{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_11100/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_11100","id":"gutenberg_11100","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/11100","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy","Philosophy, Modern -- History"],"text":"\ufeffHISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY\n\nFrom Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time\n\n\nby\n\nRICHARD FALCKENBERG\n\n_Professor of Philosophy in the University of Erlangen_\n\n\n\n\n_THIRD AMERICAN FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION_\n\n\nTRANSLATED WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION BY\nA.C. ARMSTRONG, JR.\n_Professor of Philosophy in Wesleyan University_\n\n\n\n1893\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.\n\nThe aim of this translation is the same as that of the original work. Each\nis the outcome of experience in university instruction in philosophy, and\nis intended to furnish a manual which shall be at once scientific and\npopular, one to stand midway between the exhaustive expositions of the\nlarger histories and the meager sketches of the compendiums. A pupil of\nKuno Fischer, Fortlage, J.E. Erdmann, Lotze, and Eucken among others,\nProfessor Falckenberg began his career as _Docent_ in the university of\nJena. In the year following the first edition of this work he became\n_Extraordinarius_ in the same university, and in 1888 _Ordinarius_ at\nErlangen, choosing the latter call in preference to an invitation to Dorpat\nas successor to Teichm\u00fcller. The chair at Erlangen he still holds. His work\nas teacher and author has been chiefly in the history of modern philosophy.\nBesides the present work and numerous minor articles, he has published the\nfollowing: _Ueber den intelligiblen Charakter, zur Kritik der Kantischen\nFreiheitslehre_ 1879; _Grundz\u00fcge der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus_,\n1880-81; and _Ueber die gegenw\u00e4rtige Lage der deutschen Philosophie_, 1890\n(inaugural address at Erlangen). Since 1884-5 Professor Falckenberg has\nalso been an editor of the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie und philosophische\nKritik_, until 1888 in association with Krohn, and after the latter's\ndeath, alone. At present he has in hand a treatise on Lotze for a German\nseries analogous to Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, which is to be\nissued under his direction. Professor Falckenberg's general philosophical\nposition may be described as that of moderate idealism. His historical\nmethod is strictly objective, the aim being a free reproduction of the\nsystems discussed, as far as possible in their original terminology and\nhistorical connection, and without the intrusion of personal criticism.\n\nThe translation has been made from the second German edition (1892),\nwith still later additions and corrections communicated by the author in\nmanuscript. The translator has followed the original faithfully but\nnot slavishly. He has not felt free to modify Professor Falckenberg's\nexpositions, even in the rare cases where his own opinions would have led\nhim to dissent, but minor changes have been made wherever needed to fit the\nbook for the use of English-speaking students. Thus a few alterations have\nbeen made in dates and titles, chiefly under the English systems and from\nthe latest authorities; and a few notes added in elucidation of portions\nof the text. Thus again the balance of the bibliography has been somewhat\nchanged, including transfers from text to notes and _vice versa_ and a few\nomissions, besides the introduction of a number of titles from our English\nphilosophical literature chosen on the plan referred to in the preface\nto the first German edition. The glossary of terms foreign to the German\nreader has been replaced by a revision and expansion of the index, with the\nanalyses of the glossary as a basis. Wherever possible, and this has been\ntrue in all important cases, the changes have been indicated by the usual\nsigns.\n\nThe translator has further rewritten Chapter XV., Section 3, on recent\nBritish and American Philosophy. In this so much of the author's\n(historical) standpoint and treatment as proved compatible with the aim of\na manual in English has been retained, but the section as a whole has been\nrearranged and much enlarged.\n\nThe labor of translation has been lightened by the example of previous\nwriters, especially of the translators of the standard treatises of\nUeberweg and Erdmann. The thanks of the translator are also due to several\nfriends who have kindly aided him by advice or assistance: in particular to\nhis friend and former pupil, Mr. C.M. Child, M.S., who participated in the\npreparation of a portion of the translation; and above all to Professor\nFalckenberg himself, who, by his willing sanction of the work and his\nco-operation throughout its progress, has given a striking example of\nscholarly courtesy.\n\nA.C.A., Jr.\n\nWesleyan University, June, 1893.\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION.\n\nSince the appearance of Eduard Zeller's _Grundriss der Geschichte der\ngriechischen Philosophie_ (1883; 3d ed. 1889) the need has become even more\napparent than before for a presentation of the history of modern philosophy\nwhich should be correspondingly compact and correspondingly available for\npurposes of instruction. It would have been an ambitious undertaking to\nattempt to supply a counterpart to the compendium of this honored scholar,\nwith its clear and simple summation of the results of his much admired five\nvolumes on Greek philosophy; and it has been only in regard to practical\nutility and careful consideration of the needs of students--concerning\nwhich we have enjoyed opportunity for gaining accurate information in the\nreview exercises regularly held in this university--that we have ventured\nto hope that we might not fall too far short of his example.\n\nThe predominantly practical aim of this _History_--it is intended to serve\nas an aid in introductory work, in reviewing, and as a substitute for\ndictations in academical lectures, as well as to be a guide for the\nwider circle of cultivated readers--has enjoined self-restraint in the\ndevelopment of personal views and the limitation of critical reflections\nin favor of objective presentation. It is only now and then that critical\nhints have been given. In the discussion of phenomena of minor importance\nit has been impossible to avoid the _oratio obliqua_ of exposition; but,\nwherever practicable, we have let the philosophers themselves develop their\ndoctrines and reasons, not so much by literal quotations from their\nworks, as by free, condensed reproductions of their leading ideas. If the\nprincipiant view of the forces which control the history of philosophy, and\nof the progress of modern philosophy, expressed in the Introduction and in\nthe Retrospect at the end of the book, have not been everywhere verified\nin detail from the historical facts, this is due in part to the limits, in\npart to the pedagogical aim, of the work. Thus, in particular, more space\nhas for pedagogical reasons been devoted to the \"psychological\" explanation\nof systems, as being more popular, than in our opinion its intrinsic\nimportance would entitle it to demand. To satisfy every one in the choice\nof subjects and in the extent of the discussion is impossible; but our hope\nis that those who would have preferred a guide of this sort to be entirely\ndifferent will not prove too numerous. In the classification of movements\nand schools, and in the arrangement of the contents of the various systems,\nit has not been our aim to deviate at all hazards from previous accounts;\nand as little to leave unutilized the benefits accruing to later comers\nfrom the distinguished achievements of earlier workers in the field. In\nparticular we acknowledge with gratitude the assistance derived from the\nrenewed study of the works on the subject by Kuno Fischer, J.E. Erdmann,\nZeller, Windelband, Ueberweg-Heinze, Harms, Lange, Vorl\u00e3nder, and P\u00fcnjer.\n\nThe motive which induced us to take up the present work was the perception\nthat there was lacking a text-book in the history of modern philosophy,\nwhich, more comprehensive, thorough, and precise than the sketches of\nSchwegler and his successors, should stand between the fine but detailed\nexposition of Windelband, and the substantial but--because of the division\nof the text into paragraphs and notes and the interpolation of pages of\nbibliographical references--rather dry outline of Ueberweg. While the\nformer refrains from all references to the literature of the subject and\nthe latter includes far too many, at least for purposes of instruction, and\nJ.B. Meyer's _Leitfaden_ (1882) is in general confined to biographical and\nbibliographical notices; we have mentioned, in the text or the notes and\nwith the greatest possible regard for the progress of the exposition, both\nthe chief works of the philosophers themselves and some of the\ntreatises concerning them. The principles which have guided us in these\nselections--to include only the more valuable works and those best adapted\nfor students' reading, and further to refer as far as possible to the most\nrecent works--will hardly be in danger of criticism. But we shall not\ndispute the probability that many a book worthy of mention may have been\noverlooked.\n\nThe explanation of a number of philosophical terms, which has been added as\nan appendix at the suggestion of the publishers, deals almost entirely\nwith foreign expressions and gives the preference to the designations of\nfundamental movements. It is arranged, as far as possible, so that it may\nbe used as a subject-index.\n\nJENA, December 23, 1885.\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION.\n\nThe majority of the alterations and additions in this new edition are in\nthe first chapter and the last two; no departure from the general character\nof the exposition has seemed to me necessary. I desire to return my\nsincere thanks for the suggestions which have come to me alike from public\ncritiques and private communications. In some cases contradictory requests\nhave conflicted--thus, on the one hand, I have been urged to expand, on the\nother, to cut down the sections on German idealism, especially those on\nHegel--and here I confess my inability to meet both demands. Among the\nreviews, that by B. Erdmann in the first volume of the _Archiv f\u00fcr\nGeschichte der Philosophie_, and, among the suggestions made by letter,\nthose of H. Heussler, have been of especial value. Since others commonly\nsee defects more clearly than one's self, it will be very welcome if I can\nhave my desire continually to make this _History_ more useful supported by\nfarther suggestions from the circle of its readers. In case it continues to\nenjoy the favor of teachers and students, these will receive conscientious\nconsideration.\n\nFor the sake of those who may complain of too much matter, I may remark\nthat the difficulty can easily be avoided by passing over Chapters I., V.\n(\u00a7\u00a7 1-3), VI., VIII., XII., XV., and XVI.\n\nProfessor A.C. Armstrong, Jr., is preparing an English translation. My\nearnest thanks are due to Mr. Karl Niemann of Charlottenburg for his kind\nparticipation in the labor of proof-reading.\n\nR.F.\n\nERLANGEN, June 11, 1892.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n%CONTENTS.%\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: FROM NICOLAS OF CUSA TO DESCARTES\n\n1. Nicolas of Cusa\n2. The Revival of Ancient Philosophy and the Opposition to it\n3. The Italian Philosophy of Nature\n4. Philosophy of the State and of Law\n5. Skepticism in France\n6. German Mysticism\n7. The Foundation of Modern Physics\n8. Philosophy in England to the Middle of the Seventeenth Century\n  (_a_) Bacon's Predecessors\n  (_b_) Bacon\n  (_c_) Hobbes\n  (_d_) Lord Herbert of Cherbury\n9. Preliminary Survey\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\n%From Descartes to Kant.%\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nDESCARTES\n\n1. The Principles\n2. Nature\n3. Man\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF CARTESIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND\nIN FRANCE\n\n1. Occasionalism: Geulincx\n2. Spinoza\n  _(a)_ Substance, Attributes, and Modes\n  _(b)_ Anthropology; Cognition and the Passions\n  _(c)_ Practical Philosophy\n3. Pascal, Malebranche, Bayle\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nLOCKE\n\n  _(a)_ Theory of Knowledge\n  _(b)_ Practical Philosophy\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY\n\n1. Natural Philosophy and Psychology\n2. Deism\n3. Moral Philosophy\n4. Theory of Knowledge\n _(a)_ Berkeley\n _(b)_ Hume\n _(c)_ The Scottish School\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE FRENCH ILLUMINATION\n\n1. The Entrance of English Doctrines\n2. Theoretical and Practical Sensationalism\n3. Skepticism and Materialism\n4. Rousseau's Conflict with the Illumination\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nLEIBNITZ\n\n1. Metaphysics: the Monads, Representation, the Pre-established Harmony;\nthe Laws of Thought and of the World\n2. The Organic World\n3. Man: Cognition and Volition\n4. Theology and Theodicy\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE GERMAN ILLUMINATION\n\n1. The Contemporaries of Leibnitz\n2. Christian Wolff\n3. The Illumination as Scientific and as Popular Philosophy\n4. The Faith Philosophy\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\n%From Kant to the Present Time.%\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nKANT\n\n1. Theory of Knowledge\n  _(a)_ The Pure Intuitions (Transcendental Aesthetic)\n  _(b)_ The Concepts and Principles of the Pure Understanding\n  (Transcendental Analytic)\n  _(c)_ The Reason's Ideas of the Unconditioned (Transcendental\n  Dialectic)\n2. Theory of Ethics\n3. Theory of the Beautiful and of Ends in Nature\n  _(a)_ Aesthetic Judgment\n  _(b)_ Teleological Judgment\n4. From Kant to Fichte\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nFICHTE\n\n1. The Science of Knowledge\n  _(a)_ The Problem\n  _(b)_ The Three Principles\n  _(c)_ The Theoretical Ego\n  _(d)_ The Practical Ego\n2. The Science of Ethics and of Right\n3. Fichte's Second Period: his View of History and his Theory\nof Religion\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nSCHELLING\n\n1_a_. Philosophy of Nature\n1_b_. Transcendental Philosophy\n2. System of Identity\n3_a_. Doctrine of Freedom\n3_b_. Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSCHELLING'S CO-WORKERS\n\n1. The Philosophers of Nature\n2. The Philosophers of Identity (F. Krause)\n3. The Philosophers of Religion (Baader and Schleiermacher)\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nHEGEL\n\n1. Hegel's View of the World and his Method\n2. The System\n  (_a_) Logic\n  (_b_) The Philosophy of Nature\n  (_c_) The Doctrine of Subjective Spirit\n  (_d_) The Doctrine of Objective Spirit\n  (_e_) Absolute Spirit\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE OPPOSITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEALISM: FRIES, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER\n\n1. The Psychologists: Fries and Beneke\n2. Realism: Herbart\n3. Pessimism: Schopenhauer\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nPHILOSOPHY OUT OF GERMANY\n\n1. Italy\n2. France\n3. Great Britain and America\n4. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nGERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE DEATH OF HEGEL\n\n1. From the Division of the Hegelian School to the Materialistic\nControversy\n2. New Systems: Trendelenburg, Fechner, Lotze, and Hartmann\n3. From the Revival of the Kantian Philosophy to the Present Time\n  (_a_) Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Kindred Phenomena\n  (_b_) Idealistic Reaction against the Scientific Spirit\n  (_c_) The Special Philosophical Sciences\n4. Retrospect\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nIn no other department is a thorough knowledge of history so important as\nin philosophy. Like historical science in general, philosophy is, on the\none hand, in touch with exact inquiry, while, on the other, it has a\ncertain relationship with art. With the former it has in common its\nmethodical procedure and its cognitive aim; with the latter, its intuitive\ncharacter and the endeavor to compass the whole of reality with a glance.\nMetaphysical principles are less easily verified from experience than\nphysical hypotheses, but also less easily refuted. Systems of philosophy,\ntherefore, are not so dependent on our progressive knowledge of facts as\nthe theories of natural science, and change less quickly; notwithstanding\ntheir mutual conflicts, and in spite of the talk about discarded\nstandpoints, they possess in a measure the permanence of classical works of\nart, they retain for all time a certain relative validity. The thought of\nPlato, of Aristotle, and of the heroes of modern philosophy is ever proving\nanew its fructifying power. Nowhere do we find such instructive errors as\nin the sphere of philosophy; nowhere is the new so essentially a completion\nand development of the old, even though it deem itself the whole and assume\na hostile attitude toward its predecessors; nowhere is the inquiry so much\nmore important than the final result; nowhere the categories \"true and\nfalse\" so inadequate. The spirit of the time and the spirit of the people,\nthe individuality of the thinker, disposition, will, fancy--all these exert\na far stronger influence on the development of philosophy, both by way of\npromotion and by way of hindrance, than in any other department of thought.\nIf a system gives classical expression to the thought of an epoch, a\nnation, or a great personality; if it seeks to attack the world-riddle from\na new direction, or brings us nearer its solution by important original\nconceptions, by a subtler or a simpler comprehension of the problem, by a\nwider outlook or a deeper insight; it has accomplished more than it could\nhave done by bringing forward a number of indisputably correct principles.\nThe variations in philosophy, which, on the assumption of the unity of\ntruth, are a rock of offense to many minds, may be explained, on the one\nhand, by the combination of complex variety and limitation in the motives\nwhich govern philosophical thought,--for it is the whole man that\nphilosophizes, not his understanding merely,--and, on the other, by the\ninexhaustible extent of the field of philosophy. Back of the logical labor\nof proof and inference stand, as inciting, guiding, and hindering agents,\npsychical and historical forces, which are themselves in large measure\nalogical, though stronger than all logic; while just before stretches\naway the immeasurable domain of reality, at once inviting and resisting\nconquest. The grave contradictions, so numerous in both the subjective\nand the objective fields, make unanimity impossible concerning ultimate\nproblems; in fact, they render it difficult for the individual thinker to\ncombine his convictions into a self-consistent system. Each philosopher\nsees limited sections of the world only, and these through his own eyes;\nevery system is one-sided. Yet it is this multiplicity and variety of\nsystems alone which makes the aim of philosophy practicable as it endeavors\nto give a complete picture of the soul and of the universe. The history of\nphilosophy is the philosophy of humanity, that great individual, which,\nwith more extended vision than the instruments through which it works,\nis able to entertain opposing principles, and which, reconciling old\ncontradictions as it discovers new ones, approaches by a necessary and\ncertain growth the knowledge of the one all-embracing truth, which is\nrich and varied beyond our conception. In order to energetic labor in the\nfurther progress of philosophy, it is necessary to imagine that the goddess\nof truth is about to lift the veil which has for centuries concealed her.\nThe historian of philosophy, on the contrary, looks on each new system as\na stone, which, when shaped and fitted into its place, will help to raise\nhigher the pyramid of knowledge. Hegel's doctrine of the necessity\nand motive force of contradictories, of the relative justification of\nstandpoints, and the systematic development of speculation, has great and\npermanent value as a general point of view. It needs only to be guarded\nfrom narrow scholastic application to become a safe canon for the\nhistorical treatment of philosophy.\n\nIn speaking above of the worth of the philosophical doctrines of the past\nas defying time, and as comparable to the standard character of finished\nworks of art, the special reference was to those elements in speculation\nwhich proceed less from abstract thinking than from the fancy, the heart,\nand the character of the individual, and even more directly from the\ndisposition of the people; and which to a certain degree may be divorced\nfrom logical reasoning and the scientific treatment of particular\nquestions. These may be summed up under the phrase, views of the world. The\nnecessity for constant reconsideration of them is from this standpoint at\nonce evident. The Greek view of the world is as classic as the plastic art\nof Phidias and the epic of Homer; the Christian, as eternally valid as the\narchitecture of the Middle Ages; the modern, as irrefutable as Goethe's\npoetry and the music of Beethoven. The views of the world which proceed\nfrom the spirits of different ages, as products of the general development\nof culture, are not so much thoughts as rhythms in thinking, not theories\nbut modes of intuition saturated with feelings of worth. We may dispute\nabout them, it is true; we may argue against them or in their defense; but\nthey can neither be established nor overthrown by cogent proofs. It is not\nonly optimism and pessimism, determinism and indeterminism, that have their\nultimate roots in the affective side of our nature, but pantheism and\nindividualism, also idealism and materialism, even rationalism and\nsensationalism. Even though they operate with the instruments of thought,\nthey remain in the last analysis matters of faith, of feeling, and of\nresolution. The aesthetic view of the world held by the Greeks, the\ntranscendental-religious view of Christianity, the intellectual view of\nLeibnitz and Hegel, the panthelistic views of Fichte I and Schopenhauer are\nvital forces, not doctrines, postulates, not results of thought. One view\nof the world is forced to yield its pre-eminence to another, which it has\nitself helped to produce by its own one-sidedness; only to reconquer its\nopponent later, when it has learned from her, when it has been purified,\ncorrected, and deepened by the struggle. But the elder contestant is no\nmore confuted by the younger than the drama of Sophocles by the drama of\nShakespeare, than youth by age or spring by autumn.\n\nIf it is thus indubitable that the views of the world held in earlier times\ndeserve to live on in the memory of man, and to live as something better\nthan mere reminders of the past--the history of philosophy is not a cabinet\nof antiquities, but a museum of typical products of the mind--the value\nand interest of the historical study of the past in relation to the exact\nscientific side of philosophical inquiry is not less evident. In every\nscience it is useful to trace the origin and growth of problems and\ntheories, and doubly so in philosophy. With her it is by no means the\nuniversal rule that progress shows itself by the result; the statement of\nthe question is often more important than the answer. The problem is more\nsharply defined in a given direction; or it becomes more comprehensive,\nis analyzed and refined; or if now it threatens to break up into subtle\ndetails, some genius appears to simplify it and force our thoughts back\nto the fundamental question. This advance in problems, which happily is\neverywhere manifested by unmistakable signs, is, in the case of many of the\nquestions which irresistibly force themselves upon the human heart, the\nonly certain gain from centuries of endeavor. The labor here is of more\nvalue than the result.\n\nIn treating the history of philosophy, two extremes must be avoided,\nlawless individualism and abstract logical formalism. The history\nof philosophy is neither a disconnected succession of arbitrary\nindividual opinions and clever guesses, nor a mechanically developed series\nof typical standpoints and problems, which imply one another in just the\nform and order historically assumed. The former supposition does violence\nto the regularity of philosophical development, the latter to its vitality.\nIn the one case, the connection is conceived too loosely, in the other, too\nrigidly and simply. One view underestimates the power of the logical Idea,\nthe other overestimates it. It is not easy to support the principle that\nchance rules the destiny of philosophy, but it is more difficult to avoid\nthe opposite conviction of the one-sidedness of formalistic construction,\nand to define the nature and limits of philosophical necessity. The\ndevelopment of philosophy is, perhaps, one chief aim of the world-process,\nbut it is certainly not the only one; it is a part of the universal aim,\nand it is not surprising that the instruments of its realization do not\nwork exclusively in its behalf, that their activity brings about results,\nwhich seem unessential for philosophical ends or obstacles in their way.\nPhilosophical ideas do not think themselves, but are thought by living\nspirits, which are something other and better than mere thought\nmachines--by spirits who live these thoughts, who fill them with personal\nwarmth and passionately defend them. There is often reason, no doubt, for\nthe complaint that the personality which has undertaken to develop some\ngreat idea is inadequate to the task, that it carries its subjective\ndefects into the matter in hand, that it does too much or too little, or\nthe right thing in the wrong way, so that the spirit of philosophy seems\nto have erred in the choice and the preparation of its instrument. But the\nreverse side of the picture must also be taken into account. The thinking\nspirit is more limited, it is true, than were desirable for the perfect\nexecution of a definite logical task; but, on the other hand, it is far\ntoo rich as well. A soulless play of concepts would certainly not help\nthe cause, and there is no disadvantage in the failure of the history of\nphilosophy to proceed so directly and so scholastically, as, for instance,\nin the system of Hegel. A graded series of interconnected general forces\nmediate between the logical Idea and the individual thinker--the spirit of\nthe people, of the age, of the thinker's vocation, of his time of life,\nwhich are felt by the individual as part of himself and whose impulses\nhe unconsciously obeys. In this way the modifying, furthering, hindering\ncorrelation of higher and lower, of the ruler with his commands and the\nservant with his more or less willing obedience, is twice repeated, the\nsituation being complicated further by the fact that the subject affected\nby these historical forces himself helps to make history. The most\nimportant factor in philosophical progress is, of course, the state of\ninquiry at the time, the achievements of the thinkers of the immediately\npreceding age; and in this relation of a philosopher to his predecessors,\nagain, a distinction must be made between a logical and a psychological\nelement. The successor often commences his support, his development, or his\nrefutation at a point quite unwelcome to the constructive historian. At all\nevents, if we may judge from the experience of the past, too much caution\ncannot be exercised in setting up formal laws for the development of\nthought. According to the law of contradiction and reconciliation, a\nSchopenhauer must have followed directly after Leibnitz, to oppose his\npessimistic ethelism to the optimistic intellectualism of the latter; when,\nin turn, a Schleiermacher, to give an harmonic resolution of the antithesis\ninto a concrete doctrine of feeling, would have made a fine third. But it\nturned out otherwise, and we must be content.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nThe estimate of the value of the history of philosophy in general, given at\nthe start, is the more true of the history of modern philosophy, since the\nmovement introduced by the latter still goes on unfinished. We are still at\nwork on the problems which were brought forward by Descartes, Locke, and\nLeibnitz, and which Kant gathered up into the critical or transcendental\nquestion. The present continues to be governed by the ideal of culture\nwhich Bacon proposed and Fichte exalted to a higher level; we all live\nunder the unweakened spell of that view of the world which was developed in\nhostile opposition to Scholasticism, and through the enduring influence of\nthose mighty geographical and scientific discoveries and religious reforms\nwhich marked the entrance of the modern period. It is true, indeed, that\nthe transition brought about by Kant's no\u00ebtical and ethical revolution was\nof great significance,--more significant even than the Socratic period,\nwith which we are fond of comparing it; much that was new was woven on,\nmuch of the old, weakened, broken, destroyed. And yet, if we take into\naccount the historical after-influence of Cartesianism, we shall find that\nthe thread was only knotted and twisted by Kantianism, not cut through. The\ncontinued power of the pre-Kantian modes of thought is shown by the fact\nthat Spinoza has been revived in Fichte and Schelling, Leibnitz in Herbart\nand Hegel, the sensationalism of the French Illuminati in Feuerbach; and\nthat even materialism, which had been struck down by the criticism of the\nreason (one would have thought forever), has again raised its head. Even\nthat most narrow tendency of the early philosophy of the modern period, the\napotheosis of cognition is,--in spite of the moralistic counter-movement\nof Kant and Fichte,--the controlling motive in the last of the great\nidealistic systems, while it also continues to exercise a marvelously\npowerful influence on the convictions of our Hegel-weary age, alike within\nthe sphere of philosophy and (still more) without it. In view of the\nintimate relations between contemporary inquiry and the progress of thought\nsince the beginning of the modern period, acquaintance with the latter,\nwhich it is the aim of this _History_ to facilitate, becomes a pressing\nduty. To study the history of philosophy since Descartes is to study the\npre-conditions of contemporary philosophy.\n\nWe begin with an outline sketch of the general characteristics of modern\nphilosophy. These may be most conveniently described by comparing them with\nthe characteristics of ancient and of mediaeval philosophy. The character\nof ancient philosophy or Greek philosophy,--for they are practically the\nsame,--is predominantly aesthetic. The Greek holds beauty and truth closely\nakin and inseparable; \"cosmos\" is his common expression for the world and\nfor ornament. The universe is for him a harmony, an organism, a work of\nart, before which he stands in admiration and reverential awe. In quiet\ncontemplation, as with the eye of a connoisseur, he looks upon the world or\nthe individual object as a well-ordered whole, more disposed to enjoy the\ncongruity of its parts than to study out its ultimate elements. He prefers\ncontemplation to analysis, his thought is plastic, not anatomical. He finds\nthe nature of the object in its form; and ends give him the key to the\ncomprehension of events. Discovering human elements everywhere, he is\nalways ready with judgments of worth--the stars move in circles because\ncircular motion is the most perfect; the right is better than left, upper\nfiner than lower, that which precedes more beautiful than that which\nfollows. Thinkers in whom this aesthetic reverence is weaker than the\nanalytic impulse--especially Democritus--seem half modern rather than\nGreek. By the side of the Greek philosophy, in its sacred festal garb,\nstands the modern in secular workday dress, in the laborer's blouse, with\nthe merciless chisel of analysis in its hand. This does not seek beauty,\nbut only the naked truth, no matter what it be. It holds it impossible to\nsatisfy at once the understanding and taste; nay, nakedness, ugliness,\nand offensiveness seem to it to testify for, rather than against, the\ngenuineness of truth. In its anxiety not to read human elements into\nnature, it goes so far as completely to read spirit out of nature. The\nworld is not a living whole, but a machine; not a work of art which is to\nbe viewed in its totality and enjoyed with reverence, but a clock-movement\nto be taken apart in order to be understood. Nowhere are there ends in the\nworld, but everywhere mechanical causes. The character of modern thought\nwould appear to a Greek returned to earth very sober, unsplendid, undevout,\nand intrusive. And, in fact, modern philosophy has a considerable amount\nof prose about it, is not easily impressed, accepts no limitations from\nfeeling, and holds nothing too sacred to be attacked with the weapon of\nanalytic thought. And yet it combines penetration with intrusiveness;\nacuteness, coolness, and logical courage with its soberness. Never before\nhas the demand for unprejudiced thought and certain knowledge been made\nwith equal earnestness. This interest in knowledge for its own sake\ndeveloped so suddenly and with such strength that, in presumptuous\ngladness, men believed that no previous age had rightly understood what\ntruth and love for truth are. The natural consequence was a general\noverestimation of cognition at the expense of all other mental activities.\nEven among the Greek thinkers, thought was held by the majority to be the\nnoblest and most divine function. But their intellectualism was checked\nby the aesthetic and eudaemonistic element, and preserved from the\none-sidedness which it manifests in the modern period, because of the\nlack of an effective counterpoise. However eloquently Bacon commends the\nadvantages to be derived from the conquest of nature, he still understands\ninquiry for inquiry's sake, and honors it as supreme; even the ethelistic\nphilosophers, Fichte and Schopenhauer, pay their tribute to the prejudice\nin favor of intellectualism. The fact that the modern period can show\nno one philosophic writer of the literary rank of Plato, even though it\nincludes such masters of style as Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and\nLotze, not to speak of lesser names, is an external proof of how noticeably\nthe aesthetic impulse has given way to one purely intellectual.\n\nWhen we turn to the character of mediaeval thinking; we find, instead of\nthe aesthetic views of antiquity and the purely scientific tendency of the\nmodern era, a distinctively religious spirit. Faith prescribes the objects\nand the limitations of knowledge; everything is referred to the hereafter,\nthought becomes prayer. Men speculate concerning the attributes of God, on\nthe number and rank of the angels, on the immortality of man--all purely\ntranscendental subjects. Side by side with these, it is true, the world\nreceives loving attention, but always as the lower story merely,[1] above\nwhich, with its own laws, rises the true fatherland, the kingdom of grace.\nThe most subtle acuteness is employed in the service of dogma, with the\ntask of fathoming the how and why of things whose existence is certified\nelsewhere. The result is a formalism in thought side by side with profound\nand fervent mysticism. Doubt and trust are strangely intermingled, and a\nfeeling of expectation stirs all hearts. On the one side stands sinful,\nerring man, who, try as hard as he may, only half unravels the mysteries of\nrevealed truth; on the other, the God of grace, who, after our death, will\nreveal himself to us as clearly as Adam knew him before the fall. God\nalone, however, can comprehend himself--for the finite spirit, even\ntruth unveiled is mystery, and ecstasy, unresisting devotion to the\nincomprehensible, the culmination of knowledge. In mediaeval philosophy\nthe subject looks longingly upward to the infinite object of his thought,\nexpecting that the latter will bend down toward him or lift him upward\ntoward itself; in Greek philosophy the spirit confronts its object, the\nworld, on a footing of equality; in modern philosophy the speculative\nsubject feels himself higher than the object, superior to nature. In\nthe conception of the Middle Ages, truth and mystery are identical; to\nantiquity they appear reconcilable; modern thought holds them as mutually\nexclusively as light and darkness. The unknown is the enemy of knowledge,\nwhich must be chased out of its last hiding-place. It is, therefore, easy\nto understand that the modern period stands in far sharper antithesis to\nthe mediaeval era than to the ancient, for the latter has furnished it many\nprinciples which can be used as weapons against the former. Grandparents\nand grandchildren make good friends.\n\n[Footnote 1: On the separation and union of the three worlds, _natura,\ngratia, gloria_, in Thomas Aquinas, cf. Rudolph Eucken, _Die Philosophie\ndes Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der Neuzeit_, Halle. 1886.]\n\nWhen a new movement is in preparation, but there is a lack of creative\nforce to give it form, a period of tumultuous disaffection with existing\nprinciples ensues. What is wanted is not clearly perceived, but there is a\nlively sense of that which is not wanted. Dissatisfaction prepares a place\nfor that which is to come by undermining the existent and making it\nripe for its fall. The old, the outgrown, the doctrine which had become\ninadequate, was in this case Scholasticism; modern philosophy shows\nthroughout--and most clearly at the start--an anti-Scholastic character. If\nup to this time Church dogma had ruled unchallenged in spiritual affairs,\nand the Aristotelian philosophy in things temporal, war is now declared\nagainst authority of every sort and freedom of thought is inscribed on\nthe banner.[1] \"Modern philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the\nthinking spirit\" (Erdmann). Not that which has been considered true for\ncenturies, not that which another says, though he be Aristotle or Thomas\nAquinas, not that which flatters the desires of the heart, is true, but\nthat only which is demonstrated to my own understanding with convincing\nforce. Philosophy is no longer willing to be the handmaid of theology,\nbut must set up a house of her own. The watchword now becomes freedom and\nindependent thought, deliverance from every form of constraint, alike from\nthe bondage of ecclesiastical decrees and the inner servitude of prejudice\nand cherished inclinations. But the adoption of a purpose leads to the\nconsideration of the means for attaining it. Thus the thirst for knowledge\nraises questions concerning the method, the instruments, and the limits of\nknowledge; the interest in no\u00ebtics and methodology vigorously develops,\nremains a constant factor in modern inquiry, and culminates in Kant, not\nagain to die away.\n\n[Footnote 1: The doctrine of twofold truth, under whose protecting cloak\nthe new liberal movements had hitherto taken refuge, was now disdainfully\nrepudiated. Cf. Freudenthal, _Zur Beurtheilung der Scholastik_, in vol.\niii. of the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1890. Also, H. Reuter,\n_Geschichte der religi\u00f6sen Aufkl\u00e4rung im Mittelalter_ 1875-77; and Dilthey,\n_Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften_, 1883.]\n\nThis negative aspect of modern tendencies needs, however, a positive\nsupplement. The mediaeval mode of thought is discarded and the new one is\nnot yet found. What can more fittingly furnish a support, a preliminary\nsubstitute, than antiquity? Thus philosophy, also, joins in that great\nstream of culture, the Renaissance and humanism, which, starting from\nItaly, poured forth over the whole civilized world. Plato and Neoplatonism,\nEpicurus and the Stoa are opposed to Scholasticism, the real Aristotle to\nthe transformed Aristotle of the Church and the distorted Aristotle of the\nschools. Back to the sources, is the cry. With the revival of the ancient\nlanguages and ancient books, the spirit of antiquity is also revived. The\ndust of the schools and the tyranny of the Church are thrown off, and the\nclassical ideal of a free and noble humanity gains enthusiastic adherents.\nThe man is not to be forgotten in the Christian, nor art and science, the\nrights and the riches of individuality in the interest of piety; work for\nthe future must not blind us to the demands of the present nor lead us to\nneglect the comprehensive cultivation of the natural capacities of the\nspirit. The world and man are no longer viewed through Christian eyes, the\none as a realm of darkness and the other as a vessel of weakness and wrath,\nbut nature and life gleam before the new generation in joyous, hopeful\nlight. Humanism and optimism have always been allied.\n\nThis change in the spirit of thought is accompanied by a corresponding\nchange in the object of thought: theology must yield its supremacy to the\nknowledge of nature. Weary of Christological and soteriological questions,\nweary of disputes concerning the angels, the thinking spirit longs to\nmake himself at home in the world it has learned to love, demands real\nknowledge,--knowledge which is of practical utility,--and no longer seeks\nGod outside the world, but in it and above it. Nature becomes the home, the\nbody of God. Transcendence gives place to immanence, not only in theology,\nbut elsewhere. Modern philosophy is naturalistic in spirit, not only\nbecause it takes nature for its favorite object, but also because it\ncarries into other branches of knowledge the mathematical method so\nsuccessful in natural science, because it considers everything _sub ratione\nnaturae_ and insists on the \"natural\" explanation of all phenomena, even\nthose of ethics and politics.\n\nIn a word, the tendency of modern philosophy is anti-Scholastic,\nhumanistic, and naturalistic. This summary must suffice for preliminary\norientation, while the detailed division, particularization, modification,\nand limitation of these general points must be left for later treatment.\n\nTwo further facts, however, may receive preliminary notice. The\nindifference and hostility to the Church which have been cited among the\nprominent characteristics of modern philosophy, do not necessarily mean\nenmity to the Christian religion, much less to religion in general. In\npart, it is merely a change in the object of religious feeling, which\nblazes up especially strong and enthusiastic in the philosophy of the\nsixteenth century, as it transfers its worship from a transcendent deity to\na universe indued with a soul; in part, the opposition is directed against\nthe mediaeval, ecclesiastical form of Christianity, with its monastic\nabandonment of the world. It was often nothing but a very deep and strong\nreligious feeling that led thinkers into the conflict with the hierarchy.\nSince the elements of permanent worth in the tendencies, doctrines, and\ninstitutions of the Middle Ages are thus culled out from that which is\ncorrupt and effete, and preserved by incorporation into the new view of the\nworld and the new science, and as fruitful elements from antiquity enter\nwith them, the progress of philosophy shows a continuous enrichment in\nits ideas, intuitions, and spirit. The old is not simply discarded and\ndestroyed, but purified, transformed, and assimilated. The same fact\nforces itself into notice if we consider the relations of nationality and\nphilosophy in the three great eras. The Greek philosophy was entirely\nnational in its origin and its public, it was rooted in the character of\nthe people and addressed itself to fellow-countrymen; not until toward its\ndecline, and not until influenced by Christianity, were its cosmopolitan\ninclinations aroused. The Middle Ages were indifferent to national\ndistinctions, as to everything earthly, and naught was of value in\ncomparison with man's transcendent destiny. Mediaeval philosophy is in its\naims un-national, cosmopolitan, catholic; it uses the Latin of the schools,\nit seeks adherents in every land, it finds everywhere productive\nspirits whose labors in its service remain unaffected by their national\npeculiarities. The modern period returns to the nationalism of antiquity,\nbut does not relinquish the advantage gained by the extension of mediaeval\nthought to the whole civilized world. The roots of modern philosophy are\nsunk deep in the fruitful soil of nationality, while the top of the\ntree spreads itself far beyond national limitations. It is national and\ncosmopolitan together; it is international as the common property of the\nvarious peoples, which exchange their philosophical gifts through an active\ncommerce of ideas. Latin is often retained for use abroad, as the\nuniversal language of savants, but many a work is first published in the\nmother-tongue--and thought in it. Thus it becomes possible for the ideas\nof the wise to gain an entrance into the consciousness of the people, from\nwhose spirit they have really sprung, and to become a power beyond the\ncircle of the learned public. Philosophy as illumination, as a factor in\ngeneral culture, is an exclusively modern phenomenon. In this speculative\nintercourse of nations, however, the French, the English, and the Germans\nare most involved, both as producers and consumers. France gives the\ninitiative (in Descartes), then England assumes the leadership (in Locke),\nwith Leibnitz and Kant the hegemony passes over to Germany. Besides these\npowers, Italy takes an eager part in the production of philosophical\nideas in the period of ferment before Descartes. Each of these nations\ncontributes elements to the total result which it alone is in a position\nto furnish, and each is rewarded by gifts in return which it would be\nincapable of producing out of its own store. This international exchange of\nideas, in which each gives and each receives, and the fact that the chief\nmodern thinkers, especially in the earlier half of the era, prior to Kant,\nare in great part not philosophers by profession but soldiers, statesmen,\nphysicians, as well as natural scientists, historians, and priests, give\nmodern philosophy an unprofessional, worldly appearance, in striking\ncontrast to the clerical character of mediaeval, and the prophetic\ncharacter of ancient thinking.\n\nGermany, England, and France claim the honor of having produced the first\n_modern_ philosopher, presenting Nicolas of Cusa, Bacon of Verulam, and\nRen\u00e9 Descartes as their candidates, while Hobbes, Bruno, and Montaigne have\nreceived only scattered votes. The claim of England is the weakest of all,\nfor, without intending to diminish Bacon's importance, it may be said that\nthe programme which he develops--and in essence his philosophy is nothing\nmore--was, in its leading principles, not first announced by him, and\nnot carried out with sufficient consistency. The dispute between the two\nremaining contestants may be easily and equitably settled by making the\nsimple distinction between forerunner and beginner, between path-breaker\nand founder. The entrance of a new historical era is not accompanied by an\naudible click, like the beginning of a new piece on a music-box, but is\ngradually effected. A considerable period may intervene between the point\nwhen the new movement flashes up, not understood and half unconscious of\nitself, and the time when it appears on the stage in full strength and\nmaturity, recognizing itself as new and so acknowledged by others: the\nperiod of ferment between the Middle Ages and modern times lasted almost\ntwo centuries. It is in the end little more than logomachy to discuss\nwhether this time of anticipation and desire, of endeavor and partial\nsuccess, in which the new struggles with the old without conquering it, and\nthe opposite tendencies in the conflicting views of the world interplay in\na way at once obscure and wayward, is to be classed as the epilogue of the\nold era or the prologue of the new. The simple solution to take it as a\n_transition period_, no longer mediaeval but not yet modern, has met with\nfairly general acceptance. Nicolas of Cusa (1401-64) was the first to\nannounce _fundamental principles_ of modern philosophy--he is the leader in\nthis intermediate preparatory period. Descartes (1596-1650) brought forward\nthe first _system_--he is the father of modern philosophy.\n\nA brief survey of the literature may be added in conclusion:\n\nHeinrich Ritter's _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (vols. ix.-xii. of\nhis _Geschichte der Philosophie_), 1850-53, to Wolff and Rousseau, has\nbeen superseded by more recent works, J.E. Erdmann's able _Versuch einer\nwissenschaftlichen Darstellung der neueren Philosophie_ (6 vols., 1834-53)\ngives in appendices literal excerpts from non-German writers; the same\nauthor's _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ (2 vols., 1869; 3d ed.,\n1878) contains at the end the first exposition of German Philosophy since\nthe Death of Hegel [English translation in 3 vols., edited by W. S. Hough,\n1890.--TR.]. Ueberweg's _Grundriss_ (7th ed. by M. Heinze, 1888) is\nindispensable for reference on account of the completeness of its\nbibliographical notes, which, however, are confusing to the beginner\n[English translation by G.S. Morris, with additions by the translator, Noah\nPorter, and Vincenzo Botta, New York, 1872-74.--TR.]. The most detailed and\nbrilliant exposition has been given by Kuno Fischer (1854 seq.; 3d\ned., 1878 seq.; the same author's _Baco und seine Nachfolger_, 2d ed.,\n1875,--English translation, 1857, by Oxenford,--supplements the first two\nvolumes of the _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_). This work, which is\nimportant also as a literary achievement, is better fitted than any other\nto make the reader at home in the ideal world of the great philosophers,\nwhich it reconstructs from its central point, and to prepare him for the\nstudy (which, of course, even the best exposition cannot replace) of the\nworks of the thinkers themselves. Its excessive simplification of problems\nis not of great moment in the first introduction to a system [English\ntranslation of vol. iii. book 2 (1st ed.), _A Commentary on Kant's Critick\nof the Pure Reason_, by J.P. Mahaffy, London, 1866; vol. i. part 1 and part\n2, book 1, _Descartes and his School_, by J, P. Gordy, New York, 1887;\nof vol. v. chaps, i.-v., _A Critique of Kant_, by W.S. Hough, London,\n1888.--TR.]. Wilhelm Windelband _(Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_,\n2 vols., 1878 and 1880, to Hegel and Herbart inclusive) accentuates the\nconnection of philosophy with general culture and the particular sciences,\nand emphasizes philosophical method. This work is pleasant reading, yet, in\nthe interest of clearness, we could wish that the author had given more\nof positive information concerning the content of the doctrines treated,\ninstead of merely advancing reflections on them. A projected third volume\nis to trace the development of philosophy down to the present time.\nWindelband's compendium, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1890-91, is\ndistinguished from other expositions by the fact that, for the most part,\nit confines itself to a history of _problems_. Baumann's _Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, 1890, aims to give a detailed account of those thinkers only\nwho have advanced views individual either in their content or in their\nproof. Eduard Zeller has given his _Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie\nseit Leibniz_ (1873; 2d ed., 1875) the benefit of the same thorough\nand comprehensive knowledge and mature judgment which have made his\n_Philosophie der Griechen_ a classic. [Bowen's _Modern Philosophy_,\nNew York, 1857 (6th ed., 1891); Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_,\n1892.--TR.]\n\nEugen D\u00fchring's hypercritical _Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie_\n(1869; 3d ed., 1878) can hardly be recommended to students. Lewes (German\ntranslation, 1876) assumes a positivistic standpoint; Thilo (1874), a\nposition exclusively Herbartian; A. Stoeckl (3d ed., 1889) writes from the\nstandpoint of confessional Catholicism; Vincenz Knauer (2d ed., 1882) is\na G\u00fcntherian. With the philosophico-historical work of Chr. W. Sigwart\n(1854), and one of the same date by Oischinger, we are not intimately\nacquainted.\n\nExpositions of philosophy since Kant have been given by the Hegelian, C.L.\nMichelet (a larger one in 2 vols., 1837-38, and a smaller one, 1843); by\nChalybaeus (1837; 5th ed., 1860, formerly very popular and worthy of it,\nEnglish, 1854); by Fr. K. Biedermann (1842-43); by Carl Fortlage (1852,\nKantio-Fichtean standpoint); and by Friedrich Harms (1876). The last of\nthese writers unfortunately did not succeed in giving a sufficiently clear\nand precise, not to say tasteful, form to the valuable ideas and original\nconceptions in which his work is rich. The very popular exposition by an\nanonymous author of Hegelian tendencies, _Deutschlands Denker seit Kant_\n(Dessau, 1851), hardly deserves mention.\n\nFurther, we may mention some of the works which treat the historical\ndevelopment of particular subjects: On the history of the _philosophy of\nreligion_, the first volume of Otto Pfleiderer's _Religionsphilosophie auf\ngeschichtlicher Grundlage_ (2d ed., 1883;--English translation by Alexander\nStewart and Allan Menzies, 1886-88.--TR.), and the very trustworthy\nexposition by Bernhard P\u00fcnjer (2 vols., 1880, 1883; English translation by\nW. Hastie, vol. i., 1887.--TR.). On the history of _practical philosophy_,\nbesides the first volume of I.H. Fichte's _Ethik_ (1850), Franz Vorl\u00e4nder's\n_Geschichte der philosophischen Moral, Rechts- und Staatslehre der\nEngl\u00e4nder und Franzosen_ (1855); Fr. Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik in der\nneueren Philosophie_ (2 vols., 1882, 1889), and Bluntschli, _Geschichte der\nneueren Staatswissenschaft_ (3d ed., 1881); [Sidgwick's _Outlines of\nthe History of Ethics_, 3d ed., 1892, and Martineau's _Types of Ethical\nTheory_, 3d ed., 1891.--TR.]. On the history of the _philosophy of\nhistory_: Rocholl, _Die Philosophie der Geschichte_, 1878; Richard Fester,\n_Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1890 [Flint, _The\nPhilosophy of History in Europe_, vol. i., 1874, complete in 3 vols., 1893\n_seq_.]. On the history of _aesthetics_, R. Zimmermann, 1858; H. Lotze,\n1868; Max Schasler, 1871; Ed. von Hartmann (since Kant), 1886; Heinrich\nvon Stein, _Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik_ (1886); [Bosanquet, _A\nHistory of Aesthetic_, 1892.--TR.]. Further, Fr. Alb. Lange, _Geschichte\ndes Materialismus_, 1866; 4th ed., 1882; [English translation by E.C.\nThomas, 3 vols., 1878-81.--TR.]; Jul. Baumann, _Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit\nund Mathematik in der neueren Philosophie_, 1868-69; Edm. K\u00f6nig, _Die\nEntwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius bis Kant_, 1888, _seit\nKant_, 1890; Kurd Lasswitz, _Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis\nNewton_, 2 vols., 1890; Ed. Grimm, _Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems,\nvon Bacon zu Hume_, 1890. The following works are to be recommended on the\nperiod of transition: Moritz Carri\u00e8re, _Die philosophische Weltanschauung\nder Reformationszeit_, 1847; 2d ed., 1887; and Jacob Burckhardt, _Kultur\nder Renaissance in Italien_, 4th ed., 1886. Reference may also be made to\nA. Trendelenburg, _Historische Beitr\u00e4ge zur Philosophie_, 3 vols., 1846-67;\nRudolph Eucken, _Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_,\n1878; [English translation by M. Stuart Phelps, 1880.--TR.]; the same,\n_Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie_, 1879; the same, _Beitr\u00e4ge\nzur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 1886 (including a valuable\npaper on parties and party names in philosophy); the same, _Die\nLebensanschauungen der grossen Denker_, 1890; Ludwig Noack,\n_Philosophiegeschichtliches Lexicon_, 1879; Ed. Zeller, _Vortr\u00e4ge und\nAbhandlungen_, three series, 1865-84; Chr. von Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_,\n2 vols., 1881; 2d ed., 1889. R. Seydel's _Religion und Philosophie_, 1887,\ncontains papers on Luther, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Weisse, Fechner,\nLotze, Hartmann, Darwinism, etc., which are well worth reading.\n\nAmong the smaller compends Schwegler's (1848; recent editions revised\nand supplemented by R. Koeber) remains still the least bad [English\ntranslations by Seelye and Smith, revised edition with additions, New York,\n1880; and J.H. Stirling, with annotations, 7th ed., 1879.--TR.]. The meager\nsketches by Deter, Koeber, Kirchner, Kuhn, Rabus, Vogel, and others are\nuseful for review at least. Fritz Schultze's _Stammbaum der Philosophie_,\n1890, gives skillfully constructed tabular outlines, but, unfortunately, in\na badly chosen form.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: FROM NICOLAS OF CUSA TO DESCARTES.\n\n\nThe essays at philosophy which made their appearance between the middle of\nthe fifteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth, exhibit mediaeval\nand modern characteristics in such remarkable intermixture that they can\nbe assigned exclusively to neither of these two periods. There are eager\nlongings, lofty demands, magnificent plans, and promising outlooks in\nabundance, but a lack of power to endure, a lack of calmness and maturity;\nwhile the shackles against which the leading minds revolt still bind too\nfirmly both the leaders and those to whom they speak. Only here and there\nare the fetters loosened and thrown off; if the hands are successfully\nfreed, the clanking chains still hamper the feet. It is a time just suited\nfor original thinkers, a remarkable number of whom in fact make their\nappearance, side by side or in close succession. Further, however little\nthese are able to satisfy the demand for permanent results, they ever\narouse our interest anew by the boldness and depth of their brilliant\nideas, which alternate with quaint fancies or are pervaded by them; by the\nyouthful courage with which they attacked great questions; and not least\nby the hard fate which rewarded their efforts with misinterpretation,\npersecution, and death at the stake. We must quickly pass over the broad\nthreshold between modern philosophy and Scholastic philosophy, which is\nbounded by the year 1450, in which Nicolas of Cusa wrote his chief\nwork, the _Idiota_, and 1644, when Descartes began the new era with\nhis _Principia Philosophiae_; and can touch, in passing, only the most\nimportant factors. We shall begin our account of this transition period\nwith Nicolas, and end it with the Englishmen, Bacon, Hobbes, and Lord\nHerbert of Cherbury. Between these we shall arrange the various figures\nof the Philosophical Renaissance (in the broad sense) in six groups:\nthe Restorers of the Ancient Systems and their Opponents; the Italian\nPhilosophers of Nature; the Political and Legal Philosophers; the Skeptics;\nthe Mystics; the Founders of the Exact Investigation of Nature. In Italy\nthe new spiritual birth shows an aesthetic, scientific, and humanistic\ntendency; in Germany it is pre-eminently religious emancipation--in the\nReformation.\n\n\n%1. Nicolas of Cusa.%\n\nNicolas[1] was born in 1401, at Cues (Cusa) on the Moselle near Treves.\nHe early ran away from his stern father, a boatman and vine-dresser named\nChrypps (or Krebs), and was brought up by the Brothers of the Common Life\nat Deventer. In Padua he studied law, mathematics, and philosophy, but the\nloss of his first case at Mayence so disgusted him with his profession that\nhe turned to theology, and became a distinguished preacher. He took part\nin the Council of Basle, was sent by Pope Eugen IV. as an ambassador to\nConstantinople and to the Reichstag at Frankfort; was made Cardinal in\n1448, and Bishop of Brixen in 1450. His feudal lord, the Count of Tyrol,\nArchduke Sigismund, refused him recognition on account of certain quarrels\nin which they had become engaged, and for a time held him prisoner.\nPrevious to this he had undertaken journeys to Germany and the Netherlands\non missionary business. During a second sojourn in Italy death overtook\nhim, in the year 1464, at Todi in Umbria. The first volume of the Paris\nedition of his collected works (1514) contains the most important of his\nphilosophical writings; the second, among others, mathematical essays and\nten books of selections from his sermons; the third, the extended work, _De\nConcordantia Catholica_, which he had completed at Basle. In 1440 (having\nalready written on the Reform of the Calendar) he began his imposing series\nof philosophical writings with the _De Docta Ignorantia_, to which the\n_De Conjecturis_ was added in the following year. These were succeeded by\nsmaller treatises entitled _De Quaerendo Deum, De Dato Patris Luminum, De\nFiliatione Dei, De Genesi_, and a defense of the _De Docta Ignorantia_. His\nmost important work is the third of the four dialogues of the _Idiota_ (\"On\nthe Mind\"), 1450. He clothes in continually changing forms the one supreme\ntruth on which all depends, and which cannot be expressed in intelligible\nlanguage but only comprehended by living intuition. In many different ways\nhe endeavors to lead the reader on to a vision of the inexpressible, or\nto draw him up to it, and to develop fruitfully the principle of the\ncoincidence of opposites, which had dawned upon him on his return journey\nfrom Constantinople (_De Visione Dei, Dialogus de Possest, De Beryllo,\nDe Ludo Globi, De Venatione Sapientiae, De Apice Theoriae, Compendium_).\nSometimes he uses dialectical reasoning; sometimes he soars in mystical\nexaltation; sometimes he writes with a simplicity level to the common mind,\nand in connection with that which lies at hand; sometimes, with the most\ncomprehensive brevity. Besides these his philosophico-religious works\nare of great value, _De Pace Fidei, De Cribratione Alchorani_. Liberal\nCatholics reverence him as one of the deepest thinkers of the Church; but\nthe fame of Giordano Bruno, a more brilliant but much less original figure,\nhas hitherto stood in the way of the general recognition of his great\nimportance for modern philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 1: R. Zimmermann, _Nikolaus Cusanus als Vorl\u00e4ufer Leibnizens_, in\nvol. viii. of the _Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse\nder Akademie der Wissenschaften_, Vienna, 1852, p. 306 seq. R. Falckenberg,\n_Grundz\u00fcge der Philosophie des Nikolaus Cusanus mit besonderer\nBer\u00fccksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen_, Breslau, 1880. R. Eucken,\n_Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, Heidelberg, 1886, p. 6\nseq.; Joh. Uebinger, _Die Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Cusanus_, M\u00fcnster,\n1888. Scharpff, _Des Nikolaus von Cusa wichtigste Schriften in deutscher\nUebersetzung, Freiburg i. Br_., 1862.]\n\nHuman knowledge and the relation of God to the world are the two poles of\nthe Cusan's system. He distinguishes four stages of knowledge. Lowest of\nall stands sense (together with imagination), which yields only confused\nimages; next above, the understanding (_ratio_), whose functions comprise\nanalysis, the positing of time and space, numerical operations, and\ndenomination, and which keeps the opposites distinct under the law of\ncontradiction; third, the speculative reason (_intellectus_), which finds\nthe opposites reconcilable; and highest of all the mystical, supra-rational\nintuition (_visio sine comprehensione, intuitio, unio, filiatio_),\nfor which the opposites coincide in the infinite unity. The intuitive\nculmination of knowledge, in which the soul is united with God,--since\nhere even the antithesis of subject and object disappears,--is but seldom\nattained; and it is difficult to keep out the disturbing symbols and images\nof sense, which mingle themselves in the intuition. But it is just this\ninsight into the incomprehensibility of the infinite which gives us a true\nknowledge of God; this is the meaning of the \"learned ignorance,\" the\n_docta ignorantia_. The distinctions between these several stages of\ncognition are not, however, to be understood in any rigid sense, for\neach higher function comprehends the lower, and is active therein. The\nunderstanding can discriminate only when it is furnished by sensation with\nimages of that which is to be discriminated, the reason can combine only\nwhen the understanding has supplied the results of analysis as material for\ncombination; while, on the other hand, it is the understanding which is\npresent in sense as consciousness, and the reason whose unity guides\nthe understanding in its work of separation. Thus the several modes of\ncognition do not stand for independent fundamental faculties, but for\nconnected modifications of one fundamental power which work together and\nmutually imply one another. The position that an intellectual function of\nattention and discrimination is active in sensuous perception, is a view\nentirely foreign to mediaeval modes of thought; for the Scholastics were\naccustomed to make sharp divisions between the cognitive faculties, on the\nprinciple that particulars are felt through sense and universals thought\nthrough the understanding. The idea on which Nicolas bases his argument for\nimmortality has also an entirely modern sound: viz., that space and time\nare products of the understanding, and, therefore, can have no power over\nthe spirit which produces them; for the author is higher and mightier than\nthe product.\n\nThe confession that all our knowledge is conjecture does not simply mean\nthat absolute and exact truth remains concealed from us; but is intended at\nthe same time to encourage us to draw as near as possible to the eternal\nverity by ever truer conjectures. There are degrees of truth, and our\nsurmises are neither absolutely true nor entirely false. Conjecture becomes\nerror only when, forgetting the inadequacy of human knowledge, we rest\ncontent with it as a final solution; the Socratic maxim, \"I know that I\nam ignorant,\" should not lead to despairing resignation but to courageous\nfurther inquiry. The duty of speculation is to penetrate deeper and deeper\ninto the secrets of the divine, even though the ultimate revelation will\nnot be given us until the hereafter. The fittest instrument of speculation\nis furnished by mathematics, in its conception of the infinite and the\nwonders of numerical relations: as on the infinite sphere center and\ncircumference coincide, so God's essence is exalted above all opposites;\nand as the other numbers are unfolded from the unit, so the finite proceeds\nby explication from the infinite. A controlling significance in the serial\nconstruction of the world is ascribed to the ten, as the sum of the first\nfour numbers--as reason, understanding, imagination, and sensibility are\nrelated in human cognition, so God, spirit, soul, and body, or infinity,\nthought, life, and being are related in the objective sphere; so, further,\nthe absolute necessity of God, the concrete necessity of the universe,\nthe actuality of individuals, and the possibility of matter. Beside the\nquaternary the tern also exercises its power--the world divides into the\nstages of eternity, imperishability, and the temporal world of sense,\nor truth, probability, and confusion. The divine trinity is reflected\neverywhere: in the world as creator, created, and love; in the mind as\ncreative force, concept, and will. The triunity of God is very variously\nexplained--as the subject, object, and act of cognition; as creative\nspirit, wisdom, and goodness; as being, power, and deed; and, preferably,\nas unity, equality, and the combination of the two.\n\nGod is related to the world as unity, identity, _complicatio_, to\notherness, diversity, _explicatio_, as necessity to contingency, as\ncompleted actuality to mere possibility; yet, in such a way that the\notherness participates in the unity, and receives its reality from this,\nand the unity does not have the otherness confronting it, outside it. God\nis triune only as the Creator of the world, and in relation to it; in\nhimself he is absolute unity and infinity, to which nothing disparate\nstands opposed, which is just as much all things as not all things, and\nwhich, as the Areopagite had taught of old, is better comprehended by\nnegations than by affirmations. To deny that he is light, truth, spirit,\nis more true than to affirm it, for he is infinitely greater than anything\nwhich can be expressed in words; he is the Unutterable, the Unknowable,\nthe supremely one and the supremely absolute. In the world, each thing has\nthings greater and smaller by its side, but God is the absolutely greatest\nand smallest; in accordance with the principle of the _coincidentia\noppositorum_, the absolute _maximum_ and the absolute _minimum_ coincide.\nThat which in the world exists as concretely determinate and particular,\nis in God in a simple and universal way; and that which here is present\nas incompleted striving, and as possibility realizing itself by gradual\ndevelopment, is in God completed activity. He is the realization of all\npossibility, the Can-be or Can-is (_possest_); and since this absolute\nactuality is the presupposition and cause of all finite ability and action,\nit may be unconditionally designated ability (_posse ipsum_), in antithesis\nto all determinate manifestations of force; namely, to all ability to be,\nlive, feel, think, and will.\n\nHowever much these definitions, conceived in harmony with the dualistic\nview of Christianity, accentuate the antithesis between God and the world,\nthis is elsewhere much softened, nay directly denied, in favor of a\npantheistic view which points forward to the modern period. Side by side\nwith the assertion that there is no proportion whatever between the\ninfinite and the finite, the following na\u00efvely presents itself, in open\ncontradiction to the former: God excels the reason just as much as\nthe latter is superior to the understanding, and the understanding to\nsensibility, or he is related to thought as thought to life, and life to\nbeing. Nay, Nicolas makes even bolder statements than these, when he calls\nthe universe a sensuous and mutable God, man a human God or a humanly\ncontracted infinity, the creation a created God or a limited infinity; thus\nhinting that God and the world are at bottom essentially alike, differing\nonly in the form of their existence, that it is one and the same being\nand action which manifests itself absolutely in God, relatively and in a\nlimited way in the system of creation. It was chiefly three modern ideas\nwhich led the Cusan on from dualism to pantheism--the boundlessness of the\nuniverse, the connection of all being, and the all-comprehensive richness\nof individuality. Endlessness belongs to the universe as well as to God,\nonly its endlessness is not an absolute one, beyond space and time, but\nweakened and concrete, namely unlimited extension in space and unending\nduration in time. Similarly, the universe is unity, yet not a unity\nabsolutely above multiplicity and diversity, but one which is divided into\nmany members and obscured thereby. Even the individual is infinite in a\ncertain sense; for, in its own way, it bears in itself all that is, it\nmirrors the whole world from its limited point of view, is an abridged,\ncompressed representation of the universe. As the members of the body, the\neye, the arm, the foot, interact in the closest possible way, and no one\nof them can dispense with the rest, so each thing is connected with each,\ndifferent from it and yet in harmony with it, so each contains all the\nothers and is contained by them. All is in all, for all is in the universe\nand in God, as the universe and God in all. In a still higher degree man is\na microcosm (_parvus mundus_), a mirror of the All, since he not merely,\nlike other beings, actually has in himself all that exists, but also has\na knowledge of this richness, is capable of developing it into conscious\nimages of things. And it is just this which constitutes the perfection of\nthe whole and of the parts, that the higher is in the lower, the cause in\nthe effect, the genus in the individual, the soul in the body, reason\nin the senses, and conversely. To perfect, is simply to make active a\npotential possession, to unfold capacities and to elevate the unconscious\ninto consciousness. Here we have the germ of the philosophy of Bruno and of\nLeibnitz.\n\nAs we have noticed a struggle between two opposite tendencies, one\ndualistic and Christian, one pantheistic and modern, in the theology of\nNicolas, so at many other points a conflict between the mediaeval and the\nmodern view of the world, of which our philosopher is himself unconscious,\nbecomes evident to the student. It is impossible to follow out the details\nof this interesting opposition, so we shall only attempt to distinguish in\na rough way the beginnings of the new from the remnants of the old. Modern\nis his interest in the ancient philosophers, of whom Pythagoras, Plato, and\nthe Neoplatonists especially attract him; modern, again, his interest in\nnatural science[1] (he teaches not only the boundlessness of the world, but\nalso the motion of the earth); his high estimation of mathematics, although\nhe often utilizes this merely in a fanciful symbolism of numbers; his\noptimism (the world an image of the divine, everything perfect of its kind,\nthe bad simply a halt on the way to the good); his intellectualism (knowing\nthe primal function and chief mission of the spirit; faith an undeveloped\nknowledge; volition and emotion, as is self-evident, incidental results of\nthought; knowledge a leading back of the creature to God as its source,\nhence the counterpart of creation); modern, finally, the form and\napplication given to the Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of individuality, and\nthe idealistic view which resolves the objects of thought into products\nthereof.[2] This last position, indeed, is limited by the lingering\ninfluence of nominalism, which holds the concepts of the mind to be merely\nabstract copies, and not archetypes of things. Moreover, _explicatio,\nevolutio_, unfolding, as yet does not always have the meaning of\ndevelopment to-day, of progressive advance. It denotes, quite neutrally,\nthe production of a multiplicity from a unity, in which the former has lain\nconfined, no matter whether this multiplicity and its procession signify\nenhancement or attenuation. For the most part, in fact, involution,\n_complicatio_ (which, moreover, always means merely a primal, germinal\ncondition, never, as in Leibnitz, the return thereto) represents the more\nperfect condition. The chief examples of the relation of involution and\nevolution are the principles in which science is involved and out of which\nit is unfolded; the unit, which is related to numbers in a similar way;\nthe spirit and the cognitive operations; God and his creatures. However\nobscure and unskillful this application of the idea of development may\nappear, yet it is indisputable that a discovery of great promise has been\nmade, accompanied by a joyful consciousness of its fruitfulness. Of the\nnumberless features which point backward to the Middle Ages, only one need\nbe mentioned, the large space taken up by speculations concerning the\nGod-man (the whole third book of the _De Docta Ignorantia_), and by those\nconcerning the angels. Yet even here a change is noticeable, for the\nearthly and the divine are brought into most intimate relation, while in\nThomas Aquinas, for instance, they form two entirely separate worlds. In\nshort, the new view of the world appears in Nicolas still bound on every\nhand by mediaeval conceptions. A century and a half passed before the\nfetters, grown rusty in the meanwhile, broke under the bolder touch of\nGiordano Bruno.\n\n[Footnote 1: The attention of our philosopher was called to the natural\nsciences, and thus also to geography, which at this time was springing into\nnew life, by his friend Paul Toscanelli, the Florentine. Nicolas was the\nfirst to have the map of Germany engraved (cf. S. Ruge in _Globus_, vol.\nlx., No. I, 1891), which, however, was not completed until long after his\ndeath, and issued in 1491.]\n\n[Footnote 2: On the modern elements in his theory of the state and of\nright, cf. Gierke, _Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. \u00a7 II,\n1881.]\n\n\n%2. The Revival of Ancient Philosophy and the Opposition to it%.\n\nItaly is the home of the Renaissance and the birthplace of important\nnew ideas which give the intellectual life of the sixteenth century its\ncharacter of brave endeavor after high and distant ends. The enthusiasm\nfor ancient literature already aroused by the native poets, Dante (1300),\nPetrarch (1341), and Boccaccio (1350), was nourished by the influx of Greek\nscholars, part of whom came in pursuance of an invitation to the Council of\nFerrara and Florence (1438) called in behalf of the union of the Churches\n(among these were Pletho and his pupil Bessarion; Nicolas Cusanus was one\nof the legates invited), while part were fugitives from Constantinople\nafter its capture by the Turks in 1453. The Platonic Academy, whose\nmost celebrated member, Marsilius Ficinus, translated Plato and the\nNeoplatonists into Latin, was founded in 1440 on the suggestion of Georgius\nGemistus Pletho[1] under the patronage of Cosimo dei Medici. The writings\nof Pletho (\"On the Distinction between Plato and Aristotle\"), of Bessarion\n(_Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis_, 1469, in answer to the _Comparatio\nAristotelis et Platonis_, 1464, an attack by the Aristotelian, George of\nTrebizond, on Pletho's work), and of Ficinus (_Theologia Platonica_, 1482),\nshow that the Platonism which they favored was colored by religious,\nmystical, and Neoplatonic elements. If for Bessarion and Ficinus, just as\nfor the Eclectics of the later Academy, there was scarcely any essential\ndistinction between the teachings of Plato, of Aristotle, and of\nChristianity; this confusion of heterogeneous elements was soon carried\nmuch farther, when the two Picos (John Pico of Mirandola, died 1494, and\nhis nephew Francis, died 1533) and Johann Reuchlin (_De Verbo Mirifico_,\n1494; _De Arte Cabbalistica_, 1517), who had been influenced by the former,\nintroduced the secret doctrines of the Jewish Cabala into the Platonic\nphilosophy, and Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim of Cologne (_De Occulta\nPhilosophia_, 1510; cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 1 seq.)\nmade the mixture still worse by the addition of the magic art. The impulse\nof the modern spirit to subdue nature is here already apparent, only that\nit shows inexperience in the selection of its instruments; before long,\nhowever, nature will willingly unveil to observation and calm reflection\nthe secrets which she does not yield to the compulsion of magic.\n\n[Footnote 1: Pletho died at an advanced age in 1450. His chief work, the\n[Greek: Nomoi], was given to the flames by his Aristotelian opponent,\nGeorgius Scholarius, surnamed Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople.\nPortions of it only, which had previously become known, have been\npreserved. On Pletho's life and teachings, cf. Fritz Schultze, _G.G.\nPlethon_, Jena, 1874.]\n\nA similar romantic figure was Phillipus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast\nParacelsus[1] von Hohenheim (1493-1541), a traveled Swiss, who endeavored\nto reform medicine from the standpoint of chemistry. Philosophy for\nParacelsus is knowledge of nature, in which observation and thought\nmust co-operate; speculation apart from experience and worship of the\npaper-wisdom of the ancients lead to no result. The world is a living\nwhole, which, like man, the microcosm, in whom the whole content of\nthe macrocosm is concentrated as in an extract, runs its life course.\nOriginally all things were promiscuously intermingled in a unity, the\nGod-created _prima materia_, as though inclosed in a germ, whence the\nmanifold, with its various forms and colors, proceeded by separation.\nThe development then proceeds in such a way that in each genus that is\nperfected which is posited therein, and does not cease until, at the last\nday, all that is possible in nature and history shall have fulfilled\nitself. But the one indwelling life of nature lives in all the manifold\nforms; the same laws rule in the human body as in the universe; that which\nworks secretly in the former lies open to the view in the latter, and the\nworld gives the clew to the knowledge of man. Natural becoming is brought\nabout by the chemical separation and coming together of substances; the\nultimate constituents revealed by analysis are the three fundamental\nsubstances or primitive essences, quicksilver, sulphur, and salt, by which,\nhowever, something more principiant is understood than the empirical\nsubstances bearing these names: _mercurius_ means that which makes bodies\nliquid, _sulfur_, that which makes them combustible, _sal_, that which\nmakes them fixed and rigid. From these are compounded the four elements,\neach of which is ruled by elemental spirits--earth by gnomes or pygmies,\nwater by undines or nymphs, air by sylphs, fire by salamanders (cf. with\nthis, and with Paracelsus's theory of the world as a whole, Faust's two\nmonologues in Goethe's drama); which are to be understood as forces\nor sublimated substances, not as personal, demoniacal beings. To each\nindividual being there is ascribed a vital principle, the _Archeus_, an\nindividualization of the general force of nature, _Vulcanus_; so also to\nmen. Disease is a checking of this vital principle by contrary powers,\nwhich are partly of a terrestrial and partly of a sidereal nature; and the\nchoice of medicines is to be determined by their ability to support the\nArcheus against its enemies. Man is, however, superior to nature--he is not\nmerely the universal animal, inasmuch as he is completely that which other\nbeings are only in a fragmentary way; but, as the image of God, he has also\nan eternal element in him, and is capable of attaining perfection through\nthe exercise of his rational judgment. Paracelsus distinguishes three\nworlds: the elemental or terrestrial, the astral or celestial, and the\nspiritual or divine. To the three worlds, which stand in relations of\nsympathetic interaction, there correspond in man the body, which nourishes\nitself on the elements, the spirit, whose imagination receives its food,\nsense and thoughts, from the spirits of the stars, and, finally, the\nimmortal soul, which finds its nourishment in faith in Christ. Hence\nnatural philosophy, astronomy, and theology are the pillars of\nanthropology, and ultimately of medicine. This fantastic physic of\nParacelsus found many adherents both in theory and in practice.[2] Among\nthose who accepted and developed it may be named R. Fludd (died 1637), and\nthe two Van Helmonts, father and son (died 1644 and 1699).\n\n[Footnote 1: On Paracelsus cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 25\nseq.; Eucken, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichteder neueren Philosophie_, p. 32 seq.;\nLasswitz, _Geschichte der Atomistik_, vol. i. p. 294 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The influence of Paracelsus, as of Vives and Campanella, is\nevident in the great educator, Amos Comenius (Komensky, 1592-1670), whose\npansophical treatises appeared in 1637-68. On Comenius cf. Pappenheim,\nBerlin, 1871; Kvacsala, Doctor's Dissertation, Leipsic, 1886; Walter\nMueller, Dresden, 1887.]\n\nBeside the Platonic philosophy, others of the ancient systems were also\nrevived. Stoicism was commended by Justus Lipsius (died 1606) and Caspar\nSchoppe (Scioppius, born 1562); Epicureanism was revived by Gassendi\n(1647), and rhetorizing logicians went back to Cicero and Quintilian. Among\nthe latter were Laurentius Valla (died 1457); R. Agricola (died 1485); the\nSpaniard, Ludovicus Vives (1531), who referred inquiry from the authority\nof Aristotle to the methodical utilization of experience; and Marius\nNizolius (1553), whose _Antibarbarus_ was reissued by Leibnitz in 1670.\n\nThe adherents of Aristotle were divided into two parties, one of which\nrelied on the naturalistic interpretation of the Greek exegete,\nAlexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 A.D.), the other on the pantheistic\ninterpretation of the Arabian commentator, Averro\u00ebs (died 1198). The\nconflict over the question of immortality, carried on especially in Padua,\nwas the culmination of the battle. The Alexandrist asserted that, according\nto Aristotle, the soul was mortal, the Averroists, that the rational part\nwhich is common to all men was immortal; while to this were added the\nfurther questions, if and how the Aristotelian view could be reconciled\nwith the Church doctrine, which demanded a continued personal existence.\nThe most eminent Aristotelian of the Renaissance, Petrus Pomponatius (_De\nImmortalite Animae_, 1516; _De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Providentia et\nPraedestinatione_), was on the side of the Alexandrists. Achillini and\nNiphus fought on the other side. Caesalpin (died 1603), Zabarella, and\nCremonini assumed an intermediate, or, at least, a less decided position.\nStill others, as Faber Stapulensis in Paris (1500), and Desiderius Erasmus\n(1520), were more interested in securing a correct text of Aristotle's\nworks than in his philosophical principles.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong the Anti-Aristotelians only two famous names need be mentioned, that\nof the influential Frenchman, Petrus Ramus, and the German, Taurellus.\nPierre de la Ram\u00e9e (assassinated in the massacre of St. Bartholomew,\n1572), attacked the (unnatural and useless) Aristotelian logic in his\n_Aristotelicae Animadversiones_, 1543, objecting, with the Ciceronians\nmentioned above, to the separation of logic and rhetoric; and attempted a\nnew logic of his own, in his _Institutiones Dialecticae_, which, in spite\nof its formalism, gained acceptance, especially in Germany.[1] Nicolaus\nOechslein, Latinized Taurellus (born in 1547 at M\u00f6mpelgard; at his death,\nin 1606, professor of medicine in the University of Altdorf), stood quite\nalone because of his independent position in reference to all philosophical\nand religious parties. His most important works were his _Philosophiae\nTriumphus_, 1573; _Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysicae_, 1596; _Alpes Caesae_\n(against Caesalpin, and the title punning on his name), 1597; and _De Rerum\nAeternitate_, 1604.[2] The thought of Taurellus inclines toward the ideal of\na Christian philosophy; which, however, Scholasticism, in his view, did\nnot attain, inasmuch as its thought was heathen in its blind reverence\nfor Aristotle, even though its faith was Christian. In order to heal this\nbreach between the head and the heart, it is necessary in religion to\nreturn from confessional distinctions to Christianity itself, and in\nphilosophy, to abandon authority for the reason. We should not seek to be\nLutherans or Calvinists, but simply Christians, and we should judge on\nrational grounds, instead of following Aristotle, Averro\u00ebs, or Thomas\nAquinas. Anyone who does not aim at the harmony of theology and philosophy,\nis neither a Christian nor a philosopher. One and the same God is the\nprimal source of both rational and revealed truth. Philosophy is the basis\nof theology, theology the criterion and complement of philosophy. The one\nstarts with effects evident to the senses and leads to the suprasensible,\nto the First Cause; the other follows the reverse course. To philosophy\nbelongs all that Adam knew or could know before the fall; had there been no\nsin, there would have been no other than philosophical knowledge. But after\nthe fall, the reason, which informs us, it is true, of the moral law, but\nnot of the divine purpose of salvation, would have led us to despair, since\nneither punishment nor virtue could justify us, if revelation did not teach\nus the wonders of grace and redemption. Although Taurellus thus softens the\nopposition between theology and philosophy, which had been most sharply\nexpressed in the doctrine of \"twofold truth\" (that which is true in\nphilosophy may be false in theology, and conversely), and endeavors to\nbring the two into harmony, the antithesis between God and the world still\nremains for him immovably fixed. God is not things, though he is all. He\nis pure affirmation; all without him is composed, as it were, of being and\nnothing, and can neither be nor be known independently: _negatio non nihil\nest, alias nec esset nec intelligeretur, sed limitatio est affirmationis_.\nSimple being or simple affirmation is equivalent to infinity, eternity,\nunity, uniqueness,--properties which do not belong to the world. He who\nposits things as eternal, sublates God. God and the world are opposed to\neach other as infinite cause and finite effect. Moreover, as it is our\nspirit which philosophizes and not God's spirit in us, so the faith through\nwhich man appropriates Christ's merit is a free action of the human spirit,\nthe capacity for which is inborn, not infused from above; in it, God acts\nmerely as an auxiliary or remote cause, by removing the obstacles which\nhinder the operation of the power of faith. With this anti-pantheistic\ntendency he combines an anti-intellectualistic one--being and production\nprecedes and stands higher than contemplation; God's activity does not\nconsist in thought but in production, and human blessedness, not in the\nknowledge but the love of God, even though the latter presupposes the\nformer. While man, as an end in himself, is immortal--and the whole man,\nnot his soul merely--the world of sense, which has been created only for\nthe conservation of man (his procreation and probation), must disappear;\nabove this world, however, a higher rears its walls to subserve man's\neternal happiness.\n\n[Footnote 1: On Ramus cf. Waddington's treatises, one in Latin, Paris,\n1849, the other in French, Paris, 1855.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Schmid Schwarzenburg has written on Taurellus, 1860, 2d ed.,\n1864.]\n\nThe high regard which Leibnitz expressed for Taurellus may be in part\nexplained by the many anticipations of his own thoughts to be found in\nthe earlier writer. The intimate relation into which sensibility and\nunderstanding are brought is an instance of this from the theory of\nknowledge. Receptivity is not passivity, but activity arrested (through the\nbody). All knowledge is inborn; all men are potential philosophers (and, so\nfar as they are loyal to conscience, Christians); the spirit is a thinking\nand a thinkable universe. Taurellus's philosophy of nature, recognizing\nthe relative truth of atomism, makes the world consist of manifold simple\nsubstances combined into formal unity: he calls it a well constructed\nsystem of wholes. A discussion of the origin of evil is also given, with a\nsolution based on the existence and misuse of freedom. Finally, it is to\nbe mentioned to the great credit of Taurellus, that, like his younger\ncontemporaries, Galileo and Kepler, he vigorously opposed the Aristotelian\nand Scholastic animation of the material world and the anthropomorphic\nconception of its forces, thus preparing the way for the modern view of\nnature to be perfected by Newton.\n\n\n%3. The Italian Philosophy of Nature%.\n\nWe turn now from the restorers of ancient doctrines and their opponents to\nthe men who, continuing the opposition to the authority of Aristotle, point\nout new paths for the study of nature. The physician, Hieronymus Cardanus\nof Milan (1501-76), whose inclinations toward the fanciful were restrained,\nthough not suppressed, by his mathematical training, may be considered the\nforerunner of the school. While the people should accept the dogmas of the\nChurch with submissive faith, the thinker may and should subordinate all\nthings to the truth. The wise man belongs to that rare class who neither\ndeceive nor are deceived; others are either deceivers or deceived, or both.\nIn his theory of nature, Cardanus advances two principles: one passive,\nmatter (the three cold and moist elements), and an active, formative one,\nthe world-soul, which, pervading the All and bringing it into unity,\nappears as warmth and light. The causes of motion are attraction and\nrepulsion, which in higher beings become love and hate. Even superhuman\nspirits, the demons, are subject to the mechanical laws of nature.\n\nThe standard bearer of the Italian philosophy of nature was Bernardinus\nTelesius[1] of Cosenza (1508-88; _De Rerum Natura juxta Propria Principia_,\n1565, enlarged 1586), the founder of a scientific society in Naples called\nthe Telesian, or after the name of his birthplace, the Cosentian Academy.\nTelesius maintained that the Aristotelian doctrine must be replaced by an\nunprejudiced empiricism; that nature must be explained from itself, and by\nas few principles as possible. Beside inert matter, this requires only two\nactive forces, on whose interaction all becoming and all life depend. These\nare warmth, which expands, and cold, which contracts; the former resides in\nthe sun and thence proceeds, the latter is situated in the earth. Although\nTelesius acknowledges an immaterial, immortal soul, he puts the emphasis\non sensuous experience, without which the understanding is incapable of\nattaining certain knowledge. He is a sensationalist both in the theory of\nknowledge and in ethics, holding the functions of judgment and thought\ndeducible from the fundamental power of perception, and considering the\nvirtues different manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation\n(which he ascribes to matter as well).\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. on Telesius, Florentine, 2 vols., Naples, 1872-74; K.\nHeiland, _Erkenntnisslehre und Ethik des Telesius_, Doctor's Dissertation\nat Leipsic, 1891. Further, Rixner and Siber, _Leben und Lehrmeinungen\nber\u00fchmter Physiker am Ende des XVI. und am Anfang des XVII. Jahrhunderts_,\nSulzbach (1819-26), 7 Hefte, 2d ed., 1829. Hefte 2-6 discuss Cardanus,\nTelesius, Patritius, Bruno, and Campanella; the first is devoted to\nParacelsus, and the seventh to the older Van Helmont (Joh. Bapt.).]\n\nWith the name of Telesius we usually associate that of Franciscus Patritius\n(1529-97), professor of the Platonic philosophy in Ferrara and Rome\n_(Discussiones Peripateticae,_ 1581; _Nova de Universis Philosophia_,\n1591), who, combining Neoplatonic and Telesian principles, holds that the\nincorporeal or spiritual light emanates from the divine original light, in\nwhich all reality is seminally contained; the heavenly or ethereal\nlight from the incorporeal; and the earthly or corporeal, from the\nheavenly--while the original light divides into three persons, the One and\nAll _(Unomnia)_, unity or life, and spirit.\n\nThe Italian philosophy of nature culminates in Bruno and Campanella, of\nwhom the former, although he is the earlier, appears the more advanced\nbecause of his freer attitude toward the Church. Giordano Bruno was born\nin 1548 at Nola, and educated at Naples; abandoning his membership in the\nDominican Order, he lived, with various changes of residence, in France,\nEngland, and Germany. Returning to his native land, he was arrested in\nVenice and imprisoned for seven years at Rome, where, on February 17, 1600,\nhe suffered death at the stake, refusing to recant. (The same fate overtook\nhis fellow-countryman, Vanini, in 1619, at Toulouse.) Besides three\ndidactic poems in Latin (Frankfort, 1591), the Italian dialogues, _Della\nCausa, Principio ed Uno_, Venice, 1584 (German translation by Lasson,\n1872), are of chief importance. The Italian treatises have been edited by\nWagner, Leipsic, 1829, and by De Lagarde, 2 vols., G\u00f6ttingen, 1888; the\nLatin appeared at Naples, in 3 vols., 1880, 1886, and 1891. Of a passionate\nand imaginative nature, Bruno was not an essentially creative thinker, but\nborrowed the ideas which he proclaimed with burning enthusiasm and lofty\neloquence, and through which he has exercised great influence on later\nphilosophy, from Telesius and Nicolas, complaining the while that the\npriestly garb of the latter sometimes hindered the free movement of his\nthought. Beside these thinkers he has a high regard for Pythagoras, Plato,\nLucretius, Raymundus Lullus, and Copernicus (died 1543).[1] He forms the\ntransition link between Nicolas of Cusa and Leibnitz, as also the link\nbetween Cardanus and Spinoza. To Spinoza Bruno offered the naturalistic\nconception of God (God is the \"first cause\" immanent in the universe, to\nwhich self-manifestation or self-revelation is essential; He is _natura\nnaturans_, the numberless worlds are _natura naturata_); Leibnitz he\nanticipated by his doctrine of the \"monads,\" the individual, imperishable\nelements of the existent, in which matter and form, incorrectly divorced by\nAristotle as though two antithetical principles, constitute one unity.\nThe characteristic traits of the philosophy of Bruno are the lack of\ndifferentiation between pantheistic and individualistic elements, the\nmediaeval animation and endlessness of the world, and, finally, the\nreligious relation to the universe or the extravagant deification of nature\n(nature and the world are entirely synonymous, the All, the world-soul,\nand God nearly so, while even matter is called a divine being).[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Nicolaus Copernicus (Koppernik; 1473-1543) was born at Thorn;\nstudied astronomy, law, and medicine at Cracow, Bologna, and Padua; and\ndied a Canon of Frauenberg. His treatise, _De Revolutionibus Orbium\nCaelestium_, which was dedicated to Pope Paul III., appeared at Nuremberg\nin 1543, with a preface added to it by the preacher, Andreas Osiander,\nwhich calls the heliocentric system merely an hypothesis advanced as a\nbasis for astronomical calculations. Copernicus reached his theory rather\nby speculation than by observation; its first suggestion came from the\nPythagorean doctrine of the motion of the earth. On Copernicus cf. Leop.\nProwe, vol. i. _Copernicus Leben_, vol. ii. (_Urkunden_), Berlin, 1883-84;\nand K. Lohmeyer in Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, vol. lvii., 1887.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. on Bruno, H. Brunnhofer (somewhat too enthusiastic),\nLeipsic, 1882; also Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 49 _seq_.]\n\nBruno completes the Copernican picture of the world by doing away with the\nmotionless circle of fixed stars with which Copernicus, and even Kepler,\nhad thought our solar system surrounded, and by opening up the view into\nthe immeasurability of the world. With this the Aristotelian antithesis of\nthe terrestrial and the celestial is destroyed. The infinite space (filled\nwith the aether) is traversed by numberless bodies, no one of which\nconstitutes the center of the world. The fixed stars are suns, and, like\nour own, surrounded by planets. The stars are formed of the same materials\nas the earth, and are moved by their own souls or forms, each a living\nbeing, each also the residence of infinitely numerous living beings of\nvarious degrees of perfection, in whose ranks man by no means takes the\nfirst place. All organisms are composed of minute elements, called _minima_\nor monads; each monad is a mirror of the All; each at once corporeal and\nsoul-like, matter and form, each eternal; their combinations alone being\nin constant change. The universe is boundless in time, as in space;\ndevelopment never ceases, for the fullness of forms which slumber in the\nwomb of matter is inexhaustible. The Absolute is the primal unity, exalted\nabove all antitheses, from which all created being is unfolded and in which\nit remains included. All is one, all is out of God and in God. In\nthe living unity of the universe, also, the two sides, the spiritual\n(world-soul), and the corporeal (universal matter), are distinguishable,\nbut not separate. The world-reason pervades in its omnipresence the\ngreatest and the smallest, but in varying degrees. It weaves all into\none great system, so that if we consider the whole, the conflicts and\ncontradictions which rule in particulars disappear, resolved into the\nmost perfect harmony. Whoever thus regards the world, becomes filled with\nreverence for the Infinite and bends his will to the divine law--from true\nscience proceed true religion and true morality, those of the spiritual\nhero, of the heroic sage.\n\nThomas Campanella[1] (1568-1639) was no less dependent on Nicolas and\nTelesius than Bruno. A Calabrian by birth like Telesius, whose writings\nfilled him with aversion to Aristotle, a Dominican like Bruno, he was\ndeprived of his freedom on an unfounded suspicion of conspiracy against the\nSpanish rule, spent twenty-seven years in prison, and died in Paris after a\nshort period of quiet. Renewing an old idea, Campanella directed attention\nfrom the written volume of Scripture to the living book of nature as being\nalso a divine revelation. Theology rests on faith (in theology, Campanella,\nin accordance with the traditions of his order, follows Thomas Aquinas);\nphilosophy is based on perception, which in its instrumental part comprises\nmathematics and logic, and in its real part, the doctrine of nature and of\nmorals, while metaphysics treats of the highest presuppositions and the\nultimate grounds,--the \"pro-principles,\" Campanella starts, as Augustine\nbefore him and Descartes in later times, from the indisputable certitude of\nthe spirit's own existence, from which he rises to the certitude of God's\nexistence. On this first certain truth of my own existence there follow\nthree others: my nature consists in the three functions of power,\nknowledge, and volition; I am finite and limited, might, wisdom, and\nlove are in man constantly intermingled with their opposites, weakness,\nfoolishness, and hate; my power, knowledge, and volition do not extend\nbeyond the present. The being of God follows from the idea of God in us,\nwhich can have been derived from no other than an infinite source. It would\nbe impossible for so small a part of the universe as man to produce from\nhimself the idea of a being incomparably greater than the whole universe.\nI attain a knowledge of God's nature from my own by thinking away from\nthe latter, in which, as in everything finite, being and non-being are\nintermingled, every limitation and negation, by raising to infinity\nmy positive fundamental powers, _posse, cognoscere_, and _velle_, or\n_potentia, sapientia_, and _amor_, and by transferring them to him, who is\npure affirmation, _ens_ entirely without _non-ens_. Thus I reach as the\nthree pro-principles or primalities of the existent or the Godhead,\nomnipotence, omniscience, and infinite love. But the infrahuman world may\nalso be judged after the analogy of our fundamental faculties. The\nuniverse and all its parts possess souls; there is naught without\nsensation; consciousness, it is true, is lacking in the lower creatures,\nbut they do not lack life, feeling, and desire, for it is impossible\nfor the animate to come from the inanimate. Everything loves and hates,\ndesires and avoids. Plants are motionless animals, and their roots,\nmouths. Corporeal motion springs from an obscure, unconscious impulse of\nself-preservation; the heavenly bodies circle about the sun as the center\nof sympathy; space itself seeks a content _(horror vacui_).\n\n[Footnote 1: Campanella's works have been edited by Al. d'Ancona, Turin,\n1854, Cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 125 _seq_.]\n\nThe more imperfect a thing is, the more weakened is the divine being in it\nby non-being and contingency. The entrance of the naught into the divine\nreality takes place by degrees. First God projects from himself the ideal\nor archetypal world (_mundus archetypus_), _i.e._, the totality of the\npossible. From this ideal world proceeds the metaphysical world of eternal\nintelligences _(mundus mentalis)_, including the angels, the world-soul,\nand human spirits. The third product is the mathematical world of space\n_(mundus sempiternus_), the object of geometry; the fourth, the temporal\nor corporeal world; the fifth, and last, the empirical world _(mundus\nsitualis_), in which everything appears at a definite point in space and\ntime. All things not only love themselves and seek the conservation of\ntheir own being, but strive back toward the original source of their being,\nto God; _i.e._, they possess religion. In man, natural and animal religion\nare completed by rational religion, the limitations of which render a\nrevelation necessary. A religion can be considered divine only when it is\nadapted to all, when it gains acceptance through miracles and virtue, and\nwhen it contradicts neither natural ethics nor the reason. Religion is\nunion with God through knowledge, purity of will, and love. It is inborn,\na law of nature, not, as Machiavelli teaches, a political invention.\n\nCampanella desired to see the unity in the divine government of the world\nembodied in a pyramid of states with the papacy at the apex: above the\nindividual states was to come the province, then the kingdom, the empire,\nthe (Spanish) world-monarchy, and, finally, the universal dominion of the\nPope. The Church should be superior to the State, the vicegerent of God to\ntemporal rulers and to councils.\n\n\n%4. Philosophy of the State and of Law%.\n\nThe originality of the modern doctrines of natural law was formerly\noverestimated, as it was not known to how considerable an extent the way\nhad been prepared for them by the mediaeval philosophy of the state and of\nlaw. It is evident from the equally rich and careful investigations of Otto\nGierke[1] that in the political and legal theories of a Bodin, a Grotius,\na Hobbes, a Rousseau, we have systematic developments of principles long\nextant, rather than new principles produced with entire spontaneity. Their\nmerit consists in the principiant expression and accentuation and the\nsystematic development of ideas which the Middle Ages had produced, and\nwhich in part belong to the common stock of Scholastic science, in part\nconstitute the weapons of attack for bold innovators. Marsilius of Padua\n(_Defensor Pacis_, 1325), Occam (died 1347), Gerson (about 1400), and the\nCusan[2] _(Concordantia Catholica_, 1433) especially, are now seen in a\ndifferent light. \"Under the husk of the mediaeval system there is revealed\na continuously growing antique-modern kernel, which draws all the living\nconstituents out of the husk, and finally bursts it\" (Gierke, _Deutsches\nGenossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. p. 312). Without going beyond the\nboundaries of the theocratico-organic view of the state prevalent in\nthe Middle Ages, most of the conceptions whose full development was\naccomplished by the natural law of modern times were already employed in\nthe Scholastic period. Here we already find the idea of a transition on the\npart of man from a pre-political natural state of freedom and equality into\nthe state of citizenship; the idea of the origin of the state by a contract\n(social and of submission); of the sovereignty of the ruler (_rex major\npopulo; plenitudo potestatis_), and of popular sovereignty[3] (_populus\nmajor principe_); of the original and inalienable prerogatives of the\ngenerality, and the innate and indestructible right of the individual to\nfreedom; the thought that the sovereign power is superior to positive\nlaw _(princeps legibus solutus_), but subordinate to natural law; even\ntendencies toward the division of powers (legislative and executive),\nand the representative system. These are germs which, at the fall of\nScholasticism and the ecclesiastical reformation, gain light and air for\nfree development.\n\n[Footnote 1: Gierke, _Johannes Althusius und die Entwickelung der\nnaturrechtlichen Staatstheorien_, Breslau, 1880; the same, _Deutsches\nGenossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. \u00a7 II, Berlin, 1881. Cf. further, Sigm.\nRiezler, _Die literarischen Widersacher der P\u00e4pste_, Leipsic, 1874; A.\nFranck, _R\u00e9formateurs et Publicistes de L'Europe_, Paris, 1864.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Nicolas' political ideas are discussed by T. Stumpf, Cologne,\n1865.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Cf. F. von Bezold, _Die Lehre von der Volkssouver\u00e4nit\u00e4t im\nMittelalter_, (Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, vol. xxxvi., 1876).]\n\nThe modern theory of natural law, of which Grotius was the most influential\nrepresentative, began with Bodin and Althusius. The former conceives\nthe contract by which the state is founded as an act of unconditional\nsubmission on the part of the community to the ruler, the latter conceives\nit merely as the issue of a (revocable) commission: in the view of the one,\nthe sovereignty of the people is entirely alienated, \"transferred,\" in that\nof the other, administrative authority alone is granted, \"conceded,\" while\nthe sovereign prerogatives remain with the people. Bodin is the founder\nof the theory of absolutism, to which Grotius and the school of Pufendorf\nadhere, though in a more moderate form, and which Hobbes develops to the\nlast extreme. Althusius, on the other hand, by his systematic development\nof the doctrine of social contract and the inalienable sovereignty of the\npeople, became the forerunner of Locke[1] and Rousseau.\n\n[Footnote 1: Ulrich Huber (1674) may be called the first representative\nof constitutionalism, and so the intermediate link between Althusius and\nLocke. Cf. Gierke, _Althusius_, p. 290.]\n\nThe first independent political philosopher of the modern period was\nNicolo Machiavelli of Florence (1469-1527). Patriotism was the soul of his\nthinking, questions of practical politics its subject, and historical fact\nits basis.[1] He is entirely unscholastic and unecclesiastical. The power\nand independence of the nation are for him of supreme importance, and the\ngreatness and unity of Italy, the goal of his political system. He\nopposes the Church, the ecclesiastical state, and the papacy as the chief\nhindrances to the attainment of these ends, and considers the means by\nwhich help may be given to the Fatherland. In normal circumstances a\nrepublican constitution, under which Sparta, Rome, and Venice have achieved\ngreatness, would be the best. But amid the corruption of the times, the\nonly hope of deliverance is from the absolute rule of a strong prince,\none not to be frightened back from severity and force. Should the ruler\nendeavor to keep within the bounds of morality, he would inevitably be\nruined amid the general wickedness. Let him make himself liked, especially\nmake himself feared, by the people; let him be fox and lion together; let\nhim take care, when he must have recourse to bad means for the sake of the\nFatherland, that they are justified by the result, and still to preserve\nthe appearance of loyalty and honor when he is forced to act in their\ndespite--for the populace always judges by appearance and by results. The\nworst thing of all is half-way measures, courses intermediate between good\nand evil and vacillating between reason and force. Even Moses had to kill\nthe envious refractories, while Savonarola, the unarmed prophet, was\ndestroyed. God is the friend of the strong, energy the chief virtue; and\nit is well when, as was the case with the ancient Romans, religion is\nassociated with it without paralyzing it. The current view of Christianity\nas a religion of humility and sloth, which preaches only the courage\nof endurance and makes its followers indifferent to worldly honor,\nis unfavorable to the development of political vigor. The Italians have\nbeen made irreligious by the Church and the priesthood; the nearer Rome,\nthe less pious the people. When Machiavelli, in his proposals looking\ntoward Lorenzo (II.) dei Medici (died 1519), approves any means for\nrestoring order, it must be remembered that he has an exceptional case\nin mind, that he does not consider deceit and severity just, but only\nunavoidable amid the anarchy and corruption of the time. But neither the\nloftiness of the end by which he is inspired, nor the low condition of\nmoral views in his time, justifies his treatment of the laws as mere means\nto political ends, and his unscrupulous subordination of morality to\ncalculating prudence. Machiavelli's general view of the world and of life\nis by no means a comforting one. Men are simple, governed by their passions\nand by insatiable desires, dissatisfied with what they have, and inclined\nto evil. They do good only of necessity; it is hunger which makes them\nindustrious and laws that render them good. Everything rapidly degenerates:\npower produces quiet, quiet, idleness, then disorder, and, finally, ruin,\nuntil men learn by misfortune, and so order and power again arise. History\nis a continual rising and falling, a circle of order and disorder.\nGovernmental forms, even, enjoy no stability; monarchy, when it has run out\ninto tyranny, is followed by aristocracy, which gradually passes over into\noligarchy; this in turn is replaced by democracy, until, finally, anarchy\nbecomes unendurable, and a prince again attains power. No state, however,\nis so powerful as to escape succumbing to a rival before it completes the\ncircuit. Protection against the corruption of the state is possible only\nthrough the maintenance of its principles, and its restoration only by a\nreturn to the healthy source whence it originated. This is secured either\nby some external peril compelling to reflection, or internally, by wise\nthought, by good laws (framed in accordance with the general welfare, and\nnot according to the ambition of a minority), and by the example of good\nmen.\n\n[Footnote 1: In his _Essays on the First Decade of Livy (Discorsi)_,\nMachiavelli investigates the conditions and the laws of the maintenance of\nstates; while in _The Prince (II Principe_, 1515), he gives the principles\nfor the restoration of a ruined state. Besides these he wrote a history\nof Florence, and a work on the art of war, in which he recommended the\nestablishment of national armies.]\n\nIn the interval between Machiavelli and the system of natural law of\nGrotius, the Netherlander (1625: _De Jure Belli et Pacis_), belong the\nsocialistic ideal state of the Englishman, Thomas More (_De Optimo\nReipublicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia_, 1516), the political theory of\nthe Frenchman, Jean Bodin (_Six Livres de la R\u00e9publique_, 1577, Latin 1584;\nalso a philosophico-historical treatise, _Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum\nCognitionem_, and the _Colloquium Heptaplomeres_, edited by Noack, 1857),\nand the law of war of the Italian, Albericus Gentilis, at his death\nprofessor in Oxford (_De Jure Belli_, 1588). Common to these three was\nthe advocacy of religious tolerance, from which atheists alone were to\nbe excepted; common, also, their ethical standpoint in opposition to\nMachiavelli, while they are at one with him in regard to the liberation of\npolitical and legal science from theology and the Church. With Gentilis\n(1551-1611) this separation assigns the first five commandments to divine,\nand the remainder to human law, the latter being based on the laws of human\nnature (especially the social impulse). In place of this derivation of law\nand the state from the nature of man, Jean Bodin (1530-96) insists on an\nhistorical interpretation; endeavors, though not always with success, to\ngive sharp definitions of political concepts;[1] rejects composite\nstate forms, and among the three pure forms, monarchy, aristocracy, and\ndemocracy, rates (hereditary) monarchy the highest, in which the subjects\nobey the laws of the monarch, and the latter the laws of God or of nature\nby respecting the freedom and the property of the citizens. So far, no\none has correctly distinguished between forms of the state and modes of\nadministration. Even a democratic state may be governed in a monarchical\nor aristocratic way. So far, also, there has been a failure to take into\naccount national peculiarities and differences of situation, conditions to\nwhich legislation must be adjusted. The people of the temperate zone are\ninferior to those of the North in physical power and inferior to those of\nthe South in speculative ability, but superior to both in political gifts\nand in the sense of justice. The nations of the North are guided by\nforce, those of the South by religion, those between the two by reason.\nMountaineers love freedom. A fruitful soil enervates men, when less\nfertile, it renders them temperate and industrious.\n\n[Footnote 1: What is the state? What is sovereignty? The former is defined\nas the rational and supremely empowered control over a number of families\nand of whatever is common to them; the latter is absolute and continuous\nauthority over the state, with the right of imposing laws without being\nbound by them. The prince, to whom the sovereignty has been unconditionally\nrelinquished by the people in the contract of submission, is accountable to\nGod alone.]\n\nAttention has only recently been called (by O. Gierke, in the work already\nmentioned, Heft vii. of his _Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und\nRechtsgeschichte_, Breslau, 1880) to the Westphalian, Johannes Althusius\n(Althusen or Althaus) as a legal philosopher worthy of notice. He was born,\n1557, in the Grafschaft Witgenstein; was a teacher of law in Herborn and\nSiegen from 1586, and Syndic in Emden from 1604 to his death in 1638. His\nchief legal work was the _Dicaeologica_, 1617 (a recasting of a treatise\non Roman law which appeared in 1586), and his chief political work the\n_Politica_, 1603 (altered and enlarged 1610, and reprinted, in addition,\nthree times before his death and thrice subsequently). Down to the\nbeginning of the eighteenth century he was esteemed or opposed as chief\namong the _Monarchomachi_, so called by the Scotchman, Barclay (_De Regno\net Regali Potestate_, 1600); since that time he has fallen into undeserved\noblivion. The sovereign power (_majestas_) of the people is untransferable\nand indivisible, the authority vested in the chosen wielder of the\nadministrative power is revocable, and the king is merely the chief\nfunctionary; individuals are subjects, it is true, but the community\nretains its sovereignty and has its rights represented over against the\nchief magistrate by a college of ephors. If the prince violates the\ncompact, the ephors are authorized and bound to depose the tyrant, and to\nbanish or execute him. There is but one normal state-form; monarchy and\npolyarchy are mere differences in administrative forms. Mention should\nfinally be made of his valuation of the social groups which mediate between\nthe individual and the state: the body politic is based on the narrower\nassociations of the family, the corporation, the commune, and the province.\n\nWhile with Bodin the historical, and with Gentilis the _a priori_ method of\ntreatment predominates, Hugo Grotius[1] combines both standpoints. He bases\nhis system on the traditional distinction of two kinds of law. The origin\nof positive law is historical, by voluntary enactment; natural law is\nrooted in the nature of man, is eternal, unchangeable, and everywhere the\nsame. He begins by distinguishing with Gentilis the _jus humanum_ from the\n_jus divinum_ given in the Scriptures. The former determines, on the one\nhand, the legal relations of individuals, and, on the other, those of whole\nnations; it is _jus personale_ and _jus gentium_.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hugo de Groot lived 1583-1645. He was born in Delft, became\nFiscal of Holland in 1607, and Syndic of Rotterdam and member of the States\nGeneral in 1613. A leader of the aristocratic party with Oldenbarneveld, he\nadhered to the Arminians or Remonstrants, was thrown into prison, freed in\n1621 through the address of his wife, and fled to Paris, where he lived\ntill 1631 as a private scholar, and, from 1635, as Swedish ambassador. Here\nhe composed his epoch-making work, _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 1625. Previous\nto this had appeared his treatise, _De Veritate Religionis Christianae_,\n1619, and the _Mare Liberum_, 1609, the latter a chapter from his maiden\nwork, _De Jure Praedae_, which was not printed until 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The meaning which Grotius here gives to _jus gentium_\n(=international law), departs from the customary usage of the Scholastics,\nwith whom it denotes the law uniformly acknowledged among all nations.\nThomas Aquinas understands by it, in distinction to _jus naturale_ proper,\nthe sum of the conclusions deduced from this as a result of the development\nof human culture and its departure from primitive purity. Cf. Gierke,\n_Althusius_, p. 273; _Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. p. 612.\nOn the meaning of natural law cf. Gierke's Inaugural Address as Rector at\nBreslau, _Naturrecht und Deutsches Recht_, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1883.]\n\nThe distinction between natural and conventional law which has been already\nmentioned, finds place within both: the positive law of persons is called\n_jus civile_, and the positive law of nations, _jus gentium voluntarium_.\nPositive law has its origin in regard for utility, while unwritten law\nfinds its source neither in this nor (directly) in the will of God,[1] but\nin the rational nature of man. Man is by nature social, and, as a rational\nbeing, possesses the impulse toward ordered association. Unlawful means\nwhatever renders such association of rational beings impossible, as the\nviolation of promises or the taking away and retention of the property\nof others. In the (pre-social) state of nature, all belonged to all, but\nthrough the act of taking possession _(occupatio)_ property arises (sea and\nair are excluded from appropriation). In the state of nature everyone has\nthe right to defend himself against attack and to revenge himself on the\nevil-doer; but in the political community, founded by contract, personal\nrevenge is replaced by punishment decreed by the civil power. The aim of\npunishment is not retribution, but reformation and deterrence. It belongs\nto God alone to punish because of sin committed, the state can punish only\nto prevent it. (The antithesis _quia peccatum est_--_ne peccetur_ comes\nfrom Seneca.)\n\n[Footnote 1: Natural law would be valid even if there were no God. With\nthese words the alliance between the modern and the mediaeval philosophy of\nlaw is severed.]\n\nThis energetic revival of the distinction already common in the Middle Ages\nbetween \"positive and natural,\" which Lord Herbert of Cherbury brought\nforward at the same period (1624) in the philosophy of religion, gave the\ncatchword for a movement in practical philosophy whose developments extend\ninto the nineteenth century. Not only the illumination period, but all\nmodern philosophy down to Kant and Fichte, is under the ban of the\nantithesis, natural and artificial. In all fields, in ethics as well as in\nno\u00ebtics, men return to the primitive or storm back to it, in the hope of\nfinding there the source of all truth and the cure for all evils. Sometimes\nit is called nature, sometimes reason (natural law and rational law are\nsynonymous, as also natural religion and the religion of the reason), by\nwhich is understood that which is permanent and everywhere the same in\ncontrast to the temporary and the changeable, that which is innate in\ncontrast to that which has been developed, in contrast, further, to that\nwhich has been revealed. Whatever passes as law in all places and at all\ntimes is natural law, says Grotius; that which all men believe forms the\ncontent of natural religion, says Lord Herbert. Before long it comes to\nbe said: that _alone_ is genuine, true, healthy, and valuable which has\neternal and universal validity; all else is not only superfluous and\nvalueless but of evil, for it must be unnatural and corrupt. This step is\ntaken by Deism, with the principle that whatever is not natural or rational\nin the sense indicated is unnatural and irrational. Parallel phenomena are\nnot wanting, further, in the philosophy of law (Gierke, _Althusius_). But\nthese errors must not be too harshly judged. The confidence with which they\nwere made sprang from the real and the historical force of their underlying\nidea.\n\nAs already stated, the \"natural\" forms the antithesis to the supernatural,\non the one hand, and to the historical, on the other. This combination of\nthe revealed and the historical will not appear strange, if we remember\nthat the mediaeval view of the world under criticism was, as Christian,\nhistorico-religious, and, moreover, that for the philosophy of religion the\ntwo in fact coincide, inasmuch as revelation is conceived as an historical\nevent, and the historical religions assume the character of revealed. The\nterm arbitrary, applied to both in common, was questionable, however: as\nrevelation is a divine decree, so historical institutions are the products\nof human enactment, the state, the result of a contract, dogmas, inventions\nof the priesthood, _the results of development, artificial constructions_!\nIt took long ages for man to free himself from the idea of the artificial\nand conventional in his view of history. Hegel was the first to gather\nthe fruit whose seeds had been sown by Leibnitz, Lessing, Herder, and the\nhistorical school of law. As often, however, as an attempt was made from\nthis standpoint of origins to show laws in the course of history, only one\ncould be reached, a law of necessary degeneration, interrupted at times\nby sudden restorations--thus the Deists, thus Machiavelli and Rousseau.\nEverything degenerates, science itself only contributes to the\nfall--therefore, back to the happy beginnings of things!\n\nIf, finally, we inquire into the position of the Church in regard to the\nquestions of legal philosophy, we may say that, among the Protestants,\nLuther, appealing to the Scripture text, declares rulers ordained by God\nand sacred, though at the same time he considers law and politics but\nremotely related to the inner man; that Melancthon, in his _Elements of\nEthics_ (1538), as in all his philosophical text-books,[1] went back to\nAristotle, but found the source of natural law in the Decalogue, being\nfollowed in this by Oldendorp (1539), Hemming (1562), and B. Winkler\n(1615).[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: The edition of Melancthon's works by Bretschneider and\nBindseil gives the ethical treatises in vol. xvi. and the other\nphilosophical treatises in vol. xiii. (in part also in vols. xi. and xx.).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. C.v. Kaltenborn, _Die Vorl\u00e4ufer des Hugo Grotius_,\nLeipsic, 1848.]\n\nOn the Catholic side, the Jesuits (the Order was founded in 1534, and\nconfirmed in 1540), on the one hand, revived the Pelagian theory of freedom\nin opposition to the Luthero-Augustinian doctrine of the servitude of the\nwill, and, on the other, defended the natural origin of the state in a\n(revocable) contract in opposition to its divine origin asserted by the\nReformers, and the sovereignty of the people even to the sanctioning of\ntyrannicide. Bellarmin (1542-1621) taught that the prince derives his\nauthority from the people, and as the latter have given him power, so they\nretain the natural right to take it back and bestow it elsewhere. The view\nof Juan Mariana (1537-1624; _De Rege_, 1599) is that, as the people in\ntransferring rights to the prince retain still greater power themselves,\nthey are entitled in given cases to call the king to account. If he\ncorrupts the state by evil manners, and, degenerating into the tyrant,\ndespises religion and the laws, he may, as a public enemy, be deprived by\nanyone of his authority and his life. It is lawful to arrest tyranny in any\nway, and those have always been highly esteemed who, from devotion to the\npublic welfare, have sought to kill the tyrant.\n\n\n%5. Skepticism in France.%\n\nToward the end of the sixteenth century, and in the very country which was\nto become the cradle of modern philosophy, there appeared, as a forerunner\nof the new thinking, a skepticism in which that was taken for complete\nand ultimate truth which with Descartes constitutes merely a moment or\ntransition point in the inquiry. The earliest and the most ingenious among\nthe representatives of this philosophy of doubt was Michel de Montaigne\n(1533-92), who in his _Essays_--which were the first of their kind and soon\nfound an imitator in Bacon; they appeared in 1580 in two volumes, with an\nadditional volume in 1588--combined delicate observation and keen thinking,\nboldness and prudence, elegance and solidity. The French honor him as one\nof their foremost writers. The most important among these treatises or\nessays is considered to be the \"Apology for Raymond of Sabunde\" (ii. 12)\nwith valuable excursuses on faith and knowledge. Montaigne bases his doubt\non the diversity of individual views, each man's opinion differing from his\nfellow's, while truth must be one. There exists no certain, no universally\nadmitted knowledge. The human reason is feeble and blind in all things,\nknowledge is deceptive, especially the philosophy of the day, which clings\nto tradition, which fills the memory with learned note-stuff, but leaves\nthe understanding void and, instead of things, interprets interpretations\nonly. Both sensuous and rational knowledge are untrustworthy: the former,\nbecause it cannot be ascertained whether its deliverances conform to\nreality, and the latter, because its premises, in order to be valid, need\nothers in turn for their own establishment, etc., _ad infinitum_. Every\nadvance in inquiry makes our ignorance the more evident; the doubter alone\nis free. But though certainty is denied us in regard to truth, it is not\nwithheld in regard to duty. In fact, a twofold rule of practical life is\nset up for us: nature, or life in accordance with nature and founded on\nself-knowledge, and supernatural revelation, the Gospel (to be understood\nonly by the aid of divine grace). Submission to the divine ruler and\nbenefactor is the first duty of the rational soul. From obedience proceeds\nevery virtue, from over-subtlety and conceit, which is the product of\nfancied knowledge, comes every sin. Montaigne, like all who know men, has\na sharp eye for human frailty. He depicts the universal weakness of human\nnature and the corruption of his time with great vivacity and not without a\ncertain pleasure in the obscene; and besides folly and passion, complains\nabove all of the fact that so few understand the art of enjoyment, of which\nhe, a true man of the world, was master.\n\nThe skeptico-practical standpoint of Montaigne was developed into a system\nby the Paris preacher, Pierre Charron (1541-1603), in his three books _On\nWisdom_ (1601). Doubt has a double object: to keep alive the spirit\nof inquiry and to lead us on to faith. From the fact that reason and\nexperience are liable to deception and that the mind has at its disposal no\nmeans of distinguishing truth from falsehood, it follows that we are born\nnot to possess truth but to seek it. Truth dwells alone in the bosom of\nGod; for us doubt and investigation are the only good amid all the error\nand tribulation which surround us. Life is all misery. Man is capable of\nmediocrity alone; he can neither be entirely good nor entirely evil; he is\nweak in virtue, weak in vice, and the best degenerates in his hands. Even\nreligion suffers from the universal imperfection. It is dependent on\nnationality and country, and each religion is based on its predecessor;\nthe supernatural origin of which all religions boast belongs in fact\nto Christianity alone, which is to be accepted with humility and with\nsubmission of the reason. Charron lays chief emphasis, however, on the\npractical side of Christianity, the fulfillment of duty; and the \"wisdom\"\nwhich forms the subject of his book is synonymous with uprightness\n(_probit\u00e9_), the way to which is opened up by self-knowledge and whose\nreward is repose of spirit. And yet we are not to practice it for the\nsake of the reward, but because nature and reason, i.e., God, absolutely\n(entirely apart from the pleasurable results of virtue) require us to be\ngood. True uprightness is more than mere legality, for even when outward\naction is blameless, the motives may be mixed. \"I desire men to be upright\nwithout paradise and hell.\" Religion seeks to crown morality, not to\ngenerate it; virtue is earlier and more natural than piety. In his\ndefinition of the relation between religion and ethics, his delimitation\nof morality from legality, and his insistence on the purity of motives (do\nright, because the inner rational law commands it), an anticipation of\nKantian principles may be recognized.\n\nUnder Francis Sanchez (died 1632; his chief work is entitled _Quod Nihil\nScitur_), a Portuguese by birth, and professor of medicine in Montpellier\nand Toulouse, skepticism was transformed from melancholy contemplation into\na fresh, vigorous search after new problems. In the place of book-learning,\nwhich disgusts him by its smell of the closet, its continued prating of\nAristotle, and its self-exhaustion in useless verbalism, Sanchez desires\nto substitute a knowledge of things. Perfect knowledge, it is true, can be\nhoped for only when subject and object correspond to each other. But how\nis finite man to grasp the infinite universe? Experience, the basis of\nall knowledge, gropes about the outer surface of things and illumines\nparticulars only, without the ability either to penetrate to their inner\nnature or to comprehend the whole. We know only what we produce. Thus\nGod knows the world which he has made, but to us is vouchsafed merely an\ninsight into mediate or second causes, _causae secundae_. Here, however,\na rich field still lies open before philosophy--only let her attack her\nproblem with observation and experiment rather than with words.\n\nThe French nation, predisposed to skepticism by its prevailing acuteness,\nhas never lacked representatives of skeptical philosophy. The transition\nfrom the philosophers of doubt whom we have described to the great Bayle\nwas formed by La Mothe le Vayer (died 1672; _Five Dialogues_, 1671), the\ntutor of Louis XIV., and P.D. Huet(ius), Bishop of Avranches (died 1721),\nwho agreed in holding that a recognition of the weakness of the reason is\nthe best preparation for faith.\n\n\n6. %German Mysticism%.\n\nIn a period which has given birth to a skeptical philosophy, one never\nlooks in vain for the complementary phenomenon of mysticism. The stone\noffered by doubt in place of bread is incapable of satisfying the impulse\nafter knowledge, and when the intellect grows weary and despairing, the\nheart starts out in the quest after truth. Then its path leads inward, the\nmind turns in upon itself, seeks to learn the truth by inner experience and\nlife, by inward feeling and possession, and waits in quietude for divine\nillumination. The German mysticism of Eckhart[1] (about 1300), which had\nbeen continued in Suso and Tauler and had received a practical direction\nin the Netherlands,--Ruysbroek (about 1350) to Thomas \u00e0 Kempis (about\n1450),--now puts forth new branches and blossoms at the turning point of\nthe centuries.\n\n[Footnote 1: Master Eckhart's _Works_ have been edited by F. Pfeiffer,\nLeipsic, 1857. The following have written on him: Jos. Bach, Vienna, 1864;\nAd. Lasson, Berlin, 1868; the same, in the second part of Ueberweg's\n_Grundriss_, last section; Denifle, in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Litteratur und\nKulturgeschichte des Mittelalters_. ii. 417 _seq_.; H. Siebeck,\n_Der Begriff des Gemuts in der deutschen Mystik (Beitr\u00e4ge zur\nEntstehungsgeschichte der neueren Psychologie_, i), Giessen Programme,\n1891.]\n\nLuther himself was originally a mystic, with a high appreciation of Tauler\nand Thomas \u00e0 Kempis, and published in 1518 that attractive little book by\nan anonymous Frankfort author, the _German Theology_. When, later, he fell\ninto literalism, it was the mysticism of German Protestantism which, in\nopposition to the new orthodoxy, held fast to the original principle of\nthe Reformation, _i.e._, to the principle that faith is not assent to\nhistorical facts, not the acceptance of dogmas, but an inner experience,\na renewal of the whole man. Religion and theology must not be confounded.\nReligion is not doctrine, but a new birth. With Schwenckfeld, and also with\nFranck, mysticism is still essentially pietism; with Weigel, and by the\naddition of ideas from Paracelsus, it is transformed into theosophy, and as\nsuch reaches its culmination in B\u00f6hme.\n\nCaspar Schwenckfeld sought to spiritualize the Lutheran movement and\nprotested against its being made into a pastors' religion. Though he had\nbeen aroused by Luther's pioneer feat, he soon saw that the latter had not\ngone far enough; and in his _Letter on the Eucharist_, 1527, he defined the\npoints of difference between Luther's view of the Sacrament and his own.\nLuther, he maintained, had fallen back to an historical view of faith,\nwhereas the faith which saves can never consist in the outward acceptance\nof an historical fact. He who makes salvation dependent on preaching and\nthe Sacrament, confuses the invisible and the visible Church, _Ecclesia\ninterna_ and _externa_. The layman is his own priest.\n\nAccording to Sebastian Franck (1500-45), there are in man, as in everything\nelse, two principles, one divine and one selfish, Christ and Adam, an\ninner and an outer man; if he submits himself to the former (by a timeless\nchoice), he is spiritual, if to the latter, carnal. God is not the cause\nof sin, but man, who turns the divine power to good or evil. He who denies\nhimself to live God is a Christian, whether he knows and confesses\nthe Gospel or not. Faith does not consist in assent, but in inner\ntransformation. The historical element in Christianity and its ceremonial\nobservances are only the external form and garb (its \"figure\"), have merely\na symbolic significance as media of communication, as forms of revelation\nfor the eternal truth, proclaimed but not founded by Christ; the Bible is\nmerely the shadow of the living Word of God.\n\nValentin Weigel (born in 1533, pastor in Zschopau from 1567), whose works\nwere not printed until after his death, combines his predecessors' doctrine\nof inner and eternal Christianity with the microcosmos-idea of Paracelsus.\nGod, who lacks nothing, has not created the world in order to gain, but in\norder to give. Man not only bears the earthly world in his body, and the\nheavenly world of the angels in his reason (his spirit), but by virtue of\nhis intellect (his immortal soul) participates in the divine world also. As\nhe is thus a microcosm and, moreover, an image of God, all his knowledge\nbecomes self-knowledge, both sensuous perception (which is not caused by\nthe object, but only occasioned by it), and the knowledge of God. The\nliteralist knows not God, but he alone who bears God in himself. Man\nis favored above other beings with the freedom to dwell in himself or\nin God. When man came out from God, he was his own tempter and made himself\nproud and selfish. Thus evil, which had before remained hidden, was\nrevealed, and became sin. As the separation from God is an eternal act, so\nalso redemption and resurrection form an inner event. Christ is born in\neveryone who gives up the I-ness (_Ichheit_); each regenerate man is a son\nof God. But no vicarious suffering can save him who does not put off the\nold Adam, no matter how much an atheology sunk in literalism may comfort\nitself with the hope that man can \"drink at another's cost\" (that the merit\nof another is imputed to him).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Weigel is discussed by J.O. Opel, Leipsic, 1864.]\n\nGerman mysticism reaches its culmination in the G\u00f6rlitz cobbler, Jacob\nB\u00f6hme (1575-1624; _Aurora, or the Rising Dawn_; _Mysterium Magnum, or\non the First Book of Moses_, etc. The works of B\u00f6hme, collected by his\napostle, Gichtel, appeared in 1682 in ten volumes, and in 1730 in six\nvolumes; a new edition was prepared by Schiebler in 1831-47, with a second\nedition in 1861 _seq_.). B\u00f6hme's doctrine[1] centers about the problem of\nthe origin of evil. He transfers this to God himself and joins therewith\nthe leading thought of Eckhart, that God goes through a process, that he\nproceeds from an unrevealed to a revealed condition. At the sight of a tin\nvessel glistening in the sun, he conceived, as by inspiration, the idea\nthat as the sunlight reveals itself on the dark vessel so all light needs\ndarkness and all good evil in order to appear and to become knowable.\nEverything becomes perceptible through its opposite alone: gentleness\nthrough sternness, love through anger, affirmation through negation.\nWithout evil there would be no life, no movement, no distinctions, no\nrevelation; all would be unqualified, uniform nothingness. And as in nature\nnothing exists in which good and evil do not reside, so in God, besides\npower or the good, a contrary exists, without which he would remain unknown\nto himself. The theogonic process is twofold: self-knowledge on the part of\nGod, and his revelation outward, as eternal nature, in seven moments.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Windelband's fine exposition, _Geschichte der neueren\nPhilosophie_, vol. i. \u00a719. The following have written on B\u00f6hme: Fr. Baader\n(in vols. iii. and xiii. of his _Werke_); Hamberger, Munich, 1844: H. A.\nFechner, G\u00f6rlitz, 1857; A. v. Harless, Berlin, 1870, new edition, Leipsic,\n1882.]\n\nAt the beginning of the first development God is will without object,\neternal quietude and rest, unqualified groundlessness without determinate\nvolition. But in this divine nothingness there soon awakes the hunger after\nthe aught (somewhat, existence), the impulse to apprehend and manifest\nself, and as God looks into and forms an image of himself, he divides into\nFather and Son. The Son is the eye with which the Father intuits himself,\nand the procession of this vision from the groundless is the Holy Ghost.\nThus far God, who is one in three, is only understanding or wisdom, wherein\nthe images of all the possible are contained; to the intuition of self must\nbe added divisibility; it is only through the antithesis of the revealed\nGod and the unrevealed groundless that the former becomes an actual\ntrinity (in which the persons stand related as essence, power, and\nactivity), and the latter becomes desire or nature in God.\n\nAt the creation of the world seven equally eternal qualities,\nsource-spirits or nature-forms, are distinguished in the divine nature.\nFirst comes desire as the contractile, tart quality or pain, from which\nproceed hardness and heat; next comes mobility as the expansive, sweet\nquality, as this shows itself in water. As the nature of the first was to\nbind and the second was fluid, so they both are combined in the bitter\nquality or the pain of anxiety, the principle of sensibility. (Contraction\nand expansion are the conditions of perceptibility.) From these three forms\nfright or lightning suddenly springs forth. This fourth quality is the\nturning-point at which light flames up from darkness and the love of\nGod breaks forth from out his anger; as the first three, or four, forms\nconstitute the kingdom of wrath, so the latter three constitute the kingdom\nof joy. The fifth quality is called light or the warm fire of love, and has\nfor its functions external animation and communication; the sixth, report\nand sound, is the principle of inner animation and intelligence; the\nseventh, the formative quality, corporeality, comprehends all the preceding\nin itself as their dwelling.\n\nThe dark fire of anger (the hard, sweet, and bitter qualities) and the\nlight fire of love (light, report, and corporeality), separated by the\nlightning-fire, in which God's wrath is transformed into mercy, stand\nrelated as evil and good. The evil in God is not sin, but simply the\ninciting sting, the principle of movement; which, moreover, is restrained,\novercome, transfigured by gentleness. Sin arises only when the creature\nrefuses to take part in the advance from darkness to light, and obstinately\nremains in the fire of anger instead of forcing his way through to the\nfire of love. Thus that which was one in God is divided. Lucifer becomes\nenamored of the tart quality (the _centrum naturae_ or the matrix) and will\nnot grow into the heart of God; and it is only after such lingering behind\nthat the kingdom of wrath become a real hell. Heaven and hell are not\nfuture conditions, but are experienced here on earth; he who instead of\nsubduing animality becomes enamored of it, stands under the wrath of God;\nwhereas he who abjures self dwells in the joyous kingdom of mercy. He alone\ntruly believes who himself becomes Christ, who repeats in himself what\nChrist suffered and attained.\n\nThe creation of the material world is a result of Lucifer's fall. B\u00f6hme's\ndescription of it, based on the Mosaic account of creation, may be passed\nwithout notice; similarly his view of cognition, familiar from the earlier\nmystics, that all knowledge is derived from self-knowledge, that our\ndestination is to comprehend God from ourselves, and the world from God.\nMan, whose body, spirit, and soul hold in them the earthly, the sidereal,\nand the heavenly, is at once a microcosm and a \"little God.\"\n\nUnder the intractable form of B\u00f6hme's speculations and amid their riotous\nfancy, no one will fail to recognize their true-hearted sensibility and an\nunusual depth and vigor of thought. They found acceptance in England and\nFrance, and have been revived in later times in the systems of Baader and\nSchelling.\n\n\n%7. The Foundation of Modern Physics%.\n\nIn no field has the modern period so completely broken with tradition as\nin physics. The correctness of the Copernican theory is proved by Kepler's\nlaws of planetary movement, and Galileo's telescopical observations; the\nscientific theory of motion is created by Galileo's laws of projectiles,\nfalling bodies, and the pendulum; astronomy and mechanics form the entrance\nto exact physics--Descartes ventures an attempt at a comprehensive\nmechanical explanation of nature. And thus an entirely new movement is at\nhand. Forerunners, it is true, had not been lacking. Roger Bacon (1214-94)\nhad already sought to obtain an empirical knowledge of nature based upon\nmathematics; and the great painter Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) had\ndiscovered the principles of mechanics, though without gaining much\ninfluence over the work of his contemporaries. It was reserved for the\ntriple star which has been mentioned to overthrow Scholasticism. The\nconceptions with which the Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy of nature\nsought to get at phenomena--substantial forms, properties, qualitative\nchange--are thrown aside; their place is taken by matter, forces working\nunder law, rearrangement of parts. The inquiry into final causes is\nrejected as an anthropomorphosis of natural events, and deduction from\nefficient causes is alone accepted as scientific explanation. Size, shape,\nnumber, motion, and law are the only and the sufficient principles of\nexplanation. For magnitudes alone are knowable; wherever it is impossible\nto measure and count, to determine force mathematically, there rigorous,\nexact science ceases. Nature a system of regularly moved particles of\nmass; all that takes place mechanical movement, viz., the combination,\nseparation, dislocation, oscillation of bodies and corpuscles; mathematics\nthe organon of natural science! Into this circle of modern scientific\ncategories are articulated, further, Galileo's new conception of motion\nand the conception of atoms, which, previously employed by physicists, as\nDaniel Sennert (1619) and others, is now brought into general acceptance\nby Gassendi, while the four elements are definitively discarded (Lasswitz,\n_Geschichte der Atomistik_, 1890). Still another doctrine of Democritus\nis now revived; an evident symptom of the quantification and mechanical\ninterpretation of natural phenomena being furnished by the doctrine of the\nsubjectivity of sense qualities, in which, although on varying grounds,\nKepler, Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes agree.[1] Descartes and\nHobbes will be discussed later. Here we may give a few notes on their\nfellow laborers in the service of the mechanical science of nature.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. chapter vi. in Natorp's work on _Descartes'\nErkenntnisstheorie_, Marburg, 1882, and the same author's _Analekten zur\nGeschichte der Philosophie_, in the _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol.\nxviii. 1882, p. 572 _seq_.]\n\nWe begin with John Kepler[1] (1571-1630; chief work, _The New Astronomy or\nCelestial Physics, in Commentaries on the Motions of Mars_, 1609). Kepler's\nmerit as an astronomer has long obscured his philosophical importance,\nalthough his discovery of the laws of planetary motion was the outcome of\nendeavors to secure an exact foundation for his theory of the world. The\nlatter is aesthetic in character, centers about the idea of a universal\nworld-harmony, and employs mathematics as an instrument of confirmation.\nFor the fact that this theory satisfies the mind, and, on the whole,\ncorresponds to our empirical impression of the order of nature, is not\nenough in Kepler's view to guarantee its truth; by exact methods, by means\nof induction and experiment, a detailed proof from empirical facts must be\nfound for the existence not only of a general harmony, but of definitely\nfixed proportions. Herewith the philosophical application of mathematics\nloses that obscure mystical character which had clung to it since the time\nof Pythagoras, and had strongly manifested itself as late as in Nicolas of\nCusa. Mathematical relations constitute the deepest essence of the real and\nthe object of science. Where matter is, there is geometry; the latter is\nolder than the world and as eternal as the divine Spirit; magnitudes are\nthe source of things. True knowledge exists only where quanta are known;\nthe presupposition of the capacity for knowledge is the capacity to count;\nthe spirit cognizes sensuous relations by means of the pure, archetypal,\nintellectual relations born in it, which, before the advent of\nsense-impressions, have lain concealed behind the veil of possibility;\ninclination and aversion between men, their delight in beauty, the pleasant\nimpression of a view, depend upon an unconscious and instinctive perception\nof proportions. This quantitative view of the world, which, with a\nconsciousness of its novelty as well as of its scope, is opposed to the\nqualitative view of Aristotle;[2] the opinion that the essence of the human\nspirit, as well as of the divine, nay, the essence of all things, consists\nin activity; that, consequently, the soul is always active, being conscious\nof its own harmony at least in a confused way, even when not conscious of\nexternal proportions; further, the doctrine that nature loves simplicity,\navoids the superfluous, and is accustomed to accomplish large results with\na few principles--these remind one of Leibnitz. At the same time, the law\nof parsimony and the methodological conclusions concerning true hypotheses\nand real causes (an hypothesis must not be an artificially constructed set\nof fictions, forcibly adjusted to reality, but is to trace back phenomena\nto their real grounds), obedience to which enabled him to deduce _a priori_\nfrom causes the conclusions which Copernicus by fortunate conjecture had\ngathered inductively from effects--these made our thinker a forerunner of\nNewton. The physical method of explanation must not be corrupted either\nby theological conceptions (comets are entirely natural phenomena!) or by\nanthropomorphic views, which endow nature with spiritual powers.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 182 _seq_.; R.\nEucken, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, p. 54 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Aristotle erred when he considered qualitative distinctions\n(_idem_ and _aliud_) ultimate. These are to be traced back to quantitative\ndifferences, and the _aliud_ or _diversum_ is to be replaced by _plus et\nminus_. There is nothing absolutely light, but only relatively. Since\nall things are distinguished only by \"more or less,\" the possibility of\nmediating members or proportions between them is given.]\n\nIntermediate between Bacon and Descartes, both in the order of time and in\nthe order of fact, and a co-founder of modern philosophy, stands Galileo\nGalilei (1564-1641).[1] Galileo exhibits all the traits characteristic\nof modern thinking: the reference from words to things, from memory to\nperception and thought, from authority to self-ascertained principles, from\nchance opinion, arbitrary opinion, and the traditional doctrines of the\nschools, to \"knowledge,\" that is, to one's own, well grounded, indisputable\ninsight, from the study of human affairs to the study of nature. Study\nAristotle, but do not become his slave; instead of yielding yourselves\ncaptive to his views, use your own eyes; do not believe that the mind\nremains unproductive unless it allies itself with the understanding of\nanother; copy nature, not copies merely! He equals Bacon in his high\nestimation of sensuous experience in contrast to the often illusory\nconclusions of the reason, and of the value of induction; but he does not\nconceal from himself the fact that observation is merely the first step in\nthe process of cognition, leaving the chief r\u00f4le for the understanding.\nThis, supplementing the defect of experience--the impossibility of\nobserving all cases--by its _a priori_ concept of law and with its\ninferences overstepping the bounds of experience, first makes induction\npossible, brings the facts established into connection (their combination\nunder laws is thought, not experience), reduces them to their primary,\nsimple, unchangeable, and necessary causes by abstraction from contingent\ncircumstances, regulates perception, corrects sense-illusions, _i. e_.,\nthe false judgments originating in experience, and decides concerning the\nreality or fallaciousness of phenomena. Demonstration based on experience,\na close union of observation and thought, of fact and Idea (law)--these\nare the requirements made by Galileo and brilliantly fulfilled in his\ndiscoveries; this, the \"inductive speculation,\" as D\u00fchring terms it, which\nderives laws of far-reaching importance from inconspicuous facts; this,\nas Galileo himself recognizes, the distinctive gift of the investigator.\nGalileo anticipates Descartes in regard to the subjective character of\nsense qualities and their reduction to quantitative distinctions,[2] while\nhe shares with him the belief in the typical character of mathematics and\nthe mechanical theory of the world. The truth of geometrical propositions\nand demonstrations is as unconditionally certain for man as for God, only\nthat man learns them by a discursive process, whereas God's intuitive\nunderstanding comprehends them with a glance and knows more of them than\nman. The book of the universe is written in mathematical characters; motion\nis the fundamental phenomenon in the world of matter; our knowledge reaches\nas far as phenomena are measurable; the qualitative nature of force, back\nof its quantitative determinations, remains unknown to us. When Galileo\nmaintains that the Copernican theory is philosophically true and not merely\nastronomically useful, thus interpreting it as more than a hypothesis,\nhe is guided by the conviction that the simplest explanation is the most\nprobable one, that truth and beauty are one, as in general he concedes\na guiding though not a controlling influence in scientific work to the\naesthetic demand of the mind for order, harmony, and unity in nature, to\ncorrespond to the wisdom of the Creator.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Natorp's essay on Galileo, in vol. xviii. of the\n_Philosophische Monatshefte_, 1882.]\n\n[Footnote 1: This doctrine is developed by Galileo in the controversial\ntreatise against Padre Grassi, _The Scales (Il Saggiatore_, 1623, in the\nFlorence edition of his collected works, 1842 _seq_., vol. iv. pp.\n149-369; cf. Natorp, _Descartes' Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1882, chap. vi.). In\nsubstance, moreover, this doctrine is found, as Heussler remarks, _Baco_,\np. 94, in Bacon himself, in _Valerius Terminus (Works_, Spedding, vol. iii.\npp. 217-252.)]\n\nOne of the most noted and influential among the contemporaries, countrymen,\nand opponents of Descartes, was the priest and natural scientist, Petrus\nGassendi,[1] from 1633 Provost of Digne, later for a short period professor\nof mathematics at Paris. His renewal of Epicureanism, to which he was\nimpelled by temperament, by his reverence for Lucretius, and by the\nanti-Aristotelian tendency of his thinking, was of far more importance for\nmodern thought than the attempts to revive the ancient systems which have\nbeen mentioned above (p. 29). Its superior influence depends on the fact\nthat, in the conception of atoms, it offered exact inquiry a most useful\npoint of attachment. The conflict between the Gassendists and the\nCartesians, which at first was a bitter one, centered, as far as physics\nwas concerned, around the value of the atomic hypothesis as contrasted with\nthe corpuscular and vortex theory which Descartes had opposed to it. It\nsoon became apparent, however, that these two thinkers followed along\nessentially the same lines in the philosophy of nature, sharply as they\nwere opposed in their no\u00ebtical principles. Descartes' doctrine of body is\nconceived from an entirely materialistic standpoint, his anthropology,\nindeed, going further than the principles of his system would allow.\nGassendi, on the other hand, recognizes an immaterial, immortal reason,\ntraces the origin of the world, its marvelous arrangement, and the\nbeginning of motion back to God, and, since the Bible so teaches, believes\nthe earth to be at rest,--holding that, for this reason, the decision must\nbe given in favor of Tycho Brah\u00e9 and against Copernicus, although the\nhypothesis of the latter affords the simpler and, scientifically, the more\nprobable explanation. Both thinkers rejoice in their agreement with the\ndogmas of the Church, only that with Descartes it came unsought in the\nnatural progress of his thought, while Gassendi held to it in contradiction\nto his system. It is the more surprising that Gassendi's works escaped\nbeing put upon the Index, a fate which overtook those of Descartes in 1663.\n\n[Footnote 2: Pierre Gassendi, 1592-1655: _On the Life and Character of\nEpicurus_, 1647; _Notes on the Tenth Book of Diogenes La\u00ebrtius, with a\nSurvey of the Doctrine of Epicurus_, 1649. _Works_, Lyons, 1658, Florence,\n1727. Cf. Lange, _History of Materialism_, book i. \u00a7 3, chap, 1; Natorp,\n_Analekten, Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xviii. 1882, p. 572 _seq_.]\n\nAs modern thought derives its mechanical temper equally from both these\nsources, and the natural science of the day has appropriated the corpuscles\nof Descartes under the name of molecules, as well as the atoms of Gassendi,\nthough not without considerable modification in both conceptions (Lange,\nvol. i. p. 269), so we find attempts at mediation at an early period.\nWhile P\u00e8re Mersenne (1588-1648), who was well versed in physics, sought\nan indecisive middle course between these two philosophers, the English\nchemist, Robert Boyle, effected a successful synthesis of both. The son\nof Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, he was born at Lismore in 1626, lived in\nliterary retirement at Oxford from 1654, and later in Cambridge, and died,\n1692, in London, president of the Royal Society. His principal work, _The\nSceptical Chemist (Works_, vol. i. p. 290 _seq_.), appeared in 1661, the\ntract, _De Ipsa Natura_, in 1682.[1] By his introduction of the atomic\nconception he founded an epoch in chemistry, which, now for the first, was\nfreed from bondage to the ideas of Aristotle and the alchemists.\nAtomism, however, was for Boyle merely an instrument of method and not a\nphilosophical theory of the world. A sincerely religious man,[2] he regards\nwith disfavor both the atheism of Epicurus and his complete rejection of\nteleology--the world-machine points to an intelligent Creator and a purpose\nin creation; motion, to a divine impulse. He defends, on the other hand,\nthe right of free inquiry against the priesthood and the pedantry of the\nschools, holding that the supernatural must be sharply distinguished from\nthe natural, and mere conjectures concerning insoluble problems from\npositions susceptible of experimental proof; while, in opposition to\nsubmission to authority, he remarks that the current coin of opinion must\nbe estimated, not by the date when and the person by whom it was minted but\nby the value of the metal alone. Cartesian elements in Boyle are the start\nfrom doubt, the derivation of all motion from pressure and impact, and the\nextension of the mechanical explanation to the organic world. His inquiries\nrelate exclusively to the world of matter so far as it was \"completed on\nthe last day but one of creation.\" He defends empty space against Descartes\nand Hobbes. He is the first to apply the mediaeval terms, primary and\nsecondary qualities, to the antithesis between objective properties which\nreally belong to things, and sensuous or subjective qualities present only\nin the feeling subject.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Boyle's _Works_ were published in Latin at Geneva, in 1660, in\nsix volumes, and in 1714 in five; an edition by Birch appeared at London,\n1744, in five volumes, second edition, 1772, in six. Cf. Buckle, _History\nof Civilization in England_, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 265-268; Lange,\n_History of Materialism_, vol. i. pp. 298-306; vol. ii. p. 351 _seq_.;\nGeorg Baku, _Der Streit \u00fcber den Naturbegriff, Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nPhilosophie_, vol. xcviii., 1891, p. 162 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The foundation named after him had for its object to promote\nby means of lectures the investigation of nature on the basis of atomism,\nand, at the same time, to free it from the reproach of leading to atheism\nand to show its harmony with natural religion. Samuel Clarke's work on _The\nBeing and Attributes of God_, 1705, originated in lectures delivered on\nthis foundation.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Eucken, _Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie_,\npp. 94, 196.]\n\n\n%8. Philosophy in England to the Middle of the Seventeenth Century.%\n\n%(a) Bacon's Predecessors.%--The darkness which lay over the beginnings\nof modern English philosophy has been but incompletely dispelled by\nthe meritorious work of Ch. de R\u00e9musat _(Histoire de la Philosophie en\nAngleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'a Locke_, 2 vols., 1878). The most recent\ninvestigations of J. Freudenthal _(Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der Englischen\nPhilosophie_, in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, vols. iv. and\nv., 1891) have brought assistance in a way deserving of thanks, since they\nlift at important points the veil which concealed Bacon's relations to his\npredecessors and contemporaries, by describing the scientific tendencies\nand achievements of Digby and Temple. The following may be taken from his\nresults.\n\nEverard Digby (died 1592; chief work, _Theoria Analytica,_ 1579),\ninstructor in logic in Cambridge from 1573, who was strongly influenced\nby Reuchlin and who favored an Aristotelian-Alexandrian-Cabalistic\neclecticism, was the first to disseminate Neoplatonic ideas in England;\nand, in spite of the lack of originality in his systematic presentation of\ntheoretical philosophy, aroused the study of this branch in England into\nnew life. His opponent, Sir William Temple [1] (1553-1626), by his defense\nand exposition of the doctrine of Ramus (introduced into Great Britain by\nGeorge Buchanan and his pupil, Andrew Melville), made Cambridge the chief\ncenter of Ramism. He was the first who openly opposed Aristotle.\n\n[Footnote 1: Temple was secretary to Philip Sidney, William Davison, and\nthe Earl of Essex, and, from 1619, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin.\nHis maiden work, _De Unica P. Rami Methodo_, which he published under the\npseudonym, Mildapettus 1580, was aimed at Digby's _De Duplici Methodo_. His\nchief work, _P. Rami Dialectics Libri Dua Scholiis, Illustrati_, appeared\nin 1584.]\n\nBacon was undoubtedly acquainted with both these writers and took ideas\nfrom both. Digby represented the scholastic tendency, which Bacon\nvehemently opposed, yet without being able completely to break away\nfrom it. Temple was one of those who supplied him with weapons for this\nconflict. Finally, it must be mentioned that many of the English scientists\nof the time, especially William Gilbert (1540-1603; _De Magnete_, 1600),\nphysician to Queen Elizabeth, used induction in their work before Bacon\nadvanced his theory of method.\n\n%(b) Bacon%.--The founder of the empirical philosophy of modern times was\nFrancis Bacon (1561-1626), a contemporary of Shakespeare. Bacon began\nhis political career by sitting in Parliament for many years under Queen\nElizabeth, as whose counsel he was charged with the duty of engaging in\nthe prosecution of his patron, the Earl of Essex, and at whose command he\nprepared a justification of the process. Under James I, he attained the\nhighest offices and honors, being made Keeper of the Great Seal in 1617,\nLord Chancellor and Baron Verulam in 1618, and Viscount St. Albans in\n1621. In this last year came his fall. He was charged with bribery, and\ncondemned; the king remitted the imprisonment and fine, and for the\nremainder of his life Bacon devoted himself to science, rejecting every\nsuggestion toward a renewal of his political activity. The moral laxity\nof the times throws a mitigating light over his fault; but he cannot be\naquitted of self-seeking, love of money and of display, and excessive\nambition. As Macaulay says in his famous essay, he was neither malignant\nnor tyrannical, but he lacked warmth of affection and elevation of\nsentiment; there were many things which he loved more than virtue, and many\nwhich he feared more than guilt. He first gained renown as an author by his\nethical, economic, and political _Essays_, after the manner of Montaigne;\nof these the first ten appeared in 1597, in the third edition (1625)\nincreased to fifty-eight; the Latin translation bears the title _Sermones\nFideles_. His great plan for a \"restoration of the sciences\" was intended\nto be carried out in four, or rather, in six parts. But only the first two\nparts of the _Instauratio Magna_ were developed: the _encyclopaedia_, or\ndivision of all sciences[1], a chart of the _globus intellectualis_, on\nwhich was depicted what each science had accomplished and what still\nremained for each to do; and the development of the _new method_. Bacon\npublished his survey of the circle of the sciences in the English work, the\n_Advancement of Learning_, 1605, a much enlarged revision of which, _De\nDignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum_, appeared in Latin in 1623. In 1612\nhe printed as a contribution to methodology the draft, _Cogitata et Visa_\n(written 1607), later recast into the [first book of the] _Novum Organum_,\n1620. This title, _Novum Organum_, of itself indicates opposition to\nAristotle, whose logical treatises had for ages been collected under the\ntitle _Organon_. If in this work Bacon had given no connected exposition\nof his reforming principles, but merely a series of aphorisms, and this\nan incomplete one, the remaining parts are still more fragmentary, only\nprefaces and scattered contributions having been reduced to writing. The\nthird part was to have been formed by a description of the world or natural\n_history, Historia Naturalis_, and the last,--introduced by a _Scala\nIntellectus_ (ladder of knowledge, illustrations of the method\nby examples), and by _Prodromi_ (preliminary results of his own\ninquiries),--by natural _science, Philosophia Secunda_. The best edition of\nBacon's works is the London one of Spedding, Ellis & Heath, 1857 _seq_., 7\nvols., 2d ed., 1870; with 7 volumes additional of _The Letters and Life of\nFrancis Bacon, including His Occasional Works_, and a Commentary, by J.\nSpedding, 1862-74. Spedding followed this further with a briefer _Account\nof the Life and Times of Francis Bacon_, 2 vols., 1878[2].\n\n[Footnote 1: According to the faculties of the soul, memory, imagination,\nand understanding, three principal sciences are distinguished; history,\npoesy, and philosophy. Of the three objects of the latter, \"nature strikes\nthe mind with a direct ray, God with a refracted ray, and man himself\nwith a reflected ray.\" Theology is natural or revealed. Speculative\n(theoretical) natural philosophy divides into physics, concerned with\nmaterial and efficient causes, and metaphysics, whose mission, according to\nthe traditional view, is to inquire into final causes, but in Bacon's own\nopinion, into formal causes; operative (technical) natural philosophy\nis mechanics and natural magic. The doctrine concerning man comprises\nanthropology (including logic and ethics) and politics. This division of\nBacon was still retained by D'Alembert in his preliminary discourse to the\n_Encyclop\u00e9die_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. on Bacon, K. Fischer, 2d ed., 1875; Chr. Sigwart, in the\n_Preussische Jahrb\u00fccher_, 1863 and 1864, and in vol. ii. of his _Logik_;\nH. Heussler, _Baco und seine geschichtliche Stellung_, Breslau, 1889.\n[Adamson, _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th. ed., vol. iii. pp. 200-222;\nFowler, English Philosophers Series, 1881; Nichol, Blackwood's\nPhilosophical Classics, 2 vols., 1888-89.--TR.]] Bacon's merit was\nthreefold: he felt more forcibly and more clearly than previous\nthinkers the need of a reform in science; he set up a new and grand\nideal--unbiased and methodical investigation of nature in order to\nmastery over nature; and he gave information and directions as to\nthe way in which this goal was to be attained, which, in spite of their\nincompleteness in detail, went deep into the heart of the subject and laid\nthe foundation for the work of centuries.[1] His faith in the omnipotence\nof the new method was so strong, that he thought that science for the\nfuture could almost dispense with talent. He compares his method to a\ncompass or a ruler, with which the unpractised man is able to draw circles\nand straight lines better than an expert without these instruments.\n\n[Footnote 1: His detractors are unjust when they apply the criterion of the\npresent method of investigation and find only imperfection in an imperfect\nbeginning.]\n\nAll science hitherto, Bacon declares, has been uncertain and unfruitful,\nand does not advance a step, while the mechanic arts grow daily more\nperfect; without a firm basis, garrulous, contentious, and lacking in\ncontent, it is of no practical value. The seeker after certain knowledge\nmust abandon words for things, and learn the art of forcing nature to\nanswer his questions. The seeker after fruitful knowledge must increase\nthe number of discoveries, and transform them from matters of chance into\nmatters of design. For discovery conditions the power, greatness, and\nprogress of mankind. Man's power is measured by his knowledge, knowledge is\npower, and nature is conquered by obedience--_scientia est potentia; natura\nparendo vincitur_.\n\nBacon declares three things indispensable for the attainment of this\npower-giving knowledge: the mind must understand the instruments of\nknowledge; it must turn to experience, deriving the materials of knowledge\nfrom perception; and it must not rise from particular principles to the\nhigher axioms too rapidly, but steadily and gradually through middle\naxioms. The mind can accomplish nothing when left to itself; but undirected\nexperience alone is also insufficient (experimentation without a plan is\ngroping in the dark), and the senses, moreover, are deceptive and not acute\nenough for the subtlety of nature--therefore, methodical experimentation\nalone, not chance observation, is worthy of confidence. Instead of the\ncustomary divorce of experience and understanding, a firm alliance, a\n\"lawful marriage,\" must be effected between them. The empiricists merely\ncollect, like the ants; the dogmatic metaphysicians spin the web of their\nideas out of themselves, like the spiders; but the true philosopher must be\nlike the bee, which by its own power transforms and digests the gathered\nmaterial.\n\nAs the mind, like a dull and uneven mirror, by its own nature distorts the\nrays of objects, it must first of all be cleaned and polished, that is, it\nmust be freed from all prejudices and false notions, which, deep-rooted by\nhabit, prevent the formation of a true picture of the world. It must root\nout its prejudices, or, where this is impossible, at least understand them.\nDoubt is the first step on the way to truth. Of these Phantoms or Idols to\nbe discarded, Bacon distinguishes four classes: Idols of the Theater, of\nthe Market Place, of the Den, and of the Tribe. The most dangerous are\nthe _idola theatri_, which consist in the tendency to put more trust in\nauthority and tradition than in independent reflection, to adopt current\nideas simply because they find general acceptance. Bacon's injunction\nconcerning these is not to be deceived by stage-plays (_i.e._, by the\nteachings of earlier thinkers which represent things other than they are);\ninstead of believing others, observe for thyself! The _idola fori_, which\narise from the use of language in public intercourse, depend upon the\nconfusion of words, which are mere symbols with a conventional value and\nwhich are based on the carelessly constructed concepts of the vulgar, with\nthings themselves. Here Bacon warns us to keep close to things. The _idola\nspecus_ are individual prepossessions which interfere with the apprehension\nof the true state of affairs, such as the excessive tendency of thought\ntoward the resemblances or the differences of things, or the investigator's\nhabit of transferring ideas current in his own department to subjects of a\ndifferent kind. Such individual weaknesses are numberless, yet they may in\npart be corrected by comparison with the perceptions of others. The _idola\ntribus_, finally, are grounded in the nature of the human species. To this\nclass belong, among others, illusions of the senses, which may in part be\ncorrected by the use of instruments, with which we arm our organs; further,\nthe tendency to hold fast to opinions acceptable to us in spite of contrary\ninstances; similarly, the tendency to anthropomorphic views, including,\nas its most important special instance, the mistake of thinking that we\nperceive purposive relations everywhere and the working of final causes,\nafter the analogy of human action, when in reality efficient causes alone\nare concerned. Here Bacon's injunction runs, not to interpret natural\nphenomena teleologically, but to explain them from mechanical causes; not\nto narrow the world down to the limits of the mind, but to extend the mind\nto the boundaries of the world, so that it shall understand it as it\nreally is.\n\nTo these warnings there are added positive rules. When the investigator,\nafter the removal of prejudices and habitual modes of thought, approaches\nexperience with his senses unperverted and a purified mind, he is to\nadvance from the phenomena given to their conditions. First of all, the\nfacts must be established by observation and experiment, and systematically\narranged,[1] then let him go on to causes and laws.[2] The true or\nscientific induction[3] thus inculcated is quite different from the\ncredulous induction of common life or the unmethodical induction of\nAristotle. Bacon emphasizes the fact that hitherto the importance of\nnegative instances, which are to be employed as a kind of counter-proof,\nhas been completely overlooked, and that a substitute for complete\ninduction, which is never attainable, may be found, on the one hand, in the\ncollection of as many cases as possible, and, on the other, by considering\nthe more important or decisive cases, the \"prerogative instances.\" Then the\ninductive ascent from experiment to axiom is to be followed by a deductive\ndescent from axioms to new experiments and discoveries. Bacon rejects\nthe syllogism on the ground that it fits one to overcome his opponent in\ndisputation, but not to gain an active conquest over nature. In his own\napplication of these principles of method, his procedure was that of a\ndilettante; the patient, assiduous labor demanded for the successful\npromotion of the mission of natural investigation was not his forte. His\nstrength lay in the postulation of problems, the stimulation and direction\nof inquiry, the discovery of lacunae and the throwing out of suggestions;\nand many ideas incidentally thrown off by him surprise us by their\ningenious anticipations of later discoveries. The greatest defect in his\ntheory was his complete failure to recognize the services promised by\nmathematics to natural science. The charge of utilitarianism, which has\nbeen so broadly made, is, on the contrary, unjust. For no matter how\nstrongly he emphasizes the practical value of knowledge, he is still in\nagreement with those who esteem the godlike condition of calm and cheerful\nacquaintance with truth more highly than the advantages to be expected from\nit; he desires science to be used, not as \"a courtezan for pleasure,\" but\n\"as a spouse for generation, fruit and comfort,\" and--leaving entirely out\nof view his isolated acknowledgments of the inherent value of knowledge--he\nconceives its utility wholly in the comprehensive and noble sense that the\npursuit of science, from which as such all narrow-minded regard for direct\npractical application must keep aloof, is the most important lever for the\nadvancement of human culture.\n\n[Footnote 1: Bacon illustrates the method by the explanation of heat. The\nresults of experimental observation are to be arranged in three tables. The\ntable of presence contains many different cases in which heat occurs; the\ntable of absence, those in which, under circumstances otherwise the same,\nit is wanting; the table of degrees or comparison enumerates phenomena\nwhose increase and decrease accompany similar variations in the degree of\nheat. That which remains after the _exclusion_ now to be undertaken (of\nthat which cannot be the nature or cause of heat), yields as a preliminary\nresult or commencement of interpretation (as a \"first vintage\"), the\ndefinition of heat: \"a motion, expansive, restrained, and acting in its\nstrife upon the smaller particles of bodies.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: This goal of Baconian inquiry is by no means coincident with\nthat of exact natural science. Law does not mean to him, as to the physical\nscientist of to-day, a mathematically formulated statement of the course of\nevents, but the nature of the phenomenon, to be expressed in a definition\n(E. K\u00f6nig, _Entwickelung des Causalproblems bis Kant_, 1883, pp. 154-156).\nBacon combines in a peculiar manner ancient and modern, Platonic and\ncorpuscular fundamental ideas. Rejecting final causes with the atomists,\nyet handing over material and efficient causes (the latter of which sink\nwith him to the level of mere changing occasional causes) to empirical\nphysics, he assigns to metaphysics, as the true _science_ of nature, the\nsearch for the \"forms\" and properties of things. In this he is guided by\nthe following metaphysical presupposition: Phenomena, however manifold\nthey may be, are at bottom composed of a few elements, namely, permanent\nproperties, the so-called \"simple natures,\" which form, as it were, the\nalphabet of nature or the colors on her palette, by the combination of\nwhich she produces her varied pictures; _e. g_., the nature of heat and\ncold, of a red color, of gravity, and also of age, of death. Now the\nquestion to be investigated becomes, What, then, is heat, redness, etc.?\nThe ground essence and law of the natures consist in certain forms,\nwhich Bacon conceives in a Platonic way as concepts and substances, but\nphenomenal ones, and, at the same time, with Democritus, as the grouping or\nmotion of minute material particles. Thus the form of heat is a particular\nkind of motion, the form of whiteness a determinate arrangement of material\nparticles. Cf. Natge, _Ueber F. Bacons Formenlehre_, Leipsic, 1891, in\nwhich Heussler's view is developed in more detail. [Cf. further, Fowler's\n_Bacon_, English Philosophers Series, 1881, chap. iv.--TR.]]\n\n[Footnote 3: The Baconian method is to be called induction, it is true,\nonly in the broad sense. Even before Sigwart, Apelt, _Theorie der\nInduction_, 1854, pp. 151, 153, declared that the question it discussed was\nessentially a method of abstraction. This, however, does not detract from\nthe fame of Bacon as the founder, of the theory of inductive investigation\n(in later times carefully elaborated by Mill).]\n\nBacon intended that his reforming principles should accrue to the benefit\nof practical philosophy also, but gave only aphoristic hints to this\nend. Everything is impelled by two appetites, of which the one aims at\nindividual welfare, the other at the welfare of the whole of which the\nthing is a part (_bonum suitatis_--_bonum communionis_). The second is not\nonly the nobler but also the stronger; this holds of the lower creatures as\nwell as of man, who, when not degenerate, prefers the general welfare to\nhis individual interests. Love is the highest of the virtues, and is never,\nas other human endowments, exposed to the danger of excess; therefore the\nlife of action is of more worth than the life of contemplation. By this\nprinciple of morals Bacon marked out the way for the English ethics of\nlater times.[1] He notes the lack of a science of character, for which more\nmaterial is given in ordinary discourse, in the poets and the historians,\nthan in the works of the philosophers; he explains the power of the\naffections over the reason by the fact that the idea of present good fills\nthe imagination more forcibly than the idea of good to come, and summons\npersuasion, habit, and morals to the aid of the latter. We must endeavor\nso to govern the passions (each of which combines in itself a masculine\nimpetuosity with a feminine weakness) that they shall take the part of\nthe reason instead of attacking it. Elsewhere Bacon gives (not entirely\nunquestionable) directions concerning the art of making one's way. Acute\nobservations and ingenious remarks everywhere abound. In order to inform\none's self of a man's intentions and ends, it is necessary to \"keep a good\nmediocrity in liberty of speech, which invites a similar liberty, and in\nsecrecy, which induces trust.\" \"In order to get on one must have a little\nof the fool and not too much of the honest.\" \"As the baggage is to an\narmy, so is riches to virtue. It cannot be spared nor left behind, but it\nhindereth the march; yea, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth\nthe victory\" (impedimenta--baggage and hindrance). On envy and malevolence\nhe says: \"For men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon\nothers' evil; ... and whoso is out of hope to attain another's virtue will\nseek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Vorlaender, p. 267 _seq_.]\n\nIn ethics, as in theoretical philosophy, Bacon demands the completion of\nnatural knowledge by revelation. The light of nature (the reason and the\nconscience) is able only to convince us of sin and not to give us complete\ninformation concerning our duty,--_e.g._, the lofty moral principle, Love\nyour enemies. Similarly, natural theology is quite sufficient to place\nthe existence of God beyond doubt, by reasoning from the order in nature\n(\"slight tastes of philosophy may perchance move one to atheism but fuller\ndraughts lead back to religion\"); but the doctrines of Christianity are\nmatters of faith. Religion and science are separate fields, any confusion\nof which involves the danger of an heretical religion or a fabulous\nphilosophy. The more a principle of faith contradicts the reason, the\ngreater the obedience and the honor to God in accepting it.\n\n%(c) Hobbes%.--Hobbes stands in sharp contrast to Bacon both in disposition\nand in doctrine. Bacon was a man of a wide outlook, a rich, stimulating,\nimpulsive nature, filled with great plans, but too mobile and desultory to\nallow them to ripen to perfection; Hobbes is slow, tenacious, persistent,\nunyielding, his thought strenuous and narrow. To this corresponds a\nprofound difference in their systems, which is by no means adequately\ncharacterized by saying that Hobbes brings into the foreground the\nmathematical element neglected by his predecessor, and turns his attention\nchiefly to politics. The dependence of Hobbes on Bacon is, in spite of\ntheir personal acquaintance, not so great as formerly was universally\nassumed. His guiding stars are rather the great mathematicians of the\nContinent, Kepler and Galileo, while Cartesian influences also are not\nto be denied. He finds his mission in the construction of a strictly\nmechanical view of the world. Mechanism applied to the world gives\nmaterialism; applied to knowledge, sensationalism of a mathematical type;\napplied to the will, determinism; to morality and the state, ethical and\npolitical naturalism. Nevertheless, the empirical tendency of his nation\nhas a certain power over him; he holds fast to the position that all ideas\nultimately spring from experience. With his energetic but short-breathed\nthinking, he did not succeed in fusing the rationalistic elements received\nfrom foreign sources with these native tendencies, so as to produce\na unified system. As Grimm has correctly shown (_Zur Geschichte des\nErkenntnissproblems_), there is an unreconciled contradiction between the\ndependence of thought on experience, which he does not give up, and the\nuniversal validity of the truths derived from pure reason, which he asserts\non the basis of the mathematico-philosophical doctrines of the Continent. A\nsimilar unmediated dualism will meet us in Locke also.\n\nThomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was repelled while a student at Oxford by\nScholastic methods in thought, with which he agreed only in their\nnominalistic results (there are no universals except names). During\nrepeated sojourns in Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Gassendi,\nMersenne, and Descartes, he devoted himself to the study of mathematics,\nand was greatly influenced by the doctrines of Galileo; while the disorders\nof the English revolution led him to embrace an absolutist theory of the\nstate. His chief works were his politics, under the title _Leviathan_,\n1651, and his _Elementa Philosophiae_, in three parts (_De Corpore, De\nHomine, De Cive_), of which the third, _De Cive_, appeared first (in Latin;\nin briefer form and anonymously, 1642, enlarged 1647), the first, _De\nCorpore_, in 1655, and the second, _De Homine_, in 1658. These had\nbeen preceded by two books [1] written, like the two last parts of the\n_Elements_, in English: _On Human Nature_ and _De Corpore Politico_,\ncomposed 1640, printed without the author's consent in 1650. Besides these\nhe wrote two treatises _Of Liberty and Necessity_, 1646 and 1654,\nand prepared, 1668, a collected edition of his works (in Latin). In\nMolesworth's edition, 1839-45, the Latin works occupy five volumes and the\nEnglish eleven.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Or rather one; the treatise _On Human Nature_ consists of\nthe first thirteen chapters of the work, _Elements of Law, Natural and\nPolitic_, and the _De Corpore Politico_ of the remainder.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. on Hobbes, G.C. Robertson (Blackwood's Philosophical\nClassics, vol. x.), 1886; T\u00f6nnies in the _Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr\nwissenschaftliche Philosophie_, Jahrg. 3-5, 1879-81.]\n\nPhilosophy is formally defined by Hobbes as knowledge of effects from\ncauses and causes from effects by means of legitimate rational inference.\nThis implies the equal validity of the deductive and inductive\nmethods,--while Bacon had proclaimed the latter the most important\ninstrument of knowledge,--as well as the exclusion of theology based on\nrevelation from the domain of science. Philosophy is objectively defined as\nthe theory of body and motion: _all that exists is body; all that occurs,\nmotion_. Everything real is corporeal; this holds of points, lines, and\nsurfaces, which as the limits of body cannot be incorporeal, as well as\nof the mind and of God. The mind is merely a (for the senses too) refined\nbody, or, as it is stated in another place, a movement in certain parts\nof the organic body. All events, even internal events, the feelings and\npassions, are movements of material parts. \"Endeavor\" is a diminutive\nmotion, as the atom is the smallest of bodies; sensation and representation\nare changes in the perceiving body. Space is the idea of an existing thing\nas such, _i. e_., merely as existing outside the perceiving subject; time,\nthe idea of motion. All phenomena are corporeal motions, which take place\nwith mechanical necessity. Neither formal nor final causes exist, but only\nefficient causes. All that happens takes its origin in the activity of an\nexternal cause, and not in itself; a body at rest (or in motion) remains\nat rest (or in motion) forever, unless affected by another in a contrary\nsense. And as bodies and their changes constitute the only objects of\nphilosophy, so the mathematical method is the only correct method.\n\nThere are two kinds of bodies: natural bodies, which man finds in nature,\nand artificial bodies, which he himself produces. By the latter Hobbes\nrefers especially to the state as a human artefact. Man stands between the\ntwo as the most perfect natural body and an element in the political body.\nPhilosophy, therefore, besides the introductory _philosophia prima_, which\ndiscusses the underlying concepts, consists of three parts: physics,\nanthropology, and politics. Even the theory of the state is capable of\ndemonstrative treatment; moral phenomena are as subject to the law of\nmechanical causation as physical phenomena.\n\nThe first factor in the cognitive process is an impression on a\nsense-organ, which, occasioned by external motion, continues onward to the\nheart and from this center gives rise to a reaction. The perception or\nsensation which thus arises is entirely subjective, a function of the\nknower merely, and in no way a copy of the external movement. The\nproperties light, color, and sound, which we believe to be without us, are\nmerely internal phenomena dependent on outer and inner motions, but with no\nresemblance to them. Memory consists in the lingering effects or residuary\ntraces of perception; it is a sense or consciousness of having felt before\n_(sentire se sensisse meminisse est_), and ideas are distinguished from\nsensations as the perfect from the present tense. Experience is the\ntotality of perceptions retained in memory, together with a certain\nforesight of the future after the analogy of the past. These stages of\ncognition, which can yield prudence but not necessary and universal\nknowledge, are present in animals as well as men. The human capacity for\nscience is dependent on the faculty of speech; words are conventional\nsigns to facilitate the retention and communication of ideas. As the\nmemory-images denoted by words are weaker, fainter, and less clearly\ndiscriminated than the original sensations, it comes to pass that a number\nof similar ideas of memory receive a common name. Thus abstract general\nideas and generic concepts arise, to which nothing real corresponds, for\nin reality particulars alone exist. The universal is a human artefact. The\ncombination of words into propositions, being an addition or subtraction\nof arbitrary symbols or marks, is called judgment; the combination of\npropositions into syllogisms, inference; the united body of true or\ndemonstrated principles, science--hence mathematics is the type of all\nknowledge. In short, thought is nothing but calculation and the words with\nwhich we operate are mere counters; he who takes counters for coin is a\nfool. Animals lack reason, _i.e._, this power of combining artificial\nsymbols.\n\nHobbes's theory of the will is characterized by the same! sensationalism\nand mechanism as his theory of knowledge. All spiritual events originate\nin impressions of sense. Man responds \u0016to the action of objects by a double\nreaction, adding to the theoretical reaction of sensation a practical one\nin the feeling of pleasure or pain (according as the impression furthers or\nhinders the vital function), whence desire and aversion follow in respect\nto future experience. Further developments from the feelings experienced at\nthe signs of honor (the acknowledgment of superior power) and the contrary,\nare the affections of pride, courage, anger, of shame and repentance, of\nhope and love, of pity, etc. Deliberation is the alternation of different\nappetites; the final, victorious one which immediately precedes action is\ncalled will. Freedom cannot be predicated of the will, but only of the\naction, and even in this case it means simply the absence of external\nrestraints, the procedure of the action from the will of the agent; while\nthe action is necessary nevertheless. Every motion is the inevitable result\nof the sum of the preceding (including cerebral) motions.\n\nThings which we desire are termed good, and those which we shun, evil.\nNothing is good _per se_ or absolutely, but only relatively, for a given\nperson, place, time, or set of circumstances. Different things are good to\ndifferent men, and there is no objective, universal rule of good and\nevil, so long as men are considered as individuals, apart from society. A\ndefinite criterion of the good is first reached in the state: that is right\nwhich the law permits, that wrong which it forbids; good means that which\nis conducive to the general welfare. In the state of nature nothing is\nforbidden; nature gives every man a right to everything, and right is\ncoextensive with might. What, then, induces man to abandon the state of\nnature and enter the state of citizenship? The opinion of Aristotle and\nGrotius that the state originates in the social impulse is false; for man\nis essentially not social, but selfish, and nothing but regard for his own\ninterests bids him seek the protection of the state; the civil commonwealth\nis an artificial product of fear and prudence. The highest good is\nself-preservation; all other goods, as friendship, riches, wisdom,\nknowledge, and, above all, power, are valuable only as instruments of the\nformer. The precondition of well-being, for which each man strives by\nnature, is security for life and health. This is wanting in the state of\nnature, in which the passions govern; for the state of nature is a state\nof war of everyone against everyone _(bellum omnium contra omnes_). Each\nman strives for success and power, and, since he cannot trust his fellow,\nseeks to subdue, nay, to kill him; each looks upon his fellow as a wolf\nwhich he prefers to devour rather than submit himself to the like\noperation. Now, as no one is so weak as to be incapable of inflicting on\nhis fellows that worst of evils, death, and thus the strongest is unsafe,\nreason, in the interest of everyone, enjoins a search after peace and the\nestablishment of an ordered community. The conditions of peace are the\n\"laws of nature,\" which relate both to politics and to morals but which do\nnot attain their full binding authority until they become positive laws,\ninjunctions of the sovereign power. Peace is attainable only when each man,\nin return for the protection vouchsafed to him, gives up his natural right\nto all. The compact by which each renounces his natural liberty to do what\nhe pleases, provided all others are ready for the same renunciation,--to\nwhich are added, further, the laws of justice (sanctity of covenants),\nequity, gratitude, modesty, sociability, mercifulness, etc., whose\nopposites would bring back the state of nature,--this compact is secured\nagainst violation by the transfer of the general power and freedom to a\nsingle will (the will of an assembly or of an individual person), which\nthen represents the general will. The civil contract includes, then, two\nmoments: first, renunciation; second, irrevocable transference and\n(absolute) submission. The second unites the multitude into a civil\npersonality, the most perfect unity being vouchsafed by absolute monarchy.\nThe sovereign is the soul of the political body; the officials, its limbs;\nreward and punishment, its nerves; law and equity, its reason.\n\nThe social contract theory has often experienced democratic interpretation\nand application, both before and since Hobbes's time; and, in fact, it does\nnot include _per se_ the irrevocability of the transfer, the absoluteness\nof the sovereign power, and the monarchical head, which Hobbes considered\nindispensable in order to guard against the danger of anarchy. In every\nabridgment of the supreme power, whether by division or limitation, he sees\na step toward the renewal of the state of nature; and he defends with iron\nrigor the omnipotence of the state and the complete lack of legal status on\nthe part of all individuals in contrast with it. The citizen is not to obey\nhis own conscience, which has simply the value of a private opinion,\nbut the laws, as the public conscience; while the supreme ruler, on the\ncontrary, is superior to the civil laws, for it is he that decrees,\ninterprets, alters, and abrogates them. He is lord over the property, the\nlife, and the death of the citizens, and can do no one wrong. For he\nalone has retained his original natural right to all, which the rest have\nentirely and forever renounced. He must have regard, indeed, to the welfare\nof the people, but he is accountable to God alone. The obligation of the\nsubject to obey is extinguished in one case only,--when the civil power is\nincapable of providing him further with external and internal protection.\nFor the rest, Hobbes declares the existing public order the lawful one, the\nevils of arbitrary rule much more tolerable than the universal hostility of\nthe state of nature, and aversion to tyrants a disease inherited from the\nrepublicans of antiquity.\n\nThe sovereign, by the laws and by instruction, determines what is good and\nevil; he determines also what is to be believed. Religion unsanctioned by\nthe state is superstition. The temporal ruler is also the spiritual ruler,\nthe king, the chief pastor, and the clergy his servants. One and the same\ncommunity is termed state in so far as it consists of men, and church in so\nfar as it consists of Christian men (the ecclesiastical commonwealth). The\ndogmas which the law prescribes are to be received without investigation,\nto be swallowed like pills, without mastication.\n\nThe principle that every passion and every action is in its nature\nindifferent, that right and wrong exist only in the state, that the will\nof a despot is to determine what is moral and what immoral, has given just\noffense. Moreover, this was not, in fact, Hobbes's deepest conviction. Even\nwithout ascribing great importance to isolated statements,[1] it must\nbe admitted that his doctrine was interpreted more narrowly than it was\nintended. He does not say that no moral distinctions whatever exist before\nthe foundation of the state, but only that the state first supplies a fixed\ncriterion of the good. Moral ideas have a certain currency before this, but\nthey lack power to enforce themselves. Further, when he ascribes the origin\nof the state to self-interest, this does not mean that reason, conscience,\ngenerosity, and love for our fellows are entirely wanting in the state of\nnature, but only that they are not general enough, and, as against the\npassions, not strong enough to furnish a foundation for the edifice of the\nstate. Not only exaggeration in statement but also uncouthness of thought\nmay be forgiven the representative of a movement which is at once new and\nstrengthened by the consciousness of agreement with a naturalistic theory\nof knowledge and physics; and the vigor of execution compels admiration,\neven though many obscurities remain to be deplored _(e. g_., the relation\nof the two moral standards, the standard of the reason or natural law and\nthe standard of positive law). And recognition must be accorded to the\nsignificant kernel of doctrine formed, on the one hand, by the endeavor to\nseparate ethics from theology, and on the other, by the thoughts--which, it\nis true, were not perfectly brought out--that the moral is not founded on\na natural social impulse, but on a law of the reason, and first gains a\ndefinite criterion in society, and that the interests of the individual are\ninseparably connected with those of the community. In any case, the\nattempt to form a naturalistic theory of the state would be an undertaking\ndeserving of thanks, even if the promulgation of this theory had done no\nfurther service than to challenge refutation.\n\n[Footnote 1: God inscribed the divine or natural law (Do not that to\nanother, etc.) on the heart of man, when he gave him the reason to rule his\nactions. The laws of nature are, it is true, not always legally binding\n(_in foro externo_), but always and everywhere binding on the conscience\n(_in foro interno_). Justice is the virtue which we can measure by civil\nlaws; love, that which we measure by the law of nature merely. The ruler\n_ought_ to govern in accordance with the law of nature.]\n\n%(d) Lord Herbert of Cherbury.%--Between Bacon (1605, 1620) and Hobbes\n(1642, 1651) stands Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648), who, by his\nwork _De Veritate_ (1624),[1] became the founder of deism, that theory of\n\"natural religion,\" which, in opposition to the historical dogmatic faith\nof the Church theology, takes the reason, which is the same in all men,\nas its basis and morality for its content. Lord Herbert introduces his\nphilosophy of religion by a theory of knowledge which makes universal\nconsent the highest criterion of truth (_summa veritatis norma consensus\nuniversalis_), and bases knowledge on certain self-evident principles\n(_principia_), common to all men in virtue of a natural instinct, which\ngives safe guidance. These common notions (_notitiae communes_) precede all\nreflective inquiry, as well as all observation and experience, which would\nbe impossible without them. The most important among them are the religious\nand ethical maxims of conscience.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tractatus de Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a\nVerisimili, a Possibile, et a False_. Also, _De Religione Gentilium_, 1645,\ncomplete 1663.]\n\nThis natural instinct is both an impulse toward truth and a capacity for\ngood or impulse to self-preservation. The latter extends not only to the\nindividual but to all things with which the individual is connected, to the\nspecies, nay, to all the rest of the world, and its final goal is eternal\nhappiness: all natural capacities are directed toward the highest good or\ntoward God. The sense for the divine may indeed be lulled to sleep or led\nastray by our free will, but not eradicated. To be rational and to be\nreligious are inseparable; it is religion that distinguishes man from the\nbrute, and no people can be found in which it is lacking. If atheists\nreally exist, they are to be classed with the irrational and the insane.\n\nThe content of natural religion may be summed up in the following five\narticles, which all nations confess: 1. That there is a Supreme Being\n(_numen supremum_). 2. That he ought to be worshiped. 3. That virtue and\npiety are the chief elements of worship. 4. That man ought to repent of his\nsins. 5. That there are rewards and punishments in a future life. Besides\nthese general principles, on the discovery of which Lord Herbert greatly\nprides himself, the positive religions contain arbitrary additions, which\ndistinguish them from one another and which owe their origin, for the most\npart, to priestly deception, although the rhapsodies of the poets and the\ninventions of the philosophers have contributed their share. The essential\nprinciples of natural religion (God, virtue, faith, hope, love, and\nrepentance) come more clearly to light in Christianity than in the\nreligions of heathendom, where they are overgrown with myths and\nceremonies.\n\nThe _Religio Medici_ (1642) of Sir Thomas Browne shows similar tendencies.\n\n\n%9. Preliminary Survey.%\n\nIn the line of development from the speculations of Nicolas of Cusa to the\nestablishment of the English philosophy of nature, of religion, and of the\nstate by Bacon, Herbert, and Hobbes, and to the physics of Galileo, modern\nideas have manifested themselves with increasing clearness and freedom.\nHobbes himself shows thus early the influence of Descartes's decisive step,\nwith which the twilight gives place to the brightness of the morning. In\nDescartes the empiricism and sensationalism of the English is confronted by\nrationalism, to which the great thinkers of the Continent continue loyal.\nIn Britain, experience, on the Continent the reason is declared to be the\nsource of cognition; in the former, the point of departure is found in\nparticular impressions of sense, on the latter, in general concepts and\nprinciples of the understanding; there the method of observation is\ninculcated and followed, here, the method of deduction. This antithesis\nremained decisive in the development of philosophy down to Kant, so that it\nhas long been customary to distinguish two lines or schools, the Empirical\nand the Rationalistic, whose parallelism may be exhibited in the following\ntable (when only one date is given it indicates the appearance of the\nphilosopher's chief work):\n\n  _Empiricism.                         Rationalism_.\n  Bacon, 1620.                       (Nicolas, 1450; Bruno, 1584).\n  Hobbes, 1651.                      _Descartes_, died 1650.\n _Locke_, 1690 (1632-1704).           Spinoza, (1632-) 1677.\n  Berkeley, 1710.                    _Leibnitz_, 1710.\n  Hume, 1748.                         Wolff, died 1754.\n\nWe must not forget, indeed, the lively interchange of ideas between the\nschools (especially the influence of Descartes on Hobbes, and of the latter\non Spinoza; further, of Descartes on Locke, and of the latter on Leibnitz)\nwhich led to reciprocal approximation and enrichment. Berkeley and\nLeibnitz, from opposite presuppositions, arrive at the same idealistic\nconclusion--there is no real world of matter, but only spirits and ideas\nexist. Hume and Wolff conclude the two lines of development: under the\nformer, empiricism disintegrates into skepticism; under the latter,\nrationalism stiffens into a scholastic dogmatism, soon to run out into a\npopular eclecticism of common sense.\n\nIf we compare the mental characteristics of the three great nations which,\nin the period between Descartes and Kant, participated most productively in\nthe work of philosophy,--the Italians, with their receptive temperament and\nso active in many fields, exerted a decisive influence on its development\nand progress in the transition period alone,--it will be seen that the\nFrenchman tends chiefly to acuteness, the Englishman to clearness and\nsimplicity, the German to profundity of thought. France is the land of\nmathematical, England of practical, Germany of speculative thinkers; the\nfirst is the home of the skeptics, though of the enthusiasts as well; the\nsecond, of the realists; the third, of the idealists.\n\nThe English philosopher resembles a geographer who, with conscientious\ncare, outlines a map of the region through which he journeys; the\nFrenchman, an anatomist who, with steady stroke, lays bare the nerves and\nmuscles of the organism; the German, a mountaineer who loses in clear\nvision of particular objects as much as he gains in loftiness of position\nand extent of view. The Englishman describes the given reality, the\nFrenchman analyses it, the German transfigures it.\n\nThe English thinker keeps as close as possible to phenomena, and the\nprinciples which he uses in the explanation of phenomena themselves lie in\nthe realm of concrete experience. He explains one phenomenon by another; he\nclassifies and arranges the given material without analyzing it; he keeps\nconstantly in touch with the popular consciousness. His reverence for\nreality, as this presents itself to him, and his distrust of far-reaching\nabstraction, are so strong that it is enough for him to take his bearings\nfrom the real, and to give a true reproduction of it, while he willingly\nrenounces the ambition to form it anew in concepts. With this respect for\nconcrete reality he combines a similar reverence for ethical postulates.\nWhen the development of a given line of thought threatens to bring him into\nconflict with practical life, he is honest enough to draw the conclusions\nwhich follow from his premises and to give them expression, but he avoids\nthe collision by a simple compromise, shutting up the refinements of\nphilosophy in the study and yielding in practice to the guidance of\nnatural instinct and conscience. His support, therefore, of theories which\ncontradict current views in morals is free from the levity in which the\nFrenchman indulges. Life and thought are separate fields, contradictions\nbetween them are borne in patience, and if science draws its material from\nlife it shows itself grateful for the favor by giving life the benefit of\nthe useful outcome of its labors, and, at the same time, shielding it from\nthe revolutionary or disintegrating effect of its doubtful paradoxes.\n\nWhile the deliberate craft of English philosophy does not willingly lose\nsight of the shores of the concrete world, French thought sails boldly and\nconfidently out into the open sea of abstraction. It is not strange that\nit finds the way to the principles more rapidly than the way back to\nphenomena. A free road, a fresh start, a straight course--such is the\nmotto of French thinking. Whatever is inconsistent with rectilinearity is\nignored, or opposed as unfitting. The line drawn by Descartes through the\nworld between matter and spirit, and that by Rousseau between nature\nand culture, are distinctive of the philosophical character of their\ncountrymen. Dualism is to them entirely congenial; it satisfies their\nneed for clearness, and with this they are content. Antithesis is in the\nFrenchman's blood; he thinks in it and speaks in it, in the salon or on the\nplatform, in witty jest or in scientific earnestness of thought. Either A\nor not-A, and there is no middle ground. This habit of precision and\nsharp analysis facilitates the formation of closed parties, whereas each\nindividual German, in philosophy as in politics, forms a party of his own.\nThe demand for the removal of the rubbish of existing systems and the\nsanguine return to the sources, give French philosophy an unhistorical,\nradical, and revolutionary character. Minds of the second order, who are\nincapable of taking by themselves the step from that which is given to the\nsources, prove their radicalism by following down to the roots that which\nothers have begun (so Condillac and the sensationalism of Locke). Moreover,\nphilosophical principles are to be translated into action; the thinker has\nshown himself the doctrinaire in his destructive analysis of that which\nis given, so, also, he hopes to play the dictator by overturning existing\ninstitutions and establishing a new order of things,--only his courageous\nendeavor flags as soon in the region of practice as in that of theory.\n\nThe German lacks the happy faculty, which distinguishes the two nations\njust discussed, of isolating a problem near at hand, and he is accustomed\nto begin his system with Leda's egg; but, by way of compensation, he\ncombines the lofty flight of the French with the phlegmatic endurance of\nthe English, _i.e._, he seeks his principles far above experience, but,\ninstead of stopping with the establishment of points of view or when he\nhas set the note, he carries his principles through in detail with loving\nindustry and comprehensive architectonic skill. While common sense turns\nthe scale with the English and analytical thought with the French, the\nGerman allows the fancy and the heart to take an important part in the\ndiscussion, though in such a way that the several faculties work together\nand in harmony. While in France rationalism, mysticism, and the philosophy\nof the heart were divided among different thinkers (Descartes, Malebranche\nand Pascal, Rousseau), there is in every German philosopher something of\nall three. The skeptical Kant provides a refuge for the postulates of\nthought in the sanctuary of faith; the earnest, energetic Fichte, toward\nthe end of his life, takes his place among the mystics; Schelling thinks\nwith the fancy and dreams with the understanding; and under the broad cloak\nof the Hegelian dialectic method, beside the reflection of the Critique of\nReason and of the Science of Knowledge, the fancies of the Philosophy of\nNature, the deep inwardness of B\u00f6hme, even the whole wealth of empirical\nfact, found a place. As synthesis is predominant in his view of things, so\na harmonizing, conciliatory tendency asserts itself in his relations to his\npredecessors: the results of previous philosophers are neither discarded\nout of hand nor accepted in the mass, but all that appears in any way\nuseful or akin to the new system is wrought in at its proper place, though\noften with considerable transformation. In this work of mediation there is\nconsiderable loss in definiteness, the just and comprehensive consideration\nof the most diverse interests not always making good the loss. And since\nsuch a philosophy, as we have already shown, engages the whole man, its\ndisciple has neither impulse nor strength left for reforming labors; while,\non the other hand, he perceives no external call to undertake them, since\nhe views the world through the glasses of his system. Thus philosophy in\nGermany, pursued chiefly by specialists, remains a professional affair, and\nhas not exercised a direct transforming influence on life (for Fichte, who\nhelped to philosophize the French out of Germany, was an exception); but\nits influence has been the greater in the special sciences, which in\nGermany more than any other land are handled in a philosophic spirit.\n\nThe mental characteristics of these nations are reflected also in their\nmethods of presentation. The style of the English philosopher is sober,\ncomprehensible, diffuse, and slightly wearisome. The French use a fluent,\nelegant, lucid style which entertains and dazzles by its epigrammatic\nphrases, in which not infrequently the epigram rules the thought. The\nGerman expresses his solid, thoughtful positions in a form which is at\nonce ponderous and not easily understood; each writer constructs his own\nterminology, with a liberal admixture of foreign expressions, and the\nlength of his paragraphs is exceeded only by the thickness of his books.\nThese national distinctions may be traced even in externals. The Englishman\nmakes his divisions as they present themselves at first thought, and rather\nfrom a practical than from a logical point of view. The analytic Frenchman\nprefers dichotomy, while trichotomy corresponds to the synthetic,\nsystematic character of German thinking; and Kant's na\u00efve delight, because\nin each class the third category unites its two predecessors, has been\noften experienced by many of his countrymen at the sight of their own\ntrichotomies.\n\nThe division of labor in the pre-Kantian philosophy among these three\nnationalities entirely agrees with the account given of the peculiarities\nof their philosophical endowment. The beginning falls to the share of\nFrance; Locke receives that tangled skein, the problem of knowledge,\nfrom the hand of Descartes, and passes it on to Leibnitz; and while the\nIllumination in all three countries is converting the gold inherited from\nLocke and Leibnitz into small coin, the solution of the riddle rings out\nfrom K\u00f6nigsberg.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nFROM DESCARTES TO KANT.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nDESCARTES.\n\nThe long conflict with Scholasticism, which had been carried on with ever\nincreasing energy and ever sharper weapons, was brought by Descartes to a\nvictorious close. The new movement, long desired, long sought, and prepared\nfor from many directions, at length appears, ready and well-established.\nDescartes accomplishes everything needful with the sure simplicity of\ngenius. He furnishes philosophy with a settled point of departure in\nself-consciousness, offers her a method sure to succeed in deduction from\nclear and distinct conceptions, and assigns her the mechanical explanation\nof nature as her most imperative and fruitful mission.\n\nRen\u00e9 Descartes was born at La Haye in Touraine, in 1596, and died at\nStockholm in 1650. Of the studies taught in the Jesuit school at La Fl\u00e8che,\nmathematics alone was able to satisfy his craving for clear and certain\nknowledge. The years 1613-17 he spent in Paris; then he enlisted in the\nmilitary service of the Netherlands, and, in 1619, in that of Bavaria.\nWhile in winter quarters at Neuburg, he vowed a pilgrimage to Loretto if\nthe Virgin would show him a way of escape from his tormenting doubts; and\nmade the saving discovery of the \"foundations of a wonderful science.\"\nAt the end of four years this vow was fulfilled. On his return to Paris\n(1625), he was besought by his learned friends to give to the world his\nepoch-making ideas. Though, to escape the distractions of society, he kept\nhis residence secret, as he had done during his first stay in Paris, and\nfrequently changed it, he was still unable to secure the complete privacy\nand leisure for scientific work which he desired. Therefore he went to\nHolland in 1629, and spent twenty years of quiet productivity in Amsterdam,\nFranecker, Utrecht, Leeuwarden, Egmond, Harderwijk, Leyden, the palace of\nEndegeest, and five other places. His work here was interrupted only by\na few journeys, but much disturbed in its later years by annoying\ncontroversies with the theologian Gisbert Vo\u00ebtius of Utrecht, with Regius,\na pupil who had deserted him, and with professors from Leyden. His\ncorrespondence with his French friends was conducted through P\u00e8re Mersenne.\nIn 1649 he yielded to pressing invitations from Queen Christina of Sweden\nand removed to Stockholm. There his weak constitution was not adequate to\nthe severity of the climate, and death overtook him within a few months.\n\nThe two decades of retirement in the Netherlands were Descartes's\nproductive period. His motive in developing and writing out his thoughts\nwas, essentially, the desire not to disappoint the widely spread belief\nthat he was in possession of a philosophy more certain than the common one.\nThe work entitled _Le Monde_, begun in 1630 and almost completed, remained\nunprinted, as the condemnation of Galileo (1632) frightened our philosopher\nfrom publication; fragments of it only, and a brief summary, appeared\nafter the author's death. The chief works, the _Discourse on Method_, the\n_Meditations on the First Philosophy_, and the _Principles of Philosophy_\nappeared between 1637 and 1644,--the _Discours de la M\u00e9thode_ in 1637,\ntogether with three dissertations (the \"Dioptrics,\" the \"Meteors,\" and the\n\"Geometry\"), under the common title, _Essais Philosophiques_. To the (six)\n_Meditationes de Prima Philosophia_, published in 1641, and dedicated to\nthe Paris Sorbonne, are appended the objections of various savants to whom\nthe work had been communicated in manuscript, together with Descartes's\nrejoinders. He himself considered the criticisms of Arnauld, printed fourth\nin order, as the most important. The Third Objections are from Hobbes, the\nFifth from Gassendi, the First, which were also the first received, from\nthe theologian Caterus of Antwerp, while the Second and Sixth, collected by\nMersenne, are from various theologians and mathematicians. In the second\nedition there were added, further, the Seventh Objections, by the Jesuit\nBourdin, and the Replies of the author thereto. The four books of the\n_Principia Philosophiae_, published in 1644 and dedicated to Elizabeth,\nCountess Palatine, give a systematic presentation of the new philosophy.\nThe _Discourse on Method_ appeared, 1644, in a Latin translation, the\n_Meditations_ and the _Principles_ in French, in 1647. The _Treatise on the\nPassions_ was published in 1650; the _Letters_, 1657-67, in French, 1668,\nin Latin. The _Opera Postuma_, 1701, beside the _Compendium of Music_\n(written in 1618) and other portions of his posthumous writings, contain\nthe \"Rules for the Direction of the Mind,\" supposed to have been written in\n1629, and the \"Search for Truth by the Light of Nature.\" The complete works\nhave been often published, both in Latin and in French. The eleven volume\nedition of Cousin appeared in 1824-26.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Of the many treatises on the philosophy of Descartes those of\nC. Schaarschmidt (_Descartes und Spinoza_, 1850) and J.H. L\u00f6we, 1855, may\nbe mentioned. Further, M. Heinze has discussed _Die Sittenlehre des\nDescartes_, 1872; Ed. Grimm, _Descartes' Lehre von den angeborenen\nIdeen_, 1873; G. Glogau, _Darlegung und Kritik des Grundgedankens der\nCartesianisch. Metaphysik (Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxiii. p.\n209 _seq_.), 1878; Paul Natorp, _Descartes' Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1882;\nand Kas. Twardowski, _Idee und Perception_ in Descartes, 1892. In French,\nFrancisque Bouillier (_Histoire de la Philosophie Cart\u00e9sienne_, 1854) and\nE. Saisset (_Pr\u00e9curseurs et Disciples de Descartes_, 1862) have written\non Cartesianism. [The _Method, Meditations, and Selections from the\nPrinciples_ have been translated into English by John Veitch, 5th ed.,\n1879, and others since; and H.A.P. Torrey has published _The Philosophy\nof Descartes in Extracts from his Writings_, 1892 (Sneath's Modern\nPhilosophers). The English reader may be referred, also, to Mahaffy's\n_Descartes_, 1880, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics; to the article\n\"Cartesianism,\" _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed., vol. v., by Edward\nCaird; and, for a complete discussion, to the English translation of\nFischer's _Descartes and his School_' by J.P. Gordy, 1887.--TR.]]\n\nWe begin our discussion with Descartes's no\u00ebtical and metaphysical\nprinciples, and then take up in order his doctrine of nature and of man.\n\n\n%1. The Principles%.\n\nThat which passes nowadays for science, and is taught as such in the\nschools, is nothing but a mass of disconnected, uncertain, and often\ncontradictory opinions. A principle of unity and certainty is entirely\nlacking. If anything permanent and irrefutable is to be accomplished in\nscience, everything hitherto considered true must be thoroughly demolished\nand built up anew. For we come into the world as children and we form\njudgments of things, or repeat them after others, before we have come into\nthe full possession of our intellectual powers; so that it is no wonder\nthat we are filled with a multitude of prejudices, from which we can\nthoroughly escape only by considering everything doubtful which shows the\nleast sign of uncertainty. Let us renounce, therefore, all our old views,\nin order later to accept better ones in their stead; or, perchance, to\ntake the former up again after they shall have stood the test of rational\ncriticism. The recognized precaution, never to put complete confidence in\nthat which has once deceived us, holds of our relation to the senses as\nelsewhere. It is certain that they sometimes deceive us--perhaps they do so\nalways. Again, we dream every day of things which nowhere exist, and there\nis no certain criterion by which to distinguish our dreams from our waking\nmoments,--what guarantee have we, then, that we are not always dreaming?\nTherefore, our doubt must first of all be directed to the existence of\nsense-objects. Nay, even mathematics must be suspected in spite of the\napparent certainty of its axioms and demonstrations, since controversy\nand error are found in it also.\n\nI doubt or deny, then, that the world is what it appears to be, that there\nis a God, that external objects exist, that I have a body, that twice\ntwo are four. One thing, however, it is impossible for me to bring into\nquestion, namely, that I myself, who exercise this doubting function,\nexist. There is one single point at which doubt is forced to halt--at the\ndoubter, at the self-existence of the thinker. I can doubt everything\nexcept that I doubt, and that, in doubting, I am. Even if a superior being\nsought to deceive me in all my thinking, he could not succeed unless I\nexisted, he could not cause me not to exist so long as I thought. To be\ndeceived means to think falsely; but that something is thought, no matter\nwhat it be, is no deception. It might be true, indeed, that nothing at all\nexisted; but then there would be no one to conceive this non-existence.\nGranted that everything may be a mistake; yet the being mistaken, the\nthinking is not a mistake. Everything is denied, but the denier remains.\nThe whole content of consciousness is destroyed; consciousness itself, the\ndoubting activity, the being of the thinker, is indestructible. _Cogitatio\nsola a me divelli nequit_. Thus the settled point of departure required for\nknowledge is found in the _self-certitude of the thinking ego_. From the\nfact that I doubt, _i.e._, think, it follows that I, the doubter, the\nthinker, am. _Cogito, ergo sum_ is the first and most certain of all\ntruths.\n\nThe principle, \"I think, therefore I am,\" is not to be considered a\ndeduction from the major premise, \"Whatever thinks exists.\" It is rather\ntrue that this general proposition is derived from the particular and\nearlier one. I must first realize in my own experience that, as thinking, I\nexist, before I can reach the general conclusion that thought and existence\nare inseparable. This fundamental truth is thus not a syllogism, but a\nnot further deducible, self-evident, immediate cognition, a pure\nintuition--_sum cogitans_. Now, if my existence is revealed by my activity\nof thought, if my thought is my being, and the converse, if in me thought\nand existence are identical, then I am a being whose essence consists in\nthinking. I am a spirit, an ego, a rational soul. My existence follows only\nfrom my thinking, not from any chance action. _Ambulo ergo sum_ would not\nbe valid, but _mihi videor_ or _puto me ambulare, ergo sum_. If I believe\nI am walking, I may undoubtedly be deceived concerning the outward action\n(as, for instance, in dreams), but never concerning my inward belief.\n_Cogitatio_ includes all the conscious activities of the mind, volition,\nemotion, and sensation, as well as representation and cognition; they are\nall _modi cogitandi_. The existence of the mind is therefore the most\ncertain of all things. We know the soul better than the body. It is for\nthe present the only certainty, and every other is dependent on this, the\nhighest of all.\n\nWhat, then, is the peculiarity of this first and most certain knowledge\nwhich renders it self-evident and independent of all proof, which makes\nus absolutely unable to doubt it? Its entire clearness and distinctness.\nAccordingly, I may conclude that everything which I perceive as clearly and\ndistinctly as the _cogito ergo sum_ is also true, and I reach this general\nrule, _omne est verum, quod clare et distincte percipio_. So far, then, we\nhave gained three things: a challenge; to be inscribed over the portals\nof certified knowledge, _de omnibus dubitandum_; a basal truth, _sum\ncogitans_; a criterion of truth, _clara et distinct a perceptio_.\n\nThe doubt of Descartes is not the expression of a resigned spirit which\nrenounces the unattainable; it is precept, not doctrine, the starting point\nof philosophy, not its conclusion, a methodological instrument in the hand\nof a strong and confident longing for truth, which makes use of doubt to\nfind the indubitable. It is not aimed at the possibility of attaining\nknowledge, but at the opinion that it has already been attained, at the\ncredulity of the age, at its excessive tendency toward historical and\npoly-historical study, which confuses the acquisition and handing down of\ninformation with knowledge of the truth. That knowledge alone is certain\nwhich is self-attained and self-tested--and this cannot be learned\nor handed down; it can only be rediscovered through examination and\nexperience. Instead of taking one's own unsupported conjectures or the\nopinions of others as a guide, the secret of the search for truth is to\nbecome independent and of age, to think for one's self; and the only remedy\nagainst the dangers of self-deception and the ease of repetition is to be\nfound in doubting everything hitherto considered true. This is the meaning\nof the Cartesian doubt, which is more comprehensive and more thorough\nthan the Baconian. Descartes disputed only the certitude of the knowledge\npreviously attained, not the possibility of knowledge--for of the latter no\nman is more firmly convinced than he. He is a rationalist, not a skeptic.\nThe intellect is assured against error just as soon as, freed from\nhindrances, it remains true to itself, as it puts forth all its powers and\nlets nothing pass for truth which is not clearly and distinctly known.\nDescartes demands the same thing for the human understanding as Rousseau at\na later period for the heart: a return to uncorrupted nature. This faith in\nthe unartificial, the original, the natural, this radical and naturalistic\ntendency is characteristically French. The purification of the mind, its\ndeliverance from the rubbish of scholastic learning, from the pressure of\nauthority, and from inert acceptance of the thinking of others--this is\nall. Descartes finds the clearest proof of the mind's capacity for truth in\nmathematics, whose trustworthiness he never seriously questioned, but only\nhypothetically, in order to exhibit the still higher certainty of the \"I\nthink, therefore I am.\" He wants to give philosophy the stable character\nwhich had so impressed him in mathematics when he was a boy, and recommends\nher, therefore, not merely the evidence of mathematics as a general\nexample, but the mathematical method for definite imitation. Metaphysics,\nlike mathematics, must derive its conclusions by deduction from\nself-evident principles. Thus the geometrical method begins its rule in\nphilosophy, a rule not always attended with beneficial results.\n\nWith this criterion of truth Descartes advances to the consideration of\nideas. He distinguishes volition and judgment from ideas in the narrow\nsense (_imagines_), and divides the latter, according to their origin, into\nthree classes: _ideae innatae, adventitiae, a me ipso factae_, considering\nthe second class, the \"adventitious\" ideas, the most numerous, but the\nfirst, the \"innate\" ideas, the most important. No idea is higher or clearer\nthan the idea of God or the most perfect being. Whence comes this idea?\nThat every idea must have a cause, follows from the \"clear and distinct\"\nprinciple that nothing produces nothing. It follows from this same\nprinciple, _ex nihilo nihil fit_, however, that the cause must contain as\nmuch reality or perfection--_realitas_ and _perfectio_ are synonymous--as\nthe effect, for otherwise the overplus would have come from nothing. So\nmuch (\"objective,\" representative) reality contained in an idea, so much or\nmore (\"formal,\" actual) reality must be contained in its cause. The idea\nof God as infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, and creative\nsubstance, has not come to me through the senses, nor have I formed it\nmyself. The power to conceive a being more perfect than myself, can have\nonly come from someone who is more perfect in reality than I. Since I know\nthat the infinite contains more reality than the finite, I may conclude\nthat the idea of the infinite has not been derived from the idea of the\nfinite by abstraction and negation; it precedes the latter, and I become\nconscious of my defects and my finitude only by comparison with the\nabsolute perfection of God. This idea, then, must have been implanted in me\nby God himself. The idea of God is an original endowment; it is as innate\nas the idea of myself. However incomplete it may be, it is still\nsufficient to give a knowledge of God's existence, although not a perfect\ncomprehension of his being, just as a man may skirt a mountain without\nencircling it.\n\nDescartes brings in the idea of God in order to escape solipsism. So long\nas the self-consciousness of the ego remained the only certainty, there was\nno conclusive basis for the assumption that anything exists beyond self,\nthat the ideas which apparently come from without are really occasioned by\nexternal things and do not spring from the mind itself. For our natural\ninstinct to refer them to objects without us might well be deceptive. It is\nonly through the idea of God, and by help of the principle that the cause\nmust contain at least as much reality as the effect, that I am taken beyond\nmyself and assured that I am not the only thing in the world. For as this\nidea contains more of representative, than I of actual reality, I cannot\nhave been its cause.\n\nTo this empirical argument, which derives God's existence from our idea\nof God (from the fact that we have an idea of him), Descartes joins the\n(modified) ontological argument of Anselm, which deduces the existence of\nGod from the concept of God. While the ideas of all other things include\nonly the possibility of existence, necessary existence is inseparable from\nthe concept of the most perfect being. God cannot be thought apart from\nexistence; he has the ground of his existence in himself; he is _a se_\nor _causa sui_. Finally, Descartes adds a third argument. The idea of\nperfections which I do not possess can only have been imparted to me by a\nmore perfect being than I, which has bestowed on me all that I am and\nall that I am capable of becoming. If I had created myself, I would have\nbestowed upon myself these absent perfections also. And the existence of a\nplurality of causes is negatived by the supreme perfection which I conceive\nin the idea of God, the indivisible unity of his attributes. Among the\nattributes of God his veracity is of special importance. It is impossible\nthat he should will to deceive us; that he should be the cause of our\nerrors. God would be a deceiver, if he had endowed us with a reason to\nwhich error should appear true, even when it uses all its foresight in\navoiding it and assents only to that which it clearly and distinctly\nperceives. Error is man's own fault; he falls into it only when he misuses\nthe divine gift of knowledge, which includes its own standard. Thus\nDescartes finds new confirmation for his test of truth in the _veracitas\ndei_. Erdmann has given a better defense of Descartes than the philosopher\nhimself against the charge that this is arguing in a circle, inasmuch as\nthe existence of God is proved by the criterion of truth, and then the\nlatter by the former: The criterion of certitude is the _ratio cognoscendi_\nof God's existence; God is the _ratio essendi_ of the criterion of\ncertitude. In the order of existence God is first, he creates the reason\ntogether with its criterion; in the order of knowledge the criterion\nprecedes, and God's existence follows from it. Descartes himself endeavors\nto avoid the circle by making _intuitive_ knowledge self-evident, and by\nnot bringing in the appeal to God's veracity in _demonstrative_ knowledge\nuntil, in reflective thought, we no longer have each separate link in the\nchain of proof present to our minds with full intuitive certainty, but only\nremember that we have previously understood the matter with clearness and\ndistinctness.\n\nOur ideas represent in part things, in part qualities. Substance is defined\nby the concept of independence as _res quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re\nindigeat ad existendum_; a pregnant definition with which the concept of\nsubstance gains the leadership in metaphysics, which it held till the time\nof Hume and Kant, sharing it then with the conception of cause or, rather,\nrelinquishing it to the latter. The Spinozistic conclusion that, according\nto the strict meaning of this definition, there is but one substance, God,\nwho, as _causa sui_, has absolutely no need of any other thing in order to\nhis existence, was announced by Descartes himself. If created substances\nare under discussion, the term does not apply to them in the same sense\n(not _univoce_) as when we speak of the infinite substance; created beings\nrequire a different explanation, they are things which need for their\nexistence only the co-operation of God, and have no need of one another.\nSubstance is cognized through its qualities, among which one is pre-eminent\nfrom the fact that it expresses the essence or nature of the thing, and\nthat it is conceived through itself, without the aid of the others, while\nthey presuppose it and cannot be thought without it. The former fundamental\nproperties are termed attributes, and these secondary ones, modes or\naccidents. Position, figure, motion, are contingent properties of\nbody; they presuppose that it is extended or spatial; they are _modi\nextensionis_, as feeling, volition, desire, representation, and judgment\nare possible only in a conscious being, and hence are merely modifications\nof thought. Extension is the essential or constitutive attribute of body,\nand thought of mind. Body is never without extension, and mind never\nwithout thought--_mens semper cogitat_. Guided by the self-evident\nprinciple that the non-existent has no properties, we argue from a\nperceived quality to a substance as its possessor or support. Substances\nare distinct from one another when we can clearly and distinctly cognize\none without the other. Now, we can adequately conceive mind without a\ncorporeal attribute and body without a spiritual one; the former has\nnothing of extension in it, the latter nothing of thought: hence thinking\nsubstance and extended substance are entirely distinct and have nothing\nin common. Matter and mind are distinct _realiter_, matter and extension\n_idealiter_ merely. Thus we attain three clear and distinct ideas, three\neternal verities: _substantia infinita sive deus, substantia finita\ncogitans sive mens, substantia extensa sive corpus_.\n\nBy this abrupt contraposition of body and mind as reciprocally independent\nsubstances, Descartes founded that dualism, as whose typical representative\nhe is still honored or opposed. This dualism between the material and\nspiritual worlds belongs to those standpoints which are valid without being\nultimate truth; on the pyramid of metaphysical knowledge it takes a high,\nbut not the highest, place. We may not rest in it, yet it retains a\npermanent value in opposition to subordinate theories. It is in the\nright against a materialism which still lacks insight into the essential\ndistinction between mind and matter, thought and extension, consciousness\nand motion; it loses its validity when, with a full consideration and\nconservation of the distinction between these two spheres, we succeed in\nbridging over the gulf between them, whether this is accomplished through\na philosophy of identity, like that of Spinoza and Schelling, or by an\nidealism, like that of Leibnitz or Fichte. In any case philosophy retains\nas an inalienable possession the negative conclusion, that, in view of the\nheterogeneity of consciousness and motion, the inner life is not reducible\nto material phenomena. This clear and simple distinction, which sets bounds\nto every confusion of spiritual and material existence, was an act of\nemancipation; it worked on the sultry intellectual atmosphere of the time\nwith the purifying and illuminating power of a lightning flash. We shall\nfind the later development of philosophy starting from the Cartesian\ndualism.\n\nDescartes himself looked upon the fundamental principles which have now\nbeen discussed as merely the foundation for his life work, as the entrance\nportal to his cosmology. Posterity has judged otherwise; it finds his chief\nwork in that which he considered a mere preparation for it. The start from\ndoubt, the self-certitude of the thinking ego, the rational criterion of\ncertitude, the question of the origin of ideas, the concept of substance,\nthe essential distinction between conscious activity and corporeal being,\nand, also, the principle of thoroughgoing mechanism in the material world\n(from his philosophy of nature)--these are the thoughts which assure his\nimmortality. The vestibule has brought the builder more fame, and has\nproved more enduring, than the temple: of the latter only the ruins remain;\nthe former has remained undestroyed through the centuries.\n\n\n%2. Nature.%\n\nWhat guarantee have we for the existence of material objects affecting our\nsenses? That the ideas of sense do not come from ourselves, is shown by\nthe fact that it is not in our power to determine the objects which we\nperceive, or the character of our perception of them. The supposition that\nGod has caused our perceptions directly, or by means of something which has\nno resemblance whatever to an external object extended in three dimensions\nand movable, is excluded by the fact that God is not a deceiver. In\nreliance on God's veracity we may accept as true whatever the reason\ndeclares concerning body, though not all the reports of the senses,\nwhich so often deceive us. At the instance of the senses we clearly and\ndistinctly perceive matter distinct from our mind and from God, extended\nin three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, with variously formed and\nvariously moving parts, which occasion in us sensations of many kinds. The\nbelief that perception makes known things as they really are is a prejudice\nof sense to be discarded; on the contrary, it merely informs us concerning\nthe utility or harmfulness of objects, concerning their relation to man as\na being composed of soul and body. (The body is that material thing which\nis very intimately joined with the mind, and occasions in the latter\ncertain feelings, _e.g._, pain, which as merely cogitative it would not\nhave.) Sense qualities, as color, sound, odor, cannot constitute the\nessence of matter, for their variation or loss changes nothing in it; I can\nabstract from them without the material thing disappearing.[1] There is one\nproperty, however, extensive magnitude (_quantitas_), whose removal would\nimply the destruction of matter itself. Thus I perceive by pure thought\nthat the essence of matter consists in extension, in that which constitutes\nthe object of geometry, in that magnitude which is divisible, figurable,\nand movable. This thesis (_corpus = extensio sive spatium_) is next\ndefended by Descartes against several objections. In reply to the objection\ndrawn from the condensation and rarefaction of bodies, he urges that the\napparent increase or decrease in extension is, in fact, a mere change of\nfigure; that the rarefaction of a body depends on the increase in size of\nthe intervals between its parts, and the entrance into them of foreign\nbodies, just as a sponge swells up when its pores become filled with water\nand, therefore, enlarged. The demand that the pores, and the bodies which\nforce their way into them, should always be perceptible to the senses, is\ngroundless. He meets the second point, that we call extension by itself\n_space_, and not body, by maintaining that the distinction between\nextension and corporeal substance is a distinction in thought, and not in\nreality; that attribute and substance, mathematical and physical bodies,\nare not distinct in fact but only in our thought of them. We apply the\nterm space to extension in general, as an abstraction, and body to a given\nindividual, determinate, limited extension. In reality, wherever extension\nis, there substance is also,--the non-existent has no extension,--and\nwherever space is, there matter is also. Empty space does not exist.\nWhen we say a vessel is empty, we mean that the bodies which fill it are\nimperceptible; if it were absolutely empty its sides would touch. Descartes\nargues against the atomic theory and against the finitude of the world, as\nhe argues against empty space: matter, as well as space, has no smallest,\nindivisible parts, and the extension of the world has no end. In the\nidentification of space and matter the former receives fullness from\nthe latter, and the latter unlimitedness from the former, both internal\nunlimitedness (endless divisibility) and external (boundlessness). Hence\nthere are not several matters but only one (homogeneous) matter, and only\none (illimitable) world.\n\n[Footnote 1: They are merely subjective states in the perceiver, and\nentirely unlike the motions which give rise to them, although there is\na certain agreement, as the differences and variations in sensation are\nparalleled by those in the object.]\n\nMatter is divisible, figurable, movable quantity. Natural science needs no\nother principles than these indisputably true conceptions, by which all\nnatural phenomena may be explained, and must employ no others. The most\nimportant is motion, on which all the diversity of forms depends. Corporeal\nbeing has been shown to be extension; corporeal becoming is motion. Motion\nis defined as \"the transporting of one part of matter, or of one body, from\nthe vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it,\nor which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies.\" This\nseparation of bodies is reciprocal, hence it is a matter of choice which\nshall be considered at rest. Besides its own proper motion in reference to\nthe bodies in its immediate vicinity, a body can participate in very many\nother motions: the traveler walking back and forth on the deck of a ship,\nfor instance, in the motion of the vessel, of the waves, and of the earth.\nThe common view of motion as an activity is erroneous; since it requires\nforce not only to set in motion bodies which are at rest, but also to stop\nthose which are in motion, it is clear that motion implies no more activity\nthan rest. Both are simply different states of matter. Since there is no\nempty space, each motion spreads to a whole circle of bodies: A forces B\nout of its place, B drives out C, and so on, until Z takes up the position\nwhich A has left.\n\nThe ultimate cause of motion is God. He has created bodies with an\noriginal measure of motion and rest, and, in accordance with his immutable\ncharacter, he preserves this quantity of motion unchanged: it remains\nconstant in the world as a whole, though it varies in individual bodies.\nFor with the power to create or destroy motion bodies lack, further, the\npower to alter their quantity of motion. By the side of God, the primary\ncause of motion, the laws of motion appear as secondary causes. The first\nof these is the one become familiar under the name, law of inertia:\nEverything continues of itself in the state (of motion or rest) in which it\nis, and changes its state only as a result of some extraneous cause. The\nsecond of these laws, which are so valuable in mechanics, runs: Every\nportion of matter tends to continue a motion which has been begun in the\nsame direction, hence in a straight line, and changes its direction only\nunder the influence of another body, as in the case of the circle above\ndescribed. Descartes bases these laws on the unchangeableness of God and\nthe simplicity of his world-conserving (_i.e._, constantly creative)\nactivity. The third law relates to the communication of motion; but\nDescartes does not recognize the equality of action and reaction as\nuniversally as the fact demands. If a body in motion meets another body,\nand its power (to continue its motion in a straight line) is less than the\nresistance of the other on which it has impinged, it retains its motion,\nbut in a different direction: it rebounds in the opposite direction. If, on\nthe contrary, its force is greater, it carries the other body along with\nit, and loses so much of its own motion as it imparts to the latter. The\nseven further rules added to these contain much that is erroneous. As\n_actio in distans_ is rejected, all the phenomena of motion are traced back\nto pressure and impulse. The distinction between fluid and solid bodies is\nbased on the greater or less mobility of their parts.\n\nThe leading principle in the special part of the Cartesian physics,--we\ncan only briefly sketch it,--which embraces, first, celestial, and, then,\nterrestial phenomena, is the axiom that we cannot estimate God's power and\ngoodness too highly, nor ourselves too meanly. It is presumptuous to seek\nto comprehend the purposes of God in creation, to consider ourselves\nparticipants in his plans, to imagine that things exist simply for our\nsake--there are many things which no man sees and which are of advantage\nto none. Nothing is to be interpreted teleologically, but all must be\ninterpreted from clearly known attributes, hence purely mechanically.\nAfter treating of the distances of the various heavenly bodies, of the\nindependent light of the sun and the fixed stars and the reflected light of\nthe planets, among which the earth belongs, Descartes discusses the motion\nof the heavenly bodies. In reference to the motion of the earth he seeks a\nmiddle course between the theories of Copernicus and Tycho Brah\u00e9. He agrees\nwith Copernicus in the main point, but, in reliance on his definition\nof motion, maintains that the earth is at rest, viz., in respect to its\nimmediate surroundings. It is clear that the harmony of his views with\nthose of the Church (though it was only a verbal agreement) was not\nunwelcome to him. According to his hypothesis,--as he suggests, perhaps an\nerroneous hypothesis,--the fluid matter which fills the heavenly spaces,\nand which may be compared to a vortex or whirlpool, circles about the sun\nand carries the planets along with it. Thus the planets move in relation to\nthe sun, but are at rest in relation to the adjacent portions of the matter\nof the heavens. In view of the biblical doctrine, according to which the\nworld and all that therein is was created at a stroke, he apologetically\ndescribes his attempt to explain the origin of the world from chaos under\nthe laws of motion as a scientific fiction, intended merely to make the\nprocess more comprehensible. It is more easily conceivable, if we think\nof the things in the world as though they had been gradually formed from\nelements, as the plant develops from the seed. We now pass to the Cartesian\nanthropology, with its three chief objects: the body, the soul, and the\nunion of the two.\n\n\n3. %Man.%\n\nThe human body, like all organic bodies, is a machine. Artificial automata\nand natural bodies are distinguished only in degree. Machines fashioned by\nthe hand of man perform their functions by means of visible and tangible\ninstruments, while natural bodies employ organs which, for the most part,\nare too minute to be perceived. As the clock-maker constructs a clock from\nwheels and weights so that it is able to go of itself, so God has made\nman's body out of dust, only, being a far superior artist, he produces a\nwork of art which is better constructed and capable of far more wonderful\nmovements. The cause of death is the destruction of some important part of\nthe machine, which prevents it from running longer; a corpse is a broken\nclock, and the departure of the soul comes only as a result of death. The\ncommon opinion that the soul generates life in the body is erroneous. It\nis rather true that life must be present before the soul enters into union\nwith the body, as it is also true that life must have ended before it\ndissolves the bond.\n\nThe sole principles of physiology are motion and heat. The heat (vital\nwarmth, a fire without light), which God has put in the heart as the\ncentral organ of life, has for its function the promotion of the\ncirculation of the blood, in the description of which Descartes mentions\nwith praise the discoveries of Harvey _(De Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in\nAnimalibus_, 1628). From the blood are separated its finest, most fiery,\nand most mobile parts, called by Descartes \"animal spirits\" _(spiritus\nanimales sive corporales_), and described as a \"very subtle wind\" or \"pure\nand vivid flame,\" which ascend into the cavities of the brain, reach\nthe pineal gland suspended in its center _(conarion, glans pinealis,\nglandula_), pass into the nerves, and, by their action on the muscles\nconnected with the nerves, effect the motions of the limbs. These views\nrefer to the body alone, and so are as true of animals as of men. If\nautomata existed similar to animals in all respects, both external and\ninternal, it would be absolutely impossible to distinguish them from real\nanimals. If, however, they were made to resemble human bodies, two signs\nwould indicate their unreality--we would find no communication of ideas by\nmeans of language, and also an absence of those bodily movements which\ntake their origin in the reason (and not merely in the constitution of the\nbody). The only thing which raises man above the brute is his rational\nsoul, which we are on no account to consider a product of matter, but which\nis an express creation of God, superadded. The union of the soul or the\nmind _(anima sive mens_) with the body is, it is true, not so loose that\nthe mind merely dwells in the body, like a pilot in a ship, nor, on the\nother hand, in view of the essential contrariety of the two substances, is\nit so intimate as to be more than a _unio compositionis_. Although the soul\nis united to the whole body, an especially active intercourse between them\nis developed at a single point, the pineal gland, which is distinguished by\nits central, protected position, above all, by the fact that it is the only\ncerebral organ that is not double. This gland, together with the animal\nspirits passing to and from it, mediates between mind and body; and as the\npoint of union for the twofold impressions from the (right and left) eyes\nand ears, without which objects would be perceived double instead of\nsingle, is the seat of the soul. Here the soul exercises a direct influence\non the body and is directly affected by it; here it dwells, and at will\nproduces a slight, peculiar movement of the gland, through this a change\nin the course of the animal spirits (for it is not capable of generating\nmotion, but only of changing its direction), and, finally, movements of the\nmembers; just as, on the other hand, it remarks the slightest change in the\ncourse of the _spiritus_ through a corresponding movement of the gland,\nwhose motions vary according to the sensuous properties of the object to be\nperceived, and responds by sensations. Although Descartes thus limits the\ndirect interaction of soul and body to a small part of the organism, he\nmakes an exception in the case of _memoria_, which appears to him to be\nmore of a physical than a psychical function, and which he conjectures to\nbe diffused through the whole brain.\n\nIn spite of the comprehensive meaning which Descartes gives to the notion\n_cogitatio_, it is yet too narrow to leave room for an _anima vegetativa_\nand an _anima sensitiva_. Whoever makes mind and soul equivalent, holds\nthat their essence consists in conscious activity alone, and interprets\nsensation as a mode of thought, cannot escape the paradox of denying to\nanimals the possession of a soul. Descartes does not shrink from such\na conclusion. Animals are mere machines; they are bodies animated, but\nsoulless; they lack conscious perception and appetition, though not the\nappearance of them. When a clock strikes seven it knows nothing of the\nfact; it does not regret that it is so late nor long soon to be able to\nstrike eight; it wills nothing, feels nothing, perceives nothing. The lot\nof the brute is the same. It sees and hears nothing, it does not hunger or\nthirst, it does not rejoice or fear, if by these anything more than mere\ncorporeal phenomena is to be meant; of all these it possesses merely the\nunconscious material basis; it moves and motion goes on in it--that is all.\nThe psychology of Descartes, which has had important results,[1] divides\n_cogitationes_ into two classes: _actiones_ and _passiones_. Action denotes\neverything which takes its origin in, and is in the power of, the soul;\npassion, everything which the soul receives from without, in which it can\nmake no change, which is impressed upon it. The further development of this\ndistinction is marred by the crossing of the most diverse lines of thought,\nresulting in obscurities and contradictions. Descartes's simple, na\u00efve\nhabits of thought and speech, which were those of a man of the world rather\nthan of a scholar, were quite incompatible with the adoption and consistent\nuse of a finely discriminated terminology; he is very free with _sive_, and\nnot very careful with the expressions _actio, passio, perceptio, affectio,\nvolitio_. First he equates activity and willing, for the will springs\nexclusively from the soul--it is only in willing that the latter is\nentirely independent; while, on the other hand, passivity is made\nequivalent to representation and cognition, for the soul does not create\nits ideas, but receives them,--sensuous impressions coming to her quite\nevidently from the body. These equations, \"_actio_--the practical, _passio_\n= the theoretical function,\" are soon limited and modified, however. The\nnatural appetites and affections are forms of volition, it is true, but not\nfree products of the mind, for they take their origin in its connection\nwith the body. Further, not all perceptions have a sensuous origin; when\nthe soul makes free use of its ideas in imagination, especially when in\npure thought it dwells on itself, when without the interference of the\nimagination it gazes on its rational nature, it is by no means passive\nmerely. Every act of the will, again, is accompanied by the consciousness\nof volition. The _volitio_ is an activity, the _cogitatio volitionis_ a\npassivity; the soul affects itself, is passively affected through its own\nactivity, is at the same instant both active and passive.\n\n[Footnote 1: For details cf. the able monograph of Dr. Anton Koch, 1881.]\n\nThus not every volition, _e.g._ sensuous desire, is action nor all\nperception, _e.g._ that of the pure intellect, passion. Finally, certain\npsychical phenomena fall indifferently under the head of perception or of\nvolition, _e.g._, pain, which is both an indistinct idea of something and\nan impulse to shun it. In accordance with these emendations, and omitting\ncertain disturbing points of secondary importance, the matter may be thus\nrepresented:\n\n                             COGITATIO.\n                                 \u00a6\n                                 \u00a6\n                           ACTIO \u00a6 PASSIO\n                                 \u00a6\n                                 \u00a6\n                                 \u00a6\n(Mens sola; clarae et distinctae \u00a6 (Mens unita cum corpore;\nideae.)                          \u00a6 confusae ideae.)\n                                 \u00a6\nVOLITIO:                         \u00a6\n    6. Voluntas. 3b. Commotiones \u00a6 3a. Affectus. 2. Appetitus naturales.\n           \u00a6       intellectuales\u00a6        \u00a6                  \u00a6\n           \u00a6                     \u00a6         \\                /\n           \u00a6                     \u00a6          --------v-------\n       Judicium.                 \u00a6           Sensus interni\n---------------------------------+-----------------------------------\n                                 \u00a6\n                                 \u00a6\nPERCEPTIO:                4. Imaginatio\n                           ------^------\n                          /             \\\n   5. Intellectus 4b. Phantasia. \u00a6 4a. Memoria. 1. Sensus externi.\n\n\nAccordingly six grades of mental function are to be distinguished: (1)\nThe external senses. (2) The natural appetites. (3) The passions (which,\ntogether with the natural appetites, constitute the internal senses,\nand from which the mental emotions produced by the intellect are quite\ndistinct). (4) The imagination with its two divisions, passive memory and\nactive phantasy. (5) The intellect or reason. (6) The will. These various\nstages or faculties are, however, not distinct parts of the soul, as in the\nold psychology, in opposition to which Descartes emphatically defends the\n_unity of the soul_. It is one and the same psychical power that exercises\nthe higher and the lower, the rational and the sensuous, the practical and\nthe theoretical activities.\n\nOf the mental functions, whether representative images, perceptions, or\nvolitions, a part are referred to body (to parts of our own body, often\nalso to external objects), and produced by the body (by the animal spirits\nand, generally, by the nerves as well), while the rest find both object and\ncause in the soul. Intermediate between the two classes stand those acts\nof the will which are caused by the soul, but which relate to the body,\n_e.g._, when I resolve to walk or leap; and, what is more important, the\n_passions_, which relate to the soul itself, but which are called forth,\nsustained, and intensified by certain motions of the animal spirits. Since\nonly those beings which consist of a body as well as a soul are capable of\nthe passions, these are specifically human phenomena. These affections,\nthough very numerous, may be reduced to a few simple or primary ones,\nof which the rest are mere specializations or combinations. Descartes\nenumerates six primitive passions (which number Spinoza afterward reduced\none-half)--_admiratio, amor et odium, cupiditas (d\u00e9sir), gaudium et\ntristitia_. The first and the fourth have no opposites, the former being\nneither positive nor negative, and the latter both at once. Wonder, which\nincludes under it esteem and contempt, signifies interest in an object\nwhich neither attracts us by its utility nor repels us by its hurtfulness,\nand yet does not leave us indifferent. It is aroused by the powerful or\nsurprising impression made by the extraordinary, the rare, the unexpected.\nLove seeks to appropriate that which is profitable; hate, to ward off that\nwhich is harmful, to destroy that which is hostile. Desire or longing looks\nwith hope or fear to the future. When that which is feared or hoped for\nhas come to pass, joy and grief come in, which relate to existing good and\nevil, as desire relates to those to come.\n\nThe Cartesian theory of the passions forms the bridge over which its author\npasses from psychology to ethics. No soul is so weak as to be incapable of\ncompletely mastering its passions, and of so directing them that from them\nall there will result that joyous temper advantageous to the reason. The\nfreedom of the will is unlimited. Although a direct influence on the\npassions is denied it,--it can neither annul them merely at its bidding,\nnor at once reduce them to silence, at least, not the more violent\nones,--it still has an indirect power over them in two ways. During the\ncontinuance of the affection (e.g., fear) it is able to arrest the bodily\nmovements to which the affection tends (flight), though not the emotion\nitself, and, in the intervals of quiet, it can take measures to render a\nnew attack of the passion less dangerous. Instead of enlisting one passion\nagainst another, a plan which would mean only an appearance of freedom,\nbut in fact a continuance in bondage, the soul should fight with its own\nweapons, with fixed maxims _(judicia)_, based on certain knowledge of good\nand evil. The will conquers the emotions by means of principles, by clear\nand distinct knowledge, which sees through and corrects the false values\nascribed to things by the excitement of the passions. Besides this negative\nrequirement, \"subjection of the passions,\" Descartes' contributions to\nethics--in the letters to Princess Elizabeth on human happiness, and to\nQueen Christina on love and the highest good--were inconsiderable. Wisdom\nis the carrying out of that which has been seen to be best, virtue is\nsteadfastness, sin inconstancy therein. The goal of human endeavor is peace\nof conscience, which is attained only through the determination to be\nvirtuous, i.e., to live in harmony with self.\n\nBesides its ethical mission, the will has allotted to it the theoretical\nfunction of affirmation and negation, i.e., of judgment. If God in his\nveracity and goodness has bestowed on man the power to know truth, how is\nmisuse of this power, how is error possible? Single sensations and ideas\ncannot be false, but only judgments--the reference of ideas to objects.\nJudgment or assent is a matter of the will; so that when it makes erroneous\naffirmations or negations, when it prefers the false judgment to the true,\nit alone is guilty. Our understanding is limited, our will unlimited; the\nlatter reaches further than the former, and can assent to a judgment\neven before its constituent parts have attained the requisite degree of\nclearness. False judgment is prejudgment, for which we can hold neither God\nnor our own nature responsible. The possibility of error, as well as the\npossibility of avoiding error, resides in the will. This has the power to\npostpone its assent or dissent, to hold back its decision until the ideas\nhave become entirely clear and distinct. The supreme perfection is the\n_libertas non errandi_. Thus knowledge itself becomes a moral function; the\ntrue and the good are in the last analysis identical. The contradiction\nwith which Descartes has been charged, that he makes volition and cognition\nreciprocally determinative, that he bases moral goodness on the clearness\nof ideas and _vice versa_, does not exist. We must distinguish between a\ntheoretical and a practical stadium in the will; it is true of the latter\nthat it depends on knowledge of the right, of the former that the knowledge\nof the right is dependent on it. In order to the possibility of moral\n_action_ the will must conform to clear judgment; in order to the\nproduction of the latter the will must _be_ moral. It is the unit-soul,\nwhich first, by freely avoiding overhasty judgment, cognizes the truth, to\nexemplify it later in moral conduct.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF CARTESIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND\nIN FRANCE.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. G. Monchamp, _Histoire du Cart\u00e9sianisme en Belgique_,\nBrussels, 1886.]\n\n%1. Occasionalism: Geulincx.%\n\nThe propagation and defense of a system of thought soon give occasion\nto its adherents to purify, complete, and transform it. Obscurities and\ncontradictions are discovered, which the master has overlooked or allowed\nto remain, and the disciple exerts himself to remove them, while retaining\nthe fundamental doctrines. In the system of Descartes there were two\nclosely connected points which demanded clarification and correction, viz.,\nhis double dualism (1) between extended substance and thinking substance,\n(2) between created substance and the divine substance. In contrast with\neach other matter and mind are substances or independent beings, for\nthe clear conception of body contains naught of consciousness, thought,\nrepresentation, and that of mind nothing of extension, matter, motion.\nIn comparison with God they are not so; apart from the creator they can\nneither exist nor be conceived. In every case where the attempt is made to\ndistinguish between intrinsic and general (as here, between substance in\nthe stricter and wider senses), an indecision betrays itself which is not\npermanently endured.\n\nThe substantiality of the material and spiritual worlds maintained by\nDescartes finds an excellent counterpart in his (entirely modern) tendency\nto push the _concursus dei_ as far as possible into the background, to\nlimit it to the production of the original condition of things, to give\nover motion, once created, to its own laws, and ideas implanted in the mind\nto its own independent activity; but it is hard to reconcile with it the\nview, popular in the Middle Ages, that the preservation of the world is a\nperpetual creation. In the former case the relation of God to the world is\nmade an external relation; in the latter, an internal one. In the one the\nworld is thought of as a clock, which once wound up runs on mechanically,\nin the second it is likened to a piece of music which the composer himself\nrecites. If God preserves created things by continually recreating them\nthey are not substances at all; if they are substances, preservation\nbecomes an empty word, which we repeat after the theologians without giving\nit any real meaning.\n\nMatter and spirit stand related in our thought only by way of exclusion;\nis the same true of them in reality? They can be conceived and can exist\nwithout each other; can they, further, without each other effect all that\nwe perceive them to accomplish? There are some motions in the material\nworld which we refer to a voluntary decision of the soul, and some among\nour ideas (_e.g._, perceptions of the senses) which we refer to corporeal\nphenomena as their causes. If body and soul are substances, how can they\nbe dependent on each other in certain of their activities, if they are of\nopposite natures, how can they affect each other? How can the incorporeal,\nunmoved spirit move the animal spirits and receive impulses from them?\nThe substantiality (reciprocal independence) of body and mind, and their\ninteraction (partial reciprocal dependence), are incompatible, one or\nthe other is illusory and must be abandoned. The materialists (Hobbes)\nsacrifice the independence of mind, the idealists (Berkeley, Leibnitz), the\nindependence of matter, the occasionalists, the interaction of the two.\nThis forms the advance of the last beyond Descartes, who either na\u00efvely\nmaintains that, in spite of the contrariety of material and mental\nsubstances, an exchange of effects takes place between them as an\nempirical fact, or, when he realizes the difficulty of the anthropological\nproblem,--how is the union of the two substances in man possible,--ascribes\nthe interaction of body and mind, together with the union of the two, to\nthe power of God, and by this abandonment of the attempt at a natural\nexplanation, opens up the occasionalistic way of escape. Further, in\nhis more detailed description of the intercourse between body and mind\nDescartes had been guilty of direct violations of his laws of natural\nphilosophy. If the quantity of motion is declared to be invariable and a\nchange in its direction is attributed to mechanical causes alone, we must\nnot ascribe to the soul the power to move the pineal gland, even in the\ngentlest way, nor to control the direction of the animal spirits. These\ninconsistencies also are removed by the occasionalistic thesis.\n\nThe question concerning the substantiality of mind and matter in relation\nto God, is involved from the very beginning in this latter problem, \"How\nis the appearance of interaction between the two to be explained without\ndetriment to their substantiality in relation to each other?\" The denial\nof the reciprocal dependence of matter and spirit leads to sharper\naccentuation of their common dependence upon God. Thus occasionalism forms\nthe transition to the pantheism of Spinoza, Geulincx emphasizing the\nnon-substantiality of spirits, and Malebranche the non-substantiality of\nbodies, while Spinoza combines and intensifies both. And yet history was\nnot obliging enough to carry out this convenient and agreeable scheme of\ndevelopment with chronological accuracy, for she had Spinoza complete his\npantheism _before_ Malebranche had prepared the way. The relation which was\nnoted in the case of Bruno and Campanella is here repeated: the earlier\nthinker assumes the more advanced position, while the later one seems\nbackward in comparison; and that which, viewed from the standpoint of the\nquestion itself, may be considered a transition link, is historically to be\ntaken as a reaction against the excessive prosecution of a line of thought\nwhich, up to a certain point, had been followed by the one who now shrinks\nback from its extreme consequences. The course of philosophy takes first a\ntheological direction in the earlier occasionalists, then a metaphysical\n(naturalistic) trend in Spinoza, to renew finally, in Malebranche, the\nfirst of these movements in opposition to the second. The Cartesian school,\nas a whole, however, exhibits a tendency toward mysticism, which was\nconcealed to a greater or less extent by the rationalistic need for clear\nconcepts, but never entirely suppressed.\n\nAlthough the real interaction of body and mind be denied, some explanation\nmust, at least, be given for the appearance of interaction, _i.e._ for the\nactual correspondence of bodily and mental phenomena. Occasionalism denotes\nthe theory of occasional causes. It is not the body that gives rise to\nperception, nor the mind that causes the motion of the limbs which it has\ndetermined upon--neither the one nor the other can receive influence from\nits fellow or exercise influence upon it; but it is God who, \"on the\noccasion\" of the physical motion (of the air and nerves); produces the\nsensation (of sound), and, \"at the instance\" of the determination of the\nwill, produces the movement of the arms. The systematic development and\nmarked influence of this theory, which had already been more or less\nclearly announced by the Cartesians Cordemoy and De la Forge,[1] was due to\nthe talented Arnold Geulincx (1624-69), who was born at Antwerp, taught\nin Lyons (1646-58) and Leyden, and became a convert to Calvinism. It\nultimately gained over the majority of the numerous adherents of the\nCartesian philosophy in the Dutch universities,--Renery (died 1639) and\nRegius (van Roy; _Fundamenta Physicae_, 1646; _Philosophia Naturalis_,\n1661) in Utrecht; further, Balthasar Bekker (1634-98; _The World\nBewitched_, 1690), the brave opponent of the belief in angels and devils,\nof magic, and of prosecution for witchcraft,--in the clerical orders in\nFrance and, finally, in Germany.\n\n[Footnote 1: Gerauld de Cordemoy, a Parisian advocate (died 1684,\n_Dissertations Philosophiques_, 1666), communicated his occasionalistic\nviews orally to his friends as early as 1658 (cf. L. Stein in the _Archiv\nf\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. i., 1888, p. 56). Louis de la Forge,\na physician of Saumur, _Tractatus de Mente Humana_, 1666, previously\npublished in French; cf. Seyfarth, Gotha, 1887. But the logician, Johann\nClauberg, professor in Duisburg (1622-65; _Opera_, edited by Schalbruch,\n1691), is, according to the investigations of Herm. M\u00fcller _(J. Clauberg\nund seine Stellung im Cartesianismus_, Jena, 1891), to be stricken from\nthe list of thinkers who prepared the way for occasionalism, since in his\ndiscussion of the anthropological problem (_corporis et animae conjunctio_)\nhe merely develops the Cartesian position, and does not go beyond it. He\nemploys the expression _occasio_, it is true, but not in the sense of the\noccasionalists. According to Clauberg the bodily phenomenon becomes the\nstimulus or \"occasion\" (not for God, but) for the soul to produce from\nitself the corresponding mental phenomenon.]\n\nGeulincx himself, besides two inaugural addresses at Leyden (as Lector in\n1662, Professor Extraordinary in 1665), published the following treatises:\n_Quaestiones Quodlibeticae_ (in the second edition, 1665, entitled\n_Saturnalia_) with an important introductory discourse; _Logica Fundamentis\nSuis Restituta_, 1662; _Methodus Inveniendi Argumenta_ (new edition by\nBontekoe, 1675); and the first part of his Ethics--_De Virtute et Primis\nejus Proprietatibus, quae vulgo Virtutes Cardinales Vocantur, Tractatus\nEthicus Primus_, 1665. This chief work was issued complete in all six parts\nwith the title, _[Greek: Gnothi seauton] sive Ethica_, 1675, by Bontekoe,\nunder the pseudonym Philaretus. The _Physics_, 1688, the _Metaphysics_,\n1691, and the _Annotata Majora in Cartesii Principia Philosophiae_, 1691,\nwere also posthumous publications, from the notes of his pupils. In view of\nthe rarity of these volumes, and the importance of the philosopher, it is\nwelcome news that J.P.N. Land has undertaken an edition of the collected\nworks, in three volumes, of which the first two have already appeared.[1]\nThe Hague, 1891-92.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: On vol. i. cf. Eucken, _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol.\nxxviii., 1892, p,200 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: On Geulincx see V. van der Haeghen, _Geulincx, \u00c9tude sur sa\nVie, sa Philosophie, et ses Ouvrages_, Ghent, 1886, including a complete\nbibliography; and Land in vol. iv. of the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, 1890. [English translation, _Mind_, vol. xvi. p. 223 _seq_.]]\n\nGeulincx bases the _occasionalistic_ position on the principle, _quod\nnescis, quomodo fiat, id non facis_. Unless I know how an event happens, I\nam not its cause. Since I have no consciousness how my decision to speak or\nto walk is followed by the movement of my tongue or limbs, I am not the one\nwho effects these. Since I am just as ignorant how the sensation in my mind\ncomes to pass as a sequel to the motion in the sense-organ; since, further,\nthe body as an unconscious and non-rational being can effect nothing, it is\nneither I nor the body that causes the sensation. Both the bodily movement\nand the sense-impression are, rather, the effects of a higher power, of the\ninfinite spirit. The act of my will and the sense-stimulus are only _causae\noccasionales_ for the divine will, in an incomprehensible way, to effect,\nin the one case, the execution of the movement of the limbs resolved upon,\nand, in the other, the origin of the perception; they are (unsuitable)\ninstruments, effective only in the hand of God; he brings it to pass that\nmy will goes out beyond my soul, and that corporeal motion has results in\nit. The meaning of this doctrine is misapprehended when it is assumed,--an\nassumption to which the Leibnitzian account of occasionalism may mislead\none,--that in it the continuity of events, alike in the material and the\npsychical world, is interrupted by frequent scattered interferences from\nwithout, and all becoming transformed into a series of disconnected\nmiracles. An order of nature such as would be destroyed by God's action\ndoes not exist; God brings everything to pass; even the passage of motion\nfrom one body to another is his work. Further, Geulincx expressly says that\nGod has imposed such _laws_ on motion that it harmonizes with the soul's\nfree volition, of which, however, it is entirely independent (similar\nstatements occur also in De la Forge). And with this our thinker\nappears--as Pfleiderer[1] emphasizes--closely to approach the\npre-established harmony of Leibnitz. The occasionalistic theory certainly\nconstitutes the preliminary step to the Leibnitzian; but an essential\ndifference separates the two. The advance does not consist in the\nsubstitution by Leibnitz of one single miracle at creation for a number of\nisolated and continually recurring ones, but (as Leibnitz himself remarks,\nin reply to the objection expressed by Father Lami, that a perpetual\nmiracle is no miracle) in the exchange of the immediate causality of God\nfor natural causation. With Geulincx mind and body act on each other, but\nnot by their own power; with Leibnitz the monads do not act on one another,\nbut they act by their own power.[2]--When Geulincx in the same connection\nadvances to the statements that, in view of the limitedness and passivity\nof finite things, God is the only truly active, because the only\nindependent, being in the world, that all activity is his activity, that\nthe human (finite) spirit is related to the divine (infinite) spirit as\nthe individual body to space in general, viz., as a section of it, so that,\nby thinking away all limitations from our mind, we find God in us and\nourselves in him, it shows how nearly he verges on pantheism.\n\n[Footnote 1: Edm. Pfleiderer, _Geulincx, als Hauptvertreter der\noccasionalistischen Metaphysik und Ethik_, T\u00fcbingen, 1882; the same,\n_Leibniz und Geulincx mit besonderer Beziehung auf ihr Uhrengleichnis_,\nT\u00fcbingen, 1884.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Ed. Zeller, _Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der\nWissenschaften_, 1884, p. 673 _seq_.; Eucken, _Philosophische Monatshefte_,\nvol. xix., 1893, p. 525 _seq_; vol. xxiii., 1887, p. 587 _seq_.]\n\nGeulincx's services to no\u00ebtics have been duly recognized by Ed. Grimm\n(Jena, 1875), although with an excessive approximation to Kant. In this\nfield he advances many acute and suggestive thoughts, as the deduction\nwhich reappears in Lotze, that the actually existent world of figure and\nmotion cognized by thought, though the real world, is poorer than the\nwonderful world of motley sensuous appearance conjured forth in our minds\non the occasion of the former, that the latter is the more beautiful and\nmore worthy of a divine author. Further, the conviction, also held by\nLotze, that the fundamental activities of the mind cannot be defined, but\nonly known through inner experience or immediate consciousness (he\nwho loves, knows what love is; it is a _per conscientiam et intimam\nexperientiam notissima res_); the praiseworthy attempt to give a systematic\narrangement, according to their derivation from one another, to the innate\nmathematical concepts, which Descartes had simply co-ordinated (the concept\nof surface is gained from the concept of body by abstracting from the third\ndimension, thickness--the act of thus abstracting from certain parts of\nthe content of thought, Geulincx terms _consideratio_ in contrast to\n_cogitatio_, which includes the whole content); and, finally, the still\nmore important inquiry, whether it is possible for us to reach a knowledge\nof things independently of the forms of the understanding, as in pure\nthought we strip off the fetters of sense. The possibility of this is\ndenied; there is no higher faculty of knowledge to act as judge over the\nunderstanding, as the latter over the sensibility, and even the wisest\nman cannot free himself from the forms of thought (categories, _modi\ncogitandi_). And yet the discussion of the question is not useless: the\nreason should examine into the unknowable as well as the knowable; it is\nonly in this way that we learn that it is unknowable. As the highest forms\nof thought Geulincx names subject (the empty concept of an existent, _ens_\nor _quod est_) and predicate _(modus entis_), and derives them from two\nfundamental activities of the mind, a combining function _(simulsumtio,\ntotatio_) and an abstracting function (one which removes the _nota\nsubjecti_). Substance and accident, substantive and adjective, are\nexpressions for subjective processes of thought and hence do not hold\nof things in themselves. With reference to the importance, nay, to the\nindispensability, of linguistic signs in the use of the understanding, the\nscience of the forms of thought is briefly termed grammar.\n\nThe principle _ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis_, forms the connection\nbetween the occasionalistic metaphysics and ethics, the latter deducing the\npractical consequences of the former. Where thou canst do nothing, there\nwill nothing. Since we can effect nothing in the material world, to which\nwe are related merely as spectators, we ought also not to seek in it the\nmotives and objects of our actions. God, does not require works, but\ndispositions only, for the result of our volition is beyond our power. Our\nmoral vocation, then, consists in renunciation of the world and retirement\ninto ourselves, and in patient faithfulness at the post assigned to us.\nVirtue is _amor dei ac rationis_, self-renouncing, active, obedient love\nto God and to the reason as the image and law of God in us. The cardinal\nvirtues are _diligentia_, sedulous listening for the commands of the\nreason; _obedientia_, the execution of these _justitia_, the conforming of\nthe whole life to what is perceived to be right; finally, _humilitas_,\nthe recognition of our impotency and self-renunciation (_inspectio_ and\n_despectio_, or _derelictio, neglectus, contemptus, incuria sui_). The\nhighest of these is humility, pious submission to the divine order of\nthings; its condition, the self-knowledge commended in the title of the\nEthics; the primal evil, self-love (_Philautia_--_ipsissimum peccatum_).\nMan is unhappy because he seeks happiness. Happiness is like our shadows;\nit shuns us when we pursue it, it follows us when we flee from it. The joys\nwhich spring from virtue are an adornment of it, not an enticement to it;\nthey are its result, not its aim. The ethics of Geulincx, which we cannot\nfurther trace out here, surprises one by its approximation to the views of\nSpinoza and of Kant. With the former it has in common the principle of love\ntoward God, as well as numerous details; with the latter, the absoluteness\nof the moral law (_in rebus moralibus absolute praecipit ratio aut vetat,\nnulla interposita conditione_); with both the depreciation of sympathy, on\nthe ground that it is a concealed egoistic motive.\n\nThe denial of substantiality to individual things, brought in by the\noccasionalists, is completed by Spinoza, who boldly and logically proclaims\npantheism on the basis of Cartesianism and gives to the divine All-one a\nnaturalistic instead of a theological character.\n\n\n%2. Spinoza.%\n\nBenedictus (originally Baruch) de Spinoza sprang from a Jewish family of\nPortugal or Spain, which had fled to Holland to escape persecution at home.\nHe was born in Amsterdam in 1632; taught by the Rabbin Morteira, and,\nin Latin, by Van den Ende, a free-thinking physician who had enjoyed a\nphilological training; and expelled by anathema from the Jewish communion,\n1656, on account of heretical views. During the next four years he found\nrefuge at a friend's house in the country near Amsterdam, after which he\nlived in Rhynsburg, and from 1664 in Voorburg, moving thence, in 1669, to\nThe Hague, where he died in 1677. Spinoza lived in retirement and had few\nwants; he supported himself by grinding optical glasses; and, in 1673,\ndeclined the professorship at Heidelberg offered him by Karl Ludwig, the\nElector Palatine, because of his love of quiet, and on account of the\nuncertainty of the freedom of thought which the Elector had assured him.\nSpinoza himself made but two treatises public: his dictations on the first\nand second parts of Descartes's _Principia Philosophiae_, which had been\ncomposed for a private pupil, with an appendix, _Cogitata Metaphysica_,\n1663, and the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, published anonymously\nin 1670, in defense of liberty of thought and the right to unprejudiced\ncriticism of the biblical writings. The principles expressed in the latter\nwork were condemned by all parties as sacrilegious and atheistic, and\nawakened concern even in the minds of his friends. When, in 1675, Spinoza\njourneyed to Amsterdam with the intention of giving his chief work, the\n_Ethics_, to the press, the clergy and the followers of Descartes applied\nto the government to forbid its issue. Soon after Spinoza's death it was\npublished in the _Opera Posthuma_, 1677, which were issued under the care\nof Hermann Schuller,[1] with a preface by Spinoza's friend, the physician\nLudwig Meyer, and which contained, besides the chief work, three incomplete\ntreatises (_Tractatus Politicus, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,\nCompendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae_) and a collection of Letters by\nand to Spinoza. The _Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata_, in five parts,\ntreats (1) of God, (2) of the nature and origin of the mind, (3) of the\nnature and origin of the emotions, (4) of human bondage or the strength\nof the passions, (5) of the power of the reason or human freedom. It has\nbecome known within recent times that Spinoza made a very early sketch\nof the system developed in the _Ethics_, the _Tractatus Brevis de Deo et\nHomine ejusque Felicitate_, of which a Dutch translation in two copies was\ndiscovered, though not the original Latin text. This treatise was published\nby B\u00f6hmer, 1852, in excerpts, and complete by Van Vloten, 1862, and by\nSchaarschmidt, 1869. It was not until our own century, and after Jacobi's\n_Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Moses Mendelssohn_ (1785)\nhad aroused the long slumbering interest in this much misunderstood\nphilosopher, who has been oftener despised than studied, that complete\neditions of his works were prepared, by Paulus 1802-03; Gfr\u00f6rer, 1830;\nBruder, 1843-46; Ginsberg (in Kirchmann's _Philosophische Bibliothek_,\n4 vols.), 1875-82; and Van Vloten and Land,[2] 2 vols., 1882-83. B.\nAuerbach has worked Spinoza's life into a romantic novel, _Spinoza, ein\nDenkerleben_, 1837; 2d ed., 1855 [English translation by C.T. Brooks,\n1882.]\n\n[Footnote 1: See L. Stein in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_,\nvol. i., 1888, p. 554 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: For the literature on Spinoza the reader is referred to\nUeberweg and to Van der Linde's _B. Spinoza, Bibliografie_, 1871; while\namong recent works we shall mention only Camerer's _Die Lehre Spinozas_,\nStuttgart, 1877. An English translation of _The Chief Works of Spinoza_ has\nbeen given by Elwes, 1883-84; a translation of the _Ethics_ by White,\n1883; and one of selections from the _Ethics_, with notes, by Fullerton in\nSneath's Modern Philosophers, 1892. Among the various works on Spinoza, the\nreader may be referred to Pollock's _Spinoza, His Life and Times_, 1880\n(with bibliography to same year); Martineau's _Study of Spinoza_, 1883; and\nJ. Caird's _Spinoza_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1888.--TR.]\n\nWe shall consider Spinoza's system as a completed whole as it is given in\nthe _Ethics_; for although it is interesting for the investigator to trace\nout the development of his thinking by comparing this chief work with its\nforerunner (that _Tractatus Brevis_ \"concerning God, man, and the happiness\nof the latter,\" whose dialogistical portions we may surmise to have been\nthe earliest sketch of the Spinozistic position, and which was followed by\nthe _Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione_) such a procedure is not equally\nvaluable for the student. In regard to Spinoza's relations to other\nthinkers it cannot be doubted, since Freudenthal's[1] proof, that he was\ndependent to a large degree on the predominant philosophy of the schools,\n_i.e._ on the later Scholasticism (Suarez[2]), especially on its Protestant\nside (Jacob Martini, Combachius, Scheibler, Burgersdijck, Heereboord);\nDescartes, it is true, felt the same influence. Jo\u00ebl,[3]: Schaarschmidt,\nSigwart,[4] R. Avenarius,[5] and B\u00f6hmer[6] = have advanced the view that\nthe sources of Spinoza's philosophy are not to be sought exclusively in\nCartesianism, but rather that essential elements were taken from the\nCabala, from the Jewish Scholasticism (Maimonides, 1190; Gersonides, died\n1344; Chasdai Crescas, 1410), and from Giordano Bruno. In opposition\nto this Kuno Fischer has defended, and in the main successfully, the\nproposition that Spinoza reached, and must have reached, his fundamental\npantheism by his own reflection as a development of Descartes's principles.\nThe traces of his early Talmudic education, which have been noticed in\nSpinoza's works, prove no dependence of his leading ideas on Jewish\ntheology. His pantheism is distinguished from that of the Cabalists by\nits rejection of the doctrine of emanation, and from Bruno's, which\nnevertheless may have influenced him, by its anti-teleological character.\nWhen with Greek philosophers, Jewish theologians, and the Apostle Paul\nhe teaches the immanence of God (_Epist. 21_), when with Maimonides and\nCrescas he teaches love to God as the principal of morality, and with the\nlatter of these, determinism also, it is not a necessary consequence that\nhe derived these theories from them. That which most of all separates him\nfrom the mediaeval scholastics of his own people, is his rationalistic\nconviction that God can be known. His agreement with them comes out most\nclearly in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. But even here it holds\nonly in regard to undertaking a general criticism of the Scriptures and to\ntheir figurative interpretation, while, on the other hand, the demand for\na special historical criticism, and the object which with Spinoza was\nthe basis of the investigation as a whole, were foreign to mediaeval\nJudaism--in fact, entirely modern and original. This object was to make\nscience independent of religion, whose records and doctrines are to edify\nthe mind and to improve the character, not to instruct the understanding.\n\"Spinoza could not have learned the complete separation of religion and\nscience from Jewish literature; this was a tendency which sprang from the\nspirit of his own time\" (Windelband, _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_,\nvol. i. p. 194).\n\n[Footnote 1: J. Freudenthal, _Spinoza und die Scholastik_ in the\n_Philosophische Aufs\u00e4tze, Zeller zum 50-J\u00e4hrigen Doktorjubil\u00e4um gewidmet_,\nLeipsic, 1887, p. 85 _seq_. Freudenthal's proof covers the _Cogitata\nMetaphysica_ and many of the principal propositions of the _Ethics_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The Spanish Jesuit, Francis Suarez, lived 1548-1617. _Works_,\nVenice, 1714 Cf. Karl Werner, _Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten\nJahrhunderte_, Regensburg, 1861.]\n\n[Footnote 3: M. Jo\u00ebl, _Don Chasdai Crescas' religions-philosophische Lehren\nin ihrem geschichtlichen Einfluss_, 1866; _Spinozas Theo.-pel. Traktat\nauf seine Quellen gepr\u00fcft_, 1870; _Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas mit\nbesonderer Ber\u00fccksichtigung des kurzen Traktats_, 1871.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Spinozas neu entdeckter Traktat el\u00e4utert u. s. w_., 1866;\n_Spinozas kurzer Traktat \u00fcbersetzt mit Einleitungen und Erl\u00e4uterungen_,\n1870.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen\nPantheismus und das Verh\u00e4ltniss der zweiten zur dritten Phase_, 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Spinozana_ in Fichte's _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_ vols.\nxxxvi., xlii., lvii., 1860-70.]\n\nThe logical presuppositions of Spinoza's philosophy lie in the fundamental\nideas of Descartes, which Spinoza accentuates, transforms, and adopts.\nThree pairs of thoughts captivate him and incite him to think them through:\nfirst, the rationalistic belief in the power of the human spirit to possess\nitself of the truth by pure thought, together with confidence in the\nomnipotence of the mathematical method; second, the concept of substance,\ntogether with the dualism of extension and thought; finally, the\nfundamental mechanical position, together with the impossibility\nof interaction between matter and spirit, held in common with the\noccasionalists, but reached independently of them. Whatever new elements\nare added (_e. g_., the transformation of the Deity from a mere aid to\nknowledge into its most important, nay, its only object; as, also, the\nenthusiastic, directly mystical devotion to the all-embracing world-ground)\nare of an essentially emotional nature, and to be referred less to\nhistorical influences than to the individuality of the thinker. The\ndivergences from his predecessors, however, especially the extension of\nmechanism to mental phenomena and the denial of the freedom of the will,\ninseparable from this, result simply from the more consistent application\nof Cartesian principles. Spinoza is not an inventive, impulsive spirit,\nlike Descartes and Leibnitz, but a systematic one; his strength does not\nlie in brilliant inspirations, but in the power of resolutely thinking a\nthing through; not in flashes of thought, but in strictly closed circles of\nthought. He develops, but with genius, and to the end. Nevertheless this\nconsecutiveness of Spinoza, the praises of which have been unceasingly sung\nby generations since his day, has its limits. It holds for the unwavering\ndevelopment of certain principles derived from Descartes, but not with\nequal strictness for the inter-connection of the several lines of thought\nfollowed out separately. His very custom of developing a principle straight\non to its ultimate consequences, without regard to the needs of the heart\nor to logical demands from other directions, make it impossible for the\nresults of the various lines of thought to be themselves in harmony; his\nvertical consistency prevents horizontal consistency. If the original\ntendencies come into conflict (the consciously held theoretical principles\ninto conflict with one another, or with hidden aesthetic or moral\nprinciples), either one gains the victory over the other or both insist\non their claims; thus we have inconsistencies in the one case, and\ncontradictions in the other (examples of which have been shown by Volkelt\nin his maiden work, _Pantheismus und Individualismus im Systeme Spinozas_,\n1872). Science demands unified comprehension of the given, and seeks the\nsmallest number of principles possible; but her concepts prove too narrow\nvessels for the rich plenitude of reality. He who asks from philosophy more\nthan mere special inquiries finds himself confronted by two possibilities:\nfirst, starting from one standpoint, or a few such, he may follow a direct\ncourse without looking to right or left, at the risk that in his\nthought-calculus great spheres of life will be wholly left out of view, or,\nat least, will not receive due consideration; or, second, beginning from\nmany points of departure and ascending along converging lines, he may seek\na unifying conclusion. In Spinoza we possess the most brilliant example of\nthe former one-sided, logically consecutive power of (also, no doubt,\nviolence in) thought, while Leibnitz furnishes the type of the many-sided,\nharmonistic thinking. The fact that even the rigorous Spinoza is not\ninfrequently forced out of the strict line of consistency, proves that the\nman was more many-sided than the thinker would have allowed himself to be.\n\nTo begin with the formal side of Spinozism: the rationalism of Descartes\nis heightened by Spinoza into the imposing confidence that absolutely\neverything is cognizable by the reason, that the intellect is able by its\npure concepts and intuitions entirely to exhaust the multiform world of\nreality, to follow it with its light into its last refuge.[1] Spinoza is\njust as much in earnest in regard to the typical character of mathematics.\nDescartes (with the exception of an example asked for in the second of the\nObjections, and given as an appendix to the _Meditations_, in which he\nendeavors to demonstrate the existence of God and the distinction of body\nand spirit on the synthetic Euclidean method), had availed himself of the\nanalytic form of presentation, on the ground that, though less cogent, it\nis more suited for instruction since it shows the way by which the matter\nhas been discovered. Spinoza, on the other hand, rigorously carried out the\ngeometrical method, even in externals. He begins with definitions, adds to\nthese axioms (or postulates), follows with propositions or theorems as the\nchief thing, finally with demonstrations or proofs, which derive the later\npropositions from the earlier, and these in turn from the self-evident\naxioms. To these four principal parts are further added as less essential,\ndeductions or corollaries immediately resulting from the theorems, and the\nmore detailed expositions of the demonstrations or scholia. Besides these,\nsome longer discussions are given in the form of remarks, introductions,\nand appendices.\n\n[Footnote 1: Heussler's objections (_Der Rationalismus des_ 17\n_Jahrhunderts_, 1885, pp. 82-85) to this characterization of Kuno Fischer's\nare not convincing. The question is not so much about a principle\ndemonstrable by definite citations as about an unconscious motive in\nSpinoza's thinking. Fischer's views on this point seem to us correct.\nSpinoza's mode of thinking is, in fact, saturated with this strong\nconfidence in the omnipotence of the reason and the rational constitution\nof true reality.]\n\nIf everything is to be cognizable through mathematics, then everything must\ntake place necessarily; even the thoughts, resolutions, and actions of man\ncannot be free in the sense that they might have happened otherwise. Thus\nthere is an evident methodological motive at work for the extension\nof mechanism to all becoming, even spiritual becoming. But there are\nmetaphysical reasons also. Descartes had na\u00efvely solved the anthropological\nproblem by the answer that the interaction of mind and body is\nincomprehensible but actual. The occasionalists had hesitatingly questioned\nthese conclusions a little, the incomprehensibility as well as the\nactuality, only at last to leave them intact. For the explanation that\nthere is a real influence of body on mind and _vice versa_, though not\nan immediate but an occasional one, one mediated by the divine will, is\nscarcely more than a confession that the matter is inexplicable. Spinoza,\nwho admits neither the incognizability of anything real, nor any\nsupernatural interferences, roundly denies both. There is no intercourse\nbetween body and soul; yet that which is erroneously considered such\nis both actually present and explicable. The assumed interaction is as\nunnecessary as it is impossible. Body and soul do not need to act on one\nanother, because they are not two in kind at all, but constitute one being\nwhich may be looked at from two different sides. This is called body when\nconsidered under its attribute of extension, and spirit when considered\nunder its attribute of thought. It is quite impossible for two substances\nto affect each other, because by their reciprocal influence, nay, by their\nvery duality, they would lose their independence, and, with this, their\nsubstantiality. There is no plurality of substances, but only one, the\ninfinite, the divine substance. Here we reach the center of the system.\nThere is but one becoming and but one independent, substantial being.\nMaterial and spiritual becoming form merely the two sides of one and the\nsame necessary world-process; particular extended beings and particular\nthinking beings are nothing but the changeable and transitory states\n_(modi)_ of the enduring, eternal, unified world-ground. \"Necessity in\nbecoming and unity of being,\" mechanism and pantheism--these are the\ncontrolling conceptions in Spinoza's doctrine. Multiplicity, the\nself-dependence of particular things, free choice, ends, development, all\nthis is illusion and error.\n\n%(a) Substance, Attributes, and Modes%.--There is but one substance, and\nthis is infinite (I. _prop_. 10, _schol; prop_. 14, _cor_. 1). Why, then,\nonly one and why infinite? With Spinoza as with Descartes independence is\nthe essence of substantiality. This is expressed in the third definition:\n\"By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by\nmeans of itself, _i.e._, that the conception of which can be formed without\nthe aid of the conception of any other thing.\" _Per substantiam intelligo\nid, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus\nnon indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat_. An absolutely\nself-dependent being can neither be limited (since, in respect to its\nlimits, it would be dependent on the limiting being), nor occur more than\nonce in the world. Infinity follows from its self-dependence, and its\nuniqueness from its infinity.\n\nSubstance is the being which is dependent on nothing and on which\neverything depends; which, itself uncaused, effects all else; which\npresupposes nothing, but itself constitutes the presupposition of all that\nis: it is pure being, primal being, the cause of itself and of all. Thus in\nSpinoza the being which is without presuppositions is brought into the most\nintimate relation with the fullness of multiform existence, not coldly and\nabstractly exalted above it, as by the ancient Eleatics. Substance is the\nbeing in (not above) things, that in them which constitutes their reality,\nwhich supports and produces them. As the cause of all things Spinoza calls\nit God, although he is conscious that he understands by the term something\nquite different from the Christians. God does not mean for him a\ntranscendent, personal spirit, but only the _ens absolute infinitum (def.\nsexta)_, the essential heart of things: _Deus sive substantia_.\n\nHow do things proceed from God? Neither by creation nor by emanation. He\ndoes not put them forth from himself, they do not tear themselves free from\nhim, but they follow out of the necessary nature of God, as it follows from\nthe nature of the triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right\nangles (I. _prop_. 17, _schol_.). They do not come out from him, but remain\nin him; just this fact that they are in another, in God, constitutes their\nlack of self-dependence (I. _prop_. 18, _dem.: nulla res, quae extra Deum\nin se sit_). God is their inner, indwelling cause (_causa immanens, non\nvero transiens_.--I. _prop_. 18), is not a transcendent creator, but\n_natura naturans_, over against the sum of finite beings, _natura naturata_\n(I. _prop_. 29, _schol_.): _Deus sive natura_.\n\nSince nothing exists out of God, his actions do not follow from external\nnecessity, are not constrained, but he is free cause, free in the sense\nthat he does nothing except that toward which his own nature impels him,\nthat he acts in accordance with the laws of his being (_def. septima: ea\nres libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se\nsola ad agendum determinatur; Epist_. 26). This inner necessitation is\nso little a defect that its direct opposite, undetermined choice and\ninconstancy, must rather be excluded from God as an imperfection. Freedom\nand (inner) necessity are identical; and antithetical, on the one side, to\nundetermined choice and, on the other, to (external) compulsion. Action in\nview of ends must also be denied of the infinite; to think of God as acting\nin order to the good is to make him dependent on something external to him\n(an aim) and lacking in that which is to be attained by the action. With\nGod the ground of his action is the same as the ground of his existence;\nGod's power and his essence coincide (I. _prop_. 34: _Dei potentia est ipsa\nipsius essentia_). He is the cause of himself (_def. prima: per causam sui\nintelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura\nnon potest concipi nisi existens_); it would be a contradiction to hold\nthat being was not, that God, or substance, did not exist; he cannot be\nthought otherwise than as existing; his concept includes his existence. To\nbe self-caused means to exist necessarily (I. _prop_. 7). The same thing\nis denoted by the predicate eternal, which, according to the eighth\ndefinition, denotes \"existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to\nfollow necessarily from the mere definition of the eternal thing.\"\n\nThe infinite substance stands related to finite, individual things, not\nonly as the independent to the dependent, as the cause to the caused, as\nthe one to the many, and the whole to the parts, but also as the universal\nto the particular, the indeterminate to the determinate. From infinite\nbeing as pure affirmation (I. _prop_. 8, _schol_. I: _absoluta affirmatio_)\neverything which contains a limitation or negation, and this includes every\nparticular determination, must be kept at a distance: _determinatio negatio\nest (Epist_. 50 and 41: a determination denotes nothing positive, but a\ndeprivation, a lack of existence; relates not to the being but to the\nnon-being of the thing). A determination states that which distinguishes\none thing from another, hence what it is _not_, expresses a limitation of\nit. Consequently God, who is free from every negation and limitation, is to\nbe conceived as the absolutely indeterminate. The results thus far reached\nrun: _Substantia una infinita--Deus sive natura--causa sui (aeterna) et\nrerum (immanens)--libera necessitas--non determinata_. Or more briefly:\nSubstance = God = nature. The equation of God and substance had been\nannounced by Descartes, but not adhered to, while Bruno had approached the\nequation of God and nature--Spinoza decisively completes both and combines\nthem.\n\nA further remark may be added concerning the relation of God and the world.\nIn calling the infinite at once the permanent essence of things and their\nproducing cause, Spinoza raises a demand which it is not easy to fulfill,\nthe demand to think the existence of things in substance as a following\nfrom substance, and their procession from God as a remaining in him. He\nrefers us to mathematics: the things which make up the world are related to\nGod as the properties of a geometrical figure to its concepts, as theorems\nto the axiom, as the deduction to the principle, which from eternity\ncontains all that follows from it and retains this even while putting\nit forth. It cannot be doubted that such a view of causality contains\nerror,--it has been characterized as a confusion of _ratio_ and _causa_,\nof logical ground and real cause,--but it is just as certain that Spinoza\ncommitted it. He not only compares the dependence of the effect on its\ncause to the dependence of a derivative principle on that from which it is\nderived, but fully equates the two; he thinks that in logico-mathematical\n\"consequences\" he has grasped the essence of real \"effects\": for him the\ntype of all legality, as also of real becoming, was the necessity which\ngoverns the sequence of mathematical truths, and which, on the one hand, is\neven and still, needing no special exertion of volitional energy, while, on\nthe other, it is rigid and unyielding, exalted above all choice. Philosophy\nhad sought the assistance of mathematics because of the clearness and\ncertainty which distinguish the conclusions of the latter, and which she\nwished to obtain for her own. In excess of zeal she was not content with\nstriving after this ideal of indefectible certitude, but, forgetting the\ndiversity of the two fields, strove to imitate other qualities which\nare not transferable; instead of learning from mathematics she became\nsubservient to it.\n\nSubstance does not affect us by its mere existence, but through an\n_Attribute_. By attribute is meant, according to the fourth definition,\n\"that which the understanding perceives of substance as constituting the\nessence of it\" _(quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem\nessentiam constituens)_. The more reality a substance contains, the more\nattributes it has; consequently infinite substance possesses an infinite\nnumber, each of which gives expression to its essence, but of which two\nonly fall within our knowledge. Among the innumerable divine attributes\nthe human mind knows those only which it finds in itself, thought and\nextension. Although man beholds God only as thinking and extended\nsubstance, he yet has a clear and complete; an adequate--idea of God. Since\neach of the two attributes is conceived without the other, hence in itself\n(_per se_), they are distinct from each other _realiter_, and independent.\nGod is absolutely infinite, the attributes only in their kind (_in suo\ngenere_).\n\nHow can the indeterminate possess properties? Are the attributes merely\nascribed to substance by the understanding, or do they possess reality\napart from the knowing subject? This question has given rise to much\ndebate. According to Hegel and Ed. Erdmann the attributes are something\nexternal to substance, something brought into it by the understanding,\nforms of knowledge present in the beholder alone; substance itself is\nneither extended nor cogitative, but merely appears to the understanding\nunder these determinations, without which the latter would be unable to\ncognize it. This \"formalistic\" interpretation, which, relying on a passage\nin a letter to De Vries (_Epist_. 27), explains the attributes as mere\nmodes of intellectual apprehension, numbers Kuno Fischer among its\nopponents. As the one party holds to the first half of the definition, the\nother places the emphasis on the second half (\"that which the\n_understanding_ perceives--as constituting the _essence_ of substance\").\nThe attributes are more than mere modes of representation--they are real\nproperties, which substance possesses even apart from an observer, nay, in\nwhich it consists; in Spinoza, moreover, \"must be conceived\" is the\nequivalent of \"to be.\" Although this latter \"realistic\" party undoubtedly\nhas the advantage over the former, which reads into Spinoza a subjectivism\nforeign to his system, they ought not to forget that the difference in\ninterpretation has for its basis a conflict among the motives which control\nSpinoza's thinking. The reference of the attributes to the understanding,\ngiven in the definition, is not without significance. It sprang from the\nwish not to mar the indeterminateness of the absolute by the opposition of\nthe attributes, while, on the other hand, an equally pressing need for the\nconservation of the immanence of substance forbade a bold transfer of the\nattributes to the observer. The real opinion of Spinoza is neither so\nclear and free from contradictions, nor so one-sided, as that which his\ninterpreters ascribe to him. Fischer's further interpretation of the\nattributes of God as his \"powers\" is tenable, so long as by _causa_ and\n_potentia_ we understand nothing more than the irresistible, but\nnon-kinetic, force with which an original truth establishes or effects\nthose which follow from it.\n\nAs the dualism of extension and thought is reduced from a substantial to\nan attributive distinction, so individual bodies and minds, motions and\nthoughts, are degraded a stage further. Individual things lack independence\nof every sort. The individual is, as a determinate finite thing, burdened\nwith negation and limitation, for every determination includes a negation;\nthat which is truly real in the individual is God. Finite things are\n_modi_ of the infinite substance, mere states, variable states, of God. By\nthemselves they are nothing, since out of God nothing exists. They possess\nexistence only in so far as they are conceived in their connection with the\ninfinite, that is, as transitory forms of the unchangeable substance. They\nare not in themselves, but in another, in God, and are conceived only\nin God. They are mere affections of the divine attributes, and must be\nconsidered as such.\n\nTo the two attributes correspond two classes of modes. The most important\nmodifications of extension are rest and motion. Among the modes of thought\nare understanding and will. These belong in the sphere of determinate and\ntransitory being and do not hold of the _natura naturans_: God is exalted\nabove all modality, above will and understanding, as above motion and rest.\nWe must not assert of the _natura naturata_ (the world as the sum of all\nmodes), as of the _natura naturans_, that its essence involves existence\n(I. _prop_. 24): we can conceive finite things as non-existent, as well as\nexistent (_Epist_. 29). This constitutes their \"contingency,\" which must\nby no means be interpreted as lawlessness. On the contrary, all that takes\nplace in the world is most rigorously determined; every individual, finite,\ndeterminate thing and event is determined to its existence and action by\nanother similarly finite and determinate thing or event, and this cause is,\nin turn, determined in its existence and action by a further finite mode,\nand so on to infinity (I. _prop_. 28). Because of this endlessness in the\nseries there is no first or ultimate cause in the phenomenal world; all\nfinite causes are second causes; the primary cause lies within the sphere\nof the infinite and is God himself. The modes are all subject to the\nconstraint of an unbroken and endless nexus of efficient causes, which\nleaves room neither for chance, nor choice, nor ends. Nothing can be or\nhappen otherwise than as it is and happens (I. _prop_. 29, 33).\n\nThe causal chain appears in two forms: a mode of extension has its\nproducing ground in a second mode of extension; a mode of thought can be\ncaused only by another mode of thought--each individual thing is determined\nby one of its own kind. The two series proceed side by side, without a\nmember of either ever being able to interfere in the other or to effect\nanything in it--a motion can never produce anything but other motions, an\nidea can result only in other ideas; the body can never determine the mind\nto an idea, nor the soul the body to a movement. Since, however, extension\nand thought are not two substances, but attributes of one substance,\nthis apparently double causal nexus of two series proceeding in exact\ncorrespondence is, in reality, but a single one. (III. _prop_. 2, _schol_.)\nviewed from different sides. That which represents a chain of motions when\nseen from the side of extension, bears the aspect of a series of ideas from\nthe side of thought. _Modus extensionis et idea illius modi una cademque\nest res, sed duobus modis expressa_ (II. _prop_. 7, _schol_.; cf. III.\n_prop_. 2, _schol_.). The soul is nothing but the idea of an actual body,\nbody or motion nothing but the object or event in the sphere of extended\nactuality corresponding to an idea. No idea exists without something\ncorporeal corresponding to it, no body, without at the same time existing\nas idea, or being conceived; in other words, everything is both body and\nspirit, all things are animated (II. _prop_. 13, _schol_.). Thus the famous\nproposition results; _Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio\nrerum (sive corporum; II. prop_. 7), and in application to man, \"the order\nof the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the\norder of the actions and passions of the mind\" (III. _prop. 2, schol_.).\n\nThe attempt to solve the problem of the relation between the material and\nthe mental worlds by asserting their thoroughgoing correspondence and\nsubstantial identity, was philosophically justifiable and important,\nthough many evident objections obtrude themselves upon us. The required\nassumption, that there is a mental event corresponding to _every_ bodily\none, and _vice versa_, meets with involuntary and easily supported\nopposition, which Spinoza did nothing to remove. Similarly he omitted\nto explain how body is related to motion, mind to ideas, and both to\nactuality. The ascription of a materialistic tendency to Spinoza is not\nwithout foundation. Corporeality and reality appear well-nigh identical for\nhim,--the expressions _corpora_ and _res_ are used synonymously,--so that\nthere remains for minds and ideas only an existence as reflections of\nthe real in the sphere of [an] ideality (whose degree of actuality it is\ndifficult to determine). Moreover, individualistic impulses have been\npointed out, which, in part, conflict with the monism which he consciously\nfollows, and, in part, subserve its interests. An example of this is given\nin the relation of mind and idea: Spinoza treats the soul as a sum of\nideas, as consisting in them. An (at least apparently substantial) bond\namong ideas, an ego, which possesses them, does not exist for him: the\nCartesian _cogito_ has become an impersonal _cogitatur_ or a _Deus\ncogitat_. In order to the unique substantiality of the infinite, the\nsubstantiality of individual spirits must disappear. That which argues for\nthe latter is their I-ness (_Ichheit_), the unity of self-consciousness;\nit is destroyed, if the mind is a congeries of ideas, a composite of them.\nThus in order to relieve itself from the self-dependence of the individual\nmind, monism allies itself with a spiritual atomism, the most extreme which\ncan be conceived. The mind is resolved into a mass of individual ideas.\n\nMention may be made in passing, also, of a strange conception, which\nis somewhat out of harmony with the rest of the system, and of which,\nmoreover, little use is made. This is the conception of _infinite modes_.\nAs such are cited, _facies totius mundi, motus et quies, intellectus\nabsolute infinitus_. Kuno Fischer's interpretation of this difficult\nconception may be accepted. It denotes, according to him, the connected sum\nof the modes, the itself non-finite sum total of the finite--the universe\nmeaning the totality of individual things in general (without reference to\ntheir nature as extended or cogitative); rest and motion, the totality of\nmaterial being; the absolutely infinite understanding, the totality of\nspiritual being or the ideas. Individual spirits together constitute, as\nit were, the infinite intellect; our mind is a part of the divine\nunderstanding, yet not in such a sense that the whole consists of the\nparts, but that the part exists only through the whole. When we say, the\nhuman mind perceives this or that, it is equivalent to saying that God--not\nin so far as he is infinite, but as he expresses himself in this human\nmind and constitutes its essence--has this or that idea (II. _prop_. II,\n_coroll_).\n\nThe discussion of these three fundamental concepts exhausts all the chief\npoints in Spinoza's doctrine of God. Passing over his doctrine of body (II.\nbetween _prop_. 13 and _prop_. 14) we turn at once to his discussion of\nmind and man.\n\n%(b) Anthropology: Cognition and the Passions.%--Each thing is at once mind\nand body, representation and that which is represented, idea and ideate\n(object). Body and soul are the same being, only considered under different\nattributes. The human mind is the idea of the human body; it cognizes\nitself in perceiving the affections of its body; it represents all that\ntakes place in the body, though not all adequately. As man's body is\ncomposed of very many bodies, so his soul is composed of very many ideas.\nTo judge of the relation of the human mind to the mind of lower beings, we\nmust consider the superiority of man's body to other bodies; the more\ncomplex a body is, and the greater the variety of the affections of\nwhich it is capable, the better and more adapted for adequate cognition,\nthe accompanying mind.--A result of the identity of soul and body is\nthat the acts of our will are not free (_Epist_. 62): they are, in fact,\ndeterminations of our body, only considered under the attribute of thought,\nand no more free than this from the constraint of the causal law (III.\n_prop_. 2, _schol_.).--Since the mind does nothing without at the same time\nknowing that it does it--since, in other words, its activity is a conscious\nactivity, it is not merely _idea corporis humani_, but also _idea ideae\ncorporis_ or _idea mentis_.\n\nAll adherents of the Eleatic separation of the one pure being from the\nmanifold and changing world of appearance are compelled to make a\nlike distinction between two kinds and two organs of _knowledge_. The\nrepresentation of the empirical manifold of separately existing individual\nthings, together with the organ thereof, Spinoza terms _imaginatio_; the\nfaculty of cognizing the true reality, the one, all-embracing substance, he\ncalls _intellectus. Imaginatio_ (imagination, sensuous representation)\nis the faculty of inadequate, confused ideas, among which are included\nabstract conceptions, as well as sensations and memory-images. The objects\nof perception are the affections of our body; and our perceptions,\ntherefore, are not clear and distinct, because we are not completely\nacquainted with their causes. In the merely perceptual stage, the mind\ngains only a confused and mutilated idea of external objects, of the body,\nand of itself; it is unable to separate that in the perception (_e.g._,\nheat) which is due to the external body from that which is due to its own\nbody. An inadequate idea, however, is not in itself an error; it becomes\nsuch only when, unconscious of its defectiveness, we take it for complete\nand true. Prominent examples of erroneous ideas are furnished by general\nconcepts, by the idea of ends, and the idea of the freedom of the will. The\nmore general and abstract an idea, the more inadequate and indistinct it\nbecomes; and this shows the lack of value in generic concepts, which are\nformed by the omission of differences. All cognition which is carried on by\nuniversals and their symbols, words, yields opinion and imagination merely\ninstead of truth. Quite as valueless and harmful is the idea of ends, with\nits accompaniments. We think that nature has typical forms hovering before\nit, which it is seeking to actualize in things; when this intention is\napparently fulfilled we speak of things as perfect and beautiful; when it\nfails, of imperfect and ugly things. Such concepts of value belong in the\nsphere of fictions. The same is true of the idea of the freedom of the\nwill, which depends on our ignorance of that which constrains us. Apart\nfrom the consideration that \"the will,\" the general conception of which\ncomes under the rubric of unreal abstractions, is in fact merely the sum of\nthe particular volitions, the illusion of freedom, _e.g._, that we will\nand act without a cause, arises from the fact that we are conscious of\nour action (and also of its proximate motives), but not of its (remoter)\ndetermining causes. Thus the thirsty child believes it desires its milk of\nits own free will, and the timid one, that it freely chooses to run away\n(_Ethica, III. prop_. 2, _schol_.; I. _app_.) If the falling stone were\nconscious, it would, likewise, consider itself free, and its fall the\nresult of an undetermined decision.\n\nTwo degrees are to be distinguished in the true or adequate knowledge\nof the intellect: rational knowledge attained through inference, and\nintuitive, self-evident knowledge; the latter has principles for its\nobject, the former that which follows from them. Instead of operating with\nabstract concepts the reason uses common notions, _notiones communes_.\nGenera do not exist, but, no doubt, something common to all things. All\nbodies agree in being extended; all minds and ideas in being modes of\nthought; all beings whatever in the fact that they are modes of the divine\nsubstance and its attributes; \"that which is common to all things, and\nwhich is equally in the part and in the whole, cannot but be adequately\nconceived.\" The ideas of extension, of thought, and of the eternal and\ninfinite essence of God are adequate ideas. The adequate idea of each\nindividual actual object involves the idea of God, since it can neither\nexist nor be conceived apart from God, and \"all ideas, in so far as\nthey are referred to God, are true.\" The ideas of substance and of the\nattributes are conceived through themselves, or immediately (intuitively)\ncognized; they are underivative, original, self-evident ideas.\n\nThere are thus three kinds, degrees, or faculties of cognition--sensuous or\nimaginative representation, reason, and immediate intuition. Knowledge of\nthe second and third degrees is necessarily true, and our only means\nof distinguishing the true from the false. As light reveals itself and\ndarkness, so the truth is the criterion of itself and of error. Every\ntruth is accompanied by certainty, and is its own witness (II. _prop_. 43,\n_schol_.).--Adequate knowledge does not consider things as individuals,\nbut in their necessary connection and as eternal sequences from the\nworld-ground. The reason perceives things under the form of eternity: _sub\nspecie aeternitatis_ (II. _prop_. 44, _cor_. 2).\n\nIn his theory of the _emotions_, Spinoza is more dependent on Descartes\nthan anywhere else; but even here he is guided by a successful endeavor\nafter greater rigor and simplicity. He holds his predecessor's false\nconcept of freedom responsible for the failure of his very acute inquiry.\nAll previous writers on the passions have either derided, or bewailed, or\ncondemned them, instead of investigating their nature. Spinoza will\nneither denounce nor ridicule human actions and appetites, but endeavor\nto comprehend them on the basis of natural laws, and to consider them as\nthough the question concerned lines, surfaces, and bodies. He aims not\nto look on hate, anger, and the rest as flaws, but as necessary, though\ntroublesome, properties of human nature, for which, as really as for heat\nand cold, thunder and lightning, a causal explanation is requisite.--As a\ndeterminate, finite being the mind is dependent in its existence and its\nactivity on other finite things, and is incomprehensible without them;\nfrom its involution in the general course of nature the inadequate ideas\ninevitably follow, and from these the passive states or emotions; the\npassions thus belong to human nature, as one subject to limitation and\nnegation.--The destruction of contingent and perishable things is effected\nby external causes; no one is destroyed by itself; so far as in it lies\neverything strives to persist in its being (III. _prop_. 4 and 6). The\nfundamental endeavor after self-preservation constitutes the essence of\neach thing (III. _prop_. 7). This endeavor _(conatus)_ is termed will\n_(voluntas)_ or desire _(cupiditas)_ when it is referred to the mind alone,\nand appetite _(appetitus)_ when referred to the mind and body together;\ndesire or volition is conscious appetite (III. _prop_. 9, _schol_.). We\ncall a thing good because we desire it, not desire a thing because we hold\nit good (cf. Hobbes, p. 75). To desire two further fundamental forms of the\nemotions are added, pleasure and pain. If a thing increases the power of\nour body to act, the idea of it increases the power of our soul to think,\nand is gladly imagined by it. Pleasure (_laetitia_) is the transition of\na man to a greater, and pain (_tristitia_) his transition to a lesser\nperfection.\n\nAll other emotions are modifications or combinations of the three original\nones, to which Spinoza reduces the six of Descartes (cf. p. 105). In\nthe deduction and description of them his procedure is sometimes aridly\nsystematic, sometimes even forced and artificial, but for the most part\ningenious, appropriate, and psychologically acute. Whatever gives us\npleasure augments our being, and whatever pains us diminishes it; hence we\nseek to preserve the causes of pleasurable emotions, and love them, to do\naway with the causes of painful ones, and hate them. \"Love is pleasure\naccompanied by the idea of an external cause; hate is pain accompanied by\nthe idea of an external cause.\" Since all that furthers or diminishes the\nbeing of (the cause of our pleasure) the object of our love, exercises\nat the same time a like influence on us, we love that which rejoices the\nobject of our love and hate that which disturbs it; its happiness and\nsuffering become ours also. The converse is true of the object of our hate:\nits good fortune provokes us and its ill fortune pleases us. If we are\nfilled with no emotion toward things like ourselves, we sympathize in their\nsad or joyous feelings by involuntary imitation. Pity, from which we\nstrive to free ourselves as from every painful affection, inclines us to\nbenevolence or to assistance in the removal of the cause of the misery of\nothers. Envy of those who are fortunate, and commiseration of those who are\nin trouble, are alike rooted in emulation. Man is by nature inclined\nto envy and malevolence. Hate easily leads to underestimation, love to\noverestimation, of the object, and self-love to pride or self-satisfaction,\nwhich are much more frequently met with than unfeigned humility. Immoderate\ndesire for honor is termed ambition; if the desire to please others is kept\nwithin due bounds it is praised as unpretentiousness, courtesy, modesty\n(_modestia_). Ambition, luxury, drunkenness, avarice, and lust have no\ncontraries, for temperance, sobriety, and chastity are not emotions\n(passive states), but denote the power of the soul by which the former\nare moderated, and which is discussed later under the name _fortitudo_.\nSelf-abasement or humility is a feeling of pain arising from the\nconsideration of our weakness and impotency; its opposite is\nself-complacency. Either of these may be accompanied by the (erroneous)\nbelief that we have done the saddening or gladdening act of our own free\nwill; in this case the former affection is termed repentance. Hope and fear\nare inconstant pleasure and pain, arising from the idea of something past\nor to come, concerning whose coming and whose issue we are still in doubt.\nThere is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear without hope; for he who\nstill doubts imagines something which excludes the existence of that which\nis expected. If the cause of doubt is removed, hope is transformed into a\nfeeling of confidence and fear into despair. There are as many kinds of\nemotions as there are classes among their objects or causes.\n\nBesides the emotions to be termed \"passions\" in the strict sense, states\nof passivity, Spinoza recognizes others which relate to us as active. Only\nthose which are of the nature of pleasure or desire belong to this class\nof _active_ emotions; the painful affections are entirely excluded, since\nwithout exception they diminish or arrest the mind's power to think. The\ntotality of these nobler impulses is called _fortitudo_ (fortitude), and\na distinction is made among them between _animositas_ (vigor of soul) and\n_generositas_ (magnanimity, noble-mindedness), according as rational\ndesire is directed to the preservation of our own being or to aiding our\nfellow-men. Presence of mind and temperance are examples of the former,\nmodesty and clemency of the latter. By this bridge, the idea of the active\nemotions, we may follow Spinoza into the field of ethics.\n\n%(c) Practical Philosophy.%--Spinoza's theory of ethics is based on the\nequation of the three concepts, perfection, reality, activity (V. _prop_.\n40, _dem_.). The more active a thing is, the more perfect it is and the\nmore reality it possesses. It is active, however, when it is the complete\nor adequate cause of that which takes place within it or without it;\npassive when it is not at all the cause of this, or the cause only in part.\nA cause is termed adequate, when its effect can be clearly and distinctly\nperceived from it alone. The human mind, as a _modus_ of thought, is active\nwhen it has adequate ideas; all its passion consists in confused ideas,\namong which belong the affections produced by external objects. The essence\nof the mind is thought; volition is not only dependent on cognition, but at\nbottom identical with it.\n\nDescartes had already made the will the power of affirmation and negation.\nSpinoza advances a step further: the affirmation cannot be separated from\nthe idea affirmed, it is impossible to conceive a truth without in the\nsame act affirming it, the idea involves its own affirmation. \"Will and\nunderstanding are one and the same\" (II. _prop_. 49, _cor_.). For Spinoza\nmoral activity is entirely resolved into cognitive activity. To the two\nstages of knowing, _imaginatio_ and _intellectus_, correspond two stages\nof willing--desire, which is ruled by imagination, and volition, which is\nguided by reason. The passive emotions of sensuous desire are directed to\nperishable objects, the active, which spring from reason, have an eternal\nobject--the knowledge of the truth, the intuition of God. For reason there\nare no distinctions of persons,--she brings men into concord and gives them\na common end (IV. _prop_. 35-37,40),--and no distinctions of time (IV.\n_prop_. 62, 66), and in the active emotions, which are always good, no\nexcess (IV. _prop_. 61). The passive emotions arise from confused ideas.\nThey cease to be passions, when the confused ideas of the modifications of\nthe body are transformed into clear ones; as soon as we have clear ideas,\nwe become active and cease to be slaves of desire. We master the emotions\nby gaining a clear knowledge of them. Now, an idea is clear when we cognize\nits object not as an individual thing, but in its connection, as a link in\nthe causal chain, as necessary, and as a mode of God. The more the mind\nconceives things in their necessity, and the emotions in their reference to\nGod, the less it is passively subject to the emotions, the more power it\nattains over them: \"Virtue is power\" (IV. _def_. 8; _prop_. 20, _dem_.). It\nis true, indeed, that one emotion can be conquered only by another stronger\none, a passive emotion only by an active one. The active emotion by which\nknowledge gains this victory over the passions is the joyous consciousness\nof our power (III. _prop_. 58, 59). Adequate ideas conceive their objects\nin union with God; thus the pleasure which proceeds from knowledge of,\nand victory over, the passions is accompanied by the idea of God, and,\nconsequently (according to the definition of love), by _love toward God_\n(V. _prop_. 15, 32). The knowledge and love of God, together, \"intellectual\nlove toward God,\"[1] is the highest good and the highest virtue (IV.\n_prop_. 28). Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself.\nThe intellectual love of man toward God, in which the highest peace of the\nsoul, blessedness, and freedom consist, and in virtue of which (since it,\nlike its object and cause, true knowledge, is eternal), the soul is not\nincluded in the destruction of the body (V. _prop_. 23, 33), is a part of\nthe infinite love with which God loves himself, and is one and the same\nwith the love of God to man. The eternal part of the soul is reason,\nthrough which it is active; the perishable part is imagination or sensuous\nrepresentation, through which it is passively affected. We are immortal\nonly in adequate cognition and in love to God; more of the wise man's soul\nis immortal than of the fool's.\n\n[Footnote 1: The conception _amor Dei intellectualis_ in Spinoza is\ndiscussed in a dissertation by C. L\u00fclmann, Jena, 1884.]\n\nSpinoza's ethics is intellectualistic--virtue is based on knowledge.[1] It\nis, moreover, naturalistic--morality is a necessary sequence from human\nnature; it is a physical product, not a product of freedom; for the acts of\nthe will are determined by ideas, which in their turn are the effects\nof earlier causes. The foundation of virtue is the effort after\nself-preservation: How can a man desire to act rightly unless he desires to\nbe (IV. _prop_. 21, 22)? Since reason never enjoins that which is contrary\nto nature, it of necessity requires every man to love himself, to seek\nthat which is truly useful to him, and to desire all that makes him more\nperfect. According to the law of nature all that is useful is allowable.\nThe useful is that which increases our power, activity, or perfection, or\nthat which furthers knowledge, for the life of the soul consists in thought\n(IV. _prop. 26; app. cap_. 5). That alone is an evil which restrains man\nfrom perfecting the reason and leading a rational life. Virtuous action is\nequivalent to following the guidance of the reason in self-preservation\n(IV. _prop_. 24).--Nowhere in Spinoza are fallacies more frequent than\nin his moral philosophy; nowhere is there a clearer revelation of the\ninsufficiency of his artificially constructed concepts, which, in their\nundeviating abstractness, are at no point congruent with reality. He is\nas little true to his purpose to exclude the imperative element, and to\nconfine himself entirely to the explanation of human actions considered as\nfacts, as any philosopher who has adopted a similar aim. He relieves the\ninconsistency by clothing his injunctions under the ancient ideal of the\nfree wise man. This, in fact, is not the only thing in Spinoza which\nreminds one of the customs of the Greek moralists. He renews the Platonic\nidea of a philosophical virtue, and the opinion of Socrates, that right\naction will result of itself from true insight. Arguing from himself, from\nhis own pure and strong desire for knowledge, to mankind in general, he\nmakes reason the essence of the soul, thought the essence of reason, and\nholds the direction of the impulse of self-preservation to the perfection\nof knowledge, which is \"the better part of us,\" to be the natural one.\n\n[Footnote 1: That virtue which springs from knowledge is alone genuine.\nThe painful, hence unactive, emotions of pity and repentance may impel to\nactions whose accomplishment is better than their omission. Emotion caused\nby sympathy for others and contrition for one's own guilt, both of which\nincrease present evil by new ones, have only the value of evils of a lesser\nkind. They are salutary for the irrational man, in so far as the one spurs\nhim on to acts of assistance and the other diminishes his pride. They\nare harmful to the wise man, or, at least, useless; he is in no need of\nirrational motives to rational action. Action from insight is alone true\nmorality.]\n\nAll men endeavor after continuance of existence (III. _prop_. 6); why not\nall after virtue? If all endeavor after it, why do so few reach the goal?\nWhence the sadly large number of the irrational, the selfish, the vicious?\nWhence the evil in the world? Vice is as truly an outcome of \"nature\" as\nvirtue. Virtue is power, vice is weakness; the former is knowledge, the\nlatter ignorance. Whence the powerless natures? Whence defective knowledge?\nWhence imperfection in general?\n\nThe concept of imperfection expresses nothing positive, nothing actual, but\nmerely a defect, an absence of reality. It is nothing but an idea in us,\na fiction which arises through the comparison of one thing with another\npossessing greater reality, or with an abstract generic concept, a pattern,\nwhich it seems unable to attain. That concepts of value are not properties\nof things themselves, but denote only their pleasurable or painful effects\non us, is evident from the fact that one and the same thing may be at the\nsame time good, bad, and indifferent: the music which is good for the\nmelancholy man may be bad for the mourner, and neither good nor bad for the\ndeaf. Knowledge of the bad is an abstract, inadequate idea; in God there is\nno idea of evil. If imperfection and error were something real, it would\nhave to be conceded that God is the author of evil and sin. In reality\neverything is that which it can be, hence without defect: everything actual\nis, in itself considered, perfect. Even the fool and the sinner cannot be\notherwise than he is; he appears imperfect only when placed beside the wise\nand the virtuous. Sin is thus only a lesser reality than virtue, evil a\nlesser good; good and bad, activity and passivity, power and weakness\nare merely distinctions in degree. But why is not everything absolutely\nperfect? Why are there lesser degrees of reality? Two answers are given.\nThe first is found only between the lines: the imperfections in the\nbeing and action of individual things are grounded in their finitude,\nparticularly in their involution in the chain of causality, in virtue of\nwhich they are acted on from without, and are determined in their action\nnot by their own nature only, but also by external causes. Man sins because\nhe is open to impressions from external things, and only superior natures\nare strong enough to preserve their rational self-determination in spite\nof this. The other answer is expressly given at the end of the first part\n(with an appeal to the sixteenth proposition, that everything which\nthe divine understanding conceives as creatable has actually come into\nexistence). \"To those who ask why God did not so create all men that they\nshould be governed only by reason, I reply only: because matter was not\nlacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest\nto lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature were so ample\nas so suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite\nintellect.\" All possible degrees of perfection have come into being,\nincluding sin and error, which represent the lowest grade. The universe\nforms a chain of degrees of perfection, of which none must be wanting:\nparticular cases of defect are justified by the perfection of the whole,\nwhich would be incomplete without the lowest degree of perfection, vice\nand wickedness. Here we see Spinoza following a path which Leibnitz was to\nbroaden out into a highway in his _Theodicy_. Both favor the quantitative\nview of the world, which softens the antitheses, and reduces distinctions\nof kind to distinctions of degree. Not till Kant was the qualitative view\nof the world, which had been first brought into ethics by Christianity,\nrestored to its rights. An ethics which denies freedom and evil is nothing\nbut a physics of morals.\n\nIn his _theory of the state_ Spinoza follows Hobbes pretty closely, but\nrejects absolutism, and declares democracy, in which each is obedient to\nself-imposed law, to be the form of government most in accordance with\nreason. (So in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, while in the later\n_Tractatus Politicus_ he gives the preference to aristocracy.) In\naccordance with the supreme right of nature each man deems good, and seeks\nto gain, that which seems to him useful; all things belong to all, each may\ndestroy the objects of his hate. Conflict and insecurity prevail in the\nstate of nature as a result of the sensuous desires and emotions (_homines\nex natura hostes_); and they can be done away with only through the\nestablishment of a society, which by punitive laws compels everyone to do,\nand leave undone, that which the general welfare demands. Strife and breach\nof faith become sin only in the state; before its formation that alone was\nwrong which no one had the desire and power to do. Besides this mission,\nhowever, of protecting selfish interests by the prevention of aggression,\nthe civil community has a higher one, to subserve the development of\nreason; it is only in the state that true morality and true freedom are\npossible, and the wise man will prefer to live in the state, because\nhe finds more freedom there than in isolation. Thus the dislocation of\nconcepts, which is perceptible in Spinoza's ethics, repeats itself in his\npolitics. First, virtue is based on the impulse of self-preservation and\nthe good is equated with that which is useful to the individual; then, with\na transformation of mere utility into \"true\" utility, the rational moment\nis brought in (first as practical prudence, next as the impulse after\nknowledge, and then, with a gradual change of meaning, as moral wisdom),\nuntil, finally, in strange contrast to the naturalistic beginning, the\nChristian idea of virtue as purity, self-denial, love to our neighbors and\nlove to God, is reached. In a similar way \"Spinoza conceives the starting\npoint of the state naturalistically, its culmination idealistically.\"[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: C. Schindler in his dissertation _Ueber den Begriff des\nGuten und N\u00fctzlichen bei Spinoza_, Jena, 1885, p. 42, a work, however,\nwhich does not penetrate to the full depth of the matter. Cf. Eucken,\n_Lebensanschauungen_, p. 406.]\n\nThe fundamental ideas of the Spinozistic system, and those which render\nit important, are rationalism, pantheism, the essential identity of the\nmaterial and spiritual worlds, and the uninterrupted mechanism of becoming.\nBesides the twisting of ethical concepts just mentioned, we may briefly\nnote the most striking of the other difficulties and contradictions which\nSpinoza left unexplained. There is a break between his endeavor to exalt\nthe absolute high above the phenomenal world of individual existence, and,\nat the same time, to bring the former into the closest possible conjunction\nwith the latter, to make it dwell therein--a break between the transcendent\nand immanent conceptions of the idea of God. No light is vouchsafed on the\nrelation between primary and secondary causes, between the immediate divine\ncausality and the divine causality mediated through finite causes. The\ninfinity of God is in conflict with his complete cognizability on the\npart of man; for how is a finite, transitory spirit able to conceive\nthe Infinite and Eternal? How does the human intellect rise above modal\nlimitations to become capable and worthy of the mystical union with God?\nReference has been already made to the twofold nature of the attributes (as\nforms of intellectual apprehension and as real properties of substance)\nwhich invites contradictory interpretations.\n\n\n3. %Pascal, Malebranche, Bayle.%\n\nReturning from Holland to France, we find a combination of Cartesianism\nand mysticism similar to that which we have noticed in the former country.\nUnder Geulincx these two forces had lived peacefully together; in Spinoza\nthey had entered into the closest alliance; with Blaise Pascal (1623-62),\nthe first to adopt a religious tendency, they came into a certain\nantithesis. Spinoza had taught: through the knowledge of God to the love\nof God; in Pascal the watchword becomes, God is not conceived through\nthe reason, but felt with the heart. After attacking the Jesuits in his\n_Provincial Letters_, and unveiling the worthlessness of their casuistical\nmorality, Pascal, constrained by a genuine piety, undertook to construct a\nphilosophy of Christianity; but the attempt was ended by the early death of\nthe author, who had always suffered under a weak constitution. Fragments of\nthis work were published by his friends, the Jansenists, under the title,\n_Thoughts on Religion_, 1669, though not without mediating alterations.\nThe Port-Royal _Logic (The Art of Thinking_, 1662), edited by Arnauld and\nNicole, was based on a treatise of Pascal. His thought, which was not\ndistinguished by clearness, but by depth and movement, and which, after\nthe French fashion, delighted in antitheses, was influenced by Descartes,\nMontaigne, and Epictetus. He, too, finds in mathematics the example for\nall science, and holds that whatever transcends mathematics transcends the\nreason. By the application of mathematics to the study of nature we attain\na mundane science, which is certain, no doubt, and which makes constant\nprogress,[1] but which does not satisfy, since it reveals nothing of the\ninfinite, of the whole, without which the parts remain unintelligible.\nHence all natural philosophy together is not worth an hour's toil. Pascal\nconsoles himself for our ignorance concerning external things by the\nstability of ethics.\n\n[Footnote 1: It is this uninterrupted progress which raises the reason\nabove the operations of nature and the instincts of animals. While the bees\nbuild their cells to-day just as they did a thousand years ago, science is\ncontinually developing. This guarantees to us our immortal destiny.]\n\nThe leading principles of his ethics are as follows: In sin the love to God\ncreated in us has left us and self-love has transgressed its limits; pride\nhas delivered us over to selfishness and misery. Our nature is corrupted,\nbut not beyond redemption. In his actions worthless and depraved, man is\nseen to be exalted and incomprehensible in his ends; in reality he is\nworthy of abhorrence, but great in his destination. No philosophy or\nreligion has so taught us at once to know the greatness and the misery of\nman as Christianity: this bids him recognize his low condition, but at the\nsame time to endeavor to become like God. We must humbly despise the world\nand renounce ourselves; in order to love God, we must hate ourselves. Moral\nreformation is an act of divine grace, and the merit of human volition\nconsists only in not resisting this. God transforms the heart by a heavenly\nsweetness, grants it to know that spiritual pleasure is greater than bodily\npleasure, and infuses into it a disgust at the allurements of sin. Virtue\nis finding one's greatest happiness in God or in the eternal good. As\nmorality is a matter of feeling, not of thought, so God, so even the first\nprinciples on which the certitude of demonstration depends, are the object,\nnot of reason, but of the heart. That which certifies to the highest\nindemonstrable principles is a feeling, a belief, an instinct of nature:\n_les principes se sentent_. As a defender of the needs and rights of the\nheart, Pascal is a forerunner of the great Rousseau. His depreciation of\nthe reason to exalt faith establishes a certain relationship with the\nskeptics of his native land, among whom Cousin has unjustly classed him\n(_\u00c9tudes sur Pascal_, 5th ed., 1857).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Of the works on Pascal we may mention that of H. Reuchlin,\n1840: Havet's edition of the _Pens\u00e9es_, with notes, Paris, 1866; and the\n_\u00c9tude_ by Ed. Droz, Paris, 1886.]\n\nNicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), a member of the Oratory of Jesus, in\nParis, which was opposed by the Jesuits, completed the development of\nCartesianism in the religious direction adopted by Pascal. His thought\nis controlled by the endeavor to combine Cartesian metaphysics and\nAugustinian Christianity, those two great forces which constituted the\ndouble citadel of his order. His collected works appeared three years\nbefore his death; and a new edition in four volumes, prepared by\nJ. Simon, in 1871. His chief work, _On the Search for Truth_ (new edition\nby F. Bouillier, 1880), appeared in 1675, and was followed by the\n_Treatise on Ethics_ (new edition by H. Joly, 1882) and the _Christian\nand Metaphysical Meditations_ in 1684, the _Discussions on Metaphysics and\non Religion_ in 1688, and various polemic treatises. The best known among\nthe doctrines of Malebranche is the principle that _we see all things in\nGod (que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu_.--_Recherche_, iii. 2, 6). What\ndoes this mean, and how is it established? It is intended as an answer to\nthe question, How is it possible for the mind to cognize the body if, as\nDescartes has shown, mind and body are two fundamentally distinct and\nreciprocally independent substances?\n\nThe seeker after truth must first understand the sources of error. Of these\nthere are two, or, more exactly, five--as many as there are faculties of\nthe soul. Error may spring from either the cognitive or the appetitive\nfaculty; in the first case, either from sense-perception, the imagination,\nor the pure understanding, and, in the latter, from the inclinations or the\npassions. The inclinations and the passions do not reveal the nature of\nthings, but only express how they affect us, of what value they are to\nus. Further still, the senses and the imagination only reproduce the\nimpressions which things make on us as feeling subjects, express only what\nthey are for us, not what they are in themselves. The senses have been\ngiven us simply for the preservation of our body, and so long as we expect\nnothing further from them than practical information concerning the\n(useful or hurtful) relation of things to our body, there is no reason for\nmistrusting them,--here we are not deceived by sensation, but at most by\nthe overhasty judgment of the will. \"Consider the senses as false witnesses\nin regard to the truth, but as trustworthy counselors in relation to the\ninterests of life!\"--Sensation and imagination belong to the soul in virtue\nof its union with the body; apart from this it is pure spirit. The essence\nof the soul is thought, for this function is the only one which cannot be\nabstracted from it without destroying it. Hence there can be no moment in\nthe life of the soul when it ceases to think; it thinks always (_l'\u00e2me\npense toujours_), only it does not always remember the fact.\n\nThe kinds of knowledge differ with the classes of things cognized. God is\nknown immediately and intuitively. He is necessary and unlimited being,\nthe universal, infinite being, being absolutely; he only is known through\nhimself. The concept of the infinite is the presupposition of the concept\nof the finite, and the former is earlier in us; we gain the conception of\na particular thing only when we omit something from the idea of \"being in\ngeneral,\" or limit it. God is cogitative, like spirits, and extended, like\nbodies, but in an entirely different manner from created things. We know\nour own soul through consciousness or inner perception. We know its\nexistence more certainly than that of bodies, but understand its nature\nless perfectly than theirs. To know that it is capable of sensations of\npain, of heat, of light, we must have experienced them. For knowledge\nof the minds of others we are dependent upon conjecture, on analogical\ninferences from ourselves.\n\nBut how is the unextended soul capable of cognizing extended body? Only\nthrough the medium of _ideas_. The ideas occupy an intermediate position\nbetween objects, whose archetypes they are, and representations in the\nsoul, whose causes they are. The ideas, after the pattern of which God\nhas created things, and the relations among them (necessary truths), are\neternal, hence uncaused; they constitute the wisdom of God and are not\ndependent on his will. Things are in God in archetypal form, and are\ncognized through these their archetypes in God. Ideas are not produced by\nbodies, by the emission of sensuous images,[1] nor are they originated by\nthe soul, or possessed by it as an innate possession. But God is the cause\nof knowledge, although he neither imparts ideas to the soul in creation nor\nproduces them in it on every separate occasion. The ideas or perfections of\nthings are in God and are beheld by spirits, who likewise dwell in God as\nthe universal reason. As space is the place of bodies, so God is the\nplace of spirits. As bodies are modes of extension, so their ideas are\nmodifications of the idea of extension or of \"intelligible extension.\" The\nprinciple stated at the beginning, that things are perceived in God, is,\ntherefore, supported in the following way: we perceive bodies (through\nideas, which ideas, and we ourselves, are) in God.\n\n[Footnote 1: Malebranche's refutation of the emanation hypothesis of the\nPeripatetics is acute and still worthy of attention. If bodies transmitted\nto the sense-organs forms like themselves, these copies, which would\nevidently be corporeal, must, by their departure, diminish the mass of the\nbody from which they came away, and also, because of their impenetrability,\nobstruct and interfere with one another, thus destroying the possibility of\nclear impressions. A further point against the image theory is furnished by\nthe increase in the size of an object, when approached. And, above all, it\ncan never be made conceivable how motion can be transformed into sensations\nor ideas.]\n\nAs the knowledge of truth has been found to consist in seeing things as God\nsees them, so morality consists in man's loving things as God loves them,\nor, what amounts to the same thing, in loving them to that degree which\nis their due in view of their greater or less perfection. If, in the last\nanalysis, all cognition is knowledge of God, so all volition is loving God;\nthere is implanted in every creature a direction toward the Creator. God is\nnot only the primordial, unlimited being, he is also the highest good,\nthe final end of all striving. As the ideas of things are imperfect\nparticipations in, or determinations of universal being, the absolute\nperfection of God, so the particular desires, directed toward individual\nobjects, are limitations of the universal will toward the good. How does\nit happen that the human will, so variously mistaking its fundamental\ndirection toward God, attaches itself to perishable goods, and prefers\nworthless objects to those which have value, and earthly to heavenly\npleasure? The soul is, on the one hand, united to God, on the other, united\nto the body. The possibility of error and sin rests on its union with the\nbody, since with the ideas (as representations of the pure understanding)\nare associated sensuous images, which mingle with and becloud them, and\npassions with the inclinations (or the will of the soul, in so far as it is\npure spirit). This gives, however, merely the possibility of the immoral,\nsensuous, God-estranged disposition, which becomes actual only through\nman's free act, when he fails to stand the test. For sin does not consist\nin having passions, but in consenting to them. The passion is not caused by\nthe corporeal movement of which it is the sequel, but only occasioned by\nit; and the same is true of the movement of the limbs and the decision\nof the will. The one true cause of all that happens is God. It is he who\nproduces affections in the soul, and motion in the material world. For the\nbody possesses only the capacity of being moved; and the soul cannot be the\ncause of the movement, since it would then have to know how it produces\nthe latter. In fact those who lack a medical training have no idea of the\nmuscular and nervous processes involved. Without God we cannot even move\nthe tongue. It is he who raises our arm, even when we use it contrary to\nhis law.\n\nAnxious to guard his pantheism from being identified with that of Spinoza,\nMalebranche points out that, according to his views, the universe is in\nGod, not, as with Spinoza, that God is in the universe; that he teaches\ncreation, which Spinoza denies; that he distinguishes, which Spinoza had\nnot done, between the world in God (the ideas of things) and the world of\ncreated things, and between intelligible and corporeal extension. It may\nbe added that he maintains the freedom of God and of man, which Spinoza\nrejects, and that he conceives God, who brings everything to pass, not as\nnature, but as omnipotent will. Nevertheless, as Kuno Fischer has shown,\nhe approaches the naturalism of Spinoza more nearly than he is himself\nconscious, when he explains finite things as limitations (hence as modes)\nof the divine existence, posits the will of God in dependence on his wisdom\n(the uncreated world of ideas), thus limiting it in its omnipotence, and,\nwhich is decisive, makes God the sole author of motion, _i.e._, a natural\ncause. His attempt at a Christian pantheism was consequently unsuccessful.\nBut its failure has not shattered the well-grounded fame of its thoughtful\nauthor as the second greatest metaphysician of France.\n\nPierre Poiret[1] (1646-1719; for some years a preacher in Hamburg; lived\nlater in Rhynsburg near Leyden) was rendered hostile to Cartesianism\nthrough the influence of mystical writings (among others those of\nAntoinette Bourignon, which he published), and through the perception of\nthe results to which it had led in Spinoza. All cognition is taking up the\nform of the object. The perfection of man is based more on his passive\ncapacities than on his active reason, which is concerned with mere ideas,\nunreal shadows; the mathematical spirit leads to fatalism, to the denial of\nfreedom. The passive faculties, on the contrary, are in direct intercourse\nwith reality, the senses with external material objects, and the arcanum of\nthe mind, the basis of the soul, the intellect, with spiritual truths\nand with God, whose existence is more certain than our own. Man is not\nunconcerned in the development of the highest power of the mind, he must\noffer himself to God in sincere humility. In subordination to the passive\nintellect, the external faculty, the active reason, is also to be\ncultivated; it deserves care, like the skin. Evil consists in the absurdity\nthat the creature, who apart from God is nothing, ascribes to himself an\nindependent existence.\n\n[Footnote 1: Poiret: _Cogitationes Rationates de Deo, Anima, et Malo_,\n1677, the later editions including a vehement attack on the atheism of\nSpinoza: _L'\u00c9conomie Divine_, 1682; _De Eruditione Solida, Superficiaria,\net Falsa_, 1692; _Fides et Ratio Collatae_, against Locke, 1707.]\n\nLe Vayer and Huet, who have been already mentioned (pp. 50-51),\nmediate between the founders of skepticism and Bayle, its most gifted\nrepresentative. The latter of these two wrote a _Criticism of the Cartesian\nPhilosophy_, 1689, besides a _Treatise on the Impotence of the Human Mind_,\nwhich did not appear until after his death. He opposes, among other things,\nthe criterion of truth based on evidence, since there is an evidence of\nthe false not to be distinguished from that of the true, as well as the\nposition that God becomes a deceiver in the bestowal of a weak and blind\nreason--for he gives us, at the same time, the power to know its deceptive\ncharacter.\n\nAs the last among those influenced by Descartes but who advanced beyond\nhim, may be mentioned the acute Pierre Bayle (1647-1706; professor in Sedan\nand Rotterdam; _Works_, 1725-31[1]), who greatly excited the world of\nletters by his occasional and polemic treatises, and still more by the\njournal, _Nouvelles de la R\u00e9publique des Lettres_ from 1684, and his\n_Historical and Critical Dictionary_, in two volumes, 1695 and 1697.\nNowhere do the most opposite antitheses dwell in such close proximity as\nin the mind of Bayle. Along with an ever watchful doubt he harbors a most\nactive zeal for knowledge, with a sincere spirit of belief (which has been\nwrongly disputed by Lange, Zeller, and P\u00fcnjer) a demoniacal pleasure in\nbringing to light absurdities in the doctrines of faith, with absolute\nconfidence in the infallibility of conscience an entirely pessimistic view\nof human morality. His strength lies in criticism and polemics, his work in\nthe latter (aside from his hostility to fanaticism and the persecution of\nthose differing in faith) being directed chiefly against optimism and the\ndeistic religion of reason, which holds the Christian dogmas capable of\nproof, or, at least, faith and knowledge capable of reconciliation. The\ndoctrines of faith are not only above reason, incomprehensible, but\ncontrary to reason; and it is just on this that our merit in accepting\nthem depends. The mysteries of the Gospel do not seek success before the\njudgment seat of thought, they demand the blind submission of the reason;\nnay, if they were objects of knowledge they would cease to be mysteries.\nThus we must choose between religion and philosophy, for they cannot be\ncombined. For one who is convinced of the untrustworthiness of the reason\nand her lack of competence in things supernatural, it is in no wise\ncontradictory or impossible to receive as true things which she declares\nto be false; he will thank God for the gift of a faith which is entirely\nindependent of the clearness of its objects and of its agreement with the\naxioms of philosophy. Even, when in purely scientific questions he calls\nattention to difficulties and shows contradictions on every hand, Bayle by\nno means intends to hold up principles with contradictory implications as\nfalse, but only as uncertain.[2] The reason, he says, generalizing from his\nown case, is capable only of destruction, not of construction; of\ndiscovering error, not of finding truth; of finding reasons and\ncounter-reasons, of exciting doubt and controversy, not of vouchsafing\ncertitude. So long as it contents itself with controverting that which is\nfalse, it is potent and salutary; but when, despising divine assistance, it\nadvances beyond this, it becomes dangerous, like a caustic drug which\nattacks the healthy flesh after it has consumed that which was diseased.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. on Bayle, L. Feuerbach. 1838, 2d ed., 1844; Eucken in the\n_Allgemeine Zeitung_, supplement to Nos. 251, 252, October 27, 28, 1891.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Thus, in regard to the problem of freedom, he finds it hard\nto comprehend how the creatures, who are not the authors of their own\nexistence, can be the authors of their own actions, but, at the same time,\ninadmissible to think of God as the cause of evil. He seeks only to show\nthe indemonstrability and incomprehensibility of freedom, not to reject it.\nFor he sees in it the condition of morality, and calls attention to\nthe fact that the difficulties in which those who deny freedom involve\nthemselves are far greater than those of their opponents. He shows himself\nentirely averse to the determinism and pantheism of Spinoza.]\n\nHe who seeks to refute skepticism must produce a criterion of truth. If\nsuch exists, it is certainly that advanced by Descartes, the evidence, the\nevident clearness of a principle. Well, then, the following principles pass\nfor evident: That one, who does not exist, can have no responsibility for\nan evil action; that two things, which are identical with the same thing,\nare identical with each other; that I am the same man to-day that I was\nyesterday. Now, the revealed doctrines of original sin and of the Trinity\nshow that the first and second of these axioms are false, and the Church\ndoctrine of the preservation of the world as a continuous creation, that\nthe last principle is uncertain. Thus if not even self-evidence furnishes\nus a criterion of truth, we must conclude that none whatever exists.\nFurther, in regard to the origin of the world from a single principle, its\ncreation by God, we find this supported, no doubt, both by the conclusions\nof the pure reason and by the consideration of nature, but controvened by\nthe fact of evil, by the misery and wickedness of man. Is it conceivable\nthat a holy and benevolent God has created so unhappy and wicked a being?\n\nBayle's motives in defending faith against reason were, on the one hand,\nhis personal piety, on the other, his conviction of the unassailable purity\nof Christian ethics. All the sects agree in regard to moral principles, and\nit is this which assures us of the divinity of the Christian revelation.\nNevertheless, he does not conceal from himself the fact that possession of\nthe theoretical side of religion is far from being a guarantee of practice\nin conformity with her precepts. It is neither true that faith alone leads\nto morality nor that unbelief is the cause of immorality. A state composed\nof atheists would be not at all impossible, if only strict punishments and\nstrict notions of honor were insisted upon.\n\nThe judgments of the natural reason in moral questions are as certain\nand free from error as its capacity is shown to be weak and limited in\ntheoretical science. The idea of morality never deceives anyone; the moral\nlaw is innate in every man. Although Christianity has given the best\ndevelopment of our duties, yet the moral law can be understood and followed\nby all men, even by heathen and atheists. We do not need to be Christians\nin order to act virtuously; the knowledge given by conscience is not\ndependent upon revelation. From the knowledge of the good to the practice\nof it is, it is true, a long step; we may be convinced of moral truth\nwithout loving it, and God's grace alone is able to strengthen us against\nthe power of the passions, by adding to the illumination of the mind an\ninclination of the heart toward the good. Temperament, custom, self-love\nmove the soul more strongly than general truths. As in life pleasure is far\noutbalanced by pain and vexation, so far more evil acts are done than good\nones: history is a collection of misdeeds, with scarcely one virtuous act\nfor a thousand crimes. It is not the external action that constitutes the\nethical character of a deed, but the motive or disposition; almsgiving from\nmotives of pride is a vice, and only when practiced out of love to one's\nneighbors, a virtue. God looks only at the act of the will; our highest\nduty, and one which admits of no exceptions, is never to act contrary to\nconscience.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nLOCKE.\n\nAfter the Cartesian philosophy had given decisive expression to the\ntendencies of modern thought, and had been developed through occasionalism\nto its completion in the system of Spinoza, the line of further progress\nconsisted in two factors: Descartes's principles--one-sidedly rationalistic\nand abstractly scientific, as they were--were, on the one hand, to be\nsupplemented by the addition of the empirical element which Descartes had\nneglected, and, on the other, to be made available for general culture by\napproximation to the interests of practical life. England, with its freer\nand happier political conditions, was the best place for the accomplishment\nof both ends, and Locke, a typically healthy and sober English thinker,\nwith a distaste for extreme views, the best adapted mind. Descartes, the\nrationalist, had despised experience, and Bacon, the empiricist, had\ndespised mathematics; but Locke aims to show that while the reason is the\ninstrument of science, demonstration its form, and the realm of knowledge\nwider than experience, yet this instrument and this form are dependent for\ntheir content on a supply of material from the senses. The emphasis, it is\ntrue, falls chiefly on the latter half of this programme, and posterity,\nespecially, has almost exclusively attended to the empirical side of\nLocke's theory of knowledge in giving judgment concerning it.\n\nJohn Locke was born at Wrington, not far from Bristol, in 1632. At Oxford\nhe busied himself with philosophy, natural science, and medicine, being\nrepelled by the Scholastic thinkers, but strongly attracted by the writings\nof Descartes. In 1665 he became secretary to the English ambassador to the\nCourt of Brandenburg. Returning thence to Oxford he made the acquaintance\nof Lord Anthony Ashley (from 1672 Earl of Shaftesbury; died in Holland\n1683), who received him into his own household as a friend, physician, and\ntutor to his son (the father of Shaftesbury, the moral philosopher), and\nwith whose varying fortunes Locke's own were henceforth to be intimately\nconnected. Twice he became secretary to his patron (once in 1667--with\nan official secretaryship in 1672, when Shaftesbury became Lord\nChancellor--and again in 1679, when he became President of the Council),\nbut both times he lost his post on his friend's fall. The years 1675-79\nwere spent in Montpellier and Paris. In 1683 he went into voluntary exile\nin Holland (where Shaftesbury had died in January of the same year), and\nremained there until 1689, when the ascension of the throne by William of\nOrange made it possible for him to return to England. Here he was made\nCommissioner of Appeals, and, subsequently, one of the Commissioners of\nTrade and Plantations (till 1700). He died in 1704 at Gates, in Essex, at\nthe house of Sir Francis Masham, whose wife was the daughter of Cudworth,\nthe philosopher.\n\nLocke's chief work, _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_, which had\nbeen planned as early as 1670, was published in 1689-90, a short abstract\nof it having previously appeared in French in Le Clerc's _Biblioth\u00e8que\nUniverselle_, 1688. His theoretical works include, further, the two\nposthumous treatises, _On the Conduct of the Understanding_ (originally\nintended for incorporation in the fourth edition of the _Essay_, which,\nhowever, appeared in 1700 without this chapter, which probably had proved\ntoo extended) and the _Elements of Natural Philosophy_. To political\nand politico-economic questions Locke contributed the two _Treatises on\nGovernment_, 1690, and three essays on money and the coinage. In the year\n1689 appeared the first of three _Letters on Tolerance_, followed, in 1693,\nby _Some Thoughts on Education_, and, in 1695, by _The Reasonableness of\nChristianity as delivered in the Scriptures_. The collected works appeared\nfor the first time in 1714, and in nine volumes in 1853; the philosophical\nworks (edited by St. John) are given in Bonn's Standard Library\n(1867-68).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Lord King and Fox Bourne have written on Locke's life, 1829\nand 1876. A comparison of Locke's theory of knowledge with Leibnitz's\ncritique was published by Hartenstein in 1865, and one by Von Benoit (prize\ndissertation) in 1869, and an exposition of his theory of substance by De\nFries in 1879. Victor Cousin's _Philosophie de Locke_ has passed through\nsix editions. [Among more recent English discussions reference may be made\nto Green's Introduction to Hume's _Treatise on Human Nature_, 1874 (new ed.\n1890), which is a valuable critique of the line of development, Locke,\nBerkeley, Hume; Fowler's _Locke_, in the English Men of Letters, 1880; and\nFraser's _Locke_, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1890.--TR.]]\n\n%(a) Theory of Knowledge.%--Locke's theory of knowledge is controlled by\ntwo tendencies, one native, furnished by the Baconian empiricism, and the\nother Continental, supplied by the Cartesian question concerning the origin\nof ideas. Bacon had demanded the closest connection with experience as\nthe condition of fruitful inquiry. Locke supports this commendation of\nexperience by a detailed description of the services which it renders to\ncognition, namely, by showing that, in simple ideas, perception supplies\nthe material for complex ideas, and for all the cognitive work of the\nunderstanding. Descartes had divided ideas, according to their origin, into\nthree classes: those which are self-formed, those which come from without,\nand those which are innate (p. 79), and had called this third class the\nmost valuable. Locke disputes the existence of ideas in the understanding\nfrom birth, and makes it receive the elements of knowledge from the senses,\nthat is, from without. He is a representative of sensationalism,--not in\nthe stricter sense, first put into the term by those who subsequently\ncontinued his endeavors, that thought arises from perception, that it is\ntransformed sensation--but in the wider sense, that thought is (free)\noperation with ideas, which are neither created by it nor present in it\nfrom the first, but given to it by perception, that, consequently, the\ncognitive process begins with sensation and so its first attitude is a\npassive one. From the standpoint of the Cartesian problem, which he solves\nin a sense opposite to Descartes, Locke supplements the empiricism of Bacon\nby basing it on a psychologically developed theory of knowledge. That in\nthe course of the inquiry he introduces a new principle, which causes him\nto diverge from the true empirical path, will appear in the sequel.\n\nThe question \"How our ideas come into the mind\" receives a negative answer\n(in the first book of the _Essay_): \"There are no innate principles in the\nmind\"[1] The doctrine of the innate character of certain principles is\nbased on their universal acceptance. The asserted agreement of mankind in\nregard to the laws of thought, the principles of morality, the existence\nof God, etc., is neither cogent as an argument nor correct in fact. In the\nfirst place, even if there were any principles which everyone assented to,\nthis would not prove that they had been created in the soul; the fact of\ngeneral consent would admit of a different explanation. Granted that no\natheists existed, yet it would not necessarily follow that the universal\nconviction of the existence of God is innate, for it might have been\ngradually reached in each case through the use of the reason--might have\nbeen inferred, for instance, from the perception of the purposive character\nof the world. Second, the fact to which this theory of innate ideas appeals\nis not true. No moral rule can be cited which is respected by all nations.