{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1232/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1232","id":"gutenberg_1232","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1232","summary":null,"tags":["Banned Books from Anne Haight's list","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Harvard Classics","Philosophy","Political ethics -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Philosophy -- Early works to 1800","Politics","State, The -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"The Prince\n\nby Nicolo Machiavelli\n\nTranslated by W. K. Marriott\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION\n YOUTH \u00c6t. 1-25\u20141469-94\n OFFICE \u00c6t. 25-43\u20141494-1512\n LITERATURE AND DEATH \u00c6t. 43-58\u20141512-27\n THE MAN AND HIS WORKS\n DEDICATION\n\n THE PRINCE\n CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED\n CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES\n CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES\n CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH\n CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED\n CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE\u2019S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY\n CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE\n CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS\n CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY\n CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED\n CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\n CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES\n CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE\u2019S OWN\n CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR\n CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED\n CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS\n CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED\n CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH\n CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\n CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?\n CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN\n CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\n CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED\n CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\n CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER\n CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\n\n DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI\n\n THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA\n\n\n\n\n_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to\n1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic\nmissions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512;\nlater exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd\nJune 1527._\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nNicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the\nsecond son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,\nand of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were\nmembers of the old Florentine nobility.\n\nHis life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly\nenough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of\nFlorence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an\nItalian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de\u2019 Medici, Il Magnifico.\nThe downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year\nMachiavelli entered the public service. During his official career\nFlorence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted\nuntil 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his\noffice. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they\nwere once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli\u2019s\nliterary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few\nweeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his\nfifty-eighth year, without having regained office.\n\n\n\n\nYOUTH \u2014 \u00c6t. 1-25\u20141469-94\n\n\nAlthough there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the\nFlorence of those days is so well known that the early environment of\nthis representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been\ndescribed as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by\nthe fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving\nLorenzo. Savonarola\u2019s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have\nbeen slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the\nfortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a\ngibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed\nprophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean\nrule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli\nstrongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to\nLorenzo\u2019s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_.\n\nMachiavelli, in his \u201cHistory of Florence,\u201d gives us a picture of the\nyoung men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: \u201cThey were freer\nthan their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other\nkinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming,\nand women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with\nwit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly\nwas thought the wisest.\u201d In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli\nshows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and\nleads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:\n\u201cI have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure,\nespecially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than\nwhich I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to\nme, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your\nshare.\u201d Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: \u201cThis will turn\nout well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then,\nyou have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters\nand music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I\nhave. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success\nand honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help\nyou if you help yourself.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nOFFICE \u2014 \u00c6t. 25-43\u20141494-1512\n\n\nThe second period of Machiavelli\u2019s life was spent in the service of the\nfree Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the\nexpulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After\nserving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed\nChancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and\nPeace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of\nMachiavelli\u2019s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the\naffairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and\ndispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere\nrecapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and\nsoldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and\nsupplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters\nwhich illustrate _The Prince_.\n\nHis first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, \u201cmy lady of Forli\u201d\nof _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it\nis far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on\nfortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is\nurged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.\n\nIn 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for\ncontinuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct\nof affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft\nsummarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also,\nit was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support\nto Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge\nthat such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the\nfaith of princes.\n\nMachiavelli\u2019s public life was largely occupied with events arising out\nof the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the\nDuke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The\nPrince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke\nfor the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have\nseized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the\npattern of Cesare Borgia\u2019s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed\nby some critics as the \u201chero\u201d of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the\nduke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the\nfortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that\nmight be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save\nhim; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens;\nand who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims\nthat it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen\nfatality.\n\nOn the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to\nwatch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia\ncheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano\ndelle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most\nreason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election,\nsays that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to\nforget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had\nruined Cesare.\n\nIt was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that\npontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought\nto a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing\nchiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius\nthat Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and\nwomen, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man\nthat will win and hold them both.\n\nIt is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian\nstates, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany,\nwith results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those\nevents, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they\nimpinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with\nLouis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch\u2019s character has\nalready been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as\nthe man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but\nwho in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,\nhad he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have\nbeen ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men\nof the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but\nMachiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the\nsecret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man,\nwithout force of character\u2014ignoring the human agencies necessary to\ncarry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of\nhis wishes.\n\nThe remaining years of Machiavelli\u2019s official career were filled with\nevents arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the\nthree great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the\nobject of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in\nthe battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won\nin eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during\nthese events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out\nbetween the pope and the French, because friendship with France had\ndictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II\nfinally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance\nof the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy\nof the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the\nMedici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st\nSeptember 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal\nfor the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end\nto his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining\noffice.\n\n\n\n\nLITERATURE AND DEATH \u2014 \u00c6t. 43-58\u20141512-27\n\n\nOn the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had\nvainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence,\nwas dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he\nwas accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,\nimprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope,\nLeo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at\nSan Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In\na letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a\nvery interesting description of his life at this period, which\nelucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After\ndescribing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he\nwrites: \u201cThe evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at\nthe entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt,\nand put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass\ninto the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly\nreceived by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I\ndo not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their\nactions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I\nfeel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay,\ndeath does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men.\nAnd because Dante says:\n\nKnowledge doth come of learning well retained,\nUnfruitful else,\n\nI have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have\ncomposed a small work on \u2018Principalities,\u2019 where I pour myself out as\nfully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a\nprincipality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how\nthey can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever\npleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince,\nespecially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it\nto his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will\nbe able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had\nwith him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.\u201d\n\nThe \u201clittle book\u201d suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form\nin which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work\nduring its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some\nunknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de\u2019 Medici. Although\nMachiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or\npresented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo\never received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any\nemployment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli\u2019s lifetime,\n_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still\ndisputable.\n\nMachiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: \u201cAnd as to this\nlittle thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that\nduring the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have\nneither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by\none who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my\nloyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not\nnow learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as\nI have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my\nhonesty.\u201d\n\nBefore Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his\n\u201cDiscourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,\u201d which should be read\nconcurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied\nhim until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look\nafter the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the\nMedicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her\ncitizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new\nconstitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on\none pretext or another it was not promulgated.\n\nIn 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to\nsettle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly\nremarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he\nwas much sought after, and also for the production of his \u201cArt of War.\u201d\nIt was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance\nof Cardinal de\u2019 Medici to write the \u201cHistory of Florence,\u201d a task which\noccupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have\ndetermined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer\nobserves that \u201can able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will\nendeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play\nwith.\u201d\n\nWhen the \u201cHistory of Florence\u201d was finished, Machiavelli took it to\nRome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de\u2019 Medici, who had in\nthe meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is\nsomewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The\nPrince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained\npower in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the \u201cHistory of Florence\u201d\nto the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year\nthe battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left\nFrancis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This\nwas followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular\nparty at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more\nbanished.\n\nMachiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his\nreturn, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the \u201cTen of\nLiberty and Peace.\u201d Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached\nFlorence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MAN AND HIS WORKS\n\n\nNo one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence\nhas decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her\nmost famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have\nfound in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the\ngerms of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle\nto protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name,\nit may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which\nthis sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that\nthe researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more\nreasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an \u201cunholy\nnecromancer,\u201d which so long haunted men\u2019s vision, has begun to fade.\n\nMachiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and\nindustry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and\nwith his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced\nretirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he\ndepicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the\nsuccessful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only\nmoderately prosperous in his several embassies and political\nemployments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII,\noverawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren\nof results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery\nthat he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct\nof his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear\nby the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of\ncompromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to\nsuspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when\nhe set him to write the \u201cHistory of Florence,\u201d rather than employ him\nin the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and\nthere alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.\n\nAlthough the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The\nPrince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they\nare the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as\nthey are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli\u2019s contemporaries; yet\nthey cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of\nEurope rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical\nincidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which\nMachiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and\nconduct.\n\nLeaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish\nsome European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The\nPrince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men\nare still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the\ndays of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices\nwhich Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.\nMen will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them\nto be\u2014and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;\nprudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then\u2014to pass to\na higher plane\u2014Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an\nempire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the\narms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to\nfight.\n\nIt is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli\u2019s that government\nshould be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the\npeople with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of\nsociety; to this \u201chigh argument\u201d _The Prince_ contributes but little.\nMachiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments\notherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and\ninsight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The\nPrince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the\nincontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which\nstill guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other\nand their neighbours.\n\nIn translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an\nexact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent\nparaphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.\nMachiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he\nwrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his\nsubstance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit\nunquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_\nIn _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not\nonly for every word, but for the position of every word. To an\nEnglishman of Shakespeare\u2019s time the translation of such a treatise was\nin some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius\nof the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to\nthe Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example:\nthe word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy\nadopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would\nby an Elizabethan be correctly rendered \u201centertain,\u201d and every\ncontemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that\n\u201cRome _entertained_ the \u00c6tolians and the Achaeans without augmenting\ntheir power.\u201d But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and\nambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that \u201c_Rome\nmaintained friendly relations with the \u00c6tolians_,\u201d etc., using four\nwords to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity\nof the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to\nthe sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that\nthe reader, in his eagerness to reach the author\u2019s meaning, may\noverlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.\n\nThe following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:\n\nPrincipal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di\ntrattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto\ndal duca Valentino nell\u2019 ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da\nFermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;\nDecennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell\u2019\nAlemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di\nFrancia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,\n1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,\n1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in\nverse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,\n1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d\u2019oro (poem in\nterza rima), 1517; Dell\u2019 arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il\nriformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di\nLucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie\nfiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.\n\nOther poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti\ncarnascialeschi.\n\nEditions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence,\n6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,\n1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.\n\nMinor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E.\nAlvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.\nCanestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri\nintorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D.\nFerrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.\n\n\n\n\nDEDICATION\n\n\nTo the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De\u2019 Medici\n\nThose who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed\nto come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in\nwhich they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses,\narms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented\nto princes, worthy of their greatness.\n\nDesiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some\ntestimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my\npossessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,\nthe knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience\nin contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which,\nhaving reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now\nsend, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.\n\nAnd although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,\nnevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable,\nseeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to\noffer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all\nthat I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and\ndangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent\nwords, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic\nallurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed\nto embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour\nshould be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the\nweightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.\n\nNor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low\nand humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of\nprinces; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves\nbelow in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of\nlofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves\nupon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it\nneeds to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be\nof the people.\n\nTake then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I\nsend it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you\nwill learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness\nwhich fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your\nMagnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your\neyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a\ngreat and continued malignity of fortune.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRINCE\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\nHOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE\nACQUIRED\n\n\nAll states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been\nand are either republics or principalities.\n\nPrincipalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long\nestablished; or they are new.\n\nThe new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or\nthey are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the\nprince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of\nthe King of Spain.\n\nSuch dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a\nprince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of\nthe prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\nCONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES\n\n\nI will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another\nplace I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to\nprincipalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,\nand discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.\n\nI say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary\nstates, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than\nnew ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of\nhis ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,\nfor a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless\nhe be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if\nhe should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to\nthe usurper, he will regain it.\n\nWe have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have\nwithstood the attacks of the Venetians in \u201984, nor those of Pope Julius\nin \u201910, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the\nhereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it\nhappens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices\ncause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects\nwill be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and\nduration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are\nlost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\nCONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES\n\n\nBut the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be\nnot entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken\ncollectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from\nan inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for\nmen change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and\nthis hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein\nthey are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have\ngone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common\nnecessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have\nsubmitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships\nwhich he must put upon his new acquisition.\n\nIn this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in\nseizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends\nwho put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the\nway they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,\nfeeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed\nforces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill\nof the natives.\n\nFor these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied\nMilan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it\nonly needed Lodovico\u2019s own forces; because those who had opened the\ngates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future\nbenefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is\nvery true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,\nthey are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with\nlittle reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the\ndelinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in\nthe weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time\nit was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the\nborders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to\nbring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be\ndefeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above\nmentioned.\n\n [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who\n married Beatrice d\u2019Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and\n died in 1510.\n\nNevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second\ntime. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains\nto name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and\nwhat any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself\nmore securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.\n\nNow I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an\nancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country\nand language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold\nthem, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;\nand to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of\nthe prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in\nother things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will\nlive quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,\nand Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,\nalthough there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the\ncustoms are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst\nthemselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has\nonly to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of\ntheir former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws\nnor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will\nbecome entirely one body with the old principality.\n\nBut when states are acquired in a country differing in language,\ncustoms, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great\nenergy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real\nhelps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside\nthere. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has\nmade that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other\nmeasures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled\nthere, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the\nspot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy\nthem; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are\ngreat, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the\ncountry is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied\nby prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have\nmore cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He\nwho would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost\ncaution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested\nfrom him with the greatest difficulty.\n\nThe other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,\nwhich may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do\nthis or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A\nprince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense\nhe can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority\nonly of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them\nto the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and\nscattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being\nuninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not\nto err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have\nbeen despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not\ncostly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as\nhas been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one\nhas to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,\nbecause they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious\nones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man\nought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.\n\nBut in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much\nmore, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,\nso that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are\nexasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting\nof the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and\nall become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their\nown ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such\nguards are as useless as a colony is useful.\n\nAgain, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects\nought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful\nneighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care\nthat no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a\nfooting there; for it will always happen that such a one will be\nintroduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of\nambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were\nbrought into Greece by the \u00c6tolians; and in every other country where\nthey obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And\nthe usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner\nenters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the\nhatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to\nthose subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over\nto himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he\nhas acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold\nof too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,\nand with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of\nthem, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does\nnot properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,\nand whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and\ntroubles.\n\nThe Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these\nmeasures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]\nthe minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the\ngreater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.\nGreece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and\n\u00c6tolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was\nhumbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and\n\u00c6tolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor\ndid the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends\nwithout first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make\nthem agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because\nthe Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,\nwho have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for\nwhich they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it\nis easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the\nmedicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;\nfor it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic\nfever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but\ndifficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either\ndetected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but\ndifficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the\nevils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise\nman to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not\nhaving been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that\nevery one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the\nRomans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to\navoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war\nis not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of\nothers; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in\nGreece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided\nboth, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which\nis forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:\u2014Let us enjoy the\nbenefits of the time\u2014but rather the benefits of their own valour and\nprudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring\nwith it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.\n\n [2] See remark in the introduction on the word \u201cintrattenere.\u201d\n\nBut let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the\nthings mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as\nthe one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held\npossession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he\nhas done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain\na state composed of divers elements.\n\n [3] Louis XII, King of France, \u201cThe Father of the People,\u201d born 1462,\n died 1515.\n\n [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.\n\nKing Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who\ndesired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I\nwill not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a\nfoothold in Italy, and having no friends there\u2014seeing rather that every\ndoor was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles\u2014he was forced to\naccept those friendships which he could get, and he would have\nsucceeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not\nmade some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,\nregained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;\nthe Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of\nFerrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of\nPesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,\nthe Sienese\u2014everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then\ncould the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,\nwhich, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made\nthe king master of two-thirds of Italy.\n\nLet any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could\nhave maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above\nlaid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although\nthey were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the\nChurch, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been\nforced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have\nmade himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no\nsooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to\noccupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was\nweakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had\nthrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by\nadding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater\nauthority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to\nfollow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of\nAlexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was\nhimself forced to come into Italy.\n\nAnd as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and\ndeprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,\ndivided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter\nin Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country\nand the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and\nwhereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he\ndrove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out\nin turn.\n\nThe wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always\ndo so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but\nwhen they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is\nfolly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with\nher own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she\nought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with\nthe Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she\ngot a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had\nnot the excuse of that necessity.\n\nTherefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,\nhe increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he\nbrought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did\nnot send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to\ninjure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from\nthe Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought\nSpain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to\nhumble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have\nconsented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have\nkept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would\nnever have consented except to become masters themselves there; also\nbecause the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order\nto give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not\nhave had the courage.\n\nAnd if any one should say: \u201cKing Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander\nand the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,\u201d I answer for the reasons given\nabove that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,\nbecause it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your\ndisadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king\nhad given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in\nexchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to\nRouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the\nfaith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.\n\n [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and\n married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to\n retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.\n\n [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d\u2019Amboise, created a\n cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.\n\nThus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the\nconditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and\nwished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that\nis reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes\nwith Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope\nAlexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal\nRouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I\nreplied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning\nthat otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such\ngreatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the\nChurch and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin\nmay be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which\nnever or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming\npowerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about\neither by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him\nwho has been raised to power.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\nWHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL\nAGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH\n\n\nConsidering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly\nacquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great\nbecame the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was\nscarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole\nempire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained\nthemselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose\namong themselves from their own ambitions.\n\nI answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to\nbe governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of\nservants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his\nfavour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity\nby antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons\nhave states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and\nhold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a\nprince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,\nbecause in all the country there is no one who is recognized as\nsuperior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as\nto a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular\naffection.\n\nThe examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the\nKing of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one\nlord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into\nsanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and\nchanges them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the\nmidst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,\nand beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king\ntake these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both\nof these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state\nof the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The\ncauses of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that\nthe usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can\nhe hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the\nlord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his\nministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with\ngreat difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when\nthey have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,\nfor the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in\nmind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his\nown strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has\nbeen conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot\nreplace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this\nprince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the\nothers having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not\nrely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.\n\nThe contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because\none can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,\nfor one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,\nfor the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the\nvictory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with\ninfinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from\nthose you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated\nthe family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves\nthe heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either\nto satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings\nthe opportunity.\n\nNow if you will consider what was the nature of the government of\nDarius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and\ntherefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him\nin the field, and then to take the country from him. After which\nvictory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,\nfor the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would\nhave enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults\nraised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.\n\nBut it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted\nlike that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the\nRomans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities\nthere were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them\nendured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the\npower and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed\naway, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting\nafterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself\nhis own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed\nthere; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other\nthan the Romans were acknowledged.\n\nWhen these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with\nwhich Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which\nothers have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;\nthis is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the\nconqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\nCONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER\nTHEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED\n\n\nWhenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been\naccustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three\ncourses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the\nnext is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live\nunder their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an\noligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a\ngovernment, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand\nwithout his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support\nhim; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will\nhold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other\nway.\n\nThere are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held\nAthens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they\nlost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,\ndismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as\nthe Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did\nnot succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities\nin the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them\notherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city\naccustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be\ndestroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of\nliberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither\ntime nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do\nor provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges\nunless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they\nimmediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been\nheld in bondage by the Florentines.\n\nBut when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and\nhis family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to\nobey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in\nmaking one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern\nthemselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a\nprince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But\nin republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire\nfor vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of\ntheir former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them\nor to reside there.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\nCONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE\u2019S OWN ARMS AND\nABILITY\n\n\nLet no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities\nas I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of\nstate; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,\nand following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely\nto the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A\nwise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to\nimitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not\nequal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the\nclever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far\ndistant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow\nattains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their\nstrength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of\nso high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.\n\nI say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a\nnew prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,\naccordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired\nthe state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station\npresupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of\nthese things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.\nNevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the\nstrongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no\nother state, is compelled to reside there in person.\n\nBut to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,\nhave risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,\nand such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not\ndiscuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet\nhe ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy\nto speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have\nacquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their\nparticular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be\nfound inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.\nAnd in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed\nanything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material\nto mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that\nopportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and\nwithout those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.\n\nIt was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of\nIsrael in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that\nthey should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of\nbondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and\nthat he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should\nbecome King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary\nthat Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of\nthe Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.\nTheseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians\ndispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,\nand their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity\nwhereby their country was ennobled and made famous.\n\nThose who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a\nprincipality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The\ndifficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules\nand methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their\ngovernment and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there\nis nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or\nmore uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the\nintroduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for\nenemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and\nlukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This\ncoolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on\ntheir side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily\nbelieve in new things until they have had a long experience of them.\nThus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the\nopportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others\ndefend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along\nwith them.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter\nthoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves\nor have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate\ntheir enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In\nthe first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass\nanything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they\nare rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have\nconquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the\nreasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it\nis easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that\npersuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when\nthey believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by\nforce.\n\nIf Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not\nhave enforced their constitutions for long\u2014as happened in our time to\nFra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things\nimmediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no\nmeans of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the\nunbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties\nin consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the\nascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are\novercome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,\nthey will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards\npowerful, secure, honoured, and happy.\n\nTo these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some\nresemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like\nkind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private\nstation to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to\nfortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him\nfor their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their\nprince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one\nwho writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.\nThis man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old\nalliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on\nsuch foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had\nendured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.\n\n [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\nCONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF\nOTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE\n\n\nThose who solely by good fortune become princes from being private\ncitizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they\nhave not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they\nhave many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state\nis given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as\nhappened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the\nHellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might\nhold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those\nemperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens\ncame to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the\nfortune of him who has elevated them\u2014two most inconstant and unstable\nthings. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;\nbecause, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not\nreasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having\nalways lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it\nbecause they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.\n\nStates that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature\nwhich are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and\ncorrespondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not\noverthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become\nprinces are men of so much ability that they know they have to be\nprepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,\nand that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became\nprinces, they must lay _afterwards_.\n\n [1] \u201cLe radici e corrispondenze,\u201d their roots (i.e. foundations) and\n correspondencies or relations with other states\u2014a common meaning of\n \u201ccorrespondence\u201d and \u201ccorrespondency\u201d in the sixteenth and seventeenth\n centuries.\n\nConcerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or\nfortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and\nthese are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper\nmeans and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be\nDuke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties\nhe kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called\nby the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy\nof his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he\nhad taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise\nand able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and\nfortunes of others had bestowed on him.\n\n [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria\n Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,\n on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli\n was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia\n (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations\n of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to\n his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years\n before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his\n \u201cDescritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare\n Vitellozzo Vitelli,\u201d etc., a translation of which is appended to the\n present work.\n\nBecause, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations\nmay be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be\nlaid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,\ntherefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be\nseen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not\nconsider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what\nbetter precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;\nand if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but\nthe extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.\n\nAlexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had\nmany immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see\nhis way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the\nChurch; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke\nof Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini\nwere already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he\nsaw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been\nassisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,\nnamely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved\nhim, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,\nso as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was\neasy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other\nreasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not\nonly not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving\nthe former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy\nwith the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He\nwas no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the\nattempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the\nking. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the\nColonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was\nhindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to\nhim, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that\nthe forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,\nthat not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might\nthemselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the\nsame. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and\nattacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And\nas to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the\nDuchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from\nthat undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the\narms and the luck of others.\n\nFor the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in\nRome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,\nmaking them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to\ntheir rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that\nin a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned\nentirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the\nOrsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came\nto him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length\nthat the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,\ncalled a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the\nrebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless\ndangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the\nFrench. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by\ntrusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse\nto his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the\nmediation of Signor Pagolo\u2014whom the duke did not fail to secure with\nall kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses\u2014the\nOrsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his\npower at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned\ntheir partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good\nfoundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of\nUrbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he\ngained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,\nand to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.\n\n [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.\n\nWhen the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak\nmasters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave\nthem more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was\nfull of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing\nto bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it\nnecessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer\nRamiro d\u2019Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest\npower. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the\ngreatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not\nadvisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but\nthat he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the\ncountry, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their\nadvocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some\nhatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the\npeople, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if\nany cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in\nthe natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took\nRamiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the\npiazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The\nbarbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied\nand dismayed.\n\n [4] Ramiro d\u2019Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.\n\nBut let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding\nhimself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate\ndangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great\nmeasure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if\nhe wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,\nfor he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would\nnot support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and\nto temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards\nthe kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.\nIt was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would\nhave quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.\n\nSuch was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future\nhe had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church\nmight not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which\nAlexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by\nexterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as\nto take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to\nhimself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope\nwith their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the\ncollege more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before\nthe Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first\nshock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had\naccomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords\nas he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the\nRoman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And\nas to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,\nfor he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his\nprotection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French\nwere already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and\nin this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down\nupon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through\nhatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines\nwould have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was\nprospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much\npower and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer\nhave depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his\nown power and ability.\n\nBut Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He\nleft the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the\nrest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick\nunto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and\nhe knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the\nfoundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not\nhad those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he\nwould have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his\nfoundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a\nmonth. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst\nthe Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they\ncould not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope\nhim whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not\nhave been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of\nAlexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day\nthat Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought\nof everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had\nprovided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,\nwhen the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.\n\n [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.\n\n [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad\n Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.\n\nWhen all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to\nblame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to\noffer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of\nothers, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and\nfar-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and\nonly the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness\nfrustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to\nsecure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome\neither by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the\npeople, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate\nthose who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of\nthings for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to\ndestroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship\nwith kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal\nand offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the\nactions of this man.\n\nOnly can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he\nmade a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope\nto his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected\nPope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any\ncardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they\nbecame pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom\nhe had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,\nSan Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear\nhim, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their\nrelationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the\nkingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above\neverything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,\nfailing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad\nVincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages\nto forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his\nchoice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.\n\n [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\nCONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS\n\n\nAlthough a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither\nof which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is\nmanifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be\nmore copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are\nwhen, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the\nprincipality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private\nperson becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first\nmethod, it will be illustrated by two examples\u2014one ancient, the other\nmodern\u2014and without entering further into the subject, I consider these\ntwo examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.\n\nAgathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a\nprivate but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a\npotter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous\nlife. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of\nmind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,\nhe rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established\nin that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself\nprince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that\nwhich had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding\nfor this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,\nwas fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the\nsenate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating\nto the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the\nsenators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held\nthe princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he\nwas twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not\nonly was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for\nits defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time\nraised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme\nnecessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,\nleaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.\n\n [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.\n\nTherefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will\nsee nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as\nhe attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any\none, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were\ngained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly\nheld by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent\nto slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,\nwithout mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not\nglory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and\nextricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his\ngreatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be\nseen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.\nNevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite\nwickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent\nmen. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.\n\nIn our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da\nFermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by\nhis maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his\nyouth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his\ndiscipline, he might attain some high position in the military\nprofession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,\nand in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body\nand mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a\npaltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some\ncitizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than\nits liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So\nhe wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many\nyears, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look\nupon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire\nanything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he\nhad not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would\nbe accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and\nhe entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably\nby the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also\nto that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.\n\nGiovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,\nand he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he\nlodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having\narranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a\nsolemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of\nFermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual\nin such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave\ndiscourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son\nCesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and\nothers answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to\nbe discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a\nchamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after\nhim. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places\nand slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,\nmounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief\nmagistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to\nobey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the\nprince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and\nstrengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a\nway that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only\nwas he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all\nhis neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as\nthat of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by\nCesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,\nas was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this\nparricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made\nhis leader in valour and wickedness.\n\nSome may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after\ninfinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his\ncountry, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be\nconspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by\nmeans of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold\nthe state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this\nfollows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be\ncalled properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are\napplied at one blow and are necessary to one\u2019s security, and that are\nnot persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage\nof the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding\nthey may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than\ndecrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God\nor man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is\nimpossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.\n\n [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern\n equivalent of Machiavelli\u2019s thought when he speaks of \u201ccrudelta\u201d than\n the more obvious \u201ccruelties.\u201d\n\nHence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought\nto examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for\nhim to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to\nrepeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to\nreassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does\notherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to\nkeep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor\ncan they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and\nrepeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so\nthat, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given\nlittle by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.\n\nAnd above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such\na way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall\nmake him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled\ntimes, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help\nyou, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be\nunder any obligation to you for them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\nCONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY\n\n\nBut coming to the other point\u2014where a leading citizen becomes the\nprince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,\nbut by the favour of his fellow citizens\u2014this may be called a civil\nprincipality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain\nto it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a\nprincipality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the\nfavour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties\nare found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be\nruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and\noppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in\ncities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or\nanarchy.\n\nA principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,\naccordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the\nnobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the\nreputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that\nunder his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,\nfinding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of\none of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his\nauthority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles\nmaintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the\naid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around\nhim who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can\nneither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches\nsovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around\nhim, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.\n\nBesides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,\nsatisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is\nmore righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,\nwhile the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added\nalso that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,\nbecause of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure\nhimself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect\nfrom a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile\nnobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will\nrise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and\nastute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain\nfavours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is\ncompelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well\nwithout the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and\nto give or take away authority when it pleases him.\n\nTherefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to\nbe looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape\ntheir course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or\nthey do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought\nto be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt\nwith in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a\nnatural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,\nespecially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in\nprosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.\nBut when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it\nis a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,\nand a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they\nwere open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.\n\nTherefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people\nought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only\nask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the\npeople, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above\neverything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may\neasily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they\nreceive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more\nclosely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more\ndevoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their\nfavours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as\nthese vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,\nso I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the\npeople friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.\n\nNabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,\nand of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his\ncountry and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was\nonly necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this\nwould not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not\nlet any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that \u201cHe who\nbuilds on the people, builds on the mud,\u201d for this is true when a\nprivate citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that\nthe people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the\nmagistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as\nhappened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in\nFlorence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,\nwho can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who\ndoes not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and\nenergy, keeps the whole people encouraged\u2014such a one will never find\nhimself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his\nfoundations well.\n\n [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus\n in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.\n\n [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli\u2019s\n \u201cFlorentine History,\u201d Book III.\n\nThese principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from\nthe civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either\nrule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their\ngovernment is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on\nthe goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and\nwho, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with\ngreat ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not\nthe chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the\ncitizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,\nare not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will\nalways be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For\nsuch a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when\ncitizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with\nhim; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to\ndie for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its\ncitizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this\nexperiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore\na wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will\nalways in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state\nand of him, and then he will always find them faithful.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\nCONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO\nBE MEASURED\n\n\nIt is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of\nthese principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in\ncase of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether\nhe has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite\nclear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by\ntheir own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise\na sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack\nthem; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot\nshow themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to\ndefend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been\ndiscussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second\ncase one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision\nand fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.\nAnd whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the\nother concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often\nrepeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are\nalways adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it\nwill be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town\nwell fortified, and is not hated by his people.\n\nThe cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country\naround them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits\nthem, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,\nbecause they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the\ntaking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they\nhave proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they\nalways keep in public depots enough for one year\u2019s eating, drinking,\nand firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss\nto the state, they always have the means of giving work to the\ncommunity in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,\nand on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold\nmilitary exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to\nuphold them.\n\nTherefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself\nodious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only\nbe driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this\nworld are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a\nwhole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever\nshould reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it\nburnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and\nself-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that\na powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by\ngiving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for\nlong, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving\nhimself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.\n\nFurther, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin\nthe country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot\nand ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the\nprince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the\ndamage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer\nany remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with\ntheir prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that\ntheir houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his\ndefence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they\nconfer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is\nwell considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the\nminds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not\nfail to support and defend them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\nCONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\n\n\nIt only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching\nwhich all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they\nare acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held\nwithout either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of\nreligion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the\nprincipalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.\nThese princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have\nsubjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are\nnot taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,\nand they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate\nthemselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being\nupheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak\nno more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would\nbe the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.\n\nNevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church\nhas attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from\nAlexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have\nbeen called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)\nhave valued the temporal power very slightly\u2014yet now a king of France\ntrembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and\nto ruin the Venetians\u2014although this may be very manifest, it does not\nappear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.\n\nBefore Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was\nunder the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the\nDuke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal\nanxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;\nthe other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those\nabout whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.\nTo restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as\nit was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made\nuse of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini\nand Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with\narms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate\nweak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a\ncourageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could\nrid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a\ncause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a\npope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to\nspeak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would\narise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet\nwould not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the\ntemporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.\n\n [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.\n\nAlexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have\never been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to\nprevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by\nreason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things\nwhich I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although\nhis intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,\nnevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,\nwhich, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all\nhis labours.\n\nPope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all\nthe Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the\nchastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the\nway open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been\npractised before Alexander\u2019s time. Such things Julius not only\nfollowed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin\nthe Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these\nenterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,\ninasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any\nprivate person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within\nthe bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them\nsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:\nthe one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and\nthe other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused\nthe disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their\ncardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster\nthe factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to\nsupport them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders\nand tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope\nLeo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,\nif others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more\nvenerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.\n\n [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de\u2019 Medici.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\nHOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES\n\n\nHaving discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such\nprincipalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having\nconsidered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and\nhaving shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and\nto hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of\noffence and defence which belong to each of them.\n\nWe have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his\nfoundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to\nruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or\ncomposite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good\nlaws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are\nwell armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the\ndiscussion and shall speak of the arms.\n\nI say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state\nare either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.\nMercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds\nhis state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for\nthey are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,\nvaliant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the\nfear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so\nlong as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war\nby the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for\nkeeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to\nmake them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your\nsoldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take\nthemselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble\nto prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by\nresting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they\nformerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet\nwhen the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that\nCharles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in\nhand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the\ntruth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have\nrelated. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who\nhave also suffered the penalty.\n\n [1] \u201cWith chalk in hand,\u201d \u201ccol gesso.\u201d This is one of the _bons mots_\n of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized\n Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his\n quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the\n country. _Cf_. \u201cThe History of Henry VII,\u201d by Lord Bacon: \u201cKing\n Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a\n kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy\n without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont\n to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,\n to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.\u201d\n\nI wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The\nmercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,\nyou cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own\ngreatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others\ncontrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are\nruined in the usual way.\n\nAnd if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,\nwhether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted\nto, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in\nperson and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its\ncitizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it\nought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so\nthat he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes\nand republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and\nmercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to\nbring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its\ncitizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and\nSparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely\narmed and quite free.\n\nOf ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who\nwere oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the\nRomans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.\nAfter the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of\ntheir soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their\nliberty.\n\nDuke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against\nthe Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]\nallied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His\nfather, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left\nher unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms\nof the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the\nVenetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these\narms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have\ndefended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been\nfavoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have\nstood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and\nothers have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer\nwas Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot\nbe proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the\nFlorentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the\nBracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco\nturned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the\nkingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while\nago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most\nprudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest\nrenown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have\nbeen proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became\nthe soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if\nthey held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their\nachievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and\ngloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed\ngentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned\nto enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they\nforsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the\nbeginning of their expansion on land, through not having much\nterritory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to\nfear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under\nCarmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him\na most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),\nand, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they\nfeared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they\nwere not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to\nlose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order\nto secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their\ncaptains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of\nPitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not\ngain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost\nthat which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much\ntrouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed\nand inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.\n\n [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.\n\n [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.\n\n [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John\n Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by\n Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into\n Italy. These became the famous \u201cWhite Company.\u201d He took part in many\n wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible\n Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of\n Bernabo Visconti.\n\n [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,\n executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.\n\n [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San\n Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,\n in 1487. \u201cPrimo capitano in Italia.\u201d\u2014Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;\n Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.\n\n [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.\n\nAnd as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled\nfor many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,\nin order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better\nprepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has\nrecently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired\nmore temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more\nstates, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms\nagainst their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were\noppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain\nauthority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became\nprinces. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the\nhands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of\npriests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both\ncommenced to enlist foreigners.\n\nThe first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8]\nthe Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,\nBraccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After\nthese came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms\nof Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been\noverrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted\nby the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to\nlower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own.\nThey did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,\nthey were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not\ngive them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a\nmoderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs\nwere brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand\nsoldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They\nhad, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to\nthemselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking\nprisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at\nnight, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night;\nthey did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did\nthey campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their\nmilitary rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both\nfatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and\ncontempt.\n\n [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in\n Romagna. He was the leader of the famous \u201cCompany of St George,\u201d\n composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\nCONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE\u2019S OWN\n\n\nAuxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a\nprince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by\nPope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise\nagainst Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to\nauxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his\nassistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in\nthemselves, but for him who calls them in they are always\ndisadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their\ncaptive.\n\n [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),\n surnamed \u201cThe Catholic,\u201d born 1452, died 1516.\n\nAnd although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish\nto leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which\ncannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw\nhimself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune\nbrought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his\nrash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the\nSwitzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all\nexpectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not\nbecome prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his\nauxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.\n\nThe Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand\nFrenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other\ntime of their troubles.\n\nThe Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten\nthousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not\nwilling to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to\nthe infidels.\n\n [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.\n\nTherefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,\nfor they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them\nthe ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to\nothers; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and\nbetter opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one\ncommunity, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you\nhave made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough\nauthority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most\ndangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has\nalways avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing\nrather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming\nthat a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.\n\nI shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke\nentered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French\nsoldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,\nsuch forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,\ndiscerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;\nwhom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and\ndangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference\nbetween one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one\nconsiders the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when\nhe had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he\nrelied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and\nfound it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when\nevery one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.\n\nI was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am\nunwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I\nhave named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by\nthe Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted\nlike our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him\nthat he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to\npieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with\naliens.\n\nI wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament\napplicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with\nGoliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed\nhim with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them\non his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to\nmeet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of\nothers either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind\nyou fast.\n\nCharles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]\nhaving by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,\nrecognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he\nestablished in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and\ninfantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and\nbegan to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as\nis now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised\nthe reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of\nhis own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his\nmen-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so\naccustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they\ncan now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot\nstand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come\noff well against others. The armies of the French have thus become\nmixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms\ntogether are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone,\nbut much inferior to one\u2019s own forces. And this example proves it, for\nthe kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of\nCharles had been enlarged or maintained.\n\n [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed \u201cThe Victorious,\u201d born 1403, died\n 1461.\n\n [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.\n\nBut the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks\nwell at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I\nhave said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a\nprincipality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not\ntruly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster\nto the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have\ncommenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time\nthe vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour\nwhich had raised it passed away to others.\n\n [5] \u201cMany speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the\n reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of\n the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence.\n When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank\n under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was\n \u2018wholly unhistorical.\u2019 He might well have added that the Roman power\n was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to\n fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this\n obligation was no longer recognised.\u201d\u2014_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May\n 1906.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having\nits own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good\nfortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And\nit has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing\ncan be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own\nstrength. And one\u2019s own forces are those which are composed either of\nsubjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or\nauxiliaries. And the way to make ready one\u2019s own forces will be easily\nfound if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one\nwill consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many\nrepublics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which\nrules I entirely commit myself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\nTHAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR\n\n\nA prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything\nelse for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is\nthe sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force\nthat it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often\nenables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the\ncontrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than\nof arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing\nit is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is\nto be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from\na private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding\nthe hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons.\nFor among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to\nbe despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince\nought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing\nproportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not\nreasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him\nwho is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed\nservants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other\nsuspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And\ntherefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and\nabove the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by\nhis soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to\nhave out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should\naddict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two\nways, the one by action, the other by study.\n\nAs regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well\norganized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he\naccustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of\nlocalities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the\nvalleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of\nrivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which\nknowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his\ncountry, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by\nmeans of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands\nwith ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study\nhereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and\nmarshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance\nto those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of\none country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the\nprince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable\nthat a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his\nenemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to\nbesiege towns to advantage.\n\nPhilopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which\nwriters have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he\nnever had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in\nthe country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: \u201cIf\nthe enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here\nwith our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best\nadvance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,\nhow ought we to pursue?\u201d And he would set forth to them, as he went,\nall the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their\nopinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these\ncontinual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any\nunexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.\n\n [1] Philopoemen, \u201cthe last of the Greeks,\u201d born 252 B.C., died 183\n B.C.\n\nBut to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and\nstudy there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne\nthemselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,\nso as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as\nan illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been\npraised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he\nalways kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated\nAchilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of\nCyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of\nScipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,\naffability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things\nwhich have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to\nobserve some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but\nincrease his resources with industry in such a way that they may be\navailable to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find\nhim prepared to resist her blows.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\nCONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR\nBLAMED\n\n\nIt remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a\nprince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have\nwritten on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in\nmentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from\nthe methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a\nthing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me\nmore appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the\nimagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities\nwhich in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is\nso far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is\ndone for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his\npreservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his\nprofessions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much\nthat is evil.\n\nHence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how\nto do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.\nTherefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,\nand discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are\nspoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are\nremarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or\npraise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly,\nusing a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is\nstill he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly\nwho deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed\ngenerous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless,\nanother faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave;\none affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one\nsincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another\nfrivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know\nthat every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a\nprince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but\nbecause they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human\nconditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently\nprudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which\nwould lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,\nfrom those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he\nmay with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need\nnot make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without\nwhich the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is\nconsidered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like\nvirtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which\nlooks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\nCONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS\n\n\nCommencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I\nsay that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,\nliberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation\nfor it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should\nbe exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the\nreproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among\nmen the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of\nmagnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts\nall his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to\nmaintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax\nthem, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him\nodious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by\nany one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded\nfew, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by\nwhatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing\nto draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being\nmiserly.\n\nTherefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of\nliberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if\nhe is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in\ntime he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that\nwith his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself\nagainst all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without\nburdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises\nliberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,\nand meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.\n\nWe have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have\nbeen considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was\nassisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he\ndid not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King\nof France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax\non his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his\nlong thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken\nor conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A\nprince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that\nhe can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he\nis not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a\nreputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will\nenable him to govern.\n\nAnd if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and\nmany others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,\nand by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,\nor in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is\ndangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;\nand Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;\nbut if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his\nexpenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should\nreply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,\nwho have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends\nthat which is his own or his subjects\u2019 or else that of others. In the\nfirst case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to\nneglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes\nforth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion,\nhandling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary,\notherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is\nneither yours nor your subjects\u2019 you can be a ready giver, as were\nCyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your\nreputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only\nsquandering your own that injures you.\n\nAnd there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst\nyou exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor\nor despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a\nprince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised\nand hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to\nhave a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,\nthan to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to\nincur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\nCONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED\nTHAN FEARED\n\n\nComing now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every\nprince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.\nNevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare\nBorgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled\nthe Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if\nthis be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more\nmerciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for\ncruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so\nlong as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the\nreproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more\nmerciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to\narise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to\ninjure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a\nprince offend the individual only.\n\n [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi\n factions in 1502 and 1503.\n\nAnd of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the\nimputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence\nVirgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign\nowing to its being new, saying:\n\n\u201cRes dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt\nMoliri, et late fines custode tueri.\u201d[2]\n\nNevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he\nhimself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and\nhumanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and\ntoo much distrust render him intolerable.\n\n [2] . . . against my will, my fate\nA throne unsettled, and an infant state,\nBid me defend my realms with all my pow\u2019rs,\nAnd guard with these severities my shores.\n\nChristopher Pitt.\n\nUpon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than\nfeared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to\nbe both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it\nis much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be\ndispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that\nthey are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as\nyou succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,\nproperty, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far\ndistant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince\nwho, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other\nprecautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by\npayments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be\nearned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied\nupon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than\none who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation\nwhich, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for\ntheir advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which\nnever fails.\n\nNevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he\ndoes not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well\nbeing feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he\nabstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their\nwomen. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of\nsomeone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,\nbut above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,\nbecause men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss\nof their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are\nnever wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always\nfind pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for\ntaking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner\nlapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a\nmultitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard\nthe reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army\nunited or disposed to its duties.\n\nAmong the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that\nhaving led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to\nfight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or\nagainst the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This\narose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his\nboundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his\nsoldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not\nsufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his\ndeeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal\ncause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been\nsufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most\nexcellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,\nagainst whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from\nnothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more\nlicense than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was\nupbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of\nthe Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,\nyet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate\npunished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in\nthe Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew\nmuch better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This\ndisposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have\ndestroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the\ncontrol of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed\nitself, but contributed to his glory.\n\nReturning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the\nconclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing\naccording to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself\non that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must\nendeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.[1]\nCONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH\n\n\n [1] \u201cThe present chapter has given greater offence than any other\n portion of Machiavelli\u2019s writings.\u201d Burd, \u201cIl Principe,\u201d p. 297.\n\nEvery one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and\nto live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience\nhas been that those princes who have done great things have held good\nfaith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect\nof men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on\ntheir word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one\nby the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the\nsecond to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient,\nit is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is\nnecessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast\nand the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient\nwriters, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were\ngiven to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his\ndiscipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who\nwas half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know\nhow to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not\ndurable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the\nbeast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot\ndefend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against\nwolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares\nand a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do\nnot understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor\nought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him,\nand when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If\nmen were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they\nare bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to\nobserve it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince\nlegitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless\nmodern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and\nengagements have been made void and of no effect through the\nfaithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the\nfox has succeeded best.\n\n [2] \u201cContesting,\u201d _i.e_. \u201cstriving for mastery.\u201d Mr Burd points out\n that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero\u2019s \u201cDe Officiis\u201d:\n \u201cNam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum\n per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum\n est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.\u201d\n\nBut it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,\nand to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and\nso subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will\nalways find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent\nexample I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing\nelse but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he\nalways found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power\nin asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would\nobserve it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to\nhis wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind.\n\n [3] \u201cNondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).\u201d The\n words \u201cad votum\u201d are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.\n\nAlexander never did what he said,\nCesare never said what he did.\n\nItalian Proverb.\n\nTherefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities\nI have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And\nI shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe\nthem is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear\nmerciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with\na mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able\nand know how to change to the opposite.\n\nAnd you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,\ncannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often\nforced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4]\nfriendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him\nto have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and\nvariations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to\ndiverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then\nto know how to set about it.\n\n [4] \u201cContrary to fidelity\u201d or \u201cfaith,\u201d \u201ccontro alla fede,\u201d and \u201ctutto\n fede,\u201d \u201caltogether faithful,\u201d in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy\n that these two phrases, \u201ccontro alla fede\u201d and \u201ctutto fede,\u201d were\n omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction\n of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the\n word \u201cfede\u201d was \u201cthe faith,\u201d _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as\n rendered here \u201cfidelity\u201d and \u201cfaithful.\u201d Observe that the word\n \u201creligione\u201d was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being\n used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness \u201cthe\n religion,\u201d a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot\n heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this\n passage as follows: \u201cThat great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,\n Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political\n scheme: \u2018That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but\n the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.\u2019\u201d\n\nFor this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything\nslip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five\nqualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether\nmerciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing\nmore necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as\nmen judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it\nbelongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you.\nEvery one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and\nthose few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who\nhave the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all\nmen, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge,\none judges by the result.\n\nFor that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding\nhis state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be\npraised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a\nthing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are\nonly the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have\nno ground to rest on.\n\nOne prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never\npreaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most\nhostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of\nreputation and kingdom many a time.\n\n [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. \u201cWhen Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it\n would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand\u2019s name here\n without giving offence.\u201d Burd\u2019s \u201cIl Principe,\u201d p. 308.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\nTHAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\n\n\nNow, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I\nhave spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss\nbriefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has\nbeen in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him\nhated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will\nhave fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other\nreproaches.\n\nIt makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,\nand to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from\nboth of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor\ntheir honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has\nonly to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease\nin many ways.\n\nIt makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,\neffeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince\nshould guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in\nhis actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his\nprivate dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are\nirrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can\nhope either to deceive him or to get round him.\n\nThat prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,\nand he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,\nprovided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by\nhis people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a\nprince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his\nsubjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From\nthe latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,\nand if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will\nalways remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they\nshould have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should\naffairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations\nand has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will\nresist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.\n\nBut concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has\nonly to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can\neasily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by\nkeeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for\nhim to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most\nefficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not\nto be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a\nprince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the\nconspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have\nthe courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a\nconspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the\nconspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires\ncannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he\nbelieves to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to\na malcontent you have given him the material with which to content\nhimself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so\nthat, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the\nother to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare\nfriend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith\nwith you.\n\nAnd, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side\nof the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of\npunishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the\nmajesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and\nthe state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the\npopular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to\nconspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the\nexecution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to\nthe crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and\nthus cannot hope for any escape.\n\nEndless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content\nwith one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer\nAnnibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the\npresent Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had\nconspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer\nGiovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination\nthe people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the\npopular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in\nBologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after\nthe death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese,\nhaving information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in\nFlorence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a\nblacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of\ntheir city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due\ncourse to the government.\n\n [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He\n ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli\u2019s strong condemnation of\n conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience\n (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his\n alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.\n\nFor this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies\nof little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is\nhostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear\neverything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have\ntaken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep\nthe people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most\nimportant objects a prince can have.\n\nAmong the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,\nand in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty\nand security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its\nauthority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of\nthe nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths\nwould be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the\nhatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to\nprotect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care\nof the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be\nliable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people\nfor favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who\ncould beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the\nking. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or\na greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can\ndraw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs\nof reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in\ntheir own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish\nthe nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.\n\nIt may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths\nof the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to\nmy opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great\nqualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have\nbeen killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,\ntherefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of\nsome of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were\nnot different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only\nsubmit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who\nstudies the affairs of those times.\n\nIt seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to\nthe empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were\nMarcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son\nAntoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.\n\nThere is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the\nambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be\ncontended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to\nput up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so\nbeset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard\nthing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the\npeople loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring\nprince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,\ncruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should\nexercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give\nvent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors\nwere always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great\nauthority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the\nprincipality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,\nwere inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about\ninjuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes\ncannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to\navoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they\nought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the\nmost powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had\nneed of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the\npeople; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,\naccordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.\n\nFrom these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being\nall men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,\nand benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died\nhonoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,\nand owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,\nbeing possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always\nkept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated\nnor despised.\n\nBut Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,\nwho, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not\nendure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,\nhaving given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt\nfor his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his\nadministration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as\nmuch by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a\nprince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for\nwhen that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain\nyourself\u2014it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles\u2014you\nhave to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works\nwill do you harm.\n\nBut let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,\nthat among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in\nthe fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by\nhim unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who\nallowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the\narmy conspired against him, and murdered him.\n\nTurning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus\nCaracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and\nrapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to\ncommit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except\nSeverus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour\nthat, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed\nby him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much\nadmired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were\nkept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and\nsatisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were\ngreat, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the\nfox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a\nprince to imitate.\n\nKnowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in\nSclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to\nRome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the\npraetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to\naspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy\nbefore it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the\nSenate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this\nthere remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the\nwhole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the\nAsiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in\nthe west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he\nconsidered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided\nto attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that,\nbeing elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that\ndignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that\nthe Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted\nby Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger,\nand settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the\nSenate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had\nreceived from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this\ningratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him\nout in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will,\ntherefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a\nmost valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and\nrespected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be\nwondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well,\nbecause his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which\nthe people might have conceived against him for his violence.\n\nBut his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent\nqualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and\nacceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of\nfatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which\ncaused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and\ncruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single\nmurders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those\nof Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by\nthose he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the\nmidst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that\nsuch-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and\ndesperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who\ndoes not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the\nless because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do\nany grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the\nservice of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had\ncontumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily\nthreatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was\na rash thing to do, and proved the emperor\u2019s ruin.\n\nBut let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to\nhold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and\nhe had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his\npeople and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave\nhimself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he\nmight indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not\nmaintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete\nwith gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the\nimperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being\nhated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against\nand was killed.\n\nIt remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike\nman, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,\nof whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the\nthrone. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated\nand despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought\nhim into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great\nindignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to\nhis dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the\nimperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity\nby having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,\npractised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at\nthe meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa\nrebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy\nconspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,\nbesieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were\ndisgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so\nmany against him, murdered him.\n\nI do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being\nthoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this\ndiscourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this\ndifficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far\nless degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some\nindulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that\nare veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were\nthe armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary\nto give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more\nnecessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy\nthe people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more\npowerful.\n\nFrom the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him\ntwelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend\nthe security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,\nputting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them\nhis friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in\nthe hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the\npeople, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state\nof the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that\nit is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an\nhereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old\nprince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by\nthose who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this\nbeing an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,\nbecause there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in\nnew ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state\nis old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its\nhereditary lord.\n\nBut returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will\nconsider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been\nfatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how\nit happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in\nanother, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to\nunhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for\nPertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was\nheir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly\ndestructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated\nSeverus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in\nhis footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot\nimitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow\nthose of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which\nare necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are\nproper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and\nfirm.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\nARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,\nADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?\n\n\n1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their\nsubjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;\nothers have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid\nthemselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning\nof their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown\nand destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on\nall of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those\nstates in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as\ncomprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.\n\n2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather\nwhen he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by\narming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted\nbecome faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your\nsubjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be\narmed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be\nhandled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they\nquite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,\nconsidering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and\nservice should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm\nthem, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either\nfor cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions\nbreeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it\nfollows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character\nalready shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient\nto defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.\nTherefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has\nalways distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a\nprince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old\none, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those\nwho have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time\nand opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters\nshould be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state\nshall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.\n\n3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed\nto say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by\nfortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their\ntributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This\nmay have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way\nbalanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for\nto-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;\nrather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided\ncities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always\nassist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The\nVenetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the\nGuelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although\nthey never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these\ndisputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their\ndifferences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not\nafterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one\nparty at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,\ntherefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be\npermitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the\nmore easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but\nif war comes this policy proves fallacious.\n\n4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the\ndifficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore\nfortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who\nhas a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes\nenemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may\nhave the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,\nas by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many\nconsider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with\ncraft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed\nit, his renown may rise higher.\n\n5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and\nassistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were\ndistrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo\nPetrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been\ndistrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak\ngenerally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say\nthis, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been\nhostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support\nthemselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they\nwill be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as\nthey know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad\nimpression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always\nextracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too\nmuch security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands\nit, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours\nhas acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which\ninduced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural\naffection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then\nhe will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for\nit will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons\nfor this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern\naffairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends\nof those men who were contented under the former government, and are\ntherefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it,\nwere favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.\n\n6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states\nmore securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit\nto those who might design to work against them, and as a place of\nrefuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been\nmade use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in\nour times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello\nso that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on\nreturning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,\nrazed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and\nconsidered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the\nBentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,\ntherefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you\ngood in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be\nreasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than\nfrom foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear\nfrom foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The\ncastle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,\nmore trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the\nstate. For this reason the best possible fortress is\u2014not to be hated by\nthe people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they\nwill not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be\nwanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.\nIt has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use\nto any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count\nGirolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to\nwithstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and\nthus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that\ntime that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses\nwere of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her,\nand when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore,\nit would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have\nbeen hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these\nthings considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as\nwell as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,\ncares little about being hated by the people.\n\n [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia\n Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that\n Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the\n countess announces the appointment: \u201cI have been with the signori,\u201d\n wrote Fortunati, \u201cto learn whom they would send and when. They tell me\n that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary\n to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.\u201d _Cf_. \u201cCatherine\n Sforza,\u201d by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\nHOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN\n\n\nNothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and\nsetting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the\npresent King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he\nhas risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be\nthe foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds\nyou will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the\nbeginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the\nfoundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without\nany fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile\noccupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;\nthus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power\nand authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and\nof the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the\nfoundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.\nFurther, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater\nschemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and\nclearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable\nexample, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,\nhe came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his\nachievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the\nminds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the\nissue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of\nthe other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against\nhim.\n\nAgain, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal\naffairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da\nMilano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life\ndoing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some\nmethod of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about.\nAnd a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action\nto gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.\n\nA prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a\ndownright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he\ndeclares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course\nwill always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two\nof your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character\nthat, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In\neither case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare\nyourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if\nyou do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the\nconqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been\nconquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to\nprotect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want\ndoubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who\nloses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in\nhand, court his fate.\n\nAntiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the \u00c6tolians to drive out\nthe Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the\nRomans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the\nRomans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed\nin the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged\nthem to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: \u201cAs for that\nwhich has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your\nstate not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous;\nbecause by not interfering you will be left, without favour or\nconsideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.\u201d Thus it will always\nhappen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,\nwhilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with\narms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally\nfollow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince\ndeclares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with\nwhom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful\nand may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is\nestablished a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to\nbecome a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all\nare never so complete that the victor must not show some regard,\nespecially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you\nmay be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you\nbecome companions on a fortune that may rise again.\n\nIn the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that\nyou have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it\ngreater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of\none by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved\nhim; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with\nyour assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be\nnoted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with\none more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others,\nunless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers\nyou are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as\npossible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with\nFrance against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their\nruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as\nhappened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to\nattack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince\nought to favour one of the parties.\n\nNever let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe\ncourses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,\nbecause it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid\none trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in\nknowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to\ntake the lesser evil.\n\nA prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour\nthe proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his\ncitizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and\nagriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not\nbe deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken\naway from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but\nthe prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things\nand designs in any way to honour his city or state.\n\nFurther, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles\nat convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into\nguilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem,\nand associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of\ncourtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty\nof his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.\n\n [1] \u201cGuilds or societies,\u201d \u201cin arti o in tribu.\u201d \u201cArti\u201d were craft or\n trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: \u201cArte . . . a whole company of any trade\n in any city or corporation town.\u201d The guilds of Florence are most\n admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject\n (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called\n \u201cartel,\u201d exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace\u2019s\n \u201cRussia,\u201d ed. 1905: \u201cThe sons . . . were always during the working\n season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are\n artels of a much more complex kind\u2014 permanent associations, possessing\n large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the\n individual members.\u201d The word \u201cartel,\u201d despite its apparent\n similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with \u201cars\u201d\n or \u201carte.\u201d Its root is that of the verb \u201crotisya,\u201d to bind oneself by\n an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of\n \u201crota,\u201d which now signifies a \u201cregimental company.\u201d In both words the\n underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. \u201cTribu\u201d\n were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included\n individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words \u201csects\u201d or\n \u201cclans\u201d would be most appropriate.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\nCONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\n\n\nThe choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they\nare good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the\nfirst opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is\nby observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and\nfaithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to\nrecognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are\notherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error\nwhich he made was in choosing them.\n\nThere were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of\nPandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to\nbe a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there\nare three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;\nanother which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which\nneither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first\nis the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.\nTherefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the\nfirst rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know\ngood and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have\nthe initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his\nservant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the\nservant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.\n\nBut to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one\ntest which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his\nown interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in\neverything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you\never be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in\nhis hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,\nand never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not\nconcerned.\n\nOn the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study\nhim, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with\nhim the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he\ncannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,\nmany riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him\ndread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,\nare thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,\nthe end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\nHOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED\n\n\nI do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it\nis a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless\nthey are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of\nwhom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own\naffairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with\ndifficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they\nrun the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way\nof guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that\nto tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell\nyou the truth, respect for you abates.\n\nTherefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the\nwise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking\nthe truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,\nand of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and\nlisten to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With\nthese councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry\nhimself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more\nfreely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of\nthese, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be\nsteadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either\noverthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions\nthat he falls into contempt.\n\nI wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of\naffairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,\nsaid: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.\nThis arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the\nabove; for the emperor is a secretive man\u2014he does not communicate his\ndesigns to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in\ncarrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at\nonce obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being\npliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he\ndoes one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he\nwishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.\n\n [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman\n Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after\n her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian\n politics.\n\nA prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he\nwishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every\none from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to\nbe a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning\nthe things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any\nconsideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be\nfelt.\n\nAnd if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression\nof his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good\nadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,\nbecause this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not\nwise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has\nyielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very\nprudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would\nnot be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take\naway his state from him.\n\nBut if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more\nthan one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to\nunite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,\nand the prince will not know how to control them or to see through\nthem. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always\nprove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.\nTherefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they\ncome, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the\nprince from good counsels.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\nWHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\n\n\nThe previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince\nto appear well established, and render him at once more secure and\nfixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the\nactions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an\nhereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men\nand bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more\nby the present than by the past, and when they find the present good\nthey enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost\ndefence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will\nbe a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and\nadorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and\nwith a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a\nprince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.\n\nAnd if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in\nItaly in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and\nothers, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in\nregard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in\nthe next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the\npeople hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known\nhow to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that\nhave power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.\n\nPhilip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who\nwas conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the\ngreatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a\nwarlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles,\nhe sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the\nend he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the\nkingdom.\n\nTherefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their\nprincipalities after so many years\u2019 possession, but rather their own\nsloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a\nchange (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the\ncalm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they\nthought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that\nthe people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would\nrecall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very\nbad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would\nnever wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later\non to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does,\nit will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no\navail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,\ncertain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\nWHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER\n\n\nIt is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the\nopinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by\nfortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and\nthat no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us\nbelieve that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let\nchance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times\nbecause of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may\nstill be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes\npondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.\nNevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true\nthat Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she\nstill leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.\n\n [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: \u201cThe older one gets the\n more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does\n three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.\u201d Sorel\u2019s\n \u201cEastern Question.\u201d\n\nI compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood\noverflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away\nthe soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to\nits violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,\nthough its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when\nthe weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences\nand barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass\naway by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so\ndangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour\nhas not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where\nshe knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain\nher.\n\nAnd if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and\nwhich has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open\ncountry without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been\ndefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either\nthis invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it\nwould not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say\nconcerning resistance to fortune in general.\n\nBut confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be\nseen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change\nof disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from\ncauses that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the\nprince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I\nbelieve also that he will be successful who directs his actions\naccording to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not\naccord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in\naffairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,\nglory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,\nanother with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,\nanother by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by\na different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain\nhis end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different\nobservances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other\nimpetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they\nconform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from\nwhat I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same\neffect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the\nother does not.\n\nChanges in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs\nhimself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a\nway that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if\ntimes and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course\nof action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to\nknow how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot\ndeviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having\nalways prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it\nis well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time\nto turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined;\nbut had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have\nchanged.\n\nPope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and\nfound the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of\naction that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise\nagainst Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The\nVenetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he\nhad the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France;\nnevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his\naccustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the\nVenetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the\nformer from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand,\nhe drew after him the King of France, because that king, having\nobserved the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as\nto humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore\nJulius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff\nwith simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome\nuntil he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed,\nas any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.\nBecause the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the\nothers would have raised a thousand fears.\n\nI will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they\nall succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience\nthe contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go\ncautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have\ndeviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.\n\nI conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind\nsteadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are\nsuccessful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider\nthat it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a\nwoman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and\nill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by\nthe adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She\nis, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they\nare less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\nAN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\n\n\nHaving carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and\nwondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a\nnew prince, and whether there were elements that would give an\nopportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of\nthings which would do honour to him and good to the people of this\ncountry, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new\nprince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.\n\nAnd if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be\ncaptive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians\nshould be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the\nsoul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate\nthe capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to\ndiscover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy\nshould be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should\nbe more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,\nmore scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,\ndespoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.\n\nAlthough lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us\nthink he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was\nafterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected\nhim; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet\nheal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of\nLombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,\nand cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she\nentreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs\nand barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and\nwilling to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.\n\nNor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope\nthan in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune,\nfavoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and\nwhich could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be\ndifficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the\nmen I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet\nthey were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the\npresent offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier\nthan this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.\n\n [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.\n In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.\n\nWith us there is great justice, because that war is just which is\nnecessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in\nthem. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness\nis great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those\nmen to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how\nextraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:\nthe sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth\nwater, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your\ngreatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do\neverything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory\nwhich belongs to us.\n\nAnd it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians\nhave been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious\nhouse; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many\ncampaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted,\nthis has happened because the old order of things was not good, and\nnone of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man\nmore than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was\nnewly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will\nmake him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting\nopportunities to bring such into use in every form.\n\nHere there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.\nLook attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how\nsuperior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But\nwhen it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs\nentirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are\ncapable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there\nhaving never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by\nvalour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for\nso long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years,\nwhenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a\npoor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,\nafterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2]\n\n [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501;\n Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.\n\nIf, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable\nmen who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,\nas a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own\nforces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better\nsoldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be\nmuch better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,\nhonoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is\nnecessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended\nagainst foreigners by Italian valour.\n\nAnd although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very\nformidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which\na third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be\nrelied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry,\nand the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in\nclose combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the\nSpaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are\noverthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this\nlatter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at\nthe battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by\nGerman battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the\nSpaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in\nunder the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack,\nwhile the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed\nup, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore,\nknowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one,\nwhich will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not\ncreate a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are\nthe kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new\nprince.\n\nThis opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for\nletting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the\nlove with which he would be received in all those provinces which have\nsuffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for\nrevenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.\nWhat door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?\nWhat envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To\nall of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your\nillustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with\nwhich all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard\nour native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be\nverified that saying of Petrarch:\n\nVirtu contro al Furore\n    Prendera l\u2019arme, e fia il combatter corto:\nChe l\u2019antico valore\n    Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.\n\nVirtue against fury shall advance the fight,\n    And it i\u2019 th\u2019 combat soon shall put to flight:\nFor the old Roman valour is not dead,\n    Nor in th\u2019 Italians\u2019 brests extinguished.\n\nEdward Dacre, 1640.\n\n\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING\nVITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE\nDUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI\n\nBY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI\n\n\nThe Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to\nclear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been\nraised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of\nArezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola,\nwhence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against\nGiovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring\nthat city under his domination, and to make it the head of his\nRomagnian duchy.\n\nThese matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and\ntheir following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too\npowerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek\nto destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon\nthis a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to\nwhich came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,\nVitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the\ntyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo\nPetrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and\ncourage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which\nmight otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they\ndecided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the\nFlorentines; and they sent their men to one place and another,\npromising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite\nwith them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported\nthroughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke,\namong whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a\nrevolution.\n\nThus it arose that, men\u2019s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by\ncertain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held\nfor the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The\ncastellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there;\nso the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being\ncarried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from\nbeing drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping\nupon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being\neffected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being\nencouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the\nDiet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance.\n\nThose who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose\nthe opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any\ntown, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and\nthey sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in\ndestroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and\nthat they ought not to wait for another opportunity.\n\nBut the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli\nand Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo\nMachiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the\nduke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,\nbecause, against everybody\u2019s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone\nover to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door.\nBut recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided\nto temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to\nhim, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance.\nThis latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France\nfor men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into\ncavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.\n\nNotwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached\nFossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the\naid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the\nduke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with\noffers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did\nnot fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he\nwished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough\nfor him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the\nprincipality.\n\nAnd the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to\nhim to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a\nstandstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every\ncare to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such\npreparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in\nseparate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there\ncame also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found\nhimself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open\nwar, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to\noutwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of\nreconciliation.\n\nAnd that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in\nwhich he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand\nducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed\nan alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come\npersonally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the\nother hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and\nother places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and\nnot to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his\npermission.\n\nThis reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,\nagain fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his\nstate; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the\nfortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by\nthe enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends.\nBut the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed\nhis men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of\nNovember together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to\nCesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the\nVitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of\nUrbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but\nnothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that\nif the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were\nready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To\nthis the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with\nTuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was\nvery willing to proceed against Sinigalia.\n\nIt happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the\nfortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give\nit up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to\ncome there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being\ninvited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no\nsuspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French\nmen-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred\nlancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena\nabout the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost\ncunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for\nhim at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance\nwould cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the\nreconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the\narms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very\nstubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not\noffend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by\nPagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he\nagreed to wait.\n\nUpon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on\n30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most\ntrusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor\nd\u2019Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as\nVitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should\narrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting\ncertain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they\nreached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they\ncame to the duke\u2019s quarters, where they should be seized.\n\nThe duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which\nthere were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to\nassemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from\nFano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day\nof December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of\nabout two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the\ninfantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.\n\nFano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of\nthe Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who\ngoes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases\nof which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia\nis distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot\nand from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs\na little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards\nFano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes\nfor a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river\nwhich passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank\nof it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge\nwhich crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that\nleads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before\nthis gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which\nthe bank of the river forms one side.\n\nThe Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and\nto honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant\nfrom Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men\nof the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band,\nwhich consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty\nhorsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters\nhaving been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and\nwhen the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass\nover, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and\nthe other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through\nwhich the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town.\n\nVitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a\nfew horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a\ncape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his\napproaching death\u2014a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the\nman and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that\nwhen he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet\nthe duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He\nrecommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his\nnephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of\ntheir fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came\nbefore the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him\nwith goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were\ncommissioned to look after them.\n\nBut the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band\nin Sinigalia, was missing\u2014for Oliverotto was waiting in the square\nbefore his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and\ndrilling them\u2014signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care\nof Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that\nOliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined\nOliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of\ntheir quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke;\nand he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come\nhimself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice,\ncame before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and\nOliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others.\n\nSo the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke\u2019s\nquarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made\nthem prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that\nthe men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.\nThose of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of\nthe Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment\nof the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves,\nand bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and\nVitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the\ncountry and saved themselves.\n\nBut the duke\u2019s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men\nof Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not\nrepressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have\ncompletely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,\nthe duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a\nroom and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in\nkeeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of\nthe pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the\nblame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the\nDuke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome\nthat the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of\nFlorence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th\nJanuary 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the\nsame way.\n\n\n\n\nTHE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA\n\nWRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI\n\nAnd sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI\n\nCASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328\n\n\nIt appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who\nhave considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them,\nwho have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in\ntheir day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and\nobscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way.\nThey have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have\nhad so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to\nbe sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate\nwho these persons may have been because they are well known to\neverybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to\nthose who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly\nbeginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to\nthe world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because\nshe begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in\ntheir career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio\nCastracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is\nmeasured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was\nborn; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished\nin his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to\nbe desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such\nindications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar\nto men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his\nactions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.\n\nThe family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families\nof Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in\nestate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a\nson Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca,\nand for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He\nhad an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but\nBuonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again\nwent to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the\nhouse where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens,\nany person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning,\nshortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio\nwas called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather\nherbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the\nleaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard\nsomething resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards\nit, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the\nleaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and\npartly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it\nto the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is\ncustomary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When\nhe heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised\nor compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves\nwhat should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no\nchildren, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for\nit, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They\nbaptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As\nthe years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of\nwit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those\nlessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended\nto make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his\ncanonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with\nthis object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio\nwas quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached\nthe age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of\nMesser Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left\noff reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,\ndelighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in\nrunning, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he\nfar excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at\nany time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of\nwars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with\nvexation and sorrow.\n\nThere lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,\nnamed Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,\nbodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had\noften fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a\nGhibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman\nresided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most\nmornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the\ntop of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he\nhad often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street\nin those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far\nexcelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal\nauthority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer\nFrancesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being\ninformed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt\na greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one\nday and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of\na gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in\nthe house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the\nservices of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased\nCastruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he\nstood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer\nFrancesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable,\nnothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and\ntake up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and\nin a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was\ndriven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear\nthat he would not be able to hold him much longer.\n\nThus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to\nthe house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was\nastonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that\nvirtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true\ngentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and\ncould manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and\ntournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others,\nand he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what\nenhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful\nmodesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to\nothers, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his\nequals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,\nnot only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio\nhad reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia\nby the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist\nthe Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces.\nCastruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this\nexpedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and\nhis name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all\nLombardy.\n\nCastruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he\nleft it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many\nfriends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary\nfor that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son\nthirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to\nbe his son\u2019s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died\nFrancesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that\ngoodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to\nthe son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the\nfather. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and\ntutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and\ncreated a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the\nformer universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring\ntyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli\nOpizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of\nMesser Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him\nthat Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and\nholding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity;\ntherefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of\nhis eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but\nafterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able\nto bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples\nand have him driven out of Lucca.\n\nThe Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,\nwho being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became\ntheir lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca,\nwith whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting\ntheir restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought\ninto his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of\nthe Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio\ncautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies\nand munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few\ndays in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon\nwith Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and\nPisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed\nUguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the\nportcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling\nthe people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione\nentered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer\nGiorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The\ngovernor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the\nwishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found\nthat more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those\nwho fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the\nheadquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most\nhostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.\n\nAs it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party\nthat the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they\ndetermined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a\nlarge army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence\nthey marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into\nLucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and\nwith a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved\nagainst the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the\nenemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between\nMontecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to\nMontecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight\nskirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence.\nOwing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed\ncoming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing\nworse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army\nin the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the\nGuelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain\nhad lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and\nallowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also\nshowed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the\ncamp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the\nmore they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in\nthe order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently,\ndeeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered\ntheir tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a\nfew words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the\ncertainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio\nhad noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre\nof the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the\narmy; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant\nmen on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he\nmoved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his\nlines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had\ncome in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre\nsquadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the\nwings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings\nof the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained\nout of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were\nseparated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach\neach other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio\u2019s men\nwere opposed to the weaker part of the enemy\u2019s troops, and the most\nefficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines\nwere unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or\nto give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much\ndifficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the\ncentre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to\nattack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat\nwas complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten\nthousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party\nin Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom\nwere Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and\nFilippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did\nnot amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco,\nthe son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the\nfirst onset.\n\nThis victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that\nUguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it\nappeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of\npower, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only\nwaited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the\ndeath of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in\nLucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge.\nOn the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were\ndriven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming\nto the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him\na proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his\nson Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take\nCastruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio,\nfearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was\nentertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing\nto put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive,\nin order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions.\nUgucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once\nset out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the\nbusiness in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the\nPisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo\ndella Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard\nof the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn\nback, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should\nclose their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what\nhad happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand\nthe liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had\narrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private\ncircles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised\na tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded\nthat Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse\nmight happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered\nhis friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked\nUguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away\nwith his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in\npoverty.\n\nBut Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,\nand he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people\nthat they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having\nobtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the\nrecovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of\nUguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded\na treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed\na fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course\nof two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained\nat that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a\nshort time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the\npass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and\nwrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the\nlord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed\nby the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any\nlonger to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord\nof Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico,\nFrancesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had\ncorrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected\nprince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of\nthe Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and\nCastruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at\nthe head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in\nLucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the\npeople\u2019s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in\ngreat honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,\nand he was appointed the emperor\u2019s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time\nthe Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had\ndriven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick.\nFrederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread\nof the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were\nconstrained to accept him as their lord.\n\nFrederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian\naffairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian\nGhibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio\nfor help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his\ncountry, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these\nexiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi,\nand Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.\nCastruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all\nTuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to\ngain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer\nMatteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces\nof his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he\ndivided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied\nwith arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he\ncould quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without\nthose whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he\nsurrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer\nMatteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven\nout the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the\nKing Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the\nFlorentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home,\nthey should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to\ndefend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized\nFucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country.\nWhereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely\nreached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to\nreturn to Lucca.\n\nThere resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so\npowerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance\nhim to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not\nreceived such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited\nother families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They\nfound their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set\nupon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and\nkilled him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano\ndi Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion,\nintervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms;\nand he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him\nwhat they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater\nintelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the\nnews of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in\ncommand of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home.\nContrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he\nposted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As\nit appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to\nhim, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf,\nfor he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to\npardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their\nformer friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to\ntheir house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged\nStefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure\nto find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to\nhear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to\nhim, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of\nshowing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and\nCastruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown\ninto prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered\nSan Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace,\nas it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to\nleave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce,\nwhich they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and\ndesirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded\nwith them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the\nconquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble,\nturned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should\nnot again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he,\nunder various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by\ntheir ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of\nthem, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had\nin his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that\nnone of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he\nraised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom\nhe had killed or hunted out of the state.\n\nWhilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his\nposition in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of\nincreasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he\ncould get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence,\nwhich was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends\nwith the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both\nparties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it\nalways had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the\nBianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each\nof these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each\ndesired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many\nthreatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the\nFlorentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;\nboth trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they\nbelieved that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than\nthe Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave\npromises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and\nto Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the\nappointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself\ndirect to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and\nboth were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a\nsignal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other\nBastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans\nof either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the\nhands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the\npalace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them\nmany promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to\nthe city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and\nquickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great\nvalour.\n\nAbout this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness\nof living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon.\nThe German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened\u2014murders\nand tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put\nan end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should\ncall in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of\nthe city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he\ncould apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not\nonly to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome.\nCastruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the\nemperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be\nsafe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo\nGuinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six\nhundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest\ndistinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such\nrespect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order\nwas restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from\nthe country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the\nsource of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders,\nand admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico.\nCastruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This\ndignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in\na brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its\nfront: \u201cI am what God wills.\u201d Whilst on the back was: \u201cWhat God desires\nshall be.\u201d\n\nDuring this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio\nshould have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could\ntempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be\ndifficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were\nBaldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face\ndanger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia,\nand with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and\nafter driving out some of Castruccio\u2019s officials and partisans, and\nkilling others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this\ngreatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on\nin great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return,\nknowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with\ntheir forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so\nthey would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the\nsupporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian\nterritories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his\narmy; and having heard where the Florentines\u2019 lay, he decided not to\nencounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of\nPescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the\nPass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design,\nvictory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had\nthirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he\nhad every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops,\nyet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be\noverwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and\nPistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the\nexact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places\nnarrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still\nnarrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that\ntwenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was\nManfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had\nbeen allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to\nthe Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either\u2014neither of them\nwishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of\nneutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons,\nand also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able\nto maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to\nfall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and\nthere was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force\nbefore they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this\ntrouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which\npossession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate\nfriendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with\nhim that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle\nthe night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put\nto death.\n\nCastruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the\nFlorentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away\nfrom Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his\narmy from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they\nreached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill\non the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the\ncastle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching\nfrom thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of\nSerravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the\nhill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his\ninfantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a\npath on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four\nhundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never\nexpecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they\naware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the\nFlorentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise\nwhen they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they\nupon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case\nof unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed\nwith such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,\nalthough some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting\nreached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The\ncavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were\nunable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the\nnarrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought\nto be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were\nengaged with the enemy\u2019s infantry were scattered or killed without\nhaving made any effective defence because of their unfortunate\nposition, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout\nresistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both\nflanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their\nfriends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a\ndecisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand\ninfantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred\nhorsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole\nforce to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried\nout with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack,\nbut gave way, and were soon in full retreat\u2014conquered more by their\nunfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the\nrear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man\nseeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very\nsanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini\ndei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all\nFlorentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on\nthe Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the\nGuelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out\nthe friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not\ncontent with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both\nsides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,\nabout two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the\nspoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding\nhorse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in\ncommemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to\ncorrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city\ngates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the\nparticipators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci\nand Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great\nanxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys\nto King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and\nhe, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph\ncause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to\nreceive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and\nhe sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.\n\nShortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the\npressure of Castruccio\u2019s army, owing to his being compelled to leave\nhis positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a\nconspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,\none of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland\nshould be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this\nconspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of\nCastruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy\npaucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few\nare not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy\nLanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.\nThis betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio\nCerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering\ntheir banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put\nhim to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their\nfamilies into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and\nPistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and\nenergy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines\ntheir opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of\nCarlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided\nto lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty\nthousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry\u2014having called to their aid\nevery Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should\nattack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to\nmarch on the latter\u2014a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more\nlikely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed\nthat the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.\n\nIn the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army\nand quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from\nthence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army\nwhich the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree\nalarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would\ndeliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to\nthink that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects\nof success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand\nfoot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to\nFucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand\ninfantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the\nPisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and\nGusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain.\nMoreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they\ndivided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the\ndirection of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or\nattack Castruccio\u2019s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they\nwould find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his\nown command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they\nwould have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,\nan undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to\ntake this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of\nthe river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide\nexpanse of land between them and the river.\n\nThe Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to\ndecide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,\nhaving weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the\nlatter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet\nthe water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the\nsaddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the\nFlorentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of\ncavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was\nfixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines\nwith five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing\nthem to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one\nthousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the\nArno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their\narms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the\nriver, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more\ndifficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having\nbroken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of\nthe horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so\nfast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the\ndifficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved\nhigher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and\nthe banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by\nthe forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light\narmed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with\ntremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,\nalarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and\ntrampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of\nCastruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp\nand terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither\nwould yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back\ninto the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land\nin order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they\ncould but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this\nobstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio\nshouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had\nbefore conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each\nother that the many should be overcome by the few. At length\nCastruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his\nmen and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many\nkilled and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up\na position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded\nthese latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and\none part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This\ncleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and\nthus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these\ntired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio\u2019s\nreserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into\nthe river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any\ndecisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his\ninferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the\ndefensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that\nwhen he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work\nof the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the\nFlorentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder\nof his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with\nlance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the\nenemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine\ncaptains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in\ncrossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower\ndown the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio\u2019s army. But\nhere, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of\nCastruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines\nwere so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them\nescaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains\nwere taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with\nMichelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine\ncommissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter\nwas infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the\nFlorentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men,\nwhilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.\n\nBut Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his\nlife just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus\nruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry\ninto effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but\ndeath could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle\nthe whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued\nand overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on\ntheir return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the\nwatch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day;\nhe being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be\nthe first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio\nstood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the\nArno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of\nwhich he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it\nwas the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with\nhigh fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must\nprove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and\naddressed him as follows:\n\n\u201cIf I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the\nmidst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my\nsuccesses promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left\nthee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,\nbecause I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and\nPisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the\nFlorentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these\npeoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least\nmore peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but\none more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who\ninsists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me\nwith sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time\nto surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have\nnever concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a\nboy\u2014a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should\nfeel\u2014and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been\nborn of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and\ncapable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been\nwitness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all\nhis possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love,\nand increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And\nin order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy\nfather left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained,\nI have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect\nmy mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father.\nThus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am\ndeeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure.\nThou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest\ncontented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are\nof nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be\nsometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under\na Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with\nfactions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs\nrecently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended\nFlorentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly\ndestroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than\nthey would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the\nprinces of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far\ndistant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou\nhast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory\nof my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought\nthee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist\nthee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering\nunder this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And\nwhereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that\nwar with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every\ninducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring\nthee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this\nworld that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own\nstrength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for\nfighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be\nwell for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this\nway to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this\nthou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I\nhave told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that\nI have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.\u201d\n\nAfter this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,\nand Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending\nPagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his\nsuccessor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,\nand no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he\nwas. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he\nwas buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to\nPagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the\nabilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,\nand then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This\nlatter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the\ngreat-grandson of Pagolo.\n\nFrom what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a\nman of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time,\nbut also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the\nordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious\npresence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke\nwith him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,\nand he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or\nsnowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,\nbut terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false\nwith the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he\ndesired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory\nthat brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was\nbolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He\nwas accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear\nnothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees\nthat the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully\nsharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look\nfor any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not\nangered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that\nhe has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on\nthe following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a\npartridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom\nCastruccio had said: \u201cYou would not have given more than a penny.\u201d\n\u201cThat is true,\u201d answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: \u201cA\nducat is much less to me.\u201d Having about him a flatterer on whom he had\nspat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: \u201cFisherman\nare willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that\nthey may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by\nspittle that I may catch a whale\u201d; and this was not only heard by\nCastruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it\nwas wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: \u201cIf that be\na vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our\nsaints.\u201d Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of\na house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him:\n\u201cThou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest\ninto such places.\u201d A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo\nand was told: \u201cFool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which\ngave so much trouble to fasten.\u201d Castruccio said to one who professed\nto be a philosopher: \u201cYou are like the dogs who always run after those\nwho will give them the best to eat,\u201d and was answered: \u201cWe are rather\nlike the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest\nneed of them.\u201d Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much\ndisturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for\ncowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear\nanything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since\nevery man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one\nwhat he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: \u201cWhen thou goest to a\nbanquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon\nanother.\u201d To a person who was boasting that he had read many things,\nCastruccio said: \u201cHe knows better than to boast of remembering many\nthings.\u201d Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming\nintoxicated. Castruccio replied: \u201cAn ox does the same.\u201d Castruccio was\nacquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being\nblamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be\ntaken in by a woman, he said: \u201cShe has not taken me in, I have taken\nher.\u201d Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered:\n\u201cThou dost not spend as much as I do?\u201d and being told that it was true,\nhe continued: \u201cThen thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.\u201d\nBeing invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of\nLuca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a\nchamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers\nand foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some\nsaliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much\ndisturbed by this, said to him: \u201cI knew not where to spit in order to\noffend thee less.\u201d Being asked how Caesar died he said: \u201cGod willing I\nwill die as he did.\u201d Being one night in the house of one of his\ngentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of\nhis friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was\nusual in one of his station, so he said: \u201cHe who is considered wise by\nday will not be considered a fool at night.\u201d A person came to demand a\nfavour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea\nthrew himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by\nCastruccio, said: \u201cThou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast\nthy ears in thy feet,\u201d whereupon he obtained double the favour he had\nasked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one,\nseeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled\nblindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous\nwords, he said to him: \u201cWhen you have another request to make, send\nsomeone else to make it.\u201d Having been wearied by a similar man with a\nlong oration who wound up by saying: \u201cPerhaps I have fatigued you by\nspeaking so long,\u201d Castruccio said: \u201cYou have not, because I have not\nlistened to a word you said.\u201d He used to say of one who had been a\nbeautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was\ndangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he\ntook the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he\nsaid: \u201cDo you laugh because you are successful or because another is\nunfortunate?\u201d Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco\nGuinigi, one of his companions said to him: \u201cWhat shall I give you if\nyou will let me give you a blow on the nose?\u201d Castruccio answered: \u201cA\nhelmet.\u201d Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been\ninstrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done\nwrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived\nthemselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly\nthose men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying\nthat they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused\nwhen the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise\nthat whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first\nto learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with\nonly looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to\nbe buried when he died, and answered: \u201cWith the face turned downwards,\nfor I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.\u201d On\nbeing asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order\nto save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared\nstrange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione\ndella Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat\nto preserve his health, and replied: \u201cIf the man be rich let him eat\nwhen he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.\u201d Seeing one of his\ngentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: \u201cI\npray God that you will let him feed you also.\u201d Seeing that someone had\nwritten upon his house in Latin the words: \u201cMay God preserve this house\nfrom the wicked,\u201d he said, \u201cThe owner must never go in.\u201d Passing\nthrough one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door,\nand remarked: \u201cThat house will fly through the door.\u201d He was having a\ndiscussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the\nproperty of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them,\nand the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. \u201cIs this\nking of yours a bad man or a good one?\u201d asked Castruccio, and was told\nthat he was a good one, whereupon he said, \u201cWhy should you suggest that\nI should be afraid of a good man?\u201d\n\nI could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and\nweighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his\nhigh qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a\nprince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune,\nso he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune;\ntherefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be\nseen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they\nwere placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in\nhis life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of\nAlexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his\nage as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had\nFortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia\nor Rome.","title":"The Prince","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":49943}