{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_11015/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_11015","id":"gutenberg_11015","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/11015","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Religious","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Paganism","Pantheism","Religion"],"text":"PANTHEISM\n\nBy J. ALLANSON PICTON\n\n\nRELIGIONS ANCIENT AND MODERN\n\n\nPANTHEISM\n\nIts Story and Significance\n\n\n\n\nRELIGIONS: ANCIENT AND MODERN.\n\n_Foolscap 8vo. 1s. net per volume_.\n\nIt is intended in this series to present to a large public the SALIENT\nFEATURES, first of the GREAT RELIGIONS, secondly of the GREAT\nPHILOSOPHIES, and thirdly of the GREAT LITERARY and ARTISTIC REPUTATIONS\nof the Human Race.\n\nPANTHEISM: ITS STORY AND SIGNIFICANCE. By J. ALLANSON PICTON, M.A.\nAuthor of _The Religion of the Universe_, etc.\n\nRELIGION OF ANCIENT GREECE. By Miss JANE HARRISON, Fellow of Newnham\nCollege, Author of _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_, etc.\n\nANIMISM. By EDWARD CLODD, Author of _Pioneers of Evolution_.\n\nRELIGIONS OF ANCIENT CHINA. By H.A. GILES, M.A., LL.D. (Aberd.),\nProfessor of Chinese at Cambridge University.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_The following Volumes are in preparation_:\n\nISLAM. Mr. T.W. ARNOLD, Assistant Librarian, India Office.\n\nBUDDHISM. 2 vols. Prof. RHYS DAVIDS, LL.D.\n\nHINDUISM. Mr. T.W. ARNOLD.\n\nFETISHISM AND MAGIC. Prof. ALFRED C. HADDON, F.R.S.\n\nTHE MYTHOLOGY OF ANCIENT BRITAIN. Mr. CHARLES SQUIRE.\n\nCELTIC RELIGION. Prof. ANWYL.\n\nSCANDINAVIAN RELIGION. Mr. W.A. CRAIGIE.\n\nTHE RELIGION OF ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. FLINDERS PETRIE. F.R.S.\n\nTHE RELIGION OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA, Dr. THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES.\n\n\n\n\nPANTHEISM\n\nIts Story and Significance\n\nBY J. ALLANSON PICTON\n\nLONDON\n\n1905\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n  CHAP.\n\n       FOREWORD\n    I. PRE-CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM\n   II. POST-CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM\n  III. MODERN PANTHEISM\n       AFTERWORD\n\n\n\n\nPANTHEISM\n\n\nFOREWORD.\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheism not Sectarian or even Racial.]\n\nPantheism differs from the systems of belief constituting the main\nreligions of the world in being comparatively free from any limits of\nperiod, climate, or race. For while what we roughly call the Egyptian\nReligion, the Vedic Religion, the Greek Religion, Buddhism, and others\nof similar fame have been necessarily local and temporary, Pantheism has\nbeen, for the most part, a dimly discerned background, an esoteric\nsignificance of many or all religions, rather than a \"denomination\" by\nitself. The best illustration of this characteristic of Pantheism is the\ncatholicity of its great prophet Spinoza. For he felt so little\nantagonism to any Christian sect, that he never urged any member of a\nchurch to leave it, but rather encouraged his humbler friends, who\nsought his advice, to make full use of such spiritual privileges as\nthey appreciated most. He could not, indeed, content himself with the\nfragmentary forms of any sectarian creed. But in the few writings which\nhe made some effort to adapt to the popular understanding, he seems to\nthink it possible that the faith of Pantheism might some day leaven all\nreligions alike. I shall endeavour briefly to sketch the story of that\nfaith, and to suggest its significance for the future. But first we must\nknow what it means.\n\n[Sidenote: Meaning of Pantheism.]\n\n[Sidenote: God is All.]\n\n[Sidenote: But not Everything Is God.]\n\n[Sidenote: Analogy of the Human Organism.]\n\nPantheism, then, being a term derived from two Greek words signifying\n\"all\" and \"God,\" suggests to a certain extent its own meaning. Thus, if\nAtheism be taken to mean a denial of the being of God, Pantheism is its\nextreme opposite; because Pantheism declares that there is nothing but\nGod. This, however, needs explanation. For no Pantheist has ever held\nthat _everything_ is God, any more than a teacher of physiology, in\nenforcing on his students the unity of the human organism, would insist\nthat every toe and finger is the man. But such a teacher, at least in\nthese days, would almost certainly warn his pupils against the notion\nthat the man can be really divided into limbs, or organs, or faculties,\nor even into soul and body. Indeed, he might without affectation adopt\nthe language of a much controverted creed, so far as to pronounce that\n\"the reasonable soul and flesh is one man\"--\"one altogether.\" In this\nview, the man is the unity of all organs and faculties. But it does not\nin the least follow that any of these organs or faculties, or even a\nselection of them, is the man.\n\n[Sidenote: The Analogy Imperfect but Useful.]\n\nIf I apply this analogy to an explanation of the above definition of\nPantheism as the theory that there is nothing but God, it must not be\nsupposed that I regard the parallelism as perfect. In fact, one purpose\nof the following exposition will be to show why and where all such\nanalogies fail. For Pantheism does not regard man, or any organism, as a\ntrue unity. In the view of Pantheism the only real unity is God. But\nwithout any inconsistency I may avail myself of common impressions to\ncorrect a common mis-impression. Thus, those who hold that the\nreasonable soul and flesh is one man--one altogether--but at the same\ntime deny that the toe or the finger, or the stomach or the heart, is\nthe man, are bound in consistency to recognise that if Pantheism affirms\nGod to be All in All, it does not follow that Pantheism must hold a man,\nor a tree, or a tiger to be God.\n\n[Sidenote: Farther Definition.]\n\nExcluding, then, such an apparently plausible, but really fallacious\ninversion of the Pantheistic view of the Universe, I repeat that the\nlatter is the precise opposite of Atheism. So far from tolerating any\ndoubt as to the being of God, it denies that there is anything else. For\nall objects of sense and thought, including individual consciousness,\nwhether directly observed in ourselves, or inferred as existing in\nothers, are, according to Pantheism, only facets of an infinite Unity,\nwhich is \"altogether one\" in a sense inapplicable to anything else.\nBecause that Unity is not merely the aggregate of all the finite objects\nwhich we observe or infer, but is a living whole, expressing itself in\ninfinite variety. Of that infinite variety our gleams of consciousness\nare infinitesimal parts, but not parts in a sense involving any real\ndivision. The questions raised by such a view of the Universe, many of\nthem unanswerable--as is also the case with questions raised by every\nother view of the Universe--will be considered further on. All that I\nam trying to secure in these preliminary observations is a general idea\nof the Pantheistic view of the Universe as distinguished from that of\nPolytheism, Monotheism, or Atheism.\n\n[Sidenote: Various Forms of Pantheism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Spurious Forms.]\n\n[Sidenote: Exclusion of Creation.]\n\n[Sidenote: Evolution and Decay applicable only to Parts, not to the\nWhole.]\n\nOf course, there have been different forms of Pantheism, as there have\nbeen also various phases of Monotheism; and in the brief historical\nreview which will follow this introductory explanation of the name, I\nshall note at least the most important of those forms. But any which\nfail to conform, to the general definition here given, will not be\nrecognised as Pantheism at all, though they may be worth some attention\nas approximations thereto. For any view of the Universe, allowing the\nexistence of anything outside the divine Unity, denies that God is All\nin All, and, therefore, is obviously not Pantheism. Whether we should\nrecognise as true Pantheism any theory involving the evolution of a\nfinite world or worlds out of the divine substance at some definite\nepoch or epochs, may be a debatable question, provided that the eternity\nand inviolability of the divine oneness is absolutely guarded in\nthought. Yet I will anticipate so far as to say that, in my view, the\nquestion must be negatived. At any rate, we must exclude all creeds\nwhich tolerate the idea of a creation in the popular sense of the word,\nor of a final catastrophe. True, the individual objects, great or small,\nfrom a galaxy to a moth, which have to us apparently a separate\nexistence, have all been evolved out of preceding modes of being, by a\nprocess which seems to us to involve a beginning, and to ensure an end.\nBut in the view of Pantheism, properly so-called, the transference of\nsuch a process to the whole Universe is the result of an illusion\nsuggested by false analogy. For the processes called evolution, though\neverywhere operative, affect, each of them, only parts of the infinite\nwhole of things; and experience cannot possibly afford any justification\nfor supposing that they affect the Universe itself. Thus, the matter or\nenergy of which we think we consist, was in existence, every atom of it,\nand every element of force, before we were born, and will survive our\napparent death. And the same thing, at least on the Pantheistic view, is\ntrue of every other mode of apparently separate or finite existence.\nTherefore no birth of a new nebula ever added a grain of matter or an\nimpulse of new energy to the Universe. And the final decease of our\nsolar system, if such an event be in prospect, cannot make any\ndifference whatever to the infinite balance of forces, of which,\nspeaking in anthropomorphic and inadequate language, we suppose the\nEternal All to consist.\n\n[Sidenote: Limitation of Scope.]\n\nThese observations are not intended to be controversial, but only to\nmake clear the general sense in which the term Pantheism is here used.\nNot that it would be possible at the outset to indicate all that is\nimplicit in the definition. I only wish to premise plainly that I am not\nconcerned with any view of the world such as implies or admits that,\nwhether by process of creation, or emanation, or self-division, or\nevolution, the oneness of the Eternal has ever been marred, or anything\nother than the being of God has been or can be produced.\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheism either Philosophical or Religious or both.]\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheism as a Religion almost Entirely Modern.]\n\n[Sidenote: Mystics not necessarily Pantheist.]\n\nBut before passing on to the promised historical review, it is, perhaps,\nnecessary to refer again to a remark previously made, that Pantheism may\nbe considered either from the point of view of philosophy, or from that\nof religion. Not that the two points of view are mutually exclusive.\nBut, as a matter of fact, Pantheism as a religion is, with certain\nexceptions among Indian saints and later Neoplatonists, almost entirely\na modern development, of which Spinoza was the first distinct and devout\nteacher. For this statement justification will be given hereafter.\nMeantime, to deprecate adverse prejudice, I may suggest that a careful\nstudy of the most ancient forms of Pantheism seems to show that they\nwere purely philosophical; an endeavour to reach in thought the ultimate\nreality which polytheism travestied, and which the senses disguised. But\nlittle or no attempt was made to substitute the contemplation of the\nEternal for the worship of mediator divinities. Thus, in the same spirit\nin which Socrates ordered the sacrifice of a cock to Aesculapius for his\nrecovery from the disease of mortal life, philosophical Pantheists,\nwhether Egyptian or Greek, or even Indian,[1] satisfied their religious\ninstincts by hearty communion with the popular worship of traditional\ngods. Or, if it is thought that the mediaeval mystics were religious\nPantheists, a closer examination of their devout utterances will show\nthat, though they approximated to Pantheism, and even used language such\nas, if interpreted logically, must have implied it, yet they carefully\nreserved articles of the ecclesiastical creed, entirely inconsistent\nwith the fundamental position that there is nothing but God. Indeed,\ntheir favourite comparison of creature life to the ray of a candle is\nnot really a Pantheistic conception; because to the true Pantheist the\ncreature is not an emanation external to God, but a finite mode of\ninfinite Being. Still the mystics did much to prepare the devout for an\nacceptance of Spinoza's teaching. And although so amazing a\ntransfiguration of religion rather dazzled than convinced the world at\nfirst; nay, though it must be acknowledged that one, and perhaps more of\nSpinoza's fundamental conceptions have increasingly repelled rather than\nattracted religious people, yet it can hardly be disputed that he gave\nan impulse to contemplative religion, of which the effect is only now\nbeginning to be fully realised.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: If Buddha occurs to the reader, it should be remembered\nthat he was not a Pantheist at all. His ultimate aim was the dissolution\nof personality in the Nothing. But that is not Pantheism.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nPRE-CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM\n\n[Sidenote: Its Origins Doubtful and Unimportant.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Secret of Pantheism is Within us.]