{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_10827/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_10827","id":"gutenberg_10827","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10827","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - European","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Livy. Ab urbe condita","Political science -- Early works to 1800","Rome -- Historiography"],"text":"Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius\n\nby Niccolo Machiavelli\n\nCITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BY\n\nNINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A.\n\n\nLONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883\n\n\nTO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI.\n\nDEAR PROFESSOR VILLARI,\n\n\nPermit me to inscribe your name on a translation of Machiavelli\u2019s\nDiscourses which I had your encouragement to undertake, and in which I\nhave done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original.\nYours faithfully,\n\nNINIAN HILL THOMSON.\n\n\nFLORENCE, May 17, 1883.\n\nBOOK I.\n\nPREFACE\n\nCHAPTER\n\n\nI. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of\nRome\n\nII. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman\nCommonwealth belonged\n\nIII. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of\nthe People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect\n\nIV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made\nRome free and powerful\n\nV. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of\nthe Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire\npower, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of\ncommotions\n\nVI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as\nwould have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate\n\nVII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to\naccuse\n\nVIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to\naccuse is useful\n\nIX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct\nold institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man\n\nX. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth\nmerits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame\n\nXI. Of the Religion of the Romans\n\nXII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that\nItaly, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined\n\nXIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to\ntheir City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults\n\nXIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and\nmade a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced\nto disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished\n\nXV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had\nrecourse to Religion\n\nXVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any\naccident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom\n\nXVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it\n\nXVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be\npreserved, or not existing may be created\n\nXIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but\nafter one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second\n\nXX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great\nresults: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a\nsuccession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly\nextended\n\nXXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be\nwithout a National Army\n\nXXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and\nthe three Alban Curiatii\n\nXXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not\nforth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often\nhurtful\n\nXXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments\nfor their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds\n\nXXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must\nretain at least the semblance of old ways\n\nXXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken\npossession, ought to make everything new\n\nXXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad\n\nXXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their\ncitizens than were the Athenians\n\nXXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful\n\nXXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude;\nand how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it\n\nXXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity\nfor misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through\ntheir ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all\n\nXXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until\nthey are forced to yield them\n\nXXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is\nsafer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence\n\nXXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the\nRoman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the\nfree suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp\nfor themselves that are pernicious to a State\n\nXXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought\nabout by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the\nliberties of that Republic\n\nXXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth\nshould not disdain the lower\n\nXXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is\na great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to\nancient usage with stringent retrospective effect\n\nXXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the\ncourse they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice\n\nXXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different\nNations\n\nXL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to\nbe noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes\nmay lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth\n\nXLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or\nto a haughty bearing from a humble\n\nXLII. How easily men become corrupted\n\nXLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute\nSoldiers\n\nXLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should\nnot with the same breath threaten and ask leave\n\nXLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not\nto observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity\nin a City is most hurtful to the Governor\n\nXLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at\nfirst to escape injury, and then to injure others\n\nXLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in\nparticulars they judge truly\n\nXLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or\nwicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is\nutterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest\ndegree noble and good\n\nXLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom,\nhave had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their\nfreedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find\nthis almost impossible\n\nL. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to\nbring the Government of a City to a stay\n\nLI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done\nby choice\n\nLII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too\npowerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to\nobjection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to\nadvance himself\n\nLIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often\ndesire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave\npromises easily move them\n\nLIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain\nan excited Multitude\n\nLV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body\nof the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible\nwhere equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not\n\nLVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country,\nsigns are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them\n\nLVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak\n\nLVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince\n\nLIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we\nmake with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes\n\nLX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were\ngiven without respect to Age\n\nBOOK II.\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nI. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or\nto Fortune\n\nII. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these\nwere in defending their Freedom\n\nIII. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round\nabout her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of\nCitizenship\n\nIV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their\npower\n\nV. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and\nPestilences, obliterate the memory of the past\n\nVI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War\n\nVII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist\n\nVIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the\nCountries of others\n\nIX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States\n\nX. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War\n\nXI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has\nreputation rather than strength\n\nXII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to\nawait it\n\nXIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than\nby Force\n\nXIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility\n\nXV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that\ntardy resolves are always hurtful\n\nXVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of\nancient Warfare\n\nXVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to\nArtillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be\njust\n\nXVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient\nwarfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse\n\nXIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not\nthe valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to\ntheir aggrandizement\n\nXX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to\nAuxiliary or Mercenary Arms\n\nXXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Pr\u00e6tor;\nnor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war\n\nXXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss\n\nXXIII. That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it\nthe Romans always avoided half measures\n\nXXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good\n\nXXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think\nto get possession of it through its divisions\n\nXXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them,\nwithout yielding him any advantage\n\nXXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have\nobtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory\nturns to defeat\n\nXXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or\nprivate, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth\n\nXXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have\nthem hinder her designs\n\nXXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy\nFriendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of their\nprowess\n\nXXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men\n\nXXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns\n\nXXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the\nfullest Powers\n\nBOOK III.\n\n\nI. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought\nback to its beginnings\n\nII. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly\n\nIII. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of\nBrutus\n\nIV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live\nwhom he has deprived of it\n\nV. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom\n\nVI. Of Conspiracies\n\nVII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from\nServitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at\nother times reek with blood\n\nVIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give\nheed to its character and condition\n\nIX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times\n\nX. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him\nat all hazards\n\nXI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than\nthey, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset\n\nXII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his\nown Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity\n\nXIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army,\nor to a valiant Army with a weak Captain\n\nXIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights\nor Sounds\n\nXV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is\ndisadvantageous to have more leaders than one\n\nXVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in\nquiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended\nby wealth or connection who are most in favour\n\nXVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an\nimportant Office or Command\n\nXVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to\nforestall the designs of his adversary\n\nXIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a\nMultitude\n\nXX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all\nthe might of the Roman Arms\n\nXXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that\ntaken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other\nachieved in Spain\n\nXXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of\nValerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory\n\nXXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome\n\nXXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude\n\nXXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens\n\nXXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States\n\nXXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false\nopinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided\n\nXXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are\nabout; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance\nof generous deeds\n\nXXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince\n\nXXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render\nsignal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a\nCity should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy\n\nXXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every\nchange the same spirit and bearing\n\nXXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible\n\nXXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your\nsoldiers with confidence in one another and in you\n\nXXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic\nare led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are\nbestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince\n\nXXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new\nmeasures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the\ndanger\n\nXXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at\nthe beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less\nthan Women\n\nXXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes;\nand how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy\n\nXXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide\n\nXXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places\n\nXL. That Fraud is fair in War\n\nXLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and\nin either way is well defended\n\nXLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed\n\nXLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times\nnearly the same character\n\nXLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often\nsucceed\n\nXLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy\u2019s\nattack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset\n\nXLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated\n\nXLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget\nprivate wrongs\n\nXLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we\nshould suspect some fraud to lurk behind\n\nXLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of\nnew Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius\nreceived the surname of Maximus\n\n\nNICCOL\u00d2 MACHIAVELLI\n\nTO\n\nZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI\n\nHEALTH.\n\n\nI send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you,\nis at any rate the greatest which Niccol\u00f2 Machiavelli has it in his\npower to offer. For in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or\nhave observed for myself during a long experience and constant study of\nhuman affairs. And since neither you nor any other can expect more at\nmy hands, you cannot complain if I have not given you more.\n\nYou may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since what I have to say\nis but poorly said; and tax the weakness of my judgment, which on many\npoints may have erred in its conclusions. But granting all this, I know\nnot which of us is less beholden to the other: I to you, who have\nforced me to write what of myself I never should have written; or you\nto me, who have written what can give you no content.\n\nTake this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend\nshould be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the\nintention of the giver than to the quality of the gift. And, believe\nme, that in one thing only I find satisfaction, namely, in knowing that\nwhile in many matters I may have made mistakes, at least I have not\nbeen mistaken in choosing you before all others as the persons to whom\nI dedicate these Discourses; both because I seem to myself, in doing\nso, to have shown a little gratitude for kindness received, and at the\nsame time to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads many\nauthors to inscribe their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of\nfavour or reward, to praise him as possessed of every virtue; whereas\nwith more reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every\nshameful vice.\n\nTo avoid which error I have chosen, not those who are but those who\nfrom their infinite merits deserve to be Princes; not such persons as\nhave it in their power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment,\nbut such as though they lack the power, have all the will to do so. For\nmen, if they would judge justly, should esteem those who are, and not\nthose whose means enable them to be generous; and in like manner those\nwho know how to govern kingdoms, rather than those who possess the\ngovernment without such knowledge. For Historians award higher praise\nto Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to Perseus the\nMacedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked nothing\nthat a Prince should have save the name, the latter had nothing of the\nKing but the kingdom.\n\nMake the most, therefore, of this good or this evil, as you may esteem\nit, which you have brought upon yourselves; and should you persist in\nthe mistake of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall not\nfail to proceed with the rest of the History in the manner promised in\nmy Preface. _Farewell_.\n\n\n\n\nDISCOURSES\n\nON THE FIRST DECADE OF\n\nTITUS LIVIUS.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I.\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nAlbeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure\nthan to praise the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of\nnew methods and systems no less perilous than the search after unknown\nlands and seas; nevertheless, prompted by that desire which nature has\nimplanted in me, fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I think offers a\ncommon benefit to all, I enter on a path which, being hitherto\nuntrodden by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue, may yet\nwin me thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit. And\nalthough my feeble discernment, my slender experience of current\naffairs, and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these\nefforts of mine defective and of no great utility, they may at least\nopen the way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder\nreasoning and judgment, shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain\nno credit, at all events I ought to incur no blame.\n\nWhen I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other\ninstances, the mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at\na great price, in order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn\nhis house, or to have it copied by those who take delight in this art;\nand how these, again, strive with all their skill to imitate it in\ntheir various works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble\nlabours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the\nmonarchies and republics of old times, by kings, captains, citizens,\nlawgivers, and others who have toiled for the good of their country,\nrather admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by every one\nthat not a trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot\nbut at once marvel and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more\nbecause I perceive that, in civil disputes between citizens, and in the\nbodily disorders into which men fall, recourse is always had to the\ndecisions and remedies, pronounced or prescribed by the ancients.\n\nFor the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient\njurisconsults, which, being reduced to a system, teach the\njurisconsults of our own times how to determine; while the healing art\nis simply the recorded experience of the old physicians, on which our\nmodern physicians found their practice. And yet, in giving laws to a\ncommonwealth, in maintaining States and governing kingdoms, in\norganizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations,\nand in extending a State\u2019s dominions, we find no prince, no republic,\nno captain, and no citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients.\n\nThis I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which\nthe present methods of education have brought the world, or to the\ninjury which a pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and\ncities of Christendom, as to the want of a right intelligence of\nHistory, which renders men incapable in reading it to extract its true\nmeaning or to relish its flavour. Whence it happens that by far the\ngreater number of those who read History, take pleasure in following\nthe variety of incidents which it presents, without a thought to\nimitate them; judging such imitation to be not only difficult but\nimpossible; as though the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man\nhimself were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards\nmotion, order, and power.\n\nDesiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down\nwith respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the\nmalignity of Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right\nunderstanding of ancient and modern affairs; so that any who shall read\nthese remarks of mine, may reap from them that profit for the sake of\nwhich a knowledge of History is to be sought. And although the task be\narduous, still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed the\nburthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that another shall have no\nlong way to go to bring it to its destination.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\u2014_Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular\nof that of Rome._\n\n\nNo one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its\nfounders, and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much\nexcellence was maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew\nafterwards to be so great an Empire.\n\nAnd, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been\nfounded either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by\nstrangers. Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways\nwhen the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely\nif they live dispersed in many and small societies, each of them\nunable, whether from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand\nalone against the attacks of its enemies; on whose approach there is no\ntime left to unite for defence without abandoning many strongholds, and\nthus becoming an easy prey to the invader. To escape which dangers,\nwhether of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater\nauthority among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in\ncertain places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and\neasier to defend.\n\nAmong many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and\nVenice; the former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned,\nwas built by a scattered population under the direction of Theseus. To\nescape the wars which, on the decay of the Roman Empire daily renewed\nin Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of Barbarians, numerous\nrefugees, sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the\nAdriatic Sea, gave beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized\nleader to direct them, they agreed to live together under such laws as\nthey thought best suited to maintain them. And by reason of the\nprolonged tranquility which their position secured, they being\nprotected by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the tribes who\nthen harassed Italy had no ships wherewith to molest them, they were\nable from very small beginnings to attain to that greatness they now\nenjoy.\n\nIn the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the\nsettlers are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by\nothers, as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a\nrepublic, to relieve their countries of an excessive population, or to\ndefend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small\ncost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all\nparts of their dominions. It may also happen that such cities are\nfounded by a prince merely to add to his renown, without any intention\non his part to dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the\nGreat. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom,\nseldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms.\n\nThe city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been\nindependent from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the\nsoldiers of Sylla, or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of\nFiesole (who, emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout\nthe world during the reign of Octavianus, came down to occupy the plain\non the banks of the Arno), in either case, it was founded under the\nauspices of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than was\npermitted by the grace of the sovereign State.\n\nThe origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people,\neither by themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine,\npestilence, or war to leave their native land and seek a new\nhabitation. Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities\nwhich they find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take\npossession, as did Moses; or they build new ones, as did \u00c6neas. It is\nin this last case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of\nthe city founded are best seen; and this good fortune will be more or\nless remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who\ngives the city its beginning.\n\nThe capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a\nsite, or by the laws which he frames. And since men act either of\nnecessity or from choice, and merit may seem greater where choice is\nmore restricted, we have to consider whether it may not be well to\nchoose a sterile district as the site of a new city, in order that the\ninhabitants, being constrained to industry, and less corrupted by ease,\nmay live in closer union, finding less cause for division in the\npoverty of their land; as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other\ncities built in similar situations. Such a choice were certainly the\nwisest and the most advantageous, could men be content to enjoy what is\ntheir own without seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe\nthey must be strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts,\nand to plant themselves in more fertile regions; where, the\nfruitfulness of the soil enabling them to increase and multiply, they\nmay defend themselves against any who attack them, and overthrow any\nwho would withstand their power.\n\nAnd as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be\nhad that hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced\nby the laws; and that the example of those wise nations be imitated,\nwho, inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries, and such as\nwere likely to rear a listless and effeminate race, unfit for all manly\nexercises, in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity and\nrelaxing influence of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to\nserve as soldiers to the severest training; whence it came that better\nsoldiers were raised in these countries than in others by nature rugged\nand barren. Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, which,\nthough of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the severe training\nwhich its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had their\nnames not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more\npraise than Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still\nfresh in men\u2019s minds. And even in recent times, any one contemplating\nthe kingdom of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes\nbefore they were destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, must have seen how\ncarefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of warlike\nexercise; showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which\ntheir genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless\nneutralized by strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a prudent choice\nto found your city in a fertile region when the effects of that\nfertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws.\n\nWhen Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a\ncity, Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build\nit on Mount Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could\nbe handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the\nhuman form, which would be a thing strange and striking, and worthy of\nso great a monarch. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to\nlive, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Whereupon,\nAlexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built\nAlexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of\nthe Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode.\n\nTo him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign\nits beginning to \u00c6neas, it will seem to be of those cities which were\nfounded by strangers if to Romulus, then of those founded by the\nnatives of the country. But in whichever class we place it, it will be\nseen to have had its beginning in freedom, and not in subjection to\nanother State. It will be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how\nstrict was the discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus, Numa,\nand its other founders made compulsory upon it; so that neither its\nfertility, the proximity of the sea, the number of its victories, nor\nthe extent of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it, but,\non the contrary, maintained it replete with such virtues as were never\nmatched in any other commonwealth.\n\nAnd because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has\ncelebrated, were effected at home or abroad by public or by private\nwisdom, I shall begin by treating, and noting the consequences of those\nthings done at home in accordance with the public voice, which seem\nmost to merit attention; and to this object the whole of this first\nBook or first Part of my Discourses, shall be directed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\u2014Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them\nthe Roman Commonwealth belonged.\n\n\nI forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset\nhave been dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which\nfrom their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign\ncontrol, being governed from the first as pleased themselves, whether\nas republics or as princedoms.\n\nThese as they have had different origins, so likewise have had\ndifferent laws and institutions. For to some at their very first\ncommencement, or not long after, laws have been given by a single\nlegislator, and all at one time; like those given by Lycurgus to the\nSpartans; while to others they have been given at different times, as\nneed rose or accident determined; as in the case of Rome. That\nrepublic, indeed, may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a\nfounder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can\ncontinue to live securely, without need to amend them; as we find\nSparta preserving hers for eight hundred years, without deterioration\nand without any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand, some measure\nof unhappiness attaches to the State which, not having yielded itself\nonce for all into the hands of a single wise legislator, is obliged to\nrecast its institutions for itself; and of such States, by far the most\nunhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of\ngovernment, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside\nthe path which might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is\nscarcely possible that a State in this position can ever, by any\nchance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose institutions are\nimperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its\namendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is\ncertain, however, that such States can never be reformed without great\nrisk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law altering the\ninstitutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a change be\ndemonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, the\nState may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is\nestablished. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence,\nwhich was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of\nArezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato.\n\nDesiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome,\nand to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its\nperfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of\nGovernments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names\nMonarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its\ninstitutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three,\naccording as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought,\nwiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether six forms of\ngovernment, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in\nthemselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become\nhurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others\ndependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related,\nthat it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a\nMonarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while\na Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. So that if the founder of\na State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he\nestablishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take\ncan prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close\nresemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.\n\nThese diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by\nchance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few\nin number, for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but\nafterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into\nsocieties, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who\namong them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom,\nmaking him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the\nknowledge of such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to\nthose which are bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged\nhis benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy\nfor the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who\nshowed gratitude were honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw\ndone to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they\nresorted to making laws and fixing punishments against any who should\ntransgress them; and in this way grew the recognition of Justice.\nWhence it came that afterwards, in choosing their rulers, men no longer\nlooked about for the strongest, but for him who was the most prudent\nand the most just.\n\nBut, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer\nelective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their\nancestors, and, quitting worthy courses, took up the notion that\nprinces had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in\nsumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to\npleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel\nfear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon\nsprang up. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and\nplots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were\nweak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for\ntheir birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the\nshameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these\npowerful men, took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of,\nobeyed these others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in\nhatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government and\nat first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh,\nobserved the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal\nadvantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and\nprivately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government\npassing, afterwards, to their descendants who, never having been taught\nin the school of Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of\nFortune, these not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality,\nbut abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted,\nwithout respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best\ninto a government of the few; and so very soon met with the same fate\nas the tyrant.\n\nFor the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured,\nin whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who\nwith the aid of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the\ntyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the\nminds of the people, who therefore felt no desire to restore the\nmonarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they\nestablished on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any\nplace in it. And because all governments inspire respect at the first,\nthis government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and seldom\nafter the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For,\nsuddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither private worth\nnor public authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked,\na thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by\nnecessity, or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to\nescape anarchy, the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by\nstep, in the manner and for the causes already assigned, they came\nround once more to license. For this is the circle revolving within\nwhich all States are and have been governed; although in the same State\nthe same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly\nany State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more\nthan once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea\nof disaster, when a State must always be wanting prudent counsels and\nin strength, it will become subject to some neighbouring and\nbetter-governed State; though assuming this not to happen, it might\nwell pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of\ngovernment to another.\n\nI say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious\u2014the\nthree good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their\ninherent badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects,\nand avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of\na form which shares in the qualities of all the first three, and which\nthey judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately.\nFor where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing\ntogether in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the\nother.\n\nAmong those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution\nof this nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to\nassign their proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in\nthis way established a government, which, to his great glory and to the\npeace and tranquility of his country, lasted for more than eight\nhundred years. The contrary, however, happened in the case of Solon;\nwho by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens, created there a\npurely democratic government, of such brief duration, that he himself\nlived to witness the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And\nalthough, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out,\nand Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because she reverted to\nthe same form government as had been established by Solon, she could\nmaintain it for only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it,\nmany ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great\nand the turbulence of the people, against which Solon had not provided,\nstill, since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was\ngiven a place in her constitution, Athens, as compared with Sparta, had\nbut a short life.\n\nBut let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus\nto give her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her\nlong in freedom, through a series of accidents, caused by the contests\nbetween the commons and the senate, obtained by chance what the\nforesight of her founders failed to provide. So that Fortune, if she\nbestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second; because,\nalthough the original institutions of this city were defective, still\nthey lay not outside the true path which could bring them to\nperfection. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws,\nand such as were not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought\nto found a kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the city became free\nmany things were found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was\nnecessary to supply, since these kings had not supplied them. And\nalthough the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner and\nfor the causes mentioned above, nevertheless those who drove them out,\nby at once creating two consuls to take their place, preserved in Rome\nthe regal authority while banishing from it the regal throne, so that\nas both senate and consuls were included in that republic, it in fact\npossessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, the monarchic\nand the aristocratic.\n\nIt then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and\nthe Roman nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed\nhereafter, the commons against them, when, not to lose the whole of\ntheir power, they were forced to concede a share to the people; while\nwith the share which remained, the senate and consuls retained so much\nauthority that they still held their own place in the republic. In this\nway the tribunes of the people came to be created, after whose creation\nthe stability of the State was much augmented, since each the three\nforms of government had now its due influence allowed it. And such was\nthe good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the\nkings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for\nthe reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly\nelement was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles,\nnor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the\ncommons; but three, blending together, made up a perfect State; which\nperfection, as shall be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was\nreached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\u2014Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of\nTribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.\n\n\nThey who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must,\nas is shown by all who have treated of civil government, and by\nexamples of which history is full, assume that \u2018all men are bad, and\nwill always, when they have free field, give loose to their evil\ninclinations; and that if these for a while remain hidden, it is owing\nto some secret cause, which, from our having no contrary experience, we\ndo not recognize at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time, of\nwhom we speak as the father of all truth.\n\nIn Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the\nclosest union prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that\nthe nobles, laying aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to\nsympathize with the people as to have become supportable by all, even\nof the humblest rank. This dissimulation remained undetected, and its\ncauses concealed, while the Tarquins lived; for the nobles dreading the\nTarquins, and fearing that the people, if they used them ill, might\ntake part against them, treated them with kindness. But no sooner were\nthe Tarquins got rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of their fears,\nwhen they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom which\nbefore they had kept in their breasts, offending and insulting them in\nevery way they could; confirming what I have observed already, that men\nnever behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to\nact as they please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once\ninto confusion and disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty\nand hunger are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to\nmake them good. When we do well without laws, laws are not needed; but\nwhen good customs are absent, laws are at once required.\n\nOn the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the dread of whom had\nkept the nobles in check, some new safeguard had to be contrived, which\nshould effect the same result as had been effected by the Tarquins\nwhile they lived. Accordingly, after much uproar and confusion, and\nmuch danger of violence ensuing between the commons and the nobles, to\ninsure the safety of the former, tribunes were created, and were\ninvested with such station and authority as always afterwards enabled\nthem to stand between the people and the senate, and to resist the\ninsolence of the nobles.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\u2014That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of\nRome, made Rome free and powerful.\n\n\nTouching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from the extinction of\nthe Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which I\nhave no wish to avoid, and as to certain other matters of a like\nnature, I desire to say something in opposition to the opinion of many\nwho assert that Rome was a turbulent city, and had fallen into utter\ndisorder, that had not her good fortune and military prowess made\namends for other defects, she would have been inferior to every other\nrepublic.\n\nI cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were\nthe causes of her empire; yet it certainly seems to me that those\nholding this opinion fail to perceive, that in a State where there are\ngood soldiers there must be good order, and, generally speaking, good\nfortune. And looking to the other circumstances of this city, I affirm\nthat those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the\ncommons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming free; and\ngive more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions\nwere attended, than to the good results which followed from them; not\nreflecting that while in every republic there are two conflicting\nfactions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this\nconflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may\nreadily be seen to have been the case in Rome. For from the time of the\nTarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of over three hundred years,\nthe tumults in Rome seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile, and\nvery seldom to bloodshed. So that we cannot truly declare those tumults\nto have been disastrous, or that republic to have been disorderly,\nwhich during all that time, on account of her internal broils, banished\nno more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to death, and\nrarely inflicted money penalties. Nor can we reasonably pronounce that\ncity ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue; for\nvirtuous actions have their origin in right training, right training in\nwise laws, and wise laws in these very tumults which many would\nthoughtlessly condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these\ntumults will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor to\nviolence hurtful to the common good, but to laws and ordinances\nbeneficial to the public liberty. And should any object that the\nbehaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous; that for the\nassembled people to be heard shouting against the senate, the senate\nagainst the people; for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly\nthrough the streets, closing their shops, and quitting the town, were\nthings which might well affright him even who only reads of them; it\nmay be answered, that the inhabitants of all cities, more especially of\ncities which seek to make use of the people in matters of importance,\nhave their own ways of giving expression to their wishes; among which\nthe city of Rome had the custom, that when its people sought to have a\nlaw passed they followed one or another of those courses mentioned\nabove, or else refused to be enrolled as soldiers when, to pacify them,\nsomething of their demands had to be conceded. But the demands of a\nfree people are hurtful to freedom, since they originate either in\nbeing oppressed, or in the fear that they are about to be so. When this\nfear is groundless, it finds its remedy in public meetings, wherein\nsome worthy person may come forward and show the people by argument\nthat they are deceiving themselves. For though they be ignorant, the\npeople are not therefore, as Cicero says, incapable of being taught the\ntruth, but are readily convinced when it is told them by one in whose\nhonesty they can trust.\n\nWe should, therefore, be careful how we censure the government of Rome,\nand should reflect that all the great results effected by that\nrepublic, could not have come about without good cause. And if the\npopular tumults led the creation of the tribunes, they merit all\npraise; since these magistrates not only gave its due influence to the\npopular voice in the government, but also acted as the guardians of\nRoman freedom, as shall be clearly shown in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\u2014_Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the\nhands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to\nacquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of\nCommotions._\n\n\nOf the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most\nnecessary is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for\naccording as this is placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the\nState will be more or less lasting. And because in every republic we\nfind the two parties of nobles and commons, the question arises, to\nwhich of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted.\nAmong the Laced\u00e6monians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was\nplaced in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in\nthe commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States\nmade the wiser choice. If we look to reasons, something is to be said\non both sides of the question; though were we to look to results, we\nshould have to pronounce in favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the\nliberty of Sparta and Venice has had a longer life than that of Rome.\n\nAs touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they\nare most fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it\nto their own ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the\nnobles and the commons respectively set before them, we shall find in\nthe former a great desire to dominate, in the latter merely a desire\nnot to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom,\nsince they have less to gain than the others by destroying it.\nWherefore, when the commons are put forward as the defenders of\nliberty, they may be expected to take better care of it, and, as they\nhave no desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer\nothers to do so.\n\nOn the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans\nand Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the\nnobles, two desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed\nto retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger\nparty in the State, the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied;\nand, second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude\nwhich as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and\ntumults, and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses.\nIn instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the\ntribunes of the people being vested with this authority, not content to\nhave one consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and afterwards\nlaid claim to the censorship, the pr\u00e6torship and all the other\nmagistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried\naway by the same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court\nto such men as they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave\noccasion to the rise of Marius and the overthrow of Rome.\n\nWherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might\nhesitate which party he should choose as the guardian of public\nliberty, being uncertain which class is more mischievous in a\ncommonwealth, that which would acquire what it has not, or that which\nwould keep the authority which it has already. But, on the whole, on a\ncareful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:\u2014Either we have to deal\nwith a republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with one\ncontent merely to maintain itself; in the former case it is necessary\nto do in all things as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in\nthe manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we may imitate Venice\nand Sparta.\n\nBut reverting to the question which class of citizens is more\nmischievous in a republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear\nto lose what they have acquired already, I note that when Marcus\nMenenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of them men of plebeian birth, were\nmade the one dictator, the other master of the knights, that they might\ninquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in Capua, they had at\nthe same time authority given them by the people to investigate\nwhether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been used\nto obtain the consulship and other honours of the city. The nobles\nsuspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against\nthem, everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by\nirregular and unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians,\nwho, with neither birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort\nto corruption. And more particularly they accused the dictator himself.\nAnd so telling was the effect of these charges, that Menenius, after\nharanguing the people and complaining to them of the calumnies\ncirculated against him, laid down his dictatorship, and submitted\nhimself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause\ncame to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much\ndebated, whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it,\nis the more dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead\nto the greatest disorders.\n\nNevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly\noccasioned by those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear\nof loss breeds the same passions as are felt by those seeking to\nacquire; since men never think they hold what they have securely,\nunless when they are gaining something new from others. It is also to\nbe said that their position enables them to operate changes with less\neffort and greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their\ncorrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have\nnothing, with the desire to have; either for the sake of punishing\ntheir adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a\nshare of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\u2014_Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a\nGovernment as would have composed the Differences between the Commons\nand the Senate._\n\n\nI have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the\ncontroversies between the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted\ndown to the time of the Gracchi, when they brought about the overthrow\nof freedom, some may think it matter for regret that Rome should not\nhave achieved the great things she did, without being torn by such\ndisputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while to consider whether the\ngovernment of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to\nprevent like controversies.\n\nIn making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have\nenjoyed freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent\ncontentions or tumults, and see what their government was, and whether\nit would have been possible to introduce it into Rome. Of such\nrepublics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in modern\ntimes in Venice, of both which States I have already made mention.\nSparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a\nlimited senate. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her\nrulers, all qualified to take part in her government being classed\nunder the one designation of \u201cGentlemen,\u201d an arrangement due rather to\nchance than to the foresight of those who gave this State its\nconstitution. For many persons, from causes already noticed, seeking\nshelter on these rocks on which Venice now stands, after they had so\nmultiplied that if they were to continue to live together it became\nnecessary for them to frame laws, established a form of government; and\nassembling often in their councils to consult for the interests of\ntheir city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient\nfor political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights\nagainst all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to\ntake any part in the management of affairs. And when in course of time\nthere came to be many citizens excluded from the government, to add to\nthe importance of the governing body, they named these \u201cGentlemen\u201d\n(_gentiluomini_), the others \u201cPlebeians\u201d (_popolani_). And this\ndistinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing\ndisturbance; for as at the time of its origin, whosoever then lived in\nVenice was made one of the governing body, none had reason to complain;\nwhile those who came to live there afterwards, finding the government\nin a completed form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object. No\nground, because nothing was taken from them; and no opportunity,\nbecause those in authority kept them under control, and never employed\nthem in affairs in which they could acquire importance. Besides which,\nthey who came later to dwell in Venice were not so numerous as to\ndestroy all proportion between the governors and the governed; the\nnumber of the \u201cGentlemen\u201d being as great as, or greater than that of\nthe \u201cPlebeians.\u201d For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for\nVenice to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without\ndivisions.\n\nSparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited\nsenate, was able to maintain herself for the long period she did,\nbecause, from the country being thinly inhabited and further influx of\npopulation forbidden, and from the laws of Lycurgus (the observance\nwhereof removed all ground of disturbance) being held in high esteem,\nthe citizens were able to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having\nby his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property, but\nless equality as to rank, there prevailed there an equal poverty; and\nthe commons were less ambitious, because the offices of the State,\nwhich were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few; and because\nthe nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp\nthese offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being\nappointed to that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this\nnobility, had no stronger support to their authority than in defending\nthe people against injustice. Whence it resulted that as the people\nneither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess, the\nconflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were\nescaped, together with the causes which would have led to them; and in\nthis way they were able to live long united. But of this unity in\nSparta there were two chief causes: one, the fewness of its\ninhabitants, which allowed of their being governed by a few; the other,\nthat by denying foreigners admission into their country, the people had\nless occasion to become corrupted, and never so increased in numbers as\nto prove troublesome to their few rulers.\n\nWeighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the\nsame tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses\nmust have been followed by her legislators; for either, like the\nVenetians, they must have refrained from employing the commons in war,\nor else, like the Spartans, they must have closed their country to\nforeigners. Whereas, in both particulars, they did the opposite, arming\nthe commons and increasing their number, and thus affording endless\noccasions for disorder. And had the Roman commonwealth grown to be more\ntranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, that it must at the\nsame time have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to\nthat greatness to which it came, for in removing the causes of her\ntumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth.\n\nAnd he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human\naffairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running\ninto another. So that if you would have your people numerous and\nwarlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish a great\nempire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards\ncontrol at your pleasure; while should you keep them few and unwarlike,\nto the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should\nyou extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so\ncontemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you. For which reason\nin all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to\nencounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the course to be\npreferred, since we shall never find any line of action entirely free\nfrom disadvantage.\n\nRome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a\nking for life and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a\ngreat empire, she could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of\nher citizens. So that to have created a king for life and a limited\nsenate had been of little service to her.\n\nWere any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would\nhave to consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in\nterritory and dominion, or to continue within narrow limits. In the\nformer case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as\npossible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room for dissensions and\npopular tumults, for without a great and warlike population no republic\ncan ever increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the second case he\nmight give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta;\nbut since extension is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would\nhave to provide in every possible way against the State which he had\nfounded making any additions to its territories. For these, when\nsuperimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we\nsee to have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which,\nafter subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse,\nbetrayed the insufficiency of her foundations, for when, after the\nrevolt of Thebes under Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the\nSpartan kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like manner, after\ngaining possession of a great portion of Italy (most of it not by her\narms but by her wealth and subtlety), when her strength was put to the\nproof, lost all in one pitched battle.\n\nI can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long\nendure, the best plan may be to give it internal institutions like\nthose of Sparta or Venice; placing it in a naturally strong situation,\nand so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better of it\neasily, yet, at the same time, not making it so great as to be\nformidable to its neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it\nmight long enjoy its independence. For there are two causes which lead\nto wars being made against a republic; one, your desire to be its\nmaster, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which\ndangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we\nare to assume, this republic be well prepared for defence, and\nconsequently difficult of attack, it will seldom or never happen that\nany one will form the design to attack it, and while it keeps within\nits own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be influenced by\nambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make war upon\nit, more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its\nextension. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium,\nI veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of\npolitical life, and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human\naffairs being in movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they\nmust either rise or fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not\nled by reason, we are brought by necessity. So that when we have given\ninstitutions to a State on the footing that it is to maintain itself\nwithout enlargement, should necessity require its enlargement, its\nfoundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall quickly ensue.\nOn the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie\nunder no necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to\nmake it effeminate and divided which two evils together, and each by\nitself, would insure its ruin. And since it is impossible, as I\nbelieve, to bring about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the\nmean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider what is the\nmore honourable course for it to take, and so contrive that even if\nnecessity compel its enlargement, it may be able to keep what it gains.\n\nBut returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us\nto follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics,\nfor I know of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those\ndissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as\nevils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of\nRome.\n\nIn connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority\nof the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom,\nwe may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic\nfrom the power of impeachment; which, together with others, was\nconferred upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the following\nChapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\u2014_That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the\nRight to accuse._\n\n\nTo those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom,\nno more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to\naccuse, either before the people, or before some council or tribunal,\nthose citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of\ntheir country.\n\nA law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: _first,_\nthat the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts\nhurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without\nrespect of persons: and _next,_ that a vent is given for the escape of\nall those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities\nagainst particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for\nthese by the laws, they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the\nState. There is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to the\nstability and permanence of a State, as to take care that the\nfermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of\nlaw with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but\nby none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he\ntells us, that at a time when the Roman nobles were angry with the\nplebeians (thinking that the appointment of tribunes for their\nprotection had made them too powerful), it happened that Rome was\nvisited by a grievous famine, to meet which the senate sent to Sicily\nfor corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to persuade the\nsenate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them of the\nauthority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by\nwithholding the distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish\nof hunger. Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people,\nkindled them to such fury against him, that they would have slain him\nas he left the Senate House, had not the tribunes cited him to appear\nand answer before them to a formal charge.\n\nIn respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how\nuseful and necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a\nchannel by which the displeasure of the multitude against a single\ncitizen may find a vent. For when none such is regularly provided,\nrecourse will be had to irregular channels, and these will assuredly\nlead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne down by the\noperation of the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or no\ndisturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being\nwrought by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes\nof the overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority and in\naccordance with public ordinances, which, having definite limits set\nthem, are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the\ncommonwealth. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old\nexample of Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it would have\nbeen for Rome had he been violently put to death by the people. For, as\nbetween citizen and citizen, a wrong would have been done affording\nground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence have led to\nfaction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its ruin. But\nthe matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it,\nall the evils which must have followed had it been left in private\nhands were escaped.\n\nIn Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what\nviolent commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure\nagainst particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the\ninstance of Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon as the foremost\ncitizen of our republic. But many thinking him ambitious, and likely\nfrom his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil\nfreedom, and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an\nadverse faction, the result was, that, apprehending irregular attacks,\nhe sought to gain partisans for his support; while his opponents, on\ntheir side, having no course open to them of which the laws approved,\nresorted to courses of which the laws did not approve, and, at last, to\nopen violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful\nmethods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many\nother noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional\nrestraints, his power might have been broken without injury to any save\nhimself. I might also cite from our Florentine history the fall of\nPiero Soderini, which had no other cause than there not being in our\nrepublic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens can be\nimpeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be\ntried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be numerous,\nbecause a few will always do the will of a few. But had there been\nproper methods for obtaining redress, either the people would have\nimpeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given vent to their\ndispleasure without calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent,\nwould not have ventured, through fear of being accused themselves, to\nhave taken proceedings against him. So that in either case the bitter\nspirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end.\nWherefore, when we find one of the parties in a State calling in a\nforeign power, we may safely conclude that it is because the defective\nlaws of that State provide no escape for those malignant humours which\nare natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an\nimpeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving\ncountenance to this procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that\nin spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and\nthe senate, neither the senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen,\never sought redress at the hands of a foreign power; for having a\nremedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad.\n\nAlthough the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm,\nI desire to adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history,\nwhere he relates that a sister of Aruns having been violated by a\nLucumo of Clusium, the chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable,\nfrom the interest of her ravisher, to avenge her, betook himself to the\nGauls who ruled in the province we now name Lombardy, and besought them\nto come with an armed force to Clusium; showing them how with advantage\nto themselves they might avenge his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he\ncould have had redress through the laws of his country, he never would\nhave resorted to these Barbarians for help.\n\nBut as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on\nthe other hand, is useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I\nshall proceed to show.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\u2014_That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the\npower to accuse is useful._\n\n\nSuch were the services rendered to Rome by Furius Camillus in rescuing\nher from the oppression of the Gauls, that no Roman, however high his\ndegree or station, held it derogatory to yield place to him, save only\nManlius Capitolinus, who could not brook such glory and distinction\nbeing given to another. For he thought that in saving the Capitol, he\nhad himself done as much as Camillus to preserve Rome, and that in\nrespect of his other warlike achievements he was no whit behind him. So\nthat, bursting with jealousy, and unable to remain at rest by reason of\nthe other\u2019s renown, and seeing no way to sow discord among the Fathers,\nhe set himself to spread abroad sinister reports among the commons;\nthrowing out, among other charges, that the treasure collected to be\ngiven to the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had been\nembezzled by certain citizens, and if recovered might be turned to\npublic uses in relieving the people from taxes or from private debts.\nThese assertions so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold\nmeetings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout the city. But\nthis displeasing the senate, and the matter appearing to them grave and\ndangerous, they appointed a dictator to inquire into it, and to\nrestrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator, forthwith, caused\nManlius to be cited before him; and these two were thus brought face to\nface in the presence of the whole city, the dictator surrounded by the\nnobles, and Manlius by the commons. The latter, being desired to say\nwith whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be found, since\nthe senate were as anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct\nreply, but answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what\nthey already knew. Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison.\n\nIn this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all\nfree States, as, indeed, in every society, and how we must neglect no\nmeans which may serve to check it. And there can be no more effectual\nmeans for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for\nimpeachment, which is as useful in a commonwealth as the other is\npernicious. And between them there is this difference, that calumny\nneeds neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to establish it, so\nthat any man may be calumniated by any other; but not impeached; since\nimpeachment demands that there be substantive charges made, and\ntrustworthy evidence to support them. Again, it is before the\nmagistrates, the people, or the courts of justice that men are\nimpeached; but in the streets and market places that they are\ncalumniated. Calumny, therefore, is most rife in that State wherein\nimpeachment is least practised, and the laws least favour it. For which\nreasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his State that it\nshall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear\nor favour; and, after duly providing for this, should visit\ncalumniators with the sharpest punishments. Those punished will have no\ncause to complain, since it was in their power to have impeached openly\nwhere they have secretly calumniated. Where this is not seen to, grave\ndisorders will always ensue. For calumnies sting without disabling; and\nthose who are stung being more moved by hatred of their detractors than\nby fear of the things they say against them, seek revenge.\n\nThis matter, as we have said, was well arranged for in Rome, but has\nalways been badly regulated in our city of Florence. And as the Roman\nordinances with regard to it were productive of much good, so the want\nof them in Florence has bred much mischief. For any one reading the\nhistory of our city may perceive, how many calumnies have at all times\nbeen aimed against those of its citizens who have taken a leading part\nin its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said that he had plundered the\npublic treasury, of another, that he had failed in some enterprise\nbecause he had been bribed; of a third, that this or the other disaster\nhad originated in his ambition. Hence hatred sprung up on every side,\nand hatred growing to division, these led to factions, and these again\nto ruin. But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby\ncitizens might have been impeached, and calumniators punished,\nnumberless disorders which have taken there would have been prevented.\nFor citizens who were impeached, whether condemned or acquitted, would\nhave had no power to injure the State; and they would have been\nimpeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated; for calumny, as\nI have said already, is an easier matter than impeachment.\n\nSome, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means for raising\nthemselves to power, and have found their advantage in traducing\neminent citizens who withstood their designs; for by taking the part of\nthe people, and confirming them in their ill-opinion of these great\nmen, they made them their friends. Of this, though I could give many\ninstances, I shall content myself with one. At the siege of Lucca the\nFlorentine army was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, as its\ncommissary, through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune the town was\nnot taken. But whatever the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni had\nthe blame; and the rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of\nLucca. Which calumny being fostered by his enemies, brought Messer\nGiovanni to very verge of despair; and though to clear himself he would\nwillingly have given himself up to the Captain of Justice he found he\ncould not, there being no provision in the laws of the republic which\nallowed of his doing so. Hence arose the bitterest hostility between\nthe friends of Messer Giovanni, who were mostly of the old nobility\n(_grandi_), and those who sought to reform the government of Florence;\nand from this and the like causes, the affair grew to such dimensions\nas to bring about the downfall of our republic.\n\nManlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and in\ntheir treatment of him the Romans showed how calumniators should be\ndealt with; by which I mean, that they should be forced to become\naccusers; and if their accusation be proved true, should be rewarded,\nor at least not punished, but if proved false should be punished as\nManlius was.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\u2014_That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to\nreconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work\nof one Man_.\n\n\nIt may perhaps be thought that I should not have got so far into the\nhistory of Rome, without some mention of those who gave that city its\ninstitutions, and saying something of these institutions themselves, so\nfar as they relate to religion and war. As I have no wish to keep those\nwho would know my views on these matters in suspense, I say at once,\nthat to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder of a civil\ngovernment like Romulus, should first have slain his brother, and\nafterwards have consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom\nhe had chosen to be his colleague in the kingship; since his\ncountrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of power to inflict like\ninjuries on any who opposed their designs, might plead the example of\ntheir prince. This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard\nthe object which led Romulus to put those men to death. But we must\ntake it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions, that\nno commonwealth or kingdom ever has salutary institutions given it from\nthe first or has its institutions recast in an entirely new mould,\nunless by a single person. On the contrary, it must be from one man\nthat it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that all\nsimilar reconstruction must depend. For this reason the wise founder of\na commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only, or the line of\nhis descendants, but his State and country, must endeavour to acquire\nan absolute and undivided authority. And none who is wise will ever\nblame any action, however extraordinary and irregular, which serves to\nlay the foundation of a kingdom or to establish a republic. For\nalthough the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him; and when,\nas in the case of Romulus, the end is good, it will always excuse the\nmeans; since it is he who does violence with intent to injure, not he\nwho does it with the design to secure tranquility, who merits blame.\nSuch a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid\ntransmitting the absolute authority he acquires, as an inheritance to\nanother; for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than to good, a\nsuccessor may turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor\nhas used to promote worthy ends. Moreover, though it be one man that\nmust give a State its institutions, once given they are not so likely\nto last long resting for support on the shoulders of one man only, as\nwhen entrusted to the care of many, and when it is the business of many\nto maintain them. For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in\norder, since they cannot, by reason of the divisions which prevail\namong them, agree wherein the true well-being of the State lies, yet\nwhen they have once been taught the truth, they never will consent to\nabandon it. And that Romulus, though he put his brother to death, is\nyet of those who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done for the\ncommon good and not from personal ambition, is shown by his at once\ncreating a senate, with whom he took counsel, and in accordance with\nwhose voice he determined. And whosoever shall well examine the\nauthority which Romulus reserved to himself, will find that he reserved\nnothing beyond the command of the army when war was resolved on, and\nthe right to assemble the senate. This is seen later, on Rome becoming\nfree by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the Romans altered none of\ntheir ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year\ninstead of a king for life; for this proves that all the original\ninstitutions of that city were more in conformity with a free and\nconstitutional government, than with an absolute and despotic one.\n\nIn support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable\ninstances, as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms\nand commonwealths, who, from the full powers given them, were enabled\nto shape their laws to the public advantage; but passing over these\nexamples, as of common notoriety, I take one, not indeed so famous, but\nwhich merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise laws. Agis,\nKing of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits\nwithin which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, because he thought\nthat, from having somewhat deviated from them, his city had lost much\nof its ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength and power,\nwas, at the very outset of his attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori,\nas one who sought to make himself a tyrant. But Cleomenes coming after\nhim in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and writings which he\nfound of Agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained, being\nstirred by the same desire, perceived that he could not confer this\nbenefit on his country unless he obtained sole power. For he saw that\nthe ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was useful\nfor many against the will of a few. Wherefore, finding fit occasion, he\ncaused the Ephori and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way,\nto be put to death; after which, he completely renewed the laws of\nLycurgus. And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh\nlife to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that\nof Lycurgus, had it not been for the power of the Macedonians and the\nweakness of the other Greek States. For while engaged with these\nreforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians, and being by himself no\nmatch for them, and having none to whom he could turn for help, he was\noverpowered; and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were never\nbrought to perfection.\n\nAll which circumstances considered, I conclude that he who gives new\ninstitutions to a State must stand alone; and that for the deaths of\nRemus and Tatius, Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\u2014_That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or\nCommonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame._\n\n\nOf all who are praised they are praised the most, who are the authors\nand founders of religions. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and\ncommonwealths. Next to these, they have the greatest name who as\ncommanders of armies have added to their own dominions or those of\ntheir country. After these, again, are ranked men of letters, who being\nof various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To all\nothers, whose number is infinite, is ascribed that measure of praise to\nwhich his profession or occupation entitles him. And, conversely, all\nwho contribute to the overthrow of religion, or to the ruin of kingdoms\nand commonwealths, all who are foes to letters and to the arts which\nconfer honour and benefit on the human race (among whom I reckon the\nimpious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent, the base and the\nworthless), are held in infamy and detestation.\n\nNo one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good, if asked to choose\nbetween these two kinds of men, will ever be found to withhold praise\nfrom what deserves praise, or blame from what is to be blamed. And yet\nalmost all, deceived by a false good and a false glory, allow\nthemselves either ignorantly or wilfully to follow in the footsteps\nsuch as deserve blame rather than praise; and, have it in their power\nto establish, to their lasting renown, a commonwealth or kingdom, turn\naside to create a tyranny without a thought how much they thereby lose\nin name, fame, security, tranquility, and peace of mind; and into how\nmuch infamy, scorn, danger, and disquiet they run. But were they to\nread history, and turn to profit the lessons of the past, it seems\nimpossible that those living in a republic as private citizens, should\nnot prefer, in their native city, to play the part of Scipio rather of\nC\u00e6sar; or that those who by good fortune or merit have risen to be\nrulers, should not seek rather to resemble Agesilaus, Timoleon, and\nDion, than to Nabis, Phalaris and Dionysius; since they would see how\nthe latter are loaded with infamy, while the former have been extolled\nbeyond bounds. They would see, too, how Timoleon and others like him,\nhad as great authority in their country as Dionysius or Phalaris in\ntheirs, while enjoying far greater security. Nor let any one finding\nC\u00e6sar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled by his glory; for\nthose who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune, and\noverawed by the greatness of that empire which, being governed in his\nname, would not suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning him.\nBut let him who desires to know how historians would have written of\nC\u00e6sar had they been free to declare their thoughts mark what they say\nof Catiline, than whom C\u00e6sar is more hateful, in proportion as he who\ndoes is more to be condemned than he who only desires to do evil. Let\nhim see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus, because being\nunable, out of respect for his power, to reproach C\u00e6sar, they magnify\nhis enemy. And if he who has become prince in any State will but\nreflect, how, after Rome was made an empire, far greater praise was\nearned those emperors who lived within the laws, and worthily, than by\nthose who lived in the contrary way, he will see that Titus, Nerva,\nTrajan, Hadrian, Antoninus and Marcus had no need of pr\u00e6torian cohorts,\nor of countless legions to guard them, but were defended by their own\ngood lives, the good-will of their subjects, and the attachment of the\nsenate. In like manner he will perceive in the case of Caligula, Nero,\nVitellius, and ever so many more of those evil emperors, that all the\narmies of the east and of the west were of no avail to protect them\nfrom the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up against\nthem. And were the history of these emperors rightly studied, it would\nbe a sufficient lesson to any prince how to distinguish the paths which\nlead to honour and safety from those which end in shame and insecurity.\nFor of the twenty-six emperors from C\u00e6sar to Maximinus, sixteen came to\na violent, ten only to a natural death; and though one or two of those\nwho died by violence may have been good princes, as Galba or Pertinax,\nthey met their fate in consequence of that corruption which their\npredecessors had left behind in the army. And if among those who died a\nnatural death, there be found some bad emperors, like Severus, it is to\nbe ascribed to their signal good fortune and to their great abilities,\nadvantages seldom found united in the same man. From the study of this\nhistory we may also learn how a good government is to be established;\nfor while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, except\nTitus, were bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption; as in the\ncase of the five from Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell\nonce more to the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced.\n\nLet a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to\nMarcus, and contrast it with that which went before and that which came\nafter, and then let him say in which of them he would wish to have been\nborn or to have reigned. For during these times in which good men\ngoverned, he will see the prince secure in the midst of happy subjects,\nand the whole world filled with peace and justice. He will find the\nsenate maintaining its authority, the magistrates enjoying their\nhonours, rich citizens their wealth, rank and merit held in respect,\nease and content everywhere prevailing, rancour, licence, corruption\nand ambition everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in which\nevery one might hold and support what opinions he pleased. He will see,\nin short, the world triumphing, the sovereign honoured and revered, the\npeople animated with love, and rejoicing in their security. But should\nhe turn to examine the times of the other emperors, he will find them\nwasted by battles, torn by seditions, cruel alike in war and peace;\nmany princes perishing by the sword; many wars foreign and domestic;\nItaly overwhelmed with unheard-of disasters; her towns destroyed and\nplundered; Rome burned; the Capitol razed to the ground by Roman\ncitizens; the ancient temples desolated; the ceremonies of religion\ncorrupted; the cities rank with adultery; the seas covered with exiles\nand the islands polluted with blood. He will see outrage follow\noutrage; rank, riches, honours, and, above all, virtue imputed as\nmortal crimes; informers rewarded; slaves bribed to betray their\nmasters, freedmen their patrons, and those who were without enemies\nbrought to destruction by their friends; and then he will know the true\nnature of the debt which Rome, Italy, and the world owe to C\u00e6sar; and\nif he possess a spark of human feeling, will turn from the example of\nthose evil times, and kindle with a consuming passion to imitate those\nwhich were good.\n\nAnd in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be\nthe ruler of a corrupt city; not that, like C\u00e6sar, he may destroy it,\nbut that, like Romulus, he may restore it; since man cannot hope for,\nnor Heaven offer any better opportunity of fame. Were it indeed\nnecessary in giving a constitution to a State to forfeit its\nsovereignty, the prince who, to retain his station, should withhold a\nconstitution, might plead excuse; but for him who in giving a\nconstitution can still retain his sovereignty, no excuse is to be made.\n\nLet those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this opportunity,\nremember that two courses lie open to them; one which will render them\nsecure while they live and glorious when they die; another which\nexposes them to continual difficulties in life, and condemns them to\neternal infamy after death.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\u2014_Of the Religion of the Romans._\n\n\nThough Rome had Romulus for her first founder, and as a daughter owed\nhim her being and nurture, nevertheless, when the institutions of\nRomulus were seen by Heaven to be insufficient for so great a State,\nthe Roman senate were moved to choose Numa Pompilius as his successor,\nthat he might look to all matters which Romulus had neglected. He\nfinding the people fierce and turbulent, and desiring with the help of\nthe peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience, called in the\naid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society, and\ngave it such a form, that for many ages God was nowhere so much feared\nas in that republic. The effect of this was to render easy any\nenterprise in which the senate or great men of Rome thought fit to\nengage. And whosoever pays heed to an infinity of actions performed,\nsometimes by the Roman people collectively, often by single citizens,\nwill see, that esteeming the power of God beyond that of man, they\ndreaded far more to violate their oath than to transgress the laws; as\nis clearly shown by the examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus.\nFor after the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cann\u00e6, many citizens\nmeeting together, resolved, in their terror and dismay, to abandon\nItaly and seek refuge in Sicily. But Scipio, getting word of this, went\namong them, and menacing them with his naked sword, made them swear\nnever to abandon their country. Again, when Lucius Manlius was accused\nby the tribune Marcus Pomponius, before the day fixed for trial, Titus\nManlius, afterwards named Torquatus, son to Lucius, went to seek this\nMarcus, and threatening him with death if he did not withdraw the\ncharge against his father, compelled him to swear compliance; and he,\nthrough fear, having sworn, kept his oath. In the first of these two\ninstances, therefore, citizens whom love of their country and its laws\ncould not have retained in Italy, were kept there by the oath forced\nupon them; and in the second, the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath,\nlaid aside the hatred he bore the father, and overlooked the injury\ndone him by the son, and his own dishonour. And this from no other\ncause than the religion which Numa had impressed upon this city.\n\nAnd it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman History,\nhow much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the\npeople, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame; so that\nhad it to be decided to which prince, Romulus or Numa, Rome owed the\ngreater debt, I think the balance must turn in favour of Numa; for when\nreligion is once established you may readily bring in arms; but where\nyou have arms without religion it is not easy afterwards to bring in\nreligion. We see, too, that while Romulus in order to create a senate,\nand to establish his other ordinances civil and military, needed no\nsupport from Divine authority, this was very necessary to Numa, who\nfeigned to have intercourse with a Nymph by whose advice he was guided\nin counselling the people. And this, because desiring to introduce in\nRome new and untried institutions, he feared that his own authority\nmight not effect his end. Nor, indeed, has any attempt ever been made\nto introduce unusual laws among a people, without resorting to Divine\nauthority, since without such sanction they never would have been\naccepted. For the wise recognize many things to be good which do not\nbear such reasons on the face of them as command their acceptance by\nothers; wherefore, wise men who would obviate these difficulties, have\nrecourse to Divine aid. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and thus have\ndone many besides who have had the same end in view.\n\nThe Romans, accordingly, admiring the prudence and virtues of Numa,\nassented to all the measures which he recommended. This, however, is to\nbe said, that the circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured\nwith religious feeling, and of the men with whom he had to deal being\nrude and ignorant, gave Numa better facility to carry out his plans, as\nenabling him to mould his subjects readily to any new impression. And,\ndoubtless, he who should seek at the present day to form a new\ncommonwealth, would find the task easier among a race of simple\nmountaineers, than among the dwellers in cities where society is\ncorrupt; as the sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a\nrough block, than from the block which has been badly shaped out by\nanother. But taking all this into account, I maintain that the religion\nintroduced by Numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity of\nRome, since it gave rise to good ordinances, which in turn brought with\nthem good fortune, and with good fortune, happy issues to whatsoever\nwas undertaken.\n\nAnd as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the\ngreatness of a State, so their neglect is the occasion of its decline;\nsince a kingdom without the fear of God must either fall to pieces, or\nmust be maintained by the fear of some prince who supplies that\ninfluence not supplied by religion. But since the lives of princes are\nshort, the life of this prince, also, and with it his influence, must\nsoon come to an end; whence it happens that a kingdom which rests\nwholly on the qualities of its prince, lasts for a brief time only;\nbecause these qualities, terminating with his life, are rarely renewed\nin his successor. For as Dante wisely says:\u2014\n\n\u201cSeldom through the boughs\nDoth human worth renew itself; for such\nThe will of Him who gives it, that to Him\nWe may ascribe it.\u201d[1]\n\n\n [1] Rade volta risurge per li rami\nL\u2019umana probitate: e questo vuole\nQuei che la d\u00e0, perch\u00e8 da lui si chiami.\n          _Purg_. vii. 121-123.]\n\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom\nlies, not in its having a ruler who governs it prudently while he\nlives, but in having one who so orders things, that when he dies, the\nState may still maintain itself. And though it be easier to impose new\ninstitutions or a new faith on rude and simple men, it is not therefore\nimpossible to persuade their adoption by men who are civilized, and who\ndo not think themselves rude. The people of Florence do not esteem\nthemselves rude or ignorant, and yet were persuaded by the Friar\nGirolamo Savonarola that he spoke with God. Whether in this he said\ntruth or no, I take not on me to pronounce, since of so great a man we\nmust speak with reverence; but this I do say, that very many believed\nhim without having witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their\nbelief; his life, his doctrines, the matter whereof he treated, being\nsufficient to enlist their faith.\n\nLet no man, therefore, lose heart from thinking that he cannot do what\nothers have done before him; for, as I said in my Preface, men are\nborn, and live, and die, always in accordance with the same rules.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\u2014That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and\nthat Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been\nruined.\n\n\nPrinces and commonwealths that would save themselves from growing\ncorrupted, should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and\nceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; since we can\nhave no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see Divine\nworship held therein in contempt. This is easily understood when it is\nseen on what foundation that religion rests in which a man is born. For\nevery religion has its root in certain fundamental ordinances peculiar\nto itself.\n\nThe religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the\noracles and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers. All their\nother ceremonies and observances depended upon these; because men\nnaturally believed that the God who could forecast their future weal or\nwoe, could also bring them to pass. Wherefore the temples, the prayers,\nthe sacrifices, and all the other rites of their worship, had their\norigin in this, that the oracles of Delos, of Dodona, and others\ncelebrated in antiquity, held the world admiring and devout. But,\nafterwards, when these oracles began to shape their answers to suit the\ninterests of powerful men, and their impostures to be seen through by\nthe multitude, men grew incredulous and ready to overturn every sacred\ninstitution. For which reason, the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths\nshould maintain the foundations of the faith which they hold; since\nthus it will be easy for them to keep their country religious, and,\nconsequently, virtuous and united. To which end they should countenance\nand further whatsoever tells in favour of religion, even should they\nthink it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the better they are\nacquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so. It is\nfrom this course having been followed by the wise, that the miracles\ncelebrated even in false religions, have come to be held in repute; for\nfrom whatever source they spring, discreet men will extol them, whose\nauthority afterwards gives them currency everywhere.\n\nThese miracles were common enough in Rome, and among others this was\nbelieved, that when the Roman soldiers were sacking the city of Veii,\ncertain of them entered the temple of Juno and spoke to the statue of\nthe goddess, saying, \u201c_Wilt thou come with us to Rome?_\u201d when to some\nit seemed that she inclined her head in assent, and to others that they\nheard her answer, \u201c_Yea_.\u201d For these men being filled with religious\nawe (which Titus Livius shows us by the circumstance that, in entering\nthe temple, they entered devoutly, reverently, and without tumult),\npersuaded themselves they heard that answer to their question, which,\nperhaps, they had formed beforehand in their minds. But their faith and\nbelief were wholly approved of and confirmed by Camillus and by the\nother chief men of the city.\n\nHad religion been maintained among the princes of Christendom on the\nfooting on which it was established by its Founder, the Christian\nStates and republics had been far more united and far more prosperous\nthan they now are; nor can we have surer proof of its decay than in\nwitnessing how those countries which are the nearest neighbours of the\nRoman Church, the head of our faith, have less devoutness than any\nothers; so that any one who considers its earliest beginnings and\nobserves how widely different is its present practice, might well\nbelieve its ruin or its chastisement to be close at hand.\n\nBut since some are of opinion that the welfare of Italy depends upon\nthe Church of Rome, I desire to put forward certain arguments which\noccur to me against that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones,\nwhich, to my mind, admit of no answer. The first is, that, through the\nill example of the Roman Court, the country has lost all religious\nfeeling and devoutness, a loss which draws after it infinite mischiefs\nand disorders; for as the presence of religion implies every\nexcellence, so the contrary is involved in its absence. To the Church,\ntherefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that\nthrough them we have become wicked and irreligious. And a still greater\ndebt we owe them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin, namely,\nthat by the Church our country is kept divided. For no country was ever\nunited or prosperous which did not yield obedience to some one prince\nor commonwealth, as has been the case with France and Spain. And the\nChurch is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing, and\nis subject to no one king or commonwealth. For though she holds here\nher seat, and exerts her temporal authority, she has never yet gained\nstrength and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make herself\nsupreme; yet never has been so weak that when in fear of losing her\ntemporal dominion, she could not call in some foreign potentate to aid\nher against any Italian State by which she was overmatched. Of which we\nfind many instances, both in early times, as when by the intervention\nof Charles the Great she drove the Lombards, who had made themselves\nmasters of nearly the whole country, out of Italy; and also in recent\ntimes, as when, with the help of France, she first stripped the\nVenetians of their territories, and then, with the help of the Swiss,\nexpelled the French.\n\nThe Church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take\npossession of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing\nany one else from doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under\none head; and has been the cause of her always living subject to many\nprinces or rulers, by whom she has been brought to such division and\nweakness as to have become a prey, not to Barbarian kings only, but to\nany who have thought fit to attack her. For this, I say, we Italians\nhave none to thank but the Church. And were any man powerful enough to\ntransplant the Court of Rome, with all the authority it now wields over\nthe rest of Italy, into the territories of the Swiss (the only people\nwho at this day, both as regards religion and military discipline, live\nlike the ancients,) he would have clear proof of the truth of what I\naffirm, and would find that the corrupt manners of that Court had, in a\nlittle while, wrought greater mischief in these territories than any\nother disaster which could ever befall them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\u2014_Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving\nInstitutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in\nquelling Tumults._\n\n\nHere it seems to me not out of place to cite instances of the Romans\nseeking assistance from religion in reforming their institutions and in\ncarrying out their warlike designs. And although many such are related\nby Titus Livius, I content myself with mentioning the following only:\nThe Romans having appointed tribunes with consular powers, all of them,\nsave one, plebeians, it so chanced that in that very year they were\nvisited by plague and famine, accompanied by many strange portents.\nTaking occasion from this, the nobles, at the next creation of\ntribunes, gave out that the gods were angry with Rome for lowering the\nmajesty of her government, nor could be appeased but by the choice of\ntribunes being restored to a fair footing. Whereupon the people,\nsmitten with religious awe, chose all the tribunes from the nobles.\nAgain, at the siege of Veii, we find the Roman commanders making use of\nreligion to keep the minds of their men well disposed towards that\nenterprise. For when, in the last year of the siege, the soldiers,\ndisgusted with their protracted service, began to clamour to be led\nback to Rome, on the Alban lake suddenly rising to an uncommon height,\nit was found that the oracles at Delphi and elsewhere had foretold that\nVeii should fall that year in which the Alban lake overflowed. The hope\nof near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers, led them to\nput up with the weariness of the war, and to continue in arms; until,\non Camillus being named dictator, Veii was taken after a ten years\u2019\nsiege. In these cases, therefore, we see religion, wisely used, assist\nin the reduction of this city, and in restoring the tribuneship to the\nnobles; neither of which ends could well have been effected without it.\n\nOne other example bearing on the same subject I must not omit. Constant\ndisturbances were occasioned in Rome by the tribune Terentillus, who,\nfor reasons to be noticed in their place, sought to pass a certain law.\nThe nobles, in their efforts to baffle him, had recourse to religion,\nwhich they sought to turn to account in two ways. For first they caused\nthe Sibylline books to be searched, and a feigned answer returned, that\nin that year the city ran great risk of losing its freedom through\ncivil discord; which fraud, although exposed by the tribunes,\nnevertheless aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons that they\nslackened in their support of their leaders. Their other contrivance\nwas as follows: A certain Appius Herdonius, at the head of a band of\nslaves and outlaws, to the number of four thousand, having seized the\nCapitol by night, an alarm was spread that were the Equians and\nVolscians, those perpetual enemies of the Roman name, then to attack\nthe city, they might succeed in taking it. And when, in spite of this,\nthe tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts to pass the law,\ndeclaring the act of Herdonius to be a device of the nobles and no real\ndanger. Publius Rubetius, a citizen of weight and authority, came forth\nfrom the Senate House, and in words partly friendly and partly\nmenacing, showed them the peril in which the city stood, and that their\ndemands were unseasonable; and spoke to such effect that the commons\nbound themselves by oath to stand by the consul; in fulfilment of which\nengagement they aided the consul, Publius Valerius, to carry the\nCapitol by assault. But Valerius being slain in the attack, Titus\nQuintius was at once appointed in his place, who, to leave the people\nno breathing time, nor suffer their thoughts to revert to the\nTerentillian law, ordered them to quit Rome and march against the\nVolscians; declaring them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath\nthey had sworn not to desert the consul. And though the tribunes\nwithstood him, contending that the oath had been sworn to the dead\nconsul and not to Quintius, yet the people under the influence of\nreligious awe, chose rather to obey the consul than believe the\ntribunes. And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says:\n\u201c_That neglect of the gods which now prevails, had not then made its\nway nor was it then the practice for every man to interpret his oath,\nor the laws, to suit his private ends_.\u201d The tribunes accordingly,\nfearing to lose their entire ascendency, consented to obey the consul,\nand to refrain for a year from moving in the matter of the Terentillian\nlaw; while the consuls, on their part, undertook that for a year the\ncommons should not be called forth to war. And thus, with the help of\nreligion, the senate were able to overcome a difficulty which they\nnever could have overcome without it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\u2014_That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the\noccasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion\neven when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted\nReligion they punished._\n\n\nAuguries were not only, as we have shown above, a main foundation of\nthe old religion of the Gentiles, but were also the cause of the\nprosperity of the Roman commonwealth. Accordingly, the Romans gave more\nheed to these than to any other of their observances; resorting to them\nin their consular comitia; in undertaking new enterprises; in calling\nout their armies; in going into battle; and, in short, in every\nbusiness of importance, whether civil or military. Nor would they ever\nset forth on any warlike expedition, until they had satisfied their\nsoldiers that the gods had promised them victory.\n\nAmong other means of declaring the auguries, they had in their armies a\nclass of soothsayers, named by them _pullarii_, whom, when they desired\nto give battle, they would ask to take the auspices, which they did by\nobserving the behaviour of fowls. If the fowls pecked, the engagement\nwas begun with a favourable omen. If they refused, battle was declined.\nNevertheless, when it was plain on the face of it that a certain course\nhad to be taken, they would take it at all hazards, even though the\nauspices were adverse; contriving, however, to manage matters so\nadroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on religion; as was done\nby the consul Papirius in the great battle he fought with the Samnites\nwherein that nation was finally broken and overthrown. For Papirius\nbeing encamped over against the Samnites, and perceiving that if he\nfought, victory was certain, and consequently being eager to engage,\ndesired the omens to be taken. The fowls refused to peck; but the chief\nsoothsayer observing the eagerness of the soldiers to fight and the\nconfidence felt both by them and by their captain, not to deprive the\narmy of such an opportunity of glory, reported to the consul that the\nauspices were favourable. Whereupon Papirius began to array his army\nfor battle. But some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain\nof the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked, this was told to Spurius\nPapirius, the nephew of the consul, who reporting it to his uncle, the\nlatter straightway bade him mind his own business, for that so far as\nhe himself and the army were concerned, the auspices were fair; and if\nthe soothsayer had lied, the consequences were on his head. And that\nthe event might accord with the prognostics, he commanded his officers\nto place the soothsayers in front of the battle. It so chanced that as\nthey advanced against the enemy, the chief soothsayer was killed by a\nspear thrown by a Roman soldier; which, the consul hearing of, said,\n\u201c_All goes well, and as the Gods would have it, for by the death of\nthis liar the army is purged of blame and absolved from whatever\ndispleasure these may have conceived against it_.\u201d And contriving, in\nthis way to make his designs tally with the auspices, he joined battle,\nwithout the army knowing that the ordinances of religion had in any\ndegree been disregarded.\n\nBut an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher, in Sicily, in the\nfirst Carthaginian war. For desiring to join battle, he bade the\nsoothsayers take the auspices, and on their announcing that the fowls\nrefused to feed, he answered, \u201c_Let us see, then, whether they will\ndrink,_\u201d and, so saying, caused them to be thrown into the sea. After\nwhich he fought and was defeated. For this he was condemned at Rome,\nwhile Papirius was honoured; not so much because the one had gained\nwhile the other had lost a battle, as because in their treatment of the\nauspices the one had behaved discreetly, the other with rashness. And,\nin truth, the sole object of this system of taking the auspices was to\ninsure the army joining battle with that confidence of success which\nconstantly leads to victory; a device followed not by the Romans only,\nbut by foreign nations as well; of which I shall give an example in the\nfollowing Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\u2014_How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken\nFortunes, had recourse to Religion._\n\n\nThe Samnites, who before had met with many defeats at the hands of the\nRomans, were at last decisively routed by them in Etruria, where their\narmies were cut to pieces and their commanders slain. And because their\nallies also, such as the Etruscans, the Umbrians, and the Gauls, were\nlikewise vanquished, they \u201c_could now no longer_\u201d as Livius tells us,\n\u201c_either trust to their own strength or to foreign aid; yet, for all\nthat, would not cease from hostilities, nor resign themselves to\nforfeit the liberty which they had unsuccessfully defended, preferring\nnew defeats to an inglorious submission._\u201d They resolved, therefore, to\nmake a final effort; and as they knew that victory was only to be\nsecured by inspiring their soldiers with a stubborn courage, to which\nend nothing could help so much as religion, at the instance of their\nhigh priest, Ovius Paccius, they revived an ancient sacrificial rite\nperformed by them in the manner following. After offering solemn\nsacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies, standing\nbetween the slain victims and the smoking altars, to swear never to\nabandon the war. They then summoned the common soldiers, one by one,\nand before the same altars, and surrounded by a ring of many centurions\nwith drawn swords, first bound them by oath never to reveal what they\nmight see or hear; and then, after imprecating the Divine wrath, and\nreciting the most terrible incantations, made them vow and swear to the\ngods, as they would not have a curse light on their race and offspring,\nto follow wherever their captains led, never to turn back from battle,\nand to put any they saw turn back to death. Some who in their terror\ndeclined to swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions. The rest,\nwarned by their cruel fate, complied. Assembling thereafter to the\nnumber of forty thousand, one-half of whom, to render their appearance\nof unusual splendour were clad in white, with plumes and crests over\ntheir helmets, they took up their ground in the neighbourhood of\nAquilonia. But Papirius, being sent against them, bade his soldiers be\nof good cheer, telling them \u201c_that feathers made no wounds, and that a\nRoman spear would pierce a painted shield;_\u201d and to lessen the effect\nwhich the oath taken by the Samnites had upon the minds of the Romans,\nhe said that such an oath must rather distract than strengthen those\nbound by it, since they had to fear, at once, their enemies, their\ncomrades, and their Gods. In the battle which ensued, the Samnites were\nrouted, any firmness lent them by religion or by the oath they had\nsworn, being balanced by the Roman valour, and the terror inspired by\npast defeats. Still we see that, in their own judgment, they had no\nother refuge to which to turn, nor other remedy for restoring their\nbroken hopes; and this is strong testimony to the spirit which religion\nrightly used can arouse.\n\nSome of the incidents which I have now been considering may be thought\nto relate rather to the foreign than to the domestic affairs of Rome,\nwhich last alone form the proper subject of this Book; nevertheless\nsince the matter connects itself with one of the most important\ninstitutions of the Roman republic, I have thought it convenient to\nnotice it here, so as not to divide the subject and be obliged to\nreturn to it hereafter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\u2014_That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by\nany accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom._\n\n\nShould a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident\nbecome free, as did the Romans on the expulsion of the Tarquins, we\nknow from numberless instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it\nwill be for it to maintain that freedom. And this is no more than we\nmight expect. For a people in such circumstances may be likened to the\nwild animal which, though destined by nature to roam at large in the\nwoods, has been reared in the cage and in constant confinement and\nwhich, should it chance to be set free in the open country, being\nunused to find its own food, and unfamiliar with the coverts where it\nmight lie concealed, falls a prey to the first who seeks to recapture\nit. Even thus it fares with the people which has been accustomed to be\ngoverned by others; since ignorant how to act by itself either for\nattack or defence, and neither knowing foreign princes nor being known\nof them, it is speedily brought back under the yoke, and often under a\nheavier yoke than that from which it has just freed its neck. These\ndifficulties will be met with, even where the great body of the\ncitizens has not become wholly corrupted; but where the corruption is\ncomplete, freedom, as shall presently be shown, is not merely fleeting\nbut impossible. Wherefore my remarks are to be taken as applying to\nthose States only wherein corruption has as yet made no great progress,\nand in which there is more that is sound than unsound.\n\nTo the difficulties above noticed, another has to be added, which is,\nthat a State in becoming free makes for itself bitter enemies but not\nwarm friends. All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support\nfrom the wealth of the tyrant, flourished under his government. For\nthese men, when the causes which made them powerful are withdrawn, can\nno longer live contented, but are one and all impelled to attempt the\nrestoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining their former\nimportance. On the other hand, as I have said, the State which becomes\nfree does not gain for itself warm friends. For a free government\nbestows its honours and rewards in accordance with certain fixed rules,\nand on considerations of merit, without which none is honoured or\nrewarded. But when a man obtains only those honours or rewards which he\nseems to himself to deserve, he will never admit that he is under any\nobligation to those who bestow them. Moreover the common benefits that\nall derive from a free government, which consist in the power to enjoy\nwhat is our own, openly and undisturbed, in having to feel no anxiety\nfor the honour of wife or child, nor any fear for personal safety, are\nhardly recognized by men while they still possess them, since none will\never confess obligation to him who merely refrains from injury. For\nthese reasons, I repeat, a State which has recently become free, is\nlikely to have bitter enemies and no warm friends.\n\nNow, to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders, there is\nno more potent, effectual, wholesome, and necessary remedy than _to\nslay the sons of Brutus_. They, as the historian tells us, were along\nwith other young Romans led to conspire against their country, simply\nbecause the unusual privileges which they had enjoyed under the kings,\nwere withheld under the consuls; so that to them it seemed as though\nthe freedom of the people implied their servitude. Any one, therefore,\nwho undertakes to control a people, either as their prince or as the\nhead of a commonwealth, and does not make sure work with all who are\nhostile to his new institutions, founds a government which cannot last\nlong. Undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy, who, to\nsecure their position, are forced to advance by unusual and irregular\npaths, and with the people for their enemies. For while he who has to\ndeal with a few adversaries only, can easily and without much or\nserious difficulty secure himself, he who has an entire people against\nhim can never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses the weaker\nhis authority becomes; so that his best course is to strive to make the\npeople his friends.\n\nBut since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above,\ntreating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have\nto return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it\nbriefly. Speaking, then of those princes who have become the tyrants of\ntheir country, I say that the prince who seeks to gain over an\nunfriendly people should first of all examine what it is the people\nreally desire, and he will always find that they desire two things:\nfirst, to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their servitude;\nand second, to regain their freedom. The first of these desires the\nprince can gratify wholly, the second in part. As regards the former,\nwe have an instance exactly in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea,\nbeing in exile, it so happened that on a feud arising between the\ncommons and the nobles of that city, the latter, perceiving they were\nweaker than their adversaries, began to look with favour on Clearchus,\nand conspiring with him, in opposition to the popular voice recalled\nhim to Heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom. Clearchus\nfinding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the nobles, whom\nhe could in no way either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the\npeople, who could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved\nto rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and\nrecommend himself to the people. Wherefore, watching his opportunity,\nhe caused all the nobles to be put to death, and thus, to the extreme\ndelight of the people, satisfied one of those desires by which they are\npossessed, namely, the desire for vengeance.\n\nAs for the other desire of the people, namely, to recover their\nfreedom, the prince, since he never can content them in this, should\nexamine what the causes are which make them long to be free; and he\nwill find a very few of them desiring freedom that they may obtain\npower, but all the rest, whose number is countless, only desiring it\nthat they may live securely. For in all republics, whatever the form of\ntheir government, barely forty or fifty citizens have any place in the\ndirection of affairs; who, from their number being so small, can easily\nbe reckoned with, either by making away with them, or by allowing them\nsuch a share of honours as, looking to their position, may reasonably\ncontent them. All those others whose sole aim it is to live safely, are\nwell contented where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances as\nprovide for the general security, while they establish his own\nauthority; and when he does this, and the people see that nothing\ninduces him to violate these laws, they soon begin to live happily and\nwithout anxiety. Of this we have an example in the kingdom of France,\nwhich enjoys perfect security from this cause alone, that its kings are\nbound to compliance with an infinity of laws upon which the well-being\nof the whole people depends. And he who gave this State its\nconstitution allowed its kings to do as they pleased as regards arms\nand money; but provided that as regards everything else they should not\ninterfere save as the laws might direct. Those rulers, therefore, who\nomit to provide sufficiently for the safety of their government at the\noutset, must, like the Romans, do so on the first occasion which\noffers; and whoever lets the occasion slip, will repent too late of not\nhaving acted as he should. The Romans, however, being still uncorrupted\nat the time when they recovered their freedom, were able, after slaying\nthe sons of Brutus and getting rid of the Tarquins, to maintain it with\nall those safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered.\nBut had they already become corrupted, no remedy could have been found,\neither in Rome or out of it, by which their freedom could have been\nsecured; as I shall show in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\u2014_That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly\npreserve it._\n\n\nI believe that if her kings had not been expelled, Rome must very soon\nhave become a weak and inconsiderable State. For seeing to what a pitch\nof corruption these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two or\nthree more like reigns had followed, and the taint spread from the head\nto the members, so soon as the latter became infected, cure would have\nbeen hopeless. But from the head being removed while the trunk was\nstill sound, it was not difficult for the Romans to return to a free\nand constitutional government.\n\nIt may be assumed, however, as most certain, that a corrupted city\nliving under a prince can never recover its freedom, even were the\nprince and all his line to be exterminated. For in such a city it must\nnecessarily happen that one prince will be replaced by another, and\nthat things will never settle down until a new lord be established;\nunless, indeed, the combined goodness and valour of some one citizen\nshould maintain freedom, which, even then, will endure only for his\nlifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first under the rule of Dion,\nand again under that of Timoleon, whose virtues while they lived kept\ntheir city free, but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny.\n\nBut the strongest example that can be given is that of Rome, which on\nthe expulsion of the Tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and\nto maintain it; yet, on the deaths of C\u00e6sar, Caligula, and Nero, and on\nthe extinction of the Julian line, was not only unable to establish her\nfreedom, but did not even venture a step in that direction. Results so\nopposite arising in one and the same city can only be accounted for by\nthis, that in the time of the Tarquins the Roman people were not yet\ncorrupted, but in these later times had become utterly corrupt. For on\nthe first occasion, nothing more was needed to prepare and determine\nthem to shake off their kings, than that they should be bound by oath\nto suffer no king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards, the\nauthority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed by all the legions of\nthe East, could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom,\nwhich he, following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had won for\nthem; and this because of the corruption wherewith the people had been\ninfected by the Marian faction, whereof C\u00e6sar becoming head, was able\nso to blind the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which it was\nabout to lay its neck.\n\nThough this example of Rome be more complete than any other, I desire\nto instance likewise, to the same effect, certain peoples well known in\nour own days; and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent,\ncould ever restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because in these States\nthe entire body of the people has grown corrupted. And so we find that\nMilan, although desirous to return to a free form of government, on the\ndeath of Filippo Visconti, had neither the force nor the skill needed\nto preserve it.\n\nMost fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her kings grew corrupt\nsoon, so as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had\nreached the vitals of the city. For it was because these were sound\nthat the endless commotions which took place in Rome, so far from being\nhurtful, were, from their object being good, beneficial to the\ncommonwealth. From which we may draw this inference, that where the\nbody of the people is still sound, tumults and other like disorders do\nlittle hurt, but that where it has become corrupted, laws, however well\ndevised, are of no advantage, unless imposed by some one whose\nparamount authority causes them to be observed until the community be\nonce more restored to a sound and healthy condition.\n\nWhether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether it ever can\nhappen. For we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which\nowing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is\nto recover at all, must be saved not by the excellence of the people\ncollectively, but of some one man then living among them, on whose\ndeath it at once relapses into its former plight; as happened with\nThebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it possible while he\nlived to preserve the form of a free Government, but which fell again\non his death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly any\nruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city\nwhich has long been accustomed to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be\nput on a sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced\nage, or by two virtuous rulers succeeding one another, the city upon\ntheir death at once falls back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must\nbe so by incurring great risks, and at the cost of much blood. For the\ncorruption I speak of, is wholly incompatible with a free government,\nbecause it results from an inequality which pervades the State and can\nonly be removed by employing unusual and very violent remedies, such as\nfew are willing or know how to employ, as in another place I shall more\nfully explain.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\u2014_How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be\npreserved, or not existing may be created._\n\n\nI think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent with what has been\nsaid above, to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt\ncity can be maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced. And on\nthis head I say that it is very difficult to bring about either of\nthese results, and next to impossible to lay down rules as to how it\nmay be done; because the measures to be taken must vary with the degree\nof corruption which prevails.\n\nNevertheless, since it is well to reason things out, I will not pass\nthis matter by, but will assume, in the first place, the case of a very\ncorrupt city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has\nreached a still greater height; but where corruption is universal, no\nlaws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it. Because as\ngood customs stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws,\nthat they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover,\nthe laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning,\nwhen men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad;\nbut while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its\ninstitutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the\nintroduction of new laws is of no avail, because the institutions,\nremaining unchanged, corrupt them.\n\nAnd to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all the\ninstitutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the\nmagistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of\nthe State consisted in the authority of the people, the senate, the\ntribunes, and the consuls; in the methods of choosing and appointing\nmagistrates; and in the arrangements for passing laws. These\ninstitutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the\nlaws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law\nrelating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at\nelections, and many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and\nmore corrupted. Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same\nalthough from the corruption of the people no longer suitable,\namendments in the laws could not keep men good, though they might have\nproved very useful if at the time when they were made the institutions\nhad likewise been reformed.\n\nThat its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has\nbecome corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I\nmean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For\nthe Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of\ntheir State on none save those who sought them; which was a good\ninstitution at first, because then none sought these offices save those\nwho thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held\ndisgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best\nbehaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most\nmischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those\nwho had most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were\nwithout influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This\nuntoward result was not reached all at once, but like other similar\nresults, by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and Asia, and\nreducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission, the Romans became\nperfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to themselves no longer\nto have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this security and\nthe weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the\nconsulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting\nfor the office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those\nwho knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of\nselecting those who were best liked, they came to select those who had\nmost influence; and in this way, from the imperfection of their\ninstitutions, good men came to be wholly excluded.\n\nAgain, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the\nmagistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before\nthese were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or\nagainst them. This was a good system so long as the citizens were good,\nsince it is always well that every man should be able to propose what\nhe thinks may be of use to his country, and that all should be allowed\nto express their views with regard to his proposal; so that the people,\nhaving heard all, may resolve on what is best. But when the people grew\ndepraved, this became a very mischievous institution; for then it was\nonly the powerful who proposed laws, and these not in the interest of\npublic freedom but of their own authority; and because, through fear,\nnone durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were either\ndeceived or forced into voting their own destruction.\n\nIn order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might\nstill preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of\nevents she had made new laws, so likewise she should frame new\ninstitutions, since different institutions and ordinances are needed in\na corrupt State from those which suit a State which is not corrupted;\nfor where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the form cannot be similar.\n\nBut since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon\nas they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the\nimperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two\ncourses is all but impossible. For to effect a gradual reform requires\na sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and\nin the germ. But it may well happen that no such person is found in a\ncity; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade others of what he is\nhimself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are loath to leave\nit for another, especially when they are not brought face to face with\nthe evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated to\nthem by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which\nare seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are\neasily discerned are not easily corrected, because for their correction\nit is not enough to use ordinary means, these being in themselves\ninsufficient; but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such as\nviolence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must become prince of the\ncity, and be able to deal with it at your pleasure. But since the\nrestoration of a State to new political life presupposes a good man,\nand to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it\ncan, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be good, a\ngood man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a\nbad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or\nthink of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority.\n\nFrom all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the\nimpossibility, which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing\nfree government, or in establishing a new one. So that had we to\nestablish or maintain a government in that city, it would be necessary\nto give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form, in order that men\ntoo arrogant to be restrained by the laws, might in some measure be\nkept in check by a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make them\ngood otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour.\nThis, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if he,\nthat he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus,\nwith a like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the\nSabine, and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus\nacquired, it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because\nneither Cleomenes nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as\nthat of which I am now speaking, that they were able to effect their\nends and to give a fair colour to their acts.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\u2014_After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself:\nbut after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second._\n\n\nWhen we contemplate the excellent qualities of Romulus, Numa, and\nTullus, the first three kings of Rome, and note the methods which they\nfollowed, we recognize the extreme good fortune of that city in having\nher first king fierce and warlike, her second peaceful and religious,\nand her third, like the first, of a high spirit and more disposed to\nwar than to peace. For it was essential for Rome that almost at the\noutset of her career, a ruler should be found to lay the foundations of\nher civil life; but, after that had been done, it was necessary that\nher rulers should return to the virtues of Romulus, since otherwise the\ncity must have grown feeble, and become a prey to her neighbours.\n\nAnd here we may note that a prince who succeeds to another of superior\nvalour, may reign on by virtue of his predecessor\u2019s merits, and reap\nthe fruits of his labours; but if he live to a great age, or if he be\nfollowed by another who is wanting in the qualities of the first, that\nthen the kingdom must necessarily dwindle. Conversely, when two\nconsecutive princes are of rare excellence, we commonly find them\nachieving results which win for them enduring renown. David, for\nexample, not only surpassed in learning and judgment, but was so\nvaliant in arms that, after conquering and subduing all his neighbours,\nhe left to his young son Solomon a tranquil State, which the latter,\nthough unskilled in the arts of war, could maintain by the arts of\npeace, and thus happily enjoy the inheritance of his father\u2019s valour.\nBut Solomon could not transmit this inheritance to his son Rehoboam,\nwho neither resembling his grandfather in valour, nor his father in\ngood fortune, with difficulty made good his right to a sixth part of\nthe kingdom. In like manner Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, though a man\nof peace rather than of war, was able to enjoy the labours of Mahomet\nhis father, who, like David, having subdued his neighbours, left his\nson a kingdom so safely established that it could easily be retained by\nhim by peaceful arts. But had Selim, son to Bajazet, been like his\nfather, and not like his grandfather, the Turkish monarchy must have\nbeen overthrown; as it is, he seems likely to outdo the fame of his\ngrandsire.\n\nI affirm it to be proved by these examples, that after a valiant prince\na feeble prince may maintain himself; but that no kingdom can stand\nwhen two feeble princes follow in succession, unless, as in the case of\nFrance, it be supported by its ancient ordinances. By feeble princes, I\nmean such as are not valiant in war. And, to put the matter shortly, it\nmay be said, that the great valour of Romulus left Numa a period of\nmany years within which to govern Rome by peaceful arts; that after\nNuma came Tullus, who renewed by his courage the fame of Romulus; and\nthat he in turn was succeeded by Ancus, a prince so gifted by nature\nthat he could equally avail himself of the methods of peace or war; who\nsetting himself at first to pursue the former, when he found that his\nneighbours judged him to be effeminate, and therefore held him in\nslight esteem, understood that to preserve Rome he must resort to arms\nand resemble Romulus rather than Numa. From whose example every ruler\nof a State may learn that a prince like Numa will hold or lose his\npower according as fortune and circumstances befriend him; but that the\nprince who resembles Romulus, and like him is fortified with foresight\nand arms, will hold his State whatever befall, unless deprived of it by\nsome stubborn and irresistible force. For we may reckon with certainty\nthat if Rome had not had for her third king one who knew how to restore\nher credit by deeds of valour, she could not, or at any rate not\nwithout great difficulty, have afterwards held her ground, nor could\never have achieved the great exploits she did.\n\nAnd for these reasons Rome, while she lived under her kings, was in\nconstant danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\u2014_That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce\ngreat results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a\nSuccession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly\nextended_.\n\n\nWhen Rome had driven out her kings, she was freed from those dangers to\nwhich, as I have said, she was exposed by the possible succession of a\nweak or wicked prince. For the chief share in the government then\ndevolved upon the consuls, who took their authority not by inheritance,\nnor yet by craft or by ambitious violence, but by the free suffrages of\ntheir fellow-citizens, and were always men of signal worth; by whose\nvalour and good fortune Rome being constantly aided, was able to reach\nthe height of her greatness in the same number of years as she had\nlived under her kings. And since we find that two successive reigns of\nvaliant princes, as of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, suffice\nto conquer the world, this ought to be still easier for a commonwealth,\nwhich has it in its power to choose, not two excellent rulers only, but\nan endless number in succession. And in every well ordered commonwealth\nprovision will be made for a succession of this sort.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\u2014_That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a\nCommonwealth to be without a national Army_.\n\n\nThose princes and republics of the present day who lack forces of their\nown, whether for attack or defence, should take shame to themselves,\nand should be convinced by the example of Tullus, that their deficiency\ndoes not arise from want of men fit for warlike enterprises, but from\ntheir own fault in not knowing how to make their subjects good\nsoldiers. For after Rome had been at peace for forty years, Tullus,\nsucceeding to the kingdom, found not a single Roman who had ever been\nin battle. Nevertheless when he made up his mind to enter on a war, it\nnever occurred to him to have recourse to the Samnites, or the\nEtruscans, or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed to\narms, but he resolved, like the prudent prince he was, to rely on his\nown countrymen. And such was his ability that, under his rule, the\npeople very soon became admirable soldiers. For nothing is more true\nthan that where a country, having men, lacks soldiers, it results from\nsome fault in its ruler, and not from any defect in the situation or\nclimate. Of this we have a very recent instance. Every one knows, how,\nonly the other day, the King of England invaded the realm of France\nwith an army raised wholly from among his own people, although from his\ncountry having been at peace for thirty years, he had neither men nor\nofficers who had ever looked an enemy in the face. Nevertheless, he did\nnot hesitate with such troops as he had, to attack a kingdom well\nprovided with officers and excellent soldiers who had been constantly\nunder arms in the Italian wars. And this was possible through the\nprudence of the English king and the wise ordinances of his kingdom,\nwhich never in time of peace relaxes its warlike discipline. So too, in\nold times, Pelopidas and Epaminondas the Thebans, after they had freed\nThebes from her tyrants, and rescued her from thraldom to Sparta,\nfinding themselves in a city used to servitude and surrounded by an\neffeminate people, scrupled not, so great was their courage, to furnish\nthese with arms, and go forth with them to meet and to conquer the\nSpartan forces on the field. And he who relates this, observes, that\nthese two captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred in\nLaced\u00e6mon alone, but in every country where men are found, if only some\none arise among them who knows how to direct them to arms; as we see\nTullus knew how to direct the Romans. Nor could Virgil better express\nthis opinion, or show by fitter words that he was convinced of its\ntruth than, when he says:\u2014\n\n\u201cTo arms shall Tullus rouse\nHis sluggish warriors.\u201d[2]\n\n\n [2] Residesque movebit\nTullus in arma viros. _Virg. Aen_. vi. 814.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\u2014_What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman\nHoratii and the three Alban Curiatii_.\n\n\nIt was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius king of Alba,\nthat the nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule\nover the other. The three Alban Curiatii were slain; one of the Roman\nHoratii survived. Whereupon the Alban king with all his people became\nsubject to the Romans. The surviving Horatius returning victorious to\nRome, and meeting his sister, wife to one of the dead Curiatii,\nbewailing the death of her husband, slew her; and being tried for this\ncrime, was, after much contention, liberated, rather on the entreaties\nof his father than for his own deserts.\n\nHerein three points are to be noted. _First_, that we should never\nperil our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces.\n_Second_, that in a well-governed State, merit should never be allowed\nto balance crime. And _third_, that those are never wise covenants\nwhich we cannot or should not expect to be observed. Now, for a State\nto be enslaved is so terrible a calamity that it ought never to have\nbeen supposed possible that either of these kings or nations would rest\ncontent under a slavery resulting from the defeat of three only of\ntheir number. And so it appeared to Metius; for although on the victory\nof the Roman champions, he at once confessed himself vanquished, and\npromised obedience; nevertheless, in the very first expedition which he\nand Tullus undertook jointly against the people of Veii, we find him\nseeking to circumvent the Roman, as though perceiving too late the rash\npart he had played.\n\nThis is enough to say of the third point which I noted as deserving\nattention. Of the other two I shall speak in the next two Chapters.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\u2014_That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we\nput not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile\nis often hurtful_.\n\n\nIt was never judged a prudent course to peril your whole fortunes where\nyou put not forth your whole strength; as may happen in more ways than\none. One of these ways was that taken by Tullus and Metius, when each\nstaked the existence of his country and the credit of his army on the\nvalour and good fortune of three only of his soldiers, that being an\nutterly insignificant fraction of the force at his disposal. For\nneither of these kings reflected that all the labours of their\npredecessors in framing such institutions for their States, as might,\nwith the aid of the citizens themselves, maintain them long in freedom,\nwere rendered futile, when the power to ruin all was left in the hands\nof so small a number. No rasher step, therefore, could have been taken,\nthan was taken by these kings.\n\nA like risk is almost always incurred by those who, on the approach of\nan enemy, resolve to defend some place of strength, or to guard the\ndefiles by which their country is entered. For unless room be found in\nthis place of strength for almost all your army, the attempt to hold it\nwill almost always prove hurtful. If you can find room, it will be\nright to defend your strong places; but if these be difficult of\naccess, and you cannot there keep your entire force together, the\neffort to defend is mischievous. I come to this conclusion from\nobserving the example of those who, although their territories be\nenclosed by mountains and precipices, have not, on being attacked by\npowerful enemies, attempted to fight on the mountains or in the\ndefiles, but have advanced beyond them to meet their foes; or, if\nunwilling to advance, have awaited attack behind their mountains, on\nlevel and not on broken ground. The reason of which is, as I have above\nexplained, that many men cannot be assembled in these strong places for\ntheir defence; partly because a large number of men cannot long subsist\nthere, and partly because such places being narrow and confined, afford\nroom for a few only; so that no enemy can there be withstood, who comes\nin force to the attack; which he can easily do, his design being to\npass on and not to make a stay; whereas he who stands on the defensive\ncannot do so in force, because, from not knowing when the enemy may\nenter the confined and sterile tracts of which I speak, he may have to\nlodge himself there for a long time. But should you lose some pass\nwhich you had reckoned on holding, and on the defence of which your\ncountry and army have relied, there commonly follows such panic among\nyour people and among the troops which remain to you, that you are\nvanquished without opportunity given for any display of valour, and\nlose everything without bringing all your resources into play.\n\nEvery one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps\nwhich divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards those which separate\nLombardy from Tuscany. Nevertheless the Romans awaited him, in the\nfirst instance on the banks of the Ticino, in the second on the plain\nof Arezzo, preferring to be defeated on ground which at least gave them\na chance of victory, to leading their army into mountain fastnesses\nwhere it was likely to be destroyed by the mere difficulties of the\nground. And any who read history with attention will find, that very\nfew capable commanders have attempted to hold passes of this nature, as\nwell for the reasons already given, as because to close them all were\nimpossible. For mountains, like plains, are traversed not only by\nwell-known and frequented roads, but also by many by-ways, which,\nthough unknown to strangers, are familiar to the people of the country,\nunder whose guidance you may always, and in spite of any opposition, be\neasily conducted to whatever point you please. Of this we have a recent\ninstance in the events of the year 1515. For when Francis I. of France\nresolved on invading Italy in order to recover the province of\nLombardy, those hostile to his attempt looked mainly to the Swiss, who\nit was hoped would stop him in passing through their mountains. But\nthis hope was disappointed by the event. For leaving on one side two or\nthree defiles which were guarded by the Swiss, the king advanced by\nanother unknown pass, and was in Italy and upon his enemies before they\nknew. Whereupon they fled terror-stricken into Milan; while the whole\npopulation of Lombardy, finding themselves deceived in their\nexpectation that the French would be detained in the mountains, went\nover to their side.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\u2014_That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and\nPunishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against\nMisdeeds_.\n\n\nThe valour of Horatius in vanquishing the Curiatii deserved the highest\nreward. But in slaying his sister he had been guilty of a heinous\ncrime. And so displeasing to the Romans was an outrage of this nature,\nthat although his services were so great and so recent, they brought\nhim to trial for his life. To one looking at it carelessly, this might\nseem an instance of popular ingratitude, but he who considers the\nmatter more closely, and examines with sounder judgment what the\nordinances of a State should be, will rather blame the Roman people for\nacquitting Horatius than for putting him on his trial. And this because\nno well-ordered State ever strikes a balance between the services of\nits citizens and their misdeeds; but appointing rewards for good\nactions and punishment for bad, when it has rewarded a man for acting\nwell, will afterwards, should he act ill, chastise him, without regard\nto his former deserts. When these ordinances are duly observed, a city\nwill live long in freedom, but when they are neglected, it must soon\ncome to ruin. For when a citizen has rendered some splendid service to\nhis country, if to the distinction which his action in itself confers,\nwere added an over-weening confidence that any crime he might\nthenceforth commit would pass unpunished, he would soon become so\narrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him.\n\nStill, while we would have punishment terrible to wrongdoers, it is\nessential that good actions should be rewarded, as we see to have been\nthe case in Rome. For even where a republic is poor, and has but little\nto give, it ought not to withhold that little; since a gift, however\nsmall, bestowed as a reward for services however great, will always be\nesteemed most honourable and precious by him who receives it. The story\nof Horatius Cocles and that of Mutius Sc\u00e6vola are well known: how the\none withstood the enemy on the bridge while it was being cut down, and\nthe other thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of the mistake\nmade when he sought the life of Porsenna the Etruscan king. To each of\nthese two, in requital of their splendid deeds, two ploughgates only of\nthe public land were given. Another famous story is that of Manlius\nCapitolinus, to whom, for having saved the Capitol from the besieging\nGauls, a small measure of meal was given by each of those who were shut\nup with him during the siege. Which recompense, in proportion to the\nwealth of the citizens of Rome at that time, was thought ample; so that\nafterwards, when Manlius, moved by jealousy and malice, sought to\narouse sedition in Rome, and to gain over the people to his cause, they\nwithout regard to his past services threw him headlong from that\nCapitol in saving which he had formerly gained so great a renown.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\u2014_That he who would reform the Institutions of a free\nState, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways._\n\n\nWhoever takes upon him to reform the government of a city, must, if his\nmeasures are to be well received and carried out with general approval,\npreserve at least the semblance of existing methods, so as not to\nappear to the people to have made any change in the old order of\nthings; although, in truth, the new ordinances differ altogether from\nthose which they replace. For when this is attended to, the mass of\nmankind accept what seems as what is; nay, are often touched more\nnearly by appearances than by realities.\n\nThis tendency being recognized by the Romans at the very outset of\ntheir civil freedom, when they appointed two consuls in place of a\nsingle king, they would not permit the consuls to have more than twelve\nlictors, in order that the old number of the king\u2019s attendants might\nnot be exceeded. Again, there being solemnized every year in Rome a\nsacrificial rite which could only be performed by the king in person,\nthat the people might not be led by the absence of the king to remark\nthe want of any ancient observance, a priest was appointed for the due\ncelebration of this rite, to whom was given the name of _Rex\nsacrificulus_, and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest.\nIn this way the people were contented, and had no occasion from any\ndefect in the solemnities to desire the return of their kings. Like\nprecautions should be used by all who would put an end to the old\ngovernment of a city and substitute new and free institutions. For\nsince novelty disturbs men\u2019s minds, we should seek in the changes we\nmake to preserve as far as possible what is ancient, so that if the new\nmagistrates differ from the old in number, in authority, or in the\nduration of their office, they shall at least retain the old names.\n\nThis, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish a\nconstitutional government, whether in the form of a commonwealth or of\na kingdom. But he who would create an absolute government of the kind\nwhich political writers term a tyranny, must renew everything, as shall\nbe explained in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\u2014_A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken\nPossession, ought to make Everything new._\n\n\nWhosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more especially if his\nposition be so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional\ngovernment either in the form of a republic or a monarchy, will find\nthat the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew the whole\ninstitutions of that State; that is to say, to create new magistracies\nwith new names, confer new powers, and employ new men, and like David\nwhen he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great, \u201c_filling\nthe hungry with good things, and sending the rich empty away_.\u201d\nMoreover, he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them, removing\ntheir inhabitants from one place to another; and, in short, leave\nnothing in the country as he found it; so that there shall be neither\nrank, nor condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can\nrefer to any but to him. And he must take example from Philip of\nMacedon, the father of Alexander, who by means such as these, from\nbeing a petty prince became monarch of all Greece; and of whom it was\nwritten that he shifted men from province to province as a shepherd\nmoves his flocks from one pasture to another.\n\nThese indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not merely to every\nChristian, but to every civilized rule of conduct, and such as every\nman should shun, choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a\nking on terms so hurtful to mankind. But he who will not keep to the\nfair path of virtue, must to maintain himself enter this path of evil.\nMen, however, not knowing how to be wholly good or wholly bad, choose\nfor themselves certain middle ways, which of all others are the most\npernicious, as shall be shown by an instance in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\u2014_That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly\nbad_.\n\n\nWhen in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. went to Bologna to expel from\nthat city the family of the Bentivogli, who had been princes there for\nover a hundred years, it was also in his mind, as a part of the general\ndesign he had planned against all those lords who had usurped Church\nlands, to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. And coming\nto Perugia with this intention and resolve, of which all men knew, he\nwould not wait to enter the town with a force sufficient for his\nprotection, but entered it unattended by troops, although Giovanpagolo\nwas there with a great company of soldiers whom he had assembled for\nhis defence. And thus, urged on by that impetuosity which stamped all\nhis actions, accompanied only by his body-guard, he committed himself\ninto the hands of his enemy, whom he forthwith carried away with him,\nleaving a governor behind to hold the town for the Church. All prudent\nmen who were with the Pope remarked on his temerity, and on the\npusillanimity of Giovanpagolo; nor could they conjecture why the latter\nhad not, to his eternal glory, availed himself of this opportunity for\ncrushing his enemy, and at the same time enriching himself with\nplunder, the Pope being attended by the whole College of Cardinals with\nall their luxurious equipage. For it could not be supposed that he was\nwithheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples of conscience;\nbecause in the breast of a profligate living in incest with his sister,\nand who to obtain the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to\ndeath, no virtuous impulse could prevail. So that the only inference to\nbe drawn was, that men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly\ngood, and shrink in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with an\ninherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature. For which reason\nGiovanpagolo, who thought nothing of incurring the guilt of incest, or\nof murdering his kinsmen, could not, or more truly durst not, avail\nhimself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would have admired;\nwhich would have won for him a deathless fame as the first to teach the\nprelates how little those who live and reign as they do are to be\nesteemed; and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending\nany infamy or danger that could attach to it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\u2014_Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to\ntheir Citizens than were the Athenians_.\n\n\nIn the histories of all republics we meet with instances of some sort\nof ingratitude to their great citizens, but fewer in the history of\nRome than of Athens, or indeed of any other republic. Searching for the\ncause of this, I am persuaded that, so far as regards Rome and Athens,\nit was due to the Romans having had less occasion than the Athenians to\nlook upon their fellow-citizens with suspicion. For, from the expulsion\nof her kings down to the times of Sylla and Marius, the liberty of Rome\nwas never subverted by any one of her citizens; so that there never was\nin that city grave cause for distrusting any man, and in consequence\nmaking him the victim of inconsiderate injustice. The reverse was\nnotoriously the case with Athens; for that city, having, at a time when\nshe was most flourishing, been deprived of her freedom by Pisistratus\nunder a false show of good-will, remembering, after she regained her\nliberty, her former bondage and all the wrongs she had endured, became\nthe relentless chastiser, not of offences only on the part of her\ncitizens, but even of the shadow of an offence. Hence the banishment\nand death of so many excellent men, and hence the law of ostracism, and\nall those other violent measures which from time to time during the\nhistory of that city were directed against her foremost citizens. For\nthis is most true which is asserted by the writers on civil government,\nthat a people which has recovered its freedom, bites more fiercely than\none which has always preserved it.\n\nAnd any who shall weigh well what has been said, will not condemn\nAthens in this matter, nor commend Rome, but refer all to the necessity\narising out of the different conditions prevailing in the two States.\nFor careful reflection will show that had Rome been deprived of her\nfreedom as Athens was, she would not have been a whit more tender to\nher citizens. This we may reasonably infer from remarking what, after\nthe expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and Publius Valerius; the\nformer of whom, though he had taken part in the liberation of Rome, was\nsent into exile for no other reason than that he bore the name of\nTarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter, and\nwhat almost led to his banishment, was his having built a house upon\nthe C\u00e6lian hill. Seeing how harsh and suspicious Rome was in these two\ninstances, we may surmise that she would have shown the same\ningratitude as Athens, had she, like Athens, been wronged by her\ncitizens at an early stage of her growth, and before she had attained\nto the fulness of her strength.\n\nThat I may not have to return to this question of ingratitude, I shall\nsay all that remains to be said about it in my next Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\u2014_Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful._\n\n\nIn connection with what has been said above, it seems proper to\nconsider whether more notable instances of ingratitude are supplied by\nprinces or peoples. And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that\nthis vice of ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in\nsuspicion. For a prince or people when they have sent forth a captain\non some important enterprise, by succeeding in which he earns a great\nname, are bound in return to reward him; and if moved by avarice and\ncovetousness they fail to do so, or if, instead of rewarding, they\nwrong and disgrace him, they commit an error which is not only without\nexcuse, but brings with it undying infamy. And, in fact, we find many\nprinces who have sinned in this way, for the cause given by Cornelius\nTacitus when he says, that \u201c_men are readier to pay back injuries than\nbenefits, since to requite a benefit is felt to be a burthen, to return\nan injury a gain_.\u201d[3]\n\n [3] Proclivius est injuri\u00e6 quam beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia\n oneri, ultio in quastu habetur. _Tacit. Hist._ iv. 2.\n\n\nWhen, however, reward is withheld, or, to speak more correctly, where\noffence is given, not from avarice but from suspicion, the prince or\npeople may deserve some excuse; and we read of many instances of\ningratitude proceeding from this cause. For the captain who by his\nvalour has won new dominions for his prince, since while overcoming his\nenemies, he at the same time covers himself with glory and enriches his\nsoldiers, must needs acquire such credit with his own followers, and\nwith the enemy, and also with the subjects of his prince, as cannot be\nwholly agreeable to the master who sent him forth. And since men are by\nnature ambitious as well as jealous, and none loves to set a limit to\nhis fortunes, the suspicion which at once lays hold of the prince when\nhe sees his captain victorious, is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant\nact or word of the captain himself. So that the prince will be unable\nto think of anything but how to secure himself; and to this end will\ncontrive how he may put his captain to death, or at any rate deprive\nhim of the credit he has gained with the army and among the people;\ndoing all he can to show that the victory was not won by his valour,\nbut by good fortune, or by the cowardice of the enemy, or by the skill\nand prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other\nbattle.\n\nAfter Vespasian, who was then in Jud\u00e6a, had been proclaimed emperor by\nhis army, Antonius Primus, who commanded another army in Illyria,\nadopted his cause, and marching into Italy against Vitellius who had\nbeen proclaimed emperor in Rome, courageously defeated two armies under\nthat prince, and occupied Rome; so that Mutianus, who was sent thither\nby Vespasian, found everything done to his hand, and all difficulties\nsurmounted by the valour of Antonius. But all the reward which Antonius\nhad for his pains, was, that Mutianus forthwith deprived him of his\ncommand of the army, and by degrees diminished his authority in Rome\ntill none was left him. Thereupon Antonius went to join Vespasian, who\nwas still in Asia; by whom he was so coldly received and so little\nconsidered, that in despair he put himself to death. And of cases like\nthis, history is full. Every man living at the present hour knows with\nwhat zeal and courage Gonsalvo of Cordova, while conducting the war in\nNaples against the French, conquered and subdued that kingdom for his\nmaster Ferdinand of Aragon; and how his services were requited by\nFerdinand coming from Aragon to Naples, and first of all depriving him\nof the command of the army, afterwards of the fortresses, and finally\ncarrying him back with him to Spain, where soon after he died in\ndisgrace.\n\nThis jealousy, then, is so natural to princes, that they cannot guard\nthemselves against it, nor show gratitude to those who serving under\ntheir standard have gained great victories and made great conquests on\ntheir behalf. And if it be impossible for princes to free their minds\nfrom such suspicions, there is nothing strange or surprising that a\npeople should be unable to do so. For as a city living under free\ninstitutions has two ends always before it, namely to acquire liberty\nand to preserve it, it must of necessity be led by its excessive\npassion for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both these\nobjects. Of the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty, I\nshall speak, hereafter, in the proper place. Of mistakes committed in\nthe endeavour to preserve liberty are to be noted, the injuring those\ncitizens who ought to be rewarded, and the suspecting those who should\nbe trusted. Now, although in a State which has grown corrupt these\nerrors occasion great evils, and commonly lead to a tyranny, as\nhappened in Rome when C\u00e6sar took by force what ingratitude had denied\nhim, they are nevertheless the cause of much good in the republic which\nhas not been corrupted, since they prolong the duration of its free\ninstitutions, and make men, through fear of punishment, better and less\nambitious. Of all peoples possessed of great power, the Romans, for the\nreasons I have given, have undoubtedly been the least ungrateful, since\nwe have no other instance of their ingratitude to cite, save that of\nScipio. For both Coriolanus and Camillus were banished on account of\nthe wrongs which they inflicted on the commons; and though the former\nwas not forgiven because he constantly retained ill will against the\npeople, the latter was not only recalled, but for the rest of his life\nhonoured as a prince. But the ingratitude shown towards Scipio arose\nfrom the suspicion wherewith the citizens came to regard him, which\nthey had not felt in the case of the others, and which was occasioned\nby the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown, the fame he had\nwon by prevailing in so dangerous and protracted a war, the suddenness\nof his victories, and, finally, the favour which his youth, together\nwith his prudence and his other memorable qualities had gained for him.\nThese qualities were, in truth, so remarkable that the very\nmagistrates, not to speak of others, stood in awe of his authority, a\ncircumstance displeasing to prudent citizens, as before unheard of in\nRome. In short, his whole bearing and character were so much out of the\ncommon, that even the elder Cato, so celebrated for his austere virtue,\nwas the first to declare against him, saying that no city could be\ndeemed free which contained a citizen who was feared by the\nmagistrates. And since, in this instance, the Romans followed the\nopinion of Cato, they merit that excuse which, as I have said already,\nshould be extended to the prince or people who are ungrateful through\nsuspicion.\n\nIn conclusion it is to be said that while this vice of ingratitude has\nits origin either in avarice or in suspicion, commonwealths are rarely\nled into it by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion,\nhaving, as shall presently be shown, far less reason than princes for\nsuspecting.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\u2014_How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of\nIngratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by\nit._\n\n\nThat he may not be tormented by suspicion, nor show ungrateful, a\nprince should go himself on his wars as the Roman emperors did at\nfirst, as the Turk does now, and, in short, as all valiant princes have\ndone and do. For when it is the prince himself who conquers, the glory\nand the gain are all his own; but when he is absent, since the glory is\nanother\u2019s, it will seem to the prince that he profits nothing by the\ngain, unless that glory be quenched which he knew not how to win for\nhimself; and when he thus becomes ungrateful and unjust, doubtless his\nloss is greater than his gain. To the prince, therefore, who, either\nthrough indolence or from want of foresight, sends forth a captain to\nconduct his wars while he himself remains inactive at home, I have no\nadvice to offer which he does not already know. But I would counsel the\ncaptain whom he sends, since I am sure that he can never escape the\nattacks of ingratitude, to follow one or other of two courses, and\neither quit his command at once after a victory, and place himself in\nthe hands of his prince, while carefully abstaining from every\nvainglorious or ambitious act, so that the prince, being relieved from\nall suspicion, may be disposed to reward, or at any rate not to injure\nhim; or else, should he think it inexpedient for him to act in this\nway, to take boldly the contrary course, and fearlessly to follow out\nall such measures as he thinks will secure for himself, and not for his\nprince, whatever he has gained; conciliating the good-will of his\nsoldiers and fellow-citizens, forming new friendships with neighbouring\npotentates, placing his own adherents in fortified towns, corrupting\nthe chief officers of his army and getting rid of those whom he fails\nto corrupt, and by all similar means endeavouring to punish his master\nfor the ingratitude which he looks for at his hands. These are the only\ntwo courses open; but since, as I said before, men know not how to be\nwholly good or wholly bad, it will never happen that after a victory a\ncaptain will quit his army and conduct himself modestly, nor yet that\nhe will venture to use those hardy methods which have in them some\nstrain of greatness; and so, remaining undecided, he will be crushed\nwhile he still wavers and doubts.\n\nA commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude is, as\ncompared with a prince, at this disadvantage, that while a prince can\ngo himself on his expeditions, the commonwealth must send some one of\nits citizens. As a remedy, I would recommend that course being adopted\nwhich was followed by the Roman republic in order to be less ungrateful\nthan others, having its origin in the nature of the Roman government.\nFor the whole city, nobles and commons alike, taking part in her wars,\nthere were always found in Rome at every stage of her history, so many\nvaliant and successful soldiers, that by reason of their number, and\nfrom one acting as a check upon another, the nation had never ground to\nbe jealous of any one man among them; while they, on their part, lived\nuprightly, and were careful to betray no sign of ambition, nor give the\npeople the least cause to distrust them as ambitious; so that he\nobtained most glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down.\nWhich conduct, as it excited no suspicion, could occasion no\ningratitude.\n\nWe see, then, that the commonwealth which would have no cause to be\nungrateful, must act as Rome did; and that the citizen who would escape\ningratitude, must observe those precautions which were observed by\nRoman citizens.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\u2014_That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme\nseverity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely\nthrough their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all_.\n\n\nThe Romans were not only, as has been said above, less ungrateful than\nother republics, but were also more lenient and more considerate than\nothers in punishing the captains of their armies. For if these erred of\nset purpose, they chastised them with gentleness; while if they erred\nthrough ignorance, so far from punishing, they even honoured and\nrewarded them. And this conduct was well considered. For as they judged\nit of the utmost moment, that those in command of their armies should,\nin all they had to do, have their minds undisturbed and free from\nexternal anxieties, they would not add further difficulty and danger to\na task in itself both dangerous and difficult, lest none should ever be\nfound to act with valour. For supposing them to be sending forth an\narmy against Philip of Macedon in Greece or against Hannibal in Italy,\nor against any other enemy at whose hands they had already sustained\nreverses, the captain in command of that expedition would be weighted\nwith all the grave and important cares which attend such enterprises.\nBut if to all these cares, had been added the example of Roman generals\ncrucified or otherwise put to death for having lost battles, it would\nhave been impossible for a commander surrounded by so many causes for\nanxiety to have acted with vigour and decision. For which reason, and\nbecause they thought that to such persons the mere ignominy of defeat\nwas in itself punishment enough, they would not dishearten their\ngenerals by inflicting on them any heavier penalty.\n\nOf errors committed not through ignorance, the following is an\ninstance. Sergius and Virginius were engaged in the siege of Veii, each\nbeing in command of a division of the army, and while Sergius was set\nto guard against the approach of the Etruscans, it fell to Virginius to\nwatch the town. But Sergius being attacked by the Faliscans and other\ntribes, chose rather to be defeated and routed than ask aid from\nVirginius, who, on his part, awaiting the humiliation of his rival, was\nwilling to see his country dishonoured and an army destroyed, sooner\nthan go unasked to his relief. This was notable misconduct, and likely,\nunless both offenders were punished, to bring discredit on the Roman\nname. But whereas another republic would have punished these men with\ndeath, the Romans were content to inflict only a money fine: not\nbecause the offence did not in itself deserve severe handling, but\nbecause they were unwilling, for the reasons already given, to depart\nin this instance from their ancient practice.\n\nOf errors committed through ignorance we have no better example than in\nthe case of Varro, through whose rashness the Romans were defeated by\nHannibal at Cann\u00e6, where the republic well-nigh lost its liberty. But\nbecause he had acted through ignorance and with no evil design, they\nnot only refrained from punishing him, but even treated him with\ndistinction; the whole senate going forth to meet him on his return to\nRome, and as they could not thank him for having fought, thanking him\nfor having come back, and for not having despaired of the fortunes his\ncountry.\n\nAgain, when Papirius Cursor would have had Fabius put to death,\nbecause, contrary to his orders, he had fought with the Samnites, among\nthe reasons pleaded by the father of Fabius against the persistency of\nthe dictator, he urged that never on the occasion of the defeat of any\nof their captains had the Romans done what Papirius desired them to do\non the occasion of a victory.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\u2014_That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay\nconferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties._\n\n\nThe Romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons\nat a season of danger, when Porsenna came to attack Rome and restore\nthe Tarquins. For the senate, apprehending that the people might choose\nrather to take back their kings than to support a war, secured their\nadherence by relieving them of the duty on salt and of all their other\nburthens; saying that \u201c_the poor did enough for the common welfare in\nrearing their offspring._\u201d In return for which indulgence the commons\nwere content to undergo war, siege, and famine. Let no one however,\nrelying on this example, delay conciliating the people till danger has\nactually come; or, if he do, let him not hope to have the same good\nfortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider that\nthey have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground\nto fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he\ngave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under no\nobligation. And the reason why the course followed by the Romans\nsucceeded, was that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides\nwhich, the people knew that laws had already been passed in their\nfavour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes,\nand could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them\nproceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate,\nand were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the\nmemory of their kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and\nill-treated, was still fresh in their minds. But since like conditions\nseldom recur, it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful.\nWherefore, all, whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of\ngovernment, ought to think beforehand of the adverse times which may\nawait them, and of what help they may then stand in need; and ought so\nto live with their people as they would think right were they suffering\nunder any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince or republic, but\nprince more especially, behaves otherwise, and believes that after the\nevent and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by\nbenefits, deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his\nplace, but will even precipitate his downfall.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII.\u2014_When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State,\nit is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence_.\n\n\nAs Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours, who at first\nhad taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them,\nbegan too late to see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should\nhave been remedied before, combined against her to the number of forty\nnations. Whereupon the Romans, resorting to a method usual with them in\nseasons of peril, appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to one man\nto decide without advice, and carry out his resolves without appeal.\nWhich expedient, as it then enabled them to overcome the dangers by\nwhich they were threatened, so always afterwards proved most\nserviceable, when, at any time during the growth of their power,\ndifficulties arose to embarrass their republic.\n\nIn connection with this league against Rome we have first to note, that\nwhen a mischief which springs up either in or against a republic, and\nwhether occasioned by internal or external causes, has grown to such\nproportions that it begins to fill the whole community with alarm, it\nis a far safer course to temporize with it than to attempt to quell it\nby violence. For commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel to\nthe flame, and hasten the impending ruin. Such disorders arise in a\nrepublic more often from internal causes than external, either through\nsome citizen being suffered to acquire undue influence, or from the\ncorruption of some institution of that republic, which had once been\nthe life and sinew of its freedom; and from this corruption being\nallowed to gain such head that the attempt to check it is more\ndangerous than to let it be. And it is all the harder to recognize\nthese disorders in their beginning, because it seems natural to men to\nlook with favour on the beginnings of things. Favour of this sort, more\nthan by anything else, is attracted by those actions which seem to have\nin them a quality of greatness, or which are performed by the young.\nFor when in a republic some young man is seen to come forward endowed\nwith rare excellence, the eyes of all the citizens are at once turned\nupon him, and all, without distinction, concur to do him honour; so\nthat if he have one spark of ambition, the advantages which he has from\nnature, together with those he takes from this favourable disposition\nof men\u2019s minds, raise him to such a pitch of power, that when the\ncitizens at last see their mistake it is almost impossible for them to\ncorrect it; and when they do what they can to oppose his influence the\nonly result is to extend it. Of this I might cite numerous examples,\nbut shall content myself with one relating to our own city.\n\nCosimo de\u2019 Medici, to whom the house of the Medici in Florence owes the\norigin of its fortunes, acquired so great a name from the favour\nwherewith his own prudence and the blindness of others invested him,\nthat coming to be held in awe by the government, his fellow-citizens\ndeemed it dangerous to offend him, but still more dangerous to let him\nalone. Nicol\u00f2 da Uzzano, his cotemporary, who was accounted well versed\nin all civil affairs, but who had made a first mistake in not\ndiscerning the dangers which might grow from the rising influence of\nCosimo, would never while he lived, permit a second mistake to be made\nin attempting to crush him; judging that such an attempt would be the\nruin of the State, as in truth it proved after his death. For some who\nsurvived him, disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo and\nbanished him from Florence. And so it came about that the partisans of\nCosimo, angry at the wrong done him, soon afterwards recalled him and\nmade him prince of the republic, a dignity he never would have reached\nbut for this open opposition. The very same thing happened in Rome in\nthe case of C\u00e6sar. For his services having gained him the good-will of\nPompey and other citizens, their favour was presently turned to fear,\nas Cicero testifies where he says that \u201cit was late that Pompey began\nto fear C\u00e6sar.\u201d This fear led men to think of remedies, and the\nremedies to which they resorted accelerated the destruction of the\nrepublic.\n\nI say, then, that since it is difficult to recognize these disorders in\ntheir beginning, because of the false impressions which things produce\nat the first, it is a wiser course when they become known, to temporize\nwith them than to oppose them; for when you temporize, either they die\nout of themselves, or at any rate the injury they do is deferred. And\nthe prince who would suppress such disorders or oppose himself to their\nforce and onset, must always be on his guard, lest he help where he\nwould hinder, retard when he would advance, and drown the plant he\nthinks to water. He must therefore study well the symptoms of the\ndisease; and, if he believe himself equal to the cure, grapple with it\nfearlessly; if not, he must let it be, and not attempt to treat it in\nany way. For, otherwise, it will fare with him as it fared with those\nneighbours of Rome, for whom it would have been safer, after that city\nhad grown to be so great, to have sought to soothe and restrain her by\npeaceful arts, than to provoke her by open war to contrive new means of\nattack and new methods of defence. For this league had no other effect\nthan to make the Romans more united and resolute than before, and to\nbethink themselves of new expedients whereby their power was still more\nrapidly advanced; among which was the creation of a dictator; for this\ninnovation not only enabled them to surmount the dangers which then\nthreatened them, but was afterwards the means of escaping infinite\ncalamities into which, without it, the republic must have fallen.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV.\u2014_That the authority of the Dictator did good and not\nharm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are\ngiven by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious\nCitizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State._\n\n\nThose citizens who first devised a dictatorship for Rome have been\nblamed by certain writers, as though this had been the cause of the\ntyranny afterwards established there. For these authors allege that the\nfirst tyrant of Rome governed it with the title of Dictator, and that,\nbut for the existence of the office, C\u00e6sar could never have cloaked his\nusurpation under a constitutional name. He who first took up this\nopinion had not well considered the matter, and his conclusion has been\naccepted without good ground. For it was not the name nor office of\nDictator which brought Rome to servitude, but the influence which\ncertain of her citizens were able to assume from the prolongation of\ntheir term of power; so that even had the name of Dictator been wanting\nin Rome, some other had been found to serve their ends, since power may\nreadily give titles, but not titles power. We find, accordingly, that\nwhile the dictatorship was conferred in conformity with public\nordinances, and not through personal influence, it was constantly\nbeneficial to the city. For it is the magistracies created and the\npowers usurped in unconstitutional ways that hurt a republic, not those\nwhich conform to ordinary rule; so that in Rome, through the whole\nperiod of her history, we never find a dictator who acted otherwise\nthan well for the republic. For which there were the plainest reasons.\nIn the first place, to enable a citizen to work harm and to acquire\nundue authority, many circumstances must be present which never can be\npresent in a State which is not corrupted. For such a citizen must be\nexceedingly rich, and must have many retainers and partisans, whom he\ncannot have where the laws are strictly observed, and who, if he had\nthem, would occasion so much alarm, that the free suffrage of the\npeople would seldom be in his favour. In the second place, the dictator\nwas not created for life, but for a fixed term, and only to meet the\nemergency for which he was appointed. Power was indeed given him to\ndetermine by himself what measures the exigency demanded; to do what he\nhad to do without consultation; and to punish without appeal. But he\nhad no authority to do anything to the prejudice of the State, as it\nwould have been to deprive the senate or the people of their\nprivileges, to subvert the ancient institutions of the city, or\nintroduce new. So that taking into account the brief time for which his\noffice lasted, its limited authority, and the circumstance that the\nRoman people were still uncorrupted, it was impossible for him to\noverstep the just limits of his power so as to injure the city; and in\nfact we find that he was always useful to it.\n\nAnd, in truth, among the institutions of Rome, this of the dictatorship\ndeserves our special admiration, and to be linked with the chief causes\nof her greatness; for without some such safeguard a city can hardly\npass unharmed through extraordinary dangers. Because as the ordinary\ninstitutions of a commonwealth work but slowly, no council and no\nmagistrate having authority to act in everything alone, but in most\nmatters one standing in need of the other, and time being required to\nreconcile their differences, the remedies which they provide are most\ndangerous when they have to be applied in cases which do not brook\ndelay. For which reason, every republic ought to have some resource of\nthis nature provided by its constitution; as we find that the Republic\nof Venice, one of the best of those now existing, has in cases of\nurgent danger reserved authority to a few of her citizens, if agreed\namong themselves, to determine without further consultation what course\nis to be followed. When a republic is not provided with some safeguard\nsuch as this, either it must be ruined by observing constitutional\nforms, or else, to save it, these must be broken through. But in a\nrepublic nothing should be left to be effected by irregular methods,\nbecause, although for the time the irregularity may be useful, the\nexample will nevertheless be pernicious, as giving rise to a practice\nof violating the laws for good ends, under colour of which they may\nafterwards be violated for ends which are not good. For which reason,\nthat can never become a perfect republic wherein every contingency has\nnot been foreseen and provided for by the laws, and the method of\ndealing with it defined. To sum up, therefore, I say that those\nrepublics which cannot in sudden emergencies resort either to a\ndictator or to some similar authority, will, when the danger is\nserious, always be undone.\n\nWe may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in introducing this\nnew office, contrived the conditions under which it was to be\nexercised. For perceiving that the appointment of a dictator involved\nsomething of humiliation for the consuls, who, from being the heads of\nthe State, were reduced to render obedience like every one else, and\nanticipating that this might give offence, they determined that the\npower to appoint should rest with the consuls, thinking that when the\noccasion came when Rome should have need of this regal authority, they\nwould have the consuls acting willingly and feeling the less aggrieved\nfrom the appointment being in their own hands. For those wounds or\nother injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by choice, and of his\nown free will, pain him far less than those inflicted by another.\nNevertheless, in the later days of the republic the Romans were wont to\nentrust this power to a consul instead of to a dictator, using the\nformula, _Videat_ CONSUL _ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat_.\n\nBut to return to the matter in hand, I say briefly, that when the\nneighbours of Rome sought to crush her, they led her to take measures\nnot merely for her readier defence, but such as enabled her to attack\nthem with a stronger force, with better skill, and with an undivided\ncommand.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\u2014_Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although\nbrought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was\nhurtful to the Liberties of that Republic_\n\n\nThe fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the Roman people to\nmake laws for Rome, in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of\nher freedom, may seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that\nit is the authority which is violently usurped, and not that conferred\nby the free suffrages of the people which is injurious to a republic.\nHere, however, we have to take into account both the mode in which, and\nthe term for which authority is given. Where authority is unrestricted\nand is conferred for a long term, meaning by that for a year or more,\nit is always attended with danger, and its results will be good or bad\naccording as the men are good or bad to whom it is committed. Now when\nwe compare the authority of the Ten with that possessed by the\ndictator, we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was\nout of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter. For\nwhen a dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes, the\nconsuls, and the senate, all of them invested with authority of which\nthe dictator could not deprive them. For even if he could have taken\nhis consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another,\nhe could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. So that the\nsenate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing to exist with\nundiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right\nroad. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took\nplace. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away,\nand express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and\ndo whatever else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the\nwhole Roman people. So that finding themselves alone without consuls or\ntribunes to control them, and with no appeal against them to the\npeople, and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and\nfurther being stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the second year\nof their office they began to wax insolent.\n\nLet it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given\nby the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed\nthat the people will never be led to confer that authority without due\nlimitations, or for other than a reasonable term. Should they, however\neither from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow\nauthority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will\nalways fare with them as with the Romans. And this may readily be\nunderstood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator\ngood, what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics\nwhich have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring\nauthority for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and\nthe Venetians on their doges; for it will be seen that in both these\ninstances the authority was controlled by checks which made it\nimpossible for it to be abused. But where an uncontrolled authority is\ngiven, no security is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the\npeople is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time absolute\nauthority will make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends and\npartisans. Nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority\nis vested, that he is poor and without connections, for wealth and\nevery other advantage will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully\nwhen we discuss the appointment of the Ten.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI.\u2014_That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a\nCommonwealth should not disdain the lower_.\n\n\nUnder the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius, the Romans had a memorable\nvictory in a battle fought with the Veientines and the Etruscans, in\nwhich Q. Fabius, brother of the consul, who had himself been consul the\nyear before, was slain. This event may lead us to remark how well the\nmethods followed by the city of Rome were suited to increase her power,\nand how great a mistake is made by other republics in departing from\nthem. For, eager as the Romans were in the pursuit of glory, they never\nesteemed it a dishonour to obey one whom before they had commanded, or\nto find themselves serving in the ranks of an army which once they had\nled. This usage, however, is opposed to the ideas, the rules, and the\npractice which prevail at the present day, as, for instance, in Venice,\nwhere the notion still obtains that a citizen who has filled a great\noffice should be ashamed to accept a less; and where the State itself\npermits him to decline it. This course, assuming it to lend lustre to\nindividual citizens, is plainly to the disadvantage of the community,\nwhich has reason to hope more from, and to trust more to, the citizen\nwho descends from a high office to fill a lower, than him who rises\nfrom a low office to fill a high one; for in the latter no confidence\ncan reasonably be placed, unless he be seen to have others about him of\nsuch credit and worth that it may be hoped their wise counsels and\ninfluence will correct his inexperience. But had the usage which\nprevails in Venice and in other modern commonwealths and kingdoms,\nprevailed in Rome whereby he who had once been consul was never\nafterwards to go with the army except as consul, numberless results\nmust have followed detrimental to the free institutions of that city;\nas well from the mistakes which the inexperience of new men would have\noccasioned, as because from their ambition having a freer course, and\nfrom their having none near them in whose presence they might fear to\ndo amiss, they would have grown less scrupulous; and in this way the\npublic service must have suffered grave harm.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII.\u2014_Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and\nhow it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law\nopposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect._\n\n\nIt has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched by adversity or\npampered by prosperity is the common lot of men, and that in whichever\nway they are acted upon the result is the same. For when no longer\nurged to war on one another by necessity, they are urged by ambition,\nwhich has such dominion in their hearts that it never leaves them to\nwhatsoever heights they climb. For nature has so ordered it that while\nthey desire everything, it is impossible for them to have everything,\nand thus their desires being always in excess of their capacity to\ngratify them, they remain constantly dissatisfied and discontented. And\nhence the vicissitudes in human affairs. For some seeking to enlarge\ntheir possessions, and some to keep what they have got, wars and\nenmities ensue, from which result the ruin of one country and the\ngrowth of another.\n\nI am led to these reflections from observing that the commons of Rome\nwere not content to secure themselves against the nobles by the\ncreation of tribunes, a measure to which they were driven by necessity,\nbut after effecting this, forthwith entered upon an ambitious contest\nwith the nobles, seeking to share with them what all men most esteem,\nnamely, their honours and their wealth. Hence was bred that disorder\nfrom which sprang the feuds relating to the Agrarian Laws, and which\nled in the end to the downfall of the Roman republic. And although it\nshould be the object of every well-governed commonwealth to make the\nState rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be allowed that in\nthe matter of this law the city of Rome was to blame; whether for\nhaving passed it at first in such a shape as to require it to be\ncontinually recast; or for having postponed it so long that its\nretrospective effect was the occasion of tumult; or else, because,\nalthough rightly framed at first, it had come in its operation to be\nperverted. But in whatever way it happened, so it was, that this law\nwas never spoken of in Rome without the whole city being convulsed.\n\nThe law itself embraced two principal provisions. By one it was enacted\nthat no citizen should possess more than a fixed number of acres of\nland; by the other that all lands taken from the enemy should be\ndistributed among the whole people. A twofold blow was thus aimed at\nthe nobles; since all who possessed more land than the law allowed, as\nmost of the nobles did, fell to be deprived of it; while by dividing\nthe lands of the enemy among the whole people, the road to wealth was\nclosed. These two grounds of offence being given to a powerful class,\nto whom it appeared that by resisting the law they did a service to the\nState, the whole city, as I have said, was thrown into an uproar on the\nmere mention of its name. The nobles indeed sought to temporize, and to\nprevail by patience and address; sometimes calling out the army,\nsometimes opposing another tribune to the one who was promoting the\nlaw, and sometimes coming to a compromise by sending a colony into the\nlands which were to be divided; as was done in the case of the\nterritory of Antium, whither, on a dispute concerning the law having\narisen, settlers were sent from Rome, and the land made over to them.\nIn speaking of which colony Titus Livius makes the notable remark, that\nhardly any one in Rome could be got to take part in it, so much readier\nwere the commons to indulge in covetous schemes at home, than to\nrealize them by leaving it.\n\nThe ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until\nthe Romans began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of Italy\nand to countries beyond its shores; after which it seemed for a time to\nslumber\u2014and this, because the lands held by the enemies of Rome, out of\nsight of her citizens and too remote to be conveniently cultivated,\ncame to be less desired. Whereupon the Romans grew less eager to punish\ntheir enemies by dividing their lands, and were content, when they\ndeprived any city of its territory, to send colonists to occupy it. For\ncauses such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down to the time\nof the Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the\nliberty of Rome. For as it found the power of its adversaries doubled,\nsuch a flame of hatred was kindled between commons and senate, that,\nregardless of all civil restraints, they resorted to arms and\nbloodshed. And as the public magistrates were powerless to provide a\nremedy, each of the two factions having no longer any hopes from them,\nresolved to do what it could for itself, and to set up a chief for its\nown protection. On reaching this stage of tumult and disorder, the\ncommons lent their influence to Marius, making him four times consul;\nwhose authority, lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals,\nbecame so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself consul other\nthree times. Against this scourge, the nobles, lacking other defence,\nset themselves to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their\nfaction, entered on the civil wars; wherein, after much blood had been\nspilt, and after many changes of fortune, they got the better of their\nadversaries. But afterwards, in the time of C\u00e6sar and Pompey, the\ndistemper broke out afresh; for C\u00e6sar heading the Marian party, and\nPompey, that of Sylla, and war ensuing, the victory remained with\nC\u00e6sar, who was the first tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was\nnever again free. Such, therefore, was the beginning and such the end\nof the Agrarian Law.\n\nBut since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the\ncommons and senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to\nlaws favourable to freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the\nAgrarian Law are opposed to that view. I am not, however, led to alter\nmy opinion on this account; for I maintain that the ambition of the\ngreat is so pernicious that unless controlled and counteracted in a\nvariety of ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin. So that\nif the controversy over the Agrarian Laws took three hundred years to\nbring Rome to slavery, she would in all likelihood have been brought to\nslavery in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means of this\nlaw, and by other demands, constantly restrained the ambition of the\nnobles.\n\nWe may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than\nhonours; for in the matter of honours, the Roman nobles always gave way\nto the commons without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came\nto be a question of property, so stubborn were they in its defence,\nthat the commons to effect their ends had to resort to those irregular\nmethods which have been described above. Of which irregularities the\nprime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives are more to be commended\nthan their measures; since to pass a law with stringent retrospective\neffect, in order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic, is\nan unwise step, and one which, as I have already shown at length, can\nhave no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the abuse\nleads; whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops more\nslowly, or else, in course of time, and before it comes to a head, dies\nout of itself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII.\u2014_That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and\nthat the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice._\n\n\nA terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and\nVolscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations,\ntherefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians\nand laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were\nforced to make their case known to the Romans, and to ask to be\ndefended by them. The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the\npestilence, answered that they must look to their own defence, and with\ntheir own forces, since Rome was in no position to succour them.\n\nHere we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate, and\nhow at all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the\nresponsibility of determining the course their country should take; and\nwere not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on a course contrary to\nthat which was usual with them, or which they had decided to follow on\nsome other occasion. I say this because on other occasions this same\nsenate had forbidden these nations to defend themselves; and a less\nprudent assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw\nthat prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of\nthings, and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So\nthat, although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend\ntheir subjects, and equally distasteful\u2014both for the reasons given, and\nfor others which may be understood\u2014that their subjects should take up\narms in their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have\nrecourse to arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took\nan honourable course in deciding that what had to be done should be\ndone with their leave, lest men driven to disobey by necessity should\ncome afterwards to disobey from choice. And although this may seem the\ncourse which every republic ought reasonably to follow, nevertheless\nweak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their minds to follow\nit, not knowing how to do themselves honour in like extremities.\n\nAfter Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to\nhis terms, desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of\nhis people to Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A\ncouncil was held in Florence to consider how this request should be\ndealt with, but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being\ngranted. Wherein the Roman method was not followed. For as the Duke had\na very strong force with him, while the Florentines were so bare of\ntroops that they could not have prevented his passage, it would have\nbeen far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their\nconsent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, while\ndiscredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less\nby acceding to his demand.\n\nBut of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for\nthen whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if\nby chance it should do anything well, this will be set down to\nnecessity and not to prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances\nhappening in our own times, and in our own country. In the year 1500,\nKing Louis of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous to restore\nPisa to the Florentines, so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty\nthousand ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being\ncompleted, sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though a\nFrenchman, the Florentines put much trust. Beaumont accordingly took up\nhis position with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in\nreadiness to attack the town. After he had been there for some days\nmaking arrangements for the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa\noffering to surrender their city to the French if a promise were given\nin the king\u2019s name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until four\nmonths had run. This condition was absolutely rejected by the\nFlorentines, and the siege being proceeded with, they were forced to\nretire with disgrace. Now the proposal of the Pisans was rejected by\nthe Florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted the good\nfaith of the King, into whose hands their weakness obliged them to\ncommit themselves, and did not reflect how much more it was for their\ninterest that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have it in\nhis power to restore the town to them, or, failing to restore it,\nshould at once disclose his designs, than that remaining outside he\nshould put them off with promises for which they had to pay. It would\ntherefore have been a far better course for the Florentines to have\nagreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever terms.\n\nThis was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the\nrevolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French\ntroops to assist the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and\nbegan to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were\nwilling to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms\nwas strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and\nthinking that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took\nthe entire settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without\nconsulting the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to\nhis own satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his\narmy. And he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and\nignorant of the ways of the world; since if they desired to have\nArezzo, they could signify their wishes to the King, who would be much\nbetter able to give it them when he had his soldiers inside, than when\nhe had them outside the town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never\nceased to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they came to see\nthat if Beaumont had acted in the same way, they would have got\npossession Of Pisa as well as of Arezzo.\n\nApplying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that\nirresolute republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise\ncourses; for wherever there is room for doubt, their weakness will not\nsuffer them to come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be\novercome by some superior force which impels them forward, they remain\nalways in suspense.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX.\u2014_That often the same Accidents are seen to befall\ndifferent Nations._\n\n\nAny one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in\nall cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and\npassions as always have prevailed; for which reason it should be an\neasy matter for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee\nthose which are about to happen in any republic, and to apply such\nremedies as the ancients have used in like cases; or finding none which\nhave been used by them, to strike out new ones, such as they might have\nused in similar circumstances. But these lessons being neglected or not\nunderstood by readers, or, if understood by them, being unknown to\nrulers, it follows that the same disorders are common to all times.\n\nIn the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having lost a portion of its\nterritories, including Pisa and other towns, was forced to make war\nagainst those who had taken possession of them, who being powerful, it\nfollowed that great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose.\nThis large expenditure had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion\nto numberless complaints on the part of the people; and inasmuch as the\nwar was conducted by a council of ten citizens, who were styled \u201cthe\nTen of the War,\u201d the multitude began to regard these with displeasure,\nas though they were the cause of the war and of the consequent\nexpenditure; and at last persuaded themselves that if they got rid of\nthis magistracy there would be an end to the war. Wherefore when the\nmagistracy of \u201cthe Ten\u201d should have been renewed, the people did not\nrenew it, but, suffering it to lapse, entrusted their affairs to the\n\u201cSignory.\u201d This course was most pernicious, since not only did it fail\nto put an end to the war, as the people expected it would, but by\nsetting aside men who had conducted it with prudence, led to such\nmishaps that not Pisa only, but Arezzo also, and many other towns\nbesides were lost to Florence. Whereupon, the people recognizing their\nmistake, and that the evil was in the disease and not in the physician,\nreinstated the magistracy of the Ten.\n\nSimilar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the consular authority.\nFor the people seeing one war follow another, and that they were never\nallowed to rest, when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of\nneighbouring nations who desired their overthrow, ascribed it to the\nambition of the nobles, who, as they believed, being unable to wreak\ntheir hatred against them within the city, where they were protected by\nthe power of the tribunes, sought to lead them outside the city, where\nthey were under the authority of the consuls, that they might crush\nthem where they were without help. In which belief they thought it\nnecessary either to get rid of the consuls altogether, or so to\nrestrict their powers as to leave them no authority over the people,\neither in the city or out of it.\n\nThe first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune\nTerentillus, who proposed that a committee of five should be named to\nconsider and regulate the power of the consuls. This roused the anger\nof the nobles, to whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority\nwas about to set for ever, and that no part would be left them in the\nadministration of the republic. Such, however, was the obstinacy of the\ntribunes, that they succeeded in abolishing the consular title, nor\nwere satisfied until, after other changes, it was resolved that, in\nroom of consuls, tribunes should be appointed with consular powers; so\nmuch greater was their hatred of the name than of the thing. For a long\ntime matters remained on this footing; till eventually, the commons,\ndiscovering their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in the\nsame way as the Florentines reverted to \u201cthe Ten of the War.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL.\u2014_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what\ntherein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the\nsame Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._\n\n\nIt being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in\nRome on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of\nall to relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to\ndiscuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve\nnotice. These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by\nthose who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those\nwho would subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be\nseen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate\nand people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief\ndecemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish\nin Rome.\n\nAfter much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles\nas to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be\nbetter secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by\ngeneral consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws\nwhich Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might\nserve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next\nstep was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft\nthe new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members,\namong whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was\nappointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws\nmight act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in\nparticular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the\nappeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be\nabsolute in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners\ncame to be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held\nby the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel\npersecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his\nbearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and\ndisposition.\n\nThis set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by\nno more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the\nrest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute\nauthority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they\ncited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their\nlaws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed\nthem publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any\ndefect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they were\nfinally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified\nthroughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the\nlaws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would\nconsent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the\npeople willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated,\nand partly because they thought they could hold their ground without\nthe aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges\nin criminal cases.\n\nOn it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set\nto canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such\ncordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their\nvotes, that the other candidates, \u201c_unable to persuade themselves that\nso much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly\ndisinterested,_\u201d began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him\nopenly, sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the\nyoungest of them all, to declare to the people the names of the\nproposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name himself,\nthat being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. \u201c_But\nwhat they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,_\u201d by proposing,\nto the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name\nfirst, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he\ncould depend.\n\nThe new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made,\nAppius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had\ncommitted, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance\nto appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit;\nwho, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors,\nappointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were\ndirected against high and low alike; but presently they began to\nintrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the\nlatter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to\nanother, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.\nThe commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn\ntheir eyes towards the nobles, \u201c_and to look for a breeze of freedom\nfrom that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the\nrepublic to its present straits._\u201d To the nobles the sufferings of the\ncommons were not displeasing, from the hope \u201c_that disgusted with the\nexisting state of affairs, they too might come to desire the\nrestoration of the consuls._\u201d\n\nWhen the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an\nend, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet\nbeen published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their\nmagistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering\nround them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they\nenriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned.\n\u201c_Corrupted by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence\nto public freedom._\u201d\n\nIt happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir\nup a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned\nthat the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position.\nFor without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by\nassembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority.\nNevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter\ncourse. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly\nValerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the\ndecemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the\nsenate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their\nauthority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office\nof their own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore\nthey decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command of\ncertain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the\ncity, it so fell out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that\nwhen he sought to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to\nsave her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome,\nand mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest\nof the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there\nremained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and\nconsuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient\nfreedom.\n\nIn these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of\ncreating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly\ngive rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the\npeople for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to\ngovern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to\nfreedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man,\nand a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the\ncreation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers,\nfrom the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name,\nand the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the\nappointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius\nhad become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the\nnobles, they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to\ncommit this error of lending its support to some one man, in order that\nhe may attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he\nwill inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until,\nwith the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles,\nand will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have\nbeen rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they\nrecognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for\nhelp.\n\nHad this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully\nestablished tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power\nwould have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly\nopposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For\nin his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to\nthose who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him\nin it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought\nfriendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it\nbe the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which\nfinds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who\ncan never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by\nreason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours\nor wealth enough to satisfy them all.\n\nIn abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius\ncommitted a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as\nbecause to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be\nstronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those\ntyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the\nnobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the\npeople for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in\nthe former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such\nsupport a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his\nState, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and\nby the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were\nfew in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with\ntheir assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had\nthey been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant\nhas few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its\ndefence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three\nshapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or\nhe must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought\nto be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful\nneighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes\nthem well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for\nhis enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the\npeasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he\nmight have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very\noutset.\n\nIn creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people\nmade grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking\nof the dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and\nnot those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom;\nnevertheless the people, in creating magistrates ought to take such\nprecautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad. But the\nRomans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to\nkeep them good, dispensed with it, making them the sole magistrates of\nRome, and setting aside all others; and this from the excessive desire\nof the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons to get rid\nof the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into\nall the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say,\nmen often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent\non the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the\neagle hovering overhead for their destruction.\n\nIn this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their\nefforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in\nhis endeavour to obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset,\nbeen plainly shown.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI.\u2014_That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to\nseverity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble._\n\n\nAmong the crafty devices used by Appius to aid him in maintaining his\nauthority, this, of suddenly passing from one character to the other\nextreme, was of no small prejudice to him. For his fraud in pretending\nto the commons to be well disposed towards them, was happily contrived;\nas were also the means he took to bring about the reappointment of the\ndecemvirate. Most skilful, too, was his audacity in nominating himself\ncontrary to the expectation of the nobles, and in proposing colleagues\non whom he could depend to carry out his ends. But, as I have said\nalready, it was not happily contrived that, after doing all this, he\nshould suddenly turn round, and from being the friend, reveal himself\nthe enemy of the people; haughty instead of humane; cruel instead of\nkindly; and make this change so rapidly as to leave himself no shadow\nof excuse, but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature.\nFor he who has once seemed good, should he afterwards choose, for his\nown ends, to become bad, ought to change by slow degrees, and as\nopportunity serves; so that before his altered nature strip him of old\nfavour, he may have gained for himself an equal share of new, and thus\nhis influence suffer no diminution. For otherwise, being at once\nunmasked and friendless, he is undone:\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII.\u2014_How easily Men become corrupted._\n\n\nIn this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease\nwherewith men become corrupted, and how completely, although born good\nand well brought up, they change their nature. For we see how\nfavourably disposed the youths whom Appius gathered round him became\ntowards his tyranny, in return for the trifling benefits which they\ndrew from it; and how Quintus Fabius, one of the second decemvirate and\na most worthy man, blinded by a little ambition, and misled by the evil\ncounsels of Appius, abandoning his fair fame, betook himself to most\nunworthy courses, and grew like his master.\n\nCareful consideration of this should make those who frame laws for\ncommonwealths and kingdoms more alive to the necessity of placing\nrestraints on men\u2019s evil appetites, and depriving them of all hope of\ndoing wrong with impunity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII.\u2014_That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and\nresolute Soldiers._\n\n\nFrom what has been touched upon above, we are also led to remark how\nwide is the difference between an army which, having no ground for\ndiscontent, fights in its own cause, and one which, being discontented,\nfights to satisfy the ambition of others. For whereas the Romans were\nalways victorious under the consuls, under the decemvirs they were\nalways defeated. This helps us to understand why it is that mercenary\ntroops are worthless; namely, that they have no incitement to keep them\ntrue to you beyond the pittance which you pay them, which neither is\nnor can be a sufficient motive for such fidelity and devotion as would\nmake them willing to die in your behalf. But in those armies in which\nthere exists not such an attachment towards him for whom they fight as\nmakes them devoted to his cause, there never will be valour enough to\nwithstand an enemy if only he be a little brave. And since such\nattachment and devotion cannot be looked for from any save your own\nsubjects, you must, if you would preserve your dominions, or maintain\nyour commonwealth or kingdom, arm the natives of your country; as we\nsee to have been done by all those who have achieved great things in\nwar.\n\nUnder the decemvirs the ancient valour of the Roman soldiers had in no\ndegree abated; yet, because they were no longer animated by the same\ngood will, they did not exert themselves as they were wont. But so soon\nas the decemvirate came to an end, and the soldiers began once more to\nfight as free men, the old spirit was reawakened, and, as a\nconsequence, their enterprises, according to former usage, were brought\nto a successful close.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV.\u2014_That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that\nwe should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave._\n\n\nWhen Virginia died by her father\u2019s hand, the commons of Rome withdrew\nunder arms to the Sacred Hill. Whereupon the senate sent messengers to\ndemand by what sanction they had deserted their commanders and\nassembled there in arms. And in such reverence was the authority of the\nsenate held, that the commons, lacking leaders, durst make no reply.\n\u201cNot,\u201d says Titus Livius, \u201cthat they were at a loss what to answer, but\nbecause they had none to answer for them;\u201d words which clearly show how\nhelpless a thing is the multitude when without a head.\n\nThis defect was perceived by Virginius, at whose instance twenty\nmilitary tribunes were appointed by the commons to be their spokesmen\nwith the senate, and to negotiate terms; who, having asked that\nValerius and Horatius might be sent to them, to whom their wishes would\nbe made known, these declined to go until the decemvirs had laid down\ntheir office. When this was done, and Valerius and Horatius came to the\nhill where the commons were assembled, the latter demanded that\ntribunes of the people should be appointed; that in future there should\nbe an appeal to the people from the magistrates of whatever degree; and\nthat all the decemvirs should be given up to them to be burned alive.\nValerius and Horatius approved the first two demands, but rejected the\nlast as inhuman; telling the commons that \u201cthey were rushing into that\nvery cruelty which they themselves had condemned in others;\u201d and\ncounselling them to say nothing about the decemvirs, but to be\nsatisfied to regain their own power and authority; since thus the way\nwould be open to them for obtaining every redress.\n\nHere we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to ask a thing and\nwith the same breath to say, \u201cI desire this that I may inflict an\ninjury.\u201d For we should never declare our intention beforehand, but\nwatch for every opportunity to carry it out. So that it is enough to\nask another for his weapons, without adding, \u201cWith these I purpose to\ndestroy you;\u201d for when once you have secured his weapons, you can use\nthem afterwards as you please.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV.\u2014_That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a\nLaw, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of\ninjustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor._\n\n\nTerms having been adjusted, and the old order of things restored in\nRome, Virginius cited Appius to defend himself before the people; and\non his appearing attended by many of the nobles, ordered him to be led\nto prison. Whereupon Appius began to cry out and appeal to the people.\nBut Virginius told him that he was unworthy to be allowed that appeal\nwhich he had himself done away with, or to have that people whom he had\nwronged for his protectors. Appius rejoined, that the people should not\nset at nought that right of appeal which they themselves had insisted\non with so much zeal. Nevertheless, he was dragged to prison, and\nbefore the day of trial slew himself. Now, though the wicked life of\nAppius merited every punishment, still it was impolitic to violate the\nlaws, more particularly a law which had only just been passed; for\nnothing, I think, is of worse example in a republic, than to make a law\nand not to keep it; and most of all, when he who breaks is he that made\nit.\n\nAfter the year 1494, the city of Florence reformed its government with\nthe help of the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings declare his\nlearning, his wisdom, and the excellence of his heart. Among other\nordinances for the safety of the citizens, he caused a law to be\npassed, allowing an appeal to the people from the sentences pronounced\nby \u201cthe Eight\u201d and by the \u201cSignory\u201d in trials for State offences; a law\nhe had long contended for, and carried at last with great difficulty.\nIt so happened that a very short time after it was passed, five\ncitizens were condemned to death by the \u201cSignory\u201d for State offences,\nand that when they sought to appeal to the people they were not\npermitted to do so, and the law was violated. This, more than any other\nmischance, helped to lessen the credit of the Friar; since if his law\nof appeal was salutary, he should have caused it to be observed; if\nuseless, he ought not to have promoted it. And his inconsistency was\nthe more remarked, because in all the sermons which he preached after\nthe law was broken, he never either blamed or excused the person who\nhad broken it, as though unwilling to condemn, while unable to justify\nwhat suited his purposes. This, as betraying the ambitious and partial\nturn of his mind, took from his reputation and exposed him to much\nobloquy.\n\nAnother thing which greatly hurts a government is to keep alive bitter\nfeelings in men\u2019s minds by often renewed attacks on individuals, as was\ndone in Rome after the decemvirate was put an end to. For each of the\ndecemvirs, and other citizens besides, were at different times accused\nand condemned, so that the greatest alarm was spread through the whole\nbody of the nobles, who came to believe that these prosecutions would\nnever cease until their entire order was exterminated. And this must\nhave led to grave mischief had not Marcus Duilius the tribune provided\nagainst it, by an edict which forbade every one, for the period of a\nyear, citing or accusing any Roman citizen, an ordinance which had the\neffect of reassuring the whole nobility. Here we see how hurtful it is\nfor a prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in\nconstant alarm and suspense by continually renewed punishments and\nviolence. And, in truth, no course can be more pernicious. For men who\nare in fear for their safety will seize on every opportunity for\nsecuring themselves against the dangers which surround them, and will\ngrow at once more daring, and less scrupulous in resorting to new\ncourses. For these reasons we should either altogether avoid inflicting\ninjury, or should inflict every injury at a stroke, and then seek to\nreassure men\u2019s minds and suffer them to settle down and rest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI.\u2014_That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another,\nseeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others._\n\n\nAs the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom were restored to\ntheir former position\u2014nay, to one still stronger since many new laws\nhad been passed which confirmed and extended their authority,\u2014it might\nreasonably have been hoped that Rome would for a time remain at rest.\nThe event, however, showed the contrary, for from day to day there\narose in that city new tumults and fresh dissensions. And since the\ncauses which brought this about have been most judiciously set forth by\nTitus Livius, it seems to me much to the purpose to cite his own words\nwhen he says, that \u201cwhenever either the commons or the nobles were\nhumble, the others grew haughty; so that if the commons kept within due\nbounds, the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them, against\nwhich the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects of outrage,\nwere little able to give redress; while the nobles on their part,\nalthough they could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their\nyoung men, were yet well pleased that if excesses were to be committed,\nthey should be committed by their own faction, and not by the commons.\nThus the desire to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to make\nitself strong enough to oppress the other. For this is the common\ncourse of things, that in seeking to escape cause for fear, men come to\ngive others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from\nwhich they strive to relieve themselves; as though the choice lay\nbetween injuring and being injured.\u201d\n\nHerein, among other things, we perceive in what ways commonwealths are\noverthrown, and how men climb from one ambition to another; and\nrecognize the truth of those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of\nC\u00e6sar, that \u201c_all ill actions have their origin in fair\nbeginnings._\u201d[4] For, as I have said already, the ambitious citizen in\na commonwealth seeks at the outset to secure himself against injury,\nnot only at the hands of private persons, but also of the magistrates;\nto effect which he endeavours to gain himself friends. These he obtains\nby means honourable in appearance, either by supplying them with money\nor protecting them against the powerful. And because such conduct seems\npraiseworthy, every one is readily deceived by it, and consequently no\nremedy is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance, this man\npresently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear\nhim, and the magistrates to treat him with respect. But when he has\nadvanced thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition,\nhe has reached a point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him;\nit being dangerous, as I have before explained, to contend with a\ndisorder which has already made progress in a city. Nevertheless, when\nhe has brought things to this pass, you must either endeavour to crush\nhim, at the risk of immediate ruin, or else, unless death or some like\naccident interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by letting him alone.\nFor when, as I have said, it has come to this that the citizens and\neven the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends, little further\neffort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin\nwhom he pleases.\n\n [4] Quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt. (Sall. Cat.\n 51.)\n\n\nA republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances that none of\nits citizens shall, under colour of doing good, have it in their power\nto do evil, but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may\naid and not injure freedom. How this may be done, shall presently be\nexplained.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII.\u2014_That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in\nParticulars they judge truly._\n\n\nThe commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown disgusted with the\nconsular name, and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be\nadmitted to the office or its authority be restricted, the nobles, to\nprevent its degradation in either of these two ways, proposed a middle\ncourse, whereby four tribunes, who might either be plebeians or nobles,\nwere to be created with consular authority. This compromise satisfied\nthe commons, who thought they would thus get rid of the consulship, and\nsecure the highest offices of the State for their own order. But here a\ncircumstance happened worth noting. When the four tribunes came to be\nchosen, the people, who had it in their power to choose all from the\ncommons, chose all from the nobles. With respect to which election\nTitus Livius observes, that \u201c_the result showed that the people when\ndeclaring their honest judgment after controversy was over, were\ngoverned by a different spirit from that which had inspired them while\ncontending for their liberties and for a share in public honours_.\u201d The\nreason for this I believe to be, that men deceive themselves more\nreadily in generals than in particulars. To the commons of Rome it\nseemed, in the abstract, that they had every right to be admitted to\nthe consulship, since their party in the city was the more numerous,\nsince they bore the greater share of danger in their wars, and since it\nwas they who by their valour kept Rome free and made her powerful. And\nbecause it appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire was a\nreasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards. But\nwhen they had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own\nparty, they recognized their defects, and decided that individually no\none of them was deserving of what, collectively, they seemed entitled\nto; and being ashamed of them, turned to bestow their honours on those\nwho deserved them. Of which decision Titus Livius, speaking with due\nadmiration, says, \u201c_Where shall we now find in any one man, that\nmodesty, moderation, and magnanimity which were then common to the\nentire people?_\u201d\n\nAs confirming what I have said, I shall cite another noteworthy\nincident, which occurred in Capua after the rout of the Romans by\nHannibal at Cann\u00e6. For all Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua\ntoo was threatened with civil tumult, through the hatred which\nprevailed between her people and senate. But Pacuvius Calavius, who at\nthis time filled the office of chief magistrate, perceiving the danger,\ntook upon himself to reconcile the contending factions. With this\nobject he assembled the Senate and pointed out to them the hatred in\nwhich they were held by the people, and the risk they ran of being put\nto death by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were in\ndistress, being given up to Hannibal. But he added that, were they to\nconsent to leave the matter with him, he thought he could contrive to\nreconcile them; in the meanwhile, however, he must shut them up in the\npalace, that, by putting it in the power of the people to punish them,\nhe might secure their safety.\n\nThe senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them up in the palace,\nand summoning the people to a public meeting, told them the time had at\nlast come for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and\nrequite the wrongs suffered at their hands; for he had them all safe\nunder bolt and bar; but, as he supposed they did not wish the city to\nremain without rulers, it was fit, before putting the old senators to\ndeath, they should appoint others in their room. Wherefore he had\nthrown the names of all the old senators into a bag, and would now\nproceed to draw them out one by one, and as they were drawn would cause\nthem to be put to death, so soon as a successor was found for each.\nWhen the first name he drew was declared, there arose a great uproar\namong the people, all crying out against the cruelty, pride, and\narrogance of that senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring\nthem to propose a substitute, the meeting was quieted, and after a\nbrief pause one of the commons was nominated. No sooner, however, was\nhis name mentioned than one began to whistle, another to laugh, some\njeering at him in one way and some in another. And the same thing\nhappening in every case, each and all of those nominated were judged\nunworthy of senatorial rank. Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the\nopportunity, said, \u201cSince you are agreed that the city would be badly\noff without a senate, but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of\nthe old senators, it will, perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to\nthem; for the fear into which they have been thrown must have so\nsubdued them, that you are sure to find in them that affability which\nhitherto you have looked for in vain.\u201d This proposal being agreed to, a\nreconciliation followed between the two orders; the commons having seen\ntheir error so soon as they were obliged to come to particulars.\n\nA people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their\naccidents in the abstract, but on becoming acquainted with particulars,\nspeedily discovers its mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest\ncitizens were banished from Florence, and no regular government any\nlonger existed there, but a spirit of licence prevailed, and matters\nwent continually from bad to worse, many Florentines perceiving the\ndecay of their city, and discerning no other cause for it, blamed the\nambition of this or the other powerful citizen, who, they thought, was\nfomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to his\nown liking, and to rob them of their liberties. Those who thought thus,\nwould hang about the arcades and public squares, maligning many\ncitizens, and giving it to be understood that if ever they found\nthemselves in the Signory, they would expose the designs of these\ncitizens and have them punished. From time to time it happened that one\nor another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief\nmagistracy, and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw things\nnearer, became aware whence the disorders I have spoken of really came,\nthe dangers attending them, and the difficulty in dealing with them;\nand recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and not\noccasioned by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a\nnearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had\nbeen led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him\nspeak as a private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he\nwas made a magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having\nobtained any better knowledge of things, but from his having been\ncajoled or corrupted by the great. And this happening with many men and\noften, it came to be a proverb among the people, that \u201c_men had one\nmind in the market-place, another in the palace._\u201d\n\nReflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men\u2019s eyes may be\nopened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can\nfind a way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the\ncase of the Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I\nbelieve that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the\npeople in questions relating to particulars, as, for instance, in the\ndistribution of honours and dignities. For in such matters only, the\npeople are either never mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a\nsmall number of persons would be, were the distribution entrusted to\nthem.\n\nIt seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following\nChapter, a method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people\nin making this distribution.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII.\u2014_He who would not have an Office bestowed on some\nworthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one\nwho is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the\nhighest degree noble and good._\n\n\nWhenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular\npowers being chosen exclusively from the commons, it took one or other\nof two ways,\u2014either by causing the office to be solicited by the most\ndistinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess the truth, by\nbribing some base and ignoble fellow to fasten himself on to those\nother plebeians of better quality who were seeking the office, and\nbecome a candidate conjointly with them. The latter device made the\npeople ashamed to give, the former ashamed to refuse.\n\nThis confirms what I said in my last Chapter, as to the people\ndeceiving themselves in generalities but not in particulars.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX.\u2014_That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in\nFreedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve\ntheir Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will\nfind this almost impossible._\n\n\nHow hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the\nlaws needed to maintain its freedom, is well seen from the history of\nthe Roman Republic. For although ordinances were given it first by\nRomulus, then by Numa, afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and\nlastly by the Ten created for the express purpose, nevertheless, in the\nactual government of Rome new needs were continually developed, to meet\nwhich, new ordinances had constantly to be devised; as in the creation\nof the censors, who were one of the chief means by which Rome was kept\nfree during the whole period of her constitutional government. For as\nthe censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was very much\nowing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was\nretarded. And though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake\nwas doubtless made in fixing its term at five years, this was corrected\nnot long after by the wisdom of the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law\nreducing it to eighteen months; a change which the censors then in\noffice took in such ill part, that they deprived Mamercus of his rank\nas a senator. This step was much blamed both by the commons and the\nFathers; still, as our History does not record that Mamercus obtained\nany redress, we must infer either that the Historian has omitted\nsomething, or that on this head the laws of Rome were defective; since\nit is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer a\ncitizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure\nfavourable to freedom.\n\nBut returning to the matter under consideration, we have, in connection\nwith the creation of this new office, to note, that if those cities\nwhich, as was the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom,\nand have by themselves maintained that freedom, have experienced great\ndifficulty in framing good laws for the preservation of their\nliberties, it is little to be wondered at that cities which at the\nfirst were dependent, should find it not difficult merely but\nimpossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free\nand undisturbed. This difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of\nFlorence, which, being subject at first to the power of Rome and\nsubsequently to that of other rulers, remained long in servitude,\ntaking no thought for herself; and even afterwards, when she could\nbreathe more freely and began to frame her own laws, these, since they\nwere blended with ancient ordinances which were bad, could not\nthemselves be good; and thus for the two hundred years of which we have\ntrustworthy record, our city has gone on patching her institutions,\nwithout ever possessing a government in respect of which she could\ntruly be termed a commonwealth.\n\nThe difficulties which have been felt in Florence are the same as have\nbeen felt in all cities which have had a like origin; and although,\nrepeatedly, by the free and public votes of her citizens, ample\nauthority has been given to a few of their number to reform her\nconstitution, no alteration of general utility has ever been\nintroduced, but only such as forwarded the interests of the party to\nwhich those commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead of\norder, has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city.\n\nBut to come to particulars, I say, that among other matters which have\nto be considered by the founder of a commonwealth, is the question into\nwhose hands should be committed the power of life and death over its\ncitizens\u2019 This was well seen to in Rome, where, as a rule, there was a\nright of appeal to the people, but where, on any urgent case arising in\nwhich it might have been dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial\nsentence, recourse could be had to a dictator with powers to execute\njustice at once; a remedy, however, never resorted to save in cases of\nextremity. But Florence, and other cities having a like origin,\ncommitted this power into the hands of a foreigner, whom they styled\nCaptain, and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this\nwas a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement afterwards in\nconsequence of changes in their government, they appointed eight\ncitizens to discharge the office of Captain. But this, for a reason\nalready mentioned, namely that a few will always be governed by the\nwill of a few and these the most powerful, was a change from bad to\nworse.\n\nThe city of Venice has guarded herself against a like danger. For in\nVenice ten citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without\nappeal; and because, although possessing the requisite authority, this\nnumber might not be sufficient to insure the punishment of the\npowerful, in addition to their council of Ten, they have also\nconstituted a council of Forty, and have further provided that the\ncouncil of the \u201c_Pregai_,\u201d which is their supreme council, shall have\nauthority to chastise powerful offenders. So that, unless an accuser be\nwanting, a tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep powerful\ncitizens in check.\n\nBut when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her own imposing, and\nwith so many and so wise legislators, fresh occasion arose from day to\nday for framing new laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be\nwondered at that, in other cities less happy in their beginnings,\ndifficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances could remedy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER L.\u2014_That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have\npower to bring the Government of a City to a stay._\n\n\nT.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being consuls of Rome, and being\nat variance with one another, brought the whole business of the city to\na stay; which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a dictator to\ndo what, by reason of their differences, the consuls would not. But\nthough opposed to one another in everything else, the consuls were of\none mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator; so that the senate\nhad no remedy left them but to seek the help of the tribunes, who,\nsupported by their authority, forced the consuls to yield.\n\nHere we have to note, first, the usefulness of the tribunes\u2019 authority\nin checking the ambitious designs, not only of the nobles against the\ncommons, but also of one section of the nobles against another; and\nnext, that in no city ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests\nwith a few to decide on matters, which, if the ordinary business of the\nState is to proceed at all, must be carried out. Wherefore, if you\ngrant authority to a council to distribute honours and offices, or to a\nmagistrate to administer any branch of public business, you must either\nimpose an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed, or\nordain that, on failure to perform, another may and shall do what has\nto be done. Otherwise such an arrangement will be found defective and\ndangerous; as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been\npossible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of\nthe consuls.\n\nIn the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and\noffices. But more than once it has happened that the council, whether\nfrom ill-humour or from being badly advised, has declined to appoint\nsuccessors either to the magistrates of the city or to those\nadministering the government abroad. This gave rise to the greatest\nconfusion and disorder; for, on a sudden, both the city itself and the\nsubject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful governors;\nnor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were\npacified or undeceived. And this disorder must have brought the city to\na bad end, had not provision been made against its recurrence by\ncertain of the wiser citizens, who, finding a fit opportunity, passed a\nlaw that no magistracy, whether within or without the city, should ever\nbe deemed to have been vacated until it was filled up by the\nappointment of a successor. In this way the council was deprived of its\nfacilities for stopping public business to the danger of the State.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LI.\u2014_What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem\nto be done by Choice_.\n\n\nIn all their actions, even in those which are matters of necessity\nrather than choice, prudent men will endeavour so to conduct themselves\nas to conciliate good-will. This species of prudence was well exercised\nby the Roman senate when they resolved to grant pay from the public\npurse to soldiers on active service, who, before, had served at their\nown charges. For perceiving that under the old system they could\nmaintain no war of any duration, and, consequently, could not undertake\na siege or lead an army to any distance from home, and finding it\nnecessary to be able to do both, they decided on granting the pay I\nhave spoken of. But this, which they could not help doing, they did in\nsuch a way as to earn the thanks of the people, by whom the concession\nwas so well received that all Rome was intoxicated with delight. For it\nseemed to them a boon beyond any they could have ventured to hope for,\nor have dreamed of demanding. And although the tribunes sought to make\nlight of the benefit, by showing the people that their burthens would\nbe increased rather than diminished by it, since taxes would have to be\nimposed out of which the soldier\u2019s stipend might be paid, they could\nnot persuade them to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude;\nwhich was further increased by the manner in which the senate\ndistributed the taxes, imposing on the nobles all the heavier and\ngreater, and those which had to be paid first.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LII.\u2014_That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing\ntoo powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to\nobjection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to\nadvance himself_.\n\n\nIt has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles\ngained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only\nin providing for their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation.\nHad the senate constantly adhered to methods like these, they would\nhave put an end to all disturbances in Rome, and have deprived the\ntribunes of the credit they had with the people, and of the influence\nthence arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and especially in one\nwhich has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or less\nobjectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to\nanticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to\nthe ends he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies\nof Cosimo de\u2019 Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for\nthem than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who\nopposed him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people, they\nwould have succeeded, without violence or tumult, in taking his most\neffective weapon from his hands.\n\nThe influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due\nto his skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this\nway he obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the\ncommonwealth. And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness it\nwould have been both easier and more honourable, and at the same time\nfar less dangerous and hurtful to the State, to forestall him in those\nmeasures by which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in such a\nmanner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire\nrepublic. For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him of\nthe weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood\nhim in all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without\neither being suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the\ncitizens who hated Piero Soderini committed an error in not being\nbeforehand with him in those ways whereby he came to have influence\nwith the people, Piero himself erred in like manner, in not\nanticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew formidable\nto him; I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because it would\nhave been difficult for him to have so acted, and because for him such\na course would not have been honourable. For the paths wherein his\ndanger lay were those which favoured the Medici, and it was by these\nthat his enemies attacked him, and in the end overthrew him. But these\npaths Piero could not pursue without dishonour, since he could not, if\nhe was to preserve his fair fame, have joined in destroying that\nliberty which he had been put forward to defend. Moreover, since\nfavours to the Medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and\nonce for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero, who, had\nhe shown himself friendly to the Medici, must have become suspected and\nhated by the people; in which case his enemies would have had still\nbetter opportunities than before for his destruction.\n\nMen ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course\nwhich lies before them, nor engage in it when it is plain that the\ndangers outweigh the advantages, even though they be advised by others\nthat it is the most expedient way to take. Should they act otherwise,\nit will fare with them as with Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the\npower of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who had been\ndeclared an enemy by the senate, having got together a strong force,\nmostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of C\u00e6sar,\nTullius counselled the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority,\nand to send him against Antonius with the consuls and the army;\naffirming, that so soon as those veterans who had served with C\u00e6sar saw\nthe face of him who was C\u00e6sar\u2019s nephew and had assumed his name, they\nwould rally to his side and desert Antonius, who might easily be\ncrushed when thus left bare of support.\n\nBut the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus\nto take part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And\nthis brought about the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily\nhave been foreseen. For remembering the influence of that great\ncaptain, who, after overthrowing all opponents, had seized on sovereign\npower in Rome, the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the\npersuasions of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible that from\nC\u00e6sar\u2019s heir, or from soldiers who had followed C\u00e6sar, they could look\nfor anything that consisted with the name of Freedom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIII.\u2014_That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage,\noften desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave\nPromises easily move them_.\n\n\nWhen Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be\nto the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell\nthere. For they argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and was a\nwell-built city, a moiety of the Roman people might in this way be\nenriched; while, by reason of its vicinity to Rome, the management of\ncivil affairs would in no degree be affected. To the senate, however,\nand the wiser among the citizens, the scheme appeared so rash and\nmischievous that they publicly declared they would die sooner than\nconsent to it. The controversy continuing, the commons grew so inflamed\nagainst the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued; had\nnot the senate for their protection put forward certain old and\nesteemed citizens, respect for whom restrained the populace and put a\nstop to their violence.\n\nTwo points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a\nfalse show of advantage will often labour for its own destruction; and,\nunless convinced by some one whom it trusts, that the course on which\nit is bent is pernicious, and that some other is to be preferred, will\nbring infinite danger and injury upon the State. And should it so\nhappen, as sometimes is the case, that from having been deceived\nbefore, either by men or by events, there is none in whom the people\ntrust, their ruin is inevitable. As to which Dante, in his treatise \u201cDe\nMonarchia,\u201d observes that the people will often raise the cry,\n\u201c_Flourish our death and perish our life_.\u201d[5] From which distrust it\narises that often in republics the right course is not followed; as\nwhen Venice, as has been related, on being attacked by many enemies,\ncould not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to make friends with\nany one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them,\non account of which war had been declared and a league of princes\nformed against her.\n\n [5] \u201cViva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita.\u201d The quotation does _not_\n seem to be from the \u201cDe Monarchia.\u201d\n\n\nIn considering what courses it is easy, and what it is difficult to\npersuade a people to follow, this distinction may be drawn: Either what\nyou would persuade them to, presents on the face of it a semblance of\ngain or loss, or it seems a spirited course or a base one. When any\nproposal submitted to the people holds out promise of advantage, or\nseems to them a spirited course to take, though loss lie hid behind,\nnay, though the ruin of their country be involved in it, they will\nalways be easily led to adopt it; whereas it will always be difficult\nto persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of\ndisgrace or loss, even though safety and advantage be bound up with\nthem. The truth of what I say is confirmed by numberless examples both\nRoman and foreign, modern and ancient. Hence grew the ill opinion\nentertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who could never persuade the\npeople that it behoved them to proceed warily in their conflict with\nHannibal, and withstand his onset without fighting. For this the people\nthought a base course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it,\nwhich Fabius could by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded\nare men in favour of what seems a spirited course, that although the\nRomans had already committed the blunder of permitting Varro, master of\nthe knights to Fabius, to join battle contrary to the latter\u2019s desire,\nwhereby the army must have been destroyed had not Fabius by his\nprudence saved it, this lesson was not enough; for afterwards they\nappointed this Varro to be consul, for no other reason than that he\ngave out, in the streets and market-places, that he would make an end\nof Hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so. Whence came the\nbattle and defeat of Cann\u00e6, and well-nigh the destruction of Rome.\n\nAnother example taken from Roman history may be cited to the same\neffect. After Hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in\nItaly, during which time the whole country had been deluged with Roman\nblood, a certain Marcus Centenius Penula, a man of mean origin, but who\nhad held some post in the army, came forward and proposed to the senate\nthat were leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any part of\nItaly he pleased, he would speedily deliver Hannibal into their hands,\nalive or dead. To the senate this man\u2019s offer seemed a rash one; but\nreflecting that were they to refuse it, and were the people afterwards\nto hear that it had been made, tumults, ill will, and resentment\nagainst them would result, they granted the permission asked; choosing\nrather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula, than to excite\nfresh discontent on the part of the people, to whom they knew that such\na proposal would be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade\nthem from it. And so this adventurer, marching forth with an\nundisciplined and disorderly rabble to meet Hannibal, was, with all his\nfollowers, defeated and slain in the very first encounter.\n\nIn Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and\nprudent statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the\nproposal to go and attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the\nexpedition being resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes\nof the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow of the\nAthenian power. Scipio, on being appointed consul, asked that the\nprovince of Africa might be awarded to him, promising that he would\nutterly efface Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of Fabius,\nrefused his request, he threatened to submit the matter to the people\nas very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always\nacceptable.\n\nI might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our\nown city, as when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini,\nbeing in joint command of the Florentine armies, after defeating\nBartolommeo d\u2019Alviano at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest Pisa. For\nthis enterprise was resolved on by the people in consequence of the\nbrave promises of Messer Ercole; and though many wise citizens\ndisapproved of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, being carried\naway by the popular will, which took its rise in the assurances of\ntheir captain.\n\nI say, then, that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a\nrepublic, when the power is in the hands of the people, than to suggest\ndaring courses for their adoption. For wherever the people have a\nvoice, such proposals will always be well received, nor will those\npersons who are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy. And as\nthis occasions the ruin of States, it likewise, and even more\nfrequently, occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution\nof these proposals is committed; because the people anticipating\nvictory, do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short means\nor ill fortune of the commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity;\nand commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish him; as was\ndone in the case of numberless Carthaginian generals and of many\nAthenian, no successes they might previously have obtained availing\nthem anything; for all past services are cancelled by a present loss.\nAnd so it happened with our Antonio Giacomini, who not succeeding as\nthe people had expected, and as he had promised, in taking Pisa, fell\ninto such discredit with the people, that notwithstanding his countless\npast services, his life was spared rather by the compassion of those in\nauthority than through any movement of the citizens in his behalf.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIV.\u2014_Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to\nrestrain an excited Multitude_.\n\n\nThe next noteworthy point in the passage referred to in the foregoing\nChapter is, that nothing tends so much to restrain an excited multitude\nas the reverence felt for some grave person, clothed with authority,\nwho stands forward to oppose them. For not without reason has Virgil\nsaid\u2014\n\n\u201cIf then, by chance, some reverend chief appear,\nKnown for his deeds and for his virtues dear,\nSilent they wait his words and bend a listening ear.\u201d[6]\n\n\n [6] Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem\nConspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.\n          _Virg. Aen._, I. 154.\n\n\nHe therefore who commands an army or governs a city wherein tumult\nshall have broken out, ought to assume the noblest and bravest bearing\nhe can, and clothe himself with all the ensigns of his station, that he\nmay make himself more revered. It is not many years since Florence was\ndivided into two factions, the _Frateschi_ and _Arrabbiati_, as they\nwere named, and these coming to open violence, the _Frateschi_, among\nwhom was Pagolo Antonio Soderini, a citizen of great reputation in\nthese days, were worsted. In the course of these disturbances the\npeople coming with arms in their hands to plunder the house of\nSoderini, his brother Messer Francesco, then bishop of Volterra and now\ncardinal, who happened to be dwelling there, so soon as he heard the\nuproar and saw the crowd, putting on his best apparel and over it his\nepiscopal robes, went forth to meet the armed multitude, and by his\nwords and mien brought them to a stay; and for many days his behaviour\nwas commended by the whole city. The inference from all which is, that\nthere is no surer or more necessary restraint on the violence of an\nunruly multitude, than the presence of some one whose character and\nbearing command respect.\n\nBut to return once more to the passage we are considering, we see how\nstubbornly the people clung to this scheme of transplanting themselves\nto Veii, thinking it for their advantage, and not discerning the\nmischief really involved in it; so that in addition to the many\ndissensions which it occasioned, actual violence must have followed,\nhad not the senate with the aid of certain grave and reverend citizens\nrepressed the popular fury.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LV.\u2014_That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the\nbody of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible\nwhere Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not_.\n\n\nThough what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown\ncorrupted has already been discussed, still I think it not out of place\nto notice a resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which\nCamillus made to Apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the\nVeientines. For this spoil having fallen into the hands of the people,\nthe senate, being unable by other means to get any account of it,\npassed an edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth part of\nwhat he had taken. And although this edict was not carried out, from\nthe senate having afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to\nthe content of the people, the claim of Apollo was otherwise satisfied,\nwe nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal, how\ncompletely the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when they\nassumed that no one would withhold any part of what the edict commanded\nhim to give; on the other hand, we see that it never occurred to the\npeople that they might evade the law by giving less than was due, their\nonly thought being to free themselves from the law by openly\nmanifesting their displeasure. This example, together with many others\nalready noticed, shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of\nreligion prevailed among the Roman people, and how much good was to be\nexpected from them. And, in truth, in the country where virtue like\nthis does not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should look for\nit in vain in provinces which at the present day are seen to be\ncorrupted; as Italy is beyond all others, though, in some degree,\nFrance and Spain are similarly tainted. In which last two countries, if\nwe see not so many disorders spring up as we see daily springing up in\nItaly, this is not so much due to the superior virtue of their\ninhabitants (who, to say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as\nto their being governed by a king who keeps them united, not merely by\nhis personal qualities, but also by the laws and ordinances of the\nrealm which are still maintained with vigour. In Germany, however, we\ndo see signal excellence and a devout religious spirit prevail among\nthe people, giving rise to the many free States which there maintain\nthemselves, with such strict observance of their laws that none, either\nwithin or without their walls, dare encroach on them.\n\nThat among this last-named people a great share of the ancient\nexcellence does in truth still flourish, I shall show by an example\nsimilar to that which I have above related of the senate and people of\nRome. It is customary with the German Free States when they have to\nexpend any large sum of money on the public account, for their\nmagistrates or councils having authority given them in that behalf, to\nimpose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every man\u2019s estate; which\nrate being fixed, every man, in conformity with the laws of the city,\npresents himself before the collectors of the impost, and having first\nmade oath to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest provided\nfor the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to\npay, of which payment none is witness save himself. From this fact it\nmay be gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this\npeople. For we must assume that each pays his just share, since\notherwise the impost would not yield the sum which, with reference to\nformer imposts, it was estimated to yield; whereby the fraud would be\ndetected, and thereupon some other method for raising money have to be\nresorted to.\n\nAt the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it\nseems to have survived in this province only. That it has survived\nthere may be ascribed to two circumstances: _first_, that the natives\nhave little communication with their neighbours, neither visiting them\nin their countries nor being visited by them; being content to use such\ncommodities, and subsist on such food, and to wear garments of such\nmaterials as their own land supplies; so that all occasion for\nintercourse, and every cause of corruption is removed. For living after\nthis fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French, the\nItalians, or the Spaniards, which three nations together are the\ncorruption of the world. The _second_ cause is, that these republics in\nwhich a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of\ntheir citizens either to be, or to live as gentlemen; but on the\ncontrary, while preserving a strict equality among themselves, are\nbitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their\nneighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall into their hands,\nthey put them to death, as the chief promoters of corruption and the\norigin of all disorders.\n\nBut to make plain what I mean when I speak of _gentlemen_, I say that\nthose are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the\nrevenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the\ncultivation of these estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their\nsupport. Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or\ncountry. But even more mischievous are they who, besides the estates I\nhave spoken of, are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals\nand retainers who render them obedience. Of these two classes of men\nthe kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy\nare full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth\nor free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort\nare the sworn foes to all free institutions.\n\nAnd since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this\ncondition were impossible, if these are to be reformed at all, it can\nonly be by some one man who is able there to establish a kingdom; the\nreason being that when the body of the people is grown so corrupted\nthat the laws are powerless to control it, there must in addition to\nthe laws be introduced a stronger force, to wit, the regal, which by\nits absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive ambition\nand corruption of the great. This opinion may be supported by the\nexample of Tuscany, in which within a narrow compass of territory there\nhave long existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and Siena,\nwhile the other cities of that province, although to a certain extent\ndependent, still show by their spirit and by their institutions that\nthey preserve, or at any rate desire to preserve, their freedom: and\nthis because there are in Tuscany no lords possessed of strongholds,\nand few or no gentlemen, but so complete an equality prevails, that a\nprudent statesman, well acquainted with the history of the free States\nof antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions. Such, however,\nhas been the unhappiness of this our country, that, up to the present\nhour, it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which\nwould have enabled him to act in this way.\n\nFrom what has been said, it follows, that he who would found a\ncommonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do\nso unless he first gets rid of them; and that he who would found a\nmonarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails,\nwill never succeed, unless he raise above the level of that equality\nmany persons of a restless and ambitious temperament, whom he must make\ngentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on them\ncastles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with\nretainers; that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help,\nhe may maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their\nambition; all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force\nand force alone imposes on them. For when in this way there comes to be\na proportion between him who uses force and him against whom it is\nused, each stands fixed in his own station.\n\nBut to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom, or a\nkingdom in a country suited to be a commonwealth, requires so rare a\ncombination of intelligence and power, that though many engage in the\nattempt, few are found to succeed. For the greatness of the undertaking\nquickly daunts them, and so obstructs their advance they break down at\nthe very outset. The case of the Venetian Republic, wherein none save\ngentlemen are permitted to hold any public office, does, doubtless,\nseem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen it\nis impossible to found a commonwealth. But it may be answered that the\ncase of Venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary; since the\ngentlemen of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality,\ninasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands, their wealth\nconsisting chiefly in merchandise and chattels, and not one of them\npossessing a castle or enjoying any feudal authority. For in Venice\nthis name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity, and does not\ndepend on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is\ngiven in other States. But as in other States the different ranks and\nclasses are divided under different names, so in Venice we have the\ndivision into gentlemen (_gentiluomini_) and plebeians (_popolani_), it\nbeing understood that the former hold, or have the right to hold all\nsituations of honour, from which the latter are entirely excluded. And\nin Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have\nalready explained.\n\nLet a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country where a great\nequality is found or has been made; and, conversely, let a princedom be\nconstituted where great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is\nconstituted will be discordant in itself, and without stability.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVI.\u2014_That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or\nCountry, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them_.\n\n\nWhence it happens I know not, but it is seen from examples both ancient\nand recent, that no grave calamity has ever befallen any city or\ncountry which has not been foretold by vision, by augury, by portent,\nor by some other Heaven-sent sign. And not to travel too far afield for\nevidence of this, every one knows that long before the invasion of\nItaly by Charles VIII. of France, his coming was foretold by the friar\nGirolamo Savonarola; and how, throughout the whole of Tuscany, the\nrumour ran that over Arezzo horsemen had been seen fighting in the air.\nAnd who is there who has not heard that before the death of the elder\nLorenzo de\u2019 Medici, the highest pinnacle of the cathedral was rent by a\nthunderbolt, to the great injury of the building? Or who, again, but\nknows that shortly before Piero Soderini, whom the people of Florence\nhad made gonfalonier for life, was deprived of his office and banished,\nthe palace itself was struck by lightning?\n\nOther instances might be cited, which, not to be tedious, I shall omit,\nand mention only a circumstance which Titus Livius tells us preceded\nthe invasion of the Gauls. For he relates how a certain plebeian named\nMarcus Ceditius reported to the senate that as he passed by night along\nthe Via Nova, he heard a voice louder than mortal, bidding him warn the\nmagistrates that the Gauls were on their way to Rome.\n\nThe causes of such manifestations ought, I think, to be inquired into\nand explained by some one who has a knowledge, which I have not, of\ncauses natural and supernatural. It may, however, be, as certain wise\nmen say, that the air is filled with intelligent beings, to whom it is\ngiven to forecast future events; who, taking pity upon men, warn them\nbeforehand by these signs to prepare for what awaits them. Be this as\nit may, certain it is that such warnings are given, and that always\nafter them new and strange disasters befall nations.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVII.\u2014_That the People are strong collectively, but\nindividually weak_.\n\n\nAfter the ruin brought on their country by the invasion of the Gauls,\nmany of the Romans went to dwell in Veii, in opposition to the edicts\nand commands of the senate, who, to correct this mischief, publicly\nordained that within a time fixed, and under penalties stated, all\nshould return to live in Rome. The persons against whom these\nproclamations were directed at first derided them; but, when the time\ncame for them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And Titus Livius observes\nthat, \u201c_although bold enough collectively, each separately, fearing to\nbe punished, made his submission_.\u201d And indeed the temper of the\nmultitude in such cases, cannot be better described than in this\npassage. For often a people will be open-mouthed in condemning the\ndecrees of their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look\npunishment in the face, putting no trust in one another, they hasten to\ncomply. Wherefore, if you be in a position to keep the people\nwell-disposed towards you when they already are so, or to prevent them\ninjuring you in case they be ill-disposed, it is clearly of little\nmoment whether the feelings with which they profess to regard you, be\nfavourable or no. This applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a\npeople, whencesoever it proceed, excepting only the resentment felt by\nthem on being deprived either of liberty, or of a prince whom they love\nand who still survives. For the hostile temper produced by these two\ncauses is more to be feared than any beside, and demands measures of\nextreme severity to correct it. The other untoward humours of the\nmultitude, should there be no powerful chief to foster them, are easily\ndealt with; because, while on the one hand there is nothing more\nterrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob, on the other, there is\nnothing feebler. For though it be furnished with arms it is easily\nsubdued, if you have some place of strength wherein to shelter from its\nfirst onset. For when its first fury has somewhat abated, and each man\nsees that he has to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart\nand to take thought how to insure their personal safety, whether by\nflight or by submission. For which reason a multitude stirred in this\nway, if it would avoid dangers such as I speak of, must at once appoint\na head from among its own numbers, who may control it, keep it united,\nand provide for its defence; as did the commons of Rome when, after the\ndeath of Virginia, they quitted the city, and for their protection\ncreated twenty tribunes from among themselves. Unless this be done,\nwhat Titus Livius has observed in the passage cited, will always prove\ntrue, namely, that a multitude is strong while it holds together, but\nso soon as each of those who compose it begins to think of his own\nprivate danger, it becomes weak and contemptible.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVIII.\u2014_That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince_\n\n\nThat \u201c_nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude_\u201d is\naffirmed not by Titus Livius only, but by all other historians, in\nwhose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude\ncondemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting him and\ngrieving greatly for his loss, as the Romans grieved and lamented for\nManlius Capitolinus, whom they had themselves condemned to die. In\nrelating which circumstance our author observes \u201c_In a short time the\npeople, having no longer cause to fear him, began to deplore his\ndeath_\u201d And elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse\nafter the murder of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he says, \u201c_It is the\nnature of the multitude to be an abject slave, or a domineering\nmaster_\u201d\n\nIt may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which, as I have said,\nall writers are agreed to condemn, I take upon me a task so hard and\ndifficult that I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or\npursue it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever\nshall judge it a fault, to support opinion by arguments, where it is\nnot sought to impose them by violence or authority I maintain, then,\nthat this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude, may with\nequal reason be charged against every individual man, but most of all\nagainst princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will\ncommit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled\nmultitude. Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes\nexisting, or who have existed, few indeed are or have been either wise\nor good.\n\nI speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the\nreins by which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those\nkings who reigned in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that\ncountry was governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include\nthose kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in our own times reign\nin France, which kingdom, more than any other whereof we have knowledge\nat the present day, is under the government of its laws. For kings who\nlive, as these do, subject to constitutional restraint, are not to be\ncounted when we have to consider each man\u2019s proper nature, and to see\nwhether he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison with such\nprinces as these, we must take the case of a multitude controlled as\nthey are, and regulated by the laws, when we shall find it to possess\nthe same virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting itself as\nan abject slave nor as a domineering master.\n\nSuch was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth continued\nuncorrupted, never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily;\nbut, on the contrary, by means of their magistrates and their\nordinances, maintained their place, and when forced to put forth their\nstrength against some powerful citizen, as in the case of Manlius, the\ndecemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them, did so; but when it\nwas necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the dictator\nor consuls, obeyed. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the\ndead Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had\nbeen of such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and\nwould have had power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all\nwriters being agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its\nenemies. But if Manlius when he was so greatly mourned, could have\nrisen once more from the dead, the Roman people would have pronounced\nthe same sentence against him which they pronounced when they led him\nforth from the prison-house, and straightway condemned him to die. And\nin like manner we see that princes, accounted wise, have put men to\ndeath, and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander mourned for\nClitus and others of his friends, and Herod for Mariamne.\n\nBut what our historian says of the multitude, he says not of a\nmultitude which like the people of Rome is controlled by the laws, but\nof an uncontrolled multitude like the Syracusans, who were guilty of\nall these crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit, and which\nwere equally committed by Alexander and Herod in the cases mentioned.\nWherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the\nnature of princes, since both equally err when they can do so without\nregard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides those already\ngiven, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and of\nother princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and\nfickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people.\n\nI maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that\na people when they have the management of affairs are changeable,\nfickle, and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise\nthan as they exist in individual princes; so that were any to accuse\nboth princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make\nexception in favour of princes is a mistake; for a people in command,\nif it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same\ngratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be\nreckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of\nthe laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a\npeople. And further, I say that any difference in their methods of\nacting results not from any difference in their nature, that being the\nsame in both, or, if there be advantage on either side, the advantage\nresting with the people, but from their having more or less respect for\nthe laws under which each lives. And whosoever attentively considers\nthe history of the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years\nthey never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were\nconstantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will\nfind numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both\nparticulars. And should any allege against me the ingratitude they\nshowed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been said at length on\nthat head, where I proved that peoples are less ungrateful than\nprinces. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a\npeople is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a\nprince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been\nlikened to the voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil\nthemselves, and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the\nappearance of presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe.\nAgain, as to the justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom\nfind that after hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in\nopposite directions, they do not adopt the sounder view, or are unable\nto decide on the truth of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a\npeople errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and\nadvantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are\ntouched, as is far oftener the case with them than with a people.\n\nWe see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far\nmore honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a\npeople that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and\nprofligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to\ndo so. Again, it may be seen that a people, when once they have come to\nhold a thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same mind;\nwhich we do not find happen with princes. For the truth of both of\nwhich assertions the Roman people are my sufficient witness, who, in\nthe course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections of\nconsuls and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had\nreason to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king,\nthat no obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that\nname, could shield him from the appointed penalty.\n\nFurther, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the\nhands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous\nprogress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always\nruled by princes; as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and\nAthens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can\nascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than\nthe rule of a prince.\n\nNor would I have it thought that anything our historian may have\naffirmed in the passage cited, or elsewhere, controverts these my\nopinions. For if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples\nand of princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both for\ngoodness and for glory a people is to be preferred. And if princes\nsurpass peoples in the work of legislation, in shaping civil\ninstitutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, so far\ndo the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been\nestablished, as to merit no less praise than they.\n\nAnd to state the sum of the whole matter shortly, I say that popular\ngovernments have endured for long periods in the same way as the\ngovernments of princes, and that both have need to be regulated by the\nlaws; because the prince who can do what he pleases is a madman, and\nthe people which can do as it pleases is never wise. If, then, we\nassume the case of a prince bound, and of a people chained down by the\nlaws, greater virtue will appear in the people than in the prince;\nwhile if we assume the case of each of them freed from all control, it\nwill be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince, and\nless serious errors, and such as admit of readier cure. For a turbulent\nand unruly people may be spoken to by a good man, and readily brought\nback to good ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince, nor any\nremedy be found against him but by the sword. And from this we may\ninfer which of the two suffers from the worse disease; for if the\ndisease of the people may be healed by words, while that of the prince\nmust be dealt with by the sword, there is none but will judge that evil\nto be the greater which demands the more violent remedy.\n\nWhen a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not so much the follies\nwhich it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm,\nas the mischief which may thence result, since in such disorders it\nbecomes possible for a tyrant to spring up. But with a wicked prince\nthe contrary is the case; for we dread present ill, and place our hopes\nin the future, persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince\nmay bring about our freedom. So that there is this distinction between\nthe two, that with the one we fear what is, with the other what is\nlikely to be. Again, the cruelties of a people are turned against him\nwho it fears will encroach upon the common rights, but the cruelties of\nthe prince against those who he fears may assert those rights.\n\nThe prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this,\nthat any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly, even when the\ngovernment is in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of with\na thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences.\n\nBut since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to\nconsider what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with\ncommonwealths or those made with princes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIX.\u2014_To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether\nthose we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes_.\n\n\nSince leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince\nwith another, or by one commonwealth with another, and as conventions\nand treaties are concluded in like manner between princes and\ncommonwealths, it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith of a\ncommonwealth or that of a prince is the more stable and the safer to\ncount on. All things considered, I am disposed to believe that in most\ncases they are alike, though in some they differ. Of one thing,\nhowever, I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress\nwill never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if\nmenaced with the loss of their territories, both the one and the other\nwill break faith with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius,\nwho was named the \u201cCity-taker,\u201d had conferred numberless benefits upon\nthe Athenians; but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies,\nhe sought shelter in Athens, as being a friendly city and under\nobligations to him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved\nhim far more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey,\nin like manner, when routed by C\u00e6sar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to\nPtolemy in Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom;\nby whom he was put to death. In both these instances the same causes\nwere at work, although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less\nin the case of the commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever\nthere is fear, the want of faith will be the same.\n\nAnd even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to\nkeep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a\nlike cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is\nfriend to a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without\nmeans to defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his\ndominions; or it may be that having linked his fortunes with another\u2019s,\nhe despairs of finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of\nhis ally, as was the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused\nthe interests of France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to\nthat of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which\nawaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was\nalso followed by Florence when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly\nby the cause of the French. And taking everything into account, I\nbelieve that in cases of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of\nstability sooner in commonwealths than in princes. For though\ncommonwealths be like-minded with princes, and influenced by the same\npassions, the circumstance that their movements must be slower, makes\nit harder for them to resolve than it is for a prince, for which reason\nthey will be less ready to break faith.\n\nAnd since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain\nadvantages, in this respect also, commonwealths observe their\nengagements far more faithfully than princes; for abundant examples\nmight be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to\nbreak faith, and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a\ncommonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made\nto the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting\nthat he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great\nadvantage to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose\nto them, lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity\nfor acting upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named\nAristides to receive his communication, and to act upon it as he\nthought fit. To him, accordingly, Themistocles showed how the navy of\nunited Greece, for the safety of which the Athenians stood pledged, was\nso situated that they might either gain it over or destroy it, and thus\nmake themselves absolute masters of the whole country. Aristides\nreporting to the Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles was\nextremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly\nrefused to entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted,\nnor any of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in\nbreaking faith than in any other way.\n\nAs to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been\nobserved by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of\neveryday occurrence, and I am speaking here only of those engagements\nwhich are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this respect,\nlikewise, I believe that commonwealths offend less than princes, and\nare therefore more to be trusted.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LX.\u2014_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome\nwere given without respect to Age_.\n\n\nIt is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the\nconsulship was thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this\ndignity to all its citizens, without distinction either of age or\nblood; nay, that in this matter respect for age was never made a ground\nfor preference among the Romans, whose constant aim it was to discover\nexcellence whether existing in old or young. To this we have the\ntestimony of Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his\ntwenty-fourth year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the\nconsulship that it was \u201c_the reward not of birth but of desert_.\u201d\n\nWhether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not,\nis a question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood,\nhowever, was made under necessity, and as I have observed on another\noccasion, the same necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to\nobtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which\nRome achieved. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold\nout rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards\nwhereof you have held out hopes. It was consequently necessary to\nextend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship,\non which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually\nrealizing it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had\nto be satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian\nbirth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we\nhave seen was the case with Venice, may treat these men as they please,\nthose other cities which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this\ndistinction. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood,\nnothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the\ncontrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. For\nwhere a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence\nwhich are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests with\nthe people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble\naction which he has performed; but when a young man is of such\nexcellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal\nachievement, it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable\nat once to make use of him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and\nhad lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which his country\nmight have profited; as Rome profited by the services of Valerius\nCorvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while\nyet very young.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nMen do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn\nthe present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not\nmerely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the\nrecords left by historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the\ndays in which they remember their youth to have been spent. And\nalthough this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one,\nI can see that there are many causes to account for it; chief of which\nI take to be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the\nwhole truth, those circumstances that would detract from the credit of\nthe past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that gives\nit lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers\nrender this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make\ntheir achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the\ngreat things they have done, but also lend such a colour to the actions\nof their enemies, that any one born afterwards, whether in the\nconquering or in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these\nmen and these times, and is constrained to praise and love them beyond\nall others.\n\nAgain, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most\npowerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are\npast, because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion\nfor envy. The contrary, however, is the case with the things we see,\nand in which we take part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance\nwith them, no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize, along\nwith much that is good, much that displeases us, and so are forced to\npronounce them far inferior to the old, although in truth they deserve\nfar greater praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what relates\nto the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time\ncan give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of\nthemselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which the\ngrounds for judging are not so clear.\n\nI repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising\nobtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it\nwill happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are\nin constant movement, it must be that they either rise or fall.\nWherefore, we may see a city or province furnished with free\ninstitutions by some great and wise founder, flourish for a while\nthrough his merits, and advance steadily on the path of improvement.\nAny one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to praise the\npast more than the present, and his error would be occasioned by the\ncauses already noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or\nprovince when the time has come for it to fall away from its former\nfelicity, would not be mistaken in praising the past.\n\nWhen I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world,\nremaining continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good\nand evil; but that this good and this evil shift about from one country\nto another, as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one\nnation to another, according as the manners of these nations changed,\nthe world, as a whole, continuing as before, and the only difference\nbeing that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat of its\nexcellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in Persia, until\nat last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after the\nRoman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the\nworld has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that\nexcellence diffused among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the\nFranks, for example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and the\nStates of Germany at the present day; and shared at an earlier time by\nthat sect of the Saracens who performed so many great achievements and\ngained so wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire in the\nEast.\n\nIn all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman\npower, and among all these races, there existed, and in some part of\nthem there yet exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and\njustly to be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these\ncountries should exalt past times over present, he might be mistaken;\nbut any who, living at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in\nItaly become an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason to\ncomplain of his own times, and to commend those others, in which there\nwere many things which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard\nbeing had to religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished\nwith every sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the\nlast extremity of wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices\nof our age are the more odious in that they are practised by those who\nsit on the judgment seat, govern the State, and demand public\nreverence.\n\nBut, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the\njudgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or\nthe past is the better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their\nantiquity, they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have\nof their own times, it ought not to be at fault in old men when they\ncompare the days of their youth with those of their maturity, both of\nwhich have been alike seen and known by them. This were indeed true, if\nmen at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way, and\nwere constantly influenced by the same desires; but since they alter,\nthe times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to those\nwho have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing\nthings in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since,\nwhen they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and\ndiscernment, it must needs be that those things which in their youth\nseemed to them tolerable and good, should in their old age appear\nintolerable and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this to their\njudgment, they lay the blame upon the times.\n\nBut, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting\nthem to desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few,\nthere results a constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of\nwhat they possess, prompting them to find fault with the present,\npraise the past, and long for the future, even though they be not moved\nthereto by any reasonable cause.\n\nI know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the\nnumber of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of\nmine, I render excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans\nwhile I censure our own. And, indeed, were not the excellence which\nthen prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the\nsun, I should proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from fear\nlest in accusing others I should myself fall into this self-deception.\nBut since the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold\nto speak freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in order\nthat the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may\nbe led to shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by\nantiquity whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty\nof every good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the\nmalice of Time or of Fortune has not permitted him to put in practice;\nto the end, that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better\nloved by Heaven may be found able to carry them out.\n\nHaving spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods\nfollowed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their\ncity, in this I shall speak of what was done by them to spread their\nEmpire.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\u2014_Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to\nValour or to Fortune_.\n\n\nMany authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have\nthought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to\ntheir good fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons\nwhich they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the\nadmission of the Romans themselves, since their having erected more\ntemples to Fortune than to any other deity, shows that it was to her\nthat they ascribed their success. It would seem, too, that Titus Livius\nwas of the same mind, since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth\nof any Roman in which he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also\nmake mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion with which I can\nin no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. For if no\ncommonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because\nnone was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that\ngrowth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by\nher conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and\ndevised by her first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired,\nas shall be fully shown in many of the following Discourses.\n\nThe writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their\ngood fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two\ngreat wars on their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no\nwars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome the Samnites,\nbut undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered; nor\never fought with the Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins,\nand had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats; whereas, had\nany two of these powers, while yet fresh and unexhausted, united\ntogether, it may easily be believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic\nmust have followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so\nchanced that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On\nthe contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one\nwar, another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one,\nanother broke out. And this we may plainly see from the order in which\ntheir wars succeeded one another.\n\nFor, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the\nGauls, we find that during their struggle with the Equians and the\nVolscians, and while these two nations continued strong, no others rose\nagainst them. On these being subdued, there broke out the war with the\nSamnites; and although before the close of that contest the Latin\nnations had begun to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their\nrebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and\nhelped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels; on\nwhose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed.\n\nWhen the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses,\nthere followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites\nwere once more stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.\nWhen he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered\non her first war with the Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than\nall the Gallic nations on both sides of the Alps combined against the\nRomans, by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and Pisa, where\nnow stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they were at last routed with\ntremendous slaughter.\n\nThis war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no\ncontest of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and\nthe remnant of the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this\nfooting things continued down to the second Carthaginian war, which for\nsixteen years kept the whole of Italy in a blaze. This too being\nbrought to a most glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian\nwar, at the close of which succeeded the war with Antiochus and Asia.\nThese subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king or people\nwho either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome.\n\nBut even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these\nwars, and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized\nnot only the good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary\nvalour and prudence. And were any one to search for the causes of this\ngood fortune, he would have little difficulty in finding them, since\nnothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so\ngreat a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid\nto engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none will ever\nventure to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that it\nwill almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his\nneighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who, on\ntheir part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the\nmethods he takes to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet.\nDistant powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse with either,\ntreat the matter as too remote to concern them in any way; and abiding\nin this error until the conflagration approaches their own doors, on\nits arrival have no resource for its extinction, save in their own\nstrength, which, as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly\npowerful, no longer suffices.\n\nI forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans\nwere subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid being\nprolix, shall content myself with the single instance of the\nCarthaginians, who, at the time when the Romans were contending with\nthe Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great power and held in\nhigh repute, being already masters of the whole of Africa together with\nSicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in various parts of\nSpain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a distance\nfrom the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the\nRomans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the\ncontrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those\nwhom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their\nfriendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after\nsubduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both\nin Spain and Sicily. What happened in the case of the Carthaginians,\nhappened also in the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of\nAntiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with another of them,\nbelieved that other would have the advantage, and that there would be\ntime enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace or\nwar. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in\nthis respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes\nacting as they did, and of a valour equal to theirs.\n\nAs bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what\nmethods were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of\nother nations, had I not already spoken of this at length in my\n_Treatise on Princedoms_, wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here\nit is enough to say briefly, that in a new province they always sought\nfor some friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb, a\ndoor through which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their\nhold. Thus we see them effect their entrance into Samnium through the\nCapuans, into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily through the\nMamertines, into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through\nMassinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes\nand other princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in\nlike manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether\nto acquire provinces or to keep them.\n\nThe nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to\nstand in less need of Fortune\u2019s help than others who neglect it. But\nthat all may clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided by\nvalour than by Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the\nfollowing Chapter consider the character of those nations with whom\nthey had to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending\ntheir freedom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\u2014_With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how\nstubborn these were in defending their Freedom._\n\n\nIn subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more\ndistant provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love\nwhich in those days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with\nsuch obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing\nvalour. For we know by numberless instances, what perils these nations\nwere ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their\nfreedom, and what vengeance they took against those who deprived them\nof it. We know, too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers\nfrom servitude. And though, at the present day, there is but one\nprovince which can be said to contain within it free cities, we find\nthat formerly these abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the\nancient times of which I speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany\nfrom Lombardy down to the extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous\nfree nations, such as the Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites,\nbesides many others in other parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever\nread of there being any kings over them, except those who reigned in\nRome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria. How the line of this last-named\nprince came to be extinguished, history does not inform us; but it is\nclear that at the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria\nwas free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom, and so detested the\nregal name, that when the Veientines, who for their defence had created\na king in Veii, sought aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these,\nafter much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while they\ncontinued to live under a king; judging it useless to defend a country\ngiven over to servitude by its inhabitants.\n\nIt is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among\nnations, for we know by experience that States have never signally\nincreased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have\nlived under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what\na pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had\nfreed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to\ncontemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself\nfrom her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the\nwell-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a\nState great; and, without question, this universal well-being is\nnowhere secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever\nmakes for its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this\nman or to that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are\nable to carry them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they\ninjure.\n\nBut the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what\nhelps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that\nwhenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least\nevil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor\never increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it\nwill be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some\nable tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms,\nthe advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State;\nsince he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he\ntyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards\nhe should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which\nhe acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules;\nbecause to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies\nin keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately\nrecognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his\ncountry, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have\nthis view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into\nXenophon\u2019s treatise _De Tirannide_.\n\nNo wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with\nsuch relentless hatred, and so passionately loved freedom that its very\nname was dear to them, as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero\nthe Syracusan, was put to death in Syracuse. For when word of his death\nreached the army, which lay encamped not far off, at first it was\ngreatly moved, and eager to take up arms against the murderers. But on\nhearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of Syracuse, quieted\nat once by the name, it laid aside its resentment against those who had\nslain the tyrant, and fell to consider how a free government might be\nprovided for the city.\n\nNor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible\nvengeance on those who deprived them of their freedom; of which, though\nthere be many instances, I mean only to cite one which happened in the\ncity of Corcyra at the time of the Peloponnesian war. For Greece being\ndivided into two factions, one of which sided with the Athenians, the\nother with the Spartans, it resulted that many of its cities were\ndivided against themselves, some of the citizens seeking the friendship\nof Sparta and some of Athens. In the aforesaid city of Corcyra, the\nnobles getting the upper hand, deprived the commons of their freedom;\nthese, however, recovering themselves with the help of the Athenians,\nlaid hold of the entire body of the nobles, and cast them into a prison\nlarge enough to contain them all, whence they brought them forth by\neight or ten at a time, pretending that they were to be sent to\ndifferent places into banishment, whereas, in fact, they put them to\ndeath with many circumstances of cruelty. Those who were left, learning\nwhat was going on, resolved to do their utmost to escape this\nignominious death, and arming themselves with what weapons they could\nfind, defended the door of their prison against all who sought to\nenter; till the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the\nprison, dragged down the roof, and smothered the prisoners in the\nruins. Many other horrible and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated\nin Greece, show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with more\nferocity than a threatened freedom is defended.\n\nWhen I consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were\nso much more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present\nday, I am led to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes\nthe present generation of men less vigorous and daring than those of\nancient times, namely the difference of the training of the present day\nfrom that of earlier ages; and this, again, arises from the different\ncharacter of the religions then and now prevailing. For our religion,\nhaving revealed to us the truth and the true path, teaches us to make\nlittle account of worldly glory; whereas, the Gentiles, greatly\nesteeming it, and placing therein their highest good, displayed a\ngreater fierceness in their actions.\n\nThis we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their\nsacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the\nsimplicity of our worship, though that be not without a certain dignity\nof its own, refined rather than splendid, and far removed from any\ntincture of ferocity or violence. In the religious ceremonies of the\nancients neither pomp nor splendour were wanting; but to these was\njoined the ordinance of sacrifice, giving occasion to much bloodshed\nand cruelty. For in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered, and\nthis being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the\nworshippers. Moreover, under the old religions none obtained divine\nhonours save those who were loaded with worldly glory, such as captains\nof armies and rulers of cities; whereas our religion glorifies men of a\nhumble and contemplative, rather than of an active life. Accordingly,\nwhile the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity,\nbodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave,\nour religion places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the\nthings of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is\nthat we should be brave to suffer rather than to do.\n\nThis manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler,\nand to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they\nplease; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into\nParadise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them. But\nshould it seem that the world has grown effeminate and Heaven laid\naside her arms, this assuredly results from the baseness of those who\nhave interpreted our religion to accord with indolence and ease rather\nthan with valour. For were we to remember that religion permits the\nexaltation and defence of our country, we would see it to be our duty\nto love and honour it, and would strive to be able and ready to defend\nit.\n\nThis training, therefore, and these most false interpretations are the\ncauses why, in the world of the present day, we find no longer the\nnumerous commonwealths which were found of old; and in consequence,\nthat we see not now among the nations that love of freedom which\nprevailed then; though, at the same time, I am persuaded that one cause\nof this change has been, that the Roman Empire by its arms and power\nput an end to all the free States and free institutions of antiquity.\nFor although the power of Rome fell afterwards into decay, these States\ncould never recover their strength or resume their former mode of\ngovernment, save in a very few districts of the Empire.\n\nBut, be this as it may, certain it is that in every country of the\nworld, even the least considerable, the Romans found a league of\nwell-armed republics, most resolute in the defence of their freedom,\nwhom it is clear they never could have subdued had they not been\nendowed with the rarest and most astonishing valour. To cite a single\ninstance, I shall take the case of the Samnites who, strange as it may\nnow seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself, so powerful\nand so steadfast in arms, as to be able to withstand the Romans down to\nthe consulship of Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period\nof six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats, the loss of many\nof their towns, and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere\nthroughout their country. And this is the more remarkable when we see\nthat country, which once contained so many noble cities, and supported\nso great a population, now almost uninhabited; and reflect that it\nformerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its\nconquest impossible to less than Roman valour.\n\nThere is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient\ngreatness and this modern decay have arisen, since they can be traced\nto the free life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which\nprevails now. For all countries and provinces which enjoy complete\nfreedom, make, as I have said, most rapid progress. Because, from\nmarriage being less restricted in these countries, and more sought\nafter, we find there a greater population; every man being disposed to\nbeget as many children as he thinks he can rear, when he has no anxiety\nlest they should be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only\nthat they are born to freedom and not to slavery, but that they may\nrise by their merit to be the first men of their country. In such\nStates, accordingly, we see wealth multiply, both that which comes from\nagriculture and that which comes from manufactures. For all love to\ngather riches and to add to their possessions when their enjoyment of\nthem is not likely to be disturbed. And hence it happens that the\ncitizens of such States vie with one another in whatever tends to\npromote public or private well-being; in both of which, consequently,\nthere is a wonderful growth.\n\nBut the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live\nin servitude, and the more oppressive their servitude, the more they\nfall short of the good which all desire. And the hardest of all hard\nservitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another.\nFirst, because it is more lasting, and there is less hope to escape\nfrom it; and, second, because every commonwealth seeks to add to its\nown strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside. A prince who gets\nthe better of you will not treat you after this fashion, unless he be a\nbarbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries waste and\ndestroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced by the ordinary\npromptings of humanity, will, as a rule, regard all his subject States\nwith equal favour, and suffer them to pursue their usual employments,\nand retain almost all their ancient institutions, so that if they\nflourish not as free States might, they do not dwindle as States that\nare enslaved; by which I mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other\nslavery to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens, I\nhave already spoken.\n\nWhoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been said above, will\nnot be astonished at the power possessed by the Samnites while they\nwere still free, nor at the weakness into which they fell when they\nwere subjugated. Of which change in their fortunes Livius often reminds\nus, and particularly in connection with the war with Hannibal, where he\nrelates that the Samnites, being ill-treated by a Roman legion\nquartered at Nola, sent legates to Hannibal to ask his aid; who in\nlaying their case before him told him, that with their own soldiers and\ncaptains they had fought single handed against the Romans for a hundred\nyears, and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular\narmies; but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able to defend\nthemselves against one poor legion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\u2014_That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay\nround about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of\nCitizenship._\n\n\n\u201cCrescit interea Roma Alb\u00e6 ruinis\u201d\u2014_Meanwhile Rome grows on the ruins\nof Alba_. They who would have their city become a great empire, must\nendeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants; for without a\nnumerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful. This\nmay be effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness,\nwhen you offer a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to\ncome and dwell in your city, so as to encourage them to come there of\ntheir own accord; by force, when after destroying neighbouring towns,\nyou transplant their inhabitants to live in yours. Both of these\nmethods were practised by Rome, and with such success, that in the time\nof her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens\nfit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow the methods of the\nskilful husbandman, who, to insure a plant growing big and yielding and\nmaturing its fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that the\nstrength remaining in the stem, it may in due season put forth new and\nmore vigorous and more fruitful branches. And that this was a right and\na necessary course for Rome to take for establishing and extending her\nempire, is proved by the example of Sparta and Athens, which, although\nexceedingly well-armed States, and regulated by excellent laws, never\nreached the same greatness as the Roman Republic; though the latter, to\nall appearance, was more turbulent and disorderly than they, and, so\nfar as laws went, not so perfectly governed. For this we can offer no\nother explanation than that already given. For by augmenting the\nnumbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome was soon able to\nplace two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms; while neither\nSparta nor Athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand; and\nthis, not because the situation of these countries was less\nadvantageous than that of Rome, but simply from the difference in the\nmethods they followed.\n\nFor Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking nothing so\nlikely to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens, did all he\ncould to prevent intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides\nrefusing these the right to marry, the right of citizenship, and all\nsuch other social rights as induce men to become members of a\ncommunity, he ordained that in this republic of his the only money\ncurrent should be of leather, so that none might be tempted to repair\nthither to trade or to carry on any art.\n\nUnder such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that State\ncould never much increase. For as all our actions imitate nature, and\nit is neither natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a\ngreat branch, so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or\ncountries stronger than herself; or, doing so, will resemble the tree\nwhose boughs being greater than its trunk, are supported with\ndifficulty, and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved with\nSparta. For after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of\nGreece, no sooner did Thebes rebel than all the others rebelled\nlikewise, and the trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this could\nnot have happened with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any\nbranch with ease.\n\nIt was, therefore, by adding to her population, and by, adopting\ncertain other methods presently to be noticed, that Rome became so\ngreat and powerful. And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the\nwords, \u201c_Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis_.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\u2014_That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for\nextending their Power_.\n\n\nAny one who has read ancient history with attention, must have observed\nthat three methods have been used by republics for extending their\npower. One of these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a\nconfederation of many States, wherein none has precedence over the rest\nin authority or rank, and each allows the others to share its\nacquisitions; as do the States of the Swiss League in our days, and as\nthe Achaians and Etolians did in Greece in earlier times. And because\nthe Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in many wars, that I may give\na clearer notion of this method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little in\nmy account of the Etruscan people.\n\nIn Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans were very\npowerful, both by sea and land; and although we have no separate\nhistory of their affairs, we have some slight records left us of them,\nand some indications of their greatness. We know, for instance, that\nthey planted a colony, to which they gave the name of Hadria, on the\ncoast of the upper sea; which colony became so renowned that it lent\nits name to the sea itself, which to this day by the Latins is called\nthe Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were obeyed from the Tiber\nto the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater part of the\nItalian peninsula; although, two hundred years before Rome grew to any\ngreat strength, they had lost their supremacy in the province now known\nas Lombardy, of which the French had possessed themselves. For that\npeople, whether driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence of\nthe fruits, and still more of the wine of Italy, came there under their\nchief, Bellovesus; and after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of\nthe country, settled themselves therein, and there built many cities;\ncalling the district Gallia, after the name they then bore: and this\nterritory they retained until they were subdued by the Romans.\n\nThese Etruscans, therefore, living with one another on a footing of\ncomplete equality, when they sought to extend their power, followed\nthat first method of which I have just now spoken. Their State was made\nup of twelve cities, among which were Chiusi, Veii, Friuli, Arezzo,\nVolterra, and the like, and their government was conducted in the form\nof a league. They could not, however, extend their conquests beyond\nItaly; while even within the limits of Italy, much territory remained\nunoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed.\n\nThe second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions,\ntaking heed, however, to retain in your own hands the chief command,\nthe seat of government, and the titular supremacy. This was the method\nfollowed by the Romans.\n\nThe third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you,\nand not merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan\npursued by the Spartans and Athenians.\n\nOf these three methods, the last is wholly useless, as was seen in the\ncase of the two States named, which came to ruin from no other cause\nthan that they had acquired a dominion greater than they could\nmaintain. For to undertake to govern cities by force, especially such\ncities as have been used to live in freedom, is a difficult and arduous\ntask, in which you never can succeed without an army and that a great\none. But to have such an army you must needs have associates who will\nhelp to swell the numbers of your own citizens. And because Athens and\nSparta neglected this precaution, whatever they did was done in vain;\nwhereas Rome, which offers an instance of the second of the methods we\nare considering, by attending to this precaution reached a power that\nhad no limit. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has\nattained to this pitch of power. For joining with herself many States\nthroughout Italy as her companions, who in most respects lived with her\non a footing of equality, while, as has been noted, always reserving to\nherself the seat of empire and the titular command, it came about that\nthese States, without being aware of it, by their own efforts, and with\ntheir own blood, wrought out their own enslavement.\n\nFor when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for the purpose of\nreducing foreign kingdoms to provinces, and of subjugating nations who,\nbeing used to live under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and\nwho, receiving Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies\nbearing the Roman name, recognized no masters save the Romans, those\ncompanions of Rome who dwelt in Italy suddenly found themselves\nsurrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the\nRoman power; and when at last they came to perceive the mistake in\nwhich they had been living, it was too late to remedy it, so vast was\nthe authority which Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and\nso great the resources which she possessed within herself; having by\nthis time grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of States. So that\nalthough these her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by\nconspiring against her, they were soon defeated in the attempt, and\nremained in a worse plight than before, since they too became subjects\nand no longer associates. This method, then, as I have said, was\nfollowed by the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued by a\nrepublic which desires to extend its power; experience having shown\nnone other so safe and certain.\n\nThe method which consists in forming leagues, of which I have spoken\nabove as having been adopted by the Etruscans, the Achaians, and the\nEtolians of old, and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best\nafter that followed by the Romans, for as in this way there can be no\ngreat extension of power, two advantages result: first, that you do not\nreadily involve yourself in war; and, second, that you can easily\npreserve any little acquisition which you may make. The reason why you\ncannot greatly extend your power is, that as your league is made up of\nseparate States with distinct seats of government, it is difficult for\nthese to consult and resolve in concert. The same causes make these\nStates careless to enlarge their territories; because acquisitions\nwhich have to be shared among many communities are less thought of than\nthose made by a single republic which looks to enjoy them all to\nitself. Again, since leagues govern through general councils, they must\nneeds be slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one\nfrontier.\n\nMoreover, we find from experience that this method has certain fixed\nlimits beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed; by\nwhich I mean that some twelve or fourteen communities may league\nthemselves together, but will never seek to pass beyond that limit: for\nafter associating themselves in such numbers as seem to them to secure\ntheir safety against all besides, they desire no further extension of\ntheir power, partly because no necessity compels them to extend, and\npartly because, for the reasons already given, they would find no\nprofit in extending. For were they to seek extension they would have to\nfollow one of two courses: either continuing to admit new members to\ntheir league, whose number must lead to confusion; or else making\nsubjects, a course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty\nin making them, and no great good in having them. Wherefore, when their\nnumber has so increased that their safety seems secured, they have\nrecourse to two expedients: either receiving other States under their\nprotection and engaging for their defence (in which way they obtain\nmoney from various quarters which they can easily distribute among\nthemselves); or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign\nStates, and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them\nto carry out his enterprises; as we see done by the Swiss at the\npresent day, and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of\nthose nations whom we have named above. To which we have a witness in\nTitus Livius, who relates that when Philip of Macedon came to treat\nwith Titus Quintius Flamininus, and while terms were being discussed in\nthe presence of a certain Etolian captain, this man coming to words\nwith Philip, the latter taunted him with greed and bad faith; telling\nhim that the Etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one side, and\nthen send their men to serve on the other; so that often the banner of\nEtolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps.\n\nWe see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by leagues has always\nbeen of the same character, and has led always to the same results. We\nsee, likewise, that the method which proceeds by reducing States to\ndirect subjection has constantly proved a weak one, and produced\ninsignificant gains; and that whenever these gains have passed a\ncertain limit, ruin has ensued. And if the latter of these two methods\nbe of little utility among armed States, among those that are unarmed,\nas is now the case with the republics of Italy, it is worse than\nuseless. We may conclude, therefore, that the true method was that\nfollowed by the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find none\nwho adopted it before they did, and none who have followed it since. As\nfor leagues, I know of no nations who have had recourse to them in\nrecent times except the Swiss and the Suevians.\n\nBut to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I affirm that all the\nvarious methods followed by the Romans in conducting their affairs,\nwhether foreign or domestic, so far from being imitated in our day,\nhave been held of no account, some pronouncing them to be mere fables,\nsome thinking them impracticable, others out of place and unprofitable;\nand so, abiding in this ignorance, we rest a prey to all who have\nchosen to invade our country. But should it seem difficult to tread in\nthe footsteps of the Romans, it ought not to appear so hard, especially\nfor us Tuscans, to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, from the\ncauses already assigned, they failed to establish an empire like that\nof Rome, succeeded in acquiring in Italy that degree of power which\ntheir method of acting allowed, and which they long preserved in\nsecurity, with the greatest renown in arms and government, and the\nhighest reputation for manners and religion. This power and this glory\nof theirs were first impaired by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished\nby the Romans, and so utterly extinguished, that of the Etruscan\nEmpire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have at the present day\nbarely a record. This it is which has led me to inquire whence this\noblivion of things arises, a question of which I shall treat in the\nfollowing Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\u2014_That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of\nFloods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past_.\n\n\nTo those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from\nall eternity, it were, I think, a good answer, that if what they say be\ntrue we ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand\nyears; did it not appear that the memory of past times is blotted out\nby a variety of causes, some referable to men, and some to Heaven.\n\nAmong the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and\ntongues; because when a new sect, that is to say a new religion, comes\nup, its first endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to\nefface the old; and should it so happen that the founders of the new\nreligion speak another tongue, this may readily be effected. This we\nknow from observing the methods which Christianity has followed in\ndealing with the religion of the Gentiles, for we find that it has\nabolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship, and obliterated\nevery trace of the ancient belief. True, it has not succeeded in\nutterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who\nheld that belief; and this because the propagators of the new faith,\nretaining the Latin tongue, were constrained to use it in writing the\nnew law; for could they have written this in a new tongue, we may\ninfer, having regard to their other persecutions, that no record\nwhatever would have survived to us of past events. For any one who\nreads of the methods followed by Saint Gregory and the other heads of\nthe Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity they pursued\nall ancient memorials; burning the works of poets and historians;\nbreaking images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of\nantiquity. So that if to this persecution a new language had been\njoined, it must soon have been found that everything was forgotten.\n\nWe may believe, therefore, that what Christianity has sought to effect\nagainst the sect of the Gentiles, was actually effected by that sect\nagainst the religion which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated\nchanges of belief which have taken place in the course of five or six\nthousand years, the memory of what happened at a remote date has\nperished, or, if any trace of it remain, has come to be regarded as a\nfable to which no credit is due; like the Chronicle of Diodorus\nSiculus, which, professing to give an account of the events of forty or\nfifty thousand years, is held, and I believe justly, a lying tale.\n\nAs for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to Heaven, they are\nthose which make havoc of the human race, and reduce the population of\ncertain parts of the world to a very small number. This happens by\nplague, famine, or flood, of which three the last is the most hurtful,\nas well because it is the most universal, as because those saved are\ngenerally rude and ignorant mountaineers, who possessing no knowledge\nof antiquity themselves, can impart none to those who come after them.\nOr if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed of such\nknowledge, to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal and\npervert it to suit his private ends, so that to his posterity there\nwill remain only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate,\nand no more.\n\nThat these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact happen, I see no\nreason to doubt, both because we find all histories full of them, and\nrecognize their effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because\nit is reasonable that such things should happen. For as when much\nsuperfluous matter has gathered in simple bodies, nature makes repeated\nefforts to remove and purge it away, thereby promoting the health of\nthese bodies, so likewise as regards that composite body the human\nrace, when every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that\nthey can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere, every\nregion being equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft and\nwickedness have reached their highest pitch, it must needs come about\nthat the world will purge herself in one or another of these three\nways, to the end that men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their\nlives and live with more convenience.\n\nEtruria, then, as has been said above, was at one time powerful,\nabounding in piety and valour, practising her own customs, and speaking\nher own tongue; but all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that,\nas I have observed already, nothing is left of her but the memory of a\nname.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\u2014_Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War_.\n\n\nHaving treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing\ntheir power, we shall now go on to consider those which they used in\nmaking war; and in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned\naside from the common path in order to render their progress to supreme\ngreatness easy.\n\nWhosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition, means to acquire\nand to hold what he acquires, and to carry on the war he has undertaken\nin such a manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native\ncountry and State. It is necessary, therefore, whether for acquiring or\nholding, to consider how cost may be avoided, and everything done most\nadvantageously for the public welfare. But whoever would effect all\nthis, must take the course and follow the methods of the Romans; which\nconsisted, first of all, in making their wars, as the French say,\n_great and short_. For entering the field with strong armies, they\nbrought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the Latins,\nthe Samnites, or the Etruscans.\n\nAnd if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged, from\nthe foundation of their city down to the siege of Veii, all will be\nseen to have been quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some\nin no more than six days. And this was their wont: So soon as war was\ndeclared they would go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at\nonce deliver battle. The enemy, on being routed, to save their country\nfrom pillage, very soon came to terms, when the Romans would take from\nthem certain portions of their territory. These they either assigned to\nparticular persons, or made the seat of a colony, which being settled\non the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to the\nRoman frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who had these\nlands given them, and of the Roman people whose borders were thus\nguarded at no expense to themselves. And no other system of defence\ncould have been at once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For while\nthe enemy were not actually in the field, this guard was sufficient;\nand when they came out in force to overwhelm the colony, the Romans\nalso went forth in strength and gave them battle; and getting the\nbetter of them, imposed harder terms than before, and so returned home.\nAnd in this way they came gradually to establish their name abroad, and\nto add to their power.\n\nThese methods they continued to employ until they changed their system\nof warfare, which they did during the siege of Veii; when to enable\nthem to carry on a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment of\ntheir soldiers, whom, up to that time they had not paid, nor needed to\npay, because till then their wars had been of brief duration.\nNevertheless, while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might thus\nwage longer wars, and keep their armies longer in the field when\nemployed on distant enterprises, they never departed from their old\nplan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and\ncircumstances allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies.\n\nTheir custom of terminating their wars with despatch, besides being\nnatural to the Romans, was strengthened by the ambition of their\nconsuls, who, being appointed for twelve months only, six of which they\nhad to spend in the city, were eager to bring their wars to an end as\nrapidly as they could, that they might enjoy the honours of a triumph.\nThe usage of planting colonies was recommended by the great advantage\nand convenience which resulted from it. In dealing with the spoils of\nwarfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure changed, so that in this\nrespect they were not afterwards so liberal as they were at first;\npartly, because liberality did not seem so necessary when their\nsoldiers were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils\nthemselves being greater than before, they thought by their help so to\nenrich the public treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without\ntaxing the city; and, in fact, by pursuing this course the public\nrevenues were soon greatly augmented. The methods thus followed by the\nRomans in dividing plunder and in planting colonies had, accordingly,\nthis result, that whereas other less prudent princes and republics are\nimpoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it; nay, so far was the\nsystem carried, that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he\nbrought back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and\nspoils of every kind.\n\nBy methods such as these, at one time bringing their wars to a rapid\nconclusion by invasion and actual defeat, at another wearing out an\nenemy by protracted hostilities, and again by concluding peace on\nadvantageous terms, the Romans continually grew richer and more\npowerful.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\u2014_Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each\nColonist_.\n\n\nIt would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the\nRomans allotted to each colonist, for my belief is that they gave more\nor less according to the character of the country to which they sent\nthem. We may, however, be sure that in every instance, and to whatever\ncountry they were sent, the quantity of land assigned was not very\nlarge: first, because, these colonists being sent to guard the newly\nacquired country, by giving little land it became possible to send more\nmen; and second because, as the Romans lived frugally at home, it is\nunreasonable to suppose that they should wish their countrymen to be\ntoo well off abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the capture of\nVeii, the Romans sent thither a colony, allotting to each colonist\nthree jugera and seven unciae of land, which, according to our\nmeasurement would be something under two acres.\n\nBesides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough have thought\nthat it was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its\ncareful cultivation that would make it suffice. It is very necessary,\nhowever, that every colony should have common pasturage where all may\nsend their cattle to graze, as well as woods where they may cut fuel;\nfor without such conveniences no colony can maintain itself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\u2014_Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and\noverflow the Countries of others_.\n\n\nHaving spoken above of the methods followed by the Romans in making\nwar, and related how the Etruscans were attacked by the Gauls, it seems\nto me not foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two\nkinds. One kind of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or\nrepublics who seek to extend their dominions. Such were the wars waged\nby Alexander the Great, and by the Romans, and such are those which we\nsee every day carried on by one potentate against another. Wars of this\nsort have their dangers, but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants\nof a country; what the conqueror seeks being merely the submission of\nthe conquered people, whom, generally speaking, he suffers to retain\ntheir laws, and always their houses and goods.\n\nThe other species of war is when an entire people, with all the\nfamilies of which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat,\nremoves from its former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a\nnew country, not simply with the view to establish dominion over it,\nbut to possess it as its own, and to expel or exterminate the former\ninhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust\nspeaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha, where in\nmentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of the Gauls\ninto Italy began to be noticed, he observes that \u201c_in the wars of the\nRomans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that always\nin their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for life_.\u201d\nFor a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, will be\ncontent to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs;\nbut an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must\ndestroy all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that\nwhereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted.\n\nThe Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first\nbeing that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls\nwho, as already mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the\nEtruscans and made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius\nhas assigned two causes. First, that they were attracted, as I have\nsaid before, by the fruitful soil and by the wine of Italy which they\nhad not in Gaul; second, that their population having multiplied so\ngreatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home,\nthe princes of their land decided that certain of their number should\ngo forth to seek a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of\nthose who were to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus;\nthe former of whom came into Italy while the latter passed into Spain.\nFrom the immigration under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of\nLombardy, and, subsequently, the first war of the Gauls with Rome. At a\nlater date, and after the close of the first war with Carthage, came\nthe second Gallic invasion, when more than two hundred thousand Gauls\nperished in battle between Piombino and Pisa. The third of these wars\nbroke out on the descent into Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after\ndefeating several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by Marius.\n\nIn these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but\nno ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards,\nwhen the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost\ntheir former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the\nsame race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like\nthem, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire.\n\nNations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land, when\nforced by famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new\nhabitation elsewhere. When those thus driven forth are in large\nnumbers, they violently invade the territories of other nations,\nslaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding\nnew kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses,\nand by those tribes who overran the Roman Empire. For the new names\nwhich we find in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than in\ntheir having been given by these new occupants; as when the countries\nformerly known as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the\nnames of Lombardy and France, from the Lombards and the Franks who\nsettled themselves there. In the same way Sclavonia was formerly known\nas Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and England as Britain; while many\nother provinces which it would be tedious to enumerate, have similarly\nchanged their designations; as when the name Jud\u00e6a was given by Moses\nto that part of Syria of which he took possession.\n\nAnd since I have said above that nations such as those I have been\ndescribing, are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and\nforced to seek a new country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of\nthe Maurusians, a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of\nthe inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves unable to resist\nthem, chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their\ncountry in a vain effort to defend it. For which reason, removing with\ntheir families, they went to Africa, where, after driving out the\nnative inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they could\nnot defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a\ncountry belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of\nthe war which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on\nAfrica, relates, that on certain pillars standing in places where the\nMaurusians once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in these words: \u201c_We\nMaurusians who fled before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun_;\u201d[7]\ngiving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may,\nnations thus driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in\ngreat number, in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be\nsuccessfully withstood except by a people who excel in arms.\n\n [7] Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Nav\u00e6.\n _Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. II._\n\n\nWhen those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers,\nthey are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking,\nsince they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their\naddress to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must\nlive with their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find \u00c6neas,\nDido, the Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom\ncontrived to maintain themselves in the districts in which they\nsettled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations.\n\nAlmost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to\nbe from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the\npopulation there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support\nthem, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to\ndrive them forth and none to keep them back. And if, for the last five\nhundred years, it has not happened that any of these nations has\nactually overrun another country, there are various reasons to account\nfor it. First, the great clearance which that region made of its\ninhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than\nthirty nations issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance\nthat the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations\ncame, are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort, and\nconsequently are not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides\nwhich, since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race, they\nserve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring Scythians, who\nfor this reason do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force a\npassage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale have oftentimes been\nbegun by the Tartars, and been at once withstood by the Hungarians and\nPoles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and the\nChurch would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms.\n\nOf the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\u2014_Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between\nStates_.\n\n\nThe occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for\nlong had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in\nall powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else\npurposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between\nthe Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in\nmaking war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the\nSamnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But\nthe Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of\nRomans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on\nwhose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as\ndependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could\nnot with honour decline. For though they might have thought it\nunreasonable to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends\nagainst their own friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not\nto defend them as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves\nunder their protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence\nwould close the gate against all others who at any future time might\ndesire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since\nglory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in\nview, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.\n\nA similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the\nCarthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the\ncitizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.\nBut the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For\nHannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the\nfriends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in\norder to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of\nengaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of\npicking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when\nthey are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I\ndesire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and\nbinding treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the\nfriend of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend,\neither the prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in\nwar will be realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or\nbaseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made\napparent; either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further\nmy designs.\n\nWe are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the\nCampanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power\nto war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its\nown defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,\u2014that\nremedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects\nfor its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,\nand as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples,\nwho, after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of\nLucca by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\u2014_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the\nSinews of War_.\n\n\nSince any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his\npleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike\nenterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself\naccordingly. But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to\nhis strength, which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by\nadvantage of position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is\nunprovided with an army of his own. These are things which may swell\nyour strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of\nno avail without an army on which you can depend.\n\nWithout such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the\nnatural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity\nand attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible\nthat they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them.\nLakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where\nvaliant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain;\nand money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a\nprey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion\nwhich affirms it to be the sinews of war.\n\nThis opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of\nthe war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he\nrelates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give\nbattle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a\nfew days the news of Alexander\u2019s death would have reached Greece, and\nhe might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and\nfearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was\nforced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus\nCurtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited\nand acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building\nupon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great\ntreasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed\nfor victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the\nRomans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the\npope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in\ndefeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war\nof Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory\nremained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money,\nbut in good soldiers.\n\nCroesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides,\nat last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house,\nand asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered\nthat he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these\ntreasures, for as war is made with iron and not with gold, another\ncoming with more iron might carry off his gold. After the death of\nAlexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on their\nway into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms\nof accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources,\nshowed them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when\nthey saw all this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before\nthey had looked on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus\nthe king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his\ndefence. In like manner, not many years ago, the Venetians, with a full\ntreasury, lost their whole dominions without deriving the least\nadvantage from their wealth.\n\nI maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed,\nthat is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself\nwill not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you\ngold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron\nall the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having\nregard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they\nhad to overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron\nthey never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them\nbrought gold into their camp.\n\nAnd supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money\nto risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of\nmoney as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see\nthat where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must\neither fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the\nmore honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.\nSo, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about\nto be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at\nonce deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is\ncomplete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever\ndisadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in\nthe March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman\nconsul, that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always\nfight, since it will seem to him that by this course, however\nhazardous, he has at least a chance of victory, while by the other his\nruin is certain.\n\nThere are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to\ngive battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money\nmay sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be\nthe sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of\nwhich men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I\nrepeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war.\nMoney, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this\nnecessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as\nimpossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by\nitself should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is\nshown by countless passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the\nAthenians to declare war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them\nthat their dexterity, aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off\nvictorious, the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this\nwar, in the end were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good\nsoldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and\nwealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the\ntruth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage\nof his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had\ninvaded Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three\nthings are noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many\nand good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after\nexamining whether the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage\nin each of these three particulars, he arrives at his conclusion\nwithout any mention of money.\n\nThe Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in\ntheir behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by\nsoldiers; for after declaring in their favour and suffering two\ndefeats, to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to\nRome.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\u2014_That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has\nReputation rather than Strength._\n\n\nTo mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the\nprotection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing\nthemselves able to protect the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have\nexpressed himself in apter words than by saying, that \u201c_the Campanians\nrather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any\nsubstantial aid towards their defence._\u201d\n\nHere we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a\ndistance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or\nfrom other causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather\nreputation than protection to those who put their trust in them. As was\nthe case in our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479,\nthey were attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. For being\nfriends of the French king they drew from that friendship more\nreputation than help. The same would be the case with that prince who\nshould engage in any enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian,\nhis being one of those friendships which, in the words of our\nhistorian, _nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt_.\n\nOn this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining\nthemselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of\njudgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither\nskill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which we have a further\ninstance in the Tarentines, who, when the Roman and Samnite armies were\nalready drawn up against one another for battle, sent messengers to the\nRoman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two\nnations, and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the\ntwo first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats, in\nthe presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to sound,\nand bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by\nacts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved.\n\nHaving spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by\nprinces for defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods\nthey follow in defending themselves.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\u2014_Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to\nanticipate or to await it._\n\n\nI have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs,\nwhether, when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the\nbolder of the two proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that\nother to await attack within his own frontier, or to march into the\nenemy\u2019s country and fight him there; and I have heard reasons given in\nfavour of each of these courses.\n\nThey who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country,\ncite the advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to\nthe frontiers of the Massaget\u00e6 to make war on that people. For word\nbeing sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure,\neither enter her dominions, where she would await him, or else allow\nher to come and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus,\ncontrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus to go\nforward and meet the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a\ndistance from her kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her,\nsince she would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to\ndefeat her within her own dominions, he could follow her up on her\nflight, and, without giving her time to recover herself, deprive her of\nher State. They cite also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus,\nwhen the latter was meditating a war on the Romans. For Hannibal told\nhim that the Romans could not be vanquished except in Italy, where an\ninvader might turn to account the arms and resources of their friends,\nwhereas any one making war upon them out of Italy, and leaving that\ncountry in their hands, would leave them an unfailing source whence to\ndraw whatever reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told him,\nthat the Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their\nempire, and of Italy more easily than of any of their other provinces.\nThey likewise instance Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war\nat home, invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and\nreduced them to sue for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the\nwar from Italy, carried it into Africa.\n\nThose who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a\ndisadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of\nthe Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience\nin their own territory, retained their superiority; but when they\nquitted that territory, and went with their armies to Sicily, lost\ntheir freedom. They cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is\nfigured that Ant\u00e6us, king of Libya, being assailed by the Egyptian\nHercules, could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within\nthe bounds of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from\nthese by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence\nthe fable runs that Ant\u00e6us, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown\nto the ground drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that\nHercules, perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth.\n\nRecent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one\nknows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most\nwise prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour\nthat Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how,\nafter making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being\non the point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this\nadvice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his\nown territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his\nforces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into\nRomagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions,\nwithout a battle.\n\nOther arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those\nalready noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage\nthan he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater\nconfidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many\nopportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no aid from\nsubjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy\nis at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money and\nimposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a\ncountry to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an\ninvader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger\nnecessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the\nparent of valour.\n\nOn the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to\nbe gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting\nyourself much about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies,\nwhether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need: from\nyour better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements; and\nbecause men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on\ndistant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous forces, if\ndefeated you can more easily repair your strength, because the bulk of\nyour army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save itself, and\nyour reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can use\nyour whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in\nleaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting\nforth your whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary\nstill further, some have suffered him to make a march of several days\ninto their country, and then to capture certain of their towns, that by\nleaving garrisons in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army,\nand so be attacked at greater disadvantage.\n\nBut now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this\ndistinction. Either you have your country strongly defended, as the\nRomans had and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians of old\nand the King of France and the Italians at the present day, you have it\nundefended. In the latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance\nfrom your country, for as your strength lies not in men but in money,\nwhenever the supply of money is cut off you are undone, and nothing so\nsoon cuts off this supply as a war of invasion. Of which we have\nexample in the Carthaginians, who, while their country was free from\ninvasion, were able by means of their great revenues to carry on war in\nItaly against the Romans, but when they were invaded could not defend\nthemselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines, in like manner,\ncould make no head against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, when he attacked\nthem in their own country; and to obtain protection, were compelled to\nyield themselves up to King Robert of Naples. And yet, after\nCastruccio\u2019s death, these same Florentines were bold enough to attack\nthe Duke of Milan in his own country, and strong enough to strip him of\nhis dominions. Such valour did they display in distant wars, such\nweakness in those that were near.\n\nBut when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the\ncloser you press it, the harder it is to subdue; because such States\ncan assemble a stronger force to resist attack than for attacking\nothers. Nor does the great authority of Hannibal move me in this\ninstance, since resentment and his own advantage might lead him to\nspeak as he spoke to Antiochus. For had the Romans suffered in Gaul,\nand within the same space of time, those three defeats at the hands of\nHannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must have made an end of\nthem; since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to\naccount as they did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for\nrepairing their strength; nor could they have met their enemy with such\nnumerous armies. For we never find them sending forth a force of more\nthan fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province; whereas, in\ndefending their own country against the inroad of the Gauls at the end\nof the first Carthaginian war, we hear of them bringing some eighteen\nhundred thousand men into the field; and their failure to vanquish the\nGauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished those in Tuscany arose from\ntheir inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy,\nor to encounter him with the same advantages. In Germany the Cimbrians\nrouted a Roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster;\nbut when they came into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole\nstrength, and destroy them. Out of their native country, whence they\ncan bring no more than thirty or forty thousand men, the Swiss may\nreadily be defeated; but in their own country, where they can assemble\na hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible.\n\nIn conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince who has his people\narmed and trained for war, should always await a great and dangerous\nwar at home, and never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects\nare unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should always\ncarry the war to as great a distance as he can from home. For in this\nway each will defend himself in the best manner his means admit.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\u2014_That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by\nFraud than by Force._\n\n\nI hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place\nfrom small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed,\nthey be given, or take by inheritance the place to which some other has\nalready come. Force, however, will never suffice by itself to effect\nthis end, while fraud often will, as any one may plainly see who reads\nthe lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and many others\nlike them, who from the lowest or, at any rate, from very low\nbeginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command.\n\nThis necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of\nCyrus; for the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against\nthe King of Armenia, is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud,\nand not by force, that he is represented as having acquired his\nkingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct, as\nXenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would accomplish great\nthings must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents\nhis hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the\nMedians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without\nsuch deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came.\nNor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to\nhave attained great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has\noften been effected by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni\nGaleazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government of\nLombardy.\n\nThe same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of\ntheir career, must also be used by commonwealths, until they have grown\npowerful enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone. And\nbecause Rome at all times, whether from chance or choice, followed all\nsuch methods as are necessary to attain greatness, in this also she was\nnot behindhand. And, to begin with, she could have used no greater\nfraud than was involved in her method above noticed, of making for\nherself companions; since under this name she made for herself\nsubjects, for such the Latins and the other surrounding nations, in\nfact, became. For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue\nneighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a State, her\npower was so much increased by these conquests that there was none whom\nshe could not overcome. But the Latins never knew that they were\nenslaved until they saw the Samnites twice routed and forced to make\nterms. This success, while it added greatly to the fame of the Romans\namong princes at a distance, who were thereby made familiar with the\nRoman name though not with the Roman arms, bred at the same time\njealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins, both saw and\nfelt these arms; and such were the effects of this jealousy and\ndistrust, that not the Latins only but all the Roman colonies in\nLatium, along with the Campanians whom a little while before the Romans\nhad defended leagued themselves together against the authority of Rome.\nThis war was set on foot by the Latins in the manner in which, as I\nhave already explained, most wars are begun, not by directly attacking\nthe Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians against the Samnites who\nwere making war upon them with the permission of the Romans. And that\nit was from their having found out the crafty policy of the Romans that\nthe Latins were led to take this step, is plain from the words which\nTitus Livius puts in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin pr\u00e6tor, who,\nin addressing the Latin council, is made to say, \u201c_For if even now we\ncan put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance, etc_\u201d\n\nWe see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time they first began to\nextend their power, were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving, an\nart always necessary for those who would mount to great heights from\nlow beginnings; and which is the less to be condemned when, as in the\ncase of the Romans, it is skilfully concealed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\u2014_That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by\nHumility._\n\n\nYou shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you,\nbut is even hurtful, especially when used in dealing with insolent men,\nwho, through envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against\nyou. Proof whereof is supplied by our historian where he explains the\ncauses of this war between the Romans and the Latins. For on the\nSamnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had attacked them,\nthe Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of offence, would\nnot forbid them proceeding with the war. But the endeavour to avoid\ngiving offence to the Latins only served to increase their confidence,\nand led them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of which we have\nevidence in the language used by the same Latin Pr\u00e6tor, Annius Setinus,\nat the aforesaid council, when he said:\u2014\u201c_You have tried their patience\nby refusing them, soldiers. Who doubts but that they are offended?\nStill they have put up with the affront. They have heard that we are\nassembling an army against their allies the Samnites; and yet they have\nnot stirred from their city. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but\nfrom their knowing our strength and their own weakness_?\u201d Which words\ngive us clearly to understand how much the patience of the Romans\nincreased the arrogance of the Latins.\n\nA prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity, nor should he\nif he would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily, unless\nhe be able or believe himself able to withhold it. For almost always\nwhen matters have come to such a pass that you cannot give way with\ncredit it is better that a thing be taken from you by force than\nyielded through fear of force. For if you yield through fear and to\nescape war, the chances are that you do not escape it; since he to\nwhom, out of manifest cowardice you make this concession, will not rest\ncontent, but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and\nmaking less account of you, will only be the more kindled against you.\nAt the same time you will find your friends less zealous on your\nbehalf, since to them you will appear either weak or cowardly. But if,\nso soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed, you at once prepare\nto resist though your strength be inferior to his, he will begin to\nthink more of you, other neighbouring princes will think more; and many\nwill be willing to assist you, on seeing you take up arms, who, had you\nrelinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair, would never have\nstirred a finger to save you.\n\nThe above is to be understood as applying where you have a single\nadversary only; but should you have several, it will always be a\nprudent course, even after war has been declared, to restore to some\none of their number something you have of his, so as to regain his\nfriendship and detach him from the others who have leagued themselves\nagainst you.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\u2014That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and\nthat tardy Resolves are always hurtful.\n\n\nTouching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings\nof war between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all\nour deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve,\nand not to remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen\nin connection with the council convened by the Latins when they thought\nto separate themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the\nhostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected, in order to learn\nhow things really stood, and see whether they could not win back the\nmalcontents without recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must\nsend eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion to consult\nwith them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing that they had\ndone many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council\nto determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them\nwhat they were to say. But Annius, their pr\u00e6tor, being present in the\ncouncil when these matters were being discussed, told them \u201c_that he\nthought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to\ndo than what they were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it\nwould be easy to clothe them in fit words_.\u201d This, in truth, was sound\nadvice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart.\nBecause, where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide\non doing, we know not how to suit our words to our conduct; whereas,\nwith our minds made up, and the course we are to follow fixed, it is an\neasy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I have noticed this\npoint the more readily, because I have often found such uncertainty\nhinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment and\ndiscredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed\nfor resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those\nwho have to deliberate and decide are weak.\n\nNot less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late\nand tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend.\nFor from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy\nresolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the\nperversity of those who have to determine, who being moved by a secret\ndesire to overthrow the government, or to carry out some selfish\npurpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only thwart\nand hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the popular mind\nto be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of a\nfixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay.\n\nAfter Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being\nat that time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the\ncitizens of Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which\nnation they should take part; and so fierce grew the controversy\nbetween the partisans of the two alliances, that no course could be\nagreed on, and they took part with neither; until Apollonides, one of\nthe foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete\nwith wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the Romans, nor\nthose who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were deserving\nof blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay\nin taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly\nforesaw the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided\ncourse, whatever it might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius\ncould not show more clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief\nwhich results from resting in suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the\ncase of the Lavinians, of whom he relates, that being urged by the\nLatins to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making up their\nminds, that when the army which they at last sent to succour the Latins\nwas issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were defeated.\nWhereupon Millionius, their pr\u00e6tor, said, \u201c_With the Romans this short\nmarch will cost us dear_.\u201d But had the Lavinians resolved at once\neither to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would\nnot have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering\ntimely help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But\nby delay they stood to lose in every way, as the event showed.\n\nThis example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have\nsaved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the\nhands of the French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into\nItaly against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to\npass through Tuscany he met with no objection from the Florentines,\nwhose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand\nneutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was to maintain their\ngovernment and take them under his protection; a month\u2019s time being\nallowed the republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons, who,\nin their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed this\nratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the\nFlorentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not\naccept their ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under\nconstraint and not of their own good-will. This cost the city of\nFlorence dear, and went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was\nafterwards deprived on another like occasion. And the course taken by\nthe Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of\nservice to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have shown\nthe Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king.\n\nAlthough the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort\nhas already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an\nopportunity offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly\navailed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter of which\nrepublics like ours should take special heed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\u2014_That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the\nmethods of ancient Warfare._\n\n\nIn all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever\nfought by the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when\nTorquatus and Decius were consuls. For it may well be believed that as\nby the loss of that battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so\nthe Romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the\nLatins. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the\narmies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline and in valour,\nin numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he draws being, that\nof the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. We find,\nhowever, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, the\nlike of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to\ngive steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them\nobedient to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of the\nconsuls put himself, and the other his son, to death.\n\nThe equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed in these two\narmies, arose from this, that having long served together they used the\nsame language, discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for\nbattle they followed the same system; and that the divisions and\nofficers of their armies bore the same names. It was necessary,\ntherefore, that as they were of equal strength and valour, something\nextraordinary should take place to render the courage of the one army\nmore stubborn and unflinching than that of the other, it being on this\nstubbornness, as I have already said, that victory depends. For while\nthis temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will\nnever turn their backs on their foe. And that it might endure longer in\nthe minds of the Romans than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly\nthe valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that Torquatus slew his\nson, and Decius died by his own hand.\n\nIn pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius takes occasion\nto explain the whole system followed by the Romans in the ordering of\ntheir armies and in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated\nthe subject at length, I need not go over the same ground, and shall\ntouch only on what I judge in it most to deserve attention, but, being\noverlooked by all the captains of our times, has led to disorder in\nmany armies and in many battles.\n\nFrom this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army\nhad three principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them,\nof which they named the first _hastati_, the second _principes_, and\nthe third _triarii_, to each of which cavalry were attached. In\narraying an army for battle they set the _hastati_ in front. Directly\nbehind them, in the second rank, they placed the _principes_; and in\nthe third rank of the same column, the _triarii_. The cavalry of each\nof these three divisions they disposed to the right and left of the\ndivision to which it belonged; and to these companies of horse, from\ntheir form and position, they gave the name wings (_al\u00e6_), from their\nappearing like the two wings of the main body of the army. The first\ndivision, the _hastati_, which was in front, they drew up in close\norder to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy. The second\ndivision, the _principes_, since it was not to be engaged from the\nbeginning, but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven\nin, was not formed in close order but kept in open file, so that it\nmight receive the other into its ranks whenever it was broken and\nforced to retire. The third division, that, namely, of the _triarii_,\nhad its ranks still more open than those of the second, so that, if\noccasion required, it might receive the first two divisions of the\n_hastati_ and _principes_. These divisions, therefore, being drawn up\nin this order, the engagement began, and if the _hastati_ were\noverpowered and driven back, they retired within the loose ranks of the\n_principes_, when both these divisions, being thus united into one,\nrenewed the conflict. If these, again, were routed and forced back,\nthey retreated within the open ranks of the _triarii_, and all three\ndivisions, forming into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if\nthey were overpowered, since they had no further means of recruiting\ntheir strength, they lost the battle. And because whenever this last\ndivision, of the _triarii_, had to be employed, the army was in\njeopardy, there arose the proverb, \u201c_Res redacta est ad triarios_,\u201d\nequivalent to our expression of _playing a last stake_.\n\nThe captains of our day, as they have abandoned all the other customs\nof antiquity, and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline, so\nalso have discarded this method of disposing their men, though it was\none of no small utility. For to insure the defeat of a commander who so\narranges his forces as to be able thrice during an engagement to renew\nhis strength, Fortune must thrice declare against him, and he must be\nmatched with an adversary able three times over to defeat him; whereas\nhe whose sole chance of success lies in his surviving the first onset,\nas is the case with all the armies of Christendom at the present day,\nmay easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap, and the least\nfailure in the steadiness of his men, may deprive him of victory.\n\nAnd what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is,\nthat provision is now no longer made for one division being received\ninto the ranks of another, which happens because at present an army is\narranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect methods. For\neither its divisions are placed side by side, so as to form a line of\ngreat width but of no depth or solidity; or if, to strengthen it, it be\ndrawn up in columns after the fashion of the Roman armies, should the\nfront line be broken, no provision having been made for its being\nreceived by the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and both\ndivisions fall to pieces. For if the front line be driven back, it\njostles the second, if the second line endeavour to advance, the first\nstands in its way: and thus, the first driving against the second, and\nthe second against the third, such confusion follows that often the\nmost trifling accident will cause the ruin of an entire army.\n\nAt the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French commander, was\nslain, although according to modern notions this was a well-fought\nfield, both the French and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the\nfirst of the faulty methods above described; that is to say, each army\nadvanced with the whole of its battalions side by side, so that each\npresented a single front much wider than deep; this being always the\nplan followed by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, the ground is open.\nFor knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat, forming themselves\nin a single line, they endeavour, as I have said, as much as possible\nto escape confusion by extending their front. But where the ground\nconfines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of, without an\neffort to prevent it.\n\nTroops traversing an enemy\u2019s country, whether to pillage or carry out\nany other operation of war, are liable to fall into the same disorder;\nand at S. Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places where the\nFlorentines were beaten by the Pisans during the war which followed on\nthe revolt of Pisa after the coming of Charles of France into Italy,\nour defeat was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our own\ncavalry, who being posted in front, and being repulsed by the enemy,\nfell back on the infantry and threw them into confusion, whereupon the\nwhole army took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, the veteran\nleader of the Florentine foot, has often declared in my presence that\nhe had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were fighting on\nhis side. For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest proficients\nin modern warfare, when serving with the French, make it their first\ncare to place themselves on their flank, so that the cavalry of their\nfriends, if repulsed, may not throw them into disorder.\n\nBut although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to\nput in practice, none has yet been found among the commanders of our\ntimes, who attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns.\nFor although these also have a tripartite division of their armies into\nvan-guard, main-body, and rear-guard, the only use they make of it is\nin giving orders when their men are in quarters; whereas on active\nservice it rarely happens that all divisions are not equally exposed to\nthe same onset.\n\nAnd because many, to excuse their ignorance, will have it that the\ndestructive fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day\nmany of the tactics used by the ancients, I will discuss this question\nin the following Chapter, and examine whether artillery does in fact\nprevent us from using the valiant methods of antiquity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\u2014_What importance the Armies of the present day should\nallow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion\nconcerning it be just._\n\n\nLooking to the number of pitched battles, or what are termed by the\nFrench _journ\u00e9es_, and by the Italians _fatti d\u2019arme_, fought by the\nRomans at divers times, I am led further to examine the generally\nreceived opinion, that had artillery been in use in their day, the\nRomans would not have been allowed, or at least not with the same ease,\nto subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries, and\ncould never have spread their power in the astonishing way they did.\nFor it is said that by reason of these fire-arms men can no longer use\nor display their personal valour as they could of old; that there is\ngreater difficulty now than there was in former times in joining\nbattle; that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now; and that\nin time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery.\n\nJudging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are\nsound, and how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of\narmies, and whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for\na good captain to behave valiantly, I shall at once address myself to\nthe first of the averments noticed above, namely, that the armies of\nthe ancient Romans could not have made the conquests they did, had\nartillery then been in use.\n\nTo this I answer by saying that, since war is made for purposes either\nof offence or defence, we have first to see in which of these two kinds\nof warfare artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the\ngreater hurt. Now, though something might be said both ways, I\nnevertheless believe that artillery is beyond comparison more hurtful\nto him who stands on the defensive than to him who attacks. For he who\ndefends himself must either do so in a town or in a fortified camp. If\nwithin a town, either the town will be a small one, as fortified towns\ncommonly are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he who is\non the defensive is at once undone. For such is the shock of artillery\nthat there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter\ndown, when, unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind\ncovering works and trenches, they must be beaten; it being impossible\nfor them to resist the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance\nthrough the breaches in their walls. Nor will any artillery a defender\nmay have be of any service to him; since it is an established axiom\nthat where men are able to advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery is\npowerless to check them.\n\nFor this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern\nnations prove irresistible, whereas the attacks of our Italian troops,\nwho do not rush on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots\nof skirmishers (_scaramouches_, as they are fitly named), may easily be\nwithstood. Those who advance in such loose order, and with so little\nspirit, against a breach covered by artillery, advance to certain\ndestruction, and as against them artillery is useful. But when the\nassailants swarm to the breach so massed together that one pushes on\nanother, unless they be brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks,\nthey penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any effect to keep them\nback; and though some must fall, yet not so many as to prevent a\nvictory.\n\nThe frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns, and\nmore particularly the recovery of Brescia by the French, is proof\nsufficient of the truth of what I say. For the town of Brescia rising\nagainst the French while the citadel still held out, the Venetians, to\nmeet any attack which might be made from the citadel upon the town,\nranged guns along the whole line of road which led from the one to the\nother, planting them in front, and in flank, and wherever else they\ncould be brought to bear. Of all which M. de Foix making no account,\ndismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback, and, advancing with\nthem on foot through the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do\nwe learn that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy\u2019s fire.\nSo that, as I have said, he who has to defend himself in a small town,\nwhen his walls are battered down and he has no room to retire behind\nother works, and has only his artillery to trust to, is at once undone.\n\nBut even where the town you defend is a great one, so that you have\nroom to fall back behind new works, artillery is still, by a long way,\nmore useful for the assailant than for the defender. For to enable your\nartillery to do any hurt to those without, you must raise yourself with\nit above the level of the ground, since, if you remain on the level,\nthe enemy, by erecting any low mound or earth-work, can so secure\nhimself that it will be impossible for you to touch him. But in raising\nyourself above the level of the ground, whether by extending yourself\nalong the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are exposed to two\ndisadvantages; for, first, you cannot there bring into position guns of\nthe same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against\nyou, since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space;\nand, secondly, although you should succeed in getting your guns into\nposition, you cannot construct such strong and solid works for their\nprotection as those can who are outside, and on level ground, and who\nhave all the room and every other advantage which they could desire. It\nis consequently impossible for him who defends a town to maintain his\nguns in position at any considerable height, when those who are outside\nhave much and powerful artillery; while, if he place it lower, it\nbecomes, as has been explained, to a great extent useless. So that in\nthe end the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient\ntimes, by hand to hand fighting, or else by means of the smaller kinds\nof fire-arms, from which if the defender derive some slight advantage,\nit is balanced by the injury he sustains from the great artillery of\nhis enemy, whereby the walls of the city are battered down and almost\nburied in their ditches; so that when it comes once more to an\nencounter at close quarters, by reason of his walls being demolished\nand his ditches filled up, the defender is now at a far greater\ndisadvantage than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that these arms\nare infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who\ndefends it.\n\nAs to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your\nposition in an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you\nplease, and unless you have the advantage, I say that this method\ncommonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement\nthan the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing to the use of\nartillery, you are worse off than they were. For if the enemy fall\nsuddenly upon you, and have some slight advantage (as may readily be\nthe case from his being on higher ground, or from your works on his\narrival being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by\nthem), forthwith, and without your being able to prevent him, he\ndislodges you, and you are forced to quit your defences and deliver\nbattle: as happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. For\nhaving posted themselves between the river Ronco and an earthwork, from\ntheir not having carried this work high enough, and from the French\nhaving a slight advantage of ground, they were forced by the fire of\nthe latter to quit their entrenchments come to an engagement.\n\nBut assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be, as it\nalways should, higher than that occupied by the enemy, and your works\nto be complete and sufficient, so that from your position and\npreparations the enemy dare not attack you, recourse will then be had\nto the very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times when an\narmy was so posted that it could not be assailed; that is to say, your\ncountry will be wasted, cities friendly to you besieged or stormed, and\nyour supplies intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of necessity\nto quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in which, as will\npresently appear, artillery will be of little service to you.\n\nIf we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans made wars, and that\nattack and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns, it\nwill be clear, if what I have said be true, that they would have had\nstill greater advantage, and might have achieved their conquests with\neven greater ease, had artillery been in use in their times.\n\nAnd as to the second complaint, that by reason of artillery men can no\nlonger display their valour as they could in ancient days, I admit it\nto be true that when they have to expose themselves a few at a time,\nmen run more risks now than formerly; as when they have to scale a town\nor perform some similar exploit, in which they are not massed together\nbut must advance singly and one behind another. It is true, also, that\nCaptains and commanders of armies are subjected to a greater risk of\nbeing killed now than of old, since they an be reached everywhere by\nthe enemy\u2019s fire; and it is no protection to them to be with those of\ntheir men who are furthest from the enemy, or to be surrounded by the\nbravest of their guards. Still, we do not often find either of these\ntwo dangers occasioning extraordinary loss. For towns strongly\nfortified are not attacked by escalade, nor will the assailing army\nadvance against them in weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient\ntimes, to reduce them by regular siege. And even in the case of towns\nattacked by storm, the dangers are not so very much greater now than\nthey were formerly; for in those old days also, the defenders of towns\nwere not without warlike engines, which if less terrible in their\noperation, had, so far as killing goes, much the same effect. And as\nfor the deaths of captains and leaders of companies, it may be said\nthat during the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have had\nfewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten\nyears of ancient warfare. For excepting the Count Lodovico della\nMirandola, who fell at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago\nattacked that city, and the Duke de Nemours, slain at Cirignuola, we\nhave no instance of any commander being killed by artillery. For, at\nRavenna, M. de Foix died by steel and not by shot. Wherefore I say that\nif men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess, it results not so\nmuch from the use of artillery, as from the faulty discipline and\nweakness of our armies, which being collectively without valour cannot\ndisplay it in particular instances.\n\nAs to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to\nengage one another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly\nwith artillery, I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and\nwill always be so held by those who are willing in handling their\ntroops to follow the usages of ancient valour. For whosoever would have\na good army must train it, either by real or by mimic warfare, to\napproach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust, and to grapple with\nhim; and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse, for reasons\npresently to be explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers,\nand to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes powerless to\nharm you. For foot-soldiers, in approaching an enemy, can with more\nease escape the fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could\nhave avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots, or any other\nof those strange contrivances which had to be encountered by the\nRomans, and against which they always devised some remedy. And,\ncertainly, as against artillery, their remedy would have been easier,\nby as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is shorter\nthan the time during which elephants and chariots could. For by these\nyou were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas artillery\nharasses you only before you engage; a danger which infantry can easily\nescape, either by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of\nthe ground, or by lying down while the firing continues; nay, we find\nfrom experience that even these precautions may be dispensed with,\nespecially as against great artillery, which can hardly be levelled\nwith such precision that its fire shall not either pass over your head\nfrom the range being too high, or fall short from its being too low.\n\nSo soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is perfectly clear\nthat neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer; since,\nif the enemy have his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear,\nthey will injure him before they injure you; and if in flank, they can\nnever fire so effectively as to prevent your closing, with the result\nalready explained. Nor does this admit of much dispute, since we have\nproof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, in the year 1513, when,\nwith neither guns nor cavalry, they advanced against the French army,\nwho had fortified themselves with artillery behind entrenchments, and\nrouted them without suffering the slightest check from their fire. In\nfurther explanation whereof it is to be noted, that to work artillery\neffectively it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by\nearth-works; and that whenever, from being left without such protection\nit has to be defended by men, as happens in pitched battles and\nengagements in the open field, it is either taken or otherwise becomes\nuseless. Nor can it be employed on the flank of an army, save in the\nmanner in which the ancients made use of their warlike engines, which\nthey moved out from their columns that they might be worked without\ninconvenience, but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or\nother troops. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery\ndoes not rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most\nlikely to deceive him. For although the Turk, using artillery, has\ngained victories over the Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage he\nhas had from it has been the terror into which the horses of the enemy,\nunused to such sounds, are thrown by the roar of the guns.\n\nAnd now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I say briefly that,\nemployed by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour,\nartillery is useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary,\nis utterly useless.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\u2014_That the authority of the Romans and the example of\nancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than\nHorse._\n\n\nBy many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in\ntheir military enterprises the Romans set far more store on their\ninfantry than on their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out\nall the chief objects which their armies were meant to effect. Among\nmany other examples of this, we may notice the great battle which they\nfought with the Latins near the lake Regillus, where to steady their\nwavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount, and renewing the\ncombat on foot obtained a victory. Here we see plainly that the Romans\nhad more confidence in themselves when they fought on foot than when\nthey fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted to by them in\nmany of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found\nit their surest stay.\n\nNor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of\nHannibal, who, at the battle of Cann\u00e6, on seeing the consuls make the\nhorsemen dismount, said scoffingly, \u201c_Better still had they delivered\ntheir knights to me in chains._\u201d For though this saying came from the\nmouth of a most excellent soldier, still, if we are to regard\nauthority, we ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth\nlike Rome, and of the many great captains who served her, than that of\nHannibal alone. But, apart from authority, there are manifest reasons\nto bear out what I say. For a man may go on foot into many places where\na horse cannot go; men can be taught to keep rank, and if thrown into\ndisorder to recover form; whereas, it is difficult to keep horses in\nline, and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to reform\nthem. Moreover we find that with horses as with men, some have little\ncourage and some much; and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a\nfaint-hearted rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and that in\nwhatever way such disparity is caused, confusion and disorder result.\nAgain, infantry, when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not\neasily broken by cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many ancient and\nmany modern instances, but also by the authority of those who lay down\nrules for the government of States, who show that at first wars were\ncarried on by mounted soldiers, because the methods for arraying\ninfantry were not yet understood, but that so soon as these were\ndiscovered, the superiority of foot over horse was at once recognized.\nIn saying this, I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not of\nthe greatest use in armies, whether for purposes of observation, for\nharrying and laying waste the enemy\u2019s country, for pursuing a\nretreating foe or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance and\nsinew of an army, and that part of it which ought constantly to be most\nconsidered, should always be the infantry. And among sins of the\nItalian princes who have made their country the slave of foreigners,\nthere is none worse than that they have held these arms in contempt,\nand turned their whole attention to mounted troops.\n\nThis error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of\nour rulers. For the control of the armies of Italy for the last five\nand twenty years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no lands\nof their own, may be looked on as mere soldiers of fortune, these fell\nforthwith on contriving how they might maintain their credit by being\nsupplied with the arms which the princes of the country were without.\nAnd as they had no subjects of their own of whom they could make use,\nand could not obtain constant employment and pay for a large number of\nfoot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given them no\nimportance, they had recourse to horsemen. For a _condottiere_ drawing\npay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the\nhighest credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the\nprinces who employed him. And to effect their object with more ease,\nand increase their credit still further, these adventurers would allow\nno merit or favour to be due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all for\ntheir horsemen. And to such a length was this bad system carried, that\nin the very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was\nto be found. This, together with many other ill practices which\naccompanied it, has so weakened the militia of Italy, that the country\nhas easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the North.\n\nThat it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry,\nmay be still more clearly seen from another example taken from Roman\nhistory. The Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop of\nhorse a sally from the town to attack their camp; when the Roman master\nof the knights advancing with his own horsemen to give them battle, it\nso chanced that, at the very first onset, the leaders on both sides\nwere slain. Both parties being thus left without commanders, and the\ncombat, nevertheless, continuing, the Romans thinking thereby to have\nthe advantage of their adversaries, alighted from horseback, obliging\nthe enemy\u2019s cavalry, in order to defend themselves, to do the like. The\nresult was that the Romans had the victory. Now there could be no\nstronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse.\nFor while in other battles the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls\nto dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and\nin need of such aid, on this occasion they dismounted, not to succour\ntheir infantry, nor to encounter an enemy contending on foot, but\nbecause they saw that though they could not prevail against the enemy\nfighting as horsemen against horsemen, on foot they readily might. And\nfrom this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if rightly handled, can hardly\nbe beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot.\n\nWith very few cavalry, but with a considerable force of infantry, the\nRoman commanders, Crassus and Marcus Antonius, each for many days\ntogether overran the territories of the Parthians, although opposed by\nthe countless horsemen of that nation. Crassus, indeed, with the\ngreater part of his army, was left there dead, and Antonius only saved\nhimself by his valour; but even in the extremities to which the Romans\nwere then brought, see how greatly superior foot-soldiers are to horse.\nFor though fighting in an open country, far from the sea-coast, and cut\noff from his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant soldier in the\njudgment even of the Parthians themselves, the whole strength of whose\ncavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army. And though\nCrassus perished there, any one who reads attentively the account of\nhis expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated, and\nthat even when his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not\nclose with him, but effected his destruction by hanging continually on\nthe flanks of his army, and intercepting his supplies, while cajoling\nhim with promises which they never kept.\n\nIt might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of\nfoot over horse, had we not very many modern examples affording the\nclearest proof of it. For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which\nwe have already spoken, nine thousand Swiss foot were seen to attack\nten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry, and to\ndefeat them; the cavalry being powerless to injure them, while of the\ninfantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly disciplined, they made no\naccount. On another occasion we have seen twenty-six thousand Swiss\nmarch on Milan to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him twenty\nthousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of\nartillery; and although they were not victorious as at Novara, they\nnevertheless fought valiantly for two days together, and, in the end,\nthough beaten, were able to bring off half their number. With\nfoot-soldiers only Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured to oppose himself,\nnot to cavalry merely, but to elephants; and if the attempt failed it\ndoes not follow that he was not justified by the valour of his men in\nbelieving them equal to surmount this danger.\n\nI repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry,\nyou must meet them with infantry disciplined still better, and that\notherwise you advance to certain destruction. In the time of Filippo\nVisconti, Duke of Milan, some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent on\nLombardy, whereupon the Duke, who at that time had Il Carmagnola as his\ncaptain, sent him with six thousand men-at-arms and a slender following\nof foot-soldiers to meet them. Not knowing their manner of fighting,\nCarmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, expecting to put them at\nonce to rout; but finding them immovable, after losing many of his men\nhe withdrew. But, being a most wise captain, and skilful in devising\nnew remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing his company he\nagain advanced to the attack; and when about to engage made all his\nmen-at-arms dismount, and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers,\nfell once more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer withstand him.\nFor his men, being on foot and well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss\nranks without hurt to themselves; and getting among them, had no\ndifficulty in cutting them down, so that of the entire army of the\nSwiss those only escaped who were spared by his humanity.\n\nOf this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops, many\nI believe are aware; but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the\ntimes in which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor\neven the consciousness of error, can move our present princes to amend\ntheir ways, or convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a\nState or province, it is necessary to revive this branch of their\nmilitia also, to keep it near them, to make much of it, and to give it\nlife, that in return, it may give back life and reputation to them. But\nas they have departed from all those other methods already spoken of,\nso have they departed from this, and with this result, that to them the\nacquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain, as presently\nshall be shown.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\u2014_That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as\nfollow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin\nthan to their Aggrandizement_.\n\n\nTo these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by\nthe present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing\nfrom the methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for\ninstance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten\nthousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground, attack ten thousand\ncavalry together with an equal number of infantry; and not merely\nattack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of\nNovara, to which I have already referred so often. For although history\nabounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, or,\nbelieving them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better\narmed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing\nof a column of infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied\ntheir judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty force of\nfoot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the\ncavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly\nresembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is\ndemonstrated by the example of the northern nations.\n\nAnd since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers\nis thus proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other\nmethods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and\nuseful. And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths\nwould make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger to resist\nsudden attack, and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in\nflight; while those who take in hand to provide a State with new\ninstitutions would know better what direction to give them, whether in\nthe way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to\naugment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as\ncompanions rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies\nfor the defence of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the\ncredit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched\nbattles rather than by sieges, to enrich the public purse, keep down\nprivate wealth, and zealously, to maintain all military exercises, are\nthe true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend its empire. Or if\nthese methods for adding to their power are not to their mind, let them\nremember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of\nrepublics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the\ninternal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances,\nforbidding extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that\ntheir defences are in good order, as do those republics of Germany\nwhich live and for long have lived, in freedom.\n\nAnd yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the\ndifference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those\nsuitable for maintaining, it is impossible for a republic to remain\nlong in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.\nFor should it forbear from molesting others, others are not likely to\nrefrain from molesting it; whence must grow at once the desire and the\nnecessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad,\nthey will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to all\ngreat States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been\nable to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from\ncertain conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere\nelse, without which these communities could not go on living as they\ndo.\n\nThe district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the\nRoman Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline\nof the Empire, and when its very name came to be limited to this one\nprovince, its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and\nnecessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from\nthem their liberty, subject to the payment of a trifling yearly\ntribute; until, gradually, all the cities which held directly from the\nEmperor, and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had, in like\nmanner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so happened\nthat certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which\nwere Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion\nagainst him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees\nacquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under\nthe Austrian yoke, they are become formidable to all their neighbours\nThese are the States which we now name Swiss.\n\nGermany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities\nwhich take the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and\nthe reason why, amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break\nout, or breaking out are of short continuance, is the reverence in\nwhich all hold this symbol of the Imperial authority. For although the\nEmperor be without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such credit\nwith all these others that he alone can keep them united, and,\ninterposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any\ndissensions among them.\n\nThe greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this\ncountry have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and\nalthough for many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have\nbeen united in the same man, he has always failed to subdue the\nstubbornness of the Swiss, who are never to be brought to terms save by\nforce. Nor has the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance in\nhis wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little disposed to attack\nothers whose desire is to live as they themselves do, in freedom; while\nthe Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot, or from\njealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with him\nagainst them.\n\nThese communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow\nconfines, because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have\nno occasion to desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live\nin unity within their walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and\nready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance. But\nwere the circumstances of the country other than they are these\ncommunities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions,\nand be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life.\nAnd since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other nations\ncannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their\npower either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the\nRomans; and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but\nrather death and destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from\ncauses innumerable, conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well\nhappen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing to our strength;\nbut whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his\ndominions, must needs be ruined. He who is impoverished by his wars,\neven should he come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength,\nsince he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines\nhave done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired Lombardy,\nand Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was content\nto be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six\nmiles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without\nknowing what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more\nto be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they\nhad seen what methods were used by the Romans, and could have followed\nin their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example set them,\nwere able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves.\n\nBut even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to\noccasion much harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding\nin luxury and delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes\ninfected; as happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal\non taking possession of Capua. And had Capua been at such a distance\nfrom Rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the\ndisorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree\ntainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her\nruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, \u201c_Most\nmischievous at this time to our military discipline was Capua; for\nministering to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our\nsoldiers from the remembrance of their country_.\u201d And, truly, cities\nand provinces like this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without\nblood or blow; since by infecting them with their own evil customs they\nprepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant. Nor could the\nsubject have been better handled than by Juvenal, where he says in his\nSatires, that into the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests in\nforeign lands, foreign manners found their way; and in place of\nfrugality and other admirable virtues\u2014\n\n\u201cCame luxury more mortal than the sword,\nAnd settling down, avenged a vanquished world.\u201d[8]\n\n\n [8] S\u00e6vior armis\nLuxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem.\n          _Juv. Sat_. vi. 292.\n\n\nAnd if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time\nwhen they were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it\nfare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs,\nand who, to crown their other errors of which we have already said\nenough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms, bringing upon\nthemselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the Chapter\nfollowing.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\u2014_Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort\nto Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms_.\n\n\nHad I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on the inutility of\nmercenary and auxiliary, and on the usefulness of national arms, I\nshould dwell on these matters in the present Discourse more at length\nthan it is my design to do. For having given the subject very full\nconsideration elsewhere, here I would be brief. Still when I find Titus\nLivius supplying a complete example of what we have to look for from\nauxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance by some other\nprince or ruler, paid by him and under officers by him appointed, it is\nnot fit that I should pass it by in silence.\n\nIt is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans, after defeating\non two different occasions armies of the Samnites with forces sent by\nthem to succour the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which\nthe Samnites Were waging against them, being desirious to return to\nRome, left behind two legions to defend the Capuans, that the latter\nmight not, from being altogether deprived of their protection, once\nmore become a prey to the Samnites. But these two legions, rotting in\nidleness began to take such delight therein, that forgetful of their\ncountry and the reverence due to the senate, they resolved to seize by\nviolence the city they had been left to guard by their valour. For to\nthem it seemed that the citizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy\nadvantages which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however,\ngetting timely notice of this design, at once met and defeated it, in\nthe manner to be more fully noticed when I come to treat of\nconspiracies.\n\nOnce more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops,\nauxiliaries are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic\nresorting to them for aid has no authority over them, the only person\nwho possesses such authority being he who sends them. For, as I have\nsaid, auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other\npotentate, under his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own\npay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. Such troops, if\nvictorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well as him\nagainst whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at\nthe instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for\nambitious ends of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to\nviolate the league and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to\ntheir soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the Capuans, that\nthey were readily led into this plot for depriving them of their town\nand territories. Many other examples might be given to the same effect,\nbut it is enough to mention besides this instance, that of the people\nof Regium, who were deprived of their city and of their lives by\nanother Roman legion sent for their protection.\n\nPrinces and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient\nfor the defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries,\nwhen they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any\naccord or terms, however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will\nbe carefully studied and current events well considered, it will be\nseen that for one who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have\nbeen betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better opportunity for usurping a\ncity or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth,\nthan to be asked to send an army for its defence. On the other hand, he\nwho is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help, not for purposes\nof defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can\nnever hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person\nwho helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to\ngratify the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills\nwhich must speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this\nmatter than in all those others of which I have spoken; for were they\nmoved by these examples they would see that the more disposed they are\nto deal generously with their neighbours, and the more averse they are\nto usurp authority over them, the readier will these be to throw\nthemselves into their arms; as will at once appear from the case of the\nCapuans.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\u2014_That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a\nPr\u00e6tor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make\nWar._\n\n\nThe great difference between the methods followed by the ancient Romans\nin adding to their dominions, and those used for that purpose by the\nStates of the present time, has now been sufficiently discussed. It has\nbeen seen, too how in dealing with the cities which they did not think\nfit to destroy, and even with those which had made their submission not\nas companions but as subjects, it was customary with the Romans to\npermit them to live on under their own laws, without imposing any\noutward sign of dependence, merely binding them to certain conditions,\nor complying with which they were maintained in their former dignity\nand importance. We know, further, that the same methods continued to be\nfollowed by the Romans until they passed beyond the confines of Italy,\nand began to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces: as\nplainly appears in the fact that Capua was the first city to which they\nsent a pr\u00e6tor, and him from no motive of ambition, but at the request\nof the Capuans themselves who, living at variance with one another,\nthought it necessary to have a Roman citizen in their town who might\nrestore unity and good order among them. Influenced by this example,\nand urged by the same need, the people of Antium were the next to ask\nthat they too might have a pr\u00e6tor given them; touching which request\nand in connection with which new method of governing, Titus Livius\nobserves, \u201c_that not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now began\nto exert an influence;_\u201d showing how much the course thus followed by\nthe Romans promoted the growth of their authority.\n\nFor those cities, more especially, which have been used to freedom or\nto be governed by their own citizens, rest far better satisfied with a\ngovernment which they do not see, even though it involve something of\noppression, than with one which standing constantly before their eyes,\nseems every day to reproach them with the disgrace of servitude. And to\nthe prince there is another advantage in this method of government,\nnamely, that as the judges and magistrates who administer the laws\ncivil and criminal within these cities, are not under his control, no\ndecision of theirs can throw responsibility or discredit upon him; so\nthat he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred. Of the truth\nwhereof, besides the ancient instances which might be noted, we have a\nrecent example here in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, has many\ntimes been occupied by the French king, who always, until lately, sent\nthither a French governor to rule in his name. Recently, however, not\nfrom choice but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be\nself-governed under a Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide\nwhich of these two methods of governing gives the greater security to\nthe king\u2019s authority and the greater content to the people themselves,\nwould assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter.\n\nMen, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority\nover them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands;\nand fear you less on the score of their freedom, when they find you\nacting towards them with consideration and kindness. It was the display\nof these qualities that moved the Capuans to ask the Romans for a\npr\u00e6tor; for had the Romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them\none, they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown estranged.\n\nBut why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at\nhand in Tuscany and Florence? Who is there but knows what a time it is\nsince the city of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the Florentine\nsupremacy? Who, again, but knows the animosity which down to the\npresent day exists between Florence and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and\nSiena? This difference of feeling does not arise from the citizens of\nPistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens of these other\ntowns or thinking themselves inferior to them, but from the Florentines\nhaving always acted towards the former as brothers, towards the latter\nas foes. This it was that led the Pistojans to come voluntarily under\nour authority while the others have done and do all in their power to\nescape it. For there seems no reason to doubt, that if Florence,\ninstead of exasperating these neighbours of hers, had sought to win\nthem over, either by entering into league with them or by lending them\nassistance, she would at this hour have been mistress of Tuscany. Not\nthat I would be understood to maintain that recourse is never to be had\nto force and to arms, but that these are only to be used in the last\nresort, and when all other remedies are unavailing.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\u2014_That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss._\n\n\nHow falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their\ndeliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters,\nunless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the\nconclusions come to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt\nrepublics, and especially in quiet times, either through jealousy or\nfrom other like causes, men of great ability are often obliged to stand\naloof, it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common\nerror judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek public\nfavour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort are\nfound out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had\nto those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten,\nas shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases,\nmoreover, arise in which those who have little experience of affairs\nare sure to be misled, from the matters with which they have to deal\nbeing attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to\nbelieve whatsoever they are minded to believe.\n\nThese remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the\nLatins, after being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the\npersuasion of their pr\u00e6tor Numitius, and also with reference to what\nwas believed by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France,\ncame to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis of Angoul\u00eame,\nsucceeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne of France, and\ndesiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some\nyears before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius,\nsought for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides\nthe Venetians, who had already been gained over by King Louis,\nendeavoured to secure the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.;\nthinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part\nwith him, his enterprise would be easier. For the forces of the Spanish\nking were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor at Verona.\n\nPope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being,\nit is said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand\nneutral. For they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church\nto have powerful strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that\nto restore the country to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered\nfrom the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether singly or\ntogether, was impossible, it was to be desired that the one should\noverthrow the other, after which the Church with her friends might fall\nupon the victor. And it was averred that no better opportunity for\ncarrying out this design could ever be found than then presented\nitself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while the\nPope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and\nin the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his\nown interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came\nto an engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their\nencounter might be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the\nvictor so weakened that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and\ndefeat him; and so, to his own great glory, remain master of Lombardy\nand supreme throughout Italy.\n\nHow baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the\nSwiss being routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope\nand Spain, so far from venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for\nflight; nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity or\nindifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory, and\ndisposed him to make terms with the Church.\n\nThe arguments put forward by the Pope\u2019s advisers had a certain show of\nreason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed\nplausible enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since\nit rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great\nnumber of his men, his loss being in battle only, and not in flight.\nFor in the heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few fall,\nchiefly because such combats do not last long; and even when they do\nlast, and many of the victorious army are slain, so splendid is the\nreputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it\ninspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the\nslaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him\nweakened, should then venture to attack him, would soon be taught his\nmistake, unless strong enough to give him battle at any time, before\nhis victory as well as after. For in that case he might, as fortune and\nvalour should determine, either win or lose; though, even then, the\narmy which had first fought and won would have an advantage. And this\nwe know for a truth from what befell the Latins in consequence of the\nmistake made by Numitius their pr\u00e6tor, and their blindness in believing\nhim. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the\nRomans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole\ncountry of Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy,\nexhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name,\nwhile in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat, and who\nmight easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them.\nWhereupon the Latins believed him, and getting together a new army,\nwere forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen\nto like counsels.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\u2014_That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances\nrequired it the Romans always avoided half-measures._\n\n\n\u201cSuch _was now the state of affairs in Latium, that peace and war\nseemed alike intolerable_.\u201d No worse calamity can befall a prince or\ncommonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither\naccept peace nor support war; as is the case with those whom it would\nruin to conclude peace on the terms offered, while war obliges them\neither to yield themselves a spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to\ntheir foes. To this grievous alternative are men led by evil counsels\nand unwise courses, and, as already said, from not rightly measuring\ntheir strength. For the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured\nhis strength, can hardly be brought so low as were the Latins, who made\nwar with the Romans when they should have made terms, and made terms\nwhen they should have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the\nfriendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal. Whence it came\nthat, in the first place, they were defeated and broken by Manlius\nTorquatus, and afterwards utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had\nforced them to surrender at discretion to the Roman arms, and had\nplaced garrisons in all their towns, and taken hostages from all,\nreturned to Rome and reported to the senate that the whole of Latium\nnow lay at their mercy.\n\nAnd because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable, and\nworthy to be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like\noccasion, I shall cite the exact words which Livius puts into the mouth\nof Camillus, as confirming what I have already said touching the\nmethods used by the Romans to extend their power, and as showing how in\nchastising their subjects they always avoided half-measures and took a\ndecided course. For government consists in nothing else than in so\ncontrolling your subjects that it shall neither be in their power nor\nfor their interest to harm you. And this is effected either by making\nsuch sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you\ninjury, or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly\nin them to seek to alter their condition. All which is implied first in\nthe measures proposed by Camillus, and next in the resolutions passed\non these proposals by the senate. The words of Camillus were as\nfollows: \u201c_The immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in the\nmatter you are now considering, that_ _it lies with you to pronounce\nwhether Latium shall or shall not longer exist. So far as the Latins\nare concerned, you can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by\nseverity. Would you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and\nwho have given themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole\nLatin nation. Would you, after the fashion of our ancestors, increase\nthe strength of Rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of\ncitizenship, here you have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest\nglory to yourselves. That, assuredly, is the strongest government which\nthey rejoice in who obey it. Now, then, is your time, while the minds\nof all are bent on what is about to happen, to obtain an ascendency\nover them, either by punishment or by benefits._\u201d\n\nUpon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance with the advice\ngiven by the consul, to take the case of each city separately, and\neither destroy utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more\nimportant of the Latin towns. To those cities they dealt with\nleniently, they granted exemptions and privileges, conferring upon them\nthe rights of citizenship, and securing their welfare in every\nparticular. The others they razed to the ground, and planting colonies\nin their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome, or so scattered\nand dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever\nagain in their power to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already, the\nRomans never, in matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. And the\nsentence which they then pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers,\nand ought to have been followed by the Florentines when, in the year\n1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rose in revolt. For had they\nfollowed it, they would have established their authority on a surer\nfooting, and added much to the greatness of their city by securing for\nit those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries of\nlife. But pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous\nin executing justice, some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they\ncondemned to death, and all they deprived of their dignities and\nancient importance in their town, while leaving the town itself\nuntouched. And if in the councils then held any Florentine recommended\nthat Arezzo should be dismantled, they who thought themselves wiser\nthan their fellows objected, that to do so would be little to the\nhonour of our republic, since it would look as though she lacked\nstrength to hold it. Reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound,\nbut are not really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide should be\nput to death, nor any other malefactor, however atrocious his crimes;\nbecause, forsooth, it would be discreditable to the ruler to appear\nunequal to the control of a single criminal. They who hold such\nopinions fail to see that when men individually, or entire cities\ncollectively, offend against the State, the prince for his own safety,\nand as a warning to others, has no alternative but to make an end of\nthem; and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to\nchastise such offenders, and not in incurring endless dangers in the\neffort to retain them. For the prince who does not chastise offenders\nin a way that puts it out of their power to offend again, is accounted\nunwise or worthless.\n\nHow necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the\nLatins, is further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum.\nAnd here the text of Livius suggests two points for our attention:\nfirst, as already noted, that a subjugated people is either to be\ncaressed or crushed; and second, how much it is for our advantage to\nmaintain a manly bearing, and to speak the truth fearlessly in the\npresence of the wise. For the senate being met to determine the fate of\nthe citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling had been reduced to\nsubmission by the Roman arms, certain of these citizens were sent by\ntheir countrymen to plead for pardon. When these had come into the\npresence of the senate, one of them was asked by a senator, \u201c_What\npunishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved?_\u201d To which he of\nPrivernum answered, \u201c_Such punishment as they deserve who deem\nthemselves worthy of freedom._\u201d \u201c_But,_\u201d said the consul, \u201c_should we\nremit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have with\nyou?_\u201d To which the other replied, \u201c_If granted on fair terms, a firm\nand lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief duration._\u201d Upon\nthis, though many of the senators were displeased, the wiser among them\ndeclared \u201c_that they had heard the voice of freedom and manhood, and\nwould never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought to remain\nlonger than was needful in a position which gave them cause for shame;\nsince that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly; whereas good\nfaith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose\nservitude._\u201d So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum\nshould be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all the rights and\nprivileges thereto appertaining; declaring that \u201c_men whose only\nthought was for freedom, were indeed worthy to be Romans._\u201d So pleasing\nwas this true and high answer to generous minds, while any other must\nhave seemed at once false and shameful. And they who judge otherwise of\nmen, and of those men, especially, who have been used to be free, or so\nto think themselves, are mistaken; and are led through their mistake to\nadopt courses unprofitable for themselves and affording no content to\nothers. Whence, the frequent rebellions and the downfall of States.\n\nBut, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well from this instance\nof Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when\nwe have to pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in\nfreedom, we must either destroy them utterly, or else treat them with\nmuch indulgence; and that any other course we may take with them will\nbe unprofitable. But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses\nthe most pernicious, such half-measures as were followed by the\nSamnites when they had the Romans shut up in the Caudine Forks, and\nwould not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them either\nto send their captives away with every honourable attention, or else\nput them all to death; but adopted a middle course, and after disarming\nthem and making them pass under the yoke, suffered them to depart at\nonce disgraced and angered. And no long time after, they found to their\nsorrow that the old man\u2019s warning was true, and that the course they\nhad themselves chosen was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place\nbe shown.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\u2014_That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good_\n\n\nTo the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the\nRomans, that, when they sought to protect themselves against the men of\nLatium and Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds in\ntheir cities to be a curb upon them, and insure their fidelity,\nespecially when we remember the Florentine saying which these same wise\nmen often quote, to the effect that Pisa and other like cities must be\nheld by fortresses Doubtless, had those old Romans been like-minded\nwith our modern sages, they would not have neglected to build\nthemselves fortresses, but because they far surpassed them in courage,\nsense, and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained her freedom,\nand adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never\nbuilt a single fortress with the view to hold any city or province,\nthough, sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which she found\nalready built.\n\nLooking, therefore, to the course followed by the Romans in this\nparticular, and to that adopted by our modern rulers, it seems proper\nto consider whether or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and\nwhether they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds them In\nthe first place, then, we are to remember that fortresses are built\neither as a defence against foreign foes or against subjects In the\nformer case, I pronounce them unnecessary, in the latter mischievous.\nAnd to state the reasons why in the latter case they are mischievous, I\nsay that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects and in\nfear lest they rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their\nsubjects hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their own ill\nconduct, and that again from their thinking themselves able to rule\ntheir subjects by mere force, or from their governing with little\nprudence. Now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that they\ncan rule by mere force, is this very circumstance of their people\nhaving these fortresses on their backs So that the conduct which breeds\nhatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or republics being\npossessed of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really far more\nhurtful than useful First, because, as has been said already, they\nrender a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his\nsubjects, and, next, because they do not in reality afford him that\nsecurity which he believes them to give For all those methods of\nviolence and coercion which may be used to keep a people under, resolve\nthemselves into two; since either like the Romans you must always have\nit in your power to bring a strong army into the field, or else you\nmust dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject people, and so divide\nand scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you For\nshould you merely strip them of their wealth, _spoliatis arma\nsupersunt_, arms still remain to them, or if you deprive them of their\nweapons, _furor arma ministrat_, rage will supply them, if you put\ntheir chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads will\nrenew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build fortresses,\nthese may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your\nsubjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly useless, since they\nwill be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, whom\ntogether it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever\nfortresses were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of\nthe invention of artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown\nalready, a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind\nfresh works, cannot be defended.\n\nBut to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince\nseeking by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in\ncheck; or you are a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to\ncontrol some city which you have gained in war. To the prince I would\nsay, that, for the reasons already given, nothing can be more\nunserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your subjects, since\nit only makes you the readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous how\nyou do so; while it is this very oppression which moves them to destroy\nyou, and so kindles their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause\nof all the mischief, is powerless to protect you. A wise and good\nprince, therefore, that he may continue good, and give no occasion or\nencouragement to his descendants to become evil, will never build a\nfortress, to the end that neither he nor they may ever be led to trust\nto it rather than to the good-will of their subjects. And if Francesco\nSforza, who was accounted a wise ruler, on becoming Duke of Milan\nerected a fortress in that city, I say that herein he was unwise, and\nthat the event has shown the building of this fortress to have been\nhurtful and not helpful to his heirs. For thinking that by its aid they\ncould behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and\nyet be secure, they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression,\nuntil, becoming beyond measure odious, they lost their State as soon as\nan enemy attacked it. Nor was this fortress, which in peace had\noccasioned them much hurt, any defence or of any service them in war.\nFor had they being without it, through thoughtlessness, treated their\nsubjects inhumanely, they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from\ntheir danger; and might, thereafter, with no other help than that of\nattached subjects, have withstood the attacks of the French far more\nsuccessfully than they could with their fortress, but with subjects\nwhom they had estranged.\n\nAnd, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every way, since they\nmay be lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their\ndefence, or by the overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by\nfamine. And where you seek to recover a State which you have lost, and\nin which only the fortress remains to you, if that fortress is to be of\nany service or assistance to you, you must have an army wherewith to\nattack the enemy who has driven you out. But with such an army you\nmight succeed in recovering your State as readily without a fortress as\nwith one; nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects, had you\nnot used them ill, from the overweening confidence your fortress gave\nyou, might then have felt better disposed towards you. And the event\nshows that in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has been\nof no advantage whatever, either to the Sforzas or to the French; but,\non the contrary, has brought ruin on both, because, trusting to it,\nthey did not turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving that\nState. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and son to Duke Federigo, who in\nhis day was a warrior of much renown, but who was driven from his\ndominions by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when afterwards,\nby a sudden stroke of good fortune, he was restored to the dukedom\ncaused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled, judging them\nto be hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects, so far as they\nwere concerned he had no need for fortresses; while, as against foreign\nenemies, he saw he could not defend them, since this would have\nrequired an army kept constantly in the field. For which reasons he\nmade them be razed to the ground.\n\nWhen Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from Bologna, after\nerecting a citadel in that town, he caused the people to be cruelly\noppressed by his governor; whereupon, the people rebelled, and he\nforthwith lost the citadel; so that his citadel, and the oppressions to\nwhich it led, were of less service to him than different behaviour on\nhis part had been. When Niccolo da Castello, the ancestor of the\nVitelli, returned to his country out of exile, he straightway pulled\ndown the two fortresses built there by Pope Sixtus IV., perceiving that\nit was not by fortresses, but by the good-will of the people, that he\ncould be maintained in his government.\n\nBut the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy instance, and\nthat which best demonstrates the futility of building, and the\nadvantage of destroying fortresses, is what happened only the other day\nin Genoa. Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against\nLouis XII. of France, who came in person and with all his forces to\nrecover it; and after recovering it built there a citadel stronger than\nany before known, being, both from its position and from every other\ncircumstance, most inaccessible to attack. For standing on the\nextremity of a hill, named by the Genoese Codefa, which juts out into\nthe sea, it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the\ntown. But, afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven\nout of Italy, the Genoese, in spite of this citadel, again rebelled,\nand Ottaviano Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest\nefforts, continued over a period of sixteen months, at last succeeded\nin reducing the citadel by famine. By all it was believed that he would\nretain it as a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune, and by\nsome he was advised to do so; but he, being a truly wise ruler, and\nknowing well that it is by the attachment of their subjects and not by\nthe strength of their fortifications that princes are maintained in\ntheir governments, dismantled this citadel; and founding his authority,\nnot upon material defences, but on his own valour and prudence, kept\nand still keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a thousand\nfoot-soldiers could effect a change in the government of Genoa, the\nenemies of Ottaviano have assailed him with ten thousand, without being\nable to harm him.\n\nHere, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress occasioned\nOttaviano no loss, its construction gave the French king no sort of\nadvantage. For when he could come into Italy with an army, he could\nrecover Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he could not\ncome with an army, it was not in his power to hold the city by means of\nthe citadel. Moreover it was costly for the king to build, and shameful\nfor him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano it was glorious to\ntake, and advantageous to destroy it.\n\nLet us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within\ntheir own territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession.\nAnd if the above example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the\nfutility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to\nbe conclusive. For in erecting fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines\nfailed to perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile to\nthem, which had lived in freedom, and which could cloak rebellion under\nthe name of liberty, must, if it were to be retained at all, be\nretained by those methods which were used by the Romans, and either be\nmade a companion or be destroyed. Of how little service these Pisan\nfortresses were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. of France into\nItaly, to whom, whether through the treachery of their defenders or\nfrom fear of worse evils, they were at once delivered up; whereas, had\nthere been no fortresses in Pisa, the Florentines would not have looked\nto them as the means whereby the town was to be held; the king could\nnot by their assistance have taken the town from the Florentines; and\nthe methods whereby it had previously been preserved might, in all\nlikelihood, have continued sufficient to preserve it; and, at any rate,\nhad served that end no worse than the fortresses.\n\nThese, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that\nfortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that\nthose built to retain acquired territories are useless; and I am\ncontent to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns they\nsought to hold by the strong hand, rather pulled down fortresses than\nbuilt them. And if any, to controvert these views of mine, were to cite\nthe case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in recent, as\ntowns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their\ncitadels; I answer, that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus\nwas sent at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it\neven had there been no fortress there; and that although he availed\nhimself of the fortress for the recovery of the town, he might, without\nit, have resorted to other means which would have brought about the\nsame result. Nor do I see of what service a citadel can be said to be,\nwhen to recover the city you must employ a consular army under a Fabius\nMaximus. But that the Romans would, in any case, have recovered\nTarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where there was no\ncitadel, and which they retook, simply by the valour of their soldiers.\n\nAgain, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the\nrevolt of that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the\ncitadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city, you\nshould happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French had\ntheirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being in command of the king\u2019s\nforces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither\nwithout an hour\u2019s delay, and reaching Brescia in three days, retook the\ntown with the help of the citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be\nof any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured by a de\nFoix, and by that French army which in three days\u2019 time marched to its\nrelief. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as\nagainst others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent\nwars, many fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same\nvariety of fortune with which open country has been acquired or lost;\nand this not only in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of\nNaples, and in all parts of Italy.\n\nAnd, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against\nforeign enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince\nor people who possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a\ngood army, they are useless. For good armies without fortresses are in\nthemselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good\narmies avail nothing. And this we see in the case of those nations\nwhich have been thought to excel both in their government and\notherwise, as, for instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For while the\nRomans would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained\nfrom building them, but would not even suffer their cities to be\nenclosed with walls; desiring to be protected by their own valour only,\nand by no other defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by an\nAthenian what he thought of the walls of Athens, he answered \u201cthat they\nwere fine walls if meant to hold women only.\u201d\n\nIf a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his\ndominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a\nfew days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not\nnecessary, may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is\nwithout a strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his\nterritories, or upon his frontier, is either useless or hurtful, since\nthey may readily be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing\nthem so strong that the enemy is unable to take them by assault, he may\nleave them behind, and so render them wholly unprofitable. For a brave\narmy, unless stoutly met, enters an enemy\u2019s country without regard to\nthe towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear, as we read of\nhappening in ancient times, and have seen done by Francesco Maria della\nRovere, who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino, made\nlittle of leaving ten hostile cities behind him.\n\nThe prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do\nwithout building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought\nnot to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he\ndwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well\naffected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or\nhe be relieved by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly in time\nof peace, and in war useless.\n\nWhoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that\nthe Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so\nalso showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of\nLatium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they\nsought security in bolder and more sagacious courses.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\u2014_That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must\nnot think to get possession of it through its Divisions._\n\n\nViolent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the\nnobles, it appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their\ntime to deal a fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they\nassembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent\nCaius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping\nclose by the Veientines, the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify\nthe Roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed the\nRomans by their unmeasured insolence that, from being divided they\nbecame reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and defeated\nthem. Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men\nare to adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when\nthey think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could\nconquer the Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among\nthemselves; but this very attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin\non their assailants. For the causes of division in a commonwealth are,\nfor the most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes of union are\nfear and war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been wise, the more divided\nthey saw Rome to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war with\nher, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts.\nAnd the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the\nconfidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter\nso long as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open\nviolence, then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to\nplunge them deeper in hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their\nforces without being led by your putting forth an excess of strength to\nsuspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master. Where\nthis is well managed, it will almost always happen that you succeed in\neffecting the object you propose to yourself.\n\nThe city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another\nmatter, was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice\nthan this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by\nnow favouring one side and now the other, without incurring the\nsuspicions of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied\nout with their harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their\nown accord into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, again, has\nnever made any change in her government which has had the support of\nthe Florentines, save when that support has been slight and\ninsignificant; for whenever the interference of Florence has been\nmarked and decided, it has had the effect of uniting all parties in\nsupport of things as they stood.\n\nOne other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than\nonce Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set\nwars on foot against the Florentines, and always without success; so\nthat, in lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain that\nthe mad humours of the Florentines had cost him two millions of gold,\nwithout his having anything to show for it. The Veientines and\nEtruscans, therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false\nhopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched\nbattle; and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds\nand by similar means against a divided people, will always find\nthemselves deceived.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\u2014_That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses\nthem, without yielding him any Advantage._\n\n\nTo abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of\nthe wisest precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing\nfrom the strength of an adversary; the latter only making him more\ncautious, while the former inflames his hatred against you, and leads\nhim to consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt.\n\nThis is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the\nlast Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those\nverbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their\nsoldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your\nenemy to vengeance, and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him\nfrom doing you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which wound\nthose who use them. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in\nconnection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general,\nafter besieging this town for a great while, wearied out at last by its\nprotracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had\nactually begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the\nplace, elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and\nupbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and\nto load them with every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade,\nchanging his resolution, renewed the siege with such fury that in a few\ndays he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same thing befell the\nVeientines, who, not content, as we have seen, to make war on the\nRomans with arms, must needs assail them with foul reproaches,\nadvancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and molesting\nthem more with their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman\nsoldiers, who at first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls\nto lead them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those\nothers of whom mention has just now been made, had to pay the penalty\nof their insolence.\n\nWise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities,\nshould take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches\nfrom being used by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst\nthemselves or against an enemy. For when directed against an enemy they\nlead to the mischiefs above noticed, while still worse consequences may\nfollow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as\nsensible rulers have always taken for that purpose.\n\nThe legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having, as\nshall in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their\nconspiracy led to a mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius\nCorvinus; when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made\ntheir submission, it was declared that whosoever should thereafter\nupbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this\nmutiny, should be visited with the severest punishment. So likewise,\nwhen Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with Hannibal, to\ncommand a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits for soldiers\nhad furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an order\nmaking it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin.\nSo mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words\nto others, or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in\nsport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer\nindignation; \u201c_for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth,\nleaves always behind it a rankling memory._\u201d[9]\n\n [9] Nam faceti\u00e6 asper\u00e6, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui\n memoriam relinquunt. _Tacit. An._ xv. 68.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\u2014_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to\nhave obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not,\ntheft-Victory turns to Defeat._\n\n\nThe use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by\nan insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby\nmen are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For\nsuch false hopes, when they gain an entry into men\u2019s minds, cause them\nto overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain\ngood, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And\nthis, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving\nthemselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by\nparticular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not\nplace it in so clear a light.\n\nAfter routing the Romans at Cann\u00e6, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage\nto announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the\nCarthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise\ncitizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their\nvictory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might\nhave it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;\nsince it should be their object to show the Romans that they were\nstrong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won\nin the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the\nCarthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the\nopportunity to act upon it was gone.\n\nWhen the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the\ncitizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong\nfrom being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness,\nsent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good\nservants, and to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to\nreceive either him or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon,\nAlexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its\ngates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs\nopen, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work\nto besiege their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well\nstored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence,\nafter four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting\nmore time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had\nsufficed for most of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to\nthe Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which they themselves\nhad asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not merely refused the\nterms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged\nby this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that he\ntook and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its\ninhabitants.\n\nIn the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with\nthe object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a\nsubsidy from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the\ncitizens, who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within\nthe Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the\nSpaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in\ntheir favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make\nterms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and\nso gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the\nFlorentine Republic.\n\nA prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful\nthan himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat,\nespecially when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms\noffered may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous\nfor him who accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial\nsuccess. For which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens\nof Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at\nfirst rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph\nthat, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior\nto bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a\nsufficient victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part\nyielded to their wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the\npurport of which was to change the government of Florence, to sever her\nfrom her allegiance to France, and, further, to obtain money from her.\nFor if of these three objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing\nthe last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity of their\ngovernment, a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to\neach. And while preserving their political existence, the Florentines\nshould have made small account of the other two conditions; nor ought\nthey, even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater\nadvantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the\narbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring\nrisks which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity.\n\nHannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for\nsixteen years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his\nnative country, found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been\ndefeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the\nlimits of her walls, and left without other resource save in him and\nhis army. Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake his\ncountry had to play, and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried\nevery other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, judging that\nin peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his\ncountry. But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred\nhim from battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might,\nor if he must fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant\nas Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for\npeace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his\ncountry must be enslaved, what course ought to be followed by another\ncommander, less valiant and with less experience than he? But men\nlabour under this infirmity, that they know not where to set bounds to\ntheir hopes, and building on these without otherwise measuring their\nstrength, rush headlong on destruction.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\u2014_That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether\npublic or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth_.\n\n\nCertain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly Clusium\nits chief city, the citizens of Clusium sought aid from Rome; whereupon\nthe Romans sent the three Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify to\nthem, in the name of the Roman people, that they must refrain from\nmaking war on the Etruscans. From what befell the Romans in connection\nwith this embassy, we see clearly how far men may be carried in\nresenting an affront. For these envoys arriving at the very moment when\nthe Gauls and Etruscans were about to join battle, being readier at\ndeeds than words, took part with the Etruscans and fought in their\nforemost ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing the Roman\nenvoys, turned against the Romans all the hatred which before they had\nfelt for the Etruscans; and grew still more incensed when on making\ncomplaint to the Roman senate, through their ambassador, of the wrong\ndone them, and demanding that the Fabii should be given up to them in\natonement for their offence, not merely were the offenders not given up\nor punished in any way, but, on the contrary, when the comitia met were\ncreated tribunes with consular powers. But when the Gauls found these\nmen honoured who deserved to be chastised, they concluded that what had\nhappened had been done by way of slight and insult to them, and,\nburning with fury and resentment, hastened forward to attack Rome,\nwhich they took with the exception of the Capitol.\n\nNow this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from their disregard of\njustice. For their envoys, who had violated the law of nations, and had\ntherefore deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated with\nhonour. And this should make us reflect, how carefully all princes and\ncommonwealths ought to refrain from committing like wrongs, not only\nagainst communities, but also against particular men. For if a man be\ndeeply wronged, either by a private hand or by a public officer, and be\nnot avenged to his satisfaction, if he live in a republic, he will seek\nto avenge himself, though in doing so he bring ruin on his country; or\nif he live under a prince, and be of a resolute and haughty spirit, he\nwill never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the prince,\nthough he knows it may cost him dear. Whereof we have no finer or truer\nexample than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of\nAlexander. For Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging to\nPhilip\u2019s court, having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by\nAttalus, one of the foremost men of the royal household, repeatedly\ncomplained to Philip of the outrage; who for a while put him off with\npromises of vengeance, but in the end, so far from avenging him,\npromoted Attalus to be governor of the province of Greece. Whereupon,\nPausanias, seeing his enemy honoured and not punished, turned all his\nresentment from him who had outraged, against him who had not avenged\nhim, and on the morning of the day fixed for the marriage of Philip\u2019s\ndaughter to Alexander of Epirus, while Philip walked between the two\nAlexanders, his son and his son-in-law, towards the temple to celebrate\nthe nuptials, he slew him.\n\nThis instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys; and offers a\nwarning to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to\nsuppose, that when wrong upon wrong has been done him, he will not\nbethink himself of revenge, however great the danger he runs, or the\npunishment he thereby brings upon himself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\u2014_That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would\nnot have them hinder her Designs._\n\n\nIf we note well the course of human affairs, we shall often find things\ncome about and accidents befall, against which it seems to be the will\nof Heaven that men should not provide. And if this were the case even\nin Rome, so renowned for her valour, religion, and wise ordinances, we\nneed not wonder if it be far more common in other cities and provinces\nwherein these safeguards are wanting.\n\nHaving here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven influences men\u2019s\nactions, Titus Livius turns it to account, and treats the subject at\nlarge and in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was Heaven\u2019s\nwill, for ends of its own, that the Romans should feel its power, it\nfirst of all caused these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls,\nto act amiss, and then by their misconduct stirred up the Gauls to make\nwar on Rome; and, lastly, so ordered matters that nothing worthy of\ntheir name was done by the Romans to withstand their attack. For it was\nfore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus, who alone could supply the\nremedy to so mighty an evil, should be banished to Ardea; and again,\nthat the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet attacks of\nthe Volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations, should fail to do\nso when the Gauls were marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the\nRomans got together was but a weak one, since they used no signal\neffort to make it strong; nay, were so dilatory in arming that they\nwere barely in time to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no\nmore than ten miles distant from Rome. Here, again, the Roman tribunes\npitched their camp without observing any of the usual precautions,\nattending neither to the choice of ground, nor to surround themselves\nwith trench or Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any other aid,\nhuman or Divine. In ordering their army for battle, moreover, disposed\nit in weak columns, and these far apart: so that neither men nor\nofficers accomplished anything worthy of the Roman discipline. The\nbattle was bloodless for the Romans fled before they were attacked;\nmost of them retreating to Veii, the rest to Rome, where, without\nturning aside to visit their homes, they made straight for the Capitol.\n\nMeanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves how they might\ndefend the city, did not even attend to closing the gates; and while\nsome of them made their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol\nalong with those who sought shelter there. It was only in the defence\nof the Capitol that any method was observed, measures being taken to\nprevent it being crowded with useless numbers, and all the victual\nwhich could be got, being brought into it to enable it to stand a\nsiege. Of the women, the children, and the men whose years unfitted\nthem for service, the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring\ntowns, the rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders; so that no one\nwho had heard of the achievements of the Romans in past years, on being\ntold of what took place on this occasion, could have believed that it\nwas of the same people that things so contrary were related.\n\nWherefore, Titus Livius, after setting forth all these disorders,\nconcludes with the words, \u201c_So far does Fortune darken men\u2019s minds when\nshe would not have her ascendency gainsaid._\u201d Nor could any juster\nobservation be made. And hence it is that those who experience the\nextremes whether of good or of evil fortune, are, commonly, little\ndeserving either of praise or blame; since it is apparent that it is\nfrom Heaven having afforded them, or denied them opportunities for\nacting worthily, that they have been brought to their greatness or to\ntheir undoing. Fortune, doubtless, when she seeks to effect great ends,\nwill often choose as her instrument a man of such sense and worth that\nhe can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to him; and, in\nlike manner, when she desires to bring about great calamities, will put\nforward such men as will of themselves contribute to that result. And\nall who stand in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives of\nthe means of effecting good. And it is well seen in the passage we are\nconsidering, how Fortune, to aggrandize Rome, and raise her to the\nheight she reached, judged it necessary, as shall be more fully shown\nin the following Book, to humble her; yet would not have her utterly\nundone. For which reason we find her causing Camillus to be banished,\nbut not put to death; suffering Rome to be taken, but not the Capitol;\nand bringing it to pass that, while the Romans took no wise precaution\nfor the defence of their city, they neglected none in defending their\ncitadel. That Rome might be taken, Fortune caused the mass of the army,\nafter the rout at the Allia, to direct its flight to Veii, thus\nwithdrawing the means wherewith the city might have been defended; but\nwhile thus disposing matters, she at the same time prepared all the\nneedful steps for its recovery, in bringing an almost entire Roman\narray to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, so that a great force might be\nassembled for the rescue of their country, under a captain in no way\ncompromised by previous reverses, but, on the contrary, in the\nenjoyment of an untarnished renown. I might cite many modern instances\nto confirm these opinions, but since enough has been said to convince\nany fair mind, I pass them over. But once more I repeat what, from all\nhistory, may be seen to be most true, that men may aid Fortune, but not\nwithstand her; may interweave their threads with her web, but cannot\nbreak it But, for all that, they must never lose heart, since not\nknowing what their end is to be, and moving towards it by cross-roads\nand untravelled paths, they have always room for hope, and ought never\nto abandon it, whatsoever befalls, and into whatsoever straits they\ncome.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\u2014_That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not\nbuy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their\nProwess_.\n\n\nWhen besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although expecting succour\nfrom Veii and from Camillus, nevertheless, being straitened by famine,\nentered into an agreement to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the\nvery moment when, in pursuance of this agreement, the gold was being\nweighed out, Camillus came up with his army. This, says our historian,\nwas contrived by Fortune, \u201c_that the Romans might not live thereafter\nas men ransomed for a price,_\u201d and the matter is noteworthy, not only\nwith reference to this particular occasion, but also as it bears on the\nmethods generally followed by this republic. For we never find Rome\nseeking to acquire towns, or to purchase peace with money, but always\nconfiding in her own warlike valour, which could not, I believe, be\nsaid of any other republic.\n\nNow, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any State, is to\nobserve on what terms it lives with its neighbours: for when it so\ncarries itself that, to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay it\ntribute, this is a sure sign of its strength, but when its neighbours,\nthough of less reputation, receive payments from it, this is a clear\nproof of its weakness In the course of the Roman history we read how\nthe Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, the Kings\nEumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours to the Roman frontiers,\nin order to secure the friendship of Rome, submitted to imposts and\ntribute whenever Rome had need of them, asking no return save her\nprotection. But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this\nhappening And, to begin with our own republic of Florence, we know that\nin times past, when she was at the height of her renown, there was\nnever a lordling of Romagna who had not a subsidy from her, to say\nnothing of what she paid to the Perugians, to the Castellans, and to\nall her other neighbours But had our city been armed and strong, the\ndirect contrary would have been the case, for, to obtain her\nprotection, all would have poured money into her lap, not seeking to\nsell their friendship but to purchase hers.\n\nNor are the Florentines the only people who have lived on this\ndishonourable footing The Venetians have done the same, nay, the King\nof France himself, for all his great dominions, lives tributary to the\nSwiss and to the King of England; and this because the French king and\nthe others named, with a view to escape dangers rather imaginary than\nreal, have disarmed their subjects; seeking to reap a present gain by\nwringing money from them, rather than follow a course which would\nsecure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country. Which\nill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things for a time, must in\nthe end exhaust their resources, and give rise in seasons of danger to\nincurable mischief and disorder. It would be tedious to count up how\noften in the course of their wars, the Florentines, the Venetians, and\nthe kingdom of France have had to ransom themselves from their enemies,\nand to submit to an ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were very\nnear being subjected. It would be tedious, too, to recite how many\ntowns have been bought by the Florentines and by the Venetians, which,\nafterwards, have only been a trouble to them, from their not knowing\nhow to defend with iron what they had won with gold. While the Romans\ncontinued free they adhered to this more generous and noble method, but\nwhen they came under the emperors, and these, again, began to\ndeteriorate, and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they also\ntook to purchasing peace, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans,\nand at other times from other neighbouring nations. And this was the\nbeginning of the decline of their great empire.\n\nSuch are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your\nsubjects; and this course is attended by the still greater\ndisadvantage, that the closer an enemy presses you the weaker he finds\nyou. For any one who follows the evil methods of which I speak, must,\nin order to support troops whom he thinks can be trusted to keep off\nhis enemies, be very exacting in his dealings with those of his\nsubjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the\ninterval between himself and his enemies, he must subsidize those\nprinces and peoples who adjoin his frontiers. States maintained on this\nfooting may make a little resistance on their confines; but when these\nare passed by the enemy no further defence remains. Those who pursue\nsuch methods as these seem not to perceive that they are opposed to\nreason and common sense. For the heart and vital parts of the body, not\nthe extremities, are those which we should keep guarded, since we may\nlive on without the latter, but must die if the former be hurt. But the\nStates of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend only the\nhands and feet. The mischief which has thus been, and is at this day\nwrought in Florence is plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy\npenetrates within her frontiers, and approaches her heart, all is over\nwith her. And the same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the\nVenetians, whose city, had it not been girdled by the sea, must then\nhave found its end. In France, indeed, a like result has not been seen\nso often, she being so great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier\nthan herself. Nevertheless, when the English invaded France in the year\n1513, the whole kingdom tottered; and the King himself, as well as\nevery one else, had to own that a single defeat might have cost him his\ndominions.\n\nBut with the Romans the reverse of all this took place. For the nearer\nan enemy approached Rome, the more completely he found her armed for\nresistance; and accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal\u2019s\ninvasion of Italy, the Romans, after three defeats, and after the\nslaughter of so many of their captains and soldiers, were still able,\nnot merely to withstand the invader, but even, in the end, to come off\nvictorious. This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded, while\nthe extremities were but little heeded. For the strength of Rome rested\non the Roman people themselves, on the Latin league, on the confederate\ntowns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which sources she drew\nso numerous an army, as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to\nkeep it in subjection.\n\nThe truth of what I say may be further seen from the question put by\nHanno the Carthaginian to the messengers sent to Carthage by Hannibal\nafter his victory at Cann\u00e6. For when these were vaunting the\nachievements of Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether any one had\ncome forward on behalf of the Romans to propose terms of peace, and\nwhether any town of the Latin league or of the colonized districts had\nrevolted from the Romans. And when to both inquiries the envoys\nanswered, \u201cNo,\u201d Hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than\non the day it was begun.\n\nWe can understand, therefore, as well from what has now been said, as\nfrom what I have often said before, how great a difference there is\nbetween the methods followed by the republics of the present times, and\nthose followed by the republics of antiquity; and why it is that we see\nevery day astounding losses alternate with extraordinary gains. For\nwhere men are weak, Fortune shows herself strong; and because she\nchanges, States and Governments change with her; and will continue to\nchange, until some one arise, who, following reverently the example of\nthe ancients, shall so control her, that she shall not have opportunity\nwith every revolution of the sun to display anew the greatness of her\npower.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\u2014_Of the Danger of trusting banished Men._\n\n\nThe danger of trusting those who are in exile from their own country,\nbeing one to which the rulers of States are often exposed, may, I\nthink, be fitly considered in these Discourses; and I notice it the\nmore willingly, because I am able to illustrate it by a memorable\ninstance which Titus Livius, though with another purpose, relates in\nhis history. When Alexander the Great passed with his army into Asia,\nhis brother-in-law and uncle, Alexander of Epirus, came with another\narmy into Italy, being invited thither by the banished Lucanians, who\ngave him to believe that, with their aid, he might get possession of\nthe whole of that country. But when, confiding in the promises of these\nexiles, and fed by the hopes they held out to him, he came into Italy,\nthey put him to death, their fellow-citizens having offered to restore\nthem to their country upon this condition. It behoves us, therefore, to\nremember how empty are the promises, and how doubtful the faith, of men\nin banishment from their native land. For as to their faith, it may be\nassumed that whenever they can effect their return by other means than\nyours, notwithstanding any covenants they may have made with you, they\nwill throw you over, and take part with their countrymen. And as for\nthe empty promises and delusive hopes which they set before you, so\nextreme is their desire to return home that they naturally believe many\nthings which are untrue, and designedly misrepresent many others; so\nthat between their beliefs and what they say they believe, they fill\nyou with false impressions, on which if you build, your labour is in\nvain, and you are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing but\nruin can result.\n\nTo this instance of Alexander I shall add only one other, that, namely,\nof Themistocles the Athenian, who, being proclaimed a traitor, fled\ninto Asia to Darius, to whom he made such lavish promises if he would\nonly attack Greece, that he induced him to undertake the enterprise.\nBut afterwards, when he could not fulfil what he had promised, either\nfrom shame, or through fear of punishment, he poisoned himself. But, if\nsuch a mistake as this was made by a man like Themistocles, we may\nreckon that mistakes still greater will be made by those who, being of\na feebler nature, suffer themselves to be more completely swayed by\ntheir feelings and wishes Wherefore, let a prince be careful how he\nembarks in any enterprise on the representations of an exile; for\notherwise, he is likely either to be put to shame, or to incur the\ngravest calamities.\n\nBecause towns are sometimes, though seldom, taken by craft, through\nsecret practices had with their inhabitants, I think it not out of\nplace to discuss the matter in the following Chapter, wherein I shall\nlikewise show in how many ways the Romans were wont to make such\nacquisitions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\u2014_In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of\nTowns._\n\n\nTurning their thoughts wholly to arms, the Romans always conducted\ntheir military enterprises in the most advantageous way, both as to\ncost and every other circumstance of war. For which reason they avoided\nattempting towns by siege, judging the expense and inconvenience of\nthis method of carrying on war greatly to outweigh any advantage to be\ngained by it. Accordingly, they thought it better and more for their\ninterest to reduce towns in any other way than this; and in all those\nyears during which they were constantly engaged in wars we find very\nfew instances of their proceeding by siege.\n\nFor the capture of towns, therefore, they trusted either to assault or\nto surrender. Assaults were effected either by open force, or by force\nand stratagem combined. When a town was assailed by open force, the\nwalls were stormed without being breached, and the assailants were said\n\u201c_aggredi urbem corona,_\u201d because they encircled the city with their\nentire strength and kept up an attack on all sides. In this way they\noften succeeded in carrying towns, and even great towns, at a first\nonset, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. But when they failed\nto carry a town by storm, they set themselves to breach the walls with\nbattering rams and other warlike engines; or they dug mines so as to\nobtain an entrance within the walls, this being the method followed in\ntaking Veii; or else, to be on a level with the defenders, they erected\ntowers of timber or threw up mounds of earth against the outside of the\nwalls so as to reach the top.\n\nOf these methods of attack, the first, wherein the city was entirely\nsurrounded, exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them\nmore doubtful remedies. For while it was necessary for them to have a\nsufficient force at all points, it might happen that the forces at\ntheir disposal were not numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to\nrelieve one another. Or if their numbers were sufficient, they might\nnot all be equally resolute in standing their ground, and their failure\nat any one point involved a general defeat. Consequently, as I have\nsaid, this method of attack was often successful. But when it did not\nsucceed at the first, it was rarely renewed, being a method dangerous\nto the attacking army, which having to secure itself along an extended\nline, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made from the\ntown; nay, of itself, was apt to fall into confusion and disorder. This\nmethod of attack, therefore, could be attempted once only and by way of\nsurprise.\n\nAgainst breaches in the walls the defence was, as at the present day,\nto throw up new works; while mines were met by counter-mines, in which\nthe enemy were either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled\nby some other warlike contrivance; as by filling casks with feathers,\nwhich, being set on fire and placed in the mine, choked out the\nassailants by their smoke and stench. Where towers were employed for\nthe attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with fire; and where\nmounds of earth were thrown up against the walls, they would dig holes\nat the base of the wall against which the mound rested, and carry off\nthe earth which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed from\nwithin as fast as it was thrown up from without, the mound made no\nprogress.\n\nNone of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the\nassailant, if unsuccessful, must either strike his camp and seek\nvictory in some other direction, as Scipio did when he invaded Africa\nand, after failing in the attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his\nattack on that town and turned his strength against the Carthaginian\narmy in the field; or else recourse must be had to regular siege, as by\nthe Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and divers other cities\nwhich they reduced in this way.\n\nThe capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected, as\nby the Romans at Pal\u00e6opolis, through a secret understanding with some\nwithin the walls. Many attempts of this sort have been made, both by\nthe Romans and by others, but few successfully, because the least\nhindrance disarranges the plan of action, and because such hindrances\nare very likely to occur. For either the plot is discovered before it\ncan be carried out, as it readily may, whether from treachery on the\npart of those to whom it has been communicated, or from the\ndifficulties which attend its inception, the preliminary arrangements\nhaving to be made with the enemy and with persons with whom it is not\npermitted, save under some pretext or other, to hold intercourse; or if\nit be not discovered while it is being contrived, a thousand\ndifficulties will still be met with in its execution. For if you arrive\neither before or after the appointed time, all is ruined. The faintest\nsound, as of the cackling of the geese in the Capitol, the least\ndeparture from some ordinary routine, the most trifling mistake or\nerror, mars the whole enterprise. Add to which, the darkness of night\nlends further terror to the perils of such undertakings; while the\ngreat majority of those engaged in them, having no knowledge of the\ndistrict or places into which they are brought, are bewildered and\ndisconcerted by the least mishap, and put to flight by every imaginary\ndanger. In secret nocturnal enterprises of this sort, no man was ever\nmore successful than Aratus of Sicyon, although in any encounter by day\nthere never was a more arrant coward. This we must suppose due rather\nto some special and occult quality inherent in the man, than to success\nbeing naturally to be looked for in the like attempts. Such\nenterprises, accordingly, are often planned, but few are put into\nexecution, and fewer still with success.\n\nWhen cities are acquired by surrender, the surrender is either\nvoluntary or under compulsion; voluntary, when the citizens appeal to\nyou for protection against some threatened danger from without, as\nCapua submitted to the Romans; or where they are moved by a desire to\nbe better governed, and are attracted by the good government which he\nto whom they surrender is seen exercising over others who have placed\nthemselves in his hands; as was the case with the Rhodians, the\nMassilians, and others who for like causes gave themselves up to the\nRoman people. Compulsory surrenders take place, either as the result of\na protracted siege, like those we have spoken of above; or from the\ncountry being continually wasted by incursions, forays, and similar\nseverities, to escape which a city makes its submission.\n\nOf the methods which have been noticed, the Romans, in preference to\nall others, used this last; and for four hundred and fifty years made\nit their aim to wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat in\nthe open field, while endeavouring, as I have elsewhere said, to\nestablish their influence over them by treaties and conventions. It was\nto this method of warfare therefore that they always mainly trusted,\nbecause, after trying all others, they found none so free from\ninconvenience and disadvantage\u2014the procedure by siege involving expense\nand delay, that by assault, difficulty and danger, and that by secret\npractice, uncertainty and doubt. They found, likewise, that while in\nsubduing one obstinate city by siege many years might be wasted, a\nkingdom might be gained in a single day by the defeat of a hostile army\nin the field.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII.\u2014_That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies\nwith the fullest Powers._\n\n\nIn reading this History of Titus Livius with a view to profit by it, I\nthink that all the methods of conduct followed by the Roman people and\nsenate merit attention. And among other things fit to be considered, it\nshould be noted, with how ample an authority they sent forth their\nconsuls, their dictators, and the other captains of their armies, all\nof whom we find clothed with the fullest powers: no other prerogative\nbeing reserved to itself by the senate save that of declaring war and\nmaking peace, while everything else was left to the discretion and\ndetermination of the consul. For so soon as the people and senate had\nresolved on war, for instance on a war against the Latins, they threw\nall further responsibility upon the consul, who might fight or decline\nbattle as he pleased, and attack this or the other city as he thought\nfit.\n\nThat this was so, is seen in many instances, and especially from what\nhappened during an expedition made against the Etruscans. For the\nconsul Fabius having routed that people near Sutrium, and thinking to\npass onward through the Ciminian forest into Etruria, so far from\nseeking the advice of the senate, gave them no hint whatever of his\ndesign, although for its execution the war had to be carried into a\nnew, difficult, and dangerous country. We have further witness to the\nsame effect, in the action taken in respect of this enterprise by the\nsenate, who being informed of the victory obtained by Fabius, and\napprehending that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid\nforest, and deeming it inexpedient that he should incur risk by\nattempting this invasion, sent two messengers to warn him not to enter\nEtruria. These messengers, however, did not come up with the consul\nuntil he had already made his way into that country and gained a second\nvictory; when, instead of opposing his further advance, they returned\nto Rome to announce his good fortune and the glory which he had won.\n\nWhoever, therefore, shall well consider the character of the authority\nwhereof I speak, will see that it was most wisely accorded; since had\nit been the wish of the senate that a consul, in conducting a war,\nshould proceed step by step as they might direct him, this must have\nmade him at once less cautious and more dilatory; because the credit of\nvictory would not then have seemed to be wholly his own, but shared by\nthe senate on whose advice he acted. Besides which, the senate must\nhave taken upon itself the task of advising on matters which it could\nnot possibly understand; for although it might contain among its\nmembers all who were most versed in military affairs, still, since\nthese men were not on the spot, and were ignorant of many particulars\nwhich, if they were to give sound advice, it was necessary for them to\nknow, they must in advising have made numberless mistakes. For these\nreasons they desired that the consul should act on his own\nresponsibility, and that the honours of success should be wholly his;\njudging that the love of fame would act on him at once as a spur and as\na curb, making him do whatever he had to do well.\n\nThis matter I have the rather dwelt upon because I observe that our\nmodern republics, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, view it in a\ndifferent light; so that when their captains, commissaries, or\n_provedditori_ have a single gun to place in position, the authorities\nat home must be informed and consulted; a course deserving the same\napproval as is due to all those other methods of theirs, which, one\nwith another, have brought Italy to her present condition.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\u2014_For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be\nbrought back to its Beginnings._\n\n\nDoubtless, all the things of this world have a limit set to their\nduration; yet those of them the bodies whereof have not been suffered\nto grow disordered, but have been so cared for that either no change at\nall has been wrought in them, or, if any, a change for the better and\nnot for the worse, will run that course which Heaven has in a general\nway appointed them. And since I am now speaking of mixed bodies, for\nStates and Sects are so to be regarded, I say that for them these are\nwholesome changes which bring them back to their first beginnings.\n\nThose States consequently stand surest and endure longest which, either\nby the operation of their institutions can renew themselves, or come to\nbe renewed by accident apart from any design. Nothing, however, can be\nclearer than that unless thus renewed these bodies do not last. Now the\nway to renew them is, as I have said, to bring them back to their\nbeginnings, since all beginnings of sects, commonwealths, or kingdoms\nmust needs have in them a certain excellence, by virtue of which they\ngain their first reputation and make their first growth. But because in\nprogress of time this excellence becomes corrupted, unless something be\ndone to restore it to what it was at first, these bodies necessarily\ndecay; for as the physicians tell us in speaking of the human body,\n\u201c_Something or other is daily added which sooner or later will require\ntreatment._\u201d[10]\n\n [10] \u201cQuod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget\n curatione.\u201d\n\n\nAs regards commonwealths, this return to the point of departure is\nbrought about either by extrinsic accident or by intrinsic foresight.\nAs to the first, we have seen how it was necessary that Rome should be\ntaken by the Gauls, that being thus in a manner reborn, she might\nrecover life and vigour, and resume the observances of religion and\njustice which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect. This is well\nseen from those passages of Livius wherein he tells us that when the\nRoman army was \u2018sent forth against the Gauls, and again when tribunes\nwere created with consular authority, no religious rites whatever were\ncelebrated, and wherein he further relates how the Romans not only\nfailed to punish the three Fabii, who contrary to the law of nations\nhad fought against the Gauls, but even clothed them with honour. For,\nfrom these instances, we may well infer that the rest of the wise\nordinances instituted by Romulus, and the other prudent kings, had\nbegun to be held of less account than they deserved, and less than was\nessential for the maintenance of good government.\n\nAnd therefore it was that Rome was visited by this calamity from\nwithout, to the end that all her ordinances might be reformed, and the\npeople taught that it behoved them not only to maintain religion and\njustice, but also to esteem their worthy citizens, and to prize their\nvirtues beyond any advantages of which they themselves might seem to\nhave been deprived at their instance. And this, we find, was just the\neffect produced. For no sooner was the city retaken, than all the\nordinances of the old religion were at once restored; the Fabii, who\nhad fought in violation of the law of nations, were punished; and the\nworth and excellence of Camillus so fully recognized, that the senate\nand the whole people, laying all jealousies aside, once more committed\nto him the entire charge of public affairs.\n\nIt is necessary then, as I have said already, that where men dwell\ntogether in a regulated society, they be often reminded of those\nordinances in conformity with which they ought to live, either by\nsomething inherent in these, or else by some external accident. A\nreminder is given in the former of these two ways, either by the\npassing of some law whereby the members of the society are brought to\nan account; or else by some man of rare worth arising among them, whose\nvirtuous life and example have the same effect as a law. In a\nCommonwealth, accordingly, this end is served either by the virtues of\nsome one of its citizens, or by the operation of its institutions.\n\nThe institutions whereby the Roman Commonwealth was led back to its\nstarting point, were the tribuneship of the people and the censorship,\ntogether with all those laws which were passed to check the insolence\nand ambition of its citizens. Such institutions, however, require fresh\nlife to be infused into them by the worth of some one man who\nfearlessly devotes himself to give them effect in opposition to the\npower of those who set them at defiance.\n\nOf the laws being thus reinforced in Rome, before its capture by the\nGauls, we have notable examples in the deaths of the sons of Brutus, of\nthe Decemvirs, and of Manlius Frumentarius; and after its capture, in\nthe deaths of Manlius Capitolinus, and of the son of Manlius Torquatus\nin the prosecution of his master of the knights by Papirius Cursor, and\nin the impeachment of the Scipios. Such examples as these, being signal\nand extraordinary, had the effect, whenever they took place, of\nbringing men back to the true standard of right; but when they came to\nbe of rarer occurrence, they left men more leisure to grow corrupted,\nand were attended by greater danger and disturbance. Wherefore, between\none and another of these vindications of the laws, no more than ten\nyears, at most, ought to intervene; because after that time men begin\nto change their manners and to disregard the laws; and if nothing occur\nto recall the idea of punishment, and unless fear resume its hold on\ntheir minds, so many offenders suddenly spring up together that it is\nimpossible to punish them without danger. And to this purport it used\nto be said by those who ruled Florence from the year 1434 to 1494, that\ntheir government could hardly be maintained unless it was renewed every\nfive years; by which they meant that it was necessary for them to\narouse the same terror and alarm in men\u2019s minds, as they inspired when\nthey first assumed the government, and when all who offended against\ntheir authority were signally chastised. For when the recollection of\nsuch chastisement has died out, men are emboldened to engage in new\ndesigns, and to speak ill of their rulers; for which the only remedy is\nto restore things to what they were at first.\n\nA republic may, likewise, be brought back to its original form, without\nrecourse to ordinances for enforcing justice, by the mere virtues of a\nsingle citizen, by reason that these virtues are of such influence and\nauthority that good men love to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed\nto depart from them. Those to whom Rome owed most for services of this\nsort, were Horatius Cocles, Mutius Sc\u00e6vola, the two Decii, Atilius\nRegulus, and divers others, whose rare excellence and generous example\nwrought for their city almost the same results as might have been\neffected by ordinances and laws. And if to these instances of\nindividual worth had been added, every ten years, some signal\nenforcement of justice, it would have been impossible for Rome ever to\nhave grown corrupted. But when both of these incitements to virtuous\nbehavior began to recur less frequently, corruption spread, and after\nthe time of Atilius Regulus, no like example was again witnessed. For\nthough the two Catos came later, so great an interval had elapsed\nbefore the elder Cato appeared, and again, so long a period intervened\nbetween him and the younger, and these two, moreover, stood so much\nalone, that it was impossible for them, by their influence, to work any\nimportant change; more especially for the younger, who found Rome so\nmuch corrupted that he could do nothing to improve his fellow-citizens.\n\nThis is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but as regards sects,\nwe see from the instance of our own religion that here too a like\nrenewal is needed. For had not this religion of ours been brought back\nto its original condition by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick, it must\nsoon have been utterly extinguished. They, however, by their voluntary\npoverty, and by their imitation of the life of Christ, rekindled in the\nminds of men the dying flame of faith; and by the efficacious rules\nwhich they established averted from our Church that ruin which the ill\nlives of its prelates and heads must otherwise have brought upon it.\nFor living in poverty, and gaining great authority with the people by\nconfessing them and preaching to them, they got them to believe that it\nis evil to speak ill even of what is evil; and that it is good to be\nobedient to rulers, who, if they do amiss, may be left to the judgment\nof God. By which teaching these rulers are encouraged to behave as\nbadly as they can, having no fear of punishments which they neither see\nnor credit. Nevertheless, it is this renewal which has maintained, and\nstill maintains, our religion.\n\nKingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal, and to have their laws\nrestored to their former force; and we see how, by attending to this,\nthe kingdom of France has profited. For that kingdom, more than any\nother, lies under the control of its laws and ordinances, which are\nmaintained by its parliaments, and more especially by the parliament of\nParis, from which last they derive fresh vigour whenever they have to\nbe enforced against any prince of the realm; for this assembly\npronounces sentence even against the king himself. Heretofore this\nparliament has maintained its name as the fearless champion of the laws\nagainst the nobles of the land; but should it ever at any future time\nsuffer wrongs to pass unpunished, and should offences multiply, either\nthese will have to be corrected with great disturbance to the State, or\nthe kingdom itself must fall to pieces.\n\nThis, then, is our conclusion\u2014that nothing is so necessary in any\nsociety, be it a religious sect, a kingdom, or a commonwealth, as to\nrestore to it that reputation which it had at first, and to see that it\nis provided either with wholesome laws, or with good men whose actions\nmay effect the same ends, without need to resort to external force. For\nalthough this last may sometimes, as in the case of Rome, afford an\nefficacious remedy, it is too hazardous a remedy to make us ever wish\nto employ it.\n\nAnd that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens\nhelped to make Rome great, and how many admirable results they wrought\nin that city, I shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them;\nwith which survey this Third Book of mine, and last division of the\nFirst Decade of Titus Livius, shall be brought to a close. But,\nalthough great and notable actions were done by the Roman kings,\nnevertheless, since history has treated of these at much length, here I\nshall pass them over, and say no more about these princes, save as\nregards certain things done by them with an eye to their private\ninterest. I shall begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father of Roman\nfreedom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\u2014_That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly._\n\n\nNever did any man by the most splendid achievements gain for himself so\ngreat a name for wisdom and prudence as is justly due to Junius Brutus\nfor feigning to be a fool. And although Titus Livius mentions one cause\nonly as having led him to assume this part, namely, that he might live\nmore securely and look after his patrimony; yet on considering his\nbehavior we may believe that in counterfeiting folly it was also his\nobject to escape notice, and so find better convenience to overthrow\nthe kings, and to free his country whenever an occasion offered. That\nthis was in his mind is seen first of all from the interpretation he\ngave to the oracle of Apollo, when, to render the gods favourable to\nhis designs, he pretended to stumble, and secretly kissed his mother\nearth; and, again, from this, that on the death of Lucretia, though her\nfather, her husband, and others of her kinsmen were present, he was the\nfirst to draw the dagger from her wound, and bind the bystanders by\noath never more to suffer king to reign in Rome.\n\nFrom his example all who are discontented with their prince are taught,\nfirst of all, to measure, and to weigh their strength, and if they find\nthemselves strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim open\nwar, then to take that course as at once the nobler and less dangerous;\nbut, if too weak to make open war, then sedulously to court the favour\nof the prince, using to that end all such methods as they may judge\nneedful, adapting themselves to his pleasures, and showing delight in\nwhatever they see him delight in. Such an intimacy, in the first place,\nenables you to live securely, and permits you, without incurring any\nrisk, to share the happy fortunes of the prince, while it affords you\nevery facility for carrying out your plans. Some, no doubt, will tell\nyou that you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved in\nhis downfall; nor yet at such a distance that when he falls you shall\nbe too far off to use the occasion for rising on his ruin. But although\nthis mean course, could we only follow it, were certainly the best,\nyet, since I believe it to be impracticable, we must resort to the\nmethods above indicated, and either keep altogether aloof, or else\ncleave closely to the prince. Whosoever does otherwise, if he be of\ngreat station, lives in constant peril; nor will it avail him to say,\n\u201cI concern myself with nothing; I covet neither honours nor preferment;\nmy sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life.\u201d For such excuses,\nthough they be listened to, are not accepted; nor can any man of great\nposition, however much and sincerely he desire it, elect to live this\nlife of tranquillity since his professions will not be believed; so\nthat although he might be contented to be let alone, others will not\nsuffer him to be so. Wherefore, like Brutus, men must feign folly; and\nto play the part effectively, and so as to please their prince, must\nsay, do, see, and praise things contrary to their inclinations.\n\nBut now, having spoken of the prudence shown by Brutus when he sought\nto recover the freedom of Rome, let us next speak of the severity which\nhe used to maintain it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\u2014_That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay\nthe Sons of Brutus._\n\n\nThe severity used by Brutus in preserving for Rome the freedom he had\nwon for her, was not less necessary than useful. The spectacle of a\nfather sitting on the judgment, and not merely sentencing his own sons\nto death, but being himself present at their execution, affords an\nexample rare in history. But those who study the records of ancient\ntimes will understand, that after a change in the form of a government,\nwhether it be from a commonwealth to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a\ncommonwealth, those who are hostile to the new order of things must\nalways be visited with signal punishment. So that he who sets up as a\ntyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates a free government and\nslays not the sons of Brutus, can never maintain himself long. But\nsince I have elsewhere treated of this matter at large, I shall merely\nrefer to what has there been said concerning it, and shall cite here\none instance only, happening in our own days, and memorable in the\nhistory of our country.\n\nI speak of Piero Soderini, who thought by his patience and goodness to\novercome the very same temper which prompted the sons of Brutus to\nrevert to the old government, and who failed in the endeavour. For\nalthough his sagacity should have taught him the necessity, while\nchance and the ambition of those who attacked him furnished him with\nthe opportunity of making an end of them, he never could resolve to\nstrike the blow; and not merely believed himself able to subdue\ndisaffection by patience and kindness, and to mitigate the enmity of\nparticular men by the rewards he held out to them, but also persuaded\nhimself, and often declared in the presence of his friends, that he\ncould not confront opposition openly, nor crush his adversaries,\nwithout assuming extraordinary powers and passing laws destructive of\ncivil equality; which measures, although not afterward used by him for\ntyrannical ends, would so alarm the community, that after his death\nthey would never again consent to appoint a Gonfalonier for life, an\noffice which he judged it essential both to maintain and strengthen.\nNow although these scruples of his were wise and good, we ought never\nout of regard for what is good, to suffer an evil to run its course,\nsince it may well happen that the evil will prevail over the good. And\nPiero should have believed that as his acts and intentions were to be\njudged by results, he might, if he lived and if fortune befriended him,\nhave made it clear to all, that what he did was done to preserve his\ncountry, and not from personal ambition; and he might have so contrived\nmatters that no successor of his could ever turn to bad ends the means\nwhich he had used for good ends. But he was misled by a preconceived\nopinion, and failed to understand that ill-will is not to be vanquished\nby time nor propitiated by favours. And, so, from not knowing how to\nresemble Brutus, he lost power, and fame, and was driven an exile from\nhis country.\n\nThat it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom as it is to\npreserve a commonwealth, will be shown in the Chapter following.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\u2014_That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those\nlive whom he has deprived of it._\n\n\nFrom what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of the sons of Ancus,\nand Servius Tullius at the hands of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an\narduous and perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and\nyet suffer him to live on, hoping to conciliate him by benefits. We\nsee, too, how the elder Tarquin was ruined by his belief that he held\nthe kingdom by a just title, since it had been given him by the people\nand confirmed to him by the senate, never suspecting that the sons of\nAncus would be so stirred by resentment that it would be impossible to\ncontent them with what contented all the rest of Rome. Servius Tullius\nagain, was ruined through believing that he could conciliate the sons\nof Ancus by loading them with favours.\n\nBy the fate of the first of these kings every prince may be warned that\nhe can never live securely in his princedom so long as those from whom\nhe has taken it survive; while the fate of the second should remind all\nrulers that old injuries are not to be healed by subsequent benefits,\nand least of all when the new benefit is less in degree than the injury\nsuffered. And, truly, Servius was wanting in wisdom when he imagined\nthat the sons of Tarquin would contentedly resign themselves to be the\nsons-in-law of one whom they thought should be their subject. For the\ndesire to reign is so prevailing a passion, that it penetrates the\nminds not only of those who are rightful heirs, but also of those who\nare not; as happened with the wife of the younger Tarquin, who was\ndaughter to Servius, but who, possessed by this madness, and setting at\nnaught all filial duty, incited her husband to take her father\u2019s\nkingdom, and with it his life; so much nobler did she esteem it to be a\nqueen than the daughter of a king. But while the elder Tarquin and\nServius Tullius lost the kingdom from not knowing how to secure\nthemselves against those whom they had deprived of it, the younger\nTarquin lost it from not observing the ordinances of the old kings, as\nshall be shown in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\u2014_How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom._\n\n\nTarquin the Proud, when he had put Servius Tullius to death, inasmuch\nas the latter left no heirs, took secure possession of the kingdom,\nhaving nothing to fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the\nway of his predecessors. And although the means whereby he made himself\nking were hateful and monstrous, nevertheless, had he adhered to the\nancient ordinances of the earlier kings, he might have been endured,\nnor would he have aroused both senate and people to combine against him\nand deprive him of his government. It was not, therefore, because his\nson Sextus violated Lucretia that Tarquin was driven out, but because\nhe himself had violated the laws of the kingdom, and governed as a\ntyrant, stripping the senate of all authority, and bringing everything\nunder his own control. For all business which formerly had been\ntransacted in public, and with the sanction of the senate, he caused to\nbe transacted in his palace, on his own responsibility, and to the\ndispleasure of every one else, and so very soon deprived Rome of\nwhatever freedom she had enjoyed under her other kings.\n\nNor was it enough for him to have the Fathers his enemies, but he must\nneeds also kindle the commons against him, wearing them out with mere\nmechanic labours, very different from the enterprises in which they had\nbeen employed by his predecessors; so that when Rome overflowed with\ninstances of his cruelty and pride, he had already disposed the minds\nof all the citizens to rebel whenever they found the opportunity.\nWherefore, had not occasion offered in the violence done to Lucretia,\nsome other had soon been found to bring about the same result. But had\nTarquin lived like the other kings, when Sextus his son committed that\noutrage, Brutus and Collatinus would have had recourse to him to punish\nthe offender, and not to the commons of Rome. And hence let princes\nlearn that from the hour they first violate those laws, customs, and\nusages under which men have lived for a great while, they begin to\nweaken the foundations of their authority. And should they, after they\nhave been stripped of that authority, ever grow wise enough to see how\neasily princedoms are preserved by those who are content to follow\nprudent counsels, the sense of their loss will grieve them far more,\nand condemn them to a worse punishment than any they suffer at the\nhands of others. For it is far easier to be loved by good men than by\nbad, and to obey the laws than to seek to control them.\n\nAnd to learn what means they must use to retain their authority, they\nhave only to take example by the conduct of good princes, such as\nTimoleon of Corinth, Aratus of Sicyone, and the like, in whose lives\nthey will find such security and content, both on the side of the ruler\nand the ruled, as ought to stir them with the desire to imitate them,\nwhich, for the reasons already given, it is easy for them to do. For\nmen, when they are well governed, ask no more, nor look for further\nfreedom; as was the case with the peoples governed by the two whom I\nhave named, whom they constrained to continue their rulers while they\nlived, though both of them sought repeatedly to return to private life.\n\nBut because, in this and the two preceding Chapters, I have noticed the\nill-will which arose against the kings, the plots contrived by the sons\nof Brutus against their country, and those directed against the elder\nTarquin and Servius Tullius, it seems to me not out of place to\ndiscourse of these matters more at length in the following Chapter, as\ndeserving the attention both of princes and private citizens.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\u2014_Of Conspiracies._\n\n\nIt were an omission not to say something on the subject of\nconspiracies, these being a source of much danger both to princes and\nto private men. For we see that many more princes have lost their lives\nand states through these than in open warfare; power to wage open war\nupon a prince being conceded to few, whereas power to conspire against\nhim is denied to none. On the other hand, since conspiracies are\nattended at every stage by difficulties and dangers, no more hazardous\nor desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any private citizen;\nwhence it comes that while many conspiracies are planned, few effect\ntheir object. Wherefore, to put princes on their guard against these\ndangers, and to make subjects more cautious how they take part in them,\nand rather learn to live content under whatever government fortune has\nassigned them, I shall treat of them at length, without omitting any\nnoteworthy circumstance which may serve for the instruction of either.\nThough, indeed, this is a golden sentence Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein\nhe says that \u201c_the past should have our reverence, the present our\nobedience, and that we should wish for good princes, but put up with\nany._\u201d[11] For assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring\nruin both on himself and on his country.\n\n [11] _Tac. Hist._ iv. 8.\n\n\nBut, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of all to examine\nagainst whom conspiracies are directed; and we shall find that men\nconspire either against their country or their prince; and it is of\nthese two kinds of conspiracy that at present I desire to speak. For of\nconspiracies which have for their object the surrender of cities to\nenemies who are besieging them, and of all others contrived for like\nends, I have already said enough.\n\nFirst, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed\nagainst a prince, and begin by inquiring into their causes, which are\nmanifold, but of which one is more momentous than all the rest; I mean,\nthe being hated by the whole community. For it may reasonably be\nassumed, that when a prince has drawn upon himself this universal\nhatred, he must also have given special offence to particular men,\nwhich they will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will be\naugmented by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen\nto have incurred. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of\npublic hatred. How he is to do so I need not stop here to explain,\nhaving discussed the matter already in another place; but if he can\nguard against this, offence given to particular men will expose him to\nbut few attacks. One reason being, that there are few men who think so\nmuch of an injury done them as to run great risks to revenge it;\nanother, that assuming them to have both the disposition and the\ncourage to avenge themselves, they are restrained by the universal\nfavour which they see entertained towards the prince.\n\nInjuries are either to a man\u2019s life, to his property, or to his honour.\nAs regards the first, they who threaten injuries to life incur more\ndanger than they who actually inflict them; or rather, while great\ndanger is incurred in threatening, none at all is incurred from\ninflicting such injuries. For the dead are past thinking of revenge;\nand those who survive, for the most part leave such thoughts to the\ndead. But he whose life is threatened, finding himself forced by\nnecessity either to do or suffer, becomes a man most dangerous to the\nprince, as shall be fully explained hereafter.\n\nAfter menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more\nthan any others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he can\nnever strip a man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some\nweapon wherewith to redress his wrongs, nor ever so far dishonour him\nas to quell the stubborn spirit which prompts revenge. Of all\ndishonours those done to the women of a household are the worst; after\nwhich come such personal indignities as nerved the arm of Pausanias\nagainst Philip of Macedon, and of many another against other princes;\nand, in our own days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti\nto conspire against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than that Pandolfo, who\nhad given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her from him, as\npresently shall be told. Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi to\nconspire against the Medici, was the law passed by the latter depriving\nthem of the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei.\n\nAnother most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire\nmen feel to free their country from a usurper. This it was which\nimpelled Brutus and Cassius to conspire against C\u00e6sar, and countless\nothers against such tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius, and the like.\nAgainst this humour no tyrant can guard, except by laying down his\ntyranny; which as none will do, few escape an unhappy end. Whence the\nverses of Juvenal:\u2014\n\n\u201cFew tyrants die a peaceful death, and few\nThe kings who visit Proserpine\u2019s dread lord,\nUnscathed by wounds and blood.\u201d[12]\n\n\n [12] Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci\nDescendunt reges, et sicca morte tiranni.\n          _Juv. Sat._ x. 112.\n\n\nGreat, as I have said already, are the dangers which men run in\nconspiring; for at all times they are in peril, whether in contriving,\nin executing, or after execution. And since in conspiracies either many\nare engaged, or one only (for although it cannot properly be said of\n_one_ man that he _conspires_, there may exist in him the fixed resolve\nto put the prince to death), it is only the solitary plotter who\nescapes the first of these three stages of danger. For he runs no risk\nbefore executing his design, since as he imparts it to none, there is\nnone to bring it to the ear of the prince. A deliberate resolve like\nthis may be conceived by a person in any rank of life, high or low,\nbase or noble, and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince. For\nevery one must, at some time or other, have leave to speak to the\nprince, and whoever has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his\ndesign. Pausanias, of whom we have made mention so often, slew Philip\nof Macedon as he walked between his son and his son-in-law to the\ntemple, surrounded by a thousand armed guards. Pausanias indeed was\nnoble, and known to the prince, but Ferdinand of Spain was stabbed in\nthe neck by a poor and miserable Spaniard; and though the wound was not\nmortal, it sufficed to show that neither courage nor opportunity were\nwanting to the would-be-assassin. A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew\nhis scimitar on Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if he\ndid not wound him, it was from no lack either of daring or of\nopportunity. And I believe that there are many who in their minds\ndesire the deed, no punishment or danger attending the mere wish,\nthough there be but few who dare do it. For since few or none who\nventure, escape death, few are willing to go forward to certain\ndestruction.\n\nBut to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are\nengaged, I affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have\nbeen contrived by men of great station, or by those who have been on\nterms of close intimacy with the prince, since no others, not being\ndownright madmen, would ever think of conspiring. For men of humble\nrank, and such as are not the intimates of their prince, are neither\nfed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such\nattempts. Because, in the first place, men of low degree will never\nfind any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join in their\nschemes by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks;\nwherefore, so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three,\nthey are betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate enough to\nhave no traitor of their number, they will be so hampered in the\nexecution of their plot by the want of easy access to the prince, that\nthey are sure to perish in the mere attempt. For if even men of great\nposition, who have ready access to the prince, succumb to the\ndifficulties which I shall presently notice, those difficulties must be\ninfinitely increased in the case of men who are without these\nadvantages. And because when life and property are at stake men are not\nutterly reckless, on perceiving themselves to be weak they grow\ncautious, and though cursing the tyrant in their hearts, are content to\nendure him, and to wait until some one of higher station than they,\ncomes forward to redress their wrongs. So that should we ever find\nthese weaklings attempting anything, we may commend their courage\nrather than their prudence.\n\nWe see, however, that the great majority of conspirators have been\npersons of position and the familiars of their prince, and that their\nplots have been as often the consequence of excessive indulgence as of\nexcessive injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus,\nPlautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius; all of whom\nhad been raised by their masters to such wealth, honours, and\ndignities, that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the\nimperial name. That they might not lack this also, they fell to\nconspiring against their prince; but in every instance their\nconspiracies had the end which their ingratitude deserved.\n\nThe only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the\nconspiracy of Jacopo IV. d\u2019Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti,\nlord of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero,\nand loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to\nthis, in our own days, was the conspiracy of Coppola against King\nFerdinand of Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of power that\nhe seemed to himself to have everything but sovereignty; in seeking to\nobtain which he lost his life; though if any plot entered into by a man\nof great position could be expected to succeed, this certainly might,\nbeing contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one who had the\namplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of power\nwhich blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the\nexecution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to\nadd prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim.\n\nThe prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought\nmore to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to\nwhom he has done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which\nthe former have in abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in\nboth, lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of\nrevenge. Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with so much\nauthority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and\ntheirs; that between the two something be still left them to desire.\nOtherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who\nhave been named above.\n\nBut to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be\nnecessary that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as\nhave ready access to the prince, we have next to consider what have\nbeen the results of their plots, and to trace the causes which have\nmade them succeed or fail. Now, as I have said already, we find that\nconspiracies are attended by danger at three stages: before during, and\nafter their execution; for which reason very few of them have had a\nhappy issue; it being next to impossible to surmount all these\ndifferent dangers successfully. And to begin with those which are\nincurred beforehand, and which are graver than all the rest, I say that\nhe must be both very prudent and very fortunate who, when contriving a\nconspiracy, does not suffer his secret to be discovered.\n\nConspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made, or by\nconjecture. Disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of\nthose to whom you communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked\nfor, because you can impart your plans only to such persons as you\nbelieve ready to face death on your behalf, or to those who are\ndiscontented with the prince. Of men whom you can trust thus\nimplicitly, one or two may be found; but when you have to open your\ndesigns to many, they cannot all be of this nature; and their goodwill\ntowards you must be extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and\nby fear of punishment. Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in\nrespect of the love which they imagine others bear them, nor can ever\nbe sure of it until they have put it to the proof. But to make proof of\nit in a matter like this is very perilous; and even if you have proved\nit already, and found it true in some other dangerous trial, you cannot\nassume that there will be the same fidelity here, since this far\ntranscends every other kind of danger. Again, if you gauge a man\u2019s\nfidelity by his discontent with the prince, you may easily deceive\nyourself; for so soon as you have taken this discontented man into your\nconfidence, you have supplied him with the means whereby he may become\ncontented; so that either his hatred of the prince must be great\nindeed, or your influence over him extraordinary, if it keep him\nfaithful. Hence it comes that so many conspiracies have been discovered\nand crushed in their earliest stage, and that when the secret is\npreserved among many accomplices for any length of time, it is looked\non as a miracle; as in the case of the conspiracy of Piso against Nero,\nand, in our own days, in that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano\nde\u2019 Medici; which last, though more than fifty persons were privy to\nit, was not discovered until it came to be carried out.\n\nConspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when\nhe talks so indiscreetly that some servant, or other person not in the\nplot, overhears him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when\ntreating with the envoys of Tarquin, were overheard by a slave, who\nbecame their accuser; or else through your own weakness in imparting\nyour secret to some woman or boy whom you love, or to some other such\nlight person; as when Dymnus, who was one of those who conspired with\nPhilotas against Alexander the Great, revealed the plot to Nicomachus,\na youth whom he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and Cebalinus the\nking.\n\nOf discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of\nPiso against Nero; for Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day\nbefore he was to kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves and\ngave them money, and bade Milichus, his freedman, sharpen his old rusty\ndagger, and have bandages ready for binding up wounds. From all which\npreparations Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused\nScaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested, and with him\nNatalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before had been seen\nto speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two differed\nin their account of what then passed between them, they were put to the\ntorture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was\nbrought to light, to the ruin of all concerned.\n\nAgainst these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible\nso to guard as that either through treachery, want of caution, or\nlevity, the secret shall not be found out, whenever more than three or\nfour persons are privy to it. And whenever more than one conspirator is\narrested, the plot is certain to be detected, because no two persons\ncan perfectly agree in a false account of what has passed between them.\nIf only one be taken, should he be a man of resolute courage, he may\nrefuse to implicate his comrades; but they on their part must have no\nless courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray themselves\nby flight; for if courage be absent anywhere, whether in him who is\ntaken or in those still at large, the conspiracy is revealed. And what\nis related by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy against\nHieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary, namely, that on\nthe capture of one of the conspirators, named Theodorus, he, with great\nfortitude, withheld the names of all his accomplices, and accused\nfriends of the tyrant; while his companions, on their part, trusted so\ncompletely in his courage, that not one of them quitted Syracuse or\nshowed any sign of fear.\n\nAll these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance of a plot,\nmust be passed through before you come to its execution; or if you\nwould escape them, you must observe the following precautions: Your\nfirst and surest, nay, to say truth, your only safeguard, is to leave\nyour accomplices no time to accuse you; for which reason you must\nimpart the affair to them, only at the moment when you mean it to be\ncarried out, and not before. Those who have followed this course have\nwholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies, and, generally\nspeaking, the others also; indeed, I may say that they have all\nsucceeded, and that it is open to every prudent man to act as they did.\nIt will be enough to give two instances of plots effected in this way.\nNelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of\nEpirus, assembling many of his friends and kinsmen in his house,\nexhorted them to free their country; and when some of them asked for\ntime to consider and mature their plans, he bade his slaves close the\ndoors, and told those assembled that unless they swore to go at once\nand do as he directed he would make them over to Aristotimus as\nprisoners. Alarmed by his threats, they bound themselves by a solemn\noath, and going forth at once and without delay, successfully carried\nout his bidding. A certain Magus having fraudulently usurped the throne\nof Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of that realm, discovering the fraud,\ndisclosed it to six others of the chief nobility, telling them that it\nbehoved them to free the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor. And\nwhen some among them asked for time, Darius, who was one of the six\nsummoned by Ortanes, stood up and said, \u201cEither we go at once to do\nthis deed, or I go to the Magus to accuse you all.\u201d Whereupon, all\nrising together, without time given to any to change his mind, they\nwent forth and succeeded in effecting their end. Not unlike these\ninstances was the plan taken by the Etolians to rid themselves of\nNabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence of succouring him,\nthey sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen, with two hundred foot\nsoldiers and thirty horsemen. For they imparted their real design to\nAlasamenes only, charging the rest, under pain of exile, to obey him in\nwhatever he commanded. Alasamenes repaired to Sparta, and never\ndivulged his commission till the time came for executing it; and so\nsucceeded in putting Nabis to death.\n\nIt was, therefore, by the precautions they observed, that the persons\nof whom I have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the\ncontrivance of conspiracies; and any following their example may expect\nthe like good fortune. And that all may learn to do as they did I shall\nnotice the case of Piso, of which mention has before been made. By\nreason of his rank, his reputation, and the intimate terms on which he\nlived with Nero, who trusted him without reserve, and would often come\nto his garden to sup with him, Piso was able to gain the friendship of\nmany persons of spirit and courage, and well fitted in every way to\ntake part in his plot against the emperor, which, under these\ncircumstances, might easily have been carried out. For when Nero came\nto his garden, Piso could readily have communicated his design to those\nfriends of his, and with suitable words have encouraged them to do\nwhat, in fact, they would not have had time to withdraw from, and was\ncertain to succeed. And were we to examine all similar attempts, it\nwould be seen that there are few which might not have been effected in\nthe manner shown. But since most men are very ignorant of practical\naffairs, they commit the gravest blunders, especially in matters which\nlie, as this does, a little way out of the beaten track.\n\nWherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if he can help it, to\ncommunicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed; or\nif he must communicate it, then to some one man only, with whom he has\nlong been intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings\nas himself. To find one such person is far easier than to find several,\nand, at the same time, involves less risk; for though this one man play\nyou false, you are not left altogether without resource, as you are\nwhen your accomplices are numerous. For I have heard it shrewdly said\nthat to one man you may impart anything, since, unless you have been\nled to commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as far as his\nassertion. Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there is\nnothing so damning as a letter under your own hand.\n\nPlautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the Emperor Severus and\nhis son Caracalla, intrusted the business to the tribune Saturninus,\nwho, being more disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the\nsame time afraid that, if it came to laying a charge, Plautianus might\nbe believed sooner than he, asked him for a written authority, that his\ncommission might be credited. Blinded by ambition, Plautianus complied,\nand forthwith was accused by Saturninus and found guilty; whereas, but\nfor that written warrant, together with other corroborating proofs, he\nmust have escaped by his bold denial of the charge. Against the\ntestimony of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless\nconvicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial proof\nagainst which you must guard. A woman, named Epicharis, who had\nformerly been a mistress of Nero, was privy to Piso\u2019s conspiracy, and\nthinking it might be useful to have the help of a certain captain of\ntriremes whom Nero had among his body-guards, she acquainted him with\nthe plot, but not with the names of the plotters. This fellow, turning\ntraitor, and accusing Epicharis to Nero, so stoutly did she deny the\ncharge, that Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let her go.\n\nIn imparting a plot to a single person there are, therefore, two risks:\none, that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you; the\nother, that if arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt, he\nmay, on being convicted, in the hope to escape punishment, betray you.\nBut in neither of these dangers are you left without a defence; since\nyou may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice of your\naccuser, and the other by alleging that the witness his been forced by\ntorture to say what is untrue. The wisest course, however, is to impart\nyour design to none, but to act like those who have been mentioned\nabove; or if you impart it, then to one only: for although even in this\ncourse there be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than when\nmany are admitted to your confidence.\n\nA case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is where an emergency,\nso urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety,\nconstrains you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you.\nA necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two\ninstances may suffice to show. Among the closest friends and intimates\nof the Emperor Commodus, were two captains of the pretorian guards,\nLetus and Electus, while among the most favoured of his distresses was\na certain Martia. But because these three often reproved him for his\nmanner of living, as disgraceful to himself and to his station, he\nresolved to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along with\nthose of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next\nnight, in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed. But on\nhis going to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his, while playing\nabout his room and on his bed, found the list, and coming out of the\nchamber with it in his hand, was met by Martia, who took it from him,\nand on reading it and finding what it contained, sent for Letus and\nElectus. And all three recognizing the danger in which they stood,\nresolved to be beforehand with the tyrant, and losing no time, murdered\nhim that very night.\n\nThe Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with\nhim Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his\nprefect. But because princes who are not themselves good are always\nafraid lest others treat them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote to his\nfriend Maternianus in Rome to learn from the astrologers whether any\nman had ambitious designs upon the empire, and to send him word.\nMaternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained\nby Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the emperor, fell into the\nhands of Macrinus, who, seeing when he read it that he must either put\nCaracalla to death before further letters arrived from Rome, or else\ndie himself, committed the business to a centurion, named Martialis,\nwhom he trusted, and whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few\ndays before, who succeeded in killing the emperor.\n\nWe see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has\nalmost the same results as the method already noticed as followed by\nNelematus of Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at the outset\nof this Discourse, that the threats of princes expose them to greater\ndanger than the wrongs they actually inflict, and lead to more active\nconspiracies: and, therefore, that a prince should be careful not to\nthreaten; since men are either to be treated kindly or else got rid of,\nbut never brought to such a pass that they have to choose between\nslaying and being slain.\n\nAs to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either\nfrom some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the\npart of him who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls\ninto through want of foresight, or from his not giving the affair its\nfinishing stroke, as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put\nto death. Now, nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance in\nhuman affairs, as to be forced, at a moment\u2019s notice and without time\nallowed for reflection, to vary your plan of action and adopt a\ndifferent one from that fixed on at the first. And if such changes\ncause confusion anywhere, it is in matters appertaining to war, and in\nenterprises of the kind we are now speaking of; for in such affairs as\nthese, there is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the\nexact thing intrusted to them. But when men have for many days together\nturned their whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a\ncertain order, and the way and order are suddenly altered, it is\nimpossible but that they should be disconcerted and the whole scheme\nruined. For which reason, it is far better to do everything in\naccordance with the preconcerted plan, though it be seen to be attended\nwith some disadvantages, than, in order to escape these, to involve\nyourself in an infinity of dangers. And this will happen when you\ndepart from your original design without time given to form a new one.\nFor when time is given you may manage as you please.\n\nThe conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de\u2019 Medici is\nwell known. The scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal\nS. Giorgio, at which the brothers should be put to death. To each of\nthe conspirators a part was assigned: to one the murder, to another the\nseizure of the palace, while a third was to ride through the streets\nand call on the people to free themselves. But it so chanced that at a\ntime when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were all assembled in\nthe cathedral church of Florence to hear High Mass, it became known\nthat Giuliano would not be present at the banquet; whereupon the\nconspirators, laying their heads together, resolved to do in church\nwhat they were to have done elsewhere. This, however, deranged the\nwhole scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would have no hand in\nthe murder if it was to be done in a church; and the whole distribution\nof parts had in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom the\nnew parts were assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds\nto their new tasks, they managed matters so badly that they were\noverpowered in their attempt.\n\nCourage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or\nfrom his being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty\nand awe attend the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he\nsoftens or dismays his executioners. When Caius Marius was taken by the\npeople of Minturnum, the slave sent in to slay him, overawed by the\nbearing of the man, and by the memories which his name called up,\nbecame unnerved, and powerless to perform his office. And if this\ninfluence was exercised by one who was a prisoner, and in chains, and\noverwhelmed by adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be\ninspired by a prince who is free and uncontrolled, surrounded by his\nretinue and by all the pomp and splendour of his station; whose dignity\nconfounds, and whose graciousness conciliates.\n\nCertain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king of Thrace, fixed a\nday for his murder, and assembled at the place appointed, whither the\nking had already come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him, and\nall departed without attempting anything against him or knowing why\nthey refrained; each blaming the others. And more than once the same\nfolly was repeated, until the plot getting wind, they were taken and\npunished for what they might have done, yet durst not do.\n\nTwo brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him,\nemploying as their tool a certain priest named Giennes, a singing-man\nin the service of the Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought\nthe Duke into their company, so that they had full opportunity to make\naway with him. Yet neither of them ever ventured to strike the blow;\ntill at last, their scheme being discovered, they paid the penalty of\ntheir combined cowardice and temerity. Such irresolution can only have\narisen from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or\ntouched by his graciousness.\n\nIn the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors and mishaps arise\nfrom a failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject, when,\nlosing self-control, they are led in their bewilderment to do and say\nwhat they ought not. That men are thus confounded, and thrown off their\nbalance, could not be better shown than in the words of Titus Livius,\nwhere he describes the behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian, at the time\nwhen he resolved on the death of Nabis the Spartan, of whom I have\nspoken before. For when the time to act came, and he had disclosed to\nhis followers what they had to do, Livius represents him as\n\u201c_collecting his thoughts which had grown confused by dwelling on so\ndesperate an enterprise_.\u201d For it is impossible for any one, though of\nthe most steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to handle\ndeadly weapons, not to be perturbed at such a moment. For which reason\nwe should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had\nexperience in similar affairs, and trust no others though reputed of\nthe truest courage. For in these grave undertakings, no one who is\nwithout such experience, however bold and resolute, is to be trusted.\n\nThe confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon\nfrom your hand, or to use words which will have the same results.\nQuintianus being commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to slay him,\nlay in wait for him at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and rushing\nupon him with a drawn dagger, cried out, \u201c_The senate sends you this_;\u201d\nwhich words caused him to be seized before his blow descended. In like\nmanner Messer Antonio of Volterra, who as we have elsewhere seen was\ntold off to kill Lorenzo de\u2019 Medici, exclaimed as he approached him,\n\u201c_Ah traitor!_\u201d and this exclamation proved the salvation of Lorenzo\nand the ruin of that conspiracy.\n\nFor the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a single ruler may\nreadily break down in its execution; but a conspiracy against two\nrulers is not only difficult, but so hazardous that its success is\nalmost hopeless. For to effect like actions, at the same time, in\ndifferent places, is well-nigh impossible; nor can they be effected at\ndifferent times, if you would not have one counteract another. So that\nif conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent and dangerous, to\nconspire against two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate.\nAnd were it not for the respect in which I hold the historian, I could\nnot credit as possible what Herodian relates of Plautianus, namely,\nthat he committed to the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying\nsingle-handed both Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different\nplaces; for the thing is so opposed to reason that on no other\nauthority could I be induced to accept it as true.\n\nCertain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants\nof Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged\nhim. Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired\nagainst the despots Clearchus and Satirus. Clearchus fell, but Satirus\nsurvived and avenged him. The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often,\nsucceeded in murdering Giuliano only. From such conspiracies,\ntherefore, as are directed against more heads than one, all should\nabstain; for no good is to be got from them, whether for ourselves, for\nour country, or for any one else. On the contrary, when those conspired\nagainst escape, they become harsher and more unsufferable than before,\nas, in the examples given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to\nknow. True it is that the conspiracy contrived by Pelopidas for the\nliberation of his country, had to encounter every conceivable\nhindrance, and yet had the happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not\nwith two tyrants only, but with ten; and so far from having their\nconfidence, could not, being an outlaw, even approach them. And yet he\nsucceeded in coming to Thebes, in putting the tyrants to death, and in\nfreeing his country. But whatever he did was done with the aid of one\nof the counsellors of the tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he\nhad all facilities for executing his design. Let none, however, take\nthis case as a pattern; for that it was in truth a desperate attempt,\nand its success a marvel, was and is the opinion of all historians, who\nspeak of it as a thing altogether extraordinary and unexampled.\n\nThe execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or\nunforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to\nbe carried out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates\nwere to slay C\u00e6sar, it so happened that C\u00e6sar talked for a great while\nwith Cneus Pompilius Lenas, one of the conspirators; which some of the\nothers observing, were in terror that Pompilius was divulging the\nconspiracy to C\u00e6sar; whose life they would therefore have attempted\nthen and there, without waiting his arrival in the senate house, had\nthey not been reassured by seeing that when the conference ended he\nshowed no sign of unusual emotion. False alarms of this sort are to be\ntaken into account and allowed for, all the more that they are easily\nraised. For he who has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that\nothers are speaking of him. A word used with a wholly different\npurpose, may throw his mind off its balance and lead him to fancy that\nreference is intended to the matter he is engaged on, and cause him\neither to betray the conspiracy by flight, or to derange its execution\nby anticipating the time fixed. And the more there are privy to the\nconspiracy, the likelier is this to happen.\n\nAs to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they\ncan only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious.\nGiulio Belanti of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate he\nbore Pandolfo Petrucci, who had given him his daughter to wife and\nafterwards taken her from him, resolved to murder him, and thus chose\nhis time. Almost every day Pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman,\npassing the house of Giulio on the way, who, remarking this, took\nmeasures to have his accomplices ready in his house to kill Pandolfo as\nhe passed. Wherefore, placing the rest armed within the doorway, one he\nstationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo\u2019s approach. It so\nhappened however, that as he came nigh the house, and after the\nlook-out had given the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who\nstopped him to converse; when some of those with him, going on in\nadvance, saw and heard the gleam and clash of weapons, and so\ndiscovered the ambuscade; whereby Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with\nhis companions had to fly from Siena. This plot accordingly was marred,\nand Giulio\u2019s schemes baulked, in consequence of a chance meeting.\nAgainst such accidents, since they are out of the common course of\nthings, no provision can be made. Still it is very necessary to take\ninto account all that may happen, and devise what remedies you can.\n\nIt now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after\nthe execution of a plot. These in fact resolve themselves into one,\nnamely, that some should survive who will avenge the death of the\nmurdered prince. The part of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son,\na brother, or other kinsman of the deceased, who in the ordinary course\nof events might have looked to succeed to the princedom. And such\npersons are suffered to live, either from inadvertence, or from some of\nthe causes noted already, as when Giovann\u2019 Andrea of Lampognano, with\nthe help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan. For the son\nand two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge his\ndeath. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held\nexcused, since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. But\nwhen from carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to\nlive whose death ought to have been secured, there is no excuse.\nCertain conspirators, after murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of\nForli, made prisoners of his wife and of his children who were still\nvery young. By thinking they could not be safe unless they got\npossession of the citadel, which the governor refused to surrender,\nthey obtained a promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess was\nnamed, that on their permitting her to enter the citadel she would\ncause it to be given up to them, her children in the mean time\nremaining with them as hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her\nto enter the citadel. But no sooner had she got inside than she fell to\nupbraid them from the walls with the murder of her husband, and to\nthreaten them with every kind of vengeance; and to show them how little\nstore she set upon her children, told them scoffingly that she knew how\nothers could be got. In the end, the rebels having no leader to advise\nthem, and perceiving too late the error into which they had been\nbetrayed, had to pay the penalty of their rashness by perpetual\nbanishment.\n\nBut of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot,\nnone is so much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be\nwell affected to the prince whom you have put to death. For against\nthis danger conspirators have no resource which can ensure their\nsafety. Of this we have example in the case of C\u00e6sar, who as he had the\nlove of the Roman people was by them avenged; for they it was who, by\ndriving out the conspirators from Rome, were the cause that all of\nthem, at different times and in different places, came to violent ends.\n\nConspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take\npart in them than conspiracies against princes; since there is less\nrisk beforehand, and though there be the same danger in their\nexecution, there is none afterwards. Beforehand, the risks are few,\nbecause a citizen may use means for obtaining power without betraying\nhis wishes or designs to any; and unless his course be arrested, his\ndesigns are likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws be passed to\nrestrain him, he may strike out a new path. This is to be understood of\na commonwealth which has to some degree become corrupted; for in one\nwherein there is no taint of corruption, there being no soil in which\nevil seed can grow, such designs will never suggest themselves to any\ncitizen.\n\nIn a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many means and in many\nways aspire to the princedom without risking destruction, both because\nrepublics are slower than princes are to take alarm, are less\nsuspicious and consequently less cautious, and because they look with\ngreater reverence upon their great citizens, who are in this way\nrendered bolder and more reckless in attacking them. Any one who has\nread Sallust\u2019s account of the conspiracy of Catiline, must remember\nhow, when that conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in\nRome, but even made his appearance in the senatehouse, where he was\nsuffered to address the senate in the most insulting terms,\u2014so\nscrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty of all its citizens.\nNay, even after he had left Rome and placed himself at the head of his\narmy, Lentulus and his other accomplices would not have been\nimprisoned, had not letters been found upon them clearly establishing\ntheir guilt. Hanno, the foremost citizen of Carthage, aspiring to\nabsolute power, on the occasion of the marriage of a daughter contrived\na plot for administering poison to the whole senate and so making\nhimself prince. The scheme being discovered, the senate took no steps\nagainst him beyond passing a law to limit the expense of banquets and\nmarriage ceremonies. So great was the respect they paid to his quality.\n\nTrue, the _execution_ of a plot against your country is attended with\ngreater difficulty and danger, since it seldom happens that, in\nconspiring against so many, your own resources are sufficient by\nthemselves; for it is not every one who, like C\u00e6sar, Agathocles, or\nCleomenes, is at the head of an army, so as to be able at a stroke, and\nby open force to make himself master of his country. To such as these,\ndoubtless, the path is safe and easy enough; but others who have not\nsuch an assembled force ready at their command, must effect their ends\neither by stratagem and fraud, or with the help of foreign troops. Of\nsuch stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of\nPisistratus the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and thereby\ngaining the favour of his fellow-citizens, showed himself to them one\nmorning covered with wounds and blood, declaring that he had been thus\noutraged through the jealousy of the nobles, and asking that he might\nhave an armed guard assigned for his protection. With the authority\nwhich this lent him, he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to\nbecome tyrant of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, on his\nreturn with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed the command of the\npublic guard, as a mere office of routine which others had declined.\nVery soon, however, this armed force gave him so much importance that\nhe became the supreme ruler of the State. And many others have followed\nother plans and methods, and in the course of time, and without\nincurring danger, have achieved their aim.\n\nConspirators against their country, whether trusting to their own\nforces or to foreign aid, have had more or less success in proportion\nas they have been favoured by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just\nnow, was overthrown. Hanno, who has also been mentioned, failing to\naccomplish his object by poison, armed his partisans to the number of\nmany thousands; but both he and they came to an ill end. On the other\nhand, certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to become its tyrants,\nsummoned a Spartan army to their assistance, and usurped the absolute\ncontrol of the city. In short, if we examine all the conspiracies which\nmen have engaged in against their country, we shall find that few or\nnone have been quelled in their inception, but that all have either\nsucceeded, or have broken down in their execution. Once executed, they\nentail no further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a\nprincedom. For the man who becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and\nordinary dangers in which a tyranny involves him, and has no remedies\nagainst them save those of which I have already spoken.\n\nThis is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies. If\nI have noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather\nthan those wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because,\ngenerally speaking, the method of proceeding is the same in both. It is\ntrue, nevertheless, that conspiracies which are to be carried out by\npoison are, by reason of their uncertainty, attended by greater danger.\nFor since fewer opportunities offer for their execution, you must have\nan understanding with persons who can command opportunities. But it is\ndangerous to have to depend on others. Again, many causes may hinder a\npoisoned draught from proving mortal; as when the murderers of\nCommodus, on his vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle him.\n\nPrinces, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy, for when a\nconspiracy is formed against them, it either carries them off, or\ndiscredits them: since, if it succeeds, they die; while, if it be\ndiscovered, and the conspirators be put to death themselves, it will\nalways be believed that the whole affair has been trumped up by the\nprince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the goods and\nblood of those whom he has made away with. Let me not, however, forget\nto warn the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is\ndirected, that on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to\npunish it, they endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its\ncharacter, and after carefully weighing the strength of the\nconspirators with their own, on finding it preponderate, never suffer\ntheir knowledge of the plot to appear until they are ready with a force\nsufficient to crush it. For otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will\nonly give the signal for their destruction. They must strive therefore\nto seem unconscious of what is going on; for conspirators who see\nthemselves detected are driven forward by necessity and will stick at\nnothing. Of this precaution we have an example in Roman history, when\nthe officers of the two legions, who, as has already been mentioned,\nwere left behind to defend the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired\ntogether against the Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy\nreaching Rome, Rutilius the new consul was charged to see to it; who,\nnot to excite the suspicions of the conspirators, publicly gave out\nthat by order of the senate the Capuan legions were continued in their\nstation. The conspirators believing this, and thinking they would have\nample time to execute their plans, made no effort to hasten matters,\nbut remained at their ease, until they found that the consul was moving\none of the two legions to a distance from the other. This arousing\ntheir suspicion, led them to disclose their designs and endeavour to\ncarry them out.\n\nNow, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever\nway we look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those\nmatters wherein time seems of little importance, and how active they\nbecome when necessity urges them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth\ndesiring for their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy,\nuse any more effectual means to do so, than by artfully holding out to\nthe conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present\nitself; awaiting which, and believing they have time and to spare for\nwhat they have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth all\nthe leisure needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects\nthese precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the\nDuke of Athens, and with Guglielmo de\u2019 Pazzi. For the Duke, who had\nmade himself tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being\nconspired against, without further inquiry into the matter, caused one\nof the conspirators to be seized; whereupon the rest at once armed\nthemselves and deprived him of his government. Guglielmo, again, being\ncommissary in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501, and learning that a\nconspiracy was being hatched in Arezzo to take the town from the\nFlorentines and give it over to the Vitelli, repaired thither with all\nhaste; and without providing himself with the necessary forces or\ngiving a thought to the strength of the conspirators, on the advice of\nthe bishop, his son, had one of them arrested. Which becoming known to\nthe others, they forthwith rushed to arms, and taking the town from the\nFlorentines, made Guglielmo their prisoner. Where, however,\nconspiracies are weak, they may and should be put down without scruple\nor hesitation.\n\nTwo methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which have occasionally\nbeen followed in dealing with conspiracies, are in no way to be\ncommended. One of these was that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom\nI have just now spoken, who to have it thought that he confided in the\ngoodwill of the Florentines, caused a certain man who gave information\nof a plot against him, to be put to death. The other was that followed\nby Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the intentions of one whom he\nsuspected, arranged with Calippus, whom he trusted, to pretend to get\nup a conspiracy against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped any\nadvantage from the course he followed. For the one discouraged\ninformers and gave heart to those who were disposed to conspire, the\nother prepared an easy road to his own death, or rather was prime mover\nin a conspiracy against himself. As the event showed. For Calippus\nhaving free leave to plot against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he\ndeprived him at once of his State and life.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\u2014_Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and\nfrom Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at\nother times reek with Blood_.\n\n\nSince we find from history that in the countless changes which have\nbeen made from freedom to servitude and from servitude to freedom,\nsometimes an infinite multitude have perished, while at others not a\nsoul has suffered (as when Rome made her change from kings to consuls,\non which occasion none was banished save Tarquin, and no harm was done\nto any other), it may perhaps be asked, how it happens that of these\nrevolutions, some have been attended by bloodshed and others not.\n\nThe answer I take to be this. The government which suffers change\neither has or has not had its beginning in violence. And since the\ngovernment which has its beginning in violence must start by inflicting\ninjuries on many, it must needs happen that on its downfall those who\nwere injured will desire to avenge themselves; from which desire for\nvengeance the slaughter and death of many will result. But when a\ngovernment originates with, and derives its authority from the whole\ncommunity, there is no reason why the community, if it withdraw that\nauthority, should seek to injure any except the prince from whom it\nwithdraws it. Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and the\nexpulsion of the Tarquins took place in this way. Of a like character\nwas the government of the Medici in Florence, and, accordingly, upon\ntheir overthrow in the year 1494, no injury was done to any save\nthemselves.\n\nIn such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do not occasion any\nvery great danger. But the changes wrought by men who have wrongs to\nrevenge, are always of a most dangerous kind, and such, to say the\nleast, as may well cause dismay in the minds of those who read of them.\nBut since history abounds with instances of such changes I need say no\nmore about them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\u2014_That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must\ngive heed to its Character and Condition_\n\n\nI have said before that a bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a\ncommonwealth which has not become corrupted. This opinion is not only\nsupported by the arguments already advanced, but is further confirmed\nby the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. For\nSpurius, being ambitious, and desiring to obtain extraordinary\nauthority in Rome, and to win over the people by loading them with\nbenefits (as, for instance, by selling them those lands which the\nRomans had taken from the Hernici,) his designs were seen through by\nthe senate, and laid him under such suspicion, that when in haranguing\nthe people he offered them the money realized by the sale of the grain\nbrought from Sicily at the public expense, they would have none of it,\nbelieving that he offered it as the price of their freedom. Now, had\nthe people been corrupted, they would not have refused this bribe, but\nwould have opened rather than closed the way to the tyranny.\n\nThe example of Manlius is still more striking. For in his case we see\nwhat excellent gifts both of mind and body, and what splendid services\nto his country were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness to\nreign which we find bred in him by his jealousy of the honours paid\nCamillus. For so darkened did his mind become, that without reflecting\nwhat were the institutions to which Rome was accustomed, or testing the\nmaterial he had to work on, when he would have seen that it was still\nunfit to be moulded to evil ends, he set himself to stir up tumults\nagainst the senate and against the laws of his country.\n\nAnd herein we recognize the excellence of this city of Rome, and of the\nmaterials whereof it was composed. For although the nobles were wont to\nstand up stoutly for one another, not one of them stirred to succour\nManlius, and not one of his kinsfolk made any effort on his behalf, so\nthat although it was customary, in the case of other accused persons,\nfor their friends to put on black and sordid raiment, with all the\nother outward signs of grief, in order to excite pity for the accused,\nnone was seen to do any of these things for Manlius. Even the tribunes\nof the people, though constantly ready to promote whatever courses\nseemed to favour the popular cause, and the more vehemently the more\nthey seemed to make against the nobles, in this instance sided with the\nnobles to put down the common enemy. Nay the very people themselves,\nkeenly alive to their own interests, and well disposed towards any\nattempt to damage the nobles, though they showed Manlius many proofs of\ntheir regard, nevertheless, when he was cited by the tribunes to appear\nbefore them and submit his cause for their decision, assumed the part\nof judges and not of defenders, and without scruple or hesitation\nsentenced him to die. Wherefore, I think, that there is no example in\nthe whole Roman history which serves so well as this to demonstrate the\nvirtues of all ranks in that republic. For not a man in the whole city\nbestirred himself to shield a citizen endowed with every great quality,\nand who, both publicly and privately, had done so much that deserved\npraise. But in all, the love of country outweighed every other thought,\nand all looked less to his past deserts than to the dangers which his\npresent conduct threatened; from which to relieve themselves they put\nhim to death. \u201c_Such_,\u201d says Livius, \u201c_was the fate of a man worthy our\nadmiration had he not been born in a free State_.\u201d\n\nAnd here two points should be noted. The first, that glory is to be\nsought by different methods in a corrupt city, and in one which still\npreserves its freedom. The second, which hardly differs from the first,\nthat in their actions, and especially in matters of moment, men must\nhave regard to times and circumstances and adapt themselves thereto.\nFor those persons who from an unwise choice, or from natural\ninclination, run counter to the times will for the most part live\nunhappily, and find all they undertake issue in failure; whereas those\nwho accommodate themselves to the times are fortunate and successful.\nAnd from the passage cited we may plainly infer, that had Manlius lived\nin the days of Marius and Sylla, when the body of the State had become\ncorrupted, so that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his\nambition, he might have had the same success as they had, and as those\nothers had who after them aspired to absolute power; and, conversely,\nthat if Sylla and Marius had lived in the days of Manlius, they must\nhave broken down at the very beginning of their attempts.\n\nFor one man, by mischievous arts and measures, may easily prepare the\nground for the universal corruption of a city; but no one man in his\nlifetime can carry that corruption so far, as himself to reap the\nharvest; or granting that one man\u2019s life might be long enough for this\npurpose, it would be impossible for him, having regard to the ordinary\nhabits of men, who grow impatient and cannot long forego the\ngratification of their desires, to wait until the corruption was\ncomplete. Moreover, men deceive themselves in respect of their own\naffairs, and most of all in respect of those on which they are most\nbent; so that either from impatience or from self-deception, they rush\nupon undertakings for which the time is not ripe, and so come to an ill\nend. Wherefore to obtain absolute authority in a commonwealth and to\ndestroy its liberties, you must find the body of the State already\ncorrupted, and corrupted by a gradual wasting continued from generation\nto generation; which, indeed, takes place necessarily, unless, as has\nbeen already explained, the State be often reinforced by good examples,\nor brought back to its first beginnings by wise laws.\n\nManlius, therefore, would have been a rare and renowned man had he been\nborn in a corrupt city; and from his example we see that citizens\nseeking to introduce changes in the form of their government, whether\nin favour of liberty or despotism, ought to consider what materials\nthey have to deal with, and then judge of the difficulty of their task.\nFor it is no less arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people\ndisposed to live in servitude, than to enslave a people who desire to\nlive free.\n\nAnd because it has been said above, that in their actions men must take\ninto account the character of the times in which they live, and guide\nthemselves accordingly, I shall treat this point more fully in the\nfollowing Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\u2014_That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with\nthe Times._\n\n\nI have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune of men depends on\nwhether their methods of acting accord with the character of the times.\nFor we see that in what they do some men act impulsively, others warily\nand with caution. And because, from inability to preserve the just\nmean, they in both of these ways overstep the true limit, they commit\nmistakes in one direction or the other. He, however, will make fewest\nmistakes, and may expect to prosper most, who, while following the\ncourse to which nature inclines him, finds, as I have said, his method\nof acting in accordance with the times in which he lives.\n\nAll know that in his command of the Roman armies, Fabius Maximus\ndisplayed a prudence and caution very different from the audacity and\nhardihood natural to his countrymen; and it was his good fortune that\nhis methods suited with the times. For Hannibal coming into Italy in\nall the flush of youth and recent success, having already by two\ndefeats stripped Rome of her best soldiers and filled her with dismay,\nnothing could have been more fortunate for that republic than to find a\ngeneral able, by his deliberateness and caution, to keep the enemy at\nbay. Nor, on the other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon times better\nsuited to the methods which he used, and by which he crowned himself\nwith glory. That he acted in accordance with his natural bent, and not\nfrom a reasoned choice, we may gather from this, that when Scipio, to\nbring the war to an end, proposed to pass with his army into Africa,\nFabius, unable to depart from his characteristic methods and habits,\nstrenuously opposed him; so that had it rested with him, Hannibal might\nnever have left Italy. For he perceived not that the times had changed,\nand that with them it was necessary to change the methods of\nprosecuting the war. Had Fabius, therefore, been King of Rome, he might\nwell have caused the war to end unhappily, not knowing how to\naccommodate his methods to the change in the times. As it was, he lived\nin a commonwealth in which there were many citizens, and many different\ndispositions; and which as it produced a Fabius, excellent at a time\nwhen it was necessary to protract hostilities, so also, afterwards gave\nbirth to a Scipio, at a time suited to bring them to a successful\nclose.\n\nAnd hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer, and has a more\nsustained good fortune than a princedom, because from the diversity in\nthe characters of its citizens, it can adapt itself better than a\nprince can to the diversity of times. For, as I have said before, a man\naccustomed to follow one method, will never alter it; whence it must\nneeds happen that when times change so as no longer to accord with his\nmethod, he will be ruined. Piero Soderini, of whom I have already\nspoken, was guided in all his actions by patience and gentleness, and\nhe and his country prospered while the times were in harmony with these\nmethods. But, afterwards, when a time came when it behoved him to have\ndone with patience and gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and\nwas ruined together with his country. Pope Julius II., throughout the\nwhole of his pontificate, was governed by impulse and passion, and\nbecause the times were in perfect accord, all his undertakings\nprospered. But had other times come requiring other qualities, he could\nnot have escaped destruction, since he could not have changed his\nmethods nor his habitual line of conduct.\n\nAs to why such changes are impossible, two reasons may be given. One is\nthat we cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature. The other,\nthat when a man has been very successful while following a particular\nmethod, he can never be convinced that it is for his advantage to try\nsome other. And hence it results that a man\u2019s fortunes vary, because\ntimes change and he does not change with them. So, too, with\ncommonwealths, which, as we have already shown at length, are ruined\nfrom not altering their institutions to suit the times. And\ncommonwealths are slower to change than princes are, changes costing\nthem more effort; because occasions must be waited for which shall stir\nthe whole community, and it is not enough that a single citizen alters\nhis method of acting.\n\nBut since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who wore out Hannibal\nby keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the\nfollowing Chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at\nall risks, can be prevented by that enemy from doing so.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\u2014_That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces\nit on him at all risks._\n\n\n\u201c_Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator against the Gauls, being\nunwilling to tempt Fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a\ndisadvantageous position would every day render weaker, protracted the\nwar._\u201d\n\nWhen a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to\nfall into, I think it not amiss to mark it again and again with\ndisapproval. Wherefore, although I have already shown repeatedly how in\naffairs of moment the actions of the moderns conform not to those of\nantiquity, still it seems to me not superfluous, in this place, to say\nthe same thing once more. For if in any particular the moderns have\ndeviated from the methods of the ancients, it is especially in their\nmethods of warfare, wherein not one of those rules formerly so much\nesteemed is now attended to. And this because both princes and\ncommonwealths have devolved the charge of such matters upon others,\nand, to escape danger, have kept aloof from all military service; so\nthat although one or another of the princes of our times may\noccasionally be seen present in person with his army, we are not\ntherefore to expect from him any further praiseworthy behaviour. For\neven where such personages take part in any warlike enterprise, they do\nso out of ostentation and from no nobler motive; though doubtless from\nsometimes seeing their soldiers face to face, and from retaining to\nthemselves the title of command, they are likely to make fewer blunders\nthan we find made by republics, and most of all by the republics of\nItaly, which though altogether dependent upon others, and themselves\nutterly ignorant of everything relating to warfare, do yet, that they\nmay figure as the commanders of their armies, take upon them to direct\ntheir movements, and in doing so commit countless mistakes; some of\nwhich have been considered elsewhere but one is of such importance as\nto deserve notice here.\n\nWhen these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of\ntheir Captains, it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can\ngive him is to charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the\ncontrary, to do what he can to avoid fighting. Wherein they imagine\nthemselves to imitate the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who by\nprotracting the war with Hannibal, saved the Roman commonwealth; not\nperceiving that in most instances such advice to a captain is either\nuseless or hurtful. For the truth of the matter is, that a captain who\nwould keep the field, cannot decline battle when his adversary forces\nit on him at all hazards. So that the instruction to avoid battle is\nbut tantamount to saying, \u201cYou shall engage when it pleases your enemy,\nand not when it suits yourself.\u201d For if you would keep the field and\nyet avoid battle, the only safe course is to interpose a distance of at\nleast fifty miles between you and your enemy, and afterwards to\nmaintain so vigilant a look-out, that should he advance you will have\ntime to make your retreat. Another method is to shut yourself up in\nsome town. But both of these methods are extremely disadvantageous. For\nby following the former, you leave your country a prey to the enemy,\nand a valiant prince would far sooner risk the chances of battle than\nprolong a war in a manner so disastrous to his subjects; while by\nadopting the latter method, and shutting yourself up in a town with\nyour army, there is manifest danger of your being besieged, and\npresently reduced by famine and forced to surrender. Wherefore it is\nmost mischievous to seek to avoid battle in either of these two ways.\n\nTo intrench yourself in a strong position, as Fabius was wont to do, is\na good method when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not\nadvance to attack you in your intrenchments; yet it cannot truly be\nsaid that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he sought to give\nbattle where he could do so with advantage. For had Hannibal desired to\nfight, Fabius would have waited for him and fought him. But Hannibal\nnever dared to engage him on his own ground. So that an engagement was\navoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius, since if either had been\nminded to fight at all hazards the other would have been constrained to\ntake one of three courses, that is to say, one or other of the two just\nnow mentioned, or else to retreat. The truth of this is confirmed by\nnumberless examples, and more particularly by what happened in the war\nwaged by the Romans against Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus.\nFor Philip being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to give them\nbattle; and to avoid battle, sought at first to do as Fabius had done\nin Italy, posting himself on the summit of a hill, where he intrenched\nhimself strongly, thinking that the Romans would not venture to attack\nhim there. But they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments,\ndrove him from his position; when, unable to make further resistance,\nhe fled with the greater part of his army, and was only saved from\nutter destruction by the difficulty of the ground, which made it\nimpossible for the Romans to pursue him.\n\nPhilip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping too near the\nRomans, was forced to fly; and learning from this experience that to\nescape fighting it was not enough for him to intrench himself on a\nhill, yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town, he was\nconstrained to take the other alternative of keeping at a distance of\nmany miles from the Roman legions. Accordingly, when the Romans entered\none province, he betook himself to another, and when they left a\nprovince he entered it. But perceiving that by protracting the war in\nthis way, his condition grew constantly worse, while his subjects\nsuffered grievously, now from his own troops, at another time from\nthose of the enemy, he at last resolved to hazard battle, and so came\nto a regular engagement with the Romans.\n\nIt is for your interest, therefore, not to fight, when you possess the\nsame advantages as Fabius, or as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words,\nwhen your army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not\nattack you in your intrenchments, and although he has got within your\nterritory has yet gained no footing there, and suffers in consequence\nfrom the want of necessary supplies. In such circumstances delay is\nuseful, for the reasons assigned by Titus Livius when speaking of\nSulpitius. In no other circumstances, however, can an engagement be\navoided without dishonour or danger. For to retire as Philip did, is\nnothing else than defeat; and the disgrace is greater in proportion as\nyour valour has been less put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky\nenough to escape, another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the\nground, might not have the same good fortune.\n\nThat Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none\nwill venture to maintain. Wherefore, when he had to encounter Scipio in\nAfrica, it may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging\nthe war he would have done so; and, possibly, being a skilful captain\nand in command of a valiant army, he might have been able to do what\nFabius did in Italy. But since he took not that course, we may infer\nthat he was moved by sufficient reasons. For the captain who has got an\narmy together, and perceives that from want of money or friends he\ncannot maintain it long, must be a mere madman if he do not at once,\nand before his army melts away, try the fortunes of battle; since he is\ncertain to lose by delay, while by fighting he may chance to succeed.\nAnd there is this also to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if\nwe be defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is to be won in\nbeing beaten by force, than in a defeat from any other cause. And this\nwe may suppose to have weighed with Hannibal. On the other hand,\nsupposing Hannibal to have declined battle, Scipio, even if he had\nlacked courage to follow him up and attack him in his intrenched camp,\nwould not have suffered thereby; for as he had defeated Syphax, and got\npossession of many of the African towns, he could have rested where he\nwas in the same security and with the same convenience as if he had\nbeen in Italy. But this was not the case with Hannibal when he had to\nencounter Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they were opposed to\nSulpitius.\n\nLeast of all can he decline battle who invades with his army the\ncountry of another; for seeking to enter his enemy\u2019s country, he must\nfight whenever the enemy comes forward to meet him; and is under still\ngreater necessity to fight, if he undertake the siege of any town. As\nhappened in our own day with Duke Charles of Burgundy, who, when\nbeleaguering Morat, a town of the Swiss, was by them attacked and\nrouted; or as happened with the French army encamped against Novara,\nwhich was in like manner defeated by the Swiss.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\u2014_That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker\nthan they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset._\n\n\nThe power exercised in Rome by the tribunes of the people was great,\nand, as I have repeatedly explained, was necessary, since otherwise\nthere would have been no check on the ambition of the nobles, and the\ncommonwealth must have grown corrupted far sooner than it did. But\nbecause, as I have said elsewhere, there is in everything a latent evil\npeculiar to it, giving rise to new mischances, it becomes necessary to\nprovide against these by new ordinances. The authority of the tribunes,\ntherefore, being insolently asserted so as to become formidable to the\nnobility and to the entire city, disorders dangerous to the liberty of\nthe State must thence have resulted, had not a method been devised by\nAppius Claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes. This was,\nto secure that there should always be one of their number timid, or\nvenal, or else a lover of the general good, who could be influenced to\noppose the rest whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to\nthe wishes of the senate. This remedy was a great restraint on the\nexcessive authority of the tribunes, and on many occasions proved\nserviceable to Rome.\n\nI am led by this circumstance to remark, that when many powerful\npersons are united against one, who, although no match for the others\ncollectively, is also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this\nsingle and less I powerful person, than of the many who together are\nmuch stronger. For setting aside an infinity of accidents which can be\nturned to better account by one than by many, it will always happen\nthat, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will be able to divide\nthe many, and weaken the force which was strong while it was united. In\nproof whereof, I shall not refer to ancient examples, though many such\nmight be cited, but content myself with certain modern instances taken\nfrom the events of our own times.\n\nIn the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians, who finding\ntheir position desperate, and being unable to keep their army any\nlonger in the field, bribed Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan,\nand so succeeded in effecting a settlement, whereby they not only\nrecovered the towns they had lost, but also obtained for themselves a\npart of the territories of Ferrara; so that those were by peace the\ngainers, who in war had been the losers. Not many years ago the whole\nworld was banded together against France; but before the war came to a\nclose, Spain breaking with the confederates and entering into a\nseparate treaty with France, the other members of the league also, were\npresently forced to make terms.\n\nWherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many\nagainst one, that this one, if he have strength to withstand the first\nshock, and can temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to\nprevail. But unless he can do this he runs a thousand dangers: as did\nthe Venetians in the year 1508, who, could they have temporized with\nthe French, and so got time to conciliate some of those who had\ncombined against them, might have escaped the ruin which then overtook\nthem. But not possessing such a strong army as would have enabled them\nto temporize with their enemies, and consequently not having the time\nneeded for gaining any to their side, they were undone. Yet we know\nthat the Pope, as soon as he had obtained what he wanted, made friends\nwith them, and that Spain did the like; and that both the one and the\nother of these powers would gladly have saved the Lombard territory for\nthemselves, nor would, if they could have helped it, have left it to\nFrance, so as to augment her influence in Italy.\n\nThe Venetians, therefore, should have given up a part to save the rest;\nand had they done so at a time when the surrender would not have seemed\nto be made under compulsion, and before any step had been taken in the\ndirection of war, it would have been a most prudent course; although\ndiscreditable and probably of little avail after war had been begun.\nBut until the war broke out, few of the Venetian citizens recognized\nthe danger, fewer still the remedy, and none ventured to prescribe it.\n\nBut to return to the point whence we started, I say that the same\nsafeguard for their country which the Roman senate found against the\nambition of the tribunes in their number, is within the reach of the\nprince who is attacked by many adversaries, if he only know to use\nprudently those methods which promote division.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\u2014_A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it\nnecessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from\nthat necessity._\n\n\nElsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by\nNecessity, and how much of their renown is due to her guidance, so that\nit has even been said by some philosophers, that the hands and tongues\nof men, the two noblest instruments of their fame, would never have\nworked to perfection, nor have brought their labours to that pitch of\nexcellence we see them to have reached, had they not been impelled by\nthis cause. The captains of antiquity, therefore, knowing the virtues\nof this necessity, and seeing the steadfast courage which it gave their\nsoldiers in battle, spared no effort to bring their armies under its\ninfluence, while using all their address to loosen its hold upon their\nenemies. For which reason, they would often leave open to an adversary\nsome way which they might have closed, and close against their own men\nsome way they might have left open.\n\nWhosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself stubbornly, or an\narmy fight resolutely in the field, must before all things endeavour to\nimpress the minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no\nother course is open to them. In like manner a prudent captain who\nundertakes the attack of a city, will measure the ease or difficulty of\nhis enterprise, by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity\nwhich compels the inhabitants to defend it; and where he finds that\nnecessity to be strong, he may infer that his task will be difficult,\nbut if otherwise, that it will be easy.\n\nAnd hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a\nrevolt than to be taken for the first time. Because on a first attack,\nhaving no occasion to fear punishment, since they have given no ground\nof offence, they readily surrender; but when they have revolted, they\nknow that they have given ground of offence, and, fearing punishment,\nare not so easily brought under. A like stubbornness grows from the\nnatural hostility with which princes or republics who are neighbours\nregard one another; which again is caused by the desire to dominate\nover those who live near, or from jealousy of their power. This is more\nparticularly the case with republics, as in Tuscany for example; for\ncontention and rivalry have always made, and always will make it\nextremely hard for one republic to bring another into subjection. And\nfor this reason any one who considers attentively who are the\nneighbours of Florence, and who of Venice, will not marvel so much as\nsome have done, that Florence should have spent more than Venice on her\nwars and gained less; since this results entirely from the Venetians\nfinding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their resistance\nthan the Florentines theirs. For all the towns in the neighbourhood of\nVenice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and\nthose who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing\nmasters, nay are often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though\nshe has had more powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from\nfinding their towns less stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the\nlatter, surrounded exclusively by free cities, has had it in her power\nto do.\n\nBut, to return to the matter in hand, the captain who attacks a town\nshould use what care he can, not to drive the defenders to extremities,\nlest he render them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should\npromise them pardon, and when they fear for their freedom should assure\nthem that he has no designs against the common welfare, but only\nagainst a few ambitious men in their city; for such assurances have\noften smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And although pretexts\nof this sort are easily seen through, especially by the wise, the mass\nof the people are often beguiled by them, because desiring present\ntranquillity, they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these\nspecious promises. By means such as these, therefore, cities\ninnumerable have been brought into subjection, as recently was the case\nwith Florence. The ruin of Crassus and his army was similarly caused:\nfor although he himself saw through the empty promises of the\nParthians, as meant only to blind the Roman soldiers to the necessity\nof defending themselves, yet he could not keep his men steadfast, they,\nas we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain, being\ndeceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies.\n\nOn the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the instance of a few\nambitious men, and in violation of the terms of the truce made with\nthem, had overrun and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome,\nafterwards sent envoys to Rome to implore peace, offering to restore\nwhatever they had taken, and to surrender the authors of these injuries\nand outrages as prisoners, and these offers were rejected by the\nRomans, and the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them no hope\nof an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then commanded the army of the\nSamnites, showed them in a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired\nwar at all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake of his\ncountry he wished for peace, necessity constrained him to prepare for\nwar; telling them \u201c_that was a just war which could not be escaped, and\nthose arms sacred in which lay their only hopes._\u201d And building on this\nnecessity, he raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident\nexpectation of success. That I may not have to revert to this matter\nagain, it will be convenient to notice here those examples from Roman\nhistory which most merit attention. When Caius Manilius was in command\nof the legions encamped against Veii, a division of the Veientine army\nhaving got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius ran forward with a\ncompany of his men to defend them, and, to prevent the escape of the\nVeientines, guarded all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines\nfinding themselves thus shut in, began to fight with such fury that\nthey slew Manilius, and would have destroyed all the rest of the Roman\narmy, had not the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for the\nVeientines to retreat. Here we see that so long as necessity compelled,\nthe Veientines fought most fiercely, but on finding a path opened for\nescape, preferred flight to combat. On another occasion when the\nVolscians and Equians passed with their armies across the Roman\nfrontier, the consuls were sent out to oppose them, and an engagement\nensued. It so happened that when the combat was at its height, the army\nof the Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius, suddenly found\nthemselves shut in between their own camp, which a division of the\nRomans had occupied, and the body of the Roman army; when seeing that\nthey must either perish or cut a way for themselves with their swords,\nVectius said to them, \u201c_Come on, my men, here is no wall or rampart to\nbe scaled: we fight man with man; in valour we are their equals, and\nnecessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us the advantage._\u201d\nHere, then, necessity is spoken of by Titus Livius as _the last and\nmightiest weapon_.\n\nCamillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when\nhe had got within the town of Veii with his army, to make its surrender\neasier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to\nhis men, so that the Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they\nfound unarmed. Whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons, the\ntown was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device was afterwards\nfollowed by many other captains.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\u2014_Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a\nweak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain._\n\n\nCoriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself to the Volscians,\nand when he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his\ncountrymen, came back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained to\nretire by the might of the Roman arms, but out of reverence for his\nmother. From this incident, says Titus Livius, we may learn that the\nspread of the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains\nthan of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians had always been\nrouted, and only grew successful when Coriolanus became their captain.\n\nBut though Livius be of this opinion, there are many passages in his\nhistory to show that the Roman soldiers, even when left without\nleaders, often performed astonishing feats of valour, nay, sometimes\nmaintained better discipline and fought with greater spirit after their\nconsuls were slain than they had before. For example, the army under\nthe Scipios in Spain, after its two leaders had fallen, was able by its\nvalour not merely to secure its own safety, but to overcome the enemy\nand preserve the province for the Roman Republic. So that to state the\ncase fairly, we find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers\nalone gained the day, as well as many in which success was wholly due\nto the excellence of the captain. From which it may be inferred that\nthe one stands in need of the other.\n\nAnd here the question suggests itself: which is the more formidable, a\ngood army badly led, or a good captain commanding an indifferent army;\nthough, were we to adopt the opinion of C\u00e6sar on this head, we ought\nlightly to esteem both. For when C\u00e6sar went to Spain against Afranius\nand Petreius, who were there in command of a strong army, he made\nlittle account of them, saying, \u201c_that he went to fight an army without\na captain_,\u201d indicating thereby the weakness of these generals. And,\nconversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said,\n\u201c_I go against a captain without an army_.\u201d[13]\n\n [13] Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde\n reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu. (_Suet. in Vita J. Caes._)\n\n\nA further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good\ncaptain to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain.\nAs to this it might be thought there was barely room for doubt, since\nit ought to be far easier for many who are good to find one who is good\nor teach him to become so, than for one who is good to find or make\nmany good. Lucullus when sent against Mithridates was wholly without\nexperience in war: but his brave army, which was provided with many\nexcellent officers, speedily taught him to be a good captain. On the\nother hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers, armed a\nnumber of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by Sempronius\nGracchus, he in a short time made them into a serviceable army. So too,\nas I have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas after rescuing\nThebes, their native city, from Spartan thraldom, in a short time made\nsuch valiant soldiers of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their\naid not only to withstand, but even to defeat the Spartan armies. So\nthat the question may seem to be equally balanced, excellence on one\nside generally finding excellence on the other.\n\nA good army, however, when left without a good leader, as the\nMacedonian army was on the death of Alexander, or as those veterans\nwere who had fought in the civil wars, is apt to grow restless and\nturbulent. Wherefore I am convinced that it is better to trust to the\ncaptain who has time allowed him to discipline his men, and means\nwherewith to equip them, than to a tumultuary host with a chance leader\nof its own choosing. But twofold is the merit and twofold the glory of\nthose captains who not only have had to subdue their enemies, but also\nbefore encountering them to organize and discipline their forces. This,\nhowever, is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined, that were\nmany of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world,\ncalled on to perform it, they would be much less thought of than they\nare.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\u2014_Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and\nunexpected Sights or Sounds._\n\n\nThat the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected sights or sounds\nmay have momentous consequences in combat, might be shown by many\ninstances, but by none better than by what befell in the battle fought\nbetween the Romans and the Volscians, when Quintius, the Roman general,\nseeing one wing of his army begin to waver, shouted aloud to his men to\nstand firm, for the other wing was already victorious. Which words of\nhis giving confidence to his own troops and striking the enemy with\ndismay won him the battle. But if a cry like this, produce great effect\non a well disciplined army, far greater must be its effect on one which\nis ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such a wind the whole mass\nwill be moved, as I shall show by a well-known instance happening in\nour own times.\n\nA few years ago the city of Perugia was split into the two factions of\nthe Baglioni and the Oddi, the former holding the government, the\nlatter being in exile. The Oddeschi, however, with the help of friends,\nhaving got together an armed force which they lodged in villages of\ntheir own near Perugia, obtained, by the favour of some of their party,\nan entrance into the city by night, and moving forward without\ndiscovery, came as far as the public square. And as all the streets of\nPerugia are barred with chains drawn across them at their corners, the\nOddeschi had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer\nwherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so that horsemen might\npass. When the only chain remaining unbroken was that which closed the\npublic square, the alarm having now been given, the hammerman was so\nimpeded by the crowd pressing behind him that he could not raise his\narm to strike freely. Whereupon, to get more room for his work, he\ncalled aloud to the others to stand back; and the word back passing\nfrom rank to rank those furthest off began to run, and, presently, the\nothers also, with such precipitancy, that they fell into utter\ndisorder. In this way, and from this trifling circumstance, the attempt\nof the Oddeschi came to nothing.\n\nHere we may note that discipline is needed in an army, not so much to\nenable it to fight according to a settled order, as that it may not be\nthrown into confusion by every insignificant accident. For a tumultuary\nhost is useless in war, simply because every word, or cry, or sound,\nmay throw it into a panic and cause it to fly. Wherefore it behoves a\ngood captain to provide that certain fixed persons shall receive his\norders and pass them on to the rest, and to accustom his soldiers to\nlook to these persons, and to them only, to be informed what his orders\nare. For whenever this precaution is neglected the gravest mishaps are\nconstantly seen to ensue.\n\nAs regards strange and unexpected sights, every captain should\nendeavour while his army is actually engaged with the enemy, to effect\nsome such feint or diversion as will encourage his own men and dismay\nhis adversary since this of all things that can happen is the likeliest\nto ensure victory. In evidence whereof we may cite the example of\nCneius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator, who, when about to give battle to\nthe Gauls, after arming his sutlers and camp followers, mounted them on\nmules and other beasts of burden, furnished them with spears and\nbanners to look like cavalry, and placing them behind a hill, ordered\nthem on a given signal, when the fight was at the hottest, to appear\nand show themselves to the enemy. All which being carried out as he had\narranged, threw the Gauls into such alarm, that they lost the battle.\n\nA good captain, therefore, has two things to see to: first, to contrive\nhow by some sudden surprise he may throw his enemy into confusion; and\nnext, to be prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against him\nto discover and defeat it; as the stratagem of Semiramis was defeated\nby the King of India. For Semiramis seeing that this king had elephants\nin great numbers, to dismay him by showing that she, too, was well\nsupplied, caused the skins of many oxen and buffaloes to be sewn\ntogether in the shape of elephants and placed upon camels and sent to\nthe front. But the trick being detected by the king, turned out not\nonly useless but hurtful to its contriver. In a battle which the\nDictator Mamercus fought against the people of Fidenae, the latter, to\nstrike terror into the minds of the Romans, contrived that while the\ncombat raged a number of soldiers should issue from Fidenae bearing\nlances tipped with fire, thinking that the Romans, disturbed by so\nstrange a sight, would be thrown into confusion.\n\nWe are to note, however, with regard to such contrivances, that if they\nare to serve any useful end, they should _be_ formidable as well as\n_seem_ so; for when they menace a real danger, their weak points are\nnot so soon discerned. When they have more of pretence than reality, it\nwill be well either to dispense with them altogether, or resorting to\nthem, to keep them, like the muleteers of Sulpitius, in the background,\nso that they be not too readily found out. For any weakness inherent in\nthem is soon discovered if they be brought near, when, as happened with\nthe elephants of Semiramis and the fiery spears of the men of Fidenae,\nthey do harm rather than good. For although by this last-mentioned\ndevice the Romans at the first were somewhat disconcerted, so soon as\nthe dictator came up and began to chide them, asking if they were not\nashamed to fly like bees from smoke, and calling on them to turn on\ntheir enemy, and \u201c_with her own flames efface that Fidenae whom their\nbenefits could not conciliate_,\u201d they took courage; so that the device\nproved of no service to its contrivers, who were vanquished in the\nbattle.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\u2014_That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is\nharmful to have more Leaders than one._\n\n\nThe men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom the Romans had\nsettled among them, and putting them to the sword, the Romans to avenge\nthe insult appointed four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom\nthey retained to see to the defence of Rome, while the other three were\nsent against the Fidenati and the Veientines. But these three falling\nout among themselves, and being divided in their counsels, returned\nfrom their mission with discredit though not with loss. Of which\ndiscredit they were themselves the cause. That they sustained no loss\nwas due to the valour of their soldiers But the senate perceiving the\nsource of the mischief, to the end that one man might put to rights\nwhat three had thrown into confusion, resorted to the appointment of a\ndictator.\n\nHere we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or\nin a town which has to defend itself. And the case could not be put in\nclearer words than by Titus Livius, where he says, \u201c_The three tribunes\nwith consular authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have\nmany leaders; for each forming a different opinion, and each abiding by\nhis own, they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies._\u201d And\nthough this example suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war\nof divided commands, to make the matter still plainer I shall cite two\nfurther instances, one ancient and one modern.\n\nIn the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering Milan, sent\ntroops to restore Pisa to the Florentines, Giovambattista Ridolfi and\nLuca d\u2019Antonio Albizzi going with them as commissaries. Now, because\nGiovambattista had a great name, and was older than Luca, the latter\nleft the whole management of everything to him; and although he did not\nshow his jealousy of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his\nsilence, and by being so careless and indifferent about everything,\nthat he gave no help in the business of the siege either by word or\ndeed, just as though he had been a person of no account. But when, in\nconsequence of an accident, Giovambattista had to return to Florence,\nall this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole charge, behaved with\nthe greatest courage, prudence, and zeal, all which qualities had been\nhidden while he held a joint command. Further to bear me out I shall\nagain borrow the words of Titus Livius, who, in relating how when\nQuintius and Agrippa his colleague were sent by the Romans against the\nEquians, Agrippa contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with\nQuintius, observes, \u201c_Most wholesome is it that in affairs of great\nmoment, supreme authority be vested in one man._\u201d Very different,\nhowever, is the course followed by the republics and princes of our own\ndays, who, thinking to be better served, are used to appoint several\ncaptains or commissioners to fill one command; a practice giving rise\nto so much confusion, that were we seeking for the causes of the\noverthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent times, we should\nfind this to be the most active of any.\n\nRightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon\nservice, it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence,\nthan to two of great parts but with a divided command.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\u2014_That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after;\nwhereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are\nrecommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour._\n\n\nIt always has happened and always will, that the great and admirable\nmen of a republic are neglected in peaceful times; because at such\nseasons many citizens are found, who, envying the reputation these men\nhave justly earned, seek to be regarded not merely as their equals but\nas their superiors. Touching this there is a notable passage in\nThucydides, the Greek historian, where he tells how the republic of\nAthens coming victorious out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she had\nbridled the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole of Greece\nunder her authority, was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to\npropose to herself the conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was\nmuch debated, Alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare\nvery little in their thoughts, but who hoped that the enterprise, were\nthey placed in command, might minister to their fame, recommending that\nit should be undertaken. Nicias, on the other hand, one of the best\nesteemed of the Athenian citizens, was against it, and in addressing\nthe people, gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice,\nthat in advising them not to engage in this war, he urged what was not\nfor his own advantage; for he knew that while Athens remained at peace\nnumberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him: whereas, were\nwar declared, he was certain that none would rank before him or even be\nlooked upon as his equal.\n\nHere we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the\ninfirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens. And this\noffends these persons for two reasons: first, because they are not\ngiven the place they deserve; and second, because they see unworthy men\nand of abilities inferior to their own, as much or more considered than\nthey. Injustice such as this has caused the ruin of many republics. For\ncitizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted, and perceive the\ncause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled, will strive\nto change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare.\nWhen I look for remedies for this state of things, I find two: first,\nto keep the citizens poor, so that wealth without worth shall corrupt\nneither them nor others; second, to be so prepared for war as always to\nbe ready to make war; for then there will always be a need for worthy\ncitizens, as was the case in Rome in early times. For as Rome\nconstantly kept her armies in the field, there was constant opportunity\nfor men to display their valour, nor was it possible to deprive a\ndeserving man of his post and give it to another who was not deserving.\nOr if ever this were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment,\nthere forthwith resulted such disorder and danger, that the city at\nonce retraced its steps and reverted to the true path. But other\nrepublics which are not regulated on the same plan, and make war only\nwhen driven to it by necessity, cannot help committing this injustice,\nnay, will constantly run into it, when, if the great citizen who finds\nhimself slighted be vindictive, and have some credit and following in\nthe city, disorder will always ensue. And though Rome escaped this\ndanger for a time, she too, as has elsewhere been said, having no\nlonger, after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any fear of\nwar, came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would,\nmaking less account of the valour of her captains than of those other\nqualities which gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find Paulus\nEmilius rejected oftener than once when he sought the consulship; nor,\nin fact, obtaining it until the Macedonian war broke out, which, being\njudged a formidable business, was by the voice of the whole city\ncommitted to his management. After the year 1494 our city of Florence\nwas involved in a series of wars, in conducting which none of our\ncitizens had any success until chance threw the command into the hands\nof one who showed us how an army should be led. This was Antonio\nGiacomini, and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot, all\nrivalry on the part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever a\ncaptain or commissary had to be appointed he was unopposed. But when a\nwar came to be undertaken, as to the issue of which no misgivings were\nfelt, and which promised both honour and preferment, so numerous were\nthe competitors for command, that three commissaries having to be\nchosen to conduct the siege of Pisa, Antonio was left out; and though\nit cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our\nrepublic from his not having been sent on this enterprise, we may\nreasonably conjecture that such was indeed the case. For as the people\nof Pisa were then without means either for subsistence or defence, it\nmay be believed that had Antonio been there he would have reduced them\nto such extremities as would have forced them to surrender at\ndiscretion to the Florentines. But Pisa being besieged by captains who\nknew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it, held out so long,\nthat the Florentines, who should have reduced it by force, were obliged\nto buy its submission. Neglect like this might well move Antonio to\nresentment; and he must needs have been both very patient and very\nforgiving if he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could, by the\nruin of the city or by injuries to individual citizens. But a republic\nshould beware not to rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the\nfollowing Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\u2014_That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to\nfill an important Office or Command._\n\n\nA republic should think twice before appointing to an important command\na citizen who has sustained notable wrong at the hands of his\nfellow-citizens. Claudius Nero, quitting the army with which he was\nopposing Hannibal, went with a part of his forces into the March of\nAncona, designing to join the other consul there, and after joining him\nto attack Hasdrubal before he came up with his brother. Now Claudius\nhad previously commanded against Hasdrubal in Spain, and after driving\nhim with his army into such a position that it seemed he must either\nfight at a disadvantage or perish by famine, had been outwitted by his\nadversary, who, while diverting his attention with proposals of terms,\ncontrived to slip through his hands and rob him of the opportunity for\neffecting his destruction. This becoming known in Rome brought Claudius\ninto so much discredit both with the senate and people, that to his\ngreat mortification and displeasure, he was slightingly spoken of by\nthe whole city. But being afterwards made consul and sent to oppose\nHannibal, he took the course mentioned above, which was in itself so\nhazardous that all Rome was filled with doubt and anxiety until tidings\ncame of Hasdrubal\u2019s defeat. When subsequently asked why he had played\nso dangerous a game, wherein without urgent necessity he had staked the\nvery existence of Rome, Claudius answered, he had done so because he\nknew that were he to succeed he would recover whatever credit he had\nlost in Spain; while if he failed, and his attempt had an untoward\nissue, he would be revenged on that city and On those citizens who had\nso ungratefully and indiscreetly wronged him.\n\nBut if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a Roman\ncitizen at a time when Rome was still uncorrupted, we should consider\nhow it may act on the citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then\nwas. And because there is no certain remedy we can apply to such\ndisorders when they arise in republics, it follows that it is\nimpossible to establish a republic which shall endure always; since in\na thousand unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\u2014_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able\nto forestall the designs of his Adversary._\n\n\nIt was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful\nand necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the\nintentions and designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come\nat this knowledge directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches\nit by conjecture. Yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy\u2019s\ndesigns than to construe his actions; and not so much those actions\nwhich are done at a distance from us, as those done in our presence and\nunder our very eyes. For instance, it has often happened that when a\nbattle has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed himself the\nloser, and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this\nmistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself.\nIt was from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the\nbattle of Philippi. For though Brutus was victorious with his wing of\nthe army Cassius, whose wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be\ndefeated, and under this belief gave way to despair and slew himself.\nSo too, in our own days, in the battle fought by Francis, king of\nFrance, with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell,\nthose of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not knowing that the rest had\nbeen routed and slain, thought they had the victory; and so believing\nwould not retreat, but, remaining on the field, renewed the combat the\nfollowing morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were they the only\nsufferers from their mistake, since the armies of the Pope and of Spain\nwere also misled by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction. For on\nthe false report of a victory they crossed the Po, and had they only\nadvanced a little further must have been made prisoners by the\nvictorious French.\n\nAn instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps\nboth of the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being\nin command against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the\nengagement lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as both\narmies had suffered what was almost a defeat, neither returned to their\ncamp, but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought\nthey would be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions, one of\nwhich with the consul, the other with the centurion Tempanius by whose\nvalour the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At daybreak\nthe consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made\nstraight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their\nown country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither\nthought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so\nchanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the\nsecond division of the Roman army, fell in with certain wounded\nEquians, from whom he learned that their commanders had fled,\nabandoning their camp; on hearing which, he at once returned to the\nRoman camp and secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of the\nEquians, went back victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned\nentirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy\u2019s\ncondition. And here we are to note that it may often happen that both\nthe one and the other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same\ndisorder, and be reduced to the same straits; in which case, that which\nsoonest detects the other\u2019s distress is sure to come off best.\n\nI shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own\ncountry. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the\nterritory of Pisa and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who\nhad undertaken its protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved\nto make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the\nFlorentines in another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a strong\nforce, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona, and seizing on the\nvillage of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of Castiglione which stands\non the height above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines sought to\nrelieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay round Pisa. They\naccordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh\nsquadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint\ncommand of Jacopo IV. d\u2019Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio\nof Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above\nMarradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and\nlodged themselves in the village. But when the two armies had\nconfronted one another for several days, both began to suffer sorely\nfrom want of victuals and other necessaries, and neither of them daring\nto attack the other, or knowing to what extremities the other was\nreduced, both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the\nfollowing morning, and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella\nand Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at\ndaybreak, when both armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so\nhappened that an old woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to\npass unnoticed, leaving the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine\ncamp, where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit.\nLearning from her that the Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine\ncommanders took courage, and changing their plan, went in pursuit of\nthe enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending word to Florence\nthat they had repulsed the Venetians and gained a victory. But in truth\nthis victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy\u2019s\nmovements before the latter had notice of theirs. For had that notice\nbeen given to the Venetians first, it would have wrought against us the\nsame results as it actually wrought for us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\u2014_Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for\ncontrolling a Multitude._\n\n\nThe Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and\ncommons. Nevertheless, on war breaking out, Quintius and Appius\nClaudius were sent forth in command of Roman armies. From his harshness\nand severity to his soldiers, Appius was so ill obeyed by them, that\nafter sustaining what almost amounted to a defeat, he had to resign his\ncommand. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment,\nkept his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. From this it\nmight seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be\nhumane than haughty, and kindly rather than severe.\n\nAnd yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors are agreed,\npronounces a contrary opinion where he says, \u201c_In governing a multitude\nit avails more to punish than to be compliant._\u201d[14] If it be asked how\nthese opposite views can be reconciled, I answer that you exercise\nauthority either over men used to regard you as their equal, or over\nmen who have always been subject to you. When those over whom you\nexercise authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to\npunishment or to that severity of which Tacitus speaks. And since in\nRome itself the commons had equal weight with the nobles, none\nappointed their captain for a time only, could control them by using\nharshness and severity. Accordingly we find that those Roman captains\nwho gained the love of their soldiers and were considerate of them,\noften achieved greater results than those who made themselves feared by\nthem in an unusual degree, unless, like Manlius Torquatus, these last\nwere endowed with consummate valour. But he who has to govern subjects\nsuch as those of whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their growing insolent\nand trampling upon him by reason of his too great easiness, must resort\nto punishment rather than to compliance. Still, to escape hatred,\npunishment should be moderate in degree, for to make himself hated is\nnever for the interest of any prince. And to escape hatred, a prince\nhas chiefly to guard against tampering with the property of any of his\nsubjects; for where nothing is to be gained by it, no prince will\ndesire to shed blood, unless, as seldom happens, constrained to do so\nby necessity. But where advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will\nalways flow, and neither the desire to shed it, nor causes for shedding\nit will ever be wanting, as I have fully shown when discussing this\nsubject in another treatise.\n\n [14] \u201cIn multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet.\u201d But\n compare Annals, III. 55, \u201cObsequium inde in principem et \u00e6mulandi amoi\n validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus.\u201d\n\n\nQuintius therefore was more deserving of praise than Appius.\nNevertheless the opinion of Tacitus, duly restricted and not understood\nas applying to a case like that of Appius, merits approval. But since I\nhave spoken of punishment and indulgence, it seems not out of place to\nshow how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the\ncitizens of Falerii.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\u2014_How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii,\nthan all the might of the Roman Arms._\n\n\nWhen the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii, the master of\na school wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught, thinking\nto curry favour with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town\nwith these boys, on pretence of giving them exercise, and bringing them\ninto the camp where Camillus was, presented them to him, saying, \u201c_To\nransom these that city would yield itself into your hands._\u201d Camillus,\nhowever, not only rejected this offer, but causing the schoolmaster to\nbe stripped and his hands tied behind him, gave each of the boys a\nscourge, and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging him\nas they went. When the citizens of Falerii heard of this, so much were\nthey pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus, that they\nresolved to surrender their town to him without further defence.\n\nThis authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly\naction may sometimes touch men\u2019s minds more nearly than a harsh and\ncruel one; and that those cities and provinces into which the\ninstruments and engines of war, with every other violence to which men\nresort, have failed to force a way, may be thrown open to a single act\nof tenderness, mercy, chastity, or generosity. Whereof history supplies\nus with many examples besides the one which I have just now noticed.\nFor we find that when the arms of Rome were powerless to drive Pyrrhus\nout of Italy, he was moved to depart by the generosity of Fabritius in\ndisclosing to him the proposal which his slave had made the Romans to\npoison him. Again, we read how Scipio gained less reputation in Spain\nby the capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring a young\nand beautiful wife unviolated to her husband; the fame of which action\nwon him the love of the whole province. We see, too, how much this\ngenerous temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and how much\nit is praised by historians and by those who write the lives of\nprinces, as well as by those who lay down rules of human conduct. Among\nwhom Xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours, and\nvictories, and how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus from his being kindly\nand gracious, without taint of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any\nother of those vices which cast a stain upon men\u2019s lives.\n\nAnd yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly opposite to\nthese, achieved splendid victories and a great renown, I think I am\nbound to say something in my next Chapter as to how this happened.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\u2014_How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary\nto that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the\nother achieved in Spain._\n\n\nSome, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking a contrary\ncourse, nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued\nthe methods above spoken of; since it must seem as though success did\nnot depend on the causes I have named; nay, that if glory and fame are\nto be won in other ways, these causes neither add to our strength nor\nadvance our fortunes. Wherefore, to make my meaning plain, and not to\npart company with the men of whom I have been speaking, I say, that as,\non the one hand, we see Scipio enter Spain, and by his humane and\ngenerous conduct at once secure the good-will of the province, and the\nadmiration and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other hand, we\nsee Hannibal enter Italy, and by methods wholly opposite, to wit, by\nviolence and rapine, by cruelty and treachery of every kind, effect in\nthat country the very same results. For all the States of Italy\nrevolted in his favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves\non his side.\n\nWhen we seek to know why this was, several reasons present themselves,\nthe first being that men so passionately love change, that, commonly\nspeaking, those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are\nbadly off: for as already has been said with truth, men are pampered by\nprosperity, soured by adversity. This love of change, therefore, makes\nthem open the door to any one who puts himself at the head of new\nmovements in their country, and if he be a foreigner they adopt his\ncause, if a fellow-countryman they gather round him and become his\npartisans and supporters; so that whatever methods he may there use, he\nwill succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men being moved by two\nchief passions, love and fear, he who makes himself feared commands\nwith no less authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as a rule,\nis followed and obeyed more implicitly than the other. It matters\nlittle, however, which of these two ways a captain chooses to follow,\nprovided he be of transcendent valour, and has thereby won for himself\na great name For when, like Hannibal or Scipio, a man is very valiant,\nthis quality will cloak any error he may commit in seeking either to be\ntoo much loved or too much feared. Yet from each of these two\ntendencies, grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a prince,\nmay arise. For he who would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so\nlittle from the right road, becomes contemptible; while he who would be\ngreatly feared, if he go a jot too far, incurs hatred. And since it is\nimpossible, our nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean, it\nis essential that any excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour,\nas it was in Hannibal and Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while\nthey were exalted by the methods they followed, were also injured by\nthem. How they were exalted has been shown. The injury which Scipio\nsuffered was, that in Spain his soldiers, in concert with certain of\nhis allies, rose against him, for no other reason than that they stood\nin no fear of him. For men are so restless, that if ever so small a\ndoor be opened to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the love\nthey have borne their prince in return for his graciousness and\ngoodness, as did these soldiers and allies of Scipio; when, to correct\nthe mischief, he was forced to use something of a cruelty foreign to\nhis nature.\n\nAs to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his\ncruelty or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him;\nbut we may well believe that Naples and other towns which remained\nloyal to the Roman people, did so by reason of the dread which his\ncharacter inspired. This, however, is abundantly clear, that his\ninhumanity made him more detested by the Romans than any other enemy\nthey ever had; so that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy with his army, they\ngave up the traitor who offered to poison him, Hannibal, even when\ndisarmed and a fugitive, they never forgave, until they had compassed\nhis death.\n\nTo Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious, perfidious,\nand cruel, these disadvantages resulted; but, on the other hand, there\naccrued to him one great gain, noticed with admiration by all\nhistorians, namely, that in his army, although made up of men of every\nrace and country, no dissensions ever broke out among the soldiers\nthemselves, nor any mutiny against their leader. This we can only\nascribe to the awe which his character inspired, which together with\nthe great name his valour had won for him, had the effect of keeping\nhis soldiers quiet and united. I repeat, therefore, that it is of\nlittle moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with\nsuch valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts. For, as\nI have said, there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless\ncorrected by extraordinary valour.\n\nAnd now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal, the former of whom\nby praiseworthy, the latter by odious qualities, effected the same\nresults, I must not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two\nRoman citizens, who by different, yet both by honourable methods,\nobtained a like glory.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XXII.\u2014_That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the\ngentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory._\n\n\nThere lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent captains, Manlius\nTorquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in their triumphs and in their\nrenown, and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed\nagainst the enemy; but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment\nof their soldiers, followed very different methods. For Manlius, in his\ncommand, resorted to every kind of severity, never sparing his men\nfatigue, nor remitting punishment; while Valerius, on the contrary,\ntreated them with all kindness and consideration, and was easy and\nfamiliar in his intercourse with them. So that while the one, to secure\nthe obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to death, the other\nnever dealt harshly with any man. Yet, for all this diversity in their\nmodes of acting, each had the same success against the enemy, and each\nobtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself. For\nno soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle, or rose in mutiny against\nthem, or in any particular opposed their will; though the commands of\nManlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour came\nto be spoken of as a _Manlian order_.\n\nHere, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius was obliged to\nuse such severity; next, why Valerius could behave so humanely;\nthirdly, how it was that these opposite methods had the same results;\nand lastly, which of the two methods it is better and more useful for\nus to follow. Now, if we well examine the character of Manlius from the\nmoment when Titus Livius first begins to make mention of him, we shall\nfind him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both of mind and body,\ndutiful in his behaviour to his father and to his country, and most\nreverent to his superiors. All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, in\nhis defence of his father against the tribune, and in the words in\nwhich, before going forth to fight the Gaul, he addressed the consul,\nwhen he said, \u201c_Although assured of victory, never will I without thy\nbidding engage an enemy._\u201d But when such a man as this attains to\ncommand, he looks to find all others like himself; his dauntless spirit\nprompts him to engage in daring enterprises, and to insist on their\nbeing carried out. And this is certain, that where things hard to\nexecute are ordered to be done, the order must be enforced with\nsternness, since, otherwise, it will be disobeyed.\n\nAnd here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to\ncommand, and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured\ntheir power to enforce, with the willingness of others to yield\nobedience; and who issue their orders when they find these conditions\ncombining, but, otherwise, abstain. Wherefore, a wise man was wont to\nsay that to hold a republic by force, there must be a proportion\nbetween him who uses the force and him against whom it is used; and\nthat while this proportion obtains the force will operate; but that\nwhen he who suffers is stronger than he who uses the force, we may\nexpect to see it brought to an end at any moment.\n\nBut returning to the matter in hand, I say that to command things hard\nof execution, requires hardness in him who gives the command, and that\na man of this temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to\nenforce them by gentleness. He who is not of such a temper must be\ncareful not to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty, but may use\nhis natural gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For common\npunishments are not imputed to the prince, but to the laws and\nordinances which he has to administer.\n\nWe must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act with\nseverity by the unusual character of the commands which his natural\ndisposition prompted him to issue. Such commands are useful in a\nrepublic, as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and\nexcellence. And were a republic, as I have before observed, fortunate\nenough to come frequently under the influence of men who, by their\nexample, reinforce its laws, and not only retard its progress towards\ncorruption, but bring it back to its first perfection, it might endure\nfor ever.\n\nManlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity of their commands\nmaintained the military discipline of Rome; urged thereto, in the first\nplace, by his natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever he\nwas minded to command should be done. Valerius, on the other hand,\ncould afford to act humanely, because for him it was enough if all were\ndone which in a Roman army it was customary to do. And, since the\ncustoms of that army were good customs, they sufficed to gain him\nhonour, while at the same time their maintenance cost him no effort,\nnor threw on him the burthen of punishing transgressors; as well\nbecause there were none who trangressed, as because had there been any,\nthey would, as I have said, have imputed their punishment to the\nordinary rules of discipline, and not to the severity of their\ncommander. In this way Valerius had room to exercise that humane\ndisposition which enabled him at once to gain influence over his\nsoldiers and to content them. Hence it was that both these captains\nobtaining the same obedience, could, while following different methods,\narrive at the same ends. Those, however, who seek to imitate them may\nchance to fall into the errors of which I have already spoken, in\nconnection with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding contempt or hatred,\nand which are only to be corrected by the presence of extraordinary\nvalour, and not otherwise.\n\nIt rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be\ncommended. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods\nhave their advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid down rules\nfor the conduct of princes, describe a character approaching more\nnearly to that of Valerius than to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom\nI have already cited, while giving many instances of the humanity of\nCyrus, conforms closely to what Livius tells us of Valerius. For\nValerius being made consul against the Samnites, on the eve of battle\nspoke to his men with the same kindliness with which he always treated\nthem; and Livius, after telling us what he said, remarks of him:\n\u201c_Never was there a leader more familiar with his men; cheerfully\nsharing with the meanest among them every hardship and fatigue. Even in\nthe military games, wherein those of the same rank were wont to make\ntrial of their strength or swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a\npart, nor disdain any adversary who offered; meeting victory or defeat\nwith an unruffled temper and an unchanged countenance. When called on\nto act, his bounty and generosity never fell short. When he had to\nspeak, he was as mindful of the feelings of others as of his own\ndignity. And, what more than anything else secures the popular favour,\nhe maintained when exercising his magistracies the same bearing he had\nworn in seeking them._\u201d\n\nOf Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable terms, pointing\nout that his severity in putting his son to death brought the Roman\narmy to that pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against\nthe Latins, nay, he goes so far in his praises that after describing\nthe whole order of the battle, comparing the strength of both armies,\nand showing all the dangers the Romans ran, and the difficulties they\nhad to surmount, he winds up by saying, that it was the valour of\nManlius which alone gained for them this great victory, and that\nwhichever side had Manlius for its leader must have won the day. So\nthat weighing all that the historians tell us of these two captains, it\nmight be difficult to decide between them.\n\nNevertheless, not to leave the question entirely open, I say, that for\na citizen living under a republic, I think the conduct of Manlius more\ndeserving of praise and less dangerous in its consequences. For methods\nlike his tend only to the public good and in no way subserve private\nends. He who shows himself harsh and stern at all times and to all men\nalike, and is seen to care only for the common welfare, will never gain\nhimself partisans, since this is not the way to win personal friends,\nto whom, as I said before, the name of partisans is given. For a\nrepublic, therefore, no line of conduct could be more useful or more to\nbe desired than this, because in following it the public interest is\nnot neglected, and no room is given to suspect personal ambition.\n\nBut the contrary holds as to the methods followed by Valerius. For\nthough the public service they render be the same, misgivings must\nneeds arise that the personal good-will which, in the course of a\nprolonged command, a captain obtains from his soldiers, may lead to\nconsequences fatal to the public liberty. And if this was not found to\nhappen in the case of Valerius, it was because the minds of the Roman\npeople were not yet corrupted, and because they had never remained for\na long time and continuously under his command.\n\nHad we, however, like Xenophon, to consider what is most for the\ninterest of a prince, we should have to give up Manlius and hold by\nValerius; for, undoubtedly, a prince should strive to gain the love of\nhis soldiers and subjects, as well as their obedience. The latter he\ncan secure by discipline and by his reputation for valour. But for the\nformer he will be indebted to his affability, kindliness, gentleness,\nand all those other like qualities which were possessed by Valerius,\nand which are described by Xenophon as existing in Cyrus. That a prince\nshould be personally loved and have his army wholly devoted to him is\nconsistent with the character of his government; but that this should\nhappen to a person of private station does not consist with his\nposition as a citizen who has to live in conformity with the laws and\nin subordination to the magistrates. We read in the early annals of the\nVenetian Republic, that once, on the return of the fleet, a dispute\nbroke out between the sailors and the people, resulting in tumults and\narmed violence which neither the efforts of the public officers, the\nrespect felt for particular citizens, nor the authority of the\nmagistrates could quell. But on a certain gentleman, who the year\nbefore had been in command of these sailors, showing himself among\nthem, straightway, from the love they bore him, they submitted to his\nauthority and withdrew from the fray. Which deference on their part\naroused such jealousy and suspicion in the minds of the Venetian\nsenators that very soon after they got rid of this gentleman, either by\ndeath or exile.\n\nThe sum of the matter, therefore, is, that the methods followed by\nValerius are useful in a prince, but pernicious in a private citizen,\nboth for his country and for himself, for his country, because such\nmethods pave the way to a tyranny; for himself, because his\nfellow-citizens, growing suspicious of his conduct, are constrained to\nprotect themselves to his hurt. And conversely, I maintain, that the\nmethods of Manlius, while hurtful in a prince are useful in a citizen,\nand in the highest degree for his country; and, moreover, seldom give\noffence, unless the hatred caused by his severity be augmented by the\njealousy which the fame of his other virtues inspires: a matter now to\nbe considered in connection with the banishment of Camillas.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\u2014_Why Camillus was banished from Rome._\n\n\nIt has been shown above how methods like those of Valerius are hurtful\nto the citizen who employs them and to his country, while methods like\nthose of Manlius are advantageous for a man\u2019s country, though sometimes\nthey be hurtful to the man himself. This is well seen in the example of\nCamillus, whose bearing more nearly resembled that of Manlius than that\nof Valerius, so that Titus Livius, in speaking of him, says, \u201c_His\nvirtues were at once hated and admired by his soldiers._\u201d What gained\nhim their admiration was his care for their safety, his prudence, his\nmagnanimity, and the good order he maintained in conducting and\ncommanding them. What made him hated was his being more stern to punish\nthan bountiful to reward; and Livius instances the following\ncircumstances as giving rise to this hatred. First, his having applied\nthe money got by the sale of the goods of the Veientines to public\npurposes, and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils. Second,\nhis having, on the occasion of his triumph, caused his chariot to be\ndrawn by four white horses, seeking in his pride, men said, to make\nhimself the equal of the sun god. And, third, his having vowed to\nApollo a tenth of the Veientine plunder, which, if he was to fulfil his\nvow, he had to recover from his soldiers, into whose hands it had\nalready come.\n\nHerein we may well and readily discern what causes tend to make a\nprince hateful to his people; the chief whereof is the depriving them\nof some advantage. And this is a matter of much importance. For when a\nman is deprived of what is in itself useful, he never forgets it, and\nevery trifling occasion recalls it to his mind; and because such\noccasions recur daily, he is every day reminded of his loss. Another\nerror which we are here taught to guard against, is the appearing\nhaughty and proud, than which nothing is more distasteful to a people,\nand most of all to a free people; for although such pride and\nhaughtiness do them no hurt, they nevertheless hold in detestation any\nwho display these qualities. Every show of pride, therefore, a prince\nshould shun as he would a rock, since to invite hatred without\nresulting advantage were utterly rash and futile.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\u2014_That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude_.\n\n\nIf we well examine the course of Roman history, we shall find two\ncauses leading to the break-up of that republic: one, the dissensions\nwhich arose in connection with the agrarian laws; the other, the\nprolongation of commands. For had these matters been rightly understood\nfrom the first, and due remedies applied, the freedom of Rome had been\nfar more lasting, and, possibly, less disturbed. And although, as\ntouching the prolongation of commands, we never find any tumult\nbreaking out in Rome on that account, we do in fact discern how much\nharm was done to the city by the ascendency which certain of its\ncitizens thereby gained. This mischief indeed would not have arisen, if\nother citizens whose period of office was extended had been as good and\nwise as Lucius Quintius, whose virtue affords a notable example. For\nterms of accord having been settled between the senate and commons of\nRome, the latter, thinking their tribunes well able to withstand the\nambition of the nobles, prolonged their authority for a year.\nWhereupon, the senate, not to be outdone by the commons, proposed, out\nof rivalry, to extend the consulship of Quintius. He, however, refused\nabsolutely to lend himself to their designs, and insisted on their\nappointing new consuls, telling them that they should seek to discredit\nevil examples, not add to them by setting worse. Had this prudence and\nvirtue of his been shared by all the citizens of Rome, the practice of\nprolonging the terms of civil offices would not have been suffered to\nestablish itself, nor have led to the kindred practice of extending the\nterm of military commands, which in progress of time effected the ruin\nof their republic.\n\nThe first military commander whose term was extended, was Publius\nPhilo; for when his consulship was about to expire, he being then\nengaged in the siege of Pal\u00e6opolis, the senate, seeing he had the\nvictory in his hands, would not displace him by a successor, but\nappointed him _Proconsul_, which office he was the first to hold. Now,\nalthough in thus acting the senate did what they thought best for the\npublic good, nevertheless it was this act of theirs that in time\nbrought Rome to slavery. For the further the Romans carried their arms,\nthe more necessary it seemed to them to grant similar extensions of\ncommand, and the oftener they, in fact, did so. This gave rise to two\ndisadvantages: first that a smaller number of men were trained to\ncommand; second, that by the long continuance of his command a captain\ngained so much influence and ascendency over his soldiers that in time\nthey came to hold the senate of no account, and looked only to him.\nThis it was, that enabled Sylla and Marius to find adherents ready to\nfollow them even to the public detriment, and enabled C\u00e6sar to\noverthrow the liberties of his country; whereas, had the Romans never\nprolonged the period of authority, whether civil or military, though\nthey might have taken longer to build up their empire, they certainly\nhad been later in incurring servitude.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\u2014_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman\nCitizens.\n\n\nElsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a\ncommonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And\nalthough it does not appear what particular law it was that had this\noperation in Rome (especially since we know the agrarian law to have\nbeen stubbornly resisted), we find, as a fact, that four hundred years\nafter the city was founded, great poverty still prevailed there; and\nmay assume that nothing helped so much to produce this result as the\nknowledge that the path to honours and preferment was closed to none,\nand that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be found; for\nthis manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted. In\nproof whereof I shall cite one instance only.\n\nWhen the consul Minutius was beset in his camp by the Equians, the\nRoman people were filled with such alarm lest their army should be\ndestroyed, that they appointed a dictator, always their last stay in\nseasons of peril. Their choice fell on Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who\nat the time was living on his small farm of little more than four\nacres, which he tilled with his own hand. The story is nobly told by\nTitus Livius where he says: \u201c_This is worth listening to by those who\ncontemn all things human as compared with riches, and think that glory\nand excellence can have no place unless accompanied by lavish wealth._\u201d\nCincinnatus, then, was ploughing in his little field, when there\narrived from Rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him he had\nbeen made dictator, and inform him of the dangers which threatened the\nRepublic. Putting on his gown, he hastened to Rome, and getting\ntogether an army, marched to deliver Minutius. But when he had defeated\nand spoiled the enemy, and released Minutius, he would not suffer the\narmy he had rescued to participate in the spoils, saying, \u201c_I will not\nhave you share in the plunder of those to whom you had so nearly fallen\na prey._\u201d Minutius he deprived of his consulship, and reduced to be a\nsubaltern, in which rank he bade him remain till he had learned how to\ncommand. And before this he had made Lucius Tarquininus, although\nforced by his poverty to serve on foot, his master of the knights.\n\nHere, then, we see what honour was paid in Rome to poverty, and how\nfour acres of land sufficed to support so good and great a man as\nCincinnatus. We find the same Poverty still prevailing in the time of\nMarcus Regulus, who when serving with the army in Africa sought leave\nof senate to return home that he might look after his farm which his\nlabourers had suffered to run to waste. Here again we learn two things\nworthy our attention: first, the poverty of these men and their\ncontentment under it, and how their sole study was to gain renown from\nwar, leaving all its advantages to the State. For had they thought of\nenriching themselves by war, it had given them little concern that\ntheir fields were running to waste Further, we have to remark the\nmagnanimity of these citizens, who when placed at the head of armies\nsurpassed all princes in the loftiness of their spirit, who cared\nneither for king nor for commonwealth, and whom nothing could daunt or\ndismay; but who, on returning to private life, became once more so\nhumble, so frugal, so careful of their slender means, and so submissive\nto the magistrates and reverential to their superiors, that it might\nseem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change.\n\nThis poverty prevailed down to the days of Paulus Emilius, almost the\nlast happy days for this republic wherein a citizen, while enriching\nRome by his triumphs, himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was\npoverty still esteemed at this time, that when Paulus, in conferring\nrewards on those who had behaved well in the war, presented his own\nson-in-law with a silver cup, it was the first vessel of silver ever\nseen in his house.\n\nI might run on to a great length pointing out how much better are the\nfruits of poverty than those of riches, and how poverty has brought\ncities, provinces, and nations to honour, while riches have wrought\ntheir ruin, had not this subject been often treated by others.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\u2014_How Women are a cause of the ruin of States._\n\n\nA feud broke out in Ardea touching the marriage of an heiress, whose\nhand was sought at the same time by two suitors, the one of plebeian,\nthe other of noble birth. For her father being dead, her guardian\nwished her to wed the plebeian, her mother the noble. And so hot grew\nthe dispute that resort was had to arms, the whole nobility siding with\ntheir fellow-noble, and all the plebeians with the plebeian. The latter\nfaction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the Volscians for\nhelp; whereupon, the nobles sought help from Rome. The Volscians were\nfirst in the field, and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. The\nRomans, coming up later, shut in the Volscians between themselves and\nthe town, and, reducing them by famine, forced them to surrender at\ndiscretion. They then entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders in\nthis dispute to the sword, composed the disorders of the city.\n\nIn connection with this affair there are several points to be noted.\nAnd in the first place we see how women have been the occasion of many\ndivisions and calamities in States, and have wrought great harm to\nrulers; as when, according to our historian, the violence done to\nLucretia drove the Tarquins from their kingdom, and that done to\nVirginia broke the power of the decemvirs. And among the chief causes\nwhich Aristotle assigns for the downfall of tyrants are the wrongs done\nby them to their subjects in respect of their women, whether by\nadultery, rape, or other like injury to their honour, as has been\nsufficiently noticed in the Chapter wherein we treated \u201c_of\nConspiracies_\u201d\n\nI say, then, that neither absolute princes nor the rulers of free\nStates should underrate the importance of matter, but take heed to the\ndisorders which it may breed and provide against them while remedies\ncan still be used without discredit to themselves or to their\ngovernments And this should have been done by the rulers of Ardea who\nby suffering the rivalry between their citizens to come to a head,\npromoted their divisions, and when they sought to reunite them had to\nsummon foreign help, than which nothing sooner leads to servitude.\n\nBut now let us turn to another subject which merits attention, namely,\nthe means whereby divided cities may be reunited; and of this I propose\nto speak in the following Chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\u2014_How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a\nfalse opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept\ndivided._\n\n\nFrom the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of\nArdea, we are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may\nbe composed, namely, by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to\ndeath; and that no other remedy should be used. Three courses, indeed,\nare open to you, since you may either put to death, as these consuls\ndid, or banish, or bind the citizens to live at peace with one another,\ntaking security for their good behaviour. Of which three ways the last\nis the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the least effectual;\nbecause when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage done, it\ncannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men\nwho are every day brought face to face with one another; for since\nfresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting,\nit will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury. Of this\nwe could have no better instance than in the city of Pistoja.\n\nFifteen years ago this city was divided between the Panciatichi and\nCancellieri, as indeed it still continues, the only difference being\nthat then they were in arms, whereas, now, they have laid them aside.\nAfter much controversy and wrangling, these factions would presently\nproceed to bloodshed, to pulling down houses, plundering property, and\nall the other violent courses usual in divided cities. The Florentines,\nwith whom it lay to compose these feuds, strove for a long time to do\nso by using the third of the methods mentioned; but when this only led\nto increased tumult and disorder, losing patience, they decided to try\nthe second method and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by\nimprisoning some and banishing others. In this way a sort of settlement\nwas arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present hour.\nThere can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named\nwould have been the surest. But because extreme measures have in them\nan element of greatness and nobility, a weak republic, so far from\nknowing how to use this first method, can with difficulty be brought to\nemploy even the second. This, as I said at the beginning, is the kind\nof blunder made by the princes of our times when they have to decide on\nmatters of moment, from their not considering how those men acted who\nin ancient days had to determine under like conditions. For the\nweakness of the present race of men (the result of their enfeebling\neducation and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard the\nmethods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly\nimpracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of\nlooking at things, wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages\nof our city, some time since, pronounced that _Pistoja was to be held\nby feuds and Pisa by fortresses_, not perceiving how useless each of\nthese methods is in itself.\n\nHaving spoken of fortresses already at some length, I shall not further\nrefer to them here, but shall consider the futility of trying to hold\nsubject cities by keeping them divided. In the first place, it is\nimpossible for the ruling power, whether prince or republic, to be\nfriends with both factions. For wherever there is division, it is human\nnature to take a side, and to favour one party more than another. But\nif one party in a subject city be unfriendly to you, the consequence\nwill be that you will lose that city so soon as you are involved in\nwar, since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have\nenemies both within and without. Should the ruling power be a republic,\nthere is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension\namong them, as having to control a divided city. For as each faction in\nthat city will seek support and endeavour to make friends in a variety\nof corrupt ways, two very serious evils will result: first, that the\ngoverned city will never be contented with its governors, since there\ncan be no good government where you often change its form, adapting\nyourself to the humours now of one party and now of another; and next,\nthat the factious spirit of the subject city is certain to infect your\nown republic. To which Biondo testifies, when, in speaking of the\ncitizens of Florence and Pistoja, he says, \u201c_In seeking to unite\nPistoja the Florentines themselves fell out_.\u201d[15]\n\n [15] _Flav. Blondri Hist._, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p. 337\n\n\nIt is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief attends on such\ndivisions. In the year 1501, when we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val\ndi Tevere and Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by Duke\nValentino, a certain M. de Lant was sent by the King of France to cause\nthe whole of the lost towns to be restored to the Florentines; who\nfinding in all these towns men who came to him claiming to be of the\nparty of the _Marzocco_,[16] greatly blamed this distinction,\nobserving, that if in France any of the king\u2019s subjects were to say\nthat he was of the king\u2019s party, he would be punished; since the\nexpression would imply that there was a party hostile to the king,\nwhereas it was his majesty\u2019s desire that all his subjects should be his\nfriends and live united without any distinction of party. But all these\nmistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of rulers, who,\nseeing that they cannot hold their States by their own strength and\nvalour, have recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in\ntranquil times they prove of some slight assistance to them, in times\nof danger are shown to be worthless.\n\n [16] The heraldic Lion of Florence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\u2014_That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens\nare about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a\nsemblance of generous deeds._\n\n\nThe granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the\ncity was visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for\nthese days, privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the\npeople at his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the\ncommons, that the senate, apprehending that his bounty might have\ndangerous consequences, in order to crush him before he grew too\npowerful, appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be\nput to death.\n\nHere we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and\nunlikely to occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay,\nunless corrected in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat\nthe matter with greater fulness, I say, that while a republic can never\nmaintain itself long, or manage its affairs to advantage, without\ncitizens of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed by\nparticular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny. For\nwhich reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it should be so\narranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as\nbenefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We\nmust therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly,\nare two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by\nadvising well or by acting still better for the common advantage. To\ncredit of this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards\nboth for good counsels and for good actions, so that he who renders\nsuch services may be at once honoured and satisfied. Reputation\nacquired honestly and openly by such means as these can never be\ndangerous. But credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other\nmethod spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret\npractices may be instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other\ncitizen in lending him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters,\nin defending him against the magistrates, and in conferring such other\nprivate favours as gain men devoted adherents, and encourage them after\nthey have obtained such support, to corrupt the institutions of the\nState and to violate its laws.\n\nA well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw\nwide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to\nclose it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand\nmeans. And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman republic, as a\nreward to any citizen who served it well, ordained triumphs and all the\nother honours which it had to bestow; while against those who sought to\naggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it ordained accusations and\nimpeachment; and when, from the people being blinded by a false show of\nbenevolence, these proved insufficient, it provided for a dictator, who\nwith regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed beyond\nthem, as instanced in the case of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like\nhis be ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the ruin of a\nrepublic, for men when they have such examples set them are not easily\nled back into the right path.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\u2014_That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince._\n\n\nLet no prince complain of the faults committed by a people under his\ncontrol; since these must be ascribed either to his negligence, or to\nhis being himself blemished by similar defects. And were any one to\nconsider what peoples in our own times have been most given to robbery\nand other like offences, he would find that they have only copied their\nrulers, who have themselves been of a like nature. Romagna, before\nthose lords who ruled it were driven out by Pope Alexander VI., was a\nnursery of all the worst crimes, the slightest occasion giving rise to\nwholesale rapine and murder. This resulted from the wickedness of these\nlords, and not, as they asserted, from the evil disposition of their\nsubjects. For these princes being poor, yet choosing to live as though\nthey were rich, were forced to resort to cruelties innumerable and\npractised in divers ways; and among other shameful devices contrived by\nthem to extort money, they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts,\nand then be the first to give occasion for breaking them; nor would\nthey chastise offenders until they saw many involved in the same\noffence; when they fell to punishing, not from any zeal for the laws\nwhich they had made, but out of greed to realize the penalty. Whence\nflowed many mischiefs, and more particularly this, that the people\nbeing impoverished, but not corrected, sought to make good their\ninjuries at the expense of others weaker than themselves. And thus\nthere sprang up all those evils spoken of above, whereof the prince is\nthe true cause.\n\nThe truth of what I say is confirmed by Titus Livius where he relates\nhow the Roman envoys, who were conveying the spoils of the Veientines\nas an offering to Apollo, were seized and brought on shore by the\ncorsairs of the Lipari islands in Sicily; when Timasitheus, the prince\nof these islands, on learning the nature of the offering, its\ndestination, and by whom sent, though himself of Lipari, behaved as a\nRoman might, showing his people what sacrilege it would be to intercept\nsuch a gift, and speaking to such purpose that by general consent the\nenvoys were suffered to proceed upon their voyage, taking all their\npossessions with them. With reference to which incident the historian\nobserves: \u201c_The multitude, who always take their colour from their\nruler, were filled by Timasitheus with a religious awe._\u201d And to like\npurport we find it said by Lorenzo de\u2019 Medici:\u2014\n\n\u201cA prince\u2019s acts his people imitate;\nFor on their lord the eyes of all men wait.\u201d[17]\n\n\n [17] E quel che fa il signer, fanno poi molti;\n Ch\u00e8 nel signer son tutti gli occhi volti.\n(_La Rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paolo._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\u2014_That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to\nrender signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy.\nHow a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy._\n\n\nWhen the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was assembled in arms to\nmarch against Rome, and that the Latins and Hernicians, who before had\nbeen the friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the\nVolscians the ancient enemies of the Roman name, they foresaw that a\nperilous contest awaited them. But because Camillus was at that time\ntribune with consular authority they thought all might be managed\nwithout the appointment of a dictator, provided the other tribunes, his\ncolleagues would agree to his assuming the sole direction of affairs.\nThis they willingly did; \u201c_nor_,\u201d says Titus Livius, \u201c_did they account\nanything as taken from their own dignity which was added to his._\u201d\n\nOn receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus gave orders that\nthree armies should be enrolled. Of the first, which was to be directed\nagainst the Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command of the\nsecond, which he meant to remain near Rome and meet any movement of the\nLatins and Hernicians, he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army,\nwhich he designed for the protection of the city, and the defence of\nthe gates and Curia, he entrusted to Lucius Quintius. And he further\ndirected, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies\nof arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of war. Finally he\nput forward his colleague Cornelius to preside in the senate and public\ncouncil, that from day to day he might advise what should be done. For\nin those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as\nthe welfare of their country might require.\n\nWe may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act,\nhow much good he may effect, and how serviceable he may be to his\ncountry, when by the force of his character and worth he succeeds in\nextinguishing envy. For this often disables men from acting to the best\nadvantage, not permitting them to obtain that authority which it is\nessential they should have in matters of importance. Now, envy may be\nextinguished in one or other of two ways: first, by the approach of\nsome flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves like to be overwhelmed,\nall forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience to\nhim who counts on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of\nCamillas, who from having given many proofs of surpassing ability, and\nfrom having been three times dictator and always exercised the office\nfor the public good and not for his private advantage, had brought men\nto fear nothing from his advancement; while his fame and reputation\nmade it no shame for them to recognize him as their superior. Wisely,\ntherefore, does Titus Livius use concerning him the words which I have\ncited.\n\nThe other way in which envy may be extinguished, is by the death,\nwhether by violence or in the ordinary course of nature, of those who\nhave been your rivals in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing\nyou better esteemed than themselves, could never acquiesce in your\nsuperiority or put up with it in patience. For when these men have been\nbrought up in a corrupt city, where their training is little likely to\nimprove them, nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw\ntheir pretensions; nay, to have their own way and satisfy their\nperverse humour, they will be content to look on while their country is\nruined. For envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of\nthose of whom it has taken possession. And when fortune so befriends a\ngreat man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death,\nhis glory is established without scandal or offence, since he is then\nable to display his great qualities unhindered. But when fortune is not\nthus propitious to him, he must contrive other means to rid himself of\nrivals, and must do so successfully before he can accomplish anything.\nAny one who reads with intelligence the lessons of Holy Writ, will\nremember how Moses, to give effect to his laws and ordinances, was\nconstrained to put to death an endless number of those who out of mere\nenvy withstood his designs. The necessity of this course was well\nunderstood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier\nPiero Soderini. But the former could not comply with it, because, as a\nfriar, he himself lacked the needful authority; while those of his\nfollowers who might have exercised that authority, did not rightly\ncomprehend his teaching. This, however, was no fault of his; for his\nsermons are full of invectives and attacks against \u201c_the wise of this\nworld_,\u201d that being the name he gave to envious rivals and to all who\nopposed his reforms. As for Piero Soderini, he was possessed by the\nbelief that in time and with favourable fortune he could allay envy by\ngentleness-and by benefits conferred on particular men; for as he was\nstill in the prime of life, and in the fresh enjoyment of that\ngood-will which his character and opinions had gained for him, he\nthought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him,\nwithout giving occasion for tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing\nhow time stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and malice will\nnot be won over by any benefit Wherefore, because they could not or\nknew not how to vanquish this envy, the two whom I have named came to\ntheir downfall.\n\nAnother point to be noted in the passage we are considering, is the\ncareful provision made by Camillus for the safety of Rome both within\nand without the city. And, truly, not without reason do wise\nhistorians, like our author, set forth certain events with much\nminuteness and detail, to the end that those who come after may learn\nhow to protect themselves in like dangers. Further, we have to note\nthat there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one\nconducted without method or system. This is shown in Camillus causing a\nthird army to be enrolled that it might be left in Rome for the\nprotection of the city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and now,\nwould esteem this precaution superfluous, thinking that as the Romans\nwere a warlike people and constantly under arms, there could be no\noccasion for a special levy, and that it was time enough to arm when\nthe need came. But Camillus, and any other equally prudent captain\nwould be of the same mind, judged otherwise, not permitting the\nmultitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and\ndiscipline of military service. Let him, therefore, who is called on to\ndefend a city, taking example by Camillus, before all things avoid\nplacing arms in the hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of\nall select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm, so that they may\nbe wholly governed by him as to where they shall assemble and whither\nthey shall march; and then let him direct those who are not enrolled,\nto abide every man in his own house for its defence. Whosoever observes\nthis method in a city which is attacked, will be able to defend it with\nease; but whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example of\nCamillus, shall never succeed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\u2014_That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through\nevery change the same Spirit and Bearing._\n\n\nAmong other high sayings which our historian ascribes to Camillus, as\nshowing of what stuff a truly great man should be made, he puts in his\nmouth the words, \u201c_My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went\nwith my exile;_\u201d for by these words we are taught that a great man is\nconstantly the same through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that\nalthough she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains\nunchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and in such complete\naccordance with his nature as declares to all that over him Fortune has\nno dominion.\n\nVery different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who,\npuffed up and intoxicated with their success, ascribe all their\nfelicity to virtues which they never knew, and thus grow hateful and\ninsupportable to all around them. Whence also the changes in their\nfortunes. For whenever they have to look adversity in the face, they\nsuddenly pass to the other extreme, becoming abject and base. And thus\nit happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall into\ndifficulties, think rather of flight than of defence, because, having\nmade bad use of their prosperity, they are wholly unprepared to defend\nthemselves.\n\nThe same merits and defects which I say are found in individual men,\nare likewise found in republics, whereof we have example in the case of\nRome and of Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of\nthe Roman people, nor did any success ever unduly elate them; as we see\nplainly after their defeat at Cann\u00e6, and after the victory they had\nover Antiochus. For the defeat at Cann\u00e6, although most momentous, being\nthe third they had met with, no whit daunted them; so that they\ncontinued to send forth armies, refused to ransom prisoners as contrary\nto their custom, and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or to Carthage to\nsue for peace; but without ever looking back on past humiliations,\nthought always of war, though in such straits for soldiers that they\nhad to arm their old men and slaves. Which facts being made known to\nHanno the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related, warned the\nCarthaginian senate not to lay too much stress upon their victory.\nHere, therefore, we see that in times of adversity the Romans were\nneither cast down nor dismayed. On the other hand, no prosperity ever\nmade them arrogant. Before fighting the battle wherein he was finally\nrouted, Antiochus sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an accord;\nwhen Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into\nSyria, leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the Romans\nas they thought fit. Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was\ndefeated, and again sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to accept\nwhatever conditions the victor might be pleased to impose. But Scipio\nproposed no different terms from those he had offered before saying\nthat \u201c_the Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed not\ninsolent with success._\u201d\n\nThe contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the Venetians, who\nthinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid, in\ntheir pride addressed the French king as \u201cSon of St. Mark;\u201d and making\nno account of the Church, and no longer restricting their ambition to\nthe limits of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like the\nRoman. But afterwards, when their good fortune deserted them, and they\nmet at Vail\u00e0 a half-defeat at the hands of the French king, they lost\ntheir whole dominions, not altogether from revolt, but mainly by a base\nand abject surrender to the Pope and the King of Spain. Nay, so low did\nthey stoop as to send ambassadors to the Emperor offering to become his\ntributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full of submission and\nservility, in order to move his compassion. To such abasement were they\nbrought in four days\u2019 time by what was in reality only a half-defeat.\nFor on their flight after the battle of Vail\u00e0 only about a half of\ntheir forces were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped to\nVerona with five and twenty thousand men, horse and foot. So that had\nthere been a spark of valour in Venice, or any soundness in her\nmilitary system, she might easily have renewed her armies, and again\nconfronting fortune have stood prepared either to conquer, or, if she\nmust fall, to fall more gloriously; and at any rate might have obtained\nfor herself more honourable terms. But a pusillanimous spirit,\noccasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as they relate to\nwar, caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions. And so\nwill it always happen with those who behave like the Venetians. For\nwhen men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject inn evil, the fault\nlies in themselves and in the character of their training, which, when\nslight and frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise,\nmakes them of another temper, and giving them better acquaintance with\nthe world, causes them to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less\nelated by success.\n\nAnd while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a\nconcourse of men living together in one republic, who will arrive at\nthat measure of perfection which the institutions of their State\npermit. And although I have already said on another occasion that a\ngood militia is the foundation of all States, and where that is wanting\nthere can neither be good laws, nor aught else that is good, it seems\nto me not superfluous to say the same again; because in reading this\nhistory of Titus Livius the necessity of such a foundation is made\napparent in every page. It is likewise shown that no army can be good\nunless it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this can only\nbe the case with an army raised from your own subjects. For as a State\nis not and cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train\nyour army in times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you\ncan only have in respect of your own subjects.\n\nWhen Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet the Etruscans,\nhis soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy, were filled with\nfear, thinking themselves too to withstand its onset. This untoward\ndisposition being reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his men\nand by visiting their tents, and conversing with this and the other\namong them, was able to remove their misgivings; and, finally, without\nother word of command, he bade them \u201c_each do his part as he had\nlearned and been accustomed_.\u201d Now, any one who well considers the\nmethods followed by Camillus, and the words spoken by him to encourage\nhis soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that these words and\nmethods could never have been used with an army which had not been\ntrained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war. For no\ncaptain can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at\ntheir hands; nay, though he were another Hannibal, with such troops his\ndefeat were certain. For, as a captain cannot be present everywhere\nwhile a battle is being fought, unless he have taken all measures\nbeforehand to render his men of the same temper as himself, and have\nmade sure that they perfectly understand his orders and arrangements,\nhe will inevitably be destroyed.\n\nWhen a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome was, and when its\ncitizens have daily opportunity, both singly and together, to make\ntrial of their valour and learn what fortune can effect, it will always\nhappen, that at all times, and whether circumstances be adverse or\nfavourable, they will remain of unaltered courage and preserve the same\nnoble bearing. But when its citizens are unpractised in arms, and trust\nnot to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration of Fortune, they\nwill change their temper as she changes, and offer always the same\nexample of behaviour as was given by the Venetians.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\u2014_Of the methods which some have used to make Peace\nimpossible_.\n\n\nThe towns of C\u00e6re and Velitr\u00e6, two of her own colonies, revolted from\nRome in expectation of being protected by the Latins. But the Latins\nbeing routed and all hopes of help from that quarter at an end, many of\nthe townsmen recommended that envoys should be sent to Rome to make\ntheir peace with the senate. This proposal, however, was defeated by\nthose who had been the prime movers of the revolt, who, fearing that\nthe whole punishment might fall on their heads, to put a stop to any\ntalk of an adjustment, incited the multitude to take up arms and make a\nforay into the Roman territory.\n\nAnd, in truth, when it is desired that a prince or people should banish\nfrom their minds every thought of reconciliation, there is no surer or\nmore effectual plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on him\nwith whom you would not have them be reconciled; for, then, the fear of\nthat punishment which they will seem to themselves to have deserved,\nwill always keep them apart. At the close of the first war waged by the\nRomans against Carthage, the soldiers who had served under the\nCarthaginians in Sardinia and Sicily, upon peace being proclaimed,\nreturned to Africa; where, being dissatisfied with their pay, they\nmutinied against the Carthaginians, and choosing two of their number,\nMato and Spendio, to be their leaders, seized and sacked many towns\nsubject to Carthage. The Carthaginians, being loath to use force until\nthey had tried all other methods for bringing them to reason, sent\nHasdrubal, their fellow-citizen, to mediate with them, thinking that\nfrom formerly having commanded them he might be able to exercise some\ninfluence over them. But on his arrival, Spendio and Mato, to\nextinguish any hope these mutineers might have had of making peace with\nCarthage, and so leave them no alternative but war, persuaded them that\ntheir best course was to put Hasdrubal, with all the other Carthaginian\ncitizens whom they had taken prisoners, to death. Whereupon, they not\nonly put them to death, but first subjected them to an infinity of\ntortures; crowning their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect\nthat every Carthaginian who might thereafter fall into their hands\nshould meet a like fate. This advice, therefore, and its consummation\nhad the effect of rendering these mutineers relentless and inveterate\nin their hostility to the Carthaginians.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII.\u2014_That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your\nMen with confidence in one another and in you._\n\n\nTo insure an army being victorious in battle you must inspire it with\nthe conviction that it is certain to prevail. The causes which give it\nthis confidence are its being well armed and disciplined, and the\nsoldiers knowing one another. These conditions are only to be found\nunited in soldiers born and bred in the same country.\n\nIt is likewise essential that the army should think so well of its\ncaptain as to trust implicitly to his prudence; which it will always do\nif it see him careful of its welfare, attentive to discipline, brave in\nbattle, and otherwise supporting well and honourably the dignity of his\nposition. These conditions he fulfils when, while punishing faults, he\ndoes not needlessly harass his men, keeps his word with them, shows\nthem that the path to victory is easy, and conceals from them, or makes\nlight of things which seen from a distance might appear to threaten\ndanger. The observance of these precautions will give an army great\nconfidence, and such confidence leads to victory.\n\nThis confidence the Romans were wont to inspire in the minds of their\nsoldiers by the aid of religion; and accordingly their consuls were\nappointed, their armies were enrolled, their soldiers marched forth,\nand their battles were begun, only when the auguries and auspices were\nfavourable; and without attending to all these observances no prudent\ncaptain would ever engage in combat; knowing that unless his soldiers\nwere first assured that the gods were on their side, he might readily\nsuffer defeat. But if any consul or other leader ever joined battle\ncontrary to the auspices, the Romans would punish him, as they did\nClaudius Pulcher.\n\nThe truth of what I affirm is plainly seen from the whole course of the\nRoman history, but is more particularly established by the words which\nLivius puts into the mouth of Appius Claudius, who, when complaining to\nthe people of the insolence of the tribunes, and taxing them with\nhaving caused the corruption of the auspices and other rites of\nreligion, is made to say, \u201c_And now they would strip even religion of\nits authority. For what matters it, they will tell you, that the fowls\nrefuse to peck, or come slowly from the coop, or that a cock has\ncrowed? These are small matters doubtless; but it was by not contemning\nsuch small matters as these, that our forefathers built up this great\nrepublic._\u201d And, indeed, in these small matters lies a power which\nkeeps men united and of good courage, which is of itself the chief\ncondition of success.\n\nBut the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour, for\notherwise they can nothing avail. The men of Praneste, leading forth\ntheir army against the Romans, took up their position near the river\nAllia, on the very spot where the Romans had been routed by the Gauls,\nselecting this ground that it might inspire their own side with\nconfidence, and dishearten their enemies with the unhappy memories\nwhich it recalled But although, for the reasons already noted, this was\na course which promised success, the result nevertheless showed that\ntrue valour is not to be daunted by trifling disadvantages. And this\nthe historian well expresses by the words he puts in the mouth of the\ndictator as spoken to his master of the knights \u201c_See how these\nfellows, in encamping on the banks of the Allia, have chosen their\nground in reliance upon fortune. Do you, therefore, relying on\ndiscipline and valour, fall upon then centre._\u201d For true valour, tight\ndiscipline, and the feeling of security gained by repeated victories,\nare not to be counteracted by things of no real moment, dismayed by\nempty terrors, or quelled by a solitary mishap. As was well seen when\nthe two Manlii, being consuls in command against the Volscians, rashly\nallowed a part of their army to go out foraging, and both those who\nwent out and those who stayed behind found themselves attacked at the\nsame moment For from this danger they were saved by the courage of the\nsoldiers, and not by the foresight of the consuls. With regard to which\noccurrence Titus Livius observes, \u201c_Even without a leader the steadfast\nvalour of the soldiers was maintained._\u201d\n\nHere I must not omit to notice the device practised by Fabius to give\nhis army confidence, when he led it for the first time into Etruria.\nFor judging such encouragement to be especially needed by his men,\nsince they were entering an unknown country to encounter a new foe, he\naddressed them before they joined battle, and, after reciting many\nreasons for expecting a victory, told them, that \u201c_he could have\nmentioned other favourable circumstances making victory certain, had it\nnot been dangerous to disclose them._\u201d And as this device was\ndexterously used it merits imitation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV.\u2014_By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a\nRepublic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the\nMagistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a\nPrince._\n\n\nI have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus,\nrescued his father from the charge laid against him by Marcus\nPomponius, tribune of the people. And though the means he took to\neffect this were somewhat violent and irregular, so pleasing to\neveryone were his filial piety and affection, that not only did he\nescape rebuke, but when military tribunes had to be appointed his name\nwas second on the list of those chosen. To explain his good fortune, it\nwill, I think, be useful to consider what are the methods followed by\nthe citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom\nthey bestow honours, so as to see whether what I have already said on\nthis head be true, namely, that a people is more discriminating in\nawarding honours than a prince.\n\nI say, then, that in conferring honours and offices, the people, when\nit has no knowledge of a man from his public career, follows the\nestimate given of him by the general voice, and by common report; or\nelse is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion which it\nhas adopted concerning him. Such impressions are formed either from\nconsideration of a man\u2019s descent (it being assumed, until the contrary\nappears, that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished\ncitizens their descendant will resemble them), or else from regard to\nhis manners and habits; and nothing can be more in his favour than that\nhe frequents the company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are\ngenerally reputed wise. For as we can have no better clue to a man\u2019s\ncharacter than the company he keeps, he who frequents worthy company\ndeservedly obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to be some\nsimilarity between himself and his associates. Sometimes, however, the\npopular estimate of a man is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy\naction, though not of public moment, in which he has acquitted himself\nwell. And of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a\nman\u2019s favour, none is so effectual as this last. For the presumption\nthat he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is so often misleading,\nthat men are slow to trust and quick to discard it, unless confirmed by\nthe personal worth of him of whom they are judging.\n\nThe criterion of character afforded by a man\u2019s manners and conversation\nis a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is\nfar inferior to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given\nactual proof of his worth, his credit is built on mere opinion, which\nmay readily change. But this third mode of judging, which originates in\nand rests upon his actions, at once gives him a name which can only be\ndestroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature.\nThose therefore who live in a republic should conform to this third\ncriterion, and endeavour, as did many of the Roman youth, to make their\nstart in life with some extraordinary achievement, either by promoting\na law conducive to the general well-being, or by accusing some powerful\ncitizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar\nnew and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of.\n\nActions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your\nfame, but also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must\ncontinually be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the\nwhole course of his life. For after winning his earliest renown by his\nbold and singular defence of his father, when some years had passed he\nfought his famous duel with the Gaul, from whom, when he had slain him,\nhe took the twisted golden collar which gave him the name of Torquatus.\nNor was this the last of his remarkable actions, for at a later period,\nwhen he was of ripe years, he caused his own son to be put to death,\nbecause he had fought without leave, although successfully. Which three\nactions gained for him at the time a greater name, and have made him\nmore renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories,\nthough of these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other\nRoman. The explanation of which is, that while in his victories Manlius\nhad many who resembled him, in these particular actions he stood almost\nor entirely alone.\n\nSo, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories together did not\nobtain for him so much reputation, as did his rescue, while he was yet\nyoung, of his father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after the\nrout at Cann\u00e6, when with his naked sword he constrained a number of the\nRoman youth to swear never to abandon their country, as some among them\nhad before been minded to do. It was these two actions, therefore,\nwhich laid the foundation of his future fame and paved the way for his\ntriumphs in Spain and Africa. And the fair esteem in which men held\nhim, was still further heightened when in Spain he restored a daughter\nto her father, a wife to her husband.\n\nNor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil\nhonours, who must act in this way; the prince who would maintain his\ncredit in his princedom must do likewise; since nothing helps so much\nto make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth,\nwhether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good, and\nshow him to be so magnanimous, generous, and just, that he may well\npass into a proverb among his subjects. But to return to the point\nwhence I digressed, I say that if a people, when they first confer\nhonours on a fellow-citizen, rest their judgment on any one of the\nthree circumstances above-mentioned, they build on a reasonable\nfoundation; but, when many instances of noble conduct have made a man\nfavourably known, that the foundation is still better, since then there\nis hardly room for mistake. I speak merely of those honours which are\nbestowed on a man at the outset of his career, before he has come to be\nknown by continued proof, or is found to have passed from one kind of\nconduct to another and dissimilar kind, and I maintain that in such\ncases, so far as erroneous judgments or corrupt motives are concerned,\na people will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince.\n\nBut since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character,\nreputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than\nin truth they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from\nhis being informed and warned by his advisers, in order that the people\nmay not lack similar advice, wise founders of republics have provided,\nthat when the highest dignities of the State, to which it would be\ndangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled up, and it\nappears that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice, it\nshall be lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in\nthe public assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate, that the\npeople, being made acquainted therewith, may be better able to judge of\nhis fitness. That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in the\nspeech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during the second Punic\nwar, when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards\nTitus Ottacilius. For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the\nconsulship at such a crisis, spoke against him and pointed out his\ninsufficiency, and so prevented his appointment, turning the popular\nfavour towards another who deserved it more.\n\nIn the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people judges of those\namong whom it has to choose, in accordance with the surest indications\nit can get; and when it can be advised as princes are, makes fewer\nmistakes than they. But the citizen who would make a beginning by\ngaining the good-will of the people, must, to obtain it, perform, like\nTitus Manlius, some noteworthy action.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV.\u2014_Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend\nnew Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the\nDanger_.\n\n\nHow perilous a thing it is to put one\u2019s self at the head of changes\nwhereby many are affected, how difficult to guide and bring them to\nperfection, and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide and\narduous a subject to be treated here. Wherefore I reserve it for a\nfitter occasion, and shall now speak only of those dangers which are\nincurred by the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of a\nprince in being the first to promote some grave and important measure\nin such manner that the whole responsibility attending it rests with\nthem. For as men judge of things by their results, any evil which\nensues from such measures will be imputed to their author. And although\nif good ensue he will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this\nkind, what a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose.\n\nSelim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in\nreadiness, as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an\nexpedition against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws\nwhom he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to make war upon the\nSofi. In compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise\nwith a vast army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were many\ndeserts and few streams, and encountering the same difficulties as in\nancient times had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so\nmuch from pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in battle,\nhe lost a great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw\non whose advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death.\n\nIn like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously\npromoted various measures were banished when these turned out badly.\nCertain citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding\na law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law\npassing, it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth\nwith the armies was routed; and had it not been that the party in whose\nbehalf the law was made was extremely powerful, its promoters would\nhave fared badly. It is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of\na republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they do not\nconscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their\ncity or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they\nrisk their places and their lives; all men being subject to this\ninfirmity of judging advice by the event.\n\nWhen I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be\nescaped, I find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice\nyou proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner\nwith the measure you would see carried out, but offering your opinion\nwithout heat, and supporting it temperately and modestly, so that if\nthe prince or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will,\nand not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity. When you act\nthus, neither prince nor people can reasonably bear you a grudge in\nrespect of the advice given by you, since that advice was not adopted\ncontrary to the general opinion. For your danger lies in many having\nopposed you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine\nto ruin you. And although in taking this course you fall short of the\nglory which is earned by him who stands alone against many in urging\nsome measure which succeeds, you have nevertheless two advantages to\nmake up for it: first, that you escape danger; and second, that when\nyou have temperately stated your views, and when, in consequence of\nopposition, your advice has not been taken, should other counsels\nprevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced.\nAnd although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your prince or\ncity cannot be matter of rejoicing, still it is something to be taken\ninto account.\n\nOn this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. For that you\nshould be silent and express no opinion at all, were a course hurtful\nfor your prince or city, and which would not absolve you from danger,\nsince you would soon grow to be suspected, when it might fare with you\nas with the friend of Perseus the Macedonian king. For Perseus being\ndefeated by Paulus Emilius, and making his escape with a few\ncompanions, it happened that one of them, in reviewing the past, began\nto point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which had\nbeen his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, \u201c_Traitor, hast\nthou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things_?\u201d\nand so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the penalty\nincurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who\nspoke when he should have been silent; and who found no escape from\ndanger in having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore, I believe,\nthat the course which I have recommended should be observed and\nfollowed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI.\u2014_Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls,\nthat at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards\nless than Women_.\n\n\nThe bravery of the Gaul who on the banks of the Anio challenged any\namong the Romans to fight with him, and the combat that thereupon\nensued between him and Titus Manlius, remind me of what Titus Livius\noftener than once observes in his history, that \u201c_at the beginning of a\nfray the Gauls are more than men, but ere it is ended show themselves\nless than women_.\u201d\n\nTouching the cause of this, many are content to believe that such is\ntheir nature, which, indeed, I take to be true; but we are not,\ntherefore, to assume that the natural temper which makes them brave at\nthe outset, may not be so trained and regulated as to keep them brave\nto the end. And, to prove this, I say, that armies are of three kinds.\nIn one of these you have discipline with bravery and valour as its\nconsequence. Such was the Roman army, which is shown by all historians\nto have maintained excellent discipline as the result of constant\nmilitary training. And because in a well-disciplined army none must do\nanything save by rule, we find that in the Roman army, from which as it\nconquered the world all others should take example, none either eat, or\nslept, or bought, or sold, or did anything else, whether in his\nmilitary or in his private capacity, without orders from the consul.\nThose armies which do otherwise are not true armies, and if ever they\nhave any success, it is owing to the fury and impetuosity of their\nonset and not to trained and steady valour. But of this impetuosity and\nfury, trained valour, when occasion requires, will make use; nor will\nany danger daunt it or cause it to lose heart, its courage being kept\nalive by its discipline, and its confidence fed by the hope of victory\nwhich never fails it while that discipline is maintained.\n\nBut the contrary happens with armies of the second sort, those, namely,\nwhich have impetuosity without discipline, as was the case with the\nGauls whose courage in a protracted conflict gradually wore away; so\nthat unless they succeeded in their first attack, the impetuosity to\nwhich they trusted, having no support from disciplined valour, soon\ncooled; when, as they had nothing else to depend on, their efforts\nceased. The Romans, on the other hand, being less disquieted in danger\nby reason of their perfect discipline, and never losing hope, fought\nsteadily and stubbornly to the last, and with the same courage at the\nend as at the outset; nay, growing heated by the conflict, only became\nthe fiercer the longer it was continued.\n\nIn armies of the third sort both natural spirit and trained valour are\nwanting; and to this class belong the Italian armies of our own times,\nof which it may be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless, never\nobtaining a victory, save when, by some accident, the enemy they\nencounter takes to flight. But since we have daily proofs of this\nabsence of valour, it were needless to set forth particular instances\nof it.\n\nThat all, however, may know on the testimony of Titus Livius what\nmethods a good army should take, and what are taken by a bad army, I\nshall cite the words he represents Papirius Cursor to have used when\nurging that Fabius, his master of the knights, should be punished for\ndisobedience, and denouncing the consequences which would ensue were he\nabsolved, saying:\u2014\u201c_Let neither God nor man be held in reverence; let\nthe orders of captains and the Divine auspices be alike disregarded;\nlet a vagrant soldiery range without leave through the country of\nfriend or foe; reckless of their military oath, let them disband at\ntheir pleasure; let them forsake their deserted standards, and neither\nrally nor disperse at the word of command; let them fight when they\nchoose, by day or by night, with or without advantage of ground, with\nor without the bidding of their leader, neither maintaining their ranks\n_nor observing the order of battle; and let our armies, from being a\nsolemn and consecrated company, grow to resemble some dark and\nfortuitous gathering of cut-throats._\u201d With this passage before us, it\nis easy to pronounce whether the armies of our times be \u201c_a dark and\nfortuitous gathering_,\u201d or \u201c_a solemn and consecrated company_;\u201d nay,\nhow far they fall short of anything worthy to be called an army,\npossessing neither the impetuous but disciplined valour of the Romans,\nnor even the mere undisciplined impetuosity of the Gauls.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII.\u2014_Whether a general engagement should be preceded by\nskirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new\nEnemy._\n\n\nBesides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing\nanything to its utmost perfection, it appears, as I have already\nobserved, that in close vicinity to every good is found also an evil,\nso apt to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible to have the\none without accepting the other. This we see in all human affairs, and\nthe result is, that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural and\ncommon disadvantage, we never arrive at any excellence. I am reminded\nof this by the combat between Titus Manlius and the Gaul, concerning\nwhich Livius writes that it \u201c_determined the issue of the entire war;\nsince the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily withdrew to the country\nabout Tivoli, whence they presently passed into Campania._\u201d\n\nIt may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a prudent captain\nought absolutely to refrain from all those operations which, while of\ntrifling moment in themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on\nhis army. Now, to engage in a combat wherein you risk your whole\nfortunes without putting forth your entire strength, is, as I observed\nbefore, when condemning the defence of a country by guarding its\ndefiles, an utterly foolhardy course. On the other hand, it is to be\nsaid that a prudent captain, when he has to meet a new and redoubtable\nadversary, ought, before coming to a general engagement, to accustom\nhis men by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality of their\nenemy; that they may learn to know him, and how to deal with him, and\nso free themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame\ninspire.\n\nThis for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance, and one\nwhich it might be almost fatal for him to neglect, since to risk a\npitched battle without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to\nknow their enemy and shake off their fear of him, is to rush on certain\ndestruction. When Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their\narmies against the Samnites, these being new adversaries with whom up\nto that time they had not measured their strength, Titus Livius tells\nus that before giving battle he made his men make trial of the enemy in\nseveral unimportant skirmishes, \u201c_lest they should be dismayed by a new\nfoe and a new method of warfare._\u201d Nevertheless, there is very great\ndanger that, if your soldiers get the worst in these encounters, their\nalarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a result follow contrary\nto that intended, namely, that you dispirit where you meant to\nreassure.\n\nThis, therefore, is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh\nthe good, and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay\nhold of the one when you think to grasp the other. And with regard to\nthis I say, that a good captain should do what he can that nothing\nhappen which might discourage his men, nor is there anything so likely\nto discourage them as to begin with a defeat. For which reason\nskirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only to be allowed where\nyou fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. In like\nmanner, no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into\nyour country unless your whole army can co-operate; nor are any towns\nto be defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin.\nAnd as to those towns which you do defend, you must so arrange, both in\nrespect of the garrison within and the army without, that in the event\nof a siege your whole forces can be employed. All other towns you must\nleave undefended. For, provided your army be kept together, you do not,\nin losing what you voluntarily abandon, forfeit your military\nreputation, or sacrifice your hopes of final success. But when you lose\nwhat it was your purpose, and what all know it was your purpose to\nhold, you suffer a real loss and injury, and, like the Gauls on the\ndefeat of their champion, you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in\nitself.\n\nPhilip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great soldier in his day,\nand of a great name, on being invaded by the Romans, laid waste and\nrelinquished much of his territory which he thought he could not\ndefend; rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation to lose\nterritory after an attempt to defend it, than to abandon it to the\nenemy as something he cared little to retain. So, likewise, after the\nbattle of Cann\u00e6, when their affairs were at their worst, the Romans\nrefused aid to many subject and protected States, charging them to\ndefend themselves as best they could. And this is a better course than\nto undertake to defend and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you\nlose only your friend; whereas in failing, you not only lose your\nfriend, but weaken yourself.\n\nBut to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that even when a captain\nis constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by\nmeans of skirmishes, he ought first to see that he has so much the\nadvantage that he runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is his\nbetter course, he must do as Marius did when sent against the\nCimbrians, a very courageous people who were laying Italy waste, and by\ntheir fierceness and numbers, and from the fact of their having already\nrouted a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they came. For before\nfighting a decisive battle, Marius judged it necessary to do something\nto lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army; and\nbeing a prudent commander, he, on several occasions, posted his men at\npoints where the Cimbrians must pass, that seeing and growing familiar\nwith their appearance, while themselves in safety and within the\nshelter of their intrenched camp, and finding them to be a mere\ndisorderly rabble, encumbered with baggage, and either without weapons,\nor with none that were formidable, they might at last assume courage\nand grow eager to engage them in battle. The part thus prudently taken\nby Marius, should be carefully imitated by others who would escape the\ndangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like the\nGauls to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling defeat.\n\nBut since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius\nCorvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner\nof man a captain ought to be.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII.\u2014_Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers\ncan confide._\n\n\nValerius Corvinus, as I have said already, was sent in command of an\narmy against the Samnites, who were then new enemies to Rome.\nWherefore, to reassure his soldiers and familiarize them with their\nadversaries, he made them engage with them in various unimportant\npassages of arms. But not thinking this enough, he resolved before\ndelivering battle to address his men, and by reminding them of their\nvalour and his own, to make it plain how little they should esteem such\nenemies. And from the words which Titus Livius puts in his mouth we may\ngather what manner of man the captain ought to be in whom an army will\nput its trust. For he makes him say:\u2014\u201c_Bear ye also this in mind under\nwhose conduct and auspices you are about to fight, and whether he whom\nyou are to obey be great only in exhorting, bold only in words, and all\nunpractised in arms; or whether he be one who himself knows how to use\nhis spear, to march before the eagles, and play his part in the\nthickest of the fight. Soldiers! I would have you follow my deeds and\nnot my words, and look to me for example rather than for commands; for\nwith this right hand I have won for myself three consulships, and an\nunsurpassed renown._\u201d Which words rightly understood give every one to\nknow what he must do to merit a captain\u2019s rank. And if any man obtain\nit by other means, he will soon discover that advancement due to chance\nor intrigue rather takes away than brings reputation, since it is men\nwho give lustre to titles and not titles to men.\n\nFrom what has been said it will likewise be understood that if great\ncaptains when matched against an unfamiliar foe have had to resort to\nunusual methods for reassuring the minds even of veteran soldiers, much\nmore will it be necessary for them to use all their address when in\ncommand of a raw and untried army which has never before looked an\nenemy in the face. For if an unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even\nin a veteran army, how much greater must be the terror which any army\nwill inspire in the minds of untrained men. And yet we often find all\nthese difficulties overcome by the supreme prudence of a great captain\nlike the Roman Gracchus or the Theban Epaminondas, of whom I have\nbefore spoken, who with untried troops defeated the most practised\nveterans. And the method they are said to have followed was to train\ntheir men for some months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them to\ndiscipline and obedience, after which they employed them with complete\nconfidence on actual service.\n\nNo man, therefore, of warlike genius, need despair of creating a good\narmy if only he have the men; for the prince who has many subjects and\nyet lacks soldiers, has only to thank his own inertness and want of\nforesight, and must not complain of the cowardice of his people.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX.\u2014_That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places._\n\n\nAmong other qualifications essential in a good captain is a knowledge,\nboth general and particular, of places and countries, for without such\nknowledge it is impossible for him to carry out any enterprise in the\nbest way. And while practice is needed for perfection in every art, in\nthis it is needed in the highest degree. Such practice, or particular\nknowledge as it may be termed, is sooner acquired in the chase than in\nany other exercise; and, accordingly, we find it said by ancient\nhistorians that those heroes who, in their day, ruled the world, were\nbred in the woods and trained to the chase; for this exercise not\nmerely gives the knowledge I speak of, but teaches countless other\nlessons needful in war. And Xenophon in his life of Cyrus tells us,\nthat Cyrus, on his expedition against the King of Armenia, when\nassigning to each of his followers the part he was to perform, reminded\nthem that the enterprise on which they were engaged, differed little\nfrom one of those hunting expeditions on which they had gone so often\nin his company; likening those who were to lie in ambush in the\nmountains, to the men sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops; and\nthose who were to overrun the plain, to the beaters whose business it\nis to start the game from its lair that it may be driven into the\ntoils. Now, this is related to show how, in the opinion of Xenophon,\nthe chase is a mimic representation of war, and therefore to be\nesteemed by the great as useful and honourable.\n\nNor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken of as necessary\nin a commander, be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase.\nFor he who joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the\ncharacter of the country in which it is followed; and he who has made\nhimself specially familiar with one district, will afterwards readily\nunderstand the character of any strange country into which he comes.\nFor all countries, and the districts of which they are made up, have a\ncertain resemblance to one another, so that from a knowledge of one we\ncan pass easily to the knowledge of another. He therefore who is\nwithout such practical acquaintance with some one country, can only\nwith difficulty, and after a long time, obtain a knowledge of another,\nwhile he who possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain\nspreads, how that mountain slopes, whither that valley winds, and all\nother like particulars in respect of which he has already acquired a\ncertain familiarity.\n\nThe truth of what I affirm is shown by Titus Livius in the case of\nPublius Decius, who, being military tribune in the army which the\nconsul Cornelius led against the Samnites, when the consul advanced\ninto a defile where the Roman army were like to be shut in by the\nenemy, perceiving the great danger they ran, and noting, as Livius\nrelates, a hill which rose by a steep ascent and overhung the enemy\u2019s\ncamp, and which, though hard of access for heavy-armed troops,\npresented little difficulty to troops lightly armed, turned to the\nconsul and said:\u2014\u201c_Seest thou, Aulus Cornelius, yonder height over\nabove the enemy, which they have been blind enough to neglect? There,\nwere we manfully to seize it, might we find the citadel of our hopes\nand of our safety._\u201d Whereupon, he was sent by the consul with three\nthousand men to secure the height, and so saved the Roman army. And as\nit was part of his plan to make his own escape and carry off his men\nsafely under shelter of night, Livius represents him as saying to his\nsoldiers:\u2014\u201c_Come with me, that, while daylight still serves, we may\nlearn where the enemy have posted their guards, and by what exit we may\nissue hence._\u201d Accordingly, putting on the cloak of a common soldier,\nlest the enemy should observe that an officer was making his rounds he\nsurveyed their camp in all directions.\n\nNow any one who carefully studies the whole of this passage, must\nperceive how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the\nnature of places, which knowledge had Decius not possessed he could not\nhave decided that it would be for the advantage of the Roman army to\noccupy this hill; nor could he have judged from a distance whether the\nhill was accessible or no; and when he reached the summit and desired\nto return to the consul, since he was surrounded on all sides by the\nenemy, he never could have distinguished the path it was safe for him\nto take, from those guarded by the foe. For all which reasons it was\nabsolutely essential that Decius should have that thorough knowledge\nwhich enabled him by gaining possession of this hill to save the Roman\narmy, and to discover a path whereby, in the event of his being\nattacked, he and his followers might escape.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL.\u2014_That Fraud is fair in War._\n\n\nAlthough in all other affairs it be hateful to use fraud, in the\noperations of war it is praiseworthy and glorious; so that he who gets\nthe better of his enemy by fraud, is as much extolled as he who\nprevails by force. This appears in the judgments passed by such as have\nwritten of the lives of great warriors, who praise Hannibal and those\nother captains who have been most noted for acting in this way. But\nsince we may read of many instances of such frauds, I shall not cite\nthem here. This, however, I desire to say, that I would not have it\nunderstood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your\nplighted word, or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed;\nfor though to do so may sometimes gain you territory and power, it can\nnever, as I have said elsewhere, gain you glory.\n\nThe fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed against an\nenemy who places no trust in you, and is wholly directed to military\noperations, such as the stratagem of Hannibal at the Lake of\nThrasymene, when he feigned flight in order to draw the Roman consul\nand his army into an ambuscade; or when to escape from the hands of\nFabius Maximus he fastened lights to the horns of his oxen. Similar to\nthe above was the deceit practised by Pontius the Samnite commander to\ninveigle the Roman army into the Caudine Forks. For after he had drawn\nup his forces behind the hills, he sent out a number of his soldiers,\ndisguised as herdsmen, to drive great herds of cattle across the plain;\nwho being captured by the Romans, and interrogated as to where the\nSamnite army was, all of them, as they had been taught by Pontius,\nagreed in saying that it had gone to besiege Nocera: which being\nbelieved by the consuls, led them to advance within the Caudine Valley,\nwhere no sooner were they come than they were beset by the Samnites.\nAnd the victory thus won by a fraud would have been most glorious for\nPontius had he but taken the advice of his father Herennius, who urged\nthat the Romans should either be set at liberty unconditionally, or all\nbe put to death; but that a mean course \u201c_which neither gains friends\nnor gets rid of foes_\u201d should be avoided. And this was sound advice,\nfor, as has already been shown, in affairs of moment a mean course is\nalways hurtful.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI.\u2014_That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by\nDishonour; and in either way is well defended._\n\n\nThe consuls together with the whole Roman army fell, as I have related,\ninto the hands of the Samnites, who imposed on them the most\nignominious terms, insisting that they should be stripped of their\narms, and pass under the yoke before they were allowed to return to\nRome. The consuls being astounded by the harshness of these conditions\nand the whole army overwhelmed with dismay, Lucius Lentulus, the Roman\nlieutenant, stood forward and said, that in his opinion they ought to\ndecline no course whereby their country might be saved; and that as the\nvery existence of Rome depended on the preservation of her army, that\narmy must be saved at any sacrifice, for whether the means be\nhonourable or ignominious, all is well done that is done for the\ndefence of our country. And he said that were her army preserved, Rome,\nin course of time, might wipe out the disgrace; but if her army were\ndestroyed, however gloriously it might perish, Rome and her freedom\nwould perish with it. In the event his counsel was followed.\n\nNow this incident deserves to be noted and pondered over by every\ncitizen who is called on to advise his country; for when the entire\nsafety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or\nunjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On\nthe contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that course\nalone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and\nmaintains its liberty. And this course we find followed by the people\nof France, both in their words and in their actions, with the view of\nsupporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of their\nkingdom; for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience\nthan that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king. For\ntheir king, they say, can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take,\nwhether it turn out well or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all\nmaintain that he has acted as a king should.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII.\u2014_That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be\nobserved._\n\n\nWhen, after being subjected to this disgrace, the consuls returned to\nRome with their disarmed legions, Spurius Posthumius, himself one of\nthe consuls, was the first to contend in the senate that the terms made\nin the Caudine Valley were not to be observed. For he argued that the\nRoman people were not bound by them, though he himself doubtless was,\ntogether with all the others who had promised peace; wherefore, if the\npeople desired to set themselves free from every engagement, he and all\nthe rest who had given this promise must be made over as prisoners into\nthe hands of the Samnites. And so steadfastly did he hold to this\nopinion, that the senate were content to adopt it, and sending him and\nthe rest as prisoners back to Samnium, protested to the Samnites that\nthe peace was not binding. And so kind was Fortune to Posthumius on\nthis occasion, that the Samnites would not keep him as a prisoner, and\nthat on his return to Rome, notwithstanding his defeat, he was held in\nhigher honour by the Romans than the victorious Pontius by his\ncountrymen.\n\nHere two points are to be noted; first, that glory may be won by any\naction; for although, commonly, it follow upon victory, it may also\nfollow on defeat, if this defeat be seen to have happened through no\nfault of yours, or if, directly after, you perform some valiant action\nwhich cancels it. The other point to be noted is that there is no\ndisgrace in not observing promises wrung from you by force; for\npromises thus extorted when they affect the public welfare will always\nbe broken so soon as the pressure under which they were made is\nwithdrawn, and that, too, without shame on the part of him who breaks\nthem; of which we read many instances in history, and find them\nconstantly occurring at the present day. Nay, as between princes, not\nonly are such compulsory promises broken when the force which extorted\nthem is removed, but all other promises as well, are in like manner\ndisregarded when the causes which led to them no longer operate.\n\nWhether this is a thing to be commended or no, and whether such methods\nought or ought not to be followed by princes, has already been\nconsidered by me in my \u201c_Treatise of the Prince_\u201d wherefore I say no\nmore on that subject here.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII.\u2014_That Men born in the same Province retain through all\nTimes nearly the same Character._\n\n\nThe wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he\nwho would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has\nbeen; since all human events, whether present or to come, have their\nexact counterpart in the past. And this, because these events are\nbrought about by men, whose passions and dispositions remaining in all\nages the same naturally give rise to the same effects; although,\ndoubtless, the operation of these causes takes a higher form, now in\none province, and now in another, according to the character of the\ntraining wherein the inhabitants of these provinces acquire their way\nof life.\n\nAnother aid towards judging of the future by the past, is to observe\nhow the same nation long retains the same customs, remaining constantly\ncovetous or deceitful, or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue.\nAny one reading the past history of our city of Florence, and noting\nwhat has recently befallen it, will find the French and German nations\noverflowing with avarice, pride, cruelty, and perfidy, all of which\nfour vices have at divers times wrought much harm to our city. As an\ninstance of their perfidy, every one knows how often payments of money\nwere made to Charles VIII. of France, in return for which he engaged to\nrestore the fortresses of Pisa, yet never did restore them, manifesting\nthereby his bad faith and grasping avarice. Or, to pass from these very\nrecent events, all may have heard of what happened in the war in which\nthe Florentines were involved with the Visconti, dukes of Milan, when\nFlorence, being left without other resource, resolved to invite the\nemperor into Italy, that she might be assisted by his name and power in\nher struggle with Lombardy. The emperor promised to come with a strong\narmy to take part against the Visconti and to protect Florence from\nthem, on condition that the Florentines paid him a hundred thousand\nducats on his setting out, and another hundred thousand on his arrival\nin Italy; to which terms the Florentines agreed. But although he then\nreceived payment of the first instalment and, afterwards, on reaching\nVerona, of the second, he turned back from the expedition without\neffecting anything, alleging as his excuse that he was stopped by\ncertain persons who had failed to fulfil their engagements. But if\nFlorence had not been urged by passion or overcome by necessity, or had\nshe read of and understood the ancient usages of the barbarians, she\nwould neither on this, nor on many other occasions, have been deceived\nby them, seeing that these nations have always been of the same\ncharacter, and have always, in all circumstances, and with all men\nalike, used the same methods. For in ancient times we find them\nbehaving after the same fashion to the Etruscans, who, when overpowered\nby the Romans, by whom they had been repeatedly routed and put to\nflight, perceiving that they could not stand without help, entered into\na compact with the Gauls dwelling in the parts of Italy south of the\nAlps, to pay them a certain sum if they would unite with them in a\ncampaign against the Romans. But the Gauls, after taking their money,\nrefused to arm on their behalf, alleging that they had not been paid to\nmake war on the enemies of the Etruscans, but only to refrain from\npillaging their lands. And thus the people of Etruria, through the\navarice and perfidy of the Gauls, were at once defrauded of their money\nand disappointed of the help which they had counted on obtaining.\n\nFrom which two instances of the Etruscans in ancient times and of the\nFlorentines in recent, we may see that barbaric races have constantly\nfollowed the same methods, and may easily draw our conclusions as to\nhow far princes should trust them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV.\u2014_That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring\noften succeed._\n\n\nWhen attacked by the Romans, the Samnites as they could not without\nhelp stand against them in the field, resolved to leave garrisons in\nthe towns of Samnium, and to pass with their main army into Etruria,\nthat country being then at truce with Rome, and thus ascertain whether\ntheir actual presence in arms might not move the Etruscans to renew\nhostilities against Rome, which they had refused to renew when invited\nthrough envoys. During the negotiations which, on this occasion, passed\nbetween the two nations, the Samnites in explaining the chief causes\nthat led them to take up arms, used the memorable words\u2014\u201c_they had\nrisen because peace is a heavier burthen for slaves than war for\nfreemen_\u201d In the end, partly by their persuasions, and partly by the\npresence of their army, they induced the Etruscans to join forces with\nthem.\n\nHere we are to note that when a prince would obtain something from\nanother, he ought, if the occasion allow, to leave him no time to\ndeliberate, but should so contrive that the other may see the need of\nresolving at once; as he will, if he perceive that refusal or delay in\ncomplying with what is asked of him, will draw upon him a sudden and\ndangerous resentment.\n\nThis method we have seen employed with good effect in our own times by\nPope Julius II. in dealing with France, and by M. de Foix, the general\nof the French king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. For Pope\nJulius desiring to expel the Bentivogli from Bologna, and thinking that\nfor this purpose he needed the help of French troops, and to have the\nVenetians neutral, after sounding both and receiving from both\nhesitating and ambiguous answers, determined to make both fall in with\nhis views, by giving them no time to oppose him; and so, setting forth\nfrom Rome with as strong a force as he could get together, he marched\non Bologna, sending word to the Venetians that they must stand aloof,\nand to the King of France to send him troops. The result was that in\nthe brief time allowed them, neither of the two powers could make up\ntheir mind to thwart him; and knowing that refusal or delay would be\nviolently resented by the Pope, they yielded to his demands, the king\nsending him soldiers and the Venetians maintaining neutrality.\n\nM. de Foix, again, being with the king\u2019s army in Bologna when word came\nthat Brescia had risen, could not rest till he had recovered that town.\nBut, to get there he had to choose between two routes, one long and\ncircuitous leading through the territories of the king, the other short\nand direct. In taking the latter route, however, not only would he have\nto pass through the dominions of the Marquis of Mantua, but also to\nmake his way into these through the lakes and marshes wherewith that\ncountry abounds, by following an embanked road, closed and guarded by\nthe marquis with forts and other defensive works. Resolving,\nnevertheless, to take the shortest road at all hazards, he waited till\nhis men were already on their march before signifying to the marquis\nthat he desired leave to pass through his country, so that no time\nmight be left him to deliberate. Taken aback by the unexpected demand,\nthe marquis gave the leave sought, which he never would have given had\nDe Foix acted with less impetuosity. For he was in league with the\nVenetians and with the Pope, and had a son in the hands of the latter;\nall which circumstances would have afforded him fair pretexts for\nrefusal. But carried away by the suddenness and urgency of the demand,\nhe yielded. And in like manner the Etruscans yielded to the instances\nof the Samnites, the presence of whose army decided them to renew\nhostilities which before they had declined to renew.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV.\u2014_Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the\nEnemy\u2019s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset._\n\n\nDecius and Fabius, the Roman consuls, were each of them in command of a\nseparate army, one directed against the Samnites, the other against the\nEtruscans: and as both delivered battle, we have to pronounce, in\nrespect of the two engagements, which commander followed the better\nmethod. Decius attacked his enemy at once with the utmost fury and with\nhis whole strength. Fabius was content, at first, merely to maintain\nhis ground; for judging that more was to be gained by a later attack,\nhe reserved his forces for a final effort, when the ardour of the enemy\nhad cooled and his energy spent itself. The event showed Fabius to be\nmore successful in his tactics than Decius, who being exhausted by his\nfirst onset, and seeing his ranks begin to waver, to secure by death\nthe glory he could no longer hope from victory, followed the example\nset him by his father, and sacrificed himself to save the Roman\nlegions. Word whereof being brought to Fabius, he, to gain, while he\nyet lived, as much honour as the other had earned by his death, pushed\nforward all the troops he had reserved for his final effort, and so\nobtained an unexampled victory. Whence we see that of the two methods,\nthat of Fabius was the safer and the more deserving our imitation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI.\u2014_How the Characteristics of Families come to be\nperpetuated._\n\n\nManners and institutions differing in different cities, seem here to\nproduce a harder and there a softer race; and a like difference may\nalso be discerned in the character of different families in the same\ncity. And while this holds good of all cities, we have many instances\nof it in reading the history of Rome. For we find the Manlii always\nstern and stubborn; the Valerii kindly and courteous; the Claudii\nhaughty and ambitious; and many families besides similarly\ndistinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities.\n\nThese qualities we cannot refer wholly to the _blood_, for that must\nchange as a result of repeated intermarriages, but must ascribe rather\nto the different training and education given in different families.\nFor much turns on whether a child of tender years hears a thing well or\nill spoken of, since this must needs make an impression on him whereby\nhis whole conduct in after life will be influenced. Were it otherwise\nwe should not have found the whole family of the Claudii moved by the\ndesires and stirred by the passions which Titus Livius notes in many of\nthem, and more especially in one holding the office of censor, who,\nwhen his colleague laid down his magistracy, as the law prescribed, at\nthe end of eighteen months, would not resign, maintaining that he was\nentitled to hold the office for five years in accordance with the\noriginal law by which the censorship was regulated. And although his\nrefusal gave occasion to much controversy, and bred great tumult and\ndisturbance, no means could be found to depose him from his office,\nwhich he persisted in retaining in opposition to the will of the entire\ncommons and a majority of the senate. And any who shall read the speech\nmade against him by Publius Sempronius, tribune of the people, will\nfind therein all the Claudian insolence exposed, and will recognize the\ndocility and good temper shown by the body of the citizens in\nrespecting the laws and institutions of their country.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII.\u2014_That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to\nforget private Wrongs._\n\n\nWhile commanding as consul against the Samnites, Manlius was wounded in\na skirmish. His army being thereby endangered, the senate judged it\nexpedient to send Papirius Cursor as dictator to supply his place. But\nas it was necessary that the dictator should be nominated by Fabius,\nthe other consul, who was with the army in Etruria, and as a doubt was\nfelt that he might refuse to nominate Papirius, who was his enemy, the\nsenate sent two messengers to entreat him to lay aside private\nanimosity, and make the nomination which the public interest required.\nMoved by love of his country Fabius did as he was asked, although by\nhis silence, and by many other signs, he gave it to be known that\ncompliance was distasteful. From his conduct at this juncture all who\nwould be thought good citizens should take example.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII.\u2014_That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave\nblunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind._\n\n\nThe consul having gone to Rome to perform certain ceremonial rites, and\nFulvius being left in charge of the Roman army in Etruria, the\nEtruscans, to see whether they could not circumvent the new commander,\nplanting an ambush not far from the Roman camp, sent forward soldiers\ndisguised as shepherds driving large flocks of sheep so as to pass in\nsight of the Roman army. These pretended shepherds coming close to the\nwall of his camp, Fulvius, marvelling at what appeared to him\nunaccountable audacity, hit upon a device whereby the artifice of the\nEtruscans was detected and their design defeated.\n\nHere it seems proper to note that the captain of an army ought not to\nbuild on what seems a manifest blunder on the part of an enemy; for as\nmen are unlikely to act with conspicuous want of caution, it will\ncommonly be found that this blunder is cover to a fraud. And yet, so\nblinded are men\u2019s minds by their eagerness for victory, that they look\nonly to what appears on the surface.\n\nAfter defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls, hastening on to\nRome, found the gates of the city left open and unguarded. But fearing\nsome stratagem, and being unable to believe that the Romans could be so\nfoolish and cowardly as to abandon their city, they waited during the\nwhole of that day and the following night outside the gates, without\ndaring to enter. In the year 1508, when the Florentines Avere engaged\nin besieging Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a citizen of that town,\nhappening to be taken prisoner, was released on his promise to procure\nthe surrender to the Florentines of one of the gates of the city.\nAfterwards, on pretence of arranging for the execution of this\nsurrender, he came repeatedly to confer with those whom the Florentine\ncommissaries had deputed to treat with him, coming not secretly but\nopenly, and accompanied by other citizens of Pisa, whom he caused to\nstand aside while he conversed with the Florentines. From all which\ncircumstances his duplicity might have been suspected, since, had he\nmeant to do as he had engaged, it was most unlikely that he should be\nnegotiating so openly. But the desire to recover possession of Pisa so\nblinded the Florentines that they allowed themselves to be conducted\nunder his guidance to the Lucca Gate, where, through his treachery, but\nto their own disgrace, they lost a large number of their men and\nofficers.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX.\u2014_That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant\nneed of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius\nFabius received the surname of Maximus._\n\n\nIt must happen, as I have already said, in every great city, that\ndisorders needing the care of the physician continually spring up; and\nthe graver these disorders are, the greater will be the skill needed\nfor their treatment. And if ever in any city, most assuredly in Rome,\nwe see these disorders assume strange and unexpected shapes. As when it\nappeared that all the Roman wives had conspired to murder their\nhusbands, many of them being found to have actually administered\npoison, and many others to have drugs in readiness for the purpose.\n\nOf like nature was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered at the\ntime of the Macedonian war, wherein many thousands, both men and women,\nwere implicated, and which, had it not been found out, or had the\nRomans not been accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders, must\nhave proved perilous for their city. And, indeed, if the greatness of\nthe Roman Republic were not declared by countless other signs, as well\nas by the manner in which it caused its laws to be observed, it might\nbe seen in the character of the punishments which it inflicted against\nwrong-doers. For in vindicating justice, it would not scruple or\nhesitate to put a whole legion to death, to depopulate an entire city,\nor send eight or ten thousand men at a time into banishment, subject to\nthe most stringent conditions, which had to be observed, not by one of\nthese exiles only, but by all. As in the case of those soldiers who\nfought unsuccessfully at Cann\u00e6, who were banished to Sicily, subject to\nthe condition that they should not harbour in towns, and should all eat\nstanding.\n\nBut the most formidable of all their punishments was that whereby one\nman out of every ten in an entire army was chosen by lot to be put to\ndeath. For correcting a great body of men no more effectual means could\nbe devised; because, when a multitude have offended and the ringleaders\nare not known, all cannot be punished, their number being too great;\nwhile to punish some only, and leave the rest unpunished, were unjust\nto those punished and an encouragement to those passed over to offend\nagain. But where you put to death a tenth chosen by lot, where all\nequally deserve death, he who is punished will blame his unlucky\nfortune, while he who escapes will be afraid that another time the lot\nmay be his, and for that reason will be careful how he repeats his\noffence. The poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as\ntheir crimes deserved.\n\nAlthough disorders like these occasion mischievous results in a\ncommonwealth, still they are not fatal, since almost always there is\ntime to correct them. But no time is given in the case of disorders in\nthe State itself, which unless they be treated by some wise citizen,\nwill always bring a city to destruction. From the readiness wherewith\nthe Romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came\nto be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of so large a share\nof the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, forsaking\nthose courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged\nfrom the men to whom it had before looked for guidance. Which being\nobserved by Quintius Fabius when censor, he caused all those new\ncitizens to be classed in four _Tribes_, that being reduced within this\nnarrow limit they might not have it in their power to corrupt the\nentire State. And this was a wisely contrived measure, for, without\nintroducing any violent change, it supplied a convenient remedy, and\none so acceptable to the republic as to gain for Fabius the\nwell-deserved name of Maximus.\n\nTHE END.","title":"Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":140761}