{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_12913/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_12913","id":"gutenberg_12913","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12913","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Ethics","Ethics -- History"],"text":"MORAL SCIENCE: A COMPENDIUM OF ETHICS\n\nby\n\nALEXANDER BAIN, M.A.,\n\nAuthor of \"Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology;\" \"The\nSenses and the Intellect;\" \"The Emotions and the Will;\" \"A\nManual ooof Rhetoric;\" Professor of Logic in the University\nof Aberdeen, etc., etc., etc.\n\n1869\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe present Dissertation falls under two divisions.\n\nThe first division, entitled The Theory of Ethics, gives an account of\nthe questions or points brought into discussion, and handles at length\nthe two of greatest prominence, the Ethical Standard, and the Moral\nFaculty.\n\nThe second division--on The Ethical Systems--is a full detail of all\nthe systems, ancient and modern, by conjoined Abstract and Summary.\nWith few exceptions, an abstract is made of each author's exposition\nof his own theory, the fulness being measured by relative importance;\nwhile, for better comparing and remembering the several theories, they\nare summarized at the end, on a uniform plan.\n\nThe connection of Ethics with Psychology is necessarily intimate; the\nleading ethical controversies involve a reference to mind, and can be\nsettled only by a more thorough understanding of mental processes.\n\nAlthough the present volume is properly a continuation of the Manual\nof Psychology and the History of Philosophy, recently published, and\ncontains occasional references to that treatise, it may still be\nperused as an independent work on the Ethical Doctrines and Systems.\nA.B.\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE THEORY OF ETHICS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nPRELIMINARY VIEW OF ETHICAL QUESTIONS.\n\n  I.--The ETHICAL STANDARD. Summary of views.\n\n II.--PSYCHOLOGICAL questions.\n     1. The Moral Faculty.\n     2. The Freedom of the Will; the sources of Disinterested conduct.\n\nIII.--The BONUM, SUMMUM BONUM, or Happiness.\n\n IV.--The CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES, and the Moral Code.\n\n  V.--Relationship of Ethics to POLITICS.\n\n VI.--Relation to Theology.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE ETHICAL STANDARD.\n\n 1. Ethics, as a department of Practice, is defined by its End.\n\n 2. The Ethical End is the welfare of society, realized through rules\n    of conduct duly enforced.\n\n 3. The Rules of Ethics are of two kinds. The first are imposed under\n    a penalty. These are Laws proper, or Obligatory Morality.\n\n 4. The second are supported by Rewards; constituting Optional\n    Morality, Merit, Virtue, or Nobleness.\n\n 5. The Ethical End, or Morality, _as it has been_, is founded partly\n    in Utility, and partly in Sentiment.\n\n 6. The Ethical End is limited, according to the view taken of Moral\n    Government, or Authority:--Distinction between Security and\n    Improvement.\n\n 7. Morality, in its essential parts, is 'Eternal and Immutable;' in\n    other parts, it varies with custom.\n\n 8. Enquiry as to the kind, of proof that an Ethical Standard is\n    susceptible of. The ultimate end of action must be referred to\n    individual judgment.\n\n 9. The judgment of Mankind is, with some qualifications, in favour of\n    Happiness as the supreme end of conduct.\n\n10. The Ethical end that society is tending to, is Happiness, or\n    Utility.\n\n11. Objections against Utility. I.--Happiness is not the sole aim of\n    human pursuit.\n\n12. II.--The consequences of actions are beyond calculation.\n\n13. III.--The principle of Utility contains no motives to seek the\n    happiness of others.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE MORAL FACULTY.\n\n 1. Question whether the Moral Faculty be simple or complex.\n\n 2. Arguments in favour of its being simple and intuitive:--First, Our\n    moral judgments are immediate and instantaneous.\n\n 3. Secondly, It is a faculty common to all mankind.\n\n 4. Thirdly, It is different from any other mental phenomenon.\n\n 5. Replies to these Arguments, and Counter-arguments:---First;\n    Immediateness of operation is no proof of an innate origin.\n\n 6. Secondly, The alleged similarity of men's moral judgments holds\n    only in a limited degree. Answers given by the advocates of an\n    Innate sentiment, to the discrepancies.\n\n 7. Thirdly, Moral right and wrong is not an indivisible property, but\n    an extensive Code of regulations.\n\n 8. Fourthly, Intuition is not sufficient to settle debated questions.\n\n 9. Fifthly, It is possible to analyze the Moral Faculty:--Estimate of\n    the operation of (1) Prudence, (2) Sympathy, and (3) the Emotions\n    generally.\n\n10. The _peculiar attribute_ of Rightness arises from the institution\n    of Government or Authority.\n\n11. The speciality of Conscience, or the Moral Sentiment, is\n    identified with our education under Government, or Authority.\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nTHE ETHICAL SYSTEMS.\n\nSOKRATES. His subjects were Men and Society. His Ethical Standard\nindistinctly expressed. Resolved Virtue into Knowledge. Ideal of\npursuit--Well-doing. Inculcated self-denying Precepts. Political\nTheory. Connexion of Ethics with Theology slender.\n\nPLATO. Review of the Dialogues containing portions of Ethical\nTheory:--_Alkibiades I_. discusses Just and Unjust. _Alkibiades II_.\nthe knowledge of Good or Reason. _Hippias Minor_ identifies Virtue\nwith Knowledge. _Minos_ (on Law) refers everything to the decision of\nan Ideal Wise man. _Laekes_ resolves Courage, and _Charmides_\nTemperance, into Intelligence or the supreme science of good and evil.\n_Lysis_ (on Friendship) gives the Idea of the good as the supreme\nobject of affection. _Menon_ enquires, Is virtue _teachable?_ and\niterates the science of good and evil. _Protagoras_ makes Pleasure the\nonly good, and Pain the only evil, and defines the science of good and\nevil as the comparison of pleasures and pains. _Gorgias_ contradicts\nProtagoras, and sets up Order or Discipline as a final end.\n_Politikus_ (on Government) repeats the Sokratic ideal of the One Wise\nman. _Philebus_ makes Good a compound of Pleasure with Intelligence,\nthe last predominating. The _Republic_ assimilates Society to an\nIndividual man, and defines Justice as the balance of the constituent\nparts of each. _Timoeus_ repeats the doctrine that wickedness is\ndisease, and not voluntary. The _Laws_ place all conduct under the\nprescription of the civil magistrate. Summary of Plato's views.\n\nTHE CYNICS AND THE CYRENAICS. Cynic succession. The proper description\nof the tenets of both schools comes under the Summum Bonum. The Cynic\nIdeal was the minimum of wants, and their self-denial was compensated\nby exemption from fear, and by pride of superiority. The Cyrenaic\nARISTIPPUS:--Was the first to maintain that the summum bonum is\nPleasure and the absence of Pain. Future Pleasures and Pains taken\ninto the account. His Psychology of Pleasure and Pain.\n\nARISTOTLE. Abstract of the Nicomachean Ethics. Book First. The Chief\nGood, or Highest End of human endeavours. Great differences of opinion\nas to the nature of Happiness. The Platonic Idea of the Good\ncriticised. The Highest End an _end-in-itself_. Virtue referable to\nthe special work of man; growing out of his mental capacity. External\nconditions necessary to virtue and happiness. The Soul subdivided into\nparts, each, having its characteristic virtue or excellence.\n\nBook Second. Definition and classification of the Moral virtues.\nVirtue the result of Habit. Doctrine of the MEAN. The test of virtue\nto feel no pain. Virtue defined (_genus_) an acquirement or a State,\n(_differentia_) a Mean between extremes. Rules for hitting the Mean.\n\nBook Third. The Voluntary and Involuntary. Deliberate Preference.\nVirtue and vice are voluntary. The virtues in detail:--Courage\n[Self-sacrifice implied in Courage]. Temperance.\n\nBook Fourth. Liberality. Magnificence. Magnanimity. Mildness.\nGood-breeding. Modesty.\n\nBook Fifth. Justice:--Universal Justice includes all virtue.\nParticular Justice is of two kinds, Distributive and Corrective.\n\nBook Sixth. Intellectual Excellences, or Virtues of the Intellect. The\nRational part of the Soul embraces the Scientific and the Deliberative\nfunctions. Science deals with the necessary. Prudence or the Practical\nReason; its aims and requisites. In virtue, good dispositions must be\naccompanied with Prudence.\n\nBook Seventh. Gradations of moral strength and moral weakness.\nContinence and Incontinence.\n\nBooks Eighth and Ninth. Friendship:--Grounds of Friendship. Varieties\nof Friendship, corresponding to different objects of liking.\nFriendship between the virtuous is alone perfect. A settled habit, not\na mere passion. Equality in friendship. Political friendships.\nExplanation of the family affections. Rule of reciprocity of services.\nConflicting obligations. Cessation of friendships. Goodwill. Love felt\nby benefactors. Self-love. Does the happy man need friends?\n\nBook Tenth. Pleasure:--Theories of Pleasure--Eudoxus, Speusippus,\nPlato. Pleasure is not The Good. Pleasure defined. The pleasures of\nIntellect. Nature of the Good or Happiness resumed. Perfect happiness\nfound only in the philosophical life; second to which is the active\nsocial life of the good citizen. Happiness of the gods. Transition\nfrom Ethics to Politics.\n\nTHE STOICS. The succession of Stoical philosophers. Theological\nDoctrines of the Stoics:--The Divine Government; human beings must\nrise to the comprehension of Universal Law; the soul at death absorbed\ninto the divine essence; argument from Design. Psychology:--Theory of\nPleasure and Pain; theory of the Will. Doctrine of Happiness or the\nGood:--Pain no evil; discipline of endurance--Apathy. Theory of\nVirtue:--Subordination of self to the larger interests; their view of\nactive Beneficence; the Stoical paradoxes; the idea of Duty;\nconsciousness of Self-improvement.\n\nEPICURUS. Life and writings. His successors. Virtue and vice referred\nby him to Pleasures and Pains calculated by Reason. Freedom from Pain\nthe primary object. Regulation of desires. Pleasure good if not\nleading to pain. Bodily feeling the foundation of sensibility. Mental\nfeelings contain memory and hope. The greatest miseries are from the\ndelusions of hope, and from the torments of fear. Fear of Death and\nFear of the Gods. Relations with others; Justice and Friendship--both\nbased on reciprocity. Virtue and Happiness inseparable. Epicureanism\nthe type of all systems grounded on enlightened self-interest.\n\nTHE NEO-PLATONISTS. The Moral End to be attained through an\nintellectual regimen. The soul being debased by its connection with\nmatter, the aim of human action is to regain the spiritual life. The\nfirst step is the practice of the cardinal virtues: the next the\npurifying virtues. Happiness is the undisturbed life of contemplation.\nCorrespondence of the Ethical, with the Metaphysical scheme.\n\nSCHOLASTIC ETHICS. ABAELARD:--Lays great stress on the subjective\nelement in morality; highest human good, love to God; actions\njudged by intention, and intention by conscience.\n\nST. BERNARD:--Two degrees of virtue, Humility and Love.\n\nJOHN of SALISBURY:--Combines philosophy and theology; doctrine of\nHappiness; the lower and higher desires.\n\nALEXANDER OF HALES. BONAVENTURA. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.\nAQUINAS:--Aristotelian mode of enquiry as to the end; God the highest\ngood; true happiness lies in the self-sufficing theoretic\nintelligence; virtue; division of the virtues.\n\nHOBBES. (Abstract of the Ethical part of Leviathan). Constituents of\nman's nature. The Good. Pleasure. The simple passions. Theory of the\nWill. Good and evil. Conscience. Virtue. Position of Ethics in the\nSciences. Power, Worth, Dignity. Happiness a perpetual progress;\nconsequences of the restlessness of desire. Natural state of mankind;\na state of enmity and war. Necessity of articles of peace, called Laws\nof Nature. Law defined. Rights; Renunciation of rights; Contract;\nMerit. Justice. Laws of Gratitude, Complaisance, Pardon upon\nrepentance. Laws against Cruelty, Contumely, Pride, Arrogance. Laws of\nNature, how far binding. Summary.\n\nCUMBERLAND. Standard of Moral Good summed up in Benevolence. The moral\nfaculty is the Reason, apprehending the Nature of Things. Innate Ideas\nan insufficient foundation. Will. Disinterested action. Happiness.\nMoral Code, the common good of all rational beings. Obligations in\nrespect of giving and of receiving. Politics. Religion.\n\nCUDWORTH. Moral Good and Evil cannot be arbitrary. The mind has a\npower of Intellection, above Sense, for aiming at the eternal and\nimmutable verities.\n\nCLARKE. The eternal Fitness and Unfitness of Things determine Justice,\nEquity, Goodness and Truth, and lay corresponding obligations upon\nreasonable creatures. The sanction of Rewards and Punishments\nsecondary and additional. Our Duties.\n\nWOLLASTON. Resolves good and evil into Truth and Falsehood.\n\nLOCKE. Arguments against Innate Practical Principles. Freedom of the\nWill. Moral Rules grounded in law.\n\nBUTLER. Characteristics of our Moral Perceptions. Disinterested\nBenevolence a fact of our constitutions. Our passions and affections\ndo not aim at self as their immediate end. The Supremacy of Conscience\nestablished from our moral nature. Meanings of Nature. Benevolence not\nultimately at variance with Self-Love.\n\nHUTCHESON.--Primary feelings of the mind. Finer perceptions--Beauty,\nSympathy, the Moral Sense, Social feelings; the benevolent order of\nthe world suggesting Natural Religion. Order or subordination of the\nfeelings as Motives; position of Benevolence. The Moral Faculty\ndistinct and independent. Confirmation of the doctrine from the Sense\nof Honour. Happiness. The tempers and characters bearing on happiness.\nDuties to God. Circumstances affecting the moral good or evil of\nactions. Rights and Laws.\n\nMANDEVILLE. Virtue supported solely by self-interest. Compassion\nresolvable into self. Pride an important source of moral virtue.\nPrivate vices, public benefits. Origin of Society.\n\nHUME. Question whether Reason or Sentiment be the foundation of\nmorals. The esteem for Benevolence shows that Utility enters into\nvirtue. Proofs that Justice is founded solely on Utility. Political\nSociety has utility for its end. The Laws. Why Utility pleases.\nQualities useful to ourselves. Qualities agreeable (1) to ourselves,\nand (2) to others. Obligation. The respective share of Reason and of\nSentiment in moral approbation. Benevolence not resolvable into\nSelf-Love.\n\nPRICE. The distinctions of Right and Wrong are perceived by the\nUnderstanding. The Beauty and Deformity of Actions. The feelings have\nsome part in our moral discrimination. Self-Love and Benevolence. Good\nand ill Desert. Obligation. Divisions of Virtue. Intention as an\nelement in virtuous action. Estimate of degrees of Virtue and Vice.\n\nADAM SMITH. Illustration of the workings of Sympathy. Mutual sympathy.\nThe Amiable and the Respectable Virtues. How far the several passions\nare consistent with Propriety. Influences of prosperity and adversity\non moral judgments. The Sense of Merit and Demerit. Self-approbation.\nLove of Praise and of Praiseworthiness. Influence and authority of\nConscience. Self-partiality; corrected by the use of General Rules.\nConnexion of Utility with Moral Approbation. Influence of Custom on\nthe Moral Sentiments. Character of Virtue. Self-command. Opinion\nregarding the theory of the Moral Sense.\n\nHARTLEY. Account of Disinterestedness. The Moral Sense a product of\nAssociation.\n\nFERGUSON. (Note)\n\nREID. Duty not to be resolved into Interest. Conscience an original\npower of the mind. Axiomatic first principles of Morals. Objections to\nthe theory of Utility.\n\nSTEWART. The Moral Faculty an original power. Criticism of opposing\nviews. Moral Obligation: connexion with Religion. Duties. Happiness:\nclassification of pleasures.\n\nBROWN. Moral approbation a simple emotion of the mind. Universality of\nmoral distinctions. Objections to the theory of Utility. Disinterested\nsentiment.\n\nPALEY. The Moral Sense not intuitive. Happiness. Virtue: its\ndefinition. Moral Obligation resolved into the command of God. Utility\na criterion of the Divine Will. Utility requires us to consider\n_general_ consequences. Rights. Duties.\n\nBENTHAM. Utility the sole foundation of Morals. Principles adverse to\nUtility. The Four Sanctions of Right. Comparative estimate of\nPleasures and Pains. Classification of Pleasures and Pains. Merit and\nDemerit. Pleasures and pains viewed as Motives: some motives are\nSocial or tutelary, others Dissocial or Self-regarding. Dispositions.\nThe consequences of a mischievous act. Punishment. Private Ethics\n(Prudence) and Legislation distinguished; their respective spheres.\n\nMACKINTOSH. Universality of Moral Distinctions. Antithesis or Reason\nand Passion. It is not virtuous _acts_ but virtuous _dispositions_\nthat outweigh the pains of self-sacrifice. The moral sentiments have\nfor their objects Dispositions. Utility. Development of Conscience\nthrough Association; the constituents are Gratitude, Sympathy,\nResentment and Shame, together with Education. Religion must\npresuppose Morality. Objections to Utility criticised. Duties to\nourselves, an improper expression. Reference of moral sentiments to\nthe Will.\n\nJAMES MILL. Primary constituents of the Moral Faculty--pleasurable and\npainful sensations. The Causes of these sensations. The Ideas of them,\nand of their causes. Hope, Fear; Love, Joy; Hatred, Aversion. Remote\ncauses of pleasures and pains--Wealth, Power, Dignity, and their\nopposites. Affections towards our fellow-creatures--Friendship,\nKindness, &c. Motives. Dispositions. Applications to the virtue of\nPrudence. Justice--by what motives supported. Beneficence. Importance\nin moral training, of Praise and Blame, and their associations; the\nMoral Sanction. Derivation of Disinterested Feelings.\n\nAUSTIN. Laws defined and classified. The Divine Laws; how are we to\nknow the Divine Will? Utility the sole criterion. Objections to\nUtility. Criticism of the theory of a Moral Sense. Prevailing\nmisconceptions as to Utility. Nature of Law resumed and illustrated.\nImpropriety of the term 'law' as applied to the operations of Nature.\n\nWHEWELL. Opposing schemes of Morality. Proposal to reconcile them.\nThere are some actions Universally approved. A Supreme Rule of Right\nto be arrived at by combining partial rules: these are obtained from\nthe nature of our faculties. The rule of Speech is Truth; Property\nsupposes Justice; the Affections indicate Humanity. It is a\nself-evident maxim that the Lower parts of our nature are governed by\nthe Higher. Classification of Springs of Action. Disinterestedness.\nClassification of Moral Rules. Division of Rights.\n\nFERRIER. Question of the Moral Sense: errors on both sides. Sympathy\npasses beyond feeling, and takes in Thought or self-consciousness.\nHappiness has two ends--the maintenance of man's Rational nature, and\nPleasure.\n\nMANSEL. The conceptions of Right and Wrong are _sui generis_. The\nmoral law can have no authority unless emanating from a lawgiver. The\nStandard is the moral nature, and not the arbitrary will, of God.\n\nJOHN STUART MILL. Explanation of what Utilitarianism consists in.\nReply to objections against setting up Happiness as the Ethical end.\nUltimate Sanction of the principle of Utility: the External and\nInternal sanctions; Conscience how made up. The sort of Proof that\nUtility is susceptible of:--the evidence that happiness is desirable,\nis that men desire it; it is consistent with Utility that virtue\nshould be desired for itself. Connexion between Justice and\nUtility:--meanings of Justice; essentially grounded in Law; the\nsentiments that support Justice, are Self-defence, and Sympathy;\nJustice owes its paramount character to the essential of Security;\nthere are no immutable maxims of Justice.\n\nBAILEY. Facts of the human constitution that give origin to moral\nphenomena:--susceptibility to pleasure and pain, and to the causes of\nthem; reciprocation of these; our expecting reciprocation from others;\nsympathy. Consideration of our feelings in regard to actions done to\nus by others. Our feelings as spectators of actions done to others by\nothers. Actions done to ourselves by others. The different cases\ncombine to modify each other. Explanation of the discrepancies of the\nmoral sentiment in different communities. The consequences of actions\nthe only criterion for rectifying the diversities. Objections to the\nhappiness-test. The term Utility unsuitable. Disputes as to the origin\nof moral sentiment in Reason or in a Moral Sense.\n\nSPENCER. Happiness the ultimate, but not the proximate, end. Moral\nScience a deduction from the laws of life and the conditions of\nexistence. There have been, and still are, developing in the race,\ncertain fundamental Moral Intuitions. The Expediency-Morality is\ntransitional. Reference to the general theory of Evolution.\n\nKANT. Distinguishes between the empirical and the rational mode of\ntreating Ethics. Nothing properly good, except _Will_. Subjection of\nWill to Reason. An action done from natural inclination is worthless\nmorally. Duty is respect for Law; conformity to Law is the one\nprinciple of volition. Moral Law not ascertainable empirically, it\nmust originate _a priori_ in pure (practical) Reason. The Hypothetical\nand Categorical Imperatives. Imperative of Prudence. Imperative of\nMorality. The formula of Morality. The ends of Morality. The Rational\nnature of man is an end-in-itself. The Will the source of its own\nlaws--the Autonomy of the Will. The Reason of Ends. Morality alone has\nintrinsic Worth or Dignity. Principles founded on the Heteronomy of\nthe Will--Happiness, Perfection. Duty legitimized by the conception of\nthe Freedom of the Will, properly understood. Postulates of the pure\nPractical Reason--Freedom, Immortality, God. Summary.\n\nCOUSIN. Analysis of the sentiments aroused in us by human actions. The\nMoral Sentiment made up of a variety of moral judgments--Good and\nEvil, Obligation, Liberty, Merit and Demerit. Virtue brings Happiness.\nMoral Satisfaction and Remorse. The Law of Duty is conformity to\nReason. The characteristic of Reason is Universality. Classification\nof Duties:--Duties to Self; to Others--Truth, Justice, Charity.\nApplication to Politics.\n\nJOUFFROY. Each creature has a special nature, and a special end. Man\nhas certain primary passions to be satisfied. Secondary passions--the\nUseful, the Good, Happiness. All the faculties controlled by the\nReason. The End of Interest. End of Universal Order. Morality the\nexpression of divine thought; identified with the beautiful and the\ntrue. The moral law and self-interest coincide. Boundaries of the\nthree states--Passion, Egoism, Moral determination.\n\n\n\n\nETHICS\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF ETHICS.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\nPRELIMINARY VIEW OF ETHICAL, QUESTIONS.\n\nAs a preface to the account of the Ethical Systems, and a principle of\narrangement, for the better comparing of them, we shall review in\norder the questions that arise in the discussion.\n\nI. First of all is the question as to the ETHICAL STANDARD. What, in\nthe last resort, is the test, criterion, umpire, appeal, or Standard,\nin determining Right and Wrong? In the concrete language of Paley,\n\"Why am I obliged to keep my word? The answer to this is the Theory of\nRight and Wrong, the essential part of every Ethical System.\"\n\nWe may quote the leading answers, as both explaining and summarizing\nthe chief question of Ethics, and more especially of Modern Ethics.\n\n1. It is alleged that the arbitrary Will of the Deity, as expressed in\nthe Bible, is the ultimate standard. On this view anything thus\ncommanded is right, whatever be its consequences, or however it may\nclash with our sentiments and reasonings.\n\n2. It was maintained by Hobbes, that the Sovereign, acting under his\nresponsibility to God, is the sole arbiter of Right and Wrong. As\nregards Obligatory Morality, this seems at first sight an identical\nproposition; morality is another name for law and sovereignty. In the\nview of Hobbes, however, the sovereign should be a single person, of\nabsolute authority, humanly irresponsible, and irremoveable; a type of\nsovereignty repudiated by civilized nations.\n\n3. It has been held, in various phraseology, that a certain _fitness_,\nsuitability, or propriety in actions, as determined by our\nUnderstanding or Reason, is the ultimate test. \"When a man keeps his\nword, there is a certain congruity or consistency between the action\nand the occasion, between the making of a promise and its fulfilment;\nand wherever such congruity is discernible, the action is right.\" This\nis the view of Cudworth, Clarke, and Price. It may be called the\nIntellectual or Rational theory.\n\nA special and more abstract form of the same theory is presented in\nthe dictum of Kant--'act in such a way that your conduct might be a\nlaw to all beings.'\n\n4. It is contended, that the human mind possesses an intuition or\ninstinct, whereby we feel or discern at once the right from the wrong;\na view termed the doctrine of the Moral Sense, or Moral Sentiment.\nBesides being supported by numerous theorizers in Ethics, this is the\nprevailing and popular doctrine; it underlies most of the language of\nmoral suasion. The difficulties attending the stricter interpretation\nof it have led to various modes of qualifying and explaining it, as\nwill afterwards appear. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are more especially\nidentified with the enunciation of this doctrine in its modern aspect.\n\n5. It was put forth by Mandeville that Self-interest is the only test\nof moral rightness. Self-preservation is the first law of being; and\neven when we are labouring for the good of others, we are still having\nregard to our own interest.\n\n6. The theory called, Utility, and Utilitarianism, supposes that the\nwell-being or happiness of mankind is the sole end, and ultimate\nstandard of morality. The agent takes account both of his own\nhappiness and of the happiness of others, subordinating, on proper\noccasions, the first to the second. This theory is definite in its\nopposition to all the others, but admits of considerable latitude of\nview within itself. Stoicism and Epicureanism, are both included in\nits compass.\n\nThe two last-named theories--Self-Interest, and Utility or the Common\nWell-Being, have exclusive regard to the consequences of actions; the\nothers assign to consequences a subordinate position. The terms\nExternal and Dependent are also used to express the reference to\nHappiness as the end: Internal and Independent are the contrasting\nepithets.\n\nII. Ethical Theory embraces certain questions of pure PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n1. The Psychological nature of Conscience, the Moral Sense, or by\nwhatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and\nwrong, together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew the\nother. That such a faculty exists is admitted. The question is, what\nis its place and origin in the mind?