the\nright but the duty of the State to prevent harm to its members. That is\nwhat it is for. Now no abstract or independent principle is\ndiscoverable, why liberty of speech should be a privileged form of\nliberty of action, or why society should lay down its arms of defence\nand fold its hands, when it is persuaded that harm is threatened to it\nthrough the speech of any of its members. The Government has to judge of\nthe danger, and its judgment may be wrong; but if it is convinced that\nharm is being done, is it not its plain duty to interfere?\n\nThis argument supplies an apology for the suppression of free opinion by\nGovernments in ancient and modern times. It can be urged for the\nInquisition, for Censorship of the Press, for Blasphemy laws, for all\ncoercive measures of the kind, that, if excessive or ill-judged, they\nwere intended to protect society against what their authors sincerely\nbelieved to be grave injury, and were simple acts of duty. (This\napology, of course, does not extend to acts done for the sake of the\nalleged good of the victims themselves, namely, to secure their future\nsalvation.)\n\nNowadays we condemn all such measures\n\n[235] and disallow the right of the State to interfere with the free\nexpression of opinion. So deeply is the doctrine of liberty seated in\nour minds that we find it difficult to make allowances for the coercive\npractices of our misguided ancestors. How is this doctrine justified? It\nrests on no abstract basis, on no principle independent of society\nitself, but entirely on considerations of utility.\n\nWe saw how Socrates indicated the social value of freedom of discussion.\nWe saw how Milton observed that such freedom was necessary for the\nadvance of knowledge. But in the period during which the cause of\ntoleration was fought for and practically won, the argument more\ngenerally used was the injustice of punishing a man for opinions which\nhe honestly held and could not help holding, since conviction is not a\nmatter of will; in other words, the argument that error is not a crime\nand that it is therefore unjust to punish it. This argument, however,\ndoes not prove the case for freedom of discussion. The advocate of\ncoercion may reply: We admit that it is unjust to punish a man for\nprivate erroneous beliefs; but it is not unjust to forbid the\npropagation of such beliefs if we are convinced that they are harmful;\nit is not unjust to punish him, not for holding them, but for publishing\nthem. The truth\n\n[236] is that, in examining principles, the word just is misleading. All\nthe virtues are based on experience, physiological or social, and\njustice is no exception. Just designates a class of rules or principles\nof which the social utility has been found by experience to be paramount\nand which are recognized to be so important as to override all\nconsiderations of immediate expediency. And social utility is the only\ntest. It is futile, therefore, to say to a Government that it acts\nunjustly in coercing opinion, unless it is shown that freedom of opinion\nis a principle of such overmastering social utility as to render other\nconsiderations negligible. Socrates had a true instinct in taking the\nline that freedom is valuable to society.\n\nThe reasoned justification of liberty of thought is due to J. S. Mill,\nwho set it forth in his work On Liberty, published in 1859. This book\ntreats of liberty in general, and attempts to fix the frontier of the\nregion in which individual freedom should be considered absolute and\nunassailable. The second chapter considers liberty of thought and\ndiscussion, and if many may think that Mill unduly minimized the\nfunctions of society, underrating its claims as against the individual,\nfew will deny the justice of the chief arguments or question the general\nsoundness of his conclusions.