\nThe idea of identity is entirely unknown to idiots and to children. If\nthe laws of identity and contradiction were innate they must appear in\nconsciousness prior to all other truths; but long before a child is\nconscious of the proposition \"It is impossible for the same thing to be and\nnot to be,\" it knows that sweet is not bitter, and that black is not white.\nThe ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, but\nparticular impressions of the senses. Would nature write so illegible a\nhand that the mind must wait a long time before becoming able to read what\nhad been inscribed upon it? It is often said, however, that innate ideas\nand principles may be obscured and, finally, completely extinguished\nby habit, education, and other extrinsic circumstances. Then, if\nthey gradually become corrupted and disappear, they must at least be\ndiscoverable in full purity where these disturbing influences have not\nyet acted; but it is especially vain to look for them in children and the\nignorant. Perhaps, however, these possess such principles unconsciously;\nperhaps they are imprinted on the understanding, without being attended\nto? This would be a contradiction in terms. To be in the mind or the\nunderstanding simply means \"to be understood\" or to be known; no one can\nhave an idea without being conscious of it. Finally, if the attempt be\nmade to explain \"originally in the mind\" in so wide a sense that it would\ninclude all truths which man can ever attain or is capable of discovering\nby the right use of reason, this would make not only all mathematical\nprinciples, but all knowledge in general, all sciences, and all arts\ninnate; there would be no ground even for the exclusion of wisdom and\nvirtue. Therefore, either all ideas are innate or none are. This is an\nimportant alternative. While Locke decides for the second half of the\nproposition, Leibnitz defends the first by a delicate application of the\nconcept of unconscious representation and of implicit knowledge, which his\npredecessor rejects out of hand.\n\n[Footnote 1: According to Fox Bourne this first book was written after the\nothers. Geil _(Ueber die Abh\u00e4ngigkeit Lockes von Descartes_, Strassburg,\n1887, chap, iii.) has endeavored to prove that, since the arguments\ncontroverted are wanting in Descartes, the attack was not aimed at\nDescartes and his school, but at native defenders of innate ideas, as Lord\nHerbert of Cherbury and the English Platonists (Cudworth, More, Parker,\nGale). That along with these the Cartesian doctrine was a second and\nchief object of attack is shown by Benno Erdmann in his discussion of the\ntreatises by G. Geil and R. Sommer _(Lockes Verh\u00e4ltnis zu Descartes_,\nBerlin, 1887) in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, ii, pp.\n99-121.]\n\nLocke's positive answer to the question concerning the origin of ideas is\ngiven in his second book. Ideas are not present in the understanding from\nthe beginning, nor are they originated by the understanding, but received\nthrough sensation. The understanding is like a piece of white paper\non which perception inscribes its characters. All knowledge arises in\nexperience. This is of two kinds, derived either from the external senses\nor the internal sense. The perception of external objects is termed\nSensation, that of internal phenomena (of the states of the mind itself)\nReflection. External and internal perception are the only windows\nthrough which the light of ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the\nunderstanding. The two are not opened simultaneously, however, but one\nafter the other; since the perceptions of the sensible qualities of bodies,\nunlike that of the operations of the mind itself, do not require an effort\nof attention, they are the earlier. The child receives ideas of sensation\nbefore those of reflection; internal perception presupposes external\nperception.\n\nIn this distinction between sensation and reflection, we may recognize\nan after-effect of the Cartesian dualism between matter and spirit.\nThe antithesis of substances has become a duality in the faculties of\nperception. But while Descartes had so far forth ascribed precedence to the\nmind in that he held the self-certitude of the ego to be the highest and\nclearest of all truths and the soul to be better known than the body, in\nLocke the relation of the two was reversed, since he made the perception\nof self dependent on the precedent perception of external objects. This\nantithesis was made still sharper in later thinking, when Condillac made\nfull use of the priority of sensation, which in Locke had remained without\nmuch effect; while Berkeley, on the other hand, reduced external perception\nto internal perception.\n\nAll original ideas are representations either of the external senses or\nof the internal sense, or of both. And since, in the case of ideas of\nsensation, there is a distinction between those which are perceived by a\nsingle one of the external senses and those which come from more than one,\nfour classes of simple ideas result: (1) Those which come from one external\nsense, as colors, sounds, tastes, odors, heat, solidity, and the like.\n(2) Those which come from more than one external sense (sight and touch),\nas extension, figure, and motion. (3) Reflection on the operations of our\nminds yields ideas of perception or thinking (with its various modes,\nremembrance, judging, knowledge, faith, etc.), and of volition or willing.\n(4) From both external and internal perception there come into the mind the\nideas of pleasure and pain, existence, power, unity, and succession. These\nare approximately our original ideas, which are related to knowledge as\nthe letters to written discourse; as all Homer is composed out of only\ntwenty-four letters, so these few simple ideas constitute all the material\nof knowledge. The mind can neither have more nor other simple ideas than\nthose which are furnished to it by these two sources of experience.\n\nLocke differs from Descartes again in regard to extension and thought.\nExtension does not constitute the essence of matter, nor thought the\nessence of mind. Extension and body are not the same; the former is\npresupposed by the latter as its necessary condition, but it is the former\nalone which yields mathematical matter. The essence of physical matter\nconsists rather in solidity: where impenetrability is found there is body,\nand the converse; the two are absolutely inseparable. With space the case\nis different. I cannot conceive unextended matter, indeed, but I can easily\nconceive immaterial extension, an unfilled space Further, if the essence\nof the soul consisted in thought, it must be always thinking. As the\nCartesians maintained, it must have ideas as soon as it begins to be, which\nis manifestly contrary to experience. Thinking is merely an activity of\nthe mind, as motion is an activity of the body, and not its essential\ncharacteristic. The mind does not receive ideas until external objects\noccasion perception in it through impressions, which it is not able to\navert. The understanding may be compared to a mirror, which, without\nindependent activity and without being consulted, takes up the images of\nthings. Some of the simple ideas which have been mentioned above represent\nthe properties of things as they really are, others not. The former class\nincludes all ideas of reflection (for we are ourselves the immediate object\nof the inner sense); but among the ideas of sensation those only which come\nfrom different senses, hence extension, motion and rest, number, figure,\nand, further, solidity, are to be accounted _primary_ qualities, _i. e_.,\nsuch as are actual copies of the properties of bodies. All other ideas, on\nthe contrary, have no resemblance to properties of bodies; they represent\nmerely the ways in which things act, and are not copies of things. The\nideas of _secondary_ or derivative qualities (hard and soft, warm and cold,\ncolors and sounds, tastes and odors) are in the last analysis caused--as\nare the primary--by motion, but not perceived as such. Yellow and warm are\nmerely sensations in us, which we erroneously ascribe to objects; with\nequal right we might ascribe to fire, as qualities inherent in it, the\nchanges in form and color which it produces in wax and the pain which it\ncauses in the finger brought into proximity with it. The warmth and the\nbrightness of the blaze, the redness, the pleasant taste, and the aromatic\nodor of the strawberry, exist in these bodies merely as the power to\nproduce such sensations in us by stimulation of the skin, the eye, the\npalate, and the nose. If we remove the perceptions of them, they disappear\nas such, and their causes alone remain--the bulk, figure, number, texture,\nand motion of the insensible particles. The ground of the illusion lies in\nthe fact that such qualities as color, etc., bear no resemblance to their\ncauses, in no wise point to these, and in themselves contain naught of\nbulk, density, figure, and motion, and that our senses are too weak\nto discover the material particles and their primary qualities.--The\ndistinction between qualities of the first and second order--first advanced\nby the ancient atomists, revived by Galileo and Descartes on the threshold\nof the modern period, retained by Locke, and still customary in the natural\nscience of the day--forms an important link in the transition from the\npopular view of all sense-qualities as properties of things in themselves\nto Kant's position, that spatial and temporal qualities also belong\nto phenomena alone, and are based merely on man's subjective mode of\napprehension, while the real properties of things in themselves are\nunknowable.\n\nThus far the procedure of the understanding has been purely passive. But\nbesides the capacity for passively receiving simple ideas, it possesses the\nfurther power of variously combining and extending these original ideas\nwhich have come into it from without, of working over the material given\nin sensation by the combination, relation, and separation of its various\nelements. In this it is active, but not creative. It is not able to form\nnew simple ideas (and just as little to destroy such as already exist), but\nonly freely to combine the elements furnished without its assistance by\nperception (or, following the figure mentioned above, to combine into\nsyllables and words the separate letters of sensation). Complex ideas arise\nfrom simple ideas through voluntary combination of the latter.\n\nPerception is the first step toward knowledge. After perception the most\nindispensable faculty is retention, the prolonged consciousness of present\nideas and the revival of those which have disappeared, or, as it were, have\nbeen put aside. For an idea to be \"in the memory\" means that the mind\nhas the capacity to reproduce it at will, whereupon it recognizes it as\npreviously experienced. If our ideas are not freshened up from time to time\nby new impressions of the same sort they gradually fade out, until finally\n(as the idea of color in one become blind in early life) they completely\ndisappear. Ideas impressed upon the mind by frequent repetition are rarely\nentirely lost. Memory is the basis for the intellectual functions of\ndiscernment and comparison, of composition, abstraction, and naming. Since,\namid the innumerable multitude of ideas, it is not possible to assign to\neach one a definite sign, the indispensable condition of language is found\nin the power of abstraction, that is, in the power of generalizing ideas,\nof compounding many ideas into one, and of indicating by the names of the\ngeneral ideas, or of the classes and species, the particular ideas also\nwhich are contained under these. Here is the great distinction between\nman and the brute. The brute lacks language because he lacks (not all\nunderstanding whatever, _e.g._, not a capacity, though an imperfect one, of\ncomparison and composition, but) the faculty of abstraction and of forming\ngeneral ideas. The object of language is simply the quick and easy\ncommunication of our thoughts to others, not to give expression to the real\nessence of objects. Words are not names for particular things, but signs\nof general ideas; and _abstracta_ nothing more than an artifice for\nfacilitating intellectual intercourse. This abbreviation, which aids in\nthe exchange of ideas, involves the danger that the creations of the mind\ndenoted by words will be taken for images of real general essences, of\nwhich, in fact, there are none in existence, but only particular things. In\norder to prevent anyone to whom I am speaking from understanding my words\nin a different sense from the one intended, it is necessary for me to\ndefine the complex ideas by analyzing them into their elements, and, on the\nother hand, to give examples in experience of the simple ideas, which do\nnot admit of definition, or to explain them by synonyms. Thus much from\nLocke's philosophy of language, to which he devotes the third book of the\n_Essay_.\n\nComplex ideas, which are very numerous, may be divided into three classes:\nModes, Substances, and Relations.\n\n_Modes_ (states, conditions) are such combinations of simple ideas which do\nnot \"contain in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are\nconsidered as dependencies on, or affections of substances.\" They fall into\ntwo classes according as they are composed of the same simple ideas, or\nsimple ideas of various kinds; the former are called simple, the latter\nmixed, modes. Under the former class belong, for example, a dozen or a\nscore, the idea of which is composed of simple units; under the latter,\nrunning, fighting, obstinacy, printing, theft, parricide. The formation of\n_mixed_ modes is greatly influenced by national customs. Very complicated\ntransactions (sacrilege, triumph, ostracism), if often considered and\ndiscussed, receive for the sake of brevity comprehensive names, which\ncannot be rendered by a single expression in the language of other\nnations among whom the custom in question is not found. The elements most\nfrequently employed in the formation of mixed modes are ideas of the two\nfundamental activities, thinking and motion, together with power, which is\ntheir source. Locke discusses _simple_ modes in more detail, especially\nthose derived from the ideas of space, time, unity, and power.\nModifications of space are distance, figure, place, length; since any\nlength or measure of space can be repeated to infinity, we reach the idea\nof immensity. As modes of time are enumerated succession (which we perceive\nand measure only by the flow of our ideas), duration, and lengths or\nmeasures of duration, the endless repetition of which yields the idea of\neternity. From unity are developed the modes of numbers, and from the\nunlimitedness of these the idea of infinity. No idea, however, is richer\nin modes than the idea of power. A distinction must be made between active\npower and passive power, or mere receptivity. While bodies are not capable\nof originating motion, but only of communicating motion received, we notice\nin ourselves, as spiritual beings, the capacity of originating actions and\nmotions. The body possesses only the passive power of being moved, the mind\nthe active power of producing motion. This latter is termed \"will.\" Here\nLocke discusses at length the freedom of the will, but not with entire\nclearness and freedom from contradictions (cf. below).\n\nModes are conditions which do not subsist of themselves, but have need of\na basis or support; they are not conceivable apart from a thing whose\nproperties or states they are. We notice that certain qualities always\nappear together, and habitually refer them to a substratum as the ground of\ntheir unity; in which they subsist or from which they proceed. _Substance_\ndenotes this self-existent \"we know not what,\" which has or bears the\nattributes in itself, and which arouses the ideas of them in us. It is the\ncombination of a number of simple ideas which are presumed to belong to one\nthing. From the ideas of sensation the understanding composes the idea of\nbody, and from the ideas of reflection that of mind. Each of these is just\nas clear and just as obscure as the other; of each we know only its effects\nand its sensuous properties; its essence is for us entirely unknowable.\nInstead of the customary names, material and immaterial substances,\nLocke recommends cogitative and incogitative substances, since it is not\ninconceivable that the Creator may have endowed some material beings with\nthe capacity of thought. God,--the idea of whom is attained by uniting the\nideas of existence, power, might, knowledge, and happiness with that of\ninfinity,--is absolutely immaterial, because not passive, while finite\nspirits (which are both active and passive) are perhaps only bodies which\npossess the power of thinking.\n\nWhile the ideas of substances are referred to a reality without the mind as\ntheir archetype, to which they are to conform and which they should image\nand represent, _Relations_ (_e.g._, husband, greater) are free and immanent\nproducts of the understanding. They are not copies of real things, but\nrepresent themselves alone, are their own archetypes. We do not ask whether\nthey agree with things, but, conversely, whether things agree with them\n(Book iv. 4.5). The mind reaches an idea of relation by placing two things\nside by side and comparing them. If it perceives that a thing, or a\nquality, or an idea begins to exist through the operation of some other\nthing, it derives from this the idea of the causal relation, which is the\nmost comprehensive of all relations, since all that is actual or possible\ncan be brought under it. _Cause_ is that which makes another thing to begin\nto be; _effect_, that which had its beginning from some other thing. The\nproduction of a new quality is termed alteration; of artificial things,\nmaking; of a living being, generation; of a new particle of matter,\ncreation. Next in importance is the relation of _identity and diversity_.\nSince it is impossible for a thing to be in two different places at the\nsame time and for two things to be at the same time in the same place,\neverything that at a given instant is in a given place is identical with\nitself, and, on the other hand, distinct from everything else (no matter\nhow great the resemblance between them) that at the same moment exists in\nanother place. Space and time therefore form the _principium\nindividuationis_. By what marks, however, may we recognize the identity of\nan individual at different times and in different places? The identity of\ninorganic matter depends on the continuity of the mass of atoms which\ncompose it; that of living beings upon the permanent organization of\ntheir parts (different bodies are united into _one_ animal by a common\nlife); personal identity consists in the unity of self-consciousness, not\nin the continuity of bodily existence (which is at once excluded by the\nchange of matter). The identity of the person or the ego must be carefully\ndistinguished from that of substance and of man. It would not be impossible\nfor the person to remain the same in a change of substances, in so far as\nthe different beings (for instance, the souls of Epicurus and Gassendi)\nparticipated in the same self-consciousness; and, conversely, for a spirit\nto appear in two persons by losing the consciousness of its previous\nexistence. Consciousness is the sole condition of the self, or personal\nidentity.--The determinations of space and time are for the most part\nrelations. Our answers to the questions \"When?\" \"How long?\" \"How large?\"\ndenote the distance of one point of time from another (_e.g._, the birth of\nChrist), the relation of one duration to another (of a revolution of the\nsun), the relation of one extension to another well-known one taken as a\nstandard. Many apparently positive ideas and words, as young and old, large\nand small, weak and strong, are in fact relative. They imply merely the\nrelation of a given duration of life, of a given size and strength, to that\nwhich has been adopted as a standard for the class of things in question. A\nman of twenty is called young, but a horse of like age, old; and neither of\nthese measures of time applies to stars or diamonds. Moral relations, which\nare based on a comparison of man's voluntary actions with one of the three\nmoral laws, will be discussed below.\n\nThe inquiry now turns from the origin of ideas to their _cognitive value_\nor their _validity_, beginning (in the concluding chapters of the second\nbook) with the accuracy of single ideas, and advancing (in Book iv., which\nis the most important in the whole work) to the truth of judgments. An idea\nis real when it conforms to its archetype, whether this is a thing, real\nor possible, or an idea of some other thing; it is adequate when the\nconformity is complete. The idea of a four-sided triangle or of brave\ncowardice is unreal or fantastical, since it is composed of incompatible\nelements, and the idea of a centaur, since it unites simple ideas in a\nway in which they do not occur in nature. The layman's ideas of law or of\nchemical substances are real, but inadequate, since they have a general\nresemblance to those of experts, and a basis in reality, but yet only\nimperfectly represent their archetypes. Nay, further, our ideas of\nsubstances are all inadequate, not only when they are taken for\nrepresentations of the inner essences of things (since we do not know these\nessences), but also when they are considered merely as collections of\nqualities. The copy never includes all the qualities of the thing, the less\nso since the majority of these are powers, _i.e._, consist in relations to\nother objects, and since it is impossible, even in the case of a single\nbody, to discover all the changes which it is fitted to impart to, or\nto receive from, other substances. Ideas of modes and relations are all\nadequate, for they are their own archetypes, are not intended to represent\nanything other than themselves, are images without originals. An idea of\nthis kind, however, though perfect when originally formed, may become\nimperfect through the use of language, when it is unsuccessfully intended\nto agree with the idea of some other person and denominated by a current\nterm. In the case of mixed modes and their names, therefore, the\ncompatibility of their elements and the possible existence of their objects\nare not enough to secure their reality and their complete adequacy; in\norder to be adequate they must, further, exactly conform to the meaning\nconnected with their names by their author, or in common use. Simple\nideas are best off, according to Locke, in regard both to reality and to\nadequacy. For the most part, it is true, they are not accurate copies of\nthe real qualities, of things, but only the regular effects of the powers\nof things. But although real qualities are thus only the causes and not\nthe patterns of sensations, still simple ideas, by their constant\ncorrespondence with real qualities, sufficiently fulfill their divinely\nordained end, to serve us as instruments of knowledge, _i.e._, in the\ndiscrimination of things.--An unreal and inadequate idea becomes false only\nwhen it is referred to an object, whether this be the existence of a thing,\nor its true essence, or an idea of other things. Truth and error belong\nalways to affirmations or negations, that is, to (it may be, tacit)\npropositions. Ideas uncombined, unrelated, apart from judgments, ideas,\nthat is, as mere phenomena in the mind, are neither true nor false.\n\nKnowledge is defined as the \"perception of the connexion and agreement, or\ndisagreement and repugnancy\" of two ideas; truth, as \"the right joining or\nseparating of signs, _i.e._, ideas or words.\" The object of knowledge\nis neither single ideas nor the relations of ideas to things, but the\n_relations of ideas among themselves_. This view was at once paradoxical\nand pregnant. If all cognition, as Locke suggests in objection to his own\ntheory, consists in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of our ideas,\nare not the visions of the enthusiast and the reasonings of sober thinkers\nalike certain? are not the propositions, A fairy is not a centaur, and a\ncentaur is a living being, just as true as that a circle is not a triangle,\nand that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles?\nThe mind directly perceives nothing but its own ideas, but it seeks a\nknowledge of things! If this is possible it can only be indirect\nknowledge--the mind knows things through its ideas, and possesses criteria\nwhich show that its ideas agree with things.\n\nTwo cases must be clearly distinguished, for a considerable number of our\nideas, viz., all complex ideas except those of substances, make no claim\nto represent things, and consequently cannot represent them falsely. For\nmathematical and moral ideas and principles, and the truth thereof, it is\nentirely immaterial whether things and conditions correspondent to them\nexist in nature or not. They are valid, even if nowhere actualized; they\nare \"eternal truths,\" not in the sense that they are known from childhood,\nbut in the sense that, as soon as known, they are immediately assented\nto.[1] The case is different, however, with simple ideas and the ideas of\nsubstances, which have their originals without the mind and which are to\ncorrespond with these. In regard to the former we may always be certain\nthat they agree with real things, for since the mind can neither\nvoluntarily originate them (_e.g._, cannot produce sensations of color\nin the dark) nor avoid having them at will, but only receive them from\nwithout, they are not creatures of the fancy, but the natural and regular\nproductions of external things affecting us. In regard to the latter, the\nideas of substances, we may be certain at least when the simple ideas which\ncompose them have been found so connected in experience. Perception has\nan external cause, whose influence the mind is not able to withstand. The\nmutual corroboration furnished by the reports of the different senses, the\npainfulness of certain sensations, the clear distinction between ideas from\nactual perception and those from memory, the possibility of producing and\npredicting new sensations of an entirely definite nature in ourselves and\nin others, by means of changes which we effect in the external world (e.g.\nby writing down a word)--these give further justification for the trust\nwhich we put in the senses. No one will be so skeptical as to doubt in\nearnest the existence of the things which he sees and touches, and to\ndeclare his whole life to be a deceptive dream. The certitude which\nperception affords concerning the existence of external objects is indeed\nnot an absolute one, but it is sufficient for the needs of life and the\ngovernment of our actions; it is \"as certain as our happiness or misery,\nbeyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being.\" In regard\nto the past the testimony of the senses is supplemented by memory, in\nwhich certainty [in regard to the continued existence of things previously\nperceived] is transformed into high probability; while in regard to the\nexistence of other finite spirits, numberless kinds of which may be\nconjectured to exist, though their existence is quite beyond our powers of\nperception, certitude sinks into mere (though well-grounded) faith.\n\n[Footnote 1: Thus it results that knowledge, although dependent on\nexperience for all its materials, extends beyond experience. The\nunderstanding is completely bound in the reception of simple ideas; less so\nin the combination of these into complex ideas; absolutely free in the act\nof comparison, which it can omit at will; finally, again, completely bound\nin its recognition of the relation in which the ideas it has chosen\nto compare stand to one another. There is room for choice only in the\nintermediate stage of the cognitive process; at the beginning (in the\nreception of the simple ideas of perception, a, b, c, d), and at the end\n(in judging how the concepts a b c and a b d stand related to each other),\nthe understanding is completely determined.]\n\nMore certain than our _sensitive_ knowledge of the existence of external\nobjects, are our immediate or _intuitive_ knowledge of our own existence\nand our mediate or _demonstrative_ knowledge of the existence of God.\nEvery idea that we have, every pain, every thought assures us of our own\nexistence. The existence of God, however, as the infinite cause of all\nreality, endowed with intelligence, will, and supreme power, is inferred\nfrom the existence and constitution of the world and of ourselves. Reality\nexists; the real world is composed of matter in motion and thinking beings,\nand is harmoniously ordered. Since it is impossible for any real being to\nbe produced by nothing, and since we obtain no satisfactory answer to the\nquestion of origin until we rise to something existent from all eternity,\nwe must assume as the cause of that which exists an Eternal Being, which\npossesses in a higher degree all the perfections which it has bestowed upon\nthe creatures. As the cause of matter and motion, and as the source of all\npower, this Being must be omnipotent; as the cause of beauty and order in\nthe world, and, above all, as the creator of thinking beings, it must be\nomniscient. But these perfections are those which we combine in the idea\nof God.\n\nIntuitive knowledge is the highest of the three degrees of knowledge. It is\ngained when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas\nat first sight, without hesitation, and without the intervention of any\nthird idea. This immediate knowledge is self-evident, irresistible, and\nexposed to no doubt. Knowledge is demonstrative when the mind perceives the\nagreement (or disagreement) of two ideas, not by placing them side by side\nand comparing them, but through the aid of other ideas. The intermediate\nlinks are called proofs; their discovery is the work of the reason, and\nquickness in finding them out is termed sagacity. The greater the number\nof the intermediate steps, the more the clearness and distinctness of the\nknowledge decreases, and the more the possibility of error increases.\nIn order for an argument (_e. g_., that a = d) to be conclusive, every\nparticular step in it (a = b, b = c, c = d) must possess intuitive\ncertainty. Mathematics is not the only example of demonstrative knowledge,\nbut the most perfect one, since in mathematics, by the aid of visible\nsymbols, the full equality and the least differences among ideas may be\nexactly measured and sharply determined.\n\nBesides real existence Locke, unsystematically enough, enumerates three\nother sorts of agreement between ideas,--in the perception of which he\nmakes knowledge consist,--viz., identity or diversity (blue is not yellow),\nrelation (when equals are added to equals the results are equal), and\ncoexistence or necessary connexion (gold is fixed). We are best off in\nregard to the knowledge of the first of these, \"identity or diversity,\" for\nhere our intuition extends as far as our ideas, since we recognize every\nidea, as soon as it arises, as identical with itself and different from\nothers. We are worst off in regard to \"necessary connexion.\" We know\nsomething, indeed, concerning the incompatibility or coexistence of certain\nproperties (_e. g_., that the same object cannot have two different sizes\nor colors at the same time; that figure cannot exist apart from extension):\nbut it is only in regard to a few qualities and powers of bodies that we\nare able to discover dependence and necessary connexion by intuitive or\ndemonstrative thought, while in most cases we are dependent on experience,\nwhich gives us information concerning particular cases only, and affords no\nguarantee that things are the same beyond the sphere of our observation and\nexperiment. Since empirical inquiry furnishes no certain and universal\nknowledge, and since the assumption that like bodies will in the same\ncircumstances have like effects is only a conjecture from analogy, natural\nscience in the strict sense does not exist. Both mathematics and ethics,\nhowever, belong in the sphere of the demonstrative knowledge of relations.\nThe principles of ethics are as capable of exact demonstration as those of\narithmetic and geometry, although their underlying ideas are more complex,\nmore involved, hence more exposed to misunderstanding, and lacking in\nvisible symbols; though these defects can, and should, in part be made good\nby careful and strictly consistent definitions. Such moral principles as\n\"where there is no property there is no injustice,\" or \"no government\nallows absolute liberty,\" are as certain as any proposition in Euclid.\n\nThe advantage of the mathematical and moral sciences over the physical\nsciences consists in the fact that, in the former, the real and nominal\nessences of their objects coincide, while in the latter they do not; and,\nfurther, that the real essences of substances are beyond our knowledge. The\ntrue inner constitution of bodies, the root whence all their qualities, and\nthe coexistence of these, necessarily proceed, is completely unknown to us;\nso that we are unable to deduce them from it. Mathematical and moral ideas,\non the other hand, and their relations, are entirely accessible, for they\nare the products of our own voluntary operations. They are not copied from\nthings, but are archetypal for reality and need no confirmation from\nexperience. The connexion constituted by our understanding between the\nideas crime and punishment _(e. g_., the proposition: crime deserves\npunishment) is valid, even though no crime had ever been committed, and\nnone ever punished. Existence is not at all involved in universal\npropositions; \"general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and\nconsists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas\" and their\nrelations. The truths of mathematics and ethics are both universal and\ncertain, while in natural science single observations and experiments are\ncertain, but not general, and general propositions are only more or less\nprobable. Both the particular experiments and the general conclusions are\nof great value under certain circumstances, but they do not meet the\nrequirements of comprehensive and certain knowledge.\n\nThe _extent_ of our knowledge is very limited--much less, in fact, than\nthat of our ignorance. For our knowledge reaches no further than our ideas,\nand the possibility of perceiving their agreements. Many things exist of\nwhich we have no ideas--chiefly because of the fewness of our senses and\ntheir lack of acuteness--and just as many of which our ideas are only\nimperfect. Moreover, we are often able neither to command the ideas\nwhich we really possess, or at least might attain, nor to perceive their\nconnexions. The ideas which are lacking, those which are undiscoverable,\nthose which are not combined, are the causes of the narrow limits of human\nknowledge.\n\nThere are two ways by which knowledge may be extended: by experience, on\nthe one hand, and, on the other, by the elevation of our ideas to a state\nof clearness and distinctness, together with the discovery and systematic\narrangement of those intermediate ideas which exhibit the relation of other\nideas, in themselves not immediately comparable. The syllogism, as an\nartificial form, is of little value in the perception of the agreements\nbetween these intermediate and final terms, and of none whatever in the\ndiscovery of the former. Analytical and identical propositions which merely\nexplicate the conception of the subject, but express nothing not already\nknown, are, in spite of their indefeasible certitude, valueless for the\nextension of knowledge, and when taken for more than verbal explanations,\nmere absurdities. Even those most general propositions, those \"principles\"\nwhich are so much talked of in the schools, lack the utility which is so\ncommonly ascribed to them. Maxims are, it is true, fit instruments for the\ncommunication of knowledge already acquired, and in learned disputations\nmay perform indispensable service in silencing opponents, or in bringing\nthe dispute to a conclusion; but they are of little or no use in the\ndiscovery of new truth. It is a mistake to believe that special cases (as\n5 = 2 + 3, or 5 = 1 + 4) are dependent on the truth of the abstract rule\n(the whole is equal to the sum of its parts), that they are confirmed by\nit and must be derived from it. The particular and concrete is not only\nas clear and certain as the general maxim, but better known than this,\nas well as earlier and more easily perceived. Nay, further, in cases\nwhere ideas are confused and the meanings of words doubtful, the use of\naxioms is dangerous, since they may easily lend the appearance of proved\ntruth to assertions which are really contradictory.\n\nBetween the clear daylight of certain knowledge and the dark night of\nabsolute ignorance comes the twilight of probability. We find ourselves\ndependent on _opinion_ and presumption, or judgment based upon probability,\nwhen experience and demonstration leave us in the lurch and we are,\nnevertheless, challenged to a decision by vital needs which brook no delay.\nThe judge and the historian must convince themselves from the reports of\nwitnesses concerning events which they have not themselves observed; and\neveryone is compelled by the interests of life, of duty, and of eternal\nsalvation to form conclusions concerning things which lie beyond the limits\nof his own perception and reflective thought, nay, which transcend all\nhuman experience and rigorous demonstration whatever. To delay decision and\naction until absolute certainty had been attained, would scarcely allow\nus to lift a single finger. In cases concerning events in the past, the\nfuture, or at a distance, we rely on the testimony of others (testing their\nreports by considering their credibility as witnesses and the conformity of\nthe evidence to general experience in like cases); in regard to questions\nconcerning that which is absolutely beyond experience, _e.g._, higher\norders of spirits, or the ultimate causes of natural phenomena, analogy is\nthe only help we have. If the witnesses conflict among themselves, or with\nthe usual course of nature, the grounds _pro_ and _con_ must be carefully\nbalanced; frequently, however, the degree of probability attained is so\ngreat that our assent is almost equivalent to complete certainty. No\none doubts,--although it is impossible for him to \"know,\"--that Caesar\nconquered Pompey, that gold is ductile in Australia as elsewhere, that iron\nwill sink to-morrow as well as to-day. Thus opinion supplements the lack of\ncertain knowledge, and serves as a guide for belief and action, wherever\nthe general lot of mankind or individual circumstances prevent absolute\ncertitude.\n\nAlthough in this twilight region of opinion demonstrative proofs are\nreplaced merely by an \"occasion\" for \"taking\" a given fact or idea \"as true\nrather than false,\" yet assent is by no means an act of choice, as the\nCartesians had erroneously maintained, for in knowledge it is determined by\nclearly discerned reasons, and in the sphere of opinion, by the balance of\nprobability. The understanding is free only in combining ideas, not in its\njudgment concerning the agreement or the repugnancy of the ideas compared;\nit lies within its own power to decide whether it will judge at all, and\nwhat ideas it will compare, but it has no control over the result of the\ncomparison; it is impossible for it to refuse its assent to a demonstrated\ntruth or a preponderant probability.\n\nIn this recognition of objective and universally valid relations existing\namong ideas, which the thinking subject, through comparisons voluntarily\ninstituted, discovers valid or finds given, but which it can neither alter\nnor demur to, Locke abandons empirical ground (cf. p. 155) and approaches\nthe idealists of the Platonizing type. His inquiry divides into two very\ndissimilar parts (a psychological description of the origin of ideas and a\nlogical determination of the possibility and the extent of knowledge), the\nlatter of which is, in Locke's opinion, compatible with the former, but\nwhich could never have been developed from it. The rationalistic edifice\ncontradicts the sensationalistic foundation. Locke had hoped to show the\nvalue and the limits of knowledge by an inquiry into the origin of ideas,\nbut his estimate of this value and these limits cannot be proved from the\n_a posteriori_ origin of ideas--it can only be maintained in despite of\nthis, and stands in need of support from some (rationalistic) principle\nelsewhere obtained. Thinkers who trace back all simple ideas to outer and\ninner perception we expect to reject every attempt to extend knowledge\nbeyond the sphere of experience, to declare the combinations of ideas\nwhich have their origin in sensation trustworthy, and those which are\nformed without regard to perception, illusory; or else, with Protagoras,\nto limit knowledge to the individual perceiving subject, with a consequent\ncomplete denial of its general validity. But exactly the opposite of all\nthese is found in Locke. The remarkable spectacle is presented of a\nphilosopher who admits no other sources of ideas than perception and the\nvoluntary combination of perceptions, transcending the limits of experience\nwith proofs of the divine existence, viewing with suspicion the ideas of\nsubstance formed at the instance of experience, and reducing natural\nscience to the sphere of mere opinion; while, on the other hand, he\nascribes reality and eternal validity to the combinations of ideas formed\nindependently of perception, which are employed by mathematics and ethics,\nand completely abandons the individualistic position in his na\u00efve faith in\nthe impregnable validity of the relations of ideas, which is evident to all\nwho turn their attention to them. The ground for the universal validity of\nthe relations among ideas as well as of our knowledge of them, naturally\nlies not in their empirical origin (for my experience gives information to\nme alone, and that only concerning the particular case in question), but in\nthe uniformity of man's rational constitution. If two men really have the\nsame ideas--not merely think they have because they use similar\nlanguage--it is impossible, according to Locke, that they should hold\ndifferent opinions concerning the relation of their ideas. With this\nconviction, that the universal validity of knowledge is rooted in the\nuniformity of man's rational constitution, and the further one, that we\nattain certain knowledge only when things conform to our ideas, Locke\nclosely approaches Kant; while his assumption of a fixed order of relations\namong ideas, which the individual understanding cannot refuse to recognize,\nand the typical character assigned to mathematics, associate him with\nMalebranche and Spinoza. In view of these points of contact with the\nrationalistic school and his manifold dependence on its founder, we may\nventure the paradox, that Locke may not only be termed a Baconian with\nCartesian leanings, but (almost) a Cartesian influenced by Bacon. The\npossibility must not be forgotten, however, that rationalistic suggestions\ncame to him also from Galileo, Hobbes, and Newton.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. the article by Benno Erdmann cited p. 156, note.]\n\nIntermediate between knowledge and opinion stands faith as a form of assent\nwhich is based on testimony rather than on deductions of the reason,\nbut whose certitude is not inferior to that of knowledge, since it is a\ncommunication from God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Faith\nand the certainty thereof depend on reason, in so far as reason alone can\ndetermine whether a divine revelation has really been made and the meaning\nof the words in which the revelation has come down to us. In determining\nthe boundaries of faith and reason Locke makes use of the\ndistinction--which has become famous--between things above reason,\naccording to reason, and contrary to reason. Our conviction that God exists\nis according to reason; the belief that there are more gods than one, or\nthat a body can be in two different places at the same time, contrary\nto reason; the former is a truth which can be demonstrated on rational\ngrounds, the latter an assumption incompatible with our clear and distinct\nideas. In the one case revelation confirms a proposition of which we\nwere already certain; in the other an alleged revelation is incapable\nof depriving our certain knowledge of its force. Above reason are those\nprinciples whose probability and truth cannot be shown by the natural use\nof our faculties, as that the dead shall rise again and the account of the\nfall of part of the angels. Among the things which are not contrary to\nreason belong miracles, for they contradict opinion based on the usual\ncourse of nature, it is true, but not our certain knowledge; in spite of\ntheir supernatural character they deserve willing acceptance, and receive\nit, when they are well attested, whereas principles contrary to reason must\nbe unconditionally rejected as a revelation from God. Locke's demand for\nthe subjection of faith to rational criticism assures him an honorable\nplace in the history of English deism. He enriched the philosophy of\nreligion by two treatises of his own: _The Reasonableness of Christianity_,\n1695, and three _Letters on Tolerance_, 1689-1692. The former transfers the\ncenter of gravity of the Christian religion from history to the doctrine of\nredemption; the _Letters_ demand religious freedom, mutual tolerance among\nthe different sects, and the separation of Church and State. Those sects\nalone are to receive no tolerance which themselves exercise none, and which\nendanger the well-being of society; together with atheists, who are\nincapable of taking oaths. In other respects it is the duty of the state to\nprotect all confessions and to favor none.\n\n%(b) Practical Philosophy.%--Locke contributed to practical philosophy\nimportant suggestions concerning freedom, morality, politics, and\neducation. Freedom is the \"power to begin or forbear, continue or put an\nend to\" actions (thoughts and motions). It is not destroyed by the fact\nthat the will is always moved by desire, more exactly, by uneasiness under\npresent circumstances, and that the decision is determined by the judgment\nof the understanding. Although the result of examination is itself\ndependent on the unalterable relations of ideas, it is still in our power\nto decide whether we will consider at all, and what ideas we will take into\nconsideration. Not the thought, not the determination of the will, is free,\nbut the person, the mind; this has the power to suspend the prosecution of\ndesire, and by its judgment to determine the will, even in opposition\nto inclination. Four stages must, consequently, be distinguished in the\nvolitional process: desire or uneasiness; the deliberative combination of\nideas; the judgment of the understanding; determination. Freedom has its\nplace at the beginning of the second stage: it is open to me to decide\nwhether to proceed at all to consideration and final judgment concerning a\nproposed action; thus to prevent desire from directly issuing in movements;\nand, according to the result of my examination, perhaps, to substitute for\nthe act originally desired an opposite one. Without freedom, moral judgment\nand responsibility would be impossible. The above appears to us to\nrepresent the essence of Locke's often vacillating discussion of freedom\n(II. 21). Desire is directed to pleasure; the will obeys the understanding,\nwhich is exalted above motives of pleasure and the passions. Everything is\nphysically good which occasions and increases pleasure in us, which removes\nor diminishes pain, or contributes to the attainment of some other good and\nthe avoidance of some other evil. Actions, on the contrary, are morally\ngood when they conform to a rule by which they are judged. Whoever\nearnestly meditates on his welfare will prefer moral or rational good to\nsensuous good, since the former alone vouchsafes true happiness. God has\nmost intimately united virtue and general happiness, since he has made the\npreservation of human society dependent on the exercise of virtue.\n\nThe mark of a law for free beings is the fact that it apportions reward for\nobedience and punishment for disobedience. The laws to which an action must\nconform in order to deserve the predicate \"good\" are three in number\n(II. 28): by the divine law \"men judge whether their actions are sins\nor duties\"; by the civil law, \"whether they be criminal or innocent\"\n(deserving of punishment or not); by the law of opinion or reputation,\n\"whether they be virtues or vices.\" The first of these laws threatens\nimmorality with future misery; the second, with legal punishments; the\nthird, with the disapproval of our fellow-men.\n\nThe third law, the law of opinion or reputation, called also philosophical,\ncoincides on the whole, though not throughout, with the first, the divine\nlaw of nature, which is best expressed in Christianity, and which is the\ntrue touchstone of the moral character of actions. While Locke, in his\npolemic against innate ideas, had emphasized the diversity of moral\njudgments among individuals and nations (as a result of which an action is\ncondemned in one place and praised as virtuous in another), he here gives\nprominence to the fact of general agreement in essentials, since it is only\nnatural that each should encourage by praise and esteem that which is to\nhis advantage, while virtue evidently conduces to the good of all who\ncome into contact with the virtuous. Amid the greatest diversity of moral\njudgments virtue and praise, vice and blame, go together, while in general\nthat is praised which is really praiseworthy--even the vicious man approves\nthe right and condemns that which is faulty, at least in others. Locke was\nthe first to call attention to general approval as an external mark of\nmoral action, a hint which the Scottish moralists subsequently exploited.\nThe objection that he reduced morality to the level of the conventional is\nunjust, for the law of opinion and reputation did not mean for him the\ntrue principle of morality, but only that which controls the majority of\nmankind--If anyone is inclined to doubt that commendation and disgrace are\nsufficient motives to action, he does not understand mankind; there is\nhardly one in ten thousand insensible enough to endure in quiet the\nconstant disapproval of society. Even if the lawbreaker hopes to escape\npunishment at the hands of the state, and puts out of mind the thought of\nfuture retribution, he can never escape the disapproval of his misdeeds\non the part of his fellows. In entire harmony with these views is Locke's\nadvice to educators, that they should early cultivate the love of esteem in\ntheir pupils.\n\nOf the four principles of morals which Locke employs side by side, and in\nalternation, without determining their exact relations--the reason, the\nwill of God, the general good (and, deduced from this, the approval of\nour fellow-men), self-love--the latter two possess only an accessory\nsignificance, while the former two co-operate in such a way that the one\ndetermines the content of the good and the other confirms it and gives\nit binding authority. The Christian religion does the reason a threefold\nservice--it gives her information concerning our duty, which she could have\nreached herself, indeed, without the help of revelation, but not with\nthe same certitude and rapidity; it invests the good with the majesty of\nabsolute obligation by proclaiming it as the command of God; it increases\nthe motives to morality by its doctrines of immortality and future\nretribution. Although Locke thus intimately joins virtue with earthly joy\nand eternal happiness, and although he finds in the expectation of heaven\nor hell a welcome support for the will in its conflict with the passions,\nwe must remember that he values this regard for the results and rewards of\nvirtue only as a subsidiary motive, and does not esteem it as in itself\nethical: eternal happiness forms, as it were, the \"dowry\" of virtue,\nwhich adds to its true value in the eyes of fools and the weak, though it\nconstitutes neither its essence nor its basis. Virtue seems to the wise man\nbeautiful and valuable enough even without this, and yet the commendations\nof philosophers gain for her but few wooers. The crowd is attracted to her\nonly when it is made clear to it that virtue is the \"best policy.\"\n\nIn politics Locke is an opponent of both forms of absolutism, the despotic\nabsolutism of Hobbes and the patriarchal absolutism of Filmer (died 1647;\nhis _Patriarcha_ declared hereditary monarchy a divine institution), and\na moderate exponent of the liberal tendencies of Milton (1608-74) and\nAlgernon Sidney (died 1683; _Discourses concerning Government_). The two\n_Treatises on Civil Government_, 1690, develop, the first negatively, the\nsecond positively, the constitutional theory with direct reference to the\npolitical condition of England at the time. All men are born free and with\nlike capacities and rights. Each is to preserve his own interests, without\ninjuring those of others. The right to be treated by every man as a\nrational being holds even prior to the founding of the state; but then\nthere is no authoritative power to decide conflicts. The state of nature is\nnot in itself a state of war, but it would lead to this, if each man should\nhimself attempt to exercise the right of self-protection against injury. In\norder to prevent acts of violence there is needed a civil community, based\non a free contract, to which each individual member shall transfer his\nfreedom and power. Submission to the authority of the state is a free act,\nand, by the contract made, natural rights are guarded, not destroyed;\npolitical freedom is obedience to self-imposed law, subordination to the\ncommon will expressing itself in the majority. The political power is\nneither tyrannical, for arbitrary rule is no better than the state of\nnature, nor paternal, for rulers and subjects are on an equality in the use\nof the reason, which is not the case with parents and children. The\nsupreme power is the legislative, intrusted by the community to its chosen\nrepresentatives--the laws should aim at the general good. Subordinate\nto the legislative power, and to be kept separate from it, come the two\nexecuting powers, which are best united in a single hand (the king), viz.,\nthe executive power (administrative and judicial), which carries the laws\ninto effect, and the federative power, which defends the community against\nexternal foes. The ruler is subject to the law. If the government, through\nviolation of the law, has become unworthy of the power intrusted to it, and\nhas forfeited it, sovereign authority reverts to the source whence it\nwas derived, that is, to the people. The people decides whether its\nrepresentatives and the monarch have deserved the confidence placed in\nthem, and has the right to depose them, if they exceed their authority. As\nthe sworn obedience (of the subjects) is to the law alone, the ruler who\nacts contrary to law has lost the right to govern, has put himself in a\nstate of hostility to the people, and revolution becomes merely necessary\ndefense against aggression.\n\nMontesquieu made these political ideas of Locke the common property of\nEurope.[1] Rousseau did a like service for Locke's pedagogical views, given\nin the modest but important _Thoughts concerning Education_, 1693. The\naim of education should not be to instill anything into the pupil, but to\ndevelop everything from him; it should guide and not master him, should\ndevelop his capacities in a natural way, should rouse him to independence,\nnot drill him into a scholar. In order to these ends thorough and\naffectionate consideration of his individuality is requisite, and private\ninstruction is, therefore, to be preferred to public instruction. Since it\nis the business of education to make men useful members of society, it must\nnot neglect their physical development. Learning through play and object\nteaching make the child's task a delight; modern languages are to be\nlearned more by practice than by systematic study. The chief difference\nbetween Locke and Rousseau is that the former sets great value on arousing\nthe sense of esteem, while the latter entirely rejects this as an\neducational instrument.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Theod. Pietsch, _Ueber das Verh\u00e4ltniss der politischen\nTheorien Lockes zu Montesquieus Lehre von der Teilung der Gewalten_ Berlin\ndissertation, Breslau, 1887.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.\n\nBesides the theory of knowledge, which forms the central doctrine in his\nsystem, Locke had discussed the remaining branches of philosophy, though in\nless detail, and, by his many-sided stimulation, had posited problems\nfor the Illumination movement in England and in France. Now the several\ndisciplines take different courses, but the after-influence of his powerful\nmind is felt on every hand. The development of deism from Toland on is\nunder the direct influence of his \"rational Christianity\"; the ethics of\nShaftesbury stands in polemic relation to his denial of everything innate;\nand while Berkeley and Hume are deducing the consequences of his theory of\nknowledge, Hartley derives the impulse to a new form of psychology from his\nchapter on the association of ideas.\n\n\n%1. Natural Philosophy and Psychology.%\n\nIn Locke's famous countryman, Isaac Newton (1642-1727),[1] the modern\ninvestigation of nature attains the level toward which it had striven, at\nfirst by wishes and demands, gradually, also, in knowledge and achievement,\nsince the end of the mediaeval period. Mankind was not able to discard at\na stroke its accustomed Aristotelian view of nature, which animated things\nwith inner, spirit-like forces. A full century intervened between Telesius\nand Newton, the concept of natural law requiring so long a time to break\nout of its shell. A tremendous revolution in opinion had to be effected\nbefore Newton could calmly promulgate his great principle, \"Abandon\nsubstantial forms and occult qualities and reduce natural phenomena to\nmathematical laws,\" before he could crown the discoveries of Galileo and\nKepler with his own. For this successful union of Bacon's experimental\ninduction with the mathematical deduction of Descartes, this combination of\nthe analytic and the synthetic methods, which was shown in the demand\nfor, and the establishment of, mathematically formulated natural laws,\npresupposes that nature is deprived of all inner life [2] and all\nqualitative distinctions, that all that exists is compounded of uniformly\nacting parts, and that all that takes place is conceived as motion. With\nthis Hobbes's programme of a mechanical science of nature is fulfilled. The\nheavens and the earth are made subject to the same law of gravitation. How\nfar Newton himself adhered to the narrow meaning of mechanism (motion from\npressure and impulse), is evident from the fact that, though he is often\nhonored as the creator of the dynamical view of nature, he rejected _actio\nin distans_ as absurd, and deemed it indispensable to assume some \"cause\"\nof gravity (consisting, probably, in the impact of imponderable material\nparticles). It was his disciples who first ventured to proclaim gravity as\nthe universal force of matter, as the \"primary quality of all bodies\" (so\nRoger Cotes in the preface to the second edition of the _Principia_, 1713).\n\n[Footnote 1: 1669-95 professor of mathematics in Cambridge, later resident\nin London; 1672, member, and, 1703, president of the Royal Society. Chief\nwork, _Philosophic Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, 1687. _Works_, 1779\n_seq_. On Newton cf. K. Snell, 1843; Durdik, _Leibniz und Newton_, 1869;\nLange, _History of Materialism_, vol. i. p. 306 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: That the mathematical view of nature, since it leaves room for\nquantitative distinctions alone, is equivalent to an examination of nature\nhad been clearly recognized by Poiret. As he significantly remarked: The\nprinciples of the Cartesian physics relate merely to the \"cadaver\" of\nnature _(Erud_., p. 260).]\n\nNewton resembles Boyle in uniting profound piety with the rigor of\nscientific thought. He finds the most certain proof for the existence of\nan intelligent creator in the wonderful arrangement of the world-machine,\nwhich does not need after-adjustment at the hands of its creator, and whose\nadaptation he praises as enthusiastically as he unconditionally rejects\nthe mingling of teleological considerations in the explanation of physical\nphenomena. By this \"physico-theological\" argument he furnishes a welcome\nsupport to deism. While the finite mind perceives in the sensorium of the\nbrain the images of objects which come to it from the senses, God has all\nthings in himself, is immediately present in all, and cognizes them without\nsense-organs, the expanse of the universe forming his sensorium.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe transfer of mechanical views to psychical phenomena was also\naccompanied by the conviction that no danger to faith in God would\nresult therefrom, but rather that it would aid in its support. The chief\nrepresentatives of this movement, which followed the example of Gay,\nwere the physician, David Hartley[1] (1704-57), and his pupil, Joseph\nPriestley,[2] a dissenting minister and natural scientist (born 1733, died\nin Philadelphia 1804; the discoverer of oxygen gas, 1774).\n\nThe fundamental position of these psychologists is expressed in two\nprinciples: (1) all cognitive and motive life is based on the mechanism of\npsychical elements, the highest and most complex inner phenomena (thoughts,\nfeelings, volitions) are produced by the combination of simple ideas,\nthat is, they arise through the \"association of ideas \"; (2) all inner\nphenomena, the complex as well as the simple, are accompanied by, or rather\ndepend on, more or less complicated physical phenomena, viz., nervous\nprocesses and brain vibrations. Although Hartley and Priestley are agreed\nin their demand for an associational and physiological treatment of\npsychology, and in the attempt to give one, they differ in this, that\nHartley cautiously speaks only of a parallelism, a correspondence between\nmental and cerebral processes, and rejects the materialistic interpretation\nof inner phenomena, pointing out that the heterogeneity of motion and ideas\nforbids the reduction of the latter to the former, and that psychological\nanalysis never reaches corporeal but only psychical elements. Moreover, it\nis only with reluctance that, conscious of the critical character of the\nconclusion, he admits the dependence of brain vibrations on the mechanical\nlaws of the material world and the thoroughgoing determinateness of the\nhuman will, consoling himself with the belief that moral responsibility\nnevertheless remains intact. Priestley, on the contrary, boldly avows the\nmaterialistic and deterministic consequences of his position, holds that\npsychical phenomena are not merely accompanied by material motions but\nconsist in them (thought is a function of the brain), and makes psychology,\nas the physics of the nerves, a part of physiology. The denial of\nimmortality and the divine origin of the world is, however, by no means\nto follow from materialism. Priestley not only combated the atheism of\nHolbach, but also entered the deistic ranks with works of his own on\nNatural Religion and the Corruptions of Christianity.\n\n[Footnote 1: Hartley, _Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duties, his\nExpectations_. 1749.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Priestley, _Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the\nPrinciples of the Association of Ideas_, 1775; _Disquisitions relating to\nMatter and Spirit_, 1777; _The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity_, 1777;\n_Free Discussions of the Doctrines of Materialism_, 1778 (against Richard\nPrice's _Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity_). Cf. on\nboth Schoenlank's dissertation, _Hartley und Priestley, die Begr\u00fcnder des\nAssoziationismus in England_, 1882.]\n\nAs early as in Hartley[1] the principle, which is so important for ethics,\nappears that things and actions (_e.g._, promotion of the good of others)\nwhich at first are sought and done because they are means to our own\nenjoyment, in time come to have a direct worth of their own, apart from the\noriginal egoistic end. James Mill (1829) has repeated this thought in later\ntimes. As fame becomes an immediate object of desire to the ambitious man,\nand gold to the miser, so, through association, the impulse toward that\nwhich will secure approval may be transformed into the endeavor after that\nwhich deserves approval.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik_, vol. i. p. 197 _seq_.]\n\nAmong later representatives of the Associational school we may mention\nErasmus Darwin _(Zo\u00f6nomia, or the Laws of Organic Life_, 1794-96).\n\n\n\n%2. Deism%.\n\nAs Bacon and Descartes had freed natural science, Hobbes, the state, and\nGrotius, law from the authority of the Church and had placed them on an\nindependent basis, _i.e._, the basis of nature and reason, so deism[1]\nseeks to free religion from Church dogma and blind historical faith, and to\ndeduce it from natural knowledge. In so far as deism finds both the source\nand the test of true religion in reason, it is rationalism; in so far as it\nappeals from the supernatural light of revelation and inspiration to the\nnatural light of reason, it is naturalism; in so far as revelation and its\nrecords are not only not allowed to restrict rational criticism, but are\nmade the chief object of criticism, its adherents are freethinkers.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Lechler's _Geschichte des Englischen Deismus_, 1841, which\nis rigorously drawn from the sources. [Hunt, _History of Religious Thought\nin England_, 1871-73 [1884]; Leslie Stephen, _History of English Thought in\nthe Eighteenth Century_, 1876 [1880]; Cairns, _Unbelief in the Eighteenth\nCentury_, 1881.]]\n\nThe general principles of deism may be compressed into a few theses. There\nis a natural religion, whose essential content is morality; this comprises\nnot much more than the two maxims, Believe in God and Do your duty.\n\nPositive religions are to be judged by this standard. The elements in them\nwhich are added to natural religion, or conflict with it, are superfluous\nand harmful additions, arbitrary decrees of men, the work of cunning rulers\nand deceitful priests. Christianity, which in its original form was the\nperfect expression of the true religion of reason, has experienced great\ncorruptions in its ecclesiastical development, from which it must now be\npurified.\n\nThese principles are supported by the following arguments: Truth is one\nand there is but one true religion. If the happiness of men depends on the\nfulfilment of her commands, these must be comprehensible to every man and\nmust have been communicated to him; and since a special revelation and\nlegislation could not come to the knowledge of all, they can be no other\nthan the laws of duty inscribed on the human heart. In order to salvation,\nthen, we need only to know God as creator and judge, and to fulfill his\ncommands, _i.e._. to live a moral life. The one true religion has been\ncommunicated to man in two forms, through the inner natural revelation of\nreason, and the outer historical revelation of the Gospel. Since both have\ncome from God they cannot be contradictory. Accordingly natural religion\nand the true one among the positive religions do not differ in their\ncontent, but only in the manner of their promulgation. Reason tries\nhistorical religion by the standard furnished by natural religion, and\ndistinguishes actual from asserted revelation by the harmony of its\ncontents with reason: the deist believes in the Bible because of the\nreasonableness of its teachings; he does not hold these teachings true\nbecause they are found in the Bible. If a positive religion contains\nless than natural religion it is incomplete; if it contains more it is\ntyrannical, since it imposes unnecessary requirements. The authority of\nreason to exercise the office of a judge in regard to the credibility of\nrevelation is beyond doubt; indeed, apart from it there is no means of\nattaining truth, and the acceptance of an external revelation as genuine,\nand not merely as alleged to be such, is possible only for those who have\nalready been convinced of God's existence by the inner light of reason.\n\nTo these logical considerations is added an historical position, which,\nthough only cursorily indicated at the beginning, is evidenced in\nincreasing detail as the deistic movement continues on its course. Natural\nreligion is always and everywhere the same, is universal and necessary, is\nperfect, eternal, and original. As original, it is the earliest religion,\nand as old as the world; as perfect, it is not capable of improvement, but\nonly of corruption and restoration. Twice it has existed in perfect purity,\nas the religion of the first men and as the religion of Christ. Twice\nit has been corrupted, in the pre-Christian period by idolatry, which\nproceeded from the Egyptian worship of the dead, in the period after Christ\nby the love of miracle and blind reverence for authority. In both cases the\ncorruption has come from power-loving priests, who have sought to frighten\nand control the people by incomprehensible dogmas and ostentations,\nmysterious ceremonies, and found their advantage in the superstition of the\nmultitude,--each new divinity, each new mystery meaning a gain for them. As\nthey had corrupted the primitive religion into polytheism, so Christianity\nwas corrupted by conforming it to the prejudices of those to be converted,\nin whose eyes the simplicity of the new doctrine would have been no\nrecommendation for it. The Jew sought in it an echo of the Law, the heathen\nlonged for his festivals and his occult philosophy; so it was burdened\nwith unprofitable ceremonial observances and needless profundity, it was\nJudaized and heathenized. It was inevitable that the doctrines of original\nsin, of satisfaction and atonement should prove especially objectionable to\nthe purely rational temper of the deists. Neither the guilt of others (the\nsin of our ancestors) nor the atonement of others (Christ's death on the\ncross) can be imputed to us; Christ can be called the Savior only by way of\nmetaphor, only in so far as the example of his death leads us on to faith\nand obedience for ourselves. The name atheism, which, it is true, orthodoxy\nheld ready for every belief incorrect according to its standard, was on the\ncontrary undeserved. The deists did not attack Christian revelation, still\nless belief in God. They considered the atheist bereft of reason, and they\nby no means esteemed historical revelation superfluous. The end of the\nlatter was to stir the mind to move men to reflection and conversion, to\ntransform morals, and if anyone declared it unnecessary because it contains\nnothing but natural truths, he was referred to the works of Euclid, which\ncertainly contain nothing which is not founded in the reason, but which no\none but a fool will consider unnecessary in the study of mathematics.\n\nThat which we have here summarized as the general position of deism, gained\ngradual expression through the regular development and specialization of\ndeistic ideas in individual representatives of the movement. The chief\npoints and epochs were marked by Toland's _Christianity not Mysterious_,\n1696; Collins's _Discourse of Freethinking_, 1713; Tindal's _Christianity\nas Old as the Creation_, 1730; and Chubb's _True Gospel of Jesus Christ_,\n1738. The first of these demands a critique of revelation, the second\ndefends the right of free investigation, the third declares the religion\nof Christ, which is merely a revived natural religion, to be the oldest\nreligion, the fourth reduces it entirely to moral life.\n\nThe deistic movement was called into life by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (pp.\n79-80) and continued by Locke, in so far as the latter had intrusted to\nreason the discrimination of true from false revelation, and had admitted\nin Christianity elements above reason, though not things contrary to\nreason. Following Locke, John Toland (1670-1722) goes a step further with\nthe proof that the Gospel not only contains nothing contrary to reason, but\nalso nothing above reason, and that no Christian doctrine is to be called\nmysterious. To the demand that we should worship what we do not comprehend,\nhe answers that reason is the only basis of certitude, and alone decides on\nthe divinity of the Scriptures, by a consideration of their contents. The\nmotive which impels us to assent to a truth must lie in reason, not in\nrevelation, which, like all authority and experience, is merely the way by\nwhich we attain the knowledge of the truth; it is a means of instruction,\nnot a ground of conviction. All faith has knowledge and understanding for\nits conditions, and is rational conviction. Before we can put our trust in\nthe Scriptures, we must be convinced that they were in fact written by the\nauthors to whom they are ascribed, and must consider whether these men,\ntheir deeds, and their works, were worthy of God. The fact that God's\ninmost being is for us inscrutable does not make him a mystery, for even\nthe common things of nature are known to us only by their properties.\nMiracles are also in themselves nothing incomprehensible; they are\nsimply enhancements of natural laws beyond their ordinary operations, by\nsupernatural assistance, which God vouchsafes but rarely and only for\nextraordinary ends. Toland explains the mysteries smuggled into the ethical\nreligion of Christianity as due to the toleration of Jewish and heathen\ncustoms, to the entrance of learned speculation, and to the selfish\ninventions of the clergy and the rulers. The Reformation itself had not\nentirely restored the original purity and simplicity.\n\nThus far Toland the deist. In his later writings, the five _Letters to\nSerena_, 1704, addressed to the Prussian queen, Sophia Charlotte, and\nthe _Pantheisticon_ (Cosmopoli, 1720), he advances toward a hylozoistic\npantheism.\n\nThe first of the Letters discusses the prejudices of mankind; the second,\nthe heathen doctrine of immortality; the third, the origin of idolatry;\nwhile the fourth and fifth are devoted to Spinoza, the chief defect in\nwhose philosophy is declared to be the absence of an explanation of motion.\nMotion belongs to the notion of matter as necessarily as extension and\nimpenetrability. Matter is always in motion; rest is only the reciprocal\ninterference of two moving forces. The differences of things depend on the\nvarious movements of the particles of matter, so that it is motion which\nindividualizes matter in general into particular things. As the Letters\nascribe the purposive construction of organic beings to a divine reason, so\nthe _Pantheisticon_ also stops short before it reaches the extreme of naked\nmaterialism. Everything is from the whole; the whole is infinite, one,\neternal, all-rational. God is the force of the whole, the soul of\nthe world, the law of nature. The treatise includes a liturgy of the\npantheistic society with many quotations from the ancient poets.\n\nAnthony Collins (1676-1729), in his _Discourse of Free-thinking_, shows\nthe right of free thought _(i. e_., of judgment on rational grounds) in\ngeneral, from the principle that no truth is forbidden to us, and that\nthere is no other way by which we can attain truth and free ourselves from\nsuperstition, and the right to apply it to God and the Bible in particular,\nfrom the fact that the clergy differ concerning the most important matters.\nThe fear that the differences of opinion which spring from freethinking may\nendanger the peace of society lacks foundation; on the contrary, it is\nonly restriction of the freedom of thought which leads to disorders, by\nweakening moral zeal. The clergy are the only ones who condemn liberty of\nthought. It is sacrilege to hold that error can be beneficial and truth\nharmful. As a proof that freethinking by no means corrupts character,\nCollins gives in conclusion a list of noble freethinkers from Socrates down\nto Locke and Tillotson. Among the replies to the views of Collins we may\nmention the calmly objective Boyle Lectures by Ibbot, and the sharp and\nwitty letter of Richard Bentley, the philologist. Neither of these attacks\nCollins's leading principle, both fully admitting the right to employ the\nreason, even in religious questions; but they dispute the implication that\nfreethinking is equivalent to contentious opposition. On the one hand, they\nmaintain that Collins's thinking is too free, that is, unbridled, hasty,\npresumptuous, and paradoxical; on the other, that it is not free enough\n(from prejudice).\n\nAfter Shaftesbury had based morality on a natural instinct for the\nbeautiful and had made it independent of religion, as well as served the\ncause of free thought by a keenly ironical campaign against enthusiasm and\northodoxy, and Clarke had furnished the representatives of natural religion\na useful principle of morals in the objective rationality of things, the\ndebate concerning prophecy and miracles[1] threatened to dissipate the\ndeistic movement into scattered theological skirmishes. At this juncture\nMatthew Tindal (1657-1733) led it back to the main question. His\n_Christianity as Old as the Creation_ is the doomsday book of deism.\nIt contains all that has been given above as the core of this view of\nreligion. Christ came not to bring in a new doctrine, but to exhort to\nrepentance and atonement, and to restore the law of nature, which is as old\nas the creation, as universal as reason, and as unchangeable as God,\nhuman nature, and the relations of things, which we should respect in our\nactions. Religion is morality; more exactly, it is the free, constant\ndisposition to do as much good as possible, and thereby to promote the\nglory of God and our own welfare. For the harmony of our conduct with\nthe rules of reason constitutes our perfection, and on this depends our\nhappiness. Since God is infinitely blessed and self-sufficient his purpose\nin the moral law is man's happiness alone. Whatever a positive religion\ncontains beyond the moral law is superstition, which puts emphasis on\nworthless trivialities. The true religion occupies the happy mean between\nmiserable unfaith, on the one hand, and timorous superstition, wild\nfanaticism, and pietistical zeal on the other. In proclaiming the\nsovereignty of reason in the sphere of religion as well as elsewhere, we\nare only openly demanding what our opponents have tacitly acknowledged in\npractice _(e. g_.> in allegorical interpretation) from time immemorial. God\nhas endowed us with reason in order that we should by it distinguish truth\nfrom falsehood.\n\n[Footnote 1: The chief combatant in the conflict over the argument from\nprophecy, which was called forth by Whiston's corruption hypothesis,\nwas Collins _(A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian\nReligion_, 1724). Christianity is based on Judaism; its fundamental article\nis that Jesus is the prophesied Messiah of the Jews, its chief proof the\nargument from Old Testament prophecy, which, it is true, depends on the\ntypical or allegorical interpretation of the passages in question. Whoever\nrejects this cuts away the ground from under the Christian revelation,\nwhich is only the allegorical import of the revelation of the Jews.--The\nsecond proof of revelation, the argument from miracles, was shaken by\nThomas Woolston _(Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour_, 1727-30),\nby his extension of the allegorical interpretation to these also. He\nsupported himself in this by the authority of the Church Fathers, and,\nabove all, by the argument that the accounts of the miracles, if taken\nliterally, contradict all sense and understanding. The unavoidable doubts\nwhich arise concerning the literal interpretation of the resurrection of\nthe dead, the healing of the sick, the driving out of devils, and the other\nmiracles, prove that these were intended only as symbolic representations\nof the mysterious and wonderful effects which Jesus was to accomplish. Thus\nJairus's daughter means the Jewish Church, which is to be revived at the\nsecond coming of Christ; Lazarus typifies humanity, which will be raised\nagain at the last day; the account of the bodily resurrection of Jesus is\na symbol of his spiritual resurrection from his grave in the letter of\nScripture. Sherlock, whose _Trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of\nJesus_ was long considered a cogent answer to the attacks of Woolston,\nwas opposed by Peter Annet, who, without leaving the refuge of figurative\ninterpretation open, proceeded still more regardlessly in the discovery of\ncontradictory and incredible elements in the Gospel reports, and declared\nall the scriptural writers together to be liars and falsifiers. If a man\nbelieves in miracles as supernatural interferences with the regular course\nof nature (and they must be so taken if they are to certify to the divine\norigin of the Scriptures), he makes God mutable, and natural laws imperfect\narrangements which stand in need of correction. The truth of religion is\nindependent of all history.]\n\nThomas Chubb (1679-1747), a man of the people (he was a glove maker and\ntallow-chandler), and from 1715 on a participant in deistic literature and\nconcerned to adapt the new ideas to the men of his class, preached in _The\nTrue Gospel of Jesus Christ_ an honorable working-man's Christianity.,\nFaith means obedience to the law of reason inculcated by Christ, not the\nacceptance of the facts reported about him. The gospel of Christ was\npreached to the poor before his death and his asserted resurrection and\nascension. It is probable that Christ really lived, because of the great\neffect of his message; but he was a man like other men. His gospel is his\nteaching, not his history, his own teaching, not that of his followers--the\nreflections of the apostles are private opinions. Christ's teaching\namounts, in effect, to these three fundamental principles: (1) Conform\nto the rational law of love to God and one's neighbor; this is the only\nground of divine acceptance. (2) After transgression of the law, repentance\nand reformation are the only grounds of divine grace and forgiveness. (3)\nAt the last day every one will be rewarded according to his works. By\nproclaiming these doctrines, by carrying them out in his own pure life\nand typical death, and by founding religio-ethical associations on the\nprinciple of brotherly equality, Christ selected the means best fitted for\nthe attainment of his purpose, the salvation of human souls. His aim was\nto assure men of future happiness (and of the earthly happiness connected\ntherewith), and to make them worthy of it; and this happiness can only be\nattained when from free conviction we submit ourselves to the natural moral\nlaw, which is grounded on the moral fitness of things. Everything which\nleads to the illusion that the favor of God is attainable by any other\nmeans than by righteousness and repentance, is pernicious; as, also, the\nconfusion of Christian societies with legal and civil societies, which\npursue entirely different aims.\n\nThomas Morgan _(The Moral Philosopher, a Dialogue between the Christian\nDeist, Philalethes, and the Christian Jew, Theophanes, 1737 seq_.) stands\non the same ground as his predecessors, by holding that the moral truth of\nthings is the criterion of the divinity of a doctrine, that the Christian\nreligion is merely a restoration of natural religion, and that the apostles\nwere not infallible. Peculiar to him are the application of the first of\nthese principles to the Mosaic law, with the conclusion that this was not a\nrevelation; the complete separation of the New Testament from the Old (the\nChurch of Christ and the expected kingdom of the Jewish Messiah are as\nopposed to each other as heaven and earth); and the endeavor to give a\nmore exact explanation of the origin of superstition, the pre-Christian\nmanifestations of which he traces back to the fall of the angels, and those\nsince Christ to the intermixture of Jewish elements. He seeks to solve his\nproblem by a detailed critique of Israelitish history, which is lacking in\nsympathy but not in spirit, and in which, introducing modern relations\ninto the earliest times, he explains the Old Testament miracles in part as\nmyths, in part as natural phenomena, and deprives the heroes of the Jews of\ntheir moral renown. The Jewish historians are ranked among the poets; the\nGod of Israel is reduced to a subordinate, local tutelary divinity; the\nmoral law of Moses is characterized as a civil code limited to external\nconduct, to national and mundane affairs, with merely temporal sanctions,\nand the ceremonial law as an act of worldly statecraft; David is declared\na gifted poet, musician, hypocrite, and coward; the prophets are made\nprofessors of theology and moral philosophy; and Paul is praised as the\ngreatest freethinker of his time, who defended reason against authority\nand rejected the Jewish ritual law as indifferent. Whatever is spurious in\nChristianity is a remnant of Judaism, all its mysteries are misunderstood\nand falsely (_i.e._ literally) applied allegories. Out of regard for Jewish\nprejudices Christ's death was figuratively described as sacrificial, as in\nearlier times Moses had been forced to yield to the Egyptian superstitions\nof his people. Morgan looks for the final victory of the rational morality\nof the pure, Pauline, or deistic Christianity over the Jewish Christianity\nof orthodoxy. Among the works of his opponents the following deserve\nmention: William Warburton's _Divine Legation of Moses, and_ Samuel\nChandler's _Vindication of the History of the Old Testament_.\n\nIt maybe doubted whether Bolingbroke (died 1751; cf. p. 203) is to be\nclassed among the deists or among their opponents. On the one hand, he\nfinds in monotheism the original true religion, which has degenerated\ninto superstition through priestly cunning and fantastical philosophy; in\nprimitive Christianity, the system of natural religion, which has been\ntransformed into a complicated and contentious science by its weak,\nfoolish, or deceitful adherents; in theology, the corruption of religion;\nin Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, types of untrammeled investigation. On\nthe other hand, he seeks to protect revelation from the reason whose\ncultivation he has just commended, and to keep faith and knowledge\ndistinct, while he demands that the Bible, with all the undemonstrable\nand absurd elements which it contains, be accepted on its own authority.\nReligion is an instrument indispensable to the government for keeping the\npeople in subjection. Only the fear of a higher power, not the reason,\nholds the masses in check; and the freethinkers do wrong in taking a bit\nout of the mouth of the sensual multitude, when it were better to add to\nthose already there.\n\nAs Hume, the skeptic, leads empiricism to its fall, so Hume, the\nphilosopher of religion (see below), leads deism toward dissolution. Among\nthose who defended revealed Christianity against the deistical attacks we\nmay mention the names of Conybeare (1732) and Joseph Butler (1736). The\nformer argues from the imperfection and mutability of our reason to like\ncharacteristics in natural religion. Butler (cf. p. 206) does not admit\nthat natural and revealed religion are mutually exclusive. Christian\nrevelation lends a higher authority to natural religion, in which she finds\nher foundation, and adapts it to the given relations and needs of mankind,\nadding, however, to the rational law of virtue new duties toward God the\nSon and God the Holy Ghost. It is evident that in order to be able to deal\nwith their opponents, the apologetes are forced to accommodate themselves\nto the deistic principle of a rational criticism of revelation.\n\nNotwithstanding the fear which this principle inspired in the men of the\ntime, it soon penetrated the thought even of its opponents, and found\nits way into the popular mind through the channels of the Illumination.\n\nAlthough it was often defended and applied with violence and with a\nsuperfluous hatred of the clergy, it forms the justifiable element in the\nendeavors of the deists. It is a commonplace to-day that everything which\nclaims to be true and valid must justify itself before the criticism of\nreason; but then this principle, together with the distinction between\nnatural and positive religion based upon it, exerted an enlightening and\nliberating influence. The real flaw in the deistical theory, which was\nscarcely felt as such, even by its opponents, was its lack of religious\nfeeling and all historical sense, a lack which rendered the idea acceptable\nthat religions could be \"made,\" and priestly falsehoods become world-moving\nforces. Hume was the first to seek to rise above this unspeakable\nshallowness. There was a remarkable conflict between the ascription to\nman, on the one hand, of an assured treasure of religious knowledge in\nthe reason, and the abandonment of him, on the other, to the juggling of\ncunning priests and despots. Thus the deists had no sense either for the\npeculiarities of an inward religious feeling, which, in happy prescience,\nrises above the earthly circle of moral duties to the world beyond, or for\nthe involuntary, historically necessary origin and growth of the particular\nforms of religion. Here, again, we find that turning away from will and\nfeeling to thought, from history to nature, from the oppressive complexity\nof that which has been developed to the simplicity of that which is\noriginal, which we have noted as one of the most prominent characteristics\nof the modern period.\n\n\n%3. Moral Philosophy.%\n\nThe watchword of deism was \"independence in religion\"; that of modern\nethical philosophy is \"independence in morals.\" Hobbes had given this out\nin opposition to the mediaeval dependence of ethics on theology; now it was\nturned against himself, for he had delivered morality from ecclesiastical\nbondage only to subject it to the no less oppressive and unworthy yoke of\nthe civil power. Selfish consideration, so he had taught, leads men to\ntransfer by contract all power to the ruler. Right is that which the\nsovereign enjoins, wrong that which he forbids. Thus morality was conceived\nin a purely negative way as justice, and based on interest and agreement.\nCumberland, recognizing the one-sidedness of the first of these positions,\nannounces the principle of universal benevolence, at which Bacon had hinted\nbefore him, and in which he is followed by the school of Shaftesbury.\nOpposition to the foundation of ethics on self-love and convention, again,\nsprings up in three forms, one idealistic, one logical, and one aesthetic.\nEthical ideas have not arisen artificially through shrewd calculation and\nagreement, but have a natural origin. Cudworth, returning to Plato and\nDescartes, assumes an innate idea of the good. Clarke and Woolston base\nmoral distinctions on the rational order of things, and characterize\nthe ethically good action as a logical truth translated into practice.\nShaftesbury derives ethical ideas and actions from a natural instinct for\njudging the good and the beautiful. Moreover, Hobbes's ethics of interest\nexperiences, first, correction at the hands of Locke (who, along with a\ncomplete recognition of the \"legal\" character of the good, distinguishes\nthe sphere of morality from that of mere law, and brings it under the\nlaw of \"reputation,\" hence of a \"tacit\" agreement), and then a frivolous\nintensification under Mandeville and Bolingbroke. A preliminary conclusion\nis reached in the ethical labors of Hume and Smith.\n\nRichard Cumberland _(De Legibus Naturae_, 1672) turns to experience with\nthe questions, In what does morality consist? Whence does it arise? and\nWhat is the nature of moral obligation? and finds these answers: Those\nactions are good, or in conformity to the moral law of nature, which\npromote the common good _(commune bonum summa lex)_. Individual welfare\nmust be subordinated to the good of all, of which it forms only a part. The\npsychological roots of virtuous action are the social and disinterested\naffections, which nature has implanted in all beings, especially in those\nendowed with reason. There is nothing in man more pleasing to God than\nlove. We recognize our obligation to the virtue of benevolence, or that God\ncommands it, from the rewards and punishments which we perceive to follow\nthe fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the law,--the subordination of\nindividual to universal good is the only means of attaining true happiness\nand contentment. Men are dependent on mutual benevolence. He who labors\nfor the good of the whole system of rational beings furthers thereby the\nwelfare of the individual parts, among whom he himself is one; individual\nhappiness cannot be separated from general happiness. All duties are\nimplied in the supreme one: Give to others, and preserve thyself. This\nprinciple of benevolence, advanced by Cumberland with homely simplicity,\nreceived in the later development of English ethics, for which it pointed\nout the way, a more careful foundation.\n\nThe series of emancipations of morality begins with the Intellectual System\nof Ralph Cud worth _(The Intellectual System of the Universe_, 1678; _A\nTreatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality_, 1731). Ethical ideas\ncome neither from experience nor from civil legislation nor from the will\nof God, but are necessary ideas in the divine and the human reason. Because\nof their simplicity, universality, and immutability, it is impossible for\nthem to arise from experience, which never yields anything but that which\nis particular and mutable. It is just as impossible that they should spring\nfrom political constitutions, which have a temporal origin, which are\ntransitory, and which differ from one another. For if obedience to positive\nlaw is right and disobedience wrong, then moral distinctions must have\nexisted before the law; if, on the other hand, obedience to the civil law\nis morally indifferent, then more than ever is it impossible that this\nshould be the basis of the moral distinctions in question. A law can bind\nus only in virtue of that which is necessarily, absolutely, or _per se_\nright; therefore the good is independent, also, of the will of God. The\nabsolutely good is an eternal truth which God does not create by an act of\nhis will, but which he finds present in his reason, and which, like the\nother ideas, he impresses on created spirits. On the _a priori_ ideas\ndepends the possibility of science, for knowledge is the perception of\nnecessary truth.\n\nIn agreement with Cudworth that the moral law is dependent neither on human\ncompact nor on the divine will, Samuel Clarke (died 1729) finds the eternal\nprinciples of justice, goodness, and truth, which God observes in his\ngovernment of the universe, and which should also be the guide of human\naction, embodied in the nature of things or in their properties, powers,\nand relations, in virtue of which certain things, relations, and modes\nof action are suited to one another, and others not. Morality is the\nsubjective conformity of conduct to this objective fitness of things; the\ngood is the fitting. Moral rules, to which we are bound by conscience and\nby rational insight, are valid independently of the command of God and of\nall hope or fear in reference to the life to come, although the principles\nof religion furnish them an effective support, and one which is almost\nindispensable in view of the weakness of human nature. They are not\nuniversally observed, indeed, but universally acknowledged; even the\nvicious man cannot refrain from praising virtue in others. He who is\ninduced by the voice of passion to act contrary to the eternal relations\nor harmony of things, contradicts his own reason in thus undertaking to\ndisturb the order of the universe; he commits the absurdity of willing that\nthings should be that which they are not. Injustice is in practice that\nwhich falsity and contradiction are in theoretical affairs. In his\nwell-known controversy with Leibnitz, Clarke defends the freedom of the\nwill against the determinism of the German philosopher.\n\nIn William Wollaston (died 1724), with whom the logical point of view\nbecomes still more apparent, Clarke found a thinker who shared his\nconvictions that the subjective moral principle of interest was\ninsufficient, and, hence, an objective principle to be sought; that\nmorality consists in the suitableness of the action to the nature and\ndestination of the object, and that, in the last analysis, it is coincident\nwith truth. The highest destination of man is, on the one hand, to know the\ntruth, and, on the other, to express it in actions. That act is good whose\nexecution includes the affirmation (and its omission the negation) of a\ntruth. According to the law of nature, a rational being ought so to conduct\nhimself that he shall never contradict a truth by his actions, _i. e_., to\ntreat each thing for what it is. Every immoral action is a false judgment;\nthe violation of a contract is a practical denial of it. The man who is\ncruel to animals declares by his act that the creature maltreated is\nsomething which in fact it is not, a being devoid of feeling. The murderer\nacts as though he were able to restore life to his victim. He who, in\ndisobedience toward God, deals with things in a way contrary to their\nnature, behaves as though he were mightier than the author of nature. To\nthis equation of truth and morality happiness is added as a third identical\nmember. The truer the pleasures of a being the happier it is; and a\npleasure is untrue whenever more (of pain) is given for it than it is\nworth. A rational being contradicts itself when it pursues an irrational\npleasure.--The course of moral philosophy has passed over the logical\nethics of Clarke and Wollaston as an abstract and unfruitful idiosyncrasy,\nand it is certain that with both of these thinkers their plans were greater\nthan their performances. But the search for an ethical norm which should\nbe universally valid and superior to the individual will, did not lack\njustification in contrast to the subjectivism of the other two schools of\nthe time--the school of interest and the school of benevolence, which made\nvirtue a matter of calculation or of feeling.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe English ethics of the period culminates in Shaftesbury (1671-1713),\nwho, reared on the principles of his grandfather's friend Locke, formed\nhis artistic sense on the models of classical antiquity, to recall to the\nmemory of his age the Greek ideal of a beautiful humanity. Philosophy,\nas the knowledge of ourselves and that which is truly good, a guide to\nmorality and happiness; the world and virtue, a harmony; the good, the\nbeautiful as well; the whole, a controlling force in the particular--these\nviews, and his tasteful style of exposition, make Shaftesbury a modern\nGreek; it is only his bitterness against Christianity which betrays the\nson of the new era. Among the studies collected under the title\n_Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times_, 1711, the most\nimportant are those on Enthusiasm, on Wit and Humor, on Virtue and Merit,\nand the Moralists.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Georg v. Gizycki has written on Shaftesbury's philosophy,\n1876. [Cf. Fowler's _Shaftesbury and Hutchison_, English Philosophers\nSeries, 1882.--TR.]]\n\nShaftesbury's fundamental metaphysical concept is aesthetic: unity in\nvariety is for him the all-pervasive law of the world. In every case where\nparts work in mutual dependence toward a common result, there rules a\ncentral unity, uniting and animating the members. The lowest of these\nsubstantial unities is the ego, the common source of our thoughts and\nfeelings. But as the parts of the organism are governed and held together\nby the soul, so individuals are joined with one another into species and\ngenera by higher unities. Each individual being is a member in a system of\ncreatures, which a common nature binds together. Moreover, since order and\nharmony are spread throughout the world, and no one thing exists out of\nrelation to all others and to the whole, the universe must be conceived\nas animated by a formative power which works purposively; this all-ruling\nunity is the soul of the world, the universal mind, the Deity. The finality\nand beauty of those parts of the world which we can know justifies the\ninference to a like constitution of those which are unapproachable, so that\nwe may be certain that the numerous evils which we find in the details,\nwork for the good of a system superior to them, and that all apparent\nimperfections contribute to the perfection of the whole. As our philosopher\nmakes use of the idea of the world-harmony to support theism and the\ntheodicy, so, further, he derives the content of morality from it, thus\ngiving ethics a natural basis independent of self-interest and conventional\nfancies.\n\nA being is good when its impulses toward the preservation and welfare of\nthe species is strong, and those directed to its own good not too strong.\nThe virtue of a rational being is distinguished from the goodness of\na merely \"sensible creature\" by the fact that man not only possesses\nimpulses, but reflects upon them, that he approves or disapproves his own\nconduct and that of others, and thus makes his affections the object of a\nhigher, reflective, judging affection. This faculty of moral distinctions,\nthe sense for right and wrong, or, which amounts to the same thing, for\nbeauty and ugliness, is innate; we approve virtue and condemn vice by\nnature, not as the result of a compact, and from this natural feeling for\ngood and evil exercise develops a cultivated moral taste or tact. And when,\nfurther, the reason, by means of this faculty of judgment, gains control\nover the passions, man becomes an ethical artist, a moral virtuoso.\n\nVirtue pleases by its own worth and beauty, not because of any external\nadvantage. We must not corrupt the love of the good for its own sake by\nmixing with it the hope of future reward, which at the best is admissible\nonly as a counter-weight against evil passions. When Shaftesbury speaks of\nfuture bliss, his highest conception of the heavenly life is uninterrupted\nfriendship, magnanimity, and nobility, as a continual rewarding of virtue\nby new virtue.\n\nThe good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the harmonious, the\nsymmetrical; hence the essence of virtue consists in the balance of the\naffections and passions. Of the three classes into which Shaftesbury\ndivides the passions, one, including the \"unnatural\" or unsocial\naffections, as malevolence, envy, and cruelty, which aim neither at the\ngood of the individual nor that of others, is always and entirely evil.\n\nThe two other classes, the social (or \"natural\") affections and the\n\"self-affections,\" may be virtuous or vicious, according to their degree,\n_i. e_., according to the relation of their strength to that of the other\naffections. In itself a benevolent impulse is never too strong; it\ncan become so only in comparison with self-love, or in respect to the\nconstitution of the individual in question, and conversely. Commonly the\nsocial impulses do not attain the normal standard, while the selfish exceed\nit; but the opposite case also occurs. Excessive parental tenderness, the\npity which enervates and makes useless for aid, religious zeal for making\nconverts, passionate partisanship, are examples of too violent social\naffections which interfere with the activity of the other inclinations.\nJust as erroneous, on the other side, is the neglect of one's own good.\nFor although the possession of selfish inclinations does not make a\nman virtuous, yet the lack of them is a moral defect, since they are\nindispensable to the general good. No one can be useful to others who\ndoes not keep himself in a condition for service. The impulse to care for\nprivate welfare is good and necessary in so far as it comports with the\ngeneral welfare or contributes to this. The due proportion between the\nsocial passions, which constitute the direct source of good, and those of\nself-love, consists in subordinating the latter to the former. The kinship\nof this ethics of harmony with the ethical views of antiquity is evident.\nIt is completed by the eudemonistic conclusion of the system.\n\nAs the harmony of impulses constitutes the essence of virtue, so also it is\nthe way to true happiness. Experience shows that unsocial, unsympathetic,\nvicious men are miserable; that love to society is the richest source\nof happiness; that even pity for the suffering of others occasions more\npleasure than pain. Virtue secures us the love and respect of others,\nsecures us, above all, the approval of our own conscience, and true\nhappiness consists in satisfaction with ourselves. The search after this\npure, constant, spiritual pleasure in the good, which is never accompanied\nby satiety and disgust, should not be called self-seeking; he alone takes\npleasure in the good who is already good himself.\n\nShaftesbury is not well disposed toward positive Christianity, holding that\nit has made virtue mercenary by its promises of heavenly rewards, removed\nmoral questions entirely out of this world into the world to come, and\ntaught men most piously to torment one another out of pure supernatural\nbrotherly love. In opposition to such transcendental positions Shaftesbury,\na priest of the modern view of the world, gives virtue a home on earth,\nseeks the hand of Providence in the present world, and teaches men to reach\nfaith in God by inspiring contemplation of the well-ordered universe.\nVirtue without piety is possible, indeed, though not complete. But morality\nis first and fixed, hence it is the condition and the criterion of genuine\nreligion. Revelation does not need to fear free rational criticism, for the\nScriptures are accredited by their contents. Besides reason, banter is\nwith Shaftesbury a second means for distinguishing the genuine from the\nspurious: ridicule is the test of truth, and wit and humor the only\ncure for enthusiasm. With these he scourges the over-pious as religious\nparasites, who for safety's sake prefer to believe too much rather than too\nlittle.\n\nBefore Shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense and the disinterested\naffections had gained adherents and developers, the danger, which indeed\nhad not always been escaped, that man might content himself with the\nsatisfaction of possessing noble impulses, without taking much care\nto realize them in useful actions, called forth by way of reaction, a\nparadoxical attempt at an apology for vice. Mandeville, a London physician\nof French extraction, and born in Holland, had aroused attention by his\npoem, _The Grumbling Hive; or Knaves Turned Honest_, 1706, and in response\nto vehement attacks upon his work, had added a commentary to the second\nedition, _The Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices Public Benefits_, 1714.\nThe moral of the fable is that the welfare of a society depends on the\nindustry of its members, and this, in turn, on their passions and vices.\nGreed, extravagance, envy, ambition, and rivalry are the roots of\nthe acquisitive impulse, and contribute more to the public good than\nbenevolence and the control of desire. Virtue is good for the individual,\nit is true, since it makes him contented with himself and acceptable to God\nand man, but great states require stronger motives to labor and industry\nin order to be prosperous. A people among whom frugality, self-denial, and\nquietness of spirit were the rule would remain poor and ignorant. Besides\nholding that virtue furthers the happiness of society, Shaftesbury makes a\nsecond mistake in assuming that human nature includes unselfish\ninclinations. It is not innate love and goodness that make us social, but\nour passions and weaknesses (above all, fear); man is by nature\nself-seeking. All actions, including the so-called virtues, spring from\nvanity and egoism; thus it has always been, thus it is in every grade of\nsociety. In social life, indeed, we dare not display all these desires\nopenly, nor satisfy them at will. Shrewd lawgivers have taught men to\nconceal their natural passions and to limit them by artificial ones,\npersuading them that renunciation is true happiness, on the ground that\nthrough it we attain the supreme good--reputation among, and the esteem of\nour fellows. Since then honor and shame have become the strongest motives\nand have incited men to that which is called virtue, _i.e._, to actions\nwhich apparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations for the good\nof society, while they are really done out of pride and self-love. By\nconstantly feigning noble sentiments before others man comes, finally, to\ndeceive himself, believing himself a being whose happiness consists in the\nrenunciation of self and all that is earthly, and in the thought of his\nmoral excellence.--The crass assumptions in Mandeville's reasoning are\nevident at a glance. After analyzing virtue into the suppression of desire,\nafter labeling the impulse after moral approbation vanity, lawful self-love\negoism, and rational acquisitiveness avarice, it was easy for him to prove\nthat it is vice which makes the individual industrious and the state\nprosperous, that virtue is seldom found, and that if it were universal it\nwould become injurious to society.\n\nWith different shading and with less one-sidedness, Bolingbroke (cf.\np. 193) defended the standpoint of naturalism. God has created us for\nhappiness in common; we are destined to assist one another. Happiness is\nattainable in society alone, and society cannot exist without justice and\nbenevolence. He who exercises virtue, _i.e._, promotes the good of the\nspecies, promotes at the same time his own good. All actions spring from\nself-love, which, guided at first by an immediate instinct, and later, by\nreason developed through experience, extends itself over ever widening\nspheres. We love ourselves in our relatives, in our friends, further still,\nin our country, finally, in humanity, so that self-love and social love\ncoincide, and we are impelled to virtue by the combined motives of interest\nand duty. This is an ethic of common sense from the standpoint of the\ncultured man of the world--which at the proper time has the right, no\ndoubt, to gain itself a hearing.\n\nMeanwhile Shaftesbury's ideas had impressed Hutcheson and Butler, according\nto the peculiarities of each. Both of these writers deem it necessary to\nexplain and correct the distinction between the selfish and the benevolent\naffections by additions, which were of influence on the ethics of Hume;\nboth devote their zeal to the new doctrine of feelings of reflection or\nmoral taste, in which the former gives more prominence to the aesthetic,\nmerely judging factor, the latter to the active or mandatory one.\n\nFrancis Hutcheson[1] (died 1747), professor at Glasgow, in his posthumous\n_System of Moral Philosophy_, 1755, which had been preceded by an _Inquiry\nconcerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue_, 1725, pursues\nthe double aim of showing against Hobbes and Locke the originality and\ndisinterestedness both of benevolence and of moral approval. Virtue is not\nexercised because it brings advantage to the agent, nor approved on account\nof advantage to the observer.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Fowler's treatise, cited above--TR.]\n\n(1) The benevolent affections are entirely independent of self-love and\nregard for the rewards of God and of man, nay, independent even of the\nlofty satisfaction afforded by self-approbation. This last, indeed, is\nvouchsafed to us only when we seek the good of others without personal\naims: the joy of inward approval is the result of virtue, not the motive to\nit. If love were in reality a concealed egoism, it would yield to control\nin cases where it promises advantage, which, as experience shows, is not\nthe fact. Benevolence is entirely natural and as universal in the moral\nworld as gravitation in the corporeal; and like gravitation further in\nthat its intensity increases with propinquity--the nearer the persons, the\ngreater the love. Benevolence is more widespread than malevolence; even\nthe criminal does more innocent and kind acts in his life than criminal\nones--the rarity of the latter is the reason why so much is said about\nthem.\n\n(2) Moral judgment is also entirely uninfluenced by consideration of the\nadvantageous or disadvantageous results for the agent or the spectator. The\nbeauty of a good deed arouses immediate satisfaction. Through the moral\nsense we feel pleasure at observing a virtuous action, and aversion when we\nperceive an ignoble one, feelings which are independent of all thought of\nthe rewards and punishments promised by God, as well as of the utility or\nharm for ourselves. Hutcheson argues a complete distinction between moral\napproval and the perception of the agreeable and the useful, from the facts\nthat we judge a benevolent action which is forced, or done from motives of\npersonal advantage, quite differently from one inspired by love; that we\npay esteem to high-minded characters whether their fortunes be good or\nill; and that we are moved with equal force by fictitious actions, as, for\ninstance, on the stage, and by those which really take place.\n\n(3) A few further particulars may be emphasized from the comprehensive\nsystematization which Hutcheson industriously and thoughtfully gave to\nShaftesbury's ideas. Two points reveal the forerunner of Hume. First, the\nr\u00f4le assigned to the reason in moral affairs is merely subsidiary. Our\nmotive to action is never the knowledge of a true proposition, but always\nsimply a wish, affection, or impulse. Ultimate ends are given by the\nfeelings alone; the reason can only discover the means thereto. Secondly,\nthe turbulent, blind, rapidly passing passions are distinguished from the\ncalm, permanent affections, which are mediated by cognition. The latter are\nthe nobler; among them, in turn, the highest place is occupied by those\nconducive to the general good, whose worth is still further determined\nby the extent of their objects. From this is derived the law that a kind\naffection receives the more lively approval, the more calm and deliberate\nit is, the higher the degree of happiness experienced by the object of the\naction, and the greater the number of persons affected by it. Patriotism\nand love of mankind in general are higher virtues than affection for\nfriends and children. As the goal of the self-regarding affections,\nperfection makes its appearance--for the first time in English ethics--by\nthe side of happiness.\n\nJoseph Butler[1] (1692-1752; _Sermons on Human Nature_, 1726; cf. p. 194)\nmaintains still more strictly than Hutcheson the immediateness both of the\naffections and the moral estimation of them. He declares that even the\nself-regarding impulses as such are un-egoistic, and makes moral judgment\nleave out of view all consequences, either foreseen or present, whereas his\npredecessor had resolved the goodness of the action into its advantageous\neffects (not for the agent and the spectator, but for its object and) for\nsociety. The conscience--so Butler terms the moral sense--directly approves\nor disapproves characters and actions in themselves, no matter what good or\nill they occasion in the world. We judge a mode of action good, not because\nit is useful to society, but because it corresponds to the demands of the\nconscience. This must be unconditionally obeyed, whatever be the issue. We\nmust not act contrary to truth and justice, even if it should seem to bring\nabout more happiness than misery.--Butler, too, furnishes material for the\nethics of Hume, by his revival of the separation, previously defended by\nthe Stoics, of desire and passion from self-love or interest. Self-love\ndesires a thing because it expects pleasure from it, but the natural\nimpulses impel us toward their objects immediately, _i. e_., without a\nrepresentation of the pleasure to be gained; and repetition is necessary\nbefore the artificial motive of egoistic pleasure-seeking can be added to\nthe natural motive of inborn desire. Self-love always presupposes original,\nimmediate affections.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Collins's _Butler_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.\n1881.--TR.]\n\nThe English moral science of the century is brought to a conclusion by Adam\nSmith[1] (1723-90), the celebrated founder of political economy.[2] Smith\nnot only takes into consideration--like his greater friend, Hume--all the\nproblems proposed by his predecessors, but, further (in his _Theory of\nMoral Sentiments_, 1759, published while he was professor at Glasgow),\ncombines the various attempts at their solution, not by eclectic\nco-ordination but by working them over for himself, and arranges them on a\nuniform principle, thus accomplishing a work which has not yet received\ndue recognition beyond the limits of his native land. He reached this\ncomprehensive moral principle by recognizing the full bearing of a thought\nwhich Hume had incidentally expressed, that moral judgment depends on\nparticipation in the feelings of the agent, and by following out with fine\npsychological observation this sympathy of men into its first and last\nmanifestations. In this way a twofold kind of morality was revealed to him:\nmere propriety of behavior and real merit in action. On the one hand, that\nis, the sympathy of the spectator--as Hume has one-sidedly emphasized--is\ndirected to the utility of the consequences (or to the \"merit\") of the\naction, and, on the other, to the fitness of the motives (or their\n\"propriety\"). An action is proper when the impartial spectator is able to\nsympathize with its motive, and meritorious if he can sympathize also with\nits end or effect; _i.e._, if, in the first case, the feelings are suitable\nto their objects (neither too strong nor too weak), and, in the second\ncase, the consequences of the act are advantageous to others. Merit =\npropriety + utility. The main conclusion is this: Sympathy is that by\nmeans of which virtue is recognized and approved, as well as that which is\napproved as virtue; it is _ratio cognoscendi_ as well as _ratio essendi_,\nthe criterion as well as the source of morality. Thus Smith endeavors to\nsolve the two principal problems of English ethics--the criterion and the\norigin of virtue--with a common answer.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Farrer's _Adam Smith_, English Philosophers Series,\n1880.--TR.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The epoch-making work, with which he called economic science\ninto existence, _The Wealth of Nations_\\ appeared in 1776. Cf. Wilhelm\nHassbach, _Untersuchungen \u00fcber Adam Smith_, Leipsic, 1891.]\n\n\"Sympathy\" denotes primarily nothing more than the innate and purely formal\npower of imitating to a certain degree the feelings of others. From this\nmodest germ is developed by a progressive growth the wide-spreading tree of\nmorality: moral judgment, the moral imperative with its religious sanction,\nand ethical character. Accordingly we may distinguish different stages\nin the development of sympathy--the psychological stage of mere\nfellow-feeling, the aesthetic stage of moral appreciation, the imperative\nstage of moral precepts, which further on are construed as commands of\nGod (the famous Kantian definition of religion was announced in Glasgow\na generation earlier than in K\u00f6nigsberg), finally, the concluding stage\nwherein these laws of duty are taken up into the disposition. Besides\nthese, there results from the mechanism of the sympathetic feelings a\nseries of phenomena, which, although they do not entirely conform to the\nethical standard, yet exercise a salutary effect on the permanence of\nsociety; _e.g._, our exceptional judgment of the deeds of the great, the\nrich, and the fortunate, as also the higher worth ascribed to good (and,\nconversely, the greater guilt to bad) intentions when successfully carried\nout into action, in comparison with those which fall short of their result.\n\nThe first, the purely psychological stage, includes three cases. The\nspectator sympathizes (1) with the feelings of the agent; (2) with the\ngratitude or anger of the person affected by the action; (3) the person\nobserved sympathizes in return with the imitative and judging feelings of\nthe spectator.\n\nThe fundamental laws of sympathy are as follows: We are roused to imitate\nthe feeling of another by the perception either of its signs (its natural\nconsequences or its natural expression in visible and audible motions), or\nof its causes (the circumstances and experiences which occasion it), the\nlatter exercising a more potent influence than the former. The wooden leg\nof the beggar is more effective in exciting our pity than his anxious air;\nthe sight of dental instruments is more eloquent than the plaints of\nthe sufferer from toothache. In order to be able to imitate vividly the\nfeelings of a person, we must know the causes of them.--The feeling of\nthe spectator is, on the average, less intense than that of the person\nobserved, so long as the latter does not control and repress his emotions\nin view of the calmness of the former. The difference of intensity between\nthe original and the sympathetic feelings differs widely with the various\nclasses of emotions. It is difficult to take part in feelings which arise\nfrom bodily conditions, but easy to share those in the production of which\nthe imagination is concerned--hence easier to share in hope and fear than\nin pleasure and pain.--We sympathize more readily with feelings which are\nagreeable to the observer, the observed, and other participants than with\nsuch as are not so; more willingly, therefore, with cheerfulness, love,\nbenevolence than with grief, hatred, malevolence. This is not only true of\ntemporary affections, but especially of those general dispositions which\ndepend on a more or less happy situation in life; we sympathize more\nvividly with the fortunes of the rich and noble, because we consider them\nhappier than the poor and lowly. Wealth and high rank are objects of\ngeneral desire chiefly because their possessor enjoys the advantage of\nknowing that whatever gives him joy or sorrow always arouses similar\nfeelings in countless other men. The root of all ambition is the wish to\nrule over the hearts of our fellows by compelling them to make our feelings\ntheir own; the central nerve of all happiness consists in seeing our own\nsensations shared by those about us and reflected back, as it were, from\nmanifold mirrors. Small annoyances often have a diverting effect on the\nspectator; great success easily excites his envy; great sorrows and minor\njoys, on the contrary, are always sure of our sympathy. Hence the morose\nman, to whom everything is an occasion of ill-humor, is nowhere welcome,\nand the man of cheerful disposition, who rejoices in each little event and\nwhose good spirits are contagious, everywhere.\n\nNot less admirable than the fine gift of observation which guides Smith in\nhis discovery of the primary manifestations and the laws of sympathy is the\nskill with which he deduces moral phenomena, from the simplest to the\nmost complex--moral judgment, the moral law, its application to one's own\nconduct, the conscience--from the interchange of sympathetic feelings. From\ninvoluntary comparison of the representative feeling of the spectator with\nits original in the person observed arises an agreeable or disagreeable\nfeeling of judgment, a judgment of value, approbating or rejecting the\nlatter. This is approving when the intensity of the original harmonizes\nwith that of the copy, disapproving when the former exceeds or fails to\nattain the latter. In the one case the emotion is judged suitable to the\nobject which causes it; in the other, too violent or too weak. It is always\na certain mean of passion which, as \"proper,\" receives approval (esteem,\nlove, or admiration). In the case of the social passions excess is more\nreadily condoned, in the case of the unsocial and selfish ones, defect;\nhence we judge the over-sensitive more leniently than the over-vengeful.\nAnger must be well-grounded and must express itself with great moderation\nto arouse in the spectator a like degree of sympathetic resentment. For\nhere the sympathy of the spectator is divided between two parties, and\nfellow-feeling with the angry one is weakened by fear for the person\nmenaced by him, whereas, in the case of kind affections, sympathy is\nincreased by doubling. While our judgment of propriety or decorum rests on\nsimple participation in the sentiments of the agent, our judgment of\nmerit and demerit is based, in addition, on sympathy with the feelings\nof gratitude or resentment experienced by the person on whom the action\nterminates. An act is meritorious if it appears to us to deserve thanks\nand reward, ill-deserving if it seems to merit resentment and punishment.\nNature has inscribed on the heart, apart from all reflection on the utility\nof punishment, an independent, immediate, and instinctive approbation of\nthe sacred law of retribution. This is the point at which a hitherto purely\ncontemplative sympathy passes over into an active impulse, which prepares\nus to support the victim of attack and insult in his defense and revenge.\n\nThis participation in the circumstances and feelings of others is a\nreciprocal phenomenon. The spectator takes pains to share the sentiments of\nthe person observed; and the latter, on his part, endeavors to reduce the\nemotions which move him to a degree which will render participation in them\npossible for the former. In these reciprocal efforts we have the beginnings\nof the two classes of virtues--the gentle, amiable virtues of sympathy\nand sensibility, and the exalted, estimable virtues of self-denial and\nself-command. Both of these conditions of mind, however, are considered\nvirtues only when they are manifested in unusual intensity: humanity is\na remarkably delicate fellow-feeling, greatness of soul a rare degree of\nself-command. (The consideration for those about one which is ethically\ndemanded is given, moreover, to a certain extent involuntarily. The man\nin trouble and the merry man alike restrain themselves in the company of\npersons who are indifferent, or in an opposite mood, while they give rein\nto their emotions when with those similarly affected. Joy is enhanced by\nsympathy, and grief mitigated.) Thus the perfection of human nature and the\ndivinely willed harmony among the feelings of men are dependent on every\nman feeling little for himself and much for others; on his holding his\nselfish inclinations in check and giving free course to his benevolent\nones. This is the injunction of Christianity as well as of nature. And\nas, on the one hand, the content of the moral law is thus deduced from\nsympathy, so, on the other, this yields the formal criterion of good:\nLook upon thy sentiments and actions in the light in which the impartial\nspectator would see them. Conscience is the spectator taken up into our own\nbreast. It remains to consider the origin of this third, imperative stage.\n\nFrom daily experience of the fact that we judge the conduct of others, and\nthey ours, and from the wish to gain their approval, arises the habit of\nsubjecting our own actions to criticism. We learn to look at ourselves\nthrough the eyes of others, we assign the spectator and judge a place in\nour own heart, we make his calm objective judgment our own, and hear the\nman within calling to us: Thou art responsible for thy acts and intentions.\nIn this way we are placed in a position to overcome two great delusions,\none of passion, which overestimates the present at the expense of the\nfuture, and one of self-love, which overestimates the individual at the\nexpense of other men; delusions from which the impartial spectator is free,\nfor the pleasure of the moment seems to him no more desirable than pleasure\nto come, and one person is just the same to him as another. Through\ncomparison of like cases in the exercise of self-examination certain rules\nor principles are formed concerning what is right and good. Reverence for\nthese general rules of living is called the sense of duty. The last step in\nthe process consists in our enhancement of the binding authority of moral\nrules by looking on them as commands of God. Here Smith adds subtle\ndiscussions of the question, in what cases actions ought to be done simply\nout of regard for these abstract maxims, and in what others we welcome the\nco-operation of a natural impulse or passion. We ought to be angry and to\npunish with reluctance, merely because reason enjoins it, but, on the other\nhand, we should be benevolent and grateful from affection; she is not a\nmodel wife who performs her duties merely from a sense of duty, and not\nfrom inclination also. Further, in all cases where the rules cannot be\nformulated with perfect exactness and definiteness (as they can in the case\nof justice), and are not absolutely valid without exception, reverence for\nthem must be assisted by a natural taste for modifying and supplementing\nthe general maxims to suit particular instances.\n\nIn this sketch of the course of Smith's moral philosophy much that is fine\nand much that is of importance has of necessity been passed over--his\nexcellent analysis of the relations of benevolence and justice, and\nnumerous descriptions of traits of character, _e. g_., his ingenious\nparallel between pride and vanity. We may briefly mention, in conclusion,\nhis observations on the irregularities of moral judgment. Prosperity and\nsuccess exert an influence on this, which, though hurtful to its purity,\nmust, on the whole, be considered advantageous to mankind. Our lenience\ntoward the defects of princes, the great, and the rich, and our over-praise\nfor their excellent qualities are, from the moral standpoint, an injustice,\nbut one which has this advantage, that it encourages ambition and industry,\nand maintains social distinctions intact, which without loyalty and respect\ntoward superiors would be broken down. For most men the road to fortune\ncoincides with the path to virtue. Again, it is a beneficent provision of\nnature that we put a higher estimate on a successfully executed act of\nbenevolence, and reward it more, than a kind intention which fails of\nexecution; that we judge and punish the purposed crime which is not carried\nout more leniently than the one which is completed; that we even ascribe\na certain degree of accountability to an unintentional act of good or\nevil--although in these cases the moralist is compelled to see an ethically\nunjustifiable corruption of the judgment by external success or failure\nbeyond the control of the agent. The first of these irregularities does\nnot allow the man of good intentions to content himself with noble desires\nmerely, but spurs him on to greater endeavors to carry them out--man\nis created for action; the second protects us from the inquisitorial\nquestioning of motives, for it is easy for the most innocent to fall under\ngrave suspicion. To this inconsistency of feeling we owe the necessary\nlegal principle that deeds only, not intentions, are punishable. God\nhas reserved for himself judgment concerning dispositions. The third\nirregularity, that he who inflicts unintentional injury is not guilty, even\nin his own eyes, but yet seems bound to make atonement and reparation,\nis useful in so far as it warns everyone to be prudent, while the\ncorresponding illusion, in virtue of which we are grateful to an\ninvoluntary benefactor--for instance, the bearer of good tidings--and\nreward him, is at least not harmful, for any reason appears sufficient for\nthe bestowal of kind intentions and actions.\n\nIt is impossible to explain in brief the relation of Smith's ethical\ntheory to his political economy. His merit in the former consists in his\ncomprehensive and characteristic combination of the results reached by his\npredecessors, and in his preparation for Kantian views, so far as this\nwas possible from the empirical standpoint of the English. His impartial\nspectator was the forerunner of the categorical imperative.\n\nEnglish ethics after Smith may, almost without exception, be termed\neclecticism. This is true of Ferguson _(Institutes of Moral Philosophy_,\n1769); of Paley (1785); of the Scottish School (Dugald Stewart, 1793).\nBentham's utilitarianism was the first to bring in a new phase.\n\n\n%4. Theory of Knowledge.%\n\n(a) %Berkeley%.--George Berkeley, a native of Ireland, Bishop of Cloyne\n(1685-1753; _An Essay toward a New Theory of Vision_, 1709; _A Treatise\nconcerning the Principles of Human Knowledge_, 1710; _Three Dialogues\nbetween Hylas and Philonous_, 1713; _Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher_,\n1732, against the freethinkers; _Works_, 1784. Fraser's edition of the\nCollected Works appeared in 1871, in four volumes),[1] is related to Locke\nas Spinoza to Descartes. He notices blemishes and contradictions allowed by\nhis predecessor to remain, and, recognizing that the difficulty is not to\nbe remedied by minor corrections and artificial hypotheses, goes back to\nthe fundamental principles, takes these more earnestly than their author,\nand, by carrying them out more strictly, arrives at a new view of the\nworld. The points in Locke's doctrines which invited a further advance were\nthe following: Locke proclaims that our knowledge extends no further\nthan our ideas, and that truth consists in the agreement of ideas among\nthemselves, not in the agreement of ideas with things. But this principle\nhad scarcely been announced before it was violated. In spite of his\nlimitation of knowledge to ideas, Locke maintains that we know (if not the\ninner constitution, yet) the qualities and powers of things without us, and\nhave a \"sensitive\" certainty of their existence. Against this, it is to be\nsaid that there are no primary qualities, that is, qualities which exist\nwithout as well as within us. Extension, motion, solidity, which are cited\nas such, are just as purely subjective states in us as color, heat, and\nsweetness. Impenetrability is nothing more than the feeling of resistance,\nan idea, therefore, which self-evidently can be nowhere else than in the\nmind experiencing it. Extension, size, distance, and motion are not even\nsensations (we see colors only, not quantitative determinations), but\nrelations which we in thinking add to the sense-qualities (secondary\nqualities), and which we are not able to represent apart from them; their\nrelativity alone would forbid us to consider them objective. And material\nsubstances, the \"support\" of qualities invented by the philosophers, are\nnot only unknown, but entirely non-existent. Abstract matter is a phrase\nwithout meaning, and individual things are collections of ideas in us,\nnothing more. If we take away all sense-qualities from a thing, absolutely\nnothing remains. Our ideas are not merely the only; objects of knowledge,\nbut also the only existing things--_nothing exists except minds and\ntheir ideas_. Spirits alone are active beings, they only are indivisible\nsubstances, and have real existence, while the being of bodies (as\ndependent, inert, variable beings, which are in a constant process of\nbecoming) consists alone in their appearance to spirits and their being\nperceived by them. Incogitative, hence passive, beings are neither\nsubstances, nor capable of producing ideas in us. Those ideas which we do\nnot ourselves produce are the effects of a spirit which is mightier than\nwe. With this a second inconsistency was removed which had been overlooked\nby Locke, who had ascribed active power to spirits alone and denied it to\nmatter, but at the same time had made the former affected by the latter. If\nexternal sense is to mean the capacity for having ideas occasioned by the\naction of external material things, then there is no external sense. A\nthird point wherein Locke had not gone far enough for his successor,\nconcerned the favorite English doctrine of nominalism. Locke, with his\npredecessors, had maintained that all reality is individual, and that\nuniversals exist only in the abstracting understanding. From this point\nBerkeley advances a step further, the last, indeed, which was possible in\nthis direction, by bringing into question the possibility even of abstract\nideas. As all beings are particular things, so all ideas are particular\nideas.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. also Fraser's _Berkeley_ (Blackwood's Philosophical\nClassics) 1881; Eraser's _Selections from Berkeley_, 4th ed., 1891; and\nKrauth's edition of the _Principles_, 1874, with notes from several\nsources, especially those translated from Ueberweg.--TR.]\n\nBerkeley looks on the refutation of these two fundamental mistakes--the\nassumption of general ideas in the mind, and the belief in the existence\nof a material world outside it--as his life work, holding them the chief\nsources of atheism, doubt, and philosophical discord. The first of these\nerrors arises from the use of language. Because we employ words which\ndenote more than one object, we have believed ourselves warranted in\nconcluding that we have ideas which correspond to the extension of the\nwords in question, and which contain only those characteristics which are\nuniformly found in all objects so named. This, however, is not the case.[1]\nWe speak of many things which we cannot represent: names do not always\nstand for ideas. The definition of the word triangle as a three-sided\nfigure bounded by straight lines, makes demands upon us which our faculties\nof imagination are never fully able to meet; for the triangle that we\nrepresent to ourselves is always either right-angled or oblique-angled, and\nnot--as we must demand from the abstract conception of the figure--both and\nneither at once. The name \"man\" includes men and women, children and the\naged, but we are never able to represent a man except as an individual of a\ndefinite age and sex. Nevertheless we are in a position to make a safe\nuse of these non-presentative but useful abbreviations, and by means of a\nparticular idea to develop truths of wider application. This takes place\nwhen, in the demonstration, those qualities are not considered which\ndistinguish the idea from others with a like name. In this case the\ngiven idea stands for all others which are known by the same name; the\nrepresentative idea is not universal, but serves as such. Thus when I have\ndemonstrated the proposition, the sum of all the angles of a triangle is\nequal to two right angles, for a given triangle, I do not need to prove\nit for every triangle thereafter. For not only the color and size of the\ntriangle are indifferent, but its other peculiarities as well; the question\nwhether it is right-angled or obtuse-angled, whether it has equal\nsides, whether it has equal or unequal angles, is not mentioned in the\ndemonstration, and has no influence upon it. _Abstracta_ exist only in this\nsense. In considering the individual Paul I can attend exclusively to those\ncharacteristics which he has in common with all men or with all living\nbeings, but it is impossible for me to represent this complex of common\nqualities apart from his individual peculiarities. Self-observation shows\nthat we have no general concepts; reason, that we can have none, for the\ncombination of opposite elements in one idea would be a contradiction in\nterms. Motion in general, neither swift nor slow, extension in general,\nat once great and small, abstract matter without sensuous\ndeterminations--these can neither exist nor be perceived.\n\n[Footnote 1: Against the Berkeleyan denial of abstract notions the popular\nphilosopher, Joh. Jak. Engel, directed an essay, _Ueber die Realit\u00e4t\nallgemeiner Begriffe_ (Engel's _Schriften_, vol. x.), to which attention\nhas been called by O. Liebmann, _Analysis tier Wirklichkeit_, 2d ed., p.\n473.]\n\nThe \"materialistic\" hypothesis--so Berkeley terms the assumption that a\nmaterial world exists apart from perceiving mind, and independently of\nbeing perceived--is, first, unnecessary, for the facts which it is to\nexplain can be explained as well, or even better, without it; and, second,\nfalse, since it is a contradiction to suppose that an object can exist\nunperceived, and that a sensation or idea is the copy of anything itself\nnot a sensation or idea. Ideas are the only objects of the understanding.\nSensible qualities (white, sweet) are subjective states of the soul; sense\nobjects (sugar), sensation-complexes. If sensations need a substantial\nsupport, this is the soul which perceives them, not an external thing which\ncan neither perceive nor be perceived. Single ideas, and those combined\ninto objects, can exist nowhere else than in the mind; the being of sense\nobjects consists in their being perceived (_esse est percipi_). I see light\nand feel heat, and combine these sensations of sight and touch into the\nsubstance fire, because I know from experience that they constantly\naccompany and suggest each other.[1] The assumption of an \"object\" apart\nfrom the idea is as useless as its existence would be. Why should God\ncreate a world of real things without the mind, when these can neither\nenter into the mind, nor (because unperceived) be copied by its ideas, nor\n(because they themselves lack perception and power) produce ideas in it?\nIdeas signify nothing but themselves, _i. e_., affections of the subject.\n\n[Footnote 1: The fire that I see is not the cause of the pain which I\nexperience in approaching it, but the visual image of the flame is only a\nsign which warns me not to go too near. If I look through a microscope\nI see a different object from the one perceived with the naked eye. Two\npersons never see the same object, they merely have like sensations.]\n\nThe further question arises, What is the origin of ideas? Men have been led\ninto this erroneous belief in the reality of the material world by the\nfact that certain ideas are not subject to our will, while others are.\nSensations are distinguished from the ideas of imagination, which we can\nexcite and alter at pleasure, by their greater strength, liveliness, and\ndistinctness, by their steadiness, regular order, and coherence, and by\nthe fact that they arise without our aid and whether we will or no. Unless\nthese ideas are self-originated they must have an external cause. This,\nhowever, can be nothing else than a willing, thinking Being; for without\nwill it could not be active and act upon me, and without ideas of its own\nit could not communicate ideas to me. Because of the manifoldness and\nregularity of our sensations the Being which produces them must, further,\npossess infinite power and intelligence. The ideas of imagination are\nproduced by ourselves, real perceptions are produced by God. The connected\nwhole of divinely produced ideas we call nature, and the constant\nregularity in their succession, the laws of nature. The invariableness of\nthe divine working and the purposive harmony of creation reveal the wisdom\nand goodness of the Almighty more clearly than \"astonishing and exceptional\nevents.\" When we hear a man speak we reason from this activity to his\nexistence. How much less are we entitled to doubt the existence of God, who\nspeaks to us in the thousandfold works of nature.\n\nThe natural or created ideas which God impresses on us are copies of\nthe eternal ideas which he himself perceives, not, indeed, by passive\nsensation, but through his creative reason. Accordingly when it was\nmaintained that things do not exist independently of perception, the\nreference was not to the individual spirit, but to all spirits. When I\nturn my eyes away from an object it continues to exist, indeed, after\nmy perception has ended--in the minds of other men and in that of the\nOmnipresent One. The pantheistic conclusion of these principles, in the\nsense of Geulincx and Malebranche,[1] which one expects, was really\nsuggested by Berkeley. Everything exists only in virtue of its\nparticipation in the one, permanent, all-comprehensive spirit; individual\nspirits are of the same nature with the universal reason, only they are\nless perfect, limited, and not pure activity, while God is passionless\nintelligence. But if, in the last analysis, God is the cause of all, this\ndoes not hold of the free actions of men, least of all of wicked ones. The\nfreedom of the will must not be rejected because of the contradictions\nwhich its acceptance involves; motion, also, and mathematical infinity\nimply incomprehensible elements. In the philosophy of nature Berkeley\nprefers the teleological to the mechanical view, since the latter is able\nto discover the laws of phenomena only, but not their efficient and\nfinal causes. Sense and experience acquaint us merely with the course\nof phenomenal effects; the reason, which opens up to us the realm of\ncausation, of the spiritual, is the only sure guide to science and truth.\nThe understanding does not feel, the senses do not know. We have no\n(sensuous) idea of other spirits, but only a notion of them; instead of\nthemselves we perceive their activities merely, from which we argue\nto souls like ourselves, while we know our own mind by immediate\nself-consciousness.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: The example of Arthur Collier shows that the same results\nwhich Berkeley reaches empirically can be obtained from the standpoint of\nrationalism. Following Malebranche, and developing further the idealistic\ntendencies of the latter, Collier had, independently of Berkeley, conceived\nthe doctrine of the \"non-existence or impossibility of an external world \";\nbut had not worked it out in his _Clavis Universalis_, 1713, until after\nthe appearance of Berkeley's chief work, and not without consideration of\nthis. The general point of view and the arguments are the same: Existence\nis equivalent to being perceived by God; the creation of a real world of\nmatter apart from the ideal world in God and from sensuous perceptions in\nus would have been a superfluous device, etc.]\n\n\n[Footnote 2: It should be remembered, however, that this immediate\nknowledge of ourselves is also \"not after the manner of an idea or\nsensation.\" Our knowledge of spirits is always mediated by \"notions\" not by\n\"ideas\" in the strict sense, that is, not by \"images.\" Cf. _Principles_,\n\u00a7\u00a7 27, 135 _seq_., especially in the second edition.--TR.]\n\nIn contrast to the fearlessness with which Berkeley propounds his\nspiritualism, his anxious endeavors to take away the appearance of paradox\nfrom his immaterialistic doctrine, and to show its complete agreement with\ncommon sense, excite surprise. Even the common man, he argues, desires\nnothing more than that his perceptions be real; the distinction between\nidea and object is an invention of philosophers. Here Berkeley cannot be\nacquitted of a certain sophistical play upon the term \"idea,\" which, in\nfact, is ambiguous. He understands by it _that which_ the soul perceives\n(its immediate, inner object), but the popular mind, _that through which_\nthe soul perceives an object. The reality of an idea in us is different\nfrom the idea of a real thing, or from the reality of that which is\nperceived without us by means of the idea, and it is just this last meaning\nwhich common sense affirms and Berkeley denies. In any case it was a work\nof great merit to have transferred the existence of objects beyond our\nideas, of things-in-themselves, out of the region of the self-evident into\nthe region of the problematical. We never get beyond the circle of our\nideas, and if we posit a thing-in-itself as the ground and object of the\nidea, this also is simply a thought, an idea. For us there is no being\nexcept that of the perceiver and the perceived. Later we shall meet two\nother forms of idealism, in Leibnitz and Fichte. Both of these agree with\nBerkeley that spiritual beings alone are active, and active beings alone\nreal, and that the being of the inactive consists in their being perceived.\nBut while in Berkeley the objective ideas are impressed upon finite spirits\nby the Infinite Spirit from without and singly, with Leibnitz they appear\nas a fullness of germs, which God implanted together in the monads at the\nbeginning, and which the individual develops into consciousness, and with\nFichte they become the unconscious productions of the Absolute Ego acting\nin the individual egos. For the two former as many worlds exist as there\nare individual spirits, their harmony being guaranteed, in the one case, by\nthe consistency of God's working, and, in the other, by his foresight. For\nFichte, on the other hand, there is but one world, for the absolute is not\noutside the individual spirits, but the uniformly working force within\nthem.\n\n(b) Hume.--David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711, and died in the same\ncity, 1776. His position as librarian, which he held in the place of\nhis birth, 1752-57, gave the opportunity for his _History of England_(\n1754-62). His chief work, the _Treatise on Human Nature_, which, however,\nfound few readers, was composed during his first residence in France in\n1734-37. Later he worked over the first book of this work into his\n_Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_ (1748); the second book into _A\nDissertation on the Passions_; and the third _into An Enquiry concerning\nthe Principles of Morals_. These, and others of his essays, found so much\nfavor that, during his second sojourn in France, as secretary to Lord\nHertford, in 1763-66, he was already honored as a philosopher of world-wide\nrenown. Then, after serving for some time as Under-Secretary of State, he\nretired to private life at home (1769).\n\nThe three books of the _Treatise on Human Nature_, which appeared in\n1739-40, are entitled _Of the Understanding, Of the Passions, Of Morals_.\nOf the five volumes of the Essays, the first contains the _Essays Moral,\nPolitical, and Literary_, 1741-42; the second, the _Enquiry concerning\nHuman Understanding_, 1748; the third, the _Enquiry concerning the\nPrinciples of Morals_, 1751; the fourth, the _Political Discourses_, 1752;\nthe fifth, 1757, the _Four Dissertations_, including that _On the Passions_\nand the _Natural History of Religion_. After Hume's death appeared the\n_Autobiography_, 1777; the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, 1779;\nand the two small essays on _Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_,\n1783.[1] The _Philosophical Works_ were published in 1827, and frequently\nafterward.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Or 1777, cf. Green and Grose's edition, vol. iii. p. 67\n_seq_.--Tr.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Among the works on Hume we may mention Jodl's prize treatise,\n1872, and Huxley's _Hume_ (English Men of Letters), 1879. [The reader may\nbe referred also to Knight's _Hume_ (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics),\n1886; to T.H. Green's \"Introductions\" in Green and Grose's edition of the\ncollected works in four volumes, 1874 (new ed. 1889-90), which is now\nstandard; and to Selby-Bigge's reprint of the original edition of the\n_Treatise_, I vol., 1888, with a valuable Analytical Index.]]\n\nHume's object, like that of Berkeley, is the improvement of Locke's\ndoctrine of knowledge. In several respects he does not go so far as\nBerkeley, in others very much farther. In agreement with Berkeley's\nultra-nominalism, which combats even the possibility of abstract ideas, he\nyet does not follow him to the extent of denying external reality. On the\nother hand, he carries out more consistently Berkeley's hint that immediate\nsensation includes less than is ascribed to it (_e.g._, that by vision\nwe perceive colors only, and not distance, etc.), as well as his\nprinciple--destructive to the certainty of our knowledge of nature--that\nthere is no causality among phenomena; and brings the question of substance\nto, the negative conclusion, that there is no need whatever for a support\nfor groups of qualities, and, therefore, that substantiality is to be\ndenied to immaterial as well as to material beings. The points in Locke's\nphilosophy which seemed to Hume to need completion were different from\nthose at which Berkeley had struck in. The antithesis of rational and\nempirical knowledge is more sharply conceived; the combination of ideas is\nnot left to the choice of the understanding but placed under the dominion\nof psychological laws; and to the distinction between outer and inner\nexperience (to the former of which priority is conceded, on the ground that\nwe must have had an external sensation before we can, through reflection,\nbe conscious of it as an internal phenomenon), there is added a second, as\nimportant as the other and crossing it, between impressions and ideas, of\nwhich the former are likewise made prior to the latter.\n\nEveryone will acknowledge the considerable difference between a sensation\nactually present (of heat, for instance) and the mere idea of one\npreviously experienced, or shortly to come. This consists in the greater\nforce, liveliness, and vividness of the former. Although these two classes\nof states (the idea of a landscape described by a poet and the perception\nof a real one, anger and the thought of anger) are only quantitatively\ndistinct, they are scarcely ever in danger of being confused--the most\nlively idea is always less so than the weakest perception. The actual,\nouter or inner, sensations may be termed impressions; the weaker images of\nmemory or imagination, which they leave behind them, ideas. Since nothing\ncan gain entrance to the soul except through the two portals of outer and\ninner experience, there is no idea which has not arisen from an impression\nor several such; every idea is the image and copy of an impression. But\nas the understanding and imagination variously combine, separate, and\ntranspose the elements furnished by the senses and lingering in memory, the\npossibility of error arises. A hidden, and, therefore more dangerous source\nof error consists in the reference of an idea to a different impression\nthan the one of which it is the copy. The concepts substance and causality\nare examples of such false reference.\n\nThe combination of ideas takes place without freedom, in a purely\nmechanical, way according to fixed rules, which in the last analysis\nreduce to three fundamental laws of association: Ideas are associated\n(1) according to their resemblance and contrast; (2) according to their\ncontiguity in space and time; (3) according to their causal connection.\nMathematics is based on the operation of the first of these laws, on\nthe immediate or mediate knowledge of the resemblance, contrariety, and\nquantitative relations of ideas; the descriptive and experimental part of\nthe sciences of nature and of man on the second; religion, metaphysics, and\nthat part of physical and moral science which goes beyond mere observation\non the third. The theory of knowledge has to determine the boundaries of\nhuman understanding and the degree of credibility to which these sciences\nare entitled.\n\nThe objects of human thought and inquiry are either relations of ideas or\nmatters of fact. To the former class belong the objects of mathematics, the\ntruths of which, since they are analytic (_i. e_., merely explicate in the\npredicate the characteristics already contained in the subject, and add\nnothing new to this), and since they concern possible relations only,\nnot reality, possess intuitive or demonstrative certainty. It is only\npropositions concerning quantity and number that are discoverable _a\npriori_ by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on real\nexistence, and that can be proved from the impossibility of their\nopposites--mathematics is the only demonstrative science.\n\nWe reach certainty in matters of fact by direct perception, or by\ninferences from other facts, when they transcend the testimony of our\nsenses and memory. These arguments from experience are of an entirely\ndifferent sort from the rational demonstrations of mathematics; as the\ncontrary of a fact is always thinkable (the proposition that the sun will\nnot rise to-morrow implies no logical contradiction), they yield, strictly\nspeaking, probability only, no matter how strong our conviction of their\naccuracy may be. Nevertheless it is advisable to separate this species of\ninferences from experience--whose certainty is not doubted except by the\nphilosophers--from uncertain probabilities, as a class intermediate between\nthe latter and demonstrative truth (demonstrations--proofs--probabilities).\nAll reasonings concerning matters of fact are based on the relation of\ncause and effect. Whence, then, do we obtain the knowledge of cause and\neffect? Not by _a priori_ thought. Pure reason is able only to analyze\nconcepts into their elements, not to connect new predicates with them. All\nits judgments are analytic, while synthetic judgments rest on experience.\nJudgments concerning causation belong in this latter class, for effects are\nentirely distinct from causes; the effect is not contained in the cause,\nnor the latter in the former. In the case of a phenomenon previously\nunknown we cannot tell from what causes it has proceeded, nor what\nits effect will be. We argue that fire will warm us, and bread afford\nnourishment, because we have often perceived these causal pairs closely\nconnected in space and time. But even experience does not vouchsafe all\nthat we desire. It shows nothing more than the coexistence and succession\nof phenomena and events; while the judgment itself, _e. g_., that the\nmotion of one body stands in causal connection with that of another,\nasserts more than mere contiguity in space and time, it affirms not merely\nthat the one precedes the other, but that it produces it--not merely that\nthe second follows the first, but that it results from it. The bond which\nconnects the two events, the force that puts forth the second from the\nfirst, the necessary connection between the two is not perceived, but added\nto perception by thought, construed into it.[1] What, then, is the occasion\nand what the warrant for transforming perceived succession in time into\ncausal succession, for substituting _must_ for _is_, for interpreting the\nobserved connection of fact into a necessary connection which always eludes\nobservation?\n\n[Footnote 1: The weakness of the concept of cause had been recognized\nbefore Hume by the skeptic, J. Glanvil (1636-80). Causality itself cannot\nbe perceived; we infer it from the constant succession of two phenomena,\nwithout being able to show warrant for the transformation of _thereafter_\ninto _thereby_.]\n\nWe do not causally connect every chance pair of successive events, but\nthose only which have been repeatedly observed together. The wonder is,\nthen, that through oft-repeated observation of certain objects we come to\nbelieve that we know something about the behavior of other like objects,\nand the further behavior of these same ones. From the fact that I have seen\na given apple fall ten times to the ground, I infer that all the apples in\nthe world do the same when loosened, instead of flying upward, which, in\nitself, is quite as thinkable; I infer further that this has always\nbeen the case, and will continue to be so to all eternity. Where is the\nintermediate link between the proposition, \"I have found that such an\nobject has always been attended with such an effect,\" and this other, \"I\nforesee that other objects which are, in appearance, similar, will be\nattended with similar effects\"? This postulate, that the future will be\nlike the past, and that like causes will have like effects, rests on a\npurely psychological basis. In virtue of the laws of association the sight\nof an object or event vividly recalls the image of a second, often observed\nin connection with the former, and leads us involuntarily to expect its\nappearance anew. The idea of causal connection is based on feeling (the\nfeeling of inner determination to pass from one idea to a second), not upon\ninsight; it is a product of the imagination, not of the understanding. From\nthe habitual perception of two events in connection (sunshine and heat)\narises the mental determination to think of the second when we perceive the\nfirst, and, anticipating the senses, to count on its appearance. It is now\npossible to state of what impression the idea of the causal nexus is the\ncopy: the impression on which it is based is the habitual transition from\nthe idea of a thing to its customary attendant. Hence the idea of causality\nhas a purely subjective significance, not the objective one which we\nascribe to it. It is impossible to determine whether there is a real\nnecessity of becoming corresponding to the felt necessity of thought.\nIn life we never doubt the fact, but for science our conviction of the\nuniformity of nature remains a merely probable (though a very highly\nprobable) conviction. Complete certainty is vouchsafed only by rational\ndemonstration and immediate experience. The necessary bond which we\npostulate between cause and effect can neither be demonstrated nor felt.\n\nIf all experiential reasonings depend on the idea of causality, and this\nhas no other support than subjective mental habit, it follows that all\nknowledge of nature which goes beyond mere observed fact is not knowledge\n(neither demonstrative knowledge nor knowledge of fact), but belief.[1] The\nprobability of our belief in the regularity of natural phenomena increases,\nindeed, with every new verification of the assumptions based thereon; but,\nas has been shown, it never rises to absolute certainty. Nevertheless\ninferences from experience are trustworthy and entirely sufficient for\npractical life, and the aim of the above skeptical deliverances was not\nto shake belief--only a fool or a lunatic can doubt in earnest the\nimmutability of nature--but only to make it clear that it is mere belief,\nand not, as hitherto held, demonstrative or factual knowledge. Our doubt\nis intended to define the boundary between knowledge and belief, and to\ndestroy that absolute confidence which is a hindrance rather than a help to\ninvestigation. We should recognize it as a wise provision of nature that\nthe regulation of our thoughts and the belief in the objective validity\nof our anticipation of future events have not been confided to the weak,\ninconstant, inert, and fallacious reason, but to a powerful instinct. In\nlife and action we are governed by this natural impulse, in spite of all\nthe scruples of the skeptical reason.\n\n[Footnote 1: Hume distinguishes belief as a form of knowledge from\nreligious faith, both in fact and in name. In the _Treatise_--the passage\nis wanting in the _Enquiry_--our conviction of the external existence of\nthe objects of perception is also ascribed to the former, which later\nformed Jacobi's point of departure. Religious faith is referred to\nrevelation.]\n\nIn Hume's earlier work his destructive critique of the idea of cause\nis accompanied by a deliverance in a similar strain on the concept of\nsubstance, which is not included in the shorter revision. Substances are\nnot perceived through impressions, but only qualities and powers. The\nunknown something which is supposed to have qualities, or in which these\nare supposed to inhere, is an unnecessary fiction of the imagination. A\npermanent similarity of attributes by no means requires a self-identical\nsupport for these. A thing is nothing more than a collection of qualities,\nto which we give a special name because they are always found together. The\nidea of substance, like the idea of cause, is founded in a subjective habit\nwhich we erroneously objectify. The impression from which it has arisen\nis our inner perception that our thought remains constant in the repeated\nexperience of the same group of qualities (whenever I see sugar, _I do the\nsame thing_, that is, I combine the qualities white color, sweet taste,\nhardness, etc., with one another), or the impression of a uniform\ncombination of ideas. The idea of substance becomes erroneous through the\nfact that we refer it not to the inner activity of representation, to which\nit rightly belongs, but to the external group of qualities, and make it\na real, permanent substratum for the latter. Mental substances disappear\nalong with material substances. The soul or mind is, in reality, nothing\nmore than the sum of our inner states, a collection of ideas which flow\non in a continuous and regular stream; it is like a stage, across which\nfeelings, perceptions, thoughts, and volitions are passing while it does\nnot itself come into sight. A permanent self or ego, as a substratum of\nideas, is not perceived; there is no invariable, permanent impression. That\nwhich leads to the assumption of personal identity is only the frequent\nrepetition of similar trains of ideas, and the gradual succession of\nour ideas, which is easily confused with constancy. Thus robbed of its\nsubstantiality, the soul has no further claims to immateriality and\nimmortality, and suicide ceases to be a crime.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. the essays on _Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_,\n1783, whose authorship by Hume, however, is not absolutely established [of.\nGreen and Grose, as above, p. 221, note first.--TR.]]\n\nIs Hume roundly to be called a skeptic? [1] He never impugned the validity\nof mathematical reasonings, nor experimental truths concerning matters of\nfact; in regard to the former his thought is rationalistic, in regard to\nthe latter it is empirical or, more accurately, sensationalistic. His\nattitude toward the empirical sciences of nature and of mind is that of a\nsemi-skeptic or probabilist, in so far as they go beyond the establishment\nof facts to the proof of connections under law and to inferences concerning\nthe future. Habit is for him a safe guide for life, although it does not go\nbeyond probabilities; absolute knowledge is unattainable for us, but\nnot indispensable. Toward metaphysics, as an alleged science of the\nsuprasensible, he takes up an entirely negative attitude. If an argument\nfrom experience is to be assured of merely that degree of probability which\nis sufficient for belief, it must not only have a well-established fact (an\nimpression or memory-image) for its starting point, but, together with its\nconclusion, it must keep within the limits of possible experience. The\nlimits of possible experience are also the limits of the knowable;\ninferences to the continued existence of the soul after death and to the\nbeing of God are vain sophistry and illusion. According to the famous\nconclusion of the _Essay_, all volumes which contain anything other than\n\"abstract reasonings concerning quantity or number\" or \"experimental\nreasonings concerning matter of fact and existence\" deserve to be committed\nto the flames. In view of this limitation of knowledge to that which is\ncapable of exact measurement and that which is present in experience, as\nwell of the principle that the elements added by thought are to be\nsharply distinguished from the positively given (the immediate facts of\nperception), we must agree with those who call Hume the father of modern\npositivism.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: In the _Essay_, Hume describes his own standpoint as mitigated\nor academical skepticism in antithesis to the Cartesian, which from doubt\nand through doubt hopes to reach the indubitable, and to the excessive\nskepticism of Pyrrhonism, which cripples the impulse to inquiry. This\nmoderate skepticism asks us only, after resisting the tendency to\nunreflecting conclusions, to make a duty of deliberation and caution in\njudging, and to restrain inquiry within those fields which are accessible\nto our knowledge, _i.e._, the fields of mathematics and empirical fact. In\nthe _Treatise_ Hume had favored a sharper skepticism and extended his doubt\nmore widely, _e.g._, even to the trustworthiness of geometry. Cf. on this\npoint Ed. Grimm, _Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems_, 1890, p, 559\n_seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: So Volkelt, _Erfahrung und Denken_, 1886, p. 105.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs a philosopher of religion Hume is the finisher and destroyer of deism.\nOf the three principles of the deists--religion, its origin and its truth\nare objects of scientific investigation; religion has its origin in the\nreason and the consciousness of duty; natural religion is the oldest, the\npositive religions are degenerate or revived forms of natural religion--he\naccepts the first, while rejecting the other two. Religion may correspond\nto reason or contradict it, but not proceed from it. Religion has its basis\nin human nature, yet not in its rational but its sensuous side; not in\nthe speculative desire for knowledge, but in practical needs; not in the\ncontemplation of nature, but in looking forward with fear or joy to the\nchanging events of human life. Anxiety and hope concerning future events\nlead us to posit unseen powers as directing our destiny, and to seek their\nfavor. The capriciousness of fortune points to a plurality of gods;\nthe tendency to conceive all things like ourselves gives them human\ncharacteristics; the powerful impression made by all that comes within the\nsphere of the senses incites us to connect the divine power with visible\nobjects; the allegorical laudation and deification of eminent men leads to\na completed polytheism. That this and not (mono-) theism was the original\nform of religion, Hume assumes to be a fact for historical times, and a\nwell-founded conjecture for prehistoric ages. Those who hold that humanity\nbegan with a perfect religion find it difficult to explain the obscuration\nof the truth, endow immature ages with a developed use of the reason which\nthey can scarcely have possessed, make error grow worse with increasing\nculture, and contradict the historical progress upward which is everywhere\nelse observed. The philosophical knowledge of God is a very late product of\nmature reflection; even monotheism, as a popular religion, did not arise\nfrom rational reflection, although its chief principle is in agreement\nwith the results of philosophy, but from the same irrational motives\nas polytheism. Its origin from polytheism is accomplished by the\ntransformation of the leading god (the king of the gods or the tutelary\ndeity of the nation) through the fear and emulous flattery of his votaries\ninto the one, infinite, spiritual ruler of the world. Amid the folly of the\nsuperstitious herd, however, this refined idea is not long preserved in its\npurity; the more exalted the conception entertained of the supreme deity,\nthe more imperatively the need makes itself felt for the interpolation\nbetween this being and mankind of mediators and demi-gods, partaking more\nof the human nature of the worshipers and more familiar to them. Later\na new purification takes place, so that the history of religion shows a\ncontinuous alternation of the lower and higher forms.\n\nAfter depriving theism of its prerogative of originality, Hume further\ntakes away from it its fame as in every respect the best religion. It is\ndisadvantageously distinguished from polytheism by the fact that it is more\nintolerant, makes its followers pusillanimous, and, by its incomprehensible\ndogmas, puts their faith to severer tests; while it is on a level with\npolytheism in that most of its adherents exalt belief in foolish mysteries,\nfanaticism, and the observance of useless customs above the practice of\nvirtue.\n\nThe _Natural History of Religion_, which far outbids the conclusions of\nthe deists by its endeavors to explain religion, not on rational, but on\nhistorical and psychological grounds, and to separate it entirely\nfrom knowledge by relegating it to the sphere of practice, leaves the\npossibility of a philosophical knowledge of God an open question. The\n_Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_ greatly diminish this hope.\nThe most cogent argument for the intelligence of the world-ground, the\nteleological argument, is a hypothesis which has grave weaknesses, and one\nto which many other equally probable hypotheses may be opposed. The finite\nworld, with its defects and abounding misery amid all its order and\nadaptation, can never yield an inference to an infinite, perfect\nunit-cause, to an all-powerful, all-wise, and benevolent deity. To this\nthe eleventh section of the _Enquiry_ adds the argument, that it is\ninadmissible to ascribe to the inferred cause other properties than those\nwhich are necessary to explain the observed effect. The tenth section of\nthe same _Essay_ argues that there is no miracle supported by a sufficient\nnumber of witnesses credible because of their intelligence and honesty, and\nfree from a preponderance of contradictory experiences and testimony of\ngreater probability. In short, the reason is neither capable of reaching\nthe existence of God by well-grounded inference nor of comprehending the\ntruth of the Christian religion with its accompanying miracles. That which\ntranscends experience cannot be proven and known, but only believed in.\nWhoever is moved by faith to give assent to things which contradict all\ncustom and experience, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own\nperson.\n\nHume never denied the existence of God, never directly impugned revelation.\nHis final word is doubt and uncertainty. It is certain that his counsel not\nto follow the leadership of the reason in religious matters, but to submit\nourselves to the power of instinct and common opinion, was less earnest and\nless in harmony with the nature of the philosopher than his other advice,\nto take refuge from the strife of the various forms of superstition in the\nmore quiet, though dimmer regions of--naturally, the skeptical--philosophy.\nHume's originality and greatness in this field consist in his genetic view\nof the historical religions. They are for him errors, but natural ones,\ngrounded in the nature of man, \"sick men's dreams,\" whose origin and course\nhe searches out with frightful cold-bloodedness, with the dispassionate\ninterest of the dissector.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn his moral philosophy[1] Hume shows himself the empiricist only, not the\nskeptic. The laws of human nature are capable of just as exact empirical\ninvestigation as those of external nature; observation and analysis promise\neven more brilliant success in this most important, and yet hitherto so\nbadly neglected, branch of science than in physics. As knowledge and\nopinion have been found reducible to the associative play of ideas, and the\nstore of ideas, again, to original impressions and shown derivable from\nthese; so man's volition and action present themselves as results of the\nmechanical working of the passions, which, in turn, point further back to\nmore primitive principles. The ultimate motives of all action are pleasure\nand pain, to which we owe our ideas of good and evil. The direct passions,\ndesire and aversion, joy and sorrow, hope and fear, are the immediate\neffects of these original elements. From the direct arise in certain\ncircumstances the indirect passions, pride and humility, love and hatred\n(together with respect and contempt); the first two, if the objects which\nexcite feeling are immediately connected with ourselves, the latter, when\npleasure and pain are aroused by the accomplishments or the defects of\nothers. While love and hate are always conjoined with a readiness\nfor action, with benevolence or anger, pride and humility are pure,\nself-centered, inactive emotions.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. G. von Gizycki, _Die Ethik David Humes_, 1878.]\n\nAll moral phenomena, will, moral judgment, conscience, virtue, are not\nsimple and original data, but of a composite or derivative nature. They are\nwithout exception products of the regular interaction of the passions. With\nsuch views there can be, of course, no question of a freedom of the will.\nIf anyone objects to determinism, that virtues and vices, if they are\ninvoluntary and necessary, are not praise-or blame-worthy, he is to be\nreferred to the applause paid to beauty and talent, which are considered\nmeritorious, although they are not dependent upon our choice. The legal\nattitude of theology and law first caused all desert to be based upon\nfreedom, whereas the ancient philosophers spoke unhesitatingly of\nintellectual virtues.\n\nHume does not, like nearly all his predecessors and contemporaries, find\nthe determining grounds of volition in ideas, but in the feelings. After\ncurtailing the rights of the reason in the theoretical field in favor of\ncustom and instinct, he dispossesses her also in the sphere of practice.\nImpassive reason, judging only of truth and falsehood, is an inactive\nfaculty, which of itself can never inspire us with inclination and desire\ntoward an object, can never itself become a motive. It is only capable\nof influencing the will indirectly, through the aid of some affection.\nAbstract relations of ideas, and facts as well, leave us entirely\nindifferent so long as they fail to acquire an emotional value through\ntheir relation to our state of mind. When we speak of a victory of reason\nover passion it is nothing but a conquest of one passion by another, _i.\ne_., of a violent passion by a calm one. That which is commonly called\nreason here is nothing but one of those general and calm affections _(e.\ng_., the love of life) which direct the will to a distant good, without\nexciting any sensible emotion in the mind; by passion we commonly\nunderstand the violent passions only, which engender a marked disturbance\nin the soul and the production of which requires a certain propinquity of\nthe object. A man is said to be industrious \"from reason,\" when a calm\ndesire for money makes him laborious. It is a mistake to consider all\nviolent passions powerful, and all calm ones weak. The prevalence of calm\naffections constitutes the essence of strength of mind.\n\nAs reason is thus degraded from a governor of the will to a \"slave of the\npassions,\" so, further, judgment concerning right and wrong is taken away\nfrom her. Moral distinctions are determined by our sense of the agreeable\nand the disagreeable. We pass an immediate judgment of taste on the actions\nof our fellow-men; the good pleases, evil displeases. The sight of virtue\ngives us satisfaction; that of vice repels us. Accordingly an action or\ntrait of mind is virtuous when it calls forth in the observer an agreeable,\ndisinterested sentiment of approbation.\n\nWhat, then, are the actions which receive such general approval, and how is\nthe praise to be explained which the spectator bestows on them? We approve\nsuch traits of character as are immediately agreeable or useful, either to\nthe person himself or to others. This yields four classes of praiseworthy\nqualities. The first class, those which are agreeable to the possessor\n(quite apart from any utility to himself or to others), includes\ncheerfulness, greatness of mind, courage, tranquillity, and benevolence;\nthe second, those immediately agreeable to others, modesty, good manners,\npoliteness, and wit; the third, those useful to ourselves, strength of\nwill, industry, frugality, strength of body, intelligence and other mental\ngifts. The fourth class comprises the highest virtues, the qualities useful\nto others, benevolence and justice. Pleasure and utility are in all cases\nthe criterion of merit. The monkish virtues of humility and mortification\nof the flesh, which bring no pleasure or advantage either to their\npossessor or to society, are considered meritorious by no one who\nunderstands the subject.\n\nIf the moral value of actions is thus made to depend on their effects, we\ncannot dispense with the assistance of reason in judging moral questions,\nsince it alone can inform us concerning these results of action. Reason,\nhowever, is not sufficient to determine us to praise or blame. Nothing but\na sentiment can induce us to give the preference to beneficial and useful\ntendencies over pernicious ones. This feeling is evidently no other than\nsatisfaction in the happiness of men and uneasiness in view of their\nmisery--in short, it is sympathy. By means of the imagination we enter into\nthe experiences of others and participate in their joy and sorrow. Whatever\ndepresses or rejoices them, whatever inspires them with pride, fills us\nwith similar emotions. From the habit of sympathetically passing moral\njudgment on the actions of others, and of seeing our own judged by them,\nis developed the further one of keeping a constant watch over ourselves and\nof considering our dispositions and deeds from the standpoint of the good\nof others. This custom is called conscience. Allied to this is the love of\nreputation, which continually leads us to ask, How will our behavior appear\nin the eyes of those with whom we associate?\n\nWithin the fourth and most important class, the social virtues, Hume\ndistinguishes between the natural virtues of humanity and benevolence and\nthe artificial virtues of justice and fidelity. The former proceed from our\ninborn sympathy with the good of others, while the latter, on the other\nhand, are not to be derived from a natural passion, an instinctive love of\nhumanity, but are the product of reflection and art, and take their origin\nin a social convention.\n\nIn order that an action may gain the approval of the spectator two other\nthings are required besides its salutary effects: it must be a mark\nof character, of a permanent disposition, and it must proceed from\ndisinterested motives. Hume is obliged by this latter position to show that\ndisinterested benevolence actually exists, that the unselfish affections\ndo not secretly spring from self-love. To cite only one of the thousand\nexamples of benevolence in which no discernible interest is concerned,\nwe desire happiness for our friends even when we have no expectation\nof participating in it. The accounts of human selfishness are greatly\noverdrawn, and those who deduce all actions from it make the mistake of\ntaking the inevitable consequences of virtue--the pleasure of self-approval\nand of being esteemed by others--for the only motives to virtue. Because\nvirtue, in the outcome, produces inner satisfaction and is praised by\nothers, it does not follow that it is practiced merely for the sake of\nthese agreeable consequences. Self-love is a secondary impulse, whose\nappearance at all presupposes primary impulses. Only after we have\nexperienced the pleasure which comes from the satisfaction of such an\noriginal impulse (_e. g_., ambition), can this become the object of a\nconscious reflective search after pleasure, or of egoism. Power brings no\nenjoyment to the man by nature devoid of ambition, and he who is naturally\nambitious does not desire fame because it affords him pleasure, but\nconversely, fame affords him pleasure because he desires it. The natural\npropensity which terminates directly on the object, without knowledge or\nforesight of the pleasurable results, comes first, and egoistic reflection\ndirected toward the hoped-for enjoyment can develop only after this has\nbeen satisfied. The case is the same with benevolence as with the love\nof fame. It is implanted in the constitution of our minds as an original\nimpulse immediately directed toward the happiness of other men. After\nit has been exercised and its exercise rewarded by self-satisfaction,\nadmiration, thanks, and reciprocation, it is indeed possible for the\nexpectation of such agreeable consequences to lead us to the repetition of\nbeneficent acts. But the original motive is not an egoistic, regard for\nuseful consequences. If, from the force of the passion alone, vengeance\nmay be so eagerly pursued that every consideration of personal quiet and\nsecurity is silenced, it may also be conceded that humanity causes us\nto forget our own interests. Nay, further, the social affections, as\nShaftesbury has proven, are the strongest of all, and the man will rarely\nbe found in whom the sum of the benevolent impulses will not outweigh that\nof the selfish ones.\n\nIn the section on justice Hume attacks the contract theory. Law, property,\nand the sacredness of contracts exist first in society, but not first in\nthe state. The obligation to observe contracts is, indeed, made stronger by\nthe civil law and civil authority, but not created by them. Law arises from\nconvention, _i. e_., not from a formal contract, but a tacit agreement, a\nsense of common interest, and this agreement, in turn, proceeds from an\noriginal propensity to enter into social relations. The unsocial and\nlawless state of nature is a philosophical fiction which has never existed;\nmen have always been social. They have all at least been born into the\nsociety of the family, and they know no-more terrible punishment than\nisolation. States are not created, however, by a voluntary act, but have\ntheir roots in history. The question at issue between Hobbes and Hume was\nthus adjusted at a later period by Kant: the state, it is true, has not\nhistorically arisen from a contract, yet it is allowable and useful to\nconsider it under the aspect of a contract as a regulative idea.\n\n\nOnly once since David Hume, in Herbert Spencer, has the English nation\nproduced a mind of like comprehensive power. Hume and Locke form the\nculminating points of English thought. They are national types, in that\nin them the two fundamental tendencies of English thinking, clearness of\nunderstanding and practical sense, were manifested in equal force. In Locke\nthese worked together in harmonious co-operation. In Hume the friendly\nalliance is broken, the common labor ceases; each of the two demands its\nfull rights; a painful breach opens up between science and life. Reason\nleads inevitably to doubt, to insight into its own weakness, while life\ndemands conviction. The doubter cannot act, the agent cannot know. It is\ntrue that a substitute is found for defective knowledge in belief based\nupon instinct and custom; but this is a makeshift, not a solution of the\nproblem, an acknowledgment of the evil, not a cure for it. Further, Hume's\ngreatness does not consist in the fact that he preached modesty to the\ncontending parties, that he banished the doubting reason into the study\nand restricted life to belief in probabilities, but in the mental strength\nwhich enabled him to endure sharp contradictions, and, instead of an\noverhasty and easy reconciliation, to suspend the one impulse until the\nother had made its demands thoroughly, completely, and regardlessly heard.\nThough he is distinguished from other skeptics by the fact that he not\nonly shows the fundamental conceptions of our knowledge of nature and the\nprinciples of religion uncertain and erroneous, but finds _necessary_\nerrors in them and acutely uncovers their origin in the lawful workings\nof our inner life, yet his historical influence essentially rests on his\nskepticism. In his own country it roused in the \"Scottish School\" the\nreaction of common sense, while in Germany it helped to wake a kindred but\ngreater spirit from the bonds of his dogmatic slumbers, and to fortify him\nfor his critical achievements.\n\n(c) %The Scottish School%.--Priestley's associational psychology,\nBerkeley's idealism, and Hume's skepticism are legitimate deductions from\nLocke's assumption that the immediate objects of thought are not things but\nideas, and that judgment or knowledge arises from the combination of ideas\noriginally separate. The absurdity of the consequences shows the falsity of\nthe premises. The true philosophy must not contradict common sense. It\nis not correct to look upon the mind as a sheet of white paper on which\nexperience inscribes single characters, and then to make the understanding\ncombine these originally disconnected elements into judgments by means of\ncomparison, and the belief in the existence of the object come in as a\nlater result added to the ideas by reflection. It is rather true that the\nelements discovered by the analysis of the cognitive processes are far from\nbeing the originals from which these arise. It is not isolated ideas that\ncome first, but judgments, self-evident axioms of the understanding, which\nform part of the mental constitution with which God has endowed us; and\nsensation is accompanied by an immediate belief in the reality of the\nobject. Sensation guarantees the presence of an external thing possessing a\ncertain character, although it is not an image of this property, but merely\na sign for something in no wise resembling itself.\n\nThis is the standpoint of the founder[1] of the Scottish School, Thomas\nReid (1710-96, professor in Aberdeen and Glasgow; _An Inquiry into the\nHuman Mind on the Principles of Common Sense_, 1764; _Essays on the\nIntellectual Powers of Man_, 1785, _Essays on the Active Powers_, 1788,\ntogether under the title, _Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind.\nCollected Works_, 1804, and often since, especially the edition by\nHamilton, with valuable notes and dissertations, 7th ed., 2 vols., 1872).\nWe may recognize in it a revival of the common notions of Herbert, as well\nas a transfer of the innate faculty of judgment inculcated by the ethical\nand aesthetic writers from the practical to the theoretical field; the\n\"common sense\" of Reid is an original sense for truth, as the \"taste\"\nof Shaftesbury and Hutcheson was a natural sense for the good and the\nbeautiful. Like Jacobi at a later period, Reid points out that mediate,\nreasoned knowledge presupposes a knowledge which is immediate, and all\ninference and demonstration, fixed, undemonstrable, immediately certain\nfundamental truths. The fundamental judgments or principles of common\nsense, which are true for us, even if [possibly] not true in themselves,\nare discoverable by observation (empirical rationalism). In the enumeration\nof them two dangers are to be avoided: we must neither raise contingent\nprinciples to the position of axioms, nor, from an exaggerated endeavor\nafter unity, underestimate the number of these self-evident principles.\nReid himself is always more sparing with them than his disciples. He\ndistinguishes two classes: first principles of necessary truth, and first\nprinciples of contingent truth or truth of fact. As first principles of\nnecessary truth he cites, besides the axioms of logic and mathematics,\ngrammatical, aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical principles (among the last\nbelong the principles: \"That the qualities which we perceive by our senses\nmust have a subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are\nconscious of must have a subject, which we call mind\"; \"that whatever\nbegins to exist, must have a cause which produced it\"). He lays down twelve\nprinciples as the basis of our knowledge of matters of fact, in which his\nreference to the doubt of Berkeley and Hume is evident. The most important\nof these are: \"The existence of everything of which I am conscious\"; \"that\nthe thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I\ncall myself, my mind, my person\"; \"our own personal identity and continued\nexistence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly\"; \"that those\nthings do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are\nwhat we perceive them to be\"; \"that we have some degree of power over our\nactions, and the determinations of our will\"; \"that there is life and\nintelligence in our fellow-men\"; \"that there is a certain regard due... to\nhuman authority in matters of opinion\"; \"that, in the phenomena of\nnature, what is to be, will probably be like what has been in similar\ncircumstances.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: In the sense of \"chief founder\"; cf. McCosh's _Scottish\nPhilosophy_, 1875, pp. 36, 68 _seq_., which is the standard authority on\nthe school as a whole.--TR.]\n\nThe widespread and lasting favor experienced by this theory, with its\ninvitation to forget all earnest work in the problems of philosophy\nby taking refuge in common sense, shows that a general relaxation had\nsucceeded the energetic endeavors which Hume had demanded of himself and\nof his readers. With this declaration of the infallibility of common\nconsciousness, the theory of knowledge, which had been so successfully\nbegun, was incontinently thrust aside, although, indeed, empirical\npsychology gained by the industrious investigation of the inner life by\nmeans of self-observation. James Beattie continued the attack on Hume\nin his _Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to\nSophistry and Skepticism_, 1770, on the principle that wisdom must never\ncontradict nature, and that whatever our nature compels us to believe,\nhence whatever all agree in, is true. In his briefer dissertations Beattie\ndiscussed Memory and Imagination, Fable and Romance, the Effects of\n\nPoetry and Music, Laughter, the Sublime, etc. While Beattie had given the\npreference to psychological and aesthetic questions, James Oswald (1772)\nappealed to common sense in matters of religion, describing it as an\ninstinctive faculty of judgment concerning truth and falsehood. The most\neminent among the followers of Reid was Dugald Stewart (professor in\nEdinburgh; _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, 1792-1827;\n_Collected Works_, edited by Hamilton, 1854-58), who developed the\ndoctrines of the master and in some points modified them. Thomas\nBrown (1778-1820), who is highly esteemed by Mill, Spencer, and Bain,\napproximated the teachings of Reid and Stewart to those of Hume. The\nphilosophy of the Scottish School was long in favor both in England and in\nFrance, where it was employed as a weapon against materialism.\n\nBy way of appendix we may mention the beginnings of a psychological\naesthetics in Henry Home (Lord Kames, 1696-1782), and Edmund Burke\n(1728-97).[1] Home, in ethics a follower of Hutcheson, is fond of\nsupporting his aesthetic views by examples from Shakespeare. Beauty (chap.\niii.) appears to belong to the object itself, but in reality it is only an\neffect, a \"secondary quality,\" of the object; like color, it is nothing but\nan idea in the mind, \"for an object is said to be beautiful for no other\nreason but that it appears so to the spectator.\" It arises from regularity,\nproportion, order, simplicity--properties which belong to sublimity as well\n(chap, iv.), but to which they are by no means so essential, since it is\nsatisfied with a less degree of them. While the beautiful excites emotions\nof sweetness and gayety, the sublime rouses feelings which are agreeable,\nit is true, but which are not sweet and gay, but strong and more serious.\nBurke's explanation goes deeper. He derives the antithesis of the sublime\nand the beautiful from the two fundamental impulses of human nature, the\ninstinct of self-preservation and the social impulse. Whatever is contrary\nto the former makes a strong and terrible impression on the soul; whatever\nfavors the latter makes a weak but agreeable one. The terrible delights us\n(first depressing and then exalting us), when we merely contemplate it,\nwithout being ourselves affected by the danger or the pain--this is the\nsublime. On the other hand, that is beautiful which inspires us with\ntenderness and affection without our desiring to possess it. Sublimity\nimplies a certain greatness, beauty, a certain smallness. Delight in both\nis based on bodily phenomena. Terror moderated exercises a beneficent\ninfluence on the nerves by stimulating them and giving them tension;\nthe gentle impression of beauty exerts a quieting effect upon them. The\ndisturbances caused by the former, and the recovery induced by the latter,\nare both conducive to health, and hence, experienced as pleasures.\n\n[Footnote 1: Home, _Elements of Criticism_, 1762. Burke, _A Philosophical\nInquiry info the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful_,\n1756.]\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE FRENCH ILLUMINATION.\n\nIn the last decade of the seventeenth century France had yielded the\nleadership in philosophy to England. Whereas Hobbes had in Paris imbibed\nthe spirit of the Galilean and Cartesian inquiry, while Bacon, Locke, and\neven Hume had also visited France with advantage, now French thinkers take\nthe watchword from the English. Montesquieu and Voltaire, returning from\nEngland in the same year (1729), acquaint their countrymen with the ideas\nof Locke and his contemporaries. These are eagerly caught up; are, step\nby step, and with the logical courage characteristic of the French mind,\ndeveloped to their extreme conclusions; and, at the same time, spread\nabroad in this heightened form among the people beyond the circles of the\nlearned, nay, even beyond the educated classes. The English temperament is\nfavorable neither to this advance to extreme revolutionary inferences nor\nto this propagandist tendency. Locke combines a rationalistic ethics with\nhis semi-sensational theory of knowledge; Newton is far from finding in his\nmechanical physics a danger for religious beliefs; the deists treat the\nadditions of positive religion rather as superfluous ballast than as\nhateful unreason; Bolingbroke wishes at least to conceal from the people\nthe illuminating principles which he offers to the higher classes. Such\nhalting where farther progress threatens to become dangerous to moral\ninterests does more honor to the moral, than to the logical, character of\nthe philosopher. But with the transfer of these ideas to France, the wall\nof separation is broken down between the theory of knowledge and the theory\nof ethics, between natural philosophy and the philosophy of religion;\nsensationalism forces its way from the region of theory into the sphere\nof practice, and the mechanical theory is transformed from a principal\nof physical interpretation into a metaphysical view of the world of an\natheistical character. Naturalism is everywhere determined to have its\nown: if knowledge comes from the senses, then morality must be rooted\nin self-interest; whoever confines natural science to the search for\nmechanical causes must not postulate an intelligent Power working from\ndesign, even to explain the origin of things and the beginning of\nmotion--has no right to speak of a free will, an immortal soul, and a deity\nwho has created the world. Further, as Bayle's proof that the dogmas of\nthe Church were in all points contradictory to reason had, contrary to its\nauthor's own wishes, exerted an influence hostile to religion, and as,\nmoreover, the political and social conditions of the time incited to revolt\nand to a break with all existing institutions, the philosophical ideas from\nover the Channel and the condition of things at home alike pressed toward\na revolutionary intensification of modern principles, which found\ncomprehensive expression in the atheists' Bible, the _System of Nature_ of\nBaron Holbach, 1770. The movement begins in the middle of the thirties,\nwhen Montesquieu commences to naturalize Locke's political views in France,\nand Voltaire does the same service for Locke's theory of knowledge,\nand Newton's natural philosophy, which had already been commended by\nMaupertuis. The year 1748, the year also of Hume's _Essay_, brings\nMontesquieu's chief work and La Mettrie's _Man a Machine_. While the\n_Encyclopedia_, the herald of the Illumination, begun in 1751, is advancing\nto its completion (1772, or rather 1780), Condillac (1754) and Bonnet\n(1755) develop theoretical sensationalism, and Helvetius (_On Mind_,\n1758; in the same year, D'Alembert's _Elements of Philosophy_) practical\nsensationalism. Rousseau, engaged in authorship from 1751 and a contributor\nto the _Encyclopedia_ until 1757 comes into prominence, 1762, with his two\nchief works, _Emile_ and the _Social Contract_. Parallel with these we\nfind interesting phenomena in the field of political economy: Morelly's\ncommunistic _Code of Nature_ (1755), the works of Quesnay (1758), the\nleader of the physiocrats, and those of Turgot, 1774.\n\nOur discussion takes up, first, the introduction and popularization of\nEnglish ideas; then, the further development of these into a consistent\nsensationalism, into the morality of interest, and into materialism;\nfinally, the reaction against the illumination of the understanding in\nRousseau's philosophy of feeling.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: On the whole chapter cf. Damiron, _M\u00e9moires pour Servir \u00e0\nl'Histoire de la Philosophie au XVIII. Si\u00e9cle_, 3 vols., 1858-64; and\nJohn Morley's _Voltaire_, 1872 [1886], _Rousseau_, 1873 [1886], and\n_Diderot and the Encyclopedists_, 1878 [new ed., 1886].]\n\n\n1. %The Entrance of English Doctrines%.\n\nMontesquieu[1] (1689-1755) made Locke's doctrine of constitutional\nmonarchy and the division of powers (pp. 179-180), with which he joins the\nhistorical point of view of Bodin and the naturalistic positions of the\ntime, the common property of the cultivated world. Laws must be adapted to\nthe character and spirit of the nation; the spirit of the people, again,\nis the result of nature, of the past, of manners, of religion, and of\npolitical institutions. Nature has bestowed many gifts on the Southern\npeoples, but few on those of the North; hence the latter need freedom,\nwhile the former readily dispense with it. Warm climates produce greater\nsensibility and passionateness, cold ones, muscular vigor and industry; in\nthe temperate zones nations are less constant in their habits, their vices,\nand their virtues. The laws of religion concern man as man, those of the\nstate concern him as a citizen; the former have for their object the moral\ngood of the individual, the latter, the welfare of society; the first aim\nat immutable, the second at mutable good. Laws and manners are closely\ninterrelated. Right is older than the state, and the law of justice holds\neven in the state of nature; but in order to assure peace positive right is\nrequired in three forms, international, political, and civil.\n\n[Footnote 1: Montesquieu, _Persian Letters_, 1721; _Considerations on\nthe Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Decadence_, 1734;\n_Spirit of Laws_, 1748.]\n\nEach of the four political forms has a passion for its underlying\nprinciple: despotism has fear; monarchy, honor (personal and class\nprejudice); aristocracy, the moderation of the nobility; democracy,\npolitical virtue, which subordinates personal to general welfare, and\nespecially the inclination to equality and frugality. While republics are\ndestroyed by extravagance, lust, and self-seeking, a monarchy can dispense\nwith civil virtue, patriotism, and moral disinterestedness, since in it\nfalse honor, luxury, and wantonness subserve the public good. Great states\ntend toward despotism; smaller ones toward aristocracy, or a democratic\nrepublicanism; for those of medium size monarchy, which is intermediate\nbetween the two former, is the best form of constitution. Although\nMontesquieu, in his _Lettres Persanes_, shows himself enthusiastic for the\nfederal republics of Switzerland and the Netherlands, his opinions are\ndifferent after his return from England, and in his _Esprit des Lois_ he\npraises the English form of government as the ideal of civil liberty.\n\nPolitical freedom consists in liberty to do (not what we wish, but) what\nwe ought, or in doing that which the laws allow. Such lawful freedom is\npossible only where the constitution of the state and criminal legislation\ninspire the citizen with a sense of security. In order to prevent misuse of\nthe supreme power, the different authorities in the state must be divided\nso that they shall hold one another in check. In particular Montesquieu\ndemands for the judicial power absolute independence of the executive power\n(which Locke had termed the federative) as well as of the legislative\npower. The last belongs to parliament, which includes in its two houses an\naristocratic and a democratic element.\n\nVoltaire[1] (1694-1778)--he himself had made this anagram from his name,\nArouet l(e) j(eune)--seemed by his many-sided receptivity almost made to be\nthe interpreter of English ideas; in the words of Windelband, he \"combines\nNewton's mechanical philosophy of nature, Locke's no\u00ebtical empiricism, and\nShaftesbury's moral philosophy under the deistic point of view.\" The\nsame qualities which made him the first journalist, enabled him to free\nphilosophy from its scholastic garb, and, by concentrating it on the\nproblems which press most upon the lay mind (God, freedom, immortality),\nto make it a living force among the people. His superficiality, as Erdmann\nacutely remarks, was his strength. True religion, so reason teaches us,\nconsists in loving God and in being just and forbearing to our fellow-men\nas to our brothers; morality is so natural and necessary that it is no\nwonder that all philosophers since Zoroaster have inculcated the same\nprinciples. The less of dogma the better the religion; atheism is not\nso bad as superstition, which teaches men to commit crimes with an easy\nconscience. He considered it the chief mission of his life to destroy these\ntwo miserable errors. He endeavored to controvert atheism by rational\narguments, while with passionate hatred and contemptuous wit he attacked\npositive Christianity and his persecutors, the priesthood. The existence\nof God is for him not merely a moral postulate, but a result of scientific\nreasoning. One of his famous sayings was: \"If God did not exist it would be\nnecessary to invent him; but all nature cries out to us that he exists.\" He\ndefends immortality in spite of theoretical difficulties, because of its\npractical necessity; his attitude toward the freedom of the will, which\nhe had energetically defended in the beginning, grows constantly more\nskeptical with increasing age. His position in regard to the question\nof evil experiences a similar change--the Lisbon earthquake made him an\nopponent of optimism, though he had previously favored it.\n\n[Footnote 1: David Friedrich Strauss, _Voltaire, sechs Vortr\u00e4ge_, 1870.]\n\n\n%2. Theoretical and Practical Sensationalism.%\n\nWe turn next from the popular introduction and dissemination of Locke's\ndoctrines, which left their contents unchanged, to their principiant\ndevelopment by the French sensationalists. Condillac (1715-80) always\nthinks of his work as a completion of Locke's, whose _Essay_ he held not to\nhave gone down to the final root of the cognitive process. Locke did not\ngo far enough, Condillac thinks, in his rejection of innate elements; he\nfailed to trace out the origin of perception, reflection, cognition, and\nvolition, as also the relation between the external senses, the internal\nsense, and the combining intellect, which he discussed as separate sources,\nthe two former of particular, and the last of complex, ideas; in short,\nhe omitted to inquire into the origin of the first function of the soul.\nBerkeley was right in feeling that a simplification was needed here; but by\nerroneously reducing outer perception to inner perception, he reached the\nabsurd conclusion of denying the external world. The true course is just\nthe opposite of this--the one already taken by the Bishop of Cork, Peter\nBrowne (died 1735; _The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human\nUnderstanding_, 1728): understanding and reflection must be reduced to\nsensation. All psychical functions are transformed sensations. The soul has\nonly one original faculty, that of sensation; all the others, theoretical\nand practical alike, are acquired, _i.e._, they have gradually developed\nfrom the former. Condillac is related to Locke as Fichte to Kant; in\nthe former case the transition is mediated by Browne, in the latter\nby Reinhold. Each crowns the work of his predecessor with a unifying\nconclusion; each demands and offers a genetic psychology which finds the\norigin of all the spiritual functions--from sensation and feelings of\npleasure and pain up to rational cognition and moral will--in a single\nfundamental power of the soul. But there is a great difference, materially\nas well as formally, between these kindred undertakings, a difference\ncorresponding to that between Locke's empiricism and Kant's idealism.\nThe idea of ends, which controls the course of thought in Fichte as in\nLeibnitz, is entirely lacking in Condillac; that which is first in time,\nsensation, is for the Science of Knowledge and the Monadology only the\nbeginning, not the essence, of psychical activity, while Condillac makes\nno distinction between beginning and ground, but expressly identifies\n_principe_ and _commencement_. With Fichte and Leibnitz sensation is\nimmature thought, with Condillac thought is refined sensation. The former\nteach a teleological, the latter a mechanical mono-dynamism. The Science\nof Knowledge, moreover, makes a very serious task of the deduction of the\nparticular psychical functions from the original power, while Condillac\ntakes it extraordinarily easy. Good illustrations of his way of effacing\ndistinctions instead of explaining them are given by such monotonously\nrecurring phrases as memory is \"nothing but\" modified sensation; comparison\nand simultaneous attention to two ideas \"are the same thing\"; sensation\n\"gradually becomes\" comparison and judgment; reflection is \"in its origin\"\nattention itself; speech, thought, and the formation of general notions\nare \"at bottom the same\"; the passions are \"only\" various kinds of desire;\nunderstanding and will spring \"from one root,\" etc.\n\nThe demand for a single fundamental psychical power comes from Descartes,\nand Condillac does not hesitate to retain the word _penser_ itself as a\ngeneral designation for all mental functions. Similarly he holds fast to\nthe dualism between extension and sensation as reciprocally incompatible\nproperties, opposes the soul as the \"simple\" subject of thought to\n\"divisible\" matter, and sees in the affections of the bodily organs merely\nthe \"occasions\" on which the soul of itself alone exercises its sensitive\nactivity. Even freedom--the supremacy of thought over the passions--is\nmaintained, in striking contrast to the whole tendency of his doctrine and\nto the openly announced principle, that pleasure controls the attention and\ngoverns all our actions. He has just as little intention of doubting the\nexistence of God. All is dependent on God. He is our lawgiver; it is in\nvirtue of his wisdom that from small beginnings--perception and need--the\nmost splendid results, science and morality, are developed under the hands\nof man. Whoever undertakes to complain that He has concealed from us the\nnature of things and granted us to know relations alone, forgets that we\nneed no more than this. We do not exist in order to know; to live is to\nenjoy.\n\nThe theme of the _Treatise on the Sensations_, 1754, is: Memory,\ncomparison, judgment, abstraction, and reflection (in a word, cognition)\nare nothing but different forms of attention; similarly the emotions, the\nappetites, and the will, nothing but modifications of desire; while both\nalike take their origin in sensation. Sensation is the sole source and the\nsole content of the life of the mind as a whole. To prove these positions\nCondillac makes use of the fiction of a statue, in which one sense awakes\nafter another, first the lowest of the senses, smell, and last the most\nvaluable, the sense of touch, which compels us (by its perception of\ndensity or resistance) to project our sensations, and thus wakes in us the\nidea of an external world. In themselves sensations are merely subjective\nstates, modes of our own being; without the sense of touch we would ascribe\nodor, sound, and color to ourselves. Condillac distinguishes between\nsensation and _ideas_ in a twofold sense, as mere ideas (the memory or\nimagination of something not present), and as ideas of objective things\n(the image, representative of a body); this latter sense is meant when he\nsays, touch sensations only are also ideas.\n\nFor the details of the deduction, which often makes very happy use of a\nrich store of psychological material, the reader must be referred to the\nmore extended expositions. Here we can only cite as examples the chief\namong the genetic definitions. Perceptions (impressions) and consciousness\nare the same thing under different names. A lively sensation, in which the\nmind is entirely occupied, becomes attention, without the necessity of\nassuming an additional special faculty in the mind. Attention, by its\nretentive effect on the sensation, becomes memory. Double attention--to\na new sensation, and to the lingering trace of the previous one--is\ncomparison; the recognition of a relation (resemblance or difference)\nbetween two ideas is judgment; the separation of an idea from another\nnaturally connected with it, by the aid of voluntary linguistic symbols,\nis abstraction; a series of judgments is reflection; and the sum total of\ninner phenomena, that wherein ideas succeed one another, the ego or person.\nAll truths concern relations among ideas. The tactual idea of solidity\naccustoms us to project the sensations of the other senses also, to\ntransfer them thither where they are not; hence arise the ideas of our\nbody, of external objects, and of space. If we perceive several such\nprojected qualities together, we refer them to a substratum--substance,\nwhich we know to exist, although not what it is. By force we mean the\nunknown, but indubitably existent, cause of motion.\n\nThere are no indifferent mental states; every sensation is accompanied by\npleasure or pain. Joy and pain give the determining law for the operation\nof our faculties. The soul dwells longer on agreeable sensations; without\ninterest, ideas would pass away like shadows. The remembrance of past\nimpressions more agreeable than the present ones is need; from this\nsprings desire (_d\u00e9sir_) then the emotions of love, hate, hope, fear, and\nastonishment; finally, the will as an unconditional desire accompanied by\nthe thought of its possible fulfillment. All inclinations, good and bad\nalike, spring from self-love. The predicates \"good\" and \"beautiful\"\ndenote the pleasure-giving qualities of things, the former, that which is\nagreeable to smell and taste (and the passions), the latter, that which\npleases sight, hearing, feeling (and the intellect). Morality is the\nconformity of our actions to laws, which men have established by convention\nwith mutual obligations. In this way the good, which at first was the\nservant of the passions, becomes their lord.\n\nMan's superiority to the brute depends on the greater perfection of his\nsense of touch; on the greater variety of his wants and his associations\nof ideas; on the idea of death, which leads him to seek not merely the\navoidance of pain but also self-preservation; and the possession of\nlanguage. Without denomination no abstractions, no thought, no handing\ndown of knowledge. Although all that is mental has its origin, in the last\nanalysis, in simple sensations, its development requires emancipation from\nthe sensuous, and language is the means for freeing ourselves from the\npressure of sensations by the generalization and combination of ideas.\n\nA more moderate representative of sensationalism was Charles Bonnet, who\nlater exercised a considerable influence in Germany, especially until\nTetens (1720-93; _Essay in Psychology, or Considerations on the Operations\nof the Soul_, 1755; _Analytical Essay on the Faculties of the Soul_, 1760;\n_Philosophical Palingenesis, or Ideas on the Past and the Future of Living\nBeings_, 1769, including a defense of Christianity; _Collected Works_,\n1779). Sensations, to which he, too, reduces all mental life, are, in his\nview, reactions of the immaterial soul to sense stimuli, which operate\nmerely as occasional causes. On the other hand, he emphasizes more strongly\nthan Condillac the dependence of psychical phenomena on physiological\nconditions, and endeavors to show definite brain vibrations as the basis\nnot only of habit, memory, and the association of ideas, but also of\nthe higher mental operations. In harmony with these views he adheres to\ndeterminism, and finds the motive of all endeavor: in self-love, and\nits ultimate aim in happiness. To the latter the hope of immortality is\nindispensable. The link between Bonnet's theory of the thoroughgoing\ndependence of the soul on the body and his orthodox convictions, is formed\nby his idea of an imperishable ethereal body, which enables the soul in the\nlife to come to remember its life on earth and, after the dissolution of\nthe present material body, to acquire a new one. Animals as well as men\nshare in the continuance of existence and the transition to a higher stage.\n\nThe material earnestness of these thinkers is in sharp contrast to the\nsuperficial and frivolous manner in which Helvetius (1715-71) carries out\nsensationalism in the sphere of ethics. His chief work, _On Mind_, came out\nin 1758; and a year after his death, the work _On Man, his Intellectual\nFaculties and his Education_. The search for pleasure or self-love is, as\nHelvetius thinks he has discovered for the first time,[1] the only motive\nof action; the laws of interest reign in the moral world as the laws of\nmotion in the physical world; justice and love for our neighbors are\nbased on utility; we seek friends in order to be amused, aided, and, in\nmisfortune, compassionated by them; the philanthropist and the monster both\nseek only their own pleasure.\n\n[Footnote 1: In reality not only English moralists, but also some among his\ncountrymen, had anticipated him in the position that all actions proceed\nfrom selfishness, and that virtue is merely a refined egoism. Thus La\nRochefoucauld in his _Maxims (R\u00e9flexions, ou Sentences et Maximes Morales_,\n1665), La Bruy\u00e8re _(Les Charact\u00e8res et les Moeurs de ce Si\u00e9cle_, 1687), and\nLa Mettrie (of. pp, 251-253).]\n\nHelvetius draws the proof for these positions from Condillac. Recollection\nand judgment are sensation. The soul is originally nothing more than the\ncapacity for sensation; it receives the stimulus to its development from\nself-love, _i.e._, from powerful passions such as the love of fame, on the\none hand, and, on the other, from hatred of _ennui_, which induces man to\novercome the indolence natural to him and to submit himself to the irksome\neffort of attention--without passion he would remain stupid. The sum of\nideas collected in him is called intellect. All distinctions among men\nare acquired, and concern the intellect only, not the soul: that which is\ninnate--sensibility and self-love--is the same in all; differences arise\nonly through external circumstances, through education. Man is the pupil of\nall that environs him, of his situation and his chance experience. The most\nimportant instrument in education is the law; the function of the lawgiver\nis to connect public and personal welfare by means of rewards and\npunishments, and thus to elevate morality. A man is called virtuous when\nhis stronger passions harmonize with the general interest. Unfortunately\nthe virtues of prejudice, which do not contribute to the public good, are\nmore honored among most nations than the political virtues, to which alone\nreal merit belongs. And self-interest is always the one motive to just and\ngenerous action; we serve only our own interests in furthering the welfare\nof the community. As the promulgator of these doctrines was himself a kind\nand generous man, Rousseau could make to him the apt reply: You endeavor in\nvain to degrade yourself below your own level; your spirit gives evidence\nagainst your principles; your benevolent heart discredits your doctrines.\n\nThe morality of enlightened self-love or \"intelligent self-interest\"\nappears in a milder form in Maupertuis (_Works_, 1752), and Frederick the\nGreat,[1] to the latter of whom D'Alembert objected by letter that interest\ncould never generate the sense of duty and reverence for the law.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Essay on Self-love as a Principle of Morals_, 1770, printed\nin the proceedings of the Academy of Sciences. Cf. on Frederick, Ed.\nZeller, 1886.]\n\n\n%3. Skepticism and Materialism.%\n\nThe ideas thus far developed move in a direction whose further pursuit\ninevitably issues in materialism. Diderot, the editor of the _Encyclopedia\nof the Sciences, Arts, and Trades_ (1751-72), which gathered all the\ncurrents of the Illumination into one great stream and carried them to the\nopen sea of popular culture, reflects in his intellectual development\nthe dialectical movement from deism through skepticism to atheism and\nmaterialism, and was a co-laborer in the work which brought the whole\nmovement to a conclusion, Holbach's _System of Nature_. Two decades,\nhowever, before the latter work, the outcome of a long development of\nthought, appeared, the physician La Mettrie[1] (1709-51) had promulgated\nmaterialism, though rather in an anthropological form than as a\nworld-system, and with cynical satisfaction in the violation of traditional\nbeliefs--in his _Natural History of the Soul_, 1745, in a disguised form,\nand, undisguised, in his _Man a Machine_, 1748--and at the same time\n(_Anti-Seneca, or Discourse on Happiness_, 1748) had sketched out for\nHelvetius the outlines of the sensationalistic morality of interest. While\nill with a violent fever he observed the influence of the heightened\ncirculation of the blood on his mental tone, and inferred that thought is\nthe result of the bodily organization. The soul can only be known from the\nbody. The senses, the best philosophers, teach us that matter is never\nwithout form and motion; and whether all matter is sentient or not,\ncertainly all that is sentient is material, and every part of the organism\ncontains a vital principle (the heart of a frog beats for an hour after\nits removal from the body; the parts of cut-up polyps grow into perfect\nanimals). All ideas come from without, from the senses; without\nsense-impressions no ideas, without education, few ideas, the mind of a man\ngrown up in isolation remains entirely undeveloped; and since the soul is\nentirely dependent on the bodily organs, along with which it originates,\ngrows, and declines, it is subject to mortality. Not only animals, as\nDescartes has shown, but men, who differ from the brutes only in degree,\nare mere machines; by the soul we mean that part of the body which thinks,\nand the brain has fine muscles for thinking as the leg its coarse ones for\nwalking.\n\n[Footnote 1: La Mettrie was born at St. Malo, and educated in Paris, and in\nLeyden under Boerhave; he died in Berlin, whither Frederick the Great\nhad called him after he had been driven out of his native land and from\nHolland. On La Mettrie cf. Lange, _History of Materialism_, vol. ii. pp.\n49-91; and DuBois-Reymond's Address, 1875.]\n\nIf man is nothing but body, there is no other pleasure than that of the\nbody. There is a difference, however, between sensuous pleasure, which is\nintense and brief, and intellectual pleasure, which is calm and lasting.\nThe educated man will prefer the latter, and find in it a higher and more\nnoble happiness; but nature has been just enough to grant the common\nmultitude, in the coarser pleasures, a more easily attainable happiness.\nEnjoy the moment, till the farce of life is ended! Virtue exists only in\nsociety, which restrains from evil by its laws, and incites to good by\nrousing the love of honor. The good man, who subordinates his own welfare\nto that of society, acts under the same necessity as the evil-doer; hence\nrepentance and pangs of conscience, which increase the amount of pain\nin the world, but are incapable of effecting amendment, are useless and\nreprehensible: the criminal is an ill man, and must not be more harshly\npunished than the safety of society requires. Materialism humanizes and\nexercises a tranquilizing influence on the mind, as the religious view of\nthe world, with its incitement to hatred, disturbs it; materialism frees\nus from the sense of guilt and responsibility, and from the fear of future\nsuffering. A state composed of atheists, is not only possible, as Bayle\nargued, but it would be the happiest of all states.\n\nAmong the editors of the _Encyclopedia_, the mathematician D'Alembert\n_(Elements of Philosophy_, 1758) remained loyal to skeptical views. Neither\nmatter nor spirit is in its essence knowable; the world is probably quite\ndifferent from our sensuous conception of it. As Diderot (1713-84), and\nthe _Encyclopedia_ with him, advanced from skepticism to materialism,\nD'Alembert retired from the editorial board (1757), after Rousseau, also,\nhad separated himself from the Encyclopedists. Diderot[1] was the leading\nspirit in the second half of the eighteenth century, as Voltaire in the\nfirst half. His lively and many-sided receptivity, active industry, clever\nand combative eloquence, and enthusiastic disposition qualified him for\nthis r\u00f4le beyond all his contemporaries, who testify that they owe even\nmore to his stimulating conversation than to his writings. He commenced by\nbringing Shaftesbury's _Inquiry into Virtue and Merit_ to the notice of\nhis countrymen; and then turned his sword, on the one hand, against the\natheists, to refute whom, he thought, a single glance into the microscope\nwas sufficient, and, on the other, against the traditional belief in a\nGod of anger and revenge, who takes pleasure in bathing in the tears of\nmankind. Then followed a period of skepticism, which is well illustrated by\nthe prayer in the _Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature_, 1754: O God!\nI do not know whether thou art, but I will guide my thoughts and actions\nas though thou didst see me think and act, etc. Under the influence\nof Holbach's circle he finally reached (in the _Conversation between\nD'Alembert and Diderot_, and _D'Alembert's Dream_, written in 1769, but not\npublished until 1830, in vol. iv. of the _M\u00e9moires, Correspondance, et\nOuvrages In\u00e9dits de Diderot_) the position of naturalistic monism--there\nexists but one great individual, the All. Though he had formerly\ndistinguished thinking substance from material substance, and had based the\nimmortality of the soul on the unity of sensation and the unity of the ego,\nhe now makes sensation a universal and essential property of matter\n(_la pierre sent_), declares the talk about the simplicity of the\nsoul metaphysico-theological nonsense, calls the brain a self-playing\ninstrument, ridicules self-esteem, shame, and repentance as the absurd\nfolly of a being that imputes to itself merit or demerit for necessary\nactions, and recognizes no other immortality than that of posthumous fame.\nBut even amid these extreme conclusions, his enthusiasm for virtue remains\ntoo intense to allow him to assent to the audacious theories of La Mettrie\nand Helvetius.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Works_ in twenty-two vols., Paris, Bri\u00e8re, 1821; latest\nedition, 1875 _seq_. Cf. on Diderot the fine work by Karl Rosenkranz,\n_Diderots Leben und Werke_, 1866.]\n\nFrench natural science also tended toward materialism. Buffon _(Natural\nHistory_, 1749 _seq_) endeavors to facilitate the mechanical explanation\nof the phenomena of life by the assumption of living molecules, from\nwhich visible organisms are built up. Robinet (_On Nature_, 1761 _seq_.),\navailing himself of Spinozistic and Leibnitzian conceptions, goes still\nfurther, in that he endows every particle of matter with sensation, looks\non the whole world as a succession of living beings with increasing\nmentality, and subjects the interaction of the material and psychical sides\nof the individual, as well as the relation of pleasure and pain in the\nuniverse, to a law of harmonious compensation.\n\nThe _System of Nature_, 1770, which bore on its title page the name of\nMirabaud, who had died 1760, proceeded from the company of freethinkers\naccustomed to meet in the hospitable house of Baron von Holbach (died\n1789), a native of the Palatinate. Its real author was Holbach himself,\nalthough his friends Diderot, Naigeon, Lagrange, the mathematician, and the\nclever Grimm (died 1807) seem to have co-operated in the preparation\nof certain sections. The cumbrous seriousness and the dry tone of this\nsystematic combination of the radical ideas which the century had produced,\nwere no doubt the chief causes of its unsympathetic reception by the\npublic. Similarly unsuccessful was the popular account of materialism with\nwhich Holbach followed it, in 1772, and Helvetius's excerpts from the\n_System of Nature_, 1774.\n\nHolbach applies himself to the despiritualization of nature and the\ndestruction of religious prejudices with sincere faith in the sacred\nmission of unbelief--the happiness of humanity depends on atheism. \"O\nNature, sovereign of all beings, and ye her daughters, Virtue, Reason, and\nTruth, be forever our only divinities.\" What has made virtue so difficult\nand so rare? Religion, which divides men instead of uniting them. What has\nso long delayed the illumination of the reason, and the discovery of truth?\nReligion with its mischievous errors, God, spirit, freedom, immortality.\nImmortality exists only in the memory of later generations; man is the\ncreature of a day; nothing is permanent but the great whole of nature and\nthe eternal law of universal change. Can a clock broken into a thousand\npieces continue to mark the hours? The senseless doctrine of freedom was\ninvented only to solve the senseless problem of the justification of God in\nview of the existence of evil. Man is at every moment of his life a passive\ninstrument in the hands of necessity; the universe is an immeasurable\nand uninterrupted chain of actions and reactions, an eternal round of\ninterchanging motions, ruled by laws, a change in which would at once alter\nthe nature of all things. The most fatal error is the idea of human and\ndivine spirits, which has been advanced by philosophers and adopted with\napplause by fools. The opinion that man is divided into two substances is\nbased on the fact that, of the changes in our body, we directly perceive\nonly the external molar movements, while, on the other hand, the inner\nmotions of the invisible molecules are known only by their effects. These\nlatter have been ascribed to the mind, which, moreover, we have adorned\nwith properties whose emptiness is manifested by the fact that they are all\nmere negations of that which we know. Experience reveals to us only the\nextended, the corporeal, the divisible--but the mind is to be the opposite\nof all three, yet at the same time to possess the power (how, no man can\ntell) of acting on that which is material and of being acted upon by it.\nIn thus dividing himself into body and soul, man has in reality only\ndistinguished between his brain and himself. Man is a purely physical\nbeing. All so-called spiritual phenomena are functions of the brain,\nspecial cases of the operation of the universal forces of nature. Thought\nand volition are sensation, sensation is motion. The moving forces in the\nmoral world are the same as those in the physical world; in the latter they\nare called attraction and repulsion, in the former, love and hate;\nthat which the moralist terms self-love is the same instinct of\nself-preservation which is familiar in physics as the force of inertia.\n\nAs man has doubled himself, so also he has doubled nature. Evil gave the\nfirst impulse to the formation of the idea of God, pain and ignorance have\nbeen the parents of superstition; our sufferings were ascribed to unknown\npowers, of which we were in fear, but which, at the same time, we hoped to\npropitiate by prayer and sacrifice. The wise turned with their worship and\nreverence toward a more worthy object, to the great All; and, in fact, if\nwe seek to give the word God a tenable meaning, it signifies active nature.\nThe error lay in the dualistic view, in the distinction between nature and\nitself, _i.e._ its activity, and in the belief that the explanation of\nmotion required a separate immaterial Mover. This assumption is, in the\nfirst place, false, for since the All is the complex of all that exists\nthere can be nothing outside it; motion follows from the existence of the\nuniverse as necessarily as its other properties; the world does not receive\nit from without, but imparts it to itself by its own power. In the second\nplace the assumption is useless; it explains nothing, but confuses the\nproblems of natural science to the point of insolubility. In the third\nplace it is self-contradictory, for after theology has removed the Deity\nas far away from man as possible, by means of the negative metaphysical\npredicates, it finds itself necessitated to bring the two together again\nthrough the moral attributes--which are neither compatible with one another\nnor with the meta-physical--and crowns the absurdity by the assurance that\nwe can please God by believing that which is incomprehensible. Finally, the\nassumption is dangerous; it draws men away from the present, disturbs their\npeace and enjoyment, stirs up hatred, and thus makes happiness and morality\nimpossible. If, then, utility is the criterion of truth, theism--even in\nthe mild form of deism--is proven erroneous by its disastrous consequences.\nAll error is bane.\n\n\nMatter and motion are alike eternal. Nature is an active, self-moving,\nliving whole, an endless chain of causes and effects. All is in unceasing\nmotion, all is cause (nothing is dead, nothing rests), all is effect (there\nis no spontaneous motion, none directed to an end). Order and disorder are\nnot in nature, but only in our understanding; they are abstract ideas to\ndenote that which is conformable to our nature and that which is contrary\nto it. The end of the All is itself alone, is life, activity; the universal\ngoal of particular beings, like that of the universe, is the conservation\nof being.\n\nAnthropology is for Holbach essentially reduced to two problems, the\ndeduction of thought from motion, and of morality from the physical\ntendency to self-preservation. The forces of the soul are no other than\nthose of the body. All mental faculties develop from sensation; sensations\nare motions in the brain which reveal to us motions without the brain. All\nthe passions may be reduced to love and hate, desire and aversion, and\ndepend upon temperament, on the individual mixture of the fluid parts.\nVirtue is the equilibrium of the fluids. All human actions proceed from\ninterest. Good and bad men are distinguished only by their organizations,\nand by the ideas they form concerning happiness. With the same necessity\nas that of the act itself, follow the love or contempt of fellow-men,\nthe pleasure of self-esteem and the pain of repentance (regret for evil\nconsequences, hence no evidence of freedom). Neither responsibility nor\npunishment is done away with by this necessity--have we not the right to\nprotect ourselves against the stream which damages our fields, by building\ndikes and altering its course? The end of endeavor is permanent happiness,\nand this can be attained through virtue alone. The passions which are\nuseful to society compel the affection and approval of our fellows. In\norder to interest others in our welfare we must interest ourselves in\ntheirs--nothing is more indispensable to man than man. The clever man acts\nmorally, interest binds us to the good; love for others means love for the\nmeans to our own happiness. Virtue is the art of making ourselves happy\nthrough the happiness of others. Nature itself chastises immorality, since\nshe makes the intemperate unhappy. Religion has hindered the recognition of\nthese rules, has misunderstood the diseases of the soul, and applied false\nand ineffective remedies; the renunciation which she requires is opposed to\nhuman nature. The true moralist recognizes in medicine the key to the human\nheart; he will cure the mind through the body, control the passions and\nhold them in check by other passions instead of by sermons, and will teach\nmen that the surest road to personal ends is to labor for the public good.\nIllumination is the way to virtue and to happiness.\n\nVolney (Chasseboeuf, died 1820; _Catechism of the French Citizen_, 1793,\nlater under the title _Natural Law or Physical Principles of Morals deduced\nfront the Organization of Man and of the Universe_; further, _The Ruins;\nComplete Works_, 1821) belongs among the moralists of self-love, although,\nbesides the egoistic interests, he takes account of the natural sympathetic\nimpulses also. This is still more the case with Condorcet (_Sketch of\nan Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind_, 1794), who was\ninfluenced alike by Condillac and by Turgot, and who defends a tendency\ntoward universal perfection both in the individual and in the race. Besides\nthe selfish affections, which are directed as much to the injury as to the\nsupport of others, there lies in the organization of man a force which\nsteadily tends toward the good, in the form of underived feelings of\nsympathy and benevolence, from which moral self-judgment is developed by\nthe aid of reflection. The aim of true ethics and social art is not to make\nthe \"great\" virtues universal, but to make them needless; the nearer the\nnations approximate to mental and moral perfection, the less they stand in\nneed of these--happy the people in which good deeds are so customary that\nscarcely an opportunity is left for heroism. The chief instrument for the\nmoral cultivation of the people is the development of the reason, the\nconscience, and the benevolent affections. Habituation to deeds of kindness\nis a source of pure and inexhaustible happiness. Sympathy with the good of\nothers must be so cultivated that the sacrifice of personal enjoyment will\nbe a sweeter joy than the pleasure itself. Let the child early learn to\nenjoy the delight of loving and of being loved. We must, finally, strive\ntoward the gradual diminution of the inequalities of capacity, of property,\nand between ruler and ruled, for to abolish them is impossible.\n\nOf the remaining philosophers of the revolutionary period mention may be\nmade of the physician Cabanis _(Relations of the Physical and the Moral in\nMan, 1799)_, and Destutt de Tracy _(Elements of Ideology, 1801 seq.)_. The\nformer is a materialist in psychology (the nerves are the man, ideas are\nsecretions of the brain), considers consciousness a property of organic\nmatter (the soul is not a being, but a faculty), and makes moral sympathy\ndevelop out of the animal instincts of preservation and nourishment.\nDe Tracy, also, derives all psychical activity from organization and\nsensation. His doctrine of the will, though but briefly sketched, is\ninteresting. The desires have a passive and an active side (corresponding\nto the twofold action of the nerves, on themselves and on the muscles); on\nthe one hand, they are feelings of pleasure or pain, and on the other, they\nlead us to action--will is need, and, at the same time, the source of\nthe means for satisfying this need. Both these feelings and the external\nmovements are probably based upon unconscious organic motions. The will is\nrightly identified with the personality, it is the ego itself, the totality\nof the physico-psychical life of man attaining to self-consciousness. The\ninner or organic life consists in the self-preserving functions of the\nindividual, the outer or animal life, in the functions of relation (of\nsense, of motion, of speech, of reproduction); individual interests are\nrooted in the former, sympathy in the latter. The primal good is freedom,\nor the power to do what we will; the highest thing in life is love. In\norder to be happy we must avoid punishment, blame, and pangs of conscience.\n\n\n%4. Rousseau's Conflict with the Illumination.%\n\nThe Genevese, Jean Jacques Rousseau[1] (1712-78), stands in a similar\nrelation of opposition to the French Illumination as the Scottish School to\nthe English, and Herder and Jacobi to the German. He points us away from\nthe cold sophistical inferences of the understanding to the immediate\nconviction of feeling; from the imaginations of science to the unerring\nvoice of the heart and the conscience; from the artificial conditions of\nculture to healthy nature. The vaunted Illumination is not the lever of\nprogress, but the source of all degeneration; morality does not rest on the\nshrewd calculation of self-interest, but on original social and sympathetic\ninstincts (love for the good is just as natural to the human heart as\nself-love; enthusiasm for virtue has nothing to do with our interest; what\nwould it mean to give up one's life for the sake of advantage?); the truths\nof religion are not objects of thought, but of pious feeling.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Brockerhoff, Leipsic, 1863-74; L. Moreau, Paris, 1870.]\n\nRousseau commenced his career as an author with the _Discourse on the\nSciences and the Arts_, 1750 (the discussion of a prize question, crowned\nby the Academy of Dijon), which he describes as entirely pernicious, and\nthe _Discourse on the Origin and the Bases of the Inequality among Men_,\n1753. By nature man is innocent and good, becoming evil only in society.\nReflection, civilization, and egoism are unnatural. In the happy state of\nnature pity and innocent self-love (_amour de soi_) ruled, and the\nlatter was first corrupted by the reason into the artificial feeling of\nselfishness (_amour propre_) in the course of social development--thinking\nman is a degenerate animal. Property has divided men into rich and poor;\nthe magistracy, into strong and weak; arbitrary power, into masters and\nslaves. Wealth generated luxury with its artificial delights of science and\nthe theater, which make us more unhappy and evil than we otherwise are;\nscience, the child of vice, becomes in turn the mother of new vices. All\nnature, all that is characteristic, all that is good, has disappeared with\nadvancing culture; the only relief from the universal degeneracy is to be\nhoped for from a return to nature on the part of the individual and society\nalike--from education and a state conformed to nature. The novel _Emile_ is\ndevoted to the pedagogical, and the _Social Contract, or the Principles of\nPolitical Law_, to the political problem. Both appeared in 1762, followed\ntwo years later by the _Letters from the Mountain_, a defense against the\nattacks of the clergy. In these later writings Rousseau's naturalistic\nhatred of reason appears essentially softened.\n\nSocial order is a sacred right, which forms the basis of all others. It\ndoes not proceed, however, from nature--no man has natural power over his\nfellows, and might confers no right--consequently it rests on a contract.\nNot, however, on a contract between ruler and people. The act by which the\npeople chooses a king is preceded by the act in virtue of which it is a\npeople. In the social contract each devotes himself with his powers and his\ngoods to the community, in order to gain the protection of the latter.\nWith this act the spiritual body politic comes into being, and attains its\nunity, its ego, its will. The sum of the members is called the people; each\nmember, as a participant in the sovereignty, citizen, and, as bound to\nobedience to the law, subject. The individual loses his natural freedom,\nreceiving in exchange the liberty of a citizen, which is limited by the\ngeneral will, and, in addition, property rights in all that he possesses,\nequality before the law, and moral freedom, which first really makes him\nmaster of himself. The impulse of mere desire is slavery, obedience to\nself-imposed law, freedom. The sovereign is the people, law the general\npopular will directed to the common good, the supreme goods, \"freedom and\nequality,\" the chief objects of legislation. The lawgiving power is the\nmoral will of the body politic, the government (magistracy, prince) its\nexecutive physical power; the former is its heart, the latter its brain.\nRousseau calls the government the middle term between the head of the state\nand the individual, or between the citizen as lawgiver and as subject--the\nsovereign (the people) commands, the government executes, the subject\nobeys. The act by which the people submits itself to its head is not a\ncontract, but merely a mandate; whenever it chooses it can limit, alter, or\nentirely recall the delegated power. In order to security against illegal\nencroachments on the part of the government, Rousseau recommends regular\nassemblies of the people, in which, under suspension of governmental\nauthority, the confirmation, abrogation, or alteration of the constitution\nshall be determined upon. Even the establishment of the articles of social\nbelief falls to the sovereign people. The essential difference between\nRousseau's theory of the state and that of Locke and Montesquieu consists\nin his rejection of the division of powers and of representation by\ndelegates, hence in its unlimited democratic character. A generation after\nit was given to the world, the French Revolution made the attempt to\ntranslate it into practice. \"The masses carried out what Rousseau himself\nhad thought, it is true, but never willed\" (Windelband).\n\nRousseau's theory of education is closely allied to Locke's (cf. above),\nwhose leading idea--the development of individuality--was entirely in\nharmony with the subjectivism of the philosopher of feeling. Posterity has\nnot found it a difficult task to free the sound kernel therein from the\nhusks of exaggeration and idiosyncrasy which surrounded it. Among the\nlatter belong the preference of bodily over intellectual development, and\nthe unlimited faith in the goodness of human nature. Exercise the body, the\norgans, the senses of the pupil, and keep his soul unemployed as long as\npossible; for the first, take care only that his mind be kept free from\nerror and his heart from vice. In order to secure complete freedom from\ndisturbance in this development, it is advisable to isolate the child from\nsociety, nay, even from the family, and to bring him up in retirement under\nthe guidance of a private tutor.\n\nAs the Swiss republican spoke in Rousseau's politics, so his religious\ntheories[1] betray the Genevan Calvinist. \"The Savoyard Vicar's Profession\nof Faith\" (in _Emile_) proclaims deism as a religion of feeling. The\nrational proofs brought forward for the existence of God--from the motion\nof matter in itself at rest, and from the finality of the world--are only\ndesigned, as he declares by letter, to confute the materialists, and derive\ntheir impregnability entirely from the inner evidence of feeling, which\namid the vacillation of the reason _pro_ and _con_ gives the final\ndecision.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Ch. Borgeaud, _Rousseaus Religionsphilosophie_, Geneva and\nLeipsic, 1883.]\n\nIf we limit our inquiry to that which is alone of importance for us, and\nrely on the evidence of feeling, it cannot be doubted that I myself exist\nand feel; that there exists an external world which affects me; that\nthought, comparison or judgment concerning relations is different from\nsensation or the perception of objects--for the latter is a passive,\nbut the former an active process; that I myself produce the activity of\nattention or consideration; that, consequently, I am not merely a sensitive\nor passive, but also an active or intelligent being. The freedom of my\nthought and action guarantees to me the immateriality of my soul, and is\nthat which distinguishes me from the brute. The life of the soul after\nthe decay of the body is assured to me by the fact that in this world the\nwicked triumphs, while the good are oppressed. The favored position which\nman occupies in the scale of beings--he is able to look over the universe\nand to reverence its author, to recognize order and beauty, to love the\ngood and to do it; and shall he, then, compare himself to the brute?--fills\nme with emotion and gratitude to the benevolent Creator, who existed before\nall things, and who will exist when they all shall have vanished away,\nto whom all truths are one single idea, all places a point, all times a\nmoment. The _how_ of freedom, of eternity, of creation, of the action of\nmy will upon matter, etc., is, indeed, incomprehensible to me, but _that_\nthese are so, my feeling makes me certain. The worthiest employment of\nmy reason is to annihilate itself before God. \"The more I strive to\ncontemplate his infinite essence the less do I conceive it. But it is, and\nthat suffices me. The less I conceive it, the more I adore.\"\n\nIn the depths of my heart I find the rules for my conduct engraved by\nnature in ineffaceable characters. Everything is good that I feel to be so.\nThe conscience is the most enlightened of all philosophers, and as safe\na guide for the soul as instinct for the body. The infallibility of its\njudgment is evidenced by the agreement of different peoples; amid the\nsurprising differences of manners you will everywhere find the same ideas\nof justice, the same notions of good and evil. Show me a land where it is\na crime to keep one's word, to be merciful, benevolent, magnanimous, where\nthe upright man is despised and the faithless honored! Conscience enjoins\nthe limitation of our desires to the degree to which we are capable of\nsatisfying them, but not their complete suppression--all passions are good\nwhen we control them, all evil when they control us.\n\nIn the second part of the \"Profession du Foi du Vicaire Savoyard\" Rousseau\nturns from his attacks on sensationalism, materialism, atheism, and the\nmorality of interest, to the criticism of revelation. Why, in addition to\nnatural religion, with its three fundamental doctrines, God, freedom, and\nimmortality, should other special doctrines be necessary, which rather\nconfuse than clear up our ideas of the Great Being, which exact from us\nthe acceptance of absurdities, and make men proud, intolerant, and\ncruel--whereas God requires from us no other service than that of the\nheart? Every religion is good in which men serve God in a befitting manner.\nIf God had prescribed one single religion for us, he would have provided\nit with infallible marks of its unique authenticity. The authority of the\nfathers and the priesthood is not decisive, for every religion claims to be\nrevealed and alone true; the Mohammedan has the same right as the Christian\nto adhere to the religion of his fathers. Since all revelation comes down\nto us by human tradition, reason alone can be the judge of its divinity.\nThe careful examination of the documents, which are written in ancient\nlanguages, would require an amount of learning which could not possibly be\na condition of salvation and acceptance with God. Miracles and prophecy are\nnot conclusive, for how are we to distinguish the true among them from\nthe false? If we turn from the external to the internal criteria of the\ndoctrines themselves, even here no decision can be reached between the\nreasons _pro_ and _con_ (the author puts the former into the mouth of a\nbeliever, and the latter into that of a rationalist); even if the former\noutweighed the latter, the difficulty would still remain of reconciling it\nwith God's goodness and justice that the gospel has not reached so many of\nmankind, and of explaining how those to whom the divinity of Christ is\nnow proclaimed can convince themselves of it, while his contemporaries\nmisjudged and crucified him. In my opinion, I am incapable of fathoming the\ntruth of the Christian religion and its value to those who confess it. The\ninvestigation of the reason ends in \"reverential doubt\": I neither accept\nrevelation nor reject it, but I reject the obligation to accept it. My\nheart, however, judges otherwise than the reflection of my intellect; for\nthis the sacred majesty and exalted simplicity of the Scriptures are a most\ncogent proof that they are more than human, and that He whose history they\ncontain is more than man. The touching grace and profound wisdom of his\nwords, the gentleness of his conduct, the loftiness of his maxims, his\nmastery over his passions, abundantly prove that he was neither an\nenthusiast nor an ambitious sectary. Socrates lived and died like a\nphilosopher, Jesus like a God. The virtues of justice, patriotism, and\nmoderation taught by Socrates, had been exercised by the great men of\nGreece before he inculcated them. But whence could Jesus derive in his time\nand country that lofty morality which he alone taught and exemplified?\nThings of this sort are not invented. The inventor of such deeds would\nbe more wonderful than the doer of them. Thus again, in the question of\nrevealed religion, the voice of the heart triumphs over the doubts of the\nreason, as, in the question of natural religion, it had done over the\nobjections of opponents. It is true, however, that this enthusiasm is\npaid not to the current Christianity of the priests, but to I the real\nChristianity of the gospel.\n\nRousseau was the conscience of France, which rebelled against the negations\nand the bald emptiness of the materialistic and atheistic doctrines. By\nvindicating with fervid eloquence the participation of the whole man in\nthe highest questions, in opposition to the one-sided illumination of the\nunderstanding, he became a pre-Kantian defender of the faith of practical\nreason. His emphatic summons aroused a loud and lasting echo, especially in\nGermany, in the hearts of Goethe, Kant, and Fichte.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nLEIBNITZ.\n\nIn the contemporaries Spinoza and Locke, the two schools of modern\nphilosophy, the Continental, starting from Descartes, and the English,\nwhich followed Bacon, had reached the extreme of divergence and opposition,\nSpinoza was a rationalistic pantheist, Locke, an empirical individualist.\nWith Leibnitz a twofold approximation begins. As a rationalist he sides\nwith Spinoza against Locke, as an individualist with Locke against Spinoza.\nBut he not only separated rationalism from pantheism, but also qualified\nit by the recognition (which his historical tendencies had of themselves\nsuggested to him) of a relative justification for empiricism, since he\ndistinguished the factual truths of experience from the necessary truths of\nreason, gave to the former a no\u00ebtical principle of their own, the principle\nof sufficient reason, and made sensation an indispensable step to thought.\n\nTo the tendencies thus manifested toward a just estimation and peaceful\nreconciliation of opposing standpoints, Leibnitz remained true in all the\nfields to which he devoted his activity. Thus, in the sphere of religion,\nhe took an active part in the negotiations looking toward the reunion of\nthe Protestant and Catholic Churches, as well as in those concerning the\nunion of the Lutheran and the Reformed. Himself a stimulating man, he yet\nneeded stimulation from without. He was an astonishingly wide reader, and\ndeclared that he had never found a book that did not contain something\nof value. With a ready adaptability to the ideas of others he combined a\nremarkable power of transformative appropriation; he read into books more\nthan stood written in them. The versatility of his genius was unlimited:\njurist, historian, diplomat, mathematician, physical scientist, and\nphilosopher, and in addition almost a theologian and a philologist--he is\nnot only at home in all these departments, because versed in them, but\neverywhere contributes to their advancement by original ideas and plans. In\nsuch a combination of productive genius and wealth of knowledge Aristotle\nand Leibnitz are unapproached.\n\nGottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz was born in 1646 at Leipsic, where his father\n(Friederich Leibnitz, died 1652) was professor of moral philosophy; in his\nfifteenth year he entered the university of his native city, with law as\nhis principal subject. Besides law, he devoted himself with quite as much\nof ardor to philosophy under Jacob Thomasius (died 1684, the father of\nChristian Thomasius), and to mathematics under E. Weigel in Jena. In 1663\n(with a dissertation entitled _De Principio Individui_) he became Bachelor,\nin 1664 Master of Philosophy, and in 1666, at Altdorf, Doctor of Laws, and\nthen declined the professorship extraordinary offered him in the latter\nplace. Having made the acquaintance of the former minister of the Elector\nof Mayence, Freiherr von Boineburg, in Nuremberg, he went, after a short\nstay at Frankfort-on-the-Main, to the court of the Elector at Mayence, at\nwhose request he devoted himself to the reform of legal procedure, besides\nwriting, while there, on the most diverse subjects. In 1672 he went to\nParis, where he remained during four years with the exception of a short\nstay in London. The special purpose of the journey to Paris--to persuade\nLouis XIV to undertake a campaign in Egypt, in order to divert him from his\ndesigns upon Germany--was not successful; but Leibnitz was captivated\nby the society of the Parisian scholars, among them the mathematician,\nHuygens. From the end of 1676 until his death in 1716 Leibnitz lived\nin Hanover, whither he had been called by Johann Friedrich, as court\ncouncillor and librarian. The successor of this prince, Ernst August, who,\nwith his wife Sophie, and his daughter Sophie Charlotte, showed great\nkindness to the philosopher, wished him to write a history of the princely\nhouse of Brunswick; and a journey which he made in order to study for this\npurpose was extended as far as Vienna and Rome. Upon his return he took\ncharge of the Wolfenb\u00fcttel library in addition to his other engagements.\n\nThe marriage of the Princess Sophie Charlotte with Frederick of\nBrandenburg, the first king of Prussia, brought Leibnitz into close\nrelations with Berlin. At his suggestion the Academy (Society) of Sciences\nwas founded there in 1700, and he himself became its first president. In\nCharlottenburg he worked on his principal work, the _New Essays concerning\nthe Human Understanding_, which was aimed at Locke, but the publication of\nwhich was deferred on account of the death of the latter in the interim\n(1704), and did not take place until 1765, in Raspe's collective edition.\nThe death of the Prussian queen in 1705 interrupted for several years the\n_Theodicy_, which had been undertaken at her request, and which did not\nappear until 1710. In Vienna, where he resided in 1713-14, Leibnitz\ncomposed a short statement of his system for Prince Eugen; this, according\nto Gerhardt, was not the sketch in ninety paragraphs, familiar under the\ntitle _Monadology_, which was first published in the original by J.E.\nErdmann in his excellent _Complete Edition of the Philosophical Works\nof Leibnitz_, 1840, but the _Principles of Nature and of Grace_, which\nappeared two years after the author's death in _L'Europe Savante_.\nWhile Ernst August, as well as the German emperor and Peter the Great,\ndistinguished the philosopher, who was not indifferent to such honors, by\nthe bestowal of titles and preferments, his relations with the Hanoverian\ncourt, which until then had been so cordial, grew cold after the Elector\nGeorg Ludwig ascended the English throne as George I. The letters\nwhich Leibnitz interchanged with his daughter-in-law, gave rise to the\ncorrespondence, continued to his death, with Clarke, who defended the\ntheology of Newton against him. The contest for priority between Leibnitz\nand Newton concerning the invention of the differential calculus was later\nsettled by the decision that Newton invented his method of fluxions first,\nbut that Leibnitz published his differential calculus earlier and in a more\nperfect form. The variety of pursuits in which Leibnitz was engaged was\nunfavorable to the development and influence of his philosophy, in that it\nhindered him from working out his original ideas in systematic form, and\nleft him leisure only for the composition of shorter essays. Besides the\ntwo larger works mentioned above, the _New Essays_ and the _Theodicy_, we\nhave of philosophical works by Leibnitz only a series of private letters,\nand articles for the scientific journals (the _Journal des Savants_ in\nParis, and the _Acta Eruditorum_ in Leipsic, etc.), among which may be\nmentioned as specially important the _New System of Nature, and of the\nInteraction of Substances as well as of the Union which exists between the\nSoul and the Body_, 1695, which was followed during the next year by three\nexplanations of it, and the paper _De Ipsa Natura_, 1698. Previous to\nErdmann (1840) the following had deserved credit for their editions of\nLeibnitz: Feller, Kortholt, Gruber, Raspe, Dutens, Feder, Guhrauer (the\nGerman works), and since Erdmann, Pertz, Foucher de Careil, Onno Klopp, and\nespecially J.C. Gerhardt. The last named published the mathematical\nworks in seven volumes in 1849-63, and recently, Berlin, 1875-90, the\nphilosophical treatises, also in seven volumes.[1] In our account of the\nphilosophy of Leibnitz we begin with the fundamental metaphysical concepts,\npass next to his theory of living beings and of man (theory of knowledge\nand ethics), and close with his inquiries into the philosophy of religion.\n\n[Footnote 1: We have a life of Leibnitz by G.E. Guhrauer, jubilee edition,\nBreslau, 1846 [Mackie's _Life_, Boston, 1845 is based on Guhrauer]. Among\nrecent works on Leibnitz, we note the little work by Merz, Blackwood's\nPhilosophical Classics, 1884, and Ludwig Stein's _Leibniz und Spinoza_,\nBerlin, 1890, in which with the aid of previously unedited material the\nrelations of Leibnitz to Spinoza (whom he visited at The Hague on his\nreturn journey from Paris) are discussed, and the attempt is made to trace\nthe development of the theory of monads, down to 1697. The new exposition\nof the Leibnitzian monadology by Ed. Dillman, which has just appeared,\nwe have not yet been able to examine [The English reader may be referred\nfurther to Dewey's _Leibniz_ in Griggs's Philosophical Classics, 1888, and\nDuncan's _Philosophical Works of Leibnitz_ (selections translated,\nwith notes), New Haven, 1890, as well as to the work of Merz already\nmentioned.--TR.]]\n\n\n%1. Metaphysics: the Monads, Representation, the Pre-established Harmony;\nthe Laws of Thought and of the World.%\n\nLeibnitz develops his new concept of substance, the monad,[1] in\nconjunction with, yet in opposition to, the Cartesian and the atomistic\nconceptions. The Cartesians are right when they make the concept of\nsubstance the cardinal point in metaphysics and explain it by the concept\nof independence. But they are wrong in their further definition of this\nsecond concept. If we take independence in the sense of unlimitedness and\naseity, we can speak, as the example of Spinoza shows, of only one, the\ndivine substance. If the Spinozistic result is to be avoided, we must\nsubstitute independent action for independent existence, self-activity\nfor self-existence. Substance is not that which exists through itself\n(otherwise there would be no finite substances), but that which acts\nthrough itself, or that which contains in itself the ground of its changing\nstates. Substance is to be defined by active force,[2] by which we mean\nsomething different from and better than the bare possibility or capacity\nof the Scholastics. The _potentia sive facultas_, in order to issue into\naction, requires positive stimulation from without, while the _vis activa_\n(like an elastic body) sets itself in motion whenever no external hindrance\nopposes. Substance is a being capable of action (_la substance est un \u00eatre\ncapable d'action_). With the equation of activity and existence (_quod non\nagit, non existit_) the substantiality which Spinoza had taken away from\nindividual things is restored to them: they are active, consequently, in\nspite of their limitedness, substantial beings (_quod agit, est substantia\nsingularis_). Because of its inner activity every existing thing is a\ndeterminate individual, and different from every other being. Substance is\nan individual being endowed with force.\n\n[Footnote 1: According to L. Stein's conjecture, Leibnitz took the\nexpression Monad, which he employs after 1696, from the younger (Franc.\nMercurius) van Helmont.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Francis Glisson (1596-1677, professor of medicine in Cambridge\nand London) had as early as 1671, conceived substances as forces in his\ntreatise _De Natura Substantiae Energetica_. That Glisson influenced\nLeibnitz, as maintained by H. Marion (Paris, 1880), has not been proven;\ncf. L. Stein, p. 184.]\n\nThe atomists are right when they postulate for the explanation of\nphenomenal bodies simple, indivisible, eternal units, for every composite\nconsists of simple parts. But they are wrong when they regard these\ninvisible, minute corpuscles, which are intended to subserve this purpose\nas indivisible: everything that is material, however small it be, is\ndivisible to infinity, nay, is in fact endlessly divided. If we are to find\nindivisible units, we must pass over into the realm of the immaterial and\ncome to the conclusion that bodies are composed of immaterial constituents.\nPhysical points, the atoms, are physical, but not points; mathematical\npoints are indivisible, but not real; metaphysical or substantial\npoints, the incorporeal, soul-like units, alone combine in themselves\nindivisibility and reality--the monads are the true atoms. Together with\nindivisibility they possess immortality; as it is impossible for them to\narise and perish through the combination and separation of parts, they\ncannot come into being or pass out of it in any natural way whatever, but\nonly by creation or annihilation. Their non-spatial or punctual character\nimplies the impossibility of all external influence, the monad develops its\nstates from its own inner nature, has need of no other thing, is sufficient\nunto itself, and therefore deserves the Aristotelian name, entelechy.\n\nThus two lines of thought combine in the concept of the monad. Gratefully\nrecognizing the suggestions from both sides, Leibnitz called Cartesianism\nthe antechamber of the true philosophy, and atomism the preparation for\nthe theory of monads. From the first it followed that the substances were\nself-acting forces; from the second, that they were immaterial units.\nThrough the combination of both determinations we gain information\nconcerning the kind of force or activity which constitutes the being of the\nmonad: the monads are representative forces. There is nothing truly real in\nthe world save the monads and their representations [ideas, perceptions].\n\nIn discussing the representation in which the being and activity of the\nmonads consist, we must not think directly of the conscious activity of\nthe human soul. Representation has in Leibnitz a wider meaning than that\nusually associated with the word. The distinction, which has become of the\nfirst importance for psychology, between mere representation and conscious\nrepresentation, or between perception and apperception, may be best\nexplained by the example of the sound of the waves. The roar which we\nperceive in the vicinity of the sea-beach is composed of the numerous\nsounds of the single waves. Each single sound is of itself too small to be\nheard; nevertheless it must make an impression on us, if only a small one,\nsince otherwise their total--as a sum of mere nothings--could not be\nheard. The sensation which the motion of the single wave causes is a weak,\nconfused, unconscious, infinitesimal perception (_petite, insensible\nperception_), which must be combined with many similar minute sensations\nin order to become strong and distinct, or to rise above the threshold of\nconsciousness. The sound of the single wave is felt, but not distinguished,\nis perceived, but not apperceived. These obscure states of unconscious\nrepresentation, which are present in the mind of man along with states of\nclear consciousness, make up, in the lowest grade of existence, the whole\nlife of the monad. There are beings which never rise above the condition of\ndeep sleep or stupor.\n\nIn conformity with this more inclusive meaning, perception is defined as\nthe representation of the external in the internal, of multiplicity in\nunity _(representatio multitudinis in unitate_). The representing being,\nwithout prejudice to its simplicity, bears in itself a multitude of\nrelations to external things. What now is the manifold, which is expressed,\nperceived, or represented, in the unit, the monad? It is the whole world.\nEvery monad represents all others in itself, is a concentrated all, the\nuniverse in miniature. Each individual contains an infinity in itself\n_(substantia infinitas actiones simul exercet_) and a supreme intelligence,\nfor which every obscure idea would at once become distinct, would be able\nto read in a single monad the whole universe and its history--all that is,\nhas been, or will be; for the past has left its traces behind it, and\nthe future will bring nothing not founded in the present: the monad is\nfreighted with the past and bears the future in its bosom. Every monad is\nthus a mirror of the universe,[1] but a living mirror (_miror vivant de\nl'univers_), which generates the images of things by its own activity\nor develops them from inner germs, without experiencing influences from\nwithout. The monad has no windows through which anything could pass in or\nout, but in its action is dependent only on God and on itself.\n\n[Footnote 1: The objection has been made against Leibnitz, and not without\nreason, that strictly speaking there is no content for the representation\nof the monads, although he appears to offer them the richest of all\ncontents, the whole world. The \"All\" which he makes them represent is\nitself nothing but a sum of beings, also representative. The objects of\nrepresentation are merely representing subjects; the monad A represents the\nmonads from B to Z, while these in turn do nothing more than represent one\nanother. The monad mirrors mirrors--where is the thing that is mirrored?\nThe essence of substance consists in being related to others, which\nthemselves are only points of relation; amid mere relativities we never\nreach a real. That which prevented Leibnitz himself from recognizing this\nempty formalism was, no doubt, the fact that for him the mere form of\nrepresentation was at once filled with a manifold experiential content,\nwith the whole wealth of spiritual life, and that the quantitative\ndifferences in representation, which for him meant also degrees of feeling,\ndesire, action, and progress, imperceptibly took on the qualitative\nvividness of individual characteristics. Moreover, it must not be\noverlooked that the spiritual beings represent not merely the universe but\nthe Deity as well, hence a very rich object.]\n\nAll monads represent the same universe, but each one represents it\ndifferently, that is, from its particular point of view--represents that\nwhich is near at hand distinctly, and that which is distant confusedly.\nSince they all reflect the same content or object, their difference\nconsists only in the energy or degree of clearness in their\nrepresentations. So far then, as their action consists in representation,\ndistinct representation evidently coincides with complete, unhindered\nactivity, confused representation with arrested activity, or passivity.\nThe clearer the representations of a monad the more active it is. To have\nclear and distinct perceptions only is the prerogative of God; to the\nOmnipresent everything is alike near. He alone is pure activity; all\nfinite beings are passive as well, that is, so far as their perceptions are\nnot clear and distinct. Retaining the Aristotelian-Scholastic terminology,\nLeibnitz calls the active principle form, the passive matter, and makes the\nmonad, since it is not, like God, _purus actus_ and pure form, consist of\nform (entelechy, soul) and matter. This matter, as a constituent of the\nmonad, does not mean corporeality, but only the ground for the arrest of\nits activity. The _materia prima_ (the principle of passivity in the monad)\nis the ground, the _materia secunda_ (the phenomenon of corporeal mass) the\nresult of the indistinctness of the representations. For a group of monads\nappears as a body when it is indistinctly perceived. Whoever deprives the\nmonad of activity falls into the error of Spinoza; whoever takes away\nits passivity or matter falls into the opposite error, for he deifies\nindividual beings.\n\nNo monad represents the common universe and its individual parts just as\nwell as the others, but either better or worse. There are as many\ndifferent degrees of clearness and distinctness as there are monads.\n\nNevertheless certain classes may be distinguished. By distinguishing\nbetween clear and obscure perceptions, and in the former class between\ndistinct and confused ones--a perception is clear when it is sufficiently\ndistinguished from others, distinct when its component parts are thus\ndistinguished--Leibnitz reaches three principal grades. Lowest stand the\nsimple or naked monads, which never rise above obscure and unconscious\nperception and, so to speak, pass their lives in a swoon or sleep. If\nperception rises into conscious feeling, accompanied by memory, then\nthe monad deserves the name of soul. And if the soul rises to\nself-consciousness and to reason or the knowledge of universal truth, it\nis called spirit. Each higher stage comprehends the lower, since even in\nspirits many perceptions remain obscure and confused. Hence it was an error\nwhen the Cartesians made thought or conscious activity--by which, it is\ntrue, the spirit is differentiated from the lower beings--to such a degree\nthe essence of spirit that they believed it necessary to deny to it all\nunconscious perceptions.\n\nFrom perception arises appetition, not as independent activity, but as a\nmodification of perception; it is nothing but the tendency to pass from one\nperception to another (_l'appetit est la tendance d'une perception \u00e0\nune autre_); impulse is perception in process of becoming. Where the\nperceptions are conscious and rational appetition rises into will. All\nmonads are self-active or act spontaneously, but only the thinking ones are\nfree. Freedom is the spontaneity of spirits. Freedom does not consist in\nundetermined choice, but in action without external compulsion according to\nthe laws of one's own being. The monad develops its representations out of\nitself, from the germs which form its nature. The correspondence of\nthe different pictures of the world, however, is grounded in a divine\narrangement, through which the natures of the monads have from the\nbeginning been so adapted to one another that the changes in their states,\nalthough they take place in each according to immanent laws and without\nexternal influence, follow an exactly parallel course, and the result is\nthe same as though there were a constant mutual interaction. This general\nidea of a _pre-established harmony_ finds special application in the\nproblem of the interaction between body and soul. Body and soul are like\ntwo clocks so excellently constructed that, without needing to be regulated\nby each other, they show exactly the same time. Over the numberless lesser\nmiracles with which occasionalism burdened the Deity, the one great miracle\nof the pre-established harmony has an undeniable advantage. As one great\nmiracle it is more worthy of the divine wisdom than the many lesser ones,\nnay, it is really no miracle at all, since the harmony does not interfere\nwith natural laws, but yields them. This idea may even be freed from its\ntheological investiture and reduced to the purely metaphysical expression,\nthat the natures of the monads, by which the succession of their\nrepresentations is determined in conformity with law, consist in nothing\nelse than the sum of relations in which this individual thing stands to all\nother parts of the world, wherein each member takes account of all others\nand at the same time is considered by them, and thus exerts influence\nas well as suffers it. In this way the external idea of an artificial\nadaptation is avoided. The essence of each thing is simply the position\nwhich it occupies in the organic whole of the universe; each member is\nrelated to every other and shares actively and passively in the life of\nall the rest. The history of the universe is a single great process in\nnumberless reflections.\n\nThe metaphysics of Leibnitz begins with the concept of representation\nand ends with the harmony of the universe. The representations were\nmultiplicity (the endless plurality of the represented) in unity (the unity\nof the representing monad); the harmony is unity (order, congruity of the\nworld-image) in multiplicity (the infinitely manifold degrees of clearness\nin the representations). All monads represent the same universe; each one\nmirrors it differently. The unity, as well as the difference, could not be\ngreater than it is; every possible degree of distinctness of representation\nis present in each single monad, and yet there is a single harmonic accord\nin which the unnumbered tones unite. Now order amid diversity, unity in\nvariety make up the concept of beauty and perfection. If, then, this world\nshows, as it does, the greatest unity in the greatest multiplicity, so that\nthere is nothing wanting and nothing superfluous, it is the most perfect,\nthe best of all possible worlds. Even the lowest grades contribute to the\nperfection of the whole; their disappearance would mean a hiatus; and if\nthe unclear and confused representations appear imperfect when considered\nin themselves, yet they are not so in reference to the whole; for just on\nthis fact, that the monad is arrested in its representation or is passive,\n_i.e._, conforms itself to the others and subordinates itself to them, rest\nthe order and connection of the world. Thus the idea of harmony forms the\nbridge between the Monadology and optimism.\n\nAs in regard to the harmony of the universe we found it possible to\ndistinguish between a half-mythical, narrative form of presentation and a\npurely abstract conception, so we may make a similar distinction in the\ndoctrine of creation. This actual world has been chosen by God as the best\namong many other conceivable worlds. Through the will of God the monads of\nwhich the world consists attained their reality; as possibilities or\nideas they were present in the mind of God (as it were, prior to their\nactualization), present, too, with all the distinctive properties and\nperfections that they now exhibit in a state of realization, so that their\nmerely possible or conceivable being had the same content as their actual\nbeing, and their essence is not altered or increased by their existence.\nNow, since the impulse toward actualization dwells in every possible\nessence, and is the more justifiable the more perfect the essence, a\ncompetition goes on before God, in which, first, those monod-possibilities\nunite which are mutually compatible or compossible, and, then, among the\ndifferent conceivable combinations of monads or worlds that one is ordained\nfor entrance into existence which shows the greatest possible sum of\nperfection. It was, therefore, not the perfection of the single monad, but\nthe perfection of the system of which it forms a necessary part, that was\ndecisive as to its admission into existence. The best world was known\nthrough God's wisdom, chosen through his goodness, and realized through his\npower.[1] The choice was by no means arbitrary, but wholly determined by\nthe law of fitness or of the best (_principe du meilleur_); God's will must\nrealize that which his understanding recognizes as most perfect. It is at\nonce evident that in the competition of the possible worlds the victory of\nthe best was assured by the _lex melioris_, apart from the divine decision.\n\n[Footnote 1: In regard to the dependence of the world on God, there is a\ncertain conflict noticeable in Leibnitz between the metaphysical interests\ninvolved in the substantiality of individual beings, together with the\nmoral interests involved in guarding against fatalism, and the opposing\ninterests of religion. On the one side, creation is for him only an\nactualization of finished, unchangeable possibilities, on the other, he\nteaches with the mediaeval philosophers that this was not accomplished by a\nsingle act of realization, that the world has need of conservation, _i.e._,\nof continuous creation.]\n\nThis law is the special expression of a more general one, the principle\nof sufficient reason, which Leibnitz added, as of equal authority, to the\nAristotelian laws of thought. Things or events are real (and assertions\ntrue) when there is a sufficient reason for their existence, and for their\ndeterminate existence. The _principium rationis sufficientis_ governs our\nempirical knowledge of contingent truths or truths of fact, while, on\nthe other hand, the pure rational knowledge of necessary or eternal\n(mathematical and metaphysical) truths rests on the _principium\ncontradictionis_. The principle of contradiction asserts, that is, whatever\ncontains a contradiction is false or impossible; whatever contains no\ncontradiction is possible; that whose opposite contains a contradiction\nis necessary. Or positively formulated as the principle of identity,\neverything and every representative content is identical with itself.[2]\nUpon this antithesis between the rational laws of contradiction and\nsufficient reason--which, however, is such only for us men, while the\ndivine spirit, which cognizes all things _a priori_, is able to reduce even\nthe truths of fact to the eternal truths--Leibnitz bases his distinction\nbetween two kinds of necessity. That is metaphysically necessary whose\nopposite involves a contradiction; that is morally necessary or contingent\nwhich, on account of its fitness, is preferred by God to its (equally\nconceivable) opposite. To the latter class belongs, further, the physically\nnecessary: the necessity of the laws of nature is only a conditional\nnecessity (conditioned by the choice of the best); they are contingent\ntruths or truths of fact. The principle of sufficient reason holds for\nefficient as well as for final causes, and between the two realms there is,\naccording to Leibnitz, the most complete correspondence. In the material\nworld every particular must be explained in a purely mechanical way, but\nthe totality of the laws of nature, the universal mechanism itself, cannot\nin turn be mechanically explained, but only on the basis of finality, so\nthat the mechanical point of view is comprehended in, and subordinated\nto, the teleological. Thus it becomes clear how Leibnitz in the _ratio\nsufficiens_ has final causes chiefly in mind.\n\n[Footnote 2: Within the knowledge of reason, as well as in experiential\nknowledge, a further distinction is made between primary truths (which\nneed no proof) and derived truths. The highest truths of reason are the\nidentical principles, which are self-evident; from these intuitive truths\nall others are to be derived by demonstration--proof is analysis and, as\nfree from contradictions, demonstration. The primitive truths of experience\nare the immediate facts of consciousness; whatever is inferred from them is\nless certain than demonstrative knowledge. Nevertheless experience is not\nto be estimated at a low value; it is through it alone that we can assure\nourselves of the reality of the objects of thought, while necessary truths\nguarantee only that a predicate must be ascribed to a subject (_e.g._, a\ncircle), but make no deliverance as to whether this subject exists or not.]\n\nTo the broad and comprehensive tendency which is characteristic of\nLeibnitz's thinking, philosophy owes a further series of general laws,\nwhich all stand in the closest relation to one another and to his\nmonadological and harmonistic principles, viz., the law of continuity, the\nlaw of analogy, the law of the universal dissimilarity of things or of the\nidentity of indiscernibles, and, finally, the law of the conservation of\nforce.\n\nThe most fundamental of these laws is the _lex continui_. On the one hand,\nit forbids every leap, on the other, all repetition in the series of beings\nand the series of events. Member must follow member without a break and\nwithout superfluous duplication; in the scale of creatures, as in the\ncourse of events, absolute continuity is the rule. Just as in the monad one\nstate continually develops from another, the present one giving birth\nto the future, as it has itself grown out of the past, just as nothing\npersists, as nothing makes its entrance suddenly or without the way being\nprepared for it, and as all extremes are bound together by connecting\nlinks and gradual transitions,--so the monad itself stands in a continuous\ngradation of beings, each of which is related to and different from each.\nSince the beings and events form a single uninterrupted series, there are\nno distinctions of kind in the world, but only distinctions in degree. Rest\nand motion are not opposites, for rest may be considered as infinitely\nminute motion; the ellipse and the parabola are not qualitatively\ndifferent, for the laws which hold for the one may be applied to the other.\nLikeness is vanishing unlikeness, passivity arrested activity, evil a\nlesser good, confused ideas simply less distinct ones, animals men with\ninfinitely little reason, plants animals with vanishing consciousness,\nfluidity a lower degree of solidity, etc. In the whole world similarity\nand correspondence rule, and it is everywhere the same as here--between\napparent opposites there is a distinction in degree merely, and hence,\nanalogy. In the macrocosm of the universe things go on as in the microcosm\nof the monad; every later state of the world is prefigured in the earlier,\netc. If, on the one side, the law of analogy follows as a consequence from\nthe law of continuity, on the other, we have the _principium (identitatis)\nindiscernibilium_. As nature abhors gaps, so also it avoids the\nsuperfluous. Every grade in the series must be represented, but none more\nthan once. There are no two things, no two events which are entirely alike.\nIf they were exactly alike they would not be two, but one. The distinction\nbetween them is never merely numerical, nor merely local and temporal, but\nalways an intrinsic difference: each thing is distinguished from every\nother by its peculiar nature. This law holds both for the truly real (the\nmonads) and for the phenomenal world--you will never find two leaves\nexactly alike. By the law of the conservation of force, Leibnitz corrects\nthe Cartesian doctrine of the conservation of motion, and approaches the\npoint of view of the present day. According to Descartes it is the sum of\nactual motions, which remains constant; according to Leibnitz, the sum of\nthe active forces; while, according to the modern theory, it is the sum of\nthe active and the latent or potential forces--a distinction, moreover, of\nwhich Leibnitz himself made use.\n\nWe now turn from the formal framework of general laws, to the actual, to\nthat which, obeying these laws, constitutes the living content of the\nworld.\n\n\n%2. The Organic World.%\n\nA living being is a machine composed of an infinite number of organs. The\nnatural machines formed by God differ from the artificial machines made by\nthe hand of man, in that, down to their smallest parts, they consist of\nmachines. Organisms are complexes of monads, of which one, the soul, is\nsupreme, while the rest, which serve it, form its body. The dominant monad\nis distinguished from those which surround it as its body by the greater\ndistinctness of its ideas. The supremacy of the soul-monad consists in this\none superior quality, that it is more active and more perfect, and clearly\nreflects that which the body-monads represent but obscurely. A direct\ninteraction between soul and body does not take place; there is only a\ncomplete correspondence, instituted by God. He foresaw that the soul at\nsuch and such a moment would have the sensation of warmth, or would wish an\narm-motion executed, and has so ordered the development of the body-monads\nthat, at the same instant, they appear to cause this sensation and to\nobey this impulse to move. Now, since God in this foreknowledge and\naccommodation naturally paid more regard to the perfect beings, to the more\nactive and more distinctly perceiving monads than to the less perfect ones,\nand subordinated the latter, as means and conditions, to the former\nas ends, the soul, prior to creation, actually exercised an ideal\ninfluence--through the mind of God--upon its body. Its activity is the\nreason why in less perfect monads a definite change, a passion takes place,\nsince the action was attainable only in this way, \"compossible\" with this\nalone.[1] The monads which constitute the body are the first and direct\nobject of the soul; it perceives them more distinctly than it perceives,\nthrough them, the rest of the external world. In view of the close\nconnection of the elements of the organism thus postulated, Leibnitz, in\nthe discussions with Father Des Bosses concerning the compatibility of\nthe Monadology with the doctrine of the Church, especially with the real\npresence of the body of Christ in the Supper, consented, in favor of\nthe dogma, to depart from the assumption that the simple alone could be\nsubstantial and to admit the possibility of composite substances, and of a\n\"substantial bond\" connecting the parts of living beings. It appears least\nin contradiction with the other principles of the philosopher to assign the\nr\u00f4le of this _vinculum substantiate_ to the soul or central monad itself.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Gustav Class, _Die metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des\nLeibnizischen Determinismus_, T\u00fcbingen, 1874.]\n\nEverything in nature is organized; there are no soulless bodies, no dead\nmatter. The smallest particle of dust is peopled with a multitude of living\nbeings and the tiniest drop of water swarms with organisms: every portion\nof matter may be compared to a pond filled with fish or a garden full of\nplants. This denial of the inorganic does not release our philosopher from\nthe duty of explaining its apparent existence. If we thoughtfully consider\nbodies, we perceive that there is nothing lifeless and non-representative.\nBut the phenomenon of extended mass arises for our confused sensuous\nperception, which perceives the monads composing a body together and\nregards them as a continuous unity. Body exists only as a confused idea\nin the feeling subject; since, nevertheless, a reality without the mind,\nnamely, an immaterial monad-aggregate, corresponds to it, the phenomenon\nof body is a well-founded one _(phenomenon bene fundatum)_. As matter is\nmerely something present in sensation or confused representation, so space\nand time are also nothing real, neither substances nor properties, but only\nideal things--the former the order of coexistences, the latter the order of\nsuccessions.\n\nIf there are no soulless bodies, there are also no bodiless souls; the soul\nis always joined with an aggregate of subordinate monads, though not always\nwith the same ones. Single monads are constantly passing into its body,\nor into its service, while others are passing out; it is involved in a\ncontinuous process of bodily transformation. Usually the change goes on\nslowly and with a constant replacement of the parts thrown off. If it takes\nplace quickly men call it birth or death. Actual death there is as little\nas there is an actual genesis; not the soul only, but every living thing\nis imperishable. Death is decrease and involution, birth increase and\nevolution. The dying creature loses only a portion of its bodily machine\nand so returns to the slumberous or germinal condition of \"involution\",\nin which it existed before birth, and from which it was aroused through\nconception to development. Pre-existence as well as post-existence must\nbe conceded both to animals and to men. Leuwenhoek's discovery of the\nspermatozoa furnished a welcome confirmation for this doctrine, that all\nindividuals have existed since the beginning of the world, at least as\npreformed germs. The immortality of man, conformably to his superior\ndignity, differs from the continued existence of all monads, in that after\nhis death he retains memory and the consciousness of his moral personality.\n\n\n%3. Man: Cognition and Volition.%\n\nIn reason man possesses reflection or self-consciousness as well as the\nknowledge of God, of the universal, and of the eternal truths or _a priori_\nknowledge, while the animal is limited in its perception to experience,\nand in its reasoning to the connection of perceptions in accordance with\nmemory. Man differs from higher beings in that the majority of his\nideas are confused. Under confused ideas Leibnitz includes both\nsense-perceptions--anyone who has distinct ideas alone, as God, has no\nsense-perceptions--and the feelings which mediate between the former and\nthe perfectly distinct ideas of rational thought. The delight of music\ndepends, in his opinion, on an unconscious numbering and measuring of\nthe harmonic and rhythmic relations of tones, aesthetic enjoyment of\nthe beautiful in general, and even sensuous pleasure, on the confused\nperception of a perfection, order, or harmony.\n\nThe application of the _lex continui_ to the inner life has a very wide\nrange. The principal results are: (1) the mind always thinks; (2) every\npresent idea postulates a previous one from which it has arisen; (3)\nsensation and thought differ only in degree; (4) in the order of time, the\nideas of sense precede those of reason. We are never wholly without ideas,\nonly we are often not conscious of them. If thought ceased in deep sleep,\nwe could have no ideas on awakening, since every representation proceeds\nfrom a preceding one, even though it be unconscious.\n\nIn the thoughtful _New Essays concerning the Human Understanding_ Leibnitz\ndevelops his theory of knowledge in the form of a polemical commentary\nto Locke's chief work.[1] According to Descartes some ideas (the pure\nconcepts) are innate, according to Locke none, according to Leibnitz all.\nOr: according to Descartes some ideas (sensuous perceptions) come from\nwithout, according to Locke all do so, according to Leibnitz none.\nLeibnitz agrees with Descartes against Locke in the position that the mind\noriginally possesses ideas; he agrees with Locke against Descartes, that\nthought is later than sensation and the knowledge of universals later\nthan that of particulars. The originality which Leibnitz attributes to\nintellectual ideas is different from that which Descartes had ascribed and\nLocke denied to them. They are original in that they do not come into the\nsoul and are not impressed upon it from without; they are not original in\nthat they can develop only from previously given sense-ideas; again, they\nare original in that they can be developed from confused ideas only because\nthey are contained in them _implicite_ or as pre-dispositions.\nThus Leibnitz is able to agree with both his predecessors up to a certain\npoint: with the one, that the pure concepts have their origin within the\nmind; with the other, that they are not the earliest knowledge, but are\nconditioned by sensations. This synthesis, however, was possible only\nbecause Leibnitz looked on sensation differently from both the others. If\nsensation is to be the mother of thought, and the latter at the same time\nto preserve its character as original, _i.e._, as something not obtained\nfrom without, sensation must, first, include an unconscious thinking in\nitself, and, secondly, must itself receive a title to originality and\nspontaneity. As the Catholic dogma added the immaculate conception of the\nmother to that of the Son, so Leibnitz transfers the (virginal) origin of\nrational concepts, independent of external influence, to sensations. The\nmonad has no windows. It bears germinally in itself all that it is to\nexperience, and nothing is impressed on it from without. The intellect\nshould not be compared to a blank tablet, but to a block of marble in whose\nveins the outlines of the statue are prefigured. Ideas can only arise from\nideas, never from external impressions or movements of corporeal parts.\nThus _all_ ideas are innate in the sense that they grow from inner germs;\nwe possess them from the beginning, not developed (_explicite_), but\npotentially, that is, we have the capacity to produce them. The old\nScholastic principle that \"there is nothing in the understanding which was\nnot previously in sense\" is entirely correct, only one must add, except the\nunderstanding itself, that is, the faculty of developing our knowledge\nout of ourselves. Thought lies already dormant in perception. With the\nmechanical position (sensuous representation precedes and conditions\nrational thought) is joined the teleological position (sensuous\nrepresentations exist, in order to render the origin of thoughts possible),\nand with this purposive determination, sensation attains a higher dignity:\nit is more than has been seen in it before, for it includes in itself the\nfuture concept of the understanding in an unconscious form, nay, it is\nitself an imperfect thought, a thought in process of becoming. Sensation\nand thought are not different in kind, and if the former is called a\npassive state, still passivity is nothing other than diminished activity.\nBoth are spontaneous; thought is merely spontaneous in a higher degree.\n\n[Footnote 1: A careful comparison of Locke's theory of knowledge with\nthat of Leibnitz is given by G. Hartenstein, _Abhandlungen der k. s\u00e4chs.\nGesellschaft der Wissenschaften_, Leipsic, 1865, included in Hartenstein's\n_Historisch-philosophische Abhandlungen_, 1870.]\n\nBy making sensation and feeling the preliminary step to thought, Leibnitz\nbecame the founder of that intellectualism which, in the system of Hegel,\nextended itself far beyond the psychological into the cosmical field, and\nendeavored to conceive not only all psychical phenomena but all reality\nwhatsoever as a development of the Idea toward itself. This conception,\nwhich may be characterized as intellectualistic in its content, presents\nitself on its formal side as a quantitative way of looking at the world,\nwhich sacrifices all qualitative antitheses in order to arrange the\ntotality of being and becoming in a single series with no distinctions but\nthose of degree. If Leibnitz here appears as the representative of a view\nof the world which found in Kant a powerful and victorious opponent, yet,\non the other hand, he prepared the way by his conception of innate ideas\nfor the Critique of Reason. By his theory of knowledge he forms the\ntransition link between Descartes and Kant, since he interprets necessary\ntruths not as dwelling in the mind complete and explicit from the start,\nbut as produced or raised into consciousness only on the occasion of\nsensuous experience. It must be admitted, moreover, that this in reality\nwas only a restoration of Descartes's original position, _i.e._, a\ndeliverance of it from the misinterpretations and perversions which it\nhad suffered at the hands of adherents and opponents alike, but which\nDescartes, it is true, had failed to render impossible from the start by\nconclusive explanations. The author of the theory of innate ideas certainly\ndid not mean what Locke foists upon him, that the child in the cradle\nalready possesses the ideas of God, of thought, and of extension in full\nclearness. But whether Leibnitz improved or only restored Descartes, it was\nin any case an important advance when experience and thought were brought\ninto more definite relation, and the productive force in rational concepts\nwas secured to the latter and the occasion of their production to the\nformer.\n\nThe unconscious or minute ideas, which in no\u00ebtics had served to break the\nforce of Locke's objections against the innateness of the principles of\nreason, are in ethics brought into the field against indeterminism. They\nare involved whenever we believe ourselves to act without cause, from pure\nchoice, or contrary to the motives present. In this last case, a motive\nwhich is very strong in itself is overcome by the united power of many in\nthemselves weaken The will is always determined, and that by an idea (of\nends), which generally is of a very complex nature, and in which the\nstronger side decides the issue. An absolute equilibrium of motives is\nimpossible: the world cannot be divided into two entirely similar parts\n(this in opposition to \"Buridan's ass\"). A spirit capable of looking us\nthrough and through would be able to calculate all our volitions and\nactions beforehand.\n\nIn spite of this admitted inevitableness of our resolutions and actions,\nthe predicate of freedom really belongs to them, and this on two grounds.\nFirst, they are only physically or morally, not metaphysically, necessary;\nas a matter of fact, it is true, they cannot happen otherwise, but their\nopposite involves no logical contradiction and remains conceivable. To\nexpress this thought the formula, often repeated since, that our\nmotives only impel, incite, or stimulate the will, but do not compel it\n(_inclinant, non necessitant_), was chosen, but not very happily. Secondly,\nthe determination of the will is an inner necessitation, grounded in the\nbeing's own nature, not an external compulsion. The agent determines\nhimself in accordance with his own nature, and for this each bears the\nresponsibility himself, for God, when he brought the monads out of\npossibility into actuality, left their natures as they had existed before\nthe creation in the form of eternal ideas in His understanding. Though\nLeibnitz thus draws a distinction between his deterministic doctrine and\nthe \"fatalism\" of Spinoza, he recognizes a second concept of freedom, which\ncompletely corresponds to Spinoza's. A decision is the more free the more\ndistinct the ideas which determine it, and a man the more free the more he\nwithdraws his will from the influence of the passions, _i.e._, confused\nideas, and subordinates it to that of reason. God alone is absolutely free,\nbecause he has no ideas which are not distinct. The bridge between the\ntwo conceptions of freedom is established by the principle that reason\nconstitutes the peculiar nature of man in a higher degree than the sum of\nhis ideas; for it is reason which distinguishes him from the lower beings.\nAccording to the first meaning of freedom man is free, according to the\nsecond, which coincides with activity, perfection, and morality, he should\nbecome free.\n\nMorality is the result of the natural development of the individual. Every\nbeing strives after perfection or increased activity, _i.e._, after more\ndistinct ideas. Parallel to this theoretical advance runs a practical\nadvance in a twofold form: the increasing distinctness of ideas, or\nenlightenment, or wisdom, raises the impulse to transitory, sensuous\npleasure into an impulse to permanent delight in our spiritual perfection,\nor toward happiness, while, further, it opens up an insight into the\nconnection of all beings and the harmony of the world, in virtue of which\nthe virtuous man will seek to promote the perfection and happiness of\nothers as well as his own, _i.e._, will _love_ them, for to love is to find\npleasure in the happiness of others. To promote the good of all, again,\nis the same as to contribute one's share to the world-harmony and to\nco-operate in the fulfillment of God's purposes. Probity and piety are the\nsame. They form the highest of the three grades of natural right, which\nLeibnitz distinguishes as _jus strictum_ (mere right, with the principle:\nInjure no one), _aequitas_ (equity or charity, with the maxim: To each\nhis due), and _probitas sive pietas_ (honorableness joined with religion,\naccording to the command: Lead an upright and morally pure life). They may\nalso be designated as commutative, distributive, and universal justice.\nBelief in God and immortality is a condition of the last.\n\n\n%4. Theology and Theodicy.%\n\nGod is the ground and the end of the world. All beings strive toward him,\nas all came out from him. In man the general striving toward the most\nperfect Being rises into conscious love to God, which is conditioned by the\nknowledge of God and produces virtuous action as its effect. Enlightenment\nand virtue are the essential constituents of religion; all else, as cultus\nand dogma, have only a derivative value. Religious ceremonies are an\nimperfect expression of the practical element in piety, as the doctrines of\nfaith are a weak imitation of the theoretical. It is a direct contradiction\nof the intention of the Divine Teacher when occult formulas and ceremonies,\nwhich have no connection with virtue, are made the chief thing. The points\nin which the creeds agree are more important than those by which they are\ndifferentiated. Natural religion has found its most perfect expression in\nChristianity, although paganism and Judaism had also grasped portions of\nthe truth. Salvation is not denied to the heathen, for moral purity is\nsufficient to make one a partaker of the grace of God. The religion of the\nJews elevated monotheism, which, it is true, made its appearance among the\nheathen in isolated philosophers, but was never the popular religion, into\na law; but it lacked the belief in immortality. Christianity made the\nreligion of the sage the religion of the people.\n\nWhatever of positive doctrine revelation has added to natural religion\ntranscends the reason, it is true, but does not contradict it. It contains\nno principles contrary to reason (whose opposite can be proved), but, no\ndoubt, principles above reason, _i.e._, such as the reason could not have\nfound without help from without, and which it cannot fully comprehend,\nthough it is able approximately to understand them and to defend them\nagainst objections. Hence Leibnitz defended the Trinity, which he\ninterpreted as God's power, understanding, and will, the eternity of the\ntorments of hell (which brought him the commendation of Lessing), and other\ndogmas. Miracles also belong among the things the how and why of which we\nare not in a position to comprehend, but only the that and what. Since the\nlaws of nature are only physically or conditionally necessary, _i.e._ have\nbeen enacted only because of their fitness for the purposes of God, they\nmay be suspended in special cases when a higher end requires it.\n\nWhile the positive doctrines of faith cannot be proved--as, on the other\nhand, they cannot be refuted--the principles of natural religion admit of\nstrict demonstration. The usual arguments for the existence of God are\nuseful, but need amendment. The ontological argument of Descartes, that\nfrom the concept of a most perfect Being his existence follows, is\ncorrect so soon as the idea of God is shown to be possible or free from\ncontradiction. The cosmological proof runs: Contingent beings point to a\nnecessary, self-existent Being, the eternal truths especially presuppose an\neternal intelligence in which they exist. If we ask why anything whatever,\nor why just this world exists, this ultimate ground of things cannot be\nfound within the world. Every contingent thing or event has its cause in\nanother. However far we follow out the series of conditions, we never reach\nan ultimate, unconditioned cause. Consequently the sufficient reason for\nthe series must be situated without the world, and, as is evident from the\nharmony of things, can only be an infinitely wise and good Being. Here the\nteleological proof comes in: From the finality of the world we reason to\nthe existence of a Being, as the author of the world, who works in view\nof ends and who wills and carries out that which is best,--to the supreme\nintelligence, goodness, and power of the Creator. A special inferential\nvalue accrues to this position from the system of pre-established\nharmony--it is manifest that the complete correspondence of the manifold\nsubstances in the world, which are not connected with one another by any\ndirect interaction, can proceed only from a common cause endowed with\ninfinite intelligence and power.\n\nThe possibility of proving the existence of one omnipotent and\nall-beneficent God, and the impossibility of refuting the positive\ndogmas, save the harmony of faith and reason, which Bayle had denied.\nThe conclusion of the _New Essays_ and the opening of the _Theodicy_ are\ndevoted to this theme. The second part gives, also against Bayle, the\njustification of God in view of the evil in the world. _Si Deus est, unde\nmalum_? Optimism has to reckon with the facts of experience, and to show\nthat this world, in spite of its undeniable imperfections, is still the\nbest world. God could certainly have brought into actuality a world in\nwhich there would have been less imperfection than in ours, but it would at\nthe same time have contained fewer perfections. No world whatever can exist\nentirely free from evil, entirely without limitation--whoever forbids God\nto create imperfect beings forbids him to create a world at all. Certain\nevils--in general terms, the evil of finitude--are entirely inseparable\nfrom the concept of created beings; imperfection attaches to every created\nthing as such. Other evils God has permitted because it was only through\nthem that certain higher goods, which ought not to be renounced, could be\nbrought to pass. Think of the lofty feelings, noble resolves, and great\ndeeds which war occasions, think of national enthusiasm, readiness for\nsacrifice, and defiance of death--all these would be given over, if war\nshould be taken out of the world on account of the suffering which it also\nbrings in its train.\n\nIf we turn from the general principles to their application in detail, we\nfind a separate proof for the inevitableness or salutary nature of each of\nthe three kinds of evil--the metaphysical evil of created existence, the\nphysical evil of suffering (and punishment), and the moral evil of sin.\nMetaphysical evil is absolutely unavoidable, if a world is to exist at all;\ncreated beings without imperfection, finiteness, limitation, are entirely\ninconceivable--something besides gods must exist. The physical evil of\nmisery finds its justification in that it makes for good. First of all, the\namount of suffering is not so great as it appears to discontented spirits\nto be. Life is usually quite tolerable, and vouchsafes more joy and\npleasure than grief and hardship; in balancing the good and the evil we\nmust especially remember to reckon on the positive side the goods of\nactivity, of health, and all that which affords us, perchance, no\nperceptible pleasure, but the removal of which would be felt as an evil\n(_Theodicy_, ii. \u00a7 251). Most evils serve to secure us a much greater good,\nor to ward off a still greater evil. Would a brave general, if given the\nchoice of leaving the battle unwounded, but also without the victory, or of\nwinning the victory at the cost of a wound, hesitate an instant to choose\nthe latter? Other troubles, again, must be regarded as punishment for sins\nand as means of reformation; the man who is resigned to God's will may be\ncertain that the sufferings which come to him will turn out for his good.\n\nEspecially if we consider the world as a whole, it is evident that the\nsum of evil vanishes before the sum of good. It is wrong to look upon the\nhappiness of man as the end of the world. Certainly God had the happiness\nof rational beings in mind, but not this exclusively, for they form only\na part of the world, even if it be the highest part. God's purpose has\nreference rather to the perfection of the whole system of the universe. Now\nthe harmony of the universe requires that all possible grades of reality\nbe represented, that there should be indistinct ideas, sense, and\ncorporeality, not merely a realm of spirits, and with these, conditions\nof imperfection, feelings of pain, and theoretical and moral errors are\ninevitably given. The connection and the order of the world demands a\nmaterial element in the monad, but happiness without alloy can never be the\nlot of a spirit joined to a body. Thirdly, in regard to moral evil also we\nreceive the assurance that the sum of the bad is much less than that of the\ngood. Then, moral evil is connected with metaphysical evil: created beings\ncannot be absolutely perfect, hence, also, not morally perfect or sinless.\nBut, in return for this, there is no being that is absolutely imperfect,\nnone only and entirely evil. With this is joined the well-known principle\nof the earlier thinkers, that evil is nothing actual, but merely\ndeprivation, absence of good, lack of clear reason and force of will. That\nwhich is real in the evil action, the power to act, is perfect and good,\nand, as force, comes from God--the negative or evil element in it comes\nfrom the agent himself; just as in the case of two ships of the same size,\nbut unequally laden, which drift with the current, the speed comes from the\nstream and the retardation from the load of the vessels themselves. God\nis not responsible for sin, for he has only permitted it, not willed it\ndirectly, and man was already evil before he was created. The fact that God\nforesaw that man would sin does not constrain the latter to commit the\nevil deed, but this follows from his own (eternal) being, which God left\nunaltered when he granted him existence. The guilt and the responsibility\nfall wholly on the sinner himself. The permission of evil is explained by\nthe predominantly good results which follow from it (not, as in physical\nevil, for the sufferer himself, but for others)--from the crime of Sextus\nTarquinius sprang a great kingdom with great men (of. the beautiful myth in\nconnection with a dialogue of Laurentius Valla, _Theodicy,_ iii. 413-416).\nFinally, reference is made again to the contribution which evil makes to\nthe perfection of the whole. Evil has the same function in the world as the\ndiscords in a piece of music, or the shadows in a painting--the beauty is\nheightened by the contrast. The good needs a foil in order to come out\ndistinctly and to be felt in all its excellence.\n\nIn the Leibnitzian theodicy the least satisfactory part is the\njustification of moral evil. We miss the view defended in such grand\noutlines by Hegel, and so ingeniously by Fechner, that the good is not\nthe flower of a quiet, unmolested development, but the fruit of energetic\nlabor; that it has need of its opposite; that it not merely must approve\nitself in the battle against evil without and within the acting subject,\nbut that it is only through this conflict that it is attainable at all.\nVirtue implies force of will as well as purity, and force develops only\nby resistance. Although he does not appreciate the full depth of the\nsignificance of pain, Leibnitz's view of suffering deserves more approval\nthan his questionable application to the ethical sphere of the quantitative\nview of the world, with its interpretation of evil as merely undeveloped\ngood. But, in any case, the compassionate contempt of the pessimism of the\nday for the \"shallow\" Leibnitz is most unjustifiable.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE GERMAN ILLUMINATION.\n\n\n%1. The Contemporaries of Leibnitz.%\n\nThe period between Kepler and Leibnitz in Germany was very poor in\nnoteworthy philosophical phenomena. The physicist, Christoph Sturm[1] of\nAltdorf (died 1703), was a follower of Descartes, Joachim Jungius[2] (died\n1657) a follower of Bacon, though not denying with the latter the value of\nthe mathematical method in natural science. Hieronymus Hirnhaym, Abbot at\nPrague (_The Plague of the Human Race, or the Vanity of Human Learning_,\n1676), declared the thirst for knowledge of his age a dangerous disease,\nknowledge uncertain, since no reliance can be placed on sense-perception\nand the principles of thought contradict the doctrines of faith, and\nharmful, since it contributes nothing to salvation, but makes its\npossessors proud and draws them away from piety. He maintained, further,\nthat divine authority is the only refuge for man, and moral life the true\nscience. Side by side with such skepticism Hirnhaym's contemporary, the\npoet Angelus Silesius (Joh. Scheffler, died 1667), defended mysticism.\nThe teacher of natural law, Samuel Pufendorf[3] (1632-94, professor in\nHeidelberg and Lund, died in Berlin), aimed to mediate between Grotius and\nHobbes. Natural law is demonstrable, its real ground is the will of God,\nits no\u00ebtical ground (not revelation, but) reason and observation of the\n(social) nature of man, and the fundamental law the promotion of universal\ngood. The individual must not violate the interests of society in\nsatisfying his impulse to self-preservation, because his own interests\nrequire social existence, and, consequently, respect for its conditions.\n\n[Footnote 1: Chr. Sturm: _Physica Conciliatrix_, 1687; _Physica Electiva_,\nvol. i. 1697, vol. ii. with preface by Chr. Wolff, 1722; _Compendium\nUniversalium seu Metaphysica Euclidea_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: J. Jung _Logica Hamburgiensis_, 1638; cf. Guhrauer, 1859.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Pufendorf: _Elementa Juris Universalis_, 1660; _De Statu\nImperii Germanici_, 1667, under the pseudonym Monzambano; _De Jure Natures\net Gentium_ 1672, and an abstract of this, _De Officio Hominis et Civis_,\n1673.]\n\nPufendorf was followed by Christian Thomasius[1] (1655-1728; professor of\nlaw at the University of Halle from its foundation in 1694). He was\nthe first instructor who ventured to deliver lectures in the German\nlanguage--in Leipsic from 1687--and at the same time was the editor of the\nfirst learned journal in German (_Teutsche Monate, Geschichte der Weisheit\nund Thorheit_). In Thomasius the characteristic features of the German\nIllumination first came out in full distinctness, namely, the avoidance of\nscholasticism in expression and argument, the direct relation of knowledge\nto life, sober rationality in thinking, heedless eclecticism, and the\ndemand for religious tolerance. Philosophy must be generally intelligible,\nand practically useful, knowledge of the world (not of God); its form, free\nand tasteful ratiocination; its object, man and morals; its first duty,\nculture, not learning; its highest aim, happiness; its organ and the\ncriterion of every truth, common sense. He alone gains true knowledge who\nfrees his understanding from prejudice and judges only after examining for\nhimself; the joy of mental peace is given to no one who does not free his\nheart from foolish desires and vehement passions, and devote it to virtue,\nto \"rational love.\" The positive doctrines of Thomasius have less interest\nthan this general standpoint, which prefigured the succeeding period. He\ndivides practical philosophy into natural law which treats of the _justum_,\npolitics which treats of the _decorum_, and ethics which treats of the\n_honestum_. Justice bids us, Do not to others what you would not that\nothers should do to you; decorum, Do to others as you would that they\nshould do to you; and morality, Do to yourself as you would that others\nshould do to themselves. The first two laws relate to external, the third\nto internal, peace; legal duties may be enforced by compulsion, moral\nduties not.\n\n[Footnote 1: Thomasius: _Institutionum Jurisprudentiae Divinae Libri Tres_,\n1688; _Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium_, 1705, both in Latin; in\nGerman, appeared in 1691-96 the _Introduction and Application of Rational\nand Moral Philosophy_.]\n\nIf Thomasius was the leader of those popular philosophers who, unconcerned\nabout systematic continuity, discussed every question separately before\nthe tribunal of common sense, and found in their lack of allegiance to\nany philosophical sect a sufficient guarantee of the unprejudicedness\nand impartiality of their reflections, Count Walter von Tschirnhausen\n(1651-1708; _Medecina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Praecepta Generalia_,\n1687), a friend of Spinoza and Leibnitz, became the prototype of another\ngroup of the philosophers of the Illumination. This group favored\neclecticism of a more scientific kind, by starting from considerations\nof method and seeking to overcome the antithesis between rationalism and\nempiricism. While fully persuaded of the validity and necessity of the\nmathematical method in philosophical investigations, as well as elsewhere,\nTschirnhausen still holds it indispensable that the deductions, on the one\nhand, start from empirical facts, and, on the other, that they be confirmed\nby experiments. Inner experience gives us four primal facts, of which the\nchief is the certainty of self-consciousness. The second, that many things\naffect us agreeably and many disagreeably, is the basis of morals; the\nthird, that some things are comprehensible to us and others not, the\nbasis of logic; the fourth, that through the senses we passively receive\nimpressions from without, the basis of the empirical sciences, in\nparticular, of physics. Consequently consciousness, will, understanding,\nand sensuous representation _(imaginatio)_, together with corporeality,\nare our fundamental concepts. Not perception _(perceptio)_, but conception\n_(conceptio)_ alone gives science; that which we can \"conceive\" is true;\nthe understanding as such cannot err, but undoubtedly the imagination can\nlead us to confuse the merely perceived with that which is conceived. The\nmethod of science is geometrical demonstration, which starts from\n(genetic) definitions, and from their analysis obtains axioms, from their\ncombination, theorems. That which is thus proved _a priori_ must, as\nalready remarked, be confirmed _a posteriori_. The highest of all sciences\nis natural philosophy, since it considers not sense-objects only, not (like\nmathematics) the objects of reason only, but the actual itself in its true\ncharacter. Hence it is the divine science, while the human sciences busy\nthemselves only with our ideas or the relations of things to us.\n\n\n%2. Christian Wolff.%\n\nChristian Wolff was born at Breslau in 1679, studied theology at Jena, and\nin addition mathematics and philosophy, habilitated at Leipsic in 1703,\nand obtained, through the instrumentality of Leibnitz, a professorship of\nmathematics at Halle, in 1706. His lectures, which soon extended themselves\nover all philosophical disciplines, met with great success. This\npopularity, as well as the rationalistic tendency of his thinking, aroused\nthe disfavor of the pietists, Francke and Lange, who succeeded, in 1723, in\nsecuring from King Frederick William I. his removal from his chair and his\nexpulsion from the kingdom. Finding a refuge in Marburg, he was called back\nto Halle by Frederick the Great a short time after the latter's ascension\nof the throne. Here he taught and wrote zealously until his death in 1754.\nIn his lectures, as well as in half of his writings,[1] he followed the\nexample of Thomasius in using the German language, which he prepared in\na most praiseworthy manner for the expression of philosophical ideas and\nfurnished with a large part of the technical terms current to-day. Thus\nthe terms _Verh\u00e4ltniss_ (relation), _Vorstellung_ (representation, idea),\n_Bewusstsein_ (consciousness), _stetig (continuus)_, come from Wolff, as\nwell as the distinction between _Kraft_ (power) and _Verm\u00f6gen_ (faculty),\nand between _Grund_ (ground) and _Ursache_ (cause),[2] Another great\nservice consisted in the reduction of the philosophy of Leibnitz to a\nsystematic form, by which he secured a dissemination for it which otherwise\nit would scarcely have obtained. But he did not possess sufficient\noriginality to contribute anything remarkable of his own, and it showed\nlittle self-knowledge when he became indignant at the designation\nLeibnitzio-Wolffian philosophy, which was first used by his pupil,\nBilfinger. The alterations which he made in the doctrines of Leibnitz are\nfar from being improvements, and the parts which he rejected are just the\nmost characteristic and thoughtful of all. Such at least is the opinion\nof thinkers to-day, though this mutilation and leveling down of the most\ndaring of Leibnitz's hypotheses was perhaps entirely advantageous for\nWolff's impression on his contemporaries; what appeared questionable to him\nwould no doubt have repelled them also. Leibnitz's two leading ideas, the\ntheory of monads and the pre-established harmony, were most of all affected\nby this process of toning down. Wolff weakens the former by attributing\na representative power only to actual souls, which are capable of\nconsciousness, although he holds that bodies are compounded of simple\nbeings and that the latter are endowed with (a not further defined) force.\nHe limits the application of the pre-established harmony to the relation of\nbody and soul, which to Leibnitz was only a case especially favorable for\nthe illustration of the hypothesis. By such trifling the real meaning of\nboth these ideas is sacrificed and their bloom rubbed off.--While depth\nis lacking in Wolff's thinking, he is remarkable for his power of\nsystematization, his persevering diligence, and his logical earnestness,\nso that the praise bestowed on him by Kant, that he was the author of the\nspirit of thoroughness in Germany, was well deserved. He, too, finds\nthe end of philosophy in the enlightenment of the understanding, the\nimprovement of the heart, and, ultimately, in the promotion of the\nhappiness of mankind. But while Thomasius demanded as a condition of such\nuniversal intelligibility and usefulness that, discarding the scholastic\ngarb, philosophy should appear in the form of easy ratiocination, Wolff, on\nthe other hand, regards methodical procedure and certainty in results as\nindispensable to its usefulness, and, in order to this certainty,\ninsists on distinctness of conception and cogency of proof. He demands\na _philosophia et certa et utilis_. If, finally, his methodical\ndeliberateness, especially in his later works, leads him into wearisome\ndiffuseness, this pedantry is made good by his genuinely German, honest\nspirit, which manifests itself agreeably in his judgment on practical\nquestions.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Reasonable Thoughts on the Powers of the Human\nUnderstanding_, 1712; _Reasonable Thoughts on God, the World, and the\nSoul of Man, also on All Things in General_, 1719 (_Notes_ to this 1724);\n_Reasonable Thoughts on the Conduct of Man_, 1720; _Reasonable Thoughts on\nthe Social Life of Man_, 1721; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Operations of\nNature_, 1723; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Purposes of Natural Things_,\n1724; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Parts of Man, Animals, and Plants_, 1725,\nall in German. Besides these there are extensive Latin treatises (1728-53)\non Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Empirical and Rational Psychology, Natural\nTheology, and all branches of Practical Philosophy. Detailed extracts may\nbe found in Erdmann's _Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung_, ii.\n2. The best account of the Wolffian philosophy has been given by Zeller\n(pp. 211-273).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Eucken, _Geschichte der Terminologie_^ pp. 133-134.]\n\nWolff reaches his division of the sciences by combining the two\npsychological antitheses--the higher (rational) and lower (sensuous)\nfaculties of cognition and appetition. On the first is based the\ndistinction between the rational and the empirical or historical method of\ntreatment. The latter concerns itself with the actual, the former with the\npossible and necessary, or the grounds of the actual; the one observes and\ndescribes, the other deduces. The antithesis of cognition and appetition\ngives the basis for the division into theoretical and practical philosophy.\nThe former, called metaphysics, is divided into a general part, which\ntreats of being in general whether it be of a corporeal or a spiritual\nnature, and three special parts, according to their principal subjects, the\nworld, the soul, and God,--hence into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and\ntheology. The science which establishes rules for action and regards man as\nan individual being, as a citizen, and as the head or member of a family,\nis divided (after Aristotle) into ethics, politics, and economics, which\nare preceded by practical philosophy in general, and by natural law. The\nintroduction to the two principal parts is furnished by formal logic.\n\nPhilosophy is the science of the possible, _i.e._, of that which contains\nno contradiction; it is science from concepts, its principle, the law of\nidentity, its form, demonstration, and its instrument, analysis, which in\nthe predicate explicates the determinations contained in the concept of the\nsubject. In order to confirm that which has been deduced from pure concepts\nby the facts of experience, _psychologia rationalis_ is supplemented by\n_psychologia empirica_, rational cosmology by empirical physics, and\nspeculative theology by an experimental doctrine of God (teleology). Wolff\ngives no explanation how it comes about that the deliverances of the\nreason agree so beautifully with the facts of experience; in his na\u00efve,\nunquestioning belief in the infallibility of the reason he is a typical\ndogmatist.\n\nA closer examination of the Wolffian philosophy seems unnecessary, since\nits most essential portions have already been discussed under Leibnitz and\nsince it will be necessary to recur to certain points in our chapter on\nKant. Therefore, referring the reader to the detailed accounts in Erdmann\nand Zeller, we shall only note that Wolff's ethics opposes the principle\nof perfection to the English principle of happiness (that is good which\nperfects man's condition, and this is life in conformity with nature or\nreason, with which happiness is necessarily connected); that he makes the\nwill determined by the understanding, and assigns ignorance as the cause of\nsin; that his philosophy of religion, which argues for a natural religion\nin addition to revealed religion (experiential and rational proofs for the\nexistence of God, and a deduction of his attributes), and sets up certain\ntests for the genuineness of revelation, favors a rationalism which was\nflexible enough to allow his pupils either to take part in orthodox\nmovements or to advance to a deism hostile to the Church.\n\nAmong the followers of Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62) deserves\nthe first place, as the founder of German aesthetics _(Aesthetica_, 1750\n_seq_.). He perceives a gap in the system of the philosophical sciences.\nThis contains in ethics a guide to right volition, and in logic a guide\nto correct thinking, but there are no directions for correct feeling, no\naesthetic. The beautiful would form the subject of this discipline. For the\nperfection (the harmonious unity of a manifold, which is pleasant to the\nspectator), which manifests itself to the will as the good and to the\nclear thinking of the understanding as the true, appears--according to\nLeibnitz--to confused sensuous perception as beauty. From this on the name\naesthetics was established for the theory of the beautiful, though in\nKant's great work it is used in its literal meaning as the doctrine of\nsense, of the faculty of sensations or intuitions. Baumgarten's pupils\nand followers, the aesthetic writer G.F. Meier at Halle, Baumeister, and\nothers, contributed like himself to the dissemination of the Wolffian\nsystem by their manuals on different branches of philosophy. To this school\nbelong also the following: Th\u00fcmmig (_Institutiones Philosophia Wolfianae_,\n1725-26); the theologian Siegmund Baumgarten at Halle, the elder brother\nof the aesthete; the mathematician Martin Knutzen, Kant's teacher;[1] the\nliterary historian Gottsched [2] at Leipsic; and G. Ploucquet, who in\nhis _Methodus Calculandi in Logicis_, with a _Commentatio de Arte\nCharacteristica Universali_ appended to his _Principia de Substantiis et\nPhaenomenis_, 1753, took up again Leibnitz's cherished plan for a logical\ncalculus and a universal symbolic language. The psychologist Kasimir von\nCreuz (_Essay on the Soul_, in two parts, 1753-54), and J.H. Lambert,[3]\nwhom Kant deemed worthy of a detailed correspondence, take up a more\nindependent position, both demanding that the Wolffian rationalism be\nsupplemented by the empiricism of Locke, and the latter, moreover, in\nanticipation of the Critique of Reason, pointing very definitely to the\ndistinction between content and form as the salient point in the theory of\nknowledge.\n\n[Footnote 1: Benno Erdmann, _M. Knutzen und seine Zeit_, 1876.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Th. W. Danzel, _Gottsched und seine Zeit_, 1848.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Lambert: _Cosmological Letters_, 1761; _New Organon_, 1764;\n_Groundwork of Architectonics_, 1771. Bernoulli edited some of Lambert's\npapers and his correspondence.]\n\nAmong the opponents of the Wolffian philosophy, all of whom favor\neclecticism, A. R\u00fcdiger[1] and Chr. Aug. Crusius,[2] who was influenced by\nR\u00fcdiger, and, like him, a professor at Leipsic, are the most important.\nR\u00fcdiger divides philosophy according to its objects, \"wisdom, justice,\nprudence,\" into three parts--the science of nature (which must avoid\none-sided mechanical views, and employ ether, air, and spirit as principles\nof explanation); the science of duty (which, as metaphysics, treats of\nduties toward God, as natural law, of duties to our neighbor, and deduces\nboth from the primary duty of obedience to the will of God); and the\nscience of the good (in which R\u00fcdiger follows the treatise of the Spaniard,\nGracian, on practical wisdom). Crusius agrees with R\u00fcdiger that mathematics\nis the science of the possible, and philosophy the science of the actual,\nand that the latter, instead of imitating to its own disadvantage the\ndeductive-analytical method of geometry, must, with the aid of experience\nand with attention to the probability of its conclusions, rise to the\nhighest principles synthetically. Besides its deduction the determinism\nof the Wolffian philosophy gave offense, for it was believed to endanger\nmorals, justice, and religion. The will, the special fundamental power of\nthe soul (consisting of the impulses to perfection, love, and knowledge),\nis far from being determined by ideas; it is rather they which depend on\nthe will. The application of the principle of sufficient reason, which is\nwrongly held to admit of no exception, must be restricted in favor of\nfreedom. For the rest, we may note concerning Crusius that he derives the\nprinciple of sufficient reason (everything which is now, and before was\nnot, has a cause) and the principle of contingency from the principles of\ncontradiction, inseparability, and incompatibility, and these latter from\nthe principle of conceivability; that he rejects the ontological argument,\nand makes the ground of obligation in morality consist in obedience toward\nGod, and its content in perfection. Among the other opponents of the\nWolffian philosophy, we may mention the theologian Budde(us)[3]\n_(Institutiones Philosophiae Eclecticae_, 1705); Darjes (who taught in Jena\nand Frankfort-on-the-Oder; _The Way to Truth_, 1755); and Crousaz (1744).\n\n[Footnote 1: R\u00fcdiger: _Disputatio de eo quod Omnes Idea Oriantur a\nSensione_, 1704; _Philosophia Synthetica_, 1707; _Physica Divina_, 1716;\n_Philosophia Pragmatica_, 1723.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Crusius: _De Usu et Limitibus Principii Rationis_, 1743;\n_Directions how to Live a Rational Life_ (theory of the will and of\nethics), 1744; _A Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason_, 1745; _Way to\nthe Certainty and Trustworthiness of Human Knowledge_, 1747.]\n\n[Footnote 3: J.J. Brucker _(Historia Critica Philosophiae_, 5 vols.,\n1742-44; 2d ed., 6 vols., 1766-67) was a pupil of Budde.]\n\n\n%3. The Illumination as Scientific and as Popular Philosophy.%\n\nAfter a demand for the union of Leibnitz and Locke, of rationalism and\nempiricism, had been raised within the Wolffian school itself, and still\nmore directly in the camp of its opponents, under the increasing influence\nof the empirical philosophy of England,[1] eclecticism in the spirit of\nThomasius took full possession of the stage in the Illumination period.\nThere was the less hesitation in combining principles derived from entirely\ndifferent postulates without regard to their systematic connection, as\nthe interest in scholastic investigation gave place more and more to the\ninterest in practical and reassuring results. Metaphysics, no\u00ebtics, and\nnatural philosophy were laid aside as useless subtleties, and, as in the\nperiod succeeding Aristotle, man as an individual and whatever directly\nrelates to his welfare--the constitution of his inner nature, his duties,\nthe immortality of the soul, and the existence of God--became the exclusive\nsubjects of reflection. The fact that, besides ethics and religion,\npsychology was chosen as a favorite field, is in complete harmony with the\ngeneral temper of an age for which self-observation and the enjoyment of\ntender and elevated feelings in long, delightfully friendly letters and\nsentimental diaries had become a favorite habit. Hand in hand with this\nnarrowing of the content of philosophy went a change in the form of\npresentation. As thinkers now addressed themselves to all cultivated\npeople, intelligibility and agreeableness were made the prime requisites;\nthe style became light and flowing, the method of treatment facile and\noften superficial. This is true not only of the popular philosophers\nproper--who, as Windelband pertinently remarks (vol. i. p. 563), did not\nseek after the truth, but believed that they already possessed it, and\ndesired only to disseminate it; who did not aim at the promotion of\ninvestigation, but the instruction of the public--but to a certain extent,\nalso, of those who were conscious of laboring in the service of science.\nAmong the representatives of the more polite tendency belong, Moses\nMendelssohn[2] (1729-86); Thomas Abbt (_On Death for the Fatherland_, 1761;\n_On Merit_, 1765); J.J. Engel (_The philosopher for the World_, 1775); G.S.\nSteinbart (_The Christian Doctrine of Happiness_, 1778); Ernst Platner\n(_Philosophical Aphorisms_, 1776, 1782; on Platner cf. M. Heinze, 1880);\nG.C. Lichtenberg (died 1799; _Miscellaneous Writings_, 1800 _seq_.; a\nselection is given in _Reclam's Bibliothek_); Christian Garve (died 1798;\n_Essays_, 1792 _seq.; Translations from the Ethical Works of Aristotle,\nCicero, and Ferguson_); and Friedrich Nicolai[3] (died 1811). Eberhard,\nFeder, and Meiners will be mentioned later among the opponents of the\nKantian philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 1: The influence of the English philosophers on the German\nphilosophy of the eighteenth century is discussed by Gustav Zart, 1881.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Mendelssohn: _Letters on the Sensations_, 1755; _On Evidence\nin the Metaphysical Sciences_, a prize essay crowned by the Academy, 1764;\n_Phaedo, or on Immortality_, 1767; _Jerusalem_, 1783; _Morning Hours, or on\nthe Existence of God_, 1785; _To the Friends of Lessing_ (against Jacobi),\n1786; _Works_, 1843-44. Cf. on Mendelssohn, Kayserling, 1856, 1862, 1883.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Nicolai: _Library of Belles Lettres_, from 1757; _Letters on\nthe Most Recent German Literature_, from 1759; _Universal German Library_,\nfrom 1765; _New Universal German Library_, 1793-1805.]\n\nAmong the psychologists J.N. Tetens, whose _Philosophical Essays on Human\nNature_, 1776-77, show a remarkable similarity to the views of Kant,[1]\ntakes the first rank. The two thinkers evidently influenced each other. The\nthree fold division of the activities of the soul, \"knowing, feeling,\nand willing,\" which has now become popular and which appears to us\nself-evident, is to be referred to Tetens, from whom Kant took it; in\nopposition to the twofold division of Aristotle and Wolff into \"cognition\nand appetition,\" he established the equal rights of the faculty of\nfeeling--which had previously been defended by Sulzer (1751), the aesthetic\nwriter, and by Mendelssohn (1755, 1763, 1785). Besides Tetens, the\nfollowing should be mentioned among the psychologists: Tetens's opponent,\nJohann Lossius (1775), an adherent of Bonnet; D. Tiedemann (_Inquiries\nconcerning Man_, from 1777), who was estimable also as a historian of\nphilosophy (_Spirit of Speculative Philosophy_, 1791-97); Von Irwing\n(1772 _seq_.; 2d ed., 1777); and K. Ph. Moriz (_Magazin zur\nErfahrungsseelenlehre_, from 1785). Basedow (died 1790), Campe (died 1818),\nand J.H. Pestalozzi (1745-1827) did valuable work in pedagogics.\n\n[Footnote 1: Sensation gives the content, and the understanding\nspontaneously produces the form, of knowledge. The only objectivity of\nknowledge which we can attain consists in the subjective necessity of the\nforms of thought or the ideas of relation. Perception enables us to cognize\nphenomena only, not the true essence of things and of ourselves, etc.]\n\nOne of the clearest and most acute minds among the philosophers of the\nIllumination was the deist Hermann Samuel Reimarus[1] (1694-1768), from\n1728 professor in Hamburg. He attacks atheism, in whatever form it may\npresent itself, with as much zeal and conviction as he shows in breaking\ndown the belief in revelation by his inexorable criticism (in his\n_Defense_, communicated in manuscript to a few friends only). He obtains\nhis weapons for this double battle from the Wolffian philosophy. The\nexistence of an extramundane deity is proved by the purposive arrangement\nof the world, especially of organisms, which aims at the good--not merely\nof man, as the majority of the physico-theologists have believed, but--of\nall living creatures. To believe in a special revelation, _i.e._, a\nmiracle, in addition to such a revelation of God as this, which is granted\nto all men, and is alone necessary to salvation, is to deny the perfection\nof God, and to do violence to the immutability of his providence. To these\ngeneral considerations against the credibility of positive revelation\nare to be added, as special arguments against the Jewish and Christian\nrevelations, the untrustworthiness of human testimony in general, the\ncontradictions in the biblical writings, the uncertainty of their meaning,\nand the moral character of the persons regarded as messengers of God, whose\nteachings, precepts, and deeds in no wise correspond to their high mission.\nJewish history is a \"tissue of sheer follies, shameful deeds, deceptions,\nand cruelties, the chief motives of which were self-interest and lust for\npower.\" The New Testament is also the work of man; all talk of divine\ninspiration, an idle delusion, the resurrection of Christ, a fabrication of\nthe disciples; and the Protestant system, with its dogmas of the Trinity,\nthe fall of man, original sin, the incarnation, vicarious atonement, and\neternal punishment, contrary to reason. The advance of Reimarus beyond\nWolff consists in the consistent application of the criteria for the divine\ncharacter of revelation, which Wolff had set up without making a positive,\nnot to speak of a negative, use of them. His weakness[2] consists in the\nfact that, on the one hand, he contented himself with a rationalistic\ninterpretation of the biblical narratives, instead of pushing on--as Semler\ndid after him at Halle (1725-91)--to a historical criticism of the sources,\nand, on the other, held fast to the alternative common to all the deists,\n\"Either divine or human, either an actual event or a fabrication,\" without\nany suspicion of that great intermediate region of religious myth, of the\ninvoluntary and pregnant inventions of the popular fancy.\n\n[Footnote 1: H.S. Reimarus: _Discussions on the Chief Truths of Natural\nReligion_, 1754; _General Consideration of the Instincts of Animals_, 1762;\n_Apology or Defense for the Rational Worshipers of God_. Fragments of the\nlast of these works, which was kept secret during its author's life, were\npublished by Lessing (the well-known \"Wolffenb\u00fcttel Fragments,\" from\n1774). A detailed table of contents is to be found in _Reimarus und seine\nSchutzschrift_, 1862, by D. Fr. Strauss, included in the fifth volume of\nhis _Gesammelte Schriften_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. O. Pfleiderer, _Philosophy of Religion_, vol. i. p. 102,\np. 106 _seq_.]\n\nThe philosophico-religious standpoint of G.E. Lessing (1729-81), in whom\nthe Illumination reached its best fruitage, was less one-sided. Apart from\nthe important aesthetic impulses which flowed from the _Laocoon_ (1766) and\nthe _Hamburg Dramaturgy_ (1767-69), his philosophical significance rests\non two ideas, which have had important consequences for the religious\nconceptions of the nineteenth century: the speculative interpretation of\ncertain dogmas (the Trinity, etc.), and the application of the Leibnitzian\nidea of development to the history of the positive religions. By both of\nthese he prepared the way for Hegel. In regard to his relation to his\npredecessors, Lessing sought to mediate between the pantheism of Spinoza\nand the individualism of Leibnitz; and in his comprehension of the latter\nshowed himself far superior to the Wolffians. He can be called a Spinozist\nonly by those who, like Jacobi, have this title ready for everyone\nwho expresses himself against a transcendent, personal God, and the\nunconditional freedom of the will. Moreover, in view of his critical and\ndialectical, rather than systematic, method of thinking, we must guard\nagainst laying too great stress on isolated statements by him.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: A caution which Gideon Spicker (_Lessings Weltanschauung_,\n1883) counsels us not to forget, even in view of the oft cited avowal of\ndeterminism, \"I thank God that I must, and that I must the best.\" Among the\nnumerous treatises on Lessing we may note those by G.E. Schwarz (1854), and\nZeller (in Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, 1870, incorporated in the\nsecond collection of Zeller's _Vortr\u00e4ge und Abhandlungen_, 1877); and on\nhis theological position, that of K. Fischer on Lessing's _Nathan der\nWeise_, 1864, as well as J.H. Witte's _Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen_,\nvol. i. _(Lessing and Herder_), 1880. [Cf. in English, Sime, 2 vols., 1877,\nand _Encyclopedia Britannica_, vol. xiv. pp, 478-482.--TR.]]\n\nLessing conceives the Deity as the supreme, all-comprehensive, living\nunity, which excludes neither a certain kind of plurality nor even a\ncertain kind of change; without life and action, without the experience of\nchanging states, the life of God would be miserably wearisome. Things are\nnot out of, but in him; nevertheless (as \"contingent\") they are distinct\nfrom him. The Trinity must be understood in the sense of immanent\ndistinctions. God has conceived himself, or his perfections, in a twofold\nmanner: he conceived them as united and himself as their sum, and he\nconceived them as single. Now God's thinking is creation, his ideas\nactualities. By conceiving his perfections united he created his eternal\nimage, the Son of God; the bond between God representing and God\nrepresented, between Father and Son, is the Holy Spirit. But when he\nconceived his perfections singly he created the world, in which these\nmanifest themselves divided among a continuous series of particular beings.\nEvery individual is an isolated divine perfection; the things in the world\nare limited gods, all living, all with souls, and of a spiritual nature,\nthough in different degrees. Development is everywhere; at present the soul\nhas five senses, but very probably it once had less than five, and in\nthe future it will have more. At first the actions of men were guided by\nobscure instinct; gradually the reason obtained influence over the will,\nand one day will govern it completely through its clear and distinct\ncognitions. Thus freedom is attained in the course of history--the rational\nand virtuous man consciously obeys the divine order of the world, while he\nwho is unfree obeys unconsciously.\n\nLessing shares with the deistic Illumination the belief in a religion of\nreason, whose basis and essential content are formed by morality; but he\nrises far above this level in that he regards the religion of reason not\nas the beginning but as the goal of the development, and the positive\nreligions as necessary transition stages in its attainment. As natural\nreligion differs in each individual according to his feelings and powers,\nwithout positive enactments there would be no unity and community in\nreligious matters. Nevertheless the statutory and historical element is\nnot a graft from without, but a shell organically grown around natural\nreligion, indispensable for its development, and to be removed but\ngradually and by layers--when the inclosed kernel has become ripe and firm.\nThe history of religions is an _education of the human race through divine\nrevelation_; so teaches his small but thoughtful treatise of 1780.[1] As\nthe education of the individual man puts nothing extraneous into him, but\nonly gives him more quickly and easily that which he could have reached of\nhimself, so human reason is illuminated by revelation concerning things\nto which it could have itself attained, only that without God's help the\nprocess would have been longer and more difficult--perhaps it would have\nwandered about for many millions of years in the errors of polytheism, if\nGod had not been pleased by a single stroke (his revelation to Moses) to\ngive it a better direction. And as the teacher does not impart everything\nto the pupil at once, but considers the state of development reached by him\nat each given period, so God in his revelation observes a certain order and\nmeasure. To the rude Jewish people he revealed himself first as a national\nGod, as the God of their fathers; they had to wait for the Persians to\nteach them that the God whom they had hitherto worshiped as the most\npowerful among other gods was the only one. Although this lowest stage in\nthe development of religion lacked the belief in immortality, yet it must\nnot be lightly valued; let us acknowledge that it was an heroic obedience\nfor men to observe the laws of God simply because they are the laws of God,\nand not because of temporal or future rewards! The first practical teacher\nof immortality was Christ; with him the second age of religion begins: the\nfirst good book of elementary instruction, the Old Testament, from which\nman had hitherto learned, was followed by the second, better one, the New\nTestament. As we now can dispense with the first primer in regard to the\ndoctrine of the unity of God, and as we gradually begin to be able to\ndispense with the second in regard to the doctrine of the immortality of\nthe soul, so this New Testament may easily contain still further truths,\nwhich for the present we wonder at as revelations, until the reason shall\nlearn to derive them from other truths already established. Lessing himself\nmakes an attempt at a philosophical interpretation of the dogmas of the\nTrinity (see above), of original sin, and of atonement. Such an advance\nfrom faith to knowledge, such a development of revealed truths into proved\ntruths of reason, is absolutely necessary. We cannot dispense with the\ntruths of revelation, but we must not remain content with simply believing\nthem, but must endeavor to comprehend them; for they have been revealed in\norder that they may become rational. They are, as it were, the sum which\nthe teacher of arithmetic tells his pupils beforehand so that they\nmay guide themselves by it; but if they content themselves with this\nsolution--which was given merely as a guide--they would never learn to\ncalculate. Hand in hand with the advance of the understanding goes the\nprogress of the will. Future recompenses, which the New Testament promises\nas rewards of virtue, are means of education, and will gradually fall into\ndisuse: in the highest stage, the stage of purity of heart, virtue will\nbe loved and practiced for its own sake, and no longer for the sake of\nheavenly rewards. Slowly but surely, along devious paths which are yet\nsalutary, we are being led toward that great goal. It will surely come, the\ntime of consummation, when man will do the good because it is good, this\ntime of the new, eternal Gospel, this third age, this \"Christianity of\nreason.\" Continue, Eternal Providence, thine imperceptible march; let me\nnot despair of thee because it is imperceptible, not even when to me thy\nsteps seem to lead backward. It is not true that the straight line is\nalways the shortest.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlects_.]\n\nWith the thought that every individual must traverse the same course as\nthat by which the race attains its perfection, Lessing connects the idea\nof the transmigration of souls. Why may not the individual man have been\npresent in this world more than once? Is this hypothesis so ridiculous\nbecause it is the oldest?\n\nIf Lessing abandoned the ranks of the deists by his recognition of the\nfact that the positive religions contain truth in a gradual process of\npurification, by his free criticism, on the other hand, he broke with\nthe orthodox, whose idolatrous reverence for the Bible was to him an\nabomination. The letter is not the spirit, the Bible is not religion, nor\nyet its foundation, but only its records. Contingent historical truths can\nnever serve as a proof of the necessary truths of reason. Christianity is\nolder than the New Testament.\n\nAlready, in the case of Lessing, we may doubt, in view of his historical\ntemper and of certain speculative tendencies, whether he is to be included\namong the Illuminati. In the case of Kant a decided protest must be\nraised against such a classification. When Hegel numbers him among the\nphilosophers of the Illumination, on account of his lack of rational\nintuition, and some theologians on account of his religious rationalism,\nthe answer to the former is that Kant did not lack the speculative gift,\nbut only that it was surpassed by his gift of reflection, and, to the\nlatter, that in regard to the positive element in religion he judged very\ndifferently from the deists and appreciated the historical element more\njustly than they--if not to the same extent as Lessing and Herder. We\ndo not need to lay great stress on the fact that Kant had a lively\nconsciousness that he was making a contribution to thought, and that the\nIllumination contemplated this new doctrine without comprehending it, in\norder to recognize that the difference between his efforts and achievements\nand those of the Illumination is far greater than their kinship. For\nalthough Kant is upon common ground with it, in so far as he adheres to its\nmotto, \"Have courage to use thine own understanding, become a man, cease\nto trust thyself to the guidance of others, and free thyself in all fields\nfrom the yoke of authority,\" and, although besides such formal injunctions\nto freedom of thought, he also shares in certain material tendencies and\nconvictions (the turning from the world to man, the attempt at a synthesis\nof reason and experience, and the belief in a religion of reason); yet in\nmethod and results, he stands like a giant among a race of dwarfs, like one\ninstructed, who judges from principles, among men of opinion, who merely\nstick results together, a methodical systematizer among well-meaning but\nimpotent eclectics. The philosophy of the Illumination is related to\nthat of Kant as argument to science, as halting mediation to principiant\nresolution, as patchwork to creation out of full resources, yet at the same\ntime as wish to deed and as negative preparation to positive achievement.\nIt was undeniably of great value to the Kantian criticism that the\nIllumination had created a point of intersection for the various tendencies\nof thought, and had brought about the approximation and mutual contact of\nthe opposing systems which then existed, while, at the same time, it had\ncrumbled them to pieces, and thus awakened the need for a new, more firmly\nand more deeply founded system.\n\n\n%4. The Faith Philosophy.%\n\nThe philosophers of feeling or faith stand in the same relation to the\nGerman Illumination as Rousseau to the French. Here also the rights of\nfeeling are vindicated against those of the knowing reason. Among the\ndistinguished representatives of this anti-rationalistic tendency Hamann\nled the way, Herder was the most prolific, and Jacobi the clearest. That\nthe fountain of certitude is to be sought not in discriminating thought,\nbut in intuition, experience, revelation, and tradition; that the highest\ntruths can be felt only and not proved; that all existing things are\nincomprehensible, because individual--these are convictions which, before\nJacobi defended them as based on scientific principles, had been vehemently\nproclaimed by that singular man, J.G. Hamann (died 1788) of K\u00f6nigsberg.\nFrom an unprinted review by Hamann, Herder drew the objections which his\n\"Metacritique\" raises against Kant's Critique of Reason--that the division\nof matter and form, of sensibility and understanding, is inadmissible;\nthat Kant misunderstood the significance of language, which is just where\nsensibility and understanding unite, etc.\n\nIn Herder[1] (1744-1803: after 1776 Superintendent-General in Weimar) the\nphilosophy of feeling gained a finer, more perspicuous and harmonious\nnature, who shared Lessing's interest in history and his tendency to\nhold fast equally to pantheism and to individualism. God is the all-one,\ninfinite, spiritual (non-personal) primal force, which wholly reveals\nitself in each thing _(God: Dialogues on the System of Spinoza_, 1787).\nTo the life, power, wisdom, and goodness of God correspond the life and\nperfection of the universe and of individual creatures, each of which\npossesses its own irreplaceable value and bears in itself its future in\ngerm. Everywhere, one and the same life in an ascending series of powers\nand forms with imperceptible transitions. Always, an inner and an outer\ntogether; no power without organ, no spirit without a body. As thought is\nonly a higher stage of sensation, which develops from the lower by means of\nlanguage--reason, like sense, is not a productive but a receptive faculty\nof knowing, perceiving (\"_Vernehmen_\")--so the free process of history is\nonly the continuation and completion of the nature-process (_Ideas for the\nPhilosophy of the History of Mankind_, 1784 _seq_.). Man, the last child of\nnature and her first freedman, is the nodal point where the physical series\nof events changes into the ethical; the last member of the organisms of\nearth is at the same time the first in the spiritual development. The\nmission of history is the unfolding of all the powers which nature\nhas concentrated in man as the compendium of the world; its law, that\neverywhere on our earth everything be realized that can be realized there;\nits end, humanity and the harmonious development of all our capacities. As\nnature forms a single great organism, and from the stone to man describes\na connected development, so humanity is a one great individual which passes\nthrough its several ages, from infancy (the Orient), through boyhood\n(Eygpt and Phoenicia), youth (Greece), and manhood (Rome), to old age (the\nChristian world). The spirit stands in the closest dependence upon nature,\nand nature is concerned in history throughout. The finer organization of\nhis brain, the possession of hands, above all, his erect position, make\nman, man and endow him with reason. Similarly it is natural conditions,\nclimate, the character of the soil, the surrounding animal and vegetable\nlife, etc., that play an essential part in determining the manners, the\ncharacters, and the destinies of nations. The connection of nature with\nhistory by means of the concept of development and through the idea that\nthe two merely represent different stages of the same fundamental process,\nmade Herder the forerunner of Schelling.\n\n[Footnote 1: On Herder cf. the biography by R. Haym, 2 vols., 1877, 1885;\nand the work by Witte which has been referred to above (p. 306, note).]\n\nHis polemic against Kant in the _Metacritique_, 1799 (against the _Critique\nof Pure Reason_), and the dialogue _Calligone_, 1800 (against the _Critique\nof Judgment_), is less pleasing. These are neither dignified in tone nor\nessentially of much importance. In the former the distinction between\nsensibility and reason is censured, and in the latter the separation of the\nbeautiful from the true and the good, but Kant's theory of aesthetics is\nfor the most part grossly misunderstood. The \"disinterested\" satisfaction\nHerder makes a cold satisfaction; the harmonious activity of the cognitive\npowers, a tedious, apish sport; the satisfaction \"without a concept,\"\njudgment without ground or cause. The positive elements in his own views\nare more valuable. Pleasure in mere form, without a concept, and without\nthe idea of an end, is impossible. All beauty must mean or express\nsomething, must be a symbol of inner life; its ground is perfection or\nadaptation. Beauty is that symmetrical union of the parts of a being, in\nvirtue of which it feels well itself and gives pleasure to the observer,\nwho sympathetically shares in this well-being. The charm and value of the\n_Calligone_ lie more in the warmth and clearness with which the expressive\nbeauty of single natural phenomena is described than in the abstract\ndiscussion.\n\nFriedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) gave the most detailed statement of\nthe position of the philosophy of feeling, and the most careful proof of\nit. He was born in D\u00fcsseldorf, the son of a manufacturer; until 1794 he\nlived in his native place and at his country residence in Pempelfort; later\nhe resided in Holstein, and, from 1805, in Munich, where, in 1807-13, he\nwas president of the Academy of Sciences. Of his works, collected in five\nvolumes, 1812-25, we are here chiefly concerned with the letters _On the\nDoctrine of Spinoza_, 1785; _David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism_,\n1787; and the treatise _On Divine Things_, 1811, which called out\nSchelling's merciless response, _Memorial of Jacobi_. Besides Hume and\nSpinoza, the sensationalism of Bonnet and the criticism of Kant had made\nthe most lasting impression on Jacobi. His relation to Kant is neither that\nof an opponent nor of a supporter and popularizer. He declares himself in\naccord with Kant's critique of the understanding (the understanding is\nmerely a formal function, one which forms and combines concepts only, but\ndoes not guarantee reality, one to which the material of thought must be\ngiven from elsewhere and for which the suprasensible remains unattainable);\nin regard to the critique of reason he raises the objection that it; makes\nthe Ideas mere postulates, which possess no guarantee for their reality.\nThe critique of sensibility appears to him still more unsatisfactory, as\nit does not explain the origin of sensations. Without the concept of the\n\"thing-in-itself\" one cannot enter the Kantian philosophy, and with it\none cannot remain there. Fichte has drawn the correct conclusion from the\nKantian premises; idealism is the unavoidable result of the Critique of\nReason and foretold by; it as the Messiah was foretold by John the Baptist.\nAnd by the evil fruit we know the evil root: the idealistic theory is\nphilosophical nihilism, for it denies the reality of the external world, as\nthe materialism of Spinoza denies a transcendent God and the freedom of\nthe will. Reality slips away from both these systems--they are the only\nconsistent ones there are--material reality escaping from the former\nand suprasensible reality from the latter; and this must be so, because\nreality, of whatever kind it be, cannot be known, but only believed and\nfelt. The actual, the existence of the noumenal as well as of the external\nworld, even the existence of our own body, makes itself known to us through\nrevelation alone; the understanding comprehends relations only; the\ncertainty that a thing exists is attained only through experience and\nfaith. Sense and reason are the organs of faith, and hence the true\nsources of knowledge; the former apprehends the natural, the latter, the\nsupernatural, while for the understanding is left only the analysis and\ncombination of given intuitions.\n\nPhilosophy as a science from concepts must necessarily prove atheistic and\nfatalistic. Conception and proof mean deduction from conditions. How shall\nthat which has no cause from which to explain it, the unconditioned, God,\nand freedom, be comprehended and proved? Demonstration rises along the\nchain of causes to the universe alone, not to a transcendent Creator;\nmediate knowledge is confined to the sphere of conditioned being and\nmechanical becoming. The intuitive knowledge of feeling alone leads us\nbeyond this, and along with the wonderful, the inconceivable power of\nfreedom in ourselves, which is above all nature, shows us the primal source\nof all wonders, the transcendent God above us. The inference from our\nown spiritual, self-conscious, free personality to that of God is no\nunauthorized anthropomorphism--in the knowledge of God we may fearlessly\ndeify our human existence, because God, when he created man, gave his\ndivine nature human form. Reason and freedom are the same: the former\nis theoretical, the latter practical elevation to the suprasensible.\nNevertheless virtue is not based upon an inflexible, despotic, abstractly,\nformal law, but upon an instinct, which, however, does not aim at\nhappiness. Thus Jacobi attempts to mediate between the ethics of the\nIllumination and the ethics of Kant, by agreeing with the former in regard\nto the origin of virtue (it arises from a natural impulse), and with the\nlatter in regard to its nature (it consists in disinterestedness). Hence\nwith the Illumination he rejects the imperative form, and with Kant the\neudemonistic end. At the same time he endeavors to introduce Herder's idea\nof individuality into ethics, by demanding that morality assume a special\nform in each man. Schiller and the romantic school take from Jacobi their\nideal of the \"beautiful soul,\" which from natural impulse realizes in its\naction, and still more in its being, the good in an individual way.\n\n\n\n\n\n%PART II. FROM KANT TO THE PRESENT TIME.%\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nKANT.\n\nThe suit between empiricism and rationalism had continued for centuries,\nbut still awaited final decision. Are all our ideas the result of\nexperience, or are they (wholly or in part) an original possession of the\nmind? Are they received from without (by perception), or produced from\nwithin (by self-activity)? Is knowledge a product of sensation or of pure\nthought? All who had thus far taken part in this discussion had resembled\npartisans or advocates rather than disinterested judges. They had given\nless attention to investigation than to the defense of the traditional\ntheses of their schools; they had not endeavored to obtain results, but\nto establish results already determined; and, along with real arguments,\npopular appeals had not been despised. Each of the opposing schools had\ngiven variations on a definite theme, and whenever timid attempts had been\nmade to bring the two melodies into harmony they had met with no approval.\nThe proceedings thus far had at least made it evident to the unbiased\nhearer that each of the two parties made extravagant claims, and, in the\nend, fell into self-contradiction. If the claim of empiricism is true, that\nall our concepts arise from perception, then not only the science of the\nsuprasensible, which it denies, but also the science of the objects of\nexperience, about which it concerns itself, is impossible. For perception\ninforms us concerning single cases merely, it can never comprehend all\ncases, it yields no necessary and universal truth; but knowledge which is\nnot apodictically valid for every reasoning being and for all cases is\nnot worthy the name. The very reasons which were intended to prove the\npossibility of knowledge give a direct inference to its impossibility. The\nempirical philosophy destroys itself, ending with Hume in skepticism and\nprobabilism. Rationalism is overtaken by a different, and yet an analogous\nfate--it breaks up into a popular eclecticism. It believes that it\nhas discovered an infallible criterion of truth in the clearness and\ndistinctness of ideas, and a sure example for philosophical method in the\nmethod of mathematics. In both points it is wrong. The criterion of\ntruth is insufficient, for Spinoza and Leibnitz built up their opposing\ntheories--the pantheism of the one and the monadology of the other--from\nequally clear and distinct conceptions; tried by this standard\nindividualism is just as true as pantheism. Mathematics, again, does not\nowe its unquestioned acceptance and cogent force to the clearness and\ndistinctness of its conceptions, but to the fact that these are capable\nof construction in intuition. The distinction between mathematics and\nmetaphysics was overlooked, namely, that mathematical thought can transform\nits conceptions into intuitions, can generate its objects or sensuously\npresent them, which philosophical thought is not in a position to do. The\nobjects of the latter must be given to it, and to the human mind they are\ngiven in no other way than through sensuous intuition. Metaphysics seeks\nto be a science of the real, but it is impossible to conjure being out of\nthought; reality cannot be proved from concepts, it can only be felt. In\nmaking the unperceivable and suprasensible (the real nature of things, the\ntotality of the world, the Deity, and immortality) the special object\nof philosophy, rationalism looked on the understanding as a faculty of\nknowledge by which objects are given. In reality objects can never be given\nthrough concepts; these only render it possible to think objects given\nin some other way (by intuition). It is true that concepts of the\nsuprasensible exist, but nothing can be known through them, there is\nnothing intuitively given to be subsumed under them.\n\nWith this failure to perceive the intuitive element in mathematics was\njoined the mistake of overlooking its synthetic character. The syllogistic\nmethod of presentation employed in the Euclidean geometry led to the belief\nthat the more special theorems had been derived from the simpler ones, and\nthese from the axioms, by a process of conceptual analysis; while the fact\nis that in mathematics all progress is by intuition alone, the syllogism\nserving merely to formulate and explain truths already attained, but not to\nsupply new ones. Following the example of mathematics thus misunderstood,\nthe mission of philosophy was made to consist in the development of\nthe truths slumbering in pregnant first principles by means of logical\nanalysis. If only there were metaphysical axioms! If we only did not\ndemand, and were not compelled to demand, of true science that it increase\nour knowledge, and not merely give an analytical explanation of knowledge.\nWhen once the clearness and distinctness of conceptions had been taken\nin so purely formal a sense, it was inevitable that in the end, as\nproductivity became less, the principle should be weakened down to a mere\ndemand for the explanation and elucidation of the metaphysical ideas\npresent in popular consciousness. Thus the rationalistic current lost\nitself in the shallow waters of the Illumination, which soon gave as\nready a welcome to the empirical theories--since these also were able to\nlegitimate themselves by clear and distinct conceptions--as it had given\nto the results of the rationalistic systems.\n\nIt was thus easy to see that each of the contending parties had been guilty\nof one-sidedness, and that in order to escape this a certain mean must be\nassumed between the two extremes; but it was a much more difficult matter\nto discover the due middle ground. Neither of the opposing standpoints is\nso correct as its defenders believe, and neither so false as its opponents\nmaintain. Where, then, on either side, does the mistaken narrowness begin,\nand how far does the justification of each extend?\n\nThe conflict centers, first, about the question concerning the origin of\nhuman knowledge and the sphere of its validity. Rationalism is justified\nwhen it asserts that some ideas do not come from the senses. If knowledge\nis to be possible, some concepts cannot originate in perception, those,\nnamely, by which knowledge is constituted, for if they should, it would\nlack universality and necessity. The sole organ of universally valid\nknowledge is reason. Empiricism, on the other hand, is justified when it\nasserts that the experiential alone is knowable. Whatever is to be knowable\nmust be given as a real in sensuous intuition. The only organ of reality is\nsensibility. Rationalism judges correctly concerning the origin of the\nmost important classes of ideas; empiricism concerning the sphere of their\nvalidity. The two may be thus combined: some concepts (those which produce\nknowledge) take their origin in reason or are _a priori_, but they are\nvalid for objects of experience alone. The conflict concerns, secondly, the\nuse of the deductive (syllogistic) or the inductive method. Empiricism,\nthrough its founder Bacon, had recommended induction in place of the barren\nsyllogistic method, as the only method which would lead to new discoveries.\nIt demands, above all things, the extension of knowledge. Rationalism, on\nthe contrary, held fast to the deductive method, because the syllogism\nalone, in its view, furnishes knowledge valid for all rational beings. It\ndemands, first of all, universality and necessity in knowledge. Induction\nhas the advantage of increasing knowledge, but it leads only to empirical\nand comparative, not to strict universality. The syllogism has the\nadvantage of yielding universal and necessary truth, but it can only\nexplicate and establish knowledge, not increase it. May it not be possible\nso to do justice to the demands of both that the advantages which they seek\nshall be combined, and the disadvantages which have been feared, avoided?\nAre there not cognitions which increase our knowledge (are _synthetic_)\nwithout being empirical, which are universally and necessarily valid\n(_a priori_) without being analytic? From these considerations arises the\nmain question of the _Critique of Pure Reason_: How are synthetic judgments\n_a priori_ possible?\n\nThe philosophy of experience had overestimated sense and underestimated the\nunderstanding, when it found the source of all knowledge in the faculty of\nperception and degraded the faculty of thought to an almost wholly inactive\nrecipient of messages coming to it from without. From the standpoint of\nempiricism concepts (Ideas) deserve confidence only in so far as they can\nlegitimate themselves by their origin in sensations (impressions). It\noverlooks the _active_ character of all knowing. Among the rationalists,\non the other hand, we find an underestimation of the senses and an\noverestimation of the understanding. They believe that sense reveals\nonly the deceptive exterior of things, while reason gives their true\nnon-sensuous essence. That which the mind perceives of things is deceptive,\nbut that which it thinks concerning them is true. The former power is the\nfaculty of confused, the latter the faculty of distinct knowledge. Sense is\nthe enemy rather than the servant of true knowledge, which consists in the\ndevelopment and explication of pregnant innate conceptions and principles.\nThese philosophers forget that we can never reach reality by conceptual\nanalysis; and that the senses have a far greater importance for knowledge\nthan merely to give it an impulse; that it is they which supply the\nunderstanding with real objects, and so with the content of knowledge.\nBeside the (formal) activity (of the understanding), cognition implies a\npassive factor, a reception of impressions. Neither sense alone nor the\nunderstanding alone produces knowledge, but both cognitive powers are\nnecessary, the active and the passive, the conceptual and the intuitive.\nHere the question arises, How do concept and intuition, sensuous and\nrational knowledge, differ, and what is the basis of their congruence?\nNotwithstanding their different points of departure and their variant\nresults, the two main tendencies of modern philosophy agree in certain\npoints. If the conflict between the two schools and their one-sidedness\nsuggested the idea of supplementing the conclusions of the one by those of\nthe other, the recognition of the incorrectness of their common\nconvictions furnished the occasion to go beyond them and to establish a\nnew, a higher point of view above them both, as also above the eclecticism\nwhich sought to unite the opposing principles. The errors common to both\nconcern, in the first place, the nature of judgment and the difference\nbetween sensibility and understanding. Neither side had recognized that\nthe peculiar character of judgment consists in _active connection_. The\nrationalists made judgment an active function, it is true, but a mere\nactivity of conscious development, of elucidation and analytical inference,\nwhich does not advance knowledge a single step. The empiricists described\nit as a process of comparison and discrimination, as the mere perception\nand recognition of the relations and connections already existing between\nideas; while in reality judgment does not discover the relations and\nconnections of representations, but itself establishes them. In the former\ncase the synthetic moment is ignored, in the latter the active moment. The\nimperfect view of judgment was one of the reasons for the appearance of\nextreme theories concerning the origin of ideas in reason or in perception.\nRationalism regards even those concepts which have a content as innate,\nwhereas it is only formal concepts which are so. Empiricism regards all,\neven the highest formal concepts (the categories), as abstracted from\nexperience, whereas experience furnishes only the content of knowledge,\nand not the synthesis which is necessary to it. On the one hand too much,\nand on the other too little, is regarded as the original possession of the\nunderstanding. The question \"What concepts are innate?\" can be decided only\nby answering the further question, What are the concepts through which the\nfaculty of judgment connects the representations obtained from experience?\nThese connective concepts, these formal instruments of synthesis are\n_a priori_. The agreement of the two schools is still greater in regard to\nthe relation of sense and understanding, notwithstanding the apparently\nsharp contrast between them. The empiricist considers thought transformed,\nsublimated perception, while the rationalist sees in perception only\nconfused and less distinct thought. For the former concepts are faded\nimages of sensations, for the latter sensations are concepts which have not\nyet become clear; the difference is scarcely greater than if the one should\ncall ice frozen water, and the other should prefer to call water melted\nice. Both arrange intuition and thought in a single series, and derive the\none from the other by enhancement or attenuation. Both make the mistake of\nrecognizing only a difference in degree where a difference in kind exists.\nIn such a case only an energetic dualism can afford help. Sense and\nunderstanding are not one and the same cognitive power at different stages,\nbut two heterogeneous faculties. Sensation and thought are not different in\ndegree, but in kind. As Descartes began with the metaphysical dualism of\nextension and thought, so Kant begins with the no\u00ebtical dualism of\nintuition and thought.\n\nMuch more serious, however, than any of the mistakes yet mentioned was\na sin of omission of which the two schools were alike guilty, and the\nrecognition and avoidance of which constituted in Kant's own eyes the\ndistinctive character of his philosophy and its principiant-advance beyond\npreceding systems. The pre-Kantian thinker had proceeded to the discussion\nof knowledge without raising _the question of the possibility of\nknowledge_. He had approached things in the full confidence that the human\nmind was capable of cognizing them, and with a na\u00efve trust in the power of\nreason to possess itself of the truth. His trust was na\u00efve and ingenuous,\nbecause the idea that it could deceive him had never entered his mind. Now\nno matter whether this belief in man's capacity for knowledge and in the\npossibility of knowing things is justifiable or not, and no matter how\nfar it may be justifiable, it was in any case untested; so that when the\nskeptic approached with his objections the dogmatist was defenseless.\nAll previous philosophy, so far as it had not been skeptical, had been,\naccording to Kant's expression, dogmatic; that is, it had held as an\narticle of faith, and without precedent inquiry, that we possess the power\nof cognizing objects. It had not asked _how_ this is possible; it had not\neven asked what knowledge is, what may and must be demanded of it, and by\nwhat means our reason is in a position to satisfy such demands. It had left\nhuman intelligence and its extent uninvestigated. The skeptic, on the other\nhand, had been no more thorough. He had doubted and denied man's capacity\nfor knowledge just as uncritically as the dogmatist had believed and\npresupposed it. He had directed his ingenuity against the theories of\ndogmatic philosophy, instead of toward the fundamental question of the\npossibility of knowledge. Human intelligence, which the dogmatist had\napproached with unreasoned trust and the skeptic with just as unreasoned\ndistrust, is subjected, according to the plan of the critical philosopher,\nto a searching examination. For this reason Kant termed his standpoint\n\"criticism,\" and his undertaking a \"Critique of Reason.\" Instead of\nasserting and denying, he investigates how knowledge arises, of what\nfactors it is composed, and how far it extends. He inquires into the origin\nand extent of knowledge, into its sources and its limits, into the grounds\nof its existence and of its legitimacy. The Critique of Reason finds itself\nconfronted by two problems, the second of which cannot be solved until\nafter the solution of the first. The investigation of the sources of\nknowledge must precede the inquiry into the extent of knowledge. Only after\nthe conditions of knowledge have been established can it be ascertained\nwhat objects are attainable by it. Its sphere cannot be determined except\nfrom its origin.\n\nWhether the critical philosopher stands nearer to the skeptic or to the\ndogmatist is rather an idle question. He is specifically distinct from\nboth, in that he summons and guides the reason to self-contemplation, to\na methodical examination of its capacity for knowledge. Where the one had\nblindly trusted and the other suspected and denied, he investigates; they\noverlook, he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge. The\ncritical problem does not mean, Does a faculty of knowledge exist? but, Of\nwhat powers is it composed? are all objects knowable which have been so\nregarded? Kant does not ask whether, but how and by what means, knowledge\nis possible. Everyone who gives himself to scientific reflection must\npostulate that knowledge is possible, and the demand of the no\u00ebtical\ntheorists of the day for a philosophy absolutely without assumptions is\nquite incapable of fulfillment. Nay, in order to be able to begin his\ninquiry at all, it was necessary for Kant to assume still more special\npostulates; for that a cognition of cognition is possible, that there is a\ncritical, self-investigating reason could, at first, be only a matter of\nbelief. This would not have excluded a supplementary detailed statement\nconcerning the _how_ of this self-knowledge, concerning the organ of the\ncritical philosophy. But Kant never gave one, and the omission subsequently\nled to a sharp debate concerning the character and method of the Critique\nof Reason. On this point, if we may so express it, Kant remained a\ndogmatist.\n\nKant felt himself to be the finisher of skepticism; but this was chiefly\nbecause he had received the strongest impulse to the development of his\ncritique of knowledge from Hume's inquiries concerning causation. Brought\nup in the dogmatic rationalism of the Wolffian school, to which he\nremained true for a considerable period as a teacher and writer (till about\n1760), although at the same time he was inquiring with an independent\nspirit, Kant was gradually won over through the influence of the English\nphilosophy to the side of empirical skepticism. Then--as the result, no\ndoubt, of reading the _Nouveaux Essais_ of Leibnitz, published in\n1765--he returned to rationalistic principles, until finally, after a\nrenewal of empirical influences,[1] he took the position crystallized in\nthe _Critique of Pure Reason_, 1781, which, however, experienced still\nother, though less considerable, changes in the sequel, just as in itself\nit shows the traces of previous transformations.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. H. Vaihinger's _Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen\nVernunft_, vol. i., 1881, pp. 48-49. This is a work marked by acuteness,\ngreat industry, and an objective point of view which merits respect. The\nsecond volume, which treats of the Transcendental Aesthetic, appeared in\n1892.]\n\nIt would be a most interesting task to trace in the writings which belong\nto Kant's pre-critical period the growth and development of the fundamental\ncritical positions. Here, however, we can only mention in passing the\nsubjects of his reflection and some of the most striking anticipations and\nbeginnings of his epoch-making position. Even his maiden work, _Thoughts on\nthe True Estimation of Vis Viva_, 1747, betokens the mediating nature of\nits author. In this it is argued that when men of profound and penetrating\nminds maintain exactly opposite opinions, attention must be chiefly\ndirected to some intermediate principle to a certain degree compatible with\nthe correctness of both parties. The question under discussion was whether\nthe measure of _vis viva_ is equal, as the Cartesians thought, to the\nproduct of the mass into the velocity, or, according to the Leibnitzians,\nto the product of the mass into the square of the velocity. Kant's\nunsatisfactory solution of the problem--the law of Descartes holds for\ndead, and that of Leibnitz for living forces--drew upon him the derision\nof Lessing, who said that he had endeavored to estimate living forces\nwithout having tested his own. A similar tendency toward compromise--this\ntime it is a synthesis of Leibnitz and Newton--is seen in his\n_Habilitationsschrift, Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova\nDilucidatio_, 1755, and in the dissertation _Monadologia Physica_, 1756.\nThe former distinguishes between _ratio essendi_ and _ratio cognoscendi_,\nrejects the ontological argument, and defends determinism against Crusius\non Leibnitzian grounds. In the _Physical Monadology_ Kant gives his\nadherence to dynamism (matter the product of attraction and repulsion), and\nmakes the monads or elements of body fill space without prejudice to\ntheir simplicity. A series of treatises is devoted to subjects in natural\nscience: The Effect of the Tides in retarding the Earth's Rotation; The\nObsolescence of the Earth; Fire (Inaugural Dissertation), Earthquakes, and\nthe Theory of the Winds. The most important of these, the _General Natural\nHistory and Theory of the Heavens_, 1755, which for a long time remained\nunnoticed, and which was dedicated to Frederick II., developed the\nhypothesis (carried out forty years later by Laplace in ignorance of Kant's\nwork) of the mechanical origin of the universe and of the motion of the\nplanets. It presupposes merely the two forces of matter, attraction and\nrepulsion, and its primitive chaotic condition, a world-mist with elements\nof different density. It is noticeable that Kant acknowledges the failure\nof the mechanical theory at two points: it is brought to a halt at the\norigin of the organic world and at the origin of matter. The mechanical\ncosmogony is far from denying creation; on the contrary, the proof that\nthis well-ordered and purposive world necessarily arose from the regular\naction of material forces under law and without divine intervention, can\nonly serve to support our assumption of a Supreme Intelligence as the\nauthor of matter and its laws; the belief is necessary, just because\nnature, even in its chaotic condition, can act only in an orderly and\nregular way.\n\nThe empirical phase of Kant's development is represented by the writings\nof the 60's. _The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_, 1762,\nasserts that the first figure is the only natural one, and that the others\nare superfluous and need reduction to the first. In the _Only Possible\nFoundation for a Demonstration of the Existence of God_, 1763, which, in\nthe seventh Reflection of the Second Division, recapitulates the cosmogony\nadvanced in the _Natural History of the Heavens_, the discussions\nconcerning being (\"existence\" is absolute position, not a predicate which\nincreases the sum of the qualities but is posited in a merely relative\nway), and the conclusion, prophetical of his later point of view, \"It is\naltogether necessary that we should be _convinced_ of the existence of God,\nbut not so necessary that his existence should be _demonstrated_\" are more\nnoteworthy than the argument itself. This runs: All possibility presupposes\nsomething actual wherein and whereby all that is conceivable is given as\na determination or a consequence. That actuality the destruction of which\nwould destroy all possibility is absolutely necessary. Therefore there\nexists an absolutely necessary Being as the ultimate real ground of all\npossibility; this Being is one, simple, unchangeable, eternal, the _ens\nrealissimum_ and a spirit. The _Attempt to introduce the Notion of\nNegative Quantities into Philosophy_, 1763, distinguishes--contrary to\nCrusius--between logical opposition, contradiction or mere negation (_a_\nand _not-a_, pleasure and the absence of pleasure, power and lack of\npower), and real opposition, which cannot be explained by logic (+_a_ and\n-_a_, pleasure and pain, capital and debts, attraction and repulsion;\nin real opposition both determinations are positive, but in opposite\ndirections). Parallel with this it distinguishes, also, between logical\nground and real ground. The prize essay, _Inquiry concerning the Clearness_\n(Evidence) _of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics_, 1764, draws\na sharp distinction between mathematical and metaphysical knowledge, and\nwarns philosophy against the hurtful imitation of the geometrical method,\nin place of which it should rather take as an example the method which\nNewton introduced into natural science. Quantity constitutes the object of\nmathematics, qualities, the object of philosophy; the former is easy and\nsimple, the latter difficult and complicated--how much more comprehensible\nthe conception of a trillion is than the philosophical idea of freedom,\nwhich the philosophers thus far have been unable to make intelligible.\nIn mathematics the general is considered under symbols _in concrete_, in\nphilosophy, by means of symbols _in abstracto_; the former constructs its\nobject in sensuous intuition, while the object of the latter is given\nto it, and that as a confused concept to be decomposed. Mathematics,\ntherefore, may well begin with definitions, since the conception which is\nto be explained is first brought into being through the definition, while\nphilosophy must begin by seeking her conceptions. In the former the\ndefinition is first in order, and in the latter almost always last; in the\none case the method is synthetic, in the other it is analytic. It is the\nfunction of mathematics to connect and compare clear and certain concepts\nof quantity in order to draw conclusions from them; the function of\nphilosophy is to analyze concepts given in a confused state, and to make\nthem detailed and definite. Philosophy has also this disadvantage, that\nit possesses very many undecomposable concepts and undemonstrable\npropositions, while mathematics has only a few such. \"Philosophical truths\nare like meteors, whose brightness gives no assurance of their permanence.\nThey vanish, but mathematics remains. Metaphysics is without doubt the most\ndifficult of all human sciences _(Einsichten)_, but a metaphysic has\nnever yet been written\"; for one cannot be so kind as to \"apply the term\nphilosophy to all that is contained in the books which bear this title.\" In\nthe closing paragraphs, on the ultimate bases of ethics, the stern features\nof the categorical imperative are already seen, veiled by the English\ntheory of moral sense, while the attractive _Observations on the Feeling\nof the Beautiful and the Sublime_, which appeared in the same year, still\nna\u00efvely follow the empirical road.\n\nThe empirical phase reaches its skeptical termination in the satire _Dreams\nof a Ghost-seer explained by the Dreams of Metaphysics_, 1766, which pours\nout its ingenious sarcasm impartially on spiritualism and on the assumed\nknowledge of the suprasensible. Here Kant is already clearly conscious of\nhis new problem, a theory of the limits of human reason, conscious also\nthat the attack on this problem is to be begun by a discussion of the\nquestion of space. This second question had been for many years a frequent\nsubject of his reflections;[1] and it was this part of the general critical\nproblem that first received definitive solution. In the Latin dissertation\n_On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World_, 1770,\nwhich concludes the pre-critical period, and which was written on the\noccasion of his assumption of his chair as ordinary professor, the\ncritique of sensibility, the new theory of space and time, is set forth in\napproximately the same form as in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, while the\ncritique of the understanding and of reason, the theory of the categories\nand the Ideas and of the sphere of their validity, required for its\ncompletion the intellectual labor of several more years. For this essay,\n_De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis_, leaves\nunchallenged the possibility of a knowledge of things in themselves and of\nGod, thus showing that its author has abandoned the skepticism maintained\nin the _Dreams of a Ghost-seer_, and has turned anew to dogmatic\nrationalism, whose final overthrow required another swing in the direction\nof skeptical empiricism. In regard to the progress of this latter phase\nof opinion, the letters to M. Herz are almost the only, though not very\nvaluable, source of information.\n\n[Footnote 1: _New Theory of Motion and Rest_, 1758; _On the First Ground of\nthe Distinction of Positions in Space_, 1768; besides several of the works\nmentioned above.]\n\nThe _Critique of Pure Reason_ appeared in 1781, much later than Kant had\nhoped when he began a work on \"The Limits of Sensibility and Reason,\" and a\nsecond, altered edition in 1787.[1] After the _Prolegomena to every Future\nMetaphysic which may present itself as Science_, 1783, had given a popular\nform to the critical doctrine of knowledge, it was followed by the critical\nphilosophy of ethics in the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_,\n1785, and the _Critique of Practical Reason_, 1788; by the critical\naesthetics and teleology in the _Critique of Judgment_, 1790; and by the\ncritical philosophy of religion in _Religion within the Limits of Reason\nOnly_, 1793[2] (consisting of four essays, of which the first, \"Of Radical\nEvil,\" had already appeared in the _Berliner Monatsschrift_ in 1792). The\n_Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science_, 1786, and the _Metaphysics\nof Ethics_, 1797 (in two parts, \"Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of\nRight,\" and \"Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue \"), are devoted\nto the development of the system. The year 1798 brought two more larger\nworks, the _Conflict of the Faculties_ and the _Anthropology_. Of the\nreviews, that on Herder's _Ideen_ maybe mentioned, and among the minor\nessays, the following: _Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan\nSense, Answer to the Question: What is Illumination f_ both in 1784;\n_What does it mean to Orient oneself in Thought_? 1786; _On the Use of\nTeleological Principles in Philosophy_, 1788; _On a Discovery according to\nwhich all Recent Criticism of Pure Reason is to be superseded by a Previous\nOne_, 1790; _On the Progress of Metaphysics since the Time of Wolff; On\nPhilosophy in General, The End of all Things_, 1794; _On Everlasting\nPeace_, 1795. Kant's _Logic_ was published by J\u00e4sche in 1800; his _Physical\nGeography_ and his _Observations on Pedagogics_ by F.T. Rink in 1803; his\nlectures on the _Philosophical Theory of Religion_ (1817; 2d. ed., 1830)\nand on _Metaphysics_ (1821; cf. Benno Erdmann in the _Philosophische\nMonatshefte_, vol. xix. 1883, p. 129 _seq_., and vol. xx. 1884, p. 65\n_seq_.) by P\u00f6litz. If we may judge by the specimens given by Reicke in the\n_Altpreussische Monatsschrift_, 1882-84, and by Krause himself,[3]\nthe promised publication of a manuscript of Kant's last years, now in\npossession of the Hamburg pastor, Albrecht Krause, and which discusses the\ntransition from the metaphysical elements of natural science to physics,\nwill hardly meet the expectations which some have cherished concerning it.\nBenno Erdmann has issued _Nachtr\u00e4ge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft aus\nKants Nachlass_, 1881, and _Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie\naus handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen_--the first volume first _Heft\n(Reflexionen zur Anthropologie_) appearing in 1882, the second volume\n_(Reflexionen zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, aus Kants Handexemplar\nvon Baumgartens Metaphysica)_ in 1884. Max M\u00fcller has made an English\ntranslation of the _Critique of Pure Reason_, 2 vols., 1881.[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: There has been much discussion and much has been written\nconcerning the relation of the two editions. In opposition to Schopenhauer\nand Kuno Fischer it must be maintained that the alterations in the second\nedition consist in giving greater prominence to realistic elements, which\nin the first edition remained in the background, though present even\nthere.]\n\n[Footnote 2: This publication was the occasion of a conflict between Kant\nand the censorship concerning the right of free religious inquiry; cf.\nDilthey in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. in. 1890, pp.\n418-450.]\n\n[Footnote 3: A. Krause: _I. Kant wider K. Fischer, zum ersten Male mit\nH\u00fclfe des verloren gewesenen Kantischen Hauptwerkes vertheidigt_, 1884 (in\nreply, K. Fischer, _Das Streber- und Gr\u00fcnderthum in der Litteratur_,\n1884); also, _Das nachgelassene Werk I. Kants, mit Belegen\npopul\u00e4r-wissenschaftlich dargestellt_, 1888.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Besides this (centenary) translation the English reader may\nbe referred to the earlier version of Meiklejohn in Bonn's Library; to the\nversions of the _Prolegomena_ by Bax (also in Bonn's Library, and including\nthe _Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science_), and Mahaffy and Bernard,\nnew ed., 1889; to Abbot's _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, 4th ed., 1889,\ncontaining the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_ and the _Critique\nof Practical Reason_ entire, with portions of the _Metaphysics of Ethics_\nand _Religion within the Limits of Reason Only_; to Bernard's translation\nof the _Kritik of Judgment_, 1892; and to Watson's _Selections from Kant_,\n2d ed., 1888 (in Sneath's Modern Philosophers, 1892).--TR.]\n\nThe best complete edition of the works of Kant is the second edition of\nHartenstein, in eight volumes, 1867-68, which is chronologically arranged\nand excellently gotten up. Simultaneously with the first edition of\nHartenstein in ten volumes, in 1838 _seq_., appeared the edition in twelve\nvolumes by K. Rosenkranz and F.W. Schubert (containing in the last volumes\na biography of Kant by Schubert, and a history of the Kantian philosophy by\nRosenkranz, 1842). Kehrbach's edition of the principal works in Reclam's\n_Universal-Bibliothek_, with the pagination of the original and collective\neditions (1877 _seq_.), is more valuable than Von Kirchmann's edition of\nthe complete works in his _Philosophische Bibliothek_.\n\nAmong the works on Kant those of Kuno Fischer (vols. iii.-iv. of the\n_Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 3d ed., 1882; also Kant's _Leben und\ndie Grundlagen seiner Lehre_, 1860) take the first place. The writings of\nLiebmann, Cohen, Stadler, Riehl, Volkelt, and others will be mentioned\nlater, in connection with the neo-Kantian movement; here we may give some\nof the more important monographs and essays, selected from the enormously\ndeveloped Kantian literature:\n\nAd. B\u00f6hringer, _Kants erkenntnisstheoretischer Idealismus_, 1888;\nK. Dieterich, _Die Kantische Philosophie in ihrer inneren\nEntwickelungsgeschichte_, 2 parts, 1885 (first published separately,\n_Kant und Newton_, 1877; _Kant und Rousseau_, 1878); W. Dilthey, _Aus\nden Rostocker Kanthandschriften_ in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, vols. ii.-iii. 1889-90; M.W. Drobisch, _Kants Ding an sich\nund sein Erfahrungsbegriff_, 1885; B. Erdmann, _Kants Kritizismus in der\nI. und II. Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, 1878; the same, _Kants\nProlegomena herausgegeben und erl\u00e4utert_, 1878, Introduction (in reply Emil\nArnoldt, _Kants Prolegomena nicht doppelt redigiert_, 1879; cf. also H.\nVaihinger, _Die Erdmann-Arnoldtsche Kontroverse_ in the _Philosophische\nMonatshefte_, vol. xvi. 1880); Franz Erhardt, _Kritik der Kantischen\nAntinomienlehre_, 1888; R. Eucken, _Ueber Bilder und Gleichnisse bei\nKant, Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxxiii, 1883, reprinted in his\n_Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 1886; F. Frederichs,\n_Der ph\u00e4nomenale Idealismus Berkeleys und Kants_, 1871; the same, _Kants\nPrinzip der Ethik_, 1879; Ed. von Hartmann, _Das Ding an sich und seine\nBeschaffenheit_, 1871, in the 2d ed., 1875, and the 3d, 1885, entitled\n_Kritische Grundlegung des transzendentalen Realismus_; C. Hebler,\n_Kantiana_, in his _Philosophische Aufs\u00e4tze_, 1869; Alfred Hegler, _Die\nPsychologie in Kants Ethik_, 1891; A. H\u00f6lder, _Darstellung der Kantischen\nErkenntnisstheorie_, 1873 J. Jacobson, _Die Auffindung des Apriori_, 1876;\nthe same, _Ueber die Beziehungen zwischen Kategorien und Urtheilsformen_,\n1877; Wilhelm Koppelmann, _Kants Lehre vom analytischen Urtheil, Philosoph.\nMonatshefte_, vol. xxi, 1885; the same, _Lotzes Stellung zu Kants\nKritizismus, Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxxviii, 1886; the same,\n_Kants Lehre vom kategorischen Imperativ_, 1888; the same, _Kant und die\nGrundlagen der Christlichen Religion_, 1890; E. Laas, _Kants Analogien\nder Erfahrung_, 1876; the same, _Einige Bemerkungen zur\nTranszendentalphilosophie_, Strassburg _Abhandlungen_, 1884; J. Mainzer,\n_Die kritische Epoche in der Lehre von der Einbildungskraft_, 1881; J.B.\nMeyer, _Kants Psychologie_, 1870; F. Paulsen, _Was Kant uns sein kann,\nVierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, 1881; B. P\u00fcnjer,\n_Die Religionslehre Kants_, 1874; R. Quaebicker, _Kants und Herbarts\nmetaphysische Grundansichten \u00fcber das Wesen der Seele_, 1870; J. Rehmke,\n_Physiologie und Kantianismus_, address in Eisenach, 1883; Rud. Reicke,\n_Lose Bl\u00e4tter aus Kants Nachlass_, 1889 (on this H. Vaihinger in the\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. xcvi. 1889); O. Riedel, _Die\nmonadologischen Bestimmungen in Kants Lehre vom Ding an sich_, dissertation\nat Kiel, 1884; O. Schneider, _Die psychologische Entwickelung des Apriori_,\n1883; the same, _Transzendentalpsychologie_, 1891; F. Staudinger,\n_Noumena_, 1884; M. Steckelmacher, _Die formale Logik Kants_, Breslau\nPrize Essay, 1879; A. Stern, _Die Beziehung Garves zu Kant,\nnebst ungedruckten Briefen_, 1884; C. Stumpf, _Psychologie und\nErkenntnisstheorie, Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie der\nWissenschaften_, 1891; G. Thiele, _Kants intellectuelle Anschauung als\nGrundbegriff seines Kritizismus_, 1876; the same, _Die Philosophie Kants\nnach ihrem systematischen Zusammenhange und ihrer logischhistorischen\nEntiwickelung_, I. (1) _Kants vorkritische Naturphilosophie_, 1882; (2)\n_Kants vorkritische Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1887; Ad. Trendelenburg, _Ueber\neine L\u00fccke in Kants Beweis von der ausschliessenden Subjectivit\u00e4t des\nRaumes and der Zeit_ in vol. iii. of his _Historische Beitr\u00e4ge zur\nPhilosophie_, 1867; Ueberhorst, _Kants Lehre von dem Verh\u00e4ltnisse der\nKategorien zu der Erfahrung_, 1878; H. Vaihinger, _Eine Blattversetzung in\nKants Prolegomena, Philosoph. Monatshefte_, vol. xv. 1879; the same, _Zu\nKants Widerlegung des Idealismus_, Strassburg _Abhandlungen_, 1884; J.\nWalter, _Zum Ged\u00e4chtniss Kants, Festrede_, 1881; Th. Weber, _Zur Kritik der\nKantischen Erkenntnisstheorie_ (from the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_),\n1882; W. Windelband, _Ueber die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre\nvom Ding an sich, Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Philosophie_,\n1877 (cf. the same author's _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, \u00a7 58);\nJ. Witte, _Beitr\u00e4ge zum Verst\u00e4ndniss Kants_, 1874; the same, _Kantischer\nKritizismus gegen\u00fcber unkritischem Dilettantismus_ (against A. St\u00f6hr),\n1885; Wohlrabe, _Kants Lehre vom Gewissen_, 1889; E. Zeller, _Ueber das\nKantische Moralprinzip_, 1880; R. Zimmermann, _Ueber Kants Widerlegung des\nIdealismus von Berkeley_, 1871; the same, _Ueber Kants mathematisches\nVorurtheil und dessen Folgen_, 1871.\n\nPopular expositions have been given by the following: K. Fortlage (in his\n_Philos. Vortr\u00e4ge_, 1869); E. Last, _Mehr Licht! Die Haups\u00e4tze Kants und\nSchopenhauers_, 1879; the same, _Die realistiche und die idealistische\nAnschauung entwickelt an Kants Idealit\u00e4t von Raum und Zeit_, 1884; H.\nRomundt, _Antaeus, neuer Aufbau der Lehre Kants \u00fcber Seele, Freiheit,\nund Gott_, 1882; the same, _Grundlegung zur Reform der Philosophie,\nvereinfachte und erweiterte Darstellung von Kants Kritik der reinen\nVernunft_, 1885; the same, _Die Vollendung des Socrates, Kants Grundlegung\nzur Reform der Sittenlehre_; the same, _Ein neuer Paulus, Kants Grundlegung\nzu einer sicheren Lehre von der Religion_, 1886; the same, _Die drei Fragen\nKants_, 1887; A. Krause, _Popul\u00e4re Darstellung von Kants Kritik der reinen\nVernunft_, 1881; K. Lasswitz, _Die Lehre Kants von der Idealit\u00e4t des\nRaumes und der Zeit_, 1883; Wilhelm M\u00fcnz, _Die Grundlagen der Kantischen\nErkenntnisstheorie_, 2d ed., 1885.\n\nAmong foreigners Villers, Cousin, Nolen, Desdouits, Cantoni, E. Caird [_\\A\nCritical Account of the Philosophy of Kant_, 1877; _The Critical Philosophy\nof Immanuel Kant_, 2 vols., 1889], Adamson _[On the Philosophy of Kant_,\n1879, and a valuable article in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed.,\nvol. xiii.], Stirling [_Text-book to Kant_, 1881], [Watson, _Kant and his\nEnglish Critics_, 1881], Morris _Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_, Griggs's\nPhilosophical Classics, 1882, [Wallace, _Kant_, Blackwood's Philosophical\nClassics, 1882; Porter, _Kant's Ethics_, Griggs's Philosophical Classics,\n1886; Green, _Lectures_, Works, vol. ii., 1886.--Tr.], have among others\nmade contributions to Kantian literature. Of the older works we may mention\nthe dictionaries of E. Schmid, 1788, and Mellin (in six volumes), 1797\n_seq_., the critique of the Kantian philosophy in the first volume of\nSchopenhauer's chief work, 1819, and the essay of C.H. Weisse, _In\nwelchem Sinne hat sich die deutsche Philosophie jetzt wieder an Kant zu\norientieren_, 1847.\n\nKant's outward life was less eventful and less changeful than his\nphilosophical development.[1] Born in K\u00f6nigsberg in 1724, the son of J.G.\nCant, a saddler of Scottish descent, his home and school training were both\nstrict and of a markedly religious type. He was educated at the university\nof his native city, and for nine years, from 1746 on, filled the place of\na private tutor. In 1755 he became _Docent_, in 1770 ordinary professor in\nK\u00f6nigsberg, serving also for six years of this time as under-librarian. He\nseldom left his native city and never the province. The clearness\nwhich marked his extremely popular lectures on physical geography and\nanthropology was due to his diligent study of works of travel, and to an\nunusually acute gift of observation, which enabled him to draw from his\nsurroundings a comprehensive knowledge of the world and of man. He ceased\nlecturing in 1797, and in 1804 old age ended a life which had always, even\nin minute detail, been governed by rule. A man of extreme devotion to\nduty, particularity, and love of truth, and an amiable, bright, and witty\ncompanion, Kant belongs to the acute rather than to the profound thinkers.\nAmong his manifold endowments the tendency to combination and the faculty\nof intuition (as the _Critique of Judgment_ especially shows) are present\nto a noticeable degree, yet not so markedly as the power of strict analysis\nand subtle discrimination. So that, although a mediating tendency is\nrightly regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of the Kantian\nthinking, it must also be remembered that synthesis is everywhere preceded\nby a mighty work of analysis, and that this still exerts its power even\nafter the adjustment is complete. Thus Kant became the energetic defender\nof a qualitative view of the world in opposition to the quantitative view\nof Leibnitz, for which antitheses (_e.g._, sensation and thought, feeling\nand cognition, good and evil, duty and inclination) fade into mere\ndifferences of degree.\n\n[Footnote 1: The following have done especially valuable service in the\ninvestigation of the development of Kant's doctrine: Paulsen (_Versuch\neiner Entwickelungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1875),\nB. Erdmann, Vaihinger, and Windelband. Besides Hume and Leibnitz, Newton,\nLocke, Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Wolff exercised an important influence\non Kant.]\n\nIn the beginning of this chapter we have indicated how the new ideal of\nknowledge, under whose banner Kant brought about a reform of philosophy,\ngrew out of the conflict between the rationalistic (dogmatic) and the\nempirical (skeptical) systems. This combines the Baconian ideal of the\nextension of knowledge with the Cartesian ideal of certainty in knowledge.\nIt is synthetic judgments alone which extend knowledge, while analytic\njudgments are explicative merely.[1] _A priori_ judgments alone are\nperfectly certain, absolutely universal, and necessarily valid; while _a\nposteriori_ judgments are subjectively valid merely, lack necessity, and,\nat best, yield only relative universality.[2] All analytic judgments are _a\npriori_, all empirical or _a posteriori_ judgments are synthetic. Between\nthe two lies the object of Kant's search. Do _synthetic judgments a priori_\nexist, and how are they possible?\n\n[Footnote 1: \"All bodies are extended\" is an analytic judgment; \"all bodies\npossess weight,\" a synthetic judgment. The former explicates the concept\nof the subject by bringing into notice an idea already contained in it and\nbelonging to the definition as a part thereof; it is based on the law of\ncontradiction: an unextended body is a self-contradictory concept. The\nlatter, on the contrary, goes beyond the concept of the subject and adds\na predicate which had not been thought therein. It is experience which\nteaches us that weight is joined to matter, a fact which cannot be derived\nfrom the concept of matter. Almost all mathematical principles are\nsynthetic, and here, as will be shown, it is not experience but \"pure\nintuition\" which permits us to go beyond the concept and add a new mark\nto it.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The Scholastics applied the term _a priori_ to knowledge from\ncauses (from that which precedes), and _a posteriori_ to knowledge from\neffects. Kant, following Leibnitz and Lambert, uses the terms to designate\nthe antithesis, knowledge from reason and knowledge from experience. An _a\npriori_ judgment is a judgment obtained without the aid of experience. When\nthe principle from which it is derived is also independent of experience it\nis absolutely _a priori_, otherwise it is relatively _a priori_.]\n\nTwo sciences discuss the _how_, and a third the _if_ of such judgments,\nwhich, at the same time, are ampliative and absolutely universal and\nnecessary. The first two sciences are pure mathematics and pure natural\nscience, of which the former is protected against doubt concerning its\nlegitimacy by its evident character, and the latter, by the constant\npossibility of verification in experience; each, moreover, can point to\nthe continuous course of its development. All this is absent in the third\nscience, metaphysics, as science of the suprasensible, and to its great\ndisadvantage. Experiential verification is in the nature of things denied\nto a presumptive knowledge of that which is beyond experience; it lacks\nevidence to such an extent that there is scarcely a principle to be found\nto which all metaphysicians assent, much less a metaphysical text-book\nto compare with Euclid; there is so little continuous advance that it is\nrather true that the later comers are likely to overthrow all that their\npredecessors have taught. In metaphysics, therefore, which, it must be\nconfessed, is actual as a natural tendency, the question is not, as in\nthe other two sciences, concerning the grounds of its legitimacy, but\nconcerning this legitimacy itself. Mathematics and pure physics form\nsynthetic judgments _a priori_, and metaphysics does the same. But the\nprinciples of the two former are unchallenged, while those of the third\nare not. In the former case the subject for investigation is, Whence this\nauthority? in the latter case, Is she thus authorized?\n\nThus the main question, How are synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?\ndivides into the subordinate questions, How is pure mathematics possible?\nHow is pure natural science possible, and, How is metaphysics (in two\nsenses: metaphysics in general, and metaphysics as science) possible? The\nTranscendental _Aesthetic_ (the critique of sensibility or the faculty\nof intuition) answers the first of these questions; the Transcendental\n_Analytic_ (the critique of the understanding), the second; and the\nTranscendental _Dialectic_ (the critique of \"reason\" in the narrower sense)\nand the Transcendental _Doctrine of Method (Methodenlehre)_, the third. The\nAnalytic and the Dialectic are the two parts of the Transcendental \"Logic\"\n(critique of the faculty of thought), which, together with the Aesthetic,\nforms the Transcendental \"Doctrine of Elements\" _(Elementarlehre)_, in\ncontrast to the Doctrine of Method. The _Critique of Pure Reason_ follows\nthis scheme of subordinate division, while the _Prolegomena_ co-ordinates\nall four parts in the manner first mentioned.\n\nLet us anticipate the answers. Pure mathematics is possible, because there\nare pure or _a priori intuitions_ (space and time), and pure natural\nscience or the metaphysics of phenomena, because there are _a priori\nconcepts_ (categories) _and principles_ of the pure understanding.\nMetaphysics as a presumptive science of the suprasensible has been possible\nin the form of unsuccessful attempts, because there are _Ideas_ or concepts\nof reason which point beyond experience and look as though knowable objects\nwere given through them; but as real science it is not possible, because\nthe application of the categories is restricted to the limits of\nexperience, while the objects thought through the Ideas cannot be\nsensuously given, and all assumed knowledge of them becomes involved in\nirresolvable contradictions (antinomies). On the other hand, a science is\npossible and necessary to teach the correct use of the categories, which\nmay be applied to phenomena alone, and of the Ideas, which may be applied\nonly to our knowledge of things (and our volition), and to determine the\norigin and the limits of our knowledge--that is to say, a transcendental\nphilosophy. In regard to metaphysics (knowledge from pure reason), then,\nthis is the conclusion reached: Rejection of transcendent metaphysics (that\nwhich goes beyond experience), recognition and development of immanent\nmetaphysics (that which remains within the limits of possible experience).\nIt is not possible as a metaphysic of things in themselves; it is possible\nas a metaphysic of nature (of the totality of phenomena), and as a\nmetaphysic of knowledge (critique of reason).\n\nThe interests of the reason are not exhausted, however, by the question,\nWhat can we know? but include two further questions, What ought we to do?\nand, What may we hope? Thus to the metaphysics of nature there is added\na metaphysics of morals, and to the critique of theoretical reason, a\ncritique of practical reason or of the will, together with a critique of\nreligious belief. For even if a \"knowledge\" of the suprasensible is denied\nto us, yet \"practical\" grounds are not wanting for a sufficiently certain\n\"conviction\" concerning God, freedom, and immortality.\n\nAfter carrying the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments _a\npriori_ from the knowledge of nature over to the knowledge of our duty,\nKant raises it, in the third place, in regard to our judgment concerning\nthe subjective and objective purposiveness of things, or concerning their\nbeauty and their perfection, and adds to his critique of the intellect\nand the will a critique of the faculty of aesthetic and teleological\n_judgment_.\n\nThe Kantian philosophy accordingly falls into three parts, one theoretical,\none practical (and religious), one aesthetic and teleological.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBefore advancing to our account of the first of these parts, a few\npreliminary remarks are indispensable concerning the presuppositions\ninvolved in Kant's critical work and on the method which he pursues. The\npresuppositions are partly psychological, partly (as the classification of\nthe forms of judgment and inference, and the twofold division of judgments)\nlogical, either in the formal or the transcendental sense, and partly\nmetaphysical (as the thing in itself). Kant takes the first of these from\nthe psychology of his time, by combining the Wolffian classification of the\nfaculties with that of Tetens, and thus obtains six different faculties:\nlower (sensuous) and higher (intellectual) faculties of cognition, of\nfeeling, and of appetition; or sensibility (the capacity for receiving\nrepresentations through the way in which we are affected by objects),\nunderstanding (the faculty of producing representations spontaneously and\nof connecting them); the sensuous feelings of pleasure and pain, taste;\ndesire, and will. The understanding in the wide sense is equivalent to the\nhigher faculty of cognition, and divides further into understanding in the\nstricter sense (faculty of concepts), judgment (faculty of judging), and\nreason (faculty of inference). Of these the first gives laws to the faculty\nof cognition or to nature, the second laws to taste, and the third laws to\nthe will.\n\nThe most important of the fundamental assumptions concerns the relation,\nthe nature, and the mission of the two faculties of cognition. These do\nnot differ in degree, through the possession of greater or less\ndistinctness--for there are sensuous representations which are distinct and\nintellectual ones which are not so--but specifically: Sensibility is the\nfaculty of intuitions, understanding the faculty of concepts. Intuitions\nare particular, concepts general representations. The former relate to\nobjects directly, the latter only indirectly (through the mediation of\nother representations). In intuition the mind is receptive, in conception\nit acts spontaneously. \"Through intuitions objects are _given_ to us;\nthrough concepts they are _thought_.\" It results from this that neither of\nthe two faculties is of itself sufficient for the attainment of knowledge,\nfor cognition is objective thinking, the determination of objects, the\nunifying combination or elaboration of a given manifold, the forming of a\nmaterial content. Rationalists and empiricists alike have been deceived\nin regard to the necessity for co-operation between the senses and the\nunderstanding. Sensibility furnishes the material manifold, which of itself\nit is not able to form, while the understanding gives the unifying form, to\nwhich of itself it cannot furnish a content. \"Intuitions without concepts\nare _blind_\" (formless, unintelligible), \"concepts without intuitions are\n_empty_\" (without content). In the one case, form and order are wanting; in\nthe other, the material to be formed. The two faculties are thrown back on\neach other, and knowledge can arise only from their union.\n\nA certain degree of form is attained in sense, it is true, since the chaos\nof sensations is ordered under the \"forms of intuition,\" space and time,\nwhich are an original possession of the intuiting subject, but this is\nnot sufficient, without the aid of the understanding, for the genesis of\nknowledge. In view of the _a priori_ nature of space and time, though\nwithout detraction from their intuitive character (they are immediate\nparticular representations), we may assign pure sensibility to the higher\nfaculty of cognition and speak of an intuiting reason.\n\nThe forms of intuition and of thought come from within, they lie ready in\nthe mind _a priori_, though not as completed representations. They are\nfunctions, necessary actions of the soul, for the execution of which a\nstimulus from without, through sensations, is necessary, but which, when\nonce this is given, the soul brings forth spontaneously. The external\nimpulse merely gives the soul the occasion for such productive acts, while\ntheir grounds and laws are found in its own nature. In this sense Kant\nterms them \"originally acquired,\" and in the Introduction to the _Critique\nof Pure Reason_ declares that although it is indubitable that \"all our\nknowledge begins _with_ experience (impressions of sense), yet it does not\nall arise _from_ experience.\" That a representation or cognition is _a\npriori_[1] does not mean that it precedes experience in time, but that\n(apart from the merely exciting, non-productive stimulation through\nimpressions already mentioned) it is independent of all experience, that it\nis not derived or borrowed from experience.\n\n[Footnote 1: The terms _a priori_ representation and pure representation\n(concept, intuition) are equivalent; but in judgments, on the other hand,\nthere is a distinction. A judgment is _a priori_ when the connection takes\nplace independently of experience, no matter whether the concepts connected\nare _a priori_ or not. If the former is the case the _a priori_ judgment is\npure (mixed with nothing empirical); if the latter, it is mixed.]\n\nThe material of intuition and thought is given to the soul, received by\nit; it arises through the action of objects upon the senses, and is always\nempirical. Intuition is the only organ of reality; in sensation the\npresence of a real object as the cause of the sensation is directly\nrevealed. When Kant's transcendental idealism was placed by a reviewer on a\nlevel with the empirical idealism of Berkeley, which denies the existence\nof the external world, he distinctly asserted that it had never entered\nhis mind to question the reality of external things. Further, after the\nexistence of real things affecting the senses had been transformed in\nhis mind from a basis of the investigation into an object of inquiry,\nhe endeavored to defend this assumption (which at first he had na\u00efvely\nborrowed from the realism of pre-scientific thought) by arguments, but\nwithout any satisfactory result.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: The task of confirming the existence of things in themselves\nchanges under his hands into another, that of proving the existence of\nexternal phenomena. \"That external objects are real as representations\"\nBerkeley had never disputed.]\n\nOn the basis of the inseparability of sensibility and understanding the\nideal of knowledge--an extension of knowledge to be attained by _a priori_\nmeans (p. 333)--experiences a remarkable addition in the position that the\nrational synthesis thus obtained must be a knowledge of reality, must be\napplied to matter given in intuition. To the question, \"How are synthetic\njudgments _a priori possible_?\" is joined a second equally legitimate\ninquiry, \"How do they become _objectively valid_, or applicable to objects\nof experience?\" The principle from which their validity is proved--they are\napplicable to objects of experience because _without them experience would\nnot be possible_, because they are _conditions of experience_--like the\ncriterion of apriority (strict universality and necessity), is one of the\nno\u00ebtic assumptions of the critical theory.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Vaihinger, _Kommentar_, i. pp. 425-430.]\n\nInasmuch as its investigation relates to the conditions of experience the\nKantian criticism follows a method which it itself terms _transcendental_.\nHeretofore, when the metaphysical method had been adopted, the object had\nbeen the suprasensible; and when knowledge had been made the object of\ninvestigation, the method followed had been empirical, psychological. Kant\nhad the right to consider himself the creator of no\u00ebtics, for he showed it\nthe transcendental point of view. Knowledge is an object of experience, but\nits conditions are not. The object is to explain knowledge, not merely to\ndescribe it psychologically,--to establish a new science of knowledge from\nprinciples, from pure reason. That which lies beyond experience is\nsealed from our thought; that which lies on this side of it is still\nuninvestigated, though capable and worthy of investigation, and in\nextreme need thereof. Criticism forbids the _transcendent_ use of reason\n(transcending experience); it permits, demands, and itself exercises the\n_transcendental_[1] use of it, which explains an experiential object,\nknowledge, from its conditions, which are not empirically given.\n\n[Footnote A: Kant applies the term _transcendental_ to the knowledge (the\ndiscovery, the proof) of the _a priori_ factor and its relation to objects\nof experience. Unfortunately he often uses the same word not only to\ndesignate the _a priori_ element itself, but also as a synonym for\ntranscendent. In all three cases its opposite is _empirical_, namely,\nempirico-psychological investigation by observation in distinction from\nno\u00ebtical investigation from principles; empirical origin in distinction\nfrom an origin in pure reason, and empirical use in distinction from\napplication beyond the limits of experience.]\n\nThere is, apparently, a contradiction between the empiristic result of the\nCritique of Reason (the limitation of knowledge to objects of experience)\nand its rationalistic proofs (which proceed metaphysically, not\nempirically), and, in fact, a considerable degree of opposition really\nexists. Kant argues in a metaphysical way that there can be no metaphysics.\nThis contradiction is solved by the distinction which has been mentioned\nbetween that which is beyond, and that which lies within, the boundary of\nexperience. That metaphysic is forbidden which on the objective side soars\nbeyond experience, but that pure rational knowledge is permissible and\nnecessary which develops from principles the grounds of experiential\nknowledge existing in the subject. In the Kantian school, however, these\ncomplementary elements,--empirical result, transcendental or metaphysical,\nproperly speaking, pro-physical method,--were divorced, and the one\nemphasized, favored, and further developed at the expense of the other.\nThe empiricists hold to the result, while they either weaken or completely\nmisunderstand the rationalism of the method: the _a priori_ factor, says\nFries, was not reached by _a priori_, but by _a posteriori_, means, and\nthere is no other way by which it could have been reached. The constructive\nthinkers, Fichte and his successors, adopt and continue the metaphysical\nmethod, but reject the empirical result. Fichte's aim is directed to\na system of necessary, unconscious processes of reason, among which,\nrejecting the thing in itself, he includes sensation. According to\nSchelling nature itself is _a priori_, a condition of consciousness. This\ndiscrepancy between foundation and result continues in an altered form even\namong contemporary thinkers--as a discussion whether the \"main purpose\"\nof Criticism is to be found in the limitation of knowledge to possible\nexperience, or the establishment of _a priori_ elements--though many, in\nadherence to Kant's own view, maintain that the metaphysics of knowledge\nand of phenomena (immanent rationalism) is the only legitimate metaphysics.\n\n\n%1. Theory of Knowledge.\n\n(a) The Pure Intuitions (Transcendental Aesthetic).%--The first part of the\nCritique of Reason, the Transcendental Aesthetic, lays down the position\nthat _space and time_ are not independent existences, not real beings, and\nnot properties or relations which would belong to things in themselves\nthough they were not intuited, but _forms of our intuition_, which have\ntheir basis in the subjective constitution of our, the human, mind. If we\nseparate from sensuous intuition all that the understanding thinks in it\nthrough its concepts, and all that belongs to sensation, these two forms of\nintuition remain, which may be termed pure intuitions, since they can be\nconsidered apart from all sensation. As subjective _conditions_ (lying in\nthe nature of the subject) through which alone a thing can become an object\nof intuition for us, they precede all empirical intuitions or are\n_a priori_.\n\nSpace and time are neither substantial receptacles which contain all\nthat is real nor orders inhering in things in themselves, but forms of\nintuition. Now all our representations are either pure or empirical in\ntheir origin, and either intuitive or conceptual in character. Kant\nadvances four proofs for the position that space and time are not empirical\nand not concepts, but pure intuitions: (1) Time is not an empirical\nconcept which has been abstracted from experience. For the coexistence or\nsuccession of phenomena, _i.e._, their existence at the same time or at\ndifferent times (from which, as many believe, the representation of time\nis abstracted), itself presupposes time--a coexistence or succession is\npossible only in time. It is no less false that space is abstracted from\nthe empirical space relations of external phenomena, their existence\noutside and beside one another, or in different places, for it is\nimpossible to represent relative situation except in space. Therefore\nexperience does not make space and time possible; but space and time first\nof all make experience possible, the one outer, the other inner experience.\nThey are postulates of perception, not abstractions from it. (2) Time is a\nnecessary representation _a priori_. We can easily think all phenomena away\nfrom it, but we cannot remove time itself in view of phenomena in general;\nwe can think time without phenomena, but not phenomena without time. The\nsame is true of space in reference to external objects. Both are conditions\nof the possibility of phenomena. (3) Time is not a discursive or general\nconcept. For there is but one time. And different times do not precede the\none time as the constituent parts of which it is made up, but are mere\nlimitations of it; the part is possible only through the whole. In the same\nway the various spaces are only parts of one and the same space, and can\nbe thought in it alone. But a representation which can be given only by\na single object is a particular representation or an intuition. Because,\ntherefore, of the oneness of space and time, the representation of each\nis an intuition. The _a priori_, immediate intuition of the one space is\nentirely different from the empirical, general conception of space, which\nis abstracted from the various spaces. (4) Determinate periods of time\narise by limitation of the one, fundamental time. Consequently this\noriginal time must be unlimited or infinite, and the representation of it\nmust be an intuition, not a concept. Time contains in itself an endless\nnumber of representations (its parts, times), but this is never the\ncase with a generic concept, which, indeed, is contained as a partial\nrepresentation in an endless number of representations (those of the\nindividuals having the same name), and, consequently, comprehends them all\nunder itself, but which never contains them in itself. The general concept\nhorse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a\ngeneral characteristic, and that of justice in each representation of a\ndefinite just act; time, however, is not contained in the different times,\nbut they are contained in it. Similarly the relation of infinite space to\nthe finite spaces is not the logical relation of a concept to examples of\nit, but the intuitive relation of an unlimited whole to its limited parts.\n\nThe _Prolegomena_ employs as a fifth proof for the intuitive character of\nspace, an argument which had already appeared in the essay _On the Ultimate\nGround of the Distinction of Positions in Space_. There are certain spatial\ndistinctions which can be grasped by intuition alone, and which are\nabsolutely incapable of comprehension through the understanding--for\nexample, those of right and left, above and below, before and behind. No\nlogical marks can be given for the distinction between the object and its\nimage in the mirror, or between the right ear and the left. The complete\ndescription of a right hand must, in all respects (quality, proportionate\nposition of parts, size of the whole), hold for the left as well;\nbut, despite the complete similarity, the one hand cannot be exactly\nsuper-imposed on the other; the glove of the one cannot be worn on the\nother. This difference in direction, which has significance only when\nviewed from a definite point, and the impossibility mentioned of a\ncongruence between an object (right hand) and its reflected image (left\nhand) can be understood only by intuition; they must be seen and felt, and\ncannot be made clear through concepts, and, consequently, can never be\nexplained to a being which lacks the intuition of space.\n\nIn the \"transcendental\" exposition of space and time Kant follows this\n\"metaphysical\" exposition, which had to prove their non-empirical, and\nnon-discursive, hence their _a priori_ and intuitive, character, with\nthe proof that only such an explanation of space and time could make it\nconceivable how synthetic cognitions _a priori_ can arise from them. The\nprinciples of mathematics are of this kind. The synthetic character of\ngeometrical truths is explained by the intuitive nature of space, their\napodictic character by its apriority, and their objective reality or\napplicability to empirical objects by the fact that space is the condition\nof (external) perception. The like is true of arithmetic and time.\n\nIf space were a mere concept, no proposition could be derived from it which\nshould go beyond the concept and extend our knowledge of its properties.\nThe possibility of such extension or synthesis in mathematics depends on\nthe fact that spatial concepts can always be presented or \"constructed\" in\nintuition. The geometrical axiom that in the triangle the sum of two sides\nis greater than the third is derived from intuition, by describing the\ntriangle in imagination or, actually, on the board. Here the object is\ngiven through the cognition and not before it.--If space and time were\nempirical representations the knowledge obtained from them would lack\nnecessity, which, as a matter of fact, it possesses in a marked degree.\nWhile experience teaches us only that something is thus or so, and not that\nit could not be otherwise, the axioms, (space has only three dimensions,\ntime only one; only one straight line is possible between two points),\nnay, all the propositions of mathematics are strictly universal and\napodictically certain: we are entirely relieved from the necessity of\nmeasuring all triangles in the world in order to find out whether the sum\nof their angles is equal to two right angles, and we do not need, as in the\ncase of judgments of experience, to add the limitation, so far as it is yet\nknown there are no exceptions to this rule. The apriority is the _ratio\nessendi_ of the strict necessity involved in the \"it must be so\" _(des\nSoseinm\u00fcssens_), while the latter is the _ratio cognoscendi_ of the former.\nNow since the necessity of mathematical judgments can only be explained\nthrough the ideality of space, this doctrine is perfectly certain, not\nmerely a probable hypothesis.--The validity of mathematical principles for\nall objects of perception, finally, is based on the fact that they are\nrules under which alone experience is possible for us. It should be\nmentioned, further, that the conceptions of change and motion (change of\nplace) are possible only through and in the representation of time. No\nconcept could make intelligible the possibility of change, that is, of the\nconnection of contradictory predicates in one and the same thing, but the\nintuition of succession easily succeeds in accomplishing it.\n\nThe argument is followed by conclusions and explanations based upon it;\n(1) Space is the form of the outer, time of the inner, sense. Through the\nouter sense external objects are given to us, and through the inner sense\nour own inner states. But since all representations, whether they have\nexternal things for their objects or not, belong in themselves, as mental\ndeterminations, to our inner state, time is the formal condition of all\nphenomena in general, directly of internal (psychical) phenomena, and,\nthereby, indirectly of external phenomena also. (2) The validity of the\nrelations of space and time cognizable _a priori_ is established for all\nobjects of possible experience, but is limited to these. They are valid\nfor _all phenomena_ (for all things which at any time may be given to our\nsenses), but only for these, not for things as they are _in themselves_.\nThey have \"empirical reality, but, at the same time, transcendental\nideality.\" As external phenomena all things are beside one another in\nspace, and all phenomena whatever are in time and of necessity under\ntemporal relations; in regard to all things which can occur in our\nexperience, and in so far as they can occur, space and time are\nobjectively, therefore empirically, real. But they do not possess absolute\nreality (neither subsistent reality nor the reality of inherence); for if\nwe abstract from our sensuous intuition both vanish, and, apart from the\nsubject (_N.B._, the transcendental subject, concerning which more below),\nthey are naught. It is only from man's point of view that we can speak\nof space, and of extended, moveable, changeable things; for we can know\nnothing concerning the intuitions of other thinking beings, we have no\nmeans of discovering whether they are bound by the same conditions which\nlimit our intuitions, and which for us are universally valid. (3) Nothing\nwhich is intuited in space is a thing in itself. What we call external\nobjects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, whose\ntrue correlative, the _thing in itself_, cannot be known by ever so deep\npenetration into the phenomenon; such properties as belong to things in\nthemselves can never be given to us through the senses. Similarly nothing\nthat is intuited in time is a thing in itself, so that we intuit ourselves\nonly as we appear to ourselves, and not as we are.\n\nThe merely empirical reality of space and time, the limitation of their\nvalidity to phenomena, leaves the certainty of knowledge within the limits\nof experience intact; for we are equally certain of it, whether these forms\nnecessarily belong to things in themselves, or only to our intuitions\nof things. The assertion of their absolute reality, on the other hand,\ninvolves us in sheer absurdities (that is, it necessitates the assumption\nof two infinite nonentities which exist, but without being anything real,\nmerely in order to comprehend all reality, and on one of which even our own\nexistence would be dependent), in view of which the origin of so peculiar\na theory as the idealism of Berkeley appears intelligible. The critical\ntheory of space and time is so far from being identical with, or akin to,\nthe theory of Berkeley, that it furnishes the best and only defense against\nthe latter. If anyone assumes the absolute or transcendental reality of\nthese forms, it is impossible for him to prevent everything, including even\nour own existence, from being changed thereby into mere illusion. But\nthe critical philosopher is far from degrading bodies to mere illusion;\nexternal phenomena are just as real for him as internal phenomena, though\nonly as phenomena, it is true, as (possible) representations.\n\nPhenomenon and illusion are not the same. The transcendental distinction\nbetween phenomena and things in themselves must not be confused with the\ndistinction common to ordinary life and to physics, in accordance with\nwhich we call the rainbow a mere appearance (better, illusion), but the\ncombination of sun and rain which gives rise to this illusion the thing\nin itself, as that which in universal experience and in all different\npositions with respect to the senses, is thus and not otherwise determined\nin intuition, or that which essentially belongs to the intuition of the\nobject, and is valid for every human sensibility (in antithesis to that\nwhich only contingently belongs to it, and is valid only for a special\nposition or organization of this or that sense). Similarly an object always\nappears to grow smaller as its distance increases, while in itself it is\nand remains of some fixed size. And this use of words is perfectly\ncorrect, in the _physical or empirical_ sense of \"in itself\"; but in the\n_transcendental_ sense the raindrops, also, together with their form and\nsize, are themselves mere phenomena, the \"in itself\" of which remains\nentirely unknown to us. Kant, moreover, does not wish to see the\nsubjectivity of the forms of intuition placed on a level with the\nsubjectivity of sensations or explained by this, though he accepts it as\na fact long established. The sensations of color, of tone, of temperature\nare, no doubt, like the representation of space in that they belong only to\nthe subjective constitution of the sensibility, and can be attributed to\nobjects only in relation to our senses. But the great difference between\nthe two is that these sense qualities may be different in different persons\n(the color of the rose may seem different to each eye), or may fail to\nharmonize with any human sense; that they are not _a priori_ in the same\nstrict sense as space and time, and consequently afford no knowledge of the\nobjects of possible experience independently of perception; and that they\nare connected with the phenomenon only as the contingently added effects of\na particular organization, while space, as the condition of external\nobjects, necessarily belongs to the phenomenon or intuition of them. _It is\nthrough space alone that it is possible for things to be external objects\nfor us_. The subjectivity of sensation is individual, while that of space\nand time is general or universal to mankind; the former is empirical,\nindividually different, and contingent, the latter _a priori_ and\nnecessary. Space alone, not sensation, is a _conditio sine qua non_ of\nexternal perception. Space and time are the sole _a priori_ elements of\nthe sensibility; all other sensuous concepts, even motion and change,\npresuppose perception; the movable in space and the succession of\nproperties in an existing thing are empirical data.\n\nIn confirmation of the theory that all objects of the senses are mere\nphenomena, the fact is adduced that (with the exception of the will and the\nfeelings, which are not cognitions) nothing is given us through the senses\nbut representations of relations, while a thing in itself cannot be known\nby mere relations. The phenomenon is a sum total of mere relations. In\nregard to matter we know only extension, motion, and the laws of this\nmotion or forces (attraction, repulsion, impenetrability), but all these\nare merely relations of the thing to something, else, that is, external\nrelations. Where is the inner side which underlies this exterior, and\nwhich belongs to the object in itself? This is never to be found in the\nphenomenon, and no matter how far the observation and analysis of nature\nmay advance (a work with unlimited horizons!) they reach nothing but\nportions of space occupied by matter and effects which matter exercises,\nthat is, nothing beyond that which is comparatively internal, and which,\nin its turn, consists of external relations. The absolutely inner side\nof matter is a mere fancy; and if the complaint that the \"inner side\" of\nthings is concealed from us is to mean that we do not comprehend what\nthe things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is unjust and\nirrational, for it demands that we should be able to intuit without\nsenses, in other words, that we should be other than men. The transcendent\nquestions concerning the noumenon of things are unanswerable; we know\nourselves, even, only as phenomena! A phenomenon consists in nothing but\nthe relation of something in general to the senses.\n\nIt is indubitable _that_ something corresponds to phenomena, which,\nby affecting our sensibility, occasions sensations in us, and thereby\nphenomena. The very word, the very concept, \"phenomenon\", indicates a\nrelation to something which is not phenomenon, to an object not dependent\non the sensibility. _What_ this may be continues hidden from us, for\nknowledge is impossible without intuition. Things in themselves are\nunknowable. Nevertheless the idea (it must be confessed, the entirely empty\nidea) of this \"transcendental object\", as an indeterminate somewhat = _x_\nwhich underlies phenomena, is not only allowable, but, as a limiting\nconcept, unavoidable in order to confine the pretensions of sense to the\nonly field which is accessible to it, that is, to the field of phenomena.\n\nThe inference \"space and time are nothing but representations and\nrepresentations are in us, therefore space and time as well as all\nphenomena in them, bodies with their forces and motions, are in us,\" does\nnot accurately express Kant's position, for he might justly reply that,\naccording to him, bodies as phenomena are in different parts in space from\nthat which we assign to ourselves, and thus without us; that space is the\nform of external intuition, and through it external objects arise for us\nfrom sensations; but that, in regard to the things in themselves which\naffect us, we are entirely ignorant whether they are within or without us.\n\nIt can easily be shown by literal quotations that there were distinct\ntendencies in Kant, especially in the first edition of his principal\nwork, toward a radical idealism which doubts or denies not merely the\ncognizability, but also the existence of objects external to the subject\nand its representations, and which degrades the thing in itself to a mere\nthought in us, or completely does away with it (_e.g._, \"The representation\nof an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, ...\nindependently of empirical conditions, in itself contradictory \"). But\nthese expressions indicate only a momentary inclination toward such a view,\nnot a binding avowal of it, and they are outweighed by those in which\nidealism is more or less energetically rejected. That which according to\nKant _exists outside the representation of the individual_ is twofold: (1)\nthe unknown things in themselves with their problematical characteristics,\nas the ground of phenomena; (2) the phenomena \"themselves\" with their\nknowable immanent laws, and their relations in space and time, as possible\nrepresentations. When I turn my glance away from the rose its redness\nvanishes, since this predicate belongs to it only in so far and so long\nas it acts in the light on my visual apparatus. What, then, is left? That\nthing in itself, of course, which, when it appears to me, calls forth in me\nthe intuition of the rose. But there is still something else remaining--the\nphenomenon of the rose, with its size, its form, and its motion in the\nwind. For these are predicates which must be attributed to the phenomenon\nitself as the object of my representation. If the rose, as determined in\nspace and time, vanished when I turned my head away, it could not, unless\nintuited by a subject, experience or exert effects in space and time, could\nnot lose its leaves in the wind and strew the ground with its petals.\nPerception and thought inform me not merely concerning events of which I am\na witness, but also of others which have occurred, or which will occur, in\nmy absence. The process of stripping the leaves from the rose has actually\ntaken place as a phenomenon and does not first become real by my subsequent\nrepresentation of it or inference to it. The things and events of the\nphenomenal world exist both before and after my perception, and are\nsomething distinct from my subjective and momentary representations of\nthem. The space and time, however, in which they exist and happen are\nnot furnished by the intuiting individual, but by the supra-individual,\n_transcendental consciousness_ or generic reason of the race. The\nphenomenon thus stands midway between its objective ground (the absolute\nthing in itself) and the subject, whose common product it is, as a relative\nthing in itself, as a reality which is independent of the contingent and\nchanging representation of the individual, empirical subject, which is\ndependent for its form on the transcendental subject, and which is the only\nreality accessible to us, yet entirely valid for us. The phenomenal world\nis not a contingent and individual phenomenon, but one necessary for all\nbeings organized as we are, a phenomenon for humanity. My representations\nare not the phenomena themselves, but images and signs through which I\ncognize phenomena, _i.e._, real things as they are for me and for every man\n(not as they are in themselves). The reality of phenomena consists in the\nfact that they can be perceived by men, and the objective validity of my\nknowledge of them in the fact that every man must agree in it. The laws\nwhich the understanding (not the individual understanding!) imposes upon\nnature hold for phenomena, because they hold for every man. Objectivity is\nuniversal validity. If the world of phenomena which is intuited and known\nby us wears a different appearance from the world of things in themselves,\nthis does not justify us in declaring it to be mere seeming and dreaming; a\ndream which all dream together, and which all must dream, is not a dream,\nbut reality. As we must represent the world> so it is, though for us, of\ncourse, and not in itself.\n\nMany places in Kant's works seem to argue against the intermediate position\nhere ascribed to the world of phenomena--according to which it is less than\nthings in themselves and more than subjective representation--which, since\nthey explain the phenomenon as a mere representation, leave room for only\ntwo factors (on the one hand, the thing in itself = that in the thing which\ncannot be represented; on the other, the thing for me = my representation\nof the thing). In fact, the distinction between the phenomenon \"itself\"\nand the representation which the individual now has of it and now does not\nhave, is far from being everywhere adhered to with desirable clearness; and\nwherever it is impossible to substitute that which has been represented\nand that which may be represented or possible intuitions for \"mere\nrepresentations in me,\" we must acknowledge that there is a departure\nfrom the standpoint which is assumed in some places with the greatest\ndistinctness. The latter finds unequivocal expression, among other places,\nin the \"Analogies of Experience\" and the \"Deduction of the Pure Concepts\nof the Understanding,\" \u00a7 2, No. 4 (first edition). The second of these\npassages speaks of one and the same universal experience, in which all\nperceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and regular connection, and of\nthe thoroughgoing affinity of phenomena as the basis of the possibility\nof the association of representations. This affinity is ascribed to the\nobjects of the senses, not to the representations, whose association is\nrather the result of the affinity, and not to the things in themselves, in\nregard to which the understanding has no legislative power.\n\nThe relation between the thing in itself and the phenomenon is also\nvariable. Now they are regarded as entirely heterogeneous (that which can\nnever be intuited exists in a mode opposed to that of the intuited and\nintuitable), and now as analogous to each other (non-intuitable properties\nof the thing in itself correspond to the intuitable characteristics of the\nphenomenon). The former is the case when it is said that phenomena are in\nspace and time, while things in themselves are not; that in the first of\nthese classes natural causation rules, and in the second freedom; that\nin the one-conditioned existence alone is found, in the other\nunconditioned.[1] But just as often things in themselves and phenomena are\nconceived as similar to one another, as two sides of the same object,[2]\nof which one, like the counter-earth of the Pythagoreans, always remains\nturned away from us, while the other is turned toward us, but does not\nreveal the true being of the object. According to this each particular\nthing, state, relation, and event in the world of phenomena would have its\nreal counterpart in the noumenal sphere: un-extended roses in themselves\nwould lie back of extended roses, certain non-temporal processes back of\ntheir growth and decay, intelligible relations back of their relations in\nspace. This is approximately the relation of the two conceptions as in part\ntaught by Lotze himself, in part represented by him as taught by Kant.\nHerbart's principle, \"So much seeming, so much indication of being\" (_wie\nviel Schein so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein_), might also be cited in\nthis connection. That which continually impelled Kant, in spite of his\nproclamation of the unknowableness of things in themselves, to form ideas\nabout their character, was the moral interest, but this sometimes threw its\ninfluence in favor of their commensurability with phenomena and sometimes\nin the opposite scale. For in his ethics Kant needs the intelligible\ncharacter or man as noumenon, and must assume as many men in themselves (to\nbe consistent, then, in general, as many beings in themselves) as there are\nin the world of phenomena. But for practical reasons, again, the causality\nof the man in himself must be thought of as entirely different from, and\nopposed to, the mechanical causality of the sense world. Kant's judgment\nis, also, no more stable concerning the value of the knowledge of the\nsuprasensible, which is denied to us. \"I do not _need_ to know what\nthings in themselves may be, because a thing can never be presented to me\notherwise than as a phenomenon.\" And yet a natural and ineradicable need of\nthe reason to obtain some conviction in regard to the other world is said\nto underlie the abortive attempts of metaphysics; and Kant himself uses\nall his efforts to secure to the practical reason the satisfaction of this\nneed, though he has denied it to the speculative reason, and to make good\nthe gap in knowledge by faith. From the theoretical standpoint an extension\nof knowledge beyond the limits of phenomena appears impossible, but\nunnecessary; from the practical standpoint it is, to a certain extent,\npossible and indispensable.\n\n[Footnote 1: Kant's conjectures concerning a common ground of material and\nmental phenomena, and those concerning the common root of sensibility and\nunderstanding, show the same tendency. On the one hand, duality, on the\nother, unity.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"Phenomenon, which always has _two sides_, the one when the\nobject in itself is considered (apart from the way in which it is intuited,\nand just because of which fact its character always remains problematical),\nthe other when we regard the form of the intuition of this object, which\nmust be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the\nobject appears, while it nevertheless actually and necessarily belongs\nto the phenomenon of _this object_.\" \"This predicate \"--_sc_., spatial\nquality, extension--\"is attributed to things only in so far as _they_\nappear to us.\"]\n\nThere is, then, a threefold distinction to be made: (1) _Things in\nthemselves_, which can never be the object of our knowledge, because our\nforms of intuition are not valid for them. (2) _Phenomena_, things for us,\nnature or the totality of that which either is or, at least, may be the\nobject of our knowledge (here belong the possible inhabitants of the moon,\nthe magnetic matter which pervades all bodies, and the forces of attraction\nand repulsion, though the first have never been observed, and the second is\nnot perceptible on account of the coarseness of our senses, and the\nlast, because forces in general are not perceptible; nature comprehends\neverything whose existence \"is connected with our perceptions in a possible\nexperience\"[1]). (3) _Our representations_ of phenomena, _i.e._, that of\nthe latter which actually enters into the consciousness of the empirical\nindividual. In the realm of things in themselves there is no motion\nwhatever, but at most an intelligible correlate of this relation; in the\nworld of phenomena, the world of physics, the earth moves around the sun;\nin the sphere of representation the sun moves around the earth. It is true,\nas has been said, that Kant sometimes ignores the distinction between\nphenomena as related to noumena and phenomena as related to\nrepresentations; and, as a result of this, that the phenomenon is either\ncompletely volatilized into the representation[2] or split up into an\nobjective half independent of us and a representative half dependent on us,\nof which the former falls into the thing in itself,[3] while the latter is\nresolved into subjective states of the ego.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"Nothing is actually given to us but the perception and the\nempirical progress from this to other possible perceptions.\" \"To call a\nphenomenon a real thing antecedent to perception, means ... that in the\n_progress of experience_ we must meet with such a perception.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: Phenomena \"are altogether in me,\" \"exist only in our\nsensibility as a modification of it.\" \"There is nothing in space but that\nwhich is actually represented in it.\" Phenomena are \"mere representations,\nwhich, if they are not given in us (in perception) nowhere exist.\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: Here Kant is guilty of the fault which he himself has\ncensured, of confusing the physical and transcendental meanings of \"in\nitself.\" He forgets that the thing, if it is momentarily not intuited or\nrepresented by me, and therefore is not immediately given for me as an\nindividual, is nevertheless still present for me as man, is mediately\ngiven, that is, is discoverable by future search. That which is without\nmy present consciousness is not for this reason without all human\nconsciousness. In fact, Kant often overlooks the distinction between actual\nand possible intuition, so that for him the \"objects\" of the latter slip\nout of space and time and into the thing in itself. To the \"transcendental\nobject we may ascribe the extent and connection of our possible\nperceptions, and say that it is given in itself before all experience.\" In\nit \"the real things of the past are given.\"]\n\nAfter the possibility and the legitimacy of synthetic judgments _a\npriori_ have been proved for pure mathematics upon the basis of the\npure intuitions, there emerges, in the second place, the problem of the\npossibility of _a priori_ syntheses in pure natural science, or the\nquestion, Do pure concepts exist? And after this has been answered in the\naffirmative, the further questions come up, Is the application of these,\nfirst, to phenomena, and second, to things in themselves, possible and\nlegitimate, and how far?\n\n%(b) The Concepts and Principles of the Pure Understanding (Transcendental\nAnalytic).%--Sensations, in order to become \"intuition\" or the perception\nof a phenomenon, needed to be ordered in space and time; in order to become\n\"experience\" or a unified knowledge of objects, intuitions need a synthesis\nthrough concepts. In order to objective knowledge the manifold of intuition\n(already ordered by its arrangement in space and time) must be connected in\nthe unity of the concept. Sensibility gives the manifold to be connected,\nthe understanding the connecting unity. The former is able to intuit only,\nthe latter only to think; knowledge can arise only as the result of their\nunion. Intuitions depend on affections, concepts on functions, that is, on\nunifying acts of the understanding.\n\nTo discover the pure forms of thought it is necessary to isolate the\nunderstanding, just as an isolation of the sensibility was necessary above\nin order to the discovery of the pure forms of intuition. We obtain the\nelements of the pure knowledge of the understanding by rejecting all that\nis intuitive and empirical. These elements must be pure, must be concepts,\nfurther, not derivative or composite, but fundamental concepts, and their\nnumber must be complete. This completeness is guaranteed only when the pure\nconcepts or _categories_ are sought according to some common principle,\nwhich assigns to each its position in the connection of the whole, and\nnot (as with Aristotle) collected by occasional, unsystematic inquiries\nundertaken at random. The table of the forms of judgment will serve as a\nguide for the discovery of the categories. Thought is knowledge through\nconcepts; the understanding can make no other use of concepts than to judge\nby means of them. Hence, since the understanding is the faculty of judging,\nthe various kinds of connection in judgment must yield the various pure\n\"connective-concepts\" (_Verkn\u00fcpfungsbegriffe_.--K. Fischer) or categories.\n\nIn regard to quantity, every judgment is universal, particular, or\nsingular; in regard to quality, affirmative, negative, or infinite; in\nregard to relation, categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive; and in\nregard to modality, problematical, assertory, or apodictic. To these\ntwelve forms of judgment correspond as many categories, viz., I., Unity,\nPlurality, Totality; II., Reality, Negation, Limitation; III., Subsistence\nand Inherence (Substance and Accident), Causality and Dependence (Cause and\nEffect), Community (Reciprocity between the Active and the Passive);\nIV., Possibility--Impossibility, Existence--Non-existence,\nNecessity--Contingency.\n\nThe first six of these fundamental concepts, which have no correlatives,\nconstitute the mathematical, the second six, which appear in pairs,\nthe dynamical categories. The former relate to objects of (pure or of\nempirical) intuition, the latter to the existence of these objects (in\nrelation to one another or to the understanding). Although all other _a\npriori_ division though concepts must be dichotomous, each of the four\nheads includes three categories, the third of which in each case arises\nfrom the combination of the second and first,[1] but, nevertheless, is an\noriginal (not a derivative) concept, since this combination requires a\nspecial _actus_ of the understanding. Universality or totality is plurality\nregarded as unity, limitation is reality combined with negation, community\nis the reciprocal causality of substances, and necessity is the actuality\ngiven by possibility itself. Kant omits, as unnecessary here, the useful,\neasy, and not unpleasant task of noting the great number of derivative\nconcepts _a priori_ (predicables) which spring from the combination of\nthese twelve original concepts (predicaments = categories) with one\nanother, or with the modes of pure sensibility,--the concepts force,\naction, passion, would belong as subsumptions under causality, presence\nand resistance under community, origin, extinction, and change under\nmodality,--since his object is not a system, but only the principles of\none. His liking or even love for this division according to quantity,\nquality, relation, and modality, which he always has ready as though it\nwere a universal key for philosophical problems, reveals a very strong\narchitectonic impulse, against which even his ever active skeptical\ntendency is not able to keep up the battle.\n\n[Footnote 1: Concerning this \"neat observation,\" Kant remarked that it\nmight \"perhaps have important consequences in regard to the scientific form\nof all knowledge of reason.\" This prophecy was fulfilled, although in a\ndifferent sense from that which floated before his mind. Fichte and Hegel\ncomposed their \"thought-symphonies\" in the three-four time given by Kant.]\n\nIn view of the derivation of the forms of thought from the forms of\njudgment Kant does not stop to give a detailed proof that the categories\nare concepts, and that they are pure. Their discursive (not intuitive)\ncharacter is evident from the fact that their reference to the object is\nmediate only (and not, as in the case of intuition, immediate), and their\n_a priori_ origin, from the necessity which they carry with them, and which\nwould be impossible if their origin were empirical. Here Kant starts from\nHume's criticism of the idea of cause. The Scottish skeptic had said that\nthe necessary bond between cause and effect can neither be perceived nor\nlogically demonstrated; that, therefore, the relation of causality is an\nidea which we--with what right?--add to perceived succession in time. This\ndoubt (without the hasty conclusions), says Kant, must be generalized, must\nbe extended to the category of substance (which had been already done by\nHume, pp. 226-7, though the author of the Critique of Reason was not aware\nof the fact), and to all other pure concepts of the understanding. Then we\nmay hope to kindle a torch at the spark which Hume struck out. The problem\n\"It is impossible to see why, because something exists, something else must\nnecessarily exist,\" is the starting point alike of Hume's skepticism and\nKant's criticism. The former recognized that the principle of causality\nis neither empirical nor analytic, and therefore concluded that it is an\ninvention of reason, which confuses subjective with objective necessity.\nThe latter shows that in spite of its subjective origin it has an objective\nvalue; that it is a truth which is independent of all experience, and yet\nvalid for all who have experience, and for all that can be experienced.\n\nOf the two questions, \"How can the concepts which spring from our\nunderstanding possess objective validity?\" and, \"How (through what means\nor media) does their application to objects of experience take place?\"\nthe first is answered in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the\nUnderstanding, and the second in the chapter on their Schematism.\n\nThe _Deduction_, the most difficult portion of the Critique, shows that the\nobjective validity of the categories, as concepts of objects in general,\ndepends on the fact that _through them alone experience_ as far as regards\nthe form of thought _is possible, _i.e._, it is only through them that any\nobject whatever can be thought. All knowledge consists in judgments; all\njudgments contain a connection of representations; all connection--whether\nit be conscious or not, whether it relates to concepts or to pure or\nempirical intuitions--is an _act of the understanding_; it cannot be given\nby objects, but only spontaneously performed by the subject itself. We\ncannot represent anything as connected in the object unless we have\nourselves first connected it. The connection includes three conceptions:\nthat of the manifold to be connected (which is given by intuition), that\nof the act of synthesis, and that of the unity; this last is two-fold,\nan objective unity (the conception of an object in general in which the\nmanifold is united), and a subjective unity (the unity of consciousness\nunder which or, rather, through which the connection is effected). The\ncategories represent the different kinds of combination, each one of these,\nagain, being completed in three stages, which are termed the Synthesis of\nApprehension in Intuition, the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination,\nand the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts. If I wish to think the time\nfrom one noon to the next, I must (1) grasp (apprehend) the manifold\nrepresentations (portions of time) in succession; (2) retain or renew\n(reproduce) in thought those which have preceded in passing to those which\nfollow; (3) be conscious that that which is now thought is the same\nwith that thought before, or know again (recognize) the reproduced\nrepresentation as the one previously experienced. If the mind did not\nexercise such synthetic activity the manifold of representation would not\nconstitute a whole, would lack the unity which consciousness alone can\nimpart to it. Without this _one_ consciousness, concepts and knowledge of\nobjects would be wholly impossible. The unity of pure self-consciousness\nor of \"transcendental apperception\" is the postulate of all use of the\nunderstanding. In the flux of internal phenomena there is no constant\nor abiding self, but the unchangeable consciousness here demanded is a\nprecedent condition of all experience, and gives to phenomena a connection\naccording to laws which determine an object for intuition, _i.e._, the\nconception of something in which they are necessarily connected.[1]\nReference to an object is nothing other than the necessary unity of\nconsciousness. The connective activity of the understanding, and with\nit experience, is possible only through \"the synthetic unity of pure\napperception,\" the \"I think,\" which must be able to accompany all my\nrepresentations, and through which they first become _mine_.\n\n[Footnote 1: Object is \"that which opposes the random or arbitrary\ndetermination of our cognitions,\" and which causes \"them to be determined\nin a certain way _a priori_.\"]\n\nExperience (in the strict sense) is distinguished from perception\n(experience in the wide sense) by its objectivity or universal validity. A\njudgment of perception (the sun shines upon the stone and the stone becomes\nwarm) is only subjectively valid; while, on the other hand, a judgment of\nexperience (the sun warms the stone) aims to be valid not only for me and\nmy present condition, but always, for me and for everyone else. If the\nformer is to become the latter, an _a priori_ concept must be added to\nthe perception (in the above case, the concept of cause), under which the\nperception is subsumed. The category determines the perceptions in view of\nthe form of the judgment, gives to the judgment its reference to an object,\nand thus gives to the percepts, or rather, concepts (sunshine and warmth),\nnecessary and universally valid connection. The \"reason why the judgments\nof others\" must \"agree with mine\" is \"the unity of the object to which they\nall relate, with which they agree, and hence must also all agree with one\nanother.\"\n\nThough the categories take their origin in the nature of the subject, they\nare objective and valid for objects of experience, because experience is\npossible alone through them. They are not the product, but the ground\nof experience. The second difficulty concerns their applicability to\nphenomena, which are wholly disparate. By what means is the gulf between\nthe categories, which are concepts and _a priori_, and perceptions, which\nare intuitous and empirical, bridged over? The connecting link is supplied\nby the imagination, as the faculty which mediates between sensibility and\nunderstanding to provide a concept with its image, and consists in the\nintuition of time, which, in common with the categories, has an _a priori_\ncharacter, and, in common with perceptions, an intuitive character, so that\nit is at once pure and sensuous. The subsumption of phenomena or empirical\nintuitions under the category is effected through the _Schemata_[1] of the\nconcepts of the understanding, _i.e._, through _a priori_ determinations\nof time according to rules, which relate to time-_series_, time-_content_,\ntime-_order_, and time-_comprehension_, and indicate whether I have to\napply this or that category to a given object.\n\n[Footnote 1: The schema is not an empirical image, but stands midway\nbetween this (the particular intuition of a definite triangle or dog) and\nthe unintuitable concept, as a general intuition (of a triangle or a dog\nin general, which holds alike for right- and oblique-angled triangles, for\npoodles and pugs), or as a rule for determining our intuition in accordance\nwith a concept.]\n\nEach category has its own schema. The schema of quantity is number, as\ncomprehending the successive addition of homogeneous parts. Filled time\n(being in time) is the schema of reality, empty time (not-being in time)\nthe schema of negation, and more or less filled time (the intensity of\nsensation, indicating the degree of reality) the schema of limitation.\nPermanence in time is the sign for the application of the category of\nsubstance;[1] regular succession, for the application of the concept of\ncause; the coexistence of the determinations of one substance with those of\nanother, the signal for their subsumption under the concept of reciprocity.\nThe schemata of possibility, actuality, and necessity, finally, are\nexistence at any time whatever (whensoever), existence at a definite time,\nand existence at all times. By such schematic syntheses the pure concept\nis brought near to the empirical intuition, and the way is prepared for an\napplication of the former to the latter, or, what is the same thing, for\nthe subsumption of the latter under the former.\n\n[Footnote 1: This determination is important for psychology. Since\nthe inner sense shows nothing constant, but everything in a continual\nflux,--for the permanent subject of our thoughts is an identical activity\nof the understanding, not an intuitable object,--the concept of substance\nis not applicable to psychical phenomena. Representations of a permanent\n(material substances) exist, indeed, but not permanent representations. The\nabiding self (ego, soul) which we posit back of internal phenomena is, as\nthe Dialectic will show, a mere Idea, which, or, rather, the object of\nwhich, maybe \"thought\" as substance, it is true, but cannot be \"given\" in\nintuition, hence cannot be \"known.\"]\n\nAs a result of the fact that the schematism permits a presentation of the\ncategories in time intuition antecedent to all experience, the possibility\nis given of synthetic judgments _a priori_ concerning objects of possible\nexperience. Such judgments, in so far as they are not based on higher\nand more general cognitions, are termed \"principles,\" and the system of\nthem--to be given, with the table of the categories as a guide, in\nthe _Analytic of Principles_ or the Doctrine of the Faculty of\nJudgment--furnishes the outlines of \"pure natural science.\" When thus\nthe rules of the subsumption to be effected have been found in the pure\nconcepts, and the conditions and criteria of the subsumption in the\nschemata, it remains to indicate the principles which the understanding,\nthrough the aid of the schemata, actually produces _a priori_ from its\nconcepts.\n\nThe principle of quantity is the _Axiom of Intuition_, the principle of\nquality the _Anticipation of Perception_; the principles of relation\nare termed _Analogies of Experience_, those of modality _Postulates\nof Empirical Thought in General_. The first runs, \"All intuitions are\nextensive quantities\"; the second, \"In all phenomena sensation, and the\nreal which corresponds to it in the object, has an intensive quantity,\ni.e., a degree.\" The principle of the \"Analogies\" is, \"All phenomena, as\nfar as their existence is concerned, are subject _a priori_ to rules,\ndetermining their mutual relation in time\" (in the second edition this is\nstated as follows: \"Experience is possible only through the representation\nof a necessary connection of perceptions\"). As there are three modes of\ntime, there result three \"Analogies,\" the principles of permanence, of\nsuccession (production), and of coexistence. These are: (1) \"In all changes\nof phenomena the substance is permanent, and its quantum is neither\nincreased nor diminished in nature.\" (2) \"All changes take place according\nto the law of connection between cause and effect\"; or, \"Everything that\nhappens (begins to be) presupposes something on which it follows according\nto a rule.\" (3) \"All substances, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in\ncomplete community, that is, reciprocity, one to another.\" And, finally,\nthe three \"Postulates\": \"That which agrees with the formal conditions of\nexperience (in intuition and in concepts) is possible,\" \"That which is\nconnected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is actual\"\n(perception is the only criterion of actuality). \"That which, in its\nconnection with the actual, is determined by universal conditions of\nexperience, is (exists as) necessary.\"\n\nAs the categories of substance and causality are specially preferred to the\nothers by Kant and the Kantians, and are even proclaimed by some as the\nonly fundamental concepts, so also the principles of relation have an\nestablished reputation for special importance. The leading ideas in the\nproofs of the \"Analogies of Experience\"--for in spite of their underivative\ncharacter the principles require, and are capable of, proof--may next be\nnoted.\n\nThe time determinations of phenomena, the knowledge of their duration,\ntheir succession, and their coexistence, form an indispensable part of our\nexperience, not only of scientific experience, but of everyday experience\nas well. How is the objective time-determination of things and events\npossible? If the matter in hand is the determination of the particulars of\na fight with a bloody ending, the witnesses are questioned and testify:\nWe heard and saw how A began the quarrel by insulting B, and the latter\nanswered the insult with a blow, whereupon A drew his knife and wounded his\nopponent. Here the succession of perceptions on the part of the persons\npresent is accepted as a true reproduction of the succession of the actual\nevents. But the succession of perceptions is not always the sure indication\nof an actual succession: the trees along an avenue are perceived one after\nthe other, while they are in reality coexistent. We might now propose the\nfollowing statement: The representation of the manifold of phenomena is\nalways successive, I apprehend one part after another. I can decide whether\nthese parts succeed one another in the object also, or whether they\nare coexistent, by the fact that, in the second case, the series of\nmy perceptions is reversible, while in the first it is not. I can, if I\nchoose, direct my glance along the avenue in such a way that I shall begin\nthe second time with the tree at which I left off the first time; if I wish\nto assure myself that the parts of a house are coexistent, I cause my eye\nto wander from the upper to the lower portions, from the right side to the\nleft, and then to perform the same motions in the opposite direction. On\nthe other hand, it is not left to my choice to hear the thunder either\nbefore or after I see the lightning, or to see a passing wagon now here,\nnow there, but in these cases I am bound in the succession of my sensuous\nrepresentations. The possibility of interchange in the series of\nperceptions proves an objective coexistence, the impossibility of this,\nan objective succession. But this criterion is limited to the immediate\npresent, and fails us when a time relation between unobserved phenomena is\nto be established. If I go at evening into the dining room and see a vessel\nof bubbling water, which is to be used in making tea, over a burning spirit\nlamp, whence do I derive the knowledge that the water began, and could\nbegin, to boil only after the alcohol had been lighted, and not before?\nBecause I have often seen the flame precede the boiling of the water, and\nin this the irreversibility of the two perceptions has guaranteed to me the\nsuccession of the events perceived? Then I may only assume that it is very\nprobable, not that it is certain, that in this case also the order of the\ntwo events has been the same as I have observed several times before. As a\nmatter of fact, however, we all assert that the water could not have come\ninto a boiling condition unless the generation of heat had preceded; that\nin every case the fire must be there before the boiling of the water can\ncommence. Whence do we derive this _must_? Simply and alone from the\nthought of a causal connection between the two events. Every phenomenon\n_must_ follow in time that phenomenon of which it is the effect, and must\nprecede that of which it is the cause. It is through the relation of\ncausality, and through this alone, that the objective time relation of\nphenomena is determined. If nothing preceded an event on which it must\nfollow according to a rule,[1] then all succession in perception would be\nsubjective merely, and nothing whatever would be objectively determined by\nit as to what was the antecedent and what the consequent in the phenomenon\nitself. We should then have a mere play of representations without\nsignificance for the real succession of events. Only the thought of a rule,\naccording to which the antecedent state contains the necessary condition of\nthe consequent state, justifies us in transferring the time order of our\nrepresentations to phenomena.[2] Nay, even the distinction between\nthe phenomenon itself, as the object of our representations, and our\nrepresentations of it, is effected only by subjecting the phenomenon to\nthis rule, which assigns to it its definite position in time after another\nphenomenon by which it is caused, and thus forbids the inversion of the\nperceptions. We can derive the rule of the understanding which produces the\nobjective time order of the manifold from experience, only because we have\nput it into experience, and have first brought experience into being by\nmeans of the rule. We recapitulate in Kant's own words: The objective\n(time) relation of phenomena remains undetermined by mere perception (the\nmere succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined by means of a\nrule in relation to an antecedent, does not guarantee any succession in\nthe object). In order that this may be known as determined, the relation\nbetween the two states must be so conceived (through the understanding's\nconcept of causality) that it is thereby determined with necessity which of\nthem must be taken as coming first, and which second, and not conversely.\nThus it is only by subjecting the succession of phenomena to the law of\ncausality that empirical knowledge of them is possible. Without the concept\nof cause no objective time determination, and hence, without it, no\nexperience.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"A reality following on an empty time, that is, a beginning of\nexistence preceded by no state of things, can as little be apprehended as\nempty time itself.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"If phenomena were things in themselves no one would be able,\nfrom the succession of the representations of their manifold, to tell how\nthis is connected in the object.\"]\n\nThat which the relation of cause and effect does for the succession[1] of\nphenomena, the relation of reciprocity does for their coexistence, and that\nof substance and accident for their duration. Since absolute time is not an\nobject of perception, the position of phenomena in time cannot be directly\ndetermined, but only through a concept of the understanding. When I\nconclude that two objects (the earth and the moon) must be coexistent,\nbecause perceptions of them can follow upon one another in both ways, I\ndo this on the presupposition that the objects themselves reciprocally\ndetermine their position in time, hence are not isolated, but stand in\ncausal community or a relation of reciprocal influence. It is only on the\ncondition of reciprocity between phenomena, through which they form a\nwhole, that I can represent them as coexistent.\n\n[Footnote 1: Against the objection that cause and effect are frequently,\nindeed in most cases, simultaneous (_e.g._ the heated stove and the warmth\nof the room), Kant remarks that the question concerns the order of time\nmerely, and not the lapse of time. The ball lying on a soft cushion is\nsimultaneous, it is true, with its effect, the depression in the cushion.\n\"But I, nevertheless, distinguish the two by the time relation of dynamical\nconnection. For if I place the ball on the cushion, its previously smooth\nsurface is followed by a depression, but if there is a depression in the\ncushion (I know not whence) a leaden ball does not follow from it.\"]\n\nCoexistence and succession can be represented only in a permanent\nsubstratum; they are merely the modes in which the permanent exists. Since\ntime (in which all change takes place, but which itself abides and does not\nchange) in itself cannot be perceived, the substratum of simultaneity and\nsuccession must exist in phenomena themselves: the permanent in relation\nto which alone all the time relations of phenomena can be determined, is\nsubstance; that which alters is its determinations, accidents, or special\nmodes of existing. Alteration, _i.e._, origin and extinction, is true of\nstates only, which can begin and cease to be, and not of substances, which\nchange (_sich ver\u00e4ndern_), i.e., pass from one mode of existence into\nanother, but do not alter (_wechseln_), i.e., pass from non-existence into\nexistence, or the reverse. It is the permanent alone that changes, and\nits states alone that begin and cease to be. The origin and extinction of\nsubstances, or the increase and diminution of their quantum, would remove\nthe sole condition of the empirical unity of time; for the time relations\nof the coexistent and the successive can be perceived only in an identical\nsubstratum, in a permanent, which exists always. The law \"From nothing\nnothing comes, and nothing can return to nothing,\" is everywhere assumed\nand has been frequently advanced, but never yet proved, for, indeed, it is\nimpossible to prove it dogmatically. Here the only possible proof for it,\nthe critical proof, is given: the principle of permanence is a necessary\ncondition of experience. The same argument establishes the principle of\nsufficient reason, and the principle of the community of substances,\ntogether with the unity of the world to be inferred from this. The three\nAnalogies together assert: \"All phenomena exist in one nature and must so\nexist, because without such a unity _a priori_ no unity of experience,\nand therefore no determination of objects in experience, would be\npossible.\"--In connection with the Postulates the same transcendental proof\nis given for a series of other laws of nature _a priori_, viz., that in the\ncourse of the changes in the world--for the causal principle holds only for\neffects in nature, not for the existence of things as substances--there\ncan be neither blind chance nor a blind necessity (but only a conditional,\nhence an intelligible, necessity); and, further, that in the series of\nphenomena, there can be neither leap, nor gap, nor break, and hence no\nvoid--_in mundo non datur casus, non datur fatum, non datur saltus, non\ndatur hiatus_.\n\nWhile the dynamical principles have to do with the relation of phenomena,\nwhether it be to one another (Analogies), or to our faculty of cognition\n(Postulates), the mathematical relate to the quantity of intuitions and\nsensations, and furnish the basis for the application of mathematics\nto natural science.[1] An extensive quantity is one in which the\nrepresentation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible,\nand so precedes it. I cannot represent a line without drawing it in\nthought, i.e., without producing all parts of it one after the other,\nstarting from a point. All phenomena are intuited as aggregates or as\ncollections of previously given parts. That which geometry asserts of\npure intuition (i.e., the infinite divisibility of lines) holds also of\nempirical intuition. An intensive quantity is one which is apprehended only\nas unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation\nto negation = 0. Every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena,\nhas a degree, which, however small it may be, is never the smallest, but\ncan always be still more diminished; and between reality and negation there\nexists a continuous connection of possible smaller intermediate sensations,\nor an infinite series of ever decreasing degrees. The property of\nquantities, according to which no part in them is the smallest possible\npart, and no part is simple, is termed their continuity. All phenomena\nare continuous quantities, i.e., all their parts are in turn (further\ndivisible) quantities. Hence it follows, first, that a proof for an empty\nspace or empty time can never be drawn from experience, and secondly, that\nall change is also continuous. \"It is remarkable,\" so Kant ends his proof\nof the Anticipation, \"that of quantities in general we can know one\n_quality_ only _a priori_, namely, their continuity, while with regard to\nquality (the real of phenomena) nothing is known to us _a priori_ but their\nintensive _quantity_, that is, that they must have a degree. Everything\nelse is left to experience.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: In each particular science of nature, science proper (i.e.,\napodictically certain science) is found only to the extent in which\nmathematics can be applied therein. For this reason chemistry can never\nbe anything more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine; and\npsychology not even this, but only a natural history of the inner sense or\nnatural description of the soul. That which Kant's _Metaphysical Elements\nof Natural Science_, 1786--in four chapters, Phoronomy, Dynamics,\nMechanics, and Phenomenology--advances as pure physics or the metaphysics\nof corporeal nature, is a doctrine of motion. The fundamental determination\nof matter (of a somewhat which is to be the object of the external senses)\nis motion, for it is only through motion that these senses can be affected,\nand the understanding itself reduces all other predicates of matter to\nthis. The second and most valuable part of the work defines matter as the\nmovable, that which fills space by its moving force, and recognizes two\noriginal forces, repulsive, expansive superficial force or force of\ncontact, by which a body resists the entrance of other bodies into its own\nspace, and attractive, penetrative force or the force which works at a\ndistance, in virtue of which all particles of matter attract one another.\nIn order to a determinate filling of space the co-operation of both\nfundamental forces is required. In opposition to the mechanical theory of\nthe atomists, which explains forces from matter and makes them inhere in\nit, Kant holds fast to the dynamical view which he had early adopted (cf.\np. 324), according to which forces are the primary factor and matter is\nconstituted by them.]\n\nThe outcome of the Analytic of Principles sounds bold enough. _The\nunderstanding is the lawgiver of nature_: \"It does not draw its laws _a\npriori_ from nature, but prescribes them to it\"; the principles of the pure\nunderstanding are the most universal laws of nature, the empirical laws of\nnature only particular determinations of these. All order and regularity\ntake their origin in the spirit, and are put into objects by this.\nUniversal and necessary knowledge remained inexplicable so long as it was\nassumed that the understanding must conform itself to objects; it is at\nonce explained if, conversely, we make objects conform themselves to the\nunderstanding. This is a reversal of philosophical opinion which may justly\nbe compared to the Copernican revolution in astronomy; it is just as\nparadoxical as the latter, but just as incontestably true, and just as rich\nin results. The sequel will show that this strangely sounding principle,\nthat things conform themselves to our representations and the laws of\nnature are dependent on the understanding, is calculated to make us humble\nrather than proud. Our understanding is lawgiver within the limits of its\nknowledge, no doubt, but it knows only within the limits of its legislative\nauthority; nature, to which it dictates laws, is nothing but a totality of\nphenomena; beyond the limits of the phenomenal, where its commands become\nof no effect, its wishes also find no hearing.\n\nIn the second edition the Analytic of Principles contains as a supplement a\n\"Refutation of Idealism,\" which, in opposition to Descartes's position that\nthe only immediate experience is inner experience, from which we reach\nouter experience by inference alone, argues that, conversely, it is only\nthrough outer experience, which is immediate experience proper, that inner\nexperience--as the consciousness of my own existence in time--is possible.\nFor all time determination presupposes something permanent in perception,\nand this permanent something cannot be in me (the mere representation of an\nexternal thing), but only actually existing things which I perceive without\nme. There is, further, a chapter on the \"Ground of the Distinction of all\nObjects in general into Phenomena and Noumena,\" with an appendix on the\nAmphiboly (ambiguity) of the Concepts of Reflection. The latter shows\nthat the concepts of comparison: identity and difference, agreement and\nopposition, the internal and the external, matter and form, acquire\nentirely different meanings when they relate to phenomena and to things in\nthemselves (in other words, to things in their relation to the sensibility,\nand in relation to the understanding merely); and further, in a criticism\nof the philosophy of Leibnitz, reproaches him with having intellectualized\nphenomena, while Locke is said to have sensationalized the concepts of the\nunderstanding.\n\nThe chapter on the distinction between phenomena and noumena very much\nlessens the hopes, aroused, perchance, by the establishment of the\nnon-empirical origin of the categories, for an application of these not\nconfined to any experience. Although the categories, that is, are in their\norigin entirely independent of all experience (so much so that they first\nmake experience possible), they are yet confined in their application\nwithin the bounds of possible experience. They \"serve only to spell\nphenomena, that we may be able to read them as experience,\" and when\napplied to things in themselves lose all significance.[1] Similarly the\nprinciples which spring from them are \"nothing more than principles of\npossible experience,\" and can be referred to phenomena alone, beyond which\nthey are arbitrary combinations without objective reality. Things in\nthemselves may be thought, but they can never be known; for knowledge,\nbesides the empty thought of an object, implies intuitions which must be\nsubsumed under it or by which the object must be determined. In themselves\nthe pure concepts relate to all that is thinkable, not merely to that which\ncan be experienced, but the schemata, which assures their applicability in\nthe field of experience, at the same time limit them to this sphere. The\nschematism makes the immanent use of the categories, and thus a metaphysics\nof phenomena, possible, but the transcendent use of them, and consequently\nthe metaphysics of the suprasensible, impossible. The case would be\ndifferent if our intuition were intellectual instead of sensuous, or,\nwhich is the same thing, if our understanding were intuitive instead of\ndiscursive; then the objects which we think would not need to be given us\nfrom another source (through sensuous intuition), but would be themselves\nproduced in the act by which we thought them. The divine spirit may be such\nan archetypal, creative understanding (_intellectus archetypus_), which\ngenerates objects by its thought; the human spirit is not such, and\ntherefore is confined, with its knowledge, within the circle of possible\nperception.--The conception of \"intellectual intuition\" leads to a\ndistinction in regard to things in themselves: in its negative meaning\nnoumenon denotes a thing in so far as it is _not_ the object of our\n_sensuous_ intuition, in its positive meaning a thing which is the\nobject of a _non-sensuous_ intuition. The positive thing in itself is a\nproblematical concept; its possibility depends on the existence of an\nintuitive understanding, something about which we are ignorant. The\nnegative thing in itself cannot be known, indeed, but it can be thought;\nand the representation of it is a possible concept, one which is not\nself-contradictory[2] (a principle which is of great importance for\npractical philosophy). Still further, it is an indispensable concept, which\nshows that the boundary where our intuition ends is not the boundary of\nthe thinkable as well; and even if it affords no positive extension of\nknowledge[3] it is, nevertheless, very useful, since it sets bounds to the\nuse of the understanding, and thus, as it were, negatively extends our\nknowledge. That which lies beyond the boundary, the \"how are they possible\"\n_(Wiem\u00f6glichkeit)_ of things in themselves is shrouded in darkness, but the\nboundary itself, _i.e._, the \"that they are possible\" _(Dassm\u00f6glichkeit)_,\nof things in themselves, and the unknowableness of their nature, belongs to\nthat which is within the boundary and lies in the light. In this way Kant\nbelieved that the categories of causality and substance might be applied to\nthe relation of things in themselves to phenomena without offending against\nthe prohibition of their transcendent use, since here the boundary appeared\nonly to be touched, and not overstepped.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"A pure use of the categories is no doubt possible, that is,\nnot self-contradictory, but it has no kind of objective validity, because\nit refers to no intuition to which it is meant to impart the unity of an\nobject. The categories remain forever mere functions of thought by which no\nobject can be given to me, but by which I can only think whatever may\nbe given to me in intuition\" (_Critique of Pure Reason_, Max M\u00fcller's\ntranslation, vol. ii. p. 220). Without the condition of sensuous intuition,\nfor which they supply the synthesis, the categories have no relation to any\ndefinite object; for without this condition they contain nothing but the\nlogical function, or the form of the concept, by means of which alone\nnothing can be known and distinguished as to any object belonging to it\n(_Ibid_., pp. 213, 214).]\n\n[Footnote 2: The thing in itself denotes the object in so far as it can\nbe thought by us, but not intuited, and consequently not determined by\nintuitions, _i.e._, cannot be known. It is only through the schematism\nthat the categories are limited to phenomena. O. Liebmann (_Kant und die\nEpigonen_, p. 27, and _passim_) overlooks or ignores this when he says:\nKant here allows himself to \"recognize an object emancipated from the\nforms of knowledge, therefore an irrational object, _i.e._, to represent\nsomething which is not representable--wooden iron.\" The thing in itself is\ninsensible, but not irrational, and the forms of intuition and forms of\nthought joined by Liebmann under the title forms of knowledge have in Kant\na by no means equal rank.]\n\n[Footnote 3: A category by itself, freed from all conditions of intuition\n(_e.g._, the representation of a substance which is thought without\npermanence in time, or of a cause which should not act in time), can yield\nno definite concept of an object.]\n\nThough the concepts of the understanding possess a cognitive value in the\nsphere of phenomena alone, the hope still remains of gaining an entrance\ninto the suprasensible sphere through the concepts of reason. It is\nindubitable that our spirit is conscious of a far higher need than that for\nthe mere connection of phenomena into experience; it is that which cannot\nbe experienced, the Ideas God, freedom, and immortality, which form the\nreal end of its inquiry. Can this need be satisfied, and how? Can this end\nbe attained, and reality be given to the Ideas? This is the third question\nof the Critique of Reason.\n\n%(c) The Reason's Ideas of the Unconditioned (Transcendental\nDialectic).%--\"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to\nthe understanding, and ends with reason.\" The understanding is the\nfaculty of rules, reason the faculty of principles. The categories of the\nunderstanding are necessary concepts which make experience possible, and\nwhich, therefore, can always be given in experience; the Ideas of reason\nare necessary concepts to which no corresponding object can be given. Each\nof the Ideas gives expression to an unconditioned. How does the concept of\nthe unconditioned arise, and what service does it perform for knowledge?\n\nAs perceptions are connected by the categories in the unity of the\nunderstanding, and thus are elevated into experience, so the manifold\nknowledge of experience needs a higher unity, the unity of reason, in order\nto form a connected system. This is supplied to it by the Ideas--which,\nconsequently, do not relate directly to the objects of intuition, but only\nto the understanding and its judgments--in order, through the concept\nof the unconditioned, to give completion to the knowledge of the\nunderstanding, which always moves in the sphere of the conditioned, _i.e._,\nto give it the greatest possible unity together with the greatest possible\nextension. The concept of the absolute grows out of the logical task which\nis incumbent on reason, _i.e._, inference, and it may be best explained\nfrom this as a starting point. In the syllogism the judgment asserted in\nthe conclusion is derived from a general rule, the major premise. The\nvalidity of this general proposition is, however, itself conditional,\ndependent on higher conditions. Then, as reason seeks the condition for\neach conditioned moment, and always commands a further advance in\nthe series of conditions, it acts under the Idea of _the totality\nof conditions_, which, nevertheless, since it can never be given in\nexperience, does not denote an object, but only an heuristic maxim for\nknowledge, the maxim, namely, never to stop with any one condition as\nultimate, but always to continue the search further. The Idea of the\nunconditioned or of the completeness of conditions is a goal which we never\nattain, but which we are continually to approach. The categories and the\nprinciples of the understanding were _constitutive_ principles, the Ideas\nare _regulative_ merely; their function is to guide the understanding, to\ngive it a direction helpful for the connection of knowledge, not to inform\nit concerning the actual character of things.\n\nSince reason is the faculty of inference (as the understanding was found to\nbe the faculty of judgment), the forms of the syllogism perform the same\nservice for us in our search for the Ideas as the forms of judgment in\nthe discovery of the categories. To the categorical, hypothetical, and\ndisjunctive syllogisms correspond the three concepts of reason, the soul or\nthe thinking subject, the world or the totality of phenomena, and God, the\noriginal being or the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can\nbe thought. By means of these we refer all inner phenomena to the ego as\ntheir (unknown) common subject, think all beings and events in nature as\nordered under the comprehensive system of the (never to be experienced)\nuniverse, and regard all things as the work of a supreme (unknowable)\nintelligence. These Ideas are necessary concepts; not accidental products\nnor mere fancies, but concepts sprung from the nature of reason; their\nuse is legitimate so long as we remember that we can have a problematical\nconcept of objects corresponding to them, but no knowledge of these; that\nthey are problems and rules for knowledge, never objects and instruments of\nit. Nevertheless the temptation to regard these regulative principles as\nconstitutive and these problems as knowable objects is almost irresistible;\nfor the ground of the involuntary confusion of the required with the given\nabsolute lies not so much in the carelessness of the individual as in the\nnature of our cognitive faculty. The Ideas carry with them an unavoidable\nillusion of objective reality, and the sophistical inferences which spring\nfrom them are not sophistications of men, but of pure reason itself, are\nnatural misunderstandings from which even the wisest cannot free himself.\nAt best we can succeed in avoiding the error, not in doing away with the\ntranscendental illusion from which it proceeds. We can see through the\nillusion and avoid the erroneous conclusions built upon it, not shake off\nthe illusion itself.\n\nOn this erroneous objective use of the Ideas three so-called sciences are\nbased: speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative\ntheology, which, together with ontology, constitute the stately structure\nof the (Wolffian) metaphysics. The Critique of Reason completes its work\nof destruction when, as Dialectic (Logic cf. Illusion), it follows the\nrefutation of dogmatic ontology--developed in the Analytic--which\nbelieved that it knew things in themselves through the concepts of\nthe understanding, with a refutation of rational psychology, rational\ncosmology, and rational theology. It shows that the first is founded on\nparalogisms, and the second entangled in irreconcilable contradictions,\nwhile the third makes vain efforts to prove the existence of the Supreme\nBeing.\n\n(i) _The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology_. The transcendental\nself-consciousness or pure ego which accompanies and connects all my\nrepresentations, the subject of all judgments which I form, is, as the\nAnalytic recognized, the presupposition of all knowing (pp. 358-359), but\nas such it can never become an object of knowledge. We must not make\na given object out of the subject which never can be a predicate, nor\nsubstitute a real thinking substance for the logical subject of thought,\nnor revamp the unity of self-consciousness into the simplicity and\nidentical personality of the soul. The rational psychology of the Wolffian\nschool is guilty of this error, and whatever of proof it advances for the\nsubstantiality, simplicity, and personality of the soul, and, by way\nof deduction, for its immateriality and immortality as well as for its\nrelation to the body, is based upon this substitution, this ambiguity of\nthe middle term, and therefore upon a _quaternio terminorum_,--all its\nconclusions are fallacious. It is allowable and unavoidable to add in\nthought an absolute subject, the unity of the ego, to inner phenomena;[1]\nit is inadmissible to treat the Idea of the soul as a knowable thing. In\norder to be able to apply the category of substance to it, we would have to\nlay hold of a permanent in intuition such as cannot be found in the inner\nsense. Empirical psychology, then, alone remains for the extension of our\nknowledge of mental life, while rational psychology shrivels up from\na doctrine into a mere discipline, which watches that the limits of\nexperience are not overstepped. But even as a mere limiting determination\nit has great value. For, along with the hope of proving the immateriality\nand immortality of the soul, the fear of seeing them _disproved_ is also\ndissipated; materialism is just as unfounded as spiritualism, and if the\nconclusions of the latter concerning the soul as a simple, immaterial\nsubstance which survives the death of the body, cannot be proved, yet we\nneed not, for that reason, regard them as erroneous, for the opposite is as\nlittle susceptible of demonstration. The whole question belongs not in the\nforum of knowledge, but in the forum of faith, and that which we gain by\nthe proof that nothing can be determined concerning it by theoretical\nreasoning (viz., assurance against materialistic objections) is far more\nvaluable than what we lose.\n\n[Footnote 1: The rational concept of the soul as a simple, independent\nintelligence does not signify an actual being, but only expresses certain\nprinciples of systematic unity in the explanation of psychical phenomena,\nviz., \"To regard all determinations as existing in one subject, all powers,\nas far as possible, as derived from, one fundamental power, all change\nas belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being, and\nto represent all phenomena in space as totally distinct from acts of\nthought.\"]\n\n(2) _The Antinomies of Rational Cosmology_. If in its endeavor to spin\nmetaphysical knowledge concerning the nature of the spirit and the\nexistence of the soul after death out of the concept of the thinking ego\nthe reason falls into the snare of an ambiguous _terminus medius_, the\ndifficulties which frustrate its attempts to use the Idea of the world\nin the extension of its knowledge _a priori_ are of quite a different\ncharacter. Here the formal correctness of the method of inference is not\nopen to attack. It may be proved with absolute strictness (and in the\napagogical or indirect form, from the impossibility of the contrary) that\nthe world has a beginning in time, and also that it is _limited_ in space;\nthat every compound substance consists of _simple_ parts; that, besides the\ncausality according to the laws of nature, there is a causality through\n_freedom_, and that an _absolutely necessary Being_ exists, either as a\npart of the world or as the cause of it. But the contrary may be proved\nwith equal stringency (and indirectly, as before): The world is infinite in\nspace and time; there is nothing simple in the world; there is no freedom,\nbut everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of\nnature; and there exists no absolutely necessary Being either within the\nworld or without it. This is the famous doctrine of the conflict of the\nfour cosmological theses and antitheses or of the Antinomy of Pure Reason,\nthe discovery of which indubitably exercised a determining influence upon\nthe whole course of the Kantian Critique of Reason, and which forms one of\nits poles. The transcendental idealism, the distinction between phenomena\nand noumena, and the limitation of knowledge to phenomena, all receive\nsignificant confirmation from the Antithetic. Without the critical\nidealism (that which is intuited in space and time, and known through\nthe categories, is merely the phenomenon of things, whose \"in itself\" is\nunknowable), the antinomies would be insoluble. How is reason to act in\nview of the conflict? The grounds for the antitheses are just as conclusive\nas those for the theses; on neither side is there a preponderance which\ncould decide the result. Ought reason to agree with both parties or with\nneither?\n\nThe solution distinguishes the first two antinomies, as the mathematical,\nfrom the second two, as the dynamical antinomies; in the former, since it\nis a question of the composition and division of quanta, the conditions may\nbe homogeneous with the conditioned, in the latter, heterogeneous. In the\nformer, thesis and antithesis are alike _false_, since both start from\nthe inadmissible assumption that the universe (the complete series of\nphenomena) is given, while in fact it is only required of us (is an Idea).\nThe world does not exist in itself, but only in the empirical regress of\nphenomenal conditions, in which we never can reach infinity and never the\nlimitation of the world by an empty space or an antecedent empty time, for\ninfinite space, like empty space (and the same holds in regard to time), is\nnot perceivable. Consequently the quantity of the world is neither finite\nnor infinite. The question of the quantity of the world is unanswerable,\nbecause the concept of a sense-world existing by itself _(before_ the\nregress) is self-contradictory. Similarly the problem whether the composite\nconsists of simple elements is insoluble, because the assumption that\nthe phenomenon of body is a thing in itself, which, antecedent to all\nexperience, contains all the parts that can be reached in experience--in\nother words, that representations exist outside of the representative\nfaculty--is absurd. Matter is infinitely divisible, no doubt, yet it does\nnot consist of infinitely numerous parts, and just as little of a definite\nnumber of simple parts, but the parts exist merely in the representation\nof them, in the division (decomposition), and this goes as far as possible\nexperience extends. The case is different with the dynamical antinomies,\nwhere thesis and antithesis can both be _true_, in so far as the former\nis referred to things in themselves and the latter to phenomena. The\ncontradiction vanishes if we take that which the thesis asserts and the\nantithesis denies in different senses. The fact that in the world of\nphenomena the causal nexus proceeds without interruption and without end,\nso that there is no room in it either for an absolutely necessary Being or\nfor freedom, does not conflict with this other, that beyond the world of\nsense there may exist an omnipotent, omniscient cause of the world, and an\nintelligible freedom as the ground of our empirically necessary actions.\n\"May exist,\" since for the critical philosopher, who has learned that every\nextension of knowledge beyond the limits of experience is impossible, the\nquestion can concern only the conceivability of the world-ground and of\nfreedom. This possibility is amply sufficient to give a support for faith,\nas, on the other hand, it is indispensable in order to satisfy at once the\ndemands of the understanding and of reason, especially to satisfy their\npractical interests. For if it were not possible to resolve the apparent\ncontradiction, and to show its members capable of reconciliation, it would\nbe all over either with the possibility of experiential knowledge or with\nthe basis of ethics and religion. Without unbroken causal connection, no\nnature; without freedom, no morality; and without a Deity, no religion.\nOf special interest is the solution of the third antinomy, which is\naccomplished by means of the valuable (though in the form in which it is\ngiven by Kant, untenable) conception of the _intelligible character_.[1]\nMan is a citizen of two worlds. As a being of the senses (phenomenon) he\nis subject in his volition and action to the control of natural necessity,\nwhile as a being of reason (thing in itself) he is free. For science his\nacts are the inevitable results of precedent phenomena, which, in turn,\nare themselves empirically caused; nevertheless moral judgment holds\nhim responsible for his acts. In the one case, they are referred to his\nempirical character, in the other, to his intelligible character. Man\ncannot act otherwise than he does act, if he be what he is, but he need not\nbe as he is; the moral constitution of the intelligible character, which\nreflects itself in the empirical character, is his own work, and its\nradical transformation (moral regeneration) his duty, the fulfillment of\nwhich is demanded, and, hence, of necessity possible.\n\n[Footnote 1: On the difficulties in the way of this theory and the\npossibility of their removal cf. R. Falckenberg, _Ueber den intelligiblen\nCharacter, zur Kritik der Kantischen Freiheitslehre_ (from the _Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxv.), Halle, 1879.]\n\n(3) _Speculative Theology_. The principle of complete determination,\naccording to which of all the possible predicates of things, as compared\nwith their opposites, one must belong to each thing, relates the thing to\nbe determined to the sum of all possible predicates or the _Idea of an ens\nrealissimum_, which, since it is the representation of a single being, may\nbe called the _Ideal_ of pure reason. From this prototype things, as its\nimperfect copies, derive the material of their possibility; all their\nmanifold determinations are simply so many modes of limiting the concept of\nthe highest reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures\nare possible only as different ways of limiting infinite space. Or better:\nthe derivative beings are not related to the ideal of the original Being as\nlimitations to the sum of the highest reality (on which view the Supreme\nBeing would be conceived as an aggregate consisting of the derivative\nbeings, whereas these presuppose it, and hence cannot constitute it), but\nas consequences to a ground. But reason does not remain content with this\nentirely legitimate thought of the dependence of finite things on the ideal\nof the Being of all beings, as a relation of concepts to the Idea, but,\ndazzled by an irresistible illusion, proceeds to realize, to hypostatize,\nand to personify this ideal, and, since she herself is dimly conscious of\nthe illegitimacy of such a transformation of the mere Idea into a given\nobject, devises _arguments for the existence of God_. Reason, moreover,\nwould scarcely be induced to regard a mere creation of its thought as a\nreal being, if it were not compelled from another direction to seek a\nresting place somewhere in the regress of conditions, and to think the\nempirical reality of the contingent world as founded upon the rock of\nsomething absolutely necessary. There is no being, however, which appears\nmore fit for the prerogative of absolute necessity than that one the\nconcept of which contains the therefore to every wherefore, and is in no\nrespect defective; in other words, rational theology joins the rational\nideal of the most perfect Being with the fourth cosmological Idea of the\nabsolutely necessary Being.\n\nThe proof of the existence of God may be attempted in three ways: we may\nargue the existence of a supreme cause either by starting from a definite\nexperience (the special constitution and order of the sense-world, that\nis, its purposiveness), or from an indefinite experience (any existence\nwhatever), or, finally, abstracting from all experience, from mere concepts\n_a priori_. But neither the empirical nor the transcendent nor the\nintermediate line of thought leads to the goal. The most impressive and\npopular of the proofs is the _physico-theological_ argument. But even if we\ngratuitously admit the analogy of natural products with the works of human\nart (for the argument is not able to prove that the purposive arrangement\nof the things in the world, which we observe with admiration, is\ncontingent, and could only have been produced by an ordering, rational\nprinciple, not self-produced by their own nature according to general\nmechanical laws), this can yield an inference only to an intelligent author\nof the purposive form of the world, and not to an author of its matter,\nonly, therefore, to a world-architect, not to a world-creator. Further,\nsince the cause must be proportionate to the effect, this argument can\nprove only a very wise and wonderfully powerful, but not an omniscient\nand omnipotent, designer, and so cannot give any definite concept of\nthe supreme cause of the world. In leaping from the contingency of the\npurposive order of the world to the existence of something absolutely\nnecessary and thence to an all-comprehensive reality, the teleological\nargument abandons the ground of experience and passes over into the\n_cosmological argument_, which in its turn is merely a concealed\nontological argument (these two differ only in the fact that the\ncosmological proof argues from the antecedently given absolute necessity\nof a being to its unlimited reality, and the ontological, conversely, from\nsupreme reality to necessary existence). The weaknesses of the cosmological\nargument in its first half consist in the fact that, in the inference\nfrom the contingent to a cause for it, it oversteps the boundary of the\nsense-world, and, in the inference from the impossibility of an infinite\nseries of conditions to a first cause, it employs the subjective principle\nof investigation--to assume hypothetically a necessary ultimate ground in\nbehalf of the systematic unity of knowledge--as an objective principle\napplying to things in themselves. The _ontological argument_, finally,\nwhich the two nominally empirical arguments hoped to avoid, but in which in\nthe end they were forced to take refuge, goes to wreck on the impossibility\nof dragging out of an idea the existence of the object corresponding to it.\nExistence denotes nothing further than the position of the subject with all\nthe marks which are thought in its concept--that is, its relation to our\nknowledge, but does not itself belong to the predicates of the concept, and\nhence cannot be analytically derived from the latter. The content of the\nconcept is not enriched by the addition of being; a hundred real dollars do\nnot contain a penny more than a hundred conceived dollars. All existential\npropositions are synthetic; hence the existence of God cannot be\ndemonstrated from the concept of God. It is a contradiction, to be sure, to\nsay that God is not almighty, just as it is a contradiction to deny that\na triangle has three angles: _if_ posit the concept I must not remove\nthe predicate which necessarily belongs to it. If I remove the subject,\nhowever, together with its predicate (the almighty God is not), no\ncontradiction arises, for in that case nothing remains to be contradicted.\n\nThus all the proofs for the existence of a necessary being are shown to be\nillusory, and the basis of speculative theology uncertain. Nevertheless the\nidea of God retains its validity, and the perception of the inability of\nreason to demonstrate its objective reality on theoretical grounds has\ngreat value. For though the existence of God cannot be proved, it is true,\nby way of recompense, that it cannot be disproved; the same grounds which\nshow us that the assertion of his existence is based on a weak foundation\nsuffice also to prove every contrary assertion unfounded. And should\npractical motives present themselves to turn the scale in favor of the\nassumption of a supreme and all-sufficient Being, reason would be obliged\nto take sides and to follow these grounds, which, it is true, are not\nobjectively sufficient,[1] but still preponderant, and than which we know\nnone better. After, however, the objective reality of the idea of God is\nguaranteed from the standpoint of ethics, there remains for transcendental\ntheology the important negative duty (\"censorship,\" _Censor_) of exactly\ndetermining the concept of the most perfect Being (as a being which through\nunderstanding and freedom contains the first ground of all other things),\nof removing from it all impure elements, and of putting an end to all\nopposite assertions, whether atheistic, deistic (deism maintains the\npossibility of knowing the existence of an original being, but declares all\nfurther determination of this being impossible), or (in the dogmatic\nsense) anthropomorphic. Theism is entirely possible apart from a mistaken\nanthropomorphism, in so far as through the predicates which we take from\ninner experience (understanding and will) we do not determine the concept\nof God as he is in himself, but only _analogically_[2] in his relation to\nthe world. That concept serves only to aid us in our contemplation of\nthe world,[3] not as a means of knowing the Supreme Being himself. For\nspeculative purposes it remains a mere ideal, yet a perfectly faultless\none, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"They need favor to supply their lack of legitimate claims.\"\nOf themselves alone, therefore, they are unable to yield any theological\nknowledge, but they are fitted to prepare the understanding for it, and to\ngive emphasis to other possible (moral) proofs.]\n\n[Footnote 2: We halt _at_ the boundary of the legitimate use of reason,\nwithout overstepping it, when we limit our judgment to the relation of\nthe world to the Supreme Being, and in this allow ourselves a symbolical\nanthropomorphism only, which in reality has reference to our language alone\nand not to the object.]\n\n[Footnote 3: We are compelled to _look on_ the world _as if_ it were the\nwork of a supreme intelligence and will. \"We may confidently derive the\nphenomena of the world and their existence from other (phenomena), as if no\nnecessary being existed, and yet unceasingly strive after completeness\nin the derivation, as though such a being were presupposed as a supreme\nground.\" In short, physical (mechanical) _explanation_, and a theistic\npoint of view or teleological _judgment_.]\n\nThus the value of the Ideas is twofold. By showing the untenable ness of\natheism, fatalism, and naturalism, they I clear the way for the objects of\nfaith. By providing natural science with the standpoint of a systematical\nunity through teleological connection, they make an extension of the use of\nthe understanding possible within the realm of experience,[1] though not\nbeyond it. The systematic development of the Kantian teleology, which is\nhere indicated in general outlines only, is found in the second part of the\n_Critique of Judgment_; while the practical philosophy, which furnishes the\nonly possible proof, the moral proof, for the reality of the Ideas, erects\non the site left free by the removal of the airy summer-houses of dogmatic\nmetaphysics the solid mansion of critical metaphysics, that is, the\nmetaphysics of duties and of hopes. \"I was obliged to destroy knowledge\nin order to make room for faith.\" The transition from the impossible\ntheoretical or speculative knowledge of things in themselves to the\npossible \"practical knowledge\" of them (the belief that there is a God and\na future world) is given in the _Doctrine of Method_, which is divided into\nfour parts (the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and the History\nof Pure Reason), in its second chapter. There, in the ideal of the _Summum\nBonum_, the proof is brought forward for the validity of the Ideas God,\nfreedom, and immortality, as postulates inseparable from moral obligation;\nand by a cautious investigation of the three stages of assent (opinion,\nknowledge, and belief) both doctrinal and moral belief are assigned their\nplaces in the system of the kinds of knowledge.\n\n[Footnote 1: The principle to regard all order in the world (_e.g._, the\nshape of the earth, mountains, and seas, the members of animal bodies) as\nif it proceeded from the design of a supreme reason leads the investigator\non to various discoveries.]\n\nWe may now sum up the results of the three parts of Kant's theoretical\nphilosophy. The pure intuitions, the categories, and the Ideas are\nfunctions of the spirit, and afford non-empirical _(erfahrungsfreie)_\nknowledge concerning the objects of possible experience (and concerning the\npossibility of knowledge). The first make universal and necessary knowledge\npossible in relation to the forms under which objects can be given to us;\nthe second make a similarly apodictic knowledge possible in relation to\nthe forms under which phenomena must be thought; the third make possible a\njudgment of phenomena differing from this knowledge, yet not in conflict\nwith it. The categories and the Ideas, moreover, yield problematical\nconcepts of objects which are not given to us in intuition, but which may\nexist outside of space and time: things in themselves cannot be known, it\nis true, but they can be thought, a fact of importance in case we should be\nassured of their existence in some other way than by sensuous intuition.\n\nThe determination of the limits of speculative reason is finished.\nAll knowing and all demonstration is limited to phenomena or possible\nexperience. But the boundary of that which can be experienced is not the\nboundary of that which is, still less of that which ought to be; the\nboundary of theoretical reason is not the boundary of practical reason. We\n_ought_ to act morally; in order to be able to do this we must ascribe to\nourselves the power to initiate a series of events; and, in general, we are\nwarranted in assuming everything the non-assumption of which makes moral\naction impossible. If we were merely theoretical, merely experiential\nbeings, we should lack all occasion to suppose a second, intelligible world\nbehind and above the world of phenomena; but we are volitional and active\nbeings under laws of reason, and though we are unable to know things in\nthemselves, yet we may and must _postulate_ them--our freedom, God, and\nimmortality. For not only that which is a condition of experience is true\nand necessary, but that, also, which is a condition of morality. The\ndiscovery of the laws and conditions of morality is the mission of\npractical philosophy.\n\n\n%2. Theory of Ethics.%\n\nThe investigation now turns from the laws of nature, which express a\n\"must,\" to the laws of will, in which an \"ought\" is expressed, and by which\ncertain actions are not compelled, but prescribed. (If we were merely\nrational, and not at the same time sensuous beings, the moral law would\ndetermine the will in the form of a natural law; since, however, the\nconstant possibility of deviation is given in the sensibility, or, rather,\nthe moral standpoint can only be attained by conquering the sensuous\nimpulses, therefore the moral law speaks to us in the form of an \"ought,\"\nof an imperative.) Among the laws of the will or imperatives, also,\nthere are some which possess the character of absolute necessity and\nuniversality, and which, consequently, are _a priori_. As the understanding\ndictates laws to the phenomenal world, so practical reason gives a law to\nitself, is _autonomous_; and as the _a priori_ laws of nature relate only\nto the form of the objects of experience, so the moral law determines not\nthe content, but only the form of volition: \"Act only on that maxim whereby\nthou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.\"\nThe law of practical reason is a \"categorical imperative.\" What does this\ndesignation mean, and what is the basis of the formula of the moral law\nwhich has just been given?\n\nPractical principles are either subjectively valid, in which case they are\ntermed maxims (volitional principles of the individual), or objectively\nvalid, when they are called imperatives or precepts. The latter are either\nvalid under certain conditions (If you wish to become a clergyman you must\nstudy theology; he who would prosper as a merchant must not cheat his\ncustomers), or unconditionally valid (Thou shalt not lie). All prudential\nor technical rules are hypothetical imperatives, the moral law is a\ncategorical imperative. The injunction to be truthful is not connected with\nthe condition that we intend to act morally, but this general purpose,\ntogether with all the special purposes belonging to it, to avoid lying,\netc., is demanded unconditionally and of everyone--as surely as we are\nrational beings we are under moral obligation, not in order to reputation\nhere below and happiness above, but without all \"ifs\" and \"in order to's.\"\nThou shalt unconditionally, whatever be the outcome. And as the moral law\nis independent of every end to be attained, so it suffers neither increase\nnor diminution in its binding force, whether men obey it or not. It has\nabsolute authority, no matter whether it is fulfilled frequently or seldom,\nnay, whether it is fulfilled anywhere or at any time whatsoever in the\nworld!\n\nThere is an important difference between the good which we are under\nobligation to do and the evil which we are under obligation not to do, and\nthe goods and ills which we seek and avoid. The goods are always relatively\ngood only, _good for something_--as means to ends--and a bad use can be\nmade of all that nature and fortune give us as well as a good one. That\nwhich duty commands is an end in itself, in itself good, absolutely\nworthful, and no misuse of it is possible. It might be supposed that\npleasure, that happiness is an ultimate end. But men have very different\nopinions in regard to what is pleasant, one holding one thing pleasurable\nand another another. It is impossible to discover by empirical methods what\nduty demands of all men alike and under all circumstances; the appeal is to\nour reason, not to our sensibility. If happiness were the end of rational\nbeings, then nature had endowed us but poorly for it, since instead of an\nunfailing instinct she has given us the weak and deceitful reason as a\nguide, which, with its train, culture, science, art, and luxury, has\nbrought more trouble than satisfaction to mankind. Man has a destiny other\nthan well-being, and a higher one--the formation of good dispositions: here\nwe have the only thing in the whole world that can never be used for evil,\nthe only thing that does not borrow its value from a higher end, but itself\noriginally and inalienably contains it, and that gives value to all else\nthat merits esteem. \"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or\neven out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a\n_good will_.\" Understanding, courage, moderation, and whatever other mental\ngifts or praiseworthy qualities of temperament may be cited, as also the\ngifts of fortune, \"are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects, but\nthey may also become extremely evil and mischievous, if the will which is\nto make use of them is not good.\" These are the classic words with which\nKant commences the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_.\n\nWhen does the will deserve the predicate \"good\"? Let us listen to the\npopular moral consciousness, which distinguishes three grades of moral\nrecognition. He who refrains from that which is contrary to duty, no matter\nfrom what motives--as, for example, the shopkeeper who does not cheat\nbecause he knows that honesty is the best policy--receives moderate\npraise for irreproachable outward behavior. We bestow warmer praise and\nencouragement on him whom ambition impels to industry, kind feeling to\nbeneficence, and pity to render assistance. But he alone earns our esteem\nwho does his duty for duty's sake. Only in this third case, where not\nmerely the external action, nor merely the impulse of a happy disposition,\nbut the will itself, the maxim, is in harmony with the moral law, where\nthe good is done for the sake of the good, do we find true morality, that\nunconditioned, self-grounded worth. The man who does that which is in\naccordance with duty out of reflection on its advantages, and he who does\nit from immediate--always unreliable--inclination, acts _legally_; he alone\nacts _morally_ who, without listening to advantage and inclination, takes\nup the law into his disposition, and does his duty because it is duty. The\nsole moral motive is the consciousness of duty, _respect for the moral\nlazy_[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: The respect or reverence which the law, and, derivatively, the\nperson in whom it is realized, compel from us, is, as self-produced through\na concept of reason and as the only feeling which can be known _a priori_,\nspecifically different from all feelings of inclination or fear awakened by\nsensuous influences. As it strengthens and raises our rational nature, the\nconsciousness of our freedom and of our high destination, but, at the same\ntime, humbles our sensibility, there is mingled with the joy of exaltation\na certain pain, which permits no intimate affection for the stern and\nsublime law. It is not quite willingly that we pay our respect--just\nbecause of the depressing effect which this feeling exerts on our\nself-love.]\n\nHere Kant is threatened by a danger which he does not succeed in escaping.\nThe moral law demands perfect purity in our maxims; only the idea of duty,\nnot an inclination, is to determine the will. Quite right. Further, the one\njudging is himself never absolutely certain, even when his own volition is\nconcerned, that no motives of pleasure have mingled with the feeling of\nduty in contributing to the right action, unless that which was morally\ndemanded has been contrary to all his inclinations. When a person who is\nnot in need and who is free from cupidity leaves the money-box intrusted\nto his care untouched, or when a man who loves life overcomes thoughts of\nsuicide, I may assume that the former was sufficiently protected\nagainst the temptation by his moderation, and the other by his cheerful\ndisposition, and I rate their behavior as merely legal. When, on the other\nhand, an official inclined to extravagance faithfully manages the funds\nintrusted to him, or one who is oppressed by hopeless misery preserves his\nlife, although he does not love it, then I may ascribe the abstinence from\nwrongdoing to moral principles. This, too, may be admitted. We are\ncertain of the morality of a resolution only when it can be shown that no\ninclination was involved along with the maxim. The cases where the right\naction is performed in opposition to inclination are the only ones in which\nwe may be certain that the moral quality of the action is unmixed--are\nthey, then, the only ones in which a moral disposition is present? Kant\nrightly maintains that the admixture of egoistic motives beclouds the\npurity of the disposition, and consequently diminishes its moral worth.\nWith equal correctness he draws attention to the possibility that, even\nwhen we believe that we are acting from pure principles, a hidden sensuous\nimpulse may be involved. But he leaves unconsidered the possibility that,\neven when the inclinations are favorable to right action, the action may be\nperformed, not from inclination, but because of the consciousness of duty.\nGiven that a man is naturally industrious, does this happy predisposition\nprotect him from fits of idleness? And if he resists them, must it always\nbe his inclination to activity and never moral principle which overcomes\nthe temptation? In yielding to the danger of confounding the limits of our\ncertain knowledge of the purity of motives with the limits of moral action,\nand in admitting true morality only where action proceeds from principle\nin opposition to the inclinations, Kant really deserves the reproach of\nrigorism or exaggerated purism--sometimes groundlessly extended to the\njustifiable strictness of his views--and the ridicule of the well-known\nlines of Schiller (\"Scruples of Conscience\" and \"Decision\" at the\nconclusion of his distich-group \"The Philosophers\"):\n\n\"The friends whom I love I gladly would serve, but to this inclination\n        incites me;\n And so I am forced from virtue to swerve since my act, through affection,\n        delights me.\n The friends whom thou lovest thou must first seek to scorn, for to no\n        other way can I guide thee;\n 'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform the acts to which\n        duty would lead thee.\"\n\nIf we return from this necessary limitation of a groundless inference\n(that true morality is present only when duty is performed against our\ninclinations, when it is difficult for us, when a conflict with sensuous\nmotives has preceded), to the development of the fundamental ethical\nconceptions, we find that important conclusions concerning the origin and\ncontent of the moral law result from the principle obtained by the analysis\nof moral judgment: this law commands with _unconditional authority_--for\nevery rational being and under all circumstances--what has _unconditioned\nworth_--the disposition which corresponds to it. The universality and\nnecessity (_unconditionalness_) of the categorical imperative proves that\nit springs from no other source than reason itself. Those who derive\nthe moral law from the will of God subject it to a condition, viz., the\nimmutability of the divine will. Those who find the source of moral\nlegislation in the pursuit of happiness make rational will dependent on a\nnatural law of the sensibility; it would be folly to enjoin by a moral law\nthat which everyone does of himself, and does superabundantly. Moreover,\nthe theories of the social inclinations and of moral sense fail of their\npurpose, since they base morality on the uncertain ground of feeling. Even\nthe principle of perfection proves insufficient, inasmuch as it limits the\nindividual to himself, and, in the end, like those which have preceded,\namounts to a refined self-love. Theonomic ethics, egoistic ethics, the\nethics of sympathy, and the ethics of perfection are all eudemonistic, and\nhence heteronomic. The practical reason[1] receives the law neither from\nthe will of God nor from natural impulse, but draws it out of its own\ndepths; it binds itself.\n\n[Footnote 1: Will and practical reason are identical. The definition runs:\nWill is the faculty of acting in accordance with the representation of\nlaws.]\n\nThe grounds which establish the derivation of the moral law from the will\nor reason itself exclude at the same time every material determination of\nit. If the categorical imperative posited definite ends for the will, if it\nprescribed a direction to definite objects, it could neither be known _a\npriori_ nor be valid for all rational beings: its apodictic character\nforbids the admission of empirical elements of every sort.[1] If we think\naway all content from the law we retain the form of universal legality,[2]\nand gain the formula: \"Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at\nthe same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.\" The\npossibility of conceiving the principle of volition as a universal law of\nnature is the criterion of morality. If you are in doubt concerning the\nmoral character of an action or motive simply ask yourself the question,\nWhat would become of humanity if everyone were to act according to the same\nprinciple? If no one could trust the word of another, or count on aid from\nothers, or be sure of his property and his life, then no social life would\nbe possible. Even a band of robbers cannot exist unless certain laws are\nrespected as inviolable duties.\n\n[Footnote 1: The moral law, therefore, is independent of all experience in\nthree respects, as to its origin, its content, and its validity. It springs\nfrom reason, it contains a formal precept only, and its validity is not\nconcerned, whether it meets with obedience or not. It declares what ought\nto be done, even though this never should be done.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The \"formal principle\" of the Kantian ethics has met very\nvaried criticism. Among others Edmund Pfleiderer (_Kantischer Kritizismus\nund Englische Philosophie_, 1881) and Zeller express themselves\nunfavorably, Fortlage and Liebmann (_Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit_, 2d\ned., 1880, p. 671) favorably.]\n\nIt was indispensable to free the supreme formula of the moral law from all\nmaterial determinations, _i.e._, limitations. This does not prevent us,\nhowever, from afterward giving the abstract outline a more concrete\ncoloring. First of all, the concept of the dignity of persons in contrast\nto the utility of things offers itself as an aid to explanation and\nspecialization. Things are means whose worth is always relative, consisting\nin the useful or pleasant effects which they exercise, in the satisfaction\nof a need or of the taste, they can be replaced by other means, which\nfulfill the same purpose, and they have a (market or fancy) _value_; while\nthat which is above all value and admits of no equivalent has an ultimate\nworth or _dignity_, and is an object of respect. The legislation which\ndetermines all worth, and with this the disposition which corresponds to\nit, has a dignity, an unconditioned, incomparable worth, and lends its\nsubjects, rational beings framed for morality, the advantage of being ends\nin themselves. \"Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of\nmorality, is that which alone possesses dignity.\" Accordingly the following\nformulation of the moral law may be held equivalent to the first: \"So act\nas to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other,\nin every case as an end, never as a means only.\"\n\nA further addition to the abstract formula of the categorical imperative\nresults from the discussion of the question, What universal ends admit of\nsubsumption under it, _i.e._, stand the test of fitness to be principles of\na universal legislation? Here again Kant stands forth as an arbiter between\nthe contending parties, and, with a firm grasp, combines the useful\nelements from both sides after winnowing them out from the worthless\nprinciples. The majority of the eudemonistic systems, along with the\npromotion of private welfare, prescribe the furtherance of universal good\nwithout being able to indicate at what point the pursuit of personal\nwelfare should give way to regard for the good of others, while in the\nperfectionist systems the social element is wanting or retreats unduly into\nthe background. The principle of happiness represents moral empiricism, the\nprinciple of perfection moral rationalism. Kant resolves the antithesis\nby restricting the theses of the respective parties within their proper\nlimits: \"Make _thine own perfection_ and _the happiness of others_ the end\nof thy actions;\" these are the only ends which are at the same time duties.\nThe perfection of others is excluded by the fact that I cannot impart\nto anyone a good disposition, for everyone must acquire it for himself;\npersonal happiness by the fact that everyone seeks it naturally.\n\nThis antithesis (which is crossed by the further distinction between\nperfect, _i.e._, indispensable, and imperfect duties) serves as a basis for\nthe division of moral duties into duties toward ourselves and duties toward\nother men.[1] The former enjoin the preservation and development of our\nnatural and moral powers, the latter are duties of obligation (of respect)\nor of merit (of love). Since no one can obligate me to feel, we are to\nunderstand by love not the pathological love of complacency, but only the\nactive love of benevolence or practical sympathy. Since it is just as\nimpossible that the increase of the evils in the world should be a duty,\nthe enervating and useless excitation of pity, which adds to the pain of\nthe sufferer the sympathetic pain of the spectator, is to be struck off\nthe list of virtues, and active readiness to aid put in its place. In\nfriendship love and respect unite in exact equipoise. Veracity is one of\nthe duties toward self; lying is an abandonment of human dignity and under\nno conditions allowable, not even if life depends on it.\n\n[Footnote 1: All duties are toward men, not toward supra-human or\ninfra-human beings. That which we commonly term duties toward animals,\nlikewise the so-called duties toward God, are in reality duties toward\nourselves. Cruelty to animals is immoral, because our sympathies are\nblunted by it. To have religion is a duty to ourselves, because the view of\nmoral laws as laws of God is an aid to morality.]\n\nAfter it has been settled what the categorical imperative enjoins, the\nfurther problem awaits us of explaining how it is possible. The categorical\nimperative is possible only on I the presupposition of our _freedom_. Only\na free being gives laws to itself, just as an autonomous being alone is\nfree. In theoretical philosophy the pure self-consciousness, the \"I think,\"\ndenoted a point where the thing in itself manifests to us not its nature,\nindeed, but its existence. The same holds true in practical philosophy of\nthe moral law. The incontestable fact of the moral law empowers me to rank\nmyself in a higher order of things than the merely phenomenal order, and\nin another causal relation than that of the merely necessary (mechanical)\ncausation of nature, to regard myself as a legislative member of an\nintelligible world, and one independent of sensuous impulses--in short, to\nregard myself as free. Freedom is the _ratio essendi_ of the self-given\nmoral law, the latter the _ratio cognoscendi_ of freedom. The law would\nhave no meaning if we did not possess the power to obey it: I can _because_\nI ought. It is true that freedom is a mere Idea, whose object can never be\ngiven to me in an experience, and whose reality, consequently, cannot\nbe objectively known and proved, but nevertheless, is required with\nsatisfactory subjective necessity as the condition of the moral law and of\nthe possibility of its fulfillment. I may not say it is certain, but, with\nsafety, I am certain that I am free. Freedom is not a dogmatic proposition\nof theoretical reason, but a _postulate_ of practical reason; and the\nlatter holds the _primacy_ over the former to this extent, that it can\nrequire the former to show that certain transcendent Ideas of the\nsuprasensible, which are most intimately connected with moral obligation,\nare compatible with the principles of the understanding. It was just in\nview of the practical interests involved in the rational concepts God,\nfreedom, immortality, that it was so important to establish, at least,\ntheir possibility (their conceivability without contradiction). That,\ntherefore, which the Dialectic recognized as possible is in the Ethics\nshown to be real: Whoever seeks to fulfill his moral destiny--and this is\nthe duty of every man--must not doubt concerning the conditions of its\npossible fulfillment, must, in spite of their incomprehensibility,\n_believe_ in freedom and a suprasensible world. They are both postulates\nof practical reason, _i.e._, assumptions concerning that which is in behalf\nof that which ought to be. Naturally the interests of the understanding\nmust not be infringed upon by those of the will. The principle of the\ncomplete causal determination of events retains its validity unimpeached\nfor the sphere of the knowledge of the understanding, that is, for the\nrealm of phenomena; while, on the other hand, it remains permissible for\nus to postulate another kind of causality for the realm of things in\nthemselves, although we can have no idea of its _how_, and to ascribe to\nourselves a free intelligible character.\n\nWhile the Idea of freedom can be derived directly from the moral law as\na postulate thereof, the proof of the reality of the two other Ideas is\neffected indirectly by means of the concept of the \"highest good,\" in which\nreason conceives a union of perfect virtue and perfect happiness. The\nmoral law requires absolute correspondence between the disposition and the\ncommands of reason, or holiness of will. But besides this supreme good\n(_bonum supremum_) of completed morality, the highest good (_bonum\nconsummatum_) further contains a degree of happiness corresponding to the\ndegree of virtue. Everyone agrees in the judgment that, by rights, things\nshould go well with the virtuous and ill with the wicked, though this must\nnot imply any deduction from the principle previously announced that the\nleast impulse of self-interest causes the maxim to forfeit its worth: the\nmotive of the will must never be happiness, but always the being worthy of\nhappiness. The first element in the highest good yields the argument for\n_immortality_, and the second the argument for the _existence of God_. (1)\nPerfect correspondence between the will and the law never occurs in this\nlife, because the sensibility never allows us to attain a permanently good\ndisposition, armed against every temptation; our will can never be\nholy, but at best virtuous, and our lawful disposition never escape the\nconsciousness of a constant tendency to transgression, or at least of\nimpurity. Since, nevertheless, the demands of the (Christian) moral law\ncontinue in their unrelenting stringency to be the standard, we are\njustified in the hope of an unlimited continuation of our existence,\nin order that by constant progress in goodness we may draw nearer _in\ninfinitum_ to the ideal of holiness. (2) The establishment of a rational\nproportion between happiness and virtue is also not to be expected until\nthe future life, for too often on earth it is the evil man who prospers,\nwhile the good man suffers. A justly proportioned distribution of rewards\nand punishment can only be expected from an infinite power, wisdom, and\ngoodness, which rules the moral world even as it has created the natural\nworld. Deity alone is able to bring the physical and moral realms into\nharmony, and to establish the due relation between well-being and right\naction. This, the moral argument, is the only possible proof for the\nexistence of God. Theology is not possible as speculative, but only as\nmoral theology. The certitude of faith, moreover, is only different from,\nnot less than, the certainty of knowledge, in so far as it brings with it\nnot an objective, but a subjective, although universally valid, necessity.\nHence it is better to speak of belief in God as a need of the reason than\nas a duty; while a logical error, not a moral one, should be charged\nagainst the atheist. The atheist is blind to the intimate connection which\nexists between the highest good and the Ideas of the reason; he does not\nsee that God, freedom, and immortality are the indispensable conditions of\nthe realization of this ideal.\n\nThus faith is based upon duty without being itself duty: ethics is the\n_basis of religion_, which consists in our regarding moral laws as\n(_instar_, as if they were) divine commands. They are not valid or\nobligatory because God has given them (this would be heteronomy), but they\nshould be regarded as divine because they are necessary laws of reason.\nReligion differs from ethics only in its form, not in its content, in that\nit adds to the conception of duty the idea of God as a moral lawgiver, and\nthus increases the influence of this conception on the will; it is simply\na means for the promotion of morality. Since, however, besides natural\nreligion or the pure faith of reason (the moral law and the moral\npostulates), the historical religions contain statutory determinations or a\ndoctrinal faith, it becomes the duty of the critical philosopher to inquire\nhow much of this positive admixture can be justified at the bar of reason.\nIn this investigation the question of the divine revelation of dogma\nand ceremonial laws is neither supra-rationalistically affirmed nor\nnaturalistically derived, but rationalistically treated as an open\nquestion.\n\nThe four essays combined under the title _Religion within the Limits of\nReason Only_ treat of the Radical Evil in Human Nature, the Conflict of the\nGood Principle with the Evil for the Mastery over Man, the Victory of the\nGood Principle over the Evil and the Founding of a Kingdom of God upon\nEarth, and, finally, Service and False Service under the Dominion of the\nGood Principle, or Religion and Priestcraft; or more briefly, the fall, the\natonement (the Christ-idea), the Church, and true and false service of God.\n\n(1) The individual evil deeds of the empirical character point to an\noriginal fault of the intelligible character, a _propensity to evil_\ndwelling in man and not further deducible. This, although it is\nself-incurred, may be called natural and innate, and consists (not in the\nsensibility merely, but) in a freely chosen reversal of the moral order\nof our maxims, in virtue of which the maxim of duty or morality is\nsubordinated to that of well-being or self-love instead of being\nplaced above it, and that which should be the supreme condition of all\nsatisfaction is degraded into a mere means thereto. Morality is therefore a\n_conversion_ from the evil to the good, and requires a complete revolution\nin the disposition, the putting on of a new man, a \"new birth,\"\nwhich, an act out of time, can manifest itself in the temporal world of\nphenomena only as a gradual transformation in conduct, as a continuous\nadvance, but which, we may hope, is judged by him who knows the heart,\nwho regards the disposition instead of particular imperfect actions, as a\ncompleted unity.\n\n(2) By the eternal Son of God, for whose sake God created all things, we\nare to understand the ideal of the perfect man, which in truth forms the\nend of creation, and is come down from heaven, etc. To believe in Christ\nmeans to resolve to realize in one's self the ideal of human nature which\nis well pleasing to God, or to make the divine disposition of the Son of\nGod our own, not to believe that this ideal has appeared on earth as an\nactual man, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. The only saving faith is\nthe belief of reason in the ideal which Christ represents, and not the\nhistorical belief in his person. The vicarious atonement of the ideal\nman for those who believe on him is to be interpreted to mean that the\nsufferings and sacrifices (crucifixion of the flesh) imposed by moral\nconversion, which are due to the sinful man as punishment, are assumed by\nthe regenerate man: the new Adam bears the sufferings of the old. In the\nsame way as that in which Kant handles the history of Christ and the\ndoctrine of justification, all biblical narratives and ecclesiastical\ndoctrines are in public instruction (from the pulpit) to be interpreted\nmorally, even where the authors themselves had no such meaning in mind.\n\n(3) The Church is a society based upon the laws of virtue, an ethical\ncommunity or a people of God, whose members confirm each other in the\nperformance of duty by example and by the profession of a common moral\nconviction; we are all brothers, the children of one father. Ideally there\nis only one (the universal, invisible) Church, and its foundation the pure\nfaith of reason; but in consequence of a weakness peculiar to human nature\nthe foundation of an actual church required the addition of a statutory\nhistorical faith, with claims to a divine origin, from which a multitude of\nvisible churches and the antithesis of orthodox and heretics have sprung.\nThe history of the Church since the establishment of Christianity\nrepresents the conflict between the historical faith and the faith of\nreason; its goal is the submission of the former to the latter, as, indeed,\nwe have already begun to perceive that God does not require a special\nservice beyond the practice of virtue.\n\n(4) The true service of God consists in a moral disposition and its\nmanifestation: \"All that man supposes himself able to do in order to please\nGod, beyond living a good life, is _false service_\" False service is the\nfalse subordination of the pure faith of reason to the statutory faith, by\nwhich the attainment of the goal of religious development is hindered\nand the laity are brought into dangerous dependence upon the clergy.\nPriestcraft, hypocrisy, and fanaticism enter in the train of fetich\nservice. The church-faith is destined little by little to make itself\nsuperfluous. It has been necessary as a vehicle, as a means for the\nintroduction and extension of the pure religion of morality, and it still\nremains useful for a time, until humanity shall become of age; with man's\nentrance on the period of youth and manhood, however, the leading-string of\nholy traditions, which in its time did good service, becomes unnecessary,\nnay, finally, a fetter. (This relative appreciation of the positive element\nin religion, in antithesis to the unthinking rejection of it by the\nIllumination, resembles the view of Lessing; cf. pp. 306-309.) Moreover,\nsince it is a duty to be a co-worker in the transition from the historical\nto the pure religious faith, the clergy must be free as scientific\ntheologians, as scholars and authors to examine the doctrines of faith\nand to give expression to dissenting opinions, while, as preachers in the\npulpit, speaking under commission, they are bound to the creeds. To decide\nthe articles of belief unalterable would be a crime against human\nnature, whose primal destination is just this--to progress. To renounce\nillumination means to trample upon the divine rights of reason.\n\nThe \"General Observations\" appended to each division add to the four\nprinciple discussions as many collateral inquiries concerning Operations\nof Grace, Miracles, Mysteries, and Means of Grace, objects of transcendent\nideas, which do not properly belong in the sphere of religion within pure\nreason itself, but which yet border on it. (1) We are entirely incapable of\ncalling forth works of grace, nay, even of indicating the marks by which\nactual divine illuminations are distinguished from imaginary ones; the\nsupposed experience of heavenly influences belongs in the region of\nsuperstitious religious illusion. But their impossibility is just as little\nsusceptible of proof as their reality. Nothing further can be said on the\nquestion, save that works of grace may exist, and perhaps must exist in\norder to supplement our imperfect efforts after virtue; and that everyone,\ninstead of waiting for divine assistance, should do for his own amendment\nall that is in his power. (2) Kant judges more sharply in regard to the\nbelief in miracles, which contradict the laws of experience without in the\nleast furthering the performance of our duties. In practical life no one\nregards miracles as possible; and their limitation to the past and to rare\ninstances does not make them more credible. (3) In so far as the Christian\nmysteries actually represent impenetrable secrets they have no bearing on\nmoral conduct; so far as they are morally valuable they admit of rational\ninterpretation and thus cease to be mysteries. The Trinity signifies the\nthree moral qualities or powers united in the head of the moral state: the\none God as holy lawgiver, gracious governor, and just judge. (4) The\nservices of the Church have worth as ethical ceremonies, as emblems of the\nmoral disposition (prayer) and of moral fellowship (church attendance,\nbaptism, and the Lord's Supper); but to find in these symbolic ceremonies\nmeans of grace and to seek to purchase the favor of God by them, is an\nerror of the same kind as sorcery and fetichism. The right way leads from\nvirtue to grace, not in the opposite direction; piety without morality is\nworthless.\n\nThe Kantian theory of religion is rationalistic and moralistic. The fact\nthat religion is based on morality should never be assailed. But the\nfoundation is not the building, the origin not the content and essence\nof the thing itself. As far as the nature of religion is concerned,\nthe Kantian view does not exclude completion in the direction of\nSchleiermacher's theory of feeling, just as by its speculative\ninterpretation of the Christian dogmas and its appreciation of the history\nof religion as a gradual transformation of historical faith into a faith of\nreason, it points out the path afterward followed by Hegel. The philosophy\nof religion of the future must be, as some recent attempts aim to be (O.\nPfleiderer, Biedermann, Lipsius), a synthesis of Kant, Schleiermacher, and\nHegel.\n\nWhile the moral law requires rightness not only of the action, but also of\nthe disposition, the law of right is satisfied when the act enjoined is\nperformed, no matter from what motives. Legal right, as the sum of the\nconditions under which the will of the one can consist with the will of\nothers according to a universal law, relates only to enforceable actions,\nwithout concerning itself about motives. Private right includes right in\nthings or property, personal right or right of contract, and real-personal\nright (marriage right); public right is divided into the right of states,\nof nations, and of citizens of the world. Kant's theory of punishment is\noriginal and important. He bases it not upon prudential regard for the\nprotection of society, or the deterrence or reformation of the criminal,\nbut upon the exalted idea of retaliation (_jus talionis_), which demands\nthat everyone should meet with what his deeds deserve: Eye for eye, life\nfor life. In _politics_ Kant favors democratic theories, though less\ndecidedly than Rousseau and Fichte. As he followed with interest the\nefforts after freedom manifested in the American and French Revolutions, so\nhe opposed an hereditary nobility as a hindrance to the natural equality of\nrights, and demanded freedom for the public expression of opinion as the\nsurest means of guarding against revolutions. The only legitimate form of\nthe state is the republican, _i.e._, that in which the executive power is\nseparated from the legislative power, in contrast to despotism, where they\nare united in one hand. The best guaranty for just government and civil\nliberty is offered by constitutional monarchy, in which the people through\nits representatives exercises the legislative power, the sovereign the\nexecutive power, and judges chosen by the people the judicial power. The\ncontract from which we may conceive the state to have arisen is not to be\nregarded as an historical fact, but as a rational idea or rule, by which\nwe may judge whether the laws are just or not: that which the people as a\nwhole cannot prescribe for itself, this cannot be prescribed for it by\nthe ruler (cf. p. 235). That there is a constant progress--not only of\nindividuals, but--of the race, not merely in technical and intellectual,\nbut also in moral respects, is supported both by rational grounds (without\nfaith in such progress we could not fulfill our duty as co-laborers in it)\nand by experiential grounds (above all, the unselfish sympathy which all\nthe world gave to the French Revolution); and the never-ending complaint\nthat the times are growing worse proves only that mankind is continually\nsetting up stricter standards for itself. The beginning of _history_ is to\nbe placed at the point where man passes out of the condition of innocence,\nin which instinct rules, and begins to subdue nature, which hitherto he has\nobeyed. The goal of history, again, is the establishment of the perfect\nform of the state. Nature itself co-operates with freedom in the gradual\ntransformation of the state based on necessity _(Notstaat)_ into a rational\nstate, inasmuch as selfish competition and the commercial spirit require\npeace, order, and justice for their own security and help to bring them\nabout. And so, further, we need not doubt that humanity will constantly\ndraw nearer to the ideal condition of everlasting peace among the nations\n(guaranteed by a league of states which shall as a mediator settle disputes\nbetween individual states), however impracticable the idea may at present\nappear.\n\nIf the bold declaration of Fortlage, that in Kant the system of absolute\ntruth appeared, is true of any one part of his philosophy, it is true of\nthe practical part, in which Christian morality has found its scientific\nexpression. If we may justly complain that on the basis of his sharp\ndistinction between legality and morality, between legal duty and\nvirtue-duty, Kant took into account only the legal side of the institutions\nof marriage and of the state, overlooking the fact that besides these they\nhave a moral importance and purpose, if we may demand a social ethic as a\nsupplement to his ethics, which is directed to the duties of the individual\nalone, yet these and other well-founded desiderata may be attained by\nslight corrections and by the addition of another story to the Kantian\nedifice, while the foundations are still retained. The bases are immovable.\nAutonomy, absolute oughtness, the formal character of the law of reason,\nand the incomparable worth of the pure, disinterested disposition--these\nare the corner stones of the Kantian, nay, of all morals.\n\n\n%3. Theory of the Beautiful and of Ends in Nature.%\n\nWe now know the laws which the understanding imposes upon nature and those\nwhich reason imposes upon the will. If there is a field in which to be\n(_Sein_) and ought to be (_Sollen_), nature and freedom, which we have thus\nfar been forced to consider antithetical, are reconciled--and that there\nis such a field is already deducible from the doctrine of the religious\npostulates (as practical truths or assumptions concerning what is, in\nbehalf of what ought to be), and from the hints concerning a progress in\nhistory (in which both powers co-operate toward a common goal)--then the\nsource of its laws is evidently to be sought in that faculty which mediates\nalike between understanding and reason and between knowing and feeling:\nin _Judgment_, as the higher faculty of feeling. Judgment, in the general\nsense, is the faculty of thinking a particular as contained in a universal,\nand exercises a twofold function: as \"determinant\" judgment it subsumes the\nparticular under a given universal (a law), as \"reflective\" it seeks the\nuniversal for a given particular. Since the former coincides with the\nunderstanding, we are here concerned only with the reflective judgment,\njudgment in the narrower sense, which does not cognize objects, but judges\nthem, and this according to the principle of purposiveness.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: The universal laws springing from the understanding, to\nwhich every nature must conform to become an object of experience for us,\ndetermine nothing concerning the particular form of the given reality;\nwe cannot deduce the special laws of nature from them. Nevertheless the\nnature of our cognitive faculty does not allow us to accept the empirical\nmanifoldness of our world as contingent, but impels us to regard it as\npurposive or adapted to our knowledge, and to look upon these special\nlaws as if an intelligence had given them in order to make a system of\nexperience possible.]\n\nThis, in turn, is of two kinds. An object is really or _objectively_\npurposive (perfect) when it corresponds to its nature or its determination,\nformally or _subjectively_ purposive (beautiful) when it is conformed to\nthe nature of our cognitive faculty. The perception of purpose is always\naccompanied by a feeling of pleasure; in the first case, where the pleasure\nis based on a concept of the object, it is a logical satisfaction, in the\nsecond, where it springs only from the harmony of the object with our\ncognitive powers, aesthetic satisfaction. The objects of the teleological\nand the aesthetic judgment, the purposive and the beautiful products of\nnature and art, constitute the desired intermediate field between nature\nand freedom; and here again the critical question comes up, How, in\nrelation to these, synthetic judgments _a priori_ are possible?\n\n%(a) Esthetic Judgment.%--The formula holds of Kant's aesthetics as well as\nof his theoretical and practical philosophy, that his aim is to overcome\nthe opposition between the empirical and the rationalistic theories, and to\nfind a middle course of his own between the two extremes. Neither Burke\nnor Baumgarten satisfied him. The English aesthetics was sensational, the\nGerman, _i.e._, that of the Wolffian school, rationalistic. The former\nidentified the beautiful with the agreeable, the latter identified it with\nthe perfect or with the conformity of the object to its concept; in the one\ncase, aesthetic appreciation is treated as sensuous pleasure, in the other,\nit is treated as a lower, confused kind of knowledge, its peculiar nature\nbeing in both cases overlooked. In opposition to the sensualization of\naesthetic appreciation, its character as judgment must be maintained;\nand in opposition to its rationalization, its character as feeling. This\nrelation of the Kantian aesthetics to that of his predecessors explains\nboth its fundamental tendency and the elements in it which appear defective\nand erroneous. In any case, Kant shows himself in this field also an\nunapproachable master of careful analysis.\n\nThe first task of aesthetics is the careful distinction of its object from\nrelated phenomena. The beautiful has points of contact with the agreeable,\nthe good, the perfect, the useful, and the true. It is distinguished\nfrom the true by the fact that it is not an object of knowledge, but\nof satisfaction. If we inquire further into the difference between the\nsatisfaction in the beautiful and the satisfaction in the agreeable, in the\ngood (in itself), and in the (good for something, as a means, or in the)\nuseful, which latter three have this in common, that they are objects of\nappetition--of sensuous want, of moral will, of prudential desire--it\nbecomes evident that the beautiful pleases through its mere representation\n(that is, independently of the real existence of the object), and that\nthe delight in the beautiful is a contemplative pleasure. It is for\ncontemplation only, not to be sensuously enjoyed nor put to practical use;\nand, further, its production is not a universal duty. Sensuous, prudential,\nor moral appetition has always an \"interest\" in the actual existence of\nthe object; the beautiful, on the other hand, calls forth a disinterested\nsatisfaction.\n\nAccording to quality the beautiful is the object of a disinterested, free\n(bound by no interest), and sportive satisfaction. According to quantity\nand modality the judgment of taste claims universal and necessary validity,\nwithout this being based upon concepts. This posits further differences\nbetween the beautiful and the agreeable and the good. The good also pleases\nuniversally, but it pleases through concepts; the agreeable as well as the\nbeautiful pleases without a concept, but it does not please universally.\n\nThat which pleases the reason through the concept is good; that which\npleases the senses in sensation is agreeable. That which pleases\n_universally and necessarily without a concept_ is beautiful. Moral\njudgment demands the assent of all, and its universal validity is\ndemonstrable. The judgment concerning the agreeable is not capable of\ndemonstration, but neither does it pretend to possess universal validity;\nwe readily acknowledge that what is pleasant to one need not be so to every\nother man. In regard to the beautiful, on the contrary, we do not content\nourselves with saying that tastes differ, but we expect it to please all.\nWe expect everyone to assent to our judgment of taste, although it is able\nto support itself by no proofs.\n\nHere there is a difficulty: since the judgment of taste does not express\na characteristic of the object, but a state of mind in the observer, a\nfeeling, a satisfaction, it is purely subjective; and yet it puts forth a\nclaim to be universally communicable. The difficulty can be removed only on\nthe assumption of a common aesthetic sense, of a corresponding organization\nof the powers of representation in all men, which yields the common\nstandard for the pleasurableness of the impression. The agreeable appeals\nto that in man which is different in different individuals, the beautiful\nto that which functions alike in all; the former addresses itself to\nthe passive sensibility, the latter to the active judgment. The\nagreeable--because of the non-calculable differences in our sensuous\ninclinations, which are in part conditioned by bodily states--possesses no\nuniversality whatever, the good possesses an objective, and the beautiful\na subjective universality. The judgment concerning the agreeable has an\nempirical, that concerning the beautiful an _a priori_, determining ground:\nin the former case, the judgment follows the feeling, in the latter, it\nprecedes it.\n\nAn object is considered beautiful (for, strictly speaking, we may say only\nthis, not that it is beautiful) when its form puts the powers of the human\nmind in a state of harmony, brings the intuitive and rational faculties\ninto concordant activity, and produces an agreeable proportion between the\nimagination and the understanding. In giving the occasion for an harmonious\nplay of the cognitive activities (that is, for an easy combination of the\nmanifold into unity) the beautiful object is purposive for us, for our\nfunction of apprehension; it is--here we obtain a determination of the\njudgment of taste from the standpoint of relation--_purposive without a\ndefinite purpose_. We know perfectly well that a landscape which attracts\nus has not been specially arranged for the purpose of delighting us, and we\ndo not wish to find in a work of art anything of an intention to please.\nAn object is perfect when it is purposive for itself (corresponds to its\nconcept); useful when it is purposive for our desire (corresponds to a\npractical intention of man); beautiful when the arrangement of its parts\nis purposive for the relation between the fancy and understanding of\nthe beholder (corresponds in an unusual degree to the conditions of our\napprehension). Perfection is internal (real, objective) purposiveness, and\nutility is external purposiveness, both for a definite purpose; beauty,\non the other hand, is purposiveness without a purpose, formal, subjective\npurposiveness. The beautiful pleases by its mere form. The satisfaction in\nthe perfect is of a conceptual or intellectual kind, the satisfaction in\nthe beautiful, emotional or aesthetic in character.\n\nThe combination of these four determinations yields an exhaustive\ndefinition of the beautiful: The beautiful is that which universally and\nnecessarily arouses disinterested satisfaction by its mere form\n(purposiveness without the representation of a purpose).\n\nSince the pleasurableness of the beautiful rests on the fact that\nit establishes a pleasing harmony between the imagination and the\nunderstanding, hence between sensuous and intellectual apprehension, the\naesthetic attitude is possible only in sensuous-rational beings. The\nagreeable exists for the animal as well, and the good is an object of\napproval for pure spirits; but the beautiful exists for humanity alone.\nKant succeeded in giving very delicate and felicitous verbal expression\nto these distinctions: the agreeable gratifies _(vergn\u00fcgt)_ and excites\ninclination _(Neigung)_; the good is approved _(gebilligt)_ and arouses\nrespect _(Achtung)_; the beautiful \"pleases\" _(gef\u00e4llt)_ and finds \"favor\"\n_(Gunst)_.\n\n\nIn the progress of the investigation the principle that beauty depends on\nthe form alone, and that the concept, the purpose, the nature of the\nobject is not taken into account at all in aesthetic judgment, experiences\nlimitation. In its full strictness this applies only to a definite and, in\nfact, a subordinate division of the beautiful, which Kant marks off under\nthe name of pure or _free_ beauty. With this he contrasts _adherent_\nbeauty, as that which presupposes a generic concept to which its form must\ncorrespond and which it must adequately present. Too much a purist not\nto mark the coming in of an intellectual pleasure as a beclouding of the\n\"purity\" of the aesthetic satisfaction, he is still just enough to admit\nthe higher worth of adherent beauty. For almost the whole of artificial\nbeauty and a considerable part of natural beauty belong to this latter\ndivision, which we to-day term ideal and characteristic beauty. Examples of\nfree or purely formal beauty are tapestry patterns, arabesques, fountains,\nflowers, and landscapes, the pleasurableness of which rests simply on the\nproportion of their form and relations, and not upon their conformity to a\npresupposed significance and determination of the thing. A building, on the\ncontrary--a dwelling, a summer-house, a temple--is considered beautiful\nonly when we perceive in it not merely harmonious relations of the parts\none to another, but also an agreement between the form and the purpose or\ngeneric concept: a church must not look like a chalet. Here the external\nform is compared with an inner nature, and harmony is required between form\nand content. Adherent beauty is significant and expressive beauty, which,\nalthough the satisfaction in it is not \"purely\" aesthetic, nevertheless\nstands higher than pure beauty, because it gives to the understanding also\nsomething to think, and hence busies the whole spirit.\n\nThe analytical investigations concerning the nature of the beautiful\nreceive a valuable supplement in the classical definition of genius. Kant\ngives two definitions of productive talent, one formal and one genetic.\n\nNatural beauty is a beautiful thing; artificial beauty, a beautiful\nrepresentation of a thing. The gift of agreeably presenting a thing which\nin itself, perhaps, is ugly, is called taste. To judge of the beautiful\nit is sufficient to possess taste, but for its production there is still\nanother talent needed, spirit or genius. For an art product can fulfill\nthe demands of taste and yet not aesthetically satisfy; while formally\nfaultless, it may be spiritless.\n\nWhile beautiful nature looks as though it were art (as though it were\ncalculated for our enjoyment), beautiful art should resemble nature, must\nnot appear to be intentional though, no doubt, it is so, must show a\ncareful but not an overnice adherence to rules (_i.e._, not one which\nfetters the powers of the artist). This is the case when the artist bears\nthe rule in himself, that is, when he is gifted. Genius is the\ninnate disposition (through) which (nature) gives rules to art; its\ncharacteristics are originality, exemplariness, and unreflectiveness. It\ndoes not produce according to definite rules which can be learned, but\nit is a law in itself, it is original. It creates instinctively without\nconsciousness of the rule, and cannot describe how it produces its results.\nIt creates typical works which impel others to follow, not to imitate. It\nis only in art that there are geniuses, _i.e._, spirits who produce that\nwhich absolutely cannot be learned, while the great men of science differ\nonly in degree, not in kind, from their imitators and pupils, and that\nwhich they discover can be learned by rule.\n\nThis establishes the criteria by which genius may be recognized. If we ask\nby what psychological factors it is produced the answer is as follows:\nGenius presupposes a certain favorable relation between imagination and\nreason. Genius is the faculty of aesthetic Ideas, but an aesthetic Idea is\na representation of the imagination which animates the mind, which adds to\na concept of the understanding much of ineffable thought, much that belongs\nto the concept but which cannot be comprehended in a definite concept. With\nthe aid of this idea Kant solves the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment.\nThe thesis is: The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts; for\notherwise it would admit of controversy (would be determinable by proofs).\nThe antithesis is: It is based upon concepts; for otherwise we could not\ncontend about it (endeavor to obtain assent). The two principles are\nreconcilable, for \"concept\" is understood differently in the two cases.\nThat which the thesis rightly seeks to exclude from the judgment of beauty\nis the determinate concept of the understanding; that which the antithesis\nwith equal justice pronounces indispensable is the indeterminate concept,\nthe aesthetic Idea.\n\nThe freest play is afforded the imagination by poetry, the highest of\nall arts, which, with rhetoric (\"insidious,\" on account of its earnest\nintention to deceive), forms the group termed arts of speech. To the class\nof formative arts belong architecture, sculpture, and painting as the art\nof design. A third group, the art of the beautiful play of sensations,\nincludes painting as the art of color, and music, which as a \"fine\" art is\nplaced immediately after poetry, as an \"agreeable\" art at the very foot of\nthe list, and as the play of tone in the vicinity of the entertaining play\nof fortune [games of chance] and the witty play of thought. The explanation\nof the comic (the ludicrous is based, according to Kant, on a sudden\ntransformation of strained expectation into nothing) lays great (indeed\nexaggerated) weight on the resulting physiological phenomena, the\nbodily shock which heightens vital feeling and favors health, and which\naccompanies the alternating tension and relaxation of the mind.\n\nBesides free and adherent beauty, there is still a third kind of aesthetic\neffect, the Sublime. The beautiful pleases by its bounded form. But also\nthe boundless and formless can exert aesthetic effect: that which is great\nbeyond all comparison we judge sublime. Now this magnitude is either\nextensive in space and time or intensive greatness of force or power;\naccordingly there are two forms of the sublime. That phenomenon which mocks\nthe power of comprehension possessed by the human imagination or surpasses\nevery measure of our intuition, as the ocean and the starry heavens, is\nmathematically sublime. That which overcomes all conceivable resistance,\nas the terrible forces of nature, conflagrations, floods, earthquakes,\nhurricanes, thunderstorms, is dynamically sublime or mighty. The former\nis relative to the cognitive, the latter to the appetitive faculty. The\nbeautiful brings the imagination and the understanding into accord; by\nthe sublime the fancy is brought into a certain favorable relation, not\ndirectly to be termed harmony, with reason. In the one case there arose a\nrestful, positively pleasurable mood; here a shock is produced, an indirect\nand negative pleasure proceeding from pain. Since the sublime exceeds the\nfunctional capability of our sensuous representations and does violence to\nthe imagination, we first feel small at the sight of the absolutely great,\nand incapable of compassing it with our sensuous glance. The sensibility is\nnot equal to the impression; this at first seems contrary to purpose and\nviolent. This humiliating impression, however, is quickly followed by a\nreaction, and the vital forces, which were at first checked, are stimulated\nto the more lively activity. Moreover, it is the sensuous part of man\nwhich is humbled and the spiritual part that is exalted: the overthrow of\nsensibility becomes a triumph for reason. The sight of the sublime, that\nis, awakens the _Idea of the unconditioned, of the infinite_. This Idea can\nnever be adequately presented by an intuition, but can be aroused only\nby the inadequacy of all that is sensuous to present it; the infinite is\npresented through the impossibility of presenting it. We cannot intuit the\ninfinite, but we can think it. In comparison with reason (as the faculty of\nIdeas, the faculty of thinking the infinite) even the greatest thing that\ncan be given in the sense-world appears small; reason is the absolutely\ngreat. \"That is sublime the mere ability to think which proves a faculty\nof the mind surpassing every standard of sense.\" \"That is sublime which\npleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of the senses.\"\nThe conflict between phantasy and reason, the insufficiency of the former\nfor the attainment of the rational Idea, makes us conscious of the\nsuperiority of reason. Just because we feel small as sensuous beings we\nfeel great as rational beings. The pleasure (related to the moral feeling\nof respect and, like this, mingled with a certain pain) which accompanies\nthis consciousness of inner greatness is explained by the fact that the\nimagination, in acknowledging reason superior, places itself in the\nappropriate and purposive relation of subordination. It is evident from the\nforegoing that the truly sublime is reason, the moral nature of man, his\npredisposition and destination, which point beyond the present world.\nSchiller declares that \"in space the sublime does not dwell,\" and\nKant says, \"Sublimity is contained in none of the things of nature, but\nonly in our mind, in so far as we are conscious of being superior to nature\nwithin us and without us.\" Nevertheless, since in this contemplation we fix\nour thoughts entirely on the object without reflecting on ourselves, we\ntransfer the admiration of right due to the reason and its Idea of the\ninfinite by subreption to the object by which the Idea is occasioned, and\ncall the object itself sublime, instead of the mood which it wakes in us.\n\nIf the sublime marks the point where the aesthetic touches on the boundary\nof the moral, the beautiful is also not without some relation to the good.\nBy showing the agreement of sensibility and reason, which is demanded by\nthe moral law, realized in aesthetic intuition (as a voluntary yielding of\nthe imagination to the legitimacy of the understanding), it gives us the\ninspiring consciousness that the antithesis is reconcilable, that the\nrational can be presented in the sensuous, and so becomes a \"symbol of the\ngood.\"\n\n%(b) Teleological Judgment.%--Teleological judgment is not knowledge, but\na way of looking at things which comes into play where the causal or\nmechanical explanation fails us. This is not the case if the purposiveness\nis external, relative to its utility for something else. The fact that the\nsand of the sea-shore furnishes a good soil for the pine neither furthers\nnor prevents a causal knowledge of it. Only inner purposiveness, as it\nis manifested in the products of organic nature, brings the mechanical\nexplanation to a halt. Organisms are distinguished above inorganic forms by\nthe fact that of themselves they are at once cause and effect, that they\nare self-productive and this both as a species (the oak springs from the\nacorn, and in its turn bears acorns) and as individuals (self-preservation,\ngrowth, and the replacement of dying parts by new ones), and also by the\nfact that the reciprocally productive parts are in their form and their\nexistence all conditioned by the whole. This latter fact, that the whole is\nthe determining ground for the parts, is perfectly obvious in the products\nof human art. For here it is the representation of the whole (the idea of\nthe work desired) which as the ground precedes the existence and the form\nof the parts (of the machine). But where is the subject to construct\norganisms according to its representations of ends? We may neither conceive\nnature itself as endowed with forces acting in view of ends, nor a\npraetermundane intelligence interfering in the course of nature. Either of\nthese suppositions would be the death of natural philosophy: the hylozoist\nendows matter with a property which conflicts with its nature, and the\ntheist oversteps the boundary of possible experience. Above all, the\nanalogy of the products of organic nature with the products of human\ntechnique is destroyed by the fact that machines do not reproduce\nthemselves and their parts cannot produce one another, while the organism\norganizes itself.\n\nFor our discursive understanding an interaction between the whole and the\nparts is completely incomprehensible. We understand when the parts precede\nthe whole (mechanically) or the representation of the whole precedes\nthe parts (teleologically); but to think the whole itself (not the Idea\nthereof) as the ground of the parts, which is demanded by organic life,\nis impossible for us. It would have been otherwise if an intuitive\nunderstanding had been bestowed upon us. For a being possessing\nintellectual intuition the antithesis between possibility and actuality,\nbetween necessity and contingency, between mechanism and teleology, would\ndisappear along with that between thought and intuition. For such a being\neverything possible (all that it thinks) would be at the same time\nactual (present for intuition), and all that appears to us\ncontingent--intentionally selected from several possibilities and in order\nto an end--would be necessary as well; with the whole would be given\nthe parts corresponding thereto, and consequently natural mechanism\nand purposive connection would be identical, while for us, to whom the\nintuitive understanding is denied, the two divide. Hence the teleological\nview is a mere form of human representation, a subjective principle. We may\nnot say that a mechanical origin of living beings is impossible, but only\nthat we are unable to understand it. If we knew how a blade of grass or\na frog sprang from mechanical forces, we would also be in a position to\nproduce them.\n\nThe antinomy of the teleological judgment--thesis: all production of\nmaterial things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to\nmerely mechanical laws; antithesis: some products of material nature cannot\nbe judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws, but to judge\nthem requires the causality of final causes--is insoluble so long as both\npropositions are taken for constitutive principles; but it is soluble when\nthey are taken as regulative principles or standpoints for judgment. For it\nis in no wise contradictory, on the one hand, to continue the search for\nmechanical causes as far as this is in any way possible, and, on the other,\nclearly to recognize that, at last, this will still leave a remainder which\nwe cannot make intelligible without calling to our aid the concept of ends.\nAssuming that it were possible to carry the explanation of life from life,\nfrom ancestral organisms (for the _generatio aequivoca_ is an absurd\ntheory) so far that the whole organic world should represent one great\nfamily descended from one primitive form as the common mother, even\nthen the concept of final causes would only be pushed further back, not\neliminated: the origin of the first organization will always resist\nmechanical explanation. Besides this mission of putting limits to causal\nderivation and of filling the gap in knowledge by a necessary, although\nsubjective, way of looking at things, the Idea of ends has still another,\nthe direct promotion of knowledge from efficient causes through the\ndiscovery of new causal problems. Thus, for example, physiology owes the\nimpulse to the discovery of previously unnoticed mechanical connections\n(cf. also p. 382 note) to the question concerning the purpose of organs.\nAs doctrines mechanism and teleology are irreconcilable and impossible;\nas rules or maxims of inquiry they are compatible, and the one as\nindispensable as the other.\n\nAfter the problem of life, which is insoluble by means of the mechanical\nexplanation, has necessitated the application of the concept of ends, the\nteleological principle must, at least by way of experiment, be extended to\nthe whole of nature. This consideration culminates in the position that\nman, as the subject of morality, must be held to be the final aim of the\nworld, for it is only in regard to a moral being that no further inquiry\ncan be raised as to the purpose of its existence. It also repeats the\nmoral argument for the existence of a supreme reason, thus supplementing\nphysico-theology, which is inadequate to the demonstration of one\nabsolutely perfect Deity; so that the third _Critique_, like the two\npreceding, concludes with the Idea of God as an object of practical faith.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere are three original and pregnant pairs of thoughts which cause Kant's\nname to shine in the philosophical sky as a star of the first magnitude:\nthe demand for a critique of knowledge and the proof of _a priori_ forms\nof knowledge; the moral autonomy and the categorical imperative; the\nregulative validity of the Ideas of reason and the practical knowledge of\nthe transcendent world. No philosophical theory, no scientific hypothesis\ncan henceforth avoid the duty of examining the value and legitimacy of its\nconclusions, as to whether they keep within the limits of the competency of\nhuman reason; whether Kant's determination of the origin and the limits of\nknowledge may count on continued favor or not, the fundamental critical\nidea, that reflection upon the nature and range of our cognitive faculty is\nindispensable, retains its validity for all cases and makes an end of all\nphilosophizing at random.[1] No ethical system will with impunity pass by\nthe autonomous legislation of reason and the unconditional imperative (the\nadmonition of conscience translated into conceptual language): the nature\nand worth of moral will will be everywhere sought in vain if they are not\nrecognized where Kant has found them--in the unselfish disposition, in that\nmaxim which is fitted to become a general law for all rational beings.\nThe doctrine of the Ideas, finally, reveals to us, beyond the daylight of\nphenomenal knowledge, the starlit landscape of another mode of looking at\nthings,[2] in which satisfaction is afforded for the hitherto unmet wishes\nof the heart and demands of the reason.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"_Reason_ consists just in this, that we are able to give\naccount of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either on objective\nor subjective grounds.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: Those who regard all future metaphysics as refuted by the\nCritique of Reason are to be referred to the positive side of the Kantian\ndoctrine of Ideas. Kant admits that the mechanical explanation does not\nsatisfy reason, and that, besides it, a judgment according to Ideas is\nlegitimate. When, therefore, the speculation of the constructive school\ngives an ideal interpretation of the world, it may be regarded as an\nextended application of \"regulative principles,\" which exceeds its\nauthority only when it professes to be \"objective knowledge.\"]\n\nThe effect of the three _Critiques_ upon the public was very varied. The\nfirst great work excited alarm by the sharpness of its negations and its\ndestruction of dogmatic metaphysics, which to its earliest readers appeared\nto be the core of the matter; Kant was for them the universal destroyer.\nThen the Science of Knowledge brought into prominence the positive,\nboldly conquering side, the investigation of the conditions of empirical\nknowledge. In later times the endeavor has been made to do justice to both\nsides, but, in opposition to the overbold procedure of the constructive\nthinkers, who had fallen into a revived dogmatism, more in the spirit of\ncaution and resignation. The second great work aroused glowing enthusiasm:\n\"Kant is no mundane luminary,\" writes Jean Paul in regard to the _Critique\nof Practical Reason_, \"but a whole solar system shining at once.\"\nThe third, because of its subject and by its purpose of synthetic\nreconciliation between fields heretofore sharply separated, gained the\nsympathy of our poet-heroes Schiller and Goethe, and awakened in a young,\nspeculative spirit Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. Schelling reclaimed\nthe intuitive understanding, which Kant had problematically attributed to\nthe primal spirit, as the property of the philosopher, after Fichte had\ndrawn attention to the fact that the consciousness of the categorical\nimperative, which Kant had not thoroughly investigated, could be nothing\nelse than intellectual intuition, because in it knowing and doing coincide.\nFichte, however, does not derive the material for his system from the\n_Critique of Judgment_, though he also had a high appreciation of it, but\nfrom the two earlier _Critiques_, the fundamental conceptions of which\nhe--following the hint that practical and theoretical reason are only\ndifferent applications of one and the same reason--brings into the closest\nconnection. He unites the central idea of the practical philosophy, the\nfreedom and autonomous legislation of the will, with the leading principle\nof the theoretical philosophy, the spontaneity of the understanding, under\nthe original synthesis of the pure ego, in order to deduce from the\nactivity of the ego not only the _a priori_ forms of knowledge, but also,\nrejecting the thing in itself, the whole content of empirical\nconsciousness. The thought which intervenes between the Kantian Critique\nof Reason and the development of thoroughgoing idealism by Fichte, with\nits criticisms of and additions to the former and its preparation for the\nlatter, may be glanced at in a few supplementary pages.\n\n\n%4. From Kant to Fichte.%\n\nTo begin with the works which aided in the extension and recognition of the\nKantian philosophy, besides Kant's _Prolegomena_, the following stand\nin the front rank: _Exposition of the Critique of Pure Reason_, by the\nK\u00f6nigsberg court preacher, Johannes Schulz, 1784; the flowing _Letters\nconcerning the Kantian Philosophy_, by K.L. Reinhold in Wieland's\n_Deutscher Merkur_, 1786-87; and the _Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung_, in\nJena, founded in 1785, and edited by the philologist Sch\u00fctz and the jurist\nHufeland, which offered itself as the organ of the new doctrine. Jena\nbecame the home and principal stronghold of Kantianism; while by the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century almost all German chairs belonged to\nit, and the non-philosophical sciences as well received from it stimulation\nand guiding ideas.\n\nIn the camp of the enemy there was no less of activity. The Wolffian,\nEberhard of Halle, founded a special journal for the purpose of opposing\nthe Kantian philosophy: the _Philosophisches Magazin_, 1789, continued from\n1792 as the _Philosophisches Archiv_. The Illumination collected its forces\nin the _Philosophische Bibliothek_, edited by Feder and Meiners. Nicolai\nwaved the banner of common sense in the _Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek_,\nand in satirical romances, and was handled as he deserved by the heroes\nof poetry and philosophy (cf. the _Xenien_ of Goethe and Schiller, Kant's\n_Letter on Bookmaking_, and Fichte's cutting disposal of him, _Nicolai's\nLife and Peculiar Opinions_). The attacks of the faith-philosophers have\nbeen already noticed (pp. 310-314).\n\nThe advance from Kant to Fichte was preparing alike among friends and\nenemies, and this in two points. The demand was in part for a formal\ncomplement (a first principle from which the Kantian results could be\ndeduced, and by which the dualism of sense and understanding could be\novercome), in part for material correction (the removal of the thing in\nitself) and development (to radical idealism). Karl Leonhard Reinhold (born\nat Vienna in 1758; fled from a college of the St. Barnabite order, 1783;\nin 1787-94 professor in Jena, and then as the successor of Tetens in Kiel,\nwhere he died in 1823) undertook the former task in his _Attempt at a New\nTheory of the Human Faculty of Representation_, 1789. Kant's classical\ntheory of the faculty of cognition requires for its foundation a theory of\nthe faculty of representation, or an elementary philosophy, which shall\ntake for its object the deduction of the several functions of reason\n(intuition, concept, Idea) from the original activity of representation.\nThe Kantian philosophy lacks a first principle, which, as first, cannot be\ndemonstrable, but only a fact immediately evident and admitted by everyone.\nThe primal fact, which we seek, is consciousness. No one can dispute that\nevery representation contains three things: the subject, the object, and,\nbetween the two, the activity of representation. Accordingly the principle\nof consciousness runs: \"The representation is distinguished in\nconsciousness from the represented [object] and the representing [subject],\nand is referred to both.\" From this first principle Reinhold endeavors to\ndeduce the well-known principles of the material manifold given by the\naction of objects, and the forms of representation spontaneously produced\nby the subject, which combine this manifold into unity. When, a few years\nlater, Fichte's Science of Knowledge brilliantly succeeded in bridging the\ngap between sense and understanding by means of a first principle, thus\naccomplishing what Reinhold had attempted, the latter became one of his\nadherents, only to attach himself subsequently to Jacobi, and then to\nBardili (_Outlines of Logic_, 1800), and to end with a verbal philosophy\nlacking both in influence and permanence.\n\nIn Reinhold's elementary philosophy the thing in itself was changed from a\nproblematical, negative, merely limiting concept into a positive element of\ndoctrine. Objections were raised against Kantianism, as thus dogmatically\nmodified in the direction of realism, by Schulze, Maimon, and Beck--by\nthe first for purposes of attack, by the second in order to further\ndevelopment, and by the third with an exegetical purpose. Gottlob Ernst\nSchulze, professor in Helmst\u00e4dt, and from 1810 in G\u00f6ttingen, in his\n_Aenesidemus_ (1792, published anonymously), which was followed later by\npsychological works, defended the skeptical position in opposition to\nthe Critique of Reason. Hume's skepticism remains unrefuted by Kant\nand Reinhold. The thing in itself, which is to produce the material of\nrepresentation by affecting the senses, is a self-contradictory idea. The\napplication of the category of cause to things in themselves violates\nthe doctrine that the latter are unknowable and that the use of the pure\nconcepts of the understanding beyond the sphere of experience is\ninadmissible. The transcendental philosophy has never proved that the\nground of the material of representation cannot, just as the form thereof,\nreside in the subject itself.\n\nSide by side with the anti-critical skepticism of Aenesidemus-Schulze,\nSalomon Maimon (died 1800; cf. Witte, 1876), who was highly esteemed by the\ngreatest philosophers of his time, represents critical skepticism. With\nReinhold he holds consciousness (as the combination of a manifold into\nobjective unity) to be the common root of sensibility and understanding,\nand with Schulze, the concept of the thing in itself to be an imaginary or\nirrational quantity, a thought that cannot be carried out; it is not only\nunknowable, but unthinkable. That alone is knowable which we ourselves\nproduce, hence only the form of representation. The matter of\nrepresentation is \"given,\" but this does not mean that it arises from the\naction of the thing in itself, but only that we do not know its origin.\nUnderstanding and sense, or spontaneity and receptivity, do not differ\ngenerically, but only in degree, viz., as complete and incomplete\nconsciousness. Sensation is an incomplete consciousness, because we do not\nknow how its object arises.\n\nBy the removal of the thing in itself Aenesidemus-Schulze sought to refute\nthe Kantian theory and Maimon to improve it. Sigismund Beck (1761-1840), in\nhis _Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy must be\nJudged_, 1796,[1] seeks by it to elucidate the Kantian theory, holding up\nidealism as its true meaning. In opposition to the usual opinion that a\nrepresentation is true when it agrees with its object, he points to the\nimpossibility of comparing the one with the other. Of objects out of\nconsciousness we can know nothing; after the removal of all that is\nsubjective there is nothing positive left of the representation. Everything\nin it is produced by us; the matter arises together with the form through\nthe \"original synthesis.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: This book forms the third volume of his _Expository Abridgment\nof the Critical Writings of Professor Kant_; in the same year appeared the\n_Outlines of the Critical Philosophy_. Cf. on Beck, Dilthey in the _Archiv\nf\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. ii., 1889, pp. 592-650.]\n\nThe last mentioned attempts to develop the Kantian philosophy were so far\nsurpassed by Fichte's great achievement that they have received from their\nown age and from posterity a less grateful appreciation and remembrance\nthan was essentially their due. A phenomenon of a different sort, which is\nalso to be placed at the threshold between Kant and Fichte, but which forms\nrather a supplement to the no\u00ebtics and ethics of the latter than a link in\nthe transition to them, has, on the contrary, gained an honorable position\nin the memory of the German people, viz., Schiller's aesthetics.[1] In\nits center stand the Kantian antithesis of sensibility and reason and\nthe reconciliation of the two sides of human nature brought about by its\noccupation with the beautiful. Artistic activity or the play-impulse\nmediates between the lower, sensuous matter-impulse and the higher,\nrational form-impulse, and unites the, two in harmonious co-operation.\nWhere appetite seeks after satisfaction, and where the strict idea of duty\nrules, there only half the man is occupied; neither lust nor moral worth is\nbeautiful. In order that beauty and grace may arise, the matter-impulse\nand the form-impulse, or sensibility and reason, must manifest themselves\nuniformly and in harmony. Only when he \"plays\" is man wholly and entirely\nman; only through art is the development of humanity possible. The\ndiscernment of the fact that the beautiful brings into equilibrium the two\nfundamental impulses, one or the other of which preponderates in sensuous\ndesire and in moral volition, does not of itself decide the relative rank\nof artistic and moral activity. The recognition of this mediating position\nof art may be connected with the view that it forms a transitional stage\ntoward and a means of education for morality, as well as with the other,\nthat in it human nature attains its completion. Evidence of both views can\nbe found in Schiller's writings. At first he favors the Kantian moralism,\nwhich admits nothing higher than the good will, and sets art the task\nof educating men up to morality by ennobling their natural impulses.\nGradually, however, aesthetic activity changes in his view from a\npreparation for morality into the ultimate goal of human endeavor. Peaceful\nreconciliation is of more worth than the spirit's hardly gained victory\nin the conflict with the sensibility; fine feeling is more than rational\nvolition; the highest ideal is the beautiful soul, in which inclination not\nmerely obeys the command of duty, but anticipates it.\n\n[Footnote 1: The most important of Schiller's aesthetic essays are those\n_On Grace and Dignity_, 1793; _On Na\u00efve and Sentimental Poetry_, 1795-96;\nand the _Letters on Aesthetic Education_, intermediate between them. Cf.\nKuno Fischer, _Schiller als Philosoph_, 1858, 2d ed. (_Schillerschriften_,\niii., iv.) 1891-92.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nFICHTE.\n\nFichte is a Kantian in about the same sense that Plato was a Socratic.\nInstead of taking up and developing particular critical problems he\nmakes the vivifying kernel, the soul of criticism, his own. With the\nself-activity of reason (as a real force and as a problem) for his\nfundamental idea, he outlines with magnificent boldness a new view of the\nworld, in which the idealism concealed in Kant's philosophy under the\nshell of cautious limitations was roused into vigorous life, and the great\nK\u00f6nigsberger's noble words on the freedom, the position, and the power of\nthe spirit translated from the language of sober foresight into that of\nvigorous enthusiasm. The world can be understood only from the standpoint\nof spirit, the spirit only from the will. The ego is pure activity, and all\nreality its product. Fichte's system is all life and action: its aim is not\nto mediate knowledge, but to summon the hearer and reader to the production\nof a new and pregnant fundamental view, in which the will is as much\na participant as the understanding; it begins not with a concept or a\nproposition, but with a demand for action (posit thyself; do consciously\nwhat thou hast done unconsciously so often as thou hast called thyself I;\nanalyze, then, the act of self-consciousness, and cognize in their elements\nthe forces from which all reality proceeds); its God is not a completed\nabsolute substance, but a self-realizing world-order. This inner vivacity\nof the Fichtean principle, which recalls the pure actuality of Aristotle's\n[Greek: nous] and the ceaseless becoming of Heraclitus, finds its complete\nparallel in the fact that, although he was wanting neither in logical\nconsecutiveness nor in the talent for luminous and popular exposition,\nFichte felt continually driven to express his ideas in new forms, and, just\nwhen he seemed to have succeeded in saying what he meant with the greatest\nclearness, again unsatisfied, to seek still more exact and evident\nrenderings for his fundamental position, which proved so difficult to\nformulate.\n\nThe author of the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was the son of a poor ribbon maker,\nand was born at Rammenau in Lusatia in 1762. The talents of the boy induced\nthe Freiherr von Miltiz to give him the advantage of a good education.\nFichte attended school in Meissen and in Pforta, and was a student of\ntheology at the universities of Jena and Leipsic. While a tutor in Zurich\nhe made the acquaintance of Lavater and Pestalozzi, as well as of his\nfuture wife, Johanna Rahn, a niece of Klopstock. Returning to Leipsic, his\nwhole mode of thought was revolutionized by the Kantian philosophy, in\nwhich it was his duty to instruct a pupil. This gives to the mind, as his\nletters confess, an inconceivable elevation above all earthly things. \"I\nhave adopted a nobler morality, and, instead of occupying myself with\nthings without me, have been occupied more with myself.\" \"I now believe\nwith all my heart in human freedom, and am convinced that only on this\nsupposition duty and virtue of any kind are possible.\" \"I live in a new\nworld since I have read the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Things which\nI believed never could be proved to me, _e.g._, the idea of an absolute\nfreedom and duty, have been proved, and I feel the happier for it. It is\ninconceivable what reverence for humanity, what power this philosophy gives\nus, what a blessing it is for an age in which the citadels of morality\nhad been destroyed, and the idea of duty blotted out from all the\ndictionaries!\" A journey to Warsaw, whither he had been attracted by the\nexpectation of securing a position as a private tutor, soon afforded him\nthe opportunity of visiting at K\u00f6nigsberg the author of the system which\nhad effected so radical a transformation in his convictions. His rapidly\nwritten treatise, _Essay toward a Critique of All Revelation_, attained the\nend to which its inception was due by gaining for its author a favorable\nreception from the honored master. Kant secured for Fichte a tutor's\nposition in Dantzic, and a publisher for his maiden work. When this\nappeared, at Easter, 1792, the name of its author was by oversight omitted\nfrom the title page, together with the preface, which had been furnished\nafter the rest of the book; and as the anonymous work was universally\nascribed to Kant (whose religious philosophy was at this time eagerly\nlooked for), the young writer became famous at a stroke as soon as the\nerror was explained. A second edition was issued as early as the following\nyear.\n\nAfter his marriage in Zurich, where he had completed several political\ntreatises (the address, _Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the\nPrinces of Europe, who have hitherto suppressed it, Heliopolis in the Last\nYear of the Old Darkness_, and the two _Hefte, Contributions toward the\nCorrection of the Public Judgment on the French Revolution_, 1793), Fichte\naccepted, in 1794, a call to Jena, in place of Reinhold, who had gone to\nKiel, and whose popularity was soon exceeded by his own. The same year saw\nthe birth of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. His stay in Jena was embittered by\nconflicts with the clergy, who took offense at his ethical lectures (_On\nthe Vocation of the Scholar_) held on Sunday mornings (though not at an\nhour which interfered with church service), and with the students, who,\nafter they had been untrue to their decision--which they had formed as a\nresult of these lectures--to dissolve their societies or orders, gave vent\nto their spite by repeatedly smashing the windows of Fichte's residence.\nAccordingly he took leave of absence, and spent the summer of 1795 in\nOsmannst\u00e4dt. The years 1796-98, in which, besides the two _Introductions to\nthe Science of Knowledge_, the _Natural Right_ and the _Science of Ethics_\n(one of the most all important works in German philosophical literature)\nappeared, mark the culmination of Fichte's famous labors. The so-called\natheistic controversy[1] resulted in Fichte's departure from Jena. The\n_Philosophisches Journal_, which since 1797 had been edited by Fichte in\nassociation with Niethammer, had published an article by Magister Forberg,\nrector at Saalfeld, entitled \"The Development of the Concept of Religion,\"\nand as a conciliating introduction to this a short essay by Fichte, \"On the\nGround of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World.\"[2] For this\nit was confiscated by the Dresden government on the charge of containing\natheistical matter, while other courts were summoned to take like action.\nIn Weimar hopes were entertained of an amicable adjustment of the matter.\nBut when Fichte, after publishing two vindications[3] couched in vehement\nlanguage, had in a private letter uttered the threat that he would answer\nwith his resignation any censure proceeding from the University Senate, not\nonly was censure for indiscretion actually imposed, but his (threatened)\nresignation accepted.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Karl August Hase, _Jenaisches Fichteb\u00fcchlein_, 1856.]\n\n[Footnote 2: It is a mistake, Fichte writes here, referring to the\nconclusion of Forberg's article (\"Is there a God? It is and remains\nuncertain,\" etc.), to say that it is doubtful whether there is a God or\nnot. That there is a moral order of the world, which assigns to each\nrational individual his determined place and counts on his work, is most\ncertain, nay, it is the ground of all other certitude. The living and\noperative moral order _(ordo ordinans)_ is itself God; we need no other\nGod, and can conceive no other. There is no ground in reason for going\nbeyond this world order to postulate a particular being as its cause.\nWhoever ascribes personality and consciousness to this particular being\nmakes it finite; consciousness belongs only to the individual, limited ego.\nAnd it is allowable to state this frankly and to beat down the prattle of\nthe schools, in order that the true religion of joyous well-doing may lift\nup its head.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Appeal to the Public_, and _Formal Defense against the Charge\nof Atheism_, 1799. The first of these maintains that Fichte's standpoint\nand that of his opponents are related as duty and advantage, sensible and\nsuprasensible, and that the substantial God of his accusers, to be derived\nfrom the sensibility, is, as personified fate, as the distributer of all\nhappiness and unhappiness to finite beings, a miserable fetich.]\n\nGoing to Berlin, Fichte found a friendly government, a numerous public for\nhis lectures, and a stimulating circle of friends in the romanticists, the\nbrothers Schlegel, Tieck, Schleiermacher, etc. In the first years of\nhis Berlin residence there appeared _The Vocation of Man. The Exclusive\nCommercial State_, 1800; _The Sun-clear Report to the Larger Public on the\nEssential Nature of the New Philosophy_, and the _Answer to Reinhold_,\n1801. Three works, which were the outcome of his lectures and were\npublished in the year 1806 _(Characteristics of the Present Age, The Nature\nof the Scholar, Way to the Blessed Life or Doctrine of Religion)_, form a\nconnected whole. In the summer of 1805 Fichte filled a professorship at\nErlangen, and later, after the outbreak of the war, he occupied for a short\ntime a chair at K\u00f6nigsberg, finding a permanent university position at the\nfoundation of the University of Berlin in 1810. His glowing _Addresses to\nthe German Nation_, 1808, which essentially aided in arousing the national\nspirit, have caused his name to live as one of the greatest of orators\nand most ardent of patriots in circles of the German people where his\nphilosophical importance cannot be understood. His death in 1814 was also a\nresult of unselfish labor in the service of the Fatherland. He succumbed to\na nervous fever contracted from his wife, who, with self-sacrifice equal\nto his own, had shared in the care of the wounded, and who had brought the\ncontagion back with her from the hospital. On his monument is inscribed\nthe beautiful text, \"The teachers shall shine as the brightness of the\nfirmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars that\nshine forever and ever.\" Forberg in his journal records this estimate: The\nleading trait in Fichte's character is his absolute integrity. All his\nwords are weighty and important. His principles are stern and little\nmodified by affability. The spirit of his philosophy is proud and\ncourageous, one which does not so much lead as possess us and carry us\nalong. His philosophemes are inquiries in which we see the truth arise\nbefore our eyes, and which just for this reason lay the foundations of\nscience and conviction.\n\nThe philosopher's son, Immanuel Hermann Fichte (his own name was Johann\nGottlieb), wrote a biography of his father (1830; 2d ed., 1862), and\nsupervised the publication of both the _Posthumous Works_ (1834-35, 3\nvols.) and the _Collected Works_ (1845-46, 8 vols.). The simple and\nluminous _Facts of Consciousness_ of 1811, or 1817 (not the lecture of 1813\nwith the same title), is especially valuable as an introduction to the\nsystem. Among the many redactions of the _Wissenschaftslehre_, the\nepoch-making _Foundation of the whole Science of Knowledge_, 1794, with\nthe two _Introductions to the Science of Knowledge_, 1797, takes the first\nrank, while of the practical works the most important are the _Foundation\nof Natural Right according to the Principles of the Science of Knowledge_,\n1796, and the _System of the Science of Ethics according to the Principles\nof the_ _Science of Knowledge_, 1798, and next to these the _Lectures on\nthe Theory of the State_, 1820 (delivered in 1813).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: At the same time as J.H. L\u00f6we's book _Die Philosophie\nFichtes_, 1862, there appeared in celebration of the centenary of Fichte's\nbirthyear, or birthday, a large number of minor essays and addresses by\nFriedrich Harms, A.L. Kym, Trendelenburg, Franz Hoffman, Karl Heyder, F.C.\nLott, Karl K\u00f6stlin, J.B. Meyer, and others (cf. Reichlin-Meldegg in vol.\nxlii. of the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_). Lasson has written, 1863, on\nFichte's relation to Church and state, Zeller on Fichte as a political\nthinker (_Vortr\u00e4ge und Abhandlungen_, 1865), and F. Zimmer on his\nphilosophy of religion. Among foreign works we may note Adamson's _Fichte_,\n1881, and the English translations of several of Fichte's works by Kroeger\n[_Science of Knowledge_, 1868; _Science of Rights_, 1869--both also, 1889]\nand William Smith [_Popular Writings_, 4th ed., 1889; also Everett's\n_Fichte's Science of Knowledge_ (Griggs's Philosophical Classics, 1884),\nand several translations in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_,\nincluding one of _The Facts of Consciousness_.--TR.]]\n\n\n%1. The Science of Knowledge.%\n\n%(a) The Problem.%--In Fichte's judgment Kant did not succeed in carrying\nthrough the transformation in thought which it was his aim to effect,\nbecause the age did not understand the spirit of his philosophy. This\nspirit, and with it the great service of Kant, consists in _transcendental\nidealism_, which by the doctrine that objects conform themselves to\nrepresentations, not representations to objects, draws philosophy away from\nexternal objects and leads it back into ourselves. We have followed the\nletter, he thinks, instead of the spirit of Kant, and because of a few\npassages with a dogmatic ring, whose references to a given matter, the\nthing in itself, and the like, were intended only as preliminary, have\noverlooked the numberless others in which the contrary is distinctly\nmaintained. Thus the interpreters of Kant, using their own prejudices as a\ncriterion, have read into him exactly that which he sought to refute, and\nhave made the destroyer of all dogmatism himself a dogmatist; thus in the\nKantianism of the Kantians there has sprung up a marvelous combination of\ncrude dogmatism and uncompromising idealism. Though such an absurd\nmingling of entirely heterogeneous elements may be excused in the case of\ninterpreters and successors, who have had to construct for themselves the\nguiding principle of the whole from their study of the critical writings,\nyet we cannot assume it in the author of the system, unless we believe the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ the result of the strangest chance, and not the\nwork of intellect. Two men only, Beck, the teacher of the Standpoint, and\nJacobi, the clearest mind of the century, are to be mentioned with respect\nas having risen above the confusion of the time to the perception that Kant\nteaches idealism, that, according to him, the object is not given, but\nmade.\n\nBesides the perspicuity which would have prevented these misunderstandings,\nFichte misses something further in Kant's work. Considered as a system\nKant's expositions were incomplete; and, on his own confession, his aim\nwas not to furnish the science itself, but only the foundation and the\nmaterials for it. Therefore, although the Kantian philosophy is established\nas far as its inner content is concerned, there is still need of earnest\nwork to systematize the fragments and results which he gives into a firmly\nconnected and impregnable whole. The _Wissenschaftslehre_ takes this\ncompletion of idealism for its mission. It cannot solve the problem by a\ncommentary on the Kantian writings, nor by the correction and addition of\nparticulars, but only by restoring the whole at a stroke. He alone finds\nthe truth who new creates it in himself, independently and in his own way.\nThus Fichte's system contains the same view of the matter as the critical\nsystem--the author is aware, runs the preface to the programme, _On the\nConcept of the Science of Knowledge_, 1794, \"that he never will be able to\nsay anything at which Kant has not hinted, immediately or mediately,\nmore or less clearly, before him,\"--but in his procedure he is entirely\nindependent of the Kantian exposition. We shall first raise the question,\nWhat in the Kantian philosophy is in need of completion? and, secondly,\nWhat method must be adopted in completing it?\n\nKant discusses the laws of intelligence when they are already applied to\nobjects, without enlightening us concerning the ground of these laws. He\nderived the pure concepts (the laws of substantiality, of causality, etc.)\nfrom (logic, and thus mediately from) experience instead of deducing\nthem from the nature of intelligence; similarly he never furnished\nthis deduction for the forms of intuition, space and time. In order to\nunderstand that intelligence, and why intelligence, must act in just this\nway (must think just by means of these categories), we must prove, and not\nmerely, with Kant, assert, that these functions or forms are really laws of\nthought--or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are conditions of\nself-consciousness. Again, even if it be granted that Kant has explained\nthe properties and relations of things (that they appear in space and time,\nand that their accidents must be referred to substances), the question\nstill remains unanswered, Whence comes the matter which is taken up into\nthese forms? So long as the whole object is not made to arise before the\neyes of the thinker, dogmatism is not driven out of its last corner. The\nthing in itself is, like the rest, only a thought in the ego. If thus\nthe antithesis between the form and the matter of cognition undergoes\nmodification, so, further, the allied distinction between understanding and\nsensibility must, as Reinhold accurately recognized, be reduced to a common\nprinciple and receptivity be conceived as self-limiting spontaneity. In\nhis practical philosophy also Kant left much unfinished. The categorical\nimperative is susceptible of further deduction, it is not the principle\nitself, but a conclusion from the true principle, from the injunction to\nabsolute _self-dependence on the part of reason_; moreover, the nature of\nour consciousness of the moral law must be more thoroughly discussed, and\nin order to gain a real, instead of a merely formal, ethics the relation of\nthis law to natural impulse. Finally, Kant never discussed the foundation\nof philosophy as a whole, but always separated its theoretical from its\npractical side, and Reinhold also did nothing to remove this dualism. In\nshort, some things that Kant only asserted or presupposed can and must be\nproved, some that he kept distinct must be united. In what way are both to\nbe accomplished?\n\nSince correct inferences from correct premises yield correct results, and\ncorrect inference is easy to secure, everything depends on the correct\npoint of departure. If we neglect this and consider only the process and\nthe results of inference, there are two consistent systems: the dogmatic\nor realistic course of thought, which seeks to derive representations from\nthings; and the idealistic, which, conversely, seeks to derive being from\nthought. Now, no matter how consistently dogmatism may proceed (and when it\ndoes so it becomes, like the system of Spinoza, materialism and fatalism or\ndeterminism, maintaining that all is nature, and all goes on mechanically;\ntreats the spirit as a thing among others, and denies its metaphysical and\nmoral independence, its immateriality and freedom), it may be shown to\nbe false, because it starts from a false principle. Thought can never be\nderived from being, because it is not contained therein; from being only\nbeing can proceed, and never representation. Being, however, can be derived\nfrom thought, for consciousness is also being; nay, it is more than this,\nit is conscious being. And as consciousness contains both being and a\nknowledge of this being, idealism is superior to realism, because idealism\nincludes the latter as a moment in itself, and hence can explain it, though\nit is not explicable by it. Dogmatism makes the mistake of going beyond\nconsciousness or the ego, and working with empty, merely formal concepts. A\nconcept is empty when nothing actual corresponds to it, or no intuition\ncan be subsumed under it (here it is to be noted that, besides sensuous\nintuition, there is an intellectual intuition also; an example is found in\nthe ego as a self-intuiting being). Philosophy, indeed, may abstract and\nmust abstract, must rise above that which is given--for how could she\nexplain life and particular knowledge if she assumed no higher standpoint\nthan her object?--but true abstraction is nothing other than the separation\nof factors which in experience always present themselves together; it\nanalyzes empirical consciousness in order to reconstruct it from its\nelements, it causes empirical consciousness to arise before our eyes, it\nis a pragmatic _history of consciousness_. Such abstraction, undertaken in\norder to a genetic consideration of the ego, does not go beyond experience,\nbut penetrates into the depths of experience, is not transcendent, but\ntranscendental, and, since it remains in close touch with that which is\nintuitable, yields a real philosophy in contrast to all merely formal\nphilosophy.\n\nThese theoretical advantages of idealism are supplemented by momentous\nreasons of a practical kind, which determine the choice between the two\nsystems, besides which none other is possible. The moral law says: Thou\nshalt be self-dependent. If I ought to be so I must be able to be so; but\nif I were matter I would not be able. Thus idealism proves itself to be the\nethical mode of thought, while the opposite mode shows that those who favor\nit have not raised themselves to that independence of all that is external\nwhich is morally enjoined, for in order to be able to know ourselves free\nwe must have made ourselves free.[1] Thus the philosophy which a man\nchooses depends on what sort of a man he is. If, on the other hand, the\ncategorical imperative calls for belief in the reality of the external\nworld and of other minds, this is nothing against idealism. For idealism\ndoes not deny the realism of life, but explains it as a necessary, though\nnot a final, mode of intuition. The dogmatic mode of thought is merely an\nexplanation from the standpoint of common consciousness, and for idealism,\nas the only view which is both scientifically and practically satisfactory,\nthis explanation itself needs explaining. Realism and idealism, like\nnatural impulse and moral will in the sphere of action, are both grounded\nin reason. But idealism is the true standpoint, because it is able to\ncomprehend and explain the opposing theory, while the converse is not the\ncase.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. O. Liebmann (_Ueber den individuellen Beweis f\u00fcr die\nFreiheit des Willens p, 131. 1866)_ \"Here we discover the noteworthy point\nwhere theoretical and practical philosophy actually pass over into each\nother. For this principle results: In order to carry out the individual\nproof for the freedom of the will, I must do my duty.\"]\n\nThe nature, the goal, and the methods of the Science of Knowledge have now\nbeen determined. It is genuine, thoroughgoing idealism, which raises the\nKantian philosophy to the rank of an evident science by deducing its\npremises from a first principle which is immediately certain, and by\nremoving the twofold dualism of intuition and thought, of knowledge and\nvolition, viz., by proving both contraries acts of one and the same ego.\nWhile Reinhold had sought a supreme truth as a fundamental principle of\nunity, without which the doctrine of knowledge would lack the systematic\nform essential to science, while Beck had interpreted the spirit of the\nKantian philosophy in an idealistic sense, and Jacobi had demanded the\nelimination of the thing in itself, all these desires combined are\nfulfilled in Fichte's doctrine, and at the same time the results of the\nCritique of Reason are given that evidence which Aenesidemus-Schulze had\nmissed in them. As an answer to the question, \"How is knowledge brought\nabout?\" (as well the knowledge of common sense as that given in the\nparticular sciences), \"how is experience possible?\", and as a construction\nof common consciousness as this manifests itself in life and in the\nparticular sciences, Fichteanism adopts the name _Science of Knowledge_,\nbeing distinguished from the particular sciences by the fact that they\ndiscuss the voluntary, and it the necessary, representations or actions of\nthe spirit. (The representation of a triangle or a circle is a free one, it\nmay be omitted; the representation of space in general is a necessary one,\nfrom which it is impossible for us to abstract.) How does intelligence\ncome to have sensations, to intuit space and time, and to form just such\ncategories (thing and property, cause and effect, and not others quite\ndifferent)? While Kant correctly described these functions of the intuiting\nand thinking spirit, and showed them actual, they must further be proven,\nbe shown necessary or deduced. Deduced whence? From the \"deed-acts\"\n(_Thathandlungen_) of the ego which lie at the basis of all consciousness,\nand the highest of which are formulated in three principles.\n\n%(b) The Three Principles.%--At the portal of the Science of Knowledge we\nare met not by an assertion, but by a summons--a summons to\nself-contemplation. Think anything whatever and observe what thou dost,\nand of necessity must do, in thinking. Thou wilt discover that thou dost\nnever think an object without thinking thyself therewith, that it is\nabsolutely impossible for thee to abstract from thine ego. And second,\nconsider what thou dost when thou dost think thine \"ego.\" This means\nto affirm or posit one's self, to be a subject-object. The nature of\nself-consciousness is the identity of the representing [subject] and\nthe represented [object]. The pure ego is not a fact, but an original\ndoing, the act of being for self (_F\u00fcrsichsein_), and the (philosophical,\nor--as seems to be the case according to some passages--even the common)\nconsciousness of this doing an intellectual intuition; through this we\nbecome conscious of the deed-act which is ever (though unconsciously)\nperforming. This is the meaning of the first of the principles: \"The _ego_\nposits originally and absolutely its own being,\" or, more briefly: The ego\nposits itself; more briefly still: I am. The nature of the ego consists in\npositing itself as existing.[1] Since, besides this self-cogitation of\nthe ego, an op-position is found among the facts of empirical\nconsciousness (think only of the principle of contradiction), and yet,\nbesides the ego, there is nothing which could be opposed, we must assume\nas a second principle: To the ego there is absolutely opposited\na _non-ego_. These two principles must be united, and this can be\naccomplished only by positing the contraries (ego and non-ego), since they\nare both in the ego, as reciprocally limiting or partially sublating\none another, that is, each as _divisible_ (capable of quantitative\ndetermination). Accordingly the third principle runs: \"The ego opposes in\nthe ego a divisible non-ego to the divisible ego.\" From these principles\nFichte deduces the three laws of thought, identity, contradiction, and\nsufficient reason, and the three categories of quality--reality, negation,\nand limitation or determination. Instead of following him in these labors,\nwe may emphasize the significance of his view of the ego as pure activity\nwithout an underlying substratum, with which he carries dynamism over from\nthe Kantian philosophy of nature to metaphysics. We must not conceive the\nego as something which must exist before it can put forth its activities.\nDoing is not a property or consequence of being, but being is an accident\nand effect of doing. All substantiality is derivative, activity is primal;\n_being arises from doing_. The ego is nothing more than self-position; it\nexists not only for itself (_f\u00fcr sich_), but also through itself (_durch\nsich_).\n\n[Footnote 1: The ego spoken of in the first of the principles, the ego as\nthe object of intellectual intuition and as the ground and creator of all\nbeing, is, as the second _Introduction to the Science of Knowledge_ clearly\nannounces, not the individual, but the I-ness _(Ichheit)_ (which is to be\npresupposed as the prius of the manifold of representation, and which is\nexalted above the opposition of subject and object), mentality in general,\neternal reason, which is common to all and the same in all, which is\npresent in all thinking and at the basis thereof, and to which particular\npersons stand related merely as accidents, as instruments, as special\nexpressions, destined more and more to lose themselves in the universal\nform of reason. But, further still, a distinction must be made between the\nabsolute ego as intuition (as the form of I-ness), from which the Science\nof Knowledge starts, and the ego as Idea (as the supreme goal of practical\nendeavor) with which it ends. In neither is the ego conceived as\nindividual; in the former the I-ness is not yet determined to the point of\nindividuality, in the latter individuality has disappeared, Fichte is right\nwhen he thinks it remarkable that \"a system whose beginning and end and\nwhole nature is aimed at forgetfulness of individuality in the theoretical\nsphere and denial of it in the practical sphere\" should be \"called egoism.\"\nAnd yet not only opponents, but even adherents of Fichte, as is shown by\n_Friedrich Schlegel's_ philosophy of genius, have, by confusing the pure\nand the empirical ego, been guilty of the mistake thus censured. On the\nphilosophy of the romanticists cf. Erdmann's _History_, vol. ii. \u00a7\u00a7 314,\n315; Zeller, p. 562 _seq_.; and R. Haym, _Die Romantische Schule_, 1870.]\n\nThe actions expressed in the three principles are never found pure in\nexperience, nor do they represent isolated acts of the ego. Intelligence\ncan think nothing without thinking itself therewith; it is equally\nimpossible for it to think \"I am\" without at the same time thinking\nsomething else which is not itself; subject and object are inseparable.\nIt is rather true that the acts of position described are one single,\nall-inclusive act, which forms only the first member in a connected system\nof pre-conscious actions, through which consciousness is produced, and the\ncomplete investigation of whose members constitutes the further business of\nthe Science of Knowledge as a theory of the nature of reason. In this the\nScience of Knowledge employs a method which, by its rhythm of analysis and\nsynthesis, development and reconciliation of opposites, became the model of\nHegel's dialectic method. The synthesis described in the third principle,\nalthough it balances thesis and antithesis and unites them in itself, still\ncontains contrary elements, in order to whose combination a new synthesis\nmust be sought. In this, in turn, the analytic discovery and the synthetic\nadjustment of a contrariety is repeated, etc., etc. The original synthesis,\nmoreover, prescribes a division of the inquiry into two parts, one\ntheoretical and the other practical. For it contains the following\nprinciples: The ego posits itself as limited by the non-ego--it functions\ncognitively; and: The ego posits itself as determining the non-ego--it\nfunctions volitionally and actively.\n\n%(c) The Theoretical Ego.%--In positing itself as determined by the\nnon-ego, the ego is at once passive (affected by something other than\nitself) and active (it posits its own limitation). This is possible only as\nit posits reality in itself only in part, and transfers to the non-ego so\nmuch as it does not posit in itself. Passivity is diminished activity,\nnegation of the totality of reality. From reflection on this relation\nbetween ego and non-ego spring the categories of reciprocal determination,\nof causality (the non-ego as the cause of the passion of the ego), and\nsubstantiality (this passion merely the self-limitation of the ego).\nThe conflict between the causality of the non-ego (by which the ego is\naffected) and the substantiality of the ego (in which and the activity of\nwhich all reality is contained) is resolved only by the assumption of two\nactivities (or, rather, of two opposite directions of one activity) in the\nego, one of which (centrifugal, expansive) strives infinitely outward while\nthe other (centripetal or contractile) sets a bound to the former, and\ndrives the ego back into itself, whereupon another excursus follows, and a\nnew limitation and return, etc. With every repetition of this double act\nof production and reflection a special class of representations arises.\nThrough the first limitation of the in itself unlimited activity\n\"sensation\" arises (as a product of the \"productive imagination\"). Because\nthe ego produces this unconsciously, it appears to be given, brought about\nby influence from without. The second stage, \"intuition,\" is reached when\nthe ego reflects on sensation, when it opposes to itself something foreign\nwhich limits it. Thirdly, by reflection on intuition an \"image\" of that\nwhich is intuited is constructed, and, as such, distinguished from a real\nthing to which the image corresponds; at this point the categories and the\nforms of intuition, space and time, appear, which thus arise along with\nthe object.[1] The fourth stadium is \"understanding,\" which steadies the\nfluctuating intuition into a concept, realizes the object, and looks upon\nit as the cause of the intuition. Fifthly, \"judgment\" makes its appearance\nas the faculty of free reflection and abstraction, or the power to consider\na definite content or to abstract from it. As judgment is itself the\ncondition of the bound reflection of the understanding, so it points in\nturn to its condition, to the sixth and highest stage of intelligence,\n\"reason,\" by means of which we are able to abstract from all objects\nwhatever, while reason itself, pure self-consciousness, is that from\nwhich abstraction is never possible. It is only in the highest stage that\nconsciousness or a representation of representation takes place. And at the\nculmination of the theoretical ego the point of transition to the practical\nego appears. Here the ego becomes aware that in positing itself as\ndetermined by the non-ego it has only limited itself, and therefore is\nitself the ground of the whole content of consciousness; here it apprehends\nitself as determining the non-ego or as acting, and recognizes as its chief\nmission to impress the form of the ego as far as possible on the non-ego,\nand ever to extend the boundary further.\n\n[Footnote 1: The object is a product of the ego only for the observer, not\nfor the observed ego itself, to which, from this standpoint of imagination,\nit appears rather as a thing in itself independent of the ego and affecting\nit. Further, it must so appear, because the ego, in its after reflection\non its productive activity, and just by this reflection, transforms the\nproductive action considered into a fixed and independent product found\nexisting.]\n\nThe \"deduction of representation\" whose outline has just been given was the\nfirst example (often imitated in the school of Schelling and Hegel) of a\n_constructive psychology_, which, from the mission or the concept of the\nsoul--in this case from the nature of self-consciousness--deduces the\nvarious psychical functions as a system of actions, each of which is in\nits place implied by the rest, as it in turn presupposes them. This is\ndistinguished from the sensationalistic psychology, which is also genetic\n(cf. pp. 245-250), as well as from the mechanical or associational\npsychology, which likewise excludes the idea of an isolated coexistence of\nmental faculties, by the fact that it demands a new manifestation of the\nsoul-ground in order to the ascent from one member of the series to\nthe next higher. It is also distinguished from sensationalism by its\nteleological point of view. For no matter how much Fichte, too, may speak\nof the mechanism of consciousness, it is plain to the reader of the\ntheoretical part of his system not only that he makes this mechanism work\nin the service of an end, but also that he finds its origin in purposive\nactivity of the ego; while the practical part gives further and decisive\nconfirmation of the fact. The danger and the defect of such a constructive\ntreatment of psychology--as we may at once remark for all later\nattempts--lies in imagining that the task of mental science has been\naccomplished and all its problems solved when each particular activity of\nthe ego has been assigned its mission and work for the whole, and its place\nin the system, without any indication of the means through which this\ndestination can be fulfilled.\n\n%(d) The Practical Ego.%--The deduction of representation has shown\nhow (through what unconscious acts of the ego) the different stages of\ncognition, the three sensuous and the three intellectual functions of\nrepresentation, come into being. It has proved incapable, however, of\ngiving any account of the way in which the ego comes at one point to arrest\nits activity, which tends infinitely outward, and to turn it back upon\nitself. We know, indeed, that this first limitation, through which\nsensation arises, and on which as a basis the understanding, by continued\nreflection constructs the objective world, was necessary in order that\nconsciousness and knowledge might arise. If the ego did not limit its\ninfinite activity neither representation nor an objective world\nwould exist. But why, then, are there such things as consciousness,\nrepresentation, and a world? From the standpoint of the theoretical ego\nthis problem, \"Whence the original non-ego or opposition (_Anstoss_),\nwhich impels the ego back upon itself?\" cannot be solved, since it is\nonly through the opposition that it itself arises. The \"deduction of the\nopposition,\" which the theoretical part of the Science of Knowledge did\nnot furnish, is to be looked for from the practical part. The primacy of\npractical reason, already emphasized by Kant, gives us the answer: _The\nego_ limits itself and _is theoretical, in order to be practical_. The\nwhole machinery of representation and the represented world exists only to\nfurnish us the possibility of fulfilling our duty. We are intelligence in\norder that we may be able to be will.\n\nAction, action--that is the end of our existence. Action is giving form to\nmatter, it is the alteration or elaboration of an object, the conquest of\nan impediment, of a limitation. We cannot act unless we have something\nin, on, and against which to act. The world of sensation and intuition is\nnothing but a means for attaining our ethical destiny, it is \"the material\nof our duty under the form of sense.\" The theoretical ego posits an\nobject (_Gegenstand_) that the practical ego may experience resistance\n(_Widerstand_). No action is possible without a world as the object of\naction; no world is possible without a consciousness which represents it;\nno consciousness possible without reflection of the ego on itself; no\nreflection without limitation, without an opposition or non-ego. The\n_Anstoss_ is deduced. The ego posits a limit (is theoretical) in order (as\npractical) to overcome it. Our duty is the only _per se (Ansich)_ of\nthe phenomenal world, the only truly real element in it: \"Things are in\nthemselves that which we ought to make of them.\" Objectivity exists only to\nbe more and more sublated, that is, to be so worked up that the activity\nof the ego may in it become evident.--The same ground of explanation which\nreveals the necessity of an external nature enables us to understand why\nthe one infinite ego (the universal life or the Deity, as Fichte puts it in\nhis later works) divides into the many empirical egos or individuals, why\nit does not carry out its plan immediately, but through finite spirits as\nits organs. Action is possible only under the form of the individual, only\nin individuals are consciousness and morality possible. Without resistance,\nno action; without conflict, no morality. Individuality, it is true, is to\nbe overcome and destroyed in moral endeavor; but in order to this it must\nhave existed. Virtue is a conquest over external _and internal_ nature.\n\nA gradation of practical functions corresponding to the series of\ntheoretical activities leads from feeling and striving (longing and\ndesire) through the system of impulses (the impulse to representation or\nreflection, to production, to satisfaction) up to moral will or the impulse\nto harmony with self, which stands opposed to the natural impulses as the\ncategorical imperative. The practical ego mediates between the theoretical\nand the absolute ego. The ego ought to be infinite and self-dependent, but\nfinds itself finite and dependent on a non-ego--a contradiction which is\nresolved by the ego becoming practical, by the fact that in ever increasing\nmeasure it subdues nature to itself, and by such increasing extension\nof the boundary draws nearer and ever nearer to the realization of its\ndestination, to become absolute ego.\n\n\n%2. The Science of Ethics and of Right.%\n\nThe moral law demands the control of the sensuous impulse by the pure\nimpulse. If the former aims at comfortable ease and enjoyment, the\nlatter is directed toward satisfaction with one's self, to endeavor and\nself-dependence. (Enjoyment is inevitable, it is true, as satisfaction\nwhere any impulse whatever is carried out; only it must not form the end\nof action.) Morality is activity for its own sake, the radical evil--from\nwhich only a miracle can deliver us, but a miracle which we must ourselves\nperform--is inertness, lack of will to rise above the natural\ndeterminateness of the impulse of self-preservation to the clear\nconsciousness of duty and of freedom. For the moral man there is no\nresting; each end attained becomes for him the impulse to renewed endeavor,\neach task fulfilled leads him to a fresh one. Become self-dependent, act\nautonomously, make thyself free; let every action have a place in a series,\nin the continuation of which the ego must become independent. To this\nformal and universal norm, again, there is added a special injunction for\neach individual. Each individual spirit has its definite mission assigned\nto it by the world-order: each ought to do that which it alone should and\ncan do. Always fulfill thy moral vocation, thy special destination.[1] Or\nboth in popular combination: Never act contrary to conscience.\n\n[Footnote 1: Although Fichte was justly charged with surpassing even the\nabstractness of the Kantian ethics with his bald moral principle, the\nself-dependence of the ego, he deserves praise for having given ethics a\nconcrete content of indisputable soundness and utility by his introduction\nof Jacobi's idea of purified individuality.]\n\nThe elevation to freedom is accomplished gradually. At first freedom\nconsists only in the consciousness of the natural impulse, then follows\na breaking away from this by means of maxims, which in the beginning\nare maxims of individual happiness. Later on a blind enthusiasm for\nself-dependence arises and produces an heroic spirit, which would rather be\ngenerous than just, which bestows sympathy more readily than respect; true\nmorality, however, does not arise until, with constant attention to the law\nand continued watchfulness of self, duty is done for its own sake. No man\nis for a moment secure of his morality without continued endeavor. In order\nto deliverance from the original sin of inertness and its train, cowardice\nand falsity, men stand in need of examples, such as have been given them in\nthe founders of religions, to construe for them the riddle of freedom. The\nnecessary enlightenment concerning moral conviction is given by the Church,\nwhose symbols are not to be looked upon as dogmatic propositions, but only\nas means for the proclamation of the eternal verities, and which, like the\nstate (for both are institutions based on necessity), has for its object to\nmake itself unnecessary as time goes on.\n\nThe system of duties distinguishes four classes of duties on the basis\nof the twofold opposition of universal (non-transferable) and particular\n(transferable) duties, and of unconditional duties (directed to the whole)\nand conditional duties (directed toward self). These four classes are the\nduties of self-preservation, of class, of non-interference with others,\nand of vocation. The lower calling includes the producers, artisans, and\ntradesmen, whose action terminates directly on nature; and the higher,\nthe scholars, teachers of the people or clergy, artists, and government\nofficials, who work directly on the community of rational beings. Fichte's\nthoughtful and sympathetically written discussion of marriage is in\npleasant contrast to the bald, purely legal view of this relation adopted\nby Kant.\n\n_Natural right_ is for Fichte, as for Kant, whose theory of right,\nmoreover, appeared later than Fichte's, entirely independent of ethics,\nand distinguished from the latter by its exclusive reference to external\nconduct instead of to the disposition and the will. The rule of right gains\nfrom the moral law, it is true, new sanction for conscience, but cannot be\nderived from the law.--The concept of right is to be deduced as a necessary\nact of the ego, _i.e._, to be shown a condition of self-consciousness. The\nego must posit itself as an individual, and can accomplish this only by\npositing itself in a relation of right to other finite rational beings;\nwithout a thou, no I. A finite rational being cannot posit itself without\nascribing to itself a free activity in an external sense-world; and it\ncannot effect this latter unless (1) it ascribes free activity to other\nbeings as well, hence not without assuming other finite rational beings\noutside itself, and positing itself as standing in _the relation of right_\nto them; and unless (2) it ascribes to itself a material body and posits\nthis as standing under the influence of a person outside it. But, further,\nFichte considers it possible to deduce the particular constitution both of\nthe external world and of the human body (as the sphere of all free actions\npossible to the person). In the former there must be present a tough,\ndurable matter capable of resistance, and light and air in order to the\npossibility of intercourse between spirits; while the latter must be an\norganized, articulated nature-product, furnished with senses, capable of\ninfinite determination, and adapted to all conceivable motions.\n\nIf a community of free beings, such as has been shown the condition of\nindividual self-consciousness, is to be possible, the following must hold\nas the law of right: So limit thy freedom that others may be free along\nwith thee. This law is conditioned on the lawful behavior of others. Where\nthis is lacking, where my fellow does not recognize and treat me as a free,\nrational being, the right of coercion comes in; coercion, however, is not\nto be exercised by the individual himself--since then there would be no\nguaranty either for its successful exercise or for the non-violation of the\nlegal limit--but devolves upon the state. The state takes its origin in\nthe common will of all to unite for the safeguarding of their rights, and\ndetermines by positive laws (intermediate between the law of right and\nlegal judgments) what shall be considered rights. Thus there result three\nsubjects for natural right: original rights or the sum of that which\npertains to freedom or personality (inviolability of the body and of\nproperty), the right of coercion, and political right. The aim of\npunishment is the reform of the evil doer and the deterrence of others.\nFichte is in agreement with Kant concerning the principle of popular\nsovereignty (Rousseau) and the exercise of the political power through\nrepresentatives; but not so concerning the guaranties against the violation\nof the fundamental law of the state. Instead of the division of powers\nrecommended by Kant he demands supervision of the rulers of the state by\nephors, who, themselves without any legislative or executive authority,\nshall suspend the rulers in case they violate the law, and call them to\naccount before the community. Every constitution in which the rulers\nare not responsible is despotic. Fichte did not continue loyal to this\nprinciple, that the state is merely a legal institution. He not only\ndemands a state organization of labor by which everyone shall be placed in\na position to live from his work, in the _Natural Right_ and the _Exclusive\nCommercial State_, but, in his posthumous _Theory of Right_, 1812, he makes\nit the chief duty of the state to lead men, by the moral and intellectual\ntraining of the people, to do from insight what they have hitherto done\nfrom traditional belief. Through the education of the people the empirical\nstate is gradually to transform itself into the rational state.\n\n\n%3. Fichte's Second Period: his View of History and his Theory of\nReligion.%\n\nFichte's transfer to Berlin brought him into more intimate contact with\nthe world, and along with new experiences and new emotions gave him new\nproblems. While a vigorously developing religious sentiment turned his\nspeculation to the relation of the individual ego to the primal source of\nspiritual life, empirical reality also acquired greater significance for\nhim, and the intellectual, moral, and political situation of the time\nespecially attracted his attention. The last required philosophical\ninterpretation, demanded at once inquiry into its historical conditions and\na consideration of the means by which the glaring contradiction between\nthe condition of the nation at the time and the ideals of reason could be\ndiminished. The _Addresses to the German Nation_ outlined a plan for a\nmoral reformation of the world, to start with the education of the German\npeople;[1] while the _Characteristics of the Present Age_, which had\npreceded the _Addresses_, defined the place of the age in the general\ndevelopment of humanity. The scheme of historical periods given in\nthe _Characteristics_ and similarly in the _Theory of the State_\n(innocence--sin--supremacy of reason, with intermediate stages between each\ntwo) is interesting as a forerunner of Hegel's undertaking.\n\n[Footnote 1: \"Among all nations you are the one in whom the germ of human\nperfection is most decidedly present.\" The spiritual regeneration of\nmankind must proceed from the German people, for they are the one original\nor primitive people of the new age, the only one which has preserved its\nliving language--French is a dead tongue--and has raised itself to true\ncreative poetry and free science. The ground of distinction between\nGermanism and the foreign spirit lies in the question, whether we believe\nin an original element in man, in the freedom, infinite perfectibility, and\neternal progress of our race, or put no faith in all these.]\n\nHistory is produced through the interaction of the two principles, faith\nand understanding, which are related to each other as law and freedom, and\nstrives toward a condition in which these two shall be so reconciled that\nfaith shall have entirely passed over into the form of understanding, shall\nhave been transformed into insight, and understanding shall have taken up\nthe content of faith into itself. History begins with the coming together\nof two original and primitive races, one of order or faith, and one of\nfreedom or understanding, neither of which would attain to an historical\ndevelopment apart from the other. From the legal race the free race learns\nrespect for the law, as in turn it arouses in the former the impulse toward\nfreedom. The course of history divides into five periods. In the state\nof \"innocence\" or of rational instinct that which is rational is done\nunconsciously, out of natural impulse; in the state of \"commencing sin\" the\ninstinct for the good changes into an external compulsory authority,\nthe law of reason appears as a ruling power from without, which can be\ndisobeyed as well as obeyed. We ourselves live in the period of \"completed\nsinfulness,\" of absolute license and indifference to all truth, of\nunlimited caprice and selfishness. But however far removed from the moral\nideal this age appears, in which the individual, freed from all restraints,\nheeds naught except his egoistic desire, and in his care for his own\nwelfare forgets to labor for the universal, yet this ultimate goal, this\ndoing from free insight that which in the beginning was done out of blind\nfaith, cannot be attained unless authority shall have first been shaken off\nand the individual become self-dependent. A few signs already betoken\nthe dawn of the fourth era, that of rational science or of \"commencing\njustification,\" in which truth shall be acknowledged supreme, and the\nindividual ego, at least as cognitive, shall submit itself to the generic\nreason. Finally, with the era of rational art, or the state of \"completed\njustification and sanctification,\" wherein the will of the individual shall\nentirely merge in life for the race, the end of the life of humanity\non earth--the free determination of all its relations according to\nreason--will be fulfilled.\n\nIn the Jena period the religious life of the ego simply coincided for\nFichte with its practical life; piety coincided with moral conduct; the\nDeity with the absolute ego, with the moral law, with the moral order of\nthe world. A change subsequently took place in his views on this point.\nHe experienced feelings which, at least in quality, were distinct from\nreadiness for moral action, no matter how intimately they are intertwined\nwith this, and no matter how little they can actually be separated from\nit; _religion_ is possible neither without a metaphysical belief in a\nsuprasensible world, nor without obedience to the moral law, yet in itself\nit is not that belief nor this action, but the inner spirit which pervades\nand animates all our thought and action--it is life, love, blessedness. And\nas quiet blessedness is here distinguished from ceaseless action, so for\nour thinker the inactive Deity, the self-identical life of the absolute,\nseparates from the active universal reason, which in its individual organs\nadvances from task to task. The earlier undivided and unique principle, the\nabsolute ego, divides into the _Ichheit_ (moral law, world-order), and an\nabsolute as the ground thereof. \"The spirit (the ego, or, as Fichte now\nprefers to say, knowledge) an image of God, the world an image of the\nspirit.\" The active order of the world (the moral law which realizes\nitself in individuals) the immediate, and objective reality the mediate,\nrevelation of the absolute!\n\nDoes this view of religion, which Fichte incorporates also in the later\nexpositions of the Science of Knowledge, indicate an abandonment and denial\nof the earlier standpoint? The philosophy of Fichte's second period is a\nnew system--so judge the majority of the historians of philosophy. It is\nnot a transformation, but a completion of the earlier system; the doctrine\npromulgated in Berlin continues to be idealistic, as that advanced in Jena\nhad itself been pantheistic--this is the opinion of Fortlage and Harms,\nin agreement with the philosopher himself and with his son. Kuno Fischer,\nalso, who shows a constant advance in the development of Fichteanism, a\ngradual transition \"without a break,\" may be counted among the minority who\nhold that throughout his life Fichte taught but one system. We believe it\nour duty to adhere to this latter view. The Science of Knowledge (the world\na product of the ego) enters as it is into the later form of the Fichtean\nphilosophy; the latter gives up none of the fundamental positions of the\nformer, but only adds to it a culmination, by which the appearance of\nthe building is altered, it is true, but not the edifice itself. In the\ndiscussion of the question the following three have been emphasized as\nthe most important points of distinction between the two periods: In the\nearlier system God is made equivalent to the absolute ego and the moral\norder of the world, in the later he is separated from these and removed\nbeyond them; in the former the nature of God is described as activity,\nin the latter, as being; in the one, action is designated as the highest\nmission of man, in the other, blessed devotion to God. All three variations\nof the later doctrine from the earlier may be admitted without giving up\nthe position that the former is only an extension of the latter and not\nan essential modification of it (_i.e._, in its teachings concerning the\nrelation of the ego and the world). Fichte experienced religious feelings\nthe philosophical outcome of which he worked into his system. He now knows\na first thing (the Deity as distinct from the absolute ego) and a last\nthing (the inwardness of religious devotion to the world-ground), which he\nhad before not overlooked, much less denied, but combined in one with the\nsecond (the absolute ego or the moral order of the world) and the one\nbefore the last (moral action). It is incorrect to say that, in his later\ndoctrine, Fichte substituted the inactive absolute in place of the active\nabsolute ego, and the quiet blessedness of contemplation in place of\nceaseless action. Not in place of these, but beyond them, while all\nelse remains as it was. The categorical imperative, the absolute ego or\nknowledge is no longer God himself, but the first manifestation of God,\nthough a necessary revelation of him. Religion had previously been included\nfor Fichte in moral action; now fellowship with God goes beyond this,\nthough morality remains its indispensable condition and inseparable\ncompanion. Finally, how to construe the previously avoided predicate,\nbeing, in relation to the Deity, is shown by the no less frequent\ndesignation of the absolute as the \"Universal Life.\" The expression being,\nwhich it must be confessed is ambiguous, here signifies in our opinion only\nthe quiet, self-identical activity of the absolute, in opposition to the\nunresting, changeful activity of the world-order and its finite organs, not\nthat inert and dead being posited by the ego, the ascription of which to\nthe Deity Fichte had forbidden in his essay which had been charged with\natheism, not to speak of the existence-mode of a particular self-conscious\nand personal being. Instead of speaking of a conversion of Fichte to\nthe position of his opponents, we might rather venture the paradoxical\nassertion, that, when he characterizes the absolute as the only true being,\nhe intends to produce the same view in the mind of the reader as in his\nearlier years, when he expressed himself against the application of the\nconcepts existence, substance, and conscious personality to God, on the\nground that they are categories of sense. The chief thing, at least,\nremains unaltered: the opposition to a view of religion which transforms\nthe sublime and sacred teaching of Christianity \"into an enervating\ndoctrine of happiness.\"\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nSCHELLING.\n\nFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph (von) Schelling was born January 27, 1775, at\nLeonberg (in W\u00fcrtemberg), and died August 20, 1854, at the baths of Ragatz\n(in Switzerland). In 1790-95 he attended the seminary at T\u00fcbingen, in\ncompany with H\u00f6lderlin and Hegel, who were five years older than himself;\nat seventeen he published a dissertation on the Fall of Man, and a\nyear later an essay on Religious Myths; and was called in 1798 from\nLeipsic--where, after several treatises[1] in explanation of the Science\nof Knowledge, he had issued, in 1797, the _Ideas for a Philosophy of\nNature_--to Jena. In the latter place he became acquainted with his future\nwife, Caroline,[2] _n\u00e9e_ Micha\u00eblis (1763-1809), widow of B\u00f6hmer and at this\ntime the brilliant wife of August Wilhelm Schlegel. From 1803 to 1806 he\nserved as professor in W\u00fcrzburg; then followed two residences of fourteen\nyears each in Munich, separated by seven years in Erlangen: 1806-20 as\nMember of the Academy of Sciences and General Secretary of the Academy of\nthe Plastic Arts (he received this latter position after delivering on the\nking's birthday his celebrated address on \"The Relation of the Plastic\nArts to Nature,\" 1807); and 1827-41 as professor in the newly established\nuniversity, and President of the Academy of Sciences. In 1812 Schelling\nmarried his second wife, Pauline Gotter. Besides various journals[3] and\nthe works to be noticed later, two polemic treatises should be mentioned,\nthe _Exposition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the\nImproved Doctrine of Fichte_, 1806, in which his former friend is charged\nwith plagiarism, and the _Memorial of the Treatise on Divine Things by Herr\nJacobi_, 1812, which answers a bitter attack of Jacobi still more bitterly.\nFrom this on our philosopher, once so fond of writing, becomes silent.[4]\nThe often promised issue of the positive philosophy, which had already been\ntwice commenced in print (_The Ages of the World_, 1815; _Mythological\nLectures_, 1830), was both times suspended. Being called to the Berlin\nAcademy by Frederick William IV., in order to counterbalance the prevailing\nHegelianism, Schelling delivered lectures in the university also (on\nMythology and Revelation), which he ceased, however, when notes taken by\nhis hearers were printed without his consent.[5] His collected works were\npublished in fourteen volumes (1856-61) under the care of his son, K.E.A.\nSchelling.[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: _On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General_, _On\nthe Ego as Principle of Philosophy_, both in 1795; _Letters on Dogmatism\nand Criticism_, 1796; _Essays in Explanation of the Science of Knowledge_,\n1797.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Karoline_, Letters, edited by G. Waitz, 1871.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Kritisches Journal der Philosophie_ (with Hegel), 1802;\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr spekulative Physik_, 1800 (continued as _Neue Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr spekulative Physik_); _Jahrb\u00fccher der Medizin als Wissenschaft_ (with\nMarcus), 1806-08; _Allgemeine Zeitschrift von Deutschen f\u00fcr Deutsche_,\n1813.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Besides a supplement to _Die Weltalter_ and his inaugural\nlecture at Berlin, he published only two prefaces, one to _Viktor Cousin\n\u00fcber franz\u00f6sische und deutsche Philosophie_, done into German by Hubert\nBeckers, 1834, and one to Steffens's _Nachgelassene Schriften_, 1846.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Paulus, _Die end\u00fcch offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie\nder Offenbarung_, 1843. Frauenst\u00e4dt had previously published a sketch from\nthis later doctrine, 1842.]\n\n[Footnote 6: On Schelling cf. the Lectures by K. Rosenkranz, 1843; the\narticles by Heyder in vol. xiii. of Herzog's _Realencyclop\u00e4die f\u00fcr\nprotestantische Theologie_, 1860, and Jodl in the _Allgemeine deutsche\nBiographie_; R. Haym, _Die romantische Schule_, 1870; _Aus Schellings\nLeben, in Briefen_, edited by Plitt, 3 vols., 1869-70. [Cf. also Watson's\n_Schelling's Transcendental Idealism_ (Griggs's Philosophical Classics,\n1882); and several translations from Schelling in the _Journal of\nSpeculative Philosophy_.--TR.]]\n\nThe leading motive in Schelling's thinking is an unusually powerful fancy,\nwhich gives to his philosophy a lively, stimulating, and attractive\ncharacter, without making it to a like degree logically satisfactory. If\nthe systems of Fichte and Hegel, which in their content are closely related\nto Schelling's, impress us by their logical severity, Schelling chains us\nby his lively intuition and his suggestive power of feeling his way into\nthe inner nature of things. With him analogies outweigh reasons; he is\nmore concerned about the rich content of concepts than about their sharp\ndefinition; and in the endeavor to show the unity of the universe, both in\nthe great and in the little, especially to show the unity of nature and\nspirit, he dwells longer on the relationship of objects than on their\nantitheses, which he is glad to reduce to mere quantitative and temporary\ndifferences. He adds to this an astonishing mobility of thought, in virtue\nof which every offered suggestion is at once seized and worked into his own\nsystem, though in this the previous standpoint is unconsciously exchanged\nfor a somewhat altered one. Schelling's philosophy is, therefore, in a\ncontinual state of flux, nearly every work shows it in a new form, and it\nis always ideas from without whose incorporation has caused the transition.\nBesides Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, who were already familiar to Schelling\nas a pupil at T\u00fcbingen, it was first Herder, then Spinoza and Bruno, who\nexerted a transforming influence on his system, to be followed later by\nNeoplatonism and B\u00f6hme's mysticism, and, finally, by Aristotle and\nthe Gnostics, not to speak of his intercourse with his contemporaries\nKielmeyer, Steffens, Baader, Eschenmayer, and others. Omitting his early\nadherence to Fichte, at least three periods must be distinguished\nin Schelling's thinking. The first period (1797-1800) includes the\nepoch-making feat of his youth, the _philosophy of nature_, and, as an\nequally legitimate second part of his system, the philosophy of spirit or\n_transcendental philosophy_. The latter is a supplementary recasting of\nFichte's Science of Knowledge, while in the former Schelling follows Kant\nand Herder. The second period, from 1801, adds to these two co-ordinate\nparts, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, and as a\nfundamental discipline, a science of the absolute, the _philosophy of\nidentity_, which may be characterized as Spinozism revived on a Fichtean\nbasis. Besides the example of Spinoza, Giordano Bruno had most influence on\nthis form of Schelling's philosophy. With the year 1809, after the signs of\na new phase had become perceptible from 1804 on, his system enters on its\nthird, the theosophical, period, the period of the _positive philosophy_,\nin which we shall distinguish a mystical and a scholastic stage. The former\nis represented by the doctrine of freedom inspired by Jacob B\u00f6hme; the\nlatter, by the philosophy of mythology and revelation, which goes back to\nAristotle and the Gnostics. In the first period the absolute for Schelling\nis creative nature; in the second, the identity of opposites; in the third\nit is an antemundane process which advances from the not-yet-present of\nthe contraries to their overcoming. In neither of these advances is it\nSchelling's intention to break with his previous teachings, but in each\ncase only to add a supplement. That which has hitherto been the whole is\nretained as a part. The philosophy of nature takes its place beside the\ncompleted Fichtean transcendental philosophy, with equal rights, though\nwith a reversed procedure; then the theory of identity assumes a place\nabove both; finally, a positive (existential) philosophy is added to the\nprevious negative (rational) philosophy.\n\n\n%1a. Philosophy of Nature.%\n\nSchelling agrees with Fichte that philosophy is transcendental science,\nthe doctrine of the conditions of consciousness, and has to answer the\nquestion, What must take place in order that knowledge may arise? They\nagree, further, that these conditions of knowledge are necessary acts,\noutgoings of an active original ground which is not yet conscious self, but\nseeks to become such, and that the material world is the product of these\nactions. Nature exists in order that the ego may develop. But while Fichte\ncorrectly understood the purpose of nature, to help intelligence into\nbeing, he failed to recognize the dignity of nature, for he deprived it of\nall self-dependence, all life of its own, all generative power, and treated\nit merely as a dead tool, as a passive, merely posited non-ego. Nature\nis not a board which the original ego nails up before itself in order,\nstriking against it, to be driven back upon itself, to be compelled to\nreflection, and thereby to become theoretical ego; in order, further,\nworking over the non-ego, and transforming it, to exercise its practical\nactivity: but it is a ladder on which spirit rises to itself. Spirit\ndevelops out of nature; nature itself has a spiritual element in it; it\nis undeveloped, slumbering, unconscious, benumbed intelligence. By\ntransferring to nature the power of self-position or of being subject,\nSchelling exalts the drudge of the Science of Knowledge to the throne.\nThe threefold division, \"infinite original activity--nature or\nobject--individual ego or subject,\" remains as in Fichte, only that the\nfirst member is not termed pure ego, but nature, yet creative nature,\n_natura naturans_. Schelling's aim is to show how from the object a subject\narises, from the existent something represented, from the representable a\nrepresenter, from nature an ego. He could only hope to solve this problem\nif he conceived natural objects--in the highest of which, man, he makes\nconscious spirit break forth or nature intuit itself--as themselves the\nproducts of an original subject, of a creative ground striving toward\nconsciousness. For him also doing is more original than being. It would not\nbe exact, therefore, to define the difference between Fichte and Schelling\nby saying that, with the former, nature proceeds from the ego, and with the\nlatter the ego, from nature. It is rather true that with them both nature\nand spirit are alike the products of a third and higher term, which seeks\nto become spirit, and can accomplish this only by positing nature. In the\nScience of Knowledge, it is true, this higher ground is conceived as an\nethical, in the Philosophy of Nature as a physical, power, although one\nframed for intelligence; in the former, moreover, the _natura naturata_\nappears as the position once for all of a non-spiritual, in the latter as\na progressive articulated construction, with gradually increasing\nintelligence. In the unconscious products of nature, nature's aim to\nreflect upon itself, to become intelligence, fails, in man it succeeds.\nNature is the embryonic life of spirit. Nature and spirit are essentially\nidentical: \"That which is posited _out of_ consciousness is in its essence\nthe same as that which is posited _in_ consciousness also.\" Therefore\n\"the knowable must itself bear the impress of the knower.\" Nature the\npreliminary stage, not the antithesis, of spirit; history, a continuation\nof physical becoming; the parallelism between the ideal and the real\ndevelopment-series--these are ideas from Herder which Schelling introduces\ninto the transcendental philosophy. The Kantio-Fichtean moralism, with\nits sharp contraposition of nature and spirit, is limited in the\n_Naturphilosophie_ by Herder's physicism.\n\n\"Nature _is a priori_\" (everything individual in it is pre-determined by\nthe whole, by the Idea of a nature in general); hence the forms of nature\ncan be deduced from the concept of nature. The philosopher creates nature\nanew, he constructs it. Speculative physics considers nature as _subject_,\nbecoming, productivity (not, like empirical science, as object, being,\nproduct), and for this purpose it needs, instead of individualizing\nreflection, an intuition directed to the whole. To this productive nature,\nas to the absolute ego of Fichte, are ascribed two opposite activities,\none expansive or repulsive, and one attractive, and on these is based the\nuniversal law of _polarity_. The absolute productivity strives toward an\ninfinite product, which it never attains, because apart from arrest no\nproduct exists. At definite points a check must be given it in order that\nsomething knowable may arise. Thus every product in nature is the result\nof a positive, centrifugal, accelerating, universalizing force, and a\nnegative, limiting, retarding, individualizing one. The endlessness of the\ncreative activity manifests itself in various ways: in the striving for\ndevelopment on the part of every product, in the preservation of the genus\namid the disappearance of individuals, in the endlessness of the series of\nproducts. Nature's creative impulse is inexhaustible, it transcends every\nproduct. Qualities are points of arrest in the one universal force of\nnature; all nature is a connected development. Because of the opposition in\nthe nature-ground between the stimulating and the retarding activity, the\nlaw of duality everywhere rules. To these two forces, however, still a\nthird factor must be added as their copula, which determines the relation\nor measure of their connection. This is the source of the threefold\ndivision of the Philosophy of Nature. The magnet with its union of opposite\npolar forces is the type of all configuration in nature.\n\nWith Fichte's synthetic method and Herder's naturalistic principles\nSchelling combines Kantian ideas, especially Kant's dynamism (matter is\na force-product),[1] and his view of the organic (organisms are\nself-productive beings, and are regarded by us as ends in themselves,\nbecause of the interaction between their members and the whole). The three\norganic functions sensibility, irritability, and reproduction, on the other\nhand, Schelling took from Kielmeyer, whose address _On the Relations of\nthe Organic Forces_, 1793, excited great attention. The concept of life is\ndominant in Schelling's theory of nature. The organic is more original than\nthe inorganic; the latter must be explained from the former; that which is\ndead must be considered as a product of departing life. No less erroneous\nthan the theory of a magic vital force is the mechanical interpretation,\nwhich looks on life merely as a chemical phenomenon. The dead, mechanical\nand chemical, forces are merely the negative conditions of life; to them\nthere must be added as a positive force a vital stimulus external to the\nindividual, which continually rekindles the conflict between the opposing\nactivities on which the vital process depends. Life consists, that is, in\nthe perpetual prevention of the equilibrium which is the object of the\nchemical process. This constant disturbance proceeds from \"universal\nnature,\" which, as the common principle of organic and inorganic nature, as\nthat which determines them for each other, which founds a pre-established\nharmony between them, deserves the name of the world-soul. Schelling\nthus recognizes a threefold nature: organized, inorganic, and universal\norganizing (according to Harms, cosmical) nature, of which the two former\narise from the third and are brought by it into connection and harmony. (As\nSchelling here takes an independent middle course between the mechanical\nexplanation of life and the assumption of a specific vital force, so in\nall the burning physical questions of the time he seeks to rise above the\ncontending parties by means of mediating solutions. Thus, in the question\nof \"single or double electricity,\" he ranges himself neither on the side of\nFranklin nor on that of his opponents; in regard to the problem of light,\nendeavors to overcome the antithesis between Newton's emanation theory and\nthe undulation theory of Euler; and, in his chapter on combustion, attacks\nthe defenders of phlogiston as well as those who deny it).\n\n[Footnote 1: Schelling terms his philosophy of nature dynamic atomism,\nsince it posits pure intensities as the simple (atoms), from which\nqualities are to be explained.]\n\nSchelling's philosophy of nature[1] proposes to itself three chief\nproblems: the construction of general, indeterminate, homogeneous\nmatter, with differences in density alone, of determinate, qualitatively\ndifferentiated matter and its phenomena of motion or the dynamical process,\nand of the organic process. For each of these departments of nature an\noriginal force in universal nature is assumed--gravity, light, and their\ncopula, universal life. Gravity--this does not mean that which as the force\nof attraction falls within the view of sensation, for it is the union of\nattraction and repulsion--is the principle of corporeality, and produces\nin the visible world the different conditions of aggregation in solids,\nfluids, and gases. Light--this, too, is not to be confounded with actual\nlight, of which it is the cause--is the principle of the soul (from it\nproceeds all intelligence, it is a spiritual potency, the \"first subject\"\nin nature), and produces in the visible world the dynamical processes\nmagnetism, electricity, and chemism. The higher unity of gravity and\nlight is the copula or life, the principle of the organic, of animated\ncorporeality or the processes of growth and reproduction, irritability,\nand sensibility.\n\n[Footnote 1: This is contained in the following treatises: _Ideas for a\nPhilosophy of Nature, 1797; On the World-soul, 1798; First Sketch of a\nSystem of the Philosophy of Nature, 1799; Universal Deduction of the\nDynamical Process or the Categories of Physics_ (in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nspekulative Physik_) 1800. In the above exposition, however, the modified\nphilosophy of nature of the second period has also been taken into\naccount.]\n\nGeneral _matter_ or the filling of space, arises from the co-operation of\nthree forces: the centrifugal, which manifests itself as repulsion (first\ndimension), the centripetal, manifested as attraction (second dimension),\nand the synthesis of the two, manifested as gravity (third dimension).\nThese forces are raised by light to a higher potency, and then make their\nappearance as the causes of the _dynamical_ process or of the specific\ndifferences of matter. The linear function of magnetism is the condition\nof coherence; the surface force of electricity, the basis of the qualities\nperceivable by sense; the tri-dimensional force of the chemical process, in\nwhich the two former are united, produces the chemical qualities. Galvanism\nforms the transition to living nature, in which through the operation of\nthe \"copula\" these three dynamical categories are raised to _organic_\ncategories. To magnetism as the most general, and hence the lowest force,\ncorresponds reproduction (the formative impulse, as nutrition, growth, and\nproduction, including the artistic impulse); electricity develops into\nirritability or excitability; the higher analogue to the chemical process\nas the most individual and highest stage is sensibility or the capacity\nof feeling. (Such at least is Schelling's doctrine after Steffens had\nconvinced him of the higher dignity of that which is individual, whereas\nat first he had made sensibility parallel with magnetism, and reproduction\nwith chemism, because the former two appear most seldom, and the latter\nmost frequently. Electricity and irritability always maintained their\nintermediate position.) With the awakening of feeling nature has attained\nits goal--intelligence. As inorganic substances are distinguished only by\nrelative degrees of repulsion and attraction, so the differentiation of\norganisms is conditioned by the relation of the three vital functions: in\nthe lower forms reproduction predominates, then irritability gradually\nincreases, while in the highest forms both of these are subordinated to\nsensibility. All species, however, are connected by a common life, all the\nstages are but arrests of the same fundamental force. This accentuation\nof the unity of nature, which establishes a certain kinship between\nSchelling's philosophy of nature and Darwinism, was a great idea, which\ndeserves the thanks of posterity in spite of such defects as its often\nsportive, often heedlessly bold reasoning in details.\n\nThe parallelism of the potencies of nature, as we have developed it by\nleaving out of account the numerous differences between the various\nexpositions of the _Naturphilosophie_, may be shown by a table:\n\n\n\nI. UNIVERSAL NATURE.    II. INORGANIC NATURE       III. ORGANIC NATURE.\n   (ORGANIZING)\n    3. Copula                                    3. Organization\n     or Life.                                        |\n     ___^___                    /Chemical   \\ G      | /Sensi-     Man.\n    /       \\                   |Process (3d| a      | |bility.   __^__\n    2. Light       2._Dynamical_|Dimen-     | l      | |         /     \\\n      (Soul).       _Process_. < sion)      | v      | |Irritabi-  Male\n\nb. At-   \\           (Determi-  |Electri-   | a      |_|lity.    (=Light)\ntraction.|           nate       |city (2d Di->n        |Animal.\n          >1. Gra-   matter.)   | mension.) | i        |\n         |    vity 1. Indeter-  |Magnetism  | s        |Repro-    Female\na. Re-   |   (Body)  minate     |(1st Di-   | m        |duction (-Gravity)\npulsion  /          _matter_.   \\ mension.) /          \\ Plant.\n\n\n%1b. Transcendental Philosophy.%\n\nThe philosophy of nature explained the products of nature teleologically,\ndeduced them from the concept or the mission of nature, by ignoring the\nmechanical origin of physical phenomena and inquiring into the significance\nof each stage in nature in view of this ideal meaning of the whole. It asks\nwhat is the outcome of the chemical process for the whole of nature, what\nis given by electricity, by magnetism, etc.--what part of the general aim\nof nature is attained, is realized through this or that group of phenomena.\nThe philosophy of spirit given in the _System of Transcendental Idealism_,\n1800, finds itself confronted by corresponding questions concerning the\nphenomena of intelligence, of morals, and of art. Here again Schelling does\nnot trace out the mechanics of the soul-life, but is interested only in the\nmeaning, in the teleological significance of the psychical functions.\nHis aim is a constructive psychology in the Fichtean sense, a history of\nconsciousness, and the execution of his design as well closely follows the\nexample of the _Wissenschaftslehre_.\n\nSince truth is the agreement of thought and its object, every cognition\nnecessarily implies the coming together of a subjective and an objective\nfactor. The problem of this coming together may be treated in two ways.\nWith the philosophy of nature we may start from the object and observe how\nintelligence is added to nature. The transcendental philosophy takes the\nopposite course, it takes its position with the subject, and asks, How\nis there added to intelligence an object corresponding to it? The\ntranscendental philosopher has need of intellectual intuition in order to\nrecognize the original object-positing actions of the ego, which remain\nconcealed from common consciousness, sunk in the outcome of these acts. The\n_theoretical_ part of the system explains the representation of objective\nreality (the feeling connected with certain representations that we are\ncompelled to have them), from pure self-consciousness, whose opposing\nmoments, a real and an ideal force, limit each other by degrees,--and\nfollows the development of spirit in three periods (\"epochs\"). The first\nof these extends from sensation, in which the ego finds itself limited, to\nproductive intuition, in which a thing in itself is posited over against\nthe ego and the phenomenon between the two; the second, from this point to\nreflection (feeling of self, outer and inner intuition together with space\nand time, the categories of relation as the original categories); the\nthird, finally, through judgment, wherein intuition and concept are\nseparated as well as united, up to the absolute act of will. Willing is\nthe continuation and completion of intuition;[1] intuition was unconscious\nproduction, willing is conscious production. It is only through action that\nthe world becomes objective for us, only through interaction with other\nactive intelligences that the ego attains to the consciousness of a real\nexternal world, and to the consciousness of its freedom. The _practical_\npart follows the will from impulse (the feeling of contradiction between\nthe ideal and the object) through the division into moral law and resistant\nnatural impulse up to arbitrary will. Observations on legal order, on the\nstate, and on history are added as \"supplements.\" The law of right, by\nwhich unlawful action is directed against itself, is not a moral, but a\nnatural order, which operates with blind necessity. The state, like law, is\na product of the genus, and not of individuals. The ideal of a cosmopolitan\nlegal condition is the goal of _history_, in which caprice and conformity\nto law are one, in so far as the conscious free action of individuals\nsubserves an unconscious end prescribed by the world-spirit. History is the\nnever completed revelation of the absolute (of the unity of the conscious\nand the unconscious) through human freedom. We are co-authors in the\nhistorical world-drama, and invent our own parts. Not until the third (the\nreligious) period, in which he reveals himself as \"providence,\" will God\n_be_; in the past (the tragical) period, in which the divine power was felt\nas \"fate,\" and in the present (the mechanical) period, in which he appears\nas the \"plan of nature,\" God is not, but is only _becoming_.\n\n[Footnote 1: With this transformation of the antithesis between knowledge\nand volition into a mere difference in degree, Schelling sinks back to the\nstandpoint of Leibnitz. In all the idealistic thinkers who start from Kant\nwe find the endeavor to overcome the Critical dualism of understanding and\nwill, as also that between intellect and sensibility. Schiller brings the\ncontrary impulses of the ego into ultimate harmonious union in artistic\nactivity. Fichte traces them back to a common ground; Schelling combines\nboth these methods by extolling art as a restoration of the original\nidentity. Hegel reduces volition to thought, Schopenhauer makes intellect\nproceed from will.]\n\nAn interesting supplement to the Fichtean philosophy is furnished by the\nthird, the _aesthetic_, part of the transcendental idealism, which makes\nuse of Kant's theory of the beautiful in a way similar to that in which the\nphilosophy of nature had availed itself of his theory of the organic.\nArt is the higher third in which the opposition between theoretical and\npractical action, the antithesis of subject and object, is removed; in\nwhich cognition and action, conscious and unconscious activity, freedom and\nnecessity, the impulse of genius and reflective deliberation are united.\nThe beautiful, as the manifestation of the infinite in the finite, shows\nthe problem of philosophy, the identity of the real and the ideal, solved\nin sensuous appearance. Art is the true organon and warrant of philosophy;\nshe opens up to philosophy the holy of holies, is for philosophy the\nsupreme thing, the revelation of all mysteries. Poesy and philosophy (the\naesthetic intuition of the artist and the intellectual intuition of\nthe thinker) are most intimately related; they were united in the old\nmythology--why should not this repeat itself in the future?\n\n\n%2. System of Identity.%\n\nThe assertion which had already been made in the first period that \"nature\nand spirit are fundamentally the same,\" is intensified in the second into\nthe proposition, \"The ground of nature and spirit, the absolute, is the\nidentity of the real and the ideal,\" and in this form is elevated into\na principle. As the absolute is no longer employed as a mere ground of\nexplanation, but is itself made the object of philosophy, the doctrine of\nidentity is added to the two co-ordinate disciplines, the philosophy of\nnature and the philosophy of spirit, as a higher third, which serves as a\nbasis for them, and in Schelling's exposition of which several phases must\nbe distinguished.[1]\n\n\n[Footnote 1: The philosophy of identity is given in the following\ntreatises: _Exposition of my System of Philosophy, 1801; Further\nExpositions of the System of Philosophy, 1802; Bruno, or on the Divine and\nNatural Principle of Things, 1803; Lectures on the Method of Academical\nStudy, 1803; Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature,\nAphorisms on the Philosophy of Nature_ (both in the _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr\nMedizin), 1806_. Besides these the following also bear on this doctrine:\nthe additions to the second edition of the _Ideas_, 1803, and the\n_Exposition_, against Fichte, 1806.]\n\nFollowing Spinoza, whom he at first imitated even in the geometrical method\nof proof, Schelling teaches that there are two kinds of knowledge, the\nphilosophical knowledge of the reason and the confused knowledge of\nthe imagination, and, as objects of these, two forms of existence, the\ninfinite, undivided existence of the absolute, and the finite existence of\nindividual things, split up into multiplicity and becoming. The manifold\nand self-developing things of the phenomenal world owe their existence\nto isolating thought alone; they possess as such no true reality, and\nspeculation proves them void. While things appear particular to inadequate\nrepresentation, the philosopher views them _sub specie aeterni_, in their\n_per se_, in their totality, in the identity, as Ideas. To construe things\nis to present them as they are in God. But in God all things are one;\nin the absolute all is absolute, eternal, infinitude itself. (Accord-to\nHegel's parody, the absolute is the night, in which all cows are black.)\n\nThe world-ground appears as nature and spirit; yet in itself it is neither\nthe one nor the other, but the unity of both which is raised above all\ncontrariety, the indifference of objective and subjective. Although amid\nthe finitude of the things of the world the self-identity of the absolute\nbreaks up into a plurality of self-developing individual existences, yet\neven in the phenomenal world of individuals the unity of the ground is not\nentirely lost: each particular existence is a definite expression of the\nabsolute, and to it as such the character of identity belongs, though in\na diminished degree and mingled with difference (Bruno's \"monads\"). The\nworld-ground is absolute, the individual thing is relative, identity and\ntotality; nothing exists which is merely objective or merely subjective;\neverything is both, only that one or other of these two factors always\npredominates. This Schelling terms quantitative difference: the phenomena\nof nature, like the phenomena of spirit, are a unity of the real and the\nideal, only that in the former there is a preponderance of the real, in the\nlatter a preponderance of the ideal.\n\nAt first Schelling, in Neoplatonic fashion, maintained the existence of\nanother intermediate region between the spheres of the infinite and the\nfinite: absolute knowing or the self-knowledge of the identity. In this,\nas the \"form\" of the absolute, the objective and the subjective are not\nabsolutely one, as they are in the being or \"essence\" of the absolute, but\nideally (potentially) opposed, though one _realiter_. Later he does away\nwith this distinction also, as existing for reflection alone, not for\nrational intuition, and outbids his earlier determinations concerning the\nsimplicity of the absolute with the principle, that it is not only the\nunity of opposites, but also the unity of the unity and the opposition or\nthe identity of the identity, in which fanciful description the dialogue\n_Bruno_ pours itself forth. A further alteration is brought in by\ncharacterizing the absolute as the identity of the finite and the infinite,\nand by equating the finite with the real or being, the infinite with the\nideal or knowing. With this there is joined a philosophical interpretation\nof the Trinity akin to Lessing's. In the absolute or eternal the finite\nand the infinite are alike absolute. God the Father is the eternal, or the\nunity of the finite and the infinite; the Son is the finite in God (before\nthe falling away); the Spirit is the infinite or the return of the finite\ninto the eternal.\n\nIn the construction of the real series Schelling proceeds still more\nschematically and analogically than in the _Naturphilosophie_ of the first\nperiod, the contents of which are here essentially reproduced. With this is\nclosely connected his endeavor, in correspondence with the principles of\nthe theory of identity, to show in every phenomenon the operation of\nall three moments of the absolute. In each natural product all three\n\"potencies\" or stages, gravity A(^1), light A(^2), and organization A(^3),\nare present, only in subordination to one of their number. Since the third\npotency is never lacking, all is organic; that which appears to us as\ninorganic matter is only the residuum left over from organization,\nthat which could become neither plant nor animal. New here is the\ncohesion-series of Steffens (the phenomenon of magnetism), in which\nnitrogen forms the south pole, carbon the north pole, and iron the point of\nindifference, while oxygen, hydrogen, and water represent the east pole,\nwest pole, and indifference point in electrical polarity. In the organic\nworld plants represent the carbon pole, animals the nitrogen pole; the\nformer is the north pole, the latter the south. Moreover, the points of\nindifference reappear: the plant corresponds to water, the animal to iron.\nSchelling was far outdone in fantastic analogies of this kind by his\npupils, especially by Oken, who in his _Sketch of the Philosophy of\nNature_, 1805, compares the sense of hearing, for example, to the parabola,\nto a metal, to a bone, to the bird, to the mouse, and to the horse. As\nnature was the imaging of the infinite (unity or essence) into the finite\n(plurality or form), so spirit is the taking up of the finite into the\ninfinite. In the spiritual realm also all three divine original potencies\nare every, where active, though in such a way that one is dominant. In\nintuition (sensation, consciousness, intuition, each in turn thrice\ndivided) the infinite and the eternal are subordinated to the finite; in\nthought or understanding (concept, judgment, inference, each in three\nkinds) the finite and the eternal are subordinated to the infinite; in\nreason (which comprehends all under the form of the absolute) the finite\nand the infinite are subordinated to the eternal. Intuition is finite\ncognition, thought infinite cognition, reason eternal cognition. The forms\nof the understanding do not suffice for the knowledge of reason; common\nlogic with its law of contradiction has no binding authority for\nspeculation, which starts with the equalization of opposites. In the\n_Aphorisms by way of Introduction_ science, religion, and art figure as\nstages of the ideal all, in correspondence with the potencies of the real\nall--matter, motion, and organization. Nature culminates in man, history\nin the state. Reason, philosophy, is the re-establishment of identity, the\nreturn of the absolute to itself.\n\nUnconditioned knowledge, as Schelling maintains in his encyclopedia,\n_i.e._, his _Lectures on the Method of Academical Study_, is the\npresupposition of all particular knowledge. The function of universities is\nto maintain intact the connection between particular knowledge and absolute\nknowledge. The three higher faculties correspond to the three potencies in\nthe absolute: Natural Science and Medicine to the real or finite; History\nand Law to the ideal or infinite; Theology to the eternal or the copula.\nThere is further a faculty of arts, the so-called Philosophical Faculty,\nwhich imparts whatever in philosophy is teachable. The two lectures on\ntheology (viii. and ix.) are especially important. There are two forms of\nreligion, one of which discovers God in nature, while the other finds him\nin history; the former culminates in the Greek religion, the latter in the\nChristian, and with the founding of this the third period of history (which\nSchelling had previously postponed into the future), the period of\nprovidence begins. In Christianity mythology is based on religion, not\nreligion on mythology, as was the case in heathenism. The speculative\nkernel of Christianity is the incarnation of God, already taught by the\nIndian sages; this, however, is not to be understood as a single event in\ntime, but as eternal. It has been a hindrance to the development of\nChristianity that the Bible, whose value is far below that of the sacred\nbooks of India, has been more highly prized than that which the patristic\nthinking succeeded in making out of its meager contents.\n\nIf, finally, we compare Schelling's system of identity with its model, the\nsystem of Spinoza, two essential differences become apparent. Although both\nthinkers start from a principiant equal valuation of the two phenomenal\nmanifestations of the absolute, nature and spirit, Spinoza tends to posit\nthought in dependence on extension (the soul represents what the body is),\nwhile in Schelling, conversely, the Fichtean preference of spirit is still\npotent (the state and art stand nearer to the absolute identity\nthan the organism, although, principiantly considered, the greatest\npossible approximation to the equilibrium of the real and the ideal is as\nmuch attained in the one as in the other). The second difference lies in\nthe fact that the idea of development is entirely lacking in Spinoza, while\nin Schelling it is everywhere dominant. It reminds one of Lessing and\nHerder, who also attempted to combine Spinozistic and Leibnitzian elements.\n\n\n\n%3a. Doctrine of Freedom.%\n\nThe system of identity had, with Spinoza, distinguished two worlds, the\nreal world of absolute identity and the imagined world of differentiated\nand changeable individual things; it had traced back the latter to the\nformer as its ground, but had not deduced it from the former. Whence, then,\nthe imagination which, instead of the unchangeable unity, shows us the\nchanging manifold? Whence the imperfections of the finite, whence evil?\nThe pantheism of Spinoza is inseparably connected with determinism, which\ndenies evil without explaining it. Evil and finitude demand explanation,\nnot denial, and this without the abandonment of pantheism. But explanation\nby what? By the absolute, for besides the absolute there is naught. How,\nthen, must the pantheistic doctrine of the absolute be transformed in order\nthat the fact of evil and the separate existence of the finite may become\ncomprehensible? To this task are devoted the _Inquiries into the Nature of\nHuman Freedom (Philosophical Works_, vol. i., 1809, with which should be\ncompared the _Memorial of Jacobi_, 1812, and the _Answer to Eschenmayer_,\n1813).\n\nAs early as in the _Bruno_, the problem occasionally emerges why matters do\nnot rest with the original infinite unity of the absolute, why the finite\nbreaks away from the identical primal ground. The possibility of the\nseparation, it is answered, lies in the fact that the finite is like the\ninfinite _realiter_, and yet, ideally, is different from it; the actuality\nof the coming forth, however, lies in the non-deducible self-will of\nthe finite. Then after Eschenmayer[1] _(Philosophy in its Transition to\nNot-philosophy_, 1803) had characterized the procession of the Ideas out of\nthe Godhead as an impenetrable mystery for thought, before which philosophy\nmust yield to faith, Schelling, in the essay _Religion and Philosophy_,\n1804, goes more deeply into the problem. The origin of the sense-world is\nconceivable only as a breaking away, a spring, a _falling away_,\nwhich consists in the soul's grasping itself in its selfhood, in its\nsubordination of the infinite in itself to the finite, and in its thus\nceasing to be in God. The procession of the world from the infinite is a\nfree act, a fact which can only be described, not deduced as necessary. The\ncounterpart of this attainment of independence on the part of things or\ncreation is history as the return of the world to its source. They are\nrelated to each other as the fall to redemption. Both the dismission of the\nworld and its reception back, together with the intervening development,\nare, however, events needed by God himself in order to become actual God:\nHe develops through the world. (A similar thought was not unknown in the\nMiddle Ages: if God is to give a complete revelation of himself he must\nmake known his grace; and this presupposes sin. As the occasion of divine\ngrace, the fall is a happy, saving fault; without it God could not have\nrevealed himself as gracious, as forgiving, hence not completely.)\nSchelling's study of Jacob B\u00f6hme, to which he was led by Baader,\nessentially contributed to the concentration of his thought on this point.\n_The Exposition of the True Relation_, etc., already distinctly betrays the\ninfluence of this mystic. In correspondence with B\u00f6hme's doctrine that God\nis living God only through his inclusion of negation in himself, it is here\nmaintained: A being can manifest itself only when it is not merely one, but\nhas another, an opposition (the many), in itself, whereby it is revealed to\nitself as unity. With the addition of certain Kantian ideas, in particular\nthe idea of transcendental freedom and the intelligible character,\nSchelling's theosophy now assumes the following form:\n\nThe only way to guard against the determinism and the lifeless God of\nSpinoza is to assume something in God which is not God himself, to\ndistinguish between God as existent and that which is merely the ground of\nhis existence or \"nature in God.\" In God also the perfect proceeds from the\nimperfect, he too develops and realizes himself. The actual, perfect God,\nwho is intelligence, wisdom, goodness, is preceded by something which is\nmerely the possibility of all this, an obscure, unconscious impulse toward\nself-representation. For in the last analysis there is no being but\nwilling; to willing alone belong the predicates of the primal being,\ngroundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation. This\n\"ground of existence\" is an obscure \"longing\" to give birth to self, an\nunconscious impulse to become conscious; the goal of this longing is the\n\"understanding,\" the Logos, the Word, wherein God becomes revealed to self.\nBy the self-subordination of this longing to the understanding as its\nmatter and instrument, God becomes actual God, becomes spirit and love. The\noperation of the light understanding on the dark nature-will consists in a\nseparation of forces, whence the visible world proceeds. Whatever in the\nlatter is perfect, rational, harmonious, and purposive is the work of the\nunderstanding; the irrational remainder, on the other hand, conflict and\nlawlessness, abortion, sickness and death, originates in the dark ground.\nEach thing has two principles in it: its self-will it receives from nature\nin God, yet, at the same time, as coming from the divine understanding,\nit is the instrument of the universal will. In God the light and dark\nprinciples stand in indissoluble unity, in man they are separable. The\nfreedom of man's will makes him independent of both principles; going over\nfrom truth to falsehood, he may strive to make his selfhood supreme and\nto reduce the spiritual in him to the level of a means, or--with divine\nassistance--continuing in the center, he may endeavor to subordinate\nthe particular will to the will of love. Good consists in overcoming\nresistance, for in every case a thing can be revealed only through its\nopposite. If man yields to temptation it is his own guilty choice. Evil is\nnot merely defect, privation, but something positive, selfhood breaking\naway, the reversal of the rightful order between the particular and the\nuniversal will. The possibility of a separation of the two wills lies in\nthe divine ground (it is \"permitted\" in order that by overmastering the\nself-will the will of love may approve itself), the actuality of evil is\nthe free act of the creature. Freedom is to be conceived, in the Kantian\nsense, as equally far removed from chance or caprice and from compulsion:\nMan chooses his own non-temporal, intelligible nature; he predestinates\nhimself in the first creation, _i.e._, from eternity, and is responsible\nfor his actions in the sense-world, which are the necessary results of that\nfree primal act.\n\n[Footnote 1: K. Ad. Eschenmayer was originally a physician, then, 1811-36,\nprofessor of philosophy in T\u00fcbingen, and died in 1852 at Kirchheim unter\nTeck.]\n\nAs in nature and in the individual, so also in the history of mankind, the\ntwo original grounds of things do battle with one another. The golden age\nof innocence, of happy indecision and unconsciousness concerning sin, when\nneither good nor evil yet was, was followed by a period of the omnipotence\nof nature, in which the dark ground of existence ruled alone, although\nit did not make itself felt as actual evil until, in Christianity, the\nspiritual light was born in personal form. The subsequent conflict of good\nagainst evil, in which God reveals himself as spirit, leads toward a state\nwherein evil will be reduced to the position of a potency and everything\nsubordinated to spirit, and thus the complete identity of the ground of\nexistence and the existing God be brought about.\n\nBesides this after-reconciliation of the two divine moments, Schelling\nrecognizes another, original unity of the two. The not yet unfolded unity\nof the beginning (God as Alpha) he terms _indifference_ or groundlessness;\nthe more valuable unity of the end, attained by unfolding (God as Omega)\nis called _identity_ or spirit. In the former the contraries are not yet\npresent; in the latter they are present no longer. The groundless divides\ninto two equally eternal beginnings, nature and light, or longing and\nunderstanding, in order that the two may become one in love, and thereby\nthe absolute develop into the personal God. In this way Schelling endeavors\nto overcome the antithesis between naturalism and theism, between dualism\nand pantheism, and to remove the difficulties which arise for pantheism\nfrom the fact of evil, as well as from the concepts of personality and of\nfreedom.\n\nIn the two moments of the absolute (nature in God--personal spirit) we\nrecognize at once the antithesis of the real and ideal which was given\nin the philosophy of identity. The chief difference between the mystical\nperiod and the preceding one consists in the fact that the absolute itself\nis now made to develop (from indifference to identity, from the neither-nor\nto the as-well-as of the antithesis), and that there is conceded to the\nsense-world a reality which is more than apparent, more than merely present\nfor imagination. That which facilitated this rapid, almost unceasing change\nof position for Schelling, and which at the same time concealed the fact\nfrom him, was, above all, the ambiguous and variable meaning of his leading\nconcepts. The \"objective,\" for example, now signifies unconscious being,\nbecoming, and production, now represented reality, now the real, in so far\nas it is not represented, but only _is_. \"God\" sometimes means the whole\nabsolute, sometimes only the infinite, spiritual moment in the absolute.\nScarcely a single term is sharply defined, much less consistently used in a\nsingle meaning.\n\n\n%3b. Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation.%\n\nOnce again Schelling is ready with a new statement of the problem.\nPhilosophy is the science of the existent. In this, however, a distinction\nis to be made between the _what (quid sit)_ and the _that (quod sit)_, or\nbetween essence and existence. The apprehension of the essence, of the\nconcept, is the work of reason, but this does not go as far as actual\nbeing. Rational philosophy cognizes only the universal, the possible,\nthe necessary truths (whose contradictory is unthinkable), but not the\nparticular and factual. This philosophy can only assert: If anything exists\nit must conform to these laws; existence is not given with the _what_.\nHegel has ignored this distinction between the logical and the actual, has\nconfused the rational and the real. Even the system of identity was merely\nrational, _i.e., negative_, philosophy, to which there must be added, as a\nsecond part, a positive or existential philosophy, which does not, like the\nformer, rise to the highest principle, to God, but starts from this supreme\nIdea and shows its actuality.\n\nThe content of this phase of Schelling's thought[1] was so unfruitful, and\nits influence so small, that brief hints concerning it must here suffice.\nFirst of all, the doctrine of the divine potencies and of creation is\nrepeated in altered form, and then there is given a philosophy of the\nhistory of religion as a reflection of the theogonic process in human\nconsciousness.\n\n[Footnote 1: On Schelling's negative and positive philosophy, published in\nthe four volumes of the second division of the _Works_, cf. Karl Groos,\n_Die reine Vernunftwissenschaft, systematische Darstellung von Schellings\nnegativer Philosophie_, 1889; Konstantin Frantz, _Schellings positive\nPhilosophie_, in three parts, 1879-80; Ed. von Hartmann, _Gesammelte\nStudien und Aufs\u00e4tze_, 1876, p. 650 _seq_.; Ad. Planck, _Schellings\nnachgelassene Werke_, 1858; also the essay by Heyder, referred to above].\n\nThe potencies are now called the infinite ability to be (inactive will,\nsubject), pure being (being without potentiality, object), and spirit,\nwhich is free from the one-sidednesses of mere potentiality and of\nmere being, and master of itself (subject-object); to these is added,\nfurther--not as a fourth, but as that which has the three predicates and\nis wholly in each--the absolute proper, as the cause and support of these\nattributes. The original unity of the three forms is dissolved, as the\nfirst raises itself out of the condition of a mere potency and withdraws\nitself from pure being in order to exist for itself; the tension extends\nitself to the two others--the second now comes out from its selflessness,\nsubdues the first, and so leads the third back to unity. In creation\nthe three potencies stand related as the unlimited Can-be, the limiting\nMust-be, and the Ought-to-be, or operate as material, formal, and final\ncauses, all held in undivided combination by the soul. It was not until the\nend of creation that they became personalities. Man, in whom the potencies\ncome to rest, can divide their unity again; his fall calls forth a new\ntension, and thereby the world becomes a world outside of God. History, the\nprocess o progressive reconciliation between the God-estranged world and\nGod, passes through two periods--heathenism, in which the second person\nworks as a natural potency, and Christianity, in which it works with\nfreedom. In the discussion of these positive philosophy becomes a\n_philosophy of mythology and revelation_. The irresistible force of\nmythological ideas is explained by the fact that the gods are not creations\nof the fancy, but real powers, namely, these potencies, which form the\nsubstance of human conciousness.\n\nThe history of religion has for its starting-point the relative monotheism\nof humanity in its original unity, and for its goal the absolute monotheism\nof Christianity. With the separation into nations polytheism arises. This\nis partly simultaneous polytheism (a plurality of gods under a chief god),\npartly successive polytheism (an actual plurality of divinities, changing\ndynasties of several chief gods), and develops from star worship or Sabeism\nup to the religion of the Greeks. The Greek mysteries form the transition\nfrom mythology to revelation. While in the mythological process one or\nother of the divine potencies (Ground, Son, Spirit) was always predominant,\nin Christianity they return into unity. The true monotheism of revelation\nshows God as an articulated unity, in which the opposites are contained,\nas being overcome. The person of Christ constitutes the content of\nChristianity, who, in his incarnation and sacrificial death, yields up the\nindependence out of God which had come to him through the fall of man.\nThe three periods in the development of the Church (real, substantial\nunity--ideality or freedom--the reconciliation of the two) were\nforeshadowed in the chief apostles: Peter, with his leaning toward the\npast, represents the Papal Church; Paul the thinker the Protestant Church;\nand the gentle John the Church of the future.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSCHELLING'S CO-WORKERS.\n\nIn his period of vigorous creation Schelling was the center of an animated\nphilosophical activity. Each phase of his philosophy found a circle of\nenthusiastic fellow-laborers, whom we must hesitate to term disciples\nbecause of their independence and of their reaction on Schelling himself.\nOnly G.M. Klein (1776-1820, professor in W\u00fcrzburg), Stutzmann (died 1816\nin Erlangen; _Philosophy of the Universe_, 1806; _Philosophy of History_,\n1808), and the historians of philosophy Ast and Rixner can be called\ndisciples of Schelling. Prominent among his co-workers in the philosophy\nof nature were Steffens, Oken, Schubert, and Carus; besides these the\nphysiologist Burdach, the pathologist Kieser, the plant physiologist Nees\nvon Esenbeck, and the medical thinker Schelver (_Philosophy of Medicine_,\n1809) deserve mention. Besides Hegel, J.J. Wagner and Friedrich Krause\ndistinguished themselves as independent founders of systems of identity;\nTroxler, Suabedissen, and Berger are also to be assigned to this group.\nBaader and Schleiermacher were competitors of Schelling in the philosophy\nof religion, and Solger in aesthetics. Finally Fr. J. Stahl (died 1861;\n_Philosophy of Right_, 1830 _seq_..), was also influenced by Schelling.\nThere is a wide divergence in Schelling's school, as J.E. Erdmann\naccurately remarks, between the naturalistic pantheist Oken and the\nmystical theosophist Baader, in whom elements which had been united in\nSchelling appear divided.\n\n\n%1. The Philosophers of Nature.%\n\nHenrik Steffens[1] (a Norwegian, 1773-1845; professor in Halle, Breslau,\nand Berlin) makes individual development the goal of nature--which is first\ncompletely attained in man and in his peculiarity or talent--and holds that\nthe catastrophes of the spirit are reflected in the history of the earth.\nLorenz Oken[2] (1779-1851; professor in Jena 1807-27, then in Munich and\nZurich) identifies God and the universe, which comes to self-consciousness\nin man, the most perfect animal; teaches the development of organisms from\nan original slime (a mass of organic elements, infusoria, or cells); and\nlooks on the animal kingdom as man anatomized, in that the animal world\ncontains in isolated development that which man possesses collected in\nminute organs--the worm is the feeling animal, the insect the light animal,\nthe snail the touch animal, the bird the hearing animal, the fish the\nsmelling animal, the amphibian the taste animal, the mammal the animal of\nall senses.\n\n[Footnote 1: Steffens, _Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the\nEarth_, 1801; _Caricatures of the Holiest_, 1819-21; _Anthropology_, 1822.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Oken: _On the Significance of the Bones of the Skull_, 1807;\n_Text-book of the Philosophy of Nature_, 1809-11, 2d ed. 1831, 3d ed. 1843;\nthe journal _Isis_, from 1817. On Oken cf. C. G\u00fcttler, 1885.]\n\nWhile in Steffens geological interests predominate, and in Oken biological\ninterests, Schubert, Carus, and Ennemoser are the psychologists of the\nschool. Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert[1] (1780-1860; professor in Erlangen and\nMunich) brings the human soul into intimate relation with the world-soul,\nwhose phantasy gives form to all that is corporeal, and delights to dwell\non the abnormal and mysterious phenomena of the inner life, the border-land\nbetween the physical and the psychical, on the unconscious and the\nhalf-conscious, on presentiments and clairvoyance, as from another\ndirection also Schelling's philosophy was brought into perilous connection\nwith somnambulism. A second predominantly contemplative thinker was Karl\nGustav Carus[2] (1789-1869; at his death in Dresden physician to the king;\n_Lectures on Psychology_, 1831; _Psyche_, 1846; _Physis_, 1851), greatly\ndistinguished for his services to comparative anatomy. Carus endows the\ncell with unconscious psychical life,--a memory for the past shows itself\nin the inheritance of dispositions and talents, just as the formation of\nmilk in the breasts of the pregnant and the formation of lungs in the\nembryo betray a prevision of the future,--and points out that with the\nhigher development of organic and spiritual life the antitheses constantly\nbecome more articulate: individual differences are greater among men than\namong women, among adults than among children, among Europeans than among\nnegroes.\n\n[Footnote 1: G.H. Schubert: _Views of the Dark Side of Natural Science_,\n1808; _The Primeval World and the Fixed Stars_, 1822; _History of the\nSoul_, 1830 (in briefer form, _Text-book of the Science of Man and of the\nSoul_, 1838).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Not to be confused with Friedrich August Carus (1770-1807;\nprofessor in Leipsic), whose _History of Psychology_, 1808, forms the third\npart of his posthumous works.]\n\n\n%2. The Philosophers of Identity.%\n\nIt has been said of the Dane Johann Erich von Berger (1772-1833; from\n1814 professor in Kiel; _Universal Outlines of Science_, 1817-27) that\nhe adopted a middle course between Fichte and Schelling. The same may be\nasserted of Karl Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819; at his death professor in\nBerlin; _Erwin, Four Dialogues on Beauty and Art_, 1815; _Lectures on\nAesthetics_, edited by Heyse, 1829), who points out the womb of the\nbeautiful in the fancy, and introduces into aesthetics the concept of\nirony, that spirit of sadness at the vanity of the finite, though this is\nneeded by the Idea in order to its manifestation.\n\nIn Johann Jacob Wagner[1] (1775-1841; professor in W\u00fcrzburg) and in J.P.V.\nTroxler[2] (1780-1866) we find, as in Steffens, a fourfold division instead\nof Schelling's triads. Both Wagner and Troxler find an exact correspondence\nbetween the laws of the universe and those of the human mind. Wagner\n(in conformity to the categories essence and form, opposition and\nreconciliation) makes all becoming and cognition advance from unity to\nquadruplicity, and finds the four stages of knowledge in representation,\nperception, judgment, and Idea. Troxler shares with Fries the\nanthropological standpoint, (philosophy is anthropology, knowledge of the\nworld is self-knowledge), and distinguishes, besides the emotional nature\nor the unity of human nature, four constituents thereof, spirit,\nhigher soul, lower soul (body, _Leib_), and body _(K\u00f6rper)_, and four\ncorresponding kinds of knowledge, in reverse order, sensuous perception,\nexperience, reason, and spiritual intuition, of which the middle two are\nmediate or reflective in character, while the first and last are intuitive.\nFor D. Th. A. Suabedissen also (1773-1835; professor in Marburg;\n_Examination of Man_, 1815-18) philosophy is the science of man, and\nself-knowledge its starting point.\n\n[Footnote 1: J.J. Wagner: _Ideal Philosophy_, 1804; _Mathematical\nPhilosophy_, 1811; _Organon of Human Knowledge_, 1830, in three parts,\nSystem of the World, of Knowledge, and of Language. On Wagner cf. L. Rabus,\n1862.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Troxler: _Glances into the Nature of Man_, 1812;\n_Metaphysics_, 1828; _Logic_, 1830.]\n\nThe relatively limited reputation enjoyed in his own time and to-day by\nFriedrich Krause[1] (born in Eisenberg 1781; habilitated in Jena 1802;\nlived privately in Dresden; became a _Privatdocent_ in G\u00f6ttingen from 1824;\nand died at Munich 1832; _Prototype of Humanity_, 1812, and numerous other\nworks) has been due, on the one hand, to the appearance of his more gifted\ncontemporary Hegel, and, on the other, to his peculiar terminology. He not\nonly Germanized all foreign words in a spirit of exaggerated purism, but\nalso coined new verbal roots, _(M\u00e4l, Ant, Or, Om)_ and from these formed\nthe most extraordinary combinations (_Vereinselbganzweseninnesein,\nOromlebselbstschauen_). His most important pupil, Ahrens (professor in\nLeipsic, died 1874; _Course of Philosophy_, 1836-38; _Natural Right_,\n1852), helped Krause's doctrine to gain recognition in France and Belgium\nby his fine translations into French; while it was introduced into Spain by\nJ.S. del Rio of Madrid (died 1869).--Since the finite is a negative, the\ninfinite a positive concept, and hence the knowledge of the infinite\nprimal, the principle of philosophy is the absolute, and philosophy itself\nknowledge of God or the theory of essence. The Subjective Analytic Course\nleads from the self-viewing of the ego up to the vision of God; the\nSynthetic Course starts from the fundamental Idea, God, and deduces from\nthis the partial Ideas, or presents the world as the revelation of God. For\nhis attempted reconciliation of theism and pantheism Krause invented the\nname panentheism, meaning thereby that God neither is the world nor stands\noutside the world, but has the world in himself and extends beyond it. He\nis absolute identity, nature and reason are relative identity, viz., the\nidentity of the real and ideal, the former with the character of reality,\nthe latter with the character of ideality. Or, the absolute considered from\nthe side of its wholeness (infinity) is nature, considered from the side of\nits selfhood (unconditionality) is reason; God is the common root of both.\nAbove nature and reason is humanity, which combines in itself the highest\nproducts of both, the most perfect animal body and self-consciousness. The\nhumanity of earth, the humanity known to us, is but a very small portion of\nthe humanity of the universe, which in the multitude of its members, which\ncannot be increased, constitutes the divine state. Krause's most important\nwork is his philosophy of right and of history, with its marks of a highly\nkeyed idealism. He treats human right as an effluence of divine right;\nbesides the state or legal union, he recognizes many other\nassociations--the science and the art union, the religious society, the\nleague of virtue or ethical union. His philosophy of history\n(_General Theory of Life_, edited by Von Leonhardi, 1843) follows the\nFichteo-Hegelian rhythm, unity, division, and reunion, and correlates the\nseveral ages with these. The first stage is germinal life; the second,\nyouth; the third, maturity. The culmination is followed by a\nreverse movement from counter-maturity, through counter-youth, to\ncounter-childhood, whereupon the development recommences--without\ncessation. It is to be regretted that this noble-minded man joined to his\nwarm-hearted disposition, broad outlook, and rigorous method a heated\nfancy, which, crippling the operation of these advantageous qualities,\nled his thought quite too far away from reality. Ahrens, Von Leonhardi,\nLindemann, and Roeder may be mentioned as followers of Krause.\n\n[Footnote 1: On Krause cf. P. Hohlfeld, _Die Krausesche Philosophic_, 1879;\nB. Martin, 1881; R. Eucken, _Zur Erinnerung an Krause, Festrede_, 1881.\nFrom his posthumous works Hohlfeld and W\u00fcnsche have published the _Lectures\non Aesthetics_, the _System of Aesthetics_ (both 1882), and numerous other\ntreatises.]\n\n\n%3. The Philosophers of Religion.%\n\nFranz (von) Baader, the son of a physician, was born in Munich in 1765,\nresided there as superintendent of mines, and, from 1826, as professor\nof speculative dogmatics, and died there also in 1841. His works, which\nconsisted only of a series of brief treatises, were collected (16 vols.,\n1851-60) by his most important adherent, Franz Hoffman[1] (at his death in\n1881 professor in W\u00fcrzburg). Baader may be characterized as a mediaeval\nthinker who has worked through the critical philosophy, and who, a\nbelieving, yet liberal Catholic, endeavors to solve with the instruments\nof modern speculation the old Scholastic problem of the reconciliation of\nfaith and knowledge. His themes are, on the one hand, the development\nof God, and, on the other, the fall and redemption, which mean for him,\nhowever, not merely inner phenomena, but world-events. He is in sympathy\nwith the Neoplatonists, with Augustine, with Thomas Aquinas, with Eckhart,\nwith Paracelsus, above all, with Jacob B\u00f6hme, and B\u00f6hme's follower Louis\nClaude St. Martin (1743-1804), but does not overlook the value of the\nmodern German philosophy. With Kant he begins the inquiry with the problem\nof knowledge; with Fichte he finds in self-consciousness the essence,\nand not merely a property, of spirit; with Hegel he looks on God or\nthe absolute spirit not only as the object, but also as the subject\nof knowledge. He rejects, however, the autonomy of the will and the\nspontaneity of thought; and though he criticises the Cartesian separation\nbetween the thought of the creator and that of the creature, he as little\napproves the pantheistic identification of the two--human cognition\nparticipates in the divine, without constituting a part of it.\n\n[Footnote 1: Besides Hoffman, Lutterbeck and Hamberger have described and\nexpounded Baader's system. See also Baumann's paper in the _Philosophische\nMonatshefte_, vol. xiv., 1878, p. 321 _seq_.]\n\nIn accordance with its three principal objects, \"God, Nature, and Man,\"\nphilosophy divides into fundamental science (logic or the theory of\nknowledge and theology), the philosophy of nature (cosmology or the\ntheory of creation and physics), and the philosophy of spirit (ethics and\nsociology). In all its parts it must receive religious treatment. Without\nGod we cannot know God. In our cognition of God he is at once knower\nand known; our being and all being is a being known by him; our\nself-consciousness is a consciousness of being known by God: _cogitor, ergo\ncogito et sum_; my being and thinking are based on my being thought by\nGod. Conscience is a joint knowing with God's knowing (_conscientia_).\nThe relation between the known and the knower is threefold. Cognition is\nincomplete and lacks the free co-operation of the knower when God merely\npervades (_durchwohnt_) the creature, as is the case with the devil's\ntimorous and reluctant knowledge of God. A higher stage is reached when the\nknown is present to the knower and dwells with him (_beiwohnt_). Cognition\nbecomes really free and perfect when God dwells in (_inwohnt_) the\ncreature, in which case the finite reason yields itself freely and in\nadmiration to the divine reason, lets the latter speak in itself, and\nfeels its rule, not as foreign, but as its own. (Baader maintains a like\nthreefoldness in the practical sphere: the creature is either the object\nor, rather, the passive recipient, or the organ, or the representative of\nthe divine action, i.e., in the first case, God alone works; in the second,\nhe co-operates with the creature; in the third, the creature works with the\nforces and in the name of God. Joyful obedience, conscious of its grounds,\nis the highest freedom). Knowing and loving, thought and volition,\nknowledge and faith, philosophy and dogma are as little to be abstractly\ndivided as thing and self, being and thought, object and subject. True\nfreedom and genuine speculation are neither blind traditional belief nor\ndoubting, God-estranged thinking, but the free recognition of authority,\nand self-attained conviction of the truth of the Church doctrine.\n\nBaader distinguishes a twofold creation of the world and a double process\nof development (an esoteric and an exoteric revelation) of God himself.\nThe creation of the ideal world, as a free act of love, is a non-deducible\nfact; the theogonic process, on the contrary, is a necessary event by which\nGod becomes a unity returning from division to itself, and so a living God.\nThe eternal self-generation of God is a twofold birth: in the immanent\nor logical process the unsearchable will (Father) gives birth to the\ncomprehensible will (Son) to unite with it as Spirit; the place of this\nself-revelation is wisdom or the Idea. In the emanent or real process,\nsince desire or nature is added to the Idea and is overcome by it, these\nthree moments become actual persons. In the creation of the--at first\nimmaterial--world, in which God unites, not with his essence, but with\nhis image only, the same two powers, desire and wisdom, operate as the\nprinciples of matter and form. The materialization of the world is a\nconsequence of the fall. Evil consists in the elevation of selfhood, which\nsprings from desire, into self-seeking. Lucifer fell because of pride, and\nman, yielding to Lucifer's temptation, from baseness, by falling in love\nwith nature beneath him. By the creation of matter God has out of pity\npreserved the world, which was corrupted by the fall, from the descent into\nhell, and at the same time has given man occasion for moral endeavor.\nThe appearance of Christ, the personification of the moral law, is the\nbeginning of reconciliation, which man appropriates through the sacrament.\nNature participates in the redemption, as in the corruption.\n\nFriedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in 1768 at Breslau, and died\nin 1834 in Berlin, where he had become preacher at Trinity church in 1809,\nprofessor of theology in 1810, member of the philosophical section of the\nAcademy in 1811, and its secretary in 1814. Reared in the Moravian schools\nat Niesky and Barby, he studied at Halle; and, between 1794 and 1804, was a\npreacher in Landsberg on the Warthe, in Berlin (at the Charit\u00e9 Hospital),\nand in Stolpe, then professor in Halle. He first attracted attention by the\noften republished _Discourses on Religion addressed to the Educated among\nthose who despise it_, 1799 (critical edition by P\u00fcnjer, 1879), which was\nfollowed in the succeeding year by the _Monologues_, and the anonymous\n_Confidential Letters on Lucinde (Lucinde_ was the work of his friend Fr.\nSchlegel). Besides several collections of sermons, mention must further\nbe made of his _Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethics_, 1803; _The\nCelebration of Christmas_, 1806; and his chief theological work, _The\nChristian Faith_, 1822, new edition 1830. In the third (the philosophical)\ndivision of his _Collected Works_ (1835-64) the second and third volumes\ncontain the essays on the history of philosophy, on ethical, and on\nacademic subjects; vols. vi. to ix., the Lectures on Psychology, Esthetics,\nthe Theory of the State, and Education, edited by George, Lommatsch,\nBrandis, and Platz; and the first part of vol. iv., the _History of\nPhilosophy_ (to Spinoza), edited by Ritter. The _Monologues_ and _The\nCelebration of Christmas_ have appeared in _Reclam's Bibliothek_.\n\nSchleiermacher's philosophy is a rendezvous for the most diverse systems.\nSide by side with ideas from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling we meet Platonic,\nSpinozistic, and Leibnitzian elements; even Jacobi and the Romanticists\nhave contributed their mite. Schleiermacher is an eclectic, but one who,\namid the fusion of the most diverse ideas, knows how to make his own\nindividuality felt. In spite of manifold echoes of the philosophemes of\nearlier and of contemporary thinkers, his system is not a conglomeration\nof unrelated lines of thought, but resembles a plant, which in its own way\nworks over and assimilates the nutritive elements taken up from the\nsoil. Schleiermacher is attractive rather than impressive; he is less a\ndiscoverer than a critic and systematizer. His fine critical sense works in\nthe service of a positive aim, subserves a harmonizing tendency; he\ntakes no pleasure in breaking to pieces, but in adjusting, limiting, and\ncombining. There is no one of the given views which entirely satisfies him,\nnone which simply repels him; each contains elements which seem to him\nworthy of transformation and adoption. When he finds himself confronted by\na sharp conflict of opinion, he seeks by careful mediation to construct\na whole out of the two \"half truths,\" though this, it is true, does not\nalways give a result more satisfactory than the partial views which he\nwishes to reconcile. A single example may be given of this conciliatory\ntendency: space, time, and the categories are not only subjective forms of\nknowledge, but at the same time objective forms of reality. \"Not only\"\nis the watchword of his philosophy, which became the prototype of the\nnumberless \"ideal realisms\" with which Germany was flooded after Hegel's\ndeath. If the skeptical and eclectic movements, which constantly make their\nappearance together, are elsewhere divided among different thinkers, they\nhere come together in one mind in the form of a mediating criticism, which,\nalthough it argues logically, is yet in the end always guided by the\ninvisible cords of a _feeling_ of justice in matters scientific. In its\nweaker portions Schleiermacher's philosophy is marked by lack of grasp,\npettiness, and sportiveness. It lacks courage and force, and the rare\ndelicacy of the thought is not entirely able to compensate for this defect.\nIn its fear of one-sidedness it takes refuge in the arms of an often\nfaint-hearted policy of reconciliation.\n\nWe shall not discuss the specifically theological achievements of this\nmany-sided man, nor his great services in behalf of the philological\nknowledge of the history of philosophy--through his translation of Plato,\n1804-28, and a series of valuable essays on Greek thinkers--but shall\nconfine our attention to the leading principles of his theory of knowledge,\nof religion, and of ethics.\n\nThe _Dialectic_[1] (edited by Jonas, 1839), treats in a transcendental part\nand a technical or formal part of the concept and the forms of knowledge.\n_Knowledge_ is thought. What distinguishes that thought which we call\nknowledge from that other thought which does not deserve this honorable\ntitle, from mere opinion? Two criteria: its agreement with the thought of\nother thinkers (its universality and necessity), and its agreement with\nthe being which is thought in it. That thought alone is knowledge which is\nrepresented as necessarily valid for all who are capable of thought, and\nas corresponding to a being or reproducing it. These two agreements (among\nthinkers, and of thought with the being which is thought) are the criteria\nof knowledge--let us turn now to its factors. These are essentially the\ntwo brought forward by Kant, sensibility and understanding; Schleiermacher\ncalls them the organic function and the intellectual function. The organic\nactivity of the senses furnishes us, in sensations, the unordered, manifold\nmaterial of knowledge, which is formed and unified by the activity of\nreason. If we except two concepts which limit our knowledge, chaos and\nGod--absolute formlessness or chaos is an idea just as incapable of\nrealization as absolute unity or deity--every actual cognition is a product\nof both factors, of the sensuous organization and of reason. But these two\ndo not play equal parts in every cognitive act. When the organic function\nis predominant we have perception; when the intellectual function\npredominates we have thought in the strict sense. A perfect balance of the\ntwo would be intuition, which, however, constitutes the goal of knowledge,\nnever fully to be realized. These two kinds of knowledge, therefore, are\nnot specifically, but only relatively, different: in all perception reason\nis also active, and in all thought sensibility, only to a less degree than\nthe opposite function. Moreover, perception and thought, or sensibility and\nreason, are by no means to relate to different objects. They have the same\nobject, only that the organic activity represents it as an indefinite,\nchaotic manifold, while the activity of reason (whose work consists\nin discrimination and combination), represents it as a well-ordered\nmultiplicity and unity. It is the same being which is represented by\nperception in the form of an \"image,\" and by thought in the form of a\n\"concept.\" In the former case we have the world as chaos; in the latter, we\nhave it as cosmos. Inasmuch as the two factors in knowledge represent the\nsame object in relatively different ways, it may be said of them that they\nare opposed to each other, and yet identical. The same is true of the two\nmodes of being which Schleiermacher posits as real and ideal over against\nthe two factors in thought. The real is that which corresponds to the\norganic function, the ideal that which corresponds to the activity of\nreason. These forms of being also are opposed, and yet identical. Our\nself-consciousness gives clear proof of the fact that _thought and being_\ncan be _identical_; in it, as thinking being, we have the identity of the\nreal and the ideal, of being and thought immediately given. As the ego,\nin which the subject of thought and the object of thought are one, is the\nundivided ground of its several activities, so God is the primal unity,\nwhich lies at the basis of the totality of the world. As in Schelling, the\nabsolute is described as self-identical, absolute unity, exalted above\nthe antithesis of real and ideal, nay, above all antitheses. God is the\nnegation of opposites, the world the totality of them. If there were\nan adequate knowledge of the absolute identity it would be an absolute\nknowledge. This is denied, however, to us men, who are never able to rise\nabove the opposition of sensuous and intellectual cognition. The unity of\nthought and being is presupposed in all thinking, but can never actually\nbe thought. As an Idea this identity is indispensable, but to think it\ndefinitely, either by conception or judgment, is impossible. The concepts\nsupreme power (God or creative nature) and supreme cause (fate or\nprovidence) do not attain to that which we seek to think in them: that\nwhich has in it no opposition is an idea incapable of realization by man,\nbut, nevertheless, a necessary ideal, the presupposition of all cognition\n(and volition), and the ground of all certitude. All knowledge must be\nrelated to the absolute unity and be accompanied by it. Since, then, the\nabsolute identity cannot be presented, but ever sought for only, and\nabsolute knowledge exists only as an ideal, dialectic is not so much a\nscience as a technique of thought and proof, an introduction to philosophic\nthinking or (since knowledge is thought in common) to discussion in\nconformity with the rules of the art. With this the name dialectic returns\nto its original Platonic meaning.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Quaebicker, _Ueber Schleiermachers erkeuntnisstheoretische\nGrundansicht_, 1871, and the _Inquiries_ by Bruno Weiss in the _Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr Philosophie_, vols. lxxiii.-lxxv., 1878-79.]\n\nThe popular ideas of God ill stand examination by the standard furnished\nby the principle of identity. The plurality of attributes which we are\naccustomed to ascribe to God agree but poorly with his unity free from all\ncontrariety. In reality God does not possess these manifold attributes;\nthey first arise in the religious consciousness, in which his unconditioned\nand undivided working is variously reflected and, as it were, divided. They\nare only the various reflections of his undivided nature in the mind of\nthe observer. In God ability and performance, intelligence and will, his\nthought of self and his thought of the world coincide in one. Even\nthe concept of personality must not be ascribed to God, since it is a\nlimitation of the infinite and belongs to mythology; while the idea of\nlife, on the contrary, is allowable as a protection against atheism and\nfatalism. When Schleiermacher, further, equates the activity of God and the\ncausality of nature he ranges himself on the pantheistic side in regard\nto the question of the \"immanence or transcendence of God,\" without being\nwilling to acknowledge it. It sounds Spinozistic enough when he says: God\nnever was without the world, he exists neither before nor outside it, we\nknow him only _in_ us and in things. Besides that which he actually brings\nforth, God could not produce anything further, and just as little does he\nmiraculously interfere in the course of the world as regulated by natural\nlaw. Everything takes place necessarily, and man is distinguished above\nother beings neither by freedom (if by freedom we understand anything more\nthan inner necessitation) nor by eternal existence. Like all individual\nbeings, so we are but changing states in the life of the universe, which,\nas they have arisen, will disappear again. The common representations of\nimmortality, with their hope of future compensation, are far from pious.\nThe true immortality of religion is this--amid finitude to become one with\nthe infinite, and in one moment to be eternal.\n\nSchleiermacher's optimism well harmonizes with this view of the relation\nbetween God and the world. If the universe is the phenomenon of the\ndivine activity, then considered as a whole it is perfect; whatever of\nimperfection we find in it, is merely the inevitable result of finitude.\nThe bad is merely the less perfect; everything is as good as it can be;\nthe world is the best possible; everything is in its right place; even the\nmeanest thing is indispensable; even the mistakes of men are to be treated\nwith consideration. All is good and divine. In this way Schleiermacher\nweds ideas from Spinoza to Leibnitzian conceptions. From the former he\nappropriates pantheism, from the latter optimism and the concept of\nindividuality; he shares determinism with both: all events, even the\ndecisions of the will, are subject to the law of necessity.\n\nIn the _philosophy of religion_ Schleiermacher created a new epoch by his\nseparation between religion and related departments with which it had often\nbeen identified before his time, as it has been since. In its origin and\nessence religion is not a matter of knowing, further, not a matter of\nwilling, but a matter of the heart. It lies quite outside the sphere of\nspeculation and of practice, coincides neither with metaphysics nor with\nethics, is not knowledge and not volition, but an intermediate third: it\nhas its own province in the emotional nature, where it reigns without\nlimitation; its essence is intuition and feeling in undivided unity. In\n_feeling_ is revealed the presence of the infinite; in feeling we become\nimmediately aware of the Deity. The absolute, which in cognition and\nvolition we only presuppose and demand, but never attain, is actually\ngiven in feeling alone as the relative identity and the common ground\nof cognition and volition. Religion is _piety_, an affective, not an\nobjective, consciousness. And if certain religious ideas and actions\nally themselves with the pious state of mind, these are not essential\nconstituents of religion, but derivative elements, which possess a\nreligious significance only in so far as they immediately develop from\npiety and exert an influence upon it. That which makes an act religious\nis always feeling as a point of indifference between knowing and doing,\nbetween receptive and forthgoing activity, as the center and junction\nof all the powers of the soul, as the very focus of personality. And as\nfeeling in general is the middle point in the life of the soul, so, again,\nthe religious feeling is the root of all genuine feeling. What sort of a\nfeeling, then, is piety? Schleiermacher answers: A feeling of _absolute\ndependence_. Dependence on what? On the universe, on God. Religion grows\nout of the longing after the infinite, it is the sense and taste for the\nAll, the direction toward the eternal, the impulse toward the absolute\nunity, immediate experience of the world harmony; like art, religion is the\nimmediate apprehension of a whole. In and before God all that is individual\ndisappears, the religious man sees one and the same thing in all that is\nparticular. To represent all events in the world as actions of a God,\nto see God in all and all in God, to feel one's self one with the\neternal,--this is religion. As we look on all being within us and without\nas proceeding from the world-ground, as determined by an ultimate cause, we\nfeel ourselves dependent on the divine causality. Like all that is finite,\nwe also are the effect of the absolute Power. While we stand in a relation\nof interaction with the individual parts of the world, and feel ourselves\npartially free in relation to them, we can only receive effects from God\nwithout answering them; even our self-activity we have from him.\nNevertheless the feeling of dependence is not to be depressing, not\nhumbling merely, but the joyous sense of an exaltation and broadening of\nlife. In our devotion to the universe we participate in the life of the\nuniverse; by leaning on the infinite we supplement our finitude--religion\nmakes up for the needy condition of man by bringing him into relation with\nthe absolute, and teaching him to know and to feel himself a part of the\nwhole.\n\nFrom this elevating influence of religion, which Schleiermacher eloquently\ndepicts, it is at once evident that his definition of it as a feeling of\nabsolute dependence is only half correct. It needs to be supplemented by\nthe feeling of freedom, which exalts us by the consciousness of the oneness\nof the human reason and the divine. It is only to this side of religion,\nneglected by Schleiermacher, that we can ascribe its inspiring influence,\nwhich he in vain endeavors to derive from the feeling of dependence. Power\ncan never spring from humility as such. This defect, however, does not\ndetract from Schleiermacher's merit in assigning to religion a special\nfield of spiritual activity. While Kant treats religion as an appendix to\nethics, and Hegel, with a one-sidedness which is still worse, reduces it to\nan undeveloped form of knowledge, Schleiermacher recognizes that it is\nnot a mere concomitant phenomenon--whether an incidental result or a\npreliminary stage--of morality or cognition, but something independent,\nco-ordinate with volition and cognition, and of equal legitimacy. The proof\nthat religion has its habitation in feeling is the more deserving of thanks\nsince it by no means induced Schleiermacher to overlook the connection of\nthe God-consciousness with self-consciousness and the consciousness of\nthe world. Schleiermacher's theory, moreover, may be held correct without\nignoring the relatively legitimate elements in the views of religion which\nhe attacked. With the view that religion has its seat in feeling, it is\nquite possible to combine a recognition of the fact that it has its origin\nin the will, and its basis in morals, and that, further, it has the\nsignificance of being (to use Schopenhauer's words) the \"metaphysics of the\npeople.\"\n\nAlthough religion and piety be made synonymous, it must still be admitted\nthat in a being capable of knowing and willing as well as of feeling, this\ndevout frame will have results in the spheres of cognition and action. In\nregard to _cultus_ Schleiermacher maintains that a religious observance\nwhich does not spring from one's own feeling and find an echo therein is\nsuperstitious, and demands that religious feeling, like a sacred melody,\naccompany all human action, that everything be done with religion, nothing\nfrom religion. Instead of expressing itself in single specifically\nreligious actions, the religious feeling should uniformly pervade the whole\nlife. Let a private room be the temple where the voice of the priest is\nraised. Dogmas, again, are descriptions of pious excitation, and take their\norigin in man's reflection on his religious feelings, in his endeavor to\nexplain them, in his expression of them in ideas and words. The concepts\nand principles of theology are valid only as descriptions and presentations\nof feelings, not as cognitions; by their unavoidable anthropomorphic\ncharacter alone they are completely unfitted for science. The dogmatic\nsystem is an envelopment which religion accepts with a smile. He who treats\nreligious doctrines as science falls into empty mythology. Principles of\nfaith and principles of knowledge are in no way related to one another,\nneither by way of opposition nor by way of agreement; they never come into\ncontact. A theology in the sense of an actual science of God is impossible.\nFurther, out of its dogmas the Church constructs prescriptive symbols, a\nstep which must be deplored. It is to be hoped that some time religion will\nno longer have need of the Church. In view of the present condition of\naffairs it must be said that the more religious a man is the more secular\nhe must become, and that the cultured man opposes the Church in order to\npromote religion.\n\nSo-called natural religion is nothing more than an abstraction of thought;\nin reality positive religions alone exist. Because of the infinity of God\nand the finitude of man, the one, universal, eternal religion can only\nmanifest itself in the form of particular historical religions, which\nare termed revealed because founded by religious heroes, creative\npersonalities, in whom an especially lively religious feeling is aroused by\na new view of the universe, and determines (not, like artistic inspiration,\nsingle moments, but) their whole existence. Three stages are to be\ndistinguished in the development of religion, according as the world is\nrepresented as an unordered unity (chaos), or as an indeterminate manifold\nof forces and elements (plurality without unity), or, finally, as an\norganized plurality dominated by unity (system)--fetichism with fatalism,\npolytheism, mono- (including pan-) theism. Among the religions of the third\nstadium Islam is physical or aesthetic in spirit; Judaism and Christianity,\non the other hand, ethical or teleological. The Christian religion is\nthe most perfect, because it gives the central place to the concept\nof redemption and reconciliation (hence to that which is essential to\nreligion) instead of to the Jewish idea of retribution.\n\nThe concept of individuality became of the highest importance for\nSchleiermacher's ethics, as well as for his philosophy of religion; and\nby his high appreciation of it he ranges himself with Leibnitz, Herder,\nGoethe, and Novalis. Now two sides may be distinguished both in regard to\nthat which the individual is and to that which he ought to accomplish. Like\nevery particular being, man is an abbreviated, concentrated presentation of\nthe universe; he contains everything in himself, contains all, that is, in\na not yet unfolded, germinal manner, awaiting development in life in time,\nbut yet in a form peculiar to him, which is never repeated elsewhere. This\nyields a twofold moral task. The individual ought to rouse into actuality\nthe infinite fullness of content which he possesses as possibility, as\nslumbering germs, should harmoniously develop his capacities; yet in this\nhe must not look upon the unique form which has been bestowed upon him\nas worthless. He is not to feel himself a mere specimen, an unimportant\nrepetition of the type, but as a particular, and in this particularity a\nsignificant, expression of the absolute, whose omission would cause a gap\nin the world. It is surprising that the majority of the thinkers who\nhave defended the value of individuality lay far less stress upon the\nmicro-cosmical nature of the individual and the development of his\ncapacities in all directions than on care for his peculiar qualities.\nSo also Schleiermacher. Yet he gradually returned from the extreme\nindividualism--the _Monologues_ affect one almost repellently by the\nimpulse which they give to vain self-reflection--which he at first\ndefended.\n\nIn the _Ethics_ (edited by Kirchmann, 1870; earlier editions by Schweizer,\n1835, and Twesten, 1841) Schleiermacher brings the well-nigh forgotten\nconcept of goods again into honor. The three points of view from which\nethics is to be discussed, and each of which presents the whole ethical\nfield in its own peculiar way--the good, virtue, duty--are related as\nresultant, force, and law of motion. Every union of reason and nature\nproduced by the action of the former on the latter is called a _good_; the\nsum of these unities, the highest good. According as reason uses nature\nas an instrument in formation or as a symbol in cognition her action is\nformative or indicative; it is, further, either common or peculiar. On the\ncrossing of these (fluctuating) distinctions of identical and individual\norganization and symbolization is based the division of the theory of\ngoods:\n\n                      SPHERES.      RELATIONS.        GOODS.\n  _Ident. Organ.:_    Intercourse.  Right.            The State.\n  _Individ. Organ.:_  Property.     Free Sociability. Class, House,\n                                                        Friendship.\n  _Ident. Symbol.:_   Knowledge.    Faith.            School and\n                                                        University.\n  _Individ. Symbol.:_ Feeling.      Revelation.       The Church\n                                                             (Art).\n\nThe four ethical communities, each of which represents the organic union\nof opposites--rulers and subjects, host and guests, teachers and pupils\nor scholars and the public, the clergy and the laity--have for their\nfoundation the family and the unity of the nation. Virtue (the personal\nunification of reason and sensibility) is either disposition or skill, and\nin each case either cognitive or presentative; this yields the cardinal\nvirtues wisdom, love, discretion, and perseverance. The division of duties\ninto duties of right, duties of love, duties of vocation, and duties of\nconscience rests on the distinction between community in production and\nappropriation, each of which may be universal or individual. The most\ngeneral laws of duty (duty is the Idea of the good in an imperative form)\nrun: Act at every instant with all thy moral power, and aiming at thy whole\nmoral problem; act with all virtues and in view of all goods, further,\nAlways do that action which is most advantageous for the whole sphere of\nmorality, in which two different factors are included: Always do that\ntoward which thou findest thyself inwardly moved, and that to which thou\nfindest thyself required from without. Instead of following further the\nwearisome schematism of Schleiermacher's ethics, we may notice, finally,\na fundamental thought which our philosopher also discussed by itself:\nThe sharp contraposition of natural and moral law, advocated by Kant, is\nunjustifiable; the moral law is itself a law of nature, viz., of rational\nwill. It is true neither that the moral law is a mere \"ought\" nor that the\nlaw of nature is a mere \"being,\" a universally followed \"must.\" For, on the\none hand, ethics has to do with the law which human action really follows,\nand, on the other, there are violations of rule in nature also. Immorality,\nthe imperfect mastery of the sensuous impulses by rational will, has an\nanalogue in the abnormalities--deformities and diseases--in nature, which\nshow that here also the higher (organic) principles are not completely\nsuccessful in controlling the lower processes. The higher law everywhere\nsuffers disturbances, from the resistance of the lower forces, which cannot\nbe entirely conquered. It is Schleiermacher's determinism which leads him,\nin view of the parallelism of the two legislations, to overlook their\nessential distinction.\n\nAdherents of Schleiermacher are Vorl\u00e4nder (died 1867), George (died 1874),\nthe theologian, Richard Rothe (died 1867; cf. Nippold, 1873 _seq_.), and\nthe historians of philosophy, Brandis (died 1867) and H. Ritter (died\n1869).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: W. Dilthey (born 1834), the successor of Lotze in Berlin, is\npublishing a life of Schleiermacher (vol. i. 1867-70). Cf. also Dilthey's\nbriefer account in the _Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, and Haym's\n_Romantische Schule_, 1870. Further, _Aus Schleiermachers Leben, in\nBriefen_, 4 vols., 1858-63.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nHEGEL.\n\nGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart on August 27, 1770. He\nattended the gymnasium of his native city, and, from 1788, the T\u00fcbingen\nseminary as a student of theology; while in 1793-1800 he resided as a\nprivate tutor in Berne and Frankfort-on-the-Main. In the latter city the\nplan of his future system was already maturing. A manuscript outline\ndivides philosophy, following the ancient division, logic, physics, and\nethics, into three parts, the first of which (the fundamental science, the\ndoctrine of the categories and of method, combining logic and metaphysics)\nconsiders the absolute as pure Idea, while the second considers it as\nnature, and the third as real (ethical) spirit. Hegel habilitated in 1801\nat Jena, with a Latin dissertation _On the Orbits of the Planets_, in\nwhich, ignorant of the discovery of Ceres, he maintained that on rational\ngrounds--assuming that the number-series given in Plato's _Timaeus_ is the\ntrue order of nature--no additional planet could exist between Mars and\nJupiter. This dissertation gives, further, a deduction of Kepler's laws.\nThe essay on the _Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling_\nhad appeared even previous to this. In company with Schelling he edited in\n1802-03 the _Kritisches Journal der Philosophie_. The article on \"Faith and\nKnowledge\" published in this journal characterizes the standpoint of Kant,\nJacobi, and Fichte as that of reflection, for which finite and infinite,\nbeing and thought form an antithesis, while true _speculation_ grasps these\nin their identity. In the night before the battle of Jena Hegel finished\nthe revision of his _Phenomenology of Spirit_, which was published in 1807.\nThe extraordinary professorship given him in 1805 he was forced to resign\non account of financial considerations; then he was for a year a newspaper\neditor in Bamberg, and in 1808 went as a gymnasial rector to Nuremberg,\nwhere he instructed the higher classes in philosophy. His lectures there\nare printed in the eighteenth volume of his works, under the title\n_Propaedeutic_. In the Nuremberg period fell his marriage and the\npublication of the _Logic_ (vol. i. 1812, vol. ii. 1816). In 1816 he was\ncalled as professor of philosophy to Heidelberg (where the _Encyclopedia_\nappeared, 1817), and two years later to Berlin. The _Outlines of the\nPhilosophy of Right_, 1821, is the only major work which was written in\nBerlin. The _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Kritik_, founded in 1827 as\nan organ of the school, contained a few critiques, but for the rest he\ndevoted his whole strength to his lectures. He fell a victim to the cholera\non November 14, 1831. The collected edition of his works in eighteen\nvolumes (1832-45) contains in vols. ii.-viii. the four major works which\nhad been published by Hegel himself (the _Encyclopaedia_ with additions\nfrom the Lectures); in vols. i., xvi., and xvii. the minor treatises; in\nvols. ix.-xv. the Lectures, edited by Cans, Hotho, Marheineke, and\nMichelet. The Letters from and to Hegel have been added as a nineteenth\nvolume, under the editorship of Karl Hegel, 1887.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hegel's Life has been written by Karl Rosenkranz (1844), who\nhas also defended the master (_Apologie Hegels_, 1858) against R.\nHaym _(Hegel und seine Zeit,_ 1857), and extolled him as the national\nphilosopher of Germany (1870; English by G.S. Hall). Cf., further, the\nneat popular exposition by Karl K\u00f6stlin, 1870, and the essays by Ed. von\nHartmann, _Ueber die dialektische Methode_, 1868, and _Hegels Panlogismus_\n(1870, incorporated in the _Gesammelte Studien und Aufs\u00e4tze_, 1876). [The\nEnglish reader may consult E. Caird's _Hegel_ in Blackwood's Philosophical\nClassics, 1883; Harris's _Hegel's Logic_, Morris's _Hegel's Philosophy of\nthe State and of History_, and Kedney's _Hegel's Aesthetics_ in Griggs's\nPhilosophical Classics; and Wallace's translation of the \"Logic\"--from\nthe _Encyclopaedia_--with Prolegomena, 1874, 2d. ed., Translation, 1892,\nProlegomena to follow. Stirling's _Secret of Hegel, 2_ vols., London, 1865,\nincludes a translation of a part of the _Logic_, and numerous translations\nfrom different works of the master are to be found in the _Journal of\nSpeculative Philosophy_. The _Lectures on the Philosophy of History_ have\nbeen translated by J. Sibree, M.A., in Bohn's Library, 1860, and E.S.\nHaldane is issuing a translation of those on the _History of Philosophy_,\nvol. i., 1892.--TR.]]\n\nWe may preface our exposition of the parts of the system by some remarks on\nHegel's standpoint in general and his scientific method.\n\n\n%1. Hegel's View of the World and his Method.%\n\nIn Hegel there revives in full vigor the intellectualism which from the\nfirst had lain in the blood of German philosophy, and which Kant's moralism\nhad only temporarily restrained. The primary of practical reason is\ndiscarded, and theory is extolled as the ground, center, and aim of human,\nnay, of all existence.\n\nLeibnitz and Hegel are the classical representatives of the\nintellectualistic view of the world. In the former the subjective\npsychological point of view is dominant, in the latter, the objective\ncosmical position: Leibnitz argues from the representative nature of the\nsoul to an analogous constitution of all elements of the universe; from the\ngeneral mission of all that is real, to be a manifestation of reason, Hegel\ndeduces that of the individual spirit, to realize a determinate series of\nstages of thought. The true reality is reason; all being is the embodiment\nof a pregnant thought, all becoming a movement of the concept, the world a\ndevelopment of thought. The absolute or the logical Idea exists first as\na system of antemundane concepts, then it descends into the unconscious\nsphere of nature, awakens to self-consciousness in man, realizes its\ncontent in social institutions, in order, finally, in art, religion, and\nscience to return to itself enriched and completed, _i.e._, to attain a\nhigher absoluteness than that of the beginning. Philosophy is the\nhighest product and the goal of the world-process. As will, intuition,\nrepresentation, and feeling are lower forms of thought, so ethics, art, and\nreligion are preliminary stages in philosophy; for it first succeeds in\nthat which these vainly attempt, in presenting the concept adequately, in\nconceptual form.\n\nIf we develop that which is contained as a constituent factor or by\nimplication in the intellectualistic thesis, \"All being is thought\nrealized, all becoming a development of thought,\" we reach the following\ndefinitions: (i) The object of philosophy is formed by the Ideas of things.\nIts aim is to search out the concept, the purpose, the significance of\nphenomena, and to assign to these their corresponding positions in\nthe world and in the system of knowledge. It is chiefly interested in\ndiscovering where in the scale of values a thing belongs according to\nits meaning and its destination; the procedure is teleological, valuing,\naesthetic. Instead of a causal explanation of phenomena we are given an\nideal interpretation of them. (So Lotze accurately describes the character\nof German idealism.) (2) If all that is real is a manifestation of reason\nand each thing a stage, a modification of thought, then thought and being\nare identical. (3) If the world is thought in becoming, and philosophy has\nto set forth this process, philosophy is a theory of development. If each\nthing realizes a thought, then all that is real is rational; and if the\nworld-process attains its highest stadium in philosophy, and this in\nturn its completion in the system of absolute idealism, then all that is\nrational is real. Reason or the Idea is not merely a demand, a longed for\nideal, but a world-power which accomplishes its own realization. \"The\nrational is real and the real is rational\" (Preface to the _Philosophy of\nRight_). Or to sum it up--Hegel's philosophy is _idealism, a system\nof identity, and an optimistic doctrine of development_. What, then,\ndistinguishes Hegel from other idealists, philosophers of identity, and\nteachers of development? What in particular distinguishes him from his\npredecessor Schelling?\n\nIn Schelling nature is the subject and art the conclusion of the\ndevelopment; his idealism has a physical and aesthetical character, as\nFichte's an ethical character. In Hegel, however, the concept is the\nsubject and goal of the development, his philosophy is, in the words of\nHaym, a \"_Logisierung_\" of the world, a _logical idealism_.\n\nThe theory of identity is that system which looks upon nature and spirit as\none in essence and as phenomenal modes of an absolute which is above them\nboth. But while Schelling treats the real and the ideal as having equal\nrights, Hegel restores the Fichtean subordination of nature to spirit,\nwithout, however, sharing Fichte's contempt for nature. Nature is neither\nco-ordinate with spirit nor a mere instrument for spirit, but a transition\nstage in the development of the absolute, viz., the Idea in its other-being\n_(Anderssein)_. It is spirit itself that becomes nature in order to become\nactual, conscious spirit; before the absolute became nature it was already\nspirit, not, indeed, \"for itself\" _(f\u00fcr sich)_, yet \"in itself\" _(an\nsich)_, it was Idea or reason. The ideal is not merely the morning which\nfollows the night of reality, but also the evening which precedes it.\nThe absolute (the concept) develops from in-itself _(Ansich)_ through\nout-of-self _(Aussersich)_ or other-being to for-itself _(F\u00fcrsich)_; it\nexists first as reason (system of logical concepts), then as nature,\nfinally as living spirit. Thus Hegel's philosophy of identity is\ndistinguished from Schelling's by two factors: it subordinates nature to\nspirit, and conceives the absolute of the beginning not as the indifference\nof the real and ideal, but as ideal, as a realm of eternal thoughts.\n\nThe assertion that Hegel represents a synthesis of Fichte and Schelling is\ntherefore justified. This is true, further, for the character of Hegel's\nthought as a whole, in so far as it follows a middle course between the\nworld-estranged, rigid abstractness of Fichte's thinking and Schelling's\nartistico-fanciful intuition, sharing with the former its logical\nstringency as well as its dominant interest in the philosophy of spirit,\nand with the latter its wide outlook and its sense for the worth and the\nrichness of that which is individual.\n\nWe have characterized Hegel's system, thirdly, as a philosophy of\ndevelopment. The point of distinction here is that Hegel carries out with\nlogical consecutiveness and up to the point of obstinacy the principle\nof development which Fichte had discovered, and which Schelling also\nhad occasionally employed,--the threefold rhythm _thesis, antithesis,\nsynthesis_. Here we come to Hegel's _dialectic method_. He reached this as\nthe true method of speculation through a comparison of the two forms of\nphilosophy which he found dominant at the beginning of his career--the\nIllumination culminating in Kant, on the one hand, and, on the other, the\ndoctrine of identity defended by Schelling and his circle--neither of which\nentirely satisfied him.\n\nIn regard to the main question he feels himself one with Schelling:\nphilosophy is to be metaphysics, the science of the absolute and its\nimmanence in the world, the doctrine of the identity of opposites, of the,\n_per se_ of things, not merely of their phenomenon. But the form which\nSchelling had given it seems to him unscientific, unsystematic, for\nSchelling had based philosophical knowledge on the intuition of genius--and\nscience from intuition is impossible. The philosophy of the Illumination\nimpresses him, on the other hand, by the formal strictness of its inquiry;\nhe agrees with it that philosophy must be science from concepts. Only not\nfrom abstract concepts. Kant and the Illumination stand on the platform\nof reflection, for which the antithesis of thought and being, finite and\ninfinite remains insoluble, and, consequently, the absolute transcendent,\nand the true essence of things unknowable. Hegel wishes to combine the\nadvantages of both sides, the depth of content of the one, and the\nscientific form of the other.\n\nThe intuition with which Schelling works is immediate cognition, directed\nto the concrete and particular. The concept of the philosophy of reflection\nis mediate cognition, moving in the sphere of the abstract and universal.\nIs it not feasible to do away with the (unscientific) immediateness of the\none, and the (non-intuitive, content-lacking) abstractness of the other,\nto combine the concrete with the mediate or conceptual, and in this way\nto realize the Kantian ideal of an intuitive understanding? _A concrete\nconcept_ would be one which sought the universal not without the\nparticular, but in it; which should not find the infinite beyond the\nfinite, nor the absolute at an unattainable distance above the world, nor\nthe essence hidden behind the phenomenon, but manifesting itself therein.\nIf the philosophy of reflection, in the abstract lifelessness of its\nconcepts, looked on opposites as incapable of sublation, and Schelling\nregarded them as immediately identical, if the former denied the identity\nof opposites, and the latter maintained it primordially given (in the\nabsolute indifference which is to be grasped by intuition), the concrete\nconcept secures the identity of _opposites through self-mediation_, their\npassing over into it; it teaches us to know the identity as the result of a\nprocess. First immediate unity, then divergence of opposites, and, finally,\nreconciliation of opposites--this is the universal law of all development.\n\nThe conflict between the philosophy of reflection and the philosophy of\nintuition, which Hegel endeavors to terminate by a speculation at once\nconceptual and concrete, concerns (1) the organ of thought, (2) the object\nof thought, (3) the nature and logical dignity of the contradiction.\n\nThe organ of the true philosophy is neither the abstract reflective\nunderstanding, which finds itself shut up within the limits of the\nphenomenal, nor mystical intuition, which expects by a quick leap to gain\nthe summit of knowledge concerning the absolute, but reason as the faculty\nof concrete concepts. That concept is concrete which does not assume an\nattitude of cold repulsion toward its contrary, but seeks self-mediation\nwith the latter, and moves from thesis through antithesis, and with it, to\nsynthesis. Reason neither fixes the opposites nor denies them, but has them\nbecome identical. The unity of opposites is neither impossible nor present\nfrom the first, but the result of a development.\n\nThe object of philosophy is not the phenomenal world or the relative, but\nthe absolute, and this not as passive substance, but as living subject,\nwhich divides into distinctions, and returns from them to identity, which\ndevelops through the opposites. The absolute is a process, and all that\nis real the manifestation of this process. If science is to correspond\nto reality, it also must be a process. Philosophy is thought-movement\n(dialectic); it is a system of concepts, each of which passes over into\nits successor, puts its successor forth from itself, just as it has been\ngenerated by its predecessor.\n\nAll reality is development, and the motive force in this development (of\nthe world as well as of science) is opposition, _contradiction_. Without\nthis there would be no movement and no life. Thus all reality is full of\ncontradiction, and yet rational. The contradiction is not that which is\nentirely alogical, but it is a spur to further thinking. It must not\nbe annulled, but \"sublated\" _(aufgehoben), _i.e._, at once negated and\nconserved. This is effected by thinking the contradictory concepts together\nin a third higher, more comprehensive, and richer concept, whose moments\nthey then form. As sublated moments they contradict each other no longer;\nthe opposition or contradiction is overcome. But the synthesis is still\nnot a final one; the play begins anew; again an opposition makes its\nappearance, which in turn seeks to be overcome, etc. Each separate concept\nis one-sided, defective, represents only a part of the truth, needs to be\nsupplemented by its contrary, and, by its union with this, its complement,\nyields a higher concept, which comes nearer to the whole truth, but still\ndoes not quite reach it. Even the last and richest concept--the absolute\nIdea--is by itself alone not the full truth; the result implies the whole\ndevelopment through which it has been attained. It is only at the end\nof such a dialectic of concepts that philosophy reaches complete\ncorrespondence with the living reality, which it has to comprehend; and the\nspeculative progress of thought is no capricious sporting with concepts\non the part of the thinking subject, but the adequate expression of\nthe movement of the matter itself. Since the world and its ground is\ndevelopment, it can only be known through a development of concepts. The\nlaw which this follows, in little as in great, is the advance from position\nto opposition, and thence to combination. The most comprehensive example\nof this triad--Idea, Nature, Spirit--gives the division of the system; the\nsecond--Subjective, Objective, Absolute Spirit--determines the articulation\nof the third part.\n\n\n%2. The System.%\n\nHegel began with a _Phenomenology_ by way of introduction, in which (not\nto start, like the school of Schelling, with absolute knowledge \"as though\nshot from a pistol\") he describes the genesis of philosophical cognition\nwith an attractive mingling of psychological and philosophico-historical\npoints of view. He makes spirit--the universal world-spirit as well as\nthe individual consciousness, which repeats in brief the stages in the\ndevelopment of humanity--pass through six stadia, of which the first three\n(consciousness, self-consciousness, reason) correspond to the progress\nof the intermediate part of the Doctrine of Subjective Spirit, which is\nentitled _Ph\u00e4nomenologie_, and the others (ethical spirit, religion, and\nabsolute knowledge) give an abbreviated presentation of that which the\nDoctrine of Objective and Absolute Spirit develops in richer articulation.\n\n%(a) Logic% considers the Idea in the abstract element of thought, only as\nit is thought, and not yet as it is intuited, nor as it thinks itself; its\ncontent is the truth as it is without a veil in and for itself, or God in\nhis eternal essence before the creation of the world. Unlike common logic,\nwhich is merely formal, separating form and content, speculative logic,\nwhich is at the same time ontology or metaphysics, treats the categories as\nreal relations, the forms of thought as forms of reality: as thought and\nthing are the same, so logic is the theory of thought and of being in one.\nIts three principal divisions are entitled _Being, Essence, the Concept_.\nThe first of these discusses quality, quantity, and measure or qualitative\nquantum. The second considers essence as such, appearance, and (essence\nappearing or) actuality, and this last, in turn, in the moments,\nsubstantiality, causality, and reciprocity. The third part is divided into\nthe sections, subjectivity (concept, judgment, syllogism), objectivity\n(mechanism, chemism, teleology), and the Idea (life, cognition, the\nabsolute Idea).\n\nAs a specimen of the way in which Hegel makes the concept pass over into\nits opposite and unite with this in a synthesis, it will be sufficient to\ncite the famous beginning of the _Logic_. How must the absolute first be\nthought, how first defined? Evidently as that which is absolutely without\npresupposition. The most general concept which remains after abstracting\nfrom every determinate content of thought, and from which no further\nabstraction is possible, the most indeterminate and immediate concept, is\npure _being_. As without quality and content it is equivalent to _nothing_.\nIn thinking pure being we have rather cogitated nothing; but this in turn\ncannot be retained as final, but passes back into being, for in being\nthought it exists as a something thought. Pure being and pure nothing are\nthe same, although we mean different things by them; both are absolute\nindeterminateness. The transition from being to nothing and from nothing to\nbeing is _becoming_. Becoming is the unity, and hence the truth of both.\nWhen the boy is \"becoming\" a youth he is, and at the same time is not, a\nyouth. Being and not-being are so mediated and sublated in becoming that\nthey are no longer contradictory. In a similar way it is further shown\nthat quality and quantity are reciprocally dependent and united in measure\n(which may be popularly illustrated thus: progressively diminishing heat\nbecomes cold, distances cannot be measured in bushels); that essence and\nphenomenon are mutually inseparable, inasmuch as the latter is always the\nappearance of an essence, and the former is essence only as it manifests\nitself in the phenomenon, etc.\n\nThe significance of the Hegelian logic depends less on its ingenious and\nvaluable explanations of particulars than on the fundamental idea, that the\ncategories do not form an unordered heap, but a great organically connected\nwhole, in which each member occupies its determinate position, and is\nrelated to every other by gradations of kinship and subordination. This\npurpose to construct a _globus_ of the pure concepts was itself a\nmighty feat, which is assured of the continued admiration of posterity\nnotwithstanding the failure in execution. He who shall one day take it up\nagain will draw many a lesson from Hegel's unsuccessful attempt. Before\nall, the connections between the concepts are too manifold and complex\nfor the monotonous transitions of this dialectic method (which Chalybaeus\nwittily called articular disease) to be capable of doing them justice.\nAgain, the productive force of thought must not be neglected, and to it,\nrather than to the mobility of the categories themselves, the matter of the\ntransition from one to the other must be transferred.\n\n%(b) The Philosophy of Nature% shows the Idea in its other-being. Out of\nthe realm of logical shades, wherein the souls of all reality dwell,\nwe move into the sphere of external, sensuous existence, in which the\nconcepts take on material form. Why does the Idea externalize itself? In\norder to become actual. But the actuality of nature is imperfect, unsuited\nto the Idea, and only the precondition of a better actuality, the actuality\nof spirit, which has been the aim from the beginning: reason becomes\nnature in order to become spirit; the Idea goes forth from itself in\norder--enriched--to return to itself again. Only the man who once has been\nin a foreign land knows his home aright.\n\nThe relation of natural objects to one another and their action upon one\nanother is an external one: they are governed by mechanical necessity,\nand the contingency of influences from without arrests and disturbs their\ndevelopment, so that while reason is everywhere discernible in nature,\nit is not reason alone; and much that is illogical, contrary to purpose,\nlawless, painful, and unhealthy, points to the fact that the essence of\nnature consists in externality. This inadequacy in the realization of the\nIdea, however, is gradually removed by development, until, in \"life,\" the\nway is prepared for the birth of spirit.\n\nAs Hegel in his philosophy of nature--which falls into three parts,\nmechanics, physics, and organics--follows Schelling pretty closely, and,\nmoreover, does not show his power, it does not seem necessary to dwell\nlonger upon it. In the next section, also, in view of the fact that its\nmodels, the constructive psychologies of Fichte and Schelling, have already\nbeen discussed in detail, a statement of the divisions and connections must\nsuffice.\n\n%(c) The Doctrine of Subjective Spirit% makes freedom (being with or in\nself) the essence and destination of spirit, and shows how spirit realizes\nthis predisposition in increasing independence of nature. The subject of\nanthropology is spirit as the (natural, sensitive, and actual) \"soul\" of\na body; here are discussed the distinctions of race, nation, sex, age,\nsleeping and waking, disposition and temperament, together with talents and\nmental diseases, in short, whatever belongs to spirit in its union with a\nbody. Phenomenology is the science of the \"ego,\" i.e., of spirit, in so\nfar as it opposes itself to nature as the non-ego, and passes through the\nstages of (mere) consciousness, self-consciousness, and (the synthesis of\nthe two) reason. Psychology (better pneumatology) considers \"spirit\" in its\nreconciliation with objectivity under the following divisions: Theoretical\nIntelligence as intuition (sensation, attention, intuition), as\nrepresentation (passive memory, phantasy, memory), and (as conceiving,\njudging, reasoning) thought; Practical Intelligence as feeling, impulse\n(passion and caprice), and happiness; finally, the unity of the knowing and\nwilling spirit, free spirit or rational will, which in turn realizes itself\nin right, ethics, and history.\n\n%(d) The Doctrine of Objective Spirit%, comprehending ethics, the\nphilosophy of right, of the state, and of history, is Hegel's most\nbrilliant achievement. It divides as follows: (1) Right (property,\ncontract, punishment); (2) Morality (purpose, intention and welfare, good\nand evil); (3) Social Morality: (a) the family; (b) civil society; (c) the\nstate (internal and external polity, and the history of the world). In\nright the will or freedom attains to outer actuality, in morality it\nattains to inner actuality, in social morality to objective and subjective\nactuality at once, hence to complete actuality.\n\nRight, as it were a second, higher nature, because a necessity posited and\nacknowledged by spirit, is originally a sum of prohibitions; wherever it\nseems to command the negative has only received a positive expression.\nPrivate right contains two things--the warrant to be a person, and the\ninjunction to respect other persons as such. Property is the external\nsphere which the will gives to itself; without property no personality.\nThrough punishment (retaliation) right is restored against un-right\n(_Unrecht_), and the latter shown to be a nullity. The criminal is treated\naccording to the same maxim as that of his action--that coercion is\nallowable.\n\nIn the stadium of morality the good exists in the form of a requirement\nwhich can never be perfectly fulfilled, as a mere imperative; there remains\nan irrepressible opposition between the moral law and the individual will,\nbetween intention and execution. Here the judge of good and evil is the\nconscience, which is not secure against error. That which is objectively\nevil may seem good and a duty to subjective conviction. (According to\nFichte this was impossible).\n\nOn account of the conflict between duty and will, which is at this stage\nirrepressible, Hegel is unable to consider morality, the sphere of the\nsubjective disposition, supreme. He thinks he knows a higher sphere,\nwherein legality and morality become one: \"social morality\"\n(_Sittlichkeit_). This sphere takes its name from _Sitte_, that custom\nruling in the community which is felt by the individual not as a command\nfrom without, but as his own nature. Here the good appears as the spirit\nof the family and of the people, pervading individuals as its substance.\nMarriage is neither a merely legal nor a merely sentimental relation, but\nan \"ethical\" (_sittliches_) institution. While love rules in the family, in\ncivil society each aims at the satisfaction of his private wants, and yet,\nin working for himself, subserves the good of the whole. Class distinctions\nare based on the division of labor demanded by the variant needs of men\n(the agricultural, industrial, and thinking classes). Class and party honor\nis, in Hegel's view, among the most essential supports of general morality.\nStrange to say, he brings the administration of justice and the police into\nthe same sphere.\n\nThe state, the unity of the family and civil society, is the completed\nactualization of freedom. Its organs are the political powers (which are\nto be divided, but not to be made independent): the legislative power\ndetermines the universal, the executive subsumes the particular thereunder,\nthe power of the prince combines both into personal unity. In the will of\nthe prince the state becomes subject. The perfect form of the state is\nconstitutional monarchy, its establishment the goal of history, which\nHegel, like Kant, considers chiefly from the political standpoint.\n\nHistory is the development of the rational state; the world-spirit the\nguiding force in this development; its instruments the spirits of the\nnations and great men. A particular people is the expression of but one\ndeterminate moment of the universal spirit; and when it has fulfilled\nits commission it loses its legal warrant, and yields up its dominion to\nanother, now the only authorized one: the history of the world is the\njudgment of the world, which is held over the nations. The world-historical\ncharacters, also, are only the instruments of a higher power, the purposes\nof which they execute while imagining that they are acting in their own\ninterests--their own deed is hidden from them, and is neither their purpose\nnor their object. This should be called the cunning of reason, that it\nmakes the passions work in its service.\n\nHistory is progress in the consciousness of freedom. At first one only\nknows himself free, then several, finally all. This gives three chief\nperiods, or rather four world-kingdoms,--Oriental despotism, the Greek\n(democratic) and the Roman (aristocratic) republic, and the Germanic\nmonarchy,--in which humanity passes through its several ages. Like the sun,\nhistory moves from east to west. China and India have not advanced beyond\nthe preliminary stages of the state; the Chinese kingdom is a family state,\nIndia a society of classes stiffened into castes. The Persian despotism is\nthe first true state, and this in the form of a conquering military state.\nIn the youth and manhood of humanity the sovereignty of the people replaces\nthe sovereignty of one; but not all have yet the consciousness of freedom,\nthe slaves have no share in the government. The principle of the Greek\nworld, with its fresh life and delight in beauty, is individuality; hence\nthe plurality of small states, in which Sparta is an anticipation of\nthe Roman spirit. The Roman Republic is internally characterized by the\nconstitutional struggle between the patricians and the plebeians, and\nexternally by the policy of world conquest. Out of the repellent relations\nbetween the universal and the individual, which oppose one another as\nthe abstract state and abstract personality, the unhappy imperial period\ndevelops. In the Roman Empire and Judaism the conditions were given for the\nappearance of Christianity. This brings with it the idea of humanity: every\nman is free as man, as a rational being. In the beginning this emancipation\nwas religious; through the Germans it became political as well. The\nremaining divisions cannot here be detailed. Their captions run: The\nElements of the Germanic Spirit (the Migrations; Mohammedanism; the\nFrankish Empire of Charlemagne); the Middle Ages (the Feudal System and the\nHierarchy; the Crusades; the Transition from Feudal Rule to Monarchy,\nor the Cities); Modern Times (the Reformation; its Effect on Political\nDevelopment; Illumination and Revolution).\n\nThe philosophy of history[1] is Hegel's most brilliant and most lasting\nachievement. His view of the state as the absolute end, the complete\nrealization of the good, is dominated, no doubt, by the antique ideal,\nwhich cannot take root again in the humanity of modern times. But his\nsplendid endeavor to \"comprehend\" history, to bring to light the laws of\nhistorical development and the interaction between the different spheres of\nnational life, will remain an example for all time. The leading ideas of\nhis philosophy of history have so rapidly found their way into the general\nscientific consciousness that the view of history which obtained in\nthe period of the Illumination is well nigh incomprehensible to the\ninvestigator of to-day.\n\n[Footnote 1: A well-chosen collection of aphorisms from the philosophy of\nhistory is given by M. Schasler under the title _Hegel: Popul\u00e4re Gedanken\naus seinen Werken_, 2d. ed., 1873.]\n\n%(e) Absolute Spirit% is the unity of subjective and objective spirit.\nAs such, spirit becomes perfectly free (from all contradictions)\nand reconciled with itself. The break between subject and object,\nrepresentation and thing, thought and being, infinite and finite is done\naway with, and the infinite recognized as the essence of the finite. The\nknowledge of the reconciliation of the highest opposites or of the infinite\n_in_ the finite presents itself in three forms: in the form of intuition\n(art), of feeling and representation (religion), of thought (philosophy).\n\n(1) _Aesthetics_.--The beautiful is the absolute (the infinite in the\nfinite) in sensuous existence, the Idea in limited manifestation. According\nto the relation of these moments, according as the outer form or the inner\ncontent predominates, or a balance of the two occurs, we have the symbolic\nform of art, in which the phenomenon predominates and the Idea is merely\nsuggested; or the classical form, in which Idea and intuition, or spiritual\ncontent and sensuous form, completely balance and pervade each other, in\nwhich the former of them is ceaselessly taken up into the latter; or\nthe romantic form, in which the phenomenon retires, and the Idea, the\ninwardness of the spirit predominates. Classical art, in which form and\ncontent are perfectly conformed to each other, is the most beautiful, but\nromantic art is, nevertheless, higher and more significant.\n\nOriental, including Egyptian and Hebrew, art was symbolic; Greek art,\nclassical; Christian art is romantic, bringing into art entirely new\nsentiments of a knightly and a religious sort--love, loyalty and honor,\ngrief and repentance--and understanding how by careful treatment to ennoble\neven the petty and contingent. The sublime belongs to symbolic art; the\nRoman satire is the dissolution of the classical, and humor the dissolution\nof the romantic, ideal.\n\nArchitecture is predominantly symbolic; sculpture permits the purest\nexpression of the classical ideal; painting, music, and poetry bear a\nromantic character. This does not exclude the recurrence of these three\nstages within each art--in architecture, for example, as monumental\n(the obelisk), useful (house and temple), and Gothic (the cathedral)\narchitecture. As the plastic arts reached their culmination among the\nHellenes, so the romantic arts culminate among the Christian nations. In\npoetry, as the most perfect and universal (or the totality of) art, uniting\nin itself the two contraries, the symbolic and the classical, the lyric\nis a repetition of the architectonic-musical, the epic, of the\nplastic-pictorial, the drama, the union of the lyric and the epic.\n\n(2) _Philosophy of Religion_.--The withdrawal from outer sensibility into\nthe inner spirit, begun in romantic art, especially in poetry, is completed\nin religion. In religion the nations have recorded the way in which they\nrepresent the substance of the world; in it the unity of the infinite and\nthe finite is felt, and represented through imagination. Religion is not\nmerely a feeling of piety, but a thought of the absolute, only not in the\nform of thinking. Religion and philosophy are materially the same, both\nhave God or the truth for their object, they differ only in form--religion\ncontains in an empirical, symbolic form the same speculative content which\nphilosophy presents in the adequate form of the concept. Religion is\ndeveloping knowledge as it gradually conquers imperfection. It appears\nfirst as definite religion in two stadia, natural religion and the religion\nof spiritual individuality, and finally attains the complete realization of\nits concept in the absolute religion of Christianity.\n\nNatural religion, in its lowest stage magic, develops in three forms--as\nthe religion of measure (Chinese), of phantasy (Indian or Brahmanical), and\nof being in self (Buddhistic). In the Persian (Zoroastrian) religion of\nlight, the Syrian religion of pain, and the Egyptian religion of enigma, is\nprepared the way for the transformation into the religion of freedom. The\nGreek solves the riddle of the Sphinx by apprehending himself as subject,\nas man.\n\nThe religion of spiritual individuality or free subjectivity passes through\nthree stadia: the Jewish religion of sublimity (unity), the Greek religion\nof beauty (necessity), the Roman religion of purposiveness (of the\nunderstanding). In contrast to the Jewish religion of slavish obedience,\nwhich by miracle makes known the power of the one God and the nullity of\nnature, which has been \"created\" by his will, and the prosaic severity of\nthe Roman, which, in Jupiter and Fortuna, worships only the world-dominion\nof the Roman people, the more cheerful art-religion of the Hellenes\nreverences in the beautiful forms of the gods, the powers which man is\naware of in himself--wisdom, bravery, and beauty.\n\nThe Christian or revealed religion is the religion of truth, of freedom, of\nspirit. Its content is the unity of the divine nature and the human, God\nas knowing himself in being known of man+; the knowledge of God is God's\nself-knowledge. Its fundamental truths are the Trinity (signifying that God\ndifferentiates and sublates the difference in love), the incarnation (as a\nfigure of the essential unity of the infinite and finite spirit), the fall,\nand Christ's atoning death (this signifies that the realization of the\nunity between man and God presupposes the overcoming of naturality and\nselfishness).\n\n(3) _Philosophy_.--Finally the task remains of clothing the absolute\ncontent given in religion in the form adequate to it, in the form of the\nconcept. In philosophy absolute spirit attains the highest stage, its\nperfect self-knowledge. It is the self-thinking Idea.\n\nHere we must not look for further detailed explanations: philosophy is\njust the course which has been traversed. Its systematic exposition is\nencyclopaedia; the consideration of its own actualization, the history\nof philosophy, which, as a \"philosophical\" discipline, has to show the\nconformity to law and the rationality of this historical development, to\nshow the more than mere succession, the genetic succession, of systems,\nas well as their connection with the history of culture. Each system\nis the product and expression of its time, and as the self-reflection\nof each successive stage in culture cannot appear before this has reached\nits maturity and is about to be overcome. Not until the approach of the\ntwilight does the owl of Minerva begin its flight.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE OPPOSITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEALISM: FRIES, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER.\n\nIn Fries, Herbart, and Schopenhauer a threefold opposition was raised\nagainst the idealistic school represented by Fichte, Schelling, and\nHegel. The opposition of Fries is aimed at the method of the constructive\nphilosophers, that of Herbart against their ontological positions, and that\nof Schopenhauer against their estimate of the value of existence. Fries\nand Beneke declare that a speculative knowledge of the suprasensible is\nimpossible, and seek to base philosophy on empirical psychology; to the\nmonism (panlogism) of the idealists Herbart opposes a pluralism, to their\nphilosophy of becoming, a philosophy of being; Schopenhauer rejects their\noptimism, denying rationality to the world and the world-ground. Among\nthemselves the thinkers of the opposition have little more in common than\ntheir claim to a better understanding of the Kantian philosophy, and a\ndevelopment of it more in harmony with the meaning of its author, than it\nhad experienced at the hands of the idealists. Whoever fails to agree\nwith them in this, and ascribes to the idealists whom they oppose better\ngrounded claims to the honor of being correct interpreters and consistent\ndevelopers of Kantian principles, will be ready to adopt the name\n_Semi-Kantians_, given by Fortlage to the members of the opposition,--a\ntitle which seems the more fitting since each of them appropriates only a\ndefinitely determinable part of Kant's views, and mingles a foreign element\nwith it. In Fries this non-Kantian element comes from Jacobi's philosophy\nof faith; in Herbart it comes from the monadology of Leibnitz, and the\nancient Eleatico-atomistic doctrine; in Schopenhauer, from the religion of\nIndia and (as in Beneke) from the sensationalism of the English and the\nFrench. We can only hint in passing at the parallelism which exists between\nthe chief representatives of the idealistic school and the leaders of\nthe opposition. Fries's theory of knowledge and faith is the empirical\ncounterpart of Fichte's Science of Knowledge. Schopenhauer, in his doctrine\nof Will and Idea, in his vigorously intuitive and highly fanciful view of\nnature and art, and, in general, in his aesthetical mode of philosophizing,\nwith its glad escape from the fetters of method, has so much in common with\nSchelling that many unhesitatingly treat his system as an offshoot of the\nPhilosophy of Nature. The contrast between Herbart and Hegel is the more\npronounced since they are at one in their confidence in the power of the\nconcept. The most conspicuous point of comparison between the metaphysics\nof the two thinkers is the significance ascribed by them to the\ncontradiction as the operative moment in the movement of philosophical\nthought. The attitude of hostility which Schleiermacher assumed in relation\nto Hegel's intellectualistic conception of religion induced Harms to give\nto Schleiermacher also a place in the ranks of the opposition. Following\nthe chronological order, we begin with the campaign opened by Fries under\nthe banner of anthropology against the main branch of the Kantian school.\n\n\n%1. The Psychologists: Fries and Beneke.%\n\nJacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) was born and reared at Barby, studied\nat Jena, and habilitated at the same university in the year 1801; he was\nprofessor at Heidelberg in 1806-16, and at Jena from 1816 until his death.\nHis chief work was the _New Critique of Reason_, in three volumes, 1807\n(2d ed., 1828 _seq_.), which had been preceded, in 1805, by the treatise\n_Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment_. Besides these he composed a _Handbook\nof Psychical Anthropology_, 1821 (2d ed., 1837 _seq_.), text-books of\nLogic, Metaphysics, the Mathematical Philosophy of Nature, and Practical\nPhilosophy and the Philosophy of Religion, and a philosophical novel,\n_Julius and Evagoras, or the Beauty of the Soul_.\n\nFries adopts and popularizes Kant's results, while he rejects Kant's\nmethod. With Reinhold and Fichte, he thinks \"transcendental prejudice\" has\nforced its way into philosophy, a phase of thought for which Kant himself\nwas responsible by his anxiety to demonstrate everything. That _a priori_\nforms of knowledge exist cannot be proved by speculation, but only by\nempirical methods, and discovered by inner observation; they are\ngiven facts of reason, of which we become conscious by reflection or\npsychological analysis. The _a priori_ element cannot be demonstrated nor\ndeduced, but only shown actually present. The question at issue[1] between\nFries and the idealistic school therefore becomes, Is the discovery of the\n_a priori_ element itself a cognition _a priori_ or _a posteriori_? Is\nthe criticism of reason a metaphysical or an empirical, that is, an\nanthropological inquiry? Herbart decides with the idealists: \"All concepts\nthrough which we think our faculty of knowledge are themselves metaphysical\nconcepts\" (_Lehrbuch zur Einleitung_, p. 231). Fries decides: The criticism\nof reason is an empirico-psychological inquiry, as in general empirical\npsychology forms the basis of all philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Kuno Fischer's Pro-Rectoral Address, _Die beiden\nKantischen Schulen in Jena_, 1862.]\n\nWith the exception of this divergence in method Fries accepts Kant's\nresults almost unchanged, unless we must call the leveling down which they\nsuffer at his hands a considerable alteration. Only the doctrine of the\nIdeas and of the knowledge of reason is transformed by the introduction and\nsystematization of Jacobi's principle of the immediate evidence of faith.\nReason, the faculty of Ideas, _i.e._, of the indemonstrable yet indubitable\nprinciples, is fully the peer of the sensibility and the understanding. The\nsame subjective necessity which guarantees to us the objective reality of\nthe intuitions and the categories accompanies the Ideas as well; the faith\nwhich reveals to us the _per se_ of things is no less certain than the\nknowledge of phenomena. The ideal view of the world is just as necessary as\nthe natural view; through the former we cognize the same world as through\nthe latter, only after a higher order; both spring from reason or the\nunity of transcendental apperception, only that in the natural view we are\nconscious of the fact, from which we abstract in the ideal view, that this\nis the condition of experience. That which necessitates us to rise from\nknowledge to faith is the circumstance that the empty unity-form of reason\nis never completely filled by sensuous cognition. The Ideas are of two\nkinds: the aesthetic Ideas are intuitions, which lack clear concepts\ncorresponding to them; the logical Ideas are concepts under which no\ncorrespondent definite intuitions can be subsumed. The former are reached\nthrough combination; the latter by negation, by thinking away the\nlimitations of empirical cognition, by removing the limits from the\nconcepts of the understanding. By way of the negation of all limitations we\nreach as many Ideas as there are categories, that is, twelve, among which\nthe Ideas of relation are the most important. These are the three axioms of\nfaith--the eternity of the soul (its elevation above space and time, to be\ncarefully distinguished from immortality, or its permanence in time),\nthe freedom of the will, and the Deity. Every Idea expresses something\nabsolute, unconditioned, perfect, and eternal.--The dualism of knowledge\nand faith, of nature and freedom, or of phenomenal reality and true, higher\nreality, is bridged over by a third and intermediate mode of apprehension,\nfeeling or presentiment, which teaches us the reconciliation of the two\nrealities, the union of the Idea and the phenomenon, the interpenetration\nof the eternal and the temporal. The beautiful is the Idea as it manifests\nitself in the phenomenon, or the phenomenon as it symbolizes the eternal.\nThe aesthetico-religious judgment looks on the finite as the revelation and\nsymbol of the infinite. In brief, \"Of phenomena we have knowledge; in the\ntrue nature of things we believe; presentiment enables us to cognize the\nlatter in the former.\"\n\nTheoretical philosophy is divided into the philosophy of nature, which\nis to use the mathematical method, hence to give a purely mechanical\nexplanation of all external phenomena, including those of organic life,\nand to leave the consideration of the world as a teleological realm to\nreligious presentiment--and psychology. The object of the former is\nexternal nature, that of the latter internal nature. I know myself only as\nphenomenon, my body through outer, my ego through inner, experience. It\nis only a variant mode of appearing on the part of one and the same\nreality--so Fries remarks in opposition to the _influxus physicus_ and\nthe _harmonia praestabilata_--which now shows me my person inwardly as\nmy spirit, and now outwardly as the life-process of my body. Practical\nphilosophy includes ethics, the philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. In\naccordance with the threefold interest of our animal, sensuo-rational, and\npurely rational impulses, there result three ideals for the legislation of\nvalues. These are the ideal of happiness, the ideal of perfection, and the\nideal of morality, or of the agreeable, the useful, and the good, the third\nof which alone possesses an unconditioned worth and validity as a universal\nand necessary law. The moral laws are deduced from faith in the equal\npersonal dignity of men, and the ennobling of humanity set up as the\nhighest mission of morality. The three fundamental aesthetical tempers are\nthe idyllic and epic of enthusiasm, the dramatic of resignation, the lyric\nof devotion.\n\nFries's system is thus a union of Kantian positions with elements from\nJacobi, in which the former experience deterioration, and the latter\nimprovement, namely, more exact formulation. Among his adherents, and he\nhas them still, the following appear deserving of mention: the botanists\nSchleiden and Hallier; the theologian De Wette; the philosophers Calker (of\nBonn, died 1870) and Apelt (1812-59). The last made himself favorably known\nby his _Epochs of the History of Humanity_, 1845-46, _Theory of Induction_,\n1854, and _Metaphysics_, 1857; his _Philosophy of Religion_ (1860) did not\nappear until after his death. The Catholic theologian, Georg Hermes of Bonn\n(1775-1831) favored a Kantianism akin to that of Fries.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe psychological view founded by Fries was consistently developed by\nFriedrich Eduard Beneke (1798-1854). With the exception of three years of\nteaching in G\u00f6ttingen, 1824-27, whither he had gone in consequence of a\nprohibition of his lectures called forth by his _Foundation of the Physics\nof Ethics_, 1822, he was a member of the university of his native city,\nBerlin, first as _Docent_, and, from 1832, after the death of Hegel, who\nwas unfavorably disposed toward him, as professor extraordinary.[1] Besides\nKant, Jacobi, and Fries, Schleiermacher, Herbart (with whom he became\nacquainted in 1821), and the English thinkers exerted a determining\ninfluence on the formation of his philosophy. Beneke denies the possibility\nof speculative knowledge even more emphatically than Fries. Kant's\nundertaking was aimed at the destruction of a non-experiential science from\nconcepts, and if it has not succeeded in preventing the neo-Scholasticism\nof the Fichtean school, with its overdrawn attempts to revive a deductive\nknowledge of the absolute, this has been chiefly due to the false,\nnon-empirical method of the great critic of reason. The root and basis of\nall knowledge is experience; metaphysics itself is an empirical science, it\nis the last in the series of philosophical disciplines. Whoever begins with\nmetaphysics, instead of ending with it, begins the house at the roof.\nThe point of departure for all cognition is inner experience or\nself-observation; hence the fundamental science is psychology, and all\nother branches of philosophy nothing but applied psychology. By the inner\nsense we perceive our ego as it really is, not merely as it appears to us;\nthe only object whose _per se_ we immediately know is our own soul; in\nself-consciousness being and representation are one. Thus, in opposition to\nKant, Beneke stands on the side of Descartes: The soul is better known\nto us than the external world, to which we only transfer the existence\nimmediately given in the soul as a result of instinctive analogical\ninference, so that in the descent of our knowledge from men organized\nlike ourselves to inorganic matter the inadequacy of our representations\nprogressively increases.\n\n[Footnote 1: On Beneke's character cf. the fourth of Fortlage's _Acht\npsychologische Vortr\u00e4ge_, which are well worth reading.]\n\nPsychology--we may mention of Beneke's works in this field the\n_Psychological Sketches_, 1825-27, and the _Text-book of Psychology_, 1833,\nthe third and fourth (1877) editions of which, edited by Dressler, contain\nas an appendix a chronological table of all Beneke's works--must, as\ninternal natural science, follow the same method, and, starting with\nthe immediately given, employ the same instruments in the treatment of\nexperience as external natural science, _i.e._ the explanation of facts\nby laws, and, further still, by hypotheses and theories. Gratefully\nrecognizing the removal of two obstacles to psychology, the doctrine of\ninnate ideas and the traditional theory of the faculties of the soul by\nLocke and Herbart, (the commonly accepted faculties--memory, understanding,\nfeeling, will--are in fact not simple powers, but mere abstractions,\nhypostatized class concepts of extremely complex phenomena,) Beneke seeks\nto discover the simple elements from which all mental life is compounded.\nHe finds these in the numerous elementary faculties of receiving and\nappropriating external stimuli, which the soul in part possesses, in part\nacquires in the course of its life, and which constitute its substance;\neach separate sense of itself includes many such faculties. Every act\nor product of the soul is the result of two mutually dependent factors:\n_stimulus and receptivity_. Their coming together gives the first of\nthe _four fundamental processes_, that of perception. The second is\nthe constant addition of new elementary faculties. By the third,\nthe equilibration or reciprocal transfer of the movable elements in\nrepresentations, Beneke explains the reproduction of an idea through\nanother associated with it, and the widening of the mental horizon by\nemotion, _e.g._, the astounding eloquence of the angry. Since each\nrepresentation which passes out of consciousness continues to exist in the\nsoul as an unconscious product (where we cannot tell; the soul is not in\nspace), it is not retention, but obliviscence which needs explanation. That\nwhich persists of the representation which is passing into unconsciousness,\nand which makes its reappearance in consciousness possible, is called\na \"trace\" in reference to its departed cause, and a \"disposition\"\n(_Angelegtheit_) in reference to its future results. Every such trace\nor germ (_Anlage_)--that which lies intermediate between perception and\nrecollection--is a force, a striving, a tendency. The fourth of the\nfundamental processes (which may be traced downward into the material\nworld, since the corporeal and the psychical differ only in degree and\npass over into each other) is the combination of mental products according\nto the measure of their similarity, as these come to light in the formation\nof judgments, comparisons, witticisms, of collective images, collective\nfeelings, and collective desires. The innate differences among men depend\non the greater or lesser \"powerfulness, vivacity, and receptivity\" of their\nelementary faculties; all further differences arise gradually and are due\nto the external stimuli; even the distinction between the human and the\nanimal soul, which consists in the spiritual nature of the former, is not\noriginal.\n\nOf the five constructive forms of the soul, which result from the varying\nrelation between stimulus and faculty, four are emotional products or\nproducts of moods. If the stimulus is too small pain (dissatisfaction,\nlonging) arises, while pleasure springs from a marked, but not too great,\nfullness of stimulus. If the stimulus gradually increases to the point of\nexcess, blunted appetite and satiety come in; when the excess is sudden\nit results in pain. A clear representation, a sensation arises when the\nstimulus is exactly proportioned to the faculty; it is in this case only\nthat the soul assumes a theoretical attitude, that it merely perceives\nwithout any admixture of agreeable or disagreeable feelings. Desire is\npleasure remembered, the ego the complex of all the representations which\nhave ever arisen in the soul, the totality of the manifold given within me.\nFor the immortality of the immaterial soul Beneke advances an original and\nattractive argument based on the principle that, in consequence of the\nconstantly increasing traces, through which the substance of the soul is\ncontinually growing, consciousness turns more and more from the outer\nto the inner, until finally perception dies entirely away. At death the\nconnection with the outer world ceases, it is true, but not the inner being\nof the soul, for which that which has hitherto been highest now becomes the\nfoundation for new and still higher developments.\n\nLike Herbart, on whom he was in many ways dependent, Beneke discussed\npsychology and pedagogics with greater success than logic, metaphysics,\npractical philosophy, and the philosophy of religion. He combats the\napriorism of Kant in ethics as elsewhere. The moral law does not arise\nuntil the end of a long development. First in order are the immediately\nfelt values of things, which we estimate according to the degree of\nenhancement or depression in the psychical state which they call forth.\nFrom the feelings are formed concepts, from concepts judgments; and the\nabstraction of the categorical imperative is a highly derivative phenomenon\nand a very late result, although the feeling of oughtness or of moral\nobligation, which accompanies the correct estimation of values and bids\nus prefer spiritual to sensuous delights and the general good to our own\nwelfare, grows necessarily out of the inner nature of the human soul. There\nare two sources of religion: one theoretical, for the idea of God; the\nother practical, for the worship of God. We are impelled to the assumption\nof a suprasensible, an unconditioned, a providence, on the one hand, by the\ndesire for a unitary conclusion for our fragmentary knowledge of the world;\nand, on the other, by moral need, by our unsatisfied longing after the\ngood. The attributes which we ascribe to God are taken from experience, the\nabstract attributes from being in general, the naturalistic from the world,\nthe spiritual from man. As an inevitable outcome of the transformation of\nreligious feelings into representations, and one which is harmless because\nof the unmistakableness of their symbolic character, the anthropomorphic\npredicates, through which we think the Deity as personal, themselves\nestablish the superiority of theism over pantheism. The object of religion,\nmoreover, is accessible only to the subjective certitude of feeling which\nis given by faith, and not to scientific knowledge.\n\nFeuerbach's anthropological standpoint will be discussed below. Like\nFriedrich Ueberweg (1826-71; professor in K\u00f6nigsberg; _System of Logic_,\n1857, 5th ed., edited by J.B. Meyer, 1882--English translation, 1871), Karl\nFortlage was strongly influenced in his psychological views by Beneke.\nBorn in 1806 at Osnabr\u00fcck, and at his death in 1881 a professor in Jena,\nFortlage shared with Beneke an impersonality of character, as well as the\nfate of meeting with less esteem from his contemporaries than he merited\nby the seriousness and originality of his thinking. To his _System of\nPsychology_, 1855, in two volumes, he added, as it were, a third volume,\nhis _Contributions to Psychology_, 1875, besides psychological lectures of\na more popular cast (_Eight Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872; _Four Lectures_,\n1874).[1] Fortlage characterizes his psychological method--in the criticism\nof which F.A. Lange fails to show the justice for which he is elsewhere\nto be commended--as observation by the inner sense. In the first place,\nconsciousness, as the active form of representation, must be separated from\nthat of which we are conscious, from the \"content of representation,\" which\nis in itself unconscious, but capable of coming into consciousness. Next\nFortlage seeks to determine the laws of these two factors. In regard to\nthe content of representation he distinguishes more sharply than Herbart\nbetween the fusibility of the homogeneous and the capacity for complex\ncombination possessed by the heterogeneous (the fusion of similars goes on\neven without aid from consciousness, while the connection of dissimilars is\nbrought about only through the help of the latter), and adds to these two\ngeneral properties of the content of representation two further ones, its\nrevivability (its persistence in unconsciousness), and its dissolubility in\nthe scale of size, color, etc. Consciousness, on the other hand, which for\nFortlage coincides with the ego or self, is treated as the presupposition\nof all representations, not as their result--it is underived activity. He\nexplains the nature of consciousness by the concept of attention,\ncharacterizes them both as \"questioning activity\" (_Frageth\u00e4tigkeit_), and\nfollows them out in their various degrees from expectation through\nobservation up to reflection. The listening and watching of the hunter\nwhen waiting for the game is only a prolongation of the same consciousness\nwhich accompanies all less exciting representations. The essential element\nin conscious or questioning activity is the oscillation between yes and no.\n\nAs soon as the disjunction is decided by a yes, the desire which lies at\nits basis, and which in the condition of consciousness is arrested, passes\nover into activity. All consciousness is based on interest, and in its\norigin is \"arrested impulse\" (_Triebhemmung_). \"The direction of impulse\nto an intuition to be expected only in the future is called\nconsciousness.\" The rank of a being depends on its capacity for\nreflection: the greater the extent of its attention and the smaller\nthe stimuli which suffice to rouse this to action, the higher it stands.\nImpulse--this is the fundamental idea of Fortlage's psychology, like will\nwith Fichte, and representation with Herbart--consists of an element of\nrepresentation and an element of feeling.\n\nPleasure + effort-image = impulse.\n\n[Footnote 1: Among Fortlage's other works we may mention his valuable\n_History of Poetry_, 1839; the _Genetic History of Philosophy since Kant_,\n1852; and the attractive _Six Philosophical Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872.]\n\n\nIn his metaphysical convictions, to which he gave expression in his\n_Exposition and Criticism of the Arguments for the Existence of God_,\n1840, among other works, Fortlage belongs to the philosophers of identity.\nOriginally sailing in Hegel's wake, he soon recognizes that the roots of\nthe theory of identity go back to the Kantio-Fichtean philosophy, with\nwhich the system of absolute truth, as he holds, has come into being. He\nthus becomes an adherent of the Science of Knowledge, whose deductive\nresults he finds inductively confirmed by psychological experience.\nPsychology is the empirical test for the metaphysical calculus of the\nScience of Knowledge. In regard to the absolute Fortlage is in agreement\nwith Krause, the younger Fichte, Ulrici, etc., and calls his standpoint\n_transcendent pantheism_. According to this all that is good, exalted, and\nvaluable in the world is divine in its nature; the human reason is of\nthe same essence as the divine reason (there can be nothing higher than\nreason); the Godhead is the absolute ego of Fichte, which employs the\nempirical egos as organs, which thinks and wills in individuals, in so\nfar as they think the truth and will the good, but at the same time as\nuniversal subject goes beyond them. If, after the example of Hegel, we give\nup transcendent pantheism in favor of immanence, two unphilosophical modes\nof representing the absolute at once result--on the one hand, materialism;\non the other, popular, unphilosophical theism. If the Fichtean Science\nof Knowledge could be separated from its difficult method, which it is\nimpossible ever to make comprehensible to the unphilosophical mind, it\nwould be called to take the place of religion.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Among Fortlage's posthumous manuscripts was one on the\nPhilosophy of Religion, on which Eucken published an essay in the\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxxii. 1883, p. 180 _seq_. after\nLipsius had given a single chapter from it--\"The Ideal of Morality\naccording to Christianity\"--in his _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr protestantische\nTheologie_ (vol. ix. pp. 1-45). The journals _Im Neuen Reich_, 1881, No.\n24, and _Die Gegenwart_, 1882, No. 34, contained warmly written notices of\nFortlage by J. Volkelt. Leopold Schmid (in Giessen, died 1869) gives a\nfavorable and skillfully composed outline of Fortlage's system in his\n_Grundz\u00fcge der Einleitung in die Philosophie mit einer Beleuchtung der\nvon K. Ph. Fischer, Sengler, und Fortlage erm\u00f6glichten Philosophie der\nThat_, 1860, pp. 226-357. Cf. also Moritz Brasch, _K. Fortlage, Ein\nphilosophisches Charakterbild_, in _Unsere Zeit_, 1883, Heft II,\npp. 730-756, incorporated in the same author's _Philosophie der\nGegenwart_, 1888.]\n\n\n%2. Realism: Herbart.%\n\nJohann Friedrich Herbart was scientifically the most important among the\nphilosophers of the opposition. Herbart was born at Oldenburg in 1776, the\nson of a councilor of justice, and had already become acquainted with the\nsystems of Wolff and Kant before he entered the University of Jena in\n1794. In 1796 he handed in to his instructor Fichte a critique of two of\nSchelling's treatises, in which the youthful thinker already broke\naway from idealism. While a private tutor in Switzerland he made the\nacquaintance of Pestalozzi. In 1802 he habilitated in G\u00f6ttingen, where, in\n1805, he was promoted to a professorship extraordinary; while in 1809 he\nreceived the professorship in K\u00f6nigsberg once held by Kant, and later by\nW. Tr. Krug (died 1842). He died in 1841 at G\u00f6ttingen, whither he had been\nrecalled in 1833. His _Collected Works_ were published in twelve volumes,\n1850-52 (reprinted 1883 _seq_.), by his pupil Hartenstein, who has also\ngiven an excellent exposition of his master's system in his _Probleme und\nGrundlehren der allgemeinen Metaphysik_, 1836, and his _Grundbegriffe der\nethischen Wissenschaften_, 1844; a new edition, in chronological order, and\nunder the editorship of K. Kehrbach, began to appear in 1882, or rather\n1887, and has now advanced to the fourth volume, 1891. Herbart's chief\nworks were written during his K\u00f6nigsberg residence: the _Text-book of\nIntroduction to Philosophy_, 1813, 4th ed., 1837 (very valuable as an\nintroduction to Herbartian modes of thought); _General Metaphysics_, 1829\n(preceded in 1806 and 1808 by _The Principal Points in Metaphysics_, with a\nsupplement, _The Principal Points in Logic); Text-book of Psychology_,[1]\n1816, 2d ed., 1834; _On the Possibility and Necessity of applying\nMathematics to Psychology_, 1822; _Psychology as a Science_, 1824-25. The\ntwo works on ethics, which were widely separated in time, were, on the\nother hand, written in G\u00f6ttingen: _General Practical Philosophy_, 1808;\n_Analytical Examination of Natural Right and of Morals_, 1836. To these\nmay be added a _Discourse on Evil_, 1817; _Letters on the Doctrine of\nthe Freedom of the Human Will_, 1836; and the _Brief Encyclopaedia of\nPhilosophy_, 1831, 2d ed., 1841. His works on education and instruction,\nwhose influence and value perhaps exceed those of his philosophical\nachievements (collected editions of the pedagogical works have been\nprepared by O. Willmann, 1873-75, 2d ed., 1880; and by Bartholomaei),\nextended through his whole life. Besides pedagogics, psychology was the\nchief sphere of his services.\n\n[Footnote 1: English translation by M.K. Smith, 1891.]\n\nIn antithesis to the philosophy of intuition with its imagined superiority\nto the standpoint of reflection, Herbart makes philosophy begin with\nattention to concepts, defining it as the elaboration of concepts.\nPhilosophy, therefore, is not distinguished from other sciences by its\nobject, but by its method, which again must adapt itself to the\npeculiarity of the object, to the starting point of the investigation in\nquestion--there is no universal philosophical method. There are as many\ndivisions of philosophy as there are modes of elaborating concepts. The\nfirst requisite is the discrimination of concepts, both the discrimination\nof concepts from others and of the marks within each concept. This work\nof making concepts clear and distinct is the business of logic. With this\ndiscipline, in which Herbart essentially follows Kant, are associated two\nother forms of the elaboration of concepts, that of physical and that\nof aesthetic concepts. Both of these classes require more than a merely\nlogical elucidation. The physical concepts, through which we apprehend the\nworld and ourselves, contain contradictions and must be freed from them;\ntheir correction is the business of meta-physics. Metaphysics is the\nscience of the comprehensibility of experience. The aesthetic (including\nthe ethical) concepts are distinguished from the nature-concepts by a\npeculiar increment which they occasion in our representation, and which\nconsists in a judgment of approval or disapproval. To clear up these\nconcepts and to free them from false allied ideas is the task of aesthetics\nin its widest sense. This includes all concepts which are accompanied by a\njudgment of praise or blame; the most important among them are the ethical\nconcepts. Thus, aside from logic, we reach two principal divisions of\nphilosophy, which are elsewhere contrasted as theoretical and practical,\nbut here in Herbart as metaphysics and aesthetics. Herbart maintains that\nthese are entirely independent of each other, so that aesthetics, since it\npresupposes nothing of metaphysics, may be discussed before metaphysics,\nwhile the philosophy of nature and psychology depend throughout on\nontological principles. Together with natural theology the two latter\nsciences constitute \"applied\" metaphysics. This in turn presupposes\n\"general\" metaphysics, which subdivides into four parts: Methodology,\nOntology, Synechology, _i.e._, the theory of the continuous ([Greek:\n_suneches_]), which treats of the continua, space, time, and motion, and\nEidolology, _i.e._, the theory of images or representations. The last forms\nthe transition to psychology, while synechology forms the preparation\nfor the philosophy of nature, whose most general problems it solves. Our\nexposition will not need to observe these divisions closely.\n\nMetaphysics starts with the given, but cannot rest content with it, for it\ncontains contradictions. In resolving these we rise above the given. What\n_is given_? Kant has not answered this question with entire correctness.\nWe may, indeed, term the totality of the given \"phenomena,\" but this\npresupposes something which appears. If nothing existed there would also\nnothing appear. As smoke points to fire, so appearance to being. So much\nseeming, so much indication of being. Things in themselves may be known\nmediately, though not immediately, by following out the indications of\nbeing contained by the given appearance. Further, not merely the unformed\nmatter of cognition is given to us, but it is rather true that everything\ncomes under this concept which experience so presses on us that we cannot\nresist it; hence not merely single sensations, but entire sensation-groups,\nnot merely the matter, but also the forms of experience. If the latter were\nreally subjective products, as Kant holds, it would necessarily be possible\nfor us at will to think each perceptive-content either under the category\nof substance, or property, or cause--possible for us, if we chose, to see\na round table quadrilateral. In reality we are bound in the application of\nthese forms; they are given for each object in a definite way. The given\nforms--Herbart calls them experience-concepts--contain contradictions.\nHow can these contradictions be removed? We may neither simply reject the\nconcepts which are burdened with contradictions, for they are given, nor\nleave them as they are, for the logical _principium contradictionis_\nrequires that the contradiction as such be rooted out. The\nexperience-concepts are valid (they find application in experience), but\nthey are not thinkable. Therefore we must so transform and supplement them\nthat they shall become free from contradictions and thinkable. The method\nwhich Herbart employs to remove the contradictions is as follows: The\ncontradiction always consists in the fact that an _a_ should be the same as\na _b_, but is not so. The desiderated likeness of the two is impossible so\nlong as we think _a_ as _one_ thing. That which is unsuccessful in this\ncase will succeed, perhaps, if in thought we break up the _a_ into several\nthings--[Greek: _a b g_]. Then we shall be able to explain through the\n\"together\" (_Zusammen_) of this plurality what we were unable to explain\nfrom the undecomposed _a_, or from the single constituents of it. The\n\"together\" is a \"relation\" established by thought among the elements of the\nreal. For this reason Herbart terms his method of finding out necessary\nsupplements to the given \"the method of relations.\" Another name for the\nsame thing is \"the method of contingent aspects.\" Mechanics operates with\ncontingent aspects when, for the sake of explanation, it resolves a given\nmotion into several components. Such fictions and substitutions--auxiliary\nconcepts, which are not real, but which serve only as paths for\nthought--may be successfully employed by metaphysics also. The abstract\nexpression of this method runs: The contradiction is to be removed by\nthinking one of its members as manifold rather than as one. In order to\nobserve the workings of this Herbartian machine we shall go over the four\nprincipal contradictions by which his acuteness is put to the test--the\nproblems of inherence, of change, of the continuous, of the ego.\n\nWe call the given sensation-complexes \"things,\" and ascribe \"properties\" to\nthem. How can one and the same thing have different properties--how can\nthe one be at the same time many? To say that the thing \"possesses\" the\nproperties does not help the matter. The possession of the different\nproperties is itself just as manifold and various as the properties which\nare possessed. Hence the concept of the thing and its properties must be\nso transformed that the plurality which seems to be in the thing shall be\ntransferred without it. Instead of one thing let us assume several, each\nwith a single definite property, from whose \"together\" the appearance\nof many qualities in one thing now arises. The appearance of manifold\nproperties in the one thing has its ground in the \"together\" of many\nthings, each of which has one simple quality. Again, it is just as\nimpossible for a thing to have different qualities in succession, or to\nchange, as it is for it to have them at the same time. The popular view\nof change, which holds that a thing takes on different forms (ice, water,\nsteam) and yet remains the same substance, is untenable. How is it possible\nto become another, and yet to remain the same? The universal feeling that\nthe concept needs correction betrays itself in the fact that everyone\ninvoluntarily adds a cause to the change in thought, and seeks a cause for\nit, and thus of himself undertakes a transformation of the concept, though,\nit is true, an inadequate one. If we think this concept through we come\nupon a trilemma, a threefold impossibility. Whether we endeavor to deduce\nthe change from external or from internal causes, or (with Hegel) to think\nit as causeless, in each case we involve ourselves in inconceivabilities.\nAll three ideas--change as mechanism, as self-determination or freedom,\nas absolute becoming--are alike absurd. We can escape these contradictions\nonly by the bold decision to conceive the quality of the existent as\nunchangeable. For the truly existent there is no change whatever. It\nremains, however, to explain the appearance of change, in which the wand of\ndecomposition and the \"together\" again proves its magic power. Supported by\nthe motley manifoldness of phenomena, we posit real beings as qualitatively\ndifferent, and view this diversity as partial contraposition; we resolve,\n_e.g._, the simple quality _a_ into the elements _x_ + _z_, and a second\nquality _b_ into _y - z_. So long as the individual things remain by\nthemselves, the opposition of the qualities will not make itself evident.\nBut as soon as they come together, something takes place--now the opposites\n(+_z_ and -_z_) seek to destroy or at least to disturb each other. The\nreals defend themselves against the disturbance which would follow if the\nopposites could destroy each other, by each conserving its simple,\nunchangeable quality, _i.e._, by simply remaining self-identical.\n_Self-conservation against_ threatened _disturbances_ from without (it may\nbe compared to resistance against pressure) is the only real change, and\napparent change, the empirical changes of things, to be explained from\nthis. That which changes is only the relations between the beings, as a\nthing maintains itself now against this and now against that other thing;\nthe relations, however, and their change are something entirely contingent\nand indifferent to the existent. In itself the self-conservation of a real\nis as uniform as the quality which is conserved, but in virtue of the\nchanging relations (the variety of the disturbing things) it can express\nitself for the observer in manifold ways as force. The real itself changes\nas little as a painting changes, for instance, when, seen near at hand, the\nfigures in it are clearly distinguished, while for the distant\nobserver, on the contrary, they run together into an indistinguishable\nchaos. Change has no meaning in the sphere of the existent.\n\nAnyone who speaks thus has denied change, not deduced it. Among the many\nobjections experienced by Herbart's endeavor to explain the empirical\nfact of change by his theory of self-conservation against threatened\ndisturbances Lotze's is the most cogent: The unsuccessful attempt to\nsolve the difficulties in the concept of becoming and action is still\ninstructive, for it shows that they cannot be solved in this way--from the\nconcept of inflexible being. If the \"together,\" the threatened disturbance,\nand the reaction against the latter be taken as realities, then, in the\naffection by the disturber, the concept of change remains uneliminated and\nuncorrected; if they be taken as unreal concepts auxiliary to thought,\nchange is relegated from the realm of being to the realm of seeming.\nHerbart gives to them a kind of semi-reality, less true than the unmoving\nground of things (their unchangeable, permanent qualities), and more true\nthan their contradictory exterior (the empirical appearance of change).\nBetween being and seeming he thrusts in, as though between day and night,\nthe twilight region of his \"contingent aspects,\" with their relations,\nwhich are nothing to the real, their disturbances, which do not come to\npass, and their self-conservations, which are nothing but undisturbed\ncontinuance in existence on the part of the real.\n\nBesides the contradictions in the concepts of inherence, of change,\nand action and passion, it is the concept of being which prevents our\nphilosopher from ascribing a living character to reality. Being, as Kant\ncorrectly perceived, contains nothing qualitative; it is absolute position.\nWhoever affirms that an object _is_, expresses thereby that the matter is\nto rest with the simple position; in which is included that it is nothing\ndependent, relative, or negative. (Every negation is something relative,\nrelates to a precedent position, which is to be annulled by it.) Besides\nbeing, the existent contains something more--a quality; it consists of this\nabsolute position and a _what_. If this _what_ is separated from being we\nreach an \"image\"; united with being it yields an essence or a real. This\n_what_ of things is not their sensuous qualities; the latter belong rather\nto the mere phenomenon. No one of them indicates what the object is by\nitself, when left alone. They depend on contingent circumstances, and apart\nfrom these they would not exist--what is color in the dark? what sound\nin airless space? what weight in empty space? what fusibility without\nfire?--they are each and all relative. Since being excludes negation of\nevery kind, the quality of the existent must be absolutely _simple and\nunchangeable_; it brooks no manifoldness, no quantity, no distinctions in\ndegree, no becoming; all this were a corruption of the purely affirmative\nor positive character of being. The existent is unextended and eternal.\nThe Eleatics are to be praised because the need of escaping from the\ncontradictions in the world of experience led them to make themselves\nmasters of the concept of being without relation and without negation, and\nof the simple, homogeneous quality of the existent in its full purity. But\nwhile the Eleatics conceived the existent as one, the atomists made an\nadvance by assuming a _plurality_ of reals. The truly one never becomes\na plurality; plurality is given, hence an original plurality must be\npostulated. Herbart characterizes his own standpoint as qualitative\natomism, since his reals are differentiated by their properties, not by\nquantitative relations (size and figure). The idealists and the pantheists\nmake a false use of the tendency toward unity which, no doubt, is present\nin our reason, when they maintain that true being must be one. There is\nabsolutely nothing in the concept of being to forbid us to think the\nexistent as many; while the world of phenomena, with its many things and\ntheir many properties, gives irrefragable grounds which compel us to this\nconclusion. Hence, according to Herbart, the true reality is a (very\nlarge, though not, it is true, an infinite[1]) plurality of supra-sensible\n(non-spatial and non-temporal) reals, or, according to the Leibnitzian\nexpression, monads, which all their life have nothing further to do than\nto preserve intact against disturbances the simple quality in which they\nconsist (for the existent is not distinct from its quality; it does not\nhave the quality, but is the quality). Each thing has but one response for\nthe most varied influences: it answers all suggestions from without by\naffirming its _what_, by continually repeating, as it were, the same note,\nwhich gains a varying meaning only in so far as, in accordance with the\ncharacter of the disturber, it appears now as a third, now as a fifth or\nseventh. This picture of the world is certainly not attractive; in it all\nchange and becoming, all life and all activity is offered up on the altar\nof monotonous being. Happily Herbart is inconsistent enough to enliven this\ncomfortless waste of changeless being by the relatively real or semi-real\nmanifoldness of the self-conservations.\n\nThe infinite divisibility of space and of matter forms the chief difficulty\nin the problem of the continuous. Herbart endeavors to solve it by the\nassumption of an intelligible space with \"fixed\" lines (lines formed by a\ndefinite number of points, hence finitely divisible, and not continuous).\nMetaphysics demands the fixed or discrete line, although common thought\nis incapable of conceiving it. Space is a mere form of combination in\nrepresentation or for the observer, and yet it is objective, _i.e._, it is\nvalid for all intelligences, and not merely for human intelligence.\nFrom his complex and unproductive endeavors to derive the appearance of\ncontinuity from discontinuous reality we hurry on to the fourth, the\npsychological problem, which Herbart discusses with great acuteness. He\nconsiders it the chief merit of Fichte's Science of Knowledge that it\ncalled attention to this problem.\n\nThe concept of the ego, of whose reality we have so strong and immediate a\nconviction that, in the formula of asseveration, \"as true as I exist,\"\nit is made the criterion of all other certitude, labors under various\ncontradictions. Besides the familiar difficulty, here especially sensible,\nof one thing with many marks, it contains other absurdities of its own. In\nthe ego or self-consciousness subject and object are to be identical.\nThe identity of the representing and the represented ego is a\nself-contradictory idea, for the law of contradiction forbids the equation\nof opposites, while a subject is subject only through the fact that it is\nnot object. But, again, self-consciousness can never be realized, because\nit involves a _regressus in infinitum_. The ego is defined as that which\nrepresents itself. What is this \"self\"? It is, in turn, the self-knower.\nThis new explanation contains still a further self; which once more\nsignifies the self-knower and so on to infinity. The ego represents the\nrepresentation (_Vorstellen_) of its representation (_Vorstellen)_, etc.\nThe representation (_Vorstellung_) of the ego, therefore, can never be\nactually brought to completion. (The assumption of the freedom of the will\nleads to an analogous _regressus in infinitum_, in which the question,\n\"Willst thou thy volition?\" \"Willst thou the willing of this volition\"? is\nrepeated to infinity.) The only escape from this tissue of absurdities\nis to think the ego otherwise than is done by popular consciousness. The\nknowing and the known ego are by no means the same, but the observing\nsubject in self-consciousness is one group of representations, the observed\nsubject another. Thus, for example, newly formed representations are\napperceived by the existing older ones, but the highest apperceiver is not,\nin turn, itself apperceived. The ego is not a unit being, which represents\nitself in the literal meaning of the phrase, but that which is represented\nis a plurality. The ego is the junction of numberless series of\nrepresentations, and is constantly changing its place; it dwells now in\nthis representation, now in that. But as we distinguish the point of\nmeeting from the series which meet there, and imagine that it is possible\nsimultaneously to abstract from all the represented series (whereas in fact\nwe can only abstract from each one separately), there arises the appearance\nof a permanent ego as the unit subject of all our representations. In\nreality the ego is not the source of our representations, but the final\nresult of their combination. The representation, not the ego, is the\nfundamental concept of psychology, the ego constituting rather its most\ndifficult problem.[1] It is a \"result of other representations, which,\nhowever, in order to yield this result, must be together in a single\nsubstance, and must interpenetrate one another\" (_Text-book of\nIntroduction_, p. 243). In this way Herbart defends the substantiality\nof the soul against Kant and Fries. The soul's immortality (as also its\npre-existence) goes without saying, because of the non-temporal character\nof the real.\n\n[Footnote 1: On the Herbartian psychology, cf. Ribot, _German Psychology of\nTo-day_, English Translation by Baldwin, 1886, pp. 24-67; and G.F. Stout,\n_Mind_, vols. xiii.-xiv.--TR.]\n\nThe soul is one of these reals which, unchangeable in themselves, enter\ninto various relations with others, and conserve themselves against the\nlatter. In its simple _what_ as unknowable as the rest, it is yet familiar\nto us in its self-conservations. In the absence of a more fitting\nexpression for the totality of psychical phenomena we call these\n_representations_, the phenomenal manifoldness of which is due to the\nvariety of the disturbances and exists for the observer alone. In itself,\nwithout a plurality of dispositions and impulses, the soul is originally\nnot a representative force, but first becomes such under certain\ncircumstances, viz., when it is stimulated to self-conservation by other\nbeings. The sum of the reals which stand in immediate relation to the soul\nis called its body; this, an aggregate of simple beings, furnishes the\nintermediate link of causal relation between the soul and the external\nworld. The soul has its (movable) seat in the brain. In opposition to the\nphysiological treatment of psychology, Herbart remarks that psychology\nthrows much more light on physiology than she can ever receive from it.\n\nThe simplest representations are the sensations, which, amid all their\nvariety, still group themselves into definite classes (odors, sounds,\ncolors). They serve us as symbols of the disturbing reals, but they are not\nimages of things, nor effects of these, but products of the soul itself:\nthe generation of sensations is the soul's peculiar way of guarding itself\nagainst threatened disturbances. Every representation once come into being\ndisappears again from consciousness, it is true, but not from the soul.\nIt persists, unites with others, and stands with them in a relation of\ninteraction--in both cases according to definite laws. These original\nrepresentations are the only ones which the soul produces by its own\nactivity; all other psychical phenomena, feeling, desire, will, attention,\nmemory, judgment, the whole wealth of inner events, result of themselves\nfrom the interplay of the primary representations under law. Representation\n(more exactly sensation) is alone original; space, time, the categories,\nwhich Kant makes _a priori_, are all acquired, _i.e._, like all the higher\nmental life, they are the results of a psychical _mechanism_, results whose\nproduction needs no renewed exertion on the part of the soul itself. It has\nbeen a very harmful error in psychology hitherto to ascribe each particular\nmental activity to a special _faculty of the soul_ having a similar name,\ninstead of deriving it from combinations of simple representations.\nAbstract, empty class ideas have been treated as real forces, in the belief\nthat thus the single concrete acts had been \"explained.\"\n\nThere is no bitterer foe of the faculty theory than Herbart. His campaign\nagainst it, if not victorious, was yet salutary, and the motives of his\nhostility, up to a certain point, entirely justified. Nothing is more\nuseless than the assurance that what the soul actually does, that it must\nalso have the power to do. Who disputes this? A faculty explains nothing\nso long as the laws under which its functions and its relations to other\nfaculties remain unexplained. But although the faculty idea serves no\npositive end, it cannot be entirely discarded. It marks the boundary where\nour ability to reduce one class of psychical phenomena to another ceases.\nHerbart's polemic has no force against the moderate and necessary use of\nthis idea, no matter how much it was in place in view of the impropriety of\na superfluous multiplication of the faculties of the soul. The realization\nof the ideal of psychology, the reduction of the complex phenomena of\nmental life to the smallest possible number of simple elements, is limited\nby the heterogeneity of the original phenomena, knowing, feeling, willing,\nwhich wholly resists derivation from the combination of sensations. That\nwhich blinded Herbart to these limitations was that tendency toward unity,\nwhich, as a metaphysician and moral philosopher, he had all too willfully\nsuppressed, and which now took revenge for this infringement of its rights\nby misleading the psychologist to an exaggeration which had important\nconsequences. Nevertheless his unsuccessful attempt remains interesting and\nworthy of gratitude.\n\n\n\nThe discovery of the laws which govern the interaction of the psychical\nelements is the task of a _statics and a mechanics_ of representations. The\nformer investigates the equilibrium or the settled final state; the latter,\nthe change, _i.e._ the movements of representations. These names of\nthemselves betray Herbart's conviction that mathematics can and must be\napplied to psychology. The bright hopes, however, which Herbart formed for\nthe attempt at a mathematical psychology, were fulfilled neither in his own\nendeavors nor in those of his pupils, although, as Lotze remarks, it would\nbe asserting too much to say that the most general formulas which he set up\ncontradict experience.--The unity of the soul forces representations to act\non one another. Disparate representations, those, that is, which belong\nto different representative series, as the visual image of a rose and the\nauditory image of the word rose, or as the sensations yellow, hard, round,\nringing, connected in the concept gold piece, enter into complications\n[complexes]. Homogeneous representations (the memory image and the\nperceptual image of a black poodle) fuse into a single representation.\nOpposed representations (red and blue) arrest one another when they are in\nconsciousness together. The connection and graded fusion of representations\nis the basis of their retention and reproduction, as well as of the\nformation of continuous series of representations. The reproduction is in\npart immediate, a free rising of the representation by its own power as\nsoon as the hindrances give way; in part mediate, a coming up through\nthe help of others. On the _arrest_ of partially or totally opposed\nrepresentations Herbart bases his psychological calculus. Let there be\ngiven simultaneously in consciousness three opposed representations of\ndifferent intensities, the strongest to be called _a_, the weakest _c_, the\nintermediate one _b_. What happens? They arrest one another, _i.e._ a part\nof each is forced to sink below the threshold of consciousness.[1]\n\nWhat is the amount of the arrest? As much as all the weaker representations\ntogether come to--the sum of arrest or the sum of that which becomes\nunconscious (as it were the burden to be divided) is equal to the sum of\nall the representations with the exception of the strongest (hence = _b_ +\n_c_), and is divided among the individual representations in the inverse\nratio of their strength, consequently in such a way that the strongest (the\none which most actively and successfully resists arrest) has the least,\nand the weakest the most, of it to bear. It may thus come to pass that a\nrepresentation is entirely driven out of consciousness by two stronger\nones, while it is impossible for this to happen to it from a single one,\nno matter how superior it be. The simplest case of all is when two equally\nstrong representations are present, in which case each is reduced to\nthe half of its original intensity. The sum of that which remains in\nconsciousness is always equal to the greatest representation.\n\n[Footnote 1: By their mutual pressure representations are transformed into\na mere _tendency_ to represent, which again becomes actual representation\nwhen the arrest ceases. The parts of a representation transformed into a\ntendency, and the residua remaining unobscured, are not pieces cut off,\nbut the quantity denotes merely a degree of obscuration in the whole\nrepresentation, or rather in the representation which actually takes\nplace.]\n\nAs soon as a representation reaches the zero point of consciousness, or as\nsoon as a new representation (sensation) comes in, the others begin at\nonce to rise or sink. The Mechanics seeks to investigate the laws of these\nmovements of representations; but we may the more readily pass over its\ncomplicated calculations since their precise formulas can never more than\nvery roughly represent the true state of the case, which simply rebels\nagainst precision. The rock on which every immanent use of mathematics\nin psychology must strike, is the impossibility of exactly measuring one\nrepresentation by another. We may, indeed, declare one stronger than\nanother on the basis of the immediate impression of feeling, but we cannot\nsay how much stronger it is, nor with reason assert that it is twice or\nhalf as intense. Herbart's mathematical psychology was wrecked by this\ninsurmountable difficulty. The demand for exactness which it raised, but\nwhich it was unable to satisfy with the means at its disposal, has recently\nbeen renewed, and has led to assured results in psycho-physics, which works\non a different basis and with ingenious methods of measurement.\n\nHerbart endeavors, as we have seen, to deduce the various mental activities\nfrom the play of representations, Feeling and desire are not something\nbeside representations, are not special faculties of the soul, but results\nof the relations of representations, changing states of representations\narrested and working upward against hindrances. A representation which has\nbeen forced out of consciousness persists as a _tendency or effort_ to\nrepresent, and as such exerts a pressure on the conscious representations.\nIf a representation is suspended between counteracting forces a feeling\nresults; desire is the rise of a representation in the face of hindrances,\naversion is hesitation in sinking. If the effort is accompanied by the idea\nthat its goal is attainable, it is termed will. The character of a man\ndepends on the fact that definite masses of representations have\nbecome dominant, and by their strength and persistence hold opposing\nrepresentations in check or suppress them. The longer the dominant mass of\nrepresentations exercises its power, the firmer becomes the habit of acting\nin a certain way, the more fixed the will. Herbart's intellectualistic\ndenial of self-dependence to the practical capacities of the soul leads him\nlogically to determinism. Volition depends on insight, is determined by\nrepresentations; freedom signifies nothing but the fact that the will\ncan be determined by motives. If the individual decisions of man were\nundetermined he would have no character; if the character were free in the\nchoice between two actions, then, along with the noblest resolve, there\nwould remain the possibility of an opposite decision; freedom of choice\nwould make pure chance the doer of our deeds. Pedagogics, above all,\nmust reject the idea of an undetermined freedom; education, along with\nimputation, correction, and punishment, would be a meaningless word, if no\ndetermining influence on the will of the pupil were possible.--This last\nobjection overlooks the fact that the pedagogical influence is always\nmediate, and can do no more than, by disciplining the impulses of the pupil\nand by supplying him with aids against immoral inclinations, to lighten his\nmoral task. We can work on the motives only, never directly on the will\nitself. Otherwise it would be inexplicable that even the best pedagogical\nskill proves powerless in the case of many individuals.\n\nHerbart's psychology was preceded by a philosophy of nature, which\nconstrues matter from attraction and repulsion, and declares an _actio in\ndistans_ impossible. The intermediate link between physics and psychology\nis formed by the science of organic life (physiology or biology); and\nwith this natural theology is connected by the following principles: The\npurposiveness which we notice with admiration in men and the higher animals\ncompels us, since it can neither come from chance nor be explained on\nnatural grounds alone, to assume as its author a supreme artificer,\nan intelligence which works by ends. It is true, indeed, that the existence\nof the Deity is not demonstrated by the teleological argument; this is only\nan hypothesis, but one as highly probable as the assumption that the human\nbodies by which we are surrounded are inhabited by human souls--a fact\nwhich we can only assume, not perceive nor prove. The assurance of faith\nis different from that of logic and experience, but not inferior to it.\nReligion is based on humility and grateful reverence, which is favored, not\ninjured, by the immeasurable sublimity of its object, the incompleteness of\nour idea of the Supreme Being, and the knowledge of our ignorance. If faith\nrests, on the one hand, on the teleological view of nature, it is, on the\nother, connected with moral need, and exercises, in addition, aesthetic\ninfluences. By comforting the suffering, setting right the erring,\nreclaiming and pacifying the sinner, warning, strengthening, and\nencouraging the morally sound, religion brings the spirit into a new and\nbetter land, shows it a higher order of things, the order of providence,\nwhich, amid all the mistakes of men, still furthers the good. The religious\nspirit always includes an ethical element, and the bond of the Church holds\nmen together even where the state is destroyed. Indispensable theoretically\nas a supplement to our knowledge, and practically because of the moral\nimperfection of men, who need it to humble, warn, comfort, and lift them\nup, religion is, nevertheless, in its origin independent of knowledge\nand moral will. Faith is older than science and morals: the doctrine of\nreligion did not wait for astronomy and cosmology, nor the erection of\ntemples for ethics. Before the development of the moral concepts religion\nalready existed in the form of wonder without a special object, of a gloomy\nawe which ascribed every sudden inner excitement to the impulse of an\ninvisible power. Since a speculative knowledge of the nature of God is\nimpossible, the only task which remains for metaphysics is the removal of\nimproper determinations from that which tradition and phantasy have to\nsay on the subject. We are to conceive God as personal, extramundane, and\nomnipotent, as the creator, not of the reals themselves, but of their\npurposive coexistence (_Zusammen_). In order, however, to rise from the\nidea of the original, most real, and most powerful being to that of the\nmost excellent being we need the practical Ideas, without which the former\nwould remain an indifferent theoretical concept. Man can pray only to a\nwise, holy, perfect, just, and good God.\n\nThis, in essential outline, is the content of the scattered observations\non the philosophy of religion given by Herbart. Drobisch (_Fundamental\nDoctrines of the Philosophy of Religion_, 1840), from the standpoint of\nreligious criticism and with a renewal of the moral argument, and Taute\n(1840-52) and Fl\u00fcgel (_Miracles and the Possibility of a Knowledge of God_,\n1869) with an apologetic tendency and one toward a belief in miracles,\nhave, among others, endeavored to make up for the lack of a detailed\ntreatment of this discipline by Herbart--from which, moreover, much of\nvalue could hardly have been expected in view of the jejuneness of his\nmetaphysical conceptions and the insufficiency of his appreciation of evil.\n\nIt remains only to glance at Herbart's Aesthetics. The beautiful is\ndistinguished from the agreeable and the desirable, which, like it, are the\nobjects of preference and rejection, by the facts, first, that it arouses\nan involuntary and disinterested judgment of approval; and second, that it\nis a predicate which is ascribed to the object or is objective. To these is\nadded, thirdly, that while desire seeks for that which is to come, taste\npossesses in the present that which it judges.\n\nThat which pleases or displeases is always the form, never the matter;\nand further, is always a relation, for that which is entirely simple is\nindifferent. As in music we have succeeded in discovering the simplest\nrelations, which please immediately and absolutely--we know not why--so\nthis must be attempted in all branches of the theory of art. The most\nimportant among them, that which treats of moral beauty, moral philosophy,\nhas therefore to inquire concerning the simplest relations of will, which\ncall forth moral approval or disapproval (independently of the interest\nof the spectator), to inquire concerning the practical Ideas or\npattern-concepts, in accordance with which moral taste, involuntarily and\nwith unconditional evidence, judges concerning the worth or unworth of\n(actually happening or merely represented) volitions. Herbart enumerates\nfive such primary Ideas or fundamental judgments of conscience.\n\n(1) The Idea of inner freedom compares the will with the judgment, the\nconviction, the conscience of the agent himself. The agreement of his\ndesire with his own judgment, with the precept of his taste, pleases, lack\nof agreement displeases. Since the power to determine the will according\nto one's own insight of itself establishes only an empty consistency and\nloyalty to conviction, and may also subserve immoral craft, the first Idea\nwaits for its content from the four following.\n\n(2) The Idea of perfection has reference to the quantitative relations\nof the manifold strivings of a subject, in intensity, extension, and\nconcentration. The strong is pleasing in contrast with the weak, the\ngreater (more extended, richer) in contrast with the smaller, the collected\nin contrast with the scattered; in other words, in the individual\ndesires it is energy which pleases, in their sum variety, in the system\nco-operation. While the first two Ideas have compared the will of the\nindividual man with itself, the remaining ones consider its relation to the\nwill of other rational beings, the third to a merely represented will, and\nthe last two to an actual one.\n\n(3) According to the Idea of benevolence or goodness, which gives the most\nimmediate and definite criterion of the worth of the disposition, the will\npleases if it is in harmony with the (represented) will of another, _i.e._,\nmakes the satisfaction of the latter its aim.\n\n(4) The Idea of right is based on the fact that strife displeases. If\nseveral wills come together at one point without ill-will (in claiming a\nthing), the parties ought to submit themselves to right as a rule for the\navoidance of strife.\n\n(5) In retribution and equity, also, the original element is displeasure,\ndispleasure in an unrequited act as a disturbance of equilibrium. This\nlast Idea demands that no deed of good or evil remain unanswered; that in\nreward, thanks, and punishment, a quantum of good and evil equal to that of\nwhich he has been the cause return upon the agent. The one-sided deed of\ngood or ill is a disturbance, the removal of which demands a corresponding\nrequital.\n\nHerbart warns us against the attempt to derive the five original Ideas\n(which scientific analysis alone separates, for in life we always judge\naccording to all of them together) from a single higher Idea, maintaining\nthat the demand for a common principle of morals is a prejudice. From\nthe union of several beings into one person proceed five other\npattern-concepts, the derived or social Ideas of the ethical institutions\nin which the primary Ideas are realized. These correspond to the primary\nIdeas in the reverse order: The system of rewards, which regulates\npunishment; the legal society, which hinders strife; the system of\nadministration, aimed at the greatest possible good of all; the system\nof culture, aimed at the development of the greatest possible power and\nvirtuosity; finally, as the highest, and that which unites the others in\nitself, society as a person, which, when it is provided with the necessary\npower, is termed the state.\n\nIf we combine the totality of the original Ideas into the unity of the\nperson the concept of virtue arises. If we reflect on the limitations which\noppose the full realization of the ideal of virtue, we gain the concepts of\nlaw and duty. An ethics, like that of Kant, which exclusively emphasizes\nthe imperative or obligatory character of the good, is one-sided; it\nconsiders morality only in arrest, a mistake which goes with its false\ndoctrine of freedom. On the other hand, it was a great merit in Kant\nthat he first made clear the unconditional validity of moral judgment,\nindependent of all eudemonism. Politics and pedagogics are branches of the\ntheory of virtue. The end of education is development in virtue, and, as\na means to this, the arousing of varied interests and the production of a\nstable character.\n\nIn conclusion, we may sum up the points in which Herbart shows himself\na follower of Kant--he calls himself a \"Kantian of the year 1828.\" His\npractical philosophy takes from Kant its independence of theoretical\nphilosophy, the disinterested character of aesthetic judgment, the\nabsoluteness of ethical values, the non-empirical origin of the moral\nconcepts: \"The fundamental ethical relations are not drawn from\nexperience.\" His metaphysics owes to Kant the critical treatment of the\nexperience-concepts (its task is to make experience comprehensible), in\nwhich the leading idea in the Kantian doctrine of the antinomies, the\ninevitableness of contradictions, is generalized, extended to all the\nfundamental concepts of experience, and, as it were, transferred from the\nDialectic to the Analytic; it owes to him, further, the conception of being\nas absolute position, and, finally, the dualism of phenomena and things\nin themselves. Herbart (with Schopenhauer) considers the renewal of the\nPlatonic distinction between seeming and being the chief service of the\ngreat critical philosopher, and finds his greatest mistake in the _a\npriori_ character ascribed to the forms of cognition. In the doctrine of\nthe pure intuitions and the categories, and the Critique of Judgment, he\nrejects, and with full consciousness, just those parts of Kant on which the\nFichtean school had built further. Finally, Herbart's method of thought,\nhis impersonality, the at times anxious caution of his inquiry, and the\nneatness of his conceptions, are somewhat akin to Kant's, only that he\nlacked the gift of combination to a much greater degree than his great\npredecessor on the K\u00f6nigsberg rostrum. His remarkable acuteness is busier\nin loosening than in binding; it is more happy in the discovery of\ncontradictions than in their resolution. Therefore he does not belong to\nthe kings who have decided the fate of philosophy for long periods of time;\nhe stands to one side, though it is true he is the most important figure\namong these who occupy such a position.\n\nThe first to give his adherence to Herbart in essential positions, and so\nto furnish occasion for the formation of an Herbartian school, was Drobisch\n(born 1802), in two critiques which appeared in 1828 and 1830. Besides\nDrobisch, from whom we have valuable discussions of Logic (1836, 5th ed.,\n1887) and Empirical Psychology (1842), and an interesting essay on _Moral\nStatistics and the Freedom of the Will_ (1867), L. Str\u00fcmpell (born 1812;\n_The Principal Points in Herbart's Metaphysics Critically Examined_, 1840),\nis a professor in Leipsic. The organ of the school, the _Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr exakte Philosophie_, now edited by Fl\u00fcgel (the first volume, 1860,\ncontained a survey of the literature of the school), was at first issued\nby T. Ziller, the pedagogical thinker, and Allihn. The _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nV\u00f6lkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft_, from 1859, edited by M. Lazarus\n(born 1824; _The Life of the Soul_, 3 vols., 1856 _seq_., 3d ed., 1883\n_seq_.) and H. Steinthal (born 1823; _The Origin of Language_, 4th ed.,\n1888; _Sketch of the Science of Language_, part i. 2d ed., 1881; _General\nEthics_, 1885) of Berlin, also belongs to the Herbartian movement.\nDistinguished service has been done in psychology by Nahlowsky (_The Life\nof Feeling_, 1862, 2d. ed., 1884), Theodor Waitz in Marburg (1821-84;\n_Foundation of Psychology_, 1846; _Text-book of Psychology_, 1849), and\nVolkmann in Prague (1822-77; _Text-book of Psychology_, 3d. ed., by\nCornelius, 1884 and 1885); while Friedrich Exner (died 1853) was formerly\nmuch spoken of as an opponent of the Hegelian psychology (1843-44). Robert\nZimmermann in Vienna (born 1824) represents an extreme formalistic tendency\nin aesthetics (_History of Aesthetics_, 1858; _General Esthetics as Science\nof Form_, 1865; further, a series of thorough essays on subjects in the\nhistory of philosophy). Among historians of philosophy Thilo has given a\nrather one-sided representation of the Herbartian standpoint. The school's\nphilosophers of religion have been mentioned above (p. 532). Beneke, whom\nwe have joined with Fries on account of his anthropological standpoint,\nstands about midway between Herbart and Schopenhauer. He shares in the\nformer's interest in psychology, in the latter's foundation of metaphysical\nknowledge on inner experience, and in the dislike felt by both for Hegel;\nwhile, on the other hand, he differs from Herbart in his empirical method,\nand from Schopenhauer in the priority ascribed to representation over\neffort.\n\n\n%3. Pessimism: Schopenhauer.%\n\nSchopenhauer is in all respects the antipodes of Herbart. If in Herbart\nphilosophy breaks up into a number of distinct special inquiries,\nSchopenhauer has but one fundamental thought to communicate, in the\ncarrying out of which, as he is convinced, each part implies the whole and\nis implied by the whole. The former operates with sober concepts where the\nlatter follows the lead of gifted intuition. The one is cool, thorough,\ncautious, methodical to the point of pedantry; the other is passionate,\ningenious, unmethodical to the point of capricious dilettantism. In the one\ncase, philosophy is as far as possible exact science, in which the person\nof the thinker entirely retires behind the substance of the inquiry; in the\nother, philosophy consists in a sum of artistic conceptions, which derive\ntheir content and value chiefly from the individuality of the author. The\nhistory of philosophy has no other system to show which to the same\ndegree expresses and reflects the personality of the philosopher as\nSchopenhauer's. This personality, notwithstanding its limitations and its\nwhims, was important enough to give interest to Schopenhauer's views, even\napart from the relative truth which they contain.\n\nArthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was the son of a merchant in Dantzic and\nhis wife Johanna, _n\u00e9e_ Trosiener, who subsequently became known as a\nnovelist. His early training was gained from foreign travel, but after the\ndeath of his father he exchanged the mercantile career, which he had begun\nat his father's request, for that of a scholar, studying under G.E. Schulze\nin G\u00f6ttingen, and under Fichte at Berlin. In 1813 he gained his doctor's\ndegree in Jena with a dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason_. Then he moved from Weimar, the residence of his\nmother, where he had associated considerably with Goethe and had been\nintroduced to Indian philosophy by Fr. Mayer, to Dresden (1814-18). In the\nlatter place he wrote the essay _On Sight and Colors_ (1816; subsequently\npublished by the author in Latin), and his chief work, _The World as Will\nand Idea_ (1819; new edition, with a second volume, 1844). After the\ncompletion of the latter he began his first Italian journey, while his\nsecond tour fell in the interval between his two quite unsuccessful\nattempts (in Berlin 1820 and 1825) to propagate his philosophy from the\nprofessor's desk. From 1831 until his death he lived in learned retirement\nin Frankfort-on-the-Main. Here he composed the opuscule _On Will in\nNature_, 1836, the prize treatises _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ and\n_On the Foundation of Ethics_ (together, _The Two Fundamental Problems\nof Ethics_, 1841), and the collection of minor treatises _Parerga and\nParalipomena_, 2 vols., 1851 (including an essay \"On Religion\").\nJ. Frauenst\u00e4dt has published a considerable amount of posthumous material\n(among other things the translation, _B. Gracians Handorakel der\nWeltklugheit_); the _Collected Works_ (6 vols., 1873-74, 2d ed., 1877, with\na biographical notice); _Lichtstrahlen aus Schopenhauers Werken_, 1861, 5th\ned. 1885; and a _Schopenhauer Lexicon_, 2 vols., 1871.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: From the remaining Schopenhauer literature (F. Laban has\npublished a chronological survey of it, 1880) we may call attention to the\ncritiques of the first edition of the chief work by Herbart and Beneke, and\nthat of the second edition by Fortlage (_Jenaische Litteratur Zeitung_,\n1845, Nos. 146-151); J.E. Erdmann _Herbart und Schopenhauer, eine Antithese\n(Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, 1851); Wilh. Gwinner, _Schopenhauers\nLeben_, 1878 (the second edition of _Schopenhauer aus pers\u00f6nlichem\nUmgang dargestellt_, 1862); Fr. Nietzsche, _Schopenhauer als Erzieher\n(Unzeitgem\u00e4sse Betrachtungen, St\u00fcck iii_., 1874); O. Busch, _A.\nSchopenhauer_, 2d. ed., 1878; K. Peters, _Schopenhauer als Philosoph und\nSchriftsteller_, 1880; R. Koeber, _Die Philosophie A. Schopenhauers_, 1888.\n[The English reader may be referred to Haldane and Kemp's translation of\n_The World as Will and Idea_, 3 vols., 1883-86; the translation of _The\nFourfold Root_ and the _Will in Nature_ in Bohn's Philosophical Library,\n1889; Saunders's translations from the _Parerga and Paralipomena_, 1889\n_seq_.; Helen Zimmern's _Arthur Schopenhauer, his Life and his Philosophy_,\n1876; W. Wallace's _Schopenhauer_, Great Writers Series, 1890 (with a\nbibliography by Anderson, including references to numerous magazine\narticles, etc.); Sully's _Pessimism_, 2d ed., 1882, chap. iv.; and Royce's\n_Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, chap, viii., 1892.--TR.]]\n\nIn regard to subjective idealism Schopenhauer confesses himself a\nthoroughgoing Kantian. That sensations are merely states in us has long\nbeen known; Kant opened the eyes of the world to the fact that the forms of\nknowledge are also the property of the subject. I know things only as they\nappear to me, as I represent them in virtue of the constitution of my\nintellect; the world is my idea. The Kantian theory, however, is capable of\nsimplification, the various forms of cognition may be reduced to a single\none, to the category of causality or principle of sufficient reason--which\nwas preferred by Kant himself--as the general expression of the regular\nconnection of our representations. This principle, in correspondence with\nthe several classes of objects, or rather of representations--viz., pure\n(merely formal) intuitions, empirical (complete) intuitions, acts of will,\nabstract concepts--has four forms: it is the _principium rationis essendi,\nrationis fiendi, rationis agendi, rationis cognoscendi_. The _ratio\nessendi_ is the law which regulates the coexistence of the parts of space\nand the succession of the divisions of time. The _ratio fiendi_ demands for\nevery change of state another from which it regularly follows as from its\ncause, and a substance as its unchangeable substratum--matter. All changes\ntake place necessarily, all that is real is material; the law of causality\nis valid for phenomena alone, not beyond them, and holds only for the\nstates of substances, not for substances themselves. In inorganic nature\ncauses work mechanically, in organic nature as stimuli (in which the\nreaction is not equal to the action), and in animated nature as motives.\nA motive is a conscious (but not therefore a free) cause; the law of\nmotivation is the _ratio agendi_. This serial order, \"mechanical cause,\nstimulus, and motive,\" denotes only distinctions in the mode of action, not\nin the necessity of action. Man's actions follow as inevitably from his\ncharacter and the motives which influence him as a clock strikes the hours;\nthe freedom of the will is a chimera. Finally, the _ratio cognoscendi_\ndetermines that a judgment must have a sufficient ground in order to be\ntrue. Judgment or the connection of concepts is the chief activity of the\nreason, which, as the faculty of abstract thought and the organ of science,\nconstitutes the difference between man and the brute, while the possession\nof the understanding with its intuition of objects is common to both. In\nopposition to the customary overestimation of this gift of mediate\nrepresentations, of language, and of reflection, Schopenhauer gives\nprominence to the fact that the reason is not a creative faculty like the\nunderstanding, but only a receptive power, that it clarifies and transforms\nthe content furnished by intuition without increasing it by new\nrepresentations.\n\nObjective cognition is confined within the circle of our representations;\nall that is knowable is phenomenon. Space, time, and causality spread out\nlike a triple veil between us and the _per se_ of things, and prevent a\nvision of the true nature of the world. There is one point, however, at\nwhich we know more than mere phenomena, where of these three disturbing\nmedia only one, time-form, separates us from the thing in itself. This\npoint is the consciousness of ourselves.\n\nOn the one hand, I appear to myself as body. My body is a temporal,\nspatial, material object, an object like all others, and with them subject\nto the laws of objectivity. But besides this objective cognition, I have,\nfurther, an immediate consciousness of myself, through which I apprehend\nmy true being--I know myself as willing. My will is more than a mere\nrepresentation, it is the original element in me, the truly real which\nappears to me as body. The will is related to the intellect as the primary\nto the secondary, as substance to accident; it is related to the body\nas the inner to the outer, as reality to phenomenon. The act of will is\nfollowed at once and inevitably by the movement of the body willed, nay,\nthe two are one and the same, only given in different ways: will is the\nbody seen from within, body the will seen from without, the will become\nvisible, objectified. After the analogy of ourselves, again, who appear to\nourselves as material objects but in truth are will, all existence is to\nbe judged. The universe is the _mac-anthropos_; the knowledge of our own\nessence, the key to the knowledge of the essence of the world. Like our\nbody, the whole world is the visibility of will. The human will is the\nhighest stage in the development of the same principle which manifests its\nactivity in the various forces of nature, and which properly takes its name\nfrom the highest species. To penetrate further into the inner nature of\nthings than this is impossible. What that which presents itself as will\nand which still remains after the negation of the latter (see below) is in\nitself, is for us absolutely unknowable.\n\nThe world is _per se_ will. None of the predicates are to be attributed to\nthe primal will which we ascribe to things in consequence of our subjective\nforms of thought--neither determination by causes or ends, nor plurality:\nit stands outside the law of causality, as also outside space and time,\nwhich form the _principium individuationis_. The primal will is groundless,\nblind stress, unconscious impulse toward existence; it is one, the one\nand all, [Greek: en nai pan]. That which manifests itself as gravity, as\nmagnetic force, as the impulse to growth, as the _vis medicatrix naturae_,\nis only this one world-will, whose unity (not conscious character!) shows\nitself in the purposiveness of its embodiments. The essence of each thing,\nits hidden quality, at which empirical explanation finds its limit, is its\nwill: the essence of the stone is its will to fall; that of the lungs is\nthe will to breathe; teeth, throat, and bowels are hunger objectified.\nThose qualities in which the universal will gives itself material\nmanifestation form a series with grades of increasing perfection, a realm\nof unchangeable specific forms or eternal Ideas, which (with a real value\ndifficult to determine) stand midway between the one primal will and\nthe numberless individual beings. That the organic individual does not\nperfectly correspond to the ideal of its species, but only approximates\nthis more or less closely, is grounded in the fact that the stadia in the\nobjectification of the will, or the Ideas, contend, as it were, for matter;\nand whatever of force is used up in the victory of the higher Ideas over\nthe lower is lost for the development of the examples of the former. The\nhigher the level on which a being stands the clearer the expression of its\nindividuality. The most general forces of nature, which constitute the raw\nmass, play the fundamental bass in the world-symphony, the higher stages\nof inorganic nature, with the vegetable and animal worlds, the harmonious\nmiddle parts, and man the guiding treble, the significant melody. With the\nhuman brain the world as idea is given at a stroke; in this organ the will\nhas kindled a torch in order to throw light upon itself and to carry out\nits designs with careful deliberation; it has brought forth the intellect\nas its instrument, which, with the great majority of men, remains in a\nposition of subservience to the will. Brain and thought are the same; the\nformer is nothing other than the will to know, as the stomach is will\nto digest. Those only talk of an immaterial soul who import into\nphilosophy--where such ideas do not belong--concepts taught them when they\nwere confirmed.\n\nSchopenhauer's philosophy is as rich in inconsistencies as his personality\nwas self-willed and unharmonious. \"He carries into his system all the\ncontradictions and whims of his capricious nature,\" says Zeller. From the\nmost radical idealism (the objective world a product of representation) he\nmakes a sharp transition to the crassest materialism (thought a function of\nthe brain); first matter is to be a mere idea, now thought is to be merely\na material phenomenon! The third and fourth books of _The World as Will and\nIdea_, which develop the aesthetic and ethical standpoint of their author,\nstand in as sharp a contradiction to the first (po\u00ebtical) and the second\n(metaphysical) books as these to each other. While at first it was\nmaintained that all representation is subject to the principle of\nsufficient reason, we are now told that, besides causal cognition, there is\na higher knowledge, one which is free from the control of this principle,\nviz., aesthetic and philosophical intuition. If, before, it was said that\nthe intellect is the creature and servant of the will, we now learn that in\nfavored individuals it gains the power to throw off the yoke of slavery,\nand not only to raise itself to the blessedness of contemplation free from\nall desire, but even to enter on a victorious conflict with the tyrant,\nto slay the will. The source of this power--is not revealed. R. Haym _(A.\nSchopenhauer_, 1864, reprinted from the _Preussische Jahrb\u00fccher_) was not\nfar wrong in characterizing Schopenhauer's philosophy as a clever novel,\nwhich entertains the reader by its rapid vicissitudes.\n\nThe contemplation which is free from causality and will is the essence of\naesthetic life; the partial and total sublation, the quieting and negation\nof the will, that of ethical life. It is but seldom, and only in the\nartistic and philosophical genius, that the intellect succeeds in freeing\nitself from the supremacy of the will, and, laying aside the question of\nthe _why_ and _wherefore_, _where_ and _when_, in sinking itself completely\nin the pure _what_ of things. While with the majority of mankind, as with\nanimals, the intellect always remains a prisoner in the service of the will\nto live, of self-preservation, of personal interests, in gifted men,\nin artists and thinkers, it strips off all that is individual, and, in\ndisinterested vision of the Ideas, becomes pure, timeless subject, freed\nfrom the will. Art removes individuality from the subject as well as from\nthe object; its comforting and cheering influence depends on the fact that\nit elevates those enjoying it to the stand-point--raised above all pain\nof desire--of a fixed, calm, completely objective contemplation of the\nunchangeable essence, of the eternal types of things. For aesthetic\nintuition the object is not a thing under relations of space, time, and\ncause, but only an expression, an exemplification, a representative of\nthe Idea. Poetry, which presents--most perfectly in tragedy--the Idea of\nhumanity, stands higher than the plastic arts. The highest rank, however,\nbelongs to music, since it does not, like the other arts, represent single\nIdeas, but--as an unconscious metaphysic, nay, a second, ideal world above\nthe material world--the will itself. In view of this high appreciation\nof their art, it is not surprising that musicians have contributed a\nconsiderable contingent to the band of Schopenhauer worshipers. A different\nsource of attraction for the wider circle of readers was supplied by the\npiquant spice of pessimism.\n\nIf the purposiveness of the phenomena of nature points to the unity of the\nprimal will, the unspeakable misery of life, which Schopenhauer sets forth\nwith no less of eloquence, proves the blindness and irrationality of the\nworld-ground. To live is to suffer; the world contains incomparably more\npain than pleasure; it is the worst possible world. In the world of\nsub-animal nature aimless striving; in the animal world an insatiable\nimpulse after enjoyment--while the will, deceiving itself with fancied\nhappiness to come, which always remains denied it, and continually\ntossed to and fro between necessity and _ennui_, never attains complete\nsatisfaction. The pleasure which it pursues is nothing but the removal of\na dissatisfaction, and vanishes at once when the longing is stilled, to\nbe replaced by fresh wants, that is, by new pains. In view of the\nindescribable misery in the world, to favor optimism is evidence not so\nmuch of folly and blindness as of a wanton disposition. The old saying is\ntrue: Non-existence is better than existence. The misery, however, is the\njust punishment for the original sin of the individual, which gave itself\nits particular existence by an act of intelligible freedom. Redemption from\nthe sin and misery of existence is possible only through a second act\nof transcendental freedom, which, since it consists in the complete\ntransformation of our being, and since it is supernatural in its origin,\nthe Church is right in describing as a new birth and work of grace.\n\nMorality presupposes pessimistic insight into the badness of the world and\nthe fruitlessness of all desire, and pantheistic discernment of the untruth\nof individual existence and the identity in essence of all individuals\nfrom a metaphysical standpoint. Man is able to free himself from egoistic\nself-affirmation only when he perceives the two truths, that all striving\nis vain and the longed-for pleasure unattainable, and that all individuals\nare at bottom one, viz. manifestations of the same primal will. This is\ntemporarily effected in sympathy, which, as the only counterpoise to\nnatural selfishness, is the true moral motive and the source of all love\nand justice. The sympathizer sees himself in others and feels their\nsuffering as his own. The entire negation of the will, however, inspiring\nexamples of which have been furnished by the Christian ascetics and\nOriental penitents, stands higher than the vulgar virtue of sympathy with\nthe sufferings of others. Here knowledge, turned away from the individual\nand vain to the whole and genuine, ceases to be a motive for the will and\nbecomes a means of stilling it; the intellect is transformed from a motive\ninto a quietive, and brings him who gives himself up to the All safely\nout from the storm of the passions into the peace of deliverance from\nexistence. Absence of will, resignation, is holiness and blessedness in\none. For him who has slain the will in himself the motley deceptive dream\nof phenomena has vanished, he lives in the ether of true reality, which for\nour knowledge is an empty nothingness (\"Nirvana\"), yet (as the ultimate,\nincomprehensible _per se_, which remains after the annulling of the will)\nonly a relative nothingness--relative to the phenomenon.\n\nSchopenhauer disposes of the sense of responsibility and the reproofs of\nconscience, which are inconvenient facts for his determinism, by making\nthem both refer, not to single deeds and the empirical character, but to\nthe indivisible act of the intelligible character. Conscience does not\nblame me because I have acted as I must act with my character and the\nmotives given, but for being what in these actions I reveal myself to be.\n_Operari sequitur esse_. My action follows from my being, my being was my\nown free choice, and a new act of freedom is alone capable of transforming\nit.\n\nIf Schopenhauer is fond of referring to the agreement of his views with the\noldest and most perfect religions, the idea lies in the background that\nreligion,--which springs from the same metaphysical needs as philosophy,\nand, for the great multitude, who lack the leisure and the capacity for\nphilosophical thought, takes the place of the former,--as the metaphysics\nof the people, clothes the same fundamental truths which the philosopher\noffers in conceptual form and supports by rational grounds in the garb of\nmyth and allegory, and places them under the protection of an external\nauthority. When this character of religion is overlooked, and that which\nis intended to be symbolical is taken for literal truth (it is not\nthe supernaturalists alone who start with this unjust demand, but the\nrationalists also, with their minimizing interpretations), it becomes the\nworst enemy of true philosophy. In Christianity the doctrines of original\nsin and of redemption are especially congenial to our philosopher, as well\nas mysticism and asceticism. He declares Mohammedanism the worst religion\non account of its optimism and abstract theism, and Buddhism the best,\nbecause it is idealistic, pessimistic, and--atheistic.\n\nIt was not until after the appearance of the second edition of his\nchief work that Schopenhauer experienced in increasing measure the\nsatisfaction--which his impatient ambition had expected much earlier--of\nseeing his philosophy seriously considered. A zealous apostle arose for\nhim in Julius Frauenst\u00e4dt (died 1878; _Letters on the Philosophy of\nSchopenhauer_, 1854; _New Letters on the Philosophy of Schopenhauer_,\n1876), who, originally an Hegelian, endeavored to remove pessimism from the\nmaster's system. Like Eduard von Hartmann, who will be discussed below,\nJulius Bahnsen (died 1882; _The Contradiction in the Knowledge and Being\nof the World, the Principle and Particular Verification of Real-Dialectic_,\n1880-81; also, interesting characterological studies) seeks to combine\nelements from Schopenhauer and Hegel, while K. Peters (_Will-world and\nWorld-will_, 1883) shows in another direction points of contact with the\nfirst named thinker. Of the younger members of the school we may name P.\nDeussen in Kiel (_The Elements of Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1890), and Philipp\nMainl\u00e4nder (_Philosophy of Redemption_, 2d ed., 1879). As we have mentioned\nabove, Schopenhauer's doctrines have exercised an attractive force in\nartistic circles also. Richard Wagner (1813-83; _Collected Writings_, 9\nvols., 1871-73, vol. x. 1883; 2d ed., 1887-88), whose earlier aesthetic\nwritings (_The Art-work of the Future_, 1850; _Opera and Drama_, 1851) had\nshown the influence of Feuerbach, in his later works (_Beethoven_, 1870;\n_Religion and Art_, in the third volume of the _Bayreuther Bl\u00e4tter_, 1880)\nbecame an adherent of Schopenhauer, after, in the _Ring of the Nibelung_,\nhe had given poetical expression to a view of the world nearly allied to\nSchopenhauer's, though this was previous to his acquaintance with the works\nof the latter.[1] One of the most thoughtful disciples of the Frankfort\nphilosopher and the Bayreuth dramatist is Fried rich Nietzsche (born 1844).\nHis _Unseasonable Reflections_, 1873-76,[2] is a summons to return from the\nerrors of modern culture, which, corrupted by the seekers for gain, by the\nstate, by the polite writers and savants, especially by the professors\nof philosophy, has made men cowardly and false instead of simple and\nhonorable, mere self-satisfied \"philistines of culture.\" In his writings\nsince 1878[3] Nietzsche has exchanged the r\u00f4le of a German Rousseau for\nthat of a follower of Voltaire, to arrive finally at the ideal of the man\nabove men.[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. on Wagner, Fr. v. Hausegger, _Wagner und Schopenhauer_,\n1878. [English translation of Wagner's _Prose Works_ by Ellis, vol. i.,\n1892.--TR.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"D. Strauss, the Confessor and the Author\"; \"On the Advantage\nand Disadvantage of History for Life\"; \"Schopenhauer as an Educator\"; \"R.\nWagner in Bayreuth.\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Human, All-too-human_, new ed., 1886; _The Dawn, Thoughts on\nHuman Prejudices_, 1881; _The Merry Science_, 1882; _So spake Zarathustra_,\n1883-84; _Beyond Good and Evil_, 1886; _On the Genealogy of Morals_, 1887,\n2d ed., 1887; _The Wagner Affair_, 1888, 2d ed., 1892; _G\u00f6tzend\u00e4mmerung, or\nHow to Philosophize with the Hammer_, 1889.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Cf. H. Kaatz, _Die Weltanschauung Fr. Nietzsches, I. Kultur\nund Moral_, 1892.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nPHILOSOPHY OUT OF GERMANY.\n\n\n%1. Italy.%\n\nThe Cartesian philosophy, which had been widely accepted in Italy, and had\nstill been advocated, in the sense of Malebranche, by Sigismond Gerdil\n(1718-1802), was opposed as an unhistorical view of the world by\nGiambattista Vico,[1] the bold and profound creator of the philosophy of\nhistory (1668-1744; from 1697 professor of rhetoric in the University\nof Naples). Vico's leading ideas are as follows: Man makes himself the\ncriterion of the universe, judges that which is unknown and remote by the\nknown and present. The free will of the individual rests on the judgments,\nmanners, and habits of the people, which have arisen without reflection\nfrom a universal human instinct. Uniform ideas among nations unacquainted\nwith one another are motived in a common truth. History is the development\nof human nature; in it neither chance nor fate rules, but the legislative\npower of providence, in virtue of which men through their own freedom\nprogressively realize the idea of human nature. The universal course of\ncivilization is that culture transfers its abode from the forests and huts\ninto villages, cities, and, finally, into academies; the nature of the\nnations is at first rude, then stern, gradually it becomes mild, nay,\neffeminate, and finally wanton; at first men feel only that which is\nnecessary, later they regard the useful, the convenient, the agreeable\nand attractive, until the luxury sprung from the sense for the beautiful\ndegenerates into a foolish misuse of things. Vico divides antiquity into\nthree periods: the divine (theocracy), the heroic (aristocracy), and the\nhuman (democracy and monarchy). The same course of things repeats itself in\nthe nations of later times: to the patriarchal dominion of the fanciful,\nmyth-making Orient correspond the spiritual states of the migrations; to\nthe old Greek aristocracy, the chivalry and robbery of the period of the\nCrusades; to the republicanism and the monarchy of later antiquity, the\nmodern period, which gives even the citizens and peasants a share in the\nuniversal equality. If European culture had not been transplanted to\nAmerica, the same three-act drama of human development would there be\nplaying. Vico carries this threefold division into his consideration of\nmanners, laws, languages, character, etc.\n\n[Footnote 1: Vico: _Principles of a New Science of the Common Nature of\nNations_, 1725; _Works_, in six volumes, edited by G. Ferrari, 1835-37,\nnew ed.. 1853 _seq_. On Vico cf. K. Werner, 1877 and 1879. [Also Flint's\n_Vico_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1884.--TR.]]\n\nIf Vico anticipates the Hegelian view of history, Antonio Genovesi\n(1712-69), who also taught at the University of Naples, and while the\nformer was still living, shows himself animated by a presentiment of the\nKantian criticism.[1] Appreciating Leibnitz and Locke, and appropriating\nthe idea of the monads from the one and the unknowableness of substance\nfrom the other, he reaches the conviction--according to statements in his\nletters--that sense-bodies are nothing but the appearances of intelligible\nunities; that each being for us is an activity, whose substratum and\nground remains unknown to us; that self-consciousness and the knowledge\nof external impressions yield phenomena alone, through the elaboration of\nwhich we produce the intellectual worlds of the sciences. For the rest,\nGenovesi thus advises his friends: Study the world, devote yourselves to\nlanguages and to mathematics, think more about men than about the things\nabove us, and leave metaphysical vagaries to the monks! His countrymen\nhonor in him the man who first included ethics and politics in\nphilosophical instruction, and who used the Italian language both from the\ndesk and in his writings, holding that a nation whose scientific works are\nnot composed in its own tongue is barbarian.\n\n[Footnote 1: In the following account we have made use of a translation of\nthe concluding section of Francesco Florentine's _Handbook of the History\nof Philosophy_, 1879-81, which was most kindly placed at our disposal by\nDr. J. Mainzer. Cf. _La Filosofia Contemporanea in Italia_, 1876, by the\nsame author; further, Bonatelli, _Die Philosophic in Italien seit_, 1815;\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophic und philosophische Kritik_, vol. liv. 1869, p.\n134 _seq._; and especially, K. Werner, _Die Italienische Philosophic des\nXIX. Jahrhunderts_, 5 vols., 1884-86. [The English reader may be referred to\nthe appendix on Italian philosophy in vol. ii. of the English translation\nof Ueberweg, by Vincenzo Botta; and to Barzellotti's \"Philosophy in Italy,\"\n_Mind_, vol. in. 1878.--TR.]]\n\nThe sensationalism of Condillac, starting from Parma, gained influence over\nMelchiore Gioja (1767-1828; _Statistical Logic_, 1803; _Ideology_, 1822)\nand Giandomenico Romagnosi (1761-1835; _What is the Sound Mind?_ 1827), but\nnot without experiencing essential modification from both. The importance\nof these men, moreover, lies more in the sphere of social philosophy than\nin the sphere of no\u00ebtics.\n\nOf the three greatest Italian philosophers of this century, Galluppi,\nRosmini, and Gioberti, the first named is more in sympathy with the Kantian\nposition than he himself will confess. Pasquale Galluppi[1] (1770-1846;\nfrom 1831 professor at Naples) adheres to the principle of experience, but\ndoes not conceive experience as that which is sensuously given, but as\nthe elaboration of this through the synthetic relations _(rapporti)_ of\nidentity and difference, which proceed from the activity of the mind.\nVincenzo de Grazia (_Essay on the Reality of Human Knowledge_, 1839-42),\nwho holds all relations to be objective, and Ottavio Colecchi (died 1847;\n_Philosophical Investigations_, 1843), who holds them all subjective,\noppose the view of Galluppi that some are objective and others subjective.\nAccording to De Grazia judgment is observation, not connection; it finds\nout the relations contained in the data of sensation; it discovers, but\ndoes not produce them. Colecchi reduces the Kantian categories to two,\nsubstance and cause. Testa, Borelli (1824), and, among the younger men,\nCantoni, are Kantians; Labriola is an Herbartian.\n\n[Footnote 1: Galluppi: _Philosophical Essay on the Critique of Knowledge_,\n1819 _seq.; Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics_, 1832 _seq.; Philosophy\nof the Will_, 1832 _seq.; On the System of Fichte, or Considerations on\nTranscendental Idealism and Absolute Rationalism_, 1841. By the _Letters\non the History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant_, 1827, in the later\neditions to Cousin, he became the founder of this discipline in his native\nland.]\n\nAntonio Rosmini-Serbati[1] (born 1797 at Rovereto, died 1855 at Stresa)\nregards knowledge as the common product of sensibility and understanding,\nthe former furnishing the matter, the latter the form. The form is one: the\nIdea of being which precedes all judgment, which does not come from myself,\nwhich is innate, and apprehensible by immediate inner perception _(essere\nideale, ente universale)_. The pure concepts (substance, cause, unity,\nnecessity) arise when the reflecting reason analyzes this general Idea\nof being; the mixed Ideas (space, time, motion; body, spirit), when the\nunderstanding applies it to sensuous experience. The universal Idea of\nbeing and the particular existences are in their being identical, but in\ntheir mode of existence different. In his posthumous _Theosophy_,\n1859 _seq_., Rosmini no longer makes the universal being receive its\ndeterminations from without, but produce them from its own inner nature\nby means of an _a priori_ development. Vincenzo Gioberti[1] (born 1801 in\nTurin, died 1852 at Paris) has been compared as a patriot with Fichte, and\nin his cast of thought with Spinoza. In place of Rosmini's \"psychologism,\"\nwhich was advanced by Descartes and which leads to skepticism, he seeks to\nsubstitute \"ontologism,\" which is alone held capable of reconciling science\nand the Catholic religion. By immediate intuition (the content of which\nGioberti comprehends in the formula \"Being creates the existences\") we\ncognize the absolute as the creative ground of two series, the series of\nthought and the series of reality. The endeavors of Rosmini and Gioberti to\nbring the reason into harmony with the faith of the Church were fiercely\nattacked by Giussepe Ferrari (1811-76) and Ausonio Franchi (1853), while\nFrancesco Bonatelli _(Thought and Cognition_, 1864) and Terenzio Mamiani\n(1800-85; _Confessions of a Metaphysician_, 1865), follow a line of thought\nakin to the Platonizing views of the first named thinkers. The review\n_Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane_, called into life by Mamiani in 1870, has\nbeen continued since 1886 under the direction of L. Ferri as the _Rivista\nItaliana di Filosofia_.\n\n[Footnote 1: Rosmini: _New Essay on the Origin of Ideas_, 1830 (English\ntranslation, 1883-84); _Principles of Moral Science_, 1831; _Philosophy\nof Right_, 1841.] [Footnote B: Gioberti: _Introduction to the Study of\nPhilosophy_, 1840; _Philosophical Errors of A. Rosmini_, 1842; _On the\nBeautiful_, 1841; _On the Good_, 1842; _Protology_ edited by Massari, 1857.\nOn both cf. R. Seydel, _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, 1859.]\n\nThe Thomistic doctrine has many adherents in Italy, among whom the Jesuit\nM. Liberatore (1865) may be mentioned. The Hegelian philosophy has also\nfound favor there (especially in Naples), as well as positivism. The former\nis favored by Vera, Mariano, Ragnisco, and Spaventa (died 1885); the\n_Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica_, 1881 _seq_., founded by Morselli,\nsupports the latter, and E. Caporali's _La Nuova Scienza_, 1884, moves in\na similar direction. Pietro Siciliani _(On the Revival of the Positive\nPhilosophy in Italy_, 1871) makes the third, the critical, period of\nphilosophy by which scholasticism is overthrown and the reason made\nauthoritative, commence with Vico, and bases his doctrine on Vico's\nformula: The conversion (transposition) of the _verum_ and the _factum_,\nand _vice versa_. Subsequently he inclined to positivism, which he had\npreviously opposed, and among the representatives of which we may mention,\nfurther, R. Ardig\u00f2 of Pavia _(Psychology as Positive Science_, 1870; _The\nEthics of Positivism_, 1885; _Philosophical Works_, 1883 _seq_.), and\nAndrea Angiulli of Naples (died 1890; _Philosophy and the Schools_, 1889),\nwho explain matter and spirit as two phenomena of the same essence;\nfurther, Giuseppe Sergi, Giovanni Cesca, and the psychiatrist, C. Lombroso,\nthe head of the positivistic school of penal law.\n\n\n%2. France.%\n\nAmong the French philosophers of this century[1] none can compare in\nfar-reaching influence, both at home and abroad, with Auguste Comte,[2] the\ncreator of positivism (born at Montpellier in 1798, died at Paris in 1857),\nwhose chief work, the _Course of Positive Philosophy_, 6 vols., appeared in\n1830 42. [English version, \"freely translated and condensed,\" by Harriet\nMartineau, 1853.]\n\n[Footnote 1: Accounts of French philosophy in the nineteenth century have\nbeen given by Taine (1857, 3d ed., 1867); Janet _(La Philosophie Fran\u00e7aise\nContemporaine_, 2d ed., 1879); A. Franck; Ferraz (3 vols., 1880-89); Felix\nRavaisson (2d ed., 1884); the Swede, J. Borelius _(Glances at the Present\nPosition of Philosophy in Germany and France_, German translation by Jonas,\n1887); [and Ribot, _Mind_, vol. ii., 1877].]\n\n[Footnote 2: On Comte cf. B. P\u00fcnjer, _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr protestantische\nTheologie_, 1878; R. Eucken, _Zur W\u00fcrdigung Comtes und des Positivismus_,\nin the _Aufs\u00e4tze zum Zellerjubil\u00e4um_, 1887; Maxim. Br\u00fctt, _Der\nPositivismus_, Programme of the _Realgymnasium des Johanneums_, Hamburg,\n1889; [also, besides Mill, p. 560, John Morley, _Encyclopedia Britannica_,\nvol. vi. pp. 229-238, and E. Caird, _The Social Philosophy and Religion of\nComte_, 1885.--Tr.]]\n\nThe positive philosophy seeks to put an end to the hoary error that\nanything more is open to our knowledge than given facts--phenomena and\ntheir relations. We do not know the essence of phenomena, and just\nas little their first causes and ultimate ends; we know--by means of\nobservation, experiment, and comparison--only the constant relations\nbetween phenomena, the relations of succession and of similarity among\nfacts, the uniformities of which we call their laws. All knowledge is,\ntherefore, relative; there is no absolute knowledge, for the inmost essence\nof facts, and likewise their origin, the way in which they are produced,\nis for us impenetrable. We know only, and this by experience, that the\nphenomenon A is invariably connected with the phenomenon B, that the\nsecond always follows on the first, and call the constant antecedent of a\nphenomenon its cause. We know such causes only as are themselves phenomena.\nThe fact that our knowledge is limited to the succession and coexistence of\nphenomena is not to be lamented as a defect: the only knowledge which is\nattainable by us is at the same time the only useful knowledge, that which\nlends us practical power over phenomena. When we inquire into causes we\ndesire to hasten or hinder the effect, or to change it as we wish, or at\nleast to anticipate it in order to make our preparations accordingly. Such\nforesight and control of events can be attained only through a knowledge\nof their laws, their order of succession, their phenomenal causes. _Savoir\npour pr\u00e9voir_. But, although the prevision of facts is the only knowledge\nwhich we need, men have always sought after another, an \"absolute\"\nknowledge, or have even believed that they were in possession of it; the\nforerunners of the positive philosophy themselves, Bacon and Descartes,\nhave been entangled in this prejudice. A long intellectual development was\nrequired to reach the truth, that our knowledge does not extend beyond\nthe cognition of the succession and coexistence of facts; that the same\nprocedure must be extended to abstract speculation which the common mind\nitself makes use of in its single actions. On the other hand, the positive\nphilosophy, notwithstanding its rejection of metaphysics, is far from\ngiving its sanction to empiricism. Every isolated, empirical observation\nis useless and uncertain; it obtains value and usefulness only when it is\ndefined and explained by a theory, and combined with other observations\ninto a law--this makes the difference between the observations of the\nscholar and the layman.\n\nThe positive stage of a science, which begins when we learn to explain\nphenomena by their laws, is preceded by two others: a theological stage,\nwhich ascribes phenomena to supposed personal powers, and a metaphysical\nstage, which ascribes them to abstract natural forces. These three periods\ndenote the childhood, the youth, and the manhood of science.\n\nThe earliest view of the world is the theological view, which derives the\nevents of the world from the voluntary acts of supernatural intelligent\nbeings. The crude view of nature sees in each individual thing a being\nanimated like man; later man accustoms himself to think of a whole class\nof objects as governed by one invisible being, by a divinity; finally\nthe multitude of divinities gives place to a single God, who creates,\nmaintains, and rules the universe, and by extraordinary acts, by miracles,\ninterferes in the course of events. Thus fetichism (in its highest form,\nastrolatry), polytheism, and monotheism are the stages in the development\nof the theological mode of thought. In the second, the metaphysical,\nperiod, the acts of divine volition are replaced by entities, by abstract\nconcepts, which are regarded as realities, as the true reality back of\nphenomena. A force, a power, an occult property or essence is made to dwell\nin things; the mysterious being which directs events is no longer called\nGod, but \"Nature,\" and invested with certain inclinations, with a horror\nof a vacuum, an aversion to breaks, a tendency toward the best, a _vis\nmedicatrix_, etc. Here belong, also, the vegetative soul of Aristotle, the\nvital force and the plastic impulse of modern investigators. Finally the\npositive stage is reached, when all such abstractions, which are even yet\nconceived as half personal and acting voluntarily, are abandoned, and\nthe unalterable and universally valid laws of phenomena established by\nobservation and experiment alone. But to explain the laws of nature\nthemselves transcends, according to Comte, the fixed limits of human\nknowledge. The beginning of the world lies outside the region of the\nknowable, atheism is no better grounded than the theistic hypothesis, and\nif Comte asserts that a blindly acting mechanism is less probable than a\nworld-plan, he is conscious that he is expressing a mere conjecture which\ncan never be raised to the rank of a scientific theory. The origin and the\nend of things are insoluble problems, in answering which no progress has\nyet been made in spite of man's long thought about them. Only that which\nlies intermediate between the two inscrutable termini of the world is an\nobject of knowledge.\n\nIt is not only the human mind in general that exhibits this advance from\nthe theological, through the metaphysical, to the positive mode of thought,\nbut each separate science goes through the same three periods--only that\nthe various disciplines have developed with unequal rapidity. While some\nhave already culminated in the positive method of treatment, others yet\nremain caught in the theological period of beginnings, and others still are\nin the metaphysical transition stage. Up to the present all three phases\nof development exist side by side, and even among the objects of the most\nhighly developed sciences there are some which we continue to regard\ntheologically; these are the ones which we do not yet understand how to\ncalculate, as the changes of the weather or the spread of epidemics. Which\nscience first attained the positive state, and in what order have the\nothers followed? With this criterion Comte constructs his _classification\nof the sciences_, in which, however, he takes account only of those\nsciences which he calls abstract, that is, those which treat of \"events\" in\ndistinction from \"objects.\" The abstract sciences (as biology) investigate\nthe most general laws of nature, valid for all phenomena, from which the\nparticular phenomena which experience presents to us cannot be deduced, but\non the basis of which an entirely different world were also possible. The\nconcrete sciences, on the other hand (_e.g._, botany and zo\u00f6logy), have to\ndo with the actually given combinations of phenomena. The former follow out\neach separate one of the general laws through all its possible modes of\noperation, the latter consider only the combination of laws given in an\nobject. Thus oaks and squirrels are the result of very many laws, inasmuch\nas organisms are dependent not only on biological, but also on physical,\nchemical, and mathematical laws.\n\nComte enumerates six of these abstract sciences, and arranges them in such\na way that each depends on the truths of the preceding, and adds to these\nits own special truths, while the first (the most general and simplest)\npresupposes no earlier laws whatever, but is presupposed by all the\nlater ones. According to this principle of increasing particularity and\ncomplexity the following scale results: (i) Mathematics, in which the\nscience of number, as being absolutely without presuppositions, precedes\ngeometry and mechanics; (2) Astronomy; (3) Physics (with five subordinate\ndivisions, in which the first place belongs to the theory of weight, and\nthe last to electrology, while the theory of heat, acoustics, and optics\nare intermediate); (4) Chemistry; (5) Biology or physiology; (6) Sociology\nor the science of society. This sequence, which is determined by the\nincreasing complexity and increasing dependence of the objects of the\nsciences, is the order in which they have historically developed--before\nthe special laws of the more complicated sciences can be ascertained, the\ngeneral laws of the more simple ones must be accurately known. It is also\nadvisable to follow this same order of increasing complexity and difficulty\nin the study of the sciences, for acquaintance with the methods of those\nwhich are elementary is the best preparation for the pursuit of the higher\nones. In arithmetic and geometry we study positivity at its source; in the\nsociological spirit it finds its completion.\n\nMathematics entered on its positive stage at quite an early period,\nchemistry and biology only in recent times, while, in the highest and most\ncomplicated science, the metaphysical (negative, liberal, democratic,\nrevolutionary) mode of thought is still battling with the feudalism of the\ntheological mode. To make sociology positive is the mission of the second\nhalf of Comte's work, and to this goal his philosophical activity had been\ndirected from the beginning. Comte rates the efforts of political economy\nvery low, with the exception of the work of Adam Smith, and will not let\nthem pass as a preparation for scientific sociology, holding that they are\nbased on false abstractions. Psychology, which is absent from the above\nenumeration, is to form a branch of biology, and exclusively to use the\nobjective method, especially phrenology (to the three faculties of the\nsoul, \"heart, character, and intellect,\" correspond three regions of the\nbrain). Self-observation, so Comte, making an impossibility out of a\ndifficulty, teaches, can at most inform us concerning our feelings and\npassions, and not at all concerning our own thinking, since reflection\nbrings to a stop the process to which it attends, and thus destroys its\nobject. The sole source of knowledge is external sense-perception. In his\n_Positive Polity_ Comte subsequently added a seventh fundamental science,\nethics or anthropology.\n\nSociology,[1] the elevation of which to the rank of a positive science is\nthe principal aim of our philosopher, uses the same method as the natural\nsciences, namely, the interrogation and interpretation of experience by\nmeans of induction and deduction, only that here the usual relation of\nthese two instruments of knowledge is reversed. Between inorganic and\norganic philosophy, both of which proceed from the known to the unknown,\nthere is this difference, that in the former the advance is from the\nelements, as that which alone is directly accessible, to the whole which is\ncomposed of them, while in the latter the opposite is the case, since here\nthe whole is better known than the individual parts of which it consists.\nHence, in inorganic science the laws of the composite phenomena are\nobtained by deduction (from the laws of the simple facts inductively\ndiscovered) and confirmed by observation; in sociology, on the other\nhand, the laws are found through (historical) experience, and deductively\nverified (from the nature of man as established by biology) only in the\nsequel. Since the phenomena of society are determined not merely by the\ngeneral laws of human nature, but, above all, by the growing influence of\nthe past, historical studies must form the basis of sociological inquiry.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Krohn: _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Kenntniss und W\u00fcrdigung der\nSoziologie, Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr National\u00f6konomie und Statistik_, New Series,\nvols. i. and iii., 1880 and 1881.]\n\nOf the two parts of sociology, the Statics, which investigates the\nequilibrium (the conditions of the existence, the permanence, and the\ncoexistence of social states), and Dynamics, which investigates the\nmovement (the laws of the progress) of social phenomena, the first was in\nessence established by Aristotle. The fundamental concept of the Statics\nis the _consensus_, the harmony, solidarity, or mutual dependence of the\nmembers of the social organism. All its parts, science, art, religion,\npolitics, industry, must be considered together; they stand in such\nintimate harmony and correlation that, for every important change of\ncondition in one of these parts, we may be certain of finding\ncorresponding changes in all the others, as its causes and effects.\nBesides the selfish propensities, there dwell in man an equally original,\nbut intrinsically weaker, impulse toward association, which instinctively\nleads him to seek the society of his fellows without reflection on the\nadvantages to be expected therefrom, and a moderate degree of\nbenevolence. As altruism conflicts with egoism, so the reason, together\nwith the impulse to get ahead, which can only be satisfied through\nlabor, is in continual conflict with the inborn disinclination to regulated\nactivity (especially to mental effort). The character of society depends on\nthe strength of the nobler incentives, that is, the social inclinations and\nintellectual vivacity in opposition to the egoistic impulses and natural\ninertness. The former nourish the progressive, the latter the conservative\nspirit. Women are as much superior to men in the stronger development of\ntheir sympathy and sociability as they are inferior in insight and reason.\nSociety is a group of families, not of individuals, and domestic life is\nthe foundation, preparation, and pattern for social life, Comte praises the\nfamily, the connecting link between the individual and the species, as a\nschool of unselfishness, and approves the strictness of the Catholic Church\nin regard to the indissolubility of the marriage relation. He remarks the\nevil consequences of the constantly increasing division of labor, which\nmakes man egoistic and narrow-minded, since it hides rather than reveals\nthe social significance of the employment of the individual and its\nconnection with the welfare of the community, and seeks for a means of\nchecking them. Besides the universal education of youth, he demands\nthe establishment of a spiritual power to bring the general interest\ncontinually to the minds of the members of all classes and avocations, to\ndirect education, and to enjoy the same authority in moral and intellectual\nmatters as is conceded to the astronomer in the affairs of his department.\nThe function of this power would be to occupy the position heretofore held\nby the clergy. Comte conceives it as composed of positive philosophers,\nentirely independent of the secular authorities, but in return cut off from\npolitical influence and from wealth. Secular authority, on the other hand,\nhe wishes put into the hands of an aristocracy of capitalists, with the\nbankers at the head of these governing leaders of industry.\n\nThe Dynamics, the science of the temporal succession of social phenomena,\nmakes use of the principle of development. The progress of society,\nwhich is to be regarded as a great individual, consists in the growing\npredominance of the higher, human activities over the lower and animal. The\nhumanity in us, it is true, will never attain complete ascendency over the\nanimality, but we can approach nearer and nearer to the ideal, and it is\nour duty to aid in this march of civilization. Although the law of progress\nholds good for all sides of mental life, for art, politics, and morals,\nas well as for science, nevertheless the most important factor in the\nevolution of the human race is the development of the intellect as the\nguiding power in us (though not in itself the strongest). Awakened first by\nthe lower wants, the intellect assumes in increasing measure the guidance\nof human operations, and gives a determinate direction to the feelings. The\npassions divide men, and, without the guidance of the speculative faculty,\nwould mutually cripple one another; that which alone unites them into\na collection force is a common belief, an idea. Ideas are related to\nfeeling--to quote a comparison from John Stuart Mill's valuable treatise\n_Auguste Comte and Positivism_, 3d ed., 1882, a work of which we have made\nconsiderable use--as the steersman who directs the ship is to the steam\nwhich drives it forward. Thus the history of humanity has been determined\nby the history of man's intellectual convictions, and this in turn by the\nthree familiar stages in the theory of the universe. With the development\nfrom the theological to the positive mode of thought is most intimately\nconnected, further, the transition from the military to the industrial\nmode of life. As the religious spirit prepares the way for the scientific\nspirit, so without the dominion of the military spirit industry could not\nhave been developed. It was only in the school of war that the earliest\nsocieties could learn order; slavery was beneficial in that through it\nlabor was imposed upon the greater part of mankind in spite of their\naversion to it. The political preponderance of the legists corresponds to\nthe intermediate, metaphysical stage. The sociological law (discovered by\nComte in the year 1822) harmonizes also with the customary division which\nseparates the ancient from the modern world by the Middle Ages.\n\nIn his philosophy of history Comte gives the further application of these\nprinciples. Here he has won commendation even from his opponents for a\nsense of justice which merits respect and for his comprehensive view. The\noutlooks and proposals for the future here interspersed were in later\nwritings[1] worked out into a comprehensive theory of the regeneration\nof society; the extravagant character of which has given occasion to his\ncritics to make a complete division between the second, \"subjective or\nsentimental,\" period of his thinking, in which the philosopher is said to\nbe transformed into the high priest of a new religion, and the first, the\npositivistic period, although the major part of the qualities pointed out\nas characteristic of the former are only intensifications of some which may\nbe shown to have been present in the latter. Beneath the surface of the\nmost sober inquiry mystical and dictatorial tendencies pulsate in Comte\nfrom the beginning, and science was for him simply a means to human\nhappiness. But now he no longer demands the independent pursuit of science\nin order to the attainment of this end, but only the believing acceptance\nof its results. The intellect is to be placed under the dominion of the\nheart, and only such use made of it as promises a direct advantage for\nhumanity; the determination of what problems are most important at a given\ntime belongs to the priesthood. The systematic unity or harmony of the\nmind demands this dominion of the feelings over thought. The religion of\npositivism, which has \"love for its principle, order for its basis, and\nprogress for its end,\" is a religion without God, and without any other\nimmortality than a continuance of existence in the grateful memory of\nposterity. The dogmas of the positivist religion are scientific principles.\nIts public _cultus_ with nine sacraments and a large number of annual\nfestivals, is paid to the _Grand \u00catre_ \"Humanity\" (which is not omnipotent,\nbut, on account of its composite character, most dependent, yet infinitely\nsuperior to any of its parts); and, besides this, space, the earth, the\nuniverse, and great men of the past are objects of reverence. Private\ndevotion consists in the adoration of living or dead women as our guardian\nangels. The _ethics_ of the future declares the good of others to be the\nsole moral motive to action (altruism). Comte's last work, the _Philosophy\nof Mathematics_, 1856, indulges in a most remarkable numerical mysticism.\nThe historical influence exercised by Comte through his later writings is\nextremely small in comparison with that of his chief work. Besides\nBligni\u00e8res and Robinet, E. Littr\u00e9, the well-known author of the\n_Dictionnaire de la Langue Fran\u00e7aise_ (1863 _seq_.) who was the most\neminent of Comte's disciples and the editor of his _Collected Works_ (1867\n_seq_.), has written on the life and work of the master. Comte's school\ndivided into two groups--the apostates, with Littr\u00e9 (1801-81) at their\nhead, who reject the subjective phase and hold fast to the earlier\ndoctrine, and the faithful, who until 1877, when a new division between\nstrict and liberal Comteans took place within this group, gathered about P.\nLaffitte (born 1823).[2] The leader of the English positivists is Frederic\nHarrison (born 1831). Positivistic societies exist also in Sweden, Brazil,\nChili, and elsewhere. Positivism has been developed in an independent\nspirit by J.S. Mill and Herbert Spencer.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Positivist Catechism_, 1852 [English translation by Congreve,\n1858, 2d ed., 1883]; _System of Positive Polity_, 4 vols., 1851-54 [English\ntranslation, 1875-77]. Cf. P\u00fcnjer, _A. Comtes \"Religion der Menschheit_\" in\nthe _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr protestantische Theologie_, 1882.]\n\n[Footnote 2: On this division cf. E. Caro, _M. Littr\u00e9 et le Positivisme_,\n1883, and Herm. Gruber (S.J.), _Der Positivismus vom Tode Comtes bis auf\nunsere Tage_, 1891.]\n\nThe following brief remarks on the course of French philosophy may also be\nadded. Against the sensationalism of Condillac as continued by Cabanis,\nDestutt de Tracy (see above, pp. 259-260), and various physiologists, a\ntwofold reaction asserted itself. One manifestation of this proceeded from\nthe _theological school_, represented by the \"traditionalists\" Victor de\nBonald (1818), Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821; _St. Petersburg Soir\u00e9es_,\n1821), and F. de Lamennais (1782-1854), who, however, after his break with\nthe Church (_Words of a Believer_, 1834) developed in his _Sketch of a\nPhilosophy_, 1841 _seq_., an ontological system after Italian and German\nmodels. The other came from the _spiritualistic school_, at whose head\nstood Maine de Biran[1] (1766-1824; _On the Foundations of Psychology_; his\n_Works_ have been edited by Cousin, 1841, Naville, 1859, and Bertrand) and\nRoyer Collard (1763-1845). Their pupil Victor Cousin (1792-1867; _Works_,\n1846-50), who admired Hegel also, became the head of the _eclectic school_.\nCousin will neither deny metaphysics with the Scotch, nor construe\nmetaphysics _a priori_ with the Germans, but with Descartes bases it on\npsychology. For a time an idealist of the Hegelian type (infinite and\nfinite, God and the world, are mutually inseparable; the Ideas reveal\nthemselves in history, in the nations, in great men), he gradually sank\nback to the position of common sense. His adherents, among whom Th\u00e9odore\nJouffroy (died 1842) was the most eminent, have done special service in the\nhistory of philosophy. From Cousin's school, which was opposed by P. Leroux\nand J. Reynaud, have come Ravaisson, Saisset, Jules Simon, P. Janet (born\n1823),[2] and E. Caro (born 1826; _The Philosophy of Goethe_, 1866). Kant\nhas influenced Charles Renouvier (born 1817; _Essays in General Criticism_,\n4 vols., 1854-64) and E. Vacherot (born 1809; _Metaphysics and Science_,\n1858, 2d ed., 1863; _Science and Consciousness_, 1872).\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. E. K\u00f6nig in _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxv. 1889,\np.160 _seq_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Janet: _History of Political Science in its Relations to\nMorals_, 1858, 3d ed., 1887; _German Materialism of the Present Day_, 1864,\nEnglish translation by Masson, 1866: _The Family_, 1855; _The Philosophy of\nHappiness_, 1862; _The Brain and Thought_, 1867; _Elements of Morals_,\n1869 [English translation by Corson, 1884]; _The Theory of Morals_, 1874\n[English translation by Mary Chapman, 1883]; _Final Causes_, 1876 [English\ntranslation by Affleck, with a preface by Flint, new ed., 1883].]\n\nAmong other thinkers of reputation we may mention the socialist Henri de\nSaint-Simon (1760-1825; _Selected Works_, 1859), the physiologist Claude\nBernard (1813-78), the positivist H. Taine (1828-93; _The Philosophy of\nArt_, English translation by Durand, 2d ed., 1873; _On Intelligence_, 1872,\nEnglish translation by Haye, 1871), E. Renan (1823-92; _The Life of\nJesus_, 1863, English translation by Wilbour, _Philosophical Dialogues and\nFragments_--English, 1883), the writer on aesthetics and ethics J.M. Guyau\n(_The Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics_, 1884; _Sketch of an Ethic\nwithout Obligation or Sanction_, 1885; _The Irreligion of the Future_,\n1887), Alfred Fouill\u00e9e _(The Future of Metaphysics founded on Experience_,\n1889; _Morals, Art, and Religion according to Guyau_, 1889; _The\nEvolutionism of the Idea-Forces_, 1890), and the psychologist Th. Ribot,[1]\neditor of the _Revue Philosophique_ (from 1876).\n\n[Footnote 1: Ribot: _Heredity_, 2d ed., 1882 [English translation, 1875];\n_The Diseases of Memory_, 1881 [English translation, 1882]; _The Diseases\nof the Will_, 1883 [English. 1884]; _The Diseases of Personality_, 1885\n[English, 1887]; _The Psychology of Attention_, 1889 [English, 1890];\n_German Psychology of To-day_, 2d ed., 1885 [English translation by\nBaldwin, 1886].]\n\n\n%3. Great Britain and America.%\n\nProminent among the British philosophers of the nineteenth century[1]\nare Hamilton, Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Spencer. Hamilton is the leading\nrepresentative of the Scottish School; Bentham is known as the advocate of\nutilitarianism; Mill, an exponent of the traditional empiricism of English\nthinking, develops the theory of induction and the principle of utility;\nSpencer combines an agnostic doctrine of the absolute and thoroughgoing\nevolution in the phenomenal world into a comprehensive philosophical\nsystem.[2] In recent years there has been a reaction against empirical\ndoctrines on the basis of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian principles. Foremost\namong the leaders of this movement we may mention T.H. Green.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Harald H\u00f6ffding, _Einleitung in die englische Philosophie\nunserer Zeit_ (Danish, 1874), German (with alterations and additions by the\nauthor) by H. Kurella, 1889; David Masson, _Recent British Philosophy_,\n1865, 3d ed., 1877; Ribot, _La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine_, 1870,\n2d ed., 1875 [English, 1874] Guyau, _La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine_,\n1879 [Morris, _British Thought and Thinkers_, 1880; Porter, \"On English and\nAmerican Philosophy,\" Ueberweg's _History_, English translation, vol.\nii. pp. 348-460; O. Pfleiderer, _Development of Theology_, 1890, book\niv.--TR.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. on Mill and Spencer, Bernh. P\u00fcnjer, _Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr\nprotestantische Theologie_, 1878.]\n\nThe Scottish philosophy has been continued in the nineteenth century by\nJames Mackintosh (_Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy_,\n1830, 3d ed., 1863), and William Whewell (_History of the Inductive\nSciences_, 3d ed., 1857; _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, 1840, 3d\ned., 1858-60). Its most important representative is Sir William Hamilton[1]\nof Edinburgh (1788-1856), who, like Whewell, is influenced by Kant.\nHamilton bases philosophy on the facts of consciousness, but, in antithesis\nto the associational psychology, emphasizes the mental activity of\ndiscrimination and judgment. Our knowledge is relative, and relations its\nonly object. Consciousness can never transcend itself, it is bound to\nthe antithesis of subject and object, and conceives the existent under\nrelations of space and time. Hence the unconditioned is inaccessible to\nknowledge and attainable by faith alone. Among Hamilton's followers belong\nMansel (_Metaphysics_, 3d. ed., 1875; _Limits of Religions Thought_, 5th\ned., 1870) and Veitch. The Scottish doctrine was vigorously opposed by J.F.\nFerrier (1808-64; _Institutes of Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1856), who himself\ndeveloped an idealistic standpoint.\n\n[Footnote 1: Hamilton: _Discussions on Philosophy and Literature_, 1852, 3d\ned., 1866; _Lectures on Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1860, and on _Logic_, 2d ed.,\n1866, edited by his pupils, Mansel and Veitch; _Reid's Works_, with notes\nand dissertations, 1846, 7th ed., 1872. On Hamilton cf. Veitch, 1882, 1883\n[Monck, 1881].]\n\nIn the United States the Scottish philosophy has exercised a wide\ninfluence. In recent times it has been strenuously advocated, chiefly in\nthe spirit of Reid, by James McCosh (a native of Scotland, but since 1868\nin America; _The Intuitions of the Mind_, 3d ed., 1872; _The Laws of\nDiscursive Thought_, new ed., 1891; _First and Fundamental Truths_, 1889);\nwhile in Noah Porter (died 1892; _The Human Intellect_, new ed., 1876; _The\nElements of Moral Science_, 1885) it appears modified by elements from\nGerman thinking.\n\nJeremy Bentham[1] (1748-1832) is noteworthy for his attempt to revive\nEpicureanism in modern form. Virtue is the surest means to pleasure, and\npleasure the only self-evident good. Every man strives after happiness, but\nnot every one in the right way. The honest man calculates correctly, the\ncriminal falsely; hence a careful calculation of the value of the various\npleasures, and a prudent use of the means to happiness, is the first\ncondition of virtue; in this the easily attainable minor joys, whose\nsummation amounts to a considerable quantum, must not be neglected. The\nvalue of a pleasure is measured by its intensity, duration, certainty,\npropinquity, fecundity in the production of further pleasure, purity or\nfreedom from admixture of consequent pain, and extent to the greatest\npossible number of persons. Every virtuous action results in a balance of\npleasure. Inflict no evil on thyself or others from which a balance of good\nwill not result. The end of morality is the \"greatest happiness of the\ngreatest number,\" in the production of which each has first to care for\nhis own welfare: whoever injures himself more than he serves others acts\nimmorally, for he diminishes the sum of happiness in the world; the\ninterest of the individual coincides with the interest of society. The two\nclasses of virtues are prudence and benevolence. The latter is a natural,\nthough not a disinterested affection: happiness enjoyed with others is\ngreater than happiness enjoyed alone. Love is a pleasure-giving extension\nof the individual; we serve others to be served by them.\n\n[Footnote 1: Bentham: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and\nLegislation_, 1789; new ed., 1823, reprinted 1876; _Deontology_, 1834,\nedited by Bowring, who also edited the _Works_, 1838-43. _The Principles\nof Civil and Criminal Legislation_, edited in French from Bentham's\nmanuscripts by his pupil Etienne Dumont (1801, 2d ed., 1820; English by\nHildreth, 5th ed., 1887), was translated into German with notes by F.E.\nBeneke, 1830.]\n\nAssociationalism has been reasserted by James Mill (1773-1836; _Analysis of\nthe Phenomena of the Human Mind_, 1829), whose influence lives on in the\nwork of his greater son. The latter, John Stuart Mill,[1] was born in\nLondon 1806, and was from 1823 to 1858 a secretary in the India House;\nafter the death of his wife he lived (with the exception of two years of\nservice as a Member of Parliament) at Avignon; his death occurred in\n1873. Mill's _System of Logic_ appeared in 1843, 9th ed., 1875; his\n_Utilitarianism_, 1863, new ed., 1871; _An Examination of Sir William\nHamilton's Philosophy_, 1865, 5th ed., 1878; his notes to the new edition\nof his father's work, _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_, 2d\ned., 1878, also deserve notice. With the phenomenalism of Hume and the\n(somewhat corrected) associational psychology of his father as a basis,\nMill makes experience the sole source of knowledge, rejecting _a priori_\nand intuitive elements of every sort. Matter he defines as a \"permanent\npossibility of sensation\"; mind is resolved into \"a series of feelings with\na background of possibilities of feeling,\" even though the author is not\nunaware of the difficulty involved in the question how a series of feelings\ncan be aware of itself as a series. Mathematical principles, like all\nothers, have an experiential origin--the peculiar certitude ascribed to\nthem by the Kantians is a fiction--and induction is the only fruitful\nmethod of scientific inquiry (even in mental science). The syllogism is\nitself a concealed induction.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. on Mill. Taine, _Le Positivisme Anglais_, 1864 [English,\nby Haye]; the objections of Jevons _(Contemporary Review_, December, 1877\n_seq_., reprinted in _Pure Logic and other Minor Works_, 1890; cf. _Mind_,\nvol. xvi. pp. 106-110) to Mill's doctrine of the inductive character of\ngeometry, his treatment of the relation of resemblance, and his exposition\nof the four methods of experimental inquiry in their relation to the law of\ncausation; and the finely conceived essay on utilitarianism, by C.\nHebler, _Philosophische Aufs\u00e3tze_, 1869, pp. 35-66. [Also Mill's own\n_Autobiography_, 1873: Bain's _John Stuart Mill, a Criticism_, 1882; and\nT.H. Green, Lectures on the _Logic, Works_, vol. ii.--TR.]]\n\nWhen I assert the major premise the inference proper is already made, and\nin the conclusion the comprehensive formula for a number of particular\ntruths which was given in the premise is merely explicated, interpreted.\nBecause universal judgments are for him merely brief expressions for\naggregates of particular truths, Mill is able to say that all knowledge is\ngeneralization, and at the same time to argue that all inference is from\nparticulars to particulars. Inference through a general proposition is not\nnecessary, yet useful as a collateral security, inasmuch as the syllogistic\nforms enable us more easily to discover errors committed. The ground of\ninduction, the uniformity of nature in reference both to the coexistence\nand the succession of phenomena, since it wholly depends on induction,\nis not unconditionally certain; but it may be accepted as very highly\nprobable, until some instance of lawless action (in itself conceivable)\nshall have been actually proved. Like the law of causation, the principles\nof logic are also not _a priori_, but only the highest generalizations from\nall previous experience.\n\nMill's most brilliant achievement is his theory of experimental inquiry,\nfor which he advances four methods: (1) The Method of Agreement: \"If two\nor more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one\ncircumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances\nagree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.\" (2) The Method of\nDifference: \"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation\noccurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance\nin common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance\nin which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an\nindispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon,\" These two methods (the\nmethod of observation, and the method of artificial experiment) may also be\nemployed in combination, and the Canon of the Joint Method of Agreement and\nDifference runs: \"If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs\nhave only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in\nwhich it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that\ncircumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances\ndiffer is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the\ncause, of the phenomenon.\" (3) The Method of Residues: \"Subduct from any\nphenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of\ncertain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the\nremaining antecedents.\" (4) The Method of Concomitant Variations: \"Whatever\nphenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some\nparticular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is\nconnected with it through some fact of causation.\" When the phenomena are\ncomplex the deductive method must be called in to aid: from the inductively\nascertained laws of the action of single causes this deduces the laws\nof their combined action; and, as a final step, the results of such\nratiocination are verified by the proof of their agreement with empirical\nfacts. To explain a phenomenon means to point out its cause; the\nexplanation of a law is its reduction to other, more general laws. In all\nthis, however, we remain within the sphere of phenomena; the essence of\nnature always eludes our knowledge.\n\nIn the chapter \"Of Liberty and Necessity\" (book vi. chap, ii.) Mill\nemphasizes the position that the necessity to which human actions are\nsubject must not be conceived, as is commonly done, as irresistible\ncompulsion, for it denotes nothing more than the uniform order of our\nactions and the possibility of predicting them. This does not destroy\nthe element in the idea of freedom which is legitimate and practically\nvaluable: we have the power to alter our character; it is formed _by_ us\nas well as _for_ us; the desire to mould it is one of the most influential\ncircumstances in its formation. The principle of morality is the promotion\nof the happiness of all sentient beings. Mill differs from Bentham,\nhowever, from whom he derives the principle of utility, in several\nimportant particulars--by his recognition of qualitative as well as of\nquantitative differences in pleasures, of the value of the ordinary rules\nof morality as intermediate principles, of the social feelings, and of the\ndisinterested love of virtue. Opponents of the utilitarian theory have\nnot been slow in availing themselves of the opportunities for attack thus\nafforded.[1] A third distinguished representative of the same general\nmovement is Alexander Bain, the psychologist (born 1818; _The Senses and\nthe Intellect_, 3d ed., 1868; _The Emotions and the Will_, 3d ed., 1875;\n_Mental and Moral Science_, 1868, 3d ed., 1872, part ii., 1872; _Mind and\nBody_, 3d ed., 1874).\n\n[Footnote 1: On the relation of Bentham and Mill cf. H\u00f6ffding, p. 68:\nSidgwick's _Outlines_, chap. iv. \u00a7 16; and John Grote's _Examination of the\nUtilitarian Philosophy_, 1870, chap. i.]\n\nThe system projected by Herbert Spencer (born 1820), the major part of\nwhich has already appeared, falls into five parts: _First Principles_,\n1862, 7th ed., 1889; _Principles of Biology_, 1864-67, 4th ed., 1888;\n_Principles of Psychology_, 1855, 5th ed., 1890; _Principles of Sociology_\n(vol. i. 1876, 3d ed., 1885; part iv. _Ceremonial Institutions_, 1879, 3d\ned., 1888, part v. _Political Institutions_, 1882, 2d ed., 1885, part vi.\n_Ecclesiastical Institutions_, 1885, 2d ed., 1886, together constituting\nvol. ii.); _Principles of Ethics_ (part i. _The Data of Ethics_, 1879, 5th\ned., 1888; parts ii. and iii. _The Inductions of Ethics_ and _The Ethics of\nIndividual Life_, constituting with part i. the first volume, 1892; part\niv. _Justice_, 1891). A comprehensive exposition of the system has been\ngiven, with the authority of the author, by F.H. Collins in his _Epitome of\nthe Synthetic Philosophy_, 1889.[1] The treatise on _Education_, 1861, 23d\ned., 1890, his sociological writings, and his various essays have also\ncontributed essentially to Mr. Spencer's fame, both at home and abroad. The\n_First Principles_ begin with the \"Unknowable.\" Since human opinions, no\nmatter how false they may seem, have sprung from actual experiences, and,\nwhen they find wide acceptance and are tenaciously adhered to, must have\nsomething in them which appeals to the minds of men, we must assume that\nevery error contains a kernel of truth, however small it be. No one of\nopposing views is to be accepted as wholly true, and none rejected as\nentirely false. To discover the incontrovertible fact which lies at their\nbasis, we must reject the various concrete elements in which they disagree,\nand find for the remainder the abstract expression which holds true\nthroughout its divergent manifestations. No antagonism is older, wider,\nmore profound, and more important than that between religion and science.\nHere too some most general truth, some ultimate fact must lie at the basis.\nThe ultimate religious ideas are self-contradictory and untenable. No\none of the possible hypotheses concerning the nature and origin of\nthings--every religion may be defined as an _a priori_ theory of the\nuniverse, the accompanying ethical code being a later growth--is logically\ndefensible: whether the world is conceived atheistically as self-existent,\nor pantheistically as self-created, or theistically (fetichism, polytheism,\nor monotheism), as created by an external agency, we are everywhere\nconfronted by unthinkable conclusions. The idea of a First Cause or of\nthe absolute (as Mansel, following Hamilton, has proved in his _Limits\nof Religious Thought_) is full of contradictions. But however widely the\ncreeds diverge, they show entire unanimity, from the grossest superstition\nup to the most developed theism, in the belief that the existence of the\nworld is a mystery which ever presses for interpretation, though it can\nnever be entirely explained. And in the progress of religion from crude\nfetichism to the developed theology of our time, the truth, at first but\nvaguely perceived, that there is an omnipresent Inscrutable which manifests\nitself in all phenomena, ever comes more clearly into view.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. also Fiske's _Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy_, 2 vols.,\n1874. Numerous critiques and discussions of Spencer's views have been given\nin various journals and reviews; among more extended works reference may be\nmade to Bowne, _The Phil\u00f6sophy of Herbert Spencer_, 1874; Malcolm Guthrie,\n_On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution_, 1879, and the same author, _On Mr.\nSpencer's Unification of Knowledge_, 1882; and T.H. Green, on Spencer and\nLewes, _Works_, vol. i.--TR.]\n\nScience meets this ultimate religious truth with the conviction, grasped\nwith increasing clearness as the development proceeds from Protagoras to\nKant, that the reality hidden behind all phenomena must always remain\nunknown, that our knowledge can never be absolute. This principle maybe\nestablished inductively from the incomprehensibility of the ultimate\nscientific ideas, as well as deductively from the nature of intelligence,\nthrough an analysis of the product and the process of thought. (1) The\nideas space, time, matter, motion, and force, as also the first states of\nconsciousness, and the thinking substance, the ego as the unity of subject\nand object, all represent realities whose nature and origin are entirely\nincomprehensible. (2) The subsumption of particular facts under more\ngeneral facts leads ultimately to a most general, highest fact, which\ncannot be reduced to a more general one, and hence cannot be explained or\ncomprehended. (3) All thought (as has been shown by Hamilton in his essay\n\"On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned,\" and by his follower Mansel)\nis the establishment of relations, every thought involving relation,\ndifference, and (as Spencer adds) likeness. Hence the absolute, the idea\nof which excludes every relation, is entirely beyond the reach of an\nintelligence which is concerned with relations alone, and which always\nconsists in discrimination, limitation, and assimilation--it is trebly\nunthinkable. Therefore: Religion and Science agree in the supreme truth\nthat the human understanding is capable of relative knowledge only or of a\nknowledge of the relative (Relativity). Nevertheless, according to Spencer,\nit is too much to conclude with the thinkers just mentioned, that the\nidea of the absolute is a mere expression for inconceivability, and its\nexistence problematical. The nature of the absolute is unknowable, but\nnot the existence of a basis for the relative and phenomenal. The\nconsiderations which speak in favor of the relativity of knowledge and its\nlimitation to phenomena, argue also the existence of a non-relative, whose\nphenomenon the relative is; the idea of the relative and the phenomenal\nposits _eo ipso_ the existence of the absolute as its correlative, which\nmanifests itself in phenomena. We have at least an indefinite, though not\na definite, consciousness of the Unknowable as the Unknown Cause, the\nUniversal Power, and on this is founded our ineradicable belief in\nobjective reality.\n\nAll knowledge is limited to the relative, and consists in increasing\ngeneralization: the apex of this pyramid is formed by philosophy. Common\nknowledge is un-unified knowledge; science is partially unified knowledge;\nphilosophy, which combines the highest generalizations of the sciences into\na supreme one, is completely unified knowledge. The data of philosophy\nare--besides an Unknowable Power--the existence of knowable likenesses and\ndifferences among its manifestations, and a resulting segregation of the\nmanifestations into those of subject and object. Further, derivative data\nare space (relations of coexistence), time (relations of irreversible\nsequence), matter (coexistent positions that offer resistance), motion\n(which involves space, time, and matter), and force, the ultimate of\nultimates, on which all others depend, and from our primordial experiences\nof which all the other modes of consciousness are derivable. Similarly the\nultimate primary truth is the _persistence of force_, from which, besides\nthe indestructibility of matter and the continuity of (actual or potential)\nmotion, still further truths may be deduced: the persistence of relations\namong forces or the uniformity of law, the transformation and equivalence\nof (mental and social as well as of physical) forces, the law of the\ndirection of motion (along the line of least resistance, or the line of\ngreatest traction, or their resultant), and the unceasing rhythm of\nmotion. Beyond these analytic truths, however, philosophy demands a law of\nuniversal synthesis. This must be the law of _the continuous redistribution\nof matter and motion_, for each single thing, and the whole universe\nas well, is involved in a (continuously repeated) double process of\n_evolution_ and _dissolution_, the former consisting in the integration of\nmatter[1] and the dissipation of motion, the latter in the absorption of\nmotion and the disintegration of matter. The law of evolution, in its\ncomplete development, then runs: \"Evolution is an integration of matter and\nconcomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an\nindefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity;\nand during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.\"\nThis is inductively supported by illustrations from every region of nature\nand all departments of mental and social life; and, further, shown\ndeducible from the ultimate principle of the persistence of force, through\nthe mediation of several corollaries to it, viz., the instability of the\nhomogeneous under the varied incidence of surrounding forces, the\nmultiplication of effects by action and reaction, and segregation. Finally\nthe principle of equilibration indicates the impassable limit at which\nevolution passes over into dissolution, until the eternal round is again\nbegun. If it may be said of Hegel himself, that he vainly endeavored to\nmaster the concrete fullness of reality with formal concepts, the criticism\nis applicable to Spencer in still greater measure. The barren schemata of\nconcentration, passage into heterogeneity, adaptation, etc., which are\ntaken from natural science, and which are insufficient even in their own\nfield, prove entirely impotent for the mastery of the complex and peculiar\nphenomena of spiritual life.\n\n[Footnote 1: Organic growth is the concentration of elements before\ndiffused; cf. the union of nomadic families into settled tribes.]\n\nArmed with these principles, however, Mr. Spencer advances to the\ndiscussion of the several divisions of \"Special Philosophy.\" Passing over\ninorganic nature, he finds his task in the interpretation of the phenomena\nof life, mind, and society in terms of matter, motion, and force under the\ngeneral evolution formula. This procedure, however, must not be understood\nas in any wise materialistic. Such an interpretation would be a\nmisrepresentation, it is urged, for the strict relativity of the standpoint\nlimits all conclusions to phenomena, and permits no inference concerning\nthe nature of the \"Unknowable.\" The _Principles of Biology_ take up the\nphenomena of life. Life is defined as the \"continuous adjustment of\ninternal relations to external relations.\" No attempt is made to explain\nits origin, yet (in the words of Mr. Sully) it is clear that the lowest\nforms of life are regarded as continuous in their essential nature with\nsub-vital processes. The evolution of living organisms, from the lowest to\nthe highest, with the development of all their parts and functions, results\nfrom the co-operation of various factors, external and internal, whose\naction is ultimately reducible to the universal law.\n\nThe field of _psychology_ is intimately allied with biology, and yet\nistinguished from it. Mental life is a subdivision of life in general, and\nmay be subsumed under the general definition; but while biological truths\nconcern the connection between internal phenomena, with but tacit or\noccasional recognition of the environment, psychology has to do neither\nwith the internal connection nor the external connection, but \"the\nconnection between these two connections.\" Psychology in its subjective\naspect, again, is a field entirely _sui generis_. The substance of mind,\nconceived as the underlying substratum of mental states, is unknowable; but\nthe character of those states of which mind, as we know it, is composed,\nis a legitimate subject of inquiry. If this be carefully investigated, it\nseems highly probable that the ultimate unit of consciousness is something\n\"of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock.\" Mind is\nproximately composed of feelings and the relations between feelings;\nfrom these, revived, associated, and integrated, the whole fabric of\nconsciousness is built up. There is, then, no sharp distinction between the\nseveral phases of mind. If we trace its development objectively, in terms\nof the correspondence between inner and outer phenomena, we find a gradual\nprogress from the less to the more complex, from the lower to the higher,\nwithout a break. Reflex action, instinct, memory, reason, are simply\nstages in the process. All is dependent on experience. Even the forms of\nknowledge, which are _a priori_ to the individual, are the product\nof experience in the race, integrated and transmitted by heredity, and\nbecome organic in the nervous structure. In general the correspondence of\ninner and outer in which mental life consists is mediated by the nervous\norganism. The structure and functions of this condition consciousness and\nfurnish the basis for the interpretation of mental evolution in terms of\n\"evolution at large, regarded as a process of physical transformation.\"\nNevertheless mental phenomena and bodily phenomena are not identical,\nconsciousness is not motion. They are both phenomenal modes of the\nunknowable, disparate in themselves, and giving no indication of the\nultimate nature of the absolute. Subjective analysis of human consciousness\nyields further proof of the unity of mental composition. All mental action\nis ultimately reducible to \"the continuous differentiation and integration\nof states of consciousness.\" The criterion of truth is the inconceivability\nof the negation. Tried by this test, as by all others, realism is superior\nto idealism, though in that \"transfigured\" form which implies objective\nexistence without implying the possibility of any further knowledge\nconcerning it,--hence in a form entirely congruous with the conclusion\nreached by many other routes.\n\n_Sociology_ deals with super-organic evolution, which involves the\nco-ordinated actions of many individuals. To understand the social unit, we\nmust study primitive man, especially the ideas which he forms of himself,\nof other beings, and of the surrounding world. The conception of a mind or\nother-self is gradually evolved through observation of natural phenomena\nwhich favor the notion of duality, especially the phenomena of sleep,\ndreams, swoons, and death. Belief in the influence of these doubles of the\ndead on the fortunes of the living leads to sorcery, prayer, and praise.\nAncestor-worship is the ultimate source of all forms of religion; to it\ncan be traced even such aberrant developments as fetichism and idolatry,\nanimal-, plant-, and nature-worship. Thus the primitive man feels himself\nrelated not only to his living fellows, but to multitudes of supernatural\nbeings about him. The fear of the living becomes the root of the political,\nand the fear of the dead the root of the religious, control. A society is\nan organic entity. Though differing from an individual organism in many\nways, it yet resembles it in the permanent relations among its component\nparts. The Domestic Relations, by which the maintenance of the species is\nnow secured, have come from various earlier and less developed forms; the\nmilitant type of society is accompanied by a lower, the industrial type\nby a higher stage of this development. Ceremonial observance is the most\nprimitive kind of government, and the kind from which the political and\nreligious governments have differentiated. Political organization is\nnecessary in order to co-operation for ends which benefit the society\ndirectly, and the individual only indirectly. The ultimate political force\nis the feeling of the community, including as its largest part ancestral\nfeeling. Many facts combine to obscure this truth, but however much it may\nbe obscured, public feeling remains the primal source of authority. The\nvarious forms and instruments of government have grown up through processes\nin harmony with the general law. The two antithetical types of society are\nthe militant and the industrial--the former implies compulsory co-operation\nunder more or less despotic rule, with governmental assumption of functions\nbelonging to the individual and a minimizing of individual initiative;\nin the latter, government is reduced to a minimum and best conducted by\nrepresentative agencies, public organizations are largely replaced by\nprivate organizations, the individual is freer and looks less to the state\nfor protection and for aid. The fundamental conditions of the highest\nsocial development is the cessation of war. The ideas and sentiments at the\nbasis of Ecclesiastical Institutions have been naturally derived from the\nghost-theory already described. The goal of religious development is the\nfinal rejection of all anthropomorphic conceptions of the First Cause,\nuntil the harmony of religion and science shall be reached in the\nveneration of the Unknowable. The remaining parts of Mr. Spencer's\nSociology will treat of Professional Institutions, Industrial Institutions,\nLinguistic Progress, Intellectual, Moral, and Aesthetic Progress.\n\nThe subject matter of _ethics_ is the conduct termed good or bad. Conduct\nis the adjustment of acts to ends. The evolution of conduct is marked by\nincreasing perfection in the adjustment of acts to the furtherance of\nindividual life, the life of offspring, and social life. The ascription of\nethical character to the highly evolved conduct of man in relation to\nthese ends implies the fundamental assumption, that \"life is good or bad\naccording as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling.\"\nThe ideal of moral science is rational deduction: a rational utilitarianism\ncan be attained only by the recognition of the necessary laws--physical,\nbiological, psychological, and sociological--which condition the results of\nactions; among these the biological laws have been largely neglected in\nthe past, though they are of the utmost importance as furnishing the link\nbetween life and happiness. The \"psychological view,\" again, explains the\norigin of conscience. In the course of development man comes to recognize\nthe superiority of the higher and more representative feelings as guides\nto action; this form of self-restraint, however, is characteristic of the\nnon-moral restraints as well, of the political, social, and religious\ncontrols. From these the moral control proper has emerged--differing from\nthem in that it refers to intrinsic instead of extrinsic effects--and the\nelement of coerciveness in them, transferred, has generated the feeling of\nmoral compulsion (which, however, \"will diminish as fast as moralization\nincreases\").\n\nSuch a rational ethics, based on the laws which condition welfare rather\nthan on a direct estimation of happiness, and premising the relativity of\nall pains and pleasures, escapes fundamental objections to the earlier\nhedonism (_e.g._, those to the hedonic calculus); and, combining the\nvaluable elements in the divergent ethical theories, yields satisfactory\nprinciples for the decision of ethical problems. Egoism takes precedence\nof altruism; yet it is in turn dependent on this, and the two, on due\nconsideration, are seen to be co-essential. Entirely divorced from the\nother, neither is legitimate, and a compromise is the only possibility;\nwhile in the future advancing evolution will bring the two into complete\nharmony. The goal of the whole process will be the ideal man in the ideal\nsociety, the scientific anticipation of which, absolute ethics, promises\nguidance for the relative and imperfect ethics of the transition period.\n\nExamination of the actual, not the professed, ideas and sentiments of men\nreveals wide variation in moral judgments. This is especially true of the\n\"pro-ethical\" consciousnesses of external authorities, coercions, and\nopinions--religious, political, and social--by which the mass of mankind\nare governed; and is broadly due to variation in social conditions. Where\nthe need of external co-operation predominates the ethics of enmity\ndevelops; where internal, peaceful co-operation is the chief social need\nthe ethics of amity results: and the evolution principle enables us to\ninfer that, as among certain small tribes in the past, so in the great\ncultivated nations of the future, the life of amity will unqualifiedly\nprevail. The Ethics of Individual Life shows the application of moral\njudgments to all actions which affect individual welfare. The very fact\nthat some deviations from normal life are now morally disapproved, implies\nthe existence of both egoistic and altruistic sanctions for the moral\napproval of all acts which conduce to normal living and the disapproval of\nall minor deviations, though for the most part these have hitherto remained\nunconsidered. Doubtless, however, moral control must here be somewhat\nindefinite; and even scientific observation and analysis must leave the\nproduction of a perfectly regulated conduct to \"the organic adjustment of\nconstitution to [social] conditions.\"\n\nThe Ethics of Social Life includes justice and beneficence. Human justice\nemerges from sub-human or animal justice, whose law (passing over gratis\nbenefits to offspring) is \"that each individual shall receive the benefits\nand evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct.\" This is the law\nof human justice, also, but here it is more limited than before by the\nnon-interference which gregariousness requires, and by the increasing need\nfor the sacrifice of individuals for the good of the species. The egoistic\nsentiment of justice arises from resistance to interference with free\naction; the altruistic develops through sympathy under social conditions,\nthese being maintained meanwhile by a \"pro-altruistic\" sentiment, into\nwhich dread of retaliation, of social reprobation, of legal punishment, and\nof divine vengeance enter as component parts. The idea of justice emerges\ngradually from the sentiment of justice: it has two elements, one brute or\npositive, with inequality as its ideal, one human or negative, the ideal\nof which is equality. In early times the former of these was unduly\nappreciated, as in later times the latter, the true conception includes\nboth, the idea of equality being applied to the limits and the idea of\ninequality to the benefits of action. Thus the formula of justice becomes:\n\"Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the\nequal freedom of any other man \"--a law which finds its authority in the\nfacts, that it is an _a priori_ dictum of \"consciousness after it has been\nsubject to the discipline of prolonged social life,\" and that it is also\ndeducible from the conditions of the maintenance of life at large and of\nsocial life. From this law follow various particular corollaries or rights,\nall of which coincide with ordinary ethical concepts and have legal\nenactments corresponding to them. Political rights so-called do not exist;\ngovernment is simply a system of appliances for the maintenance of private\nrights. Both the nature of the state and its constitution are variable:\nthe militant type requires centralization and a coercive constitution;\nthe industrial type implies a wider distribution of political power, but\nrequires a representation of interests rather than a representation of\nindividuals. Government develops as a result of war, and its function of\nprotection against internal aggression arises by differentiation from its\nprimary function of external defense. These two, then, constitute the\nessential duties of the state; when war ceases the first falls away, and\nits sole function becomes the maintenance of the conditions under which\neach individual may \"gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest life\nof fellow-citizens.\" All beyond this, all interference with this life of\nthe individual, whether by way of assistance, restraint, or education,\nproves in the end both unjust and impolitic. The remaining parts of the\n_Ethics_ will treat of Negative and Positive Beneficence.\n\nIf J.S. Mill and Spencer (the latter of whom, moreover, had announced\nevolution as a world-law before the appearance of Darwin), move in a\ndirection akin to positivism, the same is true, further, of G.H. Lewes\n(1817-78; _History of Philosophy_, 5th ed., 1880; _Problems of Life and\nMind_, 1874 _seq_).\n\nTurning to the discussion of particular disciplines, we may mention as\nprominent among English logicians,[1] besides Hamilton, Whewell, and Mill,\nWhately, Mansel, Thomson, De Morgan, Boole (_An Investigation of the Laws\nof Thought_, 1854); W.S. Jevons (_The Principles of Science_, 2d ed.,\n1877); Venn (_Symbolic Logic_, 1881; _Empirical Logic_, 1889), Bradley, and\nBosanquet. Among more recent investigators in the field of psychology we\nmay name Carpenter, Ferrier, Maudsley, Galton, Ward, and Sully (_The Human\nMind_, 1892), and in the field of comparative psychology, Lubbock, Romanes\n(_Mental Evolution in Animals_, 1883; _Mental Evolution in Man_, 1889), and\nMorgan (_Animal Life and Intelligence_, 1891). Among ethical writers the\nfollowing, besides Spencer and Green, hold a foremost place: H. Sidgwick\n_(The Methods of Ethics_, 4th ed., 1890), Leslie Stephen _(The Science of\nEthics_, 1882), and James Martineau _(Types of Ethical Theory_, 3d ed.,\n1891). The quarterly review _Mind_ (vols. i.-xvi. 1876-91, edited by G.\nCroom Robertson; new series from 1892, edited by G.F. Stout) has since its\nfoundation played an important part in the development of English thought.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Nedich, _Die Lehre von der Quantifikation des Pr\u00e4dikats_\nin vol. iii. of Wundt's _Philosophische Studien_; L. Liard, _Les\nLogiciens Anglais Contemporains_, 1878; Al. Riehl in vol. i. of the\n_Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, 1877 [cf. also\nappendix A to the English translation of Ueberweg's _Logic_.--TR.].]\n\nGerman idealism, for which S.T. Coleridge (died 1834) and Thomas Carlyle\n(died 1881) endeavored to secure an entrance into England, for a long\ntime gained ground there but slowly. Later years, however, have brought\nincreasing interest in German speculation, and much of recent thinking\nshows the influence of Kantian and Hegelian principles. As pioneer of this\nmovement we may name J.H. Stirling _(The Secret of Hegel_, 1865); and as\nits most prominent representatives John Caird _(An Introduction to the\nPhilosophy of Religion_, 1880), Edward Caird _(The Critical Philosophy of\nImmanuel Kant_, 1889; _The Evolution of Religion_, 1893), both in Glasgow,\nand T.H. Green (1836-82; professor at Oxford; _Prolegomena to Ethics_,\n3d ed., 1887; _Works_, edited by Nettleship, 3 vols., 1885-88).[1] In\nopposition to the hereditary empiricism of English philosophy--which\nappears in Spencer and Lewes, as it did in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,\nthough in somewhat altered form--Green maintains that all experience is\nconstituted by intelligible relations. Knowledge, therefore, is possible\nonly for a correlating self-consciousness; while nature, as a system of\nrelations, is likewise dependent on a spiritual principle, of which it is\nthe expression. Thus the central conception of Green's philosophy becomes,\n\"that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is\nthe essence to be self-conscious, that is, to be itself and not itself\nin one\" (Nettleship). To this universal consciousness we are related as\nmanifestations or \"communications\" under the limitations of our physical\norganization. As such we are free, that is, self-determined, determined by\nnothing from without. The moral ideal is self-realization or perfection,\nthe progressive reproduction of the divine self-consciousness. This is\npossible only in terms of a development of persons, for as a self-conscious\npersonality the divine spirit can reproduce itself in persons alone; and,\nsince \"social life is to personality what language is to thought,\"\nthe realization of the moral ideal implies life in common. The nearer\ndetermination of the ideal is to be sought in the manifestations of the\neternal spirit as they have been given in the moral history of individuals\nand nations. This shows what has already been implied in the relation of\nmorality to personality and society, that moral good must first of all be\na common good, one in which the permanent well-being of self includes the\nwell-being of others also. This is the germ of morality, the development of\nwhich yields, first, a gradual extension of the area of common good, and\nsecondly, a fuller and more concrete determination of its content. Further\nrepresentatives of this movement are W. Wallace, Adamson, Bradley; A. Seth\nis an ex-member.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. on Green the Memoir by Nettleship in vol. iii. of the\n_Works_.]\n\nThe first and greatest of American philosophical thinkers was the\nCalvinistic theologian Jonathan Edwards (1703-58; treatise on the _Freedom\nof Will_, 1754; _Works_, 10 vols., edited by Dwight, 1830). Edwards's\ndeterministic doctrine found numerous adherents (among them his son, who\nbore his father's name, died 1801) as well as strenuous opponents (Tappan,\nWhedon, Hazard among later names), and essentially contributed to\nthe development of philosophical thought in the United States. For a\nconsiderable period this crystallized for the most part around elements\nderived from British thinkers, especially from Locke and the Scottish\nSchool. In 1829 James Marsh called attention to German speculation [1] by\nhis American edition of Coleridge's _Aids to Reflection_, with an important\nintroduction from his own hand. Later W.E. Channing (1780-1842), the head\nof the Unitarian movement, attracted many young and brilliant minds, the\nmost noted of whom, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82), became a leader among\nthe New England transcendentalists. Metaphysical idealism has, perhaps, met\nwith less resistance in America than in England. Kant and Hegel have been\neagerly studied (G.S. Morris, died 1889; C.C. Everett; J. Watson in Canada;\nJosiah Royce, _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, 1892; and others); and\n_The Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, edited by W.T. Harris, has since\n1867 furnished a rallying point for idealistic interests. The influence\nof Lotze has also been considerable (B.P. Bowne in Boston). Sympathy\nwith German speculation, however, has not destroyed the naturally close\nconnection with the work of writers who use the English tongue. Thus\nSpencer's writings have had a wide currency, and his system numbers many\ndisciples, though these are less numerous among students of philosophy by\nprofession (John Fiske, _Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy_, 1874).\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Porter, _op. cit._]\n\nIn the latest decades the broadening of the national life, the increasing\nacquaintance with foreign thought, and the rapid development of university\nwork have greatly enlarged and deepened the interest in philosophical\npursuits. This is manifested most clearly in the field of psychology,\nincluding especially the \"new\" or \"physiological\" psychology, and the\nhistory of philosophy, though indications of pregnant thought in other\ndepartments, as ethics and the philosophy of religion, and even of\nindependent construction, are not wanting. Among psychologists of the day\nwe may mention G.S. Hall, editor of _The American Journal of Psychology_\n(1887 seq.), G.T. Ladd (_Elements of Physiological Psychology_, 1887),\nand William James (_Principles of Psychology_, 1890). _The International\nJournal of Ethics_ (Philadelphia, 1890 seq.), edited by S. Burns Weston, is\n\"devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice\"; among the\nforeign members of its editorial committee are Jodl and Von Gizycki. The\nweekly journal of popular philosophy, _The Open Court_, published in\nChicago, has for its object the reconciliation of religion and science; the\nquarterly, _The Monist_ (1890 seq.), published by the same company under\nthe direction of Paul Carus (_The Soul of Man_, 1891), the establishment of\na monistic view of the world. Several journals, among them the _Educational\nReview_ (1891 seq., edited by N.M. Butler), point to a growing interest in\npedagogical inquiry. _The American Philosophical Review_ (1892 seq.,\nedited by J.G. Schurman, _The Ethical Import of Darwinism_, 1887) is a\ncomprehensive exponent of American philosophic thought.\n\n\n%4. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland.%\n\nIn _Sweden_ an empirical period represented by Leopold (died 1829) and Th.\nThorild (died 1808), and based upon Locke and Rousseau, was followed, after\nthe introduction of Kant by D. Bo\u00ebthius, 1794, by a drift toward idealism.\nThis was represented in an extreme form by B. H\u00f6ijer (died 1812), a\ncontemporary and admirer of Fichte, who defended the right of philosophical\nconstruction, and more moderately by Christofer Jacob B\u00f6strom (1797-1866),\nthe most important systematic thinker of his country. As predecessors of\nB\u00f6strom we may mention Biberg (died 1827), E.G. Geijer (died 1846), and S.\nGrubbe (died 1853), like him professors in Upsala, and of his pupils,\nS. Ribbing, known in Germany by his peculiar conception of the Platonic\ndoctrine of ideas (German translation, 1863-64), the moralist Sahlin\n(1877), the historian, of Swedish philosophy[1] (1873 seq.) A. Nyblaeus of\nLund, and H. Edfeldt of Upsala, the editor of B\u00f6strom's works (1883).\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. H\u00f6ffding, _Die Philosophie in Schweden_ in the\n_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xv. 1879, p. 193 seq.]\n\nB\u00f6strom's philosophy is a system of self-activity and personalism which\nrecalls Leibnitz and Krause. The absolute or being is characterized as a\nconcrete, systematically articulated, self-conscious unity, which dwells\nwith its entire content in each of its moments, and whose members both bear\nthe character of the whole and are immanent in one another, standing in\nrelations of organic inter-determination. The antithesis between unity and\nplurality is only apparent, present only for the divisive view of finite\nconsciousness. God is infinite, fully determinate personality (for\ndetermination is not limitation), a system of self-dependent living beings,\ndiffering in degree, in which we, as to our true being, are eternally and\nunchangeably contained. Every being is a definite, eternal, and living\nthought of God; thinking beings with their states and activities alone\nexist; all that is real is spiritual, personal. Besides this true,\nsuprasensible world of Ideas, which is elevated above space, time, motion,\nchange, and development, and which has not arisen by creation or a process\nof production, there exists for man, but only for him--man is formally\nperfect, it is true, but materially imperfect (since he represents the real\nfrom a limited standpoint)--a sensuous world of phenomena as the sphere of\nhis activity. To this he himself belongs, and in it he is spontaneously to\ndevelop the suprasensible content which is eternally given him (i.e., his\ntrue nature), namely, to raise it from the merely potential condition of\nobscure presentiment to clear, conscious actuality. Freedom is the power\nto overcome our imperfection by means of our true nature, to realize our\nsuprasensible capacities, to become for ourselves what we are in ourselves\n(in God). The ethics of B\u00f6strom is distinguished from the Kantian ethics,\nto which it is related, chiefly by the fact that it seeks to bring\nsensibility into a more than merely negative relation to reason. Society\nis an eternal, and also a personal, Idea in God. The most perfect form\nof government is constitutional monarchy; the ideal goal of history, the\nestablishment of a system of states embracing all mankind.\n\nJ. Borelius of Lund is an Hegelian, but differs from the master in regard\nto the doctrine of the contradiction. The Hegelian philosophy has adherents\nin _Norway_ also, as G.V. Lyng (died 1884; _System of Fundamental Ideas_),\nM.J. Monrad (_Tendencies of Modern Thought_, 1874, German translation,\n1879), both professors in Christiania, and Monrad's pupil G. Kent (_Hegel's\nDoctrine of the Nature of Experience_, 1891).\n\nThe _Danish_ philosophy of the nineteenth century has been described\nby H\u00f6ffding in the second volume of the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, 1888. He begins with the representatives of the speculative\nmovement: Steffens (see above), Niels Treschow (1751-1833), Hans Christian\nOersted (1777-1851; _Spirit in Nature_, German translation, Munich,\n1850-51), and Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785-1872). A change was brought\nabout by the philosophers of religion S\u00f6ren Kierkegaard (1813-55) and\nRasmus Nielsen (1809-84; _Philosophy of Religion_, 1869), who opposed\nspeculative idealism with a strict dualism of knowledge and faith, and were\nin turn opposed by Georg Brandes (born 1842) and Hans Br\u00f6chner (1820-75).\nAmong younger investigators the Copenhagen professors, Harald H\u00f6ffding[1]\n(born 1843) and Kristian Kroman[2] (born 1846) stand in the first rank.\n\n[Footnote 1: H\u00f6ffding: _The Foundations of Human Ethics_, 1876, German\ntranslation, 1880; _Outlines of Psychology_, 1882, English translation by\nLowndes, 1891, from the German translation, 1887; _Ethics_, 1887, German\ntranslation by Bendixen, 1888.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Kroman: _Our Knowledge of Nature_, German translation, 1883;\n_A Brief Logic and Psychology_, German translation by Bendixen, 1890.]\n\nLand (_Mind_, vol. iii. 1878) and G. von Antal (1888) have written on\nphilosophy in _Holland_. Down to the middle of the nineteenth century the\nfield was occupied by an idealism based upon the ancients, in particular\nupon Plato: Franz Hemsterhuis (1721-90; _Works_, new ed., 1846-50), and the\nphilologists Wyttenbach and Van Heusde. Then Cornelius Wilhelm Opzoomer[3]\n(1821-92; professor in Utrecht) brought in a new movement. Opzoomer\nfavors empiricism. He starts from Mill and Comte, but goes beyond them in\nimportant points, and assigns faith a field of its own beside knowledge.\nIn opposition to apriorism he seeks to show that experience is capable of\nyielding universal and necessary truths; that space, time, and causality\nare received along with the content of thought; that mathematics itself is\nbased upon experience; and that the method of natural science, especially\ndeduction, must be applied to the mental sciences. The philosophy of mind\nconsiders man as an individual being, in his connection with others, in\nrelation to a higher being, and in his development; accordingly it\ndivides into psychology (which includes logic, aesthetics, and ethology),\nsociology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history.\nCentral to Opzoomer's system is his doctrine of the five sources of\nknowledge: Sensation, the feeling of pleasure and pain, aesthetic, moral,\nand religious feeling. If we build on the foundation of the first three\nalone, we end in materialism; if we leave the last unused, we reach\npositivism; if we make religious feeling the sole judge of truth, mysticism\nis the outcome. The criteria of science are utility and progress. These are\nstill wanting in the mental sciences, in which the often answered but never\ndecided questions continually recur, because we have neither derived the\nprinciples chosen as the basis of the deduction from an exact knowledge\nof the phenomena nor tested the results by experience. The causes of this\ndefective condition can only be removed by imitating the study of nature:\nwe must learn that no conclusions can be reached except from facts, and\nthat we are to strive after knowledge of phenomena and their laws alone. We\nhave no right to assume an \"essence\" of things beside and in addition to\nphenomena, which reveals itself in them or hides behind them. Pupils of\nOpzoomer are his successor in his Utrecht chair, Van der Wyck, and Pierson.\nWe may also mention J.P.N. Land, who has done good service in editing\nthe works of Spinoza and of Geulincx, and the philosopher of religion\nRauwenhoff (1888).\n\n[Footnote 1: Opzoomer: _The Method of Science_, a Handbook of Logic, German\ntranslation by Schwindt, 1852; _Religion_, German translation by Mook,\n1869.]\n\nOn the system of the Hungarian philosopher Cyrill Horv\u00e1th (died 1884 at\nPesth) see the essay by E. Nemes in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_,\nvol. lxxxviii, 1886. Since 1889 a review, _Problems of Philosophy and\nPsychology_, has appeared at Moscow in Russian, under the direction of\nProfessor N. von Grot.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nGERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE DEATH OF HEGEL.\n\nWith Hegel the glorious dynasty which, with a strong hand, had guided the\nfate of German philosophy since the conclusion of the preceding century\ndisappears. From his death (1831) we may date the second period of\npost-Kantian philosophy,[1] which is markedly and unfavorably distinguished\nfrom the first by a decline in the power of speculative creation and by\na division of effort. If previous to this the philosophical public,\ncomprising all the cultured, had been eagerly occupied with problems in\ncommon, and had followed with unanimous interest the work of those who were\nlaboring at them, during the last fifty years the interest of wider circles\nin philosophical questions has grown much less active; almost every\nthinker goes his own way, giving heed only to congenial voices; the inner\nconnection of the schools has been broken down; the touch with thinkers of\ndifferent views has been lost. The latest decades have been the first\nto bring a change for the better, in so far as new rallying points of\nphilosophical interest have been created by the neo-Kantian movement, by\nthe systems of Lotze and Von Hartmann, by the impulse toward the philosophy\nof nature proceeding from Darwinism, by energetic labors in the field of\npractical philosophy, and by new methods of investigation in psychology.\n\n[Footnote 1: On philosophy since 1831 cf. vol. iii. of J.E. Erdmann's\n_History_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, part iii. \u00a7\u00a7 37-49 (English translation,\nvol. ii. pp. 292-516); Lange, _History of Materialism_; B. Erdmann, _Die\nPhilosophie der Gegenwart_ in the _Deutsche Rundschau_, vols. xix., xx.,\n1879, June and July numbers; (A. Krohn,) _Streifz\u00fcge durch die Philosophie\nder Gegenwart_ in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie und philosophische\nKritik_, vols. lxxxvii., lxxxix., 1885-86; (Burt, _History of Modern\nPhilosophy_, 1892), also the third volume of Windelband's _Geschichte der\nneueren Philosophie_, when it appears.]\n\n\n%1. From the Division of the Hegelian School to the Materialistic\nControversy.%\n\nA decade after the philosophy of Hegel had entered on its supremacy a\ndivision in the school was called forth by Strauss's _Life of Jesus_(1835).\nThe differences were brought to light by the discussion of religious\nproblems, in regard to which Hegel had not expressed himself with\nsufficient distinctness. The relation of knowledge and faith, as he had\ndefined it, admitted of variant interpretations and deductions, and this in\nfavor of Church doctrine as well as in opposition to it. Philosophy has the\nsame content as religion, but in a different form, _i.e._, not in the form\nof representation, but in the form of the concept--it transforms dogma into\nspeculative truth. The conservative Hegelians hold fast to the identity of\ncontent in the two modes of cognition; the liberals, to the alteration\nin form, which, they assert, brings an alteration in content with it.\nAccording to Hegel the lower stage is \"sublated\" in the higher, _i.e._,\nconserved as well as negated. The orthodox members of the school emphasize\nthe conservation of religious doctrines, their justification from the side\nof the philosopher; the progressists, their negation, their overcoming by\nthe speculative concept. The general question, whether the ecclesiastical\nmeaning of a dogma is retained or to be abandoned in its transformation\ninto a philosopheme, divides into three special questions, the\nanthropological, the soteriogical, and the theological. These are: whether\non Hegelian principles immortality is to be conceived as a continuance\nof individual existence on the art of particular spirits, or only as the\neternity of the universal reason; whether by the God-man the person of\nChrist is to be understood, or, on the other hand, the human species, the\nIdea of Humanity; whether personality belongs to the Godhead before the\ncreation of the world, or whether it first attains to self-consciousness\nin human spirits, whether Hegel was a theist or a pantheist, whether he\nteaches the transcendence or the immanence of God. The Old Hegelians defend\nthe orthodox interpretation; the Young Hegelians oppose it. The former,\nG\u00f6schel, Gabler, Hinrichs, Schaller (died 1868; _History of the Philosophy\nof Nature since Bacon_, 1841 _seq_.), J.E. Erdmann in Halle (1805-92; _Body\nand Soul_, 1837; _Psychological Letters_, 1851, 6th ed., 1882; _Earnest\nSport_, 1871, 4th ed., 1890), form, according to Strauss's parliamentary\ncomparison carried out by Michelet, the \"right\"; the latter, Strauss,\nFeuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and A. Ruge, who, with Echtermeyer, edited the\n_Hallesche_, afterward _Deutsche, Jahrb\u00fccher f\u00fcr Wissenschaft und Kunst_,\n1838-42, the \"left.\" Between them, and forming the \"center,\" stand Karl\nRosenkranz[1] in K\u00f6nigsberg (1805-79), C.L. Michelet in Berlin (p. 16;\n_Hegel, the Unrefuted World-philosopher_, 1870; _System of Philosophy_,\n1876 _seq_.), and the theologians Marheineke (a pupil of Daub at\nHeidelberg) and W. Vatke (_Philosophy of Religion_, edited by Preiss,\n1888). Contrasted with these is the group of semi- or pseudo-Hegelians (p.\n596), who declare themselves in accord with the theistic doctrines of the\nright, but admit that the left represents Hegel's own opinion, or at least\nthe correct deductions from his position.\n\n[Footnote 1: K. Rosenkranz: _Psychology_, 1837, 3d ed., 1863; _Science\nof the Logical Idea_, 1858; _Studies_, 1839 _seq_., _New Studies_, 1875\n_seq_.; _Aesthetics of the Ugly_, 1853; several works on the history of\npoetry.]\n\nThe following should also be mentioned as Hegelians: the philosopher of\nhistory, Von Cieszkowski, the pedagogical writer, Thaulow (at Kiel, died\n1883), the philosopher of religion and of law, A. Lasson at Berlin, the\naesthetic writers Hotho, Friedrich Theodor Vischer[1] (1807-87), and Max\nSchasler (_Critical History of Aesthetics_, 1872; _Aesthetics_, 1886),\nthe historians of philosophy, Schwegler (died 1857; _History of Greek\nPhilosophy_, 1859, 4th ed., 1886, edited by Karl K\u00f6stlin, whose\n_Aesthetics_ appeared 1869), Eduard Zeller[2] of Berlin (born 1814),\nand Kuno Fischer (born 1824; 1856-72 professor at Jena, since then at\nHeidelberg; _Logic and Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1865). While Weissenborn (died\n1874) is influenced by Schleiermacher also, and Zeller and Fischer strive\nback toward Kant, Johannes Volkelt[3] in W\u00fcrzburg (born 1848), who started\nfrom Hegel and advanced through Schopenhauer and Hartmann, has of late\nyears established an independent no\u00ebtical position and has done good\nservice by his energetic opposition to positivism _(Das Denken als\nH\u00fclfvorstellungs--Th\u00e4tigkeit und als Aupassungsvorgang_ in the _Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr Philosophic_, vols. xcvi., xcvii., 1889-90).\n\n[Footnote 1: Vischer: _Aesthetics_, 1846-58; _Critical Excursions_, 1844\n_seq_.; several _Hefte \"Altes and Neues_\". The diary in the second part of\nthe novel _Auch Einer_ develops an original pantheistic view of the world.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Zeller: _The Philosophy of the Greeks in its Historical\nDevelopment_, 5 vols., 3d ed., vol. i. 5th ed. (English translation, 1868\n_seq_.); three collections of _Addresses and Essays_, 1865, 1877, 1884.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Volkelt: _The Phantasy in Dreams_, 1875; _Kant's Theory of\nKnowledge_, 1879; _On the Possibility of Metaphysics_, inaugural address at\nBasle, 1884; _Experience and Thought, Critical Foundation of the Theory of\nKnowledge_, 1886; _Lectures Introductory to the Philosophy of the Present\nTime_ (delivered in Frankfort on the Main), 1892.]\n\nThe leaders of the Hegelian left require more detailed consideration. In\nDavid Friedrich Strauss[1] (1808-74, born and died at Ludwigsburg) the\nphilosophy of religion becomes a historical criticism of the Bible and of\ndogmatics. The biblical narratives are, in great part, not history (this\nhas been the common error alike of the super-naturalistic and of the\nrationalistic interpreters), but myths, that is, suprasensible facts\npresented in the form of history and in symbolic language. It is evident\nfrom the contradictions in the narratives and the impossibility of miracles\nthat we are not here concerned with actual events. The myths possess\n(speculative, absolute) truth, but no (historical) reality. They are\nunintentional creations of the popular imagination; the spirit of the\ncommunity speaks in the authors of the Gospels, using the historical factor\n(the life-history of Jesus) with mythical embellishments as an investiture\nfor a supra-historical, eternal truth (the speculative Idea of\nincarnation). The God become man, in which the infinite and the finite, the\ndivine nature and the human, are united, is the human race. The Idea of\nincarnation manifests itself in a multitude of examples which supplement\none another, instead of pouring forth its whole fullness in a single one.\nThe (real) Idea of the race is to be substituted for a single individual\nas the subject of the predicates (resurrection, ascension, etc.) which the\nChurch ascribes to Christ. The Son of God is _Humanity_.\n\n[Footnote 1: Strauss: _The Life of Jesus_, 1835-36, 4th ed., 1840 [English\ntranslation by George Eliot, 2d. ed., 1893]; the same \"for the German\nPeople,\" 1864 [English translation, 1865]; _Christian Dogmatics_, 1840-41;\n_Voltaire_, 1870; _Collected Writings_, 12 vols., edited by Zeller,\n1876-78. On Strauss cf. Zeller, 1874 [English, 1874], and Hausrath,\n1876-78.]\n\nIn his second principal work Strauss criticises the dogmas of Christianity\nas sharply as he had criticised the Gospel narrative in the first one. The\nhistorical development of these has of itself effected their destruction:\nthe history of dogma is the objective criticism of dogma. Christianity and\nphilosophy, theism and pantheism, dualism and immanence, are irreconcilable\nopposites. To be able to know we must cease to believe. Dogma is the\nproduct of the unphilosophical, uncultured consciousness; belief in\nrevelation, only for those who have not yet risen to reason. In the\ntransformation of religious representations into philosophical Ideas\nnothing specifically representative is left; the form of representation\nmust be actually overcome. The Christian contraposition of the present\nworld and that which is beyond is explained by the fact that the\nsensuo-rational spirit of man, so long as it does not philosophically know\nitself as the unity of the infinite and the finite, but only feels itself\nas finite, sensuo-empirical consciousness, projects the infinite, which\nit has in itself, as though this were something foreign, looks on it\nas something beyond the world. This separation of faith is entirely\nunphilosophical; it is the mission of the philosopher to reduce all that is\nbeyond the world to the present. Thus for him immortality is not something\nto come, but the spirit's own power to rise above the finite to the Idea.\nAnd like future existence, so the transcendent God also disappears. The\nabsolute is the universal unity of the world, which posits and sublates the\nindividual as its modes. God is the being in all existence, the life in\nall that lives, the thought in all that think: he does not stand as an\nindividual person beside and above other persons, but is the infinite which\npersonifies itself and attains to consciousness in human spirits, and this\nfrom eternity; before there was a humanity of earth there were spirits on\nother stars, in whom God reflected himself.\n\nThree decades later Strauss again created a sensation by his confession\nof materialism and atheism, _The Old Faith and the New_, 1872 (since the\nsecond edition, \"With a Postscript as Preface\"),[1] in which he continues\nthe conflict against religious dualism. The question \"Are we\"--the\ncultured men of the day--\"still Christians?\" is answered in the negative.\nChristianity is a cult of poverty, despising the world, and antagonistic to\nlabor and culture; but we have learned to esteem science and art, riches\nand acquisition, as the chief levers of culture and of human progress.\nChristianity dualistically tears apart body and soul, time and eternity,\nthe world and God; we need no Creator, for the life-process has neither\nbeginning nor end. The world is framed for the highest reason, it is true,\nbut it has not been framed by a highest reason. Our highest Idea is the\nAll, which is conformed to law, and instinct with life and reason, and\nour feeling toward the universe--the consciousness of dependence on its\nlaws--exercises no less of ethical influence, is no less full of reverence,\nand no less exposed to injury from an irreverent pessimism, than the\nfeeling of the devout of the old type toward their God. Hence the answer\nto the second question \"Have we still a religion?\" maybe couched in the\naffirmative. The new faith does not need a _cultus_ and a Church. Since the\ndry services of the free congregations offer nothing for the fancy and the\nspirit, the edification of the heart must be accomplished in other ways--by\nparticipation in the interests of humanity, in the national life, and,\nnot last, by aesthetic enjoyment. Thus in his last work, which in two\nappendices reaches a discussion of the great German poets and musicians,\nthe old man returns to a thought to which he had given earlier expression,\nthat the religious _cultus_ should be replaced by the _cultus_ of genius.\n\n[Footnote 1: English translation by Mathilde Blind, 1873.]\n\nAs Strauss went over from Hegelianism to pantheism, so Ludwig Feuerbach[1]\n(1804-72), a son of the great jurist, Anselm Feuerbach, after he had for\na short time moved in the same direction, took the opposite, the\nindividualistic course, only, like Strauss, to end at last in materialism.\n\"My first thought,\" as he himself describes the course of his development,\n\"was God; my second, reason; my third and last, man.\" As theology has been\novercome by Hegel's philosophy of reason, so this in turn must give place\nto the philosophy of man. \"The new philosophy makes man, including nature\nas his basis, the highest and sole subject of philosophy, and,\nconsequently, anthropology the universal science.\" Only that which is\nimmediately self-evident is true and divine. But only that which is\nsensible is evident (_sonnenklar)_; it is only where sensibility begins\nthat all doubt and conflict cease. Sensible beings alone are true, real\nbeings; existence in space and time is alone existence; truth, reality,\nand sensibility are identical. While the old philosophy took for its\nstarting point the principle, \"I am an abstract, a merely thinking being;\nthe body does not belong to my essence,\" the new philosophy, on the other\nhand, begins with the principle, \"I am a real, a sensible being; the body\nin its totality is my ego, my essence itself.\" Feuerbach, however, uses\nthe concept of sensibility in so wide and vague a sense that,\nsupported--or deceived--by the ambiguity of the word sensation, he\nincludes under it even the most elevated and sacred feelings. Even the\nobjects of art are seen, heard, and felt; even the souls of other men are\nsensed. In the sensations the deepest and highest truths are concealed. Not\nonly the external, but the internal also, not only flesh, but spirit, not\nonly the thing, but the ego, not only the finite, the phenomenal, but also\nthe true divine essence is an object of the senses. Sensation proves the\nexistence of objects outside our head--there is no other proof of being\nthan love, than sensation in general. Everything is perceivable by the\nsenses, if not directly, yet indirectly, if not with the vulgar, untrained\nsenses, yet with the \"cultivated senses,\" if not with the eye of the\nanatomist or chemist, yet with that of the philosopher. All our ideas\nspring from the senses, but their production requires communication and\nconverse between man and man. The higher concepts cannot be derived from\nthe individual Ego without a sensuously given Thou; the highest object of\nsense is man; man does not reach concepts and reason in general by himself,\nbut only as one of two. The nature of man is contained in community alone;\nonly in life with others and for others does he attain his destiny and\nhappiness. The conscience is the ego putting itself in the place of another\nwho has been injured. Man with man, the unity of I and Thou, is God, and\nGod is love.\n\n[Footnote 1: Feuerbach was born at Landshut, studied at Heidelberg and\nBerlin, habilitated, 1828, at Erlangen, and lived, 1836-60, in the village\nof Bruckberg, not far from Bayreuth, and from 1860 until his death in\nRechenberg, a suburb of Nuremberg. _Collected Works_ in 10 vols., 1846-66.\nThe chief works are entitled: _P. Bayle_, 1838, 2d ed., 1844; _Philosophy\nand Christianity_, 1839; _The Essence of Christianity_, 1841, 4th ed., 1883\n[English translation by George Eliot, 1854]; _Principles of the Philosophy\nof the Future_, 1843; _The Essence of Religion_, 1845; _Theogony_, 1857;\n_God, Freedom, and Immortality_, 1866. Karl Gr\u00fcn, 1874, C.N. Starcke, 1885,\nand W. Bolin, 1891, treat of Feuerbach.]\n\nTo the philosophy of religion Feuerbach assigns the task of giving a\npsychological explanation of the genesis of religion, instead of showing\nreason in religion. In bidding us believe in miracles dogma is a\nprohibition to think. Hence the philosopher is not to justify it, but to\nuncover the illusion to which it owes its origin. Speculative theology is\nan intoxicated philosophy; it is time to become sober, and to recognize\nthat philosophy and religion are diametrically opposed to each other,\nthat they are related to each other as health to disease, as thought to\nphantasy. Religion arises from the fact that man objectifies his own true\nessence, and opposes it to himself as a personal being, without coming to a\nconsciousness of this divestment of self, of the identity of the divine\nand human nature. Hence the Hegelian principles, that the absolute is\nself-consciousness, that in man God knows himself, must be reversed:\nself-consciousness is the absolute; in his God man knows himself only. The\nGodhead is our own universal nature, freed from its individual limitations,\nintuited and worshiped as another, independent being, distinct from us.\nGod is self objectified, the inner nature of man expressed; man is\nthe beginning, the middle, and the end of religion. All theology is\nanthropology, for all religion is a self-deification of man. In religion\nman makes a division in his own nature, posits himself as double, first as\nlimited (as a human individual), then as unlimited, raised to infinity (as\nGod); and this deified self he worships in order to obtain from it the\nsatisfaction of his needs, which the course of the world leaves unmet. Thus\nreligion grows out of egoism: its basis is the difference between our will\nand our power; its aim, to set us free from the dependence which we feel\nbefore nature. (Like culture, religion seeks to make nature an intelligible\nand compliant being, only that in this it makes use of the supernatural\ninstruments faith, prayer, and magic; it is only gradually that men learn\nto attack the evils by natural means.) That which man himself is not, but\nwishes to be, that he represents to himself in his gods as existing; they\nare the wishes of man's heart transformed into real beings, his longing\nafter happiness satisfied by the fancy. The same holds true of all dogmas:\nas God is the affirmation of our wishes, so the world beyond is the present\nembellished and idealized by the fancy. Instead of \"God is merciful, is\nlove, is omnipotent, he performs miracles and hears prayers,\" the statement\nmust be reversed: mercy, love, omnipotence, to perform miracles, and to\nhear prayers, is divine. In the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper\nFeuerbach sees the truth that water and food are indispensable and divine.\nAs Feuerbach, following out this naturalistic tendency, reached the extreme\nof materialism, the influence of his philosophy--whose different phases\nthere is no occasion to trace out in detail--had already passed its\nculmination. From his later writings little more has found its way into\npublic notice than the pun, that man is (_ist_) what he eats (_isst_).\n\nThe remaining members of the Hegelian left may be treated more briefly.\nBruno Bauer[1] (died in 1882; his principal work is the _Critique of the\nSynoptics_, in three volumes, 1841-42, which had been preceded, in 1840, by\na _Critique of the Evangelical History of John_) at first belonged on the\nright of the school, but soon went over to the extreme left. He explains\nthe Gospel narratives as creations with a purpose (_Tendenzdichtungen_),\nas intentional, but not deceitful, inventions, from which, despite their\nunreality, history may well be learned, inasmuch as they reflect the spirit\nof the time in which they were constructed. His own publications and those\nof his brother Edgar are much more radical after the year 1844. In these\nthe brothers advocate the standpoint of \"pure or absolute criticism,\" which\nextends itself to all things and events for or against which sides are\ntaken from any quarter, and calmly watches how everything destroys\nitself. As soon as anything is admitted, it is no longer true. Nothing is\nabsolutely valid, all is vain; it is only the criticising, all-destroying\nego, free from all ethical ties, that possesses truth.\n\n[Footnote 1: Not to be confused with the head of the T\u00fcbingen School,\nFerdinand Christian Baur (died 1860).]\n\nOne further step was possible beyond Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, that from\nthe community to the particular, selfish individual, from the criticising,\ntherefore thinking, ego, to the ego of sensuous enjoyment. This step was\ntaken in that curious book _The Individual and his Property_, which Kaspar\nSchmidt, who died in 1856 at Berlin, published in 1845 (2d ed., 1882),\nunder the pseudonym of Max Stirner. The Individual of whom the title speaks\nis the egoist. For me nothing is higher than myself; I use men and use up\nthe world for my own pleasure. I seek to be and have all that I can be\nand have; I have a right to all that is within my power. Morality is a\ndelusion, justice, like all Ideas, a phantom. Those who believe in ideals,\nand worship such generalities as self-consciousness, man, society, are\nstill deep in the mire of prejudice and superstition, and have banished the\nold orthodox phantom of the Deity only to replace it by a new one. Nothing\nwhatever is to be respected.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong the opponents of the Hegelian philosophy the members of the \"theistic\nschool,\" who have above been designated as semi-Hegelians, approximate it\nmost closely. These endeavor, in part retaining the dialectic method, to\nblend the immanence of the absolute, which philosophy cannot give up and\nconcerning which Hegel had erred only by way of over-emphasis, with the\ntranscendence of God demanded by Christian consciousness, to establish a\ntheism which shall contain pantheism as a moment in itself. God is present\nin all creatures, yet distinct from them; he is intramundane as well as\nextramundane; he is self-conscious personality, free creative spirit,\nis this from all eternity, and does not first become such through the\nworld-development. He does not need the world for his perfection, but out\nof his goodness creates it. Philosophy must begin with the living Godhead\ninstead of beginning, like Hegel's Logic, with the empty concept of being.\nFor the categories--as Schelling had already objected--express necessary\nforms or general laws only, to which all reality must conform, but which\nare never capable of generating reality; the content which appears in them\nand which obeys them, can only be created by a Deity, and only empirically\ncognized. This is the standpoint of Christian Hermann Weisse[1] in Leipsic\n(1801-66), Karl Philipp Fischer[2] in Erlangen (1807-85), Immanuel Hermann\nFichte[3] (1797-1879; 1842-65 professor in T\u00fcbingen), and the follower of\nSchleiermacher, Julius Braniss in Breslau (1792-1873). The following hold\nsimilar views, influenced, like Weisse and K. Ph. Fischer, by Schelling:\nJacob Sengler of Freiburg (1799-1878; _The Idea of God_, 1845 _seq_.),\nLeopold Schmid of Giessen (1808-69; cf. p. 516, note), Johannes Huber\n(died 1879), Moritz Carri\u00e8re[4] (born 1817), both in Munich, K. Steffensen\nof Basle (1816-88; _Collected Essays_, 1890), and Karl Heyder in Erlangen\n(1812-86; _The Doctrine of Ideas_, vol. i. 1874). Chalybaeus at Kiel (died\n1862), and Friedrich Harms at Berlin (died 1880; _Metaphysics_,\nposthumously edited by H. Wiese, 1885), who, like Fortlage and I.H. Fichte,\nstart from the system of the elder Fichte, should also be mentioned as\nsympathizing with the opinions of those who have been named.\n\n[Footnote 1: Weisse: _System of Aesthetics_, 1830; _The Idea of the\nGodhead_, 1833; _Philosophical Dogmatics_, 1855. His pupil Rudolf Seydel\nhas published several of his posthumous works; H. Lotze also acknowledges\nthat he owes much to Weisse. Rud. Seydel in Leipsic (born 1835), _Logic_,\n1866; _Ethics_, 1874; cf. p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 2: K. Ph. Fischer: _The Idea of the Godhead_, 1839; _Outlines of\nthe System of Philosophy_, 1848 _seq_.; _The Untruth of Sensationalism and\nMaterialism_, 1853.]\n\n[Footnote 3: I.H. Fichte: _System of Ethics_, 1850-53, the first volume of\nwhich gives a history of moral philosophy since 1750; _Anthropology_, 1856,\n3d ed., 1876; _Psychology_, 1864.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Carri\u00e8re: _Aesthetics_, 1859, 3d ed., 1885; _The Moral Order\nof the World_, 1877, 2d ed., 1891; _Art in connection with the Development\nof Culture_, 5 vols., 1863-73.]\n\nThe same may be said, further, of Hermann Ulrici[1] of Halle (1806-84),\nfor many years the editor of the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie und\nphilosophische Kritik_, founded in 1837 by the younger Fichte and now\nedited by the author of this _History_, which, as the organ of the theistic\nschool, opposed, first, the pantheism of the Young Hegelians, and then the\nrevived materialism so loudly proclaimed after the middle of the\ncentury. This _Zeitschrift_ of Fichte and Ulrici, following the altered\ncircumstances of the time, has experienced a change of aim, so that it now\nseeks to serve idealistic efforts of every shade; while the _Philosophische\nMonatshefte_ (founded by Bergmann in 1868, edited subsequently by\nSchaarschmidt, and now) edited by P. Natorp of Marburg, favors\nneo-Kantianism, and the _Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche\nPhilosophie_ (begun in 1877, and) edited by R. Avenarius of Zurich,\nespecially cultivates those parts of philosophy which are open to exact\ntreatment.\n\n[Footnote 1: Ulrici: _On Shakespeare's Dramatic Art_, 1839, 3d ed., 1868\n[English, 1876]; _Faith and Knowledge_, 1858; _God and Nature_, 1861, 2d\ned., 1866; _God and Man_, in two volumes, _Body and Soul_, 1866, 2d ed.,\n1874, and _Natural Law_, 1872; various treatises on Logic--in which\nconsciousness is based on the distinguishing activity, and the categories\nconceived as functional modes of this--on Spiritualism, etc.]\n\nThe appearance of _materialism_ was the consequence of the flagging of\nthe philosophic spirit, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the\ndissatisfaction of the representatives of natural science with the\nconstructions of the Schelling-Hegelian school. If the German naturalist is\nespecially exposed to the danger of judging all reality from the section\nof it with which he is familiar, from the world of material substances and\nmechanical motions, the reason lies in the fact that he does not find it\neasy, like the Englishman for example, to let the scientific and the\nphilosophico-religious views of the world go on side by side as two\nentirely heterogeneous modes of looking at things. The metaphysical impulse\nto generalization and unification spurs him on to break down the boundary\nbetween the two spheres, and, since the physical view of things has become\npart of his flesh and blood, psychical phenomena are for him nothing but\nbrain-vibrations, and the freedom of the will and all religious ideas,\nnothing but illusions. The materialistic controversy broke out most\nactively at the convention of naturalists at G\u00f6ttingen in 1854, when\nRudolph Wagner in his address \"On the Creation of Man and the Substance\nof the Soul\" declared, in opposition to Karl Vogt, that there is no\nphysiological reason for denying the descent of man from one pair and an\nimmaterial immortal soul. Vogt's answer was entitled \"Collier Faith and\nScience.\" Among others Schaller (_Body and Soul_, 1855), J.B. Meyer in a\ntreatise with the same title, 1856, and the Jena physicist, Karl Snell,[1]\ntook part in the controversy by way of criticism and mediation. A much\nfiner nature than the famous leaders of materialism--Moleschott (_The\nCircle of Life_, 1852, in answer to Liebig's _Chemical Letters_), and Louis\nB\u00fcchner, with whose _Force and Matter_ (1855, 16th ed., 1888; English\ntranslation by Collingwood, 4th ed., 1884) the gymnasiast of to-day still\nsatisfies his freethinking needs--is H. Czolbe (1819-73; _New Exposition of\nSensationalism_, 1855; _The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge_, 1865),\nwho, on ethical grounds, demands the exclusion of everything suprasensible\nand contentment with the given world of phenomena, but holds that, besides\nmatter and motion, eternal, purposive forms and original sensations in a\nworld-soul are necessary to explain organic and psychical phenomena.\n\n[Footnote 1: Snell (1806-86): _The Materialistic Question_, 1858; _The\nCreation of Man_, 1863. R. Seydel has edited _Lectures on the Descent of\nMan_, 1888, from Snell's posthumous writings.]\n\n\n%2. New Systems: Trendelenburg, Fechner, Lotze, and Hartmann%.\n\nThe speculative impulse, especially in the soul of the German people,\nis ineradicable. It has neither allowed itself to be discouraged by the\ncollapse of the Hegelian edifice, nor to be led astray by the clamor of the\napostles of empiricism, nor to be intimidated by the papal proclamation of\nthe infallibility of Thomas Aquinas.[1] Manifold attempts have been made\nat a new conception of the world, and with varying success. Of the earlier\ntheories[2] only two have been able to gather a circle of adherents--the\ndualistic theism of G\u00fcnther (1783-1863), and the organic view of the world\nof Trendelenburg (1802-72).\n\n[Footnote 2: In 1879 a summons was sent forth from Rome for the revival and\ndissemination of the Thomistic system as the only true philosophy (cf. R.\nEucken, _Die Philosophic des Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der\nNeuzeit_, 1886). This movement is supported by the journals, _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr\nPhilosophie und spekulative Theologie_, edited by Professor E. Commer\nof M\u00fcnster, 1886 _seq_., and _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_, edited, at the\ninstance and with the support of the G\u00f6rres Society, by Professor Const.\nGutberlet of Fulda, 1888 _seq_. While the text-books of Hagemann, Stoeckl,\nGutberlet, Pesch, Commer, C.M. Schneider, and others also follow Scholastic\nlines, B. Bolzano (died 1848), M. Deutinger (died 1864) and his pupil\nNeudecker, Oischinger, Michelis, and W. Rosenkrantz (1821-74; _Science of\nKnowledge_, 1866-68), who was influenced by Schelling, have taken a freer\ncourse.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Trahndorff, gymnasial professor in Berlin (1782-1863),\n_Aesthetics_, 1827 (cf. E. von Hartmann in the _Philosophische\nMonatshefte_, vol. xxii. 1886, p. 59 _seq_., and J. von Billewicz, in the\nsame, vol. xxi. 1885, p. 561 _seq_.); J.F. Reiff in T\u00fcbingen: _System of\nthe Determinations of the Will_, 1842; K. Chr. Planck (died 1880): _The\nAges of the World_, 1850 _seq_.; _Testament of a German_, edited by Karl\nK\u00f6stlin, 1881; F. R\u00f6se (1815-59), _On the Method of the Knowledge of\nthe Absolute_, 1841; _Psychology as Introduction to the Philosophy of\nIndividuality_, 1856. Emanuel Sharer follows R\u00f6se. Friedrich Rohmer\n(died 1856): _Science of God, Science of Man_, in _Friedrich Rohmer's\nWissenschaft und Leben_, edited by Bluntschli and Rud. Seele, 6 vols.,\n1871-92.]\n\nAnton G\u00fcnther (engaged in authorship from 1827; _Collected Writings_, 1881;\n_Anti-Savarese_, edited with an appendix by P. Knoodt), who in 1857\nwas compelled to retract his views, invokes the spirit of Descartes in\nopposition to the Hegelian pantheism. In agreement with Descartes,\nG\u00fcnther starts from self-consciousness (in the ego being and thought are\nidentical), and brings not only the Creator and the created world, but also\nnature (to which the soul is to be regarded as belonging) and spirit into\na relation of exclusive opposition, yet holds that in man nature (body and\nsoul) and spirit are united, and that they interact without prejudice to\ntheir qualitative difference. J.H. Pabst (died in 1838 in Vienna), Theodor\nWeber of Breslau, Knoodt of Bonn (died 1889), V. Knauer of Vienna and\nothers are G\u00fcntherians.\n\nAdolf Trendelenburg[1] of Berlin, the acute critic of Hegel and Herbart,\nin his own thinking goes back to the philosophy of the past, especially to\nthat of Aristotle. Motion and purpose are for him fundamental facts, which\nare common to both being and thinking, which mediate between the two, and\nmake the agreement of knowledge and reality possible. The ethical is a\nhigher stage of the organic. Space, time, and the categories are forms of\nthought as well as of being; the logical form must not be separated from\nthe content, nor the concept from intuition. We must not fail to mention\nthat Trendelenburg introduced a peculiar and fruitful method of treating\nthe history of philosophy, viz., the historical investigation of particular\nconcepts, in which Teichm\u00fcller of Dorpat (1832-88; _Studies in the History\nof Concepts_, 1874; _New Studies in the History of Concepts_, 1876-79;\n_The Immortality of the Soul_, 2d ed., 1879; _The Nature of Love_, 1880;\n_Literary Quarrels in the Fourth Century before Christ_, 1881 and 1884),\nand Eucken of Jena (cf. pp. 17 and 623) have followed his example. Kym in\nZurich (born 1822; _Metaphysical Investigations_, 1875; _The Problem of\nEvil_, 1878) is a pupil of Trendelenburg.\n\n[Footnote 1: Trendelenburg: _Logical Investigations_, 1840, 3d ed., 1870;\n_Historical Contributions to Philosophy_, 3 vols., 1846, 1855, 1867;\n_Natural Law on the Basis of Ethics_, 1860, 2d ed., 1868. On Trendelenburg\ncf. Eucken in the _Philosophische Monatshefte_, 1884.]\n\nOf more recent systematic attempts the following appear worthy of\nmention: Von Kirchmann (1802-84; from 1868 editor of the _Philosophische\nBibliothek_), _The Philosophy of Knowledge_, 1865; _Aesthetics_, 1868; _On\nthe Principles of Realism_, 1875; _Catechism of Philosophy_ 2d ed., 1881;\nE. D\u00fchring (born 1833), _Natural Dialectic_, 1865; _The Value of Life_,\n1865, 3d ed, 1881; _Critical History of the Principles of Mechanics_,\n1873, 2d ed., 1877; _Course of Philosophy_, 1875 (cf. on D\u00fchring, Helene\nDruskowitz, 1889); J. Baumann of G\u00f6ttingen (born 1837), _Philosophy as\nOrientation concerning the World_, 1872; _Handbook of Ethics_, 1879;\n_Elements of Philosophy_, 1891; L. Noir\u00e9, _The Monistic Idea_, 1875, and\nmany other works; Frohschammer of Munich (born 1821), _The Phantasy as\nthe Fundamental Principle of the World-process_, 1877; _On the Genesis\nof Humanity, and its Spiritual Development in Religion, Morality and\nLanguage_, 1883; _On the Organization and Culture of Human Society_, 1885.\n\nIn the first rank of the thinkers who have made their appearance since\nHegel and Herbart stand Fechner and Lotze, both masters in the use of exact\nmethods, yet at the same time with their whole souls devoted to the highest\nquestions, and superior to their contemporaries in breadth of view as in\nthe importance and range of their leading ideas--Fechner a dreamer and\nsober investigator by turns, Lotze with gentle hand reconciling the\nantitheses in life and science.\n\nGustav Theodor Fechner[1] (1801-87; professor at Leipsic) opposes the\nabstract separation of God and the world, which has found a place in\nnatural inquiry and in theology alike, and brings the two into the same\nrelation of correspondence and reciprocal reference as the soul and the\nbody. The spirit gives cohesion to the manifold of material parts, and\nneeds them as a basis and material for its unifying activity. As our\nego connects the manifold of our activities and states in the unity of\nconsciousness, so the divine spirit is the supreme unity of consciousness\nfor all being and becoming. In the spirit of God everything is as in ours,\nonly expanded and enhanced. Our sensations and feelings, our thoughts and\nresolutions are His also, only that He, whose body all nature is, and to\nwhom not only that which takes place in spirits is open, but also that\nwhich goes on between them, perceives more, feels deeper, thinks higher,\nand wills better things than we. According to the analogy of the human\norganism, both the heavenly bodies and plants are to be conceived as beings\nendowed with souls, although they lack nerves, a brain, and voluntary\nmotion. How could the earth bring forth living beings, if it were itself\ndead? Shall not the flower itself rejoice in the color and fragrance which\nit produces, and with which it refreshes us? Though its psychical life may\nnot exceed that of an infant, its sensations, at all events, since they do\nnot form the basis of a higher activity, are superior in force and richness\nto those of the animal. Thus the human soul stands intermediate in the\nscale of psychical life: beneath and about us are the souls of plants and\nanimals, above us the spirits of the earth and stars, which, sharing in and\nencompassing the deeds and destinies of their inhabitants, are in\ntheir turn embraced by the consciousness of the universal spirit. The\nomnipresence of the divine spirit affords at the same time the means of\nescaping from the desolate \"night view\" of modern science, which looks upon\nthe world outside the perceiving individual as dark and silent. No, light\nand sound are not merely subjective phenomena within us, but extend around\nus with objective reality--as sensations of the divine spirit, to which\neverything that vibrates resounds and shines.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Nanna, or on the Psychical Life of Plants_, 1848;\n_Zend-Avesta, or on the Things of Heaven and the World Beyond_, 1851;\n_Physical and Philosophical Atomism_, 1855; _The Three Motives and Grounds\nof Belief_, 1863; _The Day View_, 1879; _Elements of Aesthetics_, 1876;\n_Elements of Psycho-physics_, 1860; _In the Cause of Psycho-physics_, 1877;\n_Review of the Chief Points in Psycho-physics_, 1882; _Book of the Life\nafter Death_, 1836, 3d ed., 1887; _On the Highest Good_, 1846; _Four\nParadoxes_, 1846; _On the Question of the. Soul_, 1861; _Minor Works by Dr.\nMises_ (Fechner's pseudonym), 1875. On Fechner cf. J. E. Kuntze, Leipsic,\n1892.]\n\nThe door of the world beyond also opens to the key of analogy. Similar\nlaws unite the here with the hereafter. As intuition prepares the way for\nmemory, and lives on in it, so the life of earth merges in the future life,\nand continues active in it, elevated to a higher plane. Fechner treats the\nproblem of evil in a way peculiar to himself. We must not consider the\nfact of evil apart from the effort to remove it. It is the spur to all\nactivity--without evil, no labor and no progress.\n\nFechner's \"psycho-physics,\" a science which was founded by him in\ncontinuation of the investigations of Bernoulli, Euler, and especially\nof E.H. Weber, wears an entirely different aspect from that of his\nmetaphysics (the \"day view,\" moreover does not claim to be knowledge,\nbut belief--though a belief which is historically, practically, and\ntheoretically well-grounded). This aims to be an exact science of the\nrelations between body and mind, and to reach indirectly what Herbart\nfailed to reach by direct methods, that is, a measurement of psychical\nmagnitudes, using in this attempt the least observable differences in\nsensations as the unit of measure. Weber's law of the dependence of the\nintensity of the sensation on the strength of the stimulus--the increase\nin the intensity of the sensation remains the same when the relative\nincrease of the stimulus (or the relation of the stimuli) remains\nconstant;[1] so that, _e.g._, in the case of light, an increase from a\nstimulus of intensity 1 to one of intensity 100, gives just the same\nincrease in the intensity of the sensation as an increase from a stimulus\nof intensity 2 (or 3) to a stimulus of 200 (or 300)--is much more generally\nvalid than its discoverer supposed; it holds good for all the senses. In\nthe case of the pressure sense of the skin, with an original weight of 15\ngrams (laid upon the hand when at rest and supported), in order to produce\na sensation perceptibly greater we must add not 1 gram, but 5, and with an\noriginal weight of 30 grams, not 5, but 10. Equal additions to the weights\nare not enough to produce a sensation of pressure whose intensity shall\nrender it capable of being distinguished with certainty, but the greater\nthe original weights the larger the increments must be; while the\nintensities of the sensations form an arithmetical, those of the stimuli\nform a geometrical, series; the change in sensation is proportional to the\nrelative change of the stimulus. Sensations of tone show the same\nproportion (3:4) as those of pressure; the sensibility of the muscle sense\nis finer (when weights are raised the proportion is 15:16), as also that\nof vision (the relative brightness of two lights whose difference of\nintensity is just perceptible is 100:101). In addition to the\ninvestigations on the threshold of difference there are others on the\nthreshold of stimulation (the point at which a sensation becomes just\nperceptible), on attention, on methods of measurement, on errors, etc.\nMoreover, Fechner does not fail to connect his psycho-physics, the\npresuppositions and results of which have recently been questioned in\nseveral quarters,[2] with his metaphysical conclusions. Both are pervaded\nby the fundamental view that body and spirit belong together (consequently\nthat everything is endowed with a soul, and that nothing is without a\nmaterial basis), nay, that they are the same essence, only seen from\ndifferent sides. Body is the (manifold) phenomenon for others, while spirit\nis the (unitary) self-phenomenon, in which, however, the inner aspect is\nthe truer one. That which appears to us as the external world of matter,\nis nothing but a universal consciousness which overlaps and influences our\nindividual consciousness. This is Spinozism idealistically interpreted. In\naesthetics Fechner shows himself an extreme representative of the principle\nof association.\n\n[Footnote 1: Fechner teaches: The sensation increases and diminishes in\nproportion to the logarithm of the stimulus and of the psycho-physical\nnervous activity, the latter being directly proportional to the external\nstimulus. Others, on the contrary, find a direct dependence between nervous\nactivity and sensation, and a logarithmic proportion between the external\nstimulus and the nervous activity.]\n\n[Footnote 2: So by Helmholtz; Hering _(Fechners psychophysisches Gesetz_,\n1875); P. Langer _(Grundlagen der Psychophysik_, 1876); G.E. M\u00fcller in\nG\u00f6ttingen _(Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik_, 1878); F.A. M\u00fcller _(Das\nAxiom der Psychophysik_, 1882); A. Elsas _(Ueber die Psychophysik_, 1886);\nO. Liebmann _(Aphorismen zur Psychologie, Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_,\nvol. ci.--Wundt has published a number of papers from his psycho-physical\nlaboratory in his _Philosophische Studien_, 1881 _seq_. Cf. also Hugo\nM\u00fcnsterberg, _Neue Grundlegung der Psychophysik_ in _Heft_ iii. of his\n_Beitr\u00e4ge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, 1889 _seq_). [Further,\nDelboeuf, in French, and a growing literature in English as A. Seth,\n_Encyclopedia Britannica_, vol. xxiv. 469-471; Ladd, _Elements of\nPhysiological Psychology_, part ii. chap, v.; James, _Principles of\nPsychology_, vol. i. p. 533 _seq_.; and numerous articles as Ward,\n_Mind_, vol. i.; Jastrow, _American Journal of Psychology_, vols. i. and\niii.--TR.]]\n\nThe most important of the thinkers mentioned in the title of this section\nis Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-81: born at Bautzen; a student of medicine,\nand of philosophy under Weisse, in Leipsic; 1844-81 professor in G\u00f6ttingen;\ndied in Berlin). Like Fechner, gifted rather with a talent for the fine and\nthe suggestive than for the large and the rigorous, with a greater reserve\nthan the former before the mystical and peculiar, as acute, cautious, and\nthorough as he was full of taste and loftiness of spirit, Lotze has proved\nthat the classic philosophers did not die out with Hegel and Herbart. His\n_Microcosmus_ (3 vols., 1856-64, 4th ed., 1884 _seq_; English translation\nby Hamilton and Jones, 3d ed., 1888), which is more than an anthropology,\nas it is modestly entitled, and _History of Aesthetics in Germany_, 1868,\nwhich also gives more than the title betrays, enjoy a deserved popularity.\nThese works were preceded by the _Medical Psychology_, 1852, and a polemic\ntreatise against I.H. Fichte, 1857, as well as by a _Pathology_ and a\n_Physiology_, and followed by the _System of Philosophy_, which remained\nincomplete (part i. _Logic_, 1874, 2d ed., 1881, English translation\nedited by Bosanquet, 2d ed., 1888; part ii. _Metaphysics_, 1879, English\ntranslation edited by Bosanquet, 2d ed., 1887). Lotze's _Minor Treatises_\nhave been published by Peipers in three volumes (1885-91); and Rehnisch has\nedited eight sets of dictata from his lectures, 1871-84.[1] Since these\n\"Outlines,\" all of which we now have in new editions, make a convenient\nintroduction to the Lotzean system, and are, or should be, in the\npossession of all, a brief survey may here suffice.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Outlines of Psychology, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of\nReligion, Philosophy of Nature, Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,\nMetaphysics, Aesthetics_, and the _History of Philosophy since Kant_, all\nof which may be emphatically commended to students, especially the one\nfirst mentioned, and, in spite of its subjective position, the last.\n[English translations of these _Outlines_ except the fourth and the\nlast, by Ladd, 1884 _seq_.] On Lotze cf. the obituaries by J. Baumann\n(_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xvii.), H. Sommer (_Im Neuen Reich_),\nA. Krohn (_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxxi. pp. 56-93), R.\nFalckenberg (Augsburg _Allgemeine Zeitung_, 1881, No. 233), and Rehnisch\n(_National Zeitung_ and the _Revue Philosophique_, vol. xii.). The last of\nthese was reprinted in the appendix to the _Grundz\u00fcge der Aesthetik_, 1884,\nwhich contains, further, a chronological table of Lotze's works, essays,\nand critiques, as well as of his lectures. Hugo Sommer has zealously\ndevoted himself to the popularization of the Lotzean system. Cf., further,\nFritz Koegel, _Lotzes Aesthetik_, G\u00f6ttingen, 1886, and the article by\nKoppelmann referred to above, p. 330.]\n\nThe subject of metaphysics is reality. Things which are, events which\nhappen, relations which exist, representative contents and truths which\nare valid, are real. Events happening and relations existing presuppose\nexisting things as the subjects in and between which they happen and exist.\nThe being of things is neither their being perceived (for when we say that\na thing is we mean that it continues to be, even when we do not perceive\nit), nor a pure, unrelated position, its position in general, but _to be is\nto stand in relations_. Further, the _what_ or essence of the things which\nenter into these relations cannot be conceived as passive quality, but\nonly abstractly, as a rule or a law which determines the connection and\nsuccession of a series of qualities. The nature of water, for example, is\nthe unintuitable somewhat which contains the ground of the change of ice,\nfirst into the liquid condition, and then into steam, when the temperature\nincreases, and conversely, of the possibility of changing steam back\ninto water and ice under opposite conditions. And when we speak of an\nunchangeable identity of the thing with itself, as a result of which it\nremains the same essence amid the change of its phenomena, we mean only the\nconsistency with which it keeps within the closed series of forms a1, a2,\na3, without ever going over into the series b1, b2. The relations, however,\nin which things stand, cannot pass to and fro between things like threads\nor little spirits, but are states in things themselves, and the change\nof the former always implies a change in these inner states. To stand in\nrelations means to _exchange actions_. In order to experience such effects\nfrom others and to exercise them upon others, things must neither be wholly\nincomparable (as red, hard, sweet) and mutually indifferent, nor yet\nabsolutely independent; if the independence of individual beings were\ncomplete the process of action would be entirely inconceivable. The\ndifficulty in the concept of causality--how does being _a_ come to produce\nin itself a different state _a_ because another being _b_ enters into the\nstate [Greek: _b_]?--is removed only when we look on the things as\nmodes, states, parts of a single comprehensive being, of an infinite,\nunconditioned substance, in so far as there is then only an action of\nthe absolute on itself. Nevertheless the assumption that, in virtue of\nthe unity and consistency of the absolute or of its impulse to\nself-preservation, state [Greek: _b_] in being _b_ follows state\n[Greek: _a_] in being _a_ as an accommodation or compensation follows a\ndisturbance, is not a full explanation of the process of action, does\nnot remove the difficulty as to how one state can give rise to another.\nMetaphysics is, in general, unable to show how reality is made, but only to\nremove certain contradictions which stand in the way of the conceivability\nof these notions. The so far empty concept of an absolute looks to the\nphilosophy of religion for its content; the conception of the Godhead as\ninfinite personality (it is a person in a far higher sense than we) is\nfirst produced when we add to the ontological postulate of a comprehensive\nsubstance the ethical postulate of a supreme good or a universal\nworld-Idea.\n\nBy \"thing\" we understand the permanent unit-subject of changing states. But\nthe fact of consciousness furnishes the only guaranty that the different\nstates _a, [Greek: b], y_, are in reality states of one being, and not so\nmany different things alternating with one another. Only a conscious\nbeing, which itself effects the distinction between itself and the states\noccurring in it, and in memory and recollection feels and knows itself as\ntheir identical subject, is actually a subject which has states. Hence,\nif things are to be real, we must attribute to them a nature in essence\nrelated to that of our soul. Reality is existence for self. All beings\nare spiritual, and only spiritual beings possess true reality. Thus Lotze\ncombines the monadology of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza, just\nas he understands how to reconcile the mechanical view of natural science\n(which is valid also for the explanation of organic life) with the\nteleology and the ethical idealism of Fichte. The sole mission of the\nworld of forms is to aid in the realization of the ideal purposes of the\nabsolute, of the world of values.\n\nThe ideality of space, which Kant had based on insufficient grounds, is\nmaintained by Lotze also, only that he makes things stand in \"intellectual\"\nrelations, which the knowing subject translates into spatial language. The\nsame character of subjectivity belongs not only to our sensations, but\nalso to our ideas concerning the connection of things. Representations are\nresults, not copies, of the external stimuli; cognition comes under the\ngeneral concept of the interaction of real elements, and depends, like\nevery effect, as much upon the nature of the being that experiences the\neffect as upon the nature of the one which exerts it, or rather, more upon\nthe former than upon the latter. If, nevertheless, it claims objective\nreality, truth must not be interpreted as the correspondence of thought and\nits object (the cognitive image can never be like the thing itself), nor\nthe mission of cognition, made to consist in copying a world already\nfinished and closed apart from the realm of spirits, to which mental\nrepresentation is added as something accessory. Light and sound are not\ntherefore illusions because they are not true copies of the waves of ether\nand of air from which they spring, but they are the end which nature has\nsought to attain through these motions, an end, however, which it cannot\nattain alone, but only by acting upon spiritual subjects; the beauty and\nsplendor of colors and tones are that which of right ought to be in the\nworld; without the new world of representations awakened in spirits by the\naction of external stimuli, the world would lack its essential culmination.\nThe purpose of things is to be known, experienced, and enjoyed by spirits.\nThe truth of cognition consists in the fact that it opens up the meaning\nand destination of the world. That which ought to be is the ground of that\nwhich is; that which is exists in order to the realization of values in\nit; the good is the only real. It is true that we are not permitted to\npenetrate farther than to the general conviction that the Idea of the good\nis the ground and end of the world; the question, how the world has arisen\nfrom this supreme Idea as from the absolute and why just this world with\nits determinate forms and laws has arisen, is unanswerable. We understand\nthe meaning of the play, but we do not see the machinery by which it is\nproduced at work behind the stage. In ethics Lotze emphasizes with Fechner\nthe inseparability of the good and pleasure: it is impossible to state in\nwhat the worth or goodness of a good is to consist, if it be conceived out\nof all relation to a spirit capable of finding enjoyment in it.\n\nIf Lotze's philosophy harmoniously combines Herbartian and Fichteo-Hegelian\nelements, Eduard von Hartmann (born 1842; until 1864 a soldier, now a man\nof letters in Berlin) aims at a synthesis of Schopenhauer and Hegel; with\nthe pessimism of the former he unites the evolutionism of the latter, and\nwhile the one conceives the nature of the world-ground as irrational will,\nand the other as the logical Idea, he follows the example of Schelling\nin his later days by making will and representation equally legitimate\nattributes of his absolute, the Unconscious. His principal theoretical\nwork, _The Philosophy of the Unconscious_, 1869 (10th ed., 1891; English\ntranslation by Coupland, 1884), was followed in 1879 by his chief ethical\none, _The Moral Consciousness_ (2d ed., 1886, in the _Selected Works_); the\ntwo works on the philosophy of religion, _The Religious Consciousness of\nHumanity in the Stages of its Development_, 1881, and _The Religion of\nSpirit_, 1882, together form the third chief work (_The Self-Disintegration\nof Christianity and the Religion of the Future_, 1874, and _The Crisis of\nChristianity in Modern Theology_, 1880, are to be regarded as forerunners\nof this); the fourth is the _Aesthetics_ (part i. _German Aesthetics since\nKant_, 1886; part ii. _Philosophy of the Beautiful_, 1887). The _Collected\nStudies and Essays_, 1876, were preceded by two treatises on the philosophy\nof nature, _Truth and Error in Darwinism_, 1875, and _The Unconscious\nfrom the Standpoint of Physiology and the Theory of Descent_, published\nanonymously in 1872, in the latter of which, disguised as a Darwinian,\nhe criticises his own philosophy. Of his more recent publications we may\nmention the _Philosophical Questions of the Day_, 1885; _Modern Problems_,\n1886; and the controversial treatise _Lotzes Philosophy_, 1888.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: On Hartmann cf. Volkelt in _Nord und S\u00fcd_, July, 1881; the\nsame, _Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus_, 1873; Vaihinger, _Hartmann_,\n_D\u00fchring und Lange_, 1876; R. Koeber, _Das philosophische System Ed.\nv, Hartmann_, 1884; O. Pfleiderer, critique of the _Ph\u00e4nomenologie des\nsittlichen Bewusstseins (Im neuen Reich)_, 1879; L. von Golther, _Der\nmoderne Pessimismus_, 1878; J. Huber, _Der Pessimismus_, 1876; Weygoldt,\n_Kritik des philosophischen Pessimismus der neuesten Zeit_, 1875; M.\nVenetianer, _Der Allgeist_, 1874; A Taubert (Hartmann's first wife),\n_Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner_, 1873; O. Pl\u00fcmacher, _Der Kampf ums\nUnbewusste_ (with a chronological table of Hartmann literature appended),\n1881; the same, _Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart_, 1884;\nKrohn, _Streifz\u00fcge_ (see above); Seydel (see above). During the year\n1882 four publications appeared under the title _Der Pessimismus und die\nSittenlehre_, by Bacmeister, Christ, Rehmke, and H. Sommer (2d ed., 1883).\n[English translation of _Truth and Error in Darwinism_ in the _Journal\nof Speculative Philosophy_, vols. xi.-xiii., and of _The Religion of the\nFuture_, by Dare, 1886; cf. also Sully's _Pessimism_, chap. v.--TR.]]\n\nIn polemical relation, on the one hand, to the na\u00efve realism of life,\nand, on the other, to the subjective idealism of Kant, or rather of\nthe neo-Kantians, the logical conclusion of which would be absolute\nillusionism, Hartmann founds his \"transcendental realism,\" which mediates\nbetween these two points of view (the existence and true nature of the\nworld outside our representations is knowable, if only indirectly; the\nforms of knowledge, in spite of their subjective origin, have a more\nthan subjective, a transcendental, significance) by pointing out that\nsense-impressions, which are accompanied by the feeling of compulsion and\nare different from one another, cannot be explained from the ego, but only\nby the action of things in themselves external to us, _i.e._, independent\nof consciousness, and themselves distinct from one another. The causality\nof things in themselves is the bridge which enables us to cross the gulf\nbetween the immanent world of representations and the transcendent world of\nbeing. The causality of things in themselves proves their reality, their\ndifference at different times, their changeability and their temporal\ncharacter; change, however, demands something permanent, existence, an\nexisting, unchangeable, supra-temporal, and non-spatial substance (whether\na special substance for each thing in itself or a common one for all, is\nleft for the present undetermined). My action upon the thing in itself\nassures me of its causal conditionality or necessity; the various\naffections of the same sense, that there are many things in themselves; the\npeculiar form of change shown by some bodies, that these, like my body, are\nunited with a soul. Thus it is evident that, besides the concept of cause,\na series of other categories must be applied to the thing in itself, hence\napplied transcendentally.\n\nThe \"speculative results\" obtained by Hartmann on an \"inductive\" basis\nare as follows: The _per se (Ansich)_ of the empirical world is the\nUnconscious. The two attributes of this absolute are the active,\ngroundless, alogical, infinite will, and the passive, finite representation\n(Idea); the former is the ground of the _that_ of the world, the latter\nthe ground of its purposive _what_ and _how_. Without the will the\nrepresentation, which in itself is without energy, could not become real,\nand without the representation (of an end) the will, which in itself is\nwithout reason, could not become a definite willing (relative or immanent\ndualism of the attributes, a necessary moment in absolute monism). The\nempirical preponderance of pain over pleasure, which can be shown by\ncalculation,[1] proves that the world is evil, that its non-existence were\nbetter than its existence; the purposiveness everywhere perceptible in\nnature and the progress of history toward a final goal (it is true, a\nnegative one) proves, nevertheless, that it is the best world that was\npossible (reconciliation of eudemonistic pessimism with evolutionistic\noptimism). The creation of the world begins when the blind will to live\ngroundlessly and fortuitously passes over from essence to phenomenon, from\npotency to act, from supra-existence to existence, and, in irrational\nstriving after existence, draws to itself the only content which is capable\nof realization, the logical Idea. This latter seeks to make good the\nerror committed by the will by bringing consciousness into the field as\na combatant against the insatiable, ever yearning, never satisfied will,\nwhich one day will force the will back into latency, into the (antemundane)\nblessed state of not-willing. The goal of the world-development is\ndeliverance from the misery of existence, the peace of non-existence, the\nreturn from the will and representation, become spatial and temporal, to\nthe original, harmonious equilibrium of the two functions, which has been\ndisturbed by the origin of the world or to the antemundane identity of the\nabsolute. The task of the logical element is to teach consciousness more\nand more to penetrate the illusion of the will--in its three stages of\nchildlike (Greek) expectation of happiness to be attained here, youthful\n(Christian) expectation of happiness to be attained hereafter, and\nadult expectation of happiness to be attained in the future of the\nworld-development--and, finally, to teach it to know, in senile longing\nafter rest, that only the doing away with this miserable willing, and,\nconsequently, with earthly existence (through the resolve of the majority\nof mankind) can give the sole attainable blessedness, freedom from pain.\nThe world-process is the incarnation, the suffering, and the redemption\nof the absolute; the moral task of man is not personal renunciation and\ncowardly retirement, but to make the purposes of the Unconscious his own,\nwith complete resignation to life and its sufferings to labor energetically\nin the world-process, and, by the vigorous promotion of consciousness, to\nhasten the fulfillment of the redemptive purpose; the condition of morality\nis insight into the fruitlessness of all striving after pleasure and into\nthe essential unity of all individual beings with one another and with the\nuniversal spirit, which exists in the individuals, but at the same time\nsubsists above them. \"To know one's self as of divine nature, this does\naway with all divergence between selfwill and universal will, with all\nestrangement between man and God, with all undivine, that is, merely\nnatural, conduct.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. Volkelt, _Ueber die Lust als h\u00f6chsten Werthmassstab_\n(in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_, vol. lxxxviii.), 1886, and O.\nPfleiderer, _Philosophy of Religion_, vol. ii. p. 249 _seq_.]\n\nReligion, which, in common with philosophy, has for its basis the\nmetaphysical need for, or the mystical feeling of, the unity of the human\nindividual and the world-ground, needs transformation, since in its\ntraditional forms it is opposed to modern culture, and the merging of\nreligion (as a need of the heart) in metaphysics is impossible. The\nreligion of the future, for which the way has already been prepared by the\nspeculative Protestantism of the present, is _concrete monism_ (the divine\nunity is transcendent as well as immanent in the plurality of the beings of\nearth, every moral man a God-man), which includes in itself the abstract\nmonism (pantheism) of the Indian religions and the Judeo-Christian (mono-)\ntheism as subordinate moments. (The original henotheism and its decline\ninto polytheism, demonism, and fetichism was followed by--Egyptian and\nPersian, as well as Greek, Roman, and German--naturalism, and then by\nsupernaturalism in its monistic and its theistic form. The chief defect of\nthe Christian religion is the transcendental-eudemonistic heteronomy of its\nethics.) The _Religion of Spirit_ divides into three parts. The psychology\nof religion considers the religious function in its subjective aspect,\nfaith as a combined act of representation, feeling, and will, in which one\nof these three elements may predominate--though feeling forms the inmost\nkernel of the theoretical and practical activities as well--and, as\nthe objective correlate of faith, grace (revealing, redeeming, and\nsanctifying), which elevates man above peripheral and phenomenal dependence\non the world, and frees him from it, through his becoming conscious of his\ncentral and metaphysical dependence upon God. The metaphysics of religion\n(in theological, anthropological, and cosmological sections) proves\nby induction from the facts of religion the existence, omnipotence,\nspirituality, omniscience, righteousness, and holiness of the All-one,\nwhich coincides with the moral order of the world. Further, it proves the\nneed and the capacity of man for redemption from guilt and evil--here three\nspheres of the individual will are distinguished, one beneath God, one\ncontrary to God, and one conformable to God, or a natural, an evil, and a\nmoral sphere--and, preserving alike the absoluteness of God and the reality\nof the world, shows that it is not so much man as God himself, who, as the\nbearer of all the suffering of the world, is the subject of redemption.\nThe ethics of religion discusses the subjective and objective processes of\nredemption, namely, repentance and amendment on the part of the individual\nand the ecclesiastical _cultus_ of the future, which is to despise symbols\nand art.\n\nIt is to Hartmann's credit, though the fact has not been sufficiently\nappreciated by professional thinkers, that in a time averse to speculation\nhe has devoted his energies to the highest problems of metaphysics, and in\ntheir elaboration has approached his task with scientific earnestness and\na comprehensive and thorough consideration of previous results. Thus\nthe critique of ethical standpoints in the historical part of the\n_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_, especially, contains much that\nis worthy of consideration; and his fundamental metaphysical idea, that the\nabsolute is to be conceived as the unity of will and reason, also deserves\nin general a more lively assent than has been accorded to it, while his\nrejection of an infinite consciousness has justly met with contradiction.\nIt has been impossible here to go into his discussions in the philosophy of\nnature--they cannot be described in brief--on matter (atomic forces), on\nthe mechanical and teleological views of life and its development, on\ninstinct, on sexual love, etc., which he very skillfully uses in support of\nhis metaphysical principle.\n\n\n%3. From the Revival of the Kantian Philosophy to the Present Time.%\n\n%(a) Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Kindred Phenomena.%--The Kantian\nphilosophy has created two epochs: one at the time of its appearance, and\na second two generations after the death of its author. The new Kantian\nmovement, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of the\nphilosophy of the present time, took its beginning a quarter of a century\nago. It is true that even before 1865 individual thinkers like Ernst\nReinhold of Jena (died 1855), the admirer of Fries, J.B. Meyer of Bonn,\nK.A. von Reichlin-Meldegg, and others had sought a point of departure for\ntheir views in Kant; that K. Fischer's work on Kant (1860) had given a\nlively impulse to the renewed study of the critical philosophy; nay, that\nthe cry \"Back to Kant\" had been expressly raised by Fortlage (as early as\n1832 in his treatise _The Gaps in the Hegelian System_), and by Zeller\n(p. 589). But the movement first became general after F.A. Lange in his\n_History of Materialism_ had energetically advocated the Kantian doctrine\naccording to his special conception of it, after Helmholtz[1] (born 1821)\nhad called attention to the agreement of the results of physiology with\nthose of the Critique of Reason, and at the same time Liebmann's youthful\nwork, _Kant and the Epigones_, in which every chapter ended with the\ninexorable refrain, \"therefore we must go back to Kant,\" had given the\nstrongest expression to the longing of the time.\n\n[Footnote 1: Helmholtz: _On Human Vision_, 1855; _Physiological Optics_,\n1867; _Sensations of Tone_, 1863, 4th ed., 1877 [English translation by\nEllis, 2d ed., 1885].]\n\nOtto Liebmann (cf. also the chapter on \"The Metamorphoses of the A Priori\"\nin his _Analysis of Reality_) sees the fundamental truth of criticism in\nthe irrefutable proof that, space, time, and the categories are functions\nof the intellect, and that subject and object are necessary correlates,\ninseparable factors of the empirical world, and finds Kant's fundamental\nerror, which the Epigones have not corrected, but made still worse, in the\nnon-concept of the thing in itself, which must be expelled from the Kantian\nphilosophy as a remnant of dogmatism, as a drop of alien blood, and as an\nillegitimate invader which has debased it.\n\nAccording to Friedrich Albert Lange[1] (1828-75; during the last years\nof his life professor at Marburg), materialism, which is unfruitful and\nuntenable as a principle, a system, and a view of the world, but useful\nand indispensable as a method and a maxim of investigation, must be\nsupplemented by formal idealism, which, rejecting all science from mere\nreason limits knowledge to the sensuous, to that which can be experienced,\nyet at the same time conceives the formal element in the sense world as the\nproduct of the organization of man, and hence makes objects conform to our\nrepresentations. Above the sensuous world of experience and of mechanical\nbecoming, however, the speculative impulse to construction, rounding off\nthe fragmentary truth of the sciences into a unified picture of the whole\ntruth, rears the ideal world of that which ought to be. Notwithstanding\ntheir indefeasible certitude, the Ideas possess no scientific truth, though\nthey have a moral value which makes them more than mere fabrics of the\nbrain: man is framed not merely for the knowledge of truth, but also for\nthe realization of values. But since the significance of the Ideas is\nonly practical, and since determinations of value are not grounds\nof explanation, science and metaphysics or \"concept poetry\"\n(_Begriffsdichtung_) must be kept strictly separate.\n\n[Footnote 1: F.A. Lange: _Logical Studies_, 1877. Cf. M. Heinze in the\n_Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Philosophic_, 1877, and\nVaihinger in the work cited above, p. 610 note.]\n\nFriedrich Paulsen of Berlin (born in 1846; cf. pp. 330, 332, note) sees in\nthe Kantian philosophy the foundation for the philosophy of the future. A\nprofounder Wolff (the self-dominion of the reason), a Prussian Hume (the\ncategories of the understanding are not world-categories; rejection of\nanthropomorphic metaphysics), and a German Rousseau (the primacy of the\nwill, consideration of the demands of the heart; the good will alone, not\ndeeds nor culture, constitutes the worth of man; freedom, the rights of\nman) in one person, Kant has withdrawn from scientific discussion the\nquestion concerning the dependence of reality on values or the good,\nwhich is theoretically insoluble but practically to be answered in the\naffirmative, and given it over to faith. Kant is in so far a positivist\nthat he limits the mission of knowledge to the reduction of the\ntemporo-spatial relations of phenomena to rules, and declares the\nteleological power of values to be undemonstrable. But science is able\nto prove this much, that the belief in a suprasensible world, in the\nindestructibility of that which alone has worth, and in the freedom of\nthe intelligible character, which the will demands, is not scientifically\nimpossible. Since, according to formal rationalism, the whole order of\nnature is a creation of the understanding, and hence atomism and mechanism\nare only forms of representation, valid, no doubt, for our peripheral point\nof view, but not absolutely valid, since, further, the empirical view of\nthe world apart from the Idea of the divine unity of the world (which, it\nis true, is incapable of theoretical realization) would lack completion,\nthe immediate conviction of the heart in regard to the power of the good is\nin no danger of attack from the side of science, although this can do no\nfurther service for faith than to remove the obstacles which oppose it. The\nwill, not the intellect, determines the view of the world; but this is only\na belief, and in the world of representation, the intelligible world, with\nwhich the will brings us into relation, can come before us only in the form\nof symbols.--While Albrecht Krause (_The Laws of the Human Heart, a Formal\nLogic of Pure Feeling_, 1876) and A. Classen (_Physiology of the Sense of\nSight_, 1877) are strict followers of Kant, J. Volkelt (_Analysis of the\nFundamental Principles of Kant's Theory of Knowledge_, 1879) has traced the\noften deplored inconsistencies and contradictions in Kant down to their\nroots, and has shown that in Kant's thinking, which has hitherto been\nconceived as too simple and transparent, but which, in fact, is extremely\ncomplicated and struggling in the dark, a number of entirely heterogeneous\nprinciples of thought (skeptical, subjectivistic, metaphysico-work,\nrationalistic, _a priori_, and practical motives) are at which, conflicting\nwith and crippling one another, make the attainment of harmonious results\nimpossible. Benno Erdmann (p. 330) and Hans Vaihinger (pp. 323 note, 331)\nhave given Kant's principal works careful philological interpretation.\n\nAmong the various differences of opinion which exist within the neo-Kantian\nranks, the most important relates to the question, whether the individual\nego or a transcendental consciousness is to be looked upon as the executor\nof the _a priori_ functions. In agreement with Schopenhauer and with Lotze,\nwho makes the subjectivity of space, time, and the pure concepts parallel\nwith that of the sense qualities, Lange teaches that the human individual\nis so organized that he must apprehend that which is sensuously given under\nthese forms. Others, on the contrary, urge that the individual soul with\nits organization is itself a phenomenon, and consequently cannot be the\nbearer of that which precedes phenomena--space, time, and the categories\nas \"conditions\" of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be\npresupposed. The antithesis of subject and object, the soul and the world,\nfirst arises in the sphere of phenomena. The empirical subject, like the\nworld of objects, is itself a product of the _a priori_ forms, hence not\nthat which produces them. To the transcendental group belong Hermann\nCohen[1] in Marburg, A. Stadler[2], Natorp, Lasswitz (p.17), E. K\u00f6nig (p.\n17), Koppelmann (p. 330), Staudinger (p. 331). Fritz Schultze of Dresden is\nalso to be counted among the neo-Kantians (_Philosophy of Natural Science_,\n1882; _Kant and Darwin_, 1875; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Materialism_,\n1881; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Spiritualism_, 1883; _Comparative\nPsychology_, i. 1, 1892).\n\n[Footnote 1: Cohen: _Kant's Theory of Experience_, 1871, 2d ed., 1886;\n_Kant's Foundation of Ethics_, 1877; _Kant's Foundation of Aesthetics_,\n1889.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Stadler: _Kant's Teleology_, 1874; _The Principles of the Pure\nTheory of Knowledge in the Kantian Philosophy_, 1876; _Kant's Theory of\nMatter_, 1883.]\n\nThe German positivists[1]:--E. Laas of Strasburg (1837-85), A. Riehl\nof Freiburg in Baden (born 1844), and R. Avenarius of Zurich (born\n1843)--develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical\nconnection with Kant. Ernst Laas defines positivism (founded by Protagoras,\nadvocated in modern times by Hume and J.S. Mill, and hostile to Platonic\nidealism) as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than\npositive facts (_i.e._, perceptions), and requires every opinion to exhibit\nthe experiences on which it rests. Its basis is constituted by three\narticles of belief: (1) The correlative facts, subject and object, exist\nand arise only in connection (objects are directly known only as the\ncontents of a consciousness, _cui objecta sunt_, subjects only as centers\nof relation, as the scene or foundation of a representative content, _cui\nsubjecta sunt_: outside my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I\nmyself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3)\nSensationalism--all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived\nas differences in degree, all higher mental processes and states, including\nthought, as the perceptions and experiences, transformed according to\nlaw, of beings which feel, have wants, possess memory, and are capable of\nspontaneous motion. The subject coincides with its feeling of pleasure and\npain, from which sensation is distinguished by its objective content. The\nillusions of metaphysics are scientifically untenable and practically\nunnecessary. Various yearnings, wants, presentiments, hopes, and fancies,\nit is true, lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense\nand experience, but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be\nadduced. As physics has discarded transcendent causes and learned how to\nget along with immanent causes, so ethics also must endeavor to establish\nthe worth of moral good without excursions into the suprasensible. The\nethical obligations arise naturally from human relations, from earthly\nneeds. The third volume of Laas's work differs from the earlier ones by\nconceding the rank of facts to the principles of logic as well as to\nperception. Aloys Riehl opposes the theory of knowledge (which starts from\nthe fundamental fact of sensation) as scientific philosophy to metaphysics\nas unscientific, and banishes the doctrine of the practical ideals from the\nrealm of science into the region of religion and art. Richard Avenarius\ndefends the principle of \"pure experience.\" Sensation, which is all that is\nleft as objectively given after the removal of the subjective additions,\nconstitutes the content, and motion the form of being.\n\n[Footnote 1: Laas: _Idealism and Positivism_, 1879-84. Riehl:\n_Philosophical Criticism_, 1876-87; Address _On Scientific and Unscientific\nPhilosophy_, 1883. Avenarius (p. 598): _Philosophy as Thought concerning\nthe World according to the Principle of Least Work_, 1876; _Critique of\nPure Experience_, vol. i. 1888, vol. ii. 1890; _Man's Concept of the\nWorld_, 1891. C. G\u00f6ring (died 1879; _System of Critical Philosophy_, 1875)\nmay also be placed here.]\n\nWith the neo-Kantians and the positivists there is associated, thirdly, a\ncoherent group of no\u00ebtical thinkers, who, rejecting extramental elements of\nevery kind, look on all conceivable being as merely a conscious content.\nThis monism of consciousness is advocated by W. Schuppe of Greifswald (born\n1836; _No\u00ebtical Logic_, 1878), J. Rehmke, also of Greifswald (_The World as\nPercept and Concept_, 1880; \"The Question of the Soul\" in vol. ii. of the\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Psychologie_, 1891), A. von Leclair (_Contributions to\na_ _Monistic Theory of Knowledge_, 1882), and R. von Schubert-Soldern\n(_Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge_, 1884; _On the Transcendence\nof Object and Subject_, 1882; _Foundations for an Ethics_, 1887). J.\nBergmann[1] in Marburg (born 1840) occupies a kindred position.\n\n[Footnote 1: Bergmann: _Outlines of a Theory of Consciousness_, 1870; _Pure\nLogic_, 1879; _Being and Knowing_, 1880; _The Fundamental Problems of\nLogic_, 1882; _On the Right_, 1883; _Lectures on Metaphysics_, 1886; _On\nthe Beautiful_, 1887; _History of Philosophy_, vol. i., _Pre-Kantian\nPhilosophy_, 1892.]\n\nIt is the same scientific spirit of the time, which in the fifties led many\nwho were weary of the idealistic speculations over to materialism, that now\nsecures such wide dissemination and so widespread favor for the endeavors\nof the neo-Kantians and the positivists or neo-Baconians, who desire to see\nmetaphysics stricken from the list of the sciences and replaced by no\u00ebtics,\nand the theory of the world relegated to faith. The philosophy of the\npresent, like the pre-Socratic philosophy and the philosophy of the early\nmodern period, wears the badge of physics. The world is conceived from the\nstandpoint of nature, psychical phenomena are in part neglected, in part\nsee their inconvenient claims reduced to a minimum, while it is but rarely\nthat we find an appreciation of their independence and co-ordinate value,\nnot to speak of their superior position. The power which natural science\nhas gained over philosophy dates essentially from a series of famous\ndiscoveries and theories, by which science has opened up entirely new and\nwide outlooks, and whose title to be considered in the formation of a\ngeneral view of reality is incontestable. To mention only the most\nprominent, the following have all posited important and far-reaching\nproblems for philosophy as well as for science: Johannes M\u00fcller's (M\u00fcller\ndied 1858) theory of the specific energies of the senses, which Helmholtz\nmade use of as an empirical confirmation of the Kantian apriorism; the law\nof the conservation of energy discovered by Robert Mayer (1842, 1850;\nHelmholtz, 1847, 1862), and, in particular, the law of the transformation\nof heat into motion, which invited an examination of all the forces active\nin the world to test their mutual convertibility; the extension of\nmechanism to the vital processes, favored even by Lotze; the renewed\nconflict between atomism and dynamism; further, the Darwinian theory[1]\n(1859), which makes organic species develop from one another by natural\nselection in the struggle for existence (through inheritance and\nadaptation); finally, the meta-geometrical speculations[2] of Gauss (1828),\nRiemann (_On the Hypotheses which lie at the Basis of Geometry_, 1854,\npublished in 1867), Helmholtz (1868), B. Erdmann (_The Axioms of Geometry_,\n1877). G. Cantor, and others, which look on our Euclidean space of three\ndimensions as a special case of the unintuitable yet thinkable analytic\nconcept of a space of _n_ dimensions. The circumstance that these theories\nare still largely hypothetical in their own field appears to have stirred\nup rather than moderated the zeal for carrying them over into other\ndepartments and for applying them to the world as a whole. Thus,\nespecially, the Darwinians[3] have undauntedly attempted to utilize the\nbiological hypothesis of the master as a philosophical principle of the\nworld, and to bring the mental sciences under the point of view of the\nmechanical theory of development, though thus far with more daring and\nnoise than success. The finely conceived ethics of H\u00f6ffding (p. 585) is an\nexception to the rule which is the object of this remark.\n\n[Footnote 1: A critical exposition of the modern doctrine of development\nand of the causes used to explain it is given by Otto Hamann,\n_Entwickelungslehre und Darwinismus_, Jena, 1892. Cf. also, O. Liebmann,\n_Analysis der Wirklichkeit_; and Ed. von Hartmann (above, p. 610). [Among\nthe numerous works in English the reader may be referred to the article\n\"Evolution,\" by Huxley and Sully, _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed., vol.\nviii.; Wallace's _Darwinism_, 1889; Romanes, _Darwin and after Darwin_,\ni. _The Darwinian Theory_, 1892; and Conn's _Evolution of To-day_,\n1886.--TR.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. Liebmann, _Analysis der Wirklichkeit_, 2d ed., pp. 53-59.\nG. Frege (_Begriffsschrift_, 1879; _The Foundations of Arithmetic_, 1884;\n_Function and Concept_, 1891; \"On Sense and Meaning\" in the _Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr Philosophie,_ vol. c. 1892) has also chosen the region intermediate\nbetween mathematics and philosophy for his field of work. We note, further,\nE.G. Husserl, _Philosophy of Arithmetic_, vol. i., 1891.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ernst Haeckel of Jena (born 1834; _General Morphology_, 1866;\n_Natural History of Creation_, 1868 [English, 1875] I _Anthropogeny_, 1874;\n_Aims and Methods of the Development History of To-day_, 1875; _Popular\nLectures_, 1878 _seq_.--English, 1883), G. J\u00e4ger, A. Schleicher _(The\nDarwinian Theory and the Science of Language_, 1865), Ernst Krause\n(Carus Sterne, the editor of _Kosmos_) O. Caspari, Carneri (_Morals and\nDarwinism_, 1871), O. Schmidt, Du Prel, Paul R\u00e9e (_The Origin of the Moral\nFeelings_, 1877; _The Genesis of Conscience_, 1885; _The Illusion of Free\nWill_, 1885); G.H. Schneider (_The Animal Will_, 1880; _The Human Will_,\n1882; _The Good and III of the Human Race_, 1883).]\n\nBesides the theory of knowledge, in the elaboration of which the most\neminent naturalists[1] participate with acuteness and success, psychology\nand the practical disciplines also betray the influence of the scientific\nspirit. While sociology and ethics, following the English model, seek an\nempirical basis and begin to make philosophical use of statistical results\n(E.F. Sch\u00e4ffle, _Frame and Life of the Social Body_, new ed., 1885; A. von\nOettingen, _Moral Statistic in its Significance for a Social Ethics_, 3d\ned., 1882), psychology endeavors to attain exact results in regard to\npsychical life and its relation to its physical basis--besides Fechner and\nthe Herbartians, W. Wundt and A. Horwicz should be mentioned here. Wundt\nand, of late, Haeckel go back to the Spinozistic parallelism of material\nand psychical existence, only that the latter emphasizes merely the\ninseparability _(Nichtohneeinander)_ of the two sides (the cell-body and\nthe cell-soul) with a real difference between them and a metaphysical\npreponderance of the material side, while the former emphasizes the\nessential unity of body and soul, and the higher reality of the spiritual\nside.\n\n[Footnote 1: Helmholtz, Virchow (born 1821), Z\u00f6llner (1834-82; _On the\nNature of Comets_, 1872), and Du Bois-Reymond (born 1818), who, in his\nlectures _On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature_, 1872, and _The Seven\nWorld-riddles_, 1880 (both together in 1882, and reprinted in the first\nseries of his _Addresses_, 1886), looks on the origin of life, the\npurposive order of nature, and thought as problems soluble in the future,\nbut declares, on the other hand, that the nature of matter (atoms)\nand force _(actio in distant)_, the origin of motion, the genesis of\nconsciousness (of sensation, together with pleasure and pain) from the\nknowable conditions of psychical life, and the freedom of the will, are\nabsolute limits to our knowledge of nature.]\n\n%(b) Idealistic Reaction against the Scientific Spirit.%--In opposition to\nthe preponderance of natural science and the empirico-skeptical tendency of\nthe philosophy of the day conditioned by it, an idealistic counter-movement\nis making itself increasingly felt as the years go on. Wilhelm Dilthey[1]\nabandons metaphysics as a basis, it is true, but (with the assent of\nGierke, _Preussische Jahrb\u00fccher_, vol. liii. 1884) declares against the\ntransfer of the method of natural science to the mental sciences, which\nrequire a special foundation. In spite of his critical rejection of\nmetaphysics, Wilhelm Windelband in Strasburg (born 1848; _Preludes_, 1884)\nis, like Dilthey, to be counted among the idealists. In opposition to the\nindividualism of the positivists, the folk-psychologists--at their head\nSteinthal and Lazarus (p. 536); Gustav Glogau[2] in Kiel (born 1844) is\nan adherent of the same movement--defend the power of the universal over\nindividual spirits. The spirit of the people is not a phrase, an empty\nname, but a real force, not the sum of the individuals belonging to the\npeople, but an encompassing and controlling power, which brings forth\nin the whole body processes (_e.g._, language) which could not occur in\nindividuals as such. It is only as a member of society that anyone becomes\ntruly man; the community is the subject of the higher life of spirit.\n\n[Footnote 1: Dilthey: _Introduction to the Mental Sciences_, part i.,\n1883; _Poetic Creation_ in the Zeller _Aufs\u00e4tze_, 1887; \"Contributions to\nthe Solution of the Question of the Origin of our Belief in the Reality of\nthe External World, and its Validity,\" _Sitzungsberichte_ of the Berlin\nAcademy of Sciences, 1890; \"Conception and Analysis of Man in the\nFifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries\" in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, vols. iv., v., 1891-92.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Glogau: _Sketch of the Fundamental Philosophical Sciences_\n(part i., _The Form and the Laws of Motion of the Spirit_, 1880; part\nii., _The Nature and the Fundamental Forms of Conscious Spirit_, 1888);\n_Outlines of Psychology_; 1884.]\n\nIf folk-psychology, whose title but imperfectly expresses the comprehensive\nendeavor to construct a psychology of society or of the universal spirit,\nis, as it were, an empirical confirmation of Hegel's theory of Objective\nSpirit, Rudolf Eucken[1] (born 1846), pressing on in the Fichtean manner\nfrom the secondary facts of consciousness to an original real-life,\nendeavors to solve the question of a universal becoming, of an\nall-pervasive force, of a supporting unity (\"totality\") in the life of\nspirit (neither in a purely no\u00ebtical nor a purely metaphysical, but) in a\nno\u00f6logical way, and demands that the fundamental science or doctrine of\nprinciples direct its attention not to cognition by itself, but to the\nactivity of psychical life as a whole.\n\n[Footnote 1: Eucken: _The Unity of Spiritual Life in the Consciousness and\nDeeds of Humanity_, 1888; _Prolegomena_ to this, 1885. A detailed analysis\nof the latter by Falckenberg is given in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie_,\nvol. xc, 1887; cf. above, pp. 17 and 610.]\n\nWe have elsewhere discussed the more recent attempts to establish a\nmetaphysic which shall be empirically well grounded and shall cautiously\nrise from facts.[1] In regard to the possibility of metaphysics three\nparties are to be distinguished: On the left, the positivists, the\nneo-Kantians, and the monists of consciousness, who deny it out of hand. On\nthe right, a series of philosophers--e.g., adherents of Hegel, Herbart, and\nSchopenhauer--who, without making any concessions to the modern theory of\nknowledge, hold fast to the possibility of a speculative metaphysics of the\nold type. In the center, a group of thinkers who are willing to renounce\nneither a solid no\u00ebtical foundation nor the attainment of metaphysical\nconclusions--so Eduard von Hartmann, Wundt,[2] Eucken, Volkelt (pp. 590,\n617). Otto Liebmann (born 1840; _On the Analysis of Reality_, 1876, 2d\ned., 1880; _Thoughts and Facts_, Heft i. 1882) demands a sharp separation\nbetween the certain and the uncertain and an exact estimation of the degree\nof probability which theories possess; puts the principles of metaphysics\nunder the rubric of logical hypothesis; and, in his _Climax of the\nTheories_, 1884, calls attention to the fact that experiential science, in\naddition to axioms necessarily or apodictically certain and empeiremes\npossessing actual or assertory certainty, needs, further, a number of\n\"interpolation maxims,\" which form an attribute of our type of intellectual\norganization _(i.e._, principles, according to the standard of which we\nsupplement the fragmentary and discrete series of single perceptions and\nisolated observations by the interpolation of the needed intermediate\nlinks, so that they form a connected experience). The most important of\nthese maxims are the principles of real identity, of the continuity of\nexistence, of causality, and of the continuity of becoming. Experience is\na gift of the understanding; the premises, as a rule, latent in ordinary\nconsciousness, on whose anticipatory application our experience is based\nthroughout, assert something absolutely incapable of being experienced.\nIf, in order to the production of a \"pure experience,\" we eliminate all\nsubjective additions of the understanding contained in experiential thought\n(all that cannot be present at the moment or locally at hand, in short, all\nthat cannot be the direct object and content of actual observation),\nthis breaks up into an unordered, unconnected aggregate of discontinuous\nperceptual fragments; in order that a complete and articulated condition\nof experience may result, these fragments (the purely factual content of\nobservation, the incoherent matter of perception) must be supplemented and\nconnected by very much that is not observed.\n\n[Footnote 1: R. Falckenberg, _Ueber die gegenw\u00e4rtige Lage der deutschen\nPhilosophie_, inaugural address at Erlangen, Leipsic, 1890.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Wundt: _Essays_, 1885, including \"Philosophy and Science\";\n_System of Philosophy_, 1889. On the latter cf. Volkelt's paper in the\n_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxvii. 1891; and on the _Essays_ a\nnotice by the same author in the same review, vol. xxiii. 1887.]\n\nFurther, a reaction against crude naturalism is observable in the practical\nfield, though political economists (Roscher) and jurists take a more active\npart in it than the philosophers. Personally R. von Jhering (1818-92;\n_Purpose in Law_, 2 vols., 1877-83, 2d ed., 1884-86) stands on idealistic\nground, although, rejecting the nativistic and formalistic theory, he is in\nprinciple an adherent of \"realism,\" of the principle of interest and social\nutility (the moral is that Which is permanently useful to society).\n\nFinally, similar motives underlie the growing interest in the history\nof philosophy. The idealistic impulse seeks the nourishment which the\nun-metaphysical present denies to it from the great works of the past, and\nhopes, by keeping alive the classical achievements of previous times, to\nenhance the consciousness of the urgency and irrepressibleness of the\nhighest questions, and to awaken courage for renewed attempts at their\nsolution. Thus the study of history enters the service of systematic\nphilosophy.\n\n%(c) The Special Philosophical Sciences.%--The more the courage to attack\nthe central problems of philosophy has been paralyzed by the neo-Kantian\ntheory of knowledge and the coming-in of the positivistic spirit, the more\nlively has been the work of the last decades in the special departments:\nthe transfer of the center of gravity from metaphysics to the particular\nsciences is the most prominent characteristic of the philosophy of the\ntime. Logic sees century-old convictions shattered and new foundations\narising. Psychology has entered into competition with physiology in regard\nto the discovery of the laws of the psychical functions which depend\non bodily processes, while metaphysical questions are forced into the\nbackground and there is a growing distrust of the reliability of inner\nobservation. The philosophy of religion is favored with undiminished\ninterest and aesthetics, after long neglect, with a renewal of attention;\nthe philosophy of history is about to reconquer its former rights.\nThere is, moreover, an especially lively interest in ethics; and the\ninvestigation of the history of philosophy is more widely extended than\never before. We will close our sketch with a short survey of the particular\ndisciplines.\n\nIn the department of _logic_ the following should be mentioned as classical\nachievements: the works of Christoph Sigwart of T\u00fcbingen (vol. i. 1873,\n2d ed., 1889; vol. ii. 1878), of Lotze (p. 605), and of Wundt (vol. i.\n_Erkenntnisslehre_, 1880; vol. ii. _Methodenlehre_, 1883). Besides these,\nBergmann (p. 620), Schuppe (p. 619), and Benno Erdmann (_Logik_, vol. i.\n1892) deserve notice.\n\nIn _psychology_ the following writers have made themselves prominent:\nWilhelm Wundt at Leipsic (born 1832), _Grundz\u00fcge der physiologischen\nPsychologie_, 1874, 3d ed., 1887; A. Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen auf\nphysiologischer Grundlage_, 1872 _seq_.; Franz Brentano in Vienna (born\n1838), _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_, vol. i. 1874; Carl\nStumpf of Munich (born 1848), _Ueber den psychologischen Ursprung der\nRaumvorstellung_, 1873, _Tonpsychologie_, vol. i. 1883, vol. ii. 1890;\nTheodor Lipps of Breslau (born 1851), _Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens_,\n1883. The following may be mentioned in the same connection: J.H. Witte,\n_Das Wesen der Seele_, 1888; H. M\u00fcnsterberg, _Die Willenshandlung_, 1888,\n_Beitr\u00e4ge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, 1889 _seq_,; Goswin K. Uphues\nat Halle, _Wahrnehmung und Empfindung_, 1888, _Ueber die Erinnerung_, 1889;\nH. Schmidkunz, _Psychologie der Suggestion_, 1892; H. Ebbinghaus, the\nco-editor of the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Psychologie una Physiologie der\nSinnesorgane_, 1890 _seq_.; H. Spitta; Max Dessoir, _Der Hautsinn_, in\nthe _Archiv f\u00fcr Anatomie una Physiologie_, 1892. The following works are\npsychological contributions to the theory of knowledge: E.L. Fischer,\n_Theorie der Gesichtswahrnehmung_, 1891; Hermann Schwarz, _Das\nWahrnehmungsproblem_, 1892. Finally we may add A. Dorner in K\u00f6nigsberg,\n_Das menschliche Erkennen_, 1887; and E.L. Fischer, _Die Grundfragen der\nErkenntnisstheorie_, 1887.\n\nThe literature of _moral philosophy_ has been substantially enriched by\nWundt, _Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., 1892; and Friedrich Paulsen, _System der\nEthik_, 1889, 2d ed., 1891. We may mention, further, Baumann (p. 601);\nSchuppe, _Grundz\u00fcge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie_, 1882; Witte,\n_Freiheit des Willens_, 1882; G. Class in Erlangen, _Ideale und G\u00fcter_,\n1886; Richard Wallaschek, _Ideen zur praktischen Philosophic_, 1886;\nF. T\u00f6nnies in Kiel, _Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft_, 1887; A. D\u00f6ring,\n_Philosophische G\u00fcterlehre_, 1888; Th. Ziegler, _Sittliches Sein und\nWerden_, 2d ed., 1890; G. Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_,\nvol. i. 1892.\n\nOf the newer works in the field of _aesthetics_, in addition to A.\nZeising's _Aesthetische Forschungen_, 1855, C. Hermann's _Aesthetik_,\n1875, and Hartmann's _Philosophie des Sch\u00f6nen_, 1887, we may mention the\n_Einleitung in die Aesthetik_ of Karl Groos, 1892, and the following by\nLipps: _Der Streit \u00fcber die Trag\u00f6die_, 1890; _Aesthetische Faktoren der\nRaumanschauung_, 1891; the essay _Psychologie der Komik (Philosophische\nMonatshefte_, vols. xxiv.-xxv. 1888-89), and _Aesthetische\nLitteraturberichte_, (in the same review, vol. xxvi. 1890 _seq_.).\n\nAmong the writers and works on the _philosophy of history_ we may note\nConrad Hermann in Leipsic (born 1819), _Philosophie der Geschichte_, 1870;\nBernheim, _Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1880; Karl\nFischer, _Ist eine Philosophie der Geschichte wissenschaftlich erforderlich\nbezw. m\u00f6glich?_ Dillenburg Programme, 1889; Hinneberg, _Die philosophischen\nGrundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft_ in Sybel's _Historische\nZeitschrift_, vol. lxiii. 1889; A. Dippe, _Das Geschichtsstudium mit\nseinen Zielen und Fragen_, 1891; Georg Simmel, _Die Probleme der\nGeschichtsphilosophie_, 1892.\n\nIn the _philosophy of religion_, which is discussed especially by the\ntheologians, a neo-Kantian and a neo-Hegelian tendency confront each other.\nThe former, dividing in its turn, is represented, on the one hand, by\nthe Ritschlian school--W. Herrmann in Marburg (_Die Metaphysik in der\nTheologie_, 1876, _Die Religion im Verh\u00e4ltniss zum Welterkennen und zur\nSittlichkeit_, 1889), J. Kaftan in Berlin (_Das Wesen der christlichen\nReligion_, 1881)--and, on the other, by R.A. Lipsius in Jena (born 1830;\n_Dogmatik_, 1876, 2d ed., 1879; _Philosophie und Religion_, 1885). The\nlatter is represented by A.E. Biedermann of Zurich (1819-85; _Christliche\nDogmatik_, 1868; 2d ed., 1884-85), a pupil of W. Vatke, and by Otto\nPfleiderer of Berlin (born 1839; _Religionsphilosophie_, 1879; 2d ed.,\n1883-4). The neo-Kantians base religion exclusively on the practical side\nof human nature, especially on the moral law, derive it from the contrast\nbetween external dependence on nature and the inner freedom or supernatural\ndestination of the spirit, and wish it preserved from all intermixture\nwith metaphysics. According to the neo-Hegelians, on the contrary, the\ntheoretical element in religion is no less essential; and is capable of\nbeing purified, of being elevated from the form of representation, which is\nfull of contradictions, into the adequate form of pure thought, capable,\ntherefore, of reconciliation with philosophy. Hugo Delff (_Ueber den Weg\nzum Wissen und zur Gewissheit zu gelangen_, 1882; _Die Hauptprobleme der\nPhilosophie und Religion_, 1886) follows Jacobi's course.\n\nAmong the numerous works on the _history of philosophy_, besides the\nmasterpieces of Zeller, J.E. Erdmann, and Kuno Fischer, the following are\nespecially worthy of attention:\n\nCl. B\u00e4umker in Breslau, _Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen\nPhilosophie_, 1890; H. Bonitz, _Platonische Studien_, 3d ed., 1886,\n_Aristotelische Studien_, 1862 _seq., Index Aristotelicus_, 1870, _Kleine\nSchriften_; P. Deussen (born 1845), _Das System der Vedanta_, 1883, H.\nDiels in Berlin, _Doxographi Graeci_, 1879; Eucken in Jena (p. 17), _Die\nMethode der aristotelischen Forschung_, 1872, Address _Ueber den Werth der\nGeschichte der Philosophie_, 1874; J. Freudenthal in Breslau (born 1839,\npp. 63, 118), _Hellenistische Studien, 3 Hefte_, 1879, _Ueber die Theologie\ndes Xenophanes_, 1886; M. Heinze in Leipsic, _Die Lehre vom Logos in der\ngriechischen Philosophie_, 1872; G. Freiherr von Hertling in Munich (born\n1843), _Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles_,\n1871, _Albertus Magnus_, 1880; H. Heussler in Basle (p. 65 note),\n_Der Rationalismus des XVII. Jahrhunderts in seinen Beziehungen zur\nEniwickelungslehre_, 1885; Fr. Jodl in Prague (born 1849; pp. 16, 221\nnote); A. Krohn (1840-89), _Sokrates und Xenophon_, 1874, _Der platonische\nStaat_, 1876, _Die platonische Frage_, 1878--on Krohn, an obituary by\nFalckenberg in the _Biographisches Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Alterthumskunde, Jahrg_.\n12, 1889; P. Natorp (pp. 88 note, 598), _Forschungen zur Geschichte des\nErkenntnissproblems im Alterthum_, 1884; Edmund Pfleiderer in T\u00fcbingen\n(born 1842; p. 113 note[1]), _Empirismus und Skepsis im D. Humes\nPhilosophie_, 1874, _Die Philosophie des Heraklit im Lichte der\nMysterienidee_, 1886; K. von Prantl (1820-88), _Geschichte der Logik im\nAbendlande_, 4 vols., 1855-70; Carl Schaarschmidt (pp. 88 note, 117-118);\n_Johannes Sarisberiensis_, 1862, _Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften_,\n1866; L. Schmidt in Marburg (born 1824), _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_,\n1881; Gustav Schneider, _Die platonische Metaphysik_, 1884; H. Siebeck in\nGiessen, _Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen_, 1873, 2d ed., 1888,\n_Geschichte der Psychologie_, part i. 1880-84; Chr. von Sigwart (born 1830;\npp. 17, 118); Heinrich von Stein in Rostock (born 1833), _Sieben B\u00fccher zur\nGeschichte des Platonismus_, 1862-75; Ludwig Stein in Berne, editor of the\n_Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, founded in 1877, _Die Psychologie\nder Stoa_, I. _Metaphysisch-Anthropologischer Theil_, 1886, II.\n_Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1888, _Leibniz und Spinoza_, 1890; L. Str\u00fcmpell,\n_Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie_, 1854, 1861; Susemihl in\nGreifswald, _Die Politik des Aristoteles_, Greek and German with notes,\n1879, further, a series of essays on Plato and Aristotle; Teichm\u00fcller (p.\n601); Trendelenburg (pp. 600-601), _Aristotelis de Anima_, 2d ed., by\nBelger. 1887; Th. Waitz, _Aristotelis Organon_, 1844-46; J. Walter in\nK\u00f6nigsberg, _Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen\nPhilosophie_, 1874, _Geschichte der Aesthetik im Alterthum_, 1892; Tob.\nWildauer in Innsbruck, _Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Platon,\nund Aristoteles_, 1877, 1879; W. Windelbund in Strasburg (pp. 15-16),\n_Geschichte der alten Philosophie_, 1888; Theob. Ziegler in Strasburg,\n_Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., with index, 1892; Rob.\nZimmermann (pp. 19 note, 331, 536), _Studien und Kritiken_, 1870.\n\n\n%4. Retrospect.%\n\nIn order to avoid the appearance of arbitrary construction we have been\nsparing with references of a philosophico-historical character. In\nconclusion, looking back at the period passed over, we may give expression\nto some convictions concerning the guiding threads in the development of\nmodern philosophy, though these here claim only the rights of subjective\nopinion.\n\nA mirror of modern culture, and conscious of its sharp antithesis to\nScholasticism, modern philosophy in its pre-Kantian period is pre-eminently\ncharacterized by naturalism. Nature, as a system of masses moved according\nto law, forms not only the favorite object of investigation, but also\nthe standard by which psychical reality is judged and explained. The two\ndirections in which this naturalism expresses itself, the mechanical\nview of the world, which endeavors to understand the universe from the\nstandpoint of nature and all becoming from the standpoint of motion,[1] and\nthe intellectualistic view, which seeks to understand the mind from the\nstandpoint of knowledge, are most intimately connected. Where the general\nview of the All takes form and color from nature, a content and a mission\ncan come to the mind from no other source than the external world; whether\nwe (empirically) make it take up the material of representation from\nwithout or (rationalistically) make it create an ideal reproduction of\nthe content of external reality from within, it is always the function of\nknowledge, conceived as the reproduction of a completed reality, which,\nsince it brings us into contact with nature, advances into the foreground\nand determines the nature of psychical activity. As is conceivable, along\nwith dogmatic faith in the power of the reason to possess itself of the\nreality before it and to reconstrue it in the system of science, and with\ntriumphant references to the mathematical method as a guaranty for the\nabsolute certainty of philosophical knowledge, the no\u00ebtical question\nemerges as to the means by which, and the limits within which, human\nknowledge is able to do justice to this great problem. Descartes gave out\nthe programme for all these various tendencies--the mechanical explanation\nof nature, the absolute separation of body and soul (despiritualization of\nmatter), thought the essence of the mind, the demand for certain knowledge,\narmed against every doubt, and the question as to the origin of ideas. Its\nexecution by his successors shows not only a lateral extension in the\nmost various directions (the dualistic view of the world held by the\noccasionalists, the monistic or pantheistic view of Spinoza, the\npluralistic or individualistic view of Leibnitz; similarly the antithesis\nbetween the sensationalism of Locke and Condillac and the rationalism\nof Spinoza and Leibnitz), but also a progressive deepening of problems,\nmediated by party strife which puts every energy to the strain. What a\ntremendous step from the empiricism of Bacon to the skepticism of Hume,\nfrom the innate ideas of Descartes to the potential _a priori_ of Leibnitz!\nFrom the moment when the negative and positive culminations of the\npre-Kantian movement in thought--Hume and Leibnitz--came together in\none mind, the conditions of the Kantian reform were given, just as the\npreparation for the Socratic reform had been given in the skepticism of the\nSophists and the [Greek: nous] principle of Anaxagoras.\n\n[Footnote 1: Even for Leibnitz the mind is a machine (_automaton\nspirituale_), and psychical action a movement of ideas.]\n\nKant, who dominates the second period of modern philosophy down to the\npresent time, is related to his predecessors in a twofold way. In his\ncriticism he completes the no\u00ebtical tendency, and at the same time\novercomes naturalism, by limiting the mechanical explanation (and with\nit certain knowledge, it is true) to phenomena and opposing moralism to\nintellectualism. Nature must be conceived from the standpoint of the spirit\n(as its product, for all conformity to law takes its origin in the spirit),\nthe spirit from the standpoint of the will. Metaphysics, as the theory of\nthe _a priori_ conditions of experience, is raised to the rank of a\nscience, while the suprasensible is removed from the region of proof and\nrefutation and based upon the rock of moral will. In the positive side of\nthe Kantian philosophy--the spirit the law-giver of nature, the will the\nessence of spirit and the key to true reality--we find its kernel, that\nin it which is forever valid. The conclusions on the absolute worth of\nthe moral disposition, on the ultimate moral aim of the world, on the\nintelligible character, and on radical evil, reveal the energy with which\nKant took up the mission of furnishing the life-forces opened up by\nChristianity--which the Middle Ages had hidden rather than conserved under\nthe crust of Aristotelian conceptions entirely alien to them, and the\npre-Kantian period of modern times had almost wholly ignored--an entrance\ninto philosophy, and of transforming and enriching the modern view of the\nworld from this standpoint. Kant's position is as opposite and superior to\nthe specifically modern, to the naturalistic temper of the new period, as\nPlato stands out, a stranger and a prophet of the future, above the level\nof Greek modes of thought. More fortunate, however, than Plato, he found\ndisciples who followed further in the direction pointed out by that face of\nthe Janus-head of his philosophy which looked toward the future: the\nethelism of Fichte and the historicism of Hegel have their roots in Kant's\ndoctrine of the practical reason. These are acquisitions which must never\nbe given up, which must ever be reconquered in face of attack from forces\nhostile to spirit and to morals. In life, as in science, we must ever anew\n\"win\" ethical idealism \"in order to possess it.\" As yet the reconciliation\nof the historical and the scientific, the Christian and the modern spirit\nis not effected. For the inbred naturalism of the modern period has not\nonly asserted itself, amalgamated with Kantian elements, in the realistic\nmetaphysics and mechanical psychology of Herbart and in the system of\nSchopenhauer, as a lateral current by the side of Fichte, Schelling, and\nHegel, but, under the influence of the new and powerful development of the\nnatural sciences, has once more confidently risen against the traditions of\nthe idealistic school, although now it is tempered by criticism and\nconcedes to the practical ideals at least a refuge in faith. The conviction\nthat the rule of neo-Kantianism is provisional does not rest merely on the\nmutability of human affairs. The widespread active study of the philosophy\nof the great K\u00f6nigsberger gives ground for the hope that also those\nelements in it from which the systems of the idealists have proceeded as\nnecessary consequences will again find attention and appreciation. The\nperception of the fact that the naturalistico-mechanical view represents\nonly a part, a subordinate part, of the truth will lead to the further\ntruth, that the lower can only be explained by the higher. We shall also\nlearn more and more to distinguish between the permanent import of the\nposition of fundamental idealism and the particular form which the\nconstructive thinkers have given it; the latter may fall before legitimate\nassaults, but the former will not be affected by them. _The revival of the\nFichteo-Hegelian idealism by means of a method which shall do justice to\nthe demands of the time by a closer adherence to experience, by making\ngeneral use of both the natural and the mental sciences, and by an exact\nand cautious mode of argument--this seems to us to be the task of the\nfuture_. The most important of the post-Hegelian systems, the system of\nLotze, shows that the scientific spirit does not resist reconciliation with\nidealistic convictions in regard to the highest questions, and the\nconsideration which it on all sides enjoys, that there exists a strong\nyearning in this direction. But when a deeply founded need of the time\nbecomes active, it also rouses forces which dedicate themselves to its\nservice and which are equal to the work.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nINDEX.\n\nAbbt\nAbsolute, the\n Fichte on\n Schelling on\n F. Krause on\n Schleiermacher on\n Hegel on\n Fortlage on\n Spencer on\n B\u00f6strom on\n Strauss on\n Feuerbach on\n the theistic school on\n Lotze on\n Hartmann on\n See also\n God\n the Unconditioned\nAchillini\nAdamson, R.\nAesthetics\n of Home (Lord Kames)\n of Burke\n of Baumgarten\n of Herder\n of Kant\n of Schiller\n of Schelling\n of Hegel\n of J.F. Fries\n of Herbart\n of Schopenhauer\nAgnosticism, of Spencer\nAgricola, R.\nAgrippa of Nettesheim\nAhrens, H.\nAlexandrists\nAllihn\nAlthusius\nAnderson\nAngiulli, A.\nAnnet, P.\nAntal, G. von\nAntinomies, the\n of Kant\n his antinomy of aesthetic judgment\n and of teleological judgment\nApelt, E.F.\n_A priori_, the\n in Kant\n in Kant and the post-Kantians\n nature, in Schelling\n in J.F. Fries\n Beneke on\n Herbart on\n J.S. Mill on\n Spencer's doctrine of the racial origin of\n Opzoomer on\n _Cf_. Ideas\nAquinas, Thomas\nArdig\u00f2, R.\nAristotelians, the\n opponents of\nArnauld\nArnoldt, E.\nAssociationalism\n of Hartley and Priestley\n of Hume\n of the Mills\n of Bain\nAst, G.A.F.\nAtomism\n in modern physics\n in Gassendi and Descartes\n in Boyle\n Leibnitz on\nAttributes\n in Descartes\n Spinoza's doctrine of\nAuerbach\nAugustine\nAvenarius, R.\nAverroists\n\nBaader, F. (von),\n and Schelling\n system of\nBach, J.\nBacmeister\nBacon, Francis\n a beginner of modern philosophy,\n doctrine of,\n in relation to Locke\n\nBacon, Roger\nBahnsen, J.\nBain, Alexander\nBaku\nBarclay\nBardili\nBartholomaei\nBarzellotti, G.\nBasedow\nBauer, Bruno\nBauer, Edgar\nBaumann, J.\nBaumeister\nBaumgarten, Alex.\nBaumgarten, Siegmund\nB\u00e4umker, Cl.\nBaur, F.C.\nBayle, P.,\n doctrine of,\n and Leibnitz\nBeattie, J.\nBeck, Sigismund\nBeckers, H.,\nBekker, Balthasar, III\nBelger\nBellarmin\nBeneke, F.E.\nBenoit, G. von\nBentham, J.\nBentley, Richard\nBerger, J.E. von\nBergmann, J.\nBerkeley, George,\n position in modern philosophy,\n view of mind and matter,\n relation to Locke on perception,\n on knowledge,\n his system,\n relation to Hume,\n relation to Scottish School,\n relation to Condillac,\n his idealism criticised by Kant,\n referred to\nBernard, Claude\nBernheim\nBessarion\nBezold, F. von,\nBiberg\nBiedermann, A.E.\nBiedermann, Fr. K.\nBilfinger\nBillewicz, J. von,\nBiran, Maine de\nBligni\u00e8res\nBluntschli\nBodin(us)\nBody and Mind, _see_ Mind and Body\nBo\u00ebthius, D.\nB\u00f6hme, Jacob,\n system of,\n and Schelling\nB\u00f6hmer\nB\u00f6hringer, A.\nBolin, W.\nBolingbroke\nBolzano, B.\nBonald, Victor de\nBonatelli, F.\nBonitz, H.\nBonnet\nBontekoe\nBoole, G.\nBorelius, J.\nBorelli\nBorgeaud\nBosanquet, B.\nB\u00f6strom, C.J.\nBotta, V.\nBouillier\nBourdin\nBourignon, Antoinette\nBowen, F.\nBowne, B.P.\nBoyle, R.\nBradley, F.H.\nBrah\u00e9, Tycho\nBrandes, G.\nBrandis, C.A.\nBraniss, J.\nBrasch, M.\nBrentano, F.\nBr\u00f6chner, H.\nBrockerhoff\nBrown, Thomas\nBrowne, Peter\nBrowne, Sir Thomas\nBrucker\nBruder\nBrunnhofer\nBruno, Giordano\n system of\n and Spinoza,\n and Schelling\nBr\u00fctt, M.\nBuchanan, George\nB\u00fcchner, L.\nBuckle\nBudde\nBuffon\nBurckhardt\nBurdach, K.F.\nBurgersdijck\nBurke, Edmund\nBurt, B.C.\nBusch, O.\nButler, Joseph\nButler, N.M.\n\nCabanis\nCaesalpin\nCaird, Edward\nCaird, John\nCairns\nCalker, F.V.\nCamerer\nCampanella, Thomas\n system of\nCampe\nCantoni\nCantor, G.\nCaporali, E.\nCardanus, Hieronymus\nCarlyle, Thomas\nCarneri\nCaro, E.\nCarpenter, W.B.\nCarri\u00e8re, M.\nCartesians, the\n Locke's relation to\n Leibnitz's relation to\nCarus, F.A.\nCarus, K.G.\nCarus, P.\nCaspari, O.\nCategories, the, Kant on\n Hegel's doctrine of\nCaterus\nCausation\n Spinoza's view of\n Locke on\n Hume's skeptical analysis of\n Kant on\n Schopenhauer on\n Lotze on\n Hartmann on\n _See also_ Sufficient Reason, Teleology\nCesca, Giovanni\nChalybaeus\nChandler, Samuel\nChanning, W.E.\nCharacter, the Intelligible\n in Kant\n in Schelling\n in Schopenhauer\nCharron, Pierre\nChrist, P.\nChubb, Thomas\nCieszkowski, A. von\nClarke, Samuel\n ethics of\nClass, G.\nClassen, A.\nClauberg\n_Cogito ergo sum_\n the Cartesian\nCohen, H.\nColecchi, A.\nColeridge, S.T.\nCollard, Royer\nCollier, Arthur\nCollins, Anthony\nCollins, F.H.\nCollins, W.L.\nCombachius\nComenius\nCommer, E.\nCommon Sense, Scottish doctrine of\nComte, Auguste\nCondillac\n doctrine of\nCondorcet\nConn, H.W.\nConybeare, J.\nCopernicus, N.\nCordemoy\nCosmological Argument, the\n in Locke\n in Rousseau\n in Leibnitz\n in Kant\nCotes, Roger\nCousin, Victor\nCremonini\nCrescas, Chasdai\nCreuz, K. von\nCritique of Reason, the\n meaning of\n the neo-Kantians on\n its central position in modern thought\nCrousaz\nCrusius, C.A.\nCudworth, Ralph\n ethics of\nCumberland, Richard\nCzolbe, H.\n\nD'Alembert\nDamiron\nDanzel\nDarjes\nDarwin, Charles\nDarwin, Erasmus\nDaub, K.\nDa Vinci, Leonardo\nDeism\n naturalism of\n in Herbert\n in English thinkers of XVIII. century\n in Hume\n in Rousseau\n of Reimarus\n in Lessing\n Kant's relation to\n _See also_ Faith, Faith and Reason, Religion, Theology\nDelboeuf\nDelff, H.\nDe Morgan, A.\n\nDenifle\nDes Bosses\nDescartes, Ren\u00e9\n system of\n and occasionalism\n and Spinoza\n and Locke\n and Leibnitz\n _See also_ Spinoza\nDesdouits\nDessoir, M.\nDeter\nDeterminism\n in Hobbes\n in Spinoza\n of the early associationalists\n of Hume\n in Leibnitz\n of Schleiermacher\n of Herbart\n of Schopenhauer\n of J.S. Mill\n of Jonathan Edwards\n _See also_ Character, the Intelligible; Freedom of the Will\nDeussen, P.\nDeutinger, M.\nDe Wette\nDewey, J.\nDiderot, Denis\nDiels, H.\nDieterich, K.\nDigby, Everard\nDillman\nDilthey, W.\n doctrine of,\nDippe, A.\nD\u00f6ring, A.\nDorner, A.\nDoubt\n the Cartesian\n in Bayle\n Rousseau's reverential\nDrobisch, M.W.\nDroz\nDruskowitz, Helene\nDu Bois-Reymond, E\nD\u00fchring, E.\nDumont, E.\nDuncan, G.M.\nDurdik\n\nEbbinghaus, H.\nEberhard, J.A.\nEchtermeyer\nEckhart\nEclecticism, of the German Illumination\n of Schleiermacher\n of Cousin and his School\nEdfeldt, H.\nEducation\n Locke on\n Rousseau on\nEdwards, Jonathan\nEgo, the\n certain knowledge of, in Campanella, and Descartes\n the individual, and the transcendental consciousness in Kant\n Fichte's doctrine of\n a complex of representations in Beneke\n Fortlage on\n Herbart's doctrine of\n the neo-Kantians on the individual, and the transcendental consciousness\n _See also_ Soul\nEllis\nEmerson, R.W.\nEmpiricism\n founded by Bacon\n in Hobbes\n and rationalism\n of Locke\n of J.S. Mill\n of Opzoomer\n Liebmann on\n _See also_ Experience, Sensationalism\nEncyclopedists, the\nEngel, J.J.\nEnnemoser\nErasmus, Desiderius\nErdmann, Benno\n works by\nErdmann, J.E.\n works by\n philosophy of\nErhardt, F.\nEschenmayer, K.A.\nEthelism\n in Crusius\n of Fichte\n of Schopenhauer\n in Hartmann\n _See also_ Panthelism.\nEthics\n Bacon on\n Hobbes's political theory of\n Descartes on\n Geulincx on\n Spinoza on\n Pascal on\n Malebranche on\n Locke on\n English, of XVIII. century\n Hume's empirical and mechanical\n of French sensationalists\n of French materialists\n of Rousseau\n of Leibnitz\n of Herder\n of Kant\n of Fichte\n of Schleiermacher\n of Hegel\n of J.F. Fries\n of Beneke\n of Herbart\n of Schopenhauer\n of Comte\n of Bentham\n of J.S. Mill,\n of Spencer\n of T.H. Green\n of Lotze\n of Hartmann\n recent German interest in\nEucken, R.\n works by\n philosophy of\nEverett, C.C.\nEvil\n Weigel on the origin of\n B\u00f6hme on the origin of\n Spinoza's doctrine of\n Leibnitz's doctrine of\n Schelling's theory of\n Baader's theory of\n Fechner's view of\n _See also_ Optimism, Pessimism\nEvolution\n in the sense of explication in Nicolas of Cusa\n and involution in Leibnitz\n cosmical, of Spencer\n biological, of Darwin\n _Cf_. also the systems of Schelling, Hegel, Hartmann\nExner, F.\nExperience\n the basis of science in Bacon\n Kant on\n Green on\n Liebmann's view of\n _See also_ Empiricism, Sensationalism\nExternal World, the\n reality of, in Descartes\n knowledge and reality of, in Locke\n Berkeley on\n Kant on the reality of\n the \"material of duty in the form of sense\" in Fichte\n\nFaber Stapulensis (Lef\u00e8vre of Etaples)\nFaith\n the reformers' view of\n Deistic view of\n Kant on\n Kant on moral or practical\n Paulsen on practical\n _See also_ Deism\nFaith and Reason,\n the relation of, in modern philosophy\n Bayle on\n Locke on\n Deistic view of\n in Rousseau\n Leibnitz on\n Lessing on\n Baader on\n Schleiermacher on\n _See also_ Deism\nFaith Philosophy, the\n of Hamann\n of Herder\n of Jacobi\n elements of, in J.F. Fries\nFalckenberg, R.\n works by\nFarrer, J.A.\nFechner, G.T.\n system of\nFechner, H.A.\nFeder, J.G.H.\nFeeling\n the basis of knowledge in Pascal\n the central doctrine of Rousseau\n central to religion in Schleiermacher\n _See also_ The Faith Philosophy\nFerguson, Adam\nFerrari, Giuseppe\nFerraz\nFerri, L.\nFerrier, D.\nFerrier, J.F.\nFester, R.\nFeuerbach, L.\n philosophy of\nFichte, I.H.\nFichte, J.G.\n and Kant\n system of\n and Schelling\n and Hegel\n and Herbart\n and Lotze\n _See also_ Idealism, Jacobi, Kant\nFicinus\nFilmer\nFinal Causes, _see_ Teleology\nFiorentino, F.\nFischer, E.L.\nFischer, K. Ph.\nFischer, Karl\nFischer, Kuno\n works by\n on Spinoza\n on Kant\n his philosophy\n and neo-Kantianism\nFiske, John\nFlint, K.\nFludd, R.\nFl\u00fcgel\nForberg\nForge, L. de la\nFortlage, Karl\n works by\n system of\nFouill\u00e8e, A.\nFowler, Thos.\nFox Bourne\nFranchi, A.\nFranck, A.\nFranck, Sebastian\nFrancke\nFrantz, K.\nEraser, A.C.\nFrauenst\u00e4dt, J.\nFrederichs, F.\nFrederick the Great\nFreedom of the Will, Hobbes's denial of\n Descartes's unlimited affirmation of\n denied by Spinoza\n Locke on\n denied by Hume\n in Rousseau\n Leibnitz on\n Herder on\n Kant on\n Fichte on\n Schelling on\n Herbart on\n Schopenhauer on\n J-S. Mill on\n _See also_ Character, the Intelligible; Determinism\nFrege, G.\nFreudenthal, J.\nFries, A. de\nFries, J.F., and Kant\n an opponent of constructive idealism\n his system\n and Herbart\nFroschammer\nFullerton, G.S.\n\nGabler\nGale\nGalileo (Galileo Galilei)\n his work as a foundation for modern physics\n his system\nGalluppi, P.\nGalton, Francis\nGarve, C.\nGassendi, P.\nGauss\nGay\nGeijer, E.G.\nGeil\nGenovesi, A.\nGentilis, Albericus\nGeorge, L.\nGeorge of Trebizond\nGeorgius Scholarius (Gennadius)\nGerdil, S.\nGerhardt\nGerson\nGersonides\nGeulincx, Arnold\nGichtel\nGierke, O.\nGilbert, William\nGioberti, V.\nGioja, M.\nGizycki, G. von\nGlanvil\nGlisson, Francis\nGlogau, G.\nGod, doctrine of, in Nicolas of Cusa\n in Taurellus\n in Bruno\n Campanella's argument for the existence of\n Weigel's doctrine of\n B\u00f6hme's doctrine of\n Descartes's arguments for the existence of\n Spinoza's doctrine of\n Malebranche's view of\n Locke's doctrine of\n Berkeley ascribes ideas of sense-world to\n Hume's doctrine of\n Voltaire's doctrine of\n Holbach's discussion of\n Leibnitz's doctrine of\n Reimarus's doctrine of\n Lessing's doctrine of\n Herder's doctrine of\n Jacobi's doctrine of\n Kant on the arguments for the existence of\n Fichte's doctrine of\n Schelling's doctrine of\n F. Krause's doctrine of\n Baader's doctrine of\n Schleiermacher's doctrine of\n Beneke's doctrine of\n Herbart's doctrine of\n B\u00f6strom's doctrine of\n the doctrine of, in Hegel's School\n Strauss's doctrine of\n Feuerbach's doctrine of\n the doctrine of, in the Theistic School\n Fechner on the relation of God and the world\n Lotze's doctrine of\n Hartmann's doctrine of\n See also:\n Cosmological Argument\n Deism\n Ontological Argument\n Religion\n Teleological Argument\n Theology\nG\u00f6hring, C.\nGolther, L. von\nG\u00f6schel\nGoethe\nGottsched\nGracian, B.\nGrazia, V. de\nGreen, T.H., works by\n doctrine of\nGrimm, E.\nGrimm, F.M., Baron von\nGroos, K.\nGrot, N. von\nGrote, John\nGrotius, Hugo\nGrubbe, S.\nGruber, H.\nGr\u00fcn, K.\nGuhrauer\nG\u00fcnther, A.\nGutberlet, C.\nGuthrie, M.\nG\u00fcttler, C.\nGuyau, J.M.\nGwinner, W.\n\nHaeckel, E.\nHaeghen, V. van der\nHagemann\nHall, G.S.\nHallier\nHamann, J.G.\nHamann, O.\nHamberger\nHamilton, Sir William\nHarless, A. von\nHarmony\n Leibnitz's pre-established\n Wolff's development of Leibnitz's, pre-established\nHarms, F.\nHarris, W.T.\nHarrison, Frederic\nHartenstein, G.\nHartley, David\nHartmann, E. von\n works by\n system of\nHarvey\nHase, K.A.\nHassbach\nHausegger\nHausrath\nHavet\nHaym, R.\nHazard, R.G.\nHeath\nHebler, C.\nHeereboord\nHegel, G.W.F.\n and Schelling\n system of\n opponents of\n influence and followers of\n _See also_ J.G. Fichte, Kant, Schelling\nHegelians, the Old\n the Young\n _See also_ Semi-Hegelians\nHegler, A.\nHeiland, K.\nHeinze, M.\nHelmholtz, H.\nHelmont, F.M. van\nHelmont, J.B. van\nHelvetius, C.A.\nHemming\nHemsterhuis, F.\nHerbart, J.F.\n system of\n _See also_ J.G. Fichte\nHerbert, Lord, of Cherbury\nHerder, J.G.\n system of\n Schelling and\nHering\nHermann, C.\nHermann, W.\nHermes, G.\nHerz, M.\nHeusde, P.W. van\nHeussler, H.\nHeyder, Karl\nHinneberg\nHinrichs\nHirnhaym\nHistory\n Machiavelli on\n Herder's philosophy of\n Kant's view of\n Fichte's view of\n Schelling's view of\n F. Krause's philosophy of\n Hegel's philosophy of\n Vico's philosophy of\nHistory of Philosophy, the\n importance of\n method in\n Hegel's view of\n recent development of\nHobbes, Thomas\n his system\n and Descartes\n and Spinoza\n and Locke\n and Hume\n and Pufendorf\nH\u00f6ffding, H.\nHoffmann, Franz\nH\u00f6ijer, B.\nHolbach, Baron von\nH\u00f6lder, A.\n\nH\u00f6lderlin\nHome, Henry, (Lord Kames)\nHorv\u00e1th\nHorwicz, A.\nHotho\nHuber, J.\nHuber, U.\nHuet(ius), P.D.\nHufeland\nHume, David\n system of\n and Scottish School\n and Kant\n _See also_ Berkeley, Locke\nHunt, J.\nHusserl, E.G.\nHutcheson, Francis\nHuxley, T.H.\n\nIbbot\nIdealism\n phenomenal or individual of Berkeley\n in Leibnitz\n critical or transcendental, of Kant\n post-Kantian, of Beck\n subjective, of Fichte\n objective, of Schelling\n absolute or logical, of Hegel\n the opposition to constructive\n in Schopenhauer\n German, in Great Britain\n of Green\n in America\n ethical or ideological, of Lotze\n idealistic reaction in Germany against the scientific spirit\n Falckenberg on (ethical) idealism and the future\nIdeas,\n innate, in Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, the rationalists and the empiricists\n origin of, in Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the rationalists and\n empiricists, and Herbart\n impressions and, in Hume\n unconscious ideas or representations in Leibnitz\n Ideas of reason in Kant\n the logical Idea the subject of the world-process in Hegel\nIdentity, Locke on\n Spinozism a system of\n Schelling's philosophy or system of\n the philosophy of, among Schelling's followers\n Hegel's doctrine a system of\n Fortlage's system of\n philosophy of, in Schopenhauer\nImmortality\n Hume on\n Voltaire on\n Rousseau on\n Leibnitz on\n Kant on\n Schleiermacher on\n Beneke on\n Herbart on\n Hegel's followers on\n Strauss on\n Fechner on\nImperative, the Categorical\n in Kant\n in Fichte\n in Beneke\nInduction\n Kepler on\n Galileo on\n used before Bacon\n Bacon's theory of\n in Hobbes\n J.S. Mill's theory of\nIrwing, Von\n\nJacobi, F.H.\n system of\n and Fichte\n and the anti-idealists\nJacobson, J.\nJ\u00e4ger, G.\nJames, William\nJanet, Paul\nJansenists\nJastrow, J.\nJesuits\nJevons, W.S.\nJhering, R. von\nJodl, F.\nJo\u00ebl, M.\nJouffroy, T.\nJudgment\n Descartes on\n rationalists and empiricists both mistake nature of\n Kant on synthetic judgments _a priori_\n the categories and, in Kant\n judgments of perception and of experience in Kant\n Kant on aesthetic and teleological\nJungius\n\nKaatz, H.\nKaftan, J.\nKaltenborn, C. von\nKant, I.\n\n position in modern philosophy\n and Locke\n and the Illumination\n system of\n the development to Fichte\n and Fichte\n and Schelling\n and Hegel\n and Schopenhauer\n his influence, followers, and opponents\n _See also_ Berkeley, Critique of Reason, J.G. Fichte, Hume, Leibnitz,\n Locke,\n Schopenhauer, Wolff\nKayserling\nKedney, J.S.\nKent, G.\nKepler, J.\n philosophy of\nKielmeyer\nKierkegaard, S.\nKieser\nKing, Lord\nKirchmann, J.H. von\nKirchner\nKlein, G.M.\nKnauer, V.\nKnight, W.\nKnoodt, P.\nKnowledge\n theory of, in modern thought\n doctrine of, in Nicolas of Cusa\n declared deceptive by Montaigne\n mathematical basis of, in Kepler and Galileo\n in Bacon\n in Hobbes\n in Herbart\n the two views of\n Geulincx on\n Descartes on\n Spinoza on\n Malebranche on (\"we see all things in God\")\n Locke's doctrine of\n Berkeley on\n Hume's skeptical doctrine of\n Scottish doctrine of\n sensationalistic doctrine of, in France\n Leibnitz's theory of\n Kant on\n Fichte's Science of\n Schelling's philosophy of\n Baader on\n Schleiermacher's doctrine of\n Hegel on philosophical\n J.F. Fries's doctrine of\n Beneke on speculative\n Schopenhauer's doctrine of\n Comte's doctrine of\n Sir Wm. Hamilton's doctrine of\n J.S. Mill's doctrine of\n Spencer's doctrine of\n T.H. Green's doctrine of\n Feuerbach's doctrine of\n Lotze's doctrine of\n Hartmann's doctrine of\n the neo-Kantians on\n the German positivists on\n influence of recent science on the theory of\n Liebmann's doctrine of\n _See also_ Agnosticism, Critique of Reason, Empiricism, Faith,\n Faith and Reason, Nominalism, Positivism, Rationalism and Empiricism,\n Relativity, Sensationalism, Skepticism\nKnutzen, M.\nKoch, A.\nKoeber, R. von\nKoegel, F.\nK\u00f6nig, E.\nKoppelmann\nK\u00f6stlin, Karl\nKrause, A.\nKrause, E.\nKrause, F.\nKrauth, C.P.\nKrohn, A.\nKroman, K.\nKrug, W.T.\nKuhn\nKuntze, J.E.\nKvacsala\nKym, A.L.\n\nLaas, E.\nLaban, F.\nLabriola,\nLa Bruy\u00e8re\nLadd, G.T.\nLaffitte, P.\nLagrange\nLambert, J.H.\nLamennais, F. de\nLa Mettrie, J.O. de\nLa Mothe la Vayer\nLand, J.P.N.\nLange, F.A.\nLange, J.J.\nLa Rochefoucauld\nLasson, A.\nLasswitz, K.\nLast, E.\nLavater\nLaw (or Right)\n early philosophy of\n Montesquieu on\n Pufendorf on\n C. Thomasius on\n Kant's theory of legal right\n Fichte's theory of right\n Schelling's view of\n F. Krause's philosophy of right\n Hegel's philosophy of right\nLazarus, M.\nLechler\nLeclair, A. von\nLeibnitz, Friedrich (the father)\nLeibnitz, G.W.\n position in modern thought\n and occasionalism\n system of\n and the Illumination (Wolff, Lessing)\n and Kant\n _See also_ Descartes, Locke, Spinoza\nLeonhardi, H.K. von\nLeopold\nLessing, G.E.\n system of\nLewes, G.H.\nLiard, L.\nLiberatore, M.\nLichtenberg\nLiebig\nLiebmann, O.\nLinde, A. van der\nLindemann\nLipps, T.\nLipsius, Justus\nLipsius, R.A.\nLittr\u00e9, E.\nLocke, J.\n position in modern philosophy\n system of\n and Berkeley\n and Hume\n and the French Illumination (and Rousseau)\n and Leibnitz\n and Kant\n _See also_ Bacon, Berkeley, Descartes, Empiricism, Kant\nLohmeyer\nLombroso, C.\nLossius\nLott, F.C.\nLotze, R.H.\n system of\nL\u00f6we, J.H.\nLubbock, J.\nL\u00fclmann, C.\nLuther\nLutterbeck\nLyng, G.V.\n\nMacaulay, T.B.\nMachiavelli, N.\nMackie\nMackintosh, J.\nMahaffy, J.P.\nMaimon, S.\nMaimonides\nMainl\u00e4nder, P.\nMainzer, J.\nMaistre, J, de\nMalebranche, Nicolas\n system of\nMamiani, T.\nMandeville, Bernard de\nMansel, H.L.\nMarcus\nMarheineke\nMariana, Juan\nMariano\nMarion, H.\nMarsh, James\nMarsilius of Padua\nMartin, B.\nMartineau, Harriet\nMartineau, James\nMartini, Jacob\nMasson, David\nMaterialism\n in Hobbes\n Spinoza's tendency toward\n in the early associationalists\n in France in XVIII. century\n Kant on\n in Schopenhauer\n and Spencer's philosophy\n in Strauss\n of Feuerbach\n the controversy over, in Germany\n Lange on\nMathematics\n the philosophical use of, advocated by Nicolas of Cusa\n by Kepler\n scientific use of, ignored by Bacon\n Hobbes's recognition of\n method of, adopted by Spinoza\n Kant on philosophy and\n Kant on science and\n applied to psychology by Herbart\n and by Fechner\n recent, and philosophy\nMaudsley, Henry\nMaupertuis\nMayer, F.\nMayer, R.\nMcCosh, J.\nMechanism\n in modern thought\n in modern physical science\n the central doctrine of Hobbes\n fundamental in Spinoza\n applied to mind by the associationalists\n of J.F. Fries\n of ideas in Herbart\n in Lotze\n in recent physical science\n _See also_ Naturalism, Physical Science, Teleology\nMeier, G.F.\nMeiners\nMelancthon\nMellin\nMelville, Andrew\nMendelssohn\nMersenne\nMerz, J.T.\nMetaphysics\n Bacon on\n of Descartes\n of Spinoza\n of Leibnitz\n the Wolffian division of\n Kant on\n Hegel on\n of Fortlage\n of Herbart\n Comte on\n of Fechner\n of Lotze\n of Hartmann\n recent German views on\nMeyer, J.B.\nMeyer, Ludwig\nMichelet, C.L.\nMichelis,\nMill, James\nMill, J.S.\nMilton, John\nMind and Body\n Descartes on\n occasionalistic view of, in Geulincx\n Spinoza on\n Hartley and Priestley on\n Leibnitz on\n J.F. Fries on\nModern Philosophy\n value of history of\n characteristics of\n relation to the church\n relation to nationality\n beginnings of\n bibliography of\n two main schools of\n future of\nModes (of Substance)\n in Descartes\n in Spinoza\n in Locke\nMoleschott\nMonads\n Giordano Bruno's doctrine of\n Leibnitz's doctrine of\n Wolff's development of Leibnitz's doctrine of\nMonchamp, G.\nMonck, W.H.S.\nMonrad, M.J.\nMontaigne, M. de\nMontesquieu\nMore, H.\nMore, Thomas\nMoreau\nMorelly\nMorgan, C.L.\nMorgan, Thomas\nMoriz\nMorley, J.\nMorris, G.S.\nMorselli\nMueller, W.\nM\u00fcller, F.A.\nM\u00fcller, G.E.\nM\u00fcller, H.\nM\u00fcller, Johannes\nM\u00fcller, Max\nM\u00fcnsterberg, H.\nM\u00fcnz, W.\n\nNahlowsky\nNaigeon\nNatge\nNatorp, P.\nNaturalism\n characteristic of modern philosophy\n _See also_ Mechanism, Physical Science, Teleology\nNature, Philosophy of\n early Italian\n Schelling's\n among Schelling's followers\n Hegel's\n J.F. Fries's\n Herbart's\n _See also_ Physical Science\nNedich\nNees von Esenbeck\nNemes, E.\nNeo-Kantians\nNettleship, R.L.\nNeudecker\nNewton, Isaac\nNichol\nNicolai, F.\nNicolas of Cusa\nNicole\nNielsen, R.\nNiethammer\nNietzsche, F.\nNiphus\nNippold\nNizolius, Marius\nNoack, L.\nNoir\u00e9, L.\nNolen\nNominalism\n in Hobbes\n in Locke\n of Berkeley\n of Hume\nNoumena\n _See also_ Phenomena, Things in themselves\nNovalis\nNyblaeus, A.\n\nOccam\nOccasionalists\nOischinger\nOken, L.\nOldendorp\nOntological argument, the\n in Descartes\n in Spinoza\n in Leibnitz\n in Kant\nOpel, J.O.\nOpposites\n the unity of, in Nicolas of Cusa\n in Schelling\n the reconciliation and identity of, in Hegel\nOptimism\n in Voltaire\n of Leibnitz\n of Schleiermacher\nOpzoomer, C.W.\nOratorians\nOersted, H.C.\nOswald, James\nOettingen, A. von\n\nPabst, J.H.\nPaley, W.\nPantheism\n of Nicolas of Cusa\n of Spinoza\n Malebranche's \"Christian\"\n in Toland\n Berkeley's tendency to\n of Holbach\n in Fichte\n in Schelling\n in Schleiermacher\n Fortlage's transcendent\n of Strauss\n the theistic school on\n _See also_ Hegel, Panthelism\nPanthelism\n of Fichte\n in Schelling\n of Schopenhauer\n _See also_ Ethelism\nPappenheim\nParacelsus\nParker\nPascal, Blaise\nPatritius, Franciscus\nPaulsen, F.\nPaulus\nPertz\nPessimism\n of Schopenhauer\n of Hartmann\nPesch\nPestalozzi, J.H.\nPeters, K.\nPfleiderer, E.\nPfleiderer, O.\nPhenomena\n and things in themselves in Kant\n and representation in Kant\n and things in themselves in Herbart\n in Schopenhauer\n in Lotze\n _See also_ Noumena, Things in themselves\nPhysical Science\n concepts of modern\n Newton's development of\n its influence on philosophy in XIX century\nPico, Francis, of Mirandola\nPico, John, of Mirandola\nPierson\nPietsch, T.\nPlanck, A.\nPlanck, K.C.\nPlatner\nPlatonists\nPletho, G.G.\nPlitt\nPloucquet\nPl\u00fcmacher, O.\nPoiret, P.\nPollock, F.\nPomponatius, Petrus\nPorter, N.\nPositivism\n in Italy\n of Comte\n of Comte's followers\n in England\n in Sweden, Brazil, and Chili\n in Germany\nPrantl\nPrel, K. du\nPrice, Richard\nPriestley, J.\nProwe, L.\nPsychology\n the associational\n the sensationalistic\n of Leibnitz\n of Wolff\n of Tetens\n Kant on rational\n constructive\n the basis of philosophy in J.F. Fries\n and Beneke\n of Beneke\n of Fortlage\n of Herbart\n of Comte\n physiological\n folk-psychology\n\n of Spencer\n _See also_ Ego, Mind and Body, Soul\nPufendorf, Samuel\nP\u00fcnjer, B., works by\n\nQuaebicker, R.\nQualities\n Primary and Secondary, so termed by Boyle\n Locke's doctrine of\n Kant's relation to\n Berkeley's co-ordination of\nQuesnay\n\nRabus, L.\nRagnisco\nRamus (Pierre de la Ram\u00e9e)\nRationalism and Empiricism\n in Locke\n in Leibnitz\n in Tschirnhausen\n in others of the German Illuminati\n in relation to Kant\nRauwenhoff\nRavaisson, F.\nRealism\n of Herbart\n the \"transfigured,\" of Spencer\n the \"transcendental realism\" of Hartmann\nR\u00e9e, P.\nRegius\nRegulative and constitutive principles, in Kant\nRehmke, J.\nRehnisch\nReichlin-Meldegg, K.A. von\nReicke, R\nReid, Thomas\nReiff, J.F.\nReimarus\nReinhold, E.\nReinhold, K.L.\nRelativity of Knowledge\n in Comte\n of Sir Wm. Hamilton\n of Mansel\n of Spencer\nReligion\n Bacon's view of\n Hobbes on\n Lord Herbert's doctrine of natural\n Pascal on\n deistic view of\n Hume on\n Voltaire on\n Holbach on\n Rousseau's view of\n Leibnitz on\n Reimarus on\n Lessing's developmental theory of\n Kant on\n Fichte on\n Schelling on\n Schleiermacher's philosophy of\n Hegel's philosophy of\n Beneke on\n Herbart's doctrine of\n Schopenhauer's doctrine of\n Comte's religion of humanity\n Spencer's view of\n Hegel's followers on\n Strauss on\n Feuerbach's doctrine of\n Hartmann's philosophy of\n _See also_ Deism, Faith, Faith and Reason, God, Theology\nR\u00e9musat, C. de\nRenan, E.\nRenery\nRenouvier, C.\nReuchlin, H.\nReuchlin, J.\nReuter, H.\nReynaud, J.\nRibbing, S.\nRibot, Th.\nRiedel, O.\nRiehl, A.\nRiemann\nRiezler, S.\nRight, _see_ Law\nRio, J.S. del\nRitschl, A.\nRitter, H.\nRixner\nRobertson, G.C.\nRobinet\nRobinet, J.B.\nRocholl\nRoeder\nRohmer, F.\nRomagnosi, G.\nRomanes, G.J.\nRomanticists, the\nRomundt, H.\nRoscher\nR\u00f6se, F.\nRosenkrantz, W.\nRosenkranz, K.\nRosmini, A.\nRothe, R.\nRousseau, J.J.\n system of\nRoyce, J.\nR\u00fcdiger\nRuge, A.\nRuge, S.\nRuysbroek\n\nSahlin\nSt. Martin, L.C.\nSaint Simon, H. de\nSaisset, E.\nSanchez, Francis\nSchaarschmidt, C.\nSch\u00e4ffle, E.F.\nSchaller\nSch\u00e4rer, E.\nSchasler, M.\nScheffler\nScheibler\nSchelling, F.W.J. (von)\n system of\n immediate followers of\n and Hegel\n _See also_ J.G. Fichte, Hegel, Kant, Spinoza\nSchelver\nSchematism, Kant's\nSchiller\nSchindler, C.\nSchlegel, F.\nSchleicher, A.\nSchleiden\nSchleiermacher, F.D.E.\n system of\nSchmid, E.\nSchmid, Leopold\nSchmidkunz, H.\nSchmid-Schwarzenberg\nSchmidt, K.\nSchmidt, L.\nSchmidt, O.\nSchneider, C.M.\nSchneider, G.\nSchneider, G.H.\nSchneider, O.\nSchoenlank\nSchopenhauer, A.\n and Kant\n system of\n followers of\nSchoppe (Scioppius)\nSchubert, F.W.\nSchubert, G.H.\nSchubert-Soldern, R. von\nSchuller, H.\nSchultze, Fritz\nSchulz, J.\nSchulze, G.E. (Aenesidemus-Schulze)\nSchuppe, W.\nSchurman, J.G.\nSch\u00fctz\nSchwarz, H.\nSchwarz, G.E.\nSchwegler, A.\nSchwenckfeld\nScottish School, the\nSelby-Bigge\nSemi-Hegelians, the\nSemi-Kantians, the\nSemler\nSengler, J.\nSennert, D.\nSensation\n a source of knowledge in Locke\n and in Hume\n the sole source of knowledge in Condillac\n Leibnitz's view of\n _See also_ Rationalism and Empiricism, Sensationalism\nSensationalism\n in Hobbes\n in modern thought in general\n of Locke\n of Condillac\n of Bonnet\n of Helvetius\n of La Mettrie\n of Holbach\n in Italy\n of Feuerbach\n of the German positivists\n _See also_ Empiricism, Experience, Sensation\nSergi, G.\nSeth, A.\nSeydel, R.\nSeyfarth\nShaftesbury\nSherlock, T.\nSibbern, F.C.\nSiber\nSiciliani, P.\nSidgwick, H.\nSidney, Algernon\nSiebeck\nSigwart, Chr. von\nSigwart, Chr. W.\nSilesius\nSime, J.\nSimmel, G.\nSimon, J.\nSkepticism, in Montaigne\n in Charron\n in F. Sanchez\n in Bayle\n of Hume\n of Diderot,\n of D'Alembert\n the anti-Critical, of Schulze\n the Critical, of Maimon\nSmith, Adam\nSnell, K.\nSocial Contract, the theory of, in Hobbes\n Hume on\n in Rousseau\n Kant on\nSolger, K.F.\nSommer, H.\nSommer, R.\nSoul, the, thought the essence of, in Descartes\n a congeries of ideas in Spinoza\n thought the essence of, in Malebranche,\n thought merely an activity of, in Locke\n a sum of inner states in Hume\n Leibnitz's monadological view of\n Kant on\n Herbart on\n _See also_ Ego, Immortality, Mind and Body\nSpace (and Time), Hobbes on\n in Leibnitz\n in Kant\n in Herbart\n in Schopenhauer\n in Spencer\n in Lotze\nSpaventa\nSpedding\nSpencer, H.\n system of\nSpicker, G.\nSpinoza, B. de\n position in modern philosophy\n and Descartes\n system of\n and Leibnitz\n and Schelling\n _See also_ Descartes\nSpirit, Schilling's philosophy of\n Hegel's phenomenology of\n his doctrine of subjective\n of objective\n of absolute\n recent German philosophy of\nSpitta, H.\nStadler, A.\nStahl, F.J.\nStarcke, C.N.\nState, the, early theories of\n Hobbes on\n Spinoza on\n Locke on\n Montesquieu on\n Rousseau's theory of\n Kant's view of\n Fichte on\n Schelling on\n Hegel on\n Spencer on\n _See also_ Social Contract\nStaudinger, F.\nSteckelmacher, M.\nSteffens, H.\nSteffensen, K.\nSteinbart\nStein, H. von\nStein, L.\nSteinthal\nStephen, Leslie\nStern, A.\nStewart, Dugald\nStirling, J.H.\nStirner, Max (pseudonym, cf. K. Schmidt)\nStoeckl, A.\nSt\u00f6hr, A.\nStout, G.F.\nStrauss, D.F.\nStr\u00fcmpell, L.\nStumpf, C.\nStumpf, T.\nSturm, Christoph\nStutzmann\nSuabedissen\nSuarez, Francis\nSubstance\n Descartes on\n Spinoza on\n Locke on\n Berkeley on (material)\n Hume's skeptical analysis of\n Leibnitz's doctrine of\n Kant on\n Schopenhauer on\n Hartmann on\nSufficient Reason, the Principle of\n in Leibnitz\n in Schopenhauer\nSully, James\nSulzer\nSusemihl\nSuso\n\nTaine, H.\nTappan, H.P.\nTaubert, A.\nTauler\nTaurellus\nTaute\nTeichm\u00fcller\nTeleological Argument, the\n in Boyle\n Hume on\n Reimarus on\n Leibnitz on\n Kant on\n Herbart on\nTeleology\n minimized by modern thought\n rejected by modern physics\n in Boyle\n Bacon on\n Hobbes's denial of\n Descartes on\n Spinoza's denial of\n Newton on\n Leibnitz on\n Kant on\n in Fichte\n Schelling on\n in Hegel\n in Trendelenburg\n in Hartmann\n _See also_ Mechanism, Naturalism, Sufficient Reason, Teleological\n Argument\nTelesius\nTemple, Sir William\nTesta\nTetens, J.N.\nThaulow\nTheology\n relation of, to philosophy in Taurellus\n in Campanella\n and science in Bacon\n in Leibnitz\n Lessing's speculative\n\n Kant's view of\n Schelling on\n Schleiermacher's view of\n Comte on the theological stage of thought\n Strauss on\n Feuerbach on\n _See also_ Deism, Faith, Faith and Reason, God, Religion\nThiele, G.\nThings in themselves\n in Kant's critics and immediate successors\n in Fichte\n Liebmann on\n _See also_ Phenomena, Noumena\nThomas \u00e0 Kempis\nThilo\nThomasius, Christian\nThomasius, Jacob (Father of Christian)\nThomson, W.\nThorild, T.\nTh\u00fcmmig\nTieck\nTiedemann\nTillotson, J.\nTime, Kant on objective determinations of\n _See also_ Space and Time\nTindal, Matthew\nToland, John\nT\u00f6nnies, F.\nTorrey, H.A.P.\nToscanelli\nTracy, Destutt de\nTrahndorff\nTranscendental and Transcendent, meaning of, in Kant\nTrendelenburg, A.\nTreschow, N.\nTschirnhausen\nTurgot\nTwardowski, K.\n\nUeberhorst\nUeberweg, F.\nUebinger, J.\nUlrici, H.\nUnconditioned, the\n in Kant\n in Sir Wm. Hamilton\n in Mansel\n in Spencer\n _See also_ the Absolute\nUnconscious, the, Hartmann's philosophy of\nUphues, G.K.\n\nVacherot, E.\nVaihinger, H.\nValla, L.\nVanini\nVatke, W.\nVeitch, J.\nVenetianer, M.\nVenn, J.\nVera\nVico\nVillers\nVirchow, R.\nVischer, F.T.\nVives\nVloten, J. van\nVo\u00ebtius\nVogel\nVogt, Karl\nVolkelt, J.\n works by\n position of\nVolkmann von Volkmar\nVolney (Chasseboeuf)\nVoltaire\nVorl\u00e4nder, F.\n\nWaddington\nWagner, J.J.\nWagner, Richard\nWagner, Rudolph\nWaitz, Theodor\nWallace, A.R.\nWallace, William\nWallaschek, R.\nWalter, J.\nWarburton, W.\nWard, J.\nWatson, John\nWeber, E.H.\nWeber, Theodor\nWeigel, E.\nWeigel, Valentin\nWeiss, Bruno\nWeisse, C.H.\nWeissenborn\nWerner, K.\nWeston, S. Burns\nWeygoldt\nWhately, Richard\nWhedon, D.D.\nWhewell, W.\nWhiston, W.\nWildauer, T.\nWillmann, O.\nWindelband, W.\nWinkler, B.\nWitte, J.H.\nWohlrabe\nWolff, Christian\n system of\n and Kant\nWollaston, William\nWoolston, T.\nWundt, W.\nWyck, Van der\nWyttenbach, D.\n\nZabarella\nZart, G.\nZeising, A.\nZeller, E.\n works of\n position of\nZiegler, T.\nZiller, T.\nZimmer, F.\nZimmermann, R.\nZimmern, Helen\nZ\u00f6llner","title":"History of Modern Philosophy: From Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":240459}