{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1177/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1177","id":"gutenberg_1177","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1177","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Philosophers, Ancient -- Biography -- Early works to 1800","Socrates -- Trials, litigation, etc. -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by John Bickers\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE MEMORABILIA\n\nRecollections of Socrates\n\nBy Xenophon\n\n\n\n\nTranslated by H. G. Dakyns\n\n\n\n\n\n     Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a\n     pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,\n     and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land\n     and property in Scillus, where he lived for many\n     years before having to move once more, to settle\n     in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.\n\n     The Memorabilia is a recollection of Socrates in\n     word and deed, to show his character as the best\n     and happiest of men.\n\n\n\n\n\n  PREPARER'S NOTE\n\n  First Published 1897 by Macmillan and Co.\n  This was typed from Dakyns' series, \"The Works of Xenophon,\" a\n  four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though\n  there is doubt about some of these) is:\n\n  Work                                   Number of books\n\n  The Anabasis                                         7\n  The Hellenica                                        7\n  The Cyropaedia                                       8\n  The Memorabilia                                      4\n  The Symposium                                        1\n  The Economist                                        1\n  On Horsemanship                                      1\n  The Sportsman                                        1\n  The Cavalry General                                  1\n  The Apology                                          1\n  On Revenues                                          1\n  The Hiero                                            1\n  The Agesilaus                                        1\n  The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians   2\n\n  Text in brackets \"{}\" is my transliteration of Greek text into\n  English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The\n  diacritical marks have been lost.\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE MEMORABILIA\n\nor\n\nRecollections of Socrates\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\n\nI\n\nI have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted (1) Socrates\ncould have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to\nthe state. The indictment was to this effect: \"Socrates is guilty of\ncrime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state,\nand importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of\ncorrupting the young.\"\n\n (1) {oi grapsamenoi} = Meletus (below, IV. iv. 4, viii. 4; \"Apol.\" 11,\n    19), Anytus (\"Apol.\" 29), and Lycon. See Plat. \"Apol.\" II. v. 18;\n    Diog. Laert. II. v. (Socr.); M. Schanz, \"Plat. Apol. mit deutschen\n    Kemmentar, Einleitung,\" S. 5 foll.\n\nIn the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused\nto recognise the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not\nsacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was\noften to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars\nof the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed\nthat saying of his, \"A divinity (2) gives me a sign,\" was on everybody's\nlips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of\nthe imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no\ngreater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular\nhelp, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry\nof birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, (3) or a victim's\nentrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere\nfowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things\nare profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such\ninstruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates.\nOnly, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged\nonwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates\nsuited his language to his conviction. \"The divinity,\" said he, \"gives\nme a sign.\" Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do\nthis, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this same divine\nvoice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings\nprospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards.\n(4) Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present\nhimself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave\nor fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing (5) the\nGod-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception.\nIt is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his\nbelief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom,\nor what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith\nin the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?\n\n (2) Or, \"A divine something.\" See \"Encyc. Brit.\" \"Socrates.\" Dr. H.\n    Jackason; \"The Daemon of Socrates,\" F. W. H. Myers; K. Joel, \"Der\n    echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates,\" i. p. 70 foll.; cf.\n    Aristot. \"M. M.\" 1182 a 10.\n\n (3) See Aesch. \"P. V.\" 487, {enodious te sombolous}, \"and pathway\n    tokens,\" L. Campbell; Arist. \"Birds,\" 721, {sombolon ornin}:\n    \"Frogs,\" 196, {to sometukhon exion}; \"Eccl.\" 792; Hor. \"Od.\" iii.\n    27, 1-7.\n\n (4) See \"Anab.\" III. i. 4; \"Symp.\" iv. 48.\n\n (5) Or, \"if his vaunted manifestations from heaven had but manifested\n    the falsity of his judgment.\"\n\nBut his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As\nregards the ordinary necessities of life, (6) his advice was, \"Act as\nyou believe (7) these things may best be done.\" But in the case of those\ndarker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his\nfriends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken\nor not. \"No one,\" he would say, \"who wishes to manage a house or city\nwith success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can\nafford to dipense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering,\nbuilding, smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with\nthe theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic,\neconomy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human\nintelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least\nimportant, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is\nhidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm\nnever so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits:\nanother may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not\nwho will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will\nprofit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether\nhis leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a\nfair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not\nreap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in\nthe state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his\ncity. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human\njudgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural\nfolly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven\non any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning.\nAs though a man should inquire, \"Am I to choose an expert driver as my\ncoachman, or one who has never handled the reins?\" \"Shall I appoint a\nmariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?\" And so with respect\nto all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice\nfrom Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. \"Our duty is plain,\"\nhe would observe; \"where we are permitted to work through our natural\nfaculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are\nhidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the\ngods,\" he added, \"grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious.\"\n\n (6) Or, \"in the sphere of the determined,\" {ta anagkaia} = certa,\n    quorum eventus est necessarius; \"things positive, the law-ordained\n    department of life,\" as we might say. See Grote, \"H. G.\" i. ch.\n    xvi. 500 and passim.\n\n (7) Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate \"As to\n    things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way\n    in which he believed they would be done best\"; i.e. he did not\n    say, \"follow your conscience,\" but, \"this course seems best to me\n    under the circumstances.\"\n\nAgain, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to\nbe seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds;\nat noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place;\nand as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered,\nthere was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who\nchose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him\ndo anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set\nhis face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of\nthe Universe; how the \"kosmos,\" as the savants (8) phrase it, came into\nbeing; (9) or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble\none's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He\nwould ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of\nthings human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty\nspeculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper\nparts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns\nof God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay\nbeyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their\ndiscussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For\njust as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly\nterrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do\nanything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; (10) others\nthink they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some\nhonour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name\nof God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very\nbeasts:--so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with\ncares (11) concerning the Universal Nature. One sect (12) has discovered\nthat Being is one and indivisible. Another (13) that it is infinite in\nnumber. If one (14) proclaims that all things are in a continual flux,\nanother (15) replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time.\nThe theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the\ncounter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.\n\n (8) Lit. \"the sophists.\" See H. Sidgwick, \"J. of Philol.\" iv. 1872; v.\n    1874.\n\n (9) Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, \"Icaromenip.\" xlvi. 4, in imitation of\n    this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate \"is arranged.\"\n    See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 573.\n\n (10) See \"Anab.\" V. iv. 30.\n\n (11) See Arist. \"Clouds,\" 101, {merimnophrontistai kaloi te kagathoi}.\n\n (12) e.g. Xenophanes and Parmenides, see Grote, \"Plato,\" I. i. 16\n    foll.\n\n (13) e.g. Leucippus and Democritus, ib. 63 foll.\n\n (14) e.g. Heraclitus, ib. 27 foll.\n\n (15) e.g. Zeno, ib. ii. 96.\n\nBut the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators\nsometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he\nsaid, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or\nothers, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope\nthat when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena\noccur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons?\nWill they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no\nsuch notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content\nsimply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was\nhis mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he\nhimself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is\nimpiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the\nbase? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness?\nwhat by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman?\nwhat is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like\nproblems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of\nnobility on the possessor, (16) whereas those who lacked the knowledge\nmight deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.\n\n (16) Or, \"was distinctive of the 'beautiful and good.'\" For the phrase\n    see below, ii. 2 et passim.\n\nNow, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at\nlarge, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions\nrespecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored\nis indeed astonishing.\n\nAt one time Socrates was a member of the Council, (17) he had taken\nthe senatorial oath, and sworn \"as a member of that house to act in\nconformity with the laws.\" It was thus he chanced to be President of the\nPopular Assembly, (18) when that body was seized with a desire to put\nthe nine (19) generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death\nby a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment\nof the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens,\nhe refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance\nfaithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the\npeople wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty.\nThe fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon\nmen, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most\npeople seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in\npart, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things--both the\nthings that are said and the things that are done, and the things that\nare counselled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are\npresent everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things\nof man.\n\n (17) Or \"Senate.\" Lit. \"the Boule.\"\n\n (18) Lit. \"Epistates of the Ecclesia.\" See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 271;\n    Plat. \"Apol.\" 32 B.\n\n (19) {ennea} would seem to be a slip of the pen for {okto}, eight. See\n    \"Hell.\" I. v. 16; vi. 16; vi. 29; vii. 1 foll.\n\nI can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me\nhow the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of\nsober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one\nimpious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole\nlanguage concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word\nfor word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of devoutest\npiety.\n\n\nII\n\nNo less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted\nthe young. This man, who, beyond what has been already stated, kept\nhis appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently\ncapable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat and every kind of\ntoil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest\nof means he never lacked sufficiency--is it credible that such a\nman could have made others irreverent or lawless, or licentious, or\neffeminate in face of toil? Was he not rather the saving of many through\nthe passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused\nthat through careful management of themselves they might grow to be\ntruly beautiful and good--not indeed that he ever undertook to be a\nteacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those\nwho associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last\nresemble him.\n\nBut let it not be inferred that he was negligent of his own body\nor approved of those who neglected theirs. If excess of eating,\ncounteracted by excess of toil, was a dietary of which he disapproved,\n(1) to gratify the natural claim of appetite in conjunction with\nmoderate exercise was a system he favoured, as tending to a healthy\ncondition of the body without trammelling the cultivation of the spirit.\nOn the other hand, there was nothing dandified or pretentious about\nhim; he indulged in no foppery of shawl or shoes, or other effeminacy of\nliving.\n\n (1) See  (Plat.) \"Erast.\" 132 C.\n\nLeast of all did he tend to make his companions greedy of money. He\nwould not, while restraining passion generally, make capital out of the\none passion which attached others to himself; and by this abstinence,\nhe believed, he was best consulting his own freedom; in so much that he\nstigmatised those who condescended to take wages for their society as\nvendors of their own persons, because they were compelled to discuss for\nthe benefits of their paymasters. What surprised him was that any one\npossessing virtue should deign to ask money as its price instead of\nsimply finding his reward in the acquisition of an honest friend, as if\nthe new-fledged soul of honour could forget her debt of gratitude to her\ngreatest benefactor.\n\nFor himself, without making any such profession, he was content to\nbelieve that those who accepted his views would play their parts as good\nand true friends to himself and one another their lives long. Once more\nthen: how should a man of this character corrupt the young? unless the\ncareful cultivation of virtue be corruption.\n\nBut, says the accuser, (2) by all that's sacred! did not Socrates cause\nhis associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the\nfolly of appointing state officers by ballot? (3) a principle which, he\nsaid, no one would care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player\nor in any similar case, where a mistake would be far less disastrous\nthan in matters political. Words like these, according to the accuser,\ntended to incite the young to contemn the established constitution,\nrendering them violent and headstrong. But for myself I think that\nthose who cultivate wisdom and believe themselves able to instruct\ntheir fellow-citizens as to their interests are least likely to become\npartisans of violence. They are too well aware that to violence attach\nenmities and dangers, whereas results as good may be obtained by\npersuasion safely and amicably. For the victim of violence hates with\nvindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen,\nwhile the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which\nhas done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him\nwho makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered\nby reflection. Once more: the man who ventures on violence needs the\nsupport of many to fight his battles, while he whose strength lies in\npersuasiveness triumphs single-handed, for he is conscious of a cunning\nto compel consent unaided. And what has such a one to do with the\nspilling of blood? since how ridiculous it were to do men to death\nrather than turn to account the trusty service of the living.\n\n (2) {o kategoros} = Polycrates possibly. See M. Schantz, op. cit.,\n    \"Einleitun,\" S. 6: \"Die Anklagerede des Polykrates\"; Introduction,\n    p. xxxii. foll.\n\n (3) i.e. staking the election of a magistrate on the colour of a bean.\n    See Aristot. \"Ath. Pol.\" viii. 2, and Dr. Sandys ad loc.\n\nBut, the accuser answers, the two men (4) who wrought the greatest evils\nto the state at any time--to wit, Critias and Alcibiades--were both\ncompanions of Socrates--Critias the oligarch, and Alcibiades the\ndemocrat. Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer\n(5) than the one? where such a portent of insolence, incontinence,\nand high-handedness as the other? For my part, in so far as these two\nwrought evil to the state, I have no desire to appear as the apologist\nof either. I confine myself to explaining what this intimacy of theirs\nwith Socrates really was.\n\n (4) See \"Hell.\" I. and II. passim.\n\n (5) Reading {kleptistatos te kai biaiotatos kai phonikotatos}, or if\n    {pleonektistatos te kai biaiotatis}, translate \"such a manner of\n    greed and violence as the one, of insolence, etc., as the other?\"\n    See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 337.\n\nNever were two more ambitious citizens seen at Athens. Ambition was in\ntheir blood. If they were to have their will, all power was to be in\ntheir hands; their fame was to eclipse all other. Of Socrates they\nknew--first that he lived an absolutely independent life on the\nscantiest means; next that he was self-disciplined to the last degree\nin respect of pleasures; lastly that he was so formidable in debate that\nthere was no antagonist he could not twist round his little finger. Such\nbeing their views, and such the character of the pair, which is the more\nprobable: that they sought the society of Socrates because they felt the\nfascination of his life, and were attracted by the bearing of the man?\nor because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become\nadepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action?\nFor my part I believe that if the choice from Heaven had been given them\nto live such a life as they saw Socrates living to its close, or to die,\nthey would both have chosen death.\n\nTheir acts are a conclusive witness to their characters. They no sooner\nfelt themselves to be the masters of those they came in contact with\nthan they sprang aside from Socrates and plunged into that whirl of\npolitics but for which they might never have sought his society.\n\nIt may be objected: before giving his companions lessons in politics\nSocrates had better have taught them sobriety. (6) Without disputing the\nprinciple, I would point out that a teacher cannot fail to discover to\nhis pupils his method of carrying out his own precepts, and this along\nwith argumentative encouragement. Now I know that Socrates disclosed\nhimself to his companions as a beautiful and noble being, who would\nreason and debate with them concerning virtue and other human interests\nin the noblest manner. And of these two I know that as long as they were\ncompanions of Socrates even they were temperate, not assuredly from fear\nof being fined or beaten by Socrates, but because they were persuaded\nfor the nonce of the excellence of such conduct.\n\n (6) {sophrosune} = \"sound-mindedness,\" \"temperence.\" See below, IV.\n    iii. 1.\n\nPerhaps some self-styled philosophers (7) may here answer: \"Nay, the man\ntruly just can never become unjust, the temperate man can never become\nintemperate, the man who has learnt any subject of knowledge can\nnever be as though he had learnt it not.\" That, however, is not my own\nconclusion. It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the\nbody; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here\nbodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that\nwe should nor abstain from the things we should not. And that is why\nfathers keep their sons, however temperate they may be, out of the reach\nof wicked men, considering that if the society of the good is a training\nin virtue so also is the society of the bad its dissolution.\n\n (7) In reference to some such tenet as that of Antisthenes ap. Diog.\n    Laert. VI. ix. 30, {areskei d' autois kai ten areten didakten\n    einai, katha phesin 'Antisthenes en to 'Rraklei kai anapobleton\n    uparkhein}. Cf. Plat. \"Protag.\" 340 D, 344 D.\n\nTo this the poet (8) is a witness, who says:\n\n    \"From the noble thou shalt be instructed in nobleness; but, and if\n    thou minglest with the base thou wilt destroy what wisdom thou\n    hast now\";\n\nAnd he (9) who says:\n\n    \"But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of\n    virtue\"--\n\nto whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible\nto remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is\nforgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart\nthat has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the\nrecollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned\nafter holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man\nshould let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man\nwho falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious\nlove, loses his old power of practising the right and abstaining from\nthe wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy whilst passion was\ncold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in\nhis prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand\nfrom gains which in former days were too base to invite his touch. Where\nthen is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day,\nand to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power\nto act virtuously may not quite lose that power? (10) To myself, at all\nevents, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result\nof constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of\ntemperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are\nplanted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in\nher ear, \"Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and\nthe body.\" (11)\n\n (8) Theognis, 35, 36. See \"Symp.\" ii. 4; Plat. \"Men.\" 95 D.\n\n (9) The author is unknown. See Plat. \"Protag.\" l.c.\n\n (10) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" V. i. 9 foll.; VI. i. 41.\n\n (11) See my remarks, \"Hellenica Essays,\" p. 371 foll.\n\nBut to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they\nlived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their\nignoble appetites; (12) but being separated from him, Critias had to\nfly to Thessaly, (13) where he consorted with fellows better versed in\nlawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal\nbeauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies (14) to hunt him\ndown as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state\nand among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in\nthe arts of flattery; honoured by the democracy and stepping easily\nto the front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the\nPalaestra is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus\nhe presently forgot the duty which he owed himself.\n\n (12) Cf.  (Plat.) \"Theag.\" 130 A.\n\n (13) See \"Hell.\" II. iii. 36.\n\n (14) Cf. Plut. \"Ages.,\" \"Alcib.\"\n\nSuch were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary?\nInflated with the pride of ancestry, (15) exalted by their wealth,\npuffed up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human\ntempters, separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates--what\nwonder that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the\noffences of these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser\nwill have it so. But for the fact that in early days, when they\nwere both young and of an age when dereliction from good feeling and\nself-restraint might have been expected, this same Socrates kept them\nmodest and well-behaved, not one word of praise is uttered by the\naccuser for all this. That is not the measure of justice elsewhere\nmeted. Would a master of the harp or flute, would a teacher of any sort\nwho has turned out proficient pupils, be held to account because one of\nthem goes away to another teacher and turns out to be a failure? Or what\nfather, if he have a son who in the society of a certain friend remains\nan honest lad, but falling into the company of some other becomes\na good-for-nothing, will that father straightway accuse the earlier\ninstructor? Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in\nthe company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former?\nWhat father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to\nblame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established?\nHere would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of\nany base conduct himself? If so let him be set down as a knave, but if,\non the contrary, he never faltered in sobriety from beginning to end,\nhow in the name of justice is he to be held to account for a baseness\nwhich was not in him?\n\n (15) Or, \"became overweening in arrogance.\" Cf. \"Henry VIII. II. iv.\n    110\": \"But your heart is crammed with arrogancy, spleen, and\n    pride.\"\n\nI go further: if, short of being guilty of any wrong himself, he saw\nthe evil doings of others with approval, reason were he should be held\nblameworthy. Listen then: Socrates was well aware that Critias was\nattached to Euthydemus, (16) aware too that he was endeavouring to deal\nby him after the manner of those wantons whose love is carnal of the\nbody. From this endeavour he tried to deter him, pointing out how\nilliberal a thing it was, how ill befitting a man of honour to appear\nas a beggar before him whom he loved, in whose eyes he would fain be\nprecious, ever petitioning for something base to give and base to get.\n\n (16) See below, IV. ii. 1 (if the same person).\n\nBut when this reasoning fell on deaf ears and Critias refused to be\nturned aside, Socrates, as the story goes, took occasion of the presence\nof a whole company and of Euthydemus to remark that Critias appeared to\nbe suffering from a swinish affection, or else why this desire to rub\nhimself against Euthydemus like a herd of piglings scraping against\nstones.\n\nThe hatred of Critias to Socrates doubtless dates from this incident.\nHe treasured it up against him, and afterwards, when he was one of the\nThirty and associated with Charicles as their official lawgiver, (17)\nhe framed the law against teaching the art of words (18) merely from a\ndesire to vilify Socrates. He was at a loss to know how else to lay hold\nof him except by levelling against him the vulgar charge (19) against\nphilosophers, by which he hoped to prejudice him with the public. It\nwas a charge quite unfounded as regards Socrates, if I may judge from\nanything I ever heard fall from his lips myself or have learnt about him\nfrom others. But the animus of Critias was clear. At the time when the\nThirty were putting citizens, highly respectable citizens, to death\nwholesale, and when they were egging on one man after another to the\ncommission of crime, Socrates let fall an observation: \"It would be\nsufficiently extraordinary if the keeper of a herd of cattle (20) who\nwas continually thinning and impoverishing his cattle did not admit\nhimself to be a sorry sort of herdsman, but that a ruler of the state\nwho was continually thinning and impoverishing the citizens should\nneither be ashamed nor admit himself to be a sorry sort of ruler was\nmore extraordinary still.\" The remark being reported to the government,\nSocrates was summoned by Critias and Charicles, who proceeded to point\nout the law and forbade him to converse with the young. \"Was it open to\nhim,\" Socrates inquired of the speaker, \"in case he failed to understand\ntheir commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?\"\n\n (17) Lit. \"Nomothetes.\" See \"Hell.\" II. iii. 2; Dem. 706. For\n    Charicles see Lys. \"c. Eratosth.\" S. 56; Aristot. \"Pol.\" v. 6. 6.\n\n (18) See Diog. Laert. II. v. (\"Socr.\")\n\n (19) i.e. {to ton etto logon kreitto poiein}, \"of making the worse\n    appear the better cause.\" Cf. Arist. \"Clouds.\"\n\n (20) See Dio Chrys. \"Or.\" 43.\n\n\"Certainly,\" the two assented.\n\nThen Socrates: I am prepared to obey the laws, but to avoid\ntransgression of the law through ignorance I need instruction: is it on\nthe supposition that the art of words tends to correctness of statement\nor to incorrectness that you bid us abstain from it? for if the former,\nit is clear we must abstain from speaking correctly, but if the latter,\nour endeavour should be to amend our speech.\n\nTo which Charicles, in a fit of temper, retorted: In consideration of\nyour ignorance, (21) Socrates, we will frame the prohibition in\nlanguage better suited to your intelligence: we forbid you to hold any\nconversation whatsoever with the young.\n\n (21) See Aristot. \"de Soph. El.\" 183 b7.\n\nThen Socrates: To avoid all ambiguity then, or the possibility of my\ndoing anything else than what you are pleased to command, may I ask you\nto define up to what age a human being is to be considered young?\n\nFor just so long a time (Charicles answered) as he is debarred from\nsitting as a member of the Council, (22) as not having attained to the\nmaturity of wisdom; accordingly you will not hold converse with any one\nunder the age of thirty.\n\n (22) The Boule or Senate. See W. L. Newman, \"Pol. Aristot.\" i. 326.\n\nSoc. In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of\nthis? if the vendor is under the age of thirty?\n\nCha. Tut, things of that sort: but you know, Socrates, that you have\na way of asking questions, when all the while you know how the matter\nstands. Let us have no questions of that sort.\n\nSoc. Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know,\nas, for instance, where does Charicles live? or where is Critias to be\nfound?\n\nOh yes, of course, things of that kind (replied Charicles), while\nCritias added: But at the same time you had better have done with your\nshoemakers, carpenters, and coppersmiths. (23) These must be pretty well\ntrodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have\ngiven them.\n\n (23) Cf. Plat. \"Gorg.\" 491 A; \"Symp.\" 221 E; Dio Chrys. \"Or.\" 55, 560\n    D, 564 A.\n\nSoc. And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also--the just,\nthe holy, and the like?\n\nMost assuredly (answered Charicles), and from cowherds in particular; or\nelse see that you do not lessen the number of the herd yourself.\n\nThus the secret was out. The remark of Socrates about the cattle had\ncome to their ears, and they could not forgive the author of it.\n\nPerhaps enough has been said to explain the kind of intimacy which\nhad subsisted between Critias and Socrates, and their relation to one\nanother. But I will venture to maintain that where the teacher is not\npleasing to the pupil there is no education. Now it cannot be said of\nCritias and Alcibiades that they associated with Socrates because they\nfound him pleasing to them. And this is true of the whole period. From\nthe first their eyes were fixed on the headship of the state as their\nfinal goal. During the time of their intimacy with Socrates there were\nno disputants whom they were more eager to encounter than professed\npoliticians.\n\nThus the story is told of Alcibiades--how before the age of twenty he\nengaged his own guardian, Pericles, at that time prime minister of the\nstate, in a discussion concerning laws.\n\nAlc. Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?\n\nPer. To be sure I can.\n\nAlc. I should be so much obliged if you would do so. One so often hears\nthe epithet \"law-abiding\" applied in a complimentary sense; yet, it\nstrikes me, one hardly deserves the compliment, if one does not know\nwhat a law is.\n\nPer. Fortunately there is a ready answer to your difficulty. You wish to\nknow what a law is? Well, those are laws which the majority, being met\ntogether in conclave, approve and enact as to what it is right to do,\nand what it is right to abstain from doing.\n\nAlc. Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good? or to\ndo what is bad?\n\nPer. What is good, to be sure, young sir, not what is bad.\n\nAlc. Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an\noligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what\nare these?\n\nPer. Whatever the ruling power of the state after deliberation enacts as\nour duty to do, goes by the name of laws.\n\nAlc. Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts\nrules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?\n\nPer. Yes, anything which a tyrant as head of the state enacts, also goes\nby the name of law.\n\nAlc. But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness--how do we define them?\nIs it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to\nhim--not by persuasion but by compulsion?\n\nPer. I should say so.\n\nAlc. It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading\nthe citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things--that is\nlawlessness?\n\nPer. You are right; and I retract the statement that measures passed by\na tyrant without persuasion of the citizens are law.\n\nAlc. And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the\nmajority, but in the exercise of its power only? Are we, or are we not,\nto apply the term violence to these?\n\nPer. I think that anything which any one forces another to do without\npersuasion, whether by enactment or not, is violence rather than law.\n\nAlc. It would seem that everything which the majority, in the exercise\nof its power over the possessors of wealth, and without persuading them,\nchooses to enact, is of the nature of violence rather than of law?\n\nTo be sure (answered Pericles), adding: At your age we were clever hands\nat such quibbles ourselves. It was just such subtleties which we used to\npractise our wits upon; as you do now, if I mistake not.\n\nTo which Alcibiades replied: Ah, Pericles, I do wish we could have met\nin those days when you were at your cleverest in such matters.\n\nWell, then, as soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of\nthe day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs\non Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the\nannoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith\nthey devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they\nwould never have come near him at all.\n\nNo; if one would seek to see true companions of Socrates, one must\nlook to Crito, (24) and Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, to Hermogenes,\nto Simmias and Cebes, to Phaedondes and others, who clung to him not to\nexcel in the rhetoric of the Assembly or the law-courts, but with the\nnobler ambition of attaining to such beauty and goodliness of soul as\nwould enable them to discharge the various duties of life to house and\nfamily, to relatives and friends, to fellow-citizens, and to the state\nat large. Of these true followers not one in youth or old age was ever\nguilty, or thought guilty, of committing any evil deed.\n\n (24) For these true followers, familiar to us in the pages of Plato,\n    (\"Crito,\" \"Apol.,\" \"Phaedo,\" etc) see Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\"\n\n\"But for all that,\" the accuser insists, \"Socrates taught sons to pour\ncontumely upon their fathers (25) by persuading his young friends that\nhe could make them wiser than their sires, or by pointing out that\nthe law allowed a son to sue his father for aberration of mind, and to\nimprison him, which legal ordinance he put in evidence to prove that it\nmight be well for the wiser to imprison the more ignorant.\"\n\n (25) See \"Apol.\" 20; Arist. \"Clouds,\" 1407, where Pheidippides \"drags\n    his father Strepsiades through the mire.\"\n\nNow what Socrates held was, that if a man may with justice incarcerate\nanother for no better cause than a form of folly or ignorance, this same\nperson could not justly complain if he in his turn were kept in bonds by\nhis superiors in knowledge; and to come to the bottom of such questions,\nto discover the difference between madness and ignorance was a problem\nwhich he was perpetually working at. His opinion came to this: If a\nmadman may, as a matter of expediency to himself and his friends, be\nkept in prison, surely, as a matter of justice, the man who knows not\nwhat he ought to know should be content to sit at the feet of those who\nknow, and be taught.\n\nBut it was the rest of their kith and kin, not fathers only (according\nto the accuser), whom Socrates dishonoured in the eyes of his circle\nof followers, when he said that \"the sick man or the litigant does not\nderive assistance from his relatives, (26) but from his doctor in the\none case, and his legal adviser in the other.\" \"Listen further to his\nlanguage about friends,\" says the accuser: \"'What is the good of their\nbeing kindly disposed, unless they can be of some practical use to you?\nMere goodness of disposition is nothing; those only are worthy of\nhonour who combine with the knowledge of what is right the faculty of\nexpounding it;' (27) and so by bringing the young to look upon himself\nas a superlatively wise person gifted with an extraordinary capacity for\nmaking others wise also, he so worked on the dispositions of those who\nconsorted with him that in their esteem the rest of the world counted\nfor nothing by comparison with Socrates.\"\n\n (26) See Grote, \"H. G.\" v. 535.\n\n (27) Cf. Thuc. ii. 60. Pericles says, \"Yet I with whom you are so\n    angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of\n    devising and explaining a sound policy.\"--Jowett.\n\nNow I admit the language about fathers and the rest of a man's\nrelations. I can go further, and add some other sayings of his, that\n\"when the soul (which is alone the indwelling centre of intelligence)\nis gone out of a man, be he our nearest and dearest friend, we carry the\nbody forth and bury it out of sight.\" \"Even in life,\" he used to say,\n\"each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession--to\nwit, his own body--if it be useless and unprofitable. He will remove it\nhimself, or suffer another to do so in his stead. Thus men cut off their\nown nails, hair, or corns; they allow surgeons to cut and cauterise\nthem, not without pains and aches, and are so grateful to the doctor for\nhis services that they further give him a fee. Or again, a man ejects\nthe spittle from his mouth as far as possible. (28) Why? Because it is\nof no use while it stays within the system, but is detrimental rather.\"\n\n (28) See Aristot. \"Eth. Eud.\" vii. 1.\n\nNow by these instances his object was not to inculcate the duty of\nburying one's father alive or of cutting oneself to bits, but to show\nthat lack of intelligence means lack of worth; (29) and so he called\nupon his hearers to be as sensible and useful as they could be, so that,\nbe it father or brother or any one else whose esteem he would deserve,\na man should not hug himself in careless self-interest, trusting to mere\nrelationship, but strive to be useful to those whose esteem he coveted.\n\n (29) i.e. \"witless and worthless are synonymous.\"\n\nBut (pursues the accuser) by carefully culling the most immoral\npassages of the famous poets, and using them as evidences, he taught his\nassociates to be evildoers and tyrranical: the line of Hesiod (30) for\ninstance--\n\n    No work is a disgrace; slackness of work is the disgrace--\n\n\"interpreted,\" says the accuser, \"by Socrates as if the poet enjoined us\nto abstain from no work wicked or ignoble; do everything for the sake of\ngain.\"\n\n (30) \"Works and Days,\" 309 {'Ergon d' ouden oneidos}. Cf. Plat.\n    \"Charm.\" 163 C.\n\nNow while Socrates would have entirely admitted the propositions that\n\"it is a blessing and a benefit to a man to be a worker,\" and that \"a\nlazy do-nothing is a pestilent evil,\" that \"work is good and idleness\na curse,\" the question arises, whom did he mean by workers? In his\nvocabulary only those were good workmen (31) who were engaged on good\nwork; dicers and gamblers and others engaged on any other base and\nruinous business he stigmatised as the \"idle drones\"; and from this\npoint of view the quotation from Hesiod is unimpeachable--\n\n    No work is a disgrace; only idlesse is disgrace.\n\nBut there was a passage from Homer (32) for ever on his lips, as the\naccuser tells us--the passage which says concerning Odysseus,\n\n    What prince, or man of name,\n    He found flight-giv'n, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame:\n    \"Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid,\n    You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed.\"\n\n     Thus he the best sort us'd; the worst, whose spirits brake out in\n     noise, (33) He cudgell'd with his sceptre, chid, and said, \"Stay,\n     wretch, be still, And hear thy betters; thou art base, and both in\n     power and skill Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in\n     war.\" We must not all be kings.\n\n (31) See below, III. ix. 9.\n\n (32) \"Il.\" ii. 188 foll., 199 foll. (so Chapman).\n\n (33) Lit. \"But whatever man of the people he saw and found him\n    shouting.\"--W. Leaf.\n\nThe accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though\nthe poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. Now\nno such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been\ntantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself. What he\ndid say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who\nwere incapable of rendering assistance in time of need to the army or\nthe state or the people itself, be they never so wealthy, ought to be\nrestrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.\n\nAs to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this--he was plainly\na lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many\nardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded\nany fee for his society from any one, (34) but bestowed abundantly upon\nall alike of the riches of his soul--good things, indeed, of which\nfragments accepted gratis at his hands were taken and sold at high\nprices to the rest of the community by some, (35) who were not, as he\nwas, lovers of the people, since with those who had not money to give in\nreturn they refused to discourse. But of Socrates be it said that in\nthe eyes of the whole world he reflected more honour on the state and a\nricher lustre than ever Lichas, (36) whose fame is proverbial, shed\non Lacedaemon. Lichas feasted and entertained the foreign residents in\nLacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae most handsomely. Socrates gave a lifetime\nto the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits\nbestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made\nthose who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way\nrejoicing.\n\n (34) See \"Symp.\" iv. 43; Plat. \"Hipp. maj.\" 300 D; \"Apol.\" 19 E.\n\n (35) See Diog. Laert. II. viii. 1.\n\n (36) See \"Hell.\" III. ii. 21; Thuc. v. 50; Plut. \"Cim.\" 284 C. For the\n    Gymnopaediae, see Paus. III. xi. 9; Athen. xiv. p. 631.\n\nTo no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a\nman, Socrates was worthier to have received honour from the state than\ndeath. And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for\nwhat does the law require? (37) \"If a man be proved to be a thief, a\nfilcher of clothes, a cut-purse, a housebreaker, a man-stealer, a robber\nof temples, the penalty is death.\" Even so; and of all men Socrates\nstood most aloof from such crimes.\n\n (37) See \"Symp.\" iv. 36; Plat. \"Rep.\" 575 B; \"Gorg.\" 508 E.\n\nTo the state he was never the cause of any evil--neither disaster in\nwar, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other mischief whatsoever. And if\nhis public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never\nhurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil,\nnor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings.\nwhere then is his liability to the indictment to be found? Who, so\nfar from disbelieving in the gods, as set forth in the indictment, was\nconspicuous beyond all men for service to heaven; so far from corrupting\nthe young--a charge alleged with insistence by the prosecutor--was\nnotorious for the zeal with which he strove not only to stay his\nassociates from evil desires, but to foster in them a passionate desire\nfor that loveliest and queenliest of virtues without which states and\nfamilies crumble to decay. (38) Such being his conduct, was he not\nworthy of high honour from the state of Athens?\n\n (38) Or, \"the noblest and proudest virtue by means of which states and\n    families are prosperously directed.\"\n\n\nIII\n\nIt may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his\nassociates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal\ndiscourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections (1)\non these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of\nheaven. In conduct and language his behaviour conformed to the rule laid\ndown by the Pythia (2) in reply to the question, \"How shall we act?\" as\ntouching a sacrifice or the worship of ancestors, or any similar point.\nHer answer is: \"Act according to the law and custom of your state, and\nyou will act piously.\" After this pattern Socrates behaved himself, and\nso he exhorted others to behave, holding them to be but busybodies and\nvain fellows who acted on any different principle.\n\n (1) Hence the title of the work, {'Apomenmoneumata}, \"Recollections,\n    Memoirs, Memorabilia.\" See Diog. Laert. \"Xen.\" II. vi. 48.\n\n (2) The Pythia at Delphi.\n\nHis formula or prayer was simple: \"Give me that which is best for me,\"\nfor, said he, the gods know best what good things are--to pray for gold\nor silver or despotic power were no better than to make some particular\nthrow at dice or stake in battle or any such thing the subject of\nprayer, of which the future consequences are manifestly uncertain. (3)\n\n (3) See (Plat.) \"Alcib. II.\" 142 foll.; Valerius Max. vii. 2;\n    \"Spectator,\" No. 207.\n\nIf with scant means he offered but small sacrifices he believed that he\nwas in no wise inferior to those who make frequent and large sacrifices\nfrom an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves,\ncould they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else\noftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather\nthan of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life\nbe worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous\nman found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of\nthe gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he\nwas ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,\n\n    According to thine ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods. (4)\n\n (4) Hesiod, \"Works and Days,\" 336. See \"Anab.\" III. ii. 9.\n\n\"Yes,\" he would say, \"in our dealings with friends and strangers alike,\nand in reference to the demands of life in general, there is no better\nmotto for a man than that: 'let a man do according to his ability.'\"\n\nOr to take another point. If it appeared to him that a sign from\nheaven had been given him, nothing would have induced him to go against\nheavenly warning: he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the\nguidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey\nin place of one who knew the road and could see; and so he denounced the\nfolly of others who do things contrary to the warnings of God in order\nto avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human\naids by comparison with counsel from above.\n\nThe habit and style of living to which he subjected his soul and body\nwas one which under ordinary circumstances (5) would enable any one\nadopting it to look existence cheerily in the face and to pass his days\nserenely: it would certainly entail no difficulties as regards expense.\nSo frugal was it that a man must work little indeed who could not earn\nthe quantum which contented Socrates. Of food he took just enough\nto make eating a pleasure--the appetite he brought to it was sauce\nsufficient; while as to drinks, seeing that he only drank when thirsty,\nany draught refreshed. (6) If he accepted an invitation to dinner, he\nhad no difficulty in avoiding the common snare of over-indulgence, and\nhis advice to people who could not equally control their appetite was to\navoid taking what would allure them to eat if not hungry or to drink if\nnot thirsty. (7) Such things are ruinous to the constitution, he said,\nbad for stomachs, brains, and soul alike; or as he used to put it, with\na touch of sarcasm, (8) \"It must have been by feasting men on so many\ndainty dishes that Circe produced her pigs; only Odysseus through his\ncontinency and the 'promptings (9) of Hermes' abstained from touching\nthem immoderately, and by the same token did not turn into a swine.\" So\nmuch for this topic, which he touched thus lightly and yet seriously.\n\n (5) {ei me ti daimonion eie}, \"save under some divinely-ordained\n    calamity.\" Cf. \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 18; \"Symp.\" viii. 43.\n\n (6) See \"Ages.\" ix; Cic. \"Tusc.\" v. 34, 97; \"de Fin.\" ii. 28, 90.\n\n (7) Cf. Plut. \"Mor.\" 128 D; Clement, \"Paedag.\" 2. 173, 33; \"Strom.\" 2,\n    492, 24; Aelian, \"N. A.\" 8, 9.\n\n (8) \"Half in gibe and half in jest,\" in ref. to \"Od.\" x. 233 foll.:\n    \"So she let them in...\"\n\n (9) {upothemosune}, \"inspiration.\" Cf. \"Il.\" xv. 412; \"Od.\" xvi. 233.\n\nBut as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly\naloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these\nand it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a\nparticular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard, Critobulus\n(10) had some time given to a fair youth, the son of Alcibiades. (11)\nAccordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates propounded the question.\n\n (10) For Critobulus (the son of Crito) see \"Econ.\" i. 1 foll.; \"Symp.\"\n    i. 3 foll.\n\n (11) See Isocr. \"Or.\" xvi. Cobet conj. {ton tou 'Axiokhou uion}, i.e.\n    Clinias.\n\nSoc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a\nman of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have said\nthat he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or\nfoolhardy?\n\nXen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.\n\nSoc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse--a hot-blooded,\nreckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw somersaults into\nknives, (12) or to leap into the jaws of fire.\n\n (12) Cf. \"Symp.\" ii. 10, iv. 16. See Schneider ad loc.\n\nXen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a\ncharacter?\n\nSoc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son\nof Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?\n\nXen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger which\nI could well encounter myself.\n\nSoc. Poor soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that\nkiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the\nindenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on compulsion\nto spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have scarcely a\nmoment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be driven to concern\nyourself most zealously with things which no man, not even a madman,\nwould choose to make an object of concern.\n\nXen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!\n\nSoc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which is\nno bigger than a threepenny bit, (13) has only to touch the mouth and it\nwill afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his senses.\n\n (13) Lit. \"a half-obol piece.\" For the {phalaggion} see Aristot. \"H.\n    A.\" ix. 39, 1.\n\nXen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.\n\nSoc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse\nnothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do\nyou not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom is\nall the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must first\ntouch its victim, but this at a mere glance of the beholder, without even\ncontact, will inject something into him--yards away--which will make\nhim man. And may be that is why the Loves are called \"archers,\" because\nthese beauties wound so far off. (14) But my advice to you, Xenophon,\nis, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair forms, to run\nhelter-skelter for bare life without a glance behind; and to you,\nCritobulus, I would say, \"Go abroad for a year: so long time will it\ntake to heal you of this wound.\"\n\n (14) L. Dindorf, etc. regard the sentence as a gloss. Cf. \"Symp.\" iv.\n    26  ({isos de kai... entimoteron estin}).\n\nSuch (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks,\nshould be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At least\nthey should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would dispense\nwith, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so ought\nto set up no disturbance. (15) But for himself, it was clear, he was\nprepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty in\nabstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others from\nweeds and garbage. To sum up: (16) with regard to eating and drinking\nand these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of his soul made\nhim independent; he could boast honestly that in his moderate fashion\n(17) his pleasures were no less than theirs who take such trouble to\nprocure them, and his pains far fewer.\n\n (15) Cf. \"Symp.\" iv. 38.\n\n (16) L. Dindorf  (brackets) this passage as spurious.\n\n (17) On the principle \"enough is as good as a feast,\" {arkountos}.\n\n\nIV\n\nA belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning\nSocrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that,\nhowever powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a\ntheorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. (1) It\nwould be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only\nwhat Socrates effected \"by way of castigation\" in cross-questioning\nwhose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but\nalso his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close\nintercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he\nwas incapable of making his companions better.\n\n (1) Al. \"If any one believes that Socrates, as represented in certain\n    dialogues (e.g. of Plato, Antisthenes, etc.) of an imaginary\n    character, was an adept ({protrepsasthai}) in the art of\n    stimulating people to virtue negatively but scarcely the man to\n    guide ({proagein}) his hearers on the true path himself.\" Cf.\n    (Plat.) \"Clitophon,\" 410 B; Cic. \"de Or.\" I. xlvii. 204; Plut.\n    \"Mor.\" 798 B. See Grote, \"Plato,\" iii. 21; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 51\n    foll.; Cf. below, IV. iii. 2.\n\nI will first state what I once heard fall from his lips in a discussion\nwith Aristodemus, (2) \"the little,\" as he was called, on the topic of\ndivinity. (3) Socrates had observed that Aristodemus neither sacrificed\nnor gave heed to divination, but on the contrary was disposed to\nridicule those who did.\n\n (2) See Plat. \"Symp.\" 173 B: \"He was a little fellow who never wore\n    any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum.\"--Jowett.\n\n (3) Or, \"the divine element.\"\n\nSo tell me, Aristodemus (he began), are there any human beings who have\nwon your admiration for their wisdom?\n\nAr. There are.\n\nSoc. Would you mention to us their names?\n\nAr. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for\nHomer.... And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides. (4) I admire also\nSophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a\npainter.\n\n (4) Melanippides, 430 B.C. See Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\" s.n.\n\nSoc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a fashioner\nof senseless images devoid of motion or one who could fashion living\ncreatures endowed with understanding and activity?\n\nAr. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their birth\nto design and were not the offspring of some chance.\n\nSoc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents\nno clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some useful\npurpose--which would you judge to be the result of chance, which of\ndesign?\n\nAr. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of\ndesign.\n\nSoc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the beginning\n(5) did for some useful end furnish him with his several senses--giving\nhim eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch the intonations\nof sound? Or again, what good would there be in odours if nostrils had\nnot been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet things and pungent,\nand of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a tongue been fashioned\nin us as an interpreter of the same? And besides all this, do you\nnot think this looks like a matter of foresight, this closing of the\ndelicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding doors, which, when\nthere is need to use them for any purpose, can be thrown wide open and\nfirmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the winds of heaven may not\nvisit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting\nscreen? (6) this coping of the region above the eyes with cornice-work\nof eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them?\nagain this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be\nsurcharged? this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut\nand of the \"grinders\" to receive the food and reduce it to pulp? the\nposition of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal\nof ingress for all the creature's supplies? and lastly, seeing that\nmatter passing out (7) of the body is unpleasant, this hindward\ndirection of the passages, and their removal to a distance from the\navenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all these things constructed\nwith such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of\nchance or intelligence?\n\n (5) Cf. Aristot. \"de Part. Animal.\" 1. For the \"teleological\" views\n    see IV. iii. 2 foll.\n\n (6) \"Like a sieve\" or \"colander.\"\n\n (7) \"That which goeth out of a man.\"\n\nAr. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the\nhandiwork of some wise artificer, (8) full of love for all things\nliving. (9)\n\n (8) \"Demiurge.\"\n\n (9) Passage referred to by Epictetus ap. Stob. \"Flor.\" 121, 29.\n\nSoc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget\noffspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the\ncreature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of death?\n\nAr. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one\ndeliberately planning the existence of living creatures.\n\nSoc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?\n\nAr. Put your questions, and I will answer.\n\nSoc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be\nfound? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny\nfragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters,\nand of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume,\na particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind\nalone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, (10) you had the\nlucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And\nthese things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number,\nowe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?\n\n (10) Cf. Plat. \"Phileb.\" 30 B: \"Soc. May our body be said to have a\n    soul? Pro. Clearly. Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear\n    Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains\n    elements similar to our bodies but finer, has also a soul? Can\n    there be any other source?\"--Jowett. Cic. \"de N. D.\" ii. 6; iii.\n    11.\n\nAr. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as\none sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.\n\nSoc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of your\nbody; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you like, that\nyou do nothing with intelligence, (11) but everything by chance.\n\n (11) Or, \"by your wit,\" {gnome}.\n\nAt this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not disdain\nthe Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the Divinity is too\ngrand to need any service which I could render.\n\nSoc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon\nyou, the more you are called upon to honour it.\n\nAr. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all\nmen, I would not neglect them.\n\nSoc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the\nfirst place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture,\nenabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more\nfreely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other\ncreatures (endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth). (12)\nConsider next how they gave to the beast of the field (13) feet as a\nmeans of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands--those\nhands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of happiness\nabove all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which belongs\nindeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so as to\nplay on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby we can\nproduce articulate speech, and have a code of signals to express our\nevery want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of the sexual\nappetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to certain seasons,\nbut in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to old age. Nor did\nit content the Godhead merely to watch over the interests of man's body.\nWhat is of far higher import, he implanted in man the noblest and most\nexcellent type of soul. For what other creature, to begin with, has\na soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this\ngrand and beauteous universe? What other tribe of animals save man\ncan render service to the gods? How apt is the spirit of man to take\nprecautions against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to alleviate\ndisease and foster strength! how suited to labour with a view to\nlearning! how capable of garnering in the storehouse of his memory all\nthat he has heard or seen or understood! Is it not most evident to you\nthat by the side of other animals men live and move a race of gods--by\nnature excellent, in beauty of body and of soul supreme? For, mark you,\nhad a creature of man's wit been encased in the body of an ox, (14)\nhe would have been powerless to carry out his wishes, just as the\npossession of hands divorced from human wit is profitless. And then you\ncome, you who have obtained these two most precious attributes, and give\nit as your opinion, that the gods take no thought or care for you. Why,\nwhat will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded\nthat you too are in their thoughts?\n\n (12) See Kuhner for an attempt to cure the text.\n\n (13) {erpetois}, a \"poetical\" word. Cf. \"Od.\" iv. 418; Herod. i. 140.\n\n (14) See Aristot. \"de Part. Animal.\" iv. 10.\n\nAr. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me\ncounsellors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from doing, (15)\nI will believe.\n\n (15) See IV. iii. 12.\n\nSoc. Send you counsellors! Come now, what when the people of Athens make\ninquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an Athenian?\nThink you not that to you also the answer is given? What when they send\nportents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all mankind? Are you\nnot a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you also? Can it be\nthat you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect?\nAgain, do you suppose that the gods could have implanted in the heart\nof man the belief in their capacity to work him weal or woe had they not\nthe power? Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse\nof time? Do you not perceive that the wisest and most perdurable of\nhuman institutions--be they cities or tribes of men--are ever the most\nGod-fearing; and in the individual man the riper his age and judgment,\nthe deeper his religousness? Ay, my good sir (he broke forth), lay to\nheart and understand that even as your own mind within you can turn and\ndispose of your body as it lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom\nwhich abides within the universal frame does so dispose of all things as\nit finds agreeable to itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able\nto range over many a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to\nembrace all things at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to\ndwell in thought on matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily,\nbut that the wisdom and thought of God is not sufficient to include all\nthings at one instant under His care. If only you would copy your\nown behaviour (16) where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of\nservice and of kindness that you discover which of your fellows are\nwilling to requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your\ncounsel that you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like\nprinciple, you will but make trial of the gods by acts of service,\nwhether they will choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to\nmortal vision, you shall discover the nature and the greatness of\nGodhead to be such that they are able at once to see all things and to\nhear all things and to be present everywhere, nor does the least thing\nescape their watchful care.\n\n (16) Or, \"reason as you are wont to do.\"\n\nTo my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him\nto hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only whilst\nthey were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since they must\nbelieve that no part of their conduct could escape the eye of Heaven.\n\n\nV\n\nI suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble\nacquirement for a man. (1) If so, let us turn and consider whether by\nlanguage like the following he was likely to lead his listeners onwards\n(2) to the attainment of this virtue. \"Sirs,\" he would say, \"if a war\ncame upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help us to\nsave ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should scarcely\nselect one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine, or lust,\nand prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such an one to\nsave us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing the end of\nhis days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he might entrust\nhis sons for education, his maiden daughters for protection, and his\nproperty in general for preservation, would he deem a libertine worthy\nof such offices? Why, no one would dream of entrusting his flocks and\nherds, his storehouses and barns, or the superintendence of his works to\nthe tender mercies of an intemperate slave. If a butler or an errand boy\nwith such a character were offered to us we would not take him as a free\ngift. And if he would not accept an intemperate slave, what pains should\nthe master himself take to avoid that imputation. (3) For with the\nincontinent man it is not as with the self-seeker and the covetous.\nThese may at any rate be held to enrich themselves in depriving others.\nBut the intemperate man cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing\nto himself if a curse to his neighbours; nay, the mischief which he\nmay cause to others is nothing by comparison with that which redounds\nagainst himself, since it is the height of mischief to ruin--I do not\nsay one's own house and property--but one's own body and one's own soul.\nOr to take an example from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest\nwho evidently takes more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the\nfriends beside him--who stints his comrades of the affection due to them\nto dote upon a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man\nis bound to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue:\n(4) which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his\nsoul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or\npractise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it\nconversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul\nand body? By Hera, (5) well may every free man pray to be saved from the\nservice of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to such\npleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that is the\none hope of salvation left him.\"\n\n (1) Lit. \"a beautiful and brave possession.\"\n\n (2) {proubibaze}.\n\n (3) Or, \"how should the master himself beware lest he fall into that\n    category.\"\n\n (4) {krepida}. See Pind. \"Pyth.\" iv. 138; ib. vii. 3; ib. fr. 93.\n\n (5) See below, III. x. 9, xi. 5; IV. ii. 9, iv. 8; \"Econ.\" x. 1;\n    \"Cyrop.\" I. iv. 12; Plat. \"Phaedr.\" 230 B. Cf. Shakesp. \"by'r\n    Lakin.\"\n\nWell-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in\nhis acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures\nwhich flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches, his\nbelief being that he who receives money from this or that chance donor\nsets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an abominable\nslavery.\n\n\nVI\n\nIn this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist (1) deserve\nrecord. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his\nassociates, and in their presence thus accosts him.\n\n (1) {o teratoskopos}, \"jealous of Socrates,\" according to Aristotle\n    ap. Diog. Laert. II. v. 25. See Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\"\n\nAntiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of\nphilosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other\nfruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live,\nin a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with.\nYour meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes,\nyou cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter\nalike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet\nor a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making\nmoney, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession\nof it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know\nwhether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion\ntheir pupils in imitation of themselves, (2) and propose to mould the\ncharacters of your companions; but if you do you ought to dub yourself\nprofessor of the art of wretchedness. (3)\n\n (2) Or, \"try to turn out their pupils as copies of themselves.\"\n\n (3) See Arist. \"Clouds,\" {on o kakodaimon Sokrates kai Khairephon}.\n\nThus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon;\nyou have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for\nyourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we\nturn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he\nwho takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which\nhe is paid, whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to\ndiscourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the\nground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less stengthening\nthan yours, or that the articles of my consumption are so scarce and\nso much costlier to procure than yours? Or have the fruits of your\nmarketing a flavour denied to mine? Do you not know the sharper the\nappetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the\ndesire for out-of-the-way drinks? And as to raiment, clothes, you know,\nare changed on account of cold or else of heat. People only wear boots\nand shoes in order not to gall their feet and be prevented walking.\nNow I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than\nothers on account of the cold? Have you ever seen me battling with\nany one for shade on account of the heat? Do you not know that even a\nweakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo\na giant who neglects his body? He will beat him in the particular point\nof training, and bear the strain more easily. But you apparently will\nnot have it that I, who am for ever training myself to endure this,\nthat, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all\nhardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not\nso practised. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery,\ncan you suggest more effective means than the possession of some\npowerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in\nthe using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet\nthis you do know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in\nnothing--it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing\nwith him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, (4) or any of the\nthousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To\nhim it is given to rejoice as he reflects, \"I am doing well.\" But is\nthe pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the\nconsciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better\nfriends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.\n\n (4) \"The business of a shipowner or skipper.\"\n\nAgain, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which of\nthe two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects--he who\nleads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style which\nyou deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's life more\neasily--the man who cannot get on without expensive living, or he to\nwhom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the readier to\ncapitulate and cry \"mercy\" in a siege--the man of elaborate wants, or\nhe who can get along happily with the readiest things to hand? You,\nAntiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of luxury and\nextravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to\nmy mind, an attribute of Godhead; (5) to have as few wants as possible\nthe nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is\nmightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.\n\n (5) Cf. Aristot. \"Eth. N.\" x. viii. 1.\n\nReturning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged\nSocrates in conversation thus.\n\nAnt. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man;\nbut for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute\nthe verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment\nfor your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or\nany other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and\nnever dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging\nit for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you\nthought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than\nits equivalent in gold. (6) Hence the conclusion to which I have come,\nas already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not\ncheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your\nknowledge is not worth a cent.\n\n (6) Or rather \"money,\" lit. \"silver.\"\n\nTo this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to\nthat beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and\na foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases\nan evil name, but supposing the same person has discerned a soul of\nbeauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice\nas sensible. (7) So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the\nfirst bidder we name a sophist, (8) as though one should say a man who\nprostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature\nof another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his\nfriend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every\ngood citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I\ntoo, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his\nhorse and his hounds, (9) and another in his fighting cocks, so I too\ntake my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I\nteach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be\nhelped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of\nold, written and bequeathed in their books, (10) I unfold and peruse in\ncommon with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it\neagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship\nwith one another.\n\n (7) Add \"and a sign of modesty,\" {sophrona nomizomen}.\n\n (8) {sophistas}. See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 482 foll.; \"Hunting,\" xi.\n    foll.\n\n (9) Cf. Plat. \"Lys.\" 211 E.\n\n (10) Cf. \"Symp.\" iv. 27.\n\nAs I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master,\nwas a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by\nhim to beauty and nobility of soul.\n\nAgain on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected\nto make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did\nnot engage in politics himself.\n\nSocrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were\nthe more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself\nsingle-handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible\nfit to engage in that pursuit?\n\n\nVII\n\nLet us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from\nquackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the\npursuit of virtue. (1) He used often to say there was no better road\nto renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he\ndesired to be reputed good. (2) The truth of the concept he enforced as\nfollows: \"Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted\nto be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would\nbe forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art,\nwould he not? and first or all, seeing that these artists always have\na splendid equipment, (3) and travel about with a long train of\nattendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command\nthe plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of\nclackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give\na performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a\nlaughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a\nwretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not\none advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What\nis left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and\nmockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be\nthought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of\nthe sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two\nmisfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in\nthese matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will\nbe bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands\nto reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without\nthe requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he\nleast desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the\nstage himself.\" Thus first by one instance and then another would\nhe demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or\ncourageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. \"You\nare sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your\npower to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity,\nthe world will give you no commiseration.\" \"I call that man a cheat, and\na great cheat too,\" he would say, \"who gets money or goods out of some\none by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is\nthe biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead\nthe state, when all the while he is a worthless creature.\" (4)\n\n (1) {apotrepon proutrepen}. See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 450 foll.\n\n (2) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 22.\n\n (3) Or, \"furniture of the finest,\" like Arion's in Herod. i. 24.\n    Schneid. cf. Demosth. 565. 6.\n\n (4) Here follows the sentence  ({emoi men oun edokei kai tou\n    alazoneuesthai apotrepein tous sunontas toiade dialegomenos}),\n    which, for the sake of convenience, I have attached to the first\n    sentence of Bk. II. ch. i.  ({edokei de moi... ponou.}) I\n    believe that the commentators are right in bracketing both one and\n    the other as editorial interpolations.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\n\nI\n\nNow, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his\nhearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming, (1) so I am\nsure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his\nfollowers to practise self-control and endurance: self-control in\nthe matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust;\nendurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue\nlicence which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such\nmatters. (2) Accordingly he thus addressed him:\n\n (1) This sentence in the Greek concludes Bk. I. There is something\n    wrong or very awkward in the text here.\n\n (2) Cf. Grote, \"Plato,\" III. xxxviii. p. 530.\n\nTell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children\nentrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an\naptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity\nto rule--how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our\ninquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food\nand nutriment?\n\nAr. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle, (3)\nwithout which there is no man living but would perish.\n\n (3) Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.\n\nSoc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food\nat certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?\n\nAr. It is to be expected.\n\nSoc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will, (4)\nto prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?\n\n (4) {proairesis}.\n\nAr. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not\nhave affairs of state neglected during (5) his government.\n\n (5) Lit. \"along of.\"\n\nSoc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out\nagainst thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?\n\nAr. Certainly he must.\n\nSoc. And on which of the two shall we confer such self-control in regard\nto sleep as shall enable him to rest late and rise early, or keep vigil,\nif the need arise?\n\nAr. To the same one of the two must be given that endurance also.\n\nSoc. Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that\nnothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty? Which of them\nclaims that?\n\nAr. The same one of the pair again.\n\nSoc. Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift,\nthe voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from\nthem?\n\nAr. This, too, belongs of right to him who is being trained for\ngovernment.\n\nSoc. Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all\nknowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?\n\nAr. To our future ruler certainly, for without these parts of learning\nall his other capacities will be merely waste.\n\nSoc. (6)Will not a man so educated be less liable to be entrapped by\nrival powers, and so escape a common fate of living creatures, some\nof which (as we all know) are hooked through their own greediness, and\noften even in spite of a native shyness; but through appetite for\nfood they are drawn towards the bait, and are caught; while others are\nsimilarly ensnared by drink?\n\n (6)  (SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.)\n\nAr. Undoubtedly.\n\nSoc. And others again are victims of amorous heat, as quails, for\ninstance, or partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird, with\nlust and expectation of such joys grow wild, and lose their power of\ncomputing dangers: on they rush, and fall into the snare of the hunter?\n\nAristippus assented.\n\nSoc. And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected\nlike the silliest bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades the\ninnermost sanctum (7) of the house, though he is well aware of the risks\nwhich his crime involves, (8) the formidable penalties of the law,\nthe danger of being caught in the toils, and then suffering the direst\ncontumely. Considering all the hideous penalties which hang over the\nadulterer's head, considering also the many means at hand to release him\nfrom the thraldom of his passion, that a man should so drive headlong on\nto the quicksands of perdition (9)--what are we to say of such frenzy?\nThe wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?\n(10)\n\n (7) {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.\n\n (8) Or, \"he knows the risks he runs of suffering those penalties with\n    which the law threatens his crime should he fall into the snare,\n    and being caught, be mutilated.\"\n\n (9) Or, \"leap headlong into the jaws of danger.\"\n\n (10) {kakodaimonontos}.\n\nAr. So it strikes me.\n\nSoc. And does it not strike you as a sign of strange indifference that,\nwhereas the greater number of the indispensable affairs of men, as for\ninstance, those of war and agriculture, and more than half the rest,\nneed to be conducted under the broad canopy of heaven, (11) yet the\nmajority of men are quite untrained to wrestle with cold and heat?\n\n (11) Or, \"in the open air.\"\n\nAristippus again assented.\n\nSoc. And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train\nhimself to bear these things lightly?\n\nAr. Most certainly.\n\nSoc. And whilst we rank those who are self-disciplined in all these\nmatters among persons fit to rule, we are bound to place those incapable\nof such conduct in the category of persons without any pretension\nwhatsoever to be rulers?\n\nAr. I assent.\n\nSoc. Well, then, since you know the rank peculiar to either section of\nmankind, did it ever strike you to consider to which of the two you are\nbest entitled to belong?\n\nYes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not dream for a moment of ranking\nmyself in the class of those who wish to rule. In fact, considering how\nserious a business it is to cater for one's own private needs, I look\nupon it as the mark of a fool not to be content with that, but to\nfurther saddle oneself with the duty of providing the rest of the\ncommunity with whatever they may be pleased to want. That, at the cost\nof much personal enjoyment, a man should put himself at the head of a\nstate, and then, if he fail to carry through every jot and tittle of\nthat state's desire, be held to criminal account, does seem to me the\nvery extravagance of folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat their\nrulers precisely as I treat my domestic slaves. I expect my attendants\nto furnish me with an abundance of necessaries, but not to lay a finger\non one of them themselves. So these states regard it as the duty of a\nruler to provide them with all the good things imaginable, but to keep\nhis own hands off them all the while. (12) So then, for my part, if\nanybody desires to have a heap of pother himself, (13) and be a nuisance\nto the rest of the world, I will educate him in the manner suggested,\nand he shall take his place among those who are fit to rule; but for\nmyself, I beg to be enrolled amongst those who wish to spend their days\nas easily and pleasantly as possible.\n\n (12) Or, \"but he must have no finger in the pie himself.\"\n\n (13) See Kuhner ad loc.\n\nSoc. Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are\nlikely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?\n\nAr. By all means let us do so.\n\nSoc. To begin then with the nations and races known to ourselves. (14)\nIn Asia the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians, Phrygians,\nLydians are ruled; and in Europe we find the Scythians ruling, and the\nMaeotians being ruled. In Africa (15) the Carthaginians are rulers, the\nLibyans ruled. Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier\nlife, in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home--you are yourself a\nHellene--which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you,\nthe dominant or the subject states?\n\n (14) Or, \"the outer world, the non-Hellenic races and nationalities of\n    which we have any knowledge.\"\n\n (15) Lit. \"Libya.\"\n\nNay, (16) I would have you to understand (exclaimed Aristippus) that I\nam just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I\ntake it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread,\navoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom--the high road\nwhich leads to happiness.\n\n (16) Or, \"Pardon me interrupting you, Socrates; but I have not the\n    slightest intention of placing myself.\" See W. L. Newman, op. cit.\n    i. 306.\n\nSoc. True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule\nand slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed\nas you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be\nruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those\nwho rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the\nweaker on the stool of repentance (17) both in public and in private,\nand to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this\ncommon case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes\nanother set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in\nevery way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay\nthem proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery\nrather than war against their betters. And in private life also,\nyou will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the\nhelpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of\ntheir victims.\n\n (17) See \"Symp.\" iii. 11; \"Cyrop.\" II. ii. 14; Plat. \"Ion,\" 535 E; L.\n    Dindorf ad loc.\n\nAr. Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such\nmisadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I\nroam the wide world a foreigner.\n\nSoc. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke, upon my word! (18) Of course,\never since the decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes, (19)\nforeign travellers have had an easy time of it. But still, if I bethink\nme, even in these modern days the members of free communities do\npass laws in their respective countries for self-protection against\nwrong-doing. Over and above their personal connections, they provide\nthemselves with a host of friends; they gird their cities about with\nwalls and battlements; they collect armaments to ward off evil-doers;\nand to make security doubly sure, they furnish themselves with allies\nfrom foreign states. In spite of all which defensive machinery these\nsame free citizens do occasionally fall victims to injustice. But you,\nwho are without any of these aids; you, who pass half your days on the\nhigh roads where iniquity is rife; (20) you, who, into whatever city\nyou enter, are less than the least of its free members, and moreover are\njust the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out\nfor attack--yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be\nexempt from injury? So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state\nauthorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: \"The person\nof this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in\nbe free from danger\"? Is that the ground of your confidence? or do you\nrather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a\nslave as no master would care to keep? For who would care to have in\nhis house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong\na propensity to extravagance? Suppose we stop and consider that very\npoint: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic? If I am not\nmistaken, they chastise his wantonness by starvation; they balk his\nthieving tendencies by bars and bolts where there is anything to steal;\nthey hinder him from running away by bonds and imprisonment; they drive\nthe sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is it not so? Or how do you\nproceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?\n\n (18) Or, \"Well foiled!\" \"A masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers.\"\n\n (19) For these mythical highway robbers, see Diod. iv. 59; and for\n    Sciron in particular, Plut. \"Theseus,\" 10.\n\n (20) Or, \"where so many suffer wrong.\"\n\nAr. I correct them with all the plagues, till I force them to serve me\nproperly. But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated in the royal\nart, (21) which, if I mistake not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I\nask, will he be better off than others who lie in evil case, in spite\nof themselves, simply because they suffer perforce, but in his case the\nhunger and the thirst, the cold shivers and the lying awake at nights,\nwith all the changes he will ring on pain, are of his own choosing? For\nmy part I cannot see what difference it makes, provided it is one and\nthe same bare back which receives the stripes, whether the whipping be\nself-appointed or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern my body in\ngeneral, provided it be my body, whether I am beleaguered by a whole\narmament of such evils (22) of my own will or against my will--except\nonly for the folly which attaches to self-appointed suffering.\n\n (21) Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. \"Statesm.\" 259 B; \"Euthyd.\" 291 C;\n    K. Joel, op. cit. p. 387 foll. \"Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus\"\n    (\"Rep.\" 419), W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.\n\n (22) Cf. \"suffers the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.\"\n\nSoc. What, Aristippus, does it not seem to you that, as regards such\nmatters, there is all the difference between voluntary and involuntary\nsuffering, in that he who starves of his own accord can eat when he\nchooses, and he who thirsts of his own free will can drink, and so for\nthe rest; but he who suffers in these ways perforce cannot desist from\nthe suffering when the humour takes him? Again, he who suffers hardship\nvoluntarily, gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed on hope\n(23)--just as a hunter in pursuit of wild beasts, through hope of\ncapturing his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and these are but prizes of\nlittle worth in return for their labours; but what shall we say of their\nreward who toil to obtain to themselves good friends, or to subdue their\nenemies, or that through strength of body and soul they may administer\ntheir households well, befriend their friends, and benefit the land\nwhich gave them birth? Must we not suppose that these too will take\ntheir sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose\nthat they too will gaily confront existence, who have to support them\nnot only their conscious virtue, but the praise and admiration of the\nworld? (24) And once more, habits of indolence, along with the fleeting\npleasures of the moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers say, of\nsetting up (25) a good habit of body, or of implanting in the soul any\nknowledge worthy of account; whereas by painstaking endeavour in the\npursuit of high and noble deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance\nwe shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod somewhere says: (26)\n\n    Wickedness may a man take wholesale with ease, smooth is the way\n    and her dwelling-place is very nigh; but in front of virtue the\n    immortal gods have placed toil and sweat, long is the path and\n    steep that leads to her, and rugged at the first, but when the\n    summit of the pass is reached, then for all its roughness the path\n    grows easy.