{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_12002/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_12002","id":"gutenberg_12002","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12002","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy","Philosophy"],"text":"REVIEW OF THE WORK OF MR JOHN STUART MILL\n\nENTITLED, 'EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTONS PHILOSOPHY'\n\nBY GEORGE GROTE\n\nAUTHOR OF\n\n'THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,'\n\n'PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES,' ETC.\n\n1868\n\n_Reprinted from the 'Westminster Review,' January 1, 1866._\n\n\nJOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS\n\n\n\n\n_An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the\nPrincipal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings_. By JOHN\nSTUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865.\n\nThe work bearing the above title is an octavo volume, consisting of\ntwenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty pages. This is no\ngreat amount of print; but the amount of matter contained in it is\nprodigious, and the quality of that matter such as to require a full\nstretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his readers no superfluous\nsentences, scarcely even a superfluous word, above what is necessary to\nexpress his meaning briefly and clearly. Of such a book no complete\nabstract can be given in the space to which we are confined.\n\nTo students of philosophy--doubtless but a minority among the general\ncircle of English readers--this work comes recommended by the strongest\nclaims both of interest and instruction. It presents in direct\nantithesis two most conspicuous representatives of the modern\nspeculative mind of England--Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill.\n\nSir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the stream of\nthought during the present generation. The lectures on Logic and\nMetaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty years, determined\nthe view taken of those subjects by a large number of aspiring young\nstudents, and determined that view for many of them permanently and\nirrevocably.[1] Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day\nare proud of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his\ndoctrines in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him\nwithout letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a\nleader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have\nobtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his authority.\nWe do not number ourselves among his followers; but we think his\ninfluence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He kept up the idea\nof philosophy as a subject to be studied from its own points of view: a\ndignity which in earlier times it enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous\nexcess, but from which in recent times it has far too much\nreceded--especially in England. He performed the great service of\nlabouring strenuously to piece together the past traditions of\nphilosophy, to re-discover those which had been allowed to drop into\noblivion, and to make out the genealogy of opinions as far as negligent\npredecessors had still left the possibility of doing so.\n\nThe forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five lectures on\nLogic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch, constitute the biennial\ncourse actually delivered by Sir W. Hamilton in the Professorial Chair.\nThey ought therefore to be looked at chiefly with reference to the minds\nof youthful hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly\ndescribed by Rousseau--'L'inhabitude de penser dans la jeunesse en \u00f4te\nla capacit\u00e9 pendant le reste de la vie.'\n\nNow, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally unpalatable, as\nLogic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the teacher finds in\ninspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W. Hamilton overcame such\ndifficulty with remarkable success, is the affirmation of his two\neditors; and our impression, as readers of his lectures, disposes us to\ncredit them. That Sir W. Hamilton should have done this effectively is\nin itself sufficient to stamp him as a meritorious professor--as a\nworthy successor to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled\nperfection in that department is attested by every one. Many a man who\nultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald Stewart,\nreceived his first impulse and guidance in the path of speculation from\nthe lasting impression made by Stewart's lectures.\n\nBut though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be looked at,\nchiefly with a view to the special purpose for which they were destined,\nwe are far from insinuating that they have no other merits, or that they\nare useless for readers who have already a metaphysical creed of their\nown. We have found them both instructive and interesting: they go over a\nlarge proportion of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the\npoint of view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from\nthat of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in Sir W.\nHamilton an amount of intellectual independence which seldom accompanies\nsuch vast erudition. He recites many different opinions, but he judges\nthem all for himself; and, what is of still greater moment, he\nconstantly gives the reasons for his judgments. To us these reasons are\nalways of more or less value, whether we admit them to be valid or not.\nMany philosophers present their own doctrine as if it were so much\nascertained and acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to\nsuppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly\nprevailed, these have now become discredited with every one. We do not\ncensure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir W.\nHamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy of view\nas the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; the\ncharacteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative and every\nnegative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and fully\nenunciated.\n\nIn this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is also\nvaluable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations following\nthe edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. How far Sir W.\nHamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External\nPerception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now\ndetermine; but to those who dissent from him, as well as to those who\nagree with him, his reasonings on these subjects are highly instructive:\nwhile the full citations from so many other writers contribute\nmaterially not only to elucidate the points directly approached, but\nalso to enlarge our knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular\nvalue upon this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon\nthis maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative\nminds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have found\namong the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to his care,\nseveral authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions cited from them\nnot less instructive than curious. He deserves the more gratitude,\nbecause he departs herein from received usage since Bacon and Descartes.\nThe example set by these great men was admirable, so far as it went to\nthrow off the authority of predecessors; but pernicious so far as it\nbanished those predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of\nimmaturity and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of\nthe earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part, neglected.\nOf such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out by Sir W.\nHamilton.\n\nWhile speaking about the general merits and philosophical position of\nSir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing about those of Mr\nMill. But before we proceed to analyze the separate chapters of his\nvolume, we must devote a few words to the fulfilment of another\nobligation.\n\nMr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on the\nsurname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had already ennobled\nthe name. An ampler title to distinction in history and philosophy can\nseldom be produced than that which Mr James Mill left behind him. We\nknow no work which surpasses his 'History of British India' in the main\nexcellencies attainable by historical writers: industrious accumulation,\ncontinued for many years, of original authorities--careful and\nconscientious criticism of their statements--and a large command of\npsychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret phenomena of\nsociety, both extremely complicated, and far removed from his own\npersonal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's 'Elements of Political\nEconomy' were, at the time when they appeared, the most logical and\ncondensed exposition of the entire science then existing. Lastly, his\nlatest avowed production, the 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human\nMind,' is a model of perspicuous exposition of complex states of\nconsciousness, carried farther than by any other author before him; and\nillustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to attain, by\none who has faith in the comprehensive principle of association, and has\nlearnt the secret of tracing out its innumerable windings. It is,\nmoreover, the first work in which the great fact of Indissoluble\nAssociation is brought into its due theoretical prominence. These are\nhigh merits, of which lasting evidence is before the public; but there\nwere other merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not\nless real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less effective\nthan his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial fertility on\nphilosophical subjects, his power of discussing himself, and of\nstimulating others to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations through\nall the shifts and windings of a sort of Platonic dialogue--all these\naccomplishments were, to those who knew him, even more impressive than\nwhat he composed for the press. Conversation with him was not merely\ninstructive, but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons\nwhom we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from\nthe lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic--[Greek: _Tou didhonai kahi\ndhechesthai lhogon_]--(the giving and receiving of reasons) competent\nalike to examine others, or to be examined by them, on philosophy. When\nto this we add a strenuous character, earnest convictions, and\nsingle-minded devotion to truth, with an utter disdain of mere\nparadox--it may be conceived that such a man exercised powerful\nintellectual ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed\nhis society--men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some of them\nin distinguished positions--remember and attest with gratitude such\nascendancy in their own cases: among them the writer of the present\narticle, who owes to the historian of British India an amount of\nintellectual stimulus and guidance such as he can never forget.\n\nWhen a father, such as we have described, declining to send his son\neither to school or college, constituted himself schoolmaster from the\nbeginning, and performed that duty with laborious solicitude--when,\nbesides full infusion of modern knowledge, the forcing process applied\nby the Platonic Socrates to the youth-The\u00e6t\u00eatus, was administered by Mr\nJames Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind not\nless pregnant than that of The\u00e6t\u00eatus--it would be surprising if the son\nthus trained had not reached even a higher eminence than his father. The\nfruit borne by Mr John Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture\nbestowed, and the volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest\nproduct.\n\nThe 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is intended by Mr\nMill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth published edition of\nhis 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive') as a sequel and\ncomplement to that system. We are happy to welcome so valuable an\naddition; but with or without that addition, the 'System of Logic'\nappears to us to present the most important advance in speculative\ntheory which the present century has witnessed. Either half of it, the\nRatiocinative or the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work\non the same subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into\nclear view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have\ninsensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific inquirers of\nthe post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by which some of these\nauthors have been misled. The Ratiocinative half, dealing with matters\nwhich had already been well handled by Dutrieu and other scholastic\nlogicians, invests their dead though precise formalism with a real life\nand application to the actual process of finding and proving truth. But\nbesides thus working each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed\nthe still more difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently\nan inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine the\ntwo into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the problem of\nReasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one connected whole.\nFor ourselves, we still recollect the mist which was cleared from our\nminds when we first read the 'System of Logic,' very soon after it was\npublished. We were familiar with the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius\nand Dutrieu; we were also familiar with examples of the best procedure\nin modern inductive science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart\nin our minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The\nirreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had read and\nmastered the second and third chapters of the Second Book of the 'System\nof Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the functions and value of the\nSyllogism, and the real import of its major premiss. This explanation\nstruck us at the time as one of the most profound and original efforts\nof metaphysical thought that we had ever perused, and we see no reason\nto retract that opinion now.[2] It appears all the more valuable when we\ncontrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two contemporaries--Hamilton\nand Whately: the first of whom retains the ancient theory of reasoning,\nas being only a methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and\nfrom the parts up to the whole--Induction being only this ascending part\nof the process, whereby, after having given a complete enumeration of\nall the compound parts, you conclude to the sum total described in one\nword as a whole;[3] while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating\nInduction to Syllogism, but does so in a different way--by representing\ninductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss suppressed,\nfrom which major premiss it derived its authority. The explanation of Mr\nMill attacks the problem from the opposite side. It subordinates\nsyllogism to induction, the technical to the real; it divests the major\npremiss of its illusory pretence to be itself the proving authority, or\neven any real and essential part of the proof--and acknowledges it\nmerely as a valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding\nmistake in the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as\na whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to have\nmost profited. The principles of it are constantly present to our mind\nwhen engaged in investigations of evidence, whether scientific or\nhistorical.\n\nConcerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and\nphilosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on other\ntopics--even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,' by which he is\nprobably more widely known than by anything else. Of the many\nobligations which Political Economy owes to him, one only can be noticed\nconsistent with the scope of the present article: the care which he has\ntaken--he alone, or at least, he more explicitly and formally than any\nother expositor--to set forth the general position of that science in\nthe aggregate field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as\na whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or\nco-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses, with\nwhat limits the logical methods of induction and deduction are\napplicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied on as\napproximations to truth. All these points will be found instructively\nhandled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic,' as well as in\nhis smaller and less known work, 'Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in\nPolitical Economy.' We find him, while methodizing and illustrating the\ndata of the special science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to\nphilosophy as a whole.\n\nBut there is yet another work in which the interests of philosophy, as a\nwhole, come into the foreground and become the special object of\nvindication in their largest compass and most vital requirements. We\nmean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one half of which takes for its\nthesis the _libertus philosophandi_. He maintains, emphatically, in this\nbook, the full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous\nexigencies of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims\nthe most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative on\nall questions--not merely for the purpose of discriminating truth from\nfalsehood, but also to keep up in individual minds the full sense and\nunderstanding of the matters controverted, in place of a mere partial\nand one-sided adhesion. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr\nMill was fighting with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a\npostulate which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come\nto fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you discover\nthat almost every man makes it under reserves which, though acting in\nsilence, are not the less efficacious. Every one has some dogmas which\nhe cannot bear to hear advocated, and others which he will not allow to\nbe controverted in his presence. A writer has to consider not merely by\nwhat reasons any novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but\nalso how much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the\nirritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we were\npresent at the annual meeting of the French Academy at Paris, where the\nprizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects announced for study\nbeforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles of various compositions\nannounced by the President (M. Villemain), with a brief critical\nestimate of each. Their comparative merits were appreciated, and the\nprize awarded to one of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to\ncompete for the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the\nPresident bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different\npoint of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style,\narrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely heard\nexceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this work, but to\nanother which the President praised in a manner decidedly less marked\nand emphatic. What was here the _ratio decidendi_? The reason was, and\nthe President declared it in the most explicit language, that the work\nof M. Taine _was deeply tainted with materialism_. 'Sans doute,' said\nthe esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award,\n'sans doute les opinions sont libres, _mais_'--It is precisely against\nthis _mais_--ushering in the special anathematized or consecrated\nconclusion which it is intended to except from the general liberty of\nenforcing or impugning--in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr\nMill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of Reasoned\nTruth.\n\nHe handles this grand theme--_eleythheroys eleythher\u00f4s\nphilosophein_--involving as it does the best interests of philosophy,\nas an instructress to men's judgments, and a stimulus to their\nintelligence--with great depth of psychological analysis sustained by\nabundant historical illustration. And he in the same volume discusses\nmost profitably another question akin to it--To what extent, and by what\nprinciples, the interference of others is justifiable, in restraining\nthe liberty of taste and action for each individual? A question at once\ngrave and neglected, but the discussion of which does not belong to our\npresent article.\n\nA new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of\nphilosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work exhibiting the\nanalysis and appreciation of the philosophical views of an eminent\ncontemporary, must raise the highest expectation. We think no reader\nwill be disappointed who peruses Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall\nnow endeavour to give some account of the manner in which he performs\nit. Upon topics so abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume,\nthe antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often the\nonly way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the 'Examination' here\nbefore us is professedly controversy. But of controversy in its\nobjectionable sense--of captious or acrimonious personality--not a trace\nwill here be found. A dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is\npreserved from first to last. Moreover, though the title and direct\npurpose of the volume is negative and critical, yet the destructive\ncriticism is pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition,\nembodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate problems\nof metaphysics.\n\nMr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the doctrine called\nthe Relativity of Human Knowledge:\n\n     'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in\n     the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was\n     the ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the\n     later French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and\n     others have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is\n     the subject of the most generally known and impressive of\n     all his writings--the one which first revealed to the\n     English metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in\n     philosophy. Together with its developments, it composes the\n     Philosophy of the Conditioned, which he opposed to the\n     French and German philosophies of the Absolute, and which is\n     regarded by most of his admirers as the greatest of his\n     titles to a permanent place in the history of metaphysical\n     thought. But, \"the relativity of human knowledge,\" like most\n     other phrases into which the words _relative_ or _relation_\n     enter, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings,'\n     &c.\n\nMr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings, and to\ndetermine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir W. Hamilton.\n\nOne meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as\ndistinguished from something else--that all consciousness is of\ndifference. It is not, however, in this sense that the expression is\nordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. Hamilton, though he fully\nrecognizes the truth which, when thus used, it serves to express. In\ngeneral, when he says that all our knowledge is relative, the relation\nhe has in view is not between the thing known and other objects compared\nwith it, but between the thing known and the mind knowing--(p. 6).\n\nThe doctrine in this last meaning is held by different philosophers in\ntwo different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Ferrier, &c.), usually\ncalled Idealists, maintain not merely that all we can possibly know of\nanything is the manner in which it affects the human faculties, but that\nthere is nothing else to be known; that affections of human or of other\nminds are all that we can know to exist--that the difference between the\nego and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects of\nthe same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert Spencer, Auguste\nComte, with many others) believe that the ego and the non-ego denote two\nrealities, each self-existent, and neither dependent on the other; that\nthe Noumenon, or 'thing _per se_,' is in itself a different thing from\nthe Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know its\nexistence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that we can know\nis, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it affects us, or the\nphenomena which it produces--(pp. 9--11).\n\nThe doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many followers, is\nnext distinguished from the same doctrine as held by Hartley, James\nMill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with either acceptance or\nrejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains that the attributes\nwhich we ascribe to outward things, or which are inseparable from them\nin thought, contain additional elements over and above sensations _plus_\nan unknowable cause--additional elements added by the mind itself, and\ntherefore still only relative, but constituting the original furniture\nof the mind itself--inherent laws, partly of our sensitive, partly of\nour intellectual faculty. It is on this latter point that Hartley and\nthose going along with him diverge. Admitting the same additional\nelements, these philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any innate forms\nto account for them, but hold that place, extension, substance, cause,\nand the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of\nsensation, by the known laws of Association--(pp. 12--14).\n\nPartial Relativity is the opinion professed by most philosophers (and by\nmost persons who do not philosophize). They hold that we know things\npartly as they are in themselves, partly as they are merely in relation\nto us.\n\nThis discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is highly\ninstructive, and is given with the full perspicuity belonging to Mr\nMill's style. He proceeds to examine in what sense Sir W. Hamilton\nmaintained the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites passages both\nfrom the 'Discussions on Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which\nthat doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated\nin the most emphatic language--(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also\nproduces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's\n'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and\ninconsistent is proclaimed--that our knowledge is only partially, not\nwholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed, are\nknown to us only relatively, but that the primary qualities are known to\nus as they are in themselves, or as they exist objectively, and that\nthey may be even evolved by demonstration _\u00e0 priori_--(pp. 19-26, 30).\nThe inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different\ntimes, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly\nmanifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken 'in a\nnon-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not hold, or had\nceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity of knowledge (pp.\n20-28)--the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being in his view\ninadmissible. But we think it at least equally possible that Sir W.\nHamilton held both the two opinions in their natural sense, and enforced\nboth of them _at different times_ by argument; his attention never\nhaving been called to the contradiction between them. That such\nforgetfulness was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of\nthe present article. His argument in support of both is equally\ncharacterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent with\nhim, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements of one\nstruggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.\n\nFrom hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at considerable\nlength what he justly denominates the celebrated and striking review of\nCousin's philosophy, which forms the first paper in Sir W. Hamilton's\n'Discussions on Philosophy.' According to Mr Mill--\n\n     'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we\n     not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled\n     under two extremely abstract phrases, \"The Infinite and the\n     Absolute,\" perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at\n     least, is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr\n     Mansel, for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is\n     one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that\n     the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the\n     concrete, and not conversely; and we shall see, both in the\n     case of Sir William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the\n     process cannot be reversed with impunity.'--p. 32.\n\nUpon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here laid\ndown by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the application of it\ninconvenient in the present case. Discussions on points of philosophy\nare best conducted without either invoking or offending religious\nfeeling. M. Cousin maintains that we have a direct intuition of the\nInfinite and the Absolute: Sir W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon\nthis point Mr Mill sides entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers\n'that the latter has rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M.\nCousin,' though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems\nto Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms that\nwe have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite and the\nAbsolute--that both of them are inconceivable to us, and by consequence\nunknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him, and controverts his\ndoctrine in an elaborate argument.\n\nOf this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the present\nvolume, our limits only enable us to give a brief appreciation. In so\nfar as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton, we think him perfectly\nsuccessful, though there are some points in his reasoning in which we do\nnot fully concur.\n\nIn our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as opposed\nto relative) can be necessarily unknowable, inconceivable, incogitable.\nNothing which falls under the condition of relativity can be declared to\nbe so. The structure of our minds renders us capable of knowing\neverything which is relative, though there are many such things which we\nhave no evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now\nthe Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed Sir W.\nHamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that though it cannot\nbe known, it is, must be, and ought to be, _believed_ by us, according\nto the marked distinction which he draws between belief and knowledge.\nWe agree with Mr Mill in the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable,\nknowable. Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it\nsufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to ourselves and\nothers. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately, is not to be held as\nproof that we do not conceive it at all; for in regard to finite things\nalso, we conceive the greater number of them only inadequately.\n\nWe cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an infinite number\nof sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater than any given number),\nbut neither can we construe to the imagination a polygon with a million\nof sides; nevertheless, we understand what is meant by the first\ndescription as well as by the second, and can reason upon both. There\nis, indeed, this difference between the two: That the terms used in\ndescribing the first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we\nshould in vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the\nterms used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know\nthe fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force which\nis the result of many past trials. If the difference here noted were all\nwhich Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares the Infinite to be\nunknowable and incogitable, we should accede to his opinion; but we\napprehend that he means much more, and he certainly requires more to\njustify the marked antithesis in which he places himself against M.\nCousin and Hegel. Indeed, the facility with which he declares matters to\nbe incogitable, which these two and other philosophers not only cogitate\nbut maintain as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question\nwhich appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason\nupon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us. If we\ncan, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and conceivable, whether\nwe admit the propositions affirmed concerning them or not; if we cannot,\nthen these subjects are indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present\nstate of our knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who\nemploys the terms.\n\nIn criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M. Cousin, Mr\nMill insists much on a distinction between (1) the Infinite, and (2) the\nInfinite in any one or more positive attributes, such as infinite\nwisdom, goodness, redness, hardness, &c.[4] He thinks that Sir W.\nHamilton has made out his case against the first, but not against the\nlast; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless abstraction,'\na fasciculus of negations, unknowable and inconceivable, but not the\nlast. We think that Mr Mill makes more of this distinction than the\ncase warrants; that the first is not unmeaning, but an intelligible\nabstraction, only a higher reach of abstraction than the last; that it\nis knowable inadequately, in the same way as the last--though more\ninadequately, because of its higher abstraction.\n\nAs the finite is intelligible, so also is its negation--the Infinite: we\ndo not say (with M. Cousin) that the two are conjointly given in\nconsciousness--but the two are understood and partially apprehended by\nthe mind conjointly and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless\nnegative as to a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since\nit includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to which\nthe degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated, but merely\nleft undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite, [Greek: to\npeperasmhenon--to hapeiron]) is a genus; it comprehends under it the\nInfinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, the Infinitely Swift and the\nInfinitely Slow--the infinite, in short, of any or all positive\nattributes. It includes, doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but\nso, also, does the Finite--and so, also, do the actual manifestations of\nthe real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a portion\nof the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical account of the\ngeneration of the universe, tracing its phenomena, as an aggregate, to\nsome ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in his scheme a _fundamentum_\nfor all those opposite and contradictory manifestations which experience\ndiscloses in the universe. There always have been, and still are, many\nphilosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior both in\nnature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who hold further\nthat these two last are explained, when presented as determinate and\nsuccessive manifestations of the two first, which they conceive as\nindeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite (Ens Infinitum or Entia\nInfinita, according to the point of view in which we look at it) is a\ngeneric word, including all these supposed indeterminate antecedents;\nand including therefore, of course, many contradictory agencies. But\nthis does not make it senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it\nfrom 'the Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other\ncharacter than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit the\nmarked distinction which Mr Mill contends for--that the one is\nunknowable and the other knowable.\n\nIt may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which we have\njust described is not ours. We do not agree in this way either of\nconceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy. But it is a mode\nso prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it, justly enough, as 'the\nancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.' The doctrine of these\nphilosophers appears to us unfounded, but we cannot call it unmeaning.\n\nIn another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that inferior\nabstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some particular attribute.'\nHe speaks as if this could be known not only as an abstraction, a\nconceivable, an ideal--but also as a concrete reality; as if 'we could\nknow a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there\nreally existed in actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing\ninfinitely or absolutely certain specific attributes'--(pp. 55--93). To\nthis doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we understand concrete reality, we\nfind no evidence to believe that there exist in nature any real concrete\npersons or things, possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as\nthey do possess: _e.g._ any men infinitely wise or infinitely strong,\nany horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard. Such concrete\nreal objects appear to us not admissible, because experience not only\nhas not certified their existence in any single case, but goes as far to\ndisprove their existence as it can do to disprove anything. All the real\nobjects in nature known to us by observation are finite, and possess\nonly in a finite measure their respective attributes. Upon this is\nfounded the process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill\nin his 'System of Logic '--Induction, Deduction from general facts\nattested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results\nobtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in the\nabstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will designate,\nalike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness which you may\nthink of, and any unknown degree even whiter and harder than what you\nthink of. But when perceived as invested in a given mass of snow or\ngranite before us, they are divested of that indeterminateness, and\nbecome restricted to a determinate measure and degree.\n\nHaving thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to dissent\nfrom Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the pleading against M.\nCousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, in which occurs his first\ncontroversy with Mr Mansel. This passage has excited more interest, and\nwill probably be remembered by a larger number of readers, than any\nportion of the book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99--103),\nsince the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the thought:--\n\n     'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty,\n     and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an\n     Absolute Being is unknowable in himself, but that the\n     Relative attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable\n     also.[5] He must say that we do not know what Wisdom,\n     Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God.\n     Accordingly, he does say so. \"It is a fact\" (says Mr Mansel)\n     \"which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless,\n     were it possible, to disguise, that the representation of\n     God after the model of the highest human morality which we\n     are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for\n     all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural\n     Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the\n     permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the\n     prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving\n     the misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial\n     distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the\n     world--these are facts, which no doubt are reconcilable, we\n     know not how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but which\n     certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that\n     its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite\n     goodness of man.\"\n\n     'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is\n     necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to\n     God is not the goodness which we know and love in our\n     fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree;\n     but is different in kind, and another quality altogether.\n     Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents,\n     the opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree\n     from finite goodness.--Here, then, I take my stand upon the\n     acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when\n     we mean different things we have no right to call them by\n     the same name, and to apply to them, the same predicates,\n     moral and intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that\n     there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the\n     highest human form can conceive, exist in a degree\n     inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled\n     by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are\n     we cannot learn, except that the highest human morality does\n     not sanction them--convince me of this and I will hear my\n     fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this,\n     and at the same time call this being by the names which\n     express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, in\n     plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a being\n     may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do; he\n     shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being\n     good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my\n     fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to\n     hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.'\n\nThis concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill announces\nhis resolution to determine for himself, and according to his own reason\nand conscience, what God he will worship, and what God he will not\nworship. For ourselves, we cordially sympathize with his resolution. But\nMr Mill must be aware that this is a point on which society is equally\nresolved that no individual shall determine for himself, if they can\nhelp it.[6] Each new-born child finds his religious creed ready\nprepared for him. In his earliest days of unconscious infancy, the stamp\nof the national, gentile, phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him\nby his elders; and if the future man, in the exercise of his own\nindependent reason, acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce\nthose Gods, proclaiming openly that he does so--he must count upon such\ntreatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life to him,\neven before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which Mr Mill\nindicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a declaration so\nunusual and so impressive should have been often cited in critical\nnotices of this volume; that during the month preceding the last\nWestminster election, it was studiously brought forward by some\nopponents of Mr Mill, and more or less regretted by his friends, as\nlikely to offend many electors, and damage his chance of success; and\nthat a conspicuous and noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of\nWestminster, thought the occasion so grave as to come forward with his\ncharacteristic generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished\nman suspected of heresy.\n\nThe sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, under whose\nsentence he was groaning, has never before been put into such plain\nEnglish.[7] Mr Mill's declaration reminds us also of Hippolytus, the\nchaste and pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully described by\nEuripides. Hippolytus is exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess\nArtemis; but he dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for\nhimself, in refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship\nupon Aphrodit\u00ea, because he considers her to be a very bad Goddess.[8] In\nthis refusal he persists with inflexible principle (even after having\nreceived, from an anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which\nit will bring upon him), until the insulted Aphrodit\u00ea involves him,\nalong with the unhappy Ph\u00e6dra and Theseus himself, in one common abyss\nof misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration stands in marked\ncontrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus. That\nhistorian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are\nenvious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9]\nYet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous\nin prayer and sacrifice--perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in\nconsequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being\npersuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only\nchance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself\nis, by honorific tribute in words and offerings.\n\nWhen, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill's\ndeclaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on\nthe controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess\nthat in this point of view it has little objective relevancy. The\nproblem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the\nuniverse (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms\nconveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the\ngoodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered\nby Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better\nhypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr\nMansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he\nconsiders it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we\nreflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are\napplied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood\nabout Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the\nproceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it\ncannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some\nexamples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:--\n\n     'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour\n     of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who\n     sees, and the ear by one who hears.'\n\nIn the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God.\n\nNow when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts\nof extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly\nphysical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies\nof nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with\ndirect sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past,\ninseparably associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known,\nare perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain[11] on the\n'Senses and the Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and\nelsewhere) of 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that\nhe is a veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth;\nthat is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his mental\npower of recalling and recombining words lodged in the memory, for the\npurpose of asserting no other propositions except such as declare facts\nwhich he knows, or beliefs which he really entertains. But how either\n_seeing_, or _hearing_, or _veracity_, in these senses, can be\npredicated of God, we are at a loss to understand. And if they are to\nbe predicated of God in a different sense, this admits the same license\nas Mr Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that\nundeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet univocally\nrespecting God and respecting man.[12]\n\nOn the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent to\nworship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new light on\nthe grave problem--frankly stated though imperfectly solved, by Mr\nMansel--how such a conception of God is to be reconciled with the extent\nof evil and suffering actually pervading human life and animal life\nthroughout the earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's\ntreatment of this subject--what we should not say respecting his\ntreatment of any other--that he has left an old perplexing problem not\nless perplexing than he found it.\n\nReverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we now pass on\nto Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the Interpretation of\nConsciousness. There is assuredly no lesson more requiring to be taught\nthan the proper mode of conducting such interpretation; for the number\nof different modes in which Consciousness has been interpreted is\nastonishing. Mr Mill begins by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a\npassage of some length, upon which he bestows considerable praise,\nregarding it as--\n\n     'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value\n     of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he\n     had a greater capacity for the subject than many\n     metaphysicians of high reputation; and particularly than\n     his two distinguished predecessors in the same school of\n     thought--\"Reid and Stewart.\"'--p. 131.\n\nThis is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book\ncontains, and as such we are glad to cite it.\n\nOn the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton\nother good observations besides the one last alluded to; but,\nunfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent\nopinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such\ninconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W.\nHamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically\n(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his\nmind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back\nupon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of\nSir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of\nConsciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations\nwe shall call particular attention.\n\nAll philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be\nbelieved; but they differ much on the question--To what points\nConsciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How\nshall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is\nthe proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this\nMr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):--\n\n     'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods\n     of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical\n     difference between the two great schools into which\n     metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for\n     distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the\n     _psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong\n     from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the\n     question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas.\n     This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper\n     course would have been to begin by determining what the\n     ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness\n     now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to\n     frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental\n     phenomena.\n\n     'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend\n     that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations\n     of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any\n     regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to\n     follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas.\n     For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct\n     process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its\n     revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers\n     itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those\n     original revelations are overlaid and buried under a\n     mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.\n\n     'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and\n     minuteness our present states of Consciousness,\n     distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find\n     to enter into them--every element that we seem to recognize\n     as real, and cannot \"by merely concentrating our attention\n     upon it analyze into anything simpler--we reach the ultimate\n     and primary truths, which are the sources of all our\n     knowledge, and which cannot be denied or doubted without\n     denying or doubting the evidence of Consciousness\n     itself--that is, the only evidence that there is for\n     anything. I maintain this to be a misconception of the\n     condition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of\n     psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry at the\n     point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, to beg the\n     question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least\n     of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the\n     mind--the Laws of Association, according to one class of\n     thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to\n     another--are capable of creating, out of those data of\n     Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental\n     conceptions, which become so identified in thought with all\n     our states of Consciousness, that _we seem, and cannot but\n     seem, to receive them by direct intuition_. For example, the\n     belief in matter in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at\n     least may be, thus produced:--\n\n     '\"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or\n     Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of\n     Consciousness--supposes two things: that the beliefs exist,\n     and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The first\n     is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a subject\n     of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of\n     psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that\n     'the origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem\n     of mental science, and the subject which must be first\n     considered in forming the theory of the Mind.\"'\n\nThis citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, yet we\ncould have wished to prolong it still more, from the importance of some\nof the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in clear discrimination and\ncontrast, two opposite points of view according to which the phenomena\nof mind are regarded by different philosophers, and the method of\nstudying them determined: the _introspective_ method, adopted by M.\nCousin and others--the _psychological_ or analytical method, pursued by\nLocke and by many other eminent men since Locke--'the known and approved\nmethod of physical science, adapted to the necessities of\npsychology'--(p. 148).\n\nThere are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he appears to\nfeel that the _introspective_ method alone is insufficient for the\ninterpretation of Consciousness, and that the analytical method must be\nemployed to reinforce it. But on this as on other points he is not\nalways consistent with himself. For in laying down the principle upon\nwhich the primary truths of Consciousness, the original data of\nintelligence, are to be ascertained and distinguished from\ngeneralizations out of experience and custom, he declares that the one\nsingle and certain mark is Necessity--they must be beliefs which we are\nunder the necessity of believing--of which we cannot get rid by any\nmental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by the\n_introspective_ method alone. He (with M. Cousin and other philosophers\nwho take the same view) does not apply the analytical method to inquire\nwhether his necessity of belief may not be a purely acquired necessity\nand nowise congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that these philosophers\ndo not even seek to apply the introspective method as far as that method\nwill really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own\npresent minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied\nto other minds, in different times and places. They declare various\nbeliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because\nsuch is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately\naround them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have\nbeen) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing\nthe contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really\ndisallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in\ntruth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method\nwere employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of\nbelieving otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might\nstill be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method\nmust still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose\nsuch incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it\nmay not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the\nnatural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these\nlaws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities\nin the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if\nany, as are natural.\n\n     'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the\n     same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of\n     his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which\n     have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths,\n     which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be\n     thought true, and have finally come to be deemed\n     impossible.'--p. 150.\n\nAfter various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many\ncensures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives us three\nvaluable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in\nan External World, the Belief in Mind as a separate substance or\nNoumenon, and the Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of these topics\nhe applies what he calls the _psychological_ method, as contrasted with\nthe simply _introspective_ method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and\nNon-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance of\nConsciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that these\nbeliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and that the known\nlaws of Association are sufficient to explain how they are acquired;\nespecially the Law of Inseparable Association, together with that of\n_Obliviscence_--a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first\nfind employed in this volume--(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to\nbe a _permanent possibility of Sensation_; he maintains that this is\nreally all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general\nmean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may,\nbut must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present\n'to our artificialized Consciousness' a character of objectivity--(pp.\n198, 199). The correlative subject, though present in fact and\nindispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the\nLaw of Obliviscence.\n\nThese chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We can only\nfind room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):--\n\n     'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its\n     first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to\n     a _me_ and _not-me_. As soon as I have formed, on the one\n     hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation,\n     and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which\n     I call my life--both these notions are, by an irresistible\n     association, recalled by every sensation I have. They\n     represent two things, with both of which the sensation of\n     the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I\n     cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious\n     of it as related to these two things. They have accordingly\n     received relative names, expressive of the double relation\n     in question. The thread of consciousness which I apprehend\n     the relation as a part of, is called the _Subject_; the\n     group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I\n     refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in\n     it, is called the _Object_ of the sensation. The sensation\n     itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to\n     have two such names--one denoting the sensation as opposed\n     to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its\n     Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has\n     not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to\n     every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by\n     the terms Object and Subject themselves. It is true that\n     these two are related to one another, but only through the\n     sensation. We have no conception of either Subject or\n     Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which\n     we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are\n     conscious of. _The very existence of them both, so far as\n     cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they\n     respectively bear to our states of feeling._ Their relation\n     to each other is only the relation between those two\n     relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair,\n     _Object, Subject,_ but the two pairs, Object, _Sensation\n     objectively considered_--Subject, _Sensation subjectively\n     considered_. The reason why this is overlooked might easily\n     be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that\n     important part of the Laws of Association, which may be\n     termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'\n\nThis chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts the\nopinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of\nco-existent _partes extra partes_, is immediately and necessarily\napprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms, the\ncopious proof given by Professor Bain (in his work on the Senses and the\nIntellect) that our conception of extension is derived from our muscular\nsensibility: that our sensation of _muscular motion impeded_ constitutes\nthat of filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate\nof co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which comprehends\na great number of parts in a succession so rapid as to be confounded\nwith simultaneity--and which not only becomes the symbol of muscular and\ntactile succession, but even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede\nboth of them in our consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this\nimportant doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but\nalso from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W.\nHamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, Platner. Platner\ninstituted a careful examination of a man born blind, and ascertained\nthat this man did not conceive extension as an aggregate of simultaneous\nparts, but as a series of sensations experienced or to be experienced in\nsuccession--(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner both\ncorroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its proper\ninterpretation from that theory; while it is altogether adverse to the\ndoctrine of Sir W. Hamilton--as is also another case, which he cites\nfrom Maine de Biran:--\n\n     'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's\n     sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247),\n     that he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally\n     known, two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'\n\nWe think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out besides, in\nappreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his appetite for facts was\nuseful to philosophy, as well as his appetite for speculation. But the\nperson whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer to bring into the\nforeground, is Platner himself. He spent three weeks in patient\nexamination of this blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that\nhis sagacity in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in\ncollecting them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated\nobservation of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why\n(what Mr Mill calls) the _psychological_ theory finds so little\nacceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a mental\ninteger was once a multiplicity of separate mental fragments, can\ndescribe the antecedent steps of the change only as a _latens\nprocessus_, which the reader never fully understands, and often will not\nadmit. Every man's mind is gradually built up from infancy to maturity;\nthe process is always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of\nit--especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with\ninstruction--are never studied and put on record by observers trained in\ninductive logic, knowing beforehand what they ought to look for as the\n_sine qu\u00e2 non_ for proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases\nas that cited by Platner--cases of one marked congenital defect of\nsense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference--are always within\nreach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and record them.\nHistorians of science describe to us the laborious and multiplied\nobservations, and the elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of\nobservation, which recent chemical and physical inquirers have found\nindispensable for the establishment of their results. We cannot,\ntherefore, be surprised that mental philosophers, dealing with facts\neven more obscure, and careless about enlarging, varying,\nauthenticating their records of particular facts, should have had\nlittle success in establishing any results at all.\n\nBut if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have been remiss\nin the observation of particular mental facts,--those who deny the\ntheory have been far more than remiss; they have been blind to obvious\nfacts contradicting the principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in\nchap, xiv., deals with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W.\nHamilton. That philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare\nconfidently--'what I cannot but think must be _\u00e0 priori_, or original to\nthought; it cannot be engendered by experience upon custom' (p.\n264)--appears to us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no\none ever surpassed Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual\ndiversities of human belief, and human incapacities of believing--yet he\nnever seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into account,\nwhen he assured the students in his lecture-room, that custom,\nexperience, indissoluble association, were altogether insufficient to\nengender a felt necessity of believing. Such forgetfulness of well-known\nmental facts cannot be reproached to the advocates of the psychological\ntheory.\n\nIn chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on unconscious\nmental modifications. He points out the confused manner in which Sir W.\nHamilton has conceived _mental latency_, as well as the inconclusive\ncharacter of the reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of\nDugald Stewart--That in the most rapid trains of association, each\nseparate item must have been successively present to consciousness,\nthough for a time too short to leave any memory. Sir W. Hamilton thinks\nthat the separate items may pass, and often do pass, unconsciously;\nwhich opinion Mr Mill also, though not approving his reasons, is\ninclined to adopt.\n\n     'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental\n     modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any\n     very distinct meaning to them--namely, unconscious\n     modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that\n     the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association,\n     those which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are\n     so: that they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of\n     causation being continued only physically--by one organic\n     state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the\n     state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not\n     produced.'\n\nMr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this doctrine. He at\nthe same time calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W.\nHamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on Metaphysics; especially to the\ninstructive citation from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the\nimportant fact, which descriptions of the Law of Association often keep\nout of sight--that the suggestive agency of Association is carried on,\nnot by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but by a mass\nof antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of consequents, among\nwhich attention is very unequally distributed.\n\nWe shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Theory\nof Causation--(chap. xvi.). This theory appears to Mr Mill absurd; while\nthe theory of Mr Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on\nthe same subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and\nunsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but,\npreviously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that\ndesiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory\nof Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W.\nHamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many\nobjectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent\namong mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of\nCausation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle\nwhich professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such\nquestions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used\nin a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause.\n\nIn Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's\ndoctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this\nchapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the\nvolume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and\nthe reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent\nwith what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap.\nii. \u00a7 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the\ntheory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the\nidea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or\nby James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word\n_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces\nit, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill\nsays (p. 331)--\n\n     'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the\n     words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to\n     express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a\n     general name, should ever have been invented.'\n\nwe dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,'\nhowever, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent\nwith the purpose for which the name is given.\n\nWe are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters\n(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best\nchapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of\nReasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of\nhis calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has\nnothing to do with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to\nRealism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as\ngiven in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not\nmerely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366)\n'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too\nsmall and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the\ntheory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of\nLogic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which\nare reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and\nReasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and\nxxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the\nFundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in\nmany different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir\nW. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is\ninstructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver\nof all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate\nconsequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the\nexaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it\npointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of\nsupercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his\nwritings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the\nshape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be\nentertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of\nthe recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that\nassumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per\nsyllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst\nthe generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great\nproblem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing\nonly on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential\npart, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of\nconsistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province\nof Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the\nprocess necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or\nexposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or\nvalue except as a part of that larger exigency.\n\nWhile Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to ensure for\nFormal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials of scientific\nprocedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time enlarging it on its\ntechnical side, in two modes which are highly esteemed both by himself\nand by others: 1. The recognition of two kinds of Syllogisms; one in\nExtension, the other in Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the\nQuantification of the Predicate.--Both these novelties are here\ncriticised by Mr Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to\nperuse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic.\n\nNow whereas the main objection, by which the study of the syllogistic\nlogic has been weighed down and discredited in modern times, is this,\nthat it encumbers the memory with formal distinctions, having no useful\napplication to the real process and purposes of reasoning--the procedure\nof Sir W. Hamilton might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was\ntrying to aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a\nvariety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and\nIntensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of notions,\nin Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates that all former\nlogicians have neglected--while it plainly appears, even on his own\nshowing, that the difference between syllogisms, in respect to these two\nsorts of quantity, is of no practical value; and that 'we can always\nchange a categorical syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical\nsyllogism of the other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and\nby reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, that\nevery syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p.\n431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir W. Hamilton, we\nmay set the truly philosophical explanation here given by Mr Mill of the\nmeaning of propositions.\n\n     'All judgments' (he says--p. 423), 'except where both the\n     terms are proper names, are really judgments in\n     Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural\n     tendency of the mind, to express most of them in terms of\n     Extension. In other words, we never really predicate\n     anything but attributes; though, in the usage of language,\n     we commonly predicate them by means of words which are names\n     of concrete objects--because' (p. 426)--'we have no other\n     convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes,\n     and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of\n     their own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are\n     accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to\n     themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the\n     objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary\n     judgments' (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension\n     not being thought of. But we may, if we please, make the\n     Extension of our general terms an express object of thought.\n     When I judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my\n     thoughts but the attributes and their co-existence. But when\n     by reflection I perceive what the proposition implies, I\n     remark that other things may ruminate besides oxen, and that\n     the unknown multitude of things which ruminate form a mass,\n     with which the unknown multitude of things having the\n     attributes of oxen is either identical or is wholly\n     comprised in it. Which of these two is the truth I may not\n     know, and if I did, took no notice of it when I assented to\n     the proposition, all oxen ruminate; but I perceive, on\n     consideration, that one or other of them must be true.\n     Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed that all\n     oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the concrete\n     objects denoted by each of the two names an object of\n     thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in\n     other words, I can make the Extension of the names (or\n     notions) an object of direct consciousness. When I do this,\n     I perceive that this operation introduces no new fact, but\n     is only a different mode of contemplating the very fact\n     which I had previously expressed by the words, all oxen\n     ruminate. The fact is the same, but the mode of\n     contemplating it is different. There is thus in all\n     Propositions a judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir\n     W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which we make as a\n     matter of course; and a possible judgment in or concerning\n     Extension, which we _may_ make, and which will be true if\n     the former is true.'\n\nFrom the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following paragraph\ntoo long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no real distinction\nbetween Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments in Extension; that the\n_appearance_ of distinction between them arises from the customary mode\nof enunciation, which custom is here accounted for; that the addition to\nthe theory of the Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is\nalike troublesome and unprofitable.\n\nThe like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification\nof the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by\nhimself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of\nSyllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on\nLogic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from\nAristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of\nlogic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate\nthe magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing.\nThe larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground\non which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious\ndeficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable\nlogical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on\nwhich, Sir W. Hamilton says,\n\n     'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly\n     obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into\n     account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but\n     usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not\n     only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a\n     judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)\n\nHere Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is\nalways understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated,\nin the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if\nit was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this\npoint that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies\naltogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always\nunderstood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's\nconsciousness for an answer:--\n\n     'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even\n     in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is\n     anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all\n     in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration\n     foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that\n     there are other ruminating animals, another may think that\n     there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the\n     subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating,\n     they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean\n     precisely the same thing. The mental process they go\n     through, _as far as that one judgment is concerned_, is\n     precisely identical; though some of them may go on farther,\n     and _add other judgments_ to it.'\n\nThe last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir W.\nHamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and explains why it\nwas that logicians before him declined to do so. Sir W. Hamilton, in\nthis proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not merely all that is\nthought implicitly, but a great deal more;[14] adding to it something\nelse, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more\nfrequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct\njudgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning\nof the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio\nConvertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a\ngreat advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being\nconverted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is,\nnevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified\nsyllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing\nthe predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the\nArt of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated\nform, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally\nthrows itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is\nprepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be\nconstrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the\nsame time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give\nus information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant\nrespecting the second?\n\nThe two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor\npeculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really\nunaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious\nModes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii.,\nxxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space,\nhowever, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which\n(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W.\nHamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the\ndetermining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir\nW. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of\nFree-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their\nrespective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W.\nHamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are\ninconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded\nMiddle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of\nFree-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious;\nmoreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of\nwhich also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however,\nunable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that\nthe same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the\ntwo opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in\ndefence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also\nasserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are\ndirectly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503).\n\nSir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the\ndoctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which\nare here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497,\n498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher\norder, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his\n'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and\ndiscards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything\nmore than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean\n_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of\nmind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not\nprove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor\nhave we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were\ntrue, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find\nthe testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience\nand induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called\nFree-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative.\n\n     'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious,\n     before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way;\n     exception may be taken _in limine_ to the use of the word\n     _consciousness_ in such an application. Consciousness tells\n     me what I do or feel. But what I am _able_ to do, is not a\n     subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; we\n     are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We\n     never know that we are able to do a thing, except from\n     having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we\n     know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to\n     act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is\n     often confounded with, and called by, the name of\n     consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of\n     authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme\n     over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called\n     consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a\n     delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an\n     interpretation of experience; and if it is a false\n     interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504\n\nAfter this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion\nbetween consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon\nexperience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to\nsift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and\nAccountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but\nthat there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is\nmeant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous\nmental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted.\nNow, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain\nacts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that\nwe trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring\nmotives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the\nwhole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless\ninfliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman\nis exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not\ncapable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.\nThe _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself\naccountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only\nthe _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by\nmotives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the\nstrongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can\nfeel himself to be so.\n\n     'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says\n     Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and\n     to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our\n     character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by\n     employing the proper means, improve our character: and that\n     if our character is such that, while it remains what it is,\n     it necessitates us to do wrong--it will be just to apply\n     motives which will necessitate us to strive for its\n     improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our\n     improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means\n     which must he employed for the purpose.'\n\nIt thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are\nnecessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend\non causes--neither the one nor the other is inconceivable or\nincomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first\nis true, and the second false, we learn by experience, and by that\nalone; just as we learn the like in regard to the phenomena of the\nmaterial world. Indeed, the fact that human volitions are both\npredictable and modifiable, quite as much as all those physical\nphenomena that depend upon a complication of causes--which is only a\ncorollary from what has just been said--is so universally recognized and\nacted upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference of\nopinion about this question, if the antithesis were not obscured and\nmystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of Free-will and\nNecessity.\n\nPassing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton's\nopinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or nearly so, as an\nintellectual discipline--we shall now call attention to the concluding\nremarks which sum up the results of the volume. After saying that he\n'differs from almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on\nwhich he particularly valued himself, or which is specially his own,'\nMr Mill describes Sir W. Hamilton's general merits as follows:--\n\n     'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of\n     bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions\n     of metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological\n     analysis on a small scale: and the many detached logical and\n     psychological truths which he has separately seized, and\n     which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to\n     resolve some special difficulty, and again lost sight of. I\n     can hardly point to anything he has done towards helping the\n     more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena,\n     unless it be his theory of Attention (including\n     Abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have;\n     but the subject, though a highly important, is comparatively\n     a simple one.'--p. 547.\n\nAgreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we should be\ndisposed to describe them in language stronger and more emphatic as to\ndegree, than that which has just been cited. But what is stated in the\npages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)--That Sir W. Hamilton's\ndoctrines appear to be usually taken up under the stimulus of some\nspecial dispute, and often afterwards forgotten; That he did not think\nout subjects until they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency\nwas attained between the different views which the author took from\ndifferent points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems\nmade up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical systems--All\nthis is literally and amply borne out by the many inconsistencies and\ncontradictions which Mr Mill has brought to view in the preceding\nchapters. It would appear that the controversial disposition was\npowerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present impulse of that sort\n(as has been said respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served\nto provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, but also\nexercised a Leth\u00e6an influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But we\ncan hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to 'excessive\nabsorption of time and energy by the study of old writers' (p. 551). If\nthis study did no other good, it at least kept the memory in exercise.\nNow, what surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the\namount of self-forgetfulness which they imply.\n\nWhile the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be fairly\nregarded as having produced any of his intellectual defects, it\nundoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of excellence as a\nphilosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; though he treats it as\nbelonging not so much to a philosopher as to an historian of philosophy.\nHe concludes (pp. 552--554):--\n\n     'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not\n     write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as\n     the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy\n     itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no\n     one, probably for many generations, will take the trouble of\n     acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and\n     value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development\n     of speculation, there is much in the old writers on\n     philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth\n     preserving for its scientific value. But this should be\n     extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern\n     thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the\n     ancient, and possessing a command of its language: a\n     combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W.\n     Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have done, he\n     has left undone, and has given us, instead, a contribution\n     to mental philosophy, which has been more than equalled by\n     many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of\n     erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled to the\n     name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on\n     the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their\n     intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown.\n     Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton,\n     though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some\n     tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr\n     Brown and Whately would have thought and written better than\n     they did, if they had been better read in the writings of\n     previous thinkers; but I am not afraid that posterity will\n     contradict me when I say, that either of them has done far\n     greater service to the world in the origination and\n     diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with\n     all his learning; because, though indolent readers, they\n     were both of them active and fertile thinkers.\n\n     'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not\n     frequently of real use to him on particular questions of\n     philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him\n     to know all the various opinions which can be held on the\n     questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them\n     clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even\n     this not always; but it does little else, even of what might\n     be expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy.\n     He knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of\n     each philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble\n     about the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no\n     remark bearing upon that point in any part of his writings.\n     I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been\n     required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of\n     any great thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of\n     a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher's\n     other opinions. Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual\n     relations of philosophical doctrines. One of the most\n     striking examples of this inability is in the case of\n     Leibnitz,' &c.\n\nHere we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill conceives\nto be established by his book. We shall state how far we are able to\nconcur with it. He has brought the matter to a direct issue, by weighing\nSir W. Hamilton in the balance against two other actual cotemporaries;\ninstead of comparing him with some unrealized ideal found only in the\nfancy of critics and reviewers.\n\nComparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially subscribe to the\nopinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has 'done far greater\nservice to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and\ndiffusion of important thought.' To speak only of two chief subjects in\nthe field of important thought--Causality and the Freedom of the\nWill--we not only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both\nhis acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the\nfirst of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir W.\nHamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve the\nsuperiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no compensating\nitem to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: for the great\ndoctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is our chief point of\nphilosophical brotherhood with him, was maintained by Brown also.\n\nBut in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether different. We\ncannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even as an equal, to Sir\nW. Hamilton, 'in the origination and diffusion of important thought.' He\ndid much service by reviving an inclination and respect for Logic, and\nby clearing up a part of the technical obscurity which surrounded it:\nbut we look upon him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian,\nenlarging usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which\nmany orthodox minds are confined--rather than as a fit aspirant to the\ncosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile thinker,' Mr\nMill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But such also we\nconsider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least equal. If\nthe sentence which we have quoted above be intended to deny the\npredicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot\nacquiesce in it. His intellect appears to us thoroughly active and\nfertile, even when we dissent from his reasonings--nay, even in the\nmidst of his inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is\nunexpectedly pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already\npre-occupied by another both older and different. And we find this same\njudgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his philosophical\nprocedure made by Mr Mill himself--(pp. 271, 272). For example,\nrespecting Causality and the Freedom of the Will, we detect no want of\nactivity and fertility, though marked evidence of other\ndefects--especially the unconditional surrender of a powerful mind to\ncertain privileged inspirations, worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'\n\nWhile thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here drawn of Sir\nW. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the same time add that\nthe comparison is taken under circumstances unduly favourable to these\ntwo last. There has been no exposure of _their_ errors and\ninconsistencies, equal in penetration and completeness to the crushing\nvolume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds\nfair, he ought to furnish a similar systematic examination to Brown and\nWhately; enabling us to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W.\nHamilton) with the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects\nthe minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of reasoning--and of\nhis large command of philosophical premisses, which brings into full\nnotice what the author had overlooked. Thus alone could the competition\nbetween the three be rendered perfectly fair.\n\nWe regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not undertake the\ncomposition of a history of philosophy. Nevertheless we must confess\nthat we should hardly feel such regret, if we could see evidence to\nwarrant Mr Mill's judgment (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was\n'indifferent to the [Greek: dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was\nincompetent to draw up an estimate of the opinions of any great\nthinker,' &c. Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and\nconsiderable, would deprive an author of all chance of success in\nwriting a history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's\nworks does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him of an\nerroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say _frequent_ and _considerable_,\nbecause no historian of philosophy is exempt from the defect more or\nless; or rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of the Absolute into\nthe modesty of the Relative) we seldom find any historian whose estimate\nof great philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own.\nHence we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling us\nto test the historian, and judge for ourselves--a practice which Sir W.\nHamilton would have required no stimulus to enforce upon him. There\nought, indeed, to be various histories of philosophy, composed from\ndifferent points of view; for the ablest historian cannot get clear of\na certain exclusiveness belonging to himself. But, so far as we can\nconjecture what Sir W. Hamilton _would_ or _could_ have done, we think\nthat a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any\nwork of the kind in our language.\n\nWe trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be read,\nalong with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be glad if the\nworks of other philosophers could be read along with a comment of equal\nacuteness and impartiality. Any point of view which could command the\nadherence of such a mind as Sir W. Hamilton's, deserves to be fully\nconsidered. Moreover, the living force of philosophy, as directress of\nhuman intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each of her devotees a\nfull mastery of many divergent and opposite veins of reasoning--a\nknowledge, negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as\nwell as of his own.\n\nIt is to Philosophy alone that _our_ allegiance is sworn; and while we\nconcur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number both him and Sir W.\nHamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving alike in her train.\n\n_Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes Philosophia._\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's\nLectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their preface\n(p. xiii.)--\n\n'For twenty years--from 1836 to 1856--the courses of logic and\nmetaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to\ndiscipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth\nwho gathered from Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and\nwhile, by these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and\nmoulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable\nimpress of his genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the same\nmeans, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an\ninfluence which, for depth, feeling, and elevation, was certainly never\nsurpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils\nthere are not a few who, having lived for a season under the\nconstraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those\ngreat questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human\nknowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the memory of\ntheir beloved and revered instructor inseparably blended with what is\nhighest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their\npractical aims and aspirations.']\n\n[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell,\nMr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of\nthe new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call\nit a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression\nunsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol.\ni. p. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect.\nxvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here\ndistinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which\nlatter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in\nsubstance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.\n(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost\nimagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple\nsyllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an\nearly dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was\nonly conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and\nthe doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge\nis only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily\nforgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the\nforce of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be\nknown under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated\nimportance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being\nconsidered that we only take out of a general notion what we had\npreviously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge\nis not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation\nabout abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete\nparticulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had\nits day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,\nthe total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of\nthe reasoning process.'\n\nThese very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a\ntrain of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them,\nviz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the\nlogic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to\nexplain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter\nneglected.\n\nThat which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of\nAristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and\nwhich he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not\nalways remembered by Aristotle himself.]\n\n[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.\nInfinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo\ngenere.]\n\n[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is\nconcerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by\nPascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth\ncentury, in the 'Pens\u00e9es':--\n\n'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est\ninfiniment incompr\u00e9hensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il\nn'a nul rapport \u00e0 nous; nous sommes done incapables de conn\u00e2itre ni ce\nqn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.\nlxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)]\n\n[Footnote 6: The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at\nAthens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia,\nran thus--'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe\nin those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties\nin regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the\nyouth.'\n\nThese words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the\nAthenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree\nin antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that\nantipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh\nin another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity,\nbecomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: _aphrh\u00eat\u00f4r, athhemistos,\nanhestios_]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact,\nthe man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion,\npurchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that\n'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was\nthankful under the dictatorship of Julius C\u00e6sar. 'Obsecro--abiiciamus\nista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur _et tacendo et\nlatendo'_ (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable\ndeclaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and\nabstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life\nwould not be worth having under such conditions.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006--\n\n  pros tauta, rhipthesth\u00f4 men aithaloussa phlox,\n  leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronth\u00eamasin\n  chthonhiois kykhat\u00f4 phanta kahi tarasshet\u00f4\n  gnhampsei gar ouden t\u00f4ndhe m'----\n  eiselthet\u00f4 se mh\u00eapot, h\u00f4s eg\u00f4, Dios\n  gnh\u00f4m\u00ean phob\u00eatheis, th\u00ealhynoys genh\u00easomai,\n  kai liparh\u00eas\u00f4 ton mhega stygohymenon\n  gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherh\u00f4n,\n  lyshai me dhesm\u00f4n t\u00f4nde toy pantos ohe\u00f4.\n\nAlso v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled\n_Prometheus_, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest\npoetry.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10--\n\n  (Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos\n  monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias\n  legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai\n  Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,--\n  tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--\n\n  (Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' heg\u00f4 Chairein lhego--\n  (112.)\n\nSee also v. 1328--1402.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn\nphthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri;\nalso iii. 40]\n\n[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant,\nafter his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded,\nsupplicating Aphrodit\u00ea to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but\nobstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]\n\n[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,\npp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophi\u00e6,' i 51--'Et\nquidem substantia qu\u00e6 null\u00e2 plan\u00e8 re indigeat, unica tantum potest\nintelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concurs\u00fbs Dei\nexistere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substanti\u00e6 non convenit Deo\net illis _univoc\u00e8_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus\nnominis significatio potest distinct\u00e8 intelligi, qu\u00e6 Deo et creaturis\nsit communis.']\n\n[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the\nfollowing affirmation (p. 201):--\n\n'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into\nconsideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the\nLaw of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning\nof anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such\n'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.\nFirst, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement\nis obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,\nagree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of\nSir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely\nverbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing\nfor satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.\n\nNext, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those\nwho deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without\nany cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any\ngreater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout,\nconstant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event\ndepends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without\nany such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as\npervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.\nThe greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular,\nothers in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the\nmetaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that\nall volitions occur without any cause at all.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of\nquantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable\nAppendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes\nthe same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why\nthe quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that\nthere would thus be two _qu\u00e6sita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate\nwere affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything\nbeside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all\nman is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of\neverything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _qu\u00e6sita_;\nand therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two\nseveral propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a\n_qu\u00e6situm_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in\nthat?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same\ntime inhere in nothing else?_'\n\nThe author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpassing what the\nother writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at\nPerpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An\ninteresting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his\nage, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in\n1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished\nhimself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one\nof the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of\nthe continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both\ncommented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that\nhe died earlier than 1370.]","title":"Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.'","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":18293}