\n\nIt has been the customary and perhaps inevitable method of writers on\nPantheism to trace its main idea back to the dreams of Vedic poets, the\nmusings of Egyptian priests, and the speculations of the Greeks. But\nthough it is undeniable that the divine unity of all Being was an almost\nnecessary issue of earliest human thought upon the many and the one, yet\nthe above method of treating Pantheism is to some extent misleading; and\ntherefore caution is needed in using it. For the revival of Pantheism at\nthe present day is much more a tangible resultant of action and reaction\nbetween Science and Religion than a ghost conjured up by speculation.\nThus, religious belief, driven out from \"the darkness and the cloud\" of\nSinai, takes refuge in the mystery of matter; and if the glory passes\nfrom the Mount of Transfiguration, it is because it expands to\netherialise the whole world as the garment of God. Again, the\nevanescence of the atom into galaxies of \"electrons\" destroys the only\nphysical theory that ever threatened us with Atheism; and the\ninfinitesimal electrons themselves open up an immeasurable perspective\ninto the abyss of an Unknowable in which all things \"live and move and\nhave their being.\" Therefore it matters little to us, except as a matter\nof antiquarian interest, to know what the Vedic singers may have\ndreamed; or what Thales or Xenophanes or Parmenides may have thought\nabout the first principle of things, or about the many and the one. For\nour spiritual genealogy is not from them, but from a nearer and double\nline of begetters, including seers--in the true sense of the word--and\nsaints, for both are represented by Kepler and Hooker, Newton and Jeremy\nTaylor, Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Wesley, Spencer and Newman.\nAnd even these have authority not through any divine right of genius or\nacquired claim of learning, but because they illumine and interpret\nobscure suggestions of our own thoughts. Indeed, to the sacrament of\nhistoric communion with the past, as well as to the chief rite of the\nChurch, the apostolic injunction is applicable: \"Let a man examine\nhimself; and so let him eat of that bread.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Suggestions of Nature.]\n\nObeying that injunction, any man possessing ordinary powers of\nobservation and reflection may, in the course of a summer day's walk,\nfind abundant reason for interest in the speculations of historic\nPantheism. For the aspect of nature then presented to him is one both of\nmovement and repose, of variety and harmony, of multiplicity and unity.\nThus the slight breeze, scarcely stirring the drowsy flowery the\nmonotonous cadences of the stony brook, and the gliding of feathery\nflecks of cloud across the blue, create a peace far deeper than absolute\nstillness, and suggest an infinite life in which activity and repose are\none. Besides, there is evident everywhere an interplay of forces acting\nand reacting so as mutually to help and fulfil one another. For\ninstance, the falling leaves give back the carbon they gathered from the\nair, and so repay the soil with interest for the subtler essences\nderived therefrom and dissolved in the sap. The bees, again, humming\namong the flowers, while actuated only by instincts of appetite and\nthrift, fructify the blooms, and become a connecting link between one\nvegetable generation and another. The heat of the sun draws up water\nfrom ocean and river and lake, while chilly currents of higher air\nreturn it here and there in rain. So earth, sea, and air are for ever\ntrafficking together; and their interchange of riches and force is\ncomplicated ten thousandfold by the activities of innumerable living\nthings, all adapting themselves by some internal energy to the ever\nvarying balance of heat and cold, moisture and drought, light and\ndarkness, chemical action and reaction. And all this has been going on\nfor untold millions of years; nor is there any sign of weariness now.\n\n[Sidenote: Sympathy thus awakened with the old Pantheistic Aspiration to\nfind the One in the Many.]\n\nIn the mood engendered by such familiar experiences of a holiday\nsaunter, it may well occur to anyone to think with interest and sympathy\nof the poets and seers who, thousands of years ago, first dared to\ndiscern in this maze of existence the varied expression of one\nall-embracing and eternal Life, or Power. Such contemplations and\nspeculations were entirely uninfluenced by anything which the Christian\nChurch, recognises as revelation.[2] Yet we must not on that account\nsuppose that they were without religion, or pretended to explain\nanything without reference to superhuman beings called gods and demons.\nOn the contrary, they, for the most part, shared, subject to such\nmodifications as were imperatively required by cultivated common sense,\nthe beliefs of their native land. But the difference between these men\nand their unthinking contemporaries lay in this; that the former\nconceived of one supreme and comprehensive divinity beyond the reach of\ncommon thought, an ultimate and eternal Being which included gods as\nwell as nature within its unity. So, for them, Indra, Zeus, or Jove were\nmere modes of the one Being also manifest in man and bird and tree.\n\n[Sidenote: The Vedas and Related Literature.]\n\nEvery race possessing even the rudiments of culture has been impelled by\na happy instinct, which, if we like, we may call inspiration, to record\nin more or less permanent form its experience of nature, of life, and\nof what seemed the mysteries of both. To this inspiration we owe the\nsacred books of the Jews. But it is now generally recognised that an\nimpulse not wholly dissimilar also moved prophetic or poetic minds among\nother races, such, for instance, as the Egyptians, the Chaldaeans, and\nthe Aryan conquerors of India, to inscribe on papyrus or stone, or brick\nor palm-leaf, the results of experience as interpreted by free\nimagination, traditional habits of thought, and limited knowledge. Of\nthis ancient literature a considerable part is taken up by the mysteries\napparently involved in life, conduct, and death. Most notably is this\nthe case with the ancient Indian literature called the Vedas, and such\nsequels as the Upanishads, Sutras, and--much later--the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2.\nThis collection, like our Bible, forms a library of writings issued at\nvarious dates extending over much more than a thousand years.\n\n[Sidenote: Indian Pantheism.]\n\nThe forgotten singers and preachers of this prehistoric wisdom were as\nmuch haunted as we ourselves are with the harassing questions suggested\nby sin and sorrow, by life and death, and by aspirations after a higher\nstate. And many, perhaps we may say most of them, found comfort in the\nthought that essentially they belonged to an all comprehensive and\ninfinite Life, in which, if they acted purely and nobly, their seeming\npersonality might be merged and find peace. Their frame of mind was\nreligious rather than philosophical. But their philosophy was naturally\nconformed to it; and in their contrast of the bewildering variety of\nfinite visible things with the unity of the Eternal Being of which all\nare phases, those ancients were in close sympathy with the thoughts of\nthe modern meditative saunterer by field and river and wood.\n\n[Sidenote: Differences between Ancient and Modern Conditions of\nThought.]\n\nBut the enormous interval of time separating us from those early Indian\nthinkers necessarily involves very great differences in conditions of\nthought. And we should not be surprised if amidst much in their writings\nthat stirs our sympathy, there is also a great deal which is to us\nincongruous and absurd. Therefore, it may be well before quoting these\nwritings to note one or two points marking an almost incommensurable\ndifference between their mode and ours of regarding the world.\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Survival In their day of Fetishistic and Animistic Ideas.]\n\n1. First, they were much less removed than we are from the influence of\nfetishistic and animistic traditions. Even in the Greek and Roman\nclassics the casual reader is often revolted by the grossly absurd\nstories told of gods and heroes. And, indeed, it is impossible to\nconceive of the amours of Zeus (or Jove), for instance, with Leda,\nEuropa or Dana\u00eb as having been first conceived during an age marked by\nthe poetic genius and comparative culture evinced in the most ancient\nepics. But the most probable solution of the puzzle is that the earliest\ncivilization inherited a number of animal stories, such as are\ncharacteristic of savagery in all parts of the world, and that the first\nliterary generations into whose poetic myths those stories were\ntransferred, being as much accustomed to them as to other surroundings\nof their childhood, such as bloody sacrifices, mystic expiations, and\nfantastic initiations, saw no incongruity in anything told them of the\ngods. Besides, as those wild myths were associated with sacred rites,\nthe inveterate conservatism of religion, which insisted on stone knives\nin sacrifices long after bronze and iron came in, was likely enough to\nmaintain the divine importance of those fables, just as the historicity\nof Balaam's ass and Jonah's whale is in some churches piously upheld\nstill.\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Ancient Ignorance of Natural Order.]\n\n2. In the times from which the first known Pantheistic teaching dates,\nideas of nature's order were incongruous and indeed incommensurable with\nours. Not that the world was then regarded as a chaos. But such order as\nexisted was considered to be a kind of \"balance of power\" between\nvarious unseen beings, some good, some evil, some indifferent. True,\nsome Indian prophets projected an idea of One Eternal Being including\nall such veiled Principalities and Powers. But their Pantheism was\nnecessarily conditioned by their ignorance of natural phenomena. In\nfact, an irreducible inconsistency marred their view of the world. For\nwhile their Pantheism should have taught them to think of a universal\nlife or energy as working within all things, their theological habit of\nmind bound them to the incongruous notion of devils or deities moulding,\nor at least ruling, matter from without. And, indeed, the nearest\napproach they made to the more genuine Pantheism of modern times was the\nconception of a world emanating from and projected outside Brahma, to be\nre-merged in him after the lapse of ages. Now, if I am right in my\ndefinition of Pantheism as absolutely identifying God with the\nUniverse,[3] so that, in fact, there cannot be anything but God, the\ninconsistency here noted must be regarded as fatal to the genuineness of\nthe Indian or indeed of any other ancient Pantheism. For the defect\nproved during many centuries to be incurable, and was not indeed fully\nremoved until Spinoza's time.\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Absence of Definite Creeds.]\n\n3. Another difference between ancient Pantheists and ourselves was the\nabsence in their case of any religious creed, sanctioned by supernatural\nauthority and embodied in a definite form, like that of the three\nAnglican creeds, or the Westminster Confession of Faith. Not that those\nancients supposed themselves to be without a revelation. For the Vedas,\nat least, were considered to be of divine authority, and their words,\nmetres, and grammar were regarded with a superstitious awe, such as\nreminds us of what has been called the \"bibliolatry\" of the Jewish\nRabbis. But subject to this verbal veneration, the Rishis, or learned\ndivines, used the utmost freedom in regard to the forced and fanciful\ninterpretations extorted from the sacred text, a freedom which again\nreminds us of the paradoxical caprice shown by some schools of Jewish\nRabbis in their treatment of the volume they professed to regard with\nawe. The various finite gods, such as Vishnu, Indra, Krishna, Marut, or\nVaruna, were not the subjects of any church creed chanted every day, and\ncarefully stereotyped in the tender minds of children. On the contrary,\nvarious r\u00f4les were assigned by successive generations to these\ndivinities. So that, for instance, Varuna was at one time the god of the\nocean, and at another of the sky. But the uniform tendency of all poets\nand Rishis alike was to seek, beyond all these gods, one unbeginning,\nunending, and all comprehensive Being, from whom these \"devas\" emerged,\nand into whom they must return. Not only so, but it is clearly suggested\nin many passages, of which an instance will presently be quoted, that\nthe Eternal, called Brahma who was the true Self of all gods, was also\nthe true Self of man and bird and beast. So that, in fact,\nnotwithstanding the illogical emanation theory, He was the only real\nBeing, the All in All.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration from the Upanishads.]\n\n[Sidenote: Monism.]\n\nThus, one section of the Khandogya Upanishad[4] consists entirely of\ninstructions given by a father, Udd\u00e2laka, to his son, Svetaketu, who had\ngone through the ordinary courses of study in the Vedas, but who, in the\nfather's view, had failed to reach the true significance of life.\nAccordingly, Udd\u00e2laka inquires: \"Have you ever asked for that\ninstruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive\nwhat cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known?\"[5] The\nyouth, more accustomed than we are to teaching by paradox, expresses no\nsurprise at this mode of putting things, but simply asks: \"What is that\ninstruction, sir?