\n\nOn the one side, Conscience is held to be a _unique_ and ultimate\npower of the mind, like the feeling of Resistance, the sense of Taste,\nor the consciousness of Agreement. On the other side, Conscience is\nviewed as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of\nthe mind. The Theory of the Standard (4) called the doctrine of the\nMoral Sense, proceeds upon the first view; on that theory, the\nStandard and the Faculty make properly but one question. All other\ntheories are more or less compatible with the composite or derivative\nnature of Conscience; the supporters of Utility, in particular, adopt\nthis alternative.\n\n2. A second Psychological question, regarded by many (notably by Kant)\nas vitally implicated in Moral Obligation, is the Freedom of the Will.\nThe history of opinion on this subject has been in great part already\ngiven.\n\n3. Thirdly, It has been debated, on Psychological grounds, whether our\nBenevolent actions (which all admit) are ultimately modes of\nself-regard, or whether there be, in the human mind, a source of\npurely Disinterested conduct. The first view, or the reference of\nbenevolence to Self, admits of degrees and varieties of statement.\n\n(1) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and\nobtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made.\nOccasionally we are rewarded in kind; but the reward most usually\nforthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which\nthe human mind is acutely sensitive.\n\n(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an\nobject in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the\npain. This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by\nMandeville as a secondary motive.\n\n(3) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of\nacts of kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by\nwarmth, flowers, or music; we should thus be moved to benevolence by\nan intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.\n\nBentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence, meaning\nthat we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and pain from\nthe sight of pain in others.\n\n(4) It may be affirmed that, although we have not by nature any purely\ndisinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and\nhabits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final\nends, as in the case of money. This is the view propounded by James\nMill, and by Mackintosh.\n\nAllowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various\nmodes of connecting Benevolence with self, it is still maintained in\nthe present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, that\nhuman beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting to\nrelieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of\nall self-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a\nproduct of associations with self.\n\nIn the ancient world, purely disinterested conduct was abundantly\nmanifested in practice, although not made prominent in Ethical Theory.\nThe enumeration of the Cardinal Virtues does not expressly contain\nBenevolence; but under Courage, Self-sacrifice was implied. Patriotic\nSelf-devotion, Love, and Friendship were virtues highly cultivated. In\nCicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, there is a recognition of general\nBenevolence.\n\nThe two heads now sketched--The Standard and the Psychology of our\nMoral nature--almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics. Smith, Stewart,\nand Mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these\ntwo:--First, What does virtue consist in? Secondly, What is the power\nor faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it?\n\nThese two positions, however, are inadequate as regards Ancient\nEthics. For remedying the deficiency, and for bringing to light\nmatters necessary to the completeness of an Ethical survey, we add the\nfollowing heads:--\n\nIII. The Theory of what constitutes the Supreme END of Life, the BONUM\nor the SUMMUM BONUM. The question as to the highest End has divided\nthe Ethical Schools, both ancient and modern. It was the point at\nissue between the Stoics and the Epicureans. That Happiness is not the\nhighest end has been averred, in modern times, by Butler and others:\nthe opposite position is held by the supporters of Utility. What may\nbe called the severe and ascetic systems (theoretically) refuse to\nsanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure, except through virtue,\nor duty to others. The view practically proceeded upon, now and in\nmost ages, is that virtue discharges a man's obligations to his\nfellows, which being accomplished, he is then at liberty to seek what\npleases himself. (For the application of the laws of mind to the\ntheory of HAPPINESS, see Appendix C.)\n\nIV.-The CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES is characteristic of different\nsystems and different authors. The oldest scheme is the Four Cardinal\nVirtues--Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice. The modern Christian\nmoralists usually adopt the division--Duties to God, to Others, to\nSelf.\n\nMoreover, there are differences in the substance of Morality itself,\nor the things actually imposed. The code under Christianity has varied\nboth from Judaism and from Paganism.\n\nV.-The relationship of Ethics to POLITICS is close, while the points\nof difference of the two are also of great importance. In Plato the\ntwo subjects were inseparable; and in Aristotle, they were blended to\nexcess. Hobbes also joined Ethics and Politics in one system. (See\nChap, ii., \u00a7 3.)\n\nVI.-The relation of Ethics to THEOLOGY is variously represented in\nmodern systems. The Fathers and the Schoolmen accepted the authority\nof the Bible chiefly on tradition, and did not venture to sit in\njudgment on the substance of the revelation. They, therefore, rested\ntheir Ethics exclusively on the Bible; or, at most, ventured upon\ngiving some mere supplement of its precepts.\n\nOthers, in more modern times, have considered that the moral character\nof a revelation enters into the evidence in its favour; whence,\nmorality must be considered as independent, and exclusively human, in\nits origin. It would be reasoning in a circle to derive the moral law\nfrom the bible, and then to prove the bible from the moral law.\n\nReligion superadds its own sanction to the moral duties, so far as\nadopted by it; laying especial stress upon select precepts. It\nlikewise calls into being a distinct code of duties, the religious\nduties strictly so called; which have no force except with believers.\nThe 'duties to God,' in the modern classification, are religious, as\ndistinguished from moral duties.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\nTHE ETHICAL STANDARD.\n\n1. ETHICS, or Morality, is a department of Practice; and, as with\nother practical departments, is defined by its End.\n\nEthics is not mere knowledge or speculation, like the sciences of\nAstronomy, Physiology, or Psychology; it is knowledge applied to\npractice, or useful ends, like Navigation, Medicine, or Politics.\nEvery practical subject has some end to be served, the statement of\nwhich is its definition in the first instance. Navigation is the\napplying of different kinds of knowledge, and of a variety of devices,\nto the end of sailing the seas.\n\n2. The Ethical End is a certain portion of the welfare\nof human beings living together in society, realized through\nrules of conduct duly enforced.\n\nThe obvious intention of morality is the good of mankind. The\nprecepts--do not steal, do not kill, fulfil agreements, speak\ntruth--whatever other reasons may be assigned for them, have a direct\ntendency to prevent great evils that might otherwise arise in the\nintercourse of human beings.\n\nFarther, the good aimed at by Ethics is attained by _rules of acting_,\non the part of one human being to another; and, inasmuch as these\nrules often run counter to the tendencies of the individual mind, it\nis requisite to provide _adequate inducements_ to comply with them.\n\nThe Ethical End is what is otherwise called the STANDARD, test, or\ncriterion, of Right and Wrong. The leading controversy of Morals is\ncentered in this point.\n\n3. The Rules of Ethics, termed also Law, Laws, the\nMoral Law, are of two kinds:--\n\nThe first are rules imposed under a Penalty for neglect, or violation.\nThe penalty is termed _Punishment_; the imposing party is named\nGovernment, or Authority; and the rules so imposed and enforced, are\ncalled Laws proper, Morality proper, Obligatory Morality, Duty.\n\n4. The second are rules whose only external support is\n_Rewards_; constituting Optional Morality, Merit, Virtue,\nor Nobleness.\n\nMoral duties are a set of rules, precepts, or prescriptions, for the\ndirection of human conduct in a certain sphere or province. These\nrules are enforced by two kinds of motives, requiring to be kept\ndistinct.\n\nI.--One class of rules are made compulsory by the infliction of pain,\nin the case of violation or neglect. The pain so inflicted is termed a\nPenalty, or Punishment; it is one of the most familiar experiences of\nall human beings living in society.\n\nThe Institution that issues Rules of this class, and inflicts\npunishment when they are not complied with, is termed Government, or\nAuthority; all its rules are authoritative, or obligatory; they are\nLaws strictly so called, Laws proper. Punishment, Government,\nAuthority, Superiority, Obligation, Law, Duty,--define each other;\nthey are all different modes of regarding the same fact.\n\nMorality is thus in every respect analagous to Civil Government, or\nthe Law of the Land. Nay, farther, it squares, to a very great extent,\nwith Political Authority. The points where the two coincide, and those\nwhere they do not coincide, may be briefly stated:--\n\n(1) All the most essential parts of Morality are adopted and carried\nout by the Law of the Land. The rules for protecting person and\nproperty, for fulfilling contracts, for performing reciprocal duties,\nare rules or laws of the State; and are enforced by the State, through\nits own machinery. The penalties inflicted by public authority\nconstitute what is called the Political Sanction; they are the most\nsevere, and the most strictly and dispassionately administered, of all\npenalties.\n\n(2) There are certain Moral duties enforced, not by public and\nofficial authority, but by the members of the community in their\nprivate capacity. These are sometimes called the Laws of Honour,\nbecause they are punished by withdrawing from the violator the honour\nor esteem of his fellow-citizens. Courage, Prudence as regards self,\nChastity, Orthodoxy of opinion, a certain conformity in Tastes and\nUsages,--are all prescribed by the mass of each community, to a\ngreater or less extent, and are insisted on under penalty of social\ndisgrace and excommunication. This is the Social or the Popular\nSanction. The department so marked out, being distinct from the\nPolitical sphere, is called, by Austin, Positive Morality, or Morality\nproper.\n\nPublic opinion also chimes in with the Law, and adds its own sanction\nto the legal penalties for offences: unless the law happens to be in\nconflict with the popular sentiment. Criminals, condemned by the law,\nare additionally punished by social disgrace.\n\n(3) The Law of the Land contains many enactments, besides the Moral\nCode and the machinery for executing it. The Province of government\npasses beyond the properly protective function, and includes many\ninstitutions of public convenience, which are not identified with\nright and wrong. The defence from external enemies; the erection of\nworks of public utility; the promotion of social improvements,--are\nall within the domain of the public authority.[1]\n\nII.--The second class of Rules are supported, not by penalties, but by\nRewards. Society, instead of punishing men for not being charitable or\nbenevolent, praises and otherwise rewards them, when they are so.\nHence, although Morality inculcates benevolence, this is not a Law\nproper, it is not obligatory, authoritative, or binding; it is purely\nvoluntary, and is termed merit, virtuous and noble conduct.\n\nIn this department, the members of the community, in their unofficial\ncapacity, are the chief agents and administrators. The Law of the Land\noccupies itself with the enforcement of its own obligatory rules,\nhaving at its command a perfect machinery of punishment. Private\nindividuals administer praise, honour, esteem, approbation, and\nreward. In a few instances, the Government dispenses rewards, as in\nthe bestowal of office, rank, titles, and pensions, but this function\nis exceptional and limited.\n\nThe conduct rewarded by Society is chiefly resolvable into\nBeneficence. Whoever is moved to incur sacrifices, or to go through\nlabours, for the good of others, is the object, not merely of\ngratitude from the persons benefited, but of approbation from society\nat large.\n\nAny remarkable strictness or fidelity in the discharge of duties\nproperly so called, receives general esteem. Even in matters merely\nceremonial, if importance be attached to them, sedulous and exact\ncompliance, being the distinction of the few, will earn the\napprobation of the many.[2]\n\n5. The Ethical End, or Morality, _as it has been_, is founded partly\non Well-being, or Utility: and partly on Sentiment.\n\nThe portions of Morality, having in view the prevention of human\nmisery and the promotion of human happiness, are known and obvious.\nThey are not the whole of Morality as it has been.\n\nSentiment, caprice, arbitrary liking or disliking, are names for\nstates of feeling that do not necessarily arise from their objects,\nbut may be joined or disjoined by education, custom, or the power of\nthe will. The revulsion of mind, on the part of the Jews, against\neating the pig, and on our own part, as regards horse flesh, is not a\nprimitive or natural sensibility, like the pain of hunger, or of cold,\nor of a musical discord; it is purely artificial; custom has made it,\nand could unmake it. The feeling of fatigue from overwork is natural;\nthe repugnance of caste to manual labour is factitious. The dignity\nattached to the military profession, and the indignity of the office\nof public executioner, are capricious, arbitrary, and sentimental. Our\nprospective regard to the comforts of our declining years points to a\nreal interest; our feelings as to the disposal of the body after death\nare purely factitious and sentimental. Such feelings are of the things\nin our own power; and the grand mistake of the Stoics was their\nviewing all good and evil whatever in the same light.\n\nIt is an essential part of human liberty, to permit each person to\nform and to indulge these sentiments or caprices; although a good\neducation should control them with a view to our happiness on the\nwhole. But, when any individual liking or fancy of this description is\nimposed as a law upon the entire community, it is a perversion and\nabuse of power, a confounding of the Ethical end by foreign\nadmixtures. Thus, to enjoin authoritatively one mode of sepulture,\npunishing all deviations from that, could have nothing to do with the\npreservation of the order of society. In such a matter, the\ninterference of the state in modern times, has regard to the detection\nof crime in the matter of life and death, and to the evils arising\nfrom the putrescence of the dead.\n\n6. The Ethical End, although properly confined to Utility, is subject\nto still farther limitations, according to the view taken of the\nProvince of Moral Government, or Authority.\n\nAlthough nothing should be made morally obligatory but what is\ngenerally useful, the converse does not hold; many kinds of conduct\nare generally useful, but not morally obligatory. A certain amount of\nbodily exercise in the open air every day would be generally useful;\nbut neither the law of the land nor public opinion compels it. Good\nroads are works of great utility; it is not every one's duty to make\nthem.\n\nThe machinery of coercion is not brought to bear upon every\nconceivable utility. It is principally reserved, when not abused, for\na select class of utilities.\n\nSome utilities are indispensable to the very existence of men in\nsociety. The primary moral duties must be observed to some degree, if\nmen are to live together as men, and not to roam at large as beasts.\nThe interests of _Security_ are the first and most pressing concern of\nhuman society. Whatever relates to this has a surpassing importance.\nSecurity is contrasted with Improvement; what relates to Security is\ndeclared to be Right; what relates to Improvement is said to be\nExpedient; both are forms of Utility, but the one is pressing and\nindispensable, the other is optional. The same difference is expressed\nby the contrasts--Being and Well-being; Existence and Prosperous\nExistence; Fundamentals or Essentials and Circumstantials. That the\nhighway robber should be punished is a part of Being; that the\nhighways should be in good repair, is a part of Well-being. That\nJustice should be done is Existence; that farmers and traders should\ngive in to government the statistics of their occupation, is a means\nto Prosperous Existence.[3]\n\nIt is proper to advert to one specific influence in moral enactments,\nserving to disguise the Ethical end, and to widen the distinction\nbetween morality as it has been, and morality as it ought to be. The\nenforcing of legal and moral enactments demands a _power of coercion_,\nto be lodged in the hands of certain persons; the possession of which\nis a temptation to exceed the strict exigencies of public safety, or\nthe common welfare. Probably many of the whims, fancies, ceremonies,\nlikings and antipathies, that have found their way into the moral\ncodes of nations, have arisen from the arbitrary disposition of\ncertain individuals happening to be in authority at particular\njunctures. Even the general community, acting in a spontaneous manner,\nimposes needless restraints upon itself, delighting more in the\nexercise of power, than in the freedom of individual action.\n\n7. Morality, in its essential parts, is 'Eternal and Immutable;' in\nother parts, it varies with Custom.\n\n(1) The rules for protecting one man from another, for enforcing\njustice, and the observance of contracts, are essential and\nfundamental, and may be styled 'Eternal and Immutable.' The ends to be\nserved require these rules; no caprice of custom could change them\nwithout sacrificing these ends. They are to society what food is to\nindividual life, of sexual intercourse and mother's care to the\ncontinuance of the race. The primary moralities could not be exchanged\nfor rules enacting murder, pillage, injustice, unveracity, repudiation\nof engagements; because under these rules, human society would fall to\npieces.\n\n(2) The manner of carrying into effect these primary regulations of\nsociety, varies according to Custom. In some communities the machinery\nis rude and imperfect; while others have greatly improved it. The\nGreeks took the lead in advancing judicial machinery, the Romans\nfollowed.\n\nIn the regulations not essential to Being, but important to\nWell-being, there has prevailed the widest discrepancy of usage. The\nsingle department relating to the Sexes is a sufficient testimony on\nthis head. No one form of the family is indispensable to the existence\nof society; yet some forms are more favourable to general happiness\nthan others. But which form is on the whole the best, has greatly\ndivided opinion; and legislation has varied accordingly. The more\nadvanced nations have adopted compulsory monogamy, thereby giving the\nprestige of their authority in favour of that system. But it cannot be\naffirmed that the joining of one man to one woman is a portion of\n'Eternal and Immutable Morality.'\n\nMorality is an Institution of society, but not an arbitrary\ninstitution.\n\n8. Before adducing the proofs in support of the position above\nassumed, namely, that Utility or Human Happiness, with certain\nlimitations, is the _proper_ criterion of Morality, it is proper to\nenquire, what sort of evidence the Ethical Standard is susceptible of.\n\nHitherto, the doctrine of Utility has been assumed, in order to be\nfully stated. We must next review the evidence in its favour, and the\nobjections urged against it. It is desirable, however, to ask what\nkind of proof should be expected on such a question.\n\nIn the Speculative or Theoretical sciences, we prove a doctrine by\nreferring it to some other doctrine or doctrines, until we come at\nlast to some assumption that must be rested in as ultimate or final.\nWe can prove the propositions of Euclid, the law of gravitation, the\nlaw of atomic proportions, the law of association; we cannot prove our\npresent sensations, nor can we demonstrate that what has been, will\nbe. The ultimate data must be accepted as self-evident; they have no\nhigher authority than that mankind generally are disposed to accept\nthem.\n\nIn the practical Sciences, the question is not as to a principle of\nthe order of nature, but as to an _end_ of human action. There may be\n_derived_ Ends, which are susceptible of demonstrative proof; but\nthere must also be _ultimate_ Ends, for which no proof can be offered;\nthey must be received as self-evident, and their sole authority is the\nperson receiving them. In most of the practical sciences, the ends are\nderived; the end of Medicine is Health, which is an end subsidiary to\nthe final end of human happiness. So it is with Navigation, with\nPolitics, with Education, and others. In all of them, we recognize the\nbearing upon human welfare, or happiness, as a common, comprehensive,\nand crowning end. On the theory of Utility, Morals is also governed by\nthis highest end.\n\nNow, there can be no proof offered for the position that Happiness is\nthe proper end of all human pursuit, the criterion of all right\nconduct. It is an ultimate or final assumption, to be tested by\nreference to the individual judgment of mankind. If the assumption,\nthat misery, and not happiness, is the proper end of life, found\nsupporters, no one could reply, for want of a basis of argument--an\nassumption still more fundamental agreed upon by both sides. It would\nprobably be the case, that the supporters of misery, as an end, would\nbe at some point inconsistent with themselves; which would lay them\nopen to refutation. But to any one consistently maintaining the\nposition, there is no possible reply, because there is no medium of\nproof.\n\nIf then, it appears, on making the appeal to mankind, that happiness\nis admitted to be the highest end of all action, the theory of Utility\nis proved.\n\n9. The judgment of Mankind is very generally in favour of Happiness,\nas the Supreme end of human conduct, Morality included.\n\nThis decision, however, is not given without qualifications and\nreservations; nor is there perfect unanimity regarding it.\n\nThe theory of Motives to the Will is the answer to the question as to\nthe ends of human action. According to the primary law of the Will,\neach one of us, for ourselves, seeks pleasure and avoids pain, present\nor prospective. The principle is interfered with by the operation of\nFixed Ideas, under the influence of the feelings; whence we have the\nclass of Impassioned, Exaggerated, Irrational Motives or Ends. Of\nthese influences, one deserves to be signalized as a source of\nvirtuous conduct, and as approved of by mankind generally; that is,\nSympathy with others.\n\nUnder the Fixed Idea, may be ranked the acquired sense of Dignity,\nwhich induces us often to forfeit pleasure and incur pain. We should\nnot choose the life of Plato's beatified oyster, or (to use\nAristotle's example) be content with perpetual childhood, with however\ngreat a share of childish happiness.\n\n10. The Ethical end that men are tending to, and may ultimately adopt\nwithout reservation, is human Welfare, Happiness, or Being and\nWell-being combined, that is, Utility.\n\nThe evidence consists of such facts as these:--\n\n(1) By far the greater part of the morality of every age and country\nhas reference to the welfare of society. Even in the most\nsuperstitious, sentimental, and capricious despotisms, a very large\nshare of the enactments, political and moral, consist in protecting\none man from another, and in securing justice between man and man.\nThese objects may be badly carried out, they may be accompanied with\nmuch oppression of the governed by the governing body, but they are\nalways aimed at, and occasionally secured. Of the Ten Commandments,\nfour pertain to Religious Worship; _six_ are Utilitarian, that is,\nhave no end except to ward off evils, and to further the good of\nmankind.\n\n(2) The general welfare is at all times considered a strong and\nadequate justification of moral rules, and is constantly adduced as a\nmotive for obedience. The commonplaces in support of law and morality\nrepresent, that if murder and theft were to go unpunished, neither\nlife nor property would be safe; men would be in eternal warfare;\nindustry would perish; society must soon come to an end.\n\nThere is a strong disposition to support the more purely sentimental\nrequirements, and even the excesses of mere tyranny, by utilitarian\nreasons.\n\nThe cumbersome ablutions of oriental nations are defended on the\nground of cleanliness. The divine sanctity of kings is held to be an\naid to social obedience. Slavery is alleged to have been at one time\nnecessary to break in mankind to industry. Indissoluble marriage arose\nfrom a sentiment rather than from utility; but the arguments, commonly\nurged in its favour, are utilitarian.\n\n(3) In new cases, and in cases where no sentiment or passion is called\ninto play, Utility alone is appealed to. In any fresh enactment, at\nthe present day, the good of the community is the only justification\nthat would be listened to. If it were proposed to forbid absolutely\nthe eating of pork in Christian countries, some great public evils\nwould have to be assigned as the motive. Were the fatalities attending\nthe eating of pork, on account of _trichiniae_, to become numerous,\nand unpreventible, there would then be a reason, such as a modern\ncivilized community would consider sufficient, for making the rearing\nof swine a crime and an immorality. But no mere sentimental or\ncapricious dislike to the pig, on the part of any number of persons,\ncould now procure an enactment for disusing that animal.\n\n(4) There is a gradual tendency to withdraw from the moral code,\nobservances originating purely in sentiment, and having little or no\nconnexion with human welfare.\n\nWe have abandoned the divine sacredness of kings. We no longer\nconsider ourselves morally bound to denounce and extirpate heretics\nand witches, still less to observe fasts and sacred days. Even in\nregard to the Christian Sabbath, the opinion is growing in favour of\nwithdrawing both the legal and popular sanction formerly so stringent;\nwhile the arguments for Sabbath observance are more and more charged\nwith considerations of secular utility.\n\nShould these considerations be held as adequate to support the\nproposition advanced, they are decisive in favour of Utility as the\nMoral Standard that _ought to be_. Any other standard that may be set\nup in competition with Utility, must ultimately ground itself on the\nvery same appeal to the opinions and the practice of mankind.\n\n11. The chief objections urged against Utility as the moral Standard\nhave been in great part anticipated. Still, it is proper to advert to\nthem in detail.