\n\n (23) Cf. above, I. vi. 8.\n\n (24) Or, \"in admiration of themselves, the praise and envy of the\n    world at large.\"\n\n (25) See Hippocrates, \"V. Med.\" 18.\n\n (26) Hesiod, \"Works and Days,\" 285. See Plat. \"Prot.\" 340 C; \"Rep.\"\n    ii. 364 D; \"Laws,\" iv. 718 E.\n\nAnd Ephicharmus (27) bears his testimony when he says:\n\n    The gods sell us all good things in return for our labours.\n\n (27) Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic poet among the Dorians, fl.\n    500 B.C. Cf. Plat. \"Theaet.\" 152 E, \"the prince of comedy\";\n    \"Gorg.\" 505 D.\n\nAnd again in another passage he exclaims:\n\n    Set not thine heart on soft things, thou knave, lest thou light\n    upon the hard.\n\nAnd that wise man Prodicus (28) delivers himself in a like strain\nconcerning virtue in that composition of his about Heracles, which\ncrowds have listened to. (29) This, as far as I can recollect it, is the\nsubstance at least of what he says:\n\n (28) Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. \"Men.\" 24; \"Cratyl.\" 1; Philostr.\n    \"Vit. Soph.\" i. 12.\n\n (29) Or, \"which he is fond of reciting as a specimen of style.\" The\n    title of the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according to Suidas,\n    {Prodikos}.\n\n\"When Heracles was emerging from boyhood into the bloom of youth, having\nreached that season in which the young man, now standing upon the verge\nof independence, shows plainly whether he will enter upon the path of\nvirtue or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place, and sat debating\nwith himself which of those two paths he should pursue; and as he there\nsat musing, there appeared to him two women of great stature which drew\nnigh to him. The one was fair to look upon, frank and free by gift\nof nature, (30) her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with\nbashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad in\nwhite apparel. The other was of a different type; the fleshy softness\nof her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was\nembellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really\nwas, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her;\nshe stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad\nserved but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances\nshe surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while\never and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow of herself intently.\n\n (30) Reading {eleutherion phusei,...} or if {eleutherion,\n    phusei...} translate \"nature had adorned her limbs...\"\n\n\"Now when these two had drawn near to Heracles, she who was first\nnamed advanced at an even pace (31) towards him, but the other, in her\neagerness to outstrip her, ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I see\nyou, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty what path of life to choose; make\nme your friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest road and easiest.\nThis I promise you: you shall taste all of life's sweets and escape all\nbitters. In the first place, you shall not trouble your brain with\nwar or business; other topics shall engage your mind; (32) your only\nspeculation, what meat or drink you shall find agreeable to your palate;\nwhat delight (33) of ear or eye; what pleasure of smell or touch; what\ndarling lover's intercourse shall most enrapture you; how you shall\npillow your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each individual pleasure\nwithout alloy of pain; and if ever the suspicion steal upon you that the\nstream of joys will one day dwindle, trust me I will not lead you where\nyou shall replenish the store by toil of body and trouble of soul. No!\nothers shall labour, but you shall reap the fruit of their labours; you\nshall withhold your hand from nought which shall bring you gain. For to\nall my followers I give authority and power to help themselves freely\nfrom every side.'\n\n (31) Or, \"without change in her demeanour.\"\n\n (32) Reading {diese}, or {dioisei}, \"you shall continue speculating\n    solely.\"\n\n (33) It will be recollected that Prodicus prided himself on {orthotes\n    onomaton}. Possibly Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?) his\n    style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.\n\n\"Heracles hearing these words made answer: 'What, O lady, is the name\nyou bear?' To which she: 'Know that my friends call be Happiness,\nbut they that hate me have their own nicknames (34) for me, Vice and\nNaughtiness.'\n\n (34) So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi} is interpreted. Cobet (\"Pros. Xen.\"\n    p. 36) suggests {upoknizomenoi} = \"quippe qui desiderio\n    pungantur.\"\n\n\"But just then the other of those fair women approached and spoke:\n'Heracles, I too am come to you, seeing that your parents are well\nknown to me, and in your nurture I have gauged your nature; wherefore I\nentertain good hope that if you choose the path which leads to me, you\nshall greatly bestir yourself to be the doer of many a doughty deed of\nnoble emprise; and that I too shall be held in even higher honour for\nyour sake, lit with the lustre shed by valorous deeds. (35) I will not\ncheat you with preludings of pleasure, (36) but I will relate to you the\nthings that are according to the ordinances of God in very truth. Know\nthen that among things that are lovely and of good report, not one have\nthe gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from toil and pains. Would\nyou obtain the favour of the gods, then must you pay these same gods\nservice; would you be loved by your friends, you must benefit these\nfriends; do you desire to be honoured by the state, you must give the\nstate your aid; do you claim admiration for your virtue from all Hellas,\nyou must strive to do some good to Hellas; do you wish earth to yield\nher fruits to you abundantly, to earth must you pay your court; do you\nseek to amass riches from your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow\nyour labour; or is it your ambition to be potent as a warrior, able to\nsave your friends and to subdue your foes, then must you learn the arts\nof war from those who have the knowledge, and practise their application\nin the field when learned; or would you e'en be powerful of limb and\nbody, then must you habituate limbs and body to obey the mind, and\nexercise yourself with toil and sweat.'\n\n (35) Or, \"bathed in the splendour of thy virtues.\"\n\n (36) Or, \"honeyed overtures of pleasure.\"\n\n\"At this point, (as Prodicus relates) Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See\nyou, Heracles, how hard and long the road is by which yonder woman would\nescort you to her festal joys. (37) But I will guide you by a short and\neasy road to happiness.'\n\n (37) Hesiod, \"Theog.\" 909; Milton, \"L'Allegro,\" 12.\n\n\"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one, what good thing hast thou? or\nwhat sweet thing art thou acquainted with--that wilt stir neither hand\nnor foot to gain it? Thou, that mayest not even await the desire of\npleasure, but, or ever that desire springs up, art already satiated;\neating before thou hungerest, and drinking before thou thirsteth; who to\neke out an appetite must invent an army of cooks and confectioners; and\nto whet thy thirst must lay down costliest wines, and run up and down\nin search of ice in summer-time; to help thy slumbers soft coverlets\nsuffice not, but couches and feather-beds must be prepared thee and\nrockers to rock thee to rest; since desire for sleep in thy case springs\nnot from toil but from vacuity and nothing in the world to do. Even the\nnatural appetite of love thou forcest prematurely by every means thou\nmayest devise, confounding the sexes in thy service. Thus thou educatest\nthy friends: with insult in the night season and drowse of slumber\nduring the precious hours of the day. Immortal, thou art cast forth\nfrom the company of gods, and by good men art dishonoured: that sweetest\nsound of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled thine ears; and\nthe fairest of all fair visions is hidden from thine eyes that have\nnever beheld one bounteous deed wrought by thine own hand. If thou\nopenest thy lips in speech, who will believe thy word? If thou hast need\nof aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane man will venture to join\nthy rablle rout? Ill indeed are thy revellers to look upon, young men\nimpotent of body, and old men witless in mind: in the heyday of life\nthey batten in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age\nof wrinkled wretchedness: and why? they blush with shame at the thought\nof deeds done in the past, and groan for weariness at what is left to\ndo. During their youth they ran riot through their sweet things, and\nlaid up for themselves large store of bitterness against the time of\neld. But my companionship is with the gods; and with the good among men\nmy conversation; no bounteous deed, divine or human, is wrought without\nmy aid. Therefore am I honoured in Heaven pre-eminently, and upon\nearth among men whose right it is to honour me; (38) as a beloved\nfellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful guardian of house and lands,\nwhom the owners bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants; (39) a brave\nassistant in the labours of peace; an unflinching ally in the deeds of\nwar; a sharer in all friendships indispensable. To my friends is given\nan enjoyment of meats and drinks, which is sweet in itself and devoid\nof trouble, in that they can endure until desire ripens, and sleep more\ndelicious visits them than those who toil not. Yet they are not pained\nto part with it; nor for the sake of slumber do they let slip the\nperformance of their duties. Among my followers the youth delights in\nthe praises of his elders, and the old man glories in the honour of the\nyoung; with joy they call to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's\nwell-doing are well pleased. For my sake they are dear in the sight\nof God, beloved of their friends and honoured by the country of their\nbirth. When the appointed goal is reached they lie not down in oblivion\nwith dishonour, but bloom afresh--their praise resounded on the lips of\nmen for ever. (40) Toils like these, O son of noble parents, Heracles,\nit is yours to meet with, and having endured, to enter into the heritage\nassured you of transcendant happiness.'\"\n\n (38) Reading {ois prosekei}, or if {proseko}, translate \"to whom I am\n    attached.\"\n\n (39) Cf. \"Econ.\" v. 8.\n\n (40) Or, \"so true is it, a branch is left them; undying honour to\n    their name!\"\n\nThis, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the theme which Prodicus pursues\n(41) in his \"Education of Heracles by Virtue,\" only he decked out\nhis sentiments, I admit, in far more magnificent phrases than I have\nventured on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these\nsayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the\nfuture of our life?\n\n (41) Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei} = \"so Prodicus arranged the parts\n    of his discourse.\"\n\n\nII\n\nAt another time, he had noticed the angry temper shown by Lamprocles,\nthe elder of his sons, towards their mother, and thus addressed himself\nto the lad.\n\nSoc. Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called\nungrateful?\n\nThat I have (replied the young man).\n\nSoc. And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?\n\nLamp. Yes, I have: when any one has been kindly treated, and has it in\nhis power to requite the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him\nungrateful.\n\nSoc. And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?\n\nLamp. I do.\n\nSoc. And has it ever struck you to inquire whether, as regards the right\nor wrong of it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble some such conduct\nas the enslavement, say, of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards\nfriends but justifiable towards enemies?\n\nLamp. Yes, I have put that question to myself. In my opinion, no matter\nwho confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should endeavour\nto requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer.\n\nSoc. Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an\ninstance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?\n\nLamprocles assented to the proposition.\n\nSoc. It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the\nbenefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the\nkindness?\n\nLamprocles again assented.\n\nSocrates continued: And where can we hope to find greater benefits than\nthose which children derive from their parents--their father and mother\nwho brought them out of nothingness into being, who granted them to look\nupon all these fair sights, and to partake of all those blessings which\nthe gods bestow on man, things so priceless in our eyes that one and all\nwe shudder at the thought of leaving them, and states have made death\nthe penalty for the greatest crimes, because there is no greater evil\nthrough fear of which to stay iniquity.\n\nYou do not suppose that human beings produce children for the sake of\ncarnal pleasure (1) merely; were this the motive, street and bordell are\nfull of means to quit them of that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer\nthan the pains we take to seek out wives who shall bear us the finest\nchildren. (2) With these we wed, and carry on the race. The man has a\ntwofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing her who is to raise up\nchildren along with him, and partly towards the children yet unborn\nin providing them with things that he thinks will contribute to their\nwell-being--and of these as large a store as possible. The woman,\nconceiving, bears her precious burthen with travail and pain, and at the\nrisk of life itself--sharing with that within her womb the food on which\nshe herself is fed. And when with much labour she has borne to the end\nand brought forth her offspring, she feeds it and watches over it with\ntender care--not in return for any good thing previously received, for\nindeed the babe itself is little conscious of its benefactor and cannot\neven signify its wants; only she, the mother, making conjecture of what\nis good for it, and what will please it, essays to satisfy it; (3)\nand for many months she feeds it night and day, enduring the toil nor\nrecking what return she shall receive for all her trouble. Nor does the\ncare and kindness of parents end with nurture; but when the children\nseem of an age to learn, they teach them themselves whatever cunning\nthey possess, as a guide to life, or where they feel that another is\nmore competent, to him they send them to be taught at their expense.\nThus they watch over their children, doing all in their power to enable\nthem to grow up to be as good as possible.\n\n (1) Lit. \"the joys of Aphrodite.\"\n\n (2) \"For the procreation of children.\" See below, IV. iv. 22; \"Pol.\n    Lac.\" i.\n\n (3) Lit. \"to leave nought lacking.\"\n\nSo be it (the youth answered); but even if she have done all that,\nand twenty times as much, no soul on earth could endure my mother's\ncross-grained temper.\n\nThen Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear--a wild beast's\nsavagery or a mother's?\n\nLamp. To my mind, a mother's--at least if she be such as mine.\n\nSoc. Dear me! And has this mother ever done you any injury--such as\npeople frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?\n\nLamp. If she has not done quite that, she uses words which any one would\nsooner sell his life than listen to.\n\nSoc. And how many annoyances have you caused your mother, do you\nsuppose, by fretfulness and peevishness in word and deed, night and day,\nsince you were a little boy? How much sorrow and pain, when you were\nill?\n\nLamp. Well, I never said or did anything to bring a blush to her cheeks.\n\nSoc. No, come now! Do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your\nmother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage,\n(4) when the floodgates of abuse are opened?\n\n (4) See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 457; Plut. \"Solon,\" xxix.\n\nLamp. Yes; for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their\nparts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict\na fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no\nmischief--that is why they take it all so easily.\n\nSoc. Then ought you to fly into a passion, who know well enough that,\nwhatever your mother says, she is so far from meaning you mischief that\nshe is actually wishing blessings to descend upon you beyond all others?\nOr do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?\n\nLamp. No, I do not think that.\n\nSoc. Then this mother, who is kindly disposed to you, and takes such\ntender care of you when you are ill to make you well again, and to see\nthat you want for nothing which may help you; and, more than all, who is\nperpetually pleading for blessings in your behalf and offering her vows\nto Heaven (5)--can you say of her that she is cross-grained and harsh?\nFor my part, I think, if you cannot away with such a mother, you cannot\naway with such blessings either.\n\n (5) Or, \"paying vows.\"\n\nBut tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being,\nthink you? or are you prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to please or\ntry to please a single soul? to follow none? To obey neither general nor\nruler of any sort? Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe\nallegiance to somebody?\n\nLamp. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.\n\nSoc. May I take it that you are willing to please at any rate your\nneighbour, so that he may kindle a fire for you in your need, may prove\nhimself a ready helpmate in good fortune, or if you chance on evil and\nare stumbling, may friendlily stand by your side to aid?\n\nLamp. I am willing.\n\nSoc. Well, and what of that other chance companion--your\nfellow-traveller by land or sea? what of any others, you may light upon?\nis it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you\nadmit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your\npart?\n\nLamp. I do.\n\nSoc. It stands thus then: you are prepared to pay attention to this,\nthat, and the other stranger, but to your mother who loves you more than\nall else, you are bound to render no service, no allegiance? Do you\nnot know that whilst the state does not concern itself with ordinary\ningratitude or pass judicial sentence on it; whilst it overlooks the\nthanklessness of those who fail to make return for kindly treatment, it\nreserves its pains and penalties for the special case? If a man render\nnot the service and allegiance due to his parents, on him the finger\nof the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to\nhold the archonship--which is as much as to say, \"Sacrifices in behalf\nof the state offered by such a man would be no offerings, being tainted\nwith impiety; nor could aught else be 'well and justly' performed\nof which he is the doer.\" Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the\nsepulchre of his dead parents the state takes cognisance of the matter,\nand inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates. (6) And as\nfor you, my son, if you are in your sober senses, you will earnestly\nentreat your mother, lest the very gods take you to be an ungrateful\nbeing, and on their side also refuse to do you good; and you will beware\nof men also, lest they should perceive your neglect of your parents, and\nwith one consent hold you in dishonour; (7) and so you find yourself in\na desert devoid of friends. For if once the notion be entertained that\nhere is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one will believe that any\nkindness shown you would be other than thrown away.\n\n (6) Lit. \"the docimasia.\" See Gow, \"Companion,\" xiv.\n\n (7) \"Visiti with atimia.\"\n\n\nIII\n\nAt another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon\nand Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and\non seeing the younger of the two he thus addressed him.\n\nSoc. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those strange\npeople who believe that goods are better and more precious than a\nbrother; (1) and that too although the former are but senseless chattels\nwhich need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible being who\ncan afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, whilst as for them\ntheir name is legion. And here again is a marvellous thing: that a man\nshould count his brother a loss, because the goods of his brother are\nnot his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their\npossessions are not his; only it seems in their case he has wits to see\nthat to dwell securely with many and have enough is better than to own\nthe whole wealth of a community and to live in dangerous isolation; but\nthis same doctrine as applied to brothers they ignore. Again, if a\nman have the means, he will purchase domestic slaves, because he wants\nassistants in his work; he will acquire friends, because he needs their\nsupport; but this brother of his--who cares about brothers? It seems\na friend may be discovered in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood\nrelation who is also a brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground\ntowards friendship to have sprung from the same loins and to have been\nsuckled at the same breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural\ncraving, and sympathy springs up between creatures reared together. (2)\nAdded to which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the\nrest of the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own\nbattles. (3)\n\n (1) Cf. \"Merchant of Venice,\" II. viii. 17: \"Justice! the law! my\n    ducats, and my daughter!\"\n\n (2) Or, \"a yearning after their foster-brothers manifests itself in\n    animals.\" See \"Cyrop.\" VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this\n    discussion.\n\n (3) Lit. \"and is less liable to hostility.\"\n\nChaer. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound,\nreason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for\nsome mere trifle's sake, for a brother of the right sort is, as you say,\na blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should a man\nlay his hand to achieve the impossible?\n\nSoc. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any\nmore than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable\nenough?\n\nChaer. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to detest\nhim. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever he appears\non the scene, he is not a blessing--no! but by every manner of means the\nreverse.\n\nSoc. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert\nrider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to\ndeal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother will\nkick?\n\nChaer. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of\ndealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and\ngood deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word\nand deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will not\ntry.\n\nSoc. Well now, that is a marvellous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,\nthe serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand\nof your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his\nteeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try to\npropitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were what\nhe ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you--that you admit;\nand, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words,\nyet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of\nfriends.\n\nChaer. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make\nChaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.\n\nSoc. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery.\nOnly bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will\ncapture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.\n\nChaer. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of which\nI am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and enlighten\nme.\n\nSoc. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to\ninvite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day, (4) what steps would\nyou take?\n\n (4) \"When he next does sacrifice\"; see \"Hiero,\" viii. 3. Cf. Theophr.\n    \"Char.\" xv. 2, and Prof. Jebb's note ad loc.\n\nChaer. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself\non a like occasion.\n\nSoc. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs\nduring your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?\n\nChaer. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look\nafter his in like circumstances.\n\nSoc. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his\nroof while visiting his country, what would you do?\n\nChaer. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own\nroof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering\nthe objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness to\ndo as much for him in a like case.\n\nSoc. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the philtres known\nto man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while; or is\nit that you shrink from taking the first step because of the scandal you\nwill cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it is commonly\nheld to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an enemy in\nmischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon\nwere better fitted to lead the way towards this friendship, (5) I\nshould have tried to persuade him to take the first step in winning your\naffection, but now I am persuaded the first move belongs to you, and to\nyou the final victory.\n\n (5) Reading {pros ten philian}, or if {phusin}, transl. \"natural\n    disposition.\"\n\nChaer. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most\nunlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother.\nWhy, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to the\nelder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an actor.\n\nSoc. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step\naside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is he\nnot expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honour of\na soft couch, (6) to yield him precedence in argument?\n\n (6) Lit. \"with a soft bed,\" or, as we say, \"the best bedroom.\"\n\nMy good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying, (7) but put out your hand\ncaressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at once with\nalacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud and frank and\nsensitive to honour? He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a\nbribe--no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No! gentle natures need\na finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection.\n\n (7) Or, \"have no fears, essay a soothing treatment.\"\n\nChaer. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows\nno change for the better?\n\nSoc. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest,\nbrotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness\nis wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.\nMy belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he will embrace\nthe contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist upon getting\nthe better of you in kindness of word and deed.\n\nAt present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to\nhelp each other, but which have let go their business and have turned to\nhindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on\nthe Divine plan to work together, but which have neglected this in order\nto trammel each other's gait. Now is it not insensate stupidity (8) to\nuse for injury what was meant for advantage? And yet in fashioning\ntwo brothers God intends them, methinks, to be of more benefit to one\nanother than either two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any other\nof those pairs which belong to man from his birth. (9) Consider how\npowerless these hands of ours if called upon to combine their action at\ntwo points more than a single fathom's length apart; (10) and these feet\ncould not stretch asunder (11) even a bare fathom; and these eyes, for\nall the wide-reaching range we claim for them, are incapable of seeing\nsimultaneously the back and front of an object at even closer quarters.\nBut a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity, can work each for the\nother's good, though seas divide them. (12)\n\n (8) \"Boorishness verging upon monomania.\"\n\n (9) \"With which man is endowed at birth.\"\n\n (10) \"More than an 'arms'-stretch' asunder.\"\n\n (11) Lit. \"reach at one stretch two objects, even over that small\n    distance.\"\n\n (12) \"Though leagues separate them.\"\n\n\nIV\n\nI have at another time heard him discourse on the kindred theme of\nfriendship in language well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help a\nman to choose and also to use his friends aright.\n\nHe (Socrates) had often heard the remark made that of all possessions\nthere is none equal to that of a good and sincere friend; but, in spite\nof this assertion, the mass of people, as far as he could see, concerned\nthemselves about nothing so little as the acquisition of friends.\nHouses, and fields, and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of all sorts\n(he said) they were at pains to acquire, and they strove hard to keep\nwhat they had got; but to procure for themselves this greatest of all\nblessings, as they admitted a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom\nthey already possessed, not one man in a hundred ever gave himself a\nthought. It was noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling a man's\nfriend and one of his own household simultaneously, the promptness with\nwhich the master would fetch the doctor to his domestic, and take every\nprecaution necessary for his recovery, with much expenditure of pains;\nbut meanwhile little account would be taken of the friend in like\ncondition, and if both should die, he will show signs of deep annoyance\nat the death of his domestic, which, as he reflects, is a positive loss\nto him; but as regards his friend his position is in no wise materially\naffected, and thus, though he would never dream of leaving his other\npossessions disregarded and ill cared for, friendship's mute appeal is\nmet with flat indifference. (1)\n\n (1) Or, \"the cry of a friend for careful tending falls on deaf ears.\"\n\nOr to take (said he) a crowning instance: (2) with regard to ordinary\npossessions, however multifarious these may be, most people are at least\nacquainted with their number, but if you ask a man to enumerate his\nfriends, who are not so very many after all perhaps, he cannot; or if,\nto oblige the inquirer, he essays to make a list, he will presently\nretract the names of some whom he had previously included. (3) Such is\nthe amount of thought which people bestow upon their friends.\n\n (2) Or, \"Nor had he failed to observe another striking contrast.\" Cf.\n    Cic. \"Lael.\" 17; Diog. Laert. ii. 30.\n\n (3) i.e. \"like a chess-player recalling a move.\"\n\nAnd yet what thing else may a man call his own is comparable to this one\nbest possession! what rather will not serve by contrast to enhance the\nvalue of an honest friend! Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have\ntheir worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend? Kindlier\nand more constant than the faithfullest of slaves--this is that\npossession best named all-serviceable. (4) Consider what the post is\nthat he assigns himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking to\nthe welfare of his friends, to promote their private and their public\ninterests, is his concern. Is there need of kindly action in any\nquarter? he will throw in the full weight of his support. Does some\nterror confound? he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure of\nmoney and of energy, (5) by appeals to reason or resort to force. His\nthe privilege alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour of success and\nto sustain their footing who have well-nigh slipped. All that the hands\nof a man may minister, all that the eyes of each are swift to see, the\nears to hear, and the feet to compass, he with his helpful arts will not\nfall short of. Nay, not seldom that which a man has failed to accomplish\nfor himself, has missed seeing or hearing or attaining, a friend acting\nin behalf of friend will achieve vicariously. And yet, albeit to try and\ntend a tree for the sake of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious mine\nof wealth--this friend--attracts only a lazy and listless attention on\nthe part of more than half the world.\n\n (4) \"A vessel fit for all work indeed is this friend.\" Cf. Ar. \"Ach.\"\n    936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like the \"leather bottel.\"\n\n (5) Or, \"by dint of his diplomacy.\"\n\n\nV\n\nI remember listening to another argument of his, the effect of which\nwould be to promote self-examination. The listener must needs be brought\nto ask himself, \"Of what worth am I to my friends?\" It happened thus.\nOne of those who were with him was neglectful, as he noted, of a friend\nwho was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes). (1) Accordingly, in the\npresence of the negligent person and of several others, he proceeded to\nquestion the sufferer.\n\n (1) Antisthenes, \"cynicorum et stoicorum parens.\" Cic. \"de Or.\" iii.\n    17; \"ad Att.\" xii. 38. See below, III. iii. 17; \"Symp.\" passim;\n    Diog. Laert. II. v.; VI. i.\n\nSoc. What say you, Antisthenes?--have friends their values like domestic\nslaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, (2) another\nonly half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they\ndo say that Nicias, (3) the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for\na superintendent of his silver mines. And so I propound the question to\nmyself as follows: \"Have friends, like slaves, their market values?\"\n\n (2) A mina = L4 circ.\n\n (3) For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.; \"Revenues,\" iv. 14; Plut.\n    \"Nic.\" IV. v.; Lys. \"de bon. Aristoph.\" 648.\n\nNot a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes). At any rate, I know that I\nwould rather have such a one as my friend than be paid two minae, and\nthere is such another whose worth I would not estimate at half a mina,\nand a third with whom I would not part for ten, and then again a fourth\nwhose friendship would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth and pains\nin the world to purchase it.\n\nWell then (continued Socrates), if that be so, would it not be well if\nevery one were to examine himself: \"What after all may I chance to be\nworth to my friends?\" Should he not try to become as dear as possible,\nso that his friends will not care to give him up? How often do I hear\nthe complaint: \"My friend So-and-so has given me up\"; or \"Such an one,\nwhom I looked upon as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina.\" And every\ntime I hear these remarks, the question arises in my mind: If the vendor\nof a worthless slave is ready to part with him to a purchaser for what\nhe will fetch--is there not at least a strong temptation to part with a\nbase friend when you have a chance of making something on the exchange?\nGood slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked down to the hammer;\nno, nor good friends so lightly parted with.\n\n\nVI\n\nAgain, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the\nqualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of\nSocrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive. (1)\n\n (1) Or, \"Again, as to establishing a test of character, since a friend\n    worth having must be of a particular type, I cannot but think that\n    the following remarks would prove instructive.\"\n\nTell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in\nneed of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We\nmust, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his\nappetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted\nto the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one\nenslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or\nby his friends, could he?\n\nCertainly not (Critobulus answered).\n\nSoc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so\ndominated?\n\nCri. Most assuredly.\n\nWell then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who\nhas lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbours;\nif he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get\nanything, he hates you for not giving--do you not think that this man\ntoo would prove but a disagreeable friend?\n\nCri. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then we must keep away from him too?\n\nCri. That we must.\n\nSoc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary\ntransactions? (2) His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason\nhe is an adept at driving a hard bargain (3)--glad enough to take in,\nbut loath to pay out.\n\n (2) Or, \"the money-lender? He has a passion for big money-bags.\"\n\n (3) Or, \"hard in all his dealings.\"\n\nCri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.\n\nSoc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so\nabsorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add\nto his gains?\n\nCri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of\nhim or his society.\n\nSoc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person (4) whose main\nobject is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?\n\n (4) \"The partisan.\"\n\nCri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.\n\nSoc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above\ndefects--a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never\nenters into his head to do a kindness in return.\n\nCri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of\nman shall we endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?\n\nSoc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has\ncontrol over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, (5)\nupright in all his dealings, (6) very zealous is he not to be outdone in\nkindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit\nfrom his acquaintance.\n\n (5) Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos}, transl. \"a man of his word.\"\n\n (6) Or, \"easy to deal with.\"\n\nCri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before\nacquaintance?\n\nSoc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?--not by inferences drawn\nfrom the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already\nachieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust\nhe will do equally well with the rest.\n\nCri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends\nis established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer\nfriends as amiably?\n\nSoc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling\nof horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less\nskilfully again.\n\nCri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth\nhaving, how ought we to make him our friend?\n\nSoc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be\nadvisable to make him our friend.\n\nCri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our\nchoice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?\n\nNot, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare,\nnor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. (7) To\ncapture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind\nhim in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated\nare apt to become foes instead of friends. (8)\n\n (7) Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi}, \"an enemy.\"\n\n (8) Or, \"Hate rather than friendship is the outcome of these methods.\"\n\nCri. But how convert them into friends?\n\nSoc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know\nthem have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list;\nand there are certain philtres also which those who have the secret of\nthem may administer to whom they like and win their love.\n\nCri. From what source shall we learn them?\n\nSoc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens\nsang to Odysseus, (9) the first words of which run, I think, as follows:\n\n    Hither, come hither, thou famous man, Odysseus, great glory of the\n    Achaeans!\n\n (9) \"Od.\" xii. 184.\n\nCri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had\nthe Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener\nconstrained to stay?\n\nSoc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame,\nof virtue emulous.\n\nCri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the\nlistener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the\nenchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive\na method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go\nto some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to\nbreathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall\nand stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles (10) was\nskilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won\nher love.\n\n (10) See above, I. ii. 40; \"Symp.\" viii. 39.\n\nCri. And how did Themistocles (11) win our city's love?\n\n (11) See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii. 2.\n\nSoc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle\nour city with an amulet of saving virtue. (12)\n\n (12) See Herod. vii. 143, \"the wooden wall\"; Thuc. i. 93, \"'the walls'\n    of Athens.\"\n\nCri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win\nthe love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and\naction?\n\nAnd did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad\nman to make good friends?\n\nCri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast\nfriends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander\nand general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of\ngeneralship. (13)\n\n (13) Or, \"Why, yes, when I see some base orator fast friends with a\n    great leader of the people; or, again, some fellow incapable of\n    generalship a comrade to the greatest captains of his age.\"\n\nSoc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether\nyou know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without\nbeing of use in return? (14) Can service ally in friendship with\ndisservice?\n\n (14) Add, \"Can service ally in friendship with disservice? Must there\n    not be a reciprocity of service to make friendship lasting?\"\n\nCri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man\nto be friends with the beautiful and noble, (14) I am concerned at once\nto discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character\ncan, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship\nto every other beautiful and noble nature.\n\n (14) {kalous kagathous}.\n\nSoc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that\nso often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not\nfriends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more\nharshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of\nmankind.\n\nCri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states,\nthe most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one,\nare frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on\nthese things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to\nbe acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be\nfriends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or\nreckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as\nfriends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not\nfriends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then\nagain, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonise in\nfriendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends\nwith those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that\ncultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the\nheadship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are\nleft to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among\nmen?\n\nSoc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things.\n(15) Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of\none another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in\nrecognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of\nwar implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or\nagreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of\ndisunion (16) enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps.\nDiscord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having,\nstaunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.\n(17)\n\n (15) i.e. a cunning intertwining of the threads of warp and woof.\n\n (16) Cf. Shelley, \"The devil of disunion in their souls.\"\n\n (17) The diction is poetical.\n\nBut nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her\nway and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. (18) Such\nis their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly\nthan wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will\nshare their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor\nlove's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted\nto cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely\nto eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful\ndistribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of\none another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless\noblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder\nsuch extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to\nenvy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things\nwhich a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the\ngoods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is\nthe improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the\nhonours (19) of the state not only without injury, but even to their\nmutual advantage?\n\n (18) Or, as we say, \"the elite of human kind.\"\n\n (19) \"And the offices.\"\n\nThey indeed who covet and desire the honours and offices in a state\nfor the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public\nmoneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in\nluxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons\nincapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain\nthese selfsame honours in order that, being himself secure against\nwrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and,\nraised to a high position, (20) may essay to confer some blessing on the\nland of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony\nwith some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the \"beautiful and\nnoble\" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his\npower to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that\ncommunity are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests\nof the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest\ncombatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come\noff victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This\nindeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of\npolitics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is nought\nto hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit\nthe state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged\nin state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find\npartners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists?\nAnd this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need\nallies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the\nflower of the enemy. (21) Moreover, those who are willing to fight\nyour battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to\nenthusiasm; and one good man (22) is better worth your benefiting that a\ndozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but\nwith the base the more you give them the more they ask for.\n\n (20) \"As archon,\" or \"raised to rule.\"\n\n (21) Lit. \"the beautiful and good.\"\n\n (22) Or, \"the best, though few, are better worth your benefiting than\n    the many base.\"\n\nSo keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and\nwhen you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and\ngood. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being\nmyself an adept in Love's lore. (23) No matter who it is for whom my\nheart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth.\nWith vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved\nagain; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this\nthirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will\nbe your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to\ncontract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would\nchoose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him\nwho pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of\ncatching men. (24)\n\n (23) \"An authority in matters of love.\" Cf. Plat. \"Symp.\" 177 D; Xen.\n    \"Symp.\" viii. 2.\n\n (24) See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat. \"Soph.\" 222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19,\n    {alieis anthropon}.\n\nCritobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction,\nSocrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly\nif this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of\nsoul and those who are beautiful of person.\n\nSoc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of\nmy science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon\nthem. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she\nlaid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different--they laid hands on\nnobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all;\nand therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.\n\nCri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you\nhave any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.\n\nSoc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no\napplication either of the lips; is it agreed?\n\nCri. No, nor application of the lips to any one--not beautiful.\n\nSoc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless\nutterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may\ninvite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the\nbeautiful.\n\nCri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: \"Kisses for the\nbeautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses.\" So now teach us the art\nof catching friends.\n\nSoc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will\nallow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire\nhim and desire to be his friend?\n\nCri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one\nwho hated his admirers.\n\nSoc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your\nadmiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am\ntaking away your character?\n\nCri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart\ntowards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.\n\nSoc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose\nfriendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a\ncomprehensive \"if\" to be considered: if you will further authorise me to\nsay that you are devoted to your friends; that nothing gives you so much\njoy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds\nof those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally\nwith your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure\nthem a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered\na man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in\nhostility. If I am authorised thus to report of you, I think you will\nfind me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is\nthe conquest of the good.\n\nCri. Why this appeal to me?--as if you had not free permission to say\nexactly what you like about me.\n\nSoc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. (25) I have it from\nher own lips. \"Good matchmakers,\" she said tome, \"were clever hands at\ncementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they\nvouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling\nlies, for her part she could not compliment them. (26) Their poor\ndeluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well.\"\nNow I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it\nis not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with\ntruth.\n\n (25) Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, of Miletus. See \"Econ.\" iii. 14;\n    Plat. \"Menex.\" 235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. \"de Invent.\" I.\n    xxxi. 51. See Grote, \"H. G.\" vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\"\n\n (26) Reading {ouk ethelein epainein}, or if {ouk ophelein epainousas}\n    with Kuhner transl. \"Good matchmakers, she told me, have to\n    consult truth when reporting favourably of any one: then indeed\n    they are terribly clever at bringing people together: whereas\n    false flatterers do no good; their dupes,\" etc.\n\nCri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me--in so\nfar as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will\nlend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge\nany petty fiction for my benefit.\n\nSoc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising\nyou falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is\nnot plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples.\nI wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or to make him your friend: I\nbegin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, \"You will find him a\ngood pilot\"; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,\nwho have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make\nshipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar\nfalse assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her\ndestinies to you--\"a man with a fine genius for command,\" I say, \"a\npractised lawyer,\" \"a politician born,\" and so forth. The odds are, the\nstate and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance\nfrom everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to\nentrust his affairs to you as \"a really careful and business-like\nperson with a head for economy.\" When put to the test would not your\nadministration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my\ndear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it\nis simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, endeavour\nto be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and\nyou will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and\npractice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on\nwhich we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am\nall attention, please instruct me.\n\nThen Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you\nhave said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true.\n(27)\n\n (27) {kala... alethe}.\n\n\nVII\n\nHe had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where\nignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of\ncommon sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them\nthat they should assist one another according to their ability; and here\nI may mention certain incidents which occurred within my own knowledge.\nHow, for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus wearing the look of one\nwho suffered from a fit of the \"sullens,\" and thus accosted him.\n\nSoc. You seem to have some trouble on your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you\nshould share it with your friends. Perhaps together we might lighten the\nweight of it a little.\n\nAristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am in sore straits indeed. Ever\nsince the party strife declared itself in the city, (1) what with the\nrush of people to Piraeus, and the wholesale banishments, I have been\nfairly at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives. Sisters,\nnieces, cousins, they have all come flocking to me for protection. I\nhave fourteen free-born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how\nare we to live? We can get nothing out of the soil--that is in the hands\nof the enemy; nothing from my house property, for there is scarcely a\nliving soul left in the city; my furniture? no one will buy it; money?\nthere is none to be borrowed--you would have a better chance to find\nit by looking for it on the road than to borrow it from a banker. Yes,\nSocrates, to stand by and see one's relatives die of hunger is hard\nindeed, and yet to feed so many at such a pinch impossible.\n\n (1) i.e. circa 404-403 B.C. See \"Hell.\" II. iv.\n\nAfter he listened to the story, Socrates asked: How comes it that\nCeramon, (2) with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to furnish\nhimself and them with the necessaries of life, but to realise a handsome\nsurplus, whilst you being in like plight (3) are afraid you will one and\nall perish of starvation for want of the necessaries of life?\n\n (2) An employer of labour, apparently, on a grand scale.\n\n (3) Lit. \"with your large family to feed.\" L. Dindorf would like to\n    read {su de oligous}, \"you with your small family.\"\n\nAr. Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have\nfree-born souls to feed?\n\nSoc. And which should you say were the better human beings, the\nfree-born members of your household or Ceramon's slaves?\n\nAr. The free souls under my roof without a doubt.\n\nSoc. Is it not a shame, then, that he with his baser folk to back\nhim should be in easy circumstances, while you and your far superior\nhousehold are in difficulties?\n\nAr. To be sure it is, when he has only a set of handicraftsmen to feed,\nand I my liberally-educated household.\n\nSoc. What is a handicraftsman? Does not the term apply to all who can\nmake any sort of useful product or commodity?\n\nAr. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?\n\nAr. Pre-eminently so.\n\nSoc. And loaves of bread?\n\nAr. No less.\n\nSoc. Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women--tunics,\nmantles, vests? (4)\n\n (4) For these articles of dress see Becker's \"Charicles,\" Exc. i. to\n    Sc. xi. \"Dress.\"\n\nAr. Yes, they are all highly useful commodities.\n\nSoc. Then your household do not know how to make any of these?\n\nAr. On the contrary, I believe they can make them all.\n\nSoc. Then you are not aware that by means of the manufacture of one of\nthese alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes (5) not only maintains\nhimself and his domestics, but many pigs and cattle besides, and\nrealises such large profits that he frequently contributes to the state\nbenevolences; (6) while there is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread\nfactory, more than maintains the whole of his establishment, and lives\nin the lap of luxury; and Demeas of Collytus gets a livelihood out of\na cloak business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and so, again, more than\nhalf the Megarians (7) by the making of vests.\n\n (5) Nausicydes. Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\" cf. Aristoph. \"Eccles.\" 426.\n\n (6) Lit. \"state liturgies,\" or \"to the burden of the public services.\"\n    For these see Gow, \"Companion,\" xviii. \"Athenian Finance.\"\n\n (7) Cf. Arist. \"Acharnians,\" 519, {esukophantei Megareon ta\n    khlaniskia}. See Dr. Merry's note ad loc.\n\nAr. Bless me, yes! They have got a set of barbarian fellows, whom they\npurchase and keep, to manufacture by forced labour whatever takes their\nfancy. My kinswomen, I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.\n\nSoc. Then, on the ground that they are free-born and your kinswomen,\nyou think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Or is it your\nopinion that people who live in this way--I speak of free-born people\nin general--lead happier lives, and are more to be congratulated, than\nthose who give their time and attention to such useful arts of life as\nthey are skilled in? Is this what you see in the world, that for the\npurpose of learning what it is well to know, and of recollecting the\nlessons taught, or with a view to health and strength of body, or for\nthe sake of acquiring and preserving all that gives life its charm,\nidleness and inattention are found to be helpful, whilst work and study\nare simply a dead loss? Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught\nwhat you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information\nwhich they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary,\nas something with which they were to be seriously concerned some day,\nand from which they were to reap advantage? Do human beings in general\nattain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully\nattending to what will be of use? Which will help a man the more to grow\nin justice and uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit with folded\nhands revolving the ways and means of existence? As things now stand,\nif I am not mistaken, there is no love lost between you. You cannot help\nfeeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find\nthem a burthen? This is a perilous state of affairs, in which hatred and\nbitterness have every prospect of increasing, whilst the pre-existing\nbond of affection (8) is likely to be snapped.\n\n (8) Or, \"the original stock of kindliness will be used up.\"\n\nBut now, if only you allow them free scope for their energies, when you\ncome to see how useful they can be, you will grow quite fond of them,\nand they, when they perceive that they can please you, will cling to\ntheir benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory of former kindnesses\nmade sweeter, you will increase the grace which flows from kindnesses\ntenfold; you will in consequence be knit in closer bonds of love and\ndomesticity. If, indeed, they were called upon to do any shameful work,\nlet them choose death rather than that; but now they know, it would\nseem, the very arts and accomplishments which are regarded as the\nloveliest and the most suitable for women; and the things which we know,\nany of us, are just those which we can best perform, that is to say,\nwith ease and expedition; it is a joy to do them, and the result is\nbeautiful. (9) Do not hesitate, then, to initiate your friends in what\nwill bring advantage to them and you alike; probably they will gladly\nrespond to your summons.\n\n (9) Or, \"with ease, rapidity, pleasure and effect.\"\n\nWell, upon my word (Aristarchus answered), I like so well what you\nsay, Socrates, that though hitherto I have not been disposed to borrow,\nknowing that when I had spent what I got I should not be in a condition\nto repay, I think I can now bring myself to do so in order to raise a\nfund for these works.\n\nThereupon a capital was provided; wools were purchased; the good man's\nrelatives set to work, and even whilst they breakfasted they worked, and\non and on till work was ended and they supped. Smiles took the place of\nfrowns; they no longer looked askance with suspicion, but full into each\nother's eyes with happiness. They loved their kinsman for his kindness\nto them. He became attached to them as helpmates; and the end of it all\nwas, he came to Socrates and told him with delight how matters fared;\n\"and now,\" he added, \"they tax me with being the only drone in the\nhouse, who sit and eat the bread of idleness.\"\n\nTo which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog? (10)\nOnce on a time, so goes the story, when beasts could speak, the sheep\nsaid to her master, \"What a marvel is this, master, that to us, your\nown sheep, who provide you with fleeces and lambs and cheese, you give\nnothing, save only what we may nibble off earth's bosom; but with this\ndog of yours, who provides you with nothing of the sort, you share\nthe very meat out of your mouth.\" When the dog heard these words, he\nanswered promptly, \"Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I who keep you safe\nand sound, you sheep, so that you are not stolen by man nor harried by\nwolves; since, if I did not keep watch over you, you would not be able\nso much as to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed.\" And so, says\nthe tale, the sheep had to admit that the dog was rightly preferred to\nthemselves in honour. And so do you tell your flock yonder that like the\ndog in the fable you are their guardian and overseer, and it is thanks\nto you that they are protected from evil and evildoers, so that they\nwork their work and live their lives in blissful security.\n\n (10) See Joseph Jacobs, \"The Fables of Aesop,\" vol. i. p. 26 foll.,\n    for \"a complete list of the Fables given in Greek literature up to\n    the fall of Greek independence.\" Cf. Hesiod, \"Works and Days,\" 202\n    foll.; Archilochus, 89 (60), Bergk; Herod. i. 141; Aesch.\n    \"Myrmid.\" fr. 123; Aristot. \"Rhet.\" II. xx.\n\n\nVIII\n\nAt another time chancing upon an old friend whom he had not seen for a\nlong while, he greeted him thus.\n\nSoc. What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?\n\nThe other answered: From abroad, just before the close of the war; but\nat present from the city itself. (1) You see, since we have been denuded\nof our possessions across the frontier, (2) and my father left me\nnothing in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and provide myself with\nthe necessaries of life by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable\nto begging from another, especially as I have no security on which to\nraise a loan.\n\n (1) Lit. \"from here.\" The conversation perhaps takes place in Piraeus\n    404 B.C.\n\n (2) Or, \"colonial possession.\" Cf. \"Symp.\" iv. 31.\n\nSoc. And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the\nnecessaries of life for hire?\n\nEuth. Goodness knows, Socrates--not for long.\n\nSoc. And when you find yourself an old man, expenses will not diminish,\nand yet no one will care to pay you for the labour of your hands.\n\nEuth. That is true.\n\nSoc. Would it not be better then to apply yourself at once to such\nwork as will stand you in good stead when you are old--that is, address\nyourself to some large proprietor who needs an assistant in managing his\nestate? (3) By superintending his works, helping to get in his crops,\nand guarding his property in general, you will be a benefit to the\nestate and be benefited in return.\n\n (3) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" VIII. iii. 48.\n\nI could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates! (he exclaimed).\n\nSoc. And yet the heads of departments in a state are not regarded as\nadopting the badge of slavery because they manage the public property,\nbut as having attained a higher degree of freedom rather.\n\nEuth. In a word, Socrates, the idea of being held to account to another\nis not at all to my taste.\n\nSoc. And yet, Eutherus, it would be hard to find a work which did\nnot involve some liability to account; in fact it is difficult to do\nanything without some mistake or other, and no less difficult, if\nyou should succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape all unfriendly\ncriticism. I wonder now whether you find it easy to get through your\npresent occupations entirely without reproach. No? Let me tell you what\nyou should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself\nto the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept\nwith a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do.\nWhatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. (4)\nThere lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister\nhelp to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be\ndiminished, provision against old age secured.\n\n (4) Or, \"study to make it your finest work, the expression of a real\n    enthusiasm.\"\n\n\nIX\n\nAt another time, as I am aware, he had heard a remark made by Crito (1)\nthat life at Athens was no easy matter for a man who wished to mind his\nown affairs.\n\n (1) Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet, \"P. X.\"; cf. Plat. \"Rep.\"\n    viii. 549 C.\n\nAs, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded) there are a set\nof fellows threatening me with lawsuits, not because they have any\nmisdemeanour to allege against me, but simply under the conviction that\nI will sooner pay a sum of money than be troubled further.\n\nTo which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to\nward off wolves from your flocks?\n\nCr. Certainly; it pays to do so.\n\nSoc. Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward\noff this pack of people who seek to injure you?\n\nI should not at all mind (he answered), if I were not afraid he might\nturn again and rend his keeper.\n\nWhat! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like\nyourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel\nwith you? You may be sure there are plenty of people here who will take\nthe greatest pride in making you their friend.\n\nAccordingly, they sought out Archedemus, (2) a practical man with a\nclever tongue in his head (3) but poor; the fact being, he was not the\nsort to make gain by hook or by crook, but a lover of honesty and of\ntoo good a nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger. (4) Crito\nwould then take the opportunity of times of harvesting and put aside\nsmall presents for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or wool, or any\nother of the farm produce forming the staple commodities of life, or he\nwould invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise pay him marked\nattention. Archedemus, feeling that he had in Crito's house a harbour\nof refuge, could not make too much of his patron, and ere long he\nhad hunted up a long list of iniquities which could be lodged against\nCrito's pettifogging persecutors themselves, and not only their numerous\ncrimes but their numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted one of\nthem in a public suit, where sentence would be given against him \"what\nto suffer or what to pay.\" (5) The accused, conscious as he was of\nmany rascally deeds, did all he could to be quit of Archedemus, but\nArchedemus was not to be got rid of. He held on until he had made the\ninformer not only loose his hold of Crito but pay himself a sum of\nmoney; and now that Archedemus had achieved this and other similar\nvictories, it is easy to guess what followed. (6) It was just as when\nsome shepherd has got a very good dog, all the other shepherds wish\nto lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood that they too may reap the\nbenefit of him. So a number of Crito's friends came begging him to allow\nArchedemus to be their guardian also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to\ndo something to gratify Crito, and so it came about that not only Crito\nabode in peace, but his friends likewise. If any of those people with\nwhom Archedemus was not on the best of terms were disposed to throw\nit in his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits and paid in\nflatteries, he had a ready retort: \"Answer me this question--which is\nthe more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from honest folk and to repay\nthem, with the result that I make such people my friends but quarrel\nwith knaves, or to make enemies of honourable gentlemen (7) by attempts\nto do them wrong, with the off-chance indeed of winning the friendship\nof some scamps in return for my co-operation, but the certainty of\nlosing in the tone of my acquaintances?\" (8)\n\n (2) Archedemus, possibly the demagogue, \"Hell.\" I. vii. 2. So Cobet,\n    \"P. X.,\" but see Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 245.\n\n (3) Lit. \"very capable of speech and action\"--the writer's favourite\n    formula for the well-trained Athenian who can speak fluently and\n    reason clearly, and act energetically and opportunely.\n\n (4) Reading {kai euphuesteros on}  (or {e os})... {apo sukophanton}\n     (or {sukophantion}), after Cobet, \"P. X.\" s.v. Archedemus. The\n    MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--\"nothing is easier,\" he said,\n    \"than recovering from sycophants.\"\n\n (5) For this formula cf. \"Econ.\" vi. 24. Cf. Plat. \"Statesm.\" 299 A.\n\n (6) {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" vi. 778 C.\n\n (7) Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which like {khrestous} and {ponerous}\n    has a political as well as an ethical meaning.\n\n (8) Lit. \"must associate with these (the {ponerois}) instead of those\n    (the {kalois te kagathois}).\n\nThe net result of the whole proceedings was that Archedemus was now\nCrito's right hand, (9) and by the rest of Crito's friends he was held\nin honour.\n\n (9) He was No. 1--{eis}.\n\n\nX\n\nAgain I may cite, as known to myself, (1) the following discussion; the\narguments were addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions. The master\nsaid:\n\n (1) Or, \"for which I can personally vouch.\"\n\nTell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to\nrecover him?\n\nMore than that (Diodorus answered), I summon others to my aid and I have\na reward cried for his recovery.\n\nSoc. Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in\nthe doctors to save his life?\n\nDiod. Decidedly I do.\n\nSoc. And if an intimate acquaintance who is far more precious to you\nthan any of your household slaves is about to perish of want, you would\nthink it incumbent on you to take pains to save his life? Well! now you\nknow without my telling you that Hermogenes (2) is not made of wood or\nstone. If you helped him he would be ashamed not to pay you in kind.\nAnd yet--the opportunity of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty\nassistant well fitted to do your bidding, and not merely that, but\ncapable of originating useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast\nof mind and judgment--I say such a man is worth dozens of slaves. Good\neconomists tell us that when a precious article may be got at a low\nprice we ought to buy. And nowadays when times are so bad it is possible\nto get good friends exceedingly cheap.\n\n (2) Hermogenes, presumably the son of Hipponicus. See I. ii. 48.\n\nDiodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates; bid Hermogenes come to\nme.\n\nSoc. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not I indeed! since for aught I can\nunderstand you are no better entitled to summon him that to go to him\nyourself, nor is the advantage more on his side than your own.\n\nThus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek Hermogenes, and at no great\noutlay won to himself a friend--a friend whose one concern it now was to\ndiscover how, by word or deed, he might help and gladden Diodorus.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\n\nI\n\nAspirants to honour and distinction (1) derived similar help from\nSocrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity\ntowards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He\nhad heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, (2)\nwho professed to teach the whole duty of a general. (3) Accordingly he\nremarked to one of those who were with him--a young man whose anxiety to\nobtain the office of Strategos (4) was no secret to him:\n\n (1) {ton kalon} = everything which the {kalos te kagathos} should aim\n    at, but especially the honourable offices of state such as the\n    Archonship, Strategia, Hipparchia, etc. See Plat. \"Laches.\"\n\n (2) Dionysodorus of Chios, presumably. See Plat. \"Euthyd.\" 271 C foll.\n\n (3) A professor of the science and art of strategy.\n\n (4) Lit. \"that honour,\" sc. the Strategia.\n\nSoc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become\na general (5) to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the\nduties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be\nfined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without\nhaving learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a\nstatue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted\nto the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only\nreasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes\nwill result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I\nappeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while\ntaking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office,\nwould richly deserve to be fined?\n\n (5) i.e. \"head of the war department, and commander-in-chief,\" etc.\n\nWith arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take\nlessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates\nproceeded playfully to banter him.\n\nSoc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mein\nmajestical, (6) so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like\none who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who\nhas learned to play the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the\ninstrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he\ndoes not practise, so our friend here from this time forward is now and\never shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the\nelections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general\nnor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he\nproceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find\nourselves captain or colonel (7) under you, to give us some smattering\nof the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point\nof his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.\n\n (6) \"Il.\" iii. 169, 170.\n\n (7) Or, \"brigadier or captain,\" lit. taxiarch or lochagos.\n\nThen the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics\n(8)--tactics and nothing else.\n\n (8) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 12 foll.; VIII. v. 15.\n\nYet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of\ngeneralship. A general (9) must be ready in furnishing the material of\nwar: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he\nmust be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax\nhis endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at\nonce of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious\ncraft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as\na spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his\nmunificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable\nin defence, a very dare-devil in attack--these and many other qualities\nmust he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they\nmust come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a\ngrand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in\nthe world between an army properly handled in the field and the same\nin disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled\ntogether in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain\norder--at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble or rot,\nsuch as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put\nbricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, (10) and\nfinally you get a valuable possession--to wit, a dwelling-place.\n\n (9) A strategos. For the duties and spheres of action of this officer,\n    see Gow, op. cit. xiv. 58.\n\n (10) \"As in the building of a house.\" See Vitrivius, ii. 3; Plin. xxv.\n    14.\n\nThe simile is very apt, Socrates (11) (replied the youth), for in\nbattle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear,\nwith those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the\nformer and pushed on by the hinder.\n\n (11) Cf. \"Il.\" iv. 297 foll.; \"Cyrop.\" VI. iii. 25; Polyb. x. 22.\n\nSoc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish\ngood and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would\nscarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the\nbest coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you\nwere first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.\n\nThe Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the\ntask of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.\n\nSoc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders\nbetween them?\n\nI am ready (replied the youth).\n\nSoc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed\nupon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of\nour forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of\ngain? (12)\n\n (12) \"Whose fingers itch for gold.\"\n\nThe Youth. I should think so.\n\nSoc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard\nconsist of men who are greediest of honour?\n\nThe Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake\nof praise and glory. (13) Fortunately such people are not hid away in\na corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be\ndiscovered.\n\n (13) Cf. Shakesp. \"seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's\n    mouth.\"\n\nSoc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general,\nor specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical\narrangement?\n\nThe Youth. Nothing of the sort.\n\nSoc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which\nthe same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.\n\nThe Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.\n\nHe did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again,\nthen, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is\nnot lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money\nand then to have sent you away empty.\n\n\nII\n\nAt another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and\nminister of war, and thus accosted him.\n\nSoc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon \"shepherd of the\npeoples\"? (1) Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care\nfor his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful,\nand that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general\ntake care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain\nthe objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the\nmastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and\nhappiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying--\n\n    He is both a good king and a warrior bold? (2)\n\nDid he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not\nmerely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as\ninspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,'\nnot merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life,\nbut who should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns?\nSince a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit\nnobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him.\nAnd why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? (3) and to\nthis end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to\nthe goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to\nprocure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it\nwere not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler\nthan its opposite.\n\n (1) \"Il.\" ii. 243. \"The People's Paster,\" Chapman.\n\n (2) \"Il.\" iii. 179; cf. \"Symp.\" iv. 6. A favourite line of Alexander\n    the Great's, it is said.\n\n (3) Of, \"that life may reach some flower of happiness.\"\n\nAfter such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good\nleader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as\nthe kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make\nthose happy whom he may be called upon to lead. (4)\n\n (4) Cf. Plat. \"Rep.\" 342.\n\n\nIII\n\nThe following conversation with a youth who had just been elected\nhipparch (1) (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for. (2)\n\n (1) Cf. \"Hipparch.\"\n\n (2) Lit. \"I know he once held.\"\n\nSoc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry,\nyoung sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at\nthe head of the \"knights,\" an honour not denied to the mounted archers,\n(3) who ride even in front of the generals themselves?\n\n (3) Lit. \"Hippotoxotai.\" See Boeckh, \"P. E. A.\" II. xxi. p. 264 (Eng.\n    tr.)\n\nHipp. You are right.\n\nSoc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a\nmadman might boast of that fatal distinction. (4)\n\n (4) Or, \"as we all know, 'Tom Fool' can boast,\" etc.\n\nHipp. You are right again.\n\nSoc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the\ncavalry--your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better\ncondition than you find it; and, if the cavalry chanced to be called\nout, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?\n\nHipp. Most certainly.\n\nSoc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word--if you can achieve\nyour object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and\nriders, does it not?\n\nHipp. It does, no doubt.\n\nSoc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve\nthe horses.\n\nHipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each\ntrooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.\n\nSoc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, (5) you\nfind that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise\ninfirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the\nmarch; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they\nwill not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate\nplungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What\nbecomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of\nsuch a troop, and win glory for the state?\n\n (5) For this phrase, see Schneider and Kuhner ad loc.\n\nHipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.\n\nSoc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?\n\nHipp. I will.\n\nSoc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their\nchargers?\n\nHipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then\nhave a better chance of saving himself.\n\nSoc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will\nyou do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground (6)\nwhere you are accustomed to manouvre, or endeavour beforehand to put\nyour men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?\n\n (6) e.g. the hippodrome at Phaleron.\n\nHipp. That would be better, no doubt.\n\nSoc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as\nmany of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback? (7)\n\n (7) Cf. \"Hipparch,\" i. 21.\n\nHipp. It will be better, certainly.\n\nSoc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to\nkindle in them rage to meet the enemy?--which things are but stimulants\nto make stout hearts stouter?\n\nHipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost\ntime now.\n\nSoc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to\nsecure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle\nof good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so\nstout.\n\nHipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring\nthem to this virtue? (8)\n\n (8) {protrepsasthai}. See above, I. ii. 64; below, IV. v. 1.\n\nSoc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more\napt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in\ncase of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as\nthe cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in\nmatters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.\n\nHipp. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that\nhe who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the\nreadiest obedience.\n\nHipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of\nthem, will that suffice to win their obedience?\n\nSoc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you\nbrings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.\n\nHipp. How am I to teach them that?\n\nSoc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I\ntake it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than\ngood, and more advantageous to boot.\n\nHipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a\ncommandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument? (9)\n\n (9) Or, \"practise the art of oratory\"; \"express himself clearly and\n    rationally.\" See Grote, \"H. G.\" VIII. lxvii. p. 463 note;\n    \"Hipparch,\" i. 24; viii. 22.\n\nSoc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open\nhis mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things\nwhich custom (10) compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our\nknowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech (11) and\nreason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn,\nit is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are\nthose who have the freest command of thought and language, and those\nthat have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most\nbrilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that\nwhenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses--such as that,\nfor instance, which is sent to Delos (12)--there is nothing elsewhere\nfrom any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you\nfind in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in\nAthens? (13)\n\n (10) Cf Arist. \"Rhet.\" ii. 12, {oi neoi pepaideuntai upo tou nomou\n    monon}.\n\n (11) {dia logou}.\n\n (12) See Thuc. iii. 104; and below, IV. viii. 2.\n\n (13) See references ap. Schneider and Kuhner; \"Symp.\" iv. 17.\n\nHipp. You say truly.\n\nSoc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the\nAthenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of\nbody or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honour (14)\nwhich most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of\nthings lovely and of high esteem.\n\n (14) See below, v. 3; Dem. \"de Cor.\" 28 foll.\n\nHipp. That, too, is a true saying.\n\nSoc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our\ncavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the\nworld, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness\nof battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only\nwe could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honour and\ndistinction?\n\nHipp. It is reasonable to think so.\n\nSoc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this\npath, (15) whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens,\nwill reap advantage.\n\n (15) Or, \"to conduct which will not certainly fail of profit to\n    yourself or through you to...\"\n\nYes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).\n\n\nIV\n\nAt another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the\nelections (of magistrates), (1) he asked him: Who are elected generals,\nNicomachides?\n\n (1) Cf. \"Pol. Ath.\" i. 3; Aristot. \"Ath. Pol.\" 44. 4; and Dr. Sandys'\n    note ad loc. p. 165 of his edition.\n\nAnd he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens--just like\nthem, I say--to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first\nappeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military\nservice--now as a captain, now as a colonel--and have received all these\nwounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the\naction to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars\nof ancient wounds)--they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please,\nAntisthenes! who never served as a hoplite (2) in his life nor in the\ncavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that I ever heard tell of; no! in\nfact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of\nwealth.\n\n (2) Cf. Lys. xiv. 10.\n\nBut still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his\nfavour--he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.\n\nNic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at\ncollecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will\nbe able to command an army.\n\nBut (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who\ninsists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general.\n(3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos (4) he has been\nsuccessful with one chorus after another?\n\n (3) See Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 465 foll.\n\n (4) Choir-master, or Director of the Chorus. It was his duty to\n    provide and preside over a chorus to sing, dance, or play at any\n    of the public festivals, defraying the cost as a state service of\n    {leitourgia}. See \"Pol. Ath.\" iii. 4; \"Hiero,\" ix. 4; Aristot.\n    \"Pol. Ath.\" 28. 3.\n\nNic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at\nthe head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.\n\nSoc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training\nof a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest\nproficients in both.\n\nNic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign\nhe will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others\nto fight his battles?\n\nSoc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in\nselecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is\nhighly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we\nmay presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a\nsingle tribe, (5) he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in\nwar with the whole state to back him.\n\n (5) See Dem. \"against Lept.\" 496. 26. Each tribe nominated such of its\n    members as were qualified to undertake the burden.\n\nNic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same\nman to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?\n\nSoc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide,\nand has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may\nbe--house or city or army--you will find him a good chief and director\n(6) of the same.\n\n (6) Or, \"representative.\"\n\nThen Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected\nto hear you say that a good housekeeper (7) and steward of an estate\nwould make a good general.\n\n (7) Or, \"economist\"; cf. \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 12.\n\nSoc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so\ndetermine (8) whether they are the same or different.\n\n (8) Lit. \"get to know.\"\n\nNic. Let us do so.\n\nSoc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready\nobedience of those under them to their orders?\n\nNic. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their\ndistinctive tasks?\n\nThat, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).\n\nSoc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both\nalike, methinks?\n\nNic. Decidedly.\n\nSoc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be\nthe noble ambition of both?\n\nThat too (he answered).\n\nSoc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the\nadherence of supporters and allies? (9)\n\n (9) In reference to the necessity of building up a family connection\n    or political alliances cf. Arist. \"Pol.\" iii. 9, 13.\n\nNic. Without a doubt.\n\nSoc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of\ntheir respective charges?\n\nNic. Very much so.\n\nSoc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal\nof toil in all their doings?\n\nNic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends\nwhen you come to actual fighting.\n\nSoc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?\n\nNic. There is no doubt about that.\n\nSoc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of\nthese?\n\nNic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organisation and\nthe art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.\n\nSoc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for\nthe good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative\nas victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous\nand expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide\neverything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and\nguard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is\nready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and\nwhat is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has\narrived, (10) he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men\nof economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion\nrequisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of\nquantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect\npre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which\nhuman beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we\nspeak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private\nproperty. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the\nsecret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge\nwill as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord. (11)\n\n (10) Lit. \"as long as he is unprepared.\"\n\n (11) L. Dindorf, \"Index Graec.\" Ox. ed.; cf. Hor. \"Ep.\" II. ii. 144,\n    \"sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae,\" \"the harmony of\n    life,\" Conington.\n\n\nV\n\nA conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may\nhere be introduced. (1) Socrates began:\n\n (1) Or, \"On one occasion Pericles was the person addressed in\n    conversation.\" For Pericles see \"Hell.\" I. v. 16; vii. 15; Plut.\n    \"Pericl.\" 37 (Clough, i. 368).\n\nI am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement\nin our military affairs when you are minister of war. (2) The prestige\nof Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our\nenemies.\n\n (2) \"Strategos.\"\n\nPericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how\nthis happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.\n\nShall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and\nagainst, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?\n\nPray let us do so (he answered).\n\nSoc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not\ninferior to the Boeotians?\n\nPer. Yes, I am aware of that.\n\nSoc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine\nhealthy men than the Athenians?\n\nPer. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.\n\nSoc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united\npeople--the friendlier among themselves?\n\nPer. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians,\nresenting the selfish policy (3) of Thebes, are ill disposed to that\npower, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.\n\n (3) \"The self-aggrandisement.\"\n\nSoc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of\nhonour or haughtier in spirit. (4) And these feelings are no weak\nspurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and\nfatherland.\n\n (4) Reading {megalophronestatoi}, after Cobet. See \"Hipparch,\" vii. 3;\n    or if as vulg. {philophronestatoi}, transl. \"more affable.\"\n\nPer. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.\n\nSoc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, (5) to\nno people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating\nmemories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with\ndevotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of valour like our\nsires.\n\n (5) See Wesley's anthem, Eccles. xliv. 1, \"Let us now praise famous\n    men and our fathers that begat us.\"\n\nPer. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that\never since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia,\ncoupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, (6) the prestige of\nAthens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, whilst the\nspirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so\nthat those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle\nto the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the\nLacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do\nnowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and\nthe Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians (7)\nonly, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may\nsome day harry Attica.\n\n (6) Lebadeia, 447 B.C.; Delium, 424 B.C. For Tolmides and Hippocrates\n    see Thuc. i. 113; iv. 100 foll.; Grote, \"H. G.\" v. 471; vi. 533.\n\n (7) Reading {ote B. monoi}, al. {ou monoi}, \"when the Boeotians were\n    not unaided.\"\n\nTo which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me\nthat the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for\na really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of\ncarelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to\nmake people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order.\nA proof of which you may discover in the behaviour of people on\nship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing\nto fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is\napprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not\nonly is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent\nexpectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an\norchestra with eyes upon the leader.\n\nPer. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience\nat the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are\nto rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen (8) the old fires--the\npassionate longing for antique valour, for the glory and the wellbeing\nof the days of old.\n\n (8) Reading {anerasthenai}, Schneider's emendation of the vulg.\n    {aneristhenai}.\n\nWell (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim\nto certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better\nstimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them\nthat these were ancestral possessions (9) to which they had a natural\nright. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on\nvirtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined\nwith virtue is an old time-honoured heritage which pertains to them\nbeyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly after it they will\nsoon out-top the world.\n\n (9) Cf. Solon in the matter of Salamis, Plut. \"Sol.\" 8; Bergk. \"Poet.\n    Lyr. Gr. Solon,\" SALAMIS, i. 2, 3.\n\nPor. How are we to inculcate this lesson?\n\nSoc. I think by reminding them of a fact already registered in their\nminds, (10) that the oldest of our ancestors whose names are known to us\nwere also the bravest of heroes.\n\n (10) Or, \"to which their ears are already opened.\"\n\nPer. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their\nvirtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide? (11)\n\n (11) See Apollodorus, iii. 14.\n\nSoc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus,\n(12) and also to the war (13) which in his days was waged to stay the\ntide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war\nin the days of the Heraclidae (14) against the men of Peloponnese; and\nthat series of battles fought in the days of Theseus (15)--in all which\nthe virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own\ntimes was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things\nof a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so\nlong anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia,\n(16) nay of Europe also, as far as Macedonia: a people possessing a\npower and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before--who,\nmoreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of\nAthens wrought partly single-handed, (17) and partly as sharers with\nthe Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men\nalso, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.\n\n (12) Cf. \"Il.\" ii. 547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.t.l.}\n\n (13) Cf. Isoc. \"Paneg.\" 19, who handles all the topics.\n\n (14) Commonly spoken of as \"the Return.\" See Grote, \"H. G.\" II. ch.\n    xviii.\n\n (15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf. Herod. ix. 27; Plut.\n    \"Thes.\" 27.\n\n (16) The \"Persian\" wars; cf. Thucyd. I. i.\n\n (17) He omits the Plataeans.\n\nPer. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.\n\nSoc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and\nthe migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these\nmaintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a\ncommon thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on\npoints of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the\nhand of the oppressor. (18)\n\n (18) Cf. (Plat.) \"Menex.\"; Isocr. \"Paneg.\"\n\nThen Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came\nto decline.\n\nSoc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19)\nwhose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity\nuntil he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians,\nin the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are\nbecome degenerate.\n\n (19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate \"any one\n    else.\"\n\nPer. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?\n\nSoc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the\ninstitutions of our forefathers--applying them to the regulation of our\nlives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like\nsuccess; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs\nto-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if\nwe live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival\ntheir excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim\nat, rise superior.\n\n (20) Sc. the Lacedaemonians. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 396.\n\nYou would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and\nbrave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance,\nwhen will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age--the\nAthenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt\nhe pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the\nbody, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs\nto scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians\nso obey our magistrates--we who take a pride, as it were, in despising\nauthority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people--we who,\ninstead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening\neach other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all\nthe world besides; and--which is our worst failing--who, in private and\npublic intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a\nmaze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's\ndifficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our\nconduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better\nthan if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones\nof contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in\npossessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed\nis engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice,\nand in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual\nhostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some\ndisaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)\n\n (21) Or, \"is far enough away from Athens.\"\n\n (22) See below, III. xii. 5; \"Pol. Ath.\" i. 13; \"Rev.\" iv. 52.\n\n (23) Or, \"to deal despitefully with one another.\"\n\n (24) Reading {ateria}. See L. Dindorf ad loc., Ox. ed. lxii. Al.\n    {apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness. Cf. \"Pol.\n    Ath.\" i. 5.\n\n (25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.C.\n    (see \"Hell.\" I. vii. and II.), and history may repeat itself.\n\nDo not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to\nbelieve that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you\nnot observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt\nand orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests,\n(26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the\ntraining of our choruses.\n\n (26) Epistatoi, i.e. stewards and training-masters.\n\nYes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those\ngood people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our\ncavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens\nin excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to\ndiscipline.\n\n (27) {kalokagathia}.\n\nThen Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed\nof citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?\n\n (28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}. And for the\n    \"Aeropagos\" see Grote, \"H. G.\" v. 498; Aristot. \"Pol.\" ii. 12;\n    \"Ath. Pol.\" 4. 4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p. 18.\n\nCertainly (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying\ncases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter\nlegality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?\n\nNo, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and\ngood discipline had died out of our countrymen.\n\nStill (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain\nthat in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance,\norderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials\nreceives any attention.\n\nMay it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are\nofficered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice,\nto take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the\nlike, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite\nknowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.\n\n (29) {episteme}. See below, III. ix. 10.\n\nMoreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he\ngot the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are\namateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are\none of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your\nschooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No\ndoubt you have got at first hand many of your father's \"rules for\ngeneralship,\" which you carefully preserve, besides having collected\nmany others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any\nknowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel\nsure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of\nanything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and\nif you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have\nknowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to\nsupplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.\n\n (30) Cf. \"Pol. Lac.\" xiii. 5.\n\nTo which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say\nthese words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters;\nbut rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must\nmake such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.\n\nSocrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that\na high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country\ndown towards Boeotia--cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes,\nthe only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a\nring of natural fortresses? (31)\n\n (31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N., and Cerata N.W.\n\nPer. Certainly I have.\n\nSoc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians\nliving within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their\nmountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict\nmuch injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving\ntheir own freedom?\n\n (32) For this illustration see \"Anab.\" III. ii. 23; cf. \"Econ.\" iv.\n    18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.\n\nPer. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.\n\nAnd do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied\nAthenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural\nmountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the\nenemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid\nbulwark to protect the country?\n\n (33) Cf. the reforms of Iphicrates.\n\nTo which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful\nmeasures, decidedly.\n\nIf, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation,\ntry, O best of men, to realise them--if you can carry out a portion\nof them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state;\nwhile, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the\ncity nor discredit to yourself.\n\n\nVI\n\nGlaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain\nthe headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must\ndeliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached\nthe age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him\nmaking himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3)\nSocrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of\nCharmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in\nrestraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of\nall, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the\nfollowing: (5)\n\n (1) Glaucon, Plato's brother. Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 508.\n\n (2) \"Harangue the People.\"\n\n (3) See Plat. \"Protag.\" 319 C: \"And if some person offers to give them\n    advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art\n     (sc. of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, and\n    noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot\n    him, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; or\n    if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at\n    the command of the prytanes\" (Jowett). Cf. Aristoph. \"Knights,\"\n    665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.\n\n (4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin of\n    Critias) see ch. vii. below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon's\n    brother, see Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\" p. 28.\n\n (5) Or, \"and in the first instance addressing him in such terms he\n    could not choose but hear, detained him.\" See above, II. vi. 11.\n    Socrates applies his own theory.\n\nAh, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime\nminister? (6)\n\n (6) {prostateuein}.\n\nGlauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.\n\nSoc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called\nnoble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the\nday, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you\nwill be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your\nfather's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name\nthrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even\namong barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it\nthere, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)\n\n (7) \"The centre of attraction--the cynosure of neighbouring eyes.\"\n\nThe heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and\ngladly he stayed to listen.\n\nPresently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not?\nthat you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her\nhonours?\n\nGlauc. Undoubtedly.\n\nThen, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the\ndark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state?\nwhat is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips,\nas if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point\nshould be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a\nfriend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth,\nwould you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the\nstate?\n\n (8) Or, \"tell us what your starting-point will be in the path of\n    benefaction.\"\n\nMost decidedly (he answered).\n\nSoc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as\nher revenues increase?\n\nGlauc. That seems probable, at any rate.\n\nSoc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the\nstate are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No\ndoubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these\nare failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason,\nmake some new provision. (9)\n\n (9) Or, \"or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,\n    you may replace them.\"\n\nGlauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly\ngone into.\n\nNever mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige\nus by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you\npropose to remove all those which are superfluous?\n\nGlauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side\nof the matter either as yet.\n\nSoc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making\nthe state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the\nincomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.\n\nBut, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out\nof the pockets of her enemies!\n\nYes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of\ngetting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is\nalso possible to lose what we have got.\n\nA true observation (he replied).\n\nAnd therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with\nwhat enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of\nhis own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be\non his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale\nof undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of\nexercising caution.\n\nYou are right (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces\nfirst of Athens and then of our opponents?\n\nGlauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's\nnotice.\n\nOr (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might\nproduce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.\n\nGlauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.\n\nSoc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or\nwar, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing\nto the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry\nyou have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have\nstudied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly\nhow many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not;\nyou can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective;\nand you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour\nof increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are\nsuperfluous?\n\n (10) See \"Econ.\" xi. 1.\n\n (11) Or, \"advantageously situated.\" See the author's own tract on\n    \"Revenues.\"\n\nGlauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is\nlikely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property\nof the rural districts is simply pilfered.\n\nBut suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something\nworse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free\nto any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the\nresult of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the\ndefences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?\n\nGlauc. I conjecture that it is so.\n\nSoc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall\nwe defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we\nknow the facts.)\n\nPossibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).\n\nSoc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you\nhave not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are\nless productive than formerly.\n\n (12) Again the author's tract on \"Revenues\" is a comment on the\n    matter.\n\nWell, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).\n\nSoc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so\nthat, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an\nexcuse ready to hand.\n\nI see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).\n\nSoc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected.\nNo, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how\nlong a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support\nthe city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may\nnot run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on\nthe contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give\nadvice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of\nyour country?\n\nIt is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged\nto give attention to all these details.\n\nSoc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his\nestate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and,\nin the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants.\nBut since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is\nnot easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you\ndid not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at\nany rate of these--I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be\nthrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might\ntake in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could\nyou possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he\ncannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)\n\n (13) Lit. \"a single talent's weight... to carry two.\"\n\nGlauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house,\nif my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.\n\nSoc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will\nbe able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you?\nBe careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high\nrepute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for\na man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take\nthe cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly\ntranscends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more\nblame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or,\nagain, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and\nyou will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those\nwho enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed\nwith the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister\nreputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of\nignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and\nadmiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in\nother words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do.\n(15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the\nworld you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not\nsurprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.\n\n (14) Or, \"to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle with\n    them.\"\n\n (15) Or, \"try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is to\n    know the business which you propose to carry out.\"\n\n\nVII\n\nNow Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man\nof mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass\nof those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was\na man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the\nconcerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:\n\n (1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) and\n    Plato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue\n    \"Charmides\"; \"Theag.\" 128 E; \"Hell.\" II. iv. 19; \"Symp.\" iv. 31;\n    Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 480.\n\nTell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the\narena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself\nand make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to\nrefuse to enter the lists--what kind of person should you set him down\nto be?\n\n (2) In some conquest (e.g. of the Olympic games) where the prize is a\n    mere wreath.\n\n (3) Cf. Pindar passim.\n\nClearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).\n\nSoc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs\nof state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to\nshrink and hesitate and hang back--would he too not reasonably be\nregarded as a coward?\n\nPossibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?\n\nBecause (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do\nhesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for\nno other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)\n\n (4) Or add, \"and cannot escape from.\"\n\nCharm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so\nsevere a sentence upon me?\n\nSoc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which\nyou meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they\nconsult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when\nthey make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.\n\n (5) See above, I. v. 4; here possibly of political club conversation.\n\nCharm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to\nbattle in the throng of the assembly is another.\n\nSoc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as\nwhen seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp\nin private who carries off the palm of victory in public.\n\nCharm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings\nimplanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to\nus in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.\n\nSoc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no\nsuch bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men,\nyou are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and\ndullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or\nthe cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants,\nor the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their\nwares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to\nsell the other dear--is it before these you are ashamed, for these are\nthe individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7)\nAnd what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a\nman who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of\namateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the\nforemost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down\nupon you--you, with your vast superiority over practised popular\ndebaters--are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their\nlives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never\nentered to look down upon you--than you are afraid to open your lips in\nmortal terror of being laughed at?\n\n (6) Cf. Cic. \"Tusc.\" v. 36, 104; Plat. \"Gorg.\" 452 E, 454 B.\n\n (7) Cf. Plat. \"Protag.\" 319 C. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 103.\n\nWell, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does\nfrequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.\n\nSoc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what\nrouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these\nlordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that\nyou cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do\nnot be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of\nerrors--theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of\nthe world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is\na duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must\nyou brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public\naffairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do\nnot neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only\nthe mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you\nyourself last but not least, will profit by your action.\n\n (8) {oi eteroi}, i.e. \"the foremost statesmen\" mentioned before. Al.\n    \"the opposite party,\" the \"Tories,\" if one may so say, of the\n    political clubs.\n\n (9) Lit. \"those... these.\"\n\n (10) Ernesti aptly cf. Cic. \"ad Quint.\" iii. 6. See below, III. ix. 6;\n    IV. ii. 24.\n\n\nVIII\n\nOnce when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a\ncross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of\nSocrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit\nthose who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater\nguarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of\nthe supreme importance of right conduct. (3)\n\n (1) For Aristippus see above, p. 38; for the connection, {boulomenos\n    tous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,\n    see above, Conspectus, p. xxvi.\n\n (2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above. In reference to\n    the present dialogue see Grote, \"Plato,\" I. xi. p. 380 foll.\n\n (3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf. below, III. ix. 4, 11; Plat. \"Charm.\"\n    164 B; but see J. J. Hartman, \"An. Xen.\" p. 141.\n\nAristippus asked him \"if he knew of anything good,\" (4) intending in\ncase he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or\ndrink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out\nthat the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing\ntroubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our\ntrouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)\n\n (4) See Grote, \"Plato,\" ii. 585, on Philebus.\n\n (5) Or, \"made the happiest answer.\"\n\nSoc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for\nfever?\n\nNo (he replied), that is not my question.\n\nSoc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?\n\nAristip. No, nor yet that.\n\nSoc. Well then, for hunger?\n\nAristip. No, nor yet for hunger.\n\nWell, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good\nthing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.\n\nAnd when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him \"if he knew of\nany thing beautiful.\"\n\nHe answered: Yes, many things.\n\nAristip. Are they all like each other?\n\nSoc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.\n\nHow then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?\n\nSoc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who\nis a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful\nboxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose\nof defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful\nweapon of swift and sure discharge.\n\n (6) See Grote, \"H. G.\" x. 164, in reference to Epaminondas and his\n    gymnastic training; below, III. x. 6.\n\nAristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you\nwhether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.\n\n (7) Or, \"You answer precisely as you did when...\"\n\nSoc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and\nanother beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard\nall things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place,\nvirtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful\nthing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human\nbeings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard,\nare called \"beautiful and good\"; and so the bodily frames of men\nrelatively to the same standards are seen to be \"beautiful and good,\"\nand in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as\nat once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard--the standing\nbeing in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)\n\n (8) Or, \"good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good is\n    beautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good.\"\n\n (9) Or, \"in the same breath.\" Cf. Plat. \"Hipp. maj.\" 295 D; \"Gorg.\"\n    474 D.\n\n (10) Or, \"and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in\n    question.\"\n\nAristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a\nbeautiful thing?\n\n (11) Cf. Plat. \"Hipp. maj.\" 288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc. cit.\n    p. 381: \"in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?\"\n\nSoc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their\nrespective uses--the former is well and the latter ill adapted.\n\nAristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and\nugly?\n\nSoc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and\nbad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and\nwhat is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for\nwrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good\nand beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when\nill adapted for the same.\n\nSimilarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that \"the same\nhouse must be at once beautiful and useful\"--I could not help feeling\nthat he was giving a good lesson on the problem: \"how a house ought to\nbe built.\" He investigated the matter thus:\n\n (12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; \"Classical Review,\" vii. 262.\n\nSoc. \"Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13)\nwill plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as\npossible?\" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would\nbe:\n\n (13) Or, \"the ideal house\"; lit. \"a house as it should be.\"\n\n (14) See below, IV. vi. 15.\n\n\"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter,\nis it not?\" and this proposition also having obtained assent, \"Now,\nsupposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will\nsteal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses\na path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade,\nwill it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern\nside of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter\nsun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding\ningress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and\nmost beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at\nall seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his\ngoods with the greatest security.\"\n\n (15) Or, \"porticoes\" or \"collonades.\"\n\nPaintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one\nof more joy (17) than they confer.\n\n (16) See \"Econ.\" ix. 2; Plat. \"Hipp. maj.\" 298 A; \"Rep.\" 529; Becker,\n    \"Charicles,\" 268 (Engl. trans.)\n\n (17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or \"poetical\" = \"joyance.\" See \"Hiero,\"\n    vi. 1.\n\nThe fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site\nvisible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a\nglad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up\nhis orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)\n\n (18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the\n    temple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. \"Phoen.\" 1372, {Pallados\n    khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.\n\n (19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman,\n    op. cit. i. 338.\n\n\nIX\n\nBeing again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did\nit come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by\nnature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by\nnature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly\nI do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and\ncustoms differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by\nlearning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened\ntowards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or\nThracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with\nLacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would\ndemur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to\ntheir light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some\nweapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can\nsee, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man\nfrom another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of\ncare and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has\nendowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike\nis to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve\ndistinction.\n\n (1) Or, \"When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can\n    courage be taught?'\" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11;\n    \"Symp.\" ii. 12; Plat. \"Lach.\"; \"Protag.\" 349; \"Phaedr.\" 269 D; K.\n    Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 468 foll., ii. 60;\n    Jowett, \"Plato,\" i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.\n\n (2) Or, \"against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or against\n    Scythians with bows and arrows\"; and for the national arms of\n    these peoples respectively see Arist. \"Lysistr.\" 563; \"Anab.\" III.\n    iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.\n\nBetween wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no\ndistinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things\nbeautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other\nhand, knowledge of the \"base and foul\" so as to beware of them? If so,\nSocrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).\n(4)\n\n (3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.\n\n (4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. \"he discovered the\n    wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise\n    things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his\n    being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things\n    base.\" Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. \"The man who\n    not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,\n    in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in\n    the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul.\" Cf. Plat.\n    \"Charm.\"\n\nAnd being further questioned whether \"he considered those who have\nthe knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and\nself-controlled?\"--\"Not a whit more,\" he answered, \"than I consider them\nto be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately\nchooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive\nto his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that\nthose who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor\nself-controlled.\n\n (5) For the phrase \"not a whit the more\" see below, III. xii. 1;\n    \"Econ.\" xii. 18. Al. \"I should by no means choose to consider them\n    wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate.\"\n\n (6) \"Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking.\"\n\nHe said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is\nto say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue,\nare \"beautiful and good\"; and neither will those who know these things\ndeliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the\nspecial knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the\nattempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform\nthe things which are \"beautiful and good\"; they that are unwise cannot,\nbut even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and\ngenerally all things \"beautiful and good,\" are wrought with virtue, it\nis clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.\n\nOn the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom;\nnot that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it\nthus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that\nhe knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself,\nyet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different\nlanguage: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of\nmankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him \"mad\"; (8) but a like\naberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope\nof ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who\nimagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall\nwithout stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt\nany other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in\nthe popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small\nmatters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion\nin popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled\nmadness.\n\n (7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 400.\n\n (8) Or, \"they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are\n    all abroad,\" etc. See Comte, \"Pos. Pol.\" i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.\n    trans.)\n\nIn answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a\ncertain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes\nof a friend or the good fortune of an enemy--that is not envy; but, as\nhe said, \"envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes\nof their friends.\" And when some one or other expressed astonishment\nthat any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his\nwell-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one\nis faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the\nunfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained.\n\"I do not say,\" he added, \"this could happen to a thoughtful person; but\nit is no uncommon condition of a silly mind.\" (9)\n\n (9) Or, \"a man in his senses... a simpleton\"; for the sentiment L.\n    Dind. cf. Isocr. \"ad Demonic.\" 7 D.\n\nIn answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that\nmost men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the\ngambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if\nthey like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn\nfrom the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no\nleisure, he does but ill in that.\n\n (10) See above, I. ii. 57; and in ref. to these definitions, K. Joel,\n    op. cit. p. 347 foll.\n\n (11) For \"dice-playing\" see Becker, \"Charicl.\" 354 (Engl. trans.); for\n    \"buffoonery,\" ib. 98; \"Symp.\"\n\n(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said)\nwho hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street,\n(12) or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence\nor by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge (13) how to rule.\nThus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to\nenjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he\nproceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain\nis the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner\nhimself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter\nof husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the\npatient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete\ngoing through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in\nany matter needing attention and care will either attend to this\nmatter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he\nmistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot,\nor will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this\nexpert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.\n\n (12) Tom, Dick, and Harry (as we say).\n\n (13) The {episteme}. See above, III. v. 21; Newman, op. cit. i. 256.\n\nAnd thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women\nare the rulers of men--and why? because they have the knowledge of the\nart, and men have not.\n\nAnd if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power\nnot to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: \"Pray, how has\nhe the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who\ndisobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he\ndisobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume,\nand falling into error, be punished.\" And to the suggestion that the\ntyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his\nanswer was: \"Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go\nscot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely\nto secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift\ndestruction?\" (14)\n\n (14) Or, \"Is that to choose the path of safety, think you? Is it not\n    rather to sign his own death-warrent?\" L. Dind. cf. Hesiod, \"Works\n    and Days,\" 293. See Newman, op. cit. i. 393-397.\n\nWhen some one asked him: \"What he regarded as the best pursuit or\nbusiness (15) for a man?\" he answered: \"Successful conduct\"; (16) and\nto a second question: \"Did he then regard good fortune as an end to\nbe pursued?\"--\"On the contrary,\" he answered, \"for myself, I consider\nfortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to\nsucceed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I\nhold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and\npractice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, (17) and\nthose who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do\nwell.\"\n\n (15) Or, \"the noblest study.\"\n\n (16) {eupraxia, eu prattein}--to do well, in the sense both of well or\n    right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to\n    {eutukhia}, mere good luck or success. Cf. Plat. \"Euthyd.\" 281 B.\n\n (17) Lit. \"well-doing\"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op. cit.\n    i. 305, 401.\n\nThey are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God (18) (he\nwent on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of\nfarming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or\nin statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing\nwell--nor well in anything--is (he added) neither good for anything nor\ndear to God.\n\n (18) Or, \"most divinely favoured.\" Cf. Plat. \"Euthyphro,\" 7 A.\n\n\nX\n\nBut indeed, (1) if chance brought him into conversation with any one\npossessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he\nnever failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping\none time into the studio of Parrhasius (2) the painter, and getting into\nconversation with him--\n\n (1) {alla men kai}... \"But indeed the sphere of his helpfulness was\n    not circumscribed; if,\" etc.\n\n (2) For Parrhasius of Ephesus, the son of Evenor and rival of Zeuxis,\n    see Woltmann and Woermann, \"Hist. of Painting,\" p. 47 foll.;\n    Cobet, \"Pros. Xen.\" p. 50 (cf. in particular Quint. XII. x. 627).\n    At the date of conversation (real or ideal) he may be supposed to\n    have been a young man.\n\nI suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as \"a\nrepresentation of visible objects,\" may it not? (3) That is to say, by\nmeans of colours and palette you painters represent and reproduce as\nclosely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and\nsoft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles\nof age, do you not?\n\n (3) Reading with Schneider, L. Dind., etc., after Stobaeus, {e\n    graphike estin eikasia}, or if the vulg. {graphike estin e\n    eikasia}, trans. \"Painting is the term applied to a particular\n    representation,\" etc.\n\nYou are right (he answered), that is so.\n\nSoc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy\nto light upon any one human being who is absolutely devoid of blemish,\nyou cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make\nyour figures appear completely beautiful? (4)\n\n (4) Cf. Cic. \"de Invent.\" ii. 1 ad in. of Zeuxis; Max. Tur. \"Dissert.\"\n    23, 3, ap. Schneider ad loc.\n\nParrh. Yes, that is how we do. (5)\n\n (5) Or, \"that is the secret of our creations,\" or \"our art of\n    composition.\"\n\nWell, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in\nsimilar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating\ncharm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of\nyearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable\nof being depicted?\n\nNay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates,\nwhen it possesses neither linear proportion (6) nor colour, nor any of\nthose qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not\neven visible?\n\n (6) Lit. \"symmetry.\" Cf. Plin. xxxv. 10, \"primus symmetriam picturae\n    dedit,\" etc.\n\nSoc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any\none, do find expression in the human subject, do they not? (7)\n\n (7) Or, \"the glance of love, the scowl of hate, which one directs\n    towards another, are recognised expressions of human feeling.\" Cf.\n    the description of Parrhasius's own portrait of Demos, ap. Plin.\n    loc. cit.\n\nParrh. No doubt they do.\n\nSoc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the\neyes, may it not?\n\nUndoubtedly (he answered).\n\nSoc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil\nfortune of those we love both wear the same expression?\n\nBy no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at\nthat of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.\n\nSoc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?\n\nParrh. Decidedly.\n\nSoc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces\nthrough the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body\nas he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again\nof something in him low and grovelling--the calm of self-restraint, and\nwisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?\n\nYou are right (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then these too may be imitated?\n\nNo doubt (he said).\n\nSoc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you\nthink--one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful,\ngood, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is\nugly, and bad, and hateful? (8)\n\n (8) For this theory cp. Ruskin, \"Mod. P.\" ii. 94 foll. and indeed\n    passim.\n\nParrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.\n\nAt another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton, (9) and\nin course of conversation with him said:\n\n (9) An unknown artist. Coraes conj. {Kleona}. Cf. Plin. xxxiv. 19;\n    Paus. v. 17, vi. 3. He excelled in portrait statues. See Jowett,\n    \"Plato,\" iv.; \"Laws,\" p. 123.\n\nYou have a gallery of handsome people here, (10) Cleiton, runners, and\nwrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts--that I see and know; but how\ndo you give the magic touch of life to your creations, which most of all\nallures the soul of the beholder through his sense of vision?\n\n (10) Reading after L. Dind. {kaloi ous}, or if vulg. {alloious},\n    translate \"You have a variety of types, Cleiton, not all of one\n    mould, but runners,\" etc.; al. \"I see quite well how you give the\n    diversity of form to your runners,\" etc.\n\nAs Cleiton stood perplexed, and did not answer at once, Socrates added:\nIs it by closely imitating the forms of living beings that you succeed\nin giving that touch of life to your statues?\n\nNo doubt (he answered).\n\nSoc. It is, is it not, by faithfully copying the various muscular\ncontractions of the body in obedience to the play of gesture and poise,\nthe wrinklings of flesh and the sprawl of limbs, the tensions and\nthe relaxations, that you succeed in making your statues like real\nbeings--make them \"breathe\" as people say?\n\nCleit. Without a doubt.\n\nSoc. And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of\nthe body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the\nbeholder?\n\nCleit. I should say so.\n\nSoc. Then the threatenings in the eyes of warriors engaged in battle\nshould be carefully copied, or again you should imitate the aspect of a\nconqueror radiant with success?\n\nCleit. Above all things.\n\nSoc. It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate\nin his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?\n\nPaying a visit to Pistias, (11) the corselet maker, when that artist\nshowed him some exquisite samples of his work, Socrates exclaimed:\n\n (11) Cf. Athen. iv. 20, where the same artist is referred to\n    apparently as {Piston}, and for the type of person see the\n    \"Portrait of a Tailor\" by Moroni in the National Gallery--see\n    \"Handbook,\" Edw. T. Cook, p. 152.\n\nBy Hera! a pretty invention this, Pistias, by which you contrive that\nthe corselet should cover the parts of the person which need protection,\nand at the same time leave free play to the arms and hands.... but\ntell me, Pistias (he added), why do you ask a higher price for these\ncorselets of yours if they are not stouter or made of costlier material\nthan the others?\n\nBecause, Socrates (he answered), mine are of much finer proportion.\n\nSoc. Proportion! Then how do you make this quality apparent to the\ncustomer so as to justify the higher price--by measure or weight? For\nI presume you cannot make them all exactly equal and of one pattern--if\nyou make them fit, as of course you do?\n\nFit indeed! that I most distinctly do (he answered), take my word for\nit: no use in a corselet without that.\n\nBut then are not the wearer's bodies themselves (asked Socrates) some\nwell proportioned and others ill?\n\nDecidedly so (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it\nis to fit an ill-proportioned body? (12)\n\n (12) Or, \"how do you make a well-proportioned corselet fit an ill-\n      proportioned body? how well proportioned?\"\n\nPist. To the same degree exactly as I make it fit. What fits is well\nproportioned.\n\nSoc. It seems you use the term \"well-proportioned\" not in an absolute\nsense, but in reference to the wearer, just as you might describe a\nshield as well proportioned to the individual it suits; and so of a\nmilitary cloak, and so of the rest of things, in your terminology? But\nmaybe there is another considerable advantage in this \"fitting\"?\n\nPist. Pray instruct me, Socrates, if you have got an idea.\n\nSoc. A corselet which fits is less galling by its weight than one which\ndoes not fit, for the latter must either drag from the shoulders with a\ndead weight or press upon some other part of the body, and so it becomes\ntroublesome and uncomfortable; but that which fits, having its weight\ndistributed partly along the collar-bone and shoulder-blade, partly\nover the shoulders and chest, and partly the back and belly, feels like\nanother natural integument rather than an extra load to carry. (13)\n\n (13) Schneider ad loc. cf Eur. \"Electr.\" 192, {prosthemata aglaias},\n    and for the weight cf. Aristoph. \"Peace,\" 1224.\n\nPist. You have named the very quality which gives my work its\nexceptional value, as I consider; still there are customers, I am bound\nto say, who look for something else in a corselet--they must have them\nornamental or inlaid with gold.\n\nFor all that (replied Socrates), if they end by purchasing\nan ill-fitting article, they only become the proprietors of a\ncuriously-wrought and gilded nuisance, as it seems to me. But (he\nadded), as the body is never in one fixed position, but is at one time\ncurved, at another raised erect how can an exactly-modelled corselet\nfit?\n\nPist. It cannot fit at all.\n\nYou mean (Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly-modelled\ncorselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the\nusing?\n\nPist. There, Socrates, you have hit the very point. I see you understand\nthe matter most precisely. (14)\n\n (14) Or, \"There, Socrates, you have hit the very phrase. I could not\n    state the matter more explicitly myself.\"\n\n\nXI\n\nThere was once in the city a fair woman named Theodote. (1) She was\nnot only fair, but ready to consort with any suitor who might win her\nfavour. Now it chanced that some one of the company mentioned her,\nsaying that her beauty beggared description. \"So fair is she,\" he added,\n\"that painters flock to draw her portrait, to whom, within the limits of\ndecorum, she displays the marvels of her beauty.\" \"Then there is nothing\nfor it but to go and see her,\" answered Socrates, \"since to comprehend\nby hearsay what is beyond description is clearly impossible.\" Then he\nwho had introduced the matter replied: \"Be quick then to follow me\"; and\non this wise they set off to seek Theodote. They found her \"posing\" to a\ncertain painter; and they took their stand as spectators. Presently the\npainter had ceased his work; whereupon Socrates:\n\n (1) For Theodote see Athen. v. 200 F, xiii. 574 F; Liban. i. 582. Some\n    say that it was Theodote who stood by Alcibiades to the last,\n    though there are apparently other better claimants to the honour.\n    Plut. \"Alc.\" (Clough, ii. p. 50).\n\n\"Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her\nbeauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... It would\nseem, would it not, that if the exhibition of her charms is the more\nprofitable to her, the debt is on her side; but if the spectacle of her\nbeauty confers the greater benefit on us, then we are her debtors.\"\n\nSome one answered that \"was an equitable statement of the case.\"\n\nWell then (he continued), as far as she is concerned, the praise we\nbestow on her is an immediate gain; and presently, when we have spread\nher fame abroad, she will be further benefited; but for ourselves the\nimmediate effect on us is a strong desire to touch what we have seen;\nby and by, too, we shall go away with a sting inside us, and when we\nare fairly gone we shall be consumed with longing. Consequently it seems\nthat we should do her service and she accept our court.\n\nWhereupon Theodote: Oh dear! if that is how the matter stands, it is I\nwho am your debtor for the spectacle. (2)\n\n (2) In reference to the remark of Socrates above; or, \"have to thank\n    you for coming to look at me.\"\n\nAt this point, seeing that the lady herself was expensively attired,\nand that she had with her her mother also, whose dress and style\nof attendance (3) were out of the common, not to speak of the\nwaiting-women--many and fair to look upon, who presented anything but\na forlorn appearance; while in every respect the whole house itself was\nsumptuously furnished--Socrates put a question:\n\n (3) Or, \"her mother there with her in a dress and general get-up\n    ({therapeia}) which was out of the common.\" See Becker,\n    \"Charicles,\" p. 247 (Eng. tr.)\n\nPray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?\n\nTheod. Not I indeed.\n\nSoc. Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?\n\nTheod. No, nor yet a house.\n\nSoc. You are not an employer of labour on a large scale? (4)\n\n (4) Lit. \"You have not (in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of\n    any sort?\"\n\nTheod. No, nor yet an employer of labour.\n\nSoc. From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence? (5)\n\n (5) Or, Anglice, \"derive your income.\"\n\nTheod. My friends are my life and fortune, when they care to be kind to\nme.\n\nSoc. By heaven, Theodote, a very fine property indeed, and far better\nworth possessing than a multitude of sheep or goats or cattle. A flock\nof friends!... But (he added) do you leave it to fortune whether a\nfriend lights like a fly on your hand at random, or do you use any\nartifice (6) yourself to attract him?\n\n (6) Or, \"means and appliances,\" \"machinery.\"\n\nTheod. And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?\n\nSoc. Bless me! far more naturally than any spider. You know how they\ncapture the creatures on which they live; (7) by weaving webs of\ngossamer, is it not? and woe betide the fly that tumbles into their\ntoils! They eat him up.\n\n (7) Lit. \"the creatures on which they live.\"\n\nTheod. So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?\n\nSoc. Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that\nnoblest of all game--a lover, to wit--in so artless a fashion? Do you\nnot see (to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of\ndevices are needed to bag a hare? (8) The creatures range for their food\nat night; therefore the hunter must provide himself with night dogs.\nAt peep of dawn they are off as fast as they can run. He must therefore\nhave another pack of dogs to scent out and discover which way they\nbetake them from their grazing ground to their forms; (9) and as they\nare so fleet of foot that they run and are out of sight in no time, he\nmust once again be provided with other fleet-footed dogs to follow their\ntracks and overtake them; (10) and as some of them will give even these\nthe slip, he must, last of all, set up nets on the paths at the points\nof escape, so that they may fall into the meshes and be caught.\n\n (8) See the author's own treatise on \"Hunting,\" vi. 6 foll.\n\n (9) Lit. \"from pasture to bed.\"\n\n (10) Or, \"close at their heels and run them down.\" See \"Hunting\"; cf.\n    \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 40.\n\nTheod. And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?\n\nSoc. Well now! what if in place of a dog you can get a man who will hunt\nup your wealthy lover of beauty and discover his lair, and having found\nhim, will plot and plan to throw him into your meshes?\n\nTheod. Nay, what sort of meshes have I?\n\nSoc. One you have, and a close-folding net it is, (11) I trow; to wit,\nyour own person; and inside it sits a soul that teaches you (12) with\nwhat looks to please and with what words to cheer; how, too, with smiles\nyou are to welcome true devotion, but to exclude all wantons from your\npresence. (13) It tells you, you are to visit your beloved in sickness\nwith solicitude, and when he has wrought some noble deed you are greatly\nto rejoice with him; and to one who passionately cares for you, you are\nto make surrender of yourself with heart and soul. The secret of true\nlove I am sure you know: not to love softly merely, but devotedly. (14)\nAnd of this too I am sure: you can convince your lovers of your fondness\nfor them not by lip phrases, but by acts of love.\n\n (11) Or, \"right well woven.\"\n\n (12) Lit. \"by which you understand.\"\n\n (13) Or, \"with what smiles to lie in wait for (cf. 'Cyrop.' II. iv.\n    20; Herod. vi. 104) the devoted admirer, and how to banish from\n    your presence the voluptary.\"\n\n (14) Or, \"that it should be simply soft, but full of tender goodwill.\"\n\nTheod. No, upon my word, I have none of these devices.\n\nSoc. And yet it makes all the difference whether you approach a human\nbeing in the natural and true way, since it is not by force certainly\nthat you can either catch or keep a friend. Kindness and pleasure\nare the only means to capture this fearful wild-fowl man and keep him\nconstant.\n\nTheod. You are right.\n\nSoc. In the first place you must make such demands only of your\nwell-wisher as he can grant without repentance; and in the next place\nyou must make requital, dispensing your favours with a like economy.\nThus you will best make friends whose love shall last the longest and\ntheir generosity know no stint. (15) And for your favours you will best\nwin your friends if you suit your largess to their penury; for, mark\nyou, the sweetest viands presented to a man before he wants them are apt\nto prove insipid, or, to one already sated, even nauseous; but create\nhunger, and even coarser stuff seems honey-sweet.\n\n (15) Or, \"This is the right road to friendship--permanent and open-\n    handed friendship.\"\n\nTheod. How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?\n\nSoc. In the first place you must not offer or make suggestion of your\ndainties to jaded appetites until satiety has ceased and starvation\ncries for alms. Even then shall you make but a faint suggestion to their\nwant, with modest converse--like one who would fain bestow a kindness...\nand lo! the vision fades and she is gone--until the very pinch of\nhunger; for the same gifts have then a value unknown before the moment\nof supreme desire.\n\nThen Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side (like the\nhuntsman's assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?\n\nSoc. That will I be in good sooth if only you can woo and win me.\n\nTheod. How shall I woo and win you?\n\nSoc. Seek and you will find means, if you truly need me.\n\nTheod. Come then in hither and visit me often.\n\nAnd Socrates, poking sly fun at his own lack of business occupation,\nanswered: Nay, Theodote, leisure is not a commodity in which I largely\ndeal. I have a hundred affairs of my own too, private or public, to\noccupy me; and then there are my lady-loves, my dear friends, who will\nnot suffer me day or night to leave them, for ever studying to learn\nlove-charms and incantations at my lips.\n\nTheod. Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Of course, or else how is it, do you suppose, that Apollodorus (16)\nhere and Antisthenes never leave me; or why have Cebes and Simmias come\nall the way from Thebes to stay with me? Be assured these things cannot\nhappen without diverse love-charms and incantations and magic wheels.\n\n (16) For Apollodorus see \"Apol.\" 28; Plat. \"Symp.\" 172 A; \"Phaed.\" 59\n    A, 117 D. For Antisthenes see above. For Cebes and Simmias see\n    above, I. ii. 48; Plat. \"Crit.\" 45 B; \"Phaed.\" passim.\n\nTheod. I wish you would lend me your magic-wheel, (17) then, and I will\nset it spinning first of all for you.\n\n (17) Cf. Theocr. ii. 17; Schneider ad loc.\n\nSoc. Ah! but I do not wish to be drawn to you. I wish you to come to me.\n\nTheod. Then I will come. Only, will you be \"at home\" to me?\n\nSoc. Yes, I will welcome you, unless some one still dearer holds me\nengaged, and I must needs be \"not at home.\"\n\n\nXII\n\nSeeing one of those who were with him, a young man, but feeble of body,\nnamed Epigenes, (1) he addressed him.\n\n (1) Epigenes, possibly the son of Antiphon. See Plat. \"Apol.\" 33 E;\n    \"Phaed.\" 59 B.\n\nSoc. You have not the athletic appearance of a youth in training, (2)\nEpigenes.\n\n (2) {idiotikos}, lit. of the person untrained in gymnastics. See A. R.\n    Cluer ad loc. Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" 839 E; I. ii. 4; III. v. 15;\n    \"Symp.\" ii. 17.\n\nAnd he: That may well be, seeing I am an amateur and not in training.\n\nSoc. As little of an amateur, I take it, as any one who ever entered the\nlists of Olympia, unless you are prepared to make light of that contest\nfor life and death against the public foe which the Athenians will\ninstitute when the day comes. (3) And yet they are not a few who, owing\nto a bad habit of body, either perish outright in the perils of war, or\nare ignobly saved. Many are they who for the self-same cause are taken\nprisoners, and being taken must, if it so betide, endure the pains of\nslavery for the rest of their days; or, after falling into dolorous\nstraits, (4) when they have paid to the uttermost farthing of all, or\nmay be more than the worth of all, that they possess, must drag on\na miserable existence in want of the barest necessaries until death\nrelease them. Many also are they who gain an evil repute through\ninfirmity of body, being thought to play the coward. Can it be that you\ndespise these penalties affixed to an evil habit? Do you think you\ncould lightly endure them? Far lighter, I imagine, nay, pleasant even\nby comparison, are the toils which he will undergo who duly cultivates\na healthy bodily condition. Or do you maintain that the evil habit\nis healthier, and in general more useful than the good? Do you pour\ncontempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state? And\nyet the very opposite of that which befalls the ill attends the\nsound condition. Does not the very soundness imply at once health and\nstrength? (5) Many a man with no other talisman than this has passed\nsafely through the ordeal of war; stepping, not without dignity, (6)\nthrough all its horrors unscathed. Many with no other support than this\nhave come to the rescue of friends, or stood forth as benefactors of\ntheir fatherland; whereby they were thought worthy of gratitude, and\nobtained a great renown and received as a recompense the highest honours\nof the State; to whom is also reserved a happier and brighter passage\nthrough what is left to them of life, and at their death they leave\nto their children the legacy of a fairer starting-point in the race of\nlife.\n\n (3) Or, \"should chance betide.\" Is the author thinking of a life-and-\n    death struggle with Thebes?\n\n (4) e.g. the prisoners in the Latomiae. Thuc. vii. 87.\n\n (5) It is almost a proverb--\"Sound of body and limb is hale and\n    strong.\" \"Qui valet praevalebit.\"\n\n (6) e.g. Socrates himself, according to Alcibiades, ap. Plat. \"Symp.\"\n    221 B; and for the word {euskhemonos} see Arist. \"Wasps,\" 1210,\n    \"like a gentleman\"; L. and S.; \"Cyr.\" I. iii. 8; Aristot. \"Eth.\n    N.\" i. 10, 13, \"gracefully.\"\n\nBecause our city does not practise military training in public, (7)\nthat is no reason for neglecting it in private, but rather a reason for\nmaking it a foremost care. For be you assured that there is no contest\nof any sort, nor any transaction, in which you will be the worse off for\nbeing well prepared in body; and in fact there is nothing which men do\nfor which the body is not a help. In every demand, therefore, which can\nbe laid upon the body it is much better that it should be in the best\ncondition; since, even where you might imagine the claims upon the body\nto be slightest--in the act of reasoning--who does not know the terrible\nstumbles which are made through being out of health? It suffices to say\nthat forgetfulness, and despondency, and moroseness, and madness take\noccasion often of ill-health to visit the intellectual faculties so\nseverely as to expel all knowledge (8) from the brain. But he who is in\ngood bodily plight has large security. He runs no risk of incurring any\nsuch catastrophe through ill-health at any rate; he has the expectation\nrather that a good habit must procure consequences the opposite to those\nof an evil habit; (9) and surely to this end there is nothing a man in\nhis senses would not undergo.... It is a base thing for a man to wax old\nin careless self-neglect before he has lifted up his eyes and seen\nwhat manner of man he was made to be, in the full perfection of bodily\nstrength and beauty. But these glories are withheld from him who is\nguilty of self-neglect, for they are not wont to blaze forth unbidden.\n(10)\n\n (7) Cf. \"Pol. Ath.\" i. 13; and above, III. v. 15.\n\n (8) Or, \"whole branches of knowledge\" ({tas epistemas}).\n\n (9) Or, \"he may well hope to be insured by his good habit against the\n    evils attendant on its opposite.\"\n\n (10) Or, \"to present themselves spontaneously.\"\n\n\nXII\n\nOnce when some one was in a fury of indignation because he had bidden a\npasser-by good-day and the salutation was not returned, Socrates\nsaid: \"It is enough to make one laugh! If you met a man in a wretched\ncondition of body, you would not fall into a rage; but because you\nstumble upon a poor soul somewhat boorishly disposed, you feel annoyed.\"\n\nTo the remark of another who complained that he did not take his food\nwith pleasure, he said: \"Acumenus (1) has a good prescription for that.\"\nAnd when the other asked: \"And what may that be?\" \"To stop eating,\" he\nsaid. \"On the score of pleasure, economy, and health, total abstinence\nhas much in its favour.\" (2)\n\n (1) A well-known physician. See Plat. \"Phaedr.\" 227 A, 269 A; \"Symp.\"\n    176 B. A similar story is told of Dr. Abernethy, I think.\n\n (2) Lit. \"he would live a happier, thriftier, and healthier life, if\n    he stopped eating.\"\n\nAnd when some one else lamented that \"the drinking-water in his house\nwas hot,\" he replied: \"Then when you want a warm bath you will not have\nto wait.\"\n\nThe Other. But for bathing purposes it is cold.\n\nSoc. Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing\nin it?\n\nThe Other. Quite the reverse; it is a constant marvel to me how\ncontentedly they use it for either purpose.\n\nSoc. Which is hotter to the taste--the water in your house or the hot\nspring in the temple of Asclepius? (3)\n\n (3) In the Hieron at Epidauros probably. See Baedeker, \"Greece,\" p.\n    240 foll.\n\nThe Other. The water in the temple of Asclepius.\n\nSoc. And which is colder for bathing--yours or the cold spring in the\ncave of Amphiaraus? (4)\n\n (4) Possibly at Oropos. Cf. Paus. i. 34. 3.\n\nThe Other. The water in the cave of Amphiaraus.\n\nSoc. Then please to observe: if you do not take care, they will set you\ndown as harder to please than a domestic servant or an invalid. (5)\n\n (5) i.e. \"the least and the most fastidious of men.\"\n\nA man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance\non him, and when Socrates asked: \"Why he was so wroth with his own\nserving-man?\" excused himself on the ground that \"the fellow was a lazy,\ngourmandising, good-for-nothing dolt--fonder of money than of work.\" To\nwhich Socrates: \"Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in\nthat case the more deserves a whipping--the master or the man?\"\n\nWhen some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia, \"Why are you\nafraid of the long distance?\" he asked. \"Here at home you spend nearly\nall your day in taking walks. (6) Well, on your road to Olympia you will\ntake a walk and breakfast, and then you will take another walk and dine,\nand go to bed. Do you not see, if you take and tack together five or six\ndays' length of walks, and stretch them out in one long line, it will\nsoon reach from Athens to Olympia? I would recommend you, however,\nto set off a day too soon rather than a day too late. To be forced to\nlengthen the day's journey beyond a reasonable amount may well be a\nnuisance; but to take one day's journey beyond what is necessary is pure\nrelaxation. Make haste to start, I say, and not while on the road.\" (7)\n\n (6) {peripateis}, \"promenading up and down.\"\n\n (7) \"Festina lente\"--that is your motto.\n\nWhen some one else remarked \"he was utterly prostrated after a long\njourney,\" Socrates asked him: \"Had he had any baggage to carry?\"\n\n\"Not I,\" replied the complainer; \"only my cloak.\"\n\nSoc. Were you travelling alone, or was your man-servant with you?\n\nHe. Yes, I had my man.\n\nSoc. Empty-handed, or had he something to carry?\n\nHe. Of course; carrying my rugs and other baggage.\n\nSoc. And how did he come off on the journey?\n\nHe. Better than I did myself, I take it.\n\nSoc. Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would\nyour condition have been like?\n\nHe. Sorry enough, I can tell you; or rather, I could not have carried it\nat all.\n\nSoc. What a confession! Fancy being capable of so much less toil than\na poor slave boy! Does that sound like the perfection of athletic\ntraining?\n\n\nXIV\n\nOn the occasion of a common dinner-party (1) where some of the company\nwould present themselves with a small, and others with a large supply\nof viands, Socrates would bid the servants (2) throw the small supplies\ninto the general stock, or else to help each of the party to a share all\nround. Thus the grand victuallers were ashamed in the one case not\nto share in the common stock, and in the other not to throw in their\nsupplies also. (3) Accordingly in went the grand supplies into the\ncommon stock. And now, being no better off than the small contributors,\nthey soon ceased to cater for expensive delicacies.\n\n (1) For the type of entertainment see Becker, \"Charicles,\" p. 315\n    (Eng. tr.)\n\n (2) \"The boy.\"\n\n (3) Or, \"were ashamed not to follow suit by sharing in the common\n    stock and contributing their own portion.\"\n\nAt a supper-party one member of the company, as Socrates chanced to\nnote, had put aside the plain fare and was devoting himself to certain\ndainties. (4) A discussion was going on about names and definitions,\nand the proper applications of terms to things. (5) Whereupon Socrates,\nappealing to the company: \"Can we explain why we call a man a 'dainty\nfellow'? What is the particular action to which the term applies?\n(6)--since every one adds some dainty to his food when he can get it.\n(7) But we have not quite hit the definition yet, I think. Are we to be\ncalled dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?\" (8)\n\n (4) For the distinction between {sitos} and {opson} see Plat. \"Rep.\"\n    372 C.\n\n (5) Or, \"The conversation had fallen upon names: what is the precise\n    thing denoted under such and such a term? Define the meaning of so\n    and so.\"\n\n (6) {opsophagos} = {opson} (or relish) eater, and so a \"gourmand\" or\n    \"epicure\"; but how to define a gourmand?\n\n (7) Lit. \"takes some {opson} (relish) to his {sitos} (food).\"\n\n (8) Lit. \"simply for that\" (sc. the taking of some sort of {opson}.\n    For {epi touto} cf. Plat. \"Soph.\" 218 C; \"Parmen.\" 147 D.)\n\nNo! hardly! (some member of the company replied).\n\nSoc. Well, but now suppose a man confine himself to eating venison or\nother dainty without any plain food at all, not as a matter of training,\n(9) but for the pleasure of it: has such a man earned the title? \"The\nrest of the world would have a poor chance against him,\" (10) some\none answered. \"Or,\" interposed another, \"what if the dainty dishes he\ndevours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal--what of him?\"\n(11)\n\n (9) Lit. \"{opson} (relish) by itself, not for the sake of training,\"\n    etc. The English reader wil bear in mind that a raw beefsteak or\n    other meat prescribed by the gymnastic trainer in preference to\n    farinaceous food ({sitos}) would be {opson}.\n\n (10) Or, more lit. \"Hardly any one could deserve the appellation\n    better.\"\n\n (11) Lit. \"and what of the man who eats much {opson} on the top of a\n    little ({sitos})?\" {epesthion} = follows up one course by another,\n    like the man in a fragment of Euripides, \"Incert.\" 98: {kreasi\n    boeiois khlora suk' epesthien}, who \"followed up his beefsteak\n    with a garnish of green figs.\"\n\nSoc. He has established a very fair title at any rate to the\nappellation, and when the rest of the world pray to heaven for a fine\nharvest: \"May our corn and oil increase!\" he may reasonably ejaculate,\n\"May my fleshpots multiply!\"\n\nAt this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set\nsomewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savoury\nviands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was\nall-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others\nnext him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce. (12)\n\n (12) Lit. \"see whether he will make a relish of the staple or a staple\n    of the relish\" (\"butter his bread or bread his butter\").\n\nAnother time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread\n(13) to test several savoury dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more\nextravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes\nthemselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes\ntogether?--why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one\nswoop! (14) First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the\ncook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the\naudacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the\ncooks are right in their method he is wrong in his, and consequently the\ndestroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the\ngreatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their\nskill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in\nstore for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at\nonce: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will\nfeel himself half starved, whilst his neighbour, accustomed to send his\nsop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes\nnever so few.\n\n (13) {psomos}, a sop or morsel of bread (cf. {psomion}, N. T., in mod.\n    Greek = \"bread\").\n\n (14) Huckleberry Finn (p. 2 of that young person's \"Adventures\")\n    propounds the rationale of the system: \"In a barrel of odds and\n    ends it is different; things get mixed up, and the juice kind of\n    swaps around, and the things go better.\"\n\nHe had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to \"make good cheer,\" (15) was\nin Attic parlance a synonym for \"eating,\" and the affix {eu} (the\nattributive \"good\") connoted the eating of such things as would not\ntrouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So\nthat to \"make good cheer\" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and\nwell-ordered style of living. (16)\n\n (15) {euokheisthai}, cf. \"Cyrop.\" IV. v. 7; \"Pol. Ath.\" ii. 9; Kuhner\n    cf. Eustah. \"ad Il.\" ii. p. 212, 37, {'Akhaioi ten trophen okhen\n    legousin oxutonos}. Athen. viii. 363 B. See \"Hipparch,\" viii. 4,\n    of horses. Cf. Arist. \"H. A.\" viii. 6.\n\n (16) See \"Symp.\" vi. 7; and for similar far-fetched etymologies, Plat.\n    \"Crat.\" passim.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\n\nI\n\nSuch was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every\nway that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to\nappreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time\nin his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed\na priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer\npresent, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed\nto be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to\nhis acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.\n\nLet us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips:\n\"I am in love with so and so\"; and all the while it was obvious the\ngoing-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom\nof beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue.\n(1) And these \"good natures\" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness\nto learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining\nin the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for\nthose studies in particular which serve to good administration of a\nhouse or of a state, (2) and in general to the proper handling of\nman and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to\nbe educated (3) to become not only happy themselves and happy\nadministrators of their private households, but to be capable of\nrendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.\n\n (1) Or, \"not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul\n    as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be\n    detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn,\" etc. Cf.\n    Plat. \"Rep.\" 535 B.\n\n (2) Cf. above, I. i. 7.\n\n (3) Or, \"A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a\n    fortune-favoured individual himself and,\" etc. Al. Kuhner, \"Eos,\n    qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint.\"\n\nHe had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of\npeople. (4) Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised\nlearning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most\nin need of training and education; (5) and he would point out how in the\ncase of horses it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if\nproperly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb\nanimal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good\nfor nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for\ntoil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high\nbreeding, (6) will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or\nfor any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn\nout a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It\nis just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural\nendowments--that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of\nspirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his\nhand to--will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a\nsuperlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best\nupon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained,\nand he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, (7) and for\nthis reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do,\nhe will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst the very\nmagnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either\nto rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his\ncase also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst.\n(8)\n\n (4) Or, \"His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same. It\n    varied with the individual.\"\n\n (5) Or, \"If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study\n    in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him\n    that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands,\" etc. See\n    Newman, op. cit. i. 397.\n\n (6) Cf. Aristot. \"H. A.\" ix. 1; and \"Hunting,\" iii. 11.\n\n (7) Or, \"and the same man may easily become a master villain of the\n    most dangerous sort.\"\n\n (8) Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann cf. Plato. \"Crito,\" 44 E; \"Hipp.\n    min.\" 375 E; \"Rep.\" vi. 491 E; \"Gorg.\" 526 A; \"Polit.\" 303 A.\n\nOr to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that\nhe conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education--since\nit is \"money makes the man,\" and his wealth will amply suffice him to\ncarry out his desires and to win honours from admiring humanity. (9)\nSocrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the\nfolly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the\nline of demarcation (10) between what is gainful and what is hurtful\nin conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such\ndiscrimination, a man could help himself by means of wealth alone to\nwhatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and\nwas it not the veriest simplicity to suppose that, without the power of\nlabouring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort\nof way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the\nveriest simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge\nit was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or\nwithout such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?\n\n (9) Or, \"and to be honoured by mankind.\"\n\n (10) Or, \"that without learning the distinction it was possible to\n    distinguish between,\" etc.\n\n\nII\n\nOr to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that\nthey have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom:\nhis manner of dealing with these I will now describe.\n\nEuthydemus (1) \"the beautiful\" had (Socrates was given to understand)\ncollected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and\nphilosophers, (2) by help of which he already believed himself to be\nmore than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently\nexpect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. (3) At\nfirst, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not\nas yet set foot in the agora, (4) but if he had anything to transact,\nhis habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly\nto this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those\nwho were with him. And first the question was started by some one: \"Was\nit through consorting with the wise, (5) or by his own unaided talent,\nthat Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the\nservices of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community\ninstinctively turned to him?\" Socrates, with a view to stirring (6)\nEuthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the\nbelief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only\nbe attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the\nstate, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the\nlap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. (7)\n\n (1) Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. \"Symp.\" 222 B,\n    and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, \"Prosop. Xen.\" s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit.\n    p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. \"Phaedr.\" 278 E, \"Isocrates the\n    fair.\" For the whole chapter cf. Plat. \"Alc.\" i.; \"Lys.\" 210 E.\n    See above, \"Mem.\" I. ii. 29; Grote, \"Plato,\" i. ch. x. passim.\n\n (2) Lit. \"sophists.\" See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. p. 480, note. For\n    private libraries see Becker, \"Char.\" p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)\n\n (3) See \"Hipparch,\" i. 24; \"Cyrop.\" V. v. 46.\n\n (4) See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. \"Areop.\" 149 C.\n\n (5) Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.\n\n (6) L. and S. cf. Plat. \"Lys.\" 223 A; \"Rep.\" 329 B: \"Wishing to draw\n    him out.\"\n\n (7) Cf. Plat. \"Alc.\" i. 118 C: \"And Pericles is said not to have got\n    his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with\n    several of the philosophers\" (Jowett).\n\nOn a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain\nto see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, (8)\nas if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on\nthe score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.\n\n (8) {sunedrias}, \"the council.\"\n\nSoc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when\nour friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some\nquestion for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit\nof his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary\nspeeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything\nfrom anybody, he has ready for the occasion. (9) Clearly at the outset\nhe will deliver himself thus: \"Men of Athens, I have never at any time\nlearnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as\nbeing an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action,\nhave I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as\nbeen at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who\nhave knowledge; (10) on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I\nwill not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of\nso doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I\nshall be glad to place at your disposal.\"... How appropriate (11) would\nsuch a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of\nstate physician, (12) would it not? How advantageously he might begin\nan address on this wise: \"Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of\nhealing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any\nteacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever\non my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but\nagainst the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however,\nyou will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do\nmy best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons.\" Every one\npresent laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).\n\n (9) Or, \"the pretty exordium... now in course of composition. He\n    must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any\n    crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore\n    beginning his speech thus?\"\n\n (10) Or, \"scientific experts.\"\n\n (11) Al. \"Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to\n    begin with a like exordium.\" {armoseie} = \"it would be consistent\n    (with what has gone before).\"\n\n (12) Schneider cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" iv. 720 A; \"Gorg.\" 456 A; and for\n    \"the parish doctor,\" \"Polit.\" 259 A; Arist. \"Acharn.\" 1030.\n\nPresently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that\nhe was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still\nat pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to\nattach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to\ncure him of that defect, proceeded.\n\nSoc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the\nharp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like\naccomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by\nthemselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they\nmust sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things\nand enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those\nteachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise\nbecome famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent\npolitically as orators and statesmen, (13) there are some who cannot\nsee why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a\nmoment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary\npains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter\nconcerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in\nproportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who\nreach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more\nsustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark\nupon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.\n\n (13) Or, more lit. \"powerful in speech and action within the sphere of\n    politics.\"\n\nSuch were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of\ntheir association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the\nphilosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns\nof the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager\nlistener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, (14) and when Euthydemus\nwas seated by his side the following conversation took place.\n\n (14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or\n    imaginary?\n\nSoc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me,\nthat you have made a large collection of the writings of \"the wise,\" as\nthey are called? (15)\n\n (15) Or, \"have collected several works of our classical authors and\n    philosophers.\"\n\nEuthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on\ncollecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.\n\nSoc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom\nrather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold\nand silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts\n(16) of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.\n\n (16) Lit. \"gnomes,\" maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. \"Rhet.\" ii. 21.\n\nAnd Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he\nto himself, \"In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the\nacquisition of wisdom.\" But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased\nwith the praise, continued.\n\nSoc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you\ncollect books?\n\nAnd when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should\nmake, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why,\nthe prescriptions (17) of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large\nlibrary by themselves.\n\n (17) {suggrammata}, \"medical treatises.\" See Aristot. \"Eth.\" x. 9, 21.\n\nNo, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).\n\nSoc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of\nwell-stored wit and judgment. (18)\n\n (18) Or, \"To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed\n    wisdom.\"\n\nI have no such ambition (he replied).\n\nSoc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? (19)\n\n (19) Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. \"Theaet.\") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8,\n    19.\n\nEuth. No, nor yet a mathematician.\n\nSoc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? (20) or (as the youth\nsignified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (21) (he asked), for I am told\nyou have the entire works of Homer in your possession. (22)\n\n (20) Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.\n\n (21) See \"Symp.\" iii. 6; Plat. \"Ion.\"\n\n (22) See Jowett, \"Plato,\" i. 229; Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 455.\n\nNay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very\nexact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are\nempty-pated creatures enough themselves. (23)\n\n (23) Or, \"are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but\n    are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves.\"\n\nAt last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant\nto that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators\nfit to rule and apt to benefit (24) the rest of the world and\nthemselves?\n\n (24)  Or, \"statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of\n    the rest of the world and themselves.\"\n\nYes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.\n\nUpon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the\nobject of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the\narts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled \"royal\"; but\n(he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in\nthese matters without being just and upright? (25)\n\n (25) Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} =\n    social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: \"The\n    Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with\n    the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,\n    which is what we mean by 'upright.'\"\n\nEuth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness\nit is impossible to be a good citizen.\n\nNo doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?\n\nEuth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as\nan upright man.\n\nAnd have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and\nappropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?\n\nEuth. To be sure they have.\n\nSoc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and\nproducts, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his,\nshould he not?\n\nI see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works\nof righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of\nunrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort\nwithin reach of eye and ear every day.\n\nShall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, (26)\nand on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us\nto be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and\nanything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to\nthe account of W?\n\n (26) The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The\n    letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).\n\nBy all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.\n\nAccordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and\ncontinued.\n\nSoc. Lying exists among men, does it not?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nTo which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).\n\nEuth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.\n\nSoc. Deceit too is not uncommon?\n\nEuth. By no means.\n\nSoc. To which side shall we place deceit?\n\nEuth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.\n\nSoc. Well, and chicanery (27) or mischief of any sort?\n\n (27) Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.\n\nEuth. That too.\n\nSoc. And the enslavement of free-born men? (28)\n\n (28) Or, \"the kidnapping of men into slavery.\" {to andrapodizesthai} =\n    the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery\n    itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a\n    certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.\n\nEuth. That too.\n\nSoc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the\naccount, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?\n\nIt would be monstrous (he replied).\n\nSoc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he\nsucceeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to\nsay that he is doing wrong?\n\nEuth. By no means.\n\nSoc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?\n\nEuth. That would be all fair and right also.\n\nSoc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what\nis right?\n\nEuth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question\nto the case of friends.\n\nSoc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now\nhave to be placed to the credit of Right?\n\nEuth. Apparently.\n\nSoc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a\nnew definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is\nwrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves\nus to be as straightforward as possible. (29)\n\n (29) Or, \"an absolutely straightforward course is necessary.\"\n\nI quite assent (replied Euthydemus).\n\nSo far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops\ndemoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements\nwere coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the\ncourage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act\nof fraud? (30)\n\n (30) Cf. \"Hell.\" IV. iii. 10; \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 31.\n\nOn the side of right, to my notion (he replied).\n\nSoc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of\nmedicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by\nan act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to\neat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which\naccount shall we set down this fraud?\n\nEuth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.\n\nSoc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and\nyou are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him\nof his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the\ntheft?\n\nEuth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.\n\nSoc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in\nevery case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?\n\nHeaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my\nformer statement. (31)\n\n (31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).\n\nSoc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false\nentry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to\nleave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to\nhis detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or\nunintentionally?\n\nEuth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for\nall my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I\nfirst supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the\nintentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.\n\n (32) Or, \"all my original positions seem to me now other than I first\n    conceived them\"; or, \"everything I first asserted seems now to be\n    twisted topsy-turvy.\"\n\nSoc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right\nand Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)\n\n (33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge\n    of the Just.\n\nEuth. That is my opinion.\n\nSoc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)--he who\nintentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?\n\n (34) Or, \"more grammatical\"; \"the better grammarian.\"\n\nEuth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell\nor read correctly whenever he chooses.\n\nSoc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the\ninvoluntary offender is an illiterate? (35)\n\n (35) Or, \"In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer\n    intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but\n    he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?\"\n\nEuth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.\n\nSoc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies\nand deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)\n\n (36) Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what\n    is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?\n\n    Euth. Clearly he does.\n\nEuth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.\n\nSoc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who\nhas the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such\nknowledge? (37)\n\n (37)  Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the\n    {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such\n    {episteme}?\n\n    Euth. Yes.\n\n    Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more\n    righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. \"Hipp.\n    min.\"; Arist. \"Eth. Eud.\" VI. v. 7.\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is\nmore righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?\n\nEuth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail\nof my own admission. (38)\n\n (38) Lit. \"Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,\n    heaven knows how.\" See Jowett, \"Plato,\" ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).\n\nSoc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak\nthe truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing\nfor two minutes together. First he says: \"The road is towards the east,\"\nand then he says, \"No, it's towards the west\"; or, running up a column\nof figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that,\nnow more, now less--what do you think of such a man?\n\nEuth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.\n\nSoc. And you know the appellation given to certain people--\"slavish,\"\n(39) or, \"little better than a slave?\"\n\n (39) {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and\n    a low order of intellect, cf. \"boorish,\" \"rustic,\" \"loutish,\"\n    (\"pariah,\" conceivably). \"Slavish,\" \"servile,\" with us connote\n    moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is\n    impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See\n    Newman, op. cit. i. 107.\n\nEuth. I do.\n\nSoc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to\nwhom it is applied?\n\nEuth. Clearly of their ignorance.\n\nSoc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?\n\nEuth. No, certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?\n\nEuth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.\n\nSoc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?\n\nEuth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the\nmajority of those who do know just these matters are \"little better than\nslaves.\"\n\nSoc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of\nthe beautiful, the good, the just? (40)\n\n (40) Cf. Goethe's \"Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben.\"\n\nIt is, in my opinion (he replied).\n\nSoc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the\nimputation of being slaves?\n\nEuth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that\nat any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to\nbe taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and\ngoodness his pursuit. (41) So that now you may well imagine my despair\nwhen, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put\nto me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of\nprogress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.\n\n (41) {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}--\n    nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.\n\nThereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?\n\nYes, certainly; twice (said he).\n\nSoc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple:\n{GNOMI    SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?\n\nEuth. I did.\n\nSoc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you\ngive it heed and try to discover who and what you were?\n\nI can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure\nI knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the\nworld did I know?\n\nSoc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own\nname and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like\nthe would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he\nhas got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the\nbeast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and\nhow it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in\nreference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man\nin like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's\nrequirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?\n\nEuth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not\nhimself.\n\nSoc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men\nmeet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves\nwith many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is\nadvantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by\ndoing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does\nwell; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids\nmistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human\nbeings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with\ngood and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is\nmistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of\nmankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants,\nnor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all\nabroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in\nwhat is ill.\n\nAgain, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his\nperformance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad\nto make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing\nin their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his\nprotection; (42) they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all\nthese causes (43) single him out as the chief object of their affection.\nHe, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and\nfails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers\nchastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation\nand becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of\ndishonour and contempt.\n\n (42) Cf. Dante, \"Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore.\"\n\n (43) Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate \"and\n    therefore.\"\n\nWhat is true of individuals is true also of communities. (44) That state\nwhich in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself\nends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.\n\n (44) Or, more lit. \"A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies\n    politic.\"\n\nThereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the\nprecept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the\napplication? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you\nfor an explanation, if you would kindly give one. (45)\n\n (45) Or, \"at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?--\n    there is the mystery. I look to you, if you are willing, to\n    interpret it.\"\n\nWell (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction\nbetween good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?\n\nWhy, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much\ndiscernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. (46)\n\n (46) Lit. \"if I did not know even that.\"\n\nCome then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so\ntermed.\n\nThat is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health\nin itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the\nnext place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks,\nand habits of life, (47) I regard as good or evil according as they\ncontribute either to health or to disease.\n\n (47) Or, \"pursuits and occupations\"; \"manners and customs.\"\n\nSoc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of\nany good are good, but when of any evil, evil?\n\nAnd when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source\nof good?\n\nWhy, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for\ninstance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage\nor other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to\nspare--when those who owing to their health and strength take a part\nin the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de\ncombat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.\n\nEuth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages\nto be got from strength and lost through weakness.\n\nSoc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment\nbenefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather\nthan evil?\n\nEuth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,\n(48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good;\nsince there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better\nthan a fool.\n\n (48) See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.\n\nSoc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was\nseized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave,\nand robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while\nendeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's\ndeath without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among\nbarbarians and again enslaved?\n\n (49) See Ovid. \"Met.\" viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. \"Fab.\" 39,\n    40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.\n\nYes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)\n\n (50) Or, \"Ah yes, of course; the tale is current.\"\n\nSoc. Or have you not heard of the \"woes of Palamedes,\" (51) that\ncommonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him\nand slew him?\n\n (51) See Virg. \"Aen.\" ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. \"Her.\" x.\n\nEuth. That tale also is current.\n\nSoc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on\naccount of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his\ncourt enslaved? (52)\n\n (52) Cf. Herod. iii. 129.\n\nWell, prosperity, well-being (53) (he exclaimed), must surely be a\nblessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?\n\n (53) {to eudaimonein}, \"happiness.\" Cf. Herod. i. 86.\n\nIt might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in\nitself a compound of other questionable blessings.\n\nEuth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can\npossibly be questionable?\n\nNone (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these\ncomponents beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything\nelse of that kind?\n\nEuth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would\nhappiness be without these?\n\nSoc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest\nsources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their\nfair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction (54) by the\nsight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to\nessay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how\nmany, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted\nagainst and destroyed! (55) how many through fame and political power\nhave suffered a world of woe!\n\n (54) Cf. Plat. \"Rep.\" vii. 517 D; \"Phaedr.\" 249 D.\n\n (55) e.g. Alcibiades.\n\nWell (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness,\nI must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in\nprayer. (56)\n\n (56) See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.\n\nNay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through\nexcessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to\nexamine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to\ndirect, is democratically constituted, (57) of course you know what a\ndemocracy is.\n\n (57) Or, \"popularly governed.\"\n\nEuth. I presume I do, decidedly.\n\nSoc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without\nknowing who the people are?\n\nEuth. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And whom do you consider to be the people?\n\nEuth. The poor citizens, I should say.\n\nSoc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?\n\nEuth. Of course I do.\n\nSoc. I presume you also know who the rich are?\n\nEuth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.\n\nSoc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?\n\nEuth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their\nnecessaries, (58) and by rich those who have more means than sufficient\nfor all their needs.\n\n (58) Al. \"who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes\n    (according to the census).\"\n\nSoc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only\nfind this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of\nit; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?\n\nI have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied\nEuthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being\ndriven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.\n\nThen, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class\nthese same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of\nscant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?\n\nThen Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this\nadmission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a\nlittle more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he\nwent away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he\nwas verily and indeed no better than a slave.\n\nAmongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many\nrefused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as\ndolts and dullards. (59) But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that,\nin order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate\nas much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some\nnecessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his\nhabits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the\nyoung man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the\nsimplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held\nto be needful to know or important to practise.\n\n (59) Or, \"as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament.\"\n    Cf. Plat. \"Gorg.\" 488 A.\n\n\nIII\n\nIt may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were\nwith him to discover capacities for speech and action or as\ninventive geniuses, (1) without at any rate a well-laid foundation of\nself-control. (2) For those who possessed such abilities without these\nsame saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with\ngreater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those\nwho were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. (3) That\nsuch was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be\nseen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular\noccasion. (4) I confine myself to a particular discussion with\nEuthydemus at which I was present.\n\n (1) Or, \"as speakers\" (see ch. vi. below), \"and men of action\" (see\n    ch. v. below), \"or as masters of invention\" (see ch. vii. below).\n\n (2) Or, \"but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them\n    {sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul).\"\n\n (3) Lit. \"His first object and endeavour was to make those who were\n    with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods.\"\n\n (4) Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg.\n    {diegounto}, translate, \"from the current accounts penned during\n    his lifetime by the other witnesses.\" For {alloi} see K. Joel, op.\n    cit. pp. 15, 23; above, \"Mem.\" I. iv. 1.\n\nSocrates said: (5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to\nobserve what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all\nhis needs?\n\n (5) For the subject matter of this \"teleological\" chapter, see above,\n    I. iv.; K. Joel, op. cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref. to\n    Dummler's views.\n\nEuth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.\n\nWell (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the\nfirst place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.\n\nEuth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own\neyes could help us, be like men born blind.\n\nSoc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and\nrelaxation, they bestow upon us \"the blessed balm of silent night.\" (6)\n\n (6) {kalliston anapauterion}. The diction throughout is \"poetical.\"\n\nYes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.\n\nSoc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendour makes manifest to us\nthe hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night\nin her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft\nthe starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we\ncan accomplish many of our needs? (7)\n\n (7) e.g. for temple orientation see Dr. Penrose quoted by Norman\n    Lockyer, \"Nature,\" August 31. 1893.\n\nIt is so (he answered).\n\nSoc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to\nus the quarters of the night, but of the month also?\n\nCertainly (he answered).\n\nSoc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the\nheavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring\nup (8) for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons\nto furnish us in turn not only with the many and diverse objects of\nneed, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness? (9)\n\n (8) Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" 747 D.\n\n (9) Or, \"pleasure.\"\n\nYes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for\nman. (10)\n\n (10) Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" 713 D; \"Symp.\" 189 D. \"These things are signs\n    of a beneficient regard for man.\"\n\nSoc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which\nconspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to\nall things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves,\nand commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more\nwholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to\nthe abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you\nconcerning such a boon?\n\nEuth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.\n\nSoc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with\nfire (11)--our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our\nfellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of\nits utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of\nthis, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to\nthe life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire? (12)\n\n (11) Lit. \"and then the fact that they made provision for us of even\n    fire\"; the credit of this boon, according to Hesiod, being due to\n    Prometheus.\n\n (12) Or, \"no life-aiding appliance worthy of the name.\"\n\nEuth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design. (13)\n\n (13) Or, \"Yes, that may be called an extreme instance of the divine\n    'philanthropy.'\" Cf. Cic. \"de N. D.\" ii. 62.\n\nSoc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, (14) how when he has\nturned him about in winter (15) he again draws nigh to us, ripening some\nfruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has\nfulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to\nscorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point\nwhere if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to\ndeath with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach,\ntraversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial\ninfluence best upon us.\n\n (14) A single MS. inserts a passage {to de kai era...\n    'Anekphraston}.\n\n (15) i.e. as we say, \"after the winter solstice.\"\n\nYes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of\nbeing so ordered for the sake of man.\n\nSoc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either\nscorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how\ngradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail\nto notice how we come at last to either extreme. (16)\n\n (16) Or, \"note the gradual approach and gradual recession of the sun-\n    god, so gradual that we reach either extreme in a manner\n    imperceptibly, and before we are aware of its severity.\"\n\nFor my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind,\nwhether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man;\nand I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would\nseem to share these benefits along with man.\n\nSoc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves\nare born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature\nsave man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses\nand cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should\nsuppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate,\nequally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or\narticles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not\nuse the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and\ncheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, whilst all men everywhere\ntame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to\naccount as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.\n\nYes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that\nanimals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that\nhe can use them as he lists.\n\nSoc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the\nvariety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been\nendowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby\nwe take our fill of every blessing; (17) or, again, this implanted\nfaculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the\nthings which we perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how\neach set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless\ncontrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or\nlastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative\nspeech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to\nparticipate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to\nestablish laws, and to enter upon a civilised existence (18)--what are\nwe to think?\n\n (17) Or, \"Again, when we consider how many beautiful objects there are\n    serviceable to man, and yet how unlike they are to one another,\n    the fact that man has been endowed with senses adapted to each\n    class of things, and so has access to a world of happiness.\"\n\n (18) Cf. Aristot. \"Pol.\" III. ix. 5.\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest\na great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.\n\nSoc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless\nto take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they\nthemselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through\ndivination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by\nwhat means they may best be turned to good account?\n\nEuth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly\nmanner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be\ninquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and\nwhat you must not do. (19)\n\n (19) See above, I. iv. 14, for a parallel to the train of thought on\n    the part of Aristodemus \"the little,\" and of Euthydemus; and for\n    Socrates' {daimonion}, see above; Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 400.\n\nSoc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if,\nwithout waiting to behold the outward and visible forms (20) of the gods\nthemselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these\nbefore you, to worship and honour the Divine authors of them. (21)\nI would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this\nteaching. (22) Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings;\nyet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one\nsingle boon. (23) And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together\nthe universe, (24) in which are all things beautiful and good; (25) who\nfashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn, keeping it free\nfrom sickness or decay, (26) so that swifter than thought it ministers\nto his will unerringly--this God is seen to perform the mightiest\noperations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself\ninvisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so\nvisible to all--as we suppose--will not suffer man to regard him too\nnarrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he\nwill snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are\nthus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also;\nfrom the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and\ntriumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye\nmay detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds\nalso are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through\ntheir approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul\nof man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine--however\nmanifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden\nfrom our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise\nthe invisible ones, but learn to recognise their power, as revealed in\noutward things, and to know the divine influence. (27)\n\n (20) Cf. Cic. \"de N. D.\" I. xii. 31; Lactantius, \"de Ira,\" xi. 13.\n\n (21) See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox. 1862), {theous}; G. Sauppe, vol.\n    iii. \"An. crit.\" p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C. Schenkl.\n\n (22) i.e. \"that man must walk by faith.\" For {upodeiknunai} cf.\n    \"Econ.\" xii. 18.\n\n (23) Schneid. cf. Plat. \"Crat.\" 396.\n\n (24) Or, \"the co-ordinator and container of the universe.\"\n\n (25) Or, \"in whom all beauty and goodness is.\"\n\n (26) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" VIII. vii. 22; above, I. iv. 13.\n\n (27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.\n\nNay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a\ndeaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid,\nbut I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the\nkindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.\n\nBe not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the\ngod at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking \"how shall I return\nthanks to heaven?\"--\"According to the law and custom of your city\"; and\nthis, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please\nthe gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28)\nHow then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier\nhonour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken\nor fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I\npresume, that at the moment he is not honouring the gods. You must then\nhonour the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability;\nand having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest\nblessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive\ngreat blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how\nelse should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper,\nand how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the\namplest obedience?\n\n (28) Or, \"and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a\n    man,\" etc.; and for the maxim see above; \"Anab.\" III. ii. 9.\n\nBy such words--and conduct corresponding to his words--did Socrates\nmould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more\ndevout and more virtuous. (29)\n\n (29) Or, \"sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious.\"\n\n\nIV\n\nBut indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made\nno secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of\nit, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2)\nand in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined,\nwhether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was\na pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several\noccasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of\nthe assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an\nunconstitutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to\nresist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have\ndaunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some\ninjunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for\ninstance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again,\nwhen they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to\nbe put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the\ninjunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when\nhe appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, (6)\nnotwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts\nto humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery\nand supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that\ndefendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such\nmethods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of\nlaw which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection\nfrom the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges,\n(8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress\nthem and live.\n\n (1) L. Dindorf suspects  (SS. 1-6, {'Alla men... pollakis}), ed.\n    Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.\n\n (2) Or, \"by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the\n    eye of law and custom but positively helpful.\"\n\n (3) See above, I. i. 18; \"Hell.\" I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, \"H. G.\" viii.\n    272.\n\n (4) See above, I. ii. 35.\n\n (5) Leon of Salamis. See \"Hell.\" II. iii. 39; Plat. \"Apol.\" 32 C;\n    Andoc. \"de Myst.\" 46.\n\n (6) See above, I. i. 1; Plat. \"Apol.\" 19 C.\n\n (7) Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: \"Athenis affectus movere etiam per\n    praeconem prohibatur orator\"; \"Apol.\" 4; Plat. \"Apol.\" 38 D, E.\n\n (8) See Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. p. 663 foll.\n\nThese views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and\nnow with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9)\non the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)\n\n (9) For this famous person see Cob. \"Pros. Xen.\" s.n.; Plat. \"Hipp.\n    maj.\" 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, \"H. G.\" viii. 524.\n\n (10) Or, \"I can personally vouch for.\"\n\nHippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to\nbe present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing\nit was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or\ncarpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to\nsend him for the purpose: \"People say,\" (11) he added, \"that if a man\nwants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world\nis full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son\nor his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find\nsuch instruction.\"\n\n (11) L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence\n    {phasi de tines... didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the\n    sentiment see Plat. \"Apol.\" 20 A.\n\n (12) Cf. \"Cyrop.\" II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also \"Horsem.\" iii. 5;\n    \"Hunting,\" vii. 4.\n\nHippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still\nrepeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from\nyou long ago?\n\n (13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. \"Or.\" III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.\n    \"Gorg.\" 490 E.\n\nYes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is\nnot only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I\ndaresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing\ntwice over on the same subject?\n\n (14) Or, \"such is the breadth of your learning,\" {polumathes}. Cf.\n    Plat. \"Hipp. maj.\"\n\nTo be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all\noccasions.\n\nWhat (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case\nof spelling, if any one asks you, \"How many letters in Socrates, and\nwhat is their order?\" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of\nletters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic,\n\"Does twice five make ten?\" your answer to-day will differ from that of\nyesterday?\n\n (15) Cf. \"Econ.\" viii. 14; Plat. \"Alc.\" i. 113 A.\n\nHipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.\nHowever, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself\nI can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any\none else will be able to controvert.\n\n (16) Or, \"on the topic of the just I have something to say at present\n    which,\" etc.\n\nBy Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18)\nNow we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and\nwrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling;\nthere will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will\nreconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not\nknow how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your\nown lips all about the grand discovery you have made.\n\n (17) See above, I. v. 5.\n\n (18) Or, \"what a panacea are you the inventor of\"; lit. \"By Hera, you\n    have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease\n    recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease\n    their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and\n    their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters\n    of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war.\"\n\nYou shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you\nmake a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had\nenough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and\ncross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you\nrender an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a\nsingle topic. (19)\n\n (19) See Plat. \"Gorg.\" 465 A.\n\nWhat, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a\nchronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?\n\nHipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us\nhave it in words.\n\n (20) {o logos}.\n\nSoc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and\nin fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than\na word? (21)\n\n (21) Or, \"is of greater evidential value,\" \"ubi res adsunt, quid opus\n    est verbis?\"\n\nWorth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with\njustice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer\nof right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.\n\nSoc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me\nbearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up\nstrife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing\nany other unjust and wrongful act?\n\nNo, I cannot say that I have (he answered).\n\nSoc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?\n(22)\n\n (22) Or, \"is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous\n    behaviour?\"\n\nHipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a\nplain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep\ntelling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.\n\nWhy, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do\nwrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness\nand justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I\nassert that what is \"lawful\" is \"just and righteous.\"\n\nDo you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous\nterms?\n\nSoc. I do.\n\nI ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful,\nnor what you mean by just. (23)\n\n (23) Lit. \"what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of.\"\n\nSoc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?\n\nYes (he answered).\n\nSoc. What do you take them to be?\n\nHipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a\nstate in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.\n\nThen I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who\nregulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be\nlaw-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?\n\nCertainly (he answered).\n\nSoc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and\nright, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?\n\nHipp. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who\ndoes what is unjust is unjust?\n\nHipp. Of course.\n\nSoc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the\nlawless unjust?\n\nThen Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a\nserious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them,\nwhich laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and\naltering?\n\nWhich is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually\nundertaking war and then making peace again.\n\nMost true (he answered).\n\nSoc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law\nbecause laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war\nbecause peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm\ndisplayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?\n\nNo, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the\nLacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded\nin giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by\ninstilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws?\nAnd among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would\nscarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute\nto make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would\nadmit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the\nparamount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and\nin time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which\na state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity.\n\"Concord among citizens\"--that is the constant theme of exhortation\nemphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of\nthe community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and\nbreadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be\nbound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually\nswear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote\nfor the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players,\nor choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but\nsimply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that\nstate will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the\ncitizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well\nadministered nor a household well organised.\n\n (24) Cf. \"Pol. Lac.\" viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.\n\n (25) Lit. \"the Gerousiai.\" {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.\n\n (26) Lit. \"the best men.\" {S} or {X S} speaks as an \"aristocrat.\"\n\n (27) Cf. \"Hell.\" II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.\n    \"u Leocr.\" 189.\n\nAnd if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man\nhave than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against\npenalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it\nshall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts\nunbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. (28) It is\nto him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when\nseeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it\ntheir sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is\ntrustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to\nall alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends\nand fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will\nsoonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace.\nThey would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on\nhis side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most\nconfidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or\ntheir states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to\nrecompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of\nkindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. (30)\nThe most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided,\nclearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go\nto war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his\nvery character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before\nhim hatred and hostility melt away.\n\n (28) Or, \"ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict.\"\n\n (29) Lit. \"the Allies,\" e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.\n\n (30) Lit. \"From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more\n    confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your\n    lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of\n    kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?\"\n\nAnd now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and\ndemonstration that the \"lawful\" and \"law-observant\" are synonymous\nwith the \"upright\" and the \"just\"; do you, if you hold a contrary view,\ninstruct us. (31)\n\n (31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. \"Ages.\" i.\n    36; and for the \"Socratic\" reverence for law cf. Plat. \"Crito.\"\n\nThen Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any\ncontrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)\n\n (32) Lit. \"the just and upright,\" {tou dikaiou}.\n\nSoc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)\n\n (33) See Soph. \"Antig.\" \"Oed. T.\" 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.\n    \"de Cor.\" 317, 23; Aristot. \"Rhet.\" I. xiii.\n\nYes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the\nsame sense.\n\nCan you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men\nmade them?\n\nNay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come\ntogether from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men\nare not all of one speech? (34)\n\n (34) Or, \"there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a\n    babel of tongues.\"\n\nSoc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.\n\nHipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for\nmen, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and\ncustom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.\n\nSoc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?\n\nYes, that too (he answered).\n\nSoc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between\nparents and children?\n\nHipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be\na law of God.\n\nNow, why? (he asked).\n\nBecause I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).\n(35)\n\n (35) Or, \"as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some\n    transgress it.\"\n\nSoc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people\ndo contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the\ntransgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the\noffender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man\nwith impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or\navoiding it by violence.\n\nHipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being\nrelated as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?\n\nSoc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human\nbeings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? (36)\n\n (36) Or, \"in the propagation of the species than to produce\n    misbegotten children.\"\n\nHipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders\nthem, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?\n\nSoc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not\nsimply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock,\nbut that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.\n(37) Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is\nlike theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime\nhas passed?\n\n (37) Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, \"de\n    Jure,\" ii. 5, xii. 4.\n\nHipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.\n\nSoc. And for the better--which?\n\nHipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.\n\nSoc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime\nor have passed their prime is not good?\n\nHipp. It seems most improbable it should be.\n\nSoc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?\n\nHipp. No, that is not the right way.\n\nSoc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to\nbe?\n\nHipp. So it appears to me.\n\nWhat offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and\nill born, if not these?\n\nI subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).\n\nSoc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return\ngood for good, and kindness with kindness?\n\nHipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.\n\nSoc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself\nisolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those\nwho love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in\nmy intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this\nkindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet\nI must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain\nto me of his society?\n\nHipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an\nimplication of divine authority; (38) that a law should in itself be\nloaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a\nhigher than human type of legislator.\n\n (38) Lit. \"Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like\n    (would seem to point to) the gods.\"\n\nSoc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just\nand righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?\n\nHipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God\nforbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God\nhimself.\n\nSoc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased\nthat \"the lawful\" and \"the just\" should be synonymous? (39)\n\n (39) Or, \"it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is\n    just and what is just is lawful.\"\n\nBy such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike,\nhe helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.\n\n\nV\n\nAnd now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him\nmore vigorous in action. (1) In the first place, as befitted one whose\ncreed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble\nperformance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who\nhad pre-eminently disciplined himself; (2) and in the next place by\nconversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint\nbeyond all others. (3) Thus it was that he continued ever mindful\nhimself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered,\nof matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with\nEuthydemus, which has come to my knowledge, (4) will serve to\nillustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.\n\n (1) Lit. \"more practical,\" i.e. more energetic and effective.\n\n (2) \"If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was\n    Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds\n    of his associates.\"\n\n (3) Or, \"he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-\n    restraint beyond all else.\"\n\n (4) Or, \"which I can vouch for.\"\n\nTell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and\nmagnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?\n\nI cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).\n\nSoc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the\npleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?\n\nCertainly not (he answered).\n\nSoc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour\nof freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you\ndoing the like seems a loss of freedom?\n\nMost decidedly (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are\nthe reverse of free? (5)\n\n (5) Or, \"incontinency is illiberal.\"\n\nEuth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.\n\nSoc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely\nhindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to\ndo what is most shameful?\n\nEuth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the\nother.\n\nSoc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at\nonce put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?\n\nEuth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.\n\nSoc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?\n\nI should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.\n\nIt would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound\nover to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?\n\nSo it appears to be (the other answered).\n\nSoc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence\nshuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, (6) from mankind,\nand plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she\nhinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit,\nand from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them\naway to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware\nof the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds (7) their wits and\nmakes them choose the worse in place of the better?\n\n (6) \"Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess.\"\n\n (7) Schneid. cf. Plat. \"Protag.\" 355 A; and \"Symp.\" iv. 23.\n\nYes, so it comes to pass (he answered).\n\nSoc. And (8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has\nless claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate\nspirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically\nopposed?\n\n (8) \"And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of\n    {sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?\"\n\nThat too, I admit (he answered).\n\nSoc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, (9) what with regard\nto carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything\nmore seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?\n\n (9) Or add, \"If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning\n    temperance and soundness of soul, what,\" etc.\n\nNothing that I can think of (he replied).\n\nSoc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a\nmore baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is\nhurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself\nto the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he,\nto do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?\n\nI can imagine nothing worse (he replied).\n\nSoc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of\nopposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of\nself-control?\n\nEuth. It is to be supposed so.\n\nSoc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very\nworst, will be the very best of things?\n\nEuth. That is the natural inference.\n\nSoc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best\nthing a man could have?\n\nIt does indeed, Socrates (he answered).\n\nSoc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?\n\nWhat fact? (he asked).\n\nSoc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that\nrealm of sweetness which some look upon (10) as her peculiar province;\nit is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to\nhighest pleasures.\n\n (10) Or, \"which we are apt to think of as.\"\n\nIn what way? (he asked). How so?\n\nWhy, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us\nto resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or\nwant of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure\nin eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and\nblissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till\neach particular happiness is at the flood) (11)--it comes to this: by\nincontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious\nand constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone\nenables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to\ngive us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.\n\n (11) Or, \"at its season.\" Lit. \"is as sweet as possible.\"\n\n (12) Or, \"from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most\n    necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness.\"\n\nYou speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).\n\n (13) Lit. \"What you say is absolutely and entirely true\" (the \"vraie\n    verite\" of the matter).\n\nSoc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught \"beautiful\nand good,\" or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man\nto manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to\nprove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate\nhis enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of\ndeepest satisfaction (15)--to the continent and self-controlled it\nis given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the\nincontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we\nmust be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things\nwho has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in\nthe pleasure which is nearest to hand.\n\n (14) Or, \"But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble\n    study or of such accomplishments as shall enable,\" etc.\n\n (15) Or, \"of the highest pleasures.\"\n\nEuthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man\nwho is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with\nvirtue.\n\nAnd what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid\nof self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all\nheight of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to\ngratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of\ncattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover\nthe hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and\nmake selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately\nthe good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is\nthat a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness,\nthus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion.\n(19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming\ntogether and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things\n({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to\nprepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it\nbeyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to\nexcellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a\nmaster in debate. (21)\n\n (16) Or, \"and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest.\"\n\n (17) i.e. he becomes an animal \"feeding a blind life within the\n    brain.\"\n\n (18) Or, \"selecting the ore and repudiating the dross.\" Kuhner cf.\n    Plat. \"Laws,\" v. 735 B.\n\n (19) Or, \"draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most\n    capable of truth-disclosing conversation.\" Cf. Plat. \"Apol.\" 41:\n    \"What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the\n    leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,\n    or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight\n    would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!\"\n    (Jowett).\n\n (20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, \"H. G.\"\n    viii. 590.\n\n (21) Cf. Plat. \"Rep.\" 534 D; \"Phaedr.\" 252 E; \"Crat.\" 390 C;\n    \"Statesm.\" 286 D foll.\n\n\nVI\n\nAt this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered\nthis greater \"dialectic\" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held\nfirmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would\nbe able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession\nof that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble\nthemselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason\nthat he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into\nthe true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business\ncertainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he\narrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will\nserve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will\ntake the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly\nrepresented as follows.\n\n (1) Lit. \"essayed to make those who were with him more potent in\n    dialectic.\"\n\n (2) Or, \"Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of\n    anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing\n    that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind\n    leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to\n    stumble also.\"\n\n (3) Or add, \"'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'\n    --such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an\n    answer.\"\n\nTell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?\n\nSomething most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). (4)\n\n (4) Or, \"A supreme excellence, no doubt.\"\n\nSoc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? (5)\n\n (5) Or, \"can you give me a definition of the pious man?\"; \"tell me who\n    and what the pious man is.\"\n\nI should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.\n\nSoc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one\nlikes?\n\nEuth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.\n\nSoc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?\n\nI think so (he answered).\n\nSoc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that\nhe ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his\nknowledge? (6) Is it not so?\n\n (6) i.e. \"his practice must square with his knowledge and be the\n    outward expression of his belief?\"\n\nEuth. That is so. (7)\n\n (7) \"That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and\n    persuasion.\"\n\nSoc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?\n(8)\n\n (8) \"As he should and must.\" See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.\n\nI think not (he answered).\n\nSoc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in\nreference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? (9)\n\n (9) Or, \"he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour\n    to Heaven lawfully.\"\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? (10)\n\n (10) \"As he should and must.\"\n\nEuth. I see no alternative.\n\nSoc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with\nrespect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that\nis our definition?\n\nSo it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11)\n\n (11) \"I accept it at any rate as mine.\" N.B.--in reference to this\n    definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti\n    nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is\n    a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John\n    iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous\n    proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein},\n    which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented\n    to.\n\nSoc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with\nmen in any way one pleases? (12)\n\n (12) Or, \"may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to\n    his fancy?\" See above, II. vii. 8.\n\nEuth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13)\nwho knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with\nwhich our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14)\n\n (13) Or, \"he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who\n    knows,\" etc.\n\n (14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud.\n    {allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai},\n    translate \"must be specifically conducted.\"\n\nSoc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each\nother as they ought? (15)\n\n (15) \"As they should and must.\"\n\nObviously (he answered).\n\nSoc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and\nnobly--is it not so?\n\nCertainly (he answered).\n\nSoc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in\nrespect of human affairs?\n\nThat would seem to follow (he replied).\n\nSoc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?\n\nWithout a doubt, (he answered).\n\nSoc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are\nmeant?\n\nWhat the laws ordain (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both\ndo what is right and just and what they ought? (16)\n\n (16) \"What they should and must.\"\n\nEuth. I see no alternative.\n\nSoc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?\n(17)\n\n (17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as\n    being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--\n\n    A.  Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is\n        just and right.\n\n        Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.\n\n        Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are\n        righteous and just.\n\n    B.  Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound,\n        cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.\n\n        Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.\n\n        Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as \"Those\n        who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just)\n        concerning men.\"\n\nI should say so myself (he answered).\n\nSoc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what\nthe laws ordain?\n\nI should not (he answered).\n\nSoc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to\ndo supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)\n\n (18) Or, \"and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines\n    that he must and should not do it?\"\n\nNo, I suppose not (he answered).\n\nSoc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to\ndo? (19)\n\n (19) Or, \"and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he\n    thinks he should do?\"\n\nNo, I do not (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as\nconcerning men does the things that are just and right?\n\n (20) Or, \"of lawful obligation.\"\n\nWithout a doubt (he answered).\n\nSoc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?\n(21)\n\n (21) N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel,\n    op. cit. p. 323 foll., \"Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen\n    Dialogs.\"\n\nWho else, if not? (he replied).\n\nSoc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we\nname as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as\nconcerning men?\n\nThat is my opinion (he answered).\n\nSoc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you\nthat the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are\nwise in what they know not?\n\n (22) Or, \"in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme}).\"\n\nEuth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man\nhave wisdom in that which he does not know?\n\n (23) Or, \"their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the\n    {episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge\n    of?\"\n\nSoc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?\n\nEuth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?\n\nSoc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think\nyou?\n\nEuth. No; that, and that only, I think.\n\nSoc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?\n\nEuth. So it appears to me.\n\nSoc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the\nthings that are?\n\nEuth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.\n\nSoc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?\n\nQuite impossible (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each\nis wise only in what he knows?\n\nEuth. That is my opinion. (24)\n\n (24) Cf. Plat. \"Theaet.\" 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom\n    see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.\n\nSoc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to\nsearch for the good in this way?\n\nWhat way? (he asked).\n\nSoc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to\nall?\n\nNo, I should say not (he answered).\n\nSoc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes\nhurtful to another?\n\nDecidedly (he replied).\n\nSoc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial,\nshould you say? (25)\n\n (25) Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to\n    ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to\n    ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1)\n    \"and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?\"\n    lit. \"could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good\n    (or a good)?\" or else (2) \"and what is beneficial is good (or a\n    good)? or is it anything else?\"\n\nNothing else (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to\nhim to whom it is beneficial?\n\nThat is how it appears to me (he answered).\n\nSoc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any\nother way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body,\nvessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?\n(26)\n\n (26) i.e. \"beautiful in all relations into which it enters.\" Reading\n    {to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon\n    e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma\n    Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the\n    many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R.\n    Kuhner ad loc.\n\nEuth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)\n\n (27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an}\n    above, translate \"I certainly cannot, I confess.\"\n\nSoc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it\nbeautifully?\n\nEuth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)\n\n (28) Or, \"I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this,\n    that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular\n    thing is useful?\"--\"That nobody can deny (he answered).\" It is\n    impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi-\n    argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini\n    khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.\n\nSoc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else\nexcept that to which it may be beautifully applied?\n\nEuth. No single thing else.\n\nSoc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for\nwhich it is of use?\n\nSo it appears to me (he answered).\n\nSoc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage\namong things beautiful? It is a noble quality? (30)\n\n (29) Or, perhaps better, \"fortitude.\" See H. Sidgwick, \"Hist. of\n    Ethics,\" p. 43.\n\n (30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference\n    to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425\n    foll.\n\nNay, one of the most noble (he answered).\n\nSoc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?\n\nEuth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.\n\nSoc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an\nadvantage to be ignorant of them?\n\nCertainly not (he answered).\n\nSoc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply\nbecause they do not know what they are, are not courageous?\n\nMost true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of\nmadmen and cowards would be courageous.\n\nSoc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not\ndreadful, are they--\n\nEuth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness\nknows.\n\nSoc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of\nterrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face\nof the same to be cowards?\n\nCertainly I should (he answered).\n\nSoc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such\nthings except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to\nnoble account? (31)\n\n (31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. \"make a beautiful use of them.\"\n\nNo; these and these alone (he answered).\n\nSoc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same\noccurrences, it would seem, are bad?\n\nWho else, if not they? (he asked).\n\nSoc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these\ncircumstances as they think they must and should? (32)\n\n (32) Or, \"feel bound and constrained to do.\"\n\nWhy, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).\n\nSoc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or\nto turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with\nthem? (33)\n\n (33) Or, \"Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly with\n    their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with\n    them?\"\n\nI presume not (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to\nbehave are also those who have the power? (34)\n\n (34) \"He who kens can.\"\n\nYes; these, and these alone (he said).\n\nSoc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in\nthe matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances\nwe are discussing?\n\nI think not (he answered).\n\nSoc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some\negregious blunder?\n\nEuth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.\n\nSoc. It would seem, then, that those who know (35) how to cope with\nterrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail\nutterly of this are cowards?\n\n (35) \"Who have the {episteme}.\"\n\nSo I judge them to be (he answered). (36)\n\n (36) N.B.--For this definition of courage see Plat. \"Laches,\" 195 A\n    and passim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.\n\nA kingdom and a tyranny (37) were, he opined, both of them forms of\ngovernment, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a\nkingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law,\nwhereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not\naccording to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.\n\n (37) Or, \"despotism.\"\n\nThere were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the\ncase where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the\nobligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy\n(or rule of the best); (38) where the title to office depended on\nrateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly,\nwhere all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office,\nthat was a democracy (or rule of the people).\n\n (38) Or, \"in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed)\n    obligations gave the title to magisterial office and government,\n    this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of the\n    best).\" See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.\n\nLet me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear\nstatement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend\nthat such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a\nstatesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person.\n(39) Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the\nunderlying proposition, (40) as thus:\n\n (39) Or, \"if any one encountered him in argument about any topic or\n    person without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoid\n    of demonstration, that so and so,\" etc.\n\n (40) Or, \"question at bottom.\" Cf. Plat. \"Laws,\" 949 B.\n\nSoc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that\nthis other whom I admire?\n\nThe Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.\n\nSoc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work\nor function of a good citizen?\n\nThe Disputant. Let us do so.\n\nSoc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority\nwill be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the\nexpenditure of the state? (41)\n\n (41) Or, \"In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist\n    in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?\"\n\nCertainly (the disputant would answer).\n\nSoc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her\nantagonists?\n\nThe Disputant. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends\nin place of enemies?\n\nThat I should imagine (replies the disputant).\n\nSoc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party\nstrife and fostering civic concord?\n\nThe Disputant. That is my opinion.\n\nBy this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point,\neven the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become\nmanifest to his mind.\n\nHis own--that is, the Socratic--method of conducting a rational\ndiscussion (42) was to proceed step by step from one point of general\nagreement to another: \"Herein lay the real security of reasoning,\" (43)\nhe would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the\ncommon assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying\nthat Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring\norator, (44) because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one\ncommonly accepted opinion to another.\n\n (42) Of, \"of threading the mazes of an argument.\"\n\n (43) Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} =\n    \"that this security was part and parcel of reasoning.\"\n\n (44) \"Od.\" viii. 171, {o d' asphaleos agoreuei}, \"and his speech runs\n    surely on its way\" (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus is\n    describing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. \"de Arte Rhet.\" xi. 8.\n\n\nVII\n\nThe frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare\nhis own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, (1) is,\nI think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time,\nas I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of\nindependence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all\ntransactions suited to their powers.\n\n (1) Or, \"who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has\n    been said.\"\n\nOf all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in\nwhat any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of\nhis own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything\nwhich it befits the true gentleman (2) to know; or where he was\ndeficient in knowledge himself, (3) he would introduce his friends to\nthose who knew. (4) He did not fail to teach them also up to what point\nit was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any\nparticular matter. (5)\n\n (2) Lit. \"a beautiful and good man.\"\n\n (3) Or, \"where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself.\" See,\n    for an instance, \"Econ.\" iii. 14.\n\n (4) \"To those who had the special knowledge\"; \"a connoisseur in the\n    matter.\"\n\n (5) Or, \"of any particular branch of learning\"; \"in each department of\n    things.\"\n\nTo take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be\ntaught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to\ntake over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a\nportion of it for cultivation, (6) and in every case by geometric rule.\n(7) That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn,\nthat it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of\nmensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the\npiece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement,\ndepart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry\nup to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams.\n(8) What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and\nyet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. (9) These\nthings, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to\nhinder him from many other more useful studies. (10)\n\n (6) {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or \"and to explain the process.\" Cf.\n    Plat. \"Rep.\" vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other\n    interpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.\n\n (7) Or, \"by correct measurement\"; lit. \"by measurement of the earth.\"\n\n (8) Cf. Aristot. \"Pol.\" v. (viii.) 2; Cic. \"Acad. Post.\" I. iv. 15.\n    For the attitude compare the attitude of a philosopher in other\n    respects most unlike Socrates--August Comte, e.g. as to the\n    futility of sidereal astronomy, \"Pos. Pol.\" i. 412 (Bridges).\n\n (9) Cf. Isocr. \"On the Antidosis,\" 258-269, as to the true place of\n    \"Eristic\" in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.\n\n (10) Cf. A. Comte as to \"perte intellectuelle\" in the pursuit of\n    barren studies.\n\nAgain, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in\nthe study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know\nenough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or\nthe season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or\nsea--the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; (11) and\nin general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season,\nor with the month, or the year, (12) it was well to have such reliable\ndata to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and\nseasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from\nnight sportsmen, (13) pilots of vessels, and many others who make it\ntheir business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy\nso far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside\nour own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, (14) or\nwearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from\nthe earth, their periods, and their causes, (15) all this he strongly\ndiscountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more\nthan in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed (16) in the\nsubtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these,\nagain, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to\nkeep him away from many more useful pursuits.\n\n (11) Schneid. cf. Plat. \"Rep.\" vii. 527 D.\n\n (12) \"Occurrences connected with the night, the month, or year.\" e.g.\n    the festival of the Karneia, the {tekmerion} (point de repere) of\n    which is the full moon of August. Cf. Eur. \"Alc.\" 449.\n\n (13) See Plat. \"Soph.\" 220 D; above, III. xi. 8; \"Cyrop.\" I. vi. 40;\n    \"Hunting,\" xii. 6; Hippocr. \"Aer.\" 28.\n\n (14) See Lewis, \"Astron. of the Ancients\"; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1.\n    144.\n\n (15) Or, \"the causes of these.\"\n\n (16) {oude touton ge anekoos en}. He had \"heard,\" it is said,\n    Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. \"Tusc.\" V. iv. 10.\n\nAnd to speak generally, in regard of things celestial he set his face\nagainst attempts to excogitate the machinery by which the divine power\nformed its several operations. (17) Not only were these matters beyond\nman's faculties to discover, as he believed, but the attempt to search\nout what the gods had not chosen to reveal could hardly (he supposed)\nbe well pleasing in their sight. Indeed, the man who tortured his brains\nabout such subjects stood a fair chance of losing his wits entirely,\njust as Anaxagoras, (18) the headiest speculator of them all, in his\nattempt to explain the divine mechanism, had somewhat lost his head.\nAnaxagoras took on himself to assert that sun and fire are identical,\n(19) ignoring the fact that human beings can easily look at fire, but to\ngaze steadily into the face of the sun is given to no man; or that under\nthe influence of his rays the colour of the skin changes, but under the\nrays of fire not. (20) He forgot that no plant or vegetation springs\nfrom earth's bosom with healthy growth without the help of sunlight,\nwhilst the influence of fire is to parch up everything, and to destroy\nlife; and when he came to speak of the sun as being a \"red-hot stone\" he\nignored another fact, that a stone in fire neither lights up nor lasts,\nwhereas the sun-god abides for ever with intensist brilliancy undimmed.\n\n (17) Or, \"he tried to divert one from becoming overly-wise in heavenly\n    matters and the 'mecanique celeste' of the Godhead in His several\n    operations.\" See above, I. i. 11. See Grote, \"Plato,\" i. 438.\n\n (18) Of Clazomenae. Cf. Plat. \"Apol.\" 14; Diog. Laert. II. vi; Cic.\n    \"Tusc.\" V. iv. 10; Cobet, \"Prosop. Xen.\" s.n.; Grote, \"H. G.\" i.\n    501.\n\n (19) Or, \"that the sun was simply a fire, forgetting so simple a fact\n    as that.\"\n\n (20) Or, \"the complexion darkens, whereas fire has no such effect.\"\n\nSocrates inculcated the study of reasoning processes, (21) but in these,\nequally with the rest, he bade the student beware of vain and idle\nover-occupation. Up to the limit set by utility, he was ready to join\nin any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were\nwith him; but there he stopped. He particularly urged those who were\nwith him to pay the utmost attention to health. They would learn all\nit was possible to learn from adepts, and not only so, but each one\nindividually should take pains to discover, by a lifelong observation of\nhis own case, what particular regimen, what meat or drink, or what kind\nof work, best suited him; these he should turn to account with a view to\nleading the healthiest possible life. It would be no easy matter for\nany one who would follow this advice, and study his own idiosyncrasy,\nto find a doctor to improve either on the diagnosis or the treatment\nrequisite. (22)\n\n (21) {logismous} = (1) \"arithmetic,\" (2) \"calculation,\" (3)\n    \"syllogistic reasoning.\" See L. Dind. \"Index. Gr.\" s.v., and\n    Kuhner ad loc.; cf. Plat. \"Gorg.\" 451 C. It is important to decide\n    which form of \"logism\" is meant here.\n\n (22) Or, \"to find a doctor better able than himself to 'diagnose' and\n    prescribe a treatment congenial to health.\" Cf. Tac. \"Ann.\" vi.\n    46; Plut. \"de San.\" 136 E, ap. Schneid. ad loc.\n\nWhere any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply,\nhe would counsel him to give heed to \"divination.\" He who has the secret\nof the means whereby the gods give signs to men touching their affairs\ncan never surely find himself bereft of heavenly guidance.\n\n\nVIII\n\nNow if any one should be disposed to set the statement of Socrates\ntouching the divinity (1) which warned him what he ought to do or not\nto do, against the fact that he was sentenced to death by the board of\njudges, and argue that thereby Socrates stood convicted of lying and\ndelusion in respect of this \"divinity\" of his, I would have him to note\nin the first place that, at the date of his trial, Socrates was already\nso far advanced in years that had he not died then his life would have\nreached its natural term soon afterwards; and secondly, as matters went,\nhe escaped life's bitterest load (2) in escaping those years which\nbring a diminution of intellectual force to all--instead of which he was\ncalled upon to exhibit the full robustness of his soul and acquire glory\nin addition, (3) partly by the style of his defence--felicitous alike in\nits truthfulness, its freedom, and its rectitude (4)--and partly by\nthe manner in which he bore the sentence of condemnation with infinite\ngentleness and manliness. Since no one within the memory of man, it is\nadmitted, ever bowed his head to death more nobly. After the sentence he\nmust needs live for thirty days, since it was the month of the \"Delia,\"\n(5) and the law does not suffer any man to die by the hand of the public\nexecutioner until the sacred embassy return from Delos. During the whole\nof that period (as his acquaintances without exception can testify)\nhis life proceeded as usual. There was nothing to mark the difference\nbetween now and formerly in the even tenour of its courage; and it was\na life which at all times had been a marvel of cheerfulness and calm\ncontent. (6)\n\n (1) Or, \"the words of Socrates with regard to a divine something which\n    warned him,\" etc.\n\n (2) The phraseology is poetical.\n\n (3) Or, \"in a manner which redounded to his glory.\"\n\n (4) Or, \"marvellous alike for the sincerity of its language, the free\n    unbroken spirit of its delivery, and the absolute rectitude of the\n    speaker.\"\n\n (5) i.e. the lesser \"Delian\" solemnities, an annual festival\n    instituted, it was said, by Theseus. See Plut. \"Theseus,\" 23\n    (Clough, i. 19); and for the whole matter see Plat. \"Phaed.\" 58\n    foll.\n\n (6) Cf. Arist. \"Frogs,\" 82; of Sophocles, {o d' eukolos men enthad',\n    eukolos d' ekei}.\n\n (Let us pause and ask how could man die more nobly and more\nbeautifully than in the way described? or put it thus: dying so,\nthen was his death most noble and most beautiful; and being the most\nbeautiful, then was it also the most fortunate and heaven-blest; and\nbeing most blessed of heaven, then was it also most precious in the\nsight of God.) (7)\n\n (7) This is bracketed as spurious by Sauppe and other commentators.\n    But see \"Cyrop.\" VIII. ii. 7, 8, for similar ineptitude of style.\n    R. Kuhner defends the passage as genuine.\n\nAnd now I will mention further certain things which I have heard from\nHermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, (8) concerning him. He said that even\nafter Meletus (9) had drawn up the indictment, he himself used to hear\nSocrates conversing and discussing everything rather than the suit\nimpending, and had ventured to suggest that he ought to be considering\nthe line of his defence, to which, in the first instance, the master\nanswered: \"Do I not seem to you to have been practising that my whole\nlife long?\" And upon his asking \"How?\" added in explanation that he had\npassed his days in nothing else save in distinguishing between what is\njust and what is unjust (right and wrong), and in doing what is right\nand abstaining from what is wrong; \"which conduct\" (he added) \"I hold\nto be the finest possible practice for my defence\"; and when he\n(Hermogenes), returning to the point again, pleaded with Socrates: \"Do\nyou not see, Socrates, how commonly it happens that an Athenian jury,\nunder the influence of argument, condemns innocent people to death and\nacquits real criminals?\"--Socrates replied, \"I assure you, Hermogenes,\nthat each time I have essayed to give my thoughts to the defence which I\nam to make before the court, the divinity (10) has opposed me.\" And when\nhe (Hermogenes) exclaimed, \"How strange!\"--\"Do you find it strange\" (he\ncontinued), \"that to the Godhead it should appear better for me to close\nmy life at once? Do you not know that up to the present moment there\nis no man whom I can admit to have spent a better or happier life than\nmine. Since theirs I regard as the best of lives who study best to\nbecome as good as may be, and theirs the happiest who have the liveliest\nsense of growth in goodness; and such, hitherto, is the happy fortune\nwhich I perceive to have fallen to my lot. To such conclusion I have\ncome, not only in accidental intercourse with others, but by a strict\ncomparison drawn between myself and others, and in this faith I\ncontinue to this day; and not I only, but my friends continue in a like\npersuasion with regard to me, not for the lame reason that they are\nmy friends and love me (or else would others have been in like case as\nregards their friends), but because they are persuaded that by being\nwith me they will attain to their full height of goodness. But, if I am\ndestined to prolong my days, maybe I shall be enforced to pay in full\nthe penalties of old age--to see and hear less keenly, to fail in\nintellectual force, and to leave school, as it were, more of a dunce\nthan when I came, less learned and more forgetful--in a word, I shall\nfall from my high estate, and daily grow worse in that wherein aforetime\nI excelled. But indeed, were it possible to remain unconscious of the\nchange, the life left would scarcely be worth living; but given that\nthere is a consciousness of the change, then must the existence left to\nlive be found by comparison insipid, joyless, a death in life, devoid of\nlife's charm. But indeed, if it is reserved for me to die unjustly, then\non those who unjustly slay me lies the shame (since, given injustice is\nbase, how can any unjust action whatsoever fail of baseness?) (11) But\nfor me what disgrace is it that others should fail of a just decision\nand right acts concerning me?... I see before me a long line of\npredecessors on this road, and I mark the reputation also among\nposterity which they have left. (12) I note how it varies according as\nthey did or suffered wrong, and for myself I know that I too, although I\ndie to-day, shall obtain from mankind a consideration far different from\nthat which will be accorded to those who put me to death. I know that\nundying witness will be borne me to this effect, that I never at any\ntime did wrong to any man, or made him a worse man, but ever tried to\nmake those better who were with me.\"\n\n (8) See above, II. x. 3; \"Symp.\" i. 3; iii. 14; iv. 47 foll.; vi. 2;\n    \"Apol.\" 2; Plat. \"Crat.\" 384.\n\n (9) See above, I. i. 1.\n\n (10) {to daimonion}--\"the divine (voice).\"\n\n (11) This passage also may, perhaps, be regarded as spurious.\n\n (12) Or, \"There floats before my eyes a vision of the many who have\n    gone this same gate. I note their legacies of fame among\n    posterity.\"\n\nSuch are the words which he spoke in conversation with Hermogenes and\nthe rest. But amongst those who knew Socrates and recognised what manner\nof man he was, all who make virtue and perfection their pursuit still to\nthis day cease not to lament his loss with bitterest regret, as for one\nwho helped them in the pursuit of virtue as none else could.\n\nTo me, personally, he was what I have myself endeavoured to describe: so\npious and devoutly religious (13) that he would take no step apart\nfrom the will of heaven; so just and upright that he never did even a\ntrifling injury to any living soul; so self-controlled, so temperate,\nthat he never at any time chose the sweeter in place of the better; so\nsensible, and wise, and prudent that in distinguishing the better from\nthe worse he never erred; nor had he need of any helper, but for the\nknowledge of these matters, his judgment was at once infallible and\nself-sufficing. Capable of reasonably setting forth and defining moral\nquestions, (14) he was also able to test others, and where they erred,\nto cross-examine and convict them, and so to impel and guide them in the\npath of virtue and noble manhood. With these characteristics, he seemed\nto be the very impersonation of human perfection and happiness. (15)\n\n (13) Or, \"of such piety and religious devotedness... of such\n    rectitude... of such sobreity and self-control... of such\n    sound sense and wisdom...\"\n\n (14) Or, \"gifted with an ability logically to set forth and to define\n    moral subtleties.\"\n\n (15) Or, \"I look upon him as at once the best and happiest of men.\"\n\nSuch is our estimate. If the verdict fail to satisfy I would ask those\nwho disagree with it to place the character of any other side by side\nwith this delineation, and then pass sentence.","title":"The Memorabilia","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":70313}