\" The father then proceeds to give an explanation of\nwhat in these days is called \"Monism,\" that is, the absolute singleness\nof ultimate Being, and traces all that is, or seems to be, up to one\nultimate Essence. Now, whether in the form given by Udd\u00e2laka to his\nexposition, his theory can properly be called Pantheism, according to\nthe definition of it assumed above, is perhaps questionable. But that it\nwas intended to be Pantheism there can be no doubt. \"In the beginning,\"\nsays Udd\u00e2laka, \"there was that only which is ([Greek: to hon]); one\nonly, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only\nwhich is not ([Greek: to mae hon]); one only, without a second; and from\nthat which is not, that which is was born.\" But Udd\u00e2laka rejects this\nlatter doctrine as unthinkable--which, indeed, many explorers of Hegel\nhave found with pain and anguish of mind. And then the father traces all\nthe multiformity of the Universe to the desire or will of the original\nOne, \"that which is.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Evolution from the One through Desire.]\n\n\"It thought, 'may I be many; may I grow forth.' It sent forth fire.\" My\nlimits do not allow me to quote further the fantastic account given of\nthe farther process by which water and earth, plants, animals, and men\nsprang out of that desire of the One: \"May I become many; may I grow\nforth.\" For our purpose it is more important to show that in the view of\nUdd\u00e2laka--however inconsistently he may express himself--the original\nOne was never really divided, but remains the true Self of every finite\nbeing, however apparently separate. Thus, consider the following\ndialogue, the first words being a direction of the father, Udd\u00e2laka:--\n\n\"Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree.\" \"Here is one,\nsir.\" \"Break it.\" \"It is broken, sir.\" \"What do you see there?\" \"These\nseeds, almost infinitesimal.\" \"Break one of them.\" \"It is broken, sir.\"\n\"What do you see there?\" \"Not anything, sir.\" The father said: \"My son,\nthat subtile essence which you do not perceive there, of that very\nessence this great Nyagrodha tree exists. Believe it, my son. That which\nis the subtile essence, in it all that exists has itself. It is the\nTrue. It is the Self; and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.\"\n\nHere we are clearly taught that the \"self,\" or inmost reality of every\nperson and thing is the Eternal One, or Brahma, or God.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration from the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2.]\n\nThe same doctrine is taught in a more advanced form by the poem called\nthe \"Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2,\" the date of which is probably more than a thousand\nyears later than that of the Upanishad just quoted. In this poem,\nKrishna, incarnate for the nonce as Arjuna's charioteer, reveals for a\nspecial purpose his identity with Brahma, the Eternal All; and Arjuna,\nwhen sufficiently instructed adores him thus:--\n\n  \"O infinite Lord of Gods! the world's abode,\n   Thou undivided art, o'er all supreme.\n   Thou art the first of Gods, the ancient Sire,\n   The treasure-house supreme of all the worlds.\n   The Knowing and the Known, the highest seat.\n   From Thee the All has sprung, O boundless Form!\n   Varuna, Vayu, Agni, Yama thou,[6]\n   The Moon; the Sire and Grandsire too of men.\n\n   The Infinite in power, of boundless force,\n   The All thou dost embrace; the Thou art All.\"[7]\n\n[Sidenote: Omission of Buddhism.]\n\nThese illustrations must suffice for Indian Pantheism. Because, with\nBuddhism we have nothing to do. For, according to its ablest European\nexponent (Professor T.W. Rhys Davids), that system of religion simply\nignored the conception of an All in All. And this not at all on\nphilosophical grounds, but because its aims were entirely practical. For\nthe aim of its founder was to show men how by a virtuous life, or lives,\nthey might at last attain annihilation--or, at any rate, the extinction\nof the individual self, the apparent separateness of which was, in his\nview, the source of all misery. And if he could teach his followers to\nattain that salvation, he was entirely indifferent as to the opinions\nthey might hold about the ultimate nature of the world, provided only\nthat they did not fall into any heresy which proclaimed an immortal\nsoul.[8]\n\n[Sidenote: Persian Religions, not strictly Pantheistic.]\n\n[Sidenote: A World Drama or Process is a Human, not a Divine Aspect of\nThings.]\n\nThe accounts given to us by the best authorities on Zoroaster and\nParseeism scarcely justify us in thinking the religion of the Zendavesta\nto be Pantheistic in our sense of the term. For though it would appear\nthat Ormuzd (or Ahuramazda), the God of light and goodness, originated\nin, or was born from and one with a nameless impersonal Unity, such as\nmay answer to Herbert Spencer's \"Unknowable,\" it cannot be accurately\nsaid that, according to the Persian view of the world, there is nothing\nbut God. For, to say nothing of the apparently independent existence of\nthe principle of darkness and evil called Ahriman, the relation of the\nAmshaspands, or supreme spirits, and of the Izeds, or secondary spirits,\nas well as of the Fereurs, or divine ideas to the impersonal Unity,\nseems to be rather that of emanations, than parts of a Whole. Again, if\nit be true that, according to the Zend Avesta, the conflict of light and\ndarkness will ultimately cease, and Ahriman with his demons be\nannihilated, it is obvious that this implies a beginning and an end,\nwith a process originating in the one, and consummated in the other. But\nsuch a process, though most actual on the finite scale, and joyfully or\npainfully real to us, contemplating, as we do only infinitesimal parts\nof the Universe, and always under the forms of time and space, is yet\nincongruous and incommensurate with the thought of one All in All,\nunlimited by time or space, and whose lifetime is an Eternal Now. Thus\ntrue Pantheism takes the Universe, as it is, in its infinity; regards it\nas without beginning or end; and worships it. Not that Pantheism denies\nthe existence of evil or is unmoved by the struggle between evil and\ngood, or is uninspired by faith in the reiterated triumph of good\nwherever the local conflict arises. But it insists that evil is relative\nto the finite parts of the Universe in their supposed isolation, and\ncannot possibly affect the Eternal All. It allows of no creation or\nemanation which would put any part of the \"wondrous Whole\" in opposition\nto, or separation from, the Eternal. But from its point of view all\nchange, evolution, progress retrogression, sin, pain, or any other good\nor evil is local, finite, partial; while the infinite coordination of\nsuch infinitesimal movements make one eternal peace.\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheism in Ancient Egypt]\n\n[Sidenote: Permanent Effects of Prehistoric Animism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Isis, according to Plutarch.]\n\nEgyptian Religion need not detain us. For though, there are clear traces\nof Pantheistic speculation among the Priests, it can scarcely be\ncontended that such speculations had the same influence on the cultured\nlaity as the teaching of the Rishis had in ancient India. But the truth\nseems to be that the oldest popular theology of Egypt was only a variety\nof Negro animism and fetishism.[9] Yet these grovelling superstitions,\nas is often the case, evolved in unbroken continuity a higher faith.\nFor, in the attempt made to adapt this savage cult to the religious\nneeds of various districts, all alike gradually advancing in culture,\nthe number and variety of divinities became so bewildering to the\npriests, that the latter almost inevitably adopted the device of\nrecognising in parochial gods only so many hints of one\nall-comprehensive divine energy. Not that they ever embraced\nmonotheism--or the belief in one personal God distinct from the\nUniverse. But if Plutarch be accurate--as there seems no reason to\ndoubt, in his record of an inscription in a temple of Isis--they, or at\nleast the most spiritual of them, found refuge in Pantheism. For the\ntransfigured and glorified goddess was not regarded as the maker of the\nUniverse, but as identical with it, and therefore unknowable, \"I am all\nthat hath been, is, or shall be; and no mortal has lifted my veil.\" The\nprevalence of such Pantheism, at least among the learned and spiritual\nof ancient Egypt, is, to a considerable extent, confirmed by other Greek\nwriters besides Plutarch. But the inscription noted by Plutarch gives\nthe sum and substance of what they tell us.\n\n[Sidenote: Greek Pantheism]\n\n[Sidenote: Evolved from Polytheism]\n\nBefore considering the classical and Neo-platonic Greek speculations\ncommonly regarded as Pantheistic, we may do well to recall to mind the\nimmense difference between the established habit of theological thought\nin our day, and the vague, or at best, poetically vivid ideas of the\nancients. For the long tradition of nearly two thousand years, which has\nmade monotheism to us almost as fixed an assumption as that of our own\nindividuality, was entirely wanting in this case. Not that the idea of\none supreme God had never been suggested. But it was not the Hebrew or\nChristian idea that was occasionally propounded; for in the ethnic mind\nit was rarely, if ever, regarded as inconsistent with polytheism; and\nconsequently it verged on Pantheism. \"Consequently,\" I say, because such\nmonotheism as existed had necessarily to explain the innumerable minor\ndeities as emanations from, or manifestations of the supreme God. And\nthough such conscious attempts at reconciliation of beliefs in many gods\nand in one Supreme were confined to a small minority of meditative\npriests and speculative philosophers, yet really, the combination was\nimplicit in the sort of polytheistic religion which possessed the\nfamily affections and patriotic associations of the early Greek world.\n\n[Sidenote: Not the Material Figure but the Divinity Suggested was the\nObject of Worship.]\n\nFor though we may find a difficulty in ridding ourselves of a prejudice\nwrought into the tissue of our early faith by the nursery lessons of\nchildhood, it was not the graven or molten image which was really\nworshipped by the devout, but that form of superhuman power which, by\nlocal accident, had been identified with the \"idol.\" If, indeed, we\nsupposed every \"idolator\" to have received definite religious teaching,\nanalogous to that with which we ourselves were imbued in youth, we might\nwell find his attitude inconceivable. But he had nothing of the kind. He\nonly knew that in war, in hunting, in fishing, in farming, he was\nconfronted with powers which passed his comprehension; and tradition\npermeated him with the expectation that such powers would be propitiated\nby his worship of the images set up in their names. There was therefore\nno reasoned creed, such as those of the Catholic and Reformed Churches,\nbut only a vague sentiment brought to a focus by the associations of the\nshrine. From such a view of polytheism it is easy to understand how\nmost, if not all, of the old speculative philosophers could allow the\nexistence of the traditional gods, even while in reasoned contemplation\nthey saw that all deities were subordinate to and merged in one\nuniversal God.\n\n[Sidenote: Possible Influence of Oriental Pantheism.]\n\nHow far this unstable religious position was subject to the influence of\nthe oriental mysticism at which we have glanced already, is, at any\nrate, so far as concerns the classical age of Greek philosophy, a matter\nof conjecture. But the resurrection of a prehistoric and almost\nforgotten civilization from the buried cities of Crete has brought to\nlight many evidences of frequent intercourse, two or three thousand\nyears before the Christian era, between European and Egyptian, or\nAsiatic, centres of life. Therefore, we may well believe that during the\nearliest stages of the evolution of thought in East and West, it was as\nimpossible as at the present time for any local school of thinkers to be\nabsolutely original or independent. Thus, later Greek philosophers,\nwhether themselves within sound of the echoes of Hindoo teaching or not,\nmay very well have grown up in an atmosphere impregnated with mythic\ngerms, whose origin they did not know. But however that may be, Greek\nPantheism, while it had many points of contact with Eastern speculation,\nwas more purely intellectual and less essentially religious than the\nPantheism of the Vedas, or the solemn dream that haunted Egyptian\ntemples. For while the aspiration of Hindoo Pantheists was to find and\nassume the right attitude toward \"the glory of the sum of things,\" the\nGreeks, as St. Paul long afterward said, \"sought after wisdom,\" and were\nfascinated by the idea of tracing all the bewildering variety of Nature\nup to some one \"principle\" ([Greek: arch\u00ea]), beginning, origin.\n\n[Sidenote: Thales, about 640 B.C.]\n\nThus Thales of Miletus, during the late seventh and early sixth century\nB.C., is said to have been satisfied when he found in water--or\nmoisture--the ultimate principle out of which all things and all life,\nincluding gods and men, were evolved. With such a speculation of infant\nphilosophy we are here not concerned, except to say that it was not\nPantheism as understood in modern times. For while his ablest exponents\nadmit that no sufficient evidence is left to show very clearly what he\nmeant, there seems no reason for supposing that to him the Universe was\na Living God.\n\n[Sidenote: Successors of Thales.]\n\nIt would be fruitless to relate how successors of Thales varied his\ntheory of an ultimate \"principle,\" by substituting air or fire for\nwater. But it is worth while to note that another citizen of Miletus,\nAnaximander, after an interval of some forty years, pronounced that the\nbeginning, the first principle, the origin of all things, was neither\nwater, nor air, nor fire, but the Infinite ([Greek: to apeae on]). And\nthough the best authorities confess that they cannot be sure of his\nmeaning, this may very well be because he anticipated Herbert Spencer by\ntwo and a half millenniums, in acknowledging that all things merge in\none and the same Unknowable. But, so far as our evidence goes, he made\nno such attempt as the modern philosopher did, to persuade the religious\ninstinct that this Unknowable could supply the place of all the gods.\n\n[Sidenote: Xenophanes of Elea, about 570 to 480 B.C.]\n\n[Sidenote: His Pantheism Disputed but well Established.]\n\n[Sidenote: His Religion.]\n\nThe position of Xenophanes, who, toward the latter part of the sixth\ncentury B.C. migrated, apparently for political reasons, in fear of\nPersian imperialism, from Colophon in Asia Minor to Elea in Italy, was a\nlittle different, and, for our purpose, more interesting. For the few\nfragments which are unfortunately all that is left to us of his\nphilosophical poetry, are strongly suggestive of Pantheism, and the\ninterpretation put upon them by later classical and sub-classical\nwriters, who had his works before them, would appear decisive. True, the\ndistinguished and enlightened scholar, Simon Karsten, who, in the first\nquarter of the nineteenth century, found a labour of love in collecting\nand editing the remains of early Greek philosophers, deprecated such a\njudgment. Yet, while the motives for his special pleading were\nhonourable, seeing the odious misrepresentations of Pantheism still\nprevalent in the Dutch scholar's native land,--misrepresentations\nundissipated even by the splendour of Spinoza,--his protest remains\nspecial pleading still. And he himself candidly quotes at large from an\nalleged work of Aristotle--possibly, only a student's notes of the\nlatter's lectures--and also from Simplicius, as reported by Theophrastus\nin a comment on Aristotle's Physics, sentences which describe the system\nof Xenophanos as unquestionably Pantheistic. From, which description I\ngather that the devout philosopher regarded God as the only real Being,\nincluding all that in human language has been, is, and will be, without\nbeginning or end, living and perceiving equally everywhere throughout\nHis infinite essence. And if that essence is compared by Xenophanes to a\nsphere, neither bounded nor boundless, neither moving nor immovable,\nthis is only because few, if any, in that age of the world, could\ncontent themselves with loyally accepting the limits imposed on man by\nthe very nature of things, limits which now compel us to own that, while\nthe Eternal is more real than ourselves, yet, in the strict sense of\nknowing, He is, from an intellectual standpoint, the Unknowable.\n\n[Sidenote: Extent of his Sympathy with Popular Religion.]\n\n[Sidenote: A Pantheistic Communion Feast.]\n\nThis Pantheism did not generate in Xenophanes any arrogant disdain for\nthe religion of his time. For, though he condemned, in words often\nquoted, the folly which supposed the gods to have the human form,\nsenses, passions and appetites, he was yet glad to worship the divine\nAll as partially manifested in finite beings--perhaps personified powers\nof nature. Thus among the fragments of his poetry fortunately preserved,\nis one exquisite gem, a description of a festive repast in the open air.\nThere purity comes first, symbolised by clear floor, clean hands, and\nspotless dishes. Upon purity waits beauty, not in the forms desired by\nsensuous passion, but in garlands of flowers and in delicate scents. The\nwine is unstinted, yet tempered with sparkling water. But, lest the\nplentifulness of bread and honey and cheese upon the lordly table should\neclipse the highest sanctions of human joy, an altar prominent in the\nfestive scene is heaped with offerings of flowers. Then the first note\nof music is the praise of God, a praise taking form in blameless poetic\nmyths and holy thoughts. In such a feast the minds of the guests are\nkindled with a desire to be capable of doing right. \"There is no harm in\ndrinking with reasonable moderation[10]; and we may honour the guest\nwho, warmed by wine, talks of such noble deeds and instances of virtue\nas his memory may suggest. But let him not tell of Titan battles, or\nthose of the giants or centaurs, the fictions of bygone days, nor yet of\nfactious quarrels, nor gossip, that can serve no good end. Rather let\nus ever keep a good conscience towards the gods.\"[11]\n\n[Sidenote: Empedocles, Middle of Fifth Century B.C.]\n\n[Sidenote: Not Properly a Pantheist]\n\nHaving given so much space to an ancient who seems to me specially\ninteresting as a prophet of the ultimate apotheosis of earthly\nreligions, I must be content to indicate, in a very few lines, the\ncourse of the Pantheistic tradition among the Greeks after his day. The\narithmetical mysticism of Pythagoras has no bearing upon our subject.\nEmpedocles of Agrigentum, living about the middle of the fifth century\nB.C., and thus, perhaps, in the second generation after Xenophanes, was,\nin many respects, a much more imposing figure--clothed in purple,\nwielding political power, possessing medical skill, and even working\nmiraculous cures, such as are apparently easy to men of personal\nimpressiveness, sympathy, and \"magnetism.\" But he does not appear to\nhave so nearly anticipated modern Pantheism as did his humbler\npredecessor. For though the fragments of Empedocles, much larger in\nvolume than those of Xenophanes, certainly hint at some kind of\neverlasting oneness in things, and expressly tell us that there is no\ncreation nor annihilation, but only perpetual changes of arrangement,\nyet they present other phases of thought, apparently irreconcileable\nwith the doctrine that there is nothing other than God. Thus he teaches\nthat there are four elements--earth, air, water and fire--out of which\nall things are generated. He also anticipates Lucretius in his\npessimistic view of humanity's lot; and insists on the apparently\nindependent existence of a principle of discord or strife in the\nUniverse. It would be a forced interpretation to suppose him to have set\nforth precociously the Darwinian theory of the struggle for life. For\nhis notion seems much more akin to the Zoroastrian imagination of\nAhriman. Again, he sings melodiously, but most unphilosophically, of a\nformer golden age, in which the lion and the lamb would seem to have\nlain down together in peace; and trees yielded fruit all the year round.\nAt that time the only deity was Venus, who was worshipped with bloodless\nofferings alone. Still, it must be remembered that, whether consistently\nor not, Empedocles produced an elaborate work on the Nature of Things,\nto which Lucretius makes eloquent and earnest acknowledgments. But that\nvery approval of Lucretius forbids us to regard the older poet as a\nPantheist in our sense of the term. For certainly to him the Universe\ncannot have been a living God.\n\n[Sidenote: Genesis of Modern Religious Pantheism.]\n\nBetween this philosophical idea of a Oneness, not thought of as God, and\nthe spiritual contemplation of a universal Life of which all things are\nmodes, the highest thoughts of men hovered during the process by which,\nin some measure under extraneous influences, Greek speculation finally\nproduced Neo-platonism--or, as we might say in the current phraseology\nof our time--a restatement of Plato's teaching. Of this school, arising\nin the early Christian centuries, some leaders were undoubtedly\nPantheists. But we cannot say this of Plato himself, nor of his master\nSocrates. For though these great men were more profoundly interested in\nthe moral order of the world than in any questions of physical nature,\nor even of metaphysical subtleties, they were never given to the kind of\ncontemplation suggested above in extracts from the Classical Books of\nthe East, the contemplation which educes the moral ideal from\nunreserved subordination of self to the Universe as of the part to the\nWhole. Doubtless the inspiration imparted by Socrates to a disciple in\nmere intellect his superior, and the resulting moral and religious\nsuggestions abounding in the Dialogues, did much to impel the current of\nreligious evolution toward that spiritual aspect of the Infinite All\nwhich fascinated some of the Neo-Platonists, and received its most\nsplendid exposition from Spinoza. But the conditions imposed by\nnecessary brevity compel me to pass by those classic names with this\nacknowledgment, and to hasten toward the fuller revelation of Pantheism\nas a religion.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 2: Some scholars think they can trace Christian, influences in\nthe exceptionally late Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2, hereafter quoted. But it is a\ndisputed point; and certainly in the case of the Vedas and pre-Christian\nliterature arising out of them even Jewish influence was impossible.]\n\n[Footnote 3: As imperious brevity excludes full explanation, I must\ncontent myself with a reference to _The Religion of the Universe_, pp.\n152-5. London: Macmillan & Co.]\n\n[Footnote 4: According to the late Max M\u00fcller, with whom Prof. T.W. Rhys\nDavids agrees, the word Upanishad is equivalent to our word \"sitting\" or\n\"session\"; only that it is usually confined to a sitting of master and\npupil.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Sacred Books of the East_, vol. i. p. 92. The immediately\nfollowing quotations are from the same Upanishad.]\n\n[Footnote 6: \"The gods of ocean, air and fire, and the judge of the\nlower regions respectively\" (Rev. John Davies).]\n\n[Footnote 7: The \"Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2,\" translated by the Rev. J. Davies,\nM.A.]\n\n[Footnote 8: The Karma was _not_ a soul. What it was is, according to\nour authorities, very difficult for the Western mind to conceive. But\nits practical effect was, that on the death of the imperfect man,\nanother finite existence of some sort necessarily took his place. But\nthis new finite existence was not the former man. It is only on the\ndeath of him who has attained Nirvana that Karma ceases to act, and no\nnew finite existence takes his place.]\n\n[Footnote 9: See Prof. W. Max Muller, on \"Egypt,\" in the _Encyc.\nBiblica._]\n\n[Footnote 10: \"Capability of walking home without help,\" is the limit\nquaintly fixed by the poet. To our modern feeling it seems rather wide.\nYet, practically, it is the limit professedly observed by our publicans\nin serving their customers.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Karsten, _Xenophanis Reliquiae_, p. 68 (Amsterdam, 1830).\nBoth the paraphrase and occasional translations which I give are of\ncourse free; but I think the spirit and meaning are preserved.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nPOST-CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM.\n\nIn speaking of Neo-Platonism I incidentally mentioned its apparent\nsubjection to \"extraneous influences,\" These, of course, included the\nrising power of Christianity and its Jewish traditions.\n\n[Sidenote: The Hebrew Tradition.]\n\nEven before the advent of the new revelation, the Jewish settlements\nexisting in all great cities of the Graeco-Roman world excited interest\nat any rate among sentimentalists touched by the fascination at that\ntime beginning to be exerted by oriental religions. And this influence\nof Jewish traditions was much facilitated by the existence of a Greek\ntranslation of the Hebrew scriptures.\n\n[Sidenote: Its Influence on Greek Philosophy.]\n\n[Sidenote: To Inspire Devotion, Not Solve Problems.]\n\nNow, what the Hebrew tradition did for Greek philosophy was, of course,\nnot to favour its Pantheistic trend, where that existed, but much more\nto convert such semi-Pantheism from a mere intellectual speculation to\ncontemplative devotion. For Hebraism itself had become almost as\nintensely monotheistic as the later Islam. And, though monotheism may be\na stage in the progress of religion from Animism to Pantheism, it may,\nalso, by the peculiar intensity of the personal devotion it sometimes\ninspires, cause the very idea of any farther expansion of faith to be\ncounted a sin.\n\n[Sidenote: Philo, the Jew of Alexandria.]\n\nPerhaps the influence of Hebraism on Hellenism may be illustrated by the\nAlexandrian Philo's pathetic endeavour not only to trace the wisdom of\nthe Greeks to Moses, but to show that this derived lore is much mightier\nfor good when re-invested with the spiritual power and ardent devotion\nof the Jewish faith.\n\n\"If any one will speak plainly,\" he writes,[12] \"he might say that the\nintelligible world is nothing other than the word (se. [Greek: logos],\nreason) of the world-making God. For neither is the intelligible city\nanything other than the thought [Greek: logismos] of the architect\nalready intending to build the city. This is the teaching of Moses, not\nmine. At any rate in what follows, when he records the origin of man, he\ndeclares outright that man was made in the image of God. But if a part\n(of creation) reflects the type, so also must the entire manifestation,\nthis intelligible ordered world, which is a reproduction of the divine\nimage on a larger scale than that of man.\"[13]\n\n[Sidenote: Motives Underlying his Distortion of Hebraism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Not Pantheistic.]\n\nHow Philo managed to extort this out of the Pentateuch is a question of\ninterest, but one on which I cannot delay. Suffice it, that while he\nthus showed his reverence for the traditions of his race, his whole aim\nis to fire philosophy with religious devotion. But he was not, in any\nstrict sense of the word, a Pantheist, though he regarded the Logos as\nan emanation from the Eternal, and the kosmos, the ordered world, as in\nsome way emanating from the Logos. Perhaps, indeed, if we could exclude\nfrom emanation the idea of time, as Christians are supposed to do when\nthey speak of the \"eternal generation\" of the Divine Son or the\n\"procession\" of the Holy Ghost, we might regard Philo, with the\nsucceeding Neo-Platonists and some of the Gnostics, as approximately\nPantheistic. But his vagueness and uncertainty about matter forbid such\na conclusion. For whether he regarded matter as eternally existing apart\nfrom the divine substance, or whether he looked upon it as the opposite\nof Being, as a sort of positive nothing, in either case, it cannot be\nsaid that for him the whole Universe was God, and nothing but God.\n\n[Sidenote: Neo-Platonism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Resultant of Contact between East and West.]\n\nIf I have given more space to the great Alexandrian Jew than my narrow\nlimits ought to afford, it is because I think I may thus avoid the\nnecessity of saying much about the philosophic schemes of the\nNeo-Platonists, the phantasies of the Gnostics, or the occasionally\ndaring speculations of the Christian Fathers. For whether the works of\nPhilo were much studied by the Greeks or not, they certainly described\nthe spiritual resultant--so to speak--emerging from the mutual impact of\nWestern and Oriental, especially Jewish, ideas. Which resultant was \"in\nthe air\" from the first century of the Christian age; and the later\nepistles ascribed to St. Paul, as well as the Fourth Gospel, show clear\ntraces of it.[14]\n\n[Sidenote: Its Religious Inspiration.]\n\n[Sidenote: Suggestive of Pantheism, but not such in Spinoza's Sense.]\n\nBut the inspiration of the time-spirit was not confined to the Christian\nChurch. For the city of Alexandria, where that spirit seems to have been\npeculiarly potent as shown in the transfigured Judaism of Philo, was the\nbirthplace of the Neo-Platonic school already mentioned above. And among\nits greatest members, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, the religious\ninfluence of the East was distinctly apparent. True, they followed\nSocrates and Plato in reverence for knowledge as the unfailing begetter\nof virtue. But their speculations about the divine Being were touched by\nOriental emotion. And we may with some confidence believe that their\ndevelopment of the Platonic Trinity owed a good deal to the rapid spread\nof Christianity. Thus the sentiment, the fervour, the yearning for\n\"salvation,\" the worship and devotion taught by the best of the\nNeo-Platonists were not so much, from Athens as from Sinai and Galilee.\nYet, though there were in their world-conception many anticipations of\nthe gospel of the \"God-intoxicated man,\" whom the counsels of the\nEternal reserved for the fulness of times, it would scarcely be accurate\nto describe the system of any of them as strictly Pantheistic. For they\nwere always troubled about \"matter\" as an anomalous thing in a divine\nuniverse, and in treating of it they hesitated between the notion of an\neternal nuisance which the Demiurgus, or acting God, could only modify,\nnot destroy, and, on the other hand, a strained theory of an evil\nnothing, which is yet something. Again, so far from realising Spinoza's\nfaith in God as so literally All in All that there is nothing else but\nHe, they would not tolerate the contact of the Infinite with the finite,\nof God with the world. Consistently with such prepossessions, they held\nobstinately to the notion of some beginning, and therefore some ending\nof the ordered world. And this beginning was effected by emanations such\nas the Logos, or, as others had it, the world-soul and other divine\nenergies, between the Eternal and creation; a phantasy which, however\npoetically wrought out, is not really consistent with Pantheism.\n\n[Sidenote: The Gnostics.]\n\nSuch ideas of a hierarchy of subordinate emanations to fill the supposed\nabyss between the Infinite and the Finite were eagerly adopted and\ndeveloped by the pseudo-philosophers called Gnostics, on both sides of\nthe boundary between the Church and the World. Suffice it that, like\nmost, though by no means all of their predecessors, they regarded the\nworld of earth, sun, planet, stars, and animated nature with man at its\nhead, as the whole Universe; and, assuming that it must have had a\nbeginning, they vexed their souls with futile attempts to frame some\ngradual transition from the uncreated to the created, from the eternal\nto the mortal. The grotesque chimaeras engendered thus are remembered\nnow only as illustrations of the facile transition from the sublime to\nthe ridiculous and from philosophy to folly.\n\n[Sidenote: The Church Fathers.]\n\n[Sidenote: Augustine.]\n\nThe orthodox Christian fathers were not less conscious than the\nNeo-Platonists or Gnostics of the perennial problem of the Many and the\nOne. But they were restrained, perhaps, by the \"faith that comes of\nself-control,\" perhaps by mere common sense, from indulging in attempts\nto connect the Infinite with the Finite by \"vain genealogies.\" Indeed,\nfor the most part they confessed that whatever light the Gospel might\nshed on moral issues, it left untouched the ultimate question of the\nrelation of the Infinite to the Finite. And the only aspect of their\nmost venturesome speculations which I need recall is their insistence,\neven when apparently verging toward Pantheism, on a transcendent as well\nas an immanent God, that is on a Creator existing, so to speak, outside\nthe Universe and apart from it as well as permeating every part. Thus,\nfor example, Augustine would seem to deny to the world any separate\ncreature existence when he says, that but for the divinity everywhere in\nit, creation would cease to be. But in his insistence on the creation of\nthe world from nothing, he directly contradicts Pantheism, because he\nmust necessarily be taken to mean that there is now something other than\nGod.\n\nThat there have been devout Christians whose mystic speculations on the\nrelations of the soul to the Eternal logically involved Pantheism--if\nlogic in such a case had any function--there can be no doubt. But for\nmost of them \"God's word written\" seemed to confirm God's word in\nheaven and earth as known to them, proclaiming that there had been a\nbeginning and there must be an end. Therefore, whatever might be the\nimmanence of the Creator in His works, God could not, in their minds, be\nidentified with \"the fashion of this world\" which \"passeth away.\"\n\nYet the time was coming when the Divine word both in Scripture and in\nNature was to be otherwise read. For men began to learn that the Bible\nwas other than they had supposed and the Universe immeasurably greater\nthan they had conceived.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 12: _De Mundi Opificio_, p. 5B. I take him to mean by [Greek:\nkosmos no\u00eatos]--the world as apperceived--realised in our\nconsciousness.]\n\n[Footnote 13: It should be noted that Philo, who was contemporary with\nJesus, often uses the title \"the Father\" [Greek: ho Pataer] as a\nsufficient designation of the Eternal. It was not very usual, and is\nsuggestive of certain spiritual sympathies amidst enormous intellectual\ndivergencies between the Alexandrian philosopher and the Galilean\nprophet.]\n\n[Footnote 14: See Col. i. 15-17 and refs. John i. 1-3; iii. 13; viii.\n58.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nMODERN PANTHEISM.\n\n[Sidenote: Spinoza.]\n\n[Sidenote: A Pantheistic Prophet.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Main Subject here Is his Religion and not his\nPhilosophy.]\n\nModern Pantheism as a religion begins with Spinoza. Whether it ended\nwith him is a question which the future will have to decide. But the\nsigns of the times are, at least in my view, very clearly against such a\nconclusion. And amongst the omens which portend immortality, not\nnecessarily for the philosophical scheme, but for the \"God-intoxicated\"\ndevoutness of his Pantheism, is the desire, or rather the imperious need\nincreasingly realized, for a religion emancipated from theories of\ncreation or teleology, intolerant of any miracle, save indeed the\nwonders of the spiritual life, and satisfying the heart with an ever\npresent God. For it is to be remembered that Spinoza was the first\nPantheist who was also a prophet, in the sense of speaking out the\ndivine voice of the infinite Universe to its human constituent parts.\nNot that I would minimize the religious fervour of the Neo-Platonists:\nit is their Pantheism that seems to have been imperfect. But in Spinoza\nwe have a man who, inheriting by birth the tradition--I might even say\nthe apostolic succession--of the Jewish prophets, and gifted with an\ninsight into the consummation of that tradition in Jesus Christ, was\ndriven by a commanding intellect to divorce the spiritual life he prized\nfrom creeds that had become to him Impossible, and to enshrine it in the\nworthier temple of an eternal Universe identical with God. It is not,\nthen, with his philosophy that I am so much concerned as with his\nreligion.[15]\n\n[Sidenote: His Originality.]\n\n[Sidenote: Relation to Descartes.]\n\nIt is given to no man to be absolutely original in the sense of creating\nideas of which no germs existed before his day. But short of such an\nimpossible independence of the past, Benedict de Spinoza had perhaps as\nmuch originality as any man who ever lived. Yet with a modesty ever\ncharacteristic of moral greatness, he himself was disposed, at any rate\nduring his earlier philosophical development, to exaggerate his\nindebtedness to the philosopher Descartes, whose system he laboriously\nabridged in the inappropriate form of a series of propositions supposed\nto be demonstrated after the fashion of Euclid.\n\n[Sidenote: Fundamental Differences.]\n\n[Sidenote: Spinoza Discards Creator and Creation,]\n\n[Sidenote: Beginning and End.]\n\n[Sidenote: Takes the Universe as it Is.]\n\n[Sidenote: And Worships the Static Whole as God.]\n\nBut whatever may have been the esoteric belief of Descartes about\ncreation out of nothing and the theological dogmas connected therewith,\nhe attached too much importance to the social and political functions of\nestablished ecclesiastical institutions to declare himself independent\nof them. And though his submission, signalised on his death-bed, did not\ninterfere with the freest working of his brilliant intellect within\nlimits permitted to the former ecclesiastical \"schoolmen,\" it did\nprevent his frank realization of the eternal oneness of all being. For\nit compelled him to retain belief in a Creator distinct in essence from\nCreation. Such a belief Spinoza entirely rejected. For though his\n\"Natura Naturans,\" or Nature Active, may in a manner be called the\nCreator of his \"Natura Naturata,\" or Nature Passive, these are\nconsubstantial and co-eternal, neither being before or after the other.\nThus for him there was no beginning of the Universe and there could be\nno end. There was no creation out of nothing, nor any omen of weariness,\ndecay, or death in the eternal order. He teaches us in effect to take\nthe Universe as it is, and to pry into no supposed secrets of origin or\nend, an entirely gratuitous labour, imposed by illusions arising out of\nthe continuous redistribution of parts of the Whole. Instead of thus\nspending our mental energy for nought, he would have us regard the whole\nof Being as one Substance characterized by innumerable attributes, of\nwhich Extension and Thought alone come within our human cognizance;\nwhile each Attribute is subject to infinite Modes or modifications,\nwhich, in their effect on the two attributes known to us--extension and\nthought--constitute the universe of our experience. That infinite and\neternal Substance revealed by Attributes and their Modes is God,\nabsolute in His perfections if He could be fully conceived and known in\nall His activities. And even to our ignorance He is entrancing in His\ngradual self-revelation, as with our inadequate ideas we pursue the\nunattainable from glory to glory.\n\n[Sidenote: This View of the Universe applied to Psalm civ.]\n\nThis, then, is the first note we make of the gospel of Spinoza. But if\nany one thinks that the sacred word \"gospel\" is here misused, and that\nsuch teaching is fatal to piety, let him turn to the 104th Psalm and\nread, from Spinoza's point of view, the cosmic vision of the Hebrew\nseer. True, we can think no longer of the supernatural carpenter who\nworks on \"the beams of his chambers\" above, or of the mythical engineer\nwho digs deep in the darkness to \"lay the foundations of the earth.\" For\nthat is poetry, appealing by concrete images to the emotions. But it\ndoes not bind the intellect to a literal interpretation; and we are no\nlonger tormented by vain efforts to reconcile with infinite\nimpossibilities the half-human personality presented in poetic guise. So\nthat the vision of the seer is now the suggestion to us of an infinite\nand eternal Being, whose attributes by modification take the innumerable\nshapes of sun, moon, and stars, and mountains and river, and tree and\nflower, and bird and beast, and man. And the winds that sweep and the\nfloods that roll, and the rocky barriers that stand fast, and the rivers\nthat wind among the hills, and the trees that flourish and the living\nsocieties that gather in fruitful places, the labourer in his vineyard,\nthe sailor in his ship, all are in and of the one Eternal Being. Yet we\necho not with less, but perhaps with more reverence, than the believers\nin a divine artisan, the words of the Psalmist: \"O Lord, how manifold\nare Thy works! in wisdom hast Thou made them all: the earth is full of\nThy riches.\" But if the thunder and the flaming fire and the sweeping\nflood seem discordant, they existed for the Psalmist as well as for us,\nand they do not seem to have troubled him. At this point, therefore, we\nneed only say that Spinoza's religion of one divine Substance, whose\nunity in variety is holy, ought to stir within us with not less fervour,\nat least the spirit of the Psalmist's concluding prayer: \"Let the\nsinners be consumed out of the earth and let the wicked be no more.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Spinoza no Materialist,]\n\n[Sidenote: Notwithstanding his Attribution of \"Extension\" to God.]\n\n[Sidenote: Criticism by Sir F. Pollock.]\n\n[Sidenote: Changes In Theories of Matter since Spinoza's time.]\n\nSpinoza's maintenance of extension as one of the two infinite divine\nattributes cognizable by us has, with a certain amount of plausibility,\nbeen urged as a note of materialism. And this reproach has been\nsupported by reference to his insistence that in man the body and the\nsoul are only two different aspects of the same thing; for to him the\nbody is a finite Mode of God's infinite attribute of extension and the\nsoul a finite Mode of God's infinite attribute of thought, while both\nare manifestations of the one eternal divine Substance. Still, if in any\nway we are to regard God as extended, it seems impossible to avoid the\ninference that we regard Him as identified with matter, or at least the\npossibility of matter. Sir Frederick Pollock has admitted that this is a\nweak point in Spinoza's philosophy,[16] and mars its symmetry. But,\nbeing more concerned with, his religion, I am content to point out that\nsuch an objection was much more effective in Spinoza's time than it is\nto-day. For the whole trend of philosophy during the nineteenth century\nwas towards a view of Extension itself as a mode of Thought, and\ntherefore toward the absorption of one of Spinoza's theoretical divine\nattributes in the other.\n\n[Sidenote: Their Effect on his System.]\n\nNow if this should prove to be the permanent tendency of the most\ninfluential thinkers--as indeed seems most likely--it will probably be\nheld that Spinoza was wrong in attributing extension to the Eternal as\none of the qualities of His substance, except in so far as extension is,\nif not a necessary, at any rate an actual, and so far as we know, a\nuniversal mode of thought. But though, as Sir Frederick Pollock has\npointed out, Spinoza has in a manner \"counted thought twice over\" while\ntreating of the only two infinite attributes cognizable to us, we need\nnot, on that account, surrender his luminous idea of God as a Being\nabsolutely infinite, that is, \"Substance consisting of infinite\nAttributes, whereof each one expresses eternal and infinite being.\" Nor\nneed we abandon his supplementary but essential idea of \"Modes\" or\n\"modifications\" which mould the attributes into the varieties of finite\nworlds, known and unknown. Thus it may be that, in Spinoza's sense of\nthe word \"Attribute,\" we shall have to confess that only one comes\nwithin our human ken, that of Thought in a sense which includes feeling.\nBut if the late Herbert Spencer, apart from his synthetic philosophy of\nphenomena, has left any permanent mark on the religions consciousness,\nit has been by a consecration of the mystery of the ultimate\nUnknowable.[17] And in the spirit of reverence thus taught by him we may\nstill hold with Spinoza that the Eternal has an infinity of other\nattributes with their infinite modifications not within our cognizance.\nThis would only be an enlarged application of Hamlet's words:\n\n  \"There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio,\n  Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.\"\n\nOr, to put it in another way, the Universe perceptible to us is only one\nof an infinity of Universes. By which is not meant an infinite\nextension of galaxies in space, but the co-existence and, so to speak,\ninterpenetration of an infinity of modes of existence imperceptible to\nus.\n\n[Sidenote: God Is Identical with the Whole of Being.]\n\nTo Spinoza, then, God is the totality of Being. But it is not to be\ninferred that he identified God with the visible, or with any\nconceivable Universe. For either of these must fall far short of\ninfinity, and the Being of God is infinite. All I mean, when I say that\nSpinoza identifies God with the totality of existence, is that he\nregards the deity as that Perfect Being without beginning or end, whose\nessence it is to be, and of whom all that exists, whether known to us or\nnot, is separately a partial, and comprehensively a perfect expression.\n\n[Sidenote: His Doctrine of Man.]\n\nOf more practical interest to us perhaps is Spinoza's doctrine of man,\nthough it would have been impossible to explain that without first\nindicating his idea of God. In his view, then, man is a finite mode of\nthe two divine attributes, extension and thought. Thus both the extended\nbody and the conscious mind have their substance and reality in God.[18]\nBut the essence of man does not necessarily involve his separate\nexistence as the essence of God implies Being. Of course the substance\nof man is imperishable because it is of God's substance. Nay, there is a\nsense in which each man, being an eternal thought of God, has an aspect\ntowards eternity or exists \"sub specie eternitatis.\" But that is a truth\ntranscending the finite practical world with which we have to do.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration by the Vortex Theory.]\n\n[Sidenote: Distinction between Man and Beast.]\n\nAccording to Spinoza, what constitutes the real essence of the human\nmind is the (divine) idea of a certain individual creature actually\nexisting.[19] Here, perhaps, modern speculations about the constitution\nof matter may help us--if we use them with due reserve--to grasp\nSpinoza's notion of a \"res singularis in actu\"--or as it might be\nrendered freely, \"a creature of individual functions,\" for what is\ncalled the \"vortex theory,\" though as old as Cartesian philosophy, has\nrecently flashed into sudden prominence. And whether or no the\nspeculation be only a passing phase of human thought about the\nUnknowable, it equally answers the purpose of illustration. Thus the\nso-called \"ether\" is supposed to fill all space; and within it there are\nimagined or inferred innumerable \"tourbillons\" or \"vortices,\" which,\nthough parts of the indefinitely extended ether, form by their\nself-contained motion little worlds in themselves. These little worlds\nare by some regarded as the atoms which, by composition, and\ndifferentiation, build up our palpable universe. With the possibilities\nof such a theory I have nothing to do. But the notion of the vortex in\nthe ether may perhaps help us to a glimpse of Spinoza's notion when he\nspeaks of a \"res singularis in actu\" a creature of individual functions.\nFor to him man was, as it were, an infinitesimal vortex in a phase or\nattribute of the divine Substance. The analogy, like all other\nanalogies, would not bear being pressed. But it does suggest to us a\npicture of finite individuality in action or function, subordinated to\nunity with infinite Substance. If it be said that such an explanation\nwould necessarily include the conscious life of beasts and birds, the\nanswer would seem to be, that admitting this to be the case, yet in man\nthe divine idea of individuality is more fully expressed and has more of\nreality than in any lower creature.\n\n[Sidenote: Moral Difficulties.]\n\nMan, then, according to Spinoza, is in God and of God. But what are we\nto say of bad men, the vile, the base, the liar, the murderer? Are they\nalso in God and of God? Spinoza does not blench. Yes, they are. But here\ncomes in his doctrine of \"adequate\" and \"inadequate ideas.\" Thus, if you\nsee the colour red it completely expresses itself. It cannot be defined\nand needs no explanation.[20] As it is in the Infinite Thought so it is\nin ours. We have an \"adequate idea\" of it. But now if you see on an\nartist's canvas a splotch of red and blue and yellow, part of a work\nonly begun, it gives you no adequate idea. True, you have an adequate\nidea of each several colour, but not of their relations to the work\nconceived. To get that you would have to enter into the mind of the\nartist and see as he sees. Then the splotch of colour would take its\nplace as part of a harmonious whole; and would give you an adequate idea\njust as it does to the artist.\n\n[Sidenote: But the Universe Is Not an Unfinished Picture.]\n\n[Sidenote: It is an Eternal Whole, of which a Partial consideration is\nMisleading.]\n\nNow, according to Spinoza, when we see things as they appear in Infinite\nThought we have an adequate idea. But if we see only a component element\nin an idea--let us say--of the divine Artist, then our idea is\ninadequate.[21] Hence we misjudge things. And of the part played by bad\nmen in the divine Whole we certainly have no adequate idea. But here\nagain we must be on our guard against the abuse of illustrations. For it\nis not to be inferred that Spinoza regards the Universe as an unfinished\npicture, of which, the completion will justify the beginning. On the\ncontrary, the Universe is to him eternal, the necessary expression of\nthe infinite attributes of eternal Being. Still the analogy may help us.\nFor the concentration of attention on a single part of an ordered whole\nmay, quite as certainly as a glance at an unfinished work, be the\noccasion of an inadequate idea. In effect, the suggestion is that if we,\nlike God, could contemplate the infinite Universe all at once, and have\nan adequate idea thereof, in other words if we could ascend to the self\ncontemplation of the Eternal, we should have the bliss associated by\nlong habit with the words of the Psalmist: \"I shall be satisfied when I\nawake, with thy likeness.\" Such bliss, however, is only approximately\nattainable in moments of mystic transport. And when, as in so many\nexperiences, we see only in part, and have inadequate ideas, faith in\nthe Eternal Whole is needed to keep us from blasphemy.\n\n[Sidenote: Doctrine of Man Resumed.]\n\n[Sidenote: Final Cause Replaced by Idea.]\n\n[Sidenote: Freedom, Purity, Love.]\n\nWith such necessarily brief hints as to Spinoza's attitude towards evil,\nI resume his doctrine of man--the individual creature as a centre of\naction. Of final causes Spinoza will not hear. But if instead of asking\n\"what is the chief end of man,\" we ask what is the idea of man, Spinoza\nanswers that it is the realization of a mode of the divine attributes,\nextension and thought. And if this should seem unsatisfying, let it be\nremembered that to this devout Pantheist the divine attributes and\ntheir modes were the expression of the very substance and life of God.\nNow with \"extension,\" for reasons already given, we need not trouble\nourselves except to say that at least Spinoza's teaching would suggest\nthe idea of _mens sana in corpore sano_. Because to him the mind was the\n\"idea\" of the body, and the body the \"object\"--not quite in the modern\nsense--of the mind. But as regards the human mode of the divine\nattribute of thought, Spinoza makes its ideal to be a life absorbed in\nsuch contemplation of \"the Blessed God,\" the infinite Whole, as shall\nreact on the creature in inspirations of freedom, purity and love.\n\n[Sidenote: Idea of Freedom.]\n\nAnd first as to freedom, Spinoza means by this not caprice, nor the\nmonstrous miracle of causeless action, but independence of external\nforce or of any disproportionate and illegitimate passion. The freedom\nto which he aspires is the freedom of God, who eternally acts in\naccordance with the mutual harmony of the whole attributes of His\nnature, not one of which clashes with another. So Spinoza's free man is\none in whom all aspirations and energies, converging in one resultant,\nthe expression of the divine idea, move him in harmony with the\nUniverse. From such a point of view the quibbles about \"free will,\" in\nthe sense of causeless action, cease to have any meaning. For if the\ngood man says \"I could have done otherwise if I had liked,\" the obvious\nreply is, \"Yes, but you would not have liked.\" Because the will is not a\nseparate faculty, but the expression of the whole nature, as that exists\nat the moment of \"willing.\" And the only real freedom is the unimpeded\nconglomerate impulse to do right. But should it be asked what if the\nresultant impulse of the whole nature is toward wrong? the answer is, in\nthat case there is no freedom, but a slavery to some external influence\nor to a disturbed balance of the passions. Or if it be asked what is\nright? that is a far reaching question to the solution of which Spinoza\nbends all his splendid powers. But limits of space preclude me from\nsaying more than, that his ideal of right will be found conformable to\nthe highest standards of the most spiritual religions.\n\n[Sidenote: Purity.]\n\nThis ideal I ventured to symbolize rather than define as \"purity.\" For\nafter all the philosophic reasoning with which it is no less lucidly\nthan laboriously worked out in the final book of his _Ethica_,\n\"Concerning Human. Freedom\"--the moral result of all this intellectual\neffort is that same cleansing of the soul from vain desire and that\nsubordination of the earthly self to its divine idea which we are taught\nin the Sermon on the Mount. And while surely every one but a fanatical\nanti-Christian must allow the greater prophetic worth of the Galilean,\nwho could teach these sublime lessons so that \"the common people heard\nhim gladly,\" it seems difficult to deny to the heretic Jew of the Hague\nthe second rank among the teachers given to the world by that strangely\ngifted race. For though he could not speak to \"the common people,\" he\nleft as his legacy to mankind, not so much a system of philosophy, as an\nimpregnable foundation for morals and religion, available for the time\nnow coming upon us--such a time as that suggested by the writer of the\nEpistle to the Hebrews, when he spoke of \"the removing of those things\nthat are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which\ncannot be shaken may remain.\" No doubt Sir Frederic Pollock is quite\nright in declaring that Spinoza would have been the very last man to\ndesire any one to become a Spinozist. But that is quite consistent with\nthe inspired Pantheist's infinite longing to see all men blessed by that\ninward peace which he proved, by his own heroic experience, to be\nidentical with the self-control conferred and maintained by devout\ncontemplation of God's all-comprehensive Being and our place therein.\nIf, then, I regard purity as the best symbol of such a moral ideal, it\nis because the word connotes, together with freedom from discordant\npassion, a frankly unconstrained recognition of the simplicity of our\nrelation to God. For surely when once the self has made the great\nsurrender, and becomes content to be nothing, that in St. Paul's words,\n\"God may be all in all,\" the whole problem of life is infinitely\nsimplified, in the sense that no farther degree of simplification is\npossible. Because all contradictions of pain and evil and sorrow are\ndissolved in that act of surrender. We must, indeed, recognize that to\nour \"inadequate ideas\" the time often seems \"out of joint.\" But we need\nnot, with Hamlet, cry out on an impossible \"spite.\" For when once it is\nheartily and loyally realized that not our partial likings, but the\neternal harmony of the Whole, is the glory of God, we already anticipate\nthe peace of absorption in the Infinite.\n\n[Sidenote: Love.]\n\nNor is this moral ideal without a sacred passion; at least to ordinary\nmen; though it must be confessed that Spinoza, in the stillness of his\nsacred peace, ignored the word. But he still held that the larger our\nview of the Universe and of our communion therewith, the more we have of\nGod in us and the more do we realize an \"intellectual love\" towards Him.\nThat this in his case was no barren sentiment, but a genuine moral\ninspiration, was proved by his life; for truly \"he endured as seeing Him\nwho is invisible.\" And it was not by faculties wholly wanting to smaller\nmen that he did this. For though his intellect was in some respects\nalmost beyond compare, it was rather by his self-subordinating\ncontemplation that he was kept at peace. Indeed, he knew far less of the\nextended universe than our men of science do, and his doctrines of mind\nand thought are, by indisputable authorities, regarded as imperfect. But\nimagining what God must be, could we have an adequate idea not only of\nHis Being--which Spinoza thought he had--but of His infinite attributes\nand their modes--which Spinoza recognized that he had not--he declared\nthat love toward God was the very highest good. And it was supremely\nblessed in this, that it could engender no jealousy nor selfishness, nor\nsectarian zeal, but rather a large-hearted charity which would gather\nall mankind into the present heaven of that love.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 15: It is not within the scope of the present essay to give a\nlife of Barach (or Benedict) de Spinoza. But for the sake of those to\nwhom the work of Sir Frederick Pollock is not easily accessible, the\nfollowing particulars may be given. Spinoza was born in Amsterdam,\nNovember, 1632, of a fairly prosperous Jewish family, originally from\nPortugal. He received thorough instruction in the language and\nliterature of the Hebrews, and in addition became a good Latin scholar,\nso far as to write and correspond in that language. He was early\ninterested in philosophy, and especially attracted for a time by the\nwritings of Descartes. By the time he was twenty-three years old he was\nsuspected of heresy, and in his twenty-fourth year (1655) was cut off\nfrom the Synagogue with a frightful curse. His family disowned him, and\nfor his maintenance he turned to the polishing of lenses, a trade\nalready learned in accordance with the Jewish custom that every boy must\nhave a handicraft. What he earned would hardly be considered a \"living\nwage\" in these days. But according to Colerus, his first biographer, who\nenquired of the householders with whom Spinoza lodged, his day's\nmaintenance of often cost no more than 4-1/2_d_. Various incidents\nproved his total indifference to money, except as far as needed to\n\"provide things honest in the sight of all men.\" Though of an amiable\nand sociable disposition he lived a solitary life, while not indisposed\nto kindly talk with his humbler neighbours. He had some of the greatest\nscholars of the day among his correspondents. He published but little\nduring his life, leaving his greatest work as a legacy to the world on\nhis early death, at the Hague, from consumption, in 1677.]\n\n[Footnote 16: \"It is to be observed that, inasmuch as Attribute is\ndefined by reference to intellect, and Thought itself is an attribute,\nThought appears to be in a manner, counted twice over.\"--_Spinoza: His\nLife and Philosophy_, by Sir Frederick Pollock. Second edition, 1899, p.\n153.]\n\n[Footnote 17: It is of course true that Spinoza considered himself to\nhave a clear and adequate conception of God. But by this he meant only\nthat, as a philosopher, he had an intuitive certainty of eternal and\ninfinite Being. So have all of us humbler mortals, though we should not\nhave been able to express it for ourselves. No one supposes that for an\nindefinite space of time or eternity there was nothing, and then\nsuddenly there was something. But, if not, then everyone recognises with\nSpinoza the fact of eternal Being, though, of course, he saw what this\nrecognition meant, as the many do not. But when it comes to the facts of\nmortal imperfections and ignorance, Spinoza, with his theory of\n\"inadequate ideas,\" is as ready as Spencer to acknowledge the\nUnknowable.]\n\n[Footnote 18: I do not think it necessary in an essay of this kind to\ndiscuss Spinoza's theory of the body as object of the mind, and the mind\nas \"idea\" of the body, both being different aspects of the same thing.]\n\n[Footnote 19: \"Rei alicujus singularis actu existentis.\" The word\n\"divine\" does not occur in Prop. xi. Ethices II., from which I quote.\nBut it is implied; because the mind is only a mode or modification of\nthe infinite attribute of thought, which again expresses the eternal\nSubstance in God. I venture a doubt whether \"actually existing,\" though\nadopted by such authorities as Sir F. Pollock gives, with any\ndistinctness, Spinoza's meaning. I may be wrong, but I suspect that one\nof the later uses of \"actus,\" as quoted in Ducange, affected Spinoza's\nLatinity. Thus several ecclesiastical writers are quoted as using the\nword in the sense of office, or function. Surely this would suit\nSpinoza's definition of the mind. For he treats it as a centre of\nphenomenal activity amidst the infinite modes of the divine attribute.\nIts apparent individuality is a consequence of its spontaneity as a\ncentre of action--always understood that the spontaneity is consistent\nwith the absolute eternal order assumed throughout the work.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Of course the professor of optics can tell us how many\nvibrations in a second go to produce the particular shade of colour. But\nthese cannot by any means be identified with conscious perception; and\nit is with this only that we are concerned.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Ethices Pars II., Prop. xi. Corollarium. \"Hence it follows\nthat the human mind is part of the infinite intellect (thought) of God;\nand accordingly, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that,\nwe only say that God--not in His infinity, but so far as He is expressed\nby the nature of the human mind, or, so far as He constitutes the\nessence of the human mind--has this or that idea. And when, we say that\nGod has this or that idea, not only so far as He constitutes the nature\nof the human mind, but so far as He has the idea also of some other\nthing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind\nperceives the thing in part, or inadequately.\" E.G. all races have\nnaturally supposed earthquakes and storm, battle, murder and sudden\ndeath to present ideas identical in the minds of their gods and of\nthemselves. But Spinoza's suggestion, as I interpret it, is that the\ntrue God has the idea of such things, not only so far as He constitutes\nthe human mind, but as He includes the ideas of some correlated things\nto us inconceivable. Our idea is therefore \"inadequate.\"]\n\n\n\n\nAFTERWORD.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Spinoza's Apparent Failure.]\n\n[Sidenote: Power of Ecclesiasticism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Identification of Moral Interests with Conventional Beliefs.]\n\nNotwithstanding the admiration, and even reverence, with, which Spinoza\nwas regarded by a few scholars during his life-time, it cannot be said\nthat during the century following his death, in 1677, there was any wide\nacceptance of his ideas. The times were not favourable. For the\npolitical and social power of ecclesiasticism, whether established, or\nunestablished, compelled men of science and philosophers to treat\ndominant creeds as consecrated ground, on which ordinary methods of\nresearch, reasoning or criticism could not be pursued. In saying this, I\nam far from accusing those illustrious men of insincerity. Some few of\nthem, indeed, used a sort of cryptic satire to excuse to themselves an\nunwilling conformity. But, for the most part, the moral pressure of\ntradition and education compelled enlightened men to identify the\ndoctrines of a personal God, Creation, Fall, Redemption and Immortality\nwith moral interests vitally essential to human welfare. Under such\ncircumstances a prudent conservatism was inevitable.\n\n[Sidenote: Gradual Spread of Spinoza's Influence.]\n\n[Sidenote: Fichte.]\n\n[Sidenote: Hegel.]\n\nYet, notwithstanding these restraining influences, the thoughts breathed\nforth by the lonely thinker were as living seed wafted abroad, and\nfalling here and there on good ground, germinated and brought forth\nfruit. Sometimes his influence was acknowledged, sometimes it was\nrepudiated; but it was there, nevertheless. It is doubtful whether\nFichte's idealism could have taken the form it did had not Spinoza\npreceded him. Hegel, setting out on his great intellectual career with a\nresolve to defend the faith once delivered to the saints, yet traces its\nroots to a philosophy of Being which, at any rate, looks very like\nPantheism. This is perhaps delicate ground to tread. For if one is asked\nwhether one understands Hegel, one is tempted to answer, like the pious\nScotch lady when her friends enquired whether she had understood the\nminister's sermon, \"Hech, sirs, d'ye think I'd presume?\" Still, not my\nown reading of him only, but Mr. Haldane's profoundly interesting\ninterpretations given in his _Gifford Lectures_, make the impression\nthat Hegel's eternal process is always a projection of subject as object\nand re-integration of the two. And this goes on, not only on the\ninfinite, but on the finite scale, amidst the infinite number of\nprocesses which constitute the Whole of Being. But this seems to leave\nno room for creation out of nothing, and it is to that extent\npantheistic. There are doubtless saving interpretations, but it is\ndifficult to follow them; and they cannot cancel the initial postulate\nof one eternal process, consisting in the relations of infinite subject,\nobject and reunion. On such a system I do not see how there can be\nanything but God, and, therefore, notwithstanding his aversion to the\nname, count Hegel a Pantheist.\n\n[Sidenote: Goethe and Wordsworth.]\n\nGoethe and Wordsworth, in many inspired passages of their poetry, echo\nthe faith of Spinoza. Wordsworth, of course, in the reaction from his\nfirst expectations of the new order that he hoped to see arise out of\nthe French Revolution, was Inclined to magnify the Importance of\nestablished religious ceremonies and creeds. But we cannot suppose that\nhe ever repented of his reverence for Nature as a divine revelation. And\nwe may believe that he continued to regard his practically pantheistic\nvisions as an insight into the eternal reality from which the detailed\nschemes of orthodox theology were projected.\n\n[Sidenote: Schleiermacher.]\n\nThat Schleiermacher was much indebted to Spinoza is abundantly evident\nfrom his own words. He spoke of \"the holy repudiated Spinoza.\" He\ndeclared that \"the high world-spirit penetrated him; the Infinite was\nhis beginning and his end; the universe his only and eternal love. In\nholy innocence and lowliness, he mirrored himself in the eternal world,\nand saw himself as its most love-worthy image. He was full of religion\nand of the Holy Spirit; and therefore he stands alone and unreachable,\nmaster in his art above the profane multitude, without disciples and\nwithout citizenship.\"[22]\n\n[Sidenote: Anglican Broad Churchmen.]\n\nComing down to Anglican Broad Churchmen, it would scarcely be fair to\nquote isolated utterances as proofs of their Pantheism. And yet when\nFrederick Robertson asked, \"What is this world itself but the form of\nDeity whereby the manifoldness and beauty of His mind manifests itself?\"\nand still farther, when he quotes with approval Channing's word, that\n\"perhaps matter is but a mode of thought,\" the most earnest Pantheist\nwould hardly desire more. For the conception of the Universe involved\nmust surely exclude the real being, or even the real existence, of\nanything but God. Matthew Arnold never committed himself to Pantheism,\nnor, indeed, to any other theory of the Universe. For his delicate\nhumour and lambent satire always had in view simply the practical object\nof clearing a plain way for the good life through the \"Aberglaube\" of\ntheology. His description of God as \"the Power not ourselves which makes\nfor righteousness,\" might seem, in fact, the negation of Pantheism,\nbecause, if God is not ourselves, there is something other than God. But\nthe man who deliberately justified the loose phraseology of the Bible\nabout infinite Being, by the plea that it was language \"thrown out\" at\nan object infinitely transcending linguistic expression, ought not\nhimself to be pinned to the implications logically deducible from his\nown words \"thrown out\" at the same transcendant object. And, though\nMatthew Arnold was too literary to be a Pantheist, that is, though he\nthought more of forms of expression than of ultimate reality, his\nsatirical disintegration of the creeds, wherever it is effective, makes\nPantheism the only religious alternative. So-called \"secular\" and\ngodless alternatives may be offered; but their incongruity with the\nwhole evolution of humanity from prehistoric animism to the higher\nPantheism will make their doom short and sure.\n\n[Sidenote: Why Pantheism as a Religion was called Modern.]\n\nIn the earlier part of this essay I made the remark that Pantheism as a\nreligion is almost entirely modern. The context, however, clearly showed\nwhat was meant; for several pages have been occupied with indications of\nthe ideas and teaching of individual Pantheists from Xenophanes to\nSpinoza. But we do not usually take much note of a religion that is\nconfined to one or two men in an age. If it dies out we treat it merely\nas a curiosity, or an intellectual puzzle, like the dreams of Jacob\nBoehme, or the atheistic ecclesiasticism of Comte. But, if it\nafterwards shows symptoms of unexpected adaptation to the mental and\nmoral conditions of a newer world, and if, on account of this\nadaptation, it gains a hold on men who are neither philosophers nor\nmetaphysicians, but only religious, it demands our consideration on far\nother grounds than those of intellectual curiosity.\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheistic Tendencies of Contemporary Thought]\n\nNow it has only been during the second half of the last century that\nPantheism has been able to claim attention as a religion in such a sense\nas this. As to the fact there can hardly be any dispute. For not only\nhas it become ever a more prominent motive in the music of the poets,\nand not only are all rationalizations of Christianity more or less\ntransparent disguises of Pantheism, but I may safely appeal to those\nordinary members of intelligent society who are neither poets, nor\ndivines, nor philosophers, whether the freest and most confidential\ninterchange of religious thought does not continually verge on a faith\nwhich merges everything in God.\n\n[Sidenote: Caused by the Mutual Pressure of Science and Faith.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Nebular Hypothesis taken alone Involves Absurdity.]\n\nNor are the reasons of this tendency far to seek. Indeed, they are\npalpable and conspicuous in the mutual pressure of science and faith.\nFor, on the one hand science has made unthinkable the old-world\nconception of a three-storeyed Universe, constructed by an artificer\nGod, who suddenly awoke from an eternity of idleness to make Heaven,\nEarth, and Hell--a conception involving a King of kings, enthroned like\nan eastern monarch, and sending forth His ministering spirits, or\nappointing His angel deputies to direct and govern at His beck. Or if it\nbe said that never, except in the ages of primeval simplicity, or\namongst later generations living under primeval conditions? has such a\nconception been entertained, it would be difficult for the \"broadest\"\nChurchman to say what has been, put in its place. It is vain to remind\nus how later Christianity has patronised nebular hypotheses and the\ndoctrine of evolution. For these give no definite substitute whatever\nfor the old story, that Elohim \"spoke, and it was done--he commanded,\nand it stood fast.\" Whence the fiery mists by the rotation and cooling\nof which the worlds were slowly evolved? We are told that the same\nprocess is going on now within the ken of astronomers. But does any one\nsuppose that in those realms of space God is evoking something out of\nnothing, or saying \"be,\" and \"there is\"? No; we are assured that these\nfiery mists are formed by the collision of misguided orbs; and we are\neven asked--or, at least we _were_ asked--to believe that this process\nmust go on until all systems are agglomerated in one orb, to be\nultimately congealed into stone. What, then, is the office of the\nCreator according to this scheme, as repulsive as it is absurd? It would\nappear that, at some moment in a vacuous eternity, He calls matter out\nof nothing, whirls it into fiery vortices, and then lets it cool down to\nthe absolute zero wherein death reigns for ever.\n\n[Sidenote: The Protest of Faith.]\n\n[Sidenote: Sustained by Latest Science.]\n\n[Sidenote: Which Suggests an Infinite Unity.]\n\nBut, after all, \"there is a spirit in man,\" and \"the inspiration of the\nAlmighty,\" of the Eternal, of the glorious Whole to which we belong,\nstirs in us a protest against this blasphemy of ignorance. Ignorance, I\nsay, for it was not the knowledge of our wise men that whispered such\nthings, but their sense of the vacuity beyond their knowledge. Up to\ncertain bounds, their grasp of facts, their insight into physical order,\ntheir mathematical skill, were beyond all praise. But beyond that bound,\naye, and within it, in every inconceivable mode of the action of force,\nas, for example, in gravitation, brooded the Unknowable. And it was not\ntheir knowledge, but their ignorance that entailed absurd issues.\nAlready there are signs that even celestial physics and mathematics will\nrefuse to endorse as final so revolting a scheme of material evolution\nand devolution, ending only in universal death.[23] And when once the\nre-birth of new order out of the old is seen to be everywhere and\neternally taking place, then all the hints given us by science of the\nultimate oneness of all things, converge in the faith that All is God,\nand God is All. For certainly, the latest observations on Matter suggest\nthat all forms of it are variations of one ultimate Substance. And the\nconvertibility of forces, as well as the conservation of force, point to\none eternal energy. Nor is the duality thus suggested any final\nconclusion. For few, I imagine, would now contend that, in the last\nresult Matter and Force are fundamentally different things. In fact,\nMonism holds the field; and though the evolution of human opinion is\nvery slow, it appears safe to predict that the triumph of that world\ntheory is assured.\n\n[Sidenote: Idea of Creation Incongruous with Modern Knowledge.]\n\nThis result Is additionally secured by the increasing incongruity felt\nbetween the immeasurable vastness of the Universe, even as known, and\nthe idea of creation out of nothing. When the Almighty could be\nseriously pictured as constructing chambers for Himself and His heavenly\nhost above, the middle floor of earth for the children of men, and the\nabyss for ghosts and devils, the notion that His word evoked that puny\nstructure from nothing might be invested by poets and prophets with a\ncertain grandeur. Each part of the work had an object as conceivable as\nthat of each floor in a house; and, according to petty human notions of\nutility, nothing was wasted. But now, when our astronomers confront us\nwith countless millions of orbs, to whose extension In space no bound\ncan be proved, while some of them tell us that the whole immensity is a\ndesert of alternate fire and darkness, with no spark of finite intellect\nexcept in our tiny earth, some of us, at least, cannot help feeling that\nthe notion of a personal divine worker calling this huge enigma out of\nblank eternal nothing, is enormously and utterly incongruous both with\nreverence and common sense.\n\nAnd if the Pantheist in these days be asked, \"What interpretation then\ndo you propose?\" his answer is, \"I propose none. I take things as they\nare. In their totality they are unknowable, as, indeed, even science\nfinds they are in their infinitesimal parts.\" But we need not on this\naccount lose \"the divinity that shapes our ends.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Pantheistic Morality.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Law of the Whole.]\n\nFor, between the infinite and the infinitesimal the human experience\nrealizes itself in surroundings which, when observed and reflected on,\nmake the impression of ordered relations of parts. By a necessity of our\nfinite and individual existence as centres of action--a necessity of\nwhich we can give no account--we present those relations to ourselves in\nforms of time and space. Then, when our experience is large enough and\nripe enough, being enriched and stimulated by the stored-up experience\nof humanity, as recorded in tradition, custom, Bibles, and Epics, we\nattain to the moral sense, and realize that we are bound to be loyal to\nsomething greater than self. That \"greater\" may be the tribe, the\nnation, humanity or God. But in far the larger number of cases in which\nthis sense of willing loyalty is aroused, its cause is the appeal to us\nof some whole of which we form a part. Certainly this is so with the\npatriot and the philanthropist. Indeed, it would be difficult, or\nimpossible, to find any human relationship, from the family upwards,\nthrough the wider circles of school, club, municipality, nationality, in\nwhich this sense of loyalty or devotion to the law of the whole is not\nthe best incentive to devotion.\n\n[Sidenote: Of that Law of the Whole Loyalty to God in the Supreme\nApplication.]\n\nYet, when we come to contemplate the final and supreme object of\ndevotion, the Eternal Himself, it has been almost the universal custom\nto make a surprising exception, and to regard religion as maintainable\nonly by recognition of a tremendous outward authority, to which only\nsuch loyalty is possible as in barbarous times was fostered towards a\npersonal chieftain, or feudal king. Now Pantheism holds this to be an\nerror, and regards obedience and devotion to God as the ultimate and\nmost inspiring application of that principle of the loyalty of the part\nto the whole which runs through all morality.\n\n[Sidenote: Conclusion.]\n\nWhy should we be supposed to be without God because we acknowledge Him\nto be superpersonal, and \"past finding out\"? Or why should we be\nsuspected of denying the divinity of evolution because we do not\nbelieve the Eternal All to be subject to it? This instinct of loyalty,\nin the sense of self-subordination to any greater Whole of which we are\npart, the distinction of right and wrong thence arising, and the\naspiration after a moral ideal, are not of man's invention. Speaking, as\nwe cannot help doing, in terms of time, I hold that the germs of this\nhigher creature-life were always in the divine unity out of which man is\nevolved. And in pursuing the inspirations of that higher life, as\nexperience suggests them, humanity has always had a guide and a saviour\nin the Living God, of whom the race life-time of man is an infinitesimal\nphase. In such an interpretation of man's relations to God there is\nnothing necessarily hostile to any form of genuine religion.[24] True,\nthere are in the creeds many statements which we cannot accept in the\nletter. But there are few which have not some spiritual suggestion for\nus. And if we can attain to that intellectual love of God in which\nSpinoza was absorbed, we have no quarrel with any mode of sincere\ndevotion. Pious Catholic, Protestant, Vedantist, Mohammedan--all, by\nthe implicit, though unrecognised necessities of their faith, worship\nthe same God as ourselves. But the wrangles of sectarian zeal no longer\nconcern us: for we have passed\n\n  \"To where beyond those voices there is peace.\"\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 22: Quoted by Dr. J. Hunt, in his _Essay on Pantheism_, p.\n312.]\n\n[Footnote 23: See _The Religion of the Universe_, pp. 128-30.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Limitations of space must be my apology for reference to\nan enlargement of this topic in \"A Pantheistic Sermon\" at the end of\n_The Religion of the Universe_.]","title":"Pantheism, Its Story and Significance: Religions Ancient and Modern","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":17578}