\n\nI.--It is maintained that Happiness is not, either in fact or in\nright, the sole aim of human pursuit; that men actually, deliberately,\nand by conscientious preference, seek other ends. For example, it is\naffirmed that Virtue is an end in itself, without regard to happiness.\n\nOn this argument it may be observed:--\n\n(1) It has been abundantly shown in this work, that one part of the\nforegoing affirmation is strictly true. Men are not urged to action\nexclusively by their pleasures and their pains. They are urged by\nother motives, of the impassioned kind; among which, is to be\nsignalized sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others. If this\nhad been the only instance of action at variance with the regular\ncourse of the will, we should be able to maintain that the motive to\nact is still happiness, but not always the agent's own happiness. We\nhave seen, however, that individuals, not unfrequently, act in\nopposition both to their own, and to other people's happiness; as when\nmastered by a panic, and when worked up into a frenzy of anger or\nantipathy.\n\nThe sound and tenable position seems to be this:--Human beings, in\ntheir best and soberest moods, looking before and after, weighing all\nthe consequences of actions, are generally disposed to regard\nHappiness, to some beings or others, as the proper end of all\nendeavours. The mother is not exclusively bent on her own happiness;\nshe is upon her child's. Howard abandoned the common pleasures of life\nfor himself, to diminish the misery of fellow creatures.\n\n(2) It is true that human beings are apt to regard Virtue as an\nend-in-itself, and not merely as a means to happiness as the final\nend. But the fact is fully accounted for on the general law of\nAssociation by Contiguity; there being many other examples of the same\nkind, as the love of money. Justice, Veracity, and other virtues, are\nrequisite, to some extent, for the existence of society, and, to a\nstill greater extent, for prosperous existence. Under such\ncircumstances, it would certainly happen that the means would\nparticipate in the importance of the end, and would even be regarded\nas an end in itself.\n\n(3) The great leading duties may be shown to derive their estimation\nfrom their bearing upon human welfare. Take first, Veracity or Truth.\nOf all the moral duties, this has most the appearance of being an\nabsolute and independent requirement. Yet mankind have always approved\nof deception practised upon an enemy in war, a madman, or a highway\nrobber. Also, secrecy or concealment, even although misinterpreted, is\nallowed, when it does not cause pernicious results; and is even\nenjoined and required in the intercourse of society, in order to\nprevent serious evils. But an absolute standard of truth is\nincompatible, even with secrecy or disguise; in departing from the\ncourse of perfect openness, or absolute publicity of thought and\naction, in every possible circumstance, we renounce ideal truth in\nfavour of a compromised or qualified veracity--a pursuit of truth in\nsubordination to the general well-being of society.\n\nStill less is there any form of Justice that does not have respect to\nUtility. If Justice is defined as giving to every one their own, the\nmotive clearly is to prevent misery to individuals. If there were a\nspecies of injustice that made no one unhappier, we may be quite sure\nthat tribunals would not be set up for enforcing and punishing it. The\nidea of equality in Justice is seemingly an absolute conception, but,\nin point of fact, equality is a matter of institution. The children of\nthe same parent are, in certain circumstances, regarded as unequal by\nthe law; and justice consists in respecting this inequality.\n\nThe virtue of Self-denial, is one that receives the commendation of\nsociety, and stands high in the morality of reward. Still, it is a\nmeans to an end. The operation of the associating principle tends to\nraise it above this point to the rank of a final end. And there is an\nascetic scheme of life that proceeds upon this supposition; but the\ngenerality of mankind, in practice, if not always in theory, disavow\nit.\n\n(4) It is often affirmed by those that regard virtue, and not\nhappiness, as the end, that the two coincide in the long run. Now, not\nto dwell upon the very serious doubts as to the matter of fact, a\nuniversal coincidence without causal connexion is so rare as to be in\nthe last degree improbable. A fiction of this sort was contrived by\nLeibnitz, under the title of 'pre-established harmony;' but, among the\nfacts of the universe, there are only one or two cases known to\ninvestigation.\n\n12. II.--It is objected to Utility as the Standard, that the bearings\nof conduct on general happiness are too numerous to be calculated; and\nthat even where the calculation is possible, people have seldom time\nto make it.\n\n(1) It is answered, that the primary moral duties refer to conduct\nwhere the consequences are evident and sure. The disregard of Justice\nand Truth would to an absolute certainty bring about a state of\nconfusion and ruin; their observance, in any high degree, contributes\nto raise the standard of well-being.\n\nIn other cases, the calculation is not easy, from the number of\nopposing considerations. For example, there are two sides to the\nquestion, Is dissent morally wrong? in other words, Ought all opinions\nto be tolerated? But if we venture to decide such a question, without\nthe balancing or calculating process, we must follow blindfold the\ndictates of one or other of the two opposing sentiments,--Love of\nPower and Love of Liberty.\n\nIt is not necessary that we should go through the process of\ncalculation every time we have occasion to perform a moral act. The\ncalculations have already been performed for all the leading duties,\nand we have only to apply the maxims to the cases as they arise.\n\n13. III.--The principle of Utility, it is said, contains no motives to\nseek the Happiness of others; it is essentially a form of Self-Love.\n\nThe averment is that Utility is a sufficient motive to pursue our own\nhappiness, and the happiness of others as a means to our own; but it\ndoes not afford any purely disinterested impulses; it is a Selfish\ntheory after all.\n\nNow, as Utility is, by profession, a benevolent and not a selfish\ntheory, either such profession is insincere, or there must be an\nobstruction in carrying it out. That the supporters of the theory are\ninsincere, no one has a right to affirm. The only question then is,\nwhat are the difficulties opposed by this theory, and not present in\nother theories (the Moral Sense, for example) to benevolent impulses\non the part of individuals?\n\nLet us view the objection first as regards the Morality of Obligation,\nor the duties that bind society together. Of these duties, only a\nsmall number aim at positive beneficence; they are either Protective\nof one man against another, or they enforce Reciprocity, which is\nanother name for Justice. The chief exception is the requiring of a\nminimum of charity towards the needy.\n\nThis department of duty is maintained by the force of a certain\nmixture of prudential and of beneficent considerations, on the part of\nthe majority, and by prudence (as fear of punishment) on the part of\nthe minority. But there does not appear to be anything in our\nprofessedly Benevolent Theory of Morals to interfere with the small\nportion of disinterested impulse that is bound up-with prudential\nregards, in the total of motives concerned in the morality of social\norder called the primary or obligatory morality.\n\nLet us, in the next place, view the objection as regards Optional\nMorality, where positive beneficence has full play. The principal\nmotive in this department is Reward, in the shape either of benefits\nor of approbation. Now, there is nothing to hinder the supporters of\nthe standard of Utility from joining in the rewards or commendations\nbestowed on works of charity and beneficence.\n\nAgain, there is, in the constitution of the mind, a motive superior to\nreward, namely, Sympathy proper, or the purely Disinterested impulse\nto alleviate the pains and advance the pleasures of others. This part\nof the mind is wholly _unselfish_; it needs no other prompting than\nthe fact that some one is in pain, or may be made happier by something\nwithin the power of the agent.\n\nThe objectors need to be reminded that Obligatory Morality, which\nworks by punishment, creates a purely selfish motive; that Optional\nMorality, in so far as stimulated by Reward, is also selfish; and that\nthe only source of purely disinterested impulses is in the unprompted\nSympathy of the individual mind. If such sympathies exist, and if\nnothing is done to uproot or paralyze them, they will urge men to do\ngood to others, irrespective of all theories. Good done from any other\nsource or motive is necessarily self-seeking. It is a common remark,\nwith reference to the sanctions of a future life, that they create\npurely self-regarding motives. Any proposal to increase disinterested\naction by moral obligation contains a self-contradiction; it is\nsuicidal. The rich may be made to give half their wealth to the poor;\nbut in as far as they are _made_ to do it, they are not benevolent.\nLaw distrusts generosity and supersedes it. If a man is expected to\nregard the happiness of others as an end in itself, and not as means\nto his own happiness, he must be left to his own impulses: 'the\nquality of mercy is not _strained_' The advocates of Utility may\nobserve non-interference as well as others.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\nTHE MORAL FACULTY.\n\n1. The chief question in the Psychology of Ethics is whether the Moral\nFaculty, or Conscience, be a simple or a complex fact of the mind.\n\nPractically, it would seem of little importance in what way the moral\nfaculty originated, except with a view to teach us how it may be best\nstrengthened when it happens to be weak. Still, a very great\nimportance has been attached to the view, that it is simple and\ninnate; the supposition being that a higher authority thereby belongs\nto it. If it arises from mere education, it depends on the teacher for\nthe time being; if it exists prior to all education, it seems to be\nthe voice of universal nature or of God.\n\n2. In favour of the simple and intuitive character of Moral Sentiment,\nit is argued:--\n\nFirst, That our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and\ninstantaneous.\n\nOn almost all occasions, we are ready at once to pronounce an action\nright or wrong. We do not need to deliberate or enquire, or to canvass\nreasons and considerations for and against, in order to declare a\nmurder, a theft, or a lie to be wrong. We are fully armed with the\npower of deciding all such questions; we do not hesitate, like a\nperson that has to consult a variety of different faculties or\ninterests. Just as we pronounce at once whether the day is light or\ndark, hot or cold; whether a weight is light or heavy;--we are able to\nsay whether an action is morally right or the opposite.\n\n3. Secondly, It is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind.\n\nThis was expressed by Cicero, in a famous passage, often quoted with\napprobation, by the supporters of innate moral distinctions. 'There is\none true and original law conformable to reason and to nature,\ndiffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to duty and deters\nfrom injustice, &c.'\n\n4. Thirdly, Moral Sentiment is said to be radically different in its\nnature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind.\n\nThe peculiar state of discriminating right and wrong, involving\napprobation and disapprobation, is considered to be entirely unlike\nany other mental element; and, if so, we are precluded from resolving\nor analyzing it into simpler modes of feeling, willing, or thinking.\n\nWe have many feelings that urge us to act and abstain from acting; but\nthe prompting of conscience has something peculiar to itself, which\nhas been expressed by the terms rightness, authority, supremacy. Other\nmotives,--hunger, curiosity, benevolence, and so on,--have might, this\nhas right.\n\nSo, the Intellect has many occasions for putting forth its aptitudes\nof discriminating, identifying, remembering; but the operation of\ndiscerning right and wrong is supposed to be a unique employment of\nthose functions.\n\n5. In reply to these arguments, and in support of the view that the\nMoral Faculty is complex and derived, the following considerations are\nurged:--\n\nFirst, The Immediateness of a judgment, is no proof of its being\ninnate; long practice or familiarity has the same effect.\n\nIn proportion as we are habituated to any subject, or any class of\noperations, our decisions are rapid and independent of deliberation.\nAn expert geometer sees at a glance whether a demonstration is\ncorrect. In extempore speech, a person has to perform every moment a\nseries of judgments as to the suitability of words to meaning, to\ngrammar, to taste, to effect upon an audience. An old soldier knows in\nan instant, without thought or deliberation, whether a position is\nsufficiently guarded. There is no greater rapidity in the judgments of\nright and wrong, than in these acquired professional judgments.\n\nMoreover, the decisions of conscience are quick only in the simpler\ncases. It happens not unfrequently that difficult and protracted\ndeliberations are necessary to a moral judgment.\n\n6. Secondly, The alleged similarity of men's moral judgments in all\ncountries and times holds only to a limited degree.\n\nThe very great differences among different nations, as to what\nconstitutes right and wrong, are too numerous, striking, and serious,\nnot to have been often brought forward in Ethical controversy. Robbery\nand murder are legalized in whole nations. Macaulay's picture of the\nHighland Chief of former days is not singular in the experience of\nmankind.\n\n'His own vassals, indeed, were few in number, but he came of the best\nblood of the Highlands. He kept up a close connexion with his more\npowerful kinsmen; nor did they like him the less because he was a\nrobber; for he never robbed them; and that robbery, merely as robbery,\nwas a wicked and disgraceful act, had never entered into the mind of\nany Celtic chief.'\n\nVarious answers have been given by the advocates of innate morality to\nthese serious discrepancies.\n\n(1) It is maintained that savage or uncultivated nations are not a\nfair criterion of mankind generally: that as men become more\ncivilized, they approximate to unity of moral sentiment; and what\ncivilized men agree in, is alone to be taken as the judgment of the\nrace.\n\nNow, this argument would have great weight, in any discussion as to\nwhat is good, useful, expedient, or what is in accordance with the\ncultivated reason or intelligence of mankind; because civilization\nconsists in the exercise of men's intellectual faculties to improve\ntheir condition. But in a controversy as to what is given us by\nnature,--what we possess independently of intelligent search and\nexperience,--the appeal to civilization does not apply. What civilized\nmen agree upon among themselves, as opposed to savages, is likely to\nbe the reverse of a natural instinct; in other words, something\nsuggested by reason and experience.\n\nIn the next place, counting only civilized races, that is, including\nthe chief European, American, and Asiatic peoples of the present day,\nand the Greeks and Romans of the ancient world, we still find\ndisparities on what are deemed by us fundamental points of moral right\nand wrong. Polygamy is regarded as right in Turkey, India, and China,\nand as wrong in England. Marriages that we pronounce incestuous were\nlegitimate in ancient times. The views entertained by Plato and\nAristotle as to the intercourse of the sexes are now looked upon with\nabhorrence.\n\n(2) It has been replied that, although men differ greatly in what they\nconsider right and wrong, they all agree in possessing _some notion_\nof right and wrong. No people are entirely devoid of moral judgments.\n\nBut this is to surrender the only position of any real importance. The\nsimple and underived character of the moral faculty is maintained\nbecause of the superior authority attached to what is natural, as\nopposed to what is merely conventional. But if nothing be natural but\nthe mere fact of right and wrong, while all the details, which alone\nhave any value, are settled by convention and custom, we are as much\nat sea on one system as on the other.\n\n(3) It is fully admitted, being, indeed, impossible to deny, that\neducation must concur with natural impulses in making up the moral\nsentiment. No human being, abandoned entirely to native promptings, is\never found to manifest a sense of right and wrong. As a general rule,\nthe strength of the conscience depends on the care bestowed on its\ncultivation. Although we have had to recognize primitive distinctions\namong men as to the readiness to take on moral training, still, the\nbetter the training, the stronger will be the conscientious\ndeterminations.\n\nBut this admission has the effect of reducing the part performed by\nnature to a small and uncertain amount. Even if there were native\npreferences, they might be completely overborne and reversed by an\nassiduous education. The difference made by inculcation is so great,\nthat it practically amounts to everything. A voice so feeble as to be\noverpowered by foreign elements would do no credit to nature.\n\n7. Thirdly, Moral right and wrong is not so much a simple, indivisible\nproperty, as an extensive Code of regulations, which cannot even be\nunderstood without a certain maturity of the intelligence.\n\nIf is not possible to sum up the whole field of moral right and wrong,\nso as to bring it within the scope of a single limited perception,\nlike the perception of resistance, or of colour. In regard to some of\nthe alleged intuitions at the foundation of our knowledge, as for\nexample time and space, there is a comparative simplicity and unity,\nrendering their innate origin less disputable. No such simplicity can\nbe assigned in the region of duty.\n\nAfter the subject of morals has been studied in the detail, it has,\nindeed, been found practicable to comprise the whole, by a kind of\ngeneralization, in one comprehensive recognition of regard to our\nfellows. But, in the first place, this is far from a primitive or an\nintuitive suggestion of the mind. It came at a late stage of human\nhistory, and is even regarded as a part of Revelation. In the second\nplace, this high generality must be accompanied with detailed\napplications to particular cases and circumstances. Life is full of\nconflicting demands, and there must be special rules to adjust these\nvarious demands. We have to be told that country is greater than\nfamily; that temporary interests are to succumb to more enduring, and\nso on.\n\nSupposing the Love of our Neighbour to unfold in detail, as it\nexpresses in sum, the whole of morality, this is only another name for\nour Sympathetic, Benevolent, or Disinterested regards, into which\ntherefore Conscience would be resolved, as it was by Hume.\n\nBut Morals is properly considered as a wide-ranging science, having a\nvariety of heads full of difficulty, and demanding minute\nconsideration. The subject of Justice, has nothing simple but the\nabstract statement--giving each one their due; before that can be\napplied, we must ascertain what is each person's due, which introduces\ncomplex questions of relative merit, far transcending the sphere of\nintuition.\n\nIf any part of Morals had the simplicity of an instinct, it would be\nregard to Truth. The difference between truth and falsehood might\nalmost be regarded as a primitive susceptibility, like the difference\nbetween light and dark, between resistance and non-resistance. That\neach person should say what is, instead of what is not, may well seem\na primitive and natural impulse. In circumstances of perfect\nindifference, this would be the obvious and usual course of conduct;\nbeing, like the straight line, the shortest distance between two\npoints. Let a motive arise, however, in favour of the lie, and there\nis nothing to insure the truth. Reference must be made to other parts\nof the mind, from which counter-motives may be furnished; and the\nintuition in favour of Truth, not being able to support itself, has to\nrepose on the general foundation of all virtue, the instituted\nrecognition of the claims of others.\n\n8. Fourthly, Intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions\nof Practical Morality.\n\nIf we recall some of the great questions of practical life that have\ndivided the opinions of mankind, we shall find that mere Intuition is\nhelpless to decide them.\n\nThe toleration of heretical opinions has been a greatly contested\npoint. Our feelings are arrayed on both sides; and there is no\nprompting of nature to arbitrate between the opposing impulses. If the\nadvance of civilization has tended to liberty, it has been owing\npartly to greater enlightenment, and partly to the successful\nstruggles of dissent in the war with established opinion.\n\nThe questions relating to marriage are wholly undecideable by\nintuition. The natural impulses are for unlimited co-habitation. The\ndegree of restraint to be put upon this tendency is not indicated by\nany sentiment that can be discovered in the mind. The case is very\npeculiar. In thefts and murder, the immediate consequences are injury\nto some one; in sexual indulgence, the immediate result is agreeable\nto all concerned. The evils are traceable only in remote consequences,\nwhich intuition can know nothing of. It is not to be wondered,\ntherefore, that nations, even highly civilized, have differed widely\nin their marriage institutions; agreeing only in the propriety of\nadopting and enforcing _some_ regulations. So essentially has this\nmatter been bound up with the moral code of every society, that a\nproposed criterion of morality unable to grapple with it, would be\ndiscarded as worthless. Yet there is no intuitive sentiment that can\nbe of any avail in the question of marriage with a deceased wife's\nsister.\n\n9. Fifthly, It is practicable to analyze or resolve the Moral Faculty;\nand, in so doing, to explain, both its peculiar property, and the\nsimilarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men.\n\nWe begin, by estimating the operation of (1) Prudence. (2) Sympathy,\nand (3) the Emotions generally.\n\nThe inducements to perform a moral act, as, for example, the\nfulfilling of a bargain,--are plainly seen to be of various kinds.\n\n(1) Prudence, or Self-interest, has obviously much to do with the\nmoral conduct. Postponing for the present the consideration of\nPunishment, which is one mode of appeal to the prudential regards, we\ncan trace the workings of self-interest on many occasions wherein men\nact right. To fulfil a bargain is, in the great majority of cases, for\nthe advantage of the agent; if he fails to perform his part, others\nmay do the same to him.\n\nOur self-interest may look still farther. We may readily discover that\nif we set an example of injustice, it may be taken up and repeated to\nsuch a degree that we can count upon nothing; social security comes to\nan end, and individual existence, even if possible, would cease to be\ndesirable.\n\nA yet higher view of self-interest informs us, that by performing all\nour obligations to our fellows, we not only attain reciprocal\nperformance, but generate mutual affections and sympathies, which\ngreatly augment the happiness of life.\n\n(2) Sympathy, or Fellow-feeling, the source of our disinterested\nactions, must next be taken into the account. It is a consequence of\nour sympathetic endowment that we revolt from inflicting pain on\nanother, and even forego a certain satisfaction to self rather than be\nthe occasion of suffering to a fellow creature. Moved thus, we perform\nmany obligations on the ground of the misery (not our own) accruing\nfrom their neglect.\n\nA considerable portion of human virtue springs directly from this\nsource. If purely disinterested tendencies were withdrawn from the\nbreast, the whole existence of humanity would be changed. Society\nmight not be impossible; there are races where mutual sympathy barely\nexists: but the fulfilment of obligations, if always dependent on a\nsense of self-interest, would fail where that was not apparent. On the\nother hand, if we were on all occasions touched with the unhappiness\nto others immediately and remotely springing from our conduct--if\nsympathy were perfect and unfailing--we could hardly ever omit doing\nwhat was right.\n\n(3) Our several Emotions or Passions may co-operate with Prudence and\nwith Sympathy in a way to make both the one and the other more\nefficacious.\n\nPrudence, in the shape of aversion to pain, is rendered more acute\nwhen the pain is accompanied with Fear. The perturbation of fear rises\nup as a deterring motive when dangers loom in the distance. One\npowerful check to the commission of injury is the retaliation of the\nsufferer, which is a danger of the vague and illimitable kind,\ncalculated to create alarm.\n\nAnger, or Resentment, also enters, in various ways, into our moral\nimpulses. In one shape it has just been noticed. In concurrence with\nSelf-interest and Sympathy, it heightens the feeling of reprobation\nagainst wrong-doers.\n\nThe Tender Emotion, and the Affections, uphold us in the performance\nof our duties to others, being an additional safeguard against injury\nto the objects of the feelings. It has already been shown how these\nemotions, while tending to coalesce with Sympathy proper, are yet\ndistinguished from it.\n\nThe AEsthetic Emotions have important bearings upon Ethical Sentiment.\nAs a whole, they are favourable to human virtue, being non-exclusive\npleasures. They, however, give a bias to the formation of moral rules,\nand pervert the proper test of right and wrong in a manner to be\nafterwards explained.\n\n10. Although Prudence and Sympathy, and the various Emotions named,\nare powerful inducements to what is right in action, and although,\nwithout these, right would not prevail among mankind, yet they do not\nstamp the _peculiar attribute_ of Rightness. For this, we must refer\nto the institution of Government, or Authority.\n\nAlthough the force of these various motives on the side of right is\nall-powerful and essential, so much so, that without them morality\nwould be impossible, they do not, of themselves, impart the character\nof a moral act. We do not always feel that, because we have neglected\nour interest or violated our sympathies, we have on that account done\nwrong. The criterion of rightness in particular cases is something\ndifferent.\n\nThe reasons are apparent. For although prudence, as regards self, and\nsympathy or fellow-feeling, as regards others, would comprehend all\nthe interests of mankind--everything that morality can desire to\naccomplish--nevertheless, the acting out of these impulses by each\nindividual at random would not suffice for the exigencies of human\nlife. They must be regulated, directed, reconciled by society at\nlarge; each person must be made to work upon the same plan as every\nother person. This leads to the institution of Government and\nAuthority, with the correlatives of Law, Obligation, and Punishment.