\n\n[237]\n\nPointing out that no fixed standard was recognized for testing the\npropriety of the interference on the part of the community with its\nindividual members, he finds the test in self-protection, that is, the\nprevention of harm to others. He bases the proposition not on abstract\nrights, but on \u201cutility, in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent\ninterests of man as a progressive being.\u201d He then uses the following\nargument to show that to silence opinion and discussion is always\ncontrary to those permanent interests. Those who would suppress an\nopinion (it is assumed that they are honest) deny its truth, but they\nare not infallible. They may be wrong, or right, or partly wrong and\npartly right. (1) If they are wrong and the opinion they would crush is\ntrue, they have robbed, or done their utmost to rob, mankind of a truth.\nThey will say: But we were justified, for we exercised our judgment to\nthe best of our ability, and are we to be told that because our judgment\nis fallible we are not to use it? We forbade the propagation of an\nopinion which we were sure was false and pernicious; this implies no\ngreater claim to infallibility than any act done by public authority. If\nwe are to act at all, we must assume our own opinion to be true. To this\nMill acutely replies: \u201cThere is the greatest difference\n\n[238] between assuming an opinion to be true, because with every\nopportunity for contesting it it has not been refuted, and assuming its\ntruth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty\nof contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which\njustifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action, and on no\nother terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance\nof being right.\u201d\n\n(2) If the received opinion which it is sought to protect against the\nintrusion of error is true, the suppression of discussion is still\ncontrary to general utility. A received opinion may happen to be true\n(it is very seldom entirely true); but a rational certainty that it is\nso can only be secured by the fact that it has been fully canvassed but\nhas not been shaken.\n\nCommoner and more important is (3) the case where the conflicting\ndoctrines share the truth between them. Here Mill has little difficulty\nin proving the utility of supplementing one-sided popular truths by\nother truths which popular opinion omits to consider. And he observes\nthat if either of the opinions which share the truth has a claim not\nmerely to be tolerated but to be encouraged, it is the one which happens\nto be held by the minority, since this is the one \u201cwhich\n\n[239] for the time being represents the neglected interests.\u201d He takes\nthe doctrines of Rousseau, which might conceivably have been suppressed\nas pernicious. To the self-complacent eighteenth century those doctrines\ncame as \u201ca salutary shock, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided\nopinion.\u201d The current opinions were indeed nearer to the truth than\nRousseau\u2019s, they contained much less of error; \u201cnevertheless there lay\nin Rousseau\u2019s doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along\nwith it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular\nopinion wanted; and these are the deposit which we left behind when the\nflood subsided.\u201d\n\nSuch is the drift of Mill\u2019s main argument. The present writer would\nprefer to state the justification of freedom of opinion in a somewhat\ndifferent form, though in accordance with Mill\u2019s reasoning. The progress\nof civilization, if it is partly conditioned by circumstances beyond\nman\u2019s control, depends more, and in an increasing measure, on things\nwhich are within his own power. Prominent among these are the\nadvancement of knowledge and the deliberate adaptation of his habits and\ninstitutions to new conditions. To advance knowledge and to correct\nerrors, unrestricted freedom of discussion is required.\n\n[240] History shows that knowledge grew when speculation was perfectly\nfree in Greece, and that in modern times, since restrictions on inquiry\nhave been entirely removed, it has advanced with a velocity which would\nseem diabolical to the slaves of the mediaeval Church. Then, it is\nobvious that in order to readjust social customs, institutions, and\nmethods to new needs and circumstances, there must be unlimited freedom\nof canvassing and criticizing them, of expressing the most unpopular\nopinions, no matter how offensive to prevailing sentiment they may be.\nIf the history of civilization has any lesson to teach it is this: there\nis one supreme condition of mental and moral progress which it is\ncompletely within the power of man himself to secure, and that is\nperfect liberty of thought and discussion. The establishment of this\nliberty may be considered the most valuable achievement of modern\ncivilization, and as a condition of social progress it should be deemed\nfundamental. The considerations of permanent utility on which it rests\nmust outweigh any calculations of present advantage which from time to\ntime might be thought to demand its violation.\n\nIt is evident that this whole argument depends on the assumption that\nthe progress of the race, its intellectual and moral development,\n\n[241] is a reality and is valuable. The argument will not appeal to any\none who holds with Cardinal Newman that \u201cour race\u2019s progress and\nperfectibility is a dream, because revelation contradicts it\u201d; and he\nmay consistently subscribe to the same writer\u2019s conviction that \u201cit\nwould be a gain to this country were it vastly more superstitious, more\nbigoted, more gloomy, more fierce in its religion, than at present it\nshows itself to be.\u201d\n\nWhile Mill was writing his brilliant Essay, which every one should read,\nthe English Government of the day (1858) instituted prosecutions for the\ncirculation of the doctrine that it is lawful to put tyrants to death,\non the ground that the doctrine is immoral. Fortunately the prosecutions\nwere not persisted in. Mill refers to the matter, and maintains that\nsuch a doctrine as tyrannicide (and, let us add, anarchy) does not form\nany exception to the rule that \u201cthere ought to exist the fullest liberty\nof professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any\ndoctrine, however immoral it may be considered.\u201d\n\nExceptions, cases where the interference of the authorities is proper,\nare only apparent, for they really come under another rule. For\ninstance, if there is a direct instigation\n\n[242] to particular acts of violence, there may be a legitimate case for\ninterference. But the incitement must be deliberate and direct. If I\nwrite a book condemning existing societies and defending a theory of\nanarchy, and a man who reads it presently commits an outrage, it may\nclearly be established that my book made the man an anarchist and\ninduced him to commit the crime, but it would be illegitimate to punish\nme or suppress the book unless it contained a direct incitement to the\nspecific crime which he committed.\n\nIt is conceivable that difficult cases might arise where a government\nmight be strongly tempted, and might be urged by public clamour, to\nviolate the principle of liberty. Let us suppose a case, very\nimprobable, but which will make the issue clear and definite. Imagine\nthat a man of highly magnetic personality, endowed with a wonderful\npower of infecting others with his own ideas however irrational, in\nshort a typical religious leader, is convinced that the world will come\nto an end in the course of a few months. He goes about the country\npreaching and distributing pamphlets; his words have an electrical\neffect; and the masses of the uneducated and half-educated are persuaded\nthat they have indeed only a few weeks to prepare for the day of\nJudgment. Multitudes leave their\n\n[243] occupations, abandon their work, in order to spend the short time\nthat remains in prayer and listening to the exhortations of the prophet.\nThe country is paralyzed by the gigantic strike; traffic and industries\ncome to a standstill. The people have a perfect legal right to give up\ntheir work, and the prophet has a perfect legal right to propagate his\nopinion that the end of the world is at hand \u2014an opinion which Jesus\nChrist and his followers in their day held quite as erroneously. It\nwould be said that desperate ills have desperate remedies, and there\nwould be a strong temptation to suppress the fanatic. But to arrest a\nman who is not breaking the law or exhorting any one to break it, or\ncausing a breach of the peace, would be an act of glaring tyranny. Many\nwill hold that the evil of setting back the clock of liberty would out-\nbalance all the temporary evils, great as they might be, caused by the\npropagation of a delusion. It would be absurd to deny that liberty of\nspeech may sometimes cause particular harm. Every good thing sometimes\ndoes harm. Government, for instance, which makes fatal mistakes; law,\nwhich so often bears hardly and inequitably in individual cases. And can\nthe Christians urge any other plea for their religion when they are\nunpleasantly reminded that it has caused untold\n\n[244] suffering by its principle of exclusive salvation?\n\nOnce the principle of liberty of thought is accepted as a supreme\ncondition of social progress, it passes from the sphere of ordinary\nexpediency into the sphere of higher expediency which we call justice.\nIn other words it becomes a right on which every man should be able to\ncount. The fact that this right is ultimately based on utility does not\njustify a government in curtailing it, on the ground of utility, in\nparticular cases.\n\nThe recent rather alarming inflictions of penalties for blasphemy in\nEngland illustrate this point. It was commonly supposed that the\nBlasphemy laws (see above, p. 139), though unrepealed, were a dead\nletter. But since December, 1911, half a dozen persons have been\nimprisoned for this offence. In these cases Christian doctrines were\nattacked by poor and more or less uneducated persons in language which\nmay be described as coarse and offensive. Some of the judges seem to\nhave taken the line that it is not blasphemy to attack the fundamental\ndoctrines provided \u201cthe decencies of controversy\u201d are preserved, but\nthat \u201cindecent\u201d attacks constitute blasphemy. This implies a new\ndefinition of legal blasphemy, and is entirely contrary to the intention\nof the laws. Sir\n\n[245] J. F. Stephen pointed out that the decisions of judges from the\ntime of Lord Hale (XVIIth century) to the trial of Foote (1883) laid\ndown the same doctrine and based it on the same principle: the doctrine\nbeing that it is a crime either to deny the truth of the fundamental\ndoctrines of the Christian religion or to hold them up to contempt or\nridicule; and the principle being that Christianity is a part of the law\nof the land.\n\nThe apology offered for such prosecutions is that their object is to\nprotect religious sentiment from insult and ridicule. Sir J. F. Stephen\nobserved: \u201cIf the law were really impartial and punished blasphemy only,\nbecause it offends the feelings of believers, it ought also to punish\nsuch preaching as offends the feelings of unbelievers. All the more\nearnest and enthusiastic forms of religion are extremely offensive to\nthose who do not believe them.\u201d If the law does not in any sense\nrecognize the truth of Christian doctrine, it would have to apply the\nsame rule to the Salvation Army. In fact the law \u201ccan be explained and\njustified only on what I regard as its true principle\u2014the principle of\npersecution.\u201d The opponents of Christianity may justly say: If\nChristianity is false, why is it to be attacked only in polite language?\nIts goodness depends on its truth. If you\n\n[246] grant its falsehood, you cannot maintain that it deserves special\nprotection. But the law imposes no restraint on the Christian, however\noffensive his teaching may be to those who do not agree with him;\ntherefore it is not based on an impartial desire to prevent the use of\nlanguage which causes offence; therefore it is based on the hypothesis\nthat Christianity is true; and therefore its principle is persecution.\n\nOf course, the present administration of the common law in regard to\nblasphemy does not endanger the liberty of those unbelievers who have\nthe capacity for contributing to progress. But it violates the supreme\nprinciple of liberty of opinion and discussion. It hinders uneducated\npeople from saying in the only ways in which they know how to say it,\nwhat those who have been brought up differently say, with impunity, far\nmore effectively and far more insidiously. Some of the men who have been\nimprisoned during the last two years, only uttered in language of\ndeplorable taste views that are expressed more or less politely in books\nwhich are in the library of a bishop unless he is a very ignorant\nperson, and against which the law, if it has any validity, ought to have\nbeen enforced. Thus the law, as now administered, simply penalizes bad\ntaste and places disabilities\n\n[247] upon uneducated freethinkers. If their words offend their audience\nso far as to cause a disturbance, they should be prosecuted for a breach\nof public order, [1] not because their words are blasphemous. A man who\nrobs or injures a church, or even an episcopal palace, is not prosecuted\nfor sacrilege, but for larceny or malicious damage or something of the\nkind.\n\nThe abolition of penalties for blasphemy was proposed in the House of\nCommons (by Bradlaugh) in 1889 and rejected. The reform is urgently\nneeded. It would \u201cprevent the recurrence at irregular intervals of\nscandalous prosecutions which have never in any one instance benefited\nany one, least of all the cause which they were intended to serve, and\nwhich sometimes afford a channel for the gratification of private malice\nunder the cloak of religion.\u201d [2]\n\nThe struggle of reason against authority has ended in what appears now\nto be a decisive and permanent victory for liberty. In the most\ncivilized and progressive countries, freedom of discussion is recognized\nas a\n\n[248] fundamental principle. In fact, we may say it is accepted as a\ntest of enlightenment, and the man in the street is forward in\nacknowledging that countries like Russia and Spain, where opinion is\nmore or less fettered, must on that account be considered less civilized\nthan their neighbours. All intellectual people who count take it for\ngranted that there is no subject in heaven or earth which ought not to\nbe investigated without any deference or reference to theological\nassumptions. No man of science has any fear of publishing his\nresearches, whatever consequences they may involve for current beliefs.\nCriticism of religious doctrines and of political and social\ninstitutions is free. Hopeful people may feel confident that the victory\nis permanent; that intellectual freedom is now assured to mankind as a\npossession for ever; that the future will see the collapse of those\nforces which still work against it and its gradual diffusion in the more\nbackward parts of the earth. Yet history may suggest that this prospect\nis not assured. Can we be certain that there may not come a great set-\nback? For freedom of discussion and speculation was, as we saw, fully\nrealized in the Greek and Roman world, and then an unforeseen force, in\nthe shape of Christianity, came in and laid chains upon the human mind\nand\n\n[249] suppressed freedom and imposed upon man a weary struggle to\nrecover the freedom which he had lost. Is it not conceivable that\nsomething of the same kind may occur again? that some new force,\nemerging from the unknown, may surprise the world and cause a similar\nset-back?\n\nThe possibility cannot be denied, but there are some considerations\nwhich render it improbable (apart from a catastrophe sweeping away\nEuropean culture). There are certain radical differences between the\nintellectual situation now and in antiquity. The facts known to the\nGreeks about the nature of the physical universe were few. Much that was\ntaught was not proved. Compare what they knew and what we know about\nastronomy and geography\u2014to take the two branches in which (besides\nmathematics) they made most progress. When there were so few\ndemonstrated facts to work upon, there was the widest room for\nspeculation. Now to suppress a number of rival theories in favour of one\nis a very different thing from suppressing whole systems of established\nfacts. If one school of astronomers holds that the earth goes round the\nsun, another that the sun goes round the earth, but neither is able to\ndemonstrate its proposition, it is easy for an authority, which has\ncoercive power,\n\n[250] to suppress one of them successfully. But once it is agreed by all\nastronomers that the earth goes round the sun, it is a hopeless task for\nany authority to compel men to accept a false view. In short, because\nshe is in possession of a vast mass of ascertained facts about the\nnature of the universe, reason holds a much stronger position now than\nat the time when Christian theology led her captive. All these facts are\nher fortifications. Again, it is difficult to see what can arrest the\ncontinuous progress of knowledge in the future. In ancient times this\nprogress depended on a few; nowadays, many nations take part in the\nwork. A general conviction of the importance of science prevails to-day,\nwhich did not prevail in Greece. And the circumstance that the advance\nof material civilization depends on science is perhaps a practical\nguarantee that scientific research will not come to an abrupt halt. In\nfact science is now a social institution, as much as religion.\n\nBut if science seems pretty safe, it is always possible that in\ncountries where the scientific spirit is held in honour, nevertheless,\nserious restrictions may be laid on speculations touching social,\npolitical, and religious questions. Russia has men of science inferior\nto none, and Russia has its notorious censorship. It\n\n[251] is by no means inconceivable that in lands where opinion is now\nfree coercion might be introduced. If a revolutionary social movement\nprevailed, led by men inspired by faith in formulas (like the men of the\nFrench Revolution) and resolved to impose their creed, experience shows\nthat coercion would almost inevitably be resorted to. Nevertheless,\nwhile it would be silly to suppose that attempts may not be made in the\nfuture to put back the clock, liberty is in a far more favourable\nposition now than under the Roman Empire. For at that time the social\nimportance of freedom of opinion was not appreciated, whereas now, in\nconsequence of the long conflict which was necessary in order to re-\nestablish it, men consciously realize its value. Perhaps this conviction\nwill be strong enough to resist all conspiracies against liberty.\nMeanwhile, nothing should be left undone to impress upon the young that\nfreedom of thought is an axiom of human progress. It may be feared,\nhowever, that this is not likely to be done for a long time to come. For\nour methods of early education are founded on authority. It is true that\nchildren are sometimes exhorted to think for themselves. But the parent\nor instructor who gives this excellent advice is confident that the\nresults of the child\u2019s thinking for\n\n[252] himself will agree with the opinions which his elders consider\ndesirable. It is assumed that he will reason from principles which have\nalready been instilled into him by authority. But if his thinking for\nhimself takes the form of questioning these principles, whether moral or\nreligious, his parents and teachers, unless they are very exceptional\npersons, will be extremely displeased, and will certainly discourage\nhim. It is, of course, only singularly promising children whose freedom\nof thought will go so far. In this sense it might be said that \u201cdistrust\nthy father and mother\u201d is the first commandment with promise. It should\nbe a part of education to explain to children, as soon as they are old\nenough to understand, when it is reasonable, and when it is not, to\naccept what they are told, on authority.\n\n[1] Blasphemy is an offence in Germany; but it must be proved that\noffence has actually been given, and the penalty does not exceed\nimprisonment for three days.\n\n[2] The quotations are from Sir J. F. Stephen\u2019s article, \u201cBlasphemy and\nBlasphemous Libel,\u201d in the Fortnightly Review, March, 1884, pp. 289\u2013318.\n\n[253]\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n        General\nLecky, W. E. H., History of the Rise and Influence of the\n   Spirit of Rationalism in Europe, 2 vols. (originally published\n   in 1865). White, A. D., A History of the Warfare\n   of Science with Theology in Christendom, 2 vols., 1896.\n   Robertson, J. M., A Short History of Free-thought, Ancient\n   and Modern, 2 vols., 1906.       [Comprehensive, but the\n   notices of the leading freethinkers are necessarily brief, as\n   the field covered is so large.   The judgments are always\n   independent.]    Benn, A. W., The History of English\n   Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols., 1906.\n   [Very full and valuable]\n\n        Greek Thought\nGomperz, Th., Greek Thinkers (English translation), 4 vols.\n   (1901-12).\n\n        English Deists\nStephen, Leslie, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth\n   Century, vol. i, 1881.\n\n        French Freethinkers of Eighteenth Century\nMorley,   J., Voltaire; Diderot     and     the Encyclopaedists;\n   Rousseau (see above, Chapter VI).\n\n        Rationalistic Criticism of the Bible\n           (Nineteenth Century)\nArticles in Encyclopoedia Biblica, 4 vols.  Duff, A., History of\n   Old Testament Criticism, 1910.   Conybeare, F. C., History\n   of New Testament Criticism, 1910.\n\n        Persecution and Inquisition\nLea, H., A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, 3\n   vols., 1888; A History of the Inquisition of Spain, 4 vols.,\n   1906.  Haynes, E. S. P., Religious Persecution, 1904.\n   For the case of Ferrer see Archer, W., The Life, Trial\n   and Death of Francisco Ferrer, 1911, and McCabe, J.,\n   The Martyrdom of Ferrer, 1909.\n\n        Toleration\nRuffini, F., Religious Liberty (English translation), 1912.\n   The essays of L. Luzzatti. Liberty of Conscience and\n   Science (Italian), are suggestive.\n\n[254]\n\nINDEX\n\nAesthetic movement, 213\nAgnosticism, meaning of, 213 sq.\nAlbigeois, persecution of, 58\nAnabaptists, 78, 95, 125\nAnatomy, 65\nAnaxagoras, 27\nAnnet, Peter, 172\nAnthropology, 189\nAnthropomorphism. 23\nAristotle, 35, 68, 69\nArnold, Matthew, 218 sqq.\nAsoka, 92\nAstronomy, 87\u201490\nAtheism, 103, 113, 123, 132, 158\nAthens, 27 sqq.\nAugustine, St., 55\nAustria-Hungary, 122, 224\nAuthority, meaning of, 14 sqq.\nAverroism, 88\n\nBacon, Roger, 85\nBahrdt, 175\nRain, A., 188\nBayle, 107 sq., 135 sqq.\nBenn, A. W, 152\nBible, O. T., 192 sqq.; N. T., 195 sqq\nBible-worship, 82, 201\nBlasphemy laws, 23, 88, 139 sq., 244 sqq.\nBolingbroke, 153\nBradlaugh, 228, 247\nBruno, Giordano, 84\nB\u00fcchner, 188\nBuckle, 188\nButler, Bishop, Analogy, 151 sq.\n\nCalvin, 78\nCassels, W\nCastellion, 94\nCausation, Law of, 183 sq.\nCharron. 75\nCicero, 39\nClifford, W. K., 213\nClodd, Edward, 224\nColenso, Bishop, 193\nCollins, Anthony, 141\nComte, Auguste. 188 sq., 229\nConcordat of 1801, French, 115\n\nCondorcet, 227\nCongregationalists (Independents), 95, 99, 100\nConstantine I, Emperor, 47, 51\nCopernicus, 87\n\nDarwin; Darwinism, 180, 182, 225\nDefoe, Daniel, 104 sq.\nDeism, 137 sqq.\nDemocritus, 25\nDescartes, 129, 131\nDesign, argument from, 181, 178\nD\u2019Holbach, 158\nDiderot, 158 sq.\nDiocletian, Emperor, 45\nDisestablishment, 104, 108\nDodwell, Henry, 147\nDomitian, Emperor, 42\nDouble Truth, 68 sq., 134\n\nEdelmann, 175\nEpicureanism, 36 sqq., 84\nEssays and Review, 204 sqq.\nEuripides, 29\nExclusive salvation, 52 sq., 63, 78\n\nFerrer, Francisco, 231 sq.\nFortnightly Review, 221\nFourier, 227\nFrance, 74, 100 sqq., 152 sqq.\nFrederick the Great, 120 sq.\nFrederick II, Emperor, 58, 70\nFree thought, meaning of, 18\n\nGalileo de\u2019 Galilei, 87 sqq.\nGassendi, 130\nGeology, 178 sq.\nGermany, 78 sqq., 117 sqq., 174 sqq.\nGibbon, 82, 162 sqq.\nGoethe, 175\nGreg, W. R., 203\nGregory IX, Pope, 57\nGregory XVI, Encyclical of, 123 sq.\n\nHaeckel, 187, 228\nHale, Lord Chief Justice, 139\nHarrison, Frederic, 188, 223\nHegel, 184 sqq.\nHell, controversy on, 217\n\n[255]\nHelmholtz, 182\nHeraclitus, 25\nHerbert of Cherbury, Lord, 149\nHippocrates, 64\nHobbes, 130 sq.\nHolland, 95, 107, 130, 131\nHolyoake, 224\nHomer, 24\nHume, 160 sqq.\nHuxley, 213\n\nIndependents, 95, 98 sq.\nInfallibility, Papal, 210 sq.\nInnocent III, Pope, 56\nInnocent IV, Pope, 57\nInnocent VIII, Pope, 67\nInquisition, 57 sqq.;  Spanish, 59 sqq.; Roman, 83, 84, 87 sqq.\nItaly, 122 sqq., 210\n\nJames I (England). 85 sq.\nJews, 41 sqq., 68, 99, 105, 111, 194\nJoseph II, Emperor, 122\nJowett, Benjamin, 204 sq.\nJulian, Emperor, 54\nJustice, arguments from, 235\n\nKant, 175 sq.\nKett, Francis, 85\nKyd, 85\n\nLaplace, 178\nLecky. W. H., 208, 225\nLegate, Bartholomew, 86\nLessing, 71, 120\nLinnaeus, 177\nLocke, 101 sqq., 120, 132 sq.\nLoisy, Abb\u00e9, 200 sq.\nLucian, 40\nLucretius, 37 sq.\nLuther, 77 sq., 81\nLyell, 178, 208\n\nManning, Cardinal, 210\nMarlowe, Christopher, 85\nMarsilius, 119\nMaryland, 97 sq.\nMazarin, Cardinal, 85, 107\nMiddleton, Conyers, 150, 164\nMill, James, 151, 227\nMill, J. S., 182, 213, 227, 233, 235 sqq.\nMilton, 99 sq.\nMirabeau, 112\nMiracles, 141 sqq., 151, 180, 164 sq., 206\nModernism, 199 sqq.\nMohammedan free thought, 68\nMonism, 188, 228 sqq.\n\nMontaigne, 74\nMorley, Lord (Mr. John), 159, 209, 221 sq., 225\n\nNantes, Edict of, 107\nNapoleon I, 115\nNewman, Cardinal, 199, 241\nNewman, F. W., 203\n\nOstwald, Professor, 228 sqq.\n\nPaine, Thomas, 112, 168 sqq.\nPaley, 167 sqq.\nPascal, 123, 152 sq.\nPater, 213\nPentateuch, 192 sq.\nPericles, 27\nPersecution, theory of, 47 sqq., 232 sqq.\nPitt, William, 151\nPius IX, Syllabus, 210 sq.\nPius X, Pope, 199 sq.\nPlato, 36 sq.\nPlutarch, 150\nPrayer, controversy on, 216\nPress, censorship, 91 sq., 224 sq.\nPriestley, 227\nPriscillian, 55\nProgress, idea of, 226 sqq.\nProtagoras, 25\n\nRaleigh, Sir W., 85\nRationalism, meaning of, 18\nReade, Winwood, 213\nReinach, S., 197\nRenan, 198\nRevolution, French, 111 sqq.\nRhode Island, 98\nRichelieu, Cardinal, 85, 107\nRousseau. 111, 156 sqq., 239\nRuffini, Professor, 125\nRussia, 224\n\nSacred books, 24, 53 sq., 191\nScience, physical, 64 sq., 176 sqq.\nSecularism, 224\nSeeley, J. R., 208\nServetus, 79\nShaftesbury. 148 sqq., 151\nShelley, 173, 208\nSocinianism, 83, 93 sqq.\nSocrates, 30 sqq., 39, 235, 236\nSophists, Greek, 26\nSpain, 59 sqq., 231 sq.\nSpencer, Herbert. 187\nSpinoza, 131 sq., 138, 191\nStephen. Leslie, 167, 215 sqq.\nStephen, J. F.. 203, 245 sq., 247\nStoicism, 36, 38 sq.\n\n[256]\nStrauss, David, 195, 198\nSwinburne. 208, 211 sq.\n\nTamburini. 122\nTatian, 44\nThemistius, 55\nTheodosius I, Emperor, 54\nTheophilanthropy, 114 sq.\nThomas Aquinas, 69\nThomasius, Chr., 119\nThree Rings, story of, 70\nTiherius, Emperor, 40\nTindal, Matthew, 144 sqq.\nToland, 133 sq.\nToleration, 46 sqq., 92 sqq.\nTrajan, Emperor, 42\nTurgot, 227\nTyndall, 213\n\nUnitarians, 93, 105\nUnited States, 96 sqq., 128\nUniversities, tests at, 108\nUtilitarianism, 227\n\nVanini, Lucilio, 85\nVatican Council (1869\u201470), 210\nVoltaire, 108 sqq., 114, 121, 153 sqq.\n\nWesley, 130\nWestbury, Lord, 207\nWilberforce, 201\nWilliams, Roger, 96 sq.\nWitchcraft, 66 sq., 80, 129 sq.\nWoolston, 141 sqq.\n\nXenophanes, 23 sq.","title":"A History of Freedom of Thought","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":53929}