\nOur natural impulses for good are now directed into an artificial\nchannel, and it is no longer optional whether they shall fall into\nthat channel. The nature of the case requires all to conform alike to\nthe general arrangements, and whoever is not sufficiently urged by the\nnatural motives, is brought under the spur of a new kind of prudential\nmotive--Punishment.\n\nGovernment, Authority, Law, Obligation, Punishment, are all implicated\nin the same great Institution of Society, to which Morality owes its\nchief foundation, and the Moral Sentiment its special attribute.\nMorality is not Prudence, nor Benevolence, in their primitive or\nspontaneous manifestations; it is the systematic codification of\nprudential and benevolent actions, rendered obligatory by what is\ntermed penalties or Punishment; an entirely distinct motive,\nartificially framed by human society, but made so familiar to every\nmember of society as to be a second nature. None are allowed to be\nprudential or sympathizing in their own way. Parents are compelled to\nnourish their own children; servants to obey their own masters, to the\nneglect of other regards; all citizens have to abide by the awards of\nauthority; bargains are to be fulfilled according to a prescribed form\nand letter; truth is to be spoken on certain definite occasions, and\nnot on others. In a formed society, the very best impulses of nature\nfail to guide the citizen's actions. No doubt there ought to be a\ngeneral coincidence between what Prudence and Sympathy would dictate,\nand what Law dictates; but the precise adjustment is a matter of\n_institution_. A moral act is not merely an act tending to reconcile\nthe good of the agent with the good of the whole society; it is an\nact, prescribed by the social authority, and rendered obligatory upon\nevery citizen. Its morality is constituted by its authoritative\nprescription, and not by its fulfilling the primary ends of the social\ninstitution. A bad law is still a law; an ill-judged moral precept is\nstill a moral precept, felt as such by every loyal citizen.\n\n11. It may be proved, by such evidence as the case admits of, that the\npeculiarity of the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, is identified with\nour education under government, or Authority.\n\nConscience is described by such terms as moral approbation and\ndisapprobation; and involves, when highly developed, a peculiar and\nunmistakeable revulsion of mind at what is wrong, and a strong\nresentment towards the wrong-doer, which become Remorse, in the case\nof self.\n\nIt is capable of being proved, that there is nothing natural or\nprimitive in these feelings, except in so far as the case happens to\nconcur with the dictates of Self-interest, or Sympathy, aided by the\nEmotions formerly specified. Any action that is hostile to our\ninterest, excites a form of disapprobation, such as belongs to wounded\nself-interest; and any action that puts another to pain may so affect\nour natural sympathy as to be disapproved, and resented on that\nground. These natural or inborn feelings are always liable to coincide\nwith moral right and wrong, although they are not its criterion or\nmeasure in the mind of each individual. But in those cases where an\nunusually strong feeling of moral disapprobation is awakened, there is\napt to be a concurrence of the primitive motives of self, and of\nfellow-feeling; and it is the ideal of good law, and good morality to\ncoincide with a certain well-proportioned adjustment of the Prudential\nand the Sympathetic regards of the individual.\n\nThe requisite allowance being made for the natural impulses, we must\nnow adduce the facts, showing that the characteristic of the Moral\nSense is an education under Law, or Authority, through the\ninstrumentality of Punishment.\n\n(1) It is a fact that human beings living in society are placed under\ndiscipline, accompanied by punishment. Certain actions are forbidden,\nand the doers of them are subjected to some painful infliction; which\nis increased in severity if they are persisted in. Now, what would be\nthe natural consequence of such a system, under the known laws of\nfeeling, will, and intellect? Would not an action that always brings\ndown punishment be associated with the pain and the dread of\npunishment? Such an association is inevitably formed, and becomes at\nleast a part, and a very important part, of the sense of duty; nay, it\nwould of itself, after a certain amount of repetition, be adequate to\nrestrain for ever the performance of the action, thus attaining the\nend of morality.\n\nThere may be various ways of evoking and forming the moral sentiment,\nbut the one way most commonly trusted to, and never altogether\ndispensed with, is the associating of pain, that is, punishment, with\nthe actions that are disallowed. Punishment is held out as the\nconsequence of performing certain actions; every individual is made to\ntaste of it; its infliction is one of the most familiar occurrences of\nevery-day life. Consequently, whatever else may be present in the\nmoral sentiment, this fact of the connexion of pain with forbidden\nactions must enter into it with an overpowering prominence. Any\nnatural or primitive impulse in the direction of duty must be very\nmarked and apparent, in order to divide with this communicated bias\nthe direction of our conduct. It is for the supporters of innate\ndistinctions to point out any concurring impetus (apart from the\nPrudential and Sympathetic regards) sufficiently important to cast\nthese powerful associations into a secondary or subordinate position.\n\nBy a familiar effect of Contiguous Association, the dread of\npunishment clothes the forbidden act with a feeling of aversion, which\nin the end persists of its own accord, and without reference to the\npunishment. Actions that have long been connected in the mind with\npains and penalties, come to be contemplated with a _disinterested_\nrepugnance; they seem to give pain on their own account. This is a\nparallel, from the side of pain, of the acquired attachment to money.\nNow, when, by such transference, a self-subsisting sentiment of\naversion has been created, the conscience seems to be detached from\nall external sanctions, and to possess an isolated footing in the\nmind. It has passed through the stage of reference to authority, and\nhas become a law to itself. But no conscience ever arrives at the\nindependent standing, without first existing in the reflected and\ndependent stage.\n\nWe must never omit from the composition of the Conscience the primary\nimpulses of Self-Interest and Sympathy, which in minds strongly alive\nto one or other, always count for a powerful element in human conduct,\nalthough for reasons already stated, not the strictly moral element,\nso far as the individual is concerned. They are adopted, more or less,\nby the authority imposing the moral code; and when the two sources\ncoincide, the stream is all the stronger.\n\n(2) Where moral training is omitted or greatly neglected, there is an\nabsence of security for virtuous conduct.\n\nIn no civilized community is moral discipline entirely wanting.\nAlthough children may be neglected by their parents, they come at last\nunder the discipline of the law and the public. They cannot be\nexempted from the associations of punishment with wrong. But when\nthese associations have not been early and sedulously formed, in the\nfamily, in the school, and in the workshop, the moral sentiment is\nleft in a feeble condition. There still remain the force of the law\nand of public opinion, the examples of public punishment, and the\nreprobation of guilt. Every member of the community must witness daily\nthe degraded condition of the viciously disposed, and the prosperity\nfollowing on respect for the law. No human being escapes from thus\ncontracting moral impressions to a very large amount.\n\n(3) Whenever an action is associated with Disapprobation and\nPunishment, there grows up, in reference to it, a state of mind\nundistinguishable from Moral Sentiment.\n\nThere are many instances where individuals are enjoined to a course of\nconduct wholly indifferent with regard to universal morality, as in\nthe regulations of societies formed for special purposes. Each member\nof the society has to conform to these regulations, under pain of\nforfeiting all the benefits of the society, and of perhaps incurring\npositive evils. The code of honour among gentlemen is an example of\nthese artificial impositions. It is not to be supposed that there\nshould be an innate sentiment to perform actions having nothing to\ndo-with moral right and wrong; yet the disapprobation and the remorse\nfollowing on a breach of the code of honour, will often be greater\nthan what follows a breach of the moral law. The constant habit of\nregarding with dread the consequences of violating any of the rules,\nsimulates a moral sentiment, on a subject unconnected with morality\nproperly so called.\n\nThe arbitrary ceremonial customs of nations, with reference to such\npoints as ablutions, clothing, eating and abstinence from meats,--when\nrendered obligatory by the force of penalties, occupy exactly the same\nplace in the mind as the principles of moral right and wrong. The same\nform of dread attaches to the consequences of neglect; the same\nremorse is felt by the individual offender. The exposure of the naked\nperson is as much abhorred as telling a lie. The Turkish woman\nexposing her face, is no less conscience-smitten than if she murdered\nher child. There is no act, however trivial, that cannot be raised to\nthe position of a moral act, by the imperative of society.\n\nStill more striking is the growth of a moral sentiment in connexion\nwith such usages as the Hindoo suttee. It is known that the Hindoo\nwidow, if prevented from burning herself with her husband's corpse,\noften feels all the pangs of remorse, and leads a life of misery and\nself-humiliation. The habitual inculcation of this duty by society,\nthe penalty of disgrace attached to its omission, operate to implant a\nsentiment in every respect analogous to the strongest moral sentiment.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\n\nTHE ETHICAL SYSTEMS.\n\nThe first important name in Ancient Ethical Philosophy is SOKRATES.\n[469-399 B.C.]\n\nFor the views of Sokrates, as well as his method,[4] we have first the\nMEMORABILIA of XENOPHON, and next such of the Platonic Compositions,\nas are judged, by comparison with the Memorabilia, to keep closest to\nthe real Sokrates. Of these, the chief are the APOLOGY OF SOKRATES,\nthe KRITON and the PHAEDON.\n\nThe 'Memorabilia' was composed by Xenophon, expressly to vindicate\nSokrates against the accusations and unfavourable opinions that led to\nhis execution. The 'Apology' is Plato's account of his method, and\nalso sets forth his moral attitude. The 'Kriton' describes a\nconversation between him and his friend Kriton, in prison, two days\nbefore his death, wherein, in reply to the entreaties of his friends\ngenerally that he should make his escape from prison, he declares his\ndetermination to abide by the laws of the Athenian State. Inasmuch as,\nin the Apology, he had seemed to set his private convictions above the\npublic authority, he here presents another side of his character. The\n'Phaedon' contains the conversation on 'the Immortality of the Soul'\njust before his execution.\n\nThe Ethical bearings of the Philosophical method, the Doctrines, and\nthe Life of Sokrates. are these:--\n\nThe direction he gave to philosophical enquiry, was expressed in the\nsaying that he brought 'Philosophy down from Heaven to Earth.' His\nsubjects were Man and Society. He entered a protest against the\nenquiries of the early philosophers as to the constitution of the\nKosmos, the nature of the Heavenly Bodies, the theory of Winds and\nStorms. He called these Divine things; and in a great degree useless,\nif understood. The Human relations of life, the varieties of conduct\nof men towards each other in all capacities, were alone within the\ncompass of knowledge, and capable of yielding fruit. In short, his\nturn of mind was thoroughly _practical_, we might say _utilitarian_.\n\nI.--He gave a foundation and a shape to Ethical Science, by insisting\non its practical character, and by showing that, like the other arts\nof life, it had an End, and a Theory from which flows the precepts or\nmeans. The End, which would be the STANDARD, was not stated by him,\nand hardly even by Plato, otherwise than in general language; the\nSummum Bonum had not as yet become a matter of close debate. 'The art\nof dealing with human beings,' 'the art of behaving in society,' 'the\nscience of human happiness,' were various modes of expressing the\nfinal end of conduct.[5] Sokrates clearly indicated the difference\nbetween an unscientific and a scientific art; the one is an\nincommunicable knack or dexterity, the other is founded on theoretical\nprinciples.\n\nII.--Notwithstanding his professing ignorance of what virtue is,\nSokrates had a definite doctrine with reference to Ethics, which we\nmay call his PSYCHOLOGY of the subject. This was the doctrine that\nresolves Virtue into Knowledge, Vice into Ignorance or Folly. 'To do\nright was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of\nunhappiness compatible with any given situation: now, this was\nprecisely what every one wished for and aimed at--only that many\npersons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise\nenough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own\nenemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not\nfully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so\nthat the proper remedy to apply, was enlarged teaching of consequences\nand improved judgment. To make him willing to be taught, the only\ncondition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the\nwant of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and\nof vice' (Grote). This doctrine grew out of his favourite analogy\nbetween social duty and a profession or trade. When the artizan goes\nwrong, it is usually from pure ignorance or incapacity; he is willing\nto do good work if he is able.\n\nIII.--The SUMMUM BONUM with Sokrates was Well-doing. He had no ideal\nof pursuit for man apart from virtue, or what he esteemed virtue--the\nnoble and the praiseworthy. This was the elevated point of view\nmaintained alike by him and by Plato, and common to them with the\nideal of modern ages.\n\nWell-doing consisted in doing well whatever a man undertook. 'The best\nman,' he said, 'and the most beloved by the gods, is he that, as a\nhusbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, the\nduties of the medical art; in political life, his duty towards the\ncommonwealth. The man that does nothing well is neither useful nor\nagreeable to the gods.' And as knowledge is essential to all\nundertakings, knowledge is the one thing needful. This exclusive\nregard to knowledge was his one-sidedness as a moral theorist; but he\ndid not consistently exclude all reference to the voluntary control of\nappetite and passion.\n\nIV.--He inculcated Practical Precepts of a self-denying kind, intended\nto curb the excesses of human desire and ambition. He urged the\npleasures of self-improvement and of duty against indulgences,\nhonours, and worldly advancement. In the 'Apology,' he states it as\nthe second aim of his life (after imparting the shock of conscious\nignorance) to reproach men for pursuing wealth and glory more than\nwisdom and virtue. In 'Kriton,' he lays it down that we are never to\nact wrongly or unjustly, although others are unjust to us. And, in his\nown life, he furnished an illustrious example of his teaching. The\nsame lofty strain was taken up by Plato, and repeated in most of the\nsubsequent Ethical schools.\n\nV.--His Ethical Theory extended itself to Government, where he applied\nhis analogy of the special arts. The legitimate King was he that knew\nhow to govern well.\n\nVI.--The connexion in the mind of Sokrates between Ethics and Theology\nwas very slender.\n\nIn the first place, his distinction of Divine and Human things, was an\nexclusion of the arbitrary will of the gods from human affairs, or\nfrom those things that constituted the ethical end.\n\nBut in the next place, he always preserved a pious and reverential\ntone of mind; and considered that, after patient study, men should\nstill consult the oracles, by which the gods, in cases of difficulty,\ngraciously signified their intentions, and their beneficent care of\nthe race. Then, the practice of well-doing was prompted by reference\nto the satisfaction of the gods. In so far as the gods administered\nthe world in a right spirit, they would show favour to the virtuous.\n\nPLATO. [427-347 B.C.]\n\nThe Ethical Doctrines of Plato are scattered through his various\nDialogues; and incorporated with his philosophical method, with his\ntheory of Ideas, and with his theories of man and of society.\n\nFrom Sokrates, Plato derived Dialectics, or the method of Debate; he\nembodied all his views in imaginary conversations, or Dialogues,\nsuggested by, and resembling the real conversations of Sokrates. And\nfarther, in imitation of his master, he carried on his search after\ntruth under the guise of ascertaining the exact meaning or definition\nof leading terms; as Virtue, Courage, Holiness, Temperance, Justice,\nLaw, Beauty, Knowledge, Rhetoric, &c.\n\nWe shall first pass in review the chief Dialogues containing Ethical\ndoctrines.\n\nThe APOLOGY, KRITON, and EUTHYPHRON (we follow Mr. Grote's order) may\nbe passed by as belonging more to his master than to himself;\nmoreover, everything contained in them will be found recurring in\nother dialogues.\n\nThe ALKIBIADES I. is a good specimen of the Sokratic manner. It brings\nout the loose discordant notions of _Just_ and _Unjust_ prevailing in\nthe community; sets forth that the Just is also honourable, good, and\nexpedient--the cause of happiness to the just man; urges the\nimportance of Self-knowledge; and maintains that the conditions of\nhappiness are not wealth and power, but Justice and Temperance.\n\nALKIBIADES II. brings out a Platonic position as to the _Good_. There\nare a number of things that are good, as health, money, family, but\nthere is farther required the skill to apply these in proper measure\nto the supreme end of life. All knowledge is not valuable; there may\nbe cases where ignorance is better. What we are principally interested\nin knowing is the Good, the Best, the Profitable. The man of much\nlearning, without this, is like a vessel tossed on the sea without a\npilot.[6]\n\nIn HIPPIAS MINOR, appears an extreme statement of the doctrine, common\nto Sokrates and Plato, identifying virtue with knowledge, or giving\nexclusive attention to the intellectual element of conduct. It is\nurged that a mendacious person, able to tell the truth if he chooses,\nis better than one unable to tell it, although wishing to do so; the\nknowledge is of greater worth than the good disposition.\n\nIn MINOS (or the Definition of _Law_) he refuses to accept the decree\nof the state as a law, but postulates the decision of some Ideal wise\nman. This is a following out of the Sokratic analogy of the\nprofessions, to a purely ideal demand; the wise man is never\nproducible. In many dialogues (Kriton, Laches, &c.) the decision of\nsome Expert is sought, as a physician is consulted in disease; but the\nMoral expert is unknown to any actual community.\n\nIn LACHES, the question 'what is Virtue?' is put; it is argued under\nthe special virtue of _Courage_. In a truly Sokratic dialogue,\nSokrates is in search of a definition of Courage; as happens in the\nsearch dialogues, there is no definite result, but the drift of the\ndiscussion is to make courage a mode of intelligence, and to resolve\nit into the grand desideratum of the knowledge of good and\nevil--belonging to the One Wise Man.\n\nCHARMIDES discusses _Temperance_. As usual with Plato in discussing\nthe virtues, with a view to their Logical definition, he presupposes\nthat this is something beneficial and good. Various definitions are\ngiven of Temperance; and all are rejected; but the dialogue falls into\nthe same track as the Laches, in putting forward the supreme science\nof good and evil. It is a happy example of the Sokratic manner and\npurpose, of exposing the conceit of knowledge, the fancy that people\nunderstand the meaning of the general terms habitually employed.\n\nLYSIS on _Friendship_, or Love, might be expected to furnish some\nethical openings, but it is rather a piece of dialectic, without\nresult, farther than to impart the consciousness of ignorance. If it\nsuggests anything positive, it is the Idea of Good, as the ultimate\nend of affection. The subject is one of special interest in ancient\nEthics, as being one of the aspects of Benevolent sentiment in the\nPagan world. In Aristotle we first find a definite handling of it.\n\nMENON may be considered as pre-eminently ethical in its design. It is\nexpressly devoted to the question--Is Virtue _teachable_? Sokrates as\nusual confesses that he does not know what virtue is. He will not\naccept a catalogue of the admitted virtues as a definition of virtue,\nand presses for some common, or defining attribute. He advances on his\nown side his usual doctrine that virtue is Knowledge, or a mode of\nKnowledge, and that it is good and profitable; which is merely an\niteration of the Science of good and evil. He distinguishes virtue\nfrom Right Opinion, a sort of quasi-knowledge, the knowledge of\nesteemed and useful citizens, which cannot be the highest knowledge,\nsince these citizens fail to impart it even to their own sons.\n\nIn this dialogue, we have Plato's view of Immortality, which comprises\nboth pre-existence and post-existence. The pre-existence is used to\nexplain the derivation of general notions, or Ideas, which are\nantecedent to the perceptions of sense.\n\nIn PROTAGORAS, we find one of the most important of the ethical\ndiscussions of Plato. It proceeds from the same question--Is virtue\nteachable?--Sokrates as usual expressing his doubts on the point.\nProtagoras then delivers a splendid harangue, showing how virtue is\ntaught--namely, by the practice of society in approving, condemning,\nrewarding, punishing the actions of individuals. From childhood\nupward, every human being in society is a witness to the moral\nprocedure of society, and by degrees both knows, and conforms to, the\nmaxims of virtue of the society. Protagoras himself as a professed\nteacher, or sophist, can improve but little upon, this habitual\ninculcation. Sokrates, at the end of the harangue, puts in his usual\nquestions tending to bring out the essence or definition of virtue,\nand soon drives Protagoras into a corner, bringing him to admit a view\nnowhere else developed in Plato, that Pleasure is the only good, Pain\nthe only evil, and that the science of Good and Evil consists in\nMeasuring, and in choosing between conflicting pleasures and\npains--preferring the greater pleasure to the less, the less pain to\nthe greater. For example, courage is a wise estimate of things\nterrible and things not terrible. In consistency with the doctrine\nthat Knowledge is virtue, it is maintained here as elsewhere, that a\nman knowing good and evil must act upon that knowledge. Plato often\nrepeats his theory of Measurement, but never again specifically\nintimates that the things to be measured are pleasures and pains. And\nneither here nor elsewhere, does he suppose the virtuous man taking\ndirectly into his calculation the pleasures and pains of other\npersons.\n\nGORGIAS, one of the most renowned of the dialogues in point of\ncomposition, is also ethical, but at variance with the Protagoras, and\nmore in accordance with Plato's predominating views. The professed\nsubject is Rhetoric, which, as an art, Sokrates professes to hold in\ncontempt. The dialogue begins with the position that men are prompted\nby the desire of good, but proceeds to the great Platonic paradox,\nthat it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong. The\ncriminal labours under a mental distemper, and the best thing that can\nhappen to him, is to be punished that so he may be cured. The\nunpunished wrong-doer is more miserable than if he were punished.\nSokrates in this dialogue maintains, in opposition to the thesis of\nProtagoras, that pleasure is not the same as good, that there are bad\npleasures and good pains; and a skilful adviser, one versed in the\nscience of good and evil, must discriminate between them. He does not\nmean that those pleasures only are bad that bring an overplus of\nfuture pains, which would be in accordance with the previous dialogue.\nThe sentiment of the dialogue is ascetic and self-denying.[7] Order or\nDiscipline is inculcated, not as a means to an end, but as an end in\nitself.\n\nThe POLITIKUS is on the Art of Government, and gives the Platonic\n_beau id\u00e9al_ of the One competent person, governing absolutely, by\nvirtue of his scientific knowledge, and aiming at the good and\nimprovement of the governed. This is merely another illustration of\nthe Sokratic ideal--a despotism, anointed by supreme good intentions,\nand by an ideal skill. The Republic is an enlargement of the lessons\nof the Politikus without the dialectic discussion.\n\nThe postulate of the One Wise man is repeated in KRATYLUS, on the\nunpromising subject of Language or the invention of Names.\n\nThe PHILEBUS has a decidedly ethical character. It propounds for\nenquiry the _Good_, the Summum Bonum. This is denied to be mere\npleasure, and the denial is enforced by Sokrates challenging his\nopponent to choose the lot of an ecstatic oyster. As usual, good must\nbe related to Intelligence; and the Dialogue gives a long disquisition\nupon the One and the Many, the Theory of Ideas, the Determinate and\nthe Indeterminate. Good is a compound of Pleasure and Intelligence,\nthe last predominating. Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring the\nDeterminate (Knowledge) to regulate it. This is merely another\nexpression for the doctrine of Measure, and for the common saying,\nthat the Passions must be controlled by Reason. There is, also, in the\ndialogue, a good deal on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain. Pleasure\nis the fundamental harmony of the system; Pain its disturbance. Bodily\nPleasure pre-supposes pain [true only of some pleasures]. Mental\npleasures may be without previous pain, and are therefore pure\npleasures. A life of Intelligence is conceivable without either pain\nor pleasure; this is the choice of the Wise man, and is the nature of\nthe gods. Desire is a mixed state, and comprehends body and mind. Much\nstress is laid on the moderate and tranquil pleasures; the intense\npleasures, coveted by mankind, belong to a distempered rather than a\nhealthy state; they are false and delusive. Pleasure is, by its\nnature, a change or transition, and cannot be a supreme end. The\nmixture of Pleasure and Intelligence is to be adjusted by the\nall-important principle of Measure or Proportion, which connects the\nGood with the Beautiful.\n\nA decided asceticism is the ethical tendency of this dialogue. It is\nmarkedly opposed to the view of the Protagoras. Still greater is the\nopposition between it and the two Erotic dialogues, Phaedrus and\nSymposium, where _Bonum_ and _Pulchrum_ are attained in the pursuit of\nan ecstatic and overwhelming personal affection.\n\nThe REPUBLIC starts with the question--what is JUSTICE? and, in\nanswering it, provides the scheme of a model Republic. Book I. is a\nSokratic colloquy, where one speaker, on being interrogated, defines\nJustice as 'rendering to every man his due,' and afterwards amends it\nto 'doing good to friends, evil to enemies.' Another gives 'the right\nof the strongest.' A third maintains that Injustice by itself is\nprofitable to the doer; but, as it is an evil to society in general,\nmen make laws against it and punish it; in consequence of which,\nJustice is the more profitable. Sokrates, in opposition, undertakes to\nprove that Justice is good in itself, ensuring the happiness of the\ndoer by its intrinsic effect on his mind; and irrespective of\nexemption from the penalties of injustice. He reaches this result by\nassimilating an individual to a state. Justice is shown to be good in\nthe entire city, and by analogy it is also good in the individual. He\naccordingly proceeds to construct his ideal commonwealth. In the\ncourse of this construction many ethical views crop out.\n\nThe state must prescribe the religious belief, and allow no\ncompositions at variance with it. The gods must always be set forth as\nthe causes of good; they must never be represented as the authors of\nevil, nor as practising deceit. Neither is it to be allowed to\nrepresent men as unjust, yet happy; or just, and yet miserable. The\npoetic representation of bad characters is also forbidden. The musical\ntraining is to be adapted for disposing the mind to the perception of\nBeauty, whence it becomes qualified to recognize the other virtues.\nUseful fictions are to be diffused, without regard to truth. This\npious fraud is openly recommended by Plato.\n\nThe division of the human mind into (1) REASON or Intelligence; (2)\nENERGY, Courage, Spirit, or the Military Virtue; and (3) Many-headed\nAPPETITE, all in mutual counter-play--is transferred to the State,\neach of the three parts being represented by one of the political\norders or divisions of the community. The happiness of the man and the\nhappiness of the commonwealth are attained in the same way, namely, by\nrealizing the four virtues--Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice; with\nthis condition, that Wisdom, or Reason, is sought only in the Ruling\ncaste, the Elders; Courage, or Energy, only in the second caste, the\nSoldiers or Guardians; while Temperance and Justice (meaning almost\nthe same thing) must inhere alike in all the three classes, and be the\nonly thing expected in the third, the Working Multitude.\n\nIf it be now asked, what and where is Justice? the answer is--'every\nman to attend to his own business.' Injustice occurs when any one\nabandons his post, or meddles with what does not belong to him; and\nmore especially when any one of a lower division aspires to the\nfunction of a higher. Such is Justice for the city, and such is it in\nthe individual; the higher faculty--Reason, must control the two\nlower--Courage and Appetite. Justice is thus a sort of harmony or\nbalance of the mental powers; it is to the mind what health is to the\nbody. Health is the greatest good, sickness the greatest evil, of the\nbody; so is Justice of the mind.\n\nIt is an essential of the Platonic Republic that, among the guardians\nat least, the sexual arrangements should be under public regulation,\nand the monopoly of one woman by one man forbidden: a regard to the\nbreed of the higher caste of citizens requires the magistrate to see\nthat the best couples are brought together, and to refuse to rear the\ninferior offspring of ill-assorted connexions. The number of births is\nalso to be regulated.\n\nIn carrying on war, special maxims of clemency are to be observed\ntowards Hellenic enemies.\n\nThe education of the Guardians must be philosophical; it is for them\nto rise to the Idea of the good, to master the science of Good and\nEvil; they must be emancipated from the notion that Pleasure is the\ngood. To indicate the route to this attainment Plato gives his theory\nof cognition generally--the theory of Ideas;--and indicates (darkly)\nhow these sublime generalities are to be reached.\n\nThe Ideal Commonwealth supposed established, is doomed to degradation\nand decay; passing through Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, to\nDespotism, with a corresponding declension of happiness. The same\nvarieties may be traced in the Individual; the 'despotized' mind is\nthe acme of Injustice and consequent misery.\n\nThe comparative value of Pleasures is discussed. The pleasures of\nphilosophy, or wisdom (those of Reason), are alone true and pure; the\npleasures corresponding to the two other parts of the mind are\ninferior; Love of Honour (from Courage or Energy), and Love of Money\n(Appetite). The well-ordered mind--Justice--is above all things the\nsource of happiness. Apart from all consequences of Justice, this is\ntrue; the addition of the natural results only enhances the strength\nof the position.\n\nIn TIMAEUS, Plato repeats the doctrine that wickedness is to the mind\nwhat disease is to the body. The soul suffers from two distempers,\nmadness and ignorance; the man under passionate heat is not wicked\nvoluntarily. No man is bad willingly; but only from some evil habit of\nbody, the effect of bad bringing-up [very much the view of Robert\nOwen].\n\nThe long treatise called the LAWS, being a modified scheme of a\nRepublic, goes over the same ground with more detail. We give the\nchief ethical points. It is the purpose of the lawgiver to bring about\nhappiness, and to provide all good things divine and human. The divine\nthings are the cardinal virtues--Wisdom, Justice, Temperance, Courage;\nthe human are the leading personal advantages--Health, Beauty,\nStrength, Activity, Wealth. He requires the inculcation of\nself-command, and a training in endurance. The moral and religious\nfeelings are to be guided in early youth, by the influence of Poetry\nand the other Fine Arts, in which, as before, a stringent censorship\nis to be exercised; the songs and dances are all to be publicly\nauthorized. The ethical doctrine that the just man is happy and the\nunjust miserable, is to be preached; and every one prohibited from\ncontradicting it. Of all the titles to command in society, Wisdom is\nthe highest, although policy may require it to be conjoined with some\nof the others (Birth, Age, Strength, Accident, &c.). It is to be a\npart of the constitution to provide public exhortations, or sermons,\nfor inculcating virtue; Plato having now passed into an opposite phase\nas to the value of Rhetoric, or continuous address. The family is to\nbe allowed in its usual form, but with restraints on the age of\nmarriage, on the choice of the parties, and on the increase of the\nnumber of the population. Sexual intercourse is to be as far as\npossible confined to persons legally married; those departing from\nthis rule are, at all events, to observe secresy. The slaves are not\nto be of the same race as the masters. As regards punishment, there is\na great complication, owing to the author's theory that wickedness is\nnot properly voluntary. Much of the harm done by persons to others is\nunintentional or involuntary, and is to be made good by reparation.\nFor the loss of balance or self-control, making the essence of\ninjustice, there must be a penal and educational discipline, suited to\ncure the moral distemper; not for the sake of the past, which cannot\nbe recalled, but of the future. Under cover of this theory, the\npunishments are abundantly severe; and the crimes include Heresy, for\nwhich there is a gradation of penalties terminating in death.\n\nWe may now summarize the Ethics of Plato, under the general scheme as\nfollows:--\n\nI.--The Ethical Standard, or criterion of moral Right and Wrong. This\nwe have seen is, ultimately, the Science of Good and Evil, as\ndetermined by a Scientific or Wise man; the Idea of the Good, which\nonly a philosopher can ascend to. Plato gave no credit to the maxims\nof the existing society; these were wholly unscientific.\n\nIt is obvious that this vague and indeterminate standard would settle\nnothing practically; no one can tell what it is. It is only of value\nas belonging to a very exalted and poetic conception of virtue,\nsomething that raises the imagination above common life into a sphere\nof transcendental existence.\n\nII.--The Psychology of Ethics.\n\n1. As to the Faculty of discerning Right. This is implied in the\nforegoing statement of the criterion. It is the Cognitive or\nIntellectual power. In the definite position taken up in Protagoras,\nit is the faculty of Measuring pleasures against one another and\nagainst pains. In other dialogues, measure is still the important\naspect of the process, although the things to be measured are not\ngiven.\n\n2. As regards the Will. The theory that vice, if not the result of\nignorance, is a form of madness, an uncontrollable fury, a mental\ndistemper, gives a peculiar rendering of the nature of man's Will. It\nis a kind of Necessity, not exactly corresponding, however, with the\nmodern doctrine of that name.\n\n3. Disinterested Sentiment is not directly and plainly recognized by\nPlato. His highest virtue is self-regarding; a concern for the Health\nof the Soul.\n\nIII.--On the Bonum, or Summum Bonum, Plato is ascetic and\nself-denying. 1. We have seen that in Philebus, Pleasure is not good,\nunless united with Knowledge or Intelligence; and the greater the\nIntelligence, the higher the pleasure. That the highest happiness of\nman is the pursuit of truth or Philosophy, was common to Plato and to\nAristotle.\n\n2. Happiness is attainable only through Justice or Virtue. Justice is\ndeclared to be happiness, first, in itself, and secondly, in its\nconsequences. Such is the importance attached to this maxim as a\nsafeguard of Society, that, whether true or not, it is to be\nmaintained by state authority.\n\n3. The Psychology of Pleasure and Pain is given at length in the\nPhilebus.\n\nIV.--With regard to the scheme of Duty. In Plato, we find the first\nstatement of the four Cardinal Virtues.\n\nAs to the Substance of the Moral Code, the references above made to\nthe Republic and the Laws will show in what points his views differed\nfrom modern Ethics.\n\nBenevolence was not one of the Cardinal Virtues.\n\nHis notions even of Reciprocity were rendered hazy and indistinct by\nhis theory of Justice as an end in itself.\n\nThe inducements, means, and stimulants to virtue, in addition to penal\ndiscipline, are training, persuasion, or hortatory discourse,\ndialectic cognition of the Ideas, and, above all, that ideal\naspiration towards the Just, the Good, around which he gathered all\nthat was fascinating in poetry, and all the associations of religion\nand divinity. Plato employed his powerful genius in working up a lofty\nspiritual reward, an ideal intoxication, for inciting men to the\nself-denying virtues. He was the first and one of the greatest of\npreachers. His theory of Justice is suited to preaching, and not to a\nscientific analysis of society.\n\nV.--The relation of Ethics to Politics is intimate, and even\ninseparable. The Civil Magistrate, as in Hobbes, supplies the Ethical\nsanction. All virtue is an affair of the state, a political\ninstitution. This, however, is qualified by the demand for an ideal\nstate, and an ideal governor, by whom alone anything like perfect\nvirtue can be ascertained.\n\nVI.--The relationship with Theology is also close. That is to say,\nPlato was not satisfied to construct a science of good and evil,\nwithout conjoining the sentiments towards the Gods. His Theology,\nhowever, was of his own invention, and adapted to his ethical theory.\nIt was necessary to suppose that the gods were the authors of good, in\norder to give countenance to virtue.\n\nPlato was the ally of the Stoics, as against the Epicureans, and of\nsuch modern theorists as Butler, who make virtue, and not happiness,\nthe highest end of man. With him, discipline was an end in itself, and\nnot a means; and he endeavoured to soften its rigour by his poetical\nand elevated Idealism.\n\nAlthough he did not preach the good of mankind, or direct beneficence,\nhe undoubtedly prepared the way for it, by urging self-denial, which\nhas no issue or relevance, except either by realizing greater\nhappiness to Self (mere exalted Prudence, approved of by all sects),\nor by promoting the welfare of others.\n\nTHE CYNICS AND THE CYRENAICS.\n\nThese opposing sects sprang from Sokrates, and passed, with little\nmodification, the one into the Stoics, the other into the Epicureans.\nBoth ANTISTHENES, the founder of the Cynics, and ARISTIPPUS, the\nfounder of the Cyrenaics, were disciples of Sokrates.\n\nTheir doctrines chiefly referred to the Summum Bonum--the Art of\nLiving, or of Happiness.\n\nThe CYNICS were most closely allied to Sokrates; they, in fact,\ncarried out to the full his chosen mode of life. His favourite\nmaxim--that the gods had no wants, and that the most godlike man was\nhe that approached to the same state--was the Cynic Ideal. To subsist\nupon the narrowest means; to acquire indifference to pain, by a\ndiscipline of endurance; to despise all the ordinary pursuits of\nwealth and pleasure,--were Sokratic peculiarities, and were the _beau\nid\u00e9al_ of Cynicism.\n\nThe Cynic succession of philosophers were, (1) ANTISTHENES, one of the\nmost constant friends and companions of Sokrates; (2) DIOGENES of\nSinope, the pupil of Antisthenes, and the best known type of the sect.\n(His disciple Krates, a Theban, was the master of Zeno, the first\nStoic.) (3) STILPON of Megara, (4) MENEDEMUS of Eretria, (5) MONIMUS\nof Syracuse, (6) KRATES.\n\nThe two first heads of the Ethical scheme, so meagrely filled up by\nthe ancient systems generally, are almost a total blank as regards\nboth Cynics and Cyrenaics.\n\nI.--As regards a Standard of right and wrong, moral good or evil, they\nrecognized nothing but obedience to the laws and customs of society.\n\nII.--They had no Psychology of a moral faculty, of the will, or of\nbenevolent sentiment. The Cyrenaic Aristippus had a Psychology of\nPleasure and Pain.\n\nThe Cynics, instead of discussing Will, exercised it, in one of its\nmost prominent forms,--self-control and endurance.\n\nDisinterested conduct was no part of their scheme, although the\nascetic discipline necessarily promotes abstinence from sins against\nproperty, and from all the vices of public ambition.\n\nIII.--The proper description of both systems comes under the Summum\nBonum, or the Art of Living.\n\nThe Cynic Ideal was the minimum of wants, the habituation to pain,\ntogether with indifference to the common enjoyments. The compensating\nreward was exemption from fear, anxiety, and disappointment; also, the\npride of superiority to fellow-beings and of approximation to the\ngods. Looking at the great predominance of misery in human life, they\nbelieved the problem of living to consist in a mastery over all the\nforms of pain; until this was first secured, there was to be a total\nsacrifice of pleasure.\n\nThe Cynics were mostly, like Sokrates, men of robust health, and if\nthey put their physical constitution to a severe test by poor living\nand exposure to wind and weather, they also saved it from the wear and\ntear of steady industry and toil. Exercise of body and of mind, with a\nview to strength and endurance, was enjoined; but it was the drill of\nthe soldier rather than the drudgery of the artisan.\n\nIn the eyes of the public, the prominent feature of the Cynic was his\ncontemptuous jeering, and sarcastic abuse of everybody around. The\nname (Cynic, dog-like) denotes this peculiarity. The anecdotes\nrelating to Diogenes illustrate his coarse denunciation of men in\ngeneral and their luxurious ways. He set at defiance all the\nconventions of courtesy and of decency; spoke his mind on everything\nwithout fear or remorse; and delighted in his antagonism to public\nopinion. He followed the public and obtrusive life of Sokrates, but\ninstead of dialectic skill, his force lay in vituperation, sarcasm,\nand repartee. 'To Sokrates,' says Epiktetus, 'Zeus assigned the\ncross-examining function; to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising\nfunction; to Zeno (the Stoic), the didactic and dogmatical.'\n\nThe Cynics had thus in full measure one of the rewards of asceticism,\nthe pride of superiority and power. They did not profess an end apart\nfrom their own happiness; they believed and maintained that theirs was\nthe only safe road to happiness. They agreed with the Cyrenaics as to\nthe end; they differed as to the means.\n\nThe founders of the sect, being men of culture, set great store by\neducation, from which, however, they excluded (as it would appear)\nboth the Artistic and the Intellectual elements of the superior\ninstruction of the time, namely, Music, and the Sciences of Geometry,\nAstronomy, &c. Plato's writings and teachings were held in low esteem.\nPhysical training, self-denial and endurance, and literary or\nRhetorical cultivation, comprise the items taught by Diogenes when he\nbecame a slave, and was made tutor to the sons of his master.\n\nIV.--As to the Moral Code, the Cynics were dissenters from the\nreceived usages of society. They disapproved of marriage laws, and\nmaintained the liberty of individual tastes in the intercourse of the\nsexes. Being free-thinkers in religion they had no respect for any of\nthe customs founded on religion.\n\nV. The collateral relations of Cynical Ethics to Politics and to\nTheology afford no scope for additional observations. The Cynic and\nCyrenaic both stood aloof from the affairs of the state, and were\nalike disbelievers in the gods.\n\nThe Cynics appear to have been inclined to communism among themselves,\nwhich was doubtless easy with their views as to the wants of life. It\nis thought not unlikely that Sokrates himself held views of communism\nboth as to property and to wives; being in this respect also the\nprompter of Plato (Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, Essay ii.).\n\nThe CYRENAIC system originated with ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene, another\nhearer and companion of Sokrates. The temperament of Aristippus was\nnaturally inactive, easy, and luxurious; nevertheless he set great\nvalue on mental cultivation and accomplishments. His conversations\nwith Sokrates form one of the most interesting chapters of Xenophon's\nMemorabilia, and are the key to the plan of life ultimately elaborated\nby him. Sokrates finding out his disposition, repeats all the\narguments in favour of the severe and ascetic system. He urges the\nnecessity of strength, courage, energy, self-denial, in order to\nattain the post of ruler over others; which, however, Aristippus\nfences by saying that he has no ambition to rule; he prefers the\nmiddle course of a free man, neither ruling nor ruled over. Next,\nSokrates recalls the dangers and evil contingencies of subjection, of\nbeing oppressed, unjustly treated, sold into slavery, and the\nconsequent wretchedness to one unhardened by an adequate discipline.\nIt is in this argument that he recites the well-known apologue called\nthe choice of Herakles; in which, Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure\nwith attendant vice on the other, with their respective consequences,\nare set before a youth in his opening career. The whole argument with\nAristippus was purely prudential; but Aristippus was not convinced nor\nbrought over to the Sokratic ideal. He nevertheless adopted a no less\nprudential and self-denying plan of his own.\n\nAristippus did not write an account of his system; and the particulars\nof his life, which would show how he acted it, are but imperfectly\npreserved. He was the first theorist to avow and maintain that\nPleasure, and the absence of Pain, are the proper, the direct, the\nimmediate, the sole end of living; not of course mere present\npleasures and present relief from pain, but present and future taken\nin one great total. He would surrender present pleasure, and incur\npresent pain, with a view to greater future good; but he did not\nbelieve in the necessity of that extreme surrender and renunciation\nenjoined by the Cynics. He gratified all his appetites and cravings\nwithin the limits of safety. He could sail close upon the island of\nCalypso without surrendering himself to the sorceress. Instead of\ndeadening the sexual appetite he gave it scope, and yet resisted the\ndangerous consequences of associating with Hetaerae. In his enjoyments\nhe was free from jealousies; thinking it no derogation to his pleasure\nthat others had the same pleasure. Having thus a fair share of natural\nindulgences, he dispenses with the Cynic pride of superiority and the\nluxury of contemning other men. Strength of will was required for this\ncourse no less than for the Cynic life.\n\nAristippus put forward strongly the impossibility of realizing all the\nHappiness that might seem within one's reach; such were the attendant\nand deterring evils, that many pleasures had to be foregone by the\nwise man. Sometimes even the foolish person attained more pleasure\nthan the wise; such is the lottery of life; but, as a general rule,\nthe fact would be otherwise. The wisest could not escape the natural\nevils, pain and death; but envy, passionate love, and superstition,\nbeing the consequences of vain and mistaken opinion, might be\nconquered by a knowledge of the real nature of Good and Evil.\n\nAs a proper appendage to such a system, Aristippus sketched a\nPsychology of Pleasure and Pain, which was important as a beginning,\nand is believed to have brought the subject into prominence. The soul\ncomes under three conditions,--a gentle, smooth, equable motion,\ncorresponding to Pleasure; a rough, violent motion, which is Pain; and\na calm, quiescent state, indifference or Unconsciousness. More\nremarkable is the farther assertion that Pleasure is only _present_ or\n_realized_ consciousness; the memory of pleasures past, and the idea\nof pleasures to come, are not to be counted; the painful\naccompaniments of desire, hope, and fear, are sufficient to neutralize\nany enjoyment that may arise from ideal bliss, Consequently, the\nhappiness of a life means the sum total of these moments of realized\nor present pleasure. He recognized pleasures of the mind, as well as\nof the body; sympathy with the good fortunes of friends or country\ngives a thrill of genuine and lively joy. Still, the pleasures and the\npains of the body, and of one's own self, are more intense; witness\nthe bodily inflictions used in punishing offenders.\n\nThe Cyrenaics denied that there is anything just, or honourable, or\nbase, by nature; all depended on the laws and customs. These laws and\ncustoms the wise man obeys, to avoid punishment and discredit from the\nsociety where he lives; doubtless, also, from higher motives, if the\npolitical constitution, and his fellow citizens generally, can inspire\nhim with respect.\n\nNeither the Cynics nor the Cyrenaics made any profession of generous\nor disinterested impulses.\n\nARISTOTLE. [384-322 B.C.]\n\nThree treatises on Ethics have come down associated with the name of\nAristotle; one large work, the Nicomachean Ethics, referred to by\ngeneral consent as the chief and important source of Aristotle's\nviews; and two smaller works, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna\nMoralia, attributed by later critics to his disciples. Even of the\nlarge work, which consists of ten books, three books (V. VI. VII.),\nrecurring in the Eudemian Ethics, are considered by Sir A. Grant,\nthough not by other critics, to have been composed by Eudemus, the\nsupposed author of this second treatise, and a leading disciple of\nAristotle.\n\nLike many other Aristotelian treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics is\ndeficient in method and consistency on any view of its composition.\nBut the profound and sagacious remarks scattered throughout give it a\npermanent interest, as the work of a great mind. There may be\nextracted from it certain leading doctrines, whose point of departure\nwas Platonic, although greatly modified and improved by the genius and\npersonality of Aristotle.\n\nOur purpose will be best served by a copious abstract of the\nNicomachean Ethics.\n\nBook First discusses the Chief Good, or the Highest End of all human\nendeavours. Every exercise of the human powers aims at some good; all\nthe arts of life have their several ends--medicine, ship-building,\ngeneralship. But the ends of these special arts are all subordinate to\nsome higher end; which end is the chief good, and the subject of the\nhighest art of all, the Political; for as Politics aims at the welfare\nof the state, or aggregate of individuals, it is identical with and\ncomprehends the welfare of the individual (Chaps. I., II.).\n\nAs regards the _method_ of the science, the highest exactness is not\nattainable; the political art studies what is just, honourable, and\ngood; and these are matters about which the utmost discrepancy of\nopinion prevails. From such premises, the conclusions which we draw\ncan only be probabilities. The man of experience and cultivation will\nexpect nothing more. Youths, who are inexperienced in the concerns of\nlife, and given to follow their impulses, can hardly appreciate our\nreasoning, and will derive no benefit from it: but reasonable men will\nfind the knowledge highly profitable (III.).\n\nResuming the main question--What is the highest practical good--the\naim of the all-comprehending political science?--we find an agreement\namong men as to the name _happiness_ [Greek: eudaimonia]; but great\ndifferences as to the nature of the thing. The many regard it as made\nup of the tangible elements--pleasures, wealth, or honour; while\nindividuals vary in their estimate according to each man's state for\nthe time being; the sick placing it in health, the poor in wealth, the\nconsciously ignorant in knowledge. On the other hand, certain\nphilosophers [in allusion to Plato] set up an absolute good,--an Idea\nof the Good, apart from all the particulars, yet imparting to each its\nproperty of being good (IV.).\n\nReferring to men's lives (as a clue to their notions of the good), we\nfind three prominent varieties; the life of pleasure or\nsensuality,--the political life, aspiring to honour,--and the\ncontemplative life. The first is the life of the brutes, although\ncountenanced by men high in power. The second is too precarious, as\ndepending on others, and is besides only a means to an end--namely,\nour consciousness of our own merits; for the ambitious man seeks to be\nhonoured for his virtue and by good judges--thus showing that he too\nregards virtue as the superior good. Yet neither will virtue satisfy\nall the conditions. The virtuous man may slumber or pass his life in\ninactivity, or may experience the maximum of calamity; and such a man\ncannot be regarded as happy. The money-lender is still less entitled,\nfor he is an unnatural character; and money is obviously good as a\nmeans. So that there remains only the life of contemplation;\nrespecting which more presently (V.).\n\nTo a review of the Platonic doctrine, Aristotle devotes a whole\nchapter. He urges against it various objections, very much of a piece\nwith those brought against the theory of Ideas generally. If there be\nbut one good, there should be but one science; the alleged Idea is\nmerely a repetition of the phenomena; the recognized goods (_i.e._,\nvarieties of good) cannot be brought under one Idea; moreover, even\ngranting the reality of such an Idea, it is useless for all practical\npurposes. What our science seeks is Good, human and attainable (VI.).\n\nThe Supreme End is what is not only chosen as an End, but is never\nchosen except as an End: not chosen both for itself and with a view to\nsomething ulterior. It must thus be--(1) An _end-in-itself_ pursued\nfor its own sake; (2) it must farther be _self-sufficing_ leaving no\noutstanding wants--man's sociability being taken into account and\ngratified. Happiness is such an end; but we must state more clearly\nwherein happiness consists.\n\nThis will appear, if we examine what is the work appropriate and\npeculiar to man. Every artist, the sculptor, carpenter, currier (so\ntoo the eye and the hand), has his own peculiar work: and good, to\nhim, consists in his performing that work well. Man also has his\nappropriate and peculiar work: not merely living--for that he has in\ncommon with vegetables; nor the life of sensible perception--for that\nhe has in common with other animals, horses, oxen, &c. There remains\nthe life of man as a rational being: that is, as a being possessing\nreason along with other mental elements, which last are controllable\nor modifiable by reason. This last life is the peculiar work or\nprovince of man. For our purpose, we must consider man, not merely as\npossessing, but as actually exercising and putting in action, these\nmental capacities. Moreover, when we talk generally of the work or\nprovince of an artist, we always tacitly imply a complete and\nexcellent artist in his own craft: and so likewise when we speak of\nthe work of a man, we mean that work as performed by a complete and\ncompetent man. Since the work of man, therefore, consists in the\nactive exercise of the mental capacities, conformably to reason, the\nsupreme good of man will consist in performing this work with\nexcellence or virtue. Herein he will obtain happiness, if we assume\ncontinuance throughout a full period of life: one day or a short time\nis not sufficient for happiness (VII.).\n\nAristotle thus lays down the outline of man's supreme Good or\nHappiness: which he declares to be the beginning or principle [Greek:\narchae] of his deductions, and to be obtained in the best way that the\nsubject admits. He next proceeds to compare this outline with the\nvarious received opinions on the subject of happiness, showing that it\nembraces much of what has been considered essential by former\nphilosophers: such as being 'a good of the mind,' and not a mere\nexternal good: being equivalent to 'living well and doing well,'\nanother definition; consisting in virtue (the Cynics); in practical\nwisdom--[Greek: phronaesis] (Sokrates); in philosophy; or in all these\ncoupled with pleasure (Plato, in the Philebus). Agreeing with those\nwho insisted on virtue, Aristotle considers his own theory an\nimprovement, by requiring virtue in act, and not simply in possession.\nMoreover, he contends that to the virtuous man, virtuous performance\nis in itself pleasurable; so that no extraneous source of pleasure is\nneeded. Such (he says) is the judgment of the truly excellent man;\nwhich must be taken as conclusive respecting the happiness, as well as\nthe honourable pre-eminence of the best mental exercises.\nNevertheless, he admits (so far complying with the Cyrenaics) that\nsome extraneous conditions cannot be dispensed with; the virtuous man\ncan hardly exhibit his virtue in act, without some aid from friends\nand property; nor can he be happy if his person is disgusting to\nbehold or his parentage vile (VIII.).\n\nThis last admission opens the door to those that place good fortune in\nthe same line with happiness, and raises the question, how happiness\nis attained. By teaching? By habitual exercise? By divine grace? By\nFortune? If there be any gift vouchsafed by divine grace to man, it\nought to be this; but whether such be the case or not, it is at any\nrate the most divine and best of all acquisitions. To ascribe such an\nacquisition as this to Fortune would be absurd. Nature, which always\naims at the best, provides that it shall be attained, through a\ncertain course of teaching and training, by all who are not physically\nor mentally disqualified. It thus falls within the scope of political\nscience, whose object is to impart the best character and active\nhabits to the citizens. It is with good reason that we never call a\nhorse happy, for he can never reach such an attainment; nor indeed can\na child be so called while yet a child, for the same reason; though in\nhis case we may hope for the future, presuming on a full term of life,\nas was before postulated (IX.). But-this long term allows room for\nextreme calamities and change in a man's lot. Are we then to say, with\nSolon, that no one can be called happy so long as he lives? or that\nthe same man may often pass backwards and forwards from happiness to\nmisery? No; this only shows the mistake of resting happiness upon so\nunsound a basis as external fortune. The only true basis of it is the\nactive manifestation of mental excellence, which no ill fortune can\nefface from a man's mind (X.). Such a man will bear calamity, if it\ncomes, with dignity, and can never be made thoroughly miserable. If he\nbe moderately supplied as to external circumstances, he is to be\nstyled happy; that is, happy as a man--as far as man can reasonably\nexpect. Even after his decease he-will be affected, yet only feebly\naffected, by the good or ill fortune of his surviving children.\nAristotle evidently assigns little or no value to presumed posthumous\nhappiness (XI.).\n\nIn his love of subtle distinctions, he asks, Is happiness a thing\nadmirable in itself, or a thing praiseworthy? It is admirable in\nitself; for what is praiseworthy has a relative character, and is\npraised as conducive to some ulterior end; while the chief good must\nbe an End in itself, for the sake of which everything else is done\n(XII.). [This is a defective recognition of Relativity.]\n\nHaving assumed as one of the items of his definition, that man's\nhappiness must be in his special or characteristic work, performed\nwith perfect excellence,--Aristotle now proceeds to settle wherein\nthat excellence consists. This leads to a classification of the parts\nof the soul. The first distribution is, into Rational and Irrational;\nwhether these two are separable in fact, or only logically separable\n(like concave and convex), is immaterial to the present enquiry. Of\nthe irrational, the lowest portion is the Vegetative [Greek:\nphytikon], which seems most active in sleep; a state where bad men and\ngood are on a par, and which is incapable of any human excellence. The\nnext portion is the Appetitive [Greek: epithymaetikon], which is not\nthus incapable. It partakes of reason, yet it includes something\nconflicting with reason. These conflicting tendencies are usually\nmodifiable by reason, and may become in the temperate man completely\nobedient to reason. There remains Reason--the highest and sovereign\nportion of the soul. Human excellence [Greek: aretae] or virtue, is\neither of the Appetitive part,--moral [Greek: aethikae] virtue; or of\nthe Reason--intellectual [Greek: dianoaetikae] virtue. Liberality and\ntemperance are Moral virtues; philosophy, intelligence, and wisdom,\nIntellectual (XIII.).\n\nSuch is an outline of the First Book, having for its subject the Chief\nGood, the Supreme End of man.\n\nBook Second embraces the consideration of points relative to the Moral\nVirtues; it also commences Aristotle's celebrated definition and\nclassification of the virtues or excellencies.\n\nWhereas intellectual excellence is chiefly generated and improved by\nteaching, moral excellence is a result of habit [Greek: ethos]; whence\nits name (Ethical). Hence we may see that moral excellence is no\ninherent part of our nature: if it were, it could not be reversed by\nhabit--any more than a stone can acquire from any number of\nrepetitions the habit of moving upward, or fire the habit of moving\ndownward. These moral excellencies are neither a part of our nature,\nnor yet contrary to our nature: we are by nature fitted to take them\non, but they are brought to consummation through habit. It is not with\nthem, as with our senses, where nature first gives us the power to see\nand hear, and where we afterwards exercise that power. Moral virtues\nare acquired only by practice. We learn to build or to play the harp,\nby building or playing the harp: so too we become just or courageous,\nby a course of just or courageous acts. This is attested by all\nlawgivers in their respective cities; all of them shape the characters\nof their respective citizens, by enforcing habitual practice. Some do\nit well; others ill; according to the practice, so will be the\nresulting character; as he that is practised in building badly, will\nbe a bad builder in the end; and he that begins on a bad habit of\nplaying the harp, becomes confirmed into a bad player. Hence the\nimportance of making the young perform good actions habitually and\nfrom the beginning. The permanent ethical acquirements are generated\nby uniform and persistent practice (I.). [This is the earliest\nstatement of the philosophy of _habit_.]\n\nEverything thus turns upon practice: and Aristotle reminds us that his\npurpose here is, not simply to teach what virtue is, but to produce\nvirtuous agents. How are we to know what the practice should be? It\nmust be conformable to right reason: every one admits this, and we\nshall explain it further in a future book. But let us proclaim at\nonce, that in regard to moral action, as in regard to health, no exact\nrules can be laid down. Amidst perpetual variability, each agent must\nin the last resort be guided by the circumstances of the case. Still,\nhowever, something may be done to help him. Here Aristotle proceeds to\nintroduce the famous doctrine of the MEAN. We may err, as regards\nhealth, both by too much and by too little of exercise, food, or\ndrink. The same holds good in regard to temperance, courage, and the\nother excellences (II.).\n\nHis next remark is another of his characteristic doctrines, that the\n_test of a formed habit of virtue, is to feel no pain_; he that feels\npain in brave acts is a coward. Whence he proceeds to illustrate the\nposition, that moral virtue [Greek: aethikae aretae] has to do with\npleasures and pains. A virtuous education consists in making us feel\npleasure and pain at proper objects, and on proper occasions.\nPunishment is a discipline of pain. Some philosophers (the Cynics)\nhave been led by this consideration to make virtue consist in apathy,\nor insensibility; but Aristotle would regulate, and not extirpate our\nsensibilities (III.).\n\nBut does it not seem a paradox to say (according to the doctrine of\nhabit in I.), that a man becomes just, by performing just actions;\nsince, if he performs just actions, he is already just? The answer is\ngiven by a distinction drawn in a comparison with the training in the\ncommon arts of life. That a man is a good writer or musician, we see\nby his writing or his music; we take no account of the state of his\nmind in other respects: if he knows how to do this, it is enough. But\nin respect to moral excellence, such knowledge is not enough: a man\nmay do just or temperate acts, but he is not necessarily a just or\ntemperate man, unless he does them with right intention and on their\nown account. This state of the internal mind, which is requisite to\nconstitute the just and temperate man, follows upon the habitual\npractice of just and temperate acts, and follows upon nothing else.\nBut most men are content to talk without any such practice. They fancy\nerroneously that _knowing_, without doing, will make a good man. [We\nhave here the reaction against the Sokratic doctrine of virtue, and\nalso the statement of the necessity of a _prosper motive_, in order to\nvirtue.]\n\nAristotle now sets himself to find a definition of virtue, _per genus\net differentiam_. There are three qualities in the Soul--_Passions_\n[Greek: pathae], as Desire, Anger, Fear, &c., followed by pleasure or\npain; _Capacities_ or _Faculties_ [Greek: dynameis], as our capability\nof being angry, afraid, affected by pity, &c.; _Fixed tendencies,\nacquirements_, or _states_ [Greek: hexeis]. To which of the three does\nvirtue or excellence belong? It cannot be a Passion; for passions are\nnot in themselves good or evil, and are not accompanied with\ndeliberate choice [Greek: prouiresis], will, or intention. Nor is it a\nFaculty: for we are not praised or blamed because we _can_ have such\nor such emotions; and moreover our faculties are innate, which virtue\nis not. Accordingly, virtue, or excellence, must be an acquirement\n[Greek: hexis]--a State (V.). This is the _genus_.\n\nNow, as to the _differentia_, which brings us to a more specific\nstatement of the doctrine of the _Mean_. The specific excellence of\nvirtue is to be got at from quantity in the abstract, from which we\nderive the conceptions of more, less, and equal; or excess, defect,\nand mean; the equal being the mean between excess and defect. But in\nthe case of moral actions, the arithmetical mean may not hold (for\nexample, six between two and ten); it must be a mean relative to the\nindividual; Milo must have more food than a novice in the training\nschool. In the arts, we call a work perfect, when anything either\nadded or taken away would spoil it. Now, virtue, which, like Nature,\nis better and more exact than any art, has for its subject-matter,\npassions and actions; all which are wrong either in defect or in\nexcess. Virtue aims at the mean between them, or the maximum of Good:\nwhich implies a correct estimation of all the circumstances of the\nact,--when we ought to do it--under what conditions--towards whom--for\nwhat purpose--in what manner, &c. This is the praise-worthy mean,\nwhich virtue aspires to. We may err in many ways (for evil, as the\nPythagoreans said, is of the nature of the Infinite, good of the\nFinite), but we can do right only in one way; so much easier is the\npath of error.\n\nCombining then this _differentia_ with the _genus_, as above\nestablished, the complete definition is given thus--'Virtue is an\nacquirement or fixed state, tending by deliberate purpose (genus),\ntowards a mean relative to us (difference).' To which is added the\nfollowing all-important qualification, 'determined by reason [Greek:\nlogos], and as the _judicious man_ [Greek: ho Phronimos] would\ndetermine.' Such is the doctrine of the Mean, which combines the\npractical matter-of-fact quality of moderation, recognized by all\nsages, with a high and abstract conception, starting from the\nPythagorean remark quoted by Aristotle, 'the Infinite, or Indefinite,\nis evil, the Finite or the Definite is good,' and re-appearing in\nPlato as 'conformity to measure' [Greek: metriotaes], by which he\n(Plato) proposes to discriminate between good and evil. The concluding\nqualification of virtue--'a rational determination, according to the\nideal judicious man'--is an attempt to assign a standard or authority\nfor what is the proper 'Mean;' an authority purely ideal or imaginary;\nthe actual authority being always, rightly or wrongly, the society of\nthe time.\n\nAristotle admits that his doctrine of Virtue being a mean, cannot have\nan application quite universal; because there are some acts that in\ntheir very name connote badness, which are wrong therefore, not from\nexcess or defect, but in themselves (VI.). He next proceeds to resolve\nhis general doctrine into particulars; enumerating the different\nvirtues stated, each as a mean, between two extremes--Courage,\nTemperance, Liberality, Magnanimity, Magnificence, Meekness,\nAmiability or Friendliness, Truthfulness, Justice (VII.). They are\ndescribed in detail in the two following books. In chap. VIII., he\nqualifies his doctrine of Mean and Extremes, by the remark that one\nExtreme may be much farther removed from the Mean than the other.\nCowardice and Rashness are the extremes of Courage, but Cowardice is\nfarthest removed from the Mean.\n\nThe concluding chapter (IX.) of the Book reflects on the great\ndifficulty of hitting the mean in all things, and of correctly\nestimating all the requisite circumstances, in each particular case.\nHe gives as practical rules:--To avoid at all events the worst\nextreme; to keep farthest from our natural bent; to guard against the\nsnare of pleasure. Slight mistakes on either side are little blamed,\nbut grave and conspicuous cases incur severe censure. Yet how far the\ncensure ought to go, is difficult to lay down beforehand in general\nterms. There is the same difficulty in regard to all particular cases,\nand all the facts of sense: which must be left, after all, to the\njudgment of Sensible Perception [Greek: aisthaesis].\n\nBook Third takes up the consideration of the Virtues in detail, but\nprefaces them with a dissertation, occupying five chapters, on the\nVoluntary and Involuntary. Since praise and blame are bestowed only on\nvoluntary actions,--the involuntary being pardoned, and even\npitied,--it is requisite to define Voluntary and Involuntary. What is\ndone under physical compulsion, or through ignorance, is clearly\ninvoluntary. What is done under the fear of greater evils is partly\nvoluntary, and partly involuntary. Such actions are voluntary in the\nsense of being a man's own actions; involuntary in that they are not\nchosen on their own account; being praised or blamed according to the\ncircumstances. There are cases where it is difficult to say which of\ntwo conflicting pressures ought to preponderate, and compulsion is an\nexcuse often misapplied: but compulsion, in its strict sense, is not\nstrength of motive at all; it is taking the action entirely out of our\nown hands. As regards Ignorance, a difference is made. Ignorance of a\ngeneral rule is matter for censure; ignorance of particular\ncircumstances may be excused. [This became the famous maxim of\nlaw,--'Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat.'] If\nthe agent, when better informed, repents of his act committed in\nignorance, he affords good proof that the act done was really\ninvoluntary. Acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent's\nself) are not to be held as involuntary. (1) If they were, the actions\nof brutes and children would be involuntary. (2) Some of these acts\nare morally good and approved. (3) Obligation often attaches to these\nfeelings. (4) What is done from desire is pleasant; the involuntary is\npainful. (5) Errors of passion are to be eschewed, no less than those\nof reason (I.).\n\nThe next point is the nature of Purpose, Determination, or Deliberate\nPreference [Greek: proairesis], which is in the closest kindred with\nmoral excellence, and is even more essential, in the ethical estimate,\nthan acts themselves. This is a part of the Voluntary; but not\nco-extensive therewith. For it excludes sudden and unpremeditated\nacts; and is not shared by irrational beings. It is distinct from\ndesire, from anger, from wish, and from opinion; with all which it is\nsometimes confounded. Desire is often opposed to it; the incontinent\nman acts upon his desires, but without any purpose, or even against\nhis purpose; the continent man acts upon his purpose, but against his\ndesires. Purpose is still more distinct from anger, and is even\ndistinct (though in a less degree) from wish [Greek: boulaesis], which\nis choice of the End, while Purpose is of the Means; moreover, we\nsometimes wish for impossibilities, known as such, but we never\npurpose them. Nor is purpose identical with opinion [Greek: doxa],\nwhich relates to truth and falsehood, not to virtue and vice. It is\namong our voluntary proceedings, and includes intelligence; but is it\nidentical with predeliberated action and its results? (II.)\n\nTo answer this query, Aristotle analyzes the process of Deliberation,\nas to its scope, and its mode of operation. We exclude from\ndeliberation things Eternal, like the Kosmos, or the incommensurability\nof the side and the diagonal of a square; also things mutable, that are\nregulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance; things out of our\npower; also final ends of action, for we deliberate only about the\n_means_ to ends. The deliberative process is compared to the\ninvestigation of a geometrical problem. We assume the end, and enquire\nby what means it can be produced; then again, what will produce the\nmeans, until we at last reach something that we ourselves can command.\nIf, after such deliberation, we see our way to execution, we form a\nPurpose, or Deliberate Preference [Greek: proairesis]. Purpose is then\ndefinable as a deliberative appetency of things in our power (III.).\n\nNext is started the important question as to the choice of the final\n_End_. Deliberation and Purpose respect means; our Wish respects the\nEnd--but what is the End that we wish? Two opinions are noticed;\naccording to one (Plato) we are moved to the good; according to the\nother, to the apparent good. Both opinions are unsatisfactory; the one\nwould make out an incorrect choice to be no choice at all; the other\nwould take away all constancy from ends.\n\nAristotle settles the point by distinguishing, in this case as in\nothers, between what bears a given character simply and absolutely,\nand what bears the same character relatively to this or that\nindividual. The object of Wish, simply, truly, and absolutely, is the\nGood; while the object of Wish, to any given individual, is what\nappears Good to him. But by the Absolute here, Aristotle explains that\nhe means what appears good to the _virtuous_ and _intelligent_ man;\nwho is is declared, here as elsewhere, to be the infallible standard;\nwhile most men, misled by pleasure, choose what is not truly good. In\nlike manner, Aristotle affirms, that those substances are truly and\nabsolutely wholesome, which are wholesome to the healthy and\nwell-constituted man; other substances may be wholesome to the sick or\ndegenerate. Aristotle's Absolute is thus a Relative with its correlate\nchosen or imagined by himself.\n\nHe then proceeds to maintain that virtue and vice are voluntary, and\nin our own power. The arguments are these. (1) If it be in our power\nto act right, the contrary is equally in our own power; hence vice is\nas much voluntary as virtue. (2) Man must be admitted to be the origin\nof his own actions. (3) Legislators and others punish men for\nwickedness, and confer honour on good actions; even culpable ignorance\nand negligence are punished. (4) Our character itself, or our fixed\nacquirements, are in our power, being produced by our successive acts;\nmen become intemperate, by acts of drunkenness. (5) Not only the\ndefects of the mind, but the infirmities of the body also, are blamed,\nwhen arising through our own neglect and want of training. (6) Even if\nit should be said that all men aim at the apparent good, but cannot\ncontrol their mode of conceiving [Greek: phantasia] the end; still\neach person, being by his acts the cause of his own fixed\nacquirements, must be to a certain extent the cause of his own\nconceptions. On this head, too, Aristotle repeats the clenching\nargument, that the supposed imbecility of conceiving would apply alike\nto virtue and to vice; so that if virtuous action be regarded as\nvoluntary, vicious action must be so regarded likewise. It must be\nremembered that a man's fixed acquirements or habits are not in his\nown power, in the same sense and degree in which his separate acts are\nin his own power. Each act, from first to last, is alike in his power;\nbut in regard to the habit, it is only the initiation thereof that is\nthoroughly in his power; the habit, like a distemper, is taken on by\nimperceptible steps in advance (V.).\n\nIn the foregoing account of the Ethical questions connected with the\nWill, Aristotle is happily unembroiled with the modern controversy.\nThe _mal-apropos_ of 'Freedom' had not been applied to voluntary\naction. Accordingly, he treats the whole question from the inductive\nside, distinguishing the cases where people are praised or blamed for\ntheir conduct, from those where praise and blame are inapplicable as\nbeing powerless. It would have been well if the method had never been\ndeparted from; a sound Psychology would have improved the induction,\nbut would never have introduced any question except as to the relative\nstrength of the different feelings operating as motives to voluntary\nconduct.\n\nIn one part of his argument, however, where he maintains that vice\nmust be voluntary, because its opposite, virtue, is voluntary, he is\nalready touching on the magical island of the bad enchantress;\nallowing a question of fact to be swayed by the notion of factitious\ndignity. Virtue is assumed to be voluntary, not on the evidence of\nfact, but because there would be an _indignity_ cast on it, to suppose\notherwise. Now, this consideration, which Aristotle gives way to on\nvarious occasions, is the motive underlying the objectionable\nmetaphor.\n\nAfter the preceding digression on the Voluntary and Involuntary,\nAristotle takes up the consideration of the Virtues in order,\nbeginning with COURAGE, which was one of the received cardinal\nvirtues, and a subject of frequent discussion. (Plato, _Laches,\nProtagoras, Republic_, &c.)\n\nCourage [Greek: andreia], the mean between timidity and foolhardiness,\nhas to do with evils. All evils are objects of fear; but there are\nsome evils that even the brave man does right to fear--as disgrace.\nPoverty or disease he ought not to fear. Yet, he will not acquire the\nreputation of courage from not fearing these, nor will he acquire it\nif he be exempt from fear when about to be scourged. Again, if a man\nbe afraid of envy from others, or of insults to his children or wife,\nhe will not for that reason be regarded as a coward. It is by being\nsuperior to the fear of great evils, that a man is extolled as\ncourageous; and the greatest of evils is death, since it is a final\nclose, as well of good as of evil. Hence the dangers of war are the\ngreatest occasion of courage. But the cause must be honourable (VI.).\n\nThus the key to true courage is the quality or merit of the action.\nThat man is brave, who both fears, and affronts without fear, what he\nought and when he ought: who suffers and acts according to the value\nof the cause, and according to a right judgment of it. The opposites\nor extremes of courage include (1) Deficiency of fear; (2) Excess of\nfear, cowardice; (3) Deficiency of daring, another formula for\ncowardice; (4) Excess of daring, Rashness. Between these, Courage is\nthe mean (VII.).\n\nAristotle enumerates five analogous forms of quasi-courage,\napproaching more or less to genuine courage. (1) The first, most like\nto the true, is political courage, which is moved to encounter danger\nby the Punishments and the Honours of society. The desire of honour\nrises to virtue, and is a noble spring of action. (2) A second kind is\nthe effect of Experience, which dispels seeming terrors, and gives\nskill to meet real danger. (3) Anger, Spirit, Energy [Greek: thymos] is\na species of courage, founded on physical power and excitement, but not\nunder the guidance of high emotions. (4) The Sanguine temperament, by\noverrating the chances of success, gives courage. (5) Lastly, Ignorance\nof the danger may have the same effect as courage (VIII.).\n\nCourage is mainly connected with pain and loss. Men are called brave\nfor the endurance of pain, even although it bring pleasure in the end,\nas to the boxer who endures bruises from the hope of honour. Death is\npainful, and most so to the man that by his virtue has made life\nvaluable. Such a man is to be considered more courageous, as a soldier,\nthan a mercenary with little to lose (IX.).\n\nThe account of Courage thus given is remarkably exhaustive; although\nthe constituent parts might have been more carefully disentangled. A\nclear line should be drawn between two aspects of courage. The one is\nthe resistance to Fear properly so called; that is, to the perturbation\nthat exaggerates coming evil: a courageous man, in this sense, is one\nthat possesses the true measure of impending danger, and acts according\nto that, and not according to an excessive measure. The other aspect of\nCourage, is what gives it all its nobleness as a virtue, namely,\n_Self-sacrifice_, or the deliberate encountering of evil, for some\nhonourable or virtuous cause. When a man knowingly risks his life in\nbattle for his country, he may be called courageous, but he is still\nbetter described as a heroic and devoted man.\n\nInasmuch as the leading form of heroic devotion, in the ancient world,\nwas exposure of life in war, Self-sacrifice was presented under the\nguise of Courage, and had no independent standing as a cardinal virtue.\nFrom this circumstance, paganism is made to appear in a somewhat\ndisadvantageous light, as regards self-denying duties.\n\nNext in order among the excellences or virtues of the irrational\ndepartment of mind is TEMPERANCE, or Moderation, [Greek: sophrosynae],\na mean or middle state in the enjoyment of pleasure. Pleasures are\nmental and bodily. With the mental, as love of learning or of honour,\ntemperance is not concerned. Nor with the bodily pleasures of muscular\nexercise, of hearing and of smell, but only with the animal pleasures\nof touch and taste: in fact, sensuality resides in touch; the pleasure\nof eating being a mode of contact (X.).\n\nIn the desires natural and common to men, as eating and the nuptial\ncouch, men are given to err, and error is usually on the side of\nexcess. But it is in the case of special tastes or preferences, that\npeople are most frequently intemperate. Temperance does not apply to\nenduring pains, except those of abstinence from pleasures. The extreme\nof insensibility to pleasure is rarely found, and has no name. The\ntemperate man has the feelings of pleasure and pain, but moderates his\ndesires according to right reason (XL.). He desires what he ought, when\nhe ought, and as he ought: correctly estimating each separate case\n(XII.). The question is raised, which is most voluntary, Cowardice or\nIntemperance? (1) Intemperance is more voluntary than Cowardice, for\nthe one consists in choosing pleasure, while in the other there is a\nsort of compulsory avoidance of pain. (2) Temperance is easier to\nacquire as a habit than Courage. (3) In Intemperance, the particular\nacts are voluntary, although not the habit; in Cowardice, the first\nacts are involuntary, while by habit, it tends to become voluntary\n(XII.).\n\n[Temperance is the virtue most suited to the formula of the Mean,\nalthough the settling of what is the mean depends after all upon a\nman's own judgment. Aristotle does not recognize asceticism as a thing\nexisting. His Temperance is moderation in the sensual pleasures of\neating and love.]\n\nBook Fourth proceeds with the examination of the Virtues or Ethical\nExcellences.\n\nLIBERALITY [Greek: eleutheristaes], in the matter of property, is the\nmean of Prodigality and Illiberality. The right uses of money are\nspending and giving. Liberality consists in giving willingly, from an\nhonourable motive, to proper persons, in proper quantities, and at\nproper times; each individual case being measured by correct reason. If\nsuch measure be not taken, or if the gift be not made willingly, it is\nnot liberality. The liberal man is often so free as to leave little to\nhimself. This virtue is one more frequent in the inheritors than in the\nmakers of fortunes. Liberality beyond one's means is prodigality. The\nliberal man will receive only from proper sources and in proper\nquantities. Of the extremes, prodigality is more curable than\nilliberality. The faults of prodigality are, that it must derive\nsupplies from improper sources; that it gives to the wrong objects, and\nis usually accompanied with intemperance. Illiberality is incurable: it\nis confirmed by age, and is more congenial to men generally than\nprodigality. Some of the illiberal fall short in giving--those called\nstingy, close-fisted, and so on; but do not desire what belongs to\nother people. Others are excessive in receiving from all sources; such\nare they that ply disreputable trades (I.).\n\nMAGNIFICENCE [Greek: megaloprepeia] is a grander kind of Liberality;\nits characteristic is greatness of expenditure, with suitableness to\nthe person, the circumstances, and the purpose. The magnificent man\ntakes correct measure of each; he is in his way a man of Science\n[Greek: ho de megaloprepaes epistaemoni eoike]--II. The motive must be\nhonourable, the outlay unstinted, and the effect artistically splendid.\nThe service of the gods, hospitality to foreigners, public works, and\ngifts, are proper occasions. Magnificence especially becomes the\nwell-born and the illustrious. The house of the magnificent man will be\nof suitable splendour; everything that he does will show taste and\npropriety. The extremes, or corresponding defects of character, are, on\nthe one side, vulgar, tasteless profusion, and on the other, meanness\nor pettiness, which for some paltry saving will spoil the effect of a\ngreat outlay (II.).\n\nMAGNANIMITY, or HIGH-MINDEDNESS [Greek: megalopsychia], loftiness of\nspirit, is the culmination of the virtues. It is concerned with\ngreatness. The high-minded man is one that, being worthy, rates himself\nat his real worth, and neither more (which is vanity) nor less (which\nis littleness of mind). Now, worth has reference to external goods, of\nwhich the greatest is honour. The high-minded man must be in the\nhighest degree honourable, for which he must be a good man; honour\nbeing the prize of virtue. He will accept honour only from the good,\nand will despise dishonour, knowing it to be undeserved. In all good or\nbad fortune, he will behave with moderation; in not highly valuing even\nthe highest thing of all, honour itself, he may seem to others\nsupercilious. Wealth and fortune contribute to high-mindedness; but\nmost of all, superior goodness; for the character cannot exist without\nperfect virtue. The high-minded man neither shuns nor courts danger;\nnor is he indisposed to risk even his life. He gives favours, but does\nnot accept them; he is proud to the great, but affable to the lowly. He\nattempts only great and important matters; is open in friendship and in\nhatred; truthful in conduct, with an ironical reserve. He talks little,\neither of himself or of others; neither desiring his own praise, nor\ncaring to utter blame. He wonders at nothing, bears no malice, is no\ngossip. His movements are slow, his voice deep, his diction stately\n(III.).\n\nThere is a nameless virtue, a mean between the two extremes of too much\nand too little ambition, or desire of honour; the reference being to\nsmaller matters and to ordinary men. The fact that both extremes are\nmade terms of reproach, shows that there is a just mean; while each\nextreme alternately claims to be the virtue, as against the other,\nsince there is no term to express the mean (IV.).\n\nMILDNESS [Greek: praotaes] is a mean state with reference to Anger,\nalthough inclining to the defective side. The exact mean, which has no\ncurrent name, is that state wherein the agent is free from perturbation\n[Greek: atarachos], is not impelled by passion, but guided by reason;\nis angry when he ought, as he ought, with whom, and as long as, he\nought: taking right measure of all the circumstances. Not to be angry\non the proper provocation, is folly, insensibility, slavish submission.\nOf those given to excess in anger, some are quick, impetuous, and soon\nappeased; others are sulky, repressing and perpetuating their\nresentment. It is not easy to define the exact mean; each case must be\nleft to individual perception (V.).\n\nThe next virtue is Good-breeding in society, a balance between\nsurliness on the one hand, and weak assent or interested flattery on\nthe other. It is a nameless virtue, resembling friendship without the\nspecial affection. Aristotle shows what he considers the bearing of the\nfinished gentleman, studying to give pleasure, and yet expressing\ndisapprobation when it would be wrong to do otherwise (VI.).\n\nClosely allied to the foregoing is the observance of a due mean, in the\nmatter of Boastfulness. The boastful lay claim to what they do not\npossess; false modesty [Greek: eironeia] is denying or underrating\none's own merits. The balance of the two is the straightforward and\ntruthful character; asserting just what belongs to him, neither more\nnor less. This is a kind of truthfulness,--distinguished from 'truth'\nin its more serious aspect, as discriminating between justice and\ninjustice--and has a worth of its own; for he that is truthful in\nlittle things will be so in more important affairs (VII.).\n\nIn the playful intercourse of society, there is room for the virtue of\nWit, a balance or mean between buffoonish excess, and the clownish\ndulness that can neither make nor enjoy a joke. Here the man of\nrefinement must be a law to himself (VIII.).\n\nMODESTY [Greek: aidos] is briefly described, without being put through\nthe comparison with its extremes. It is more a feeling than a state, or\nsettled habit. It is the fear of ill-report; and has the physical\nexpression of fear under danger--the blushing and the pallor. It befits\nyouth as the age of passion and of errors. In the old it is no virtue,\nas they should do nothing to be ashamed of (IX.).\n\nBook Fifth (the first of the so-called Eudemian books), treats of\nJustice, the Social virtue by pre-eminence. Justice as a virtue is\ndefined, the state of mind, or moral disposition, to do what is just.\nThe question then is--what is the just and the unjust in action? The\nwords seem to have more senses than one. The just may be (1) the\nLawful, what is established by law; which includes, therefore, all\nobedience, and all moral virtue (for every kind of conduct came under\npublic regulation, in the legislation of Plato and Aristotle). Or (2)\nthe just may be restricted to the fair and equitable as regards\nproperty. In both senses, however, justice concerns our behaviour to\nsome one else: and it thus stands apart from the other virtues, as\n(essentially and in its first character) seeking another's good--not\nthe good of the agent himself (I.).\n\nThe first kind of justice, which includes all virtue, called Universal\nJustice, being set aside, the enquiry is reduced to the Particular\nJustice, or Justice proper and distinctive. Of this there are two\nkinds, Distributive and Corrective (II.). Distributive Justice is a\nkind of equality or proportion in the distribution of property,\nhonours, &c., in the State, according to the merits of each citizen;\nthe standard of worth or merit being settled by the constitution,\nwhether democratic, oligarchic, or aristocratic (III.). Corrective, or\nReparative Justice takes no account of persons; but, looking at cases\nwhere unjust loss or gain has occurred, aims to restore the balance, by\nstriking an arithmetical mean (IV.). The Pythagorean idea, that Justice\nis Retaliation, is inadequate; proportion and other circumstances must\nbe included. Proportionate Retaliation, or Reciprocity of services,--as\nin the case of Commercial Exchange, measured through the instrument of\nmoney, with its definite value,--is set forth as the great bond of\nsociety. Just dealing is the mean between doing injustice and suffering\ninjustice (V.). Justice is definitely connected with Law, and exists\nonly between citizens of the State, and not between father and\nchildren, master and slave, between whom there is no law proper, but\nonly a sort of relation analogous to law (VI.). Civil Justice is partly\nNatural, partly conventional. The natural is what has the same force\neverywhere, whether accepted or not; the conventional varies with\ninstitutions, acquiring all its force from adoption by law, and being\nin itself a matter of indifference prior to such adoption. Some persons\nregard all Justice as thus conventional. They say--'What exists by\nnature is unchangeable, and has everywhere the same power; for example,\nfire burns alike in Persia and here; but we see regulations of justice\noften varied--differing here and there.' This, however, is not exactly\nthe fact, though to a certain extent it is the fact. Among the gods\nindeed, it perhaps is not the fact at all: but among men, it is true\nthat there exists something by nature changeable, though everything is\nnot so. Nevertheless, there are some things existing by nature, other\nthings not by nature. And we can plainly see, among those matters that\nadmit of opposite arrangement, which of them belong to nature and which\nto law and convention; and the same distinction will fit in other cases\nalso. Thus the right hand is by nature more powerful than the left; yet\nit is possible that all men may become ambidextrous. Those regulations\nof justice that are not by nature, but by human appointment, are not\nthe same everywhere; nor is the political constitution everywhere the\nsame; yet there is one political constitution only that is by nature\nthe best everywhere (VII.).\n\nTo constitute Justice and Injustice in acts, the acts must be\nvoluntary; there being degrees of culpability in injustice according to\nthe intention, the premeditation, the greater or less knowledge of\ncircumstances. The act that a person does may perhaps be unjust; but he\nis not, on that account, always to be regarded as an unjust man\n(VIII.).\n\nHere a question arises, Can one be injured voluntarily? It seems not,\nfor what a man consents to is not injury. Nor can a person injure\nhimself. Injury is a relationship between two parties (IX.). Equity\ndoes not contradict, or set aside, Justice, but is a higher and finer\nkind of justice, coming in where the law is too rough and general.\n\nBook Sixth treats of Intellectual Excellences, or Virtues of the\nIntellect. It thus follows out the large definition of virtue given at\nthe outset, and repeated in detail as concerns each of the ethical or\nmoral virtues successively.\n\nAccording to the views most received at present, Morality is an affair\nof conscience and sentiment; little or nothing is said about estimating\nthe full circumstances and consequences of each act, except that there\nis no time to calculate correctly, and that the attempt to do so is\ngenerally a pretence for evading the peremptory order of virtuous\nsentiment, which, if faithfully obeyed, ensures virtuous action in each\nparticular case. If these views be adopted, an investigation of our\nintellectual excellences would find no place in a treatise on Ethics.\nBut the theory of Aristotle is altogether different. Though he\nrecognizes Emotion and Intellect as inseparably implicated in the mind\nof Ethical agents, yet the sovereign authority that he proclaims is not\nConscience or Sentiment, but Reason. The subordination of Sentiment to\nReason is with him essential. It is true that Reason must be supplied\nwith First Principles, whence to take its start; and these First\nPrinciples are here declared to be, fixed emotional states or\ndispositions, engendered in the mind of the agent by a succession of\nsimilar acts. But even these dispositions themselves, though not\nbelonging to the department of Reason, are not exempt from the\nchallenge and scrutiny of Reason; while the proper application of them\nin act to the complicated realities of life, is the work of Reason\naltogether. Such an ethical theory calls upon Aristotle to indicate,\nmore or less fully, those intellectual excellences, whereby alone we\nare enabled to overcome the inherent difficulties of right ethical\nconduct; and he indicates them in the present Book, comparing them with\nthose other intellectual excellences which guide our theoretical\ninvestigations, where conduct is not directly concerned.\n\nIn specifying the ethical excellences, or excellences of disposition,\nwe explained that each of them aimed to realize a mean--and that this\nmean was to be determined by Right Reason. To find the mean, is thus an\noperation of the Intellect; and we have now to explain what the right\nperformance of it is,--or to enter upon the Excellences of the\nIntellect. The soul having been divided into Irrational and Rational,\nthe Rational must farther be divided into two parts,--the Scientific\n(dealing with necessary matter), the Calculative, or Deliberative\n(dealing with contingent matter). We must touch, upon the excellence or\nbest condition of both of them (I). There are three principal functions\nof the soul--Sensation, Reason, and Appetite or Desire. Now, Sensation\n(which beasts have as well as men) is not a principle of moral action.\nThe Reason regards truth and falsehood only; it does not move to\naction, it is not an end in itself. Appetite or Desire, which aims at\nan end, introduces us to moral action. Truth and Falsehood, as regards\nReason, correspond to Good and Evil as regards Appetite: Affirmation\nand Negation, with the first, are the analogues of Pursuit and\nAvoidance, with the second. In purpose, which is the principle of moral\naction, there is included deliberation or calculation. Reason and\nAppetite are thus combined: Good Purpose comprises both true\naffirmation and right pursuit: you may call it either an Intelligent\nAppetite, or an Appetitive Intelligence. Such is man, as a principle of\naction [hae toiautae archae anthropos].\n\nScience has to do with the necessary and the eternal; it is teachable,\nbut teachable always from _praecognita_, or principles, obtained by\ninduction; from which principles, conclusions are demonstrated by\nsyllogism (III.). Art, or Production, is to be carefully distinguished\nfrom the action or agency that belongs to man as an ethical agent, and\nthat does not terminate in any separate assignable product. But both\nthe one and the other deal with contingent matters only. Art deals for\nthe most part with the same matters as are subject to the intervention\nof Fortune or Chance (IV.).\n\nPrudence or Judiciousness [Greek: phronaesis], the quality of [Greek:\nho phronimos], the Practical Reason, comes next. We are told what are\nthe matters wherewith it is, and wherewith it is not, conversant. It\ndoes not deal with matters wherein there exist art, or with rules of\nart. It does not deal with necessary matters, nor with matters not\nmodifiable by human agency. The prudent or judicious man is one who\n(like Pericles) can accurately estimate and foresee matters (apart from\nScience and Art) such as are good or evil for himself and other human\nbeings. On these matters, feelings of pleasure or pain are apt to bias\nthe mind, by insinuating wrong aims; which they do not do in regard to\nthe properties of a triangle and other scientific conclusions. To guard\nagainst such bias, the judicious man must be armed with the ethical\nexcellence described above as Temperance or Moderation. Judiciousness\nis not an Art, admitting of better and worse; there are not good\njudicious men, and bad judicious men, as there are good and bad\nartists. Judiciousness is itself an excellence (_i.e._, the term\nconnotes excellence)--an excellence of the rational soul, and of that\nbranch of the rational soul which is calculating, deliberative, not\nscientific (V.). Reason or Intellect [Greek: nous] is the faculty for\napprehending the first principles of demonstrative science. It is among\nthe infallible faculties of the mind, together with Judiciousness,\nScience, and Philosophy. Each of these terms connotes truth and\naccuracy (VI.). Wisdom in the arts is the privilege of the superlative\nartists, such as Phidias in sculpture. But there are some men wise, not\nin any special art, but absolutely; and this wisdom [Greek: sophia] is\nPhilosophy. It embraces both principles of science (which Aristotle\nconsiders to come under the review of the First Philosophy) and\ndeductions therefrom; it is [Greek: nous] and [Greek: epistaemae] in\none. It is more venerable and dignified than Prudence or Judiciousness;\nbecause its objects, the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, are far more\nglorious than man, with whose interests alone Prudence is concerned;\nand also because the celestial objects are eternal and unvarying; while\nman and his affairs are transitory and ever fluctuating. Hence the\ngreat honour paid to Thales, Anaxagoras, and others, who speculated on\ntheories thus magnificent and superhuman, though useless in respect to\nhuman good.\n\nWe have already said that Prudence or Judiciousness is good counsel on\nhuman interests, with a view to action. But we must also add that it\ncomprises a knowledge not of universals merely, but also of\nparticulars; and experienced men, much conversant with particulars, are\noften better qualified for action than inexperienced men of science\n(VII.). Prudence is the same in its intellectual basis as the political\nscience or art--yet looked at in a different aspect. Both of them are\npractical and consultative, respecting matters of human good and evil;\nbut prudence, in the stricter sense of the word, concerns more\nespecially the individual self; still, the welfare of the individual is\nperhaps inseparable from household and state concerns. Prudence farther\nimplies a large experience; whence boys, who can become good\nmathematicians, cannot have practical judgment or prudence. In\nconsultation, we are liable to error both in regard to universals, and\nin regard to particulars; it is the business of prudence, as well as of\nthe political science, to guard against both. That prudence is not\nidentical with Science, is plain enough; for Science is the\nintermediate process between the first principles and the last\nconclusions; whereas prudence consists chiefly in seizing these last,\nwhich are the applications of reasoning, and represent the particular\nacts to be done. Prudence is the counterpart of Reason [Greek: Nous] or\nIntellect, but at the opposite extremity of the mental process. For\nIntellect [Greek: Nous] apprehends the extreme Universals,--the first\nprinciples,--themselves not deducible, but from which deduction starts;\nwhile Prudence fastens on the extreme particulars, which are not known\nby Science, but by sensible Perception. We mean here by sensible\nPerception, not what is peculiar to any of the five senses, but what is\ncommon to them all--whereby we perceive that the triangle before us is\na geometrical ultimatum, and that it is the final subject of\napplication for all the properties previously demonstrated to belong to\ntriangles generally. The mind will stop here in the downward march\ntowards practical application, as it stopped at first principles in the\nupward march. Prudence becomes, however, confounded with sensible\nperception, when we reach this stage. [The statement here given\ninvolves Aristotle's distinction of the proper and the common\nSensibles; a shadowing out of the muscular element in sensation]\n(VIII.).\n\nGood counsel [Greek: euboulia] is distinguished from various other\nqualities. It is, in substance, choosing right means to a good end; the\nend being determined by the great faculty--Prudence or Judiciousness\n(IX.). Sagacity [Greek: synesis] is a just intellectual measure in\nregard to the business of life, individual and social; critical ability\nin appreciating and interpreting the phenomena of experience. It is\ndistinguished from Prudence in this respect--that Prudence carries\ninferences into Practice (X.). Considerateness [Greek: gnomae] is\nanother intellectual virtue, with a practical bearing. It is that\nvirtue whereby we discern the proper occasions for indulgent\nconstruction, softening the rigour of logical consistency. It is the\nsource of equitable decisions.\n\nThe different intellectual excellences just named--Considerateness,\nSagacity, Prudence [Greek: phronaesis], and Intellect [Greek: Nous],\nseem all to bear on the same result, and are for the most part\npredicable of the same individuals. All of them are concerned with the\nultimate applications of principle to practice, and with the actual\nmoments for decision and action. Indeed, Intellect [Greek: Nous] deals\nwith the extremes at both ends of the scale: with the highest and\nlowest terms. In theoretical science, it apprehends and sanctions the\nmajor propositions, the first and highest _principia_ of\ndemonstrations: in practical dealings, it estimates the minor\npropositions of the syllogism, the possibilities of the situation, and\nthe ultimate action required. All these are the _principia_ from whence\narises the determining motive: for the universal is always derived from\nparticulars; these we must know through sensible perception, which is\nin this case the same thing as intellect [Greek: Nous]. Intellect is in\nfact both the beginning and the end: it cognizes both the first grounds\nof demonstration and the last applications of the results of\ndemonstration. A man cannot acquire science by nature, or without\nteaching: but he may acquire Intellect and Sagacity by nature, simply\nthrough, long life and abundant experience. The affirmations and\nopinions of old men deserve attention, hardly less than demonstrations:\nthey have acquired an eye from experience, and can thus see the\npractical principles (though they may not be able to lay out their\nreasons logically) (XI.).\n\nBut an objector may ask--Of what use are Philosophy and Prudence? He\nmay take such grounds as these. (1) Philosophy has no practical aim at\nall; nor does it consider the means of happiness? (2) Prudence, though\nbearing on practice, is merely knowledge, and does not ensure right\naction. (3) Even granting the knowledge to be of value as direction, it\nmight be obtained, like medical knowledge, from a professional adviser.\n(4) If philosophy is better than prudence, why does prudence control\nphilosophy? We have to answer these doubts. The first is answered by\nasserting the independent value of philosophy and prudence, as\nperfections of our nature, and as sources of happiness in themselves.\nThe second and third doubts are set at rest, by affirming prudence to\nhave no existence apart from virtue. Without a virtuous aim, there is\nno such thing as Prudence: there is nothing but cleverness degenerating\ninto cunning; while virtue without virtuous prudence is nothing better\nthan a mere instinct, liable to be misguided in every way (XII.).\n\nThere is one more difficulty to be cleared up respecting virtue. All\nour dispositions; and therefore all our ethical excellences, come to us\nin a certain sense by nature; that is, we have from the moment of birth\na certain aptitude for becoming temperate, courageous, just, &c. But\nthese natural aptitudes or possessions [Greek: physikai hexeis] are\nsomething altogether distinct from the ethical excellences proper,\nthough capable of being matured into them, if intellect and prudence be\nsuperadded. Sokrates was mistaken in resolving all the virtues into\nprudence; but he was right in saying that none of them can exist\nwithout prudence. The virtues ought to be defined as, not merely\nethical dispositions _according_ to right reason, but ethical\ndispositions _along with_ right reason or prudence (_i.e._, prudence is\nan ever present co-efficient). It is thus abundantly evident that none\nbut a prudent man can be good, and none but a good man can be prudent.\nThe virtues are separable from each other, so far as the natural\naptitudes are concerned: a man may have greater facility for acquiring\none than another. But so far as regards the finished acquirements of\nexcellence, in virtue of which a man is called _good_--no such\nseparation is possible. All of them alike need the companionship of\nPrudence (XIII.).\n\nBook Seventh has, two Parts. Part first discusses the grades of moral\nstrength and moral weakness. Part second is a short dissertation on\nPleasure, superseded by the superior handling of the subject in the\nTenth Book.\n\nWith reference to moral power, in self-restraint, six grades are\nspecified. (1) God-like virtue, or reason impelling as well as\ndirecting. (2) The highest human virtue, expressed by Temperance\n[Greek: sophrosynae]--appetite and passion perfectly harmonized with\nreason. (3) Continence [Greek: egkrateia] or the mastery of reason,\nafter a struggle. (4) Incontinence, the mastery of appetite or passion,\nbut not without a struggle. (5) Vice, reason perverted so as to\nharmonize entirely with appetite or passion. (6) Bestiality, naked\nappetite or passion, without reason. Certain prevalent opinions are\nenumerated, which are to form the subject of the discussions\nfollowing--(1) Continence and endurance are morally good. (2) The\nContinent man sticks to his opinion. (3) The Incontinent err knowingly.\n(4) Temperance and Continence are the same. (5) Wise and clever men may\nbe Incontinent. (6) Incontinence applies to other things than Pleasure,\nas anger, honour, and gain (I.).\n\nThe third point (the Incontinent sin knowingly) is first mooted.\nSokrates held the contrary; he made vice and ignorance convertible.\nOthers think that the knowledge possessed by the incontinent is mere\nopinion, or a vague and weak conviction. It is objected to No. 4, that\ncontinence implies evil desires to be controlled; while temperance\nmeans the character fully harmonized. As to No. 2, Continence must\noften be bad, if it consists in sticking to an opinion (II.).\n\nThe third point, the only question of real interest or difficulty, is\nresumed at greater length. The distinction between _knowledge_ and\n_opinion_ (the higher and the lower kinds of knowledge) does not settle\nthe question, for opinion may be as _strong_ as knowledge. The real\npoint is, what is meant by _having knowledge_? A man's knowledge may be\nin abeyance, as it is when he is asleep or intoxicated. Thus, we may\nhave in the mind two knowledges (like two separate syllogisms), one\nleading to continence, the other to incontinence; the first is not\ndrawn out, like the syllogism wanting a minor; hence it may be said to\nbe not present to the mind; so that, in a certain sense, Sokrates was\nright in denying that actual and present knowledge could be overborne.\nVice is a form of oblivion (III.).\n\nThe next question is, what is the object-matter of incontinence;\nwhether there is any man incontinent simply and absolutely (without any\nspecification of wherein), or whether all incontinent men are so in\nregard to this or that particular matter? (No. 6). The answer is, that\nit applies directly to the bodily appetites and pleasures, which are\nnecessary up to a certain point (the sphere of Temperance), and then he\nthat commits unreasonable excess above this point is called Incontinent\nsimply. But if he commits excess in regard to pleasures, which, though\nnot necessary, are natural and, up to a certain point, reasonable--such\nas victory, wealth, honour--we designate him as incontinent, yet with a\nspecification of the particular matter (IV.).\n\nThe modes of Bestiality, as cannibalism and unnatural passion, are\nascribed to morbid depravity of nature or of habits, analogous to\ndisease or madness (V.).\n\nIncontinence in anger is not so bad as Incontinence in lust, because\nanger (1) has more semblance of reason, (2) is more a matter of\nconstitution, (3) has less of deliberate purpose--while lust is crafty,\n(4) arises under pain; and not from wantonness (VI.).\n\nPersons below the average in resisting _pleasures_ are incontinent;\nthose below the average in resisting _pains_ are soft or effeminate.\nThe mass of men incline to both weaknesses. He that deliberately\npursues excessive pleasures, or other pleasures in an excessive way, is\nsaid to be abandoned. The intemperate are worse than the incontinent.\nSport, in its excess, is effeminacy, as being relaxation from toil.\nThere are two kinds of incontinence: the one proceeding from\nprecipitancy, where a man acts without deliberating at all; the other\nfrom feebleness,--where he deliberates, but where the result of\ndeliberation is too weak to countervail his appetite (VII.).\nIntemperance or profligacy is more vicious, and less curable than\nIncontinence. The profligate man is one who has in him no principle\n(archae) of good or of right reason, and who does wrong without\nafterwards repenting of it; the incontinent man has the good principle\nin him, but it is overcome when he does wrong, and he afterwards\nrepents (VIII.). Here, again, Aristotle denies that sticking to one's\nopinions is, _per se_, continence. The opinion may be wrong; in that\ncase, if a man sticks to it, prompted by mere self-assertion and love\nof victory, it is a species of incontinence. One of the virtues of the\ncontinent man is to be open to persuasion, and to desert one's\nresolutions for a noble end (IX.). Incontinence is like sleep or\ndrunkenness as opposed to wakeful knowledge. The incontinent man is\nlike a state having good laws, but not acting on them. The incontinence\nof passion is more curable than that of weakness; what proceeds from\nhabit more than what is natural (X.).\n\nThe Eighth and Ninth Books contain the treatise on Friendship.\n\nThe subject deserves a place in an Ethical treatise, because of its\nconnexion with virtue and with happiness. Several questions have been\ndebated concerning Friendship,--Is it based on likeness or unlikeness?\nCan bad men be friends? Is there but one species of Friendship, or more\nthan one? (I.) Some progress towards a solution of these questions may\nbe made by considering what are the objects of liking; these are the\ngood, the pleasant, the useful. By the good is not meant the absolute\ngood of Plato, but the apparent good. Inanimate things must be\nexcluded, as wanting reciprocation (II.). The varieties of friendship\nfollow these three modes of the likeable. The friendships for the\nuseful and the pleasant, are not disinterested, but self-seeking; they\nare therefore accidental and transitory; they do not involve intimate\nand frequent association. Friendship for the good, and between the\nvirtuous, is alone perfect; it is formed slowly, and has the requisites\nof permanence. It occurs rarely (III.). As regards the useful and the\npleasant, the bad may be friends. It may happen that two persons are\nmutually pleasant to each other, as lover and beloved; while this\nlasts, there is friendship. It is only as respects the good, that there\nexists a permanent liking for the person. Such friendship is of an\nabsolute nature; the others are accidental (IV.). Friendship is in full\nexercise only during actual intercourse; it may exist potentially at a\ndistance; but in long absence, there is danger of its being dissolved.\nFriendship is a settled state or habit, while fondness is a mere\npassion, which does not imply our wishing to do good to the object of\nit, as friendship does (V.). The perfect kind of friendship, from its\nintensity, cannot be exercised towards more than a small number. In\nregard to the useful and the pleasant, on the other hand, there may be\nfriendship with many; as the friendship towards tradesmen and between\nthe young. The happy desire pleasant friends. Men in power have two\nclasses of friends; one for the useful, the other for the pleasant.\nBoth qualities are found in the good man; but he will not be the friend\nof a superior, unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue\nalso. In all the kinds of friendship now specified there is equality\n(VI.). There are friendships where one party is superior, as father and\nson, older and younger, husband and wife, governor and governed. In\nsuch cases there should be a proportionably greater love on the part of\nthe inferior. When the love on each side is proportioned to the merit\nof the party beloved, then we have a certain species of equality, which\nis an ingredient in friendship. But equality in matters of friendship,\nis not quite the same as equality in matters of justice. In matters of\njustice, equality proportioned to merit stands first--equality between\nman and man (no account being taken of comparative merit) stands only\nsecond. In friendship, the case is the reverse; the perfection of\nfriendship is equal love between the friends towards each other; to\nhave greater love on one side, by reason of and proportioned to\nsuperior merit, is friendship only of the second grade. This will be\nevident if we reflect that extreme inequality renders friendship\nimpossible--as between private men and kings or gods. Hence the friend\ncan scarcely wish for his friend the maximum of good, to become a god;\nsuch extreme elevation would terminate the friendship. Nor will he wish\nhis friend to possess all the good; for every one wishes most for good\nto self (VII.). The essence of friendship is to love rather than to be\nloved, as seen in mothers; but the generality of persons desire rather\nto be loved, which is akin to being honoured (although honour is partly\nsought as a sign of future favours). By means of love, as already said,\nunequal friendships may be equalized. Friendship with the good, is\nbased on equality and similarity, neither party ever desiring base\nservices. Friendships for the useful are based on the contrariety of\nfulness and defect, as poor and rich, ignorant and knowing (VIII.).\nFriendship is an incident of political society; men associating\ntogether for common ends, become friends. Political justice becomes\nmore binding when men are related by friendship. The state itself is a\ncommunity for the sake of advantage; the expedient to all is the just.\nIn the large society of the state, there are many inferior societies\nfor business, and for pleasure: friendship starts up in all (IX.).\nThere are three forms of Civil Government, with a characteristic\ndeclension or perversion of each:--Monarchy passing into Despotism;\nAristocracy into Oligarchy; Timocracy (based on wealth) into Democracy;\nparent and child typifies the first; husband and wife the second;\nbrothers the third (X.). The monarchial or paternal type has\nsuperiority on one side, and demands honour as well as love on the\nother. In aristocracy, the relation is one of merit, and the greater\nlove is given to the better. In timocracy, and among brothers, there is\nequality; and hence the most frequent friendships. There is no\nfriendship towards a slave, as a slave, for, as such he is a mere\nanimate tool (XL.). In the relations of the family, friendship varies\nwith the different situations. Parents love their children as a part of\nthemselves, and from the first; children grow to love their parents.\nBrothers are affected by their community of origin, as well as by\ncommon education and habits of intimacy. Husband and wife come together\nby a natural bond, and as mutual helps; their friendship contains the\nuseful and the pleasant, and, with virtue, the good. Their offspring\nstrengthens the bond (XII.). The friendships that give rise to\ncomplaints are confined to the Useful. Such friendships involve a legal\nelement of strict and measured reciprocity [mere trade], and a moral or\nunwritten understanding, which is properly friendship. Each party is\napt to give less and expect more than he gets; and the rule must be for\neach to reciprocate liberally and fully, in such manner and kind as\nthey are able (XIII.). In unequal friendships, between a superior and\ninferior, the inferior has the greater share of material assistance,\nthe superior should receive the greater honour (XIV.).\n\nBook Ninth proceeds without any real break. It may not be always easy\nto fix the return to be made for services received. Protagoras, the\nsophist, left it to his pupils to settle the amount of fee that he\nshould receive. When there is no agreement, we must render what is in\nour power, for example, to the gods and to our parents (I.). Cases may\narise of conflicting obligation; as, shall we prefer a friend to a\ndeserving man? shall a person robbed reciprocate to robbers? and\nothers. [We have here the germs of Casuistry.] (II.) As to the\ntermination of Friendship; in the case of the useful and the pleasant,\nthe connexion ceases with the motives. In the case of the good, it may\nhappen that one party counterfeits the good, but is really acting the\nuseful or the pleasant; or one party may turn out wicked, and the only\nquestion is, how far hopes of his improvement shall be entertained.\nAgain, one may continue the same, while the other makes large advances\nin mental training; how far shall present disparity operate against old\nassociations? (III.). There is a sort of illustrative parallelism\nbetween the feelings and acts of friendship, and the feelings and acts\nof self-love, or of a good man to himself. The virtuous man wishes what\nis good for himself, especially for his highest part--the intellect or\nthinking part; he desires to pass his life in the company of his own\nthoughts; he sympathizes with his own sorrows. On the other hand, the\nbad choose the pleasant, although it be hurtful; they fly from\nthemselves; their own thoughts are unpleasant companions; they are full\nof repentance (IV.). Good-will is different from friendship; it is a\nsudden impulse of feeling towards some distinguished or likeable\nquality, as in an antagonist. It has not the test of longing in\nabsence. It may be the prelude to friendship (V.). Unanimity, or\nagreement of opinion, is a part of friendship. Not as regards mere\nspeculation, as about the heavenly bodies; but in practical matters,\nwhere interests are at stake, such as the politics of the day. This\nunanimity cannot occur in the bad, from their selfish and grasping\ndisposition (VI.).\n\nThe position is next examined--that the love felt by benefactors is\nstronger than the love felt by those benefitted. It is not a sufficient\nexplanation to say, the benefactor is a creditor, who wishes the\nprosperity of his debtor. Benefactors are like workmen, who love their\nown work, and the exercise of their own powers. They also have the\nfeeling of nobleness on their side; while the recipient has the less\nlovable idea of profit. Finally, activity is more akin to love than\nrecipiency (VII.). Another question raised for discussion is--'Ought a\nman to love himself most, or another?' On the one hand, selfishness is\nusually condemned as the feature of bad men; on the other hand, the\nfeelings towards self are made the standard of the feelings towards\nfriends. The solution is given thus. There is a lower self (predominant\nwith most men) that gratifies the appetites, seeking wealth, power, &c.\nWith the select few, there is a higher self that seeks the honourable,\nthe noble, intellectual excellence, at any cost of pleasure, wealth,\nhonour, &c. These noble-minded men procure for themselves the greater\ngood by sacrificing the less: and their self-sacrifice is thus a mode\nof self. It is the duty of the good man to love himself: for his noble\nlife is profitable, both to himself, and to others; but the bad man\nought not to love himself. [Self-sacrifice, formerly brought under\nCourage, is here depicted from another point of view] (VIII.).\n\nBy way of bringing out the advantages of friendship, it is next asked,\nDoes the happy man need friends? To this, it is answered, (1) That\nhappiness, being the sum of all human good, must suppose the possession\nof the greatest of external goods, which is friendship. (2) The happy\nman will require friends as recipients, of his overflow of kindness.\n(3) He cannot be expected either to be solitary, or to live with\nstrangers. (4) The highest play of existence is to see the acts of\nanother in harmony with self. (5) Sympathy supports and prolongs the\nglow of one's own emotions. (6) A friend confirms us in the practice of\nvirtue. (7) The sense of existence in ourselves is enlarged by the\nconsciousness of another's existence (IX.). The number of friends is\nagain considered, and the same barriers stated--the impossibility of\nsharing among many the highest kind of affection, or of keeping up\nclose and harmonious intimacy. The most renowned friendships are\nbetween pairs (X.). As to whether friends are most needed in adversity\nor in prosperity--in the one, friendship is more necessary, in the\nother more glorious (XI.). The essential support and manifestation of\nfriendship is Intercourse. Whatever people's tastes are, they desire\nthe society of others in exercising them (XII.).\n\nBook Tenth discusses Pleasure, and lays down as the highest and perfect\npleasure, the exercise of the Intellect in Philosophy.\n\nPleasure is deserving of consideration, from its close intimacy with\nthe constitution of our race; on which account, in our training of\nyouth, we steer them by pleasure and pain; and it is of the first\nimportance that they should feel pleasure in what they ought, and\ndispleasure in what they ought, as the groundwork (or _principium_) of\ngood ethical dispositions. Such a topic can never be left unnoticed,\nespecially when we look at the great difference of opinion thereupon.\nSome affirm pleasure to be the chief good [Eudoxus]. Others call it\naltogether vile and worthless [party of Speusippus]. Of these last,\nsome perhaps really think so; but the rest are actuated by the\nnecessity of checking men's too great proneness to it, and disparage it\non that account. This policy Aristotle strongly censures, and contends\nfor the superior efficacy of truth (I.).\n\nThe arguments urged by Eudoxus as proving pleasure to be the chief\ngood, are, (1) That all beings seek pleasure; (2) and avoid its\nopposite, pain; (3) that they seek pleasure as an end-in-itself, and\nnot as a means to any farther end; (4) that pleasure, added to any\nother good, such as justice or temperance, increases the amount of\ngood; which could not be the case, unless pleasure were itself good.\nYet this last argument (Aristotle urges) proves pleasure to be _a_\ngood, but not to be _the_ Good; indeed, Plato urged the same argument,\nto show that pleasure could _not_ be The Good: since The Good (the\nChief Good) must be something that does not admit of being enhanced or\nmade more good. The objection of Speusippus,--that irrational creatures\nare not to be admitted as witnesses,--Aristotle disallows, seeing that\nrational and irrational agree on the point; and the thing that seems to\nall, must be true. Another objection, That the opposite of pain is not\npleasure, but a neutral state--is set aside as contradicted by the fact\nof human desire and aversion, the two opposite states of feeling (II.).\n\nThe arguments of the Platonists, to prove that pleasure is not good,\nare next examined. (1) Pleasure, they say, is not a quality; but\nneither (replies Aristotle) are the exercises or actual manifestations\nof virtue or happiness. (2) Pleasure is not definite, but unlimited, or\nadmitting of degrees, while The Good is a something definite, and does\nnot admit of degrees. But if these reasoners speak about the pure\npleasures, they might take objection on similar grounds against virtue\nand justice also; for these too admit of degrees, and one man is more\nvirtuous than another. And if they speak of the mixed pleasures\n(alloyed with pain), their reasoning will not apply to the unmixed.\nGood health is acknowledged to be a good, and to be a definite\nsomething; yet there are nevertheless some men more healthy, some less.\n(3) The Good is perfect or complete; but objectors urge that no motion\nor generation is complete, and pleasure is in one of these two\ncategories. This last assertion Aristotle denies. Pleasure is _not_ a\nmotion; for the attribute of velocity, greater or less, which is\nessential to all motion, does not attach to pleasure. A man may be\nquick in becoming pleased, or in becoming angry; but in the act of\nbeing pleased or angry, he can neither be quick nor slow. Nor is it\ntrue that pleasure is a generation. In all generation, there is\nsomething assignable out of which generation takes place (not any one\nthing out of any other), and into which it reverts by destruction. If\npleasure be a generation, pain must be the destruction of what is\ngenerated; but this is not correct, for pain does not re-establish the\nstate antecedent to the pleasure. Accordingly, it is not true that\npleasure is a generation. Some talk of pain as a want of something\nrequired by nature, and of pleasure as a filling up of that want. But\nthese are corporeal, not mental facts, and are applicable only to\neating and drinking; not applicable to many other pleasures, such as\nthose of sight, hearing, or learning. (4) There are some disgraceful\npleasures. Aristotle replies that these are not absolutely and properly\npleasures, but only to the depraved man; just as things are not yellow,\nwhich appear so to men in a jaundice. Pleasures differ from each other\nin species: there are good pleasures, _i.e._, those arising from good\nsources; and bad pleasures, _i.e._, from bad sources. The pleasure _per\nse_ is always desirable; but not when it comes from objectionable acts.\nThe pleasures of each man will vary according to his character; none\nbut a musical man can enjoy the pleasures of music. No one would\nconsent to remain a child for life, even though he were to have his\nfill of childish pleasure.\n\nAristotle sums up the result thus. Pleasure is not The Good. Not every\nmode of pleasure is to be chosen. Some pleasures, distinguished from\nthe rest specifically or according to their sources, are to be chosen\n_per se_ (III.).\n\nHe then attempts to define pleasure. It is something perfect and\ncomplete in itself, at each successive moment of time; hence it is not\nmotion, which is at every moment incomplete. Pleasure is like the act\nof vision, or a point, or a monad, always complete in itself. It\naccompanies every variety of sensible perception, intelligence, and\ntheorizing contemplation. In each of these faculties, the act is more\nperfect, according as the subjective element is most perfect, and the\nobject most grand and dignified. When the act is most perfect, the\npleasure accompanying it is also the most perfect; and this pleasure\nputs the finishing consummation to the act. The pleasure is not a\npre-existing acquirement now brought into exercise, but an accessory\nend implicated with the act, like the fresh look which belongs to the\norganism just matured. It is a sure adjunct, so long as subject and\nobject are in good condition. But continuity of pleasure, as well as of\nthe other exercises, is impossible. Life is itself an exercise much\ndiversified, and each man follows the diversity that is suitable to his\nown inclination--music, study, &c. Each has its accessory and\nconsummating mode of pleasure; and to say that all men desire pleasure,\nis the same as saying that all men desire life. It is no real question\nto ask--Do we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the\nsake of life? The truth is, that the two are implicated and inseparable\n(IV.).\n\nAs our acts or exercises differ from each other specifically, so also\nthe pleasures that are accessory to them differ specifically. Exercises\nintellectual differ from exercises perceptive, and under each head\nthere are varieties differing from each other. The pleasures accessory\nand consummating to each, are diversified accordingly. Each pleasure\ncontributes to invigorate and intensify the particular exercise that it\nis attached to; the geometer who studies his science with pleasure\nbecomes more acute and successful in prosecuting it. On the other hand,\nthe pleasures attached to one exercise impede the mind in regard to\nother exercises; thus men fond of the flute cannot listen to a speaker\nwith attention, if any one is playing the flute near them. What we\ndelight in doing, we are more likely to do well; what we feel pain in\ndoing, we are not likely to do well. And thus each variety of exercise\nis alike impeded by the pains attached to itself, and by the pleasures\nattached to other varieties.\n\nAmong these exercises or acts, some are morally good, others morally\nbad; the desires of the good are also praise-worthy, the desires of the\nbad are blameable; but if so, much more are the pleasures attached to\nthe good exercises, good pleasures--and the pleasures attached to the\nbad exercises, bad pleasures. For the pleasures attached to an exercise\nare more intimately identified with that exercise than the desire of it\ncan be. The pleasure of the exercise, and the exercise itself, are\nindeed so closely identified one with the other, that to many they\nappear the same. Sight, hearing, and smell, differ in purity from touch\nand taste; and the pleasures attached to each differ in like manner.\nThe pleasures of intellect differ from those of sense, as these two\nexercises differ from one another. Every animal has its own peculiar\npleasures, as it has also its own peculiar manifestation and exercises.\nAmong the human race, the same things give pleasure to one individual\nand pain to another. The things that appear sweet to the strong and\nhealthy man, do not appear sweet to one suffering from fever, or\nweakly. Now, amidst this discrepancy, what _appears_ to the virtuous\nand intelligent man, really _is_. His pleasures are the true and real\npleasures. Excellence, and the good man _qu\u00e2tenus_ good, are to be\ntaken as the standard. If what he abhors appears pleasurable to some\npersons, we must not be surprised, since there are many depravations of\nindividuals, in one way or another; but these things are not pleasures\nreally, they are only pleasures to these depraved mortals (V.).\n\nSo far the theory of Pleasure. Aristotle now goes back to his starting\npoint--the nature of the Good, and Happiness. He re-states his\npositions: That Happiness is an exercise or actuality [Greek:\nenergeia], and not an acquirement or state (hexis), That it belongs to\nsuch exercises as are worthy of choice for their own sake, and not to\nsuch as are worthy of choice for the sake of something else; That it is\nperfect and self-sufficing, seeking nothing beyond itself, and leaving\nno wants unsupplied. Hence he had concluded that it consisted in acting\naccording to virtue; for the honourable and good are chosen for their\nown sake. But amusements are also sought for their own sake; Are these\nalso to be called happiness? No. It is true that they are much pursued\nby those whom the vulgar envy--men of wealth and despots--who patronize\nand reward the practitioners of amusement. But this proves nothing, for\nwe cannot adopt the choice of these despots, who have little virtue or\nintellect, and have never known the taste of refined and liberal\npleasure. Children and mature men, bad men and virtuous, have each\ntheir different pleasures; the virtuous and intelligent man finds a\nlife of excellence and the pleasures attached thereunto most worthy of\nhis choice, and such a man (Aristotle has declared more than once) is\nour standard. It would indeed be childish to treat amusements as the\nmain end of life; they are the relaxation of the virtuous man, who\nderives from them fresh vigour for the prosecution of the serious\nbusiness of life, which he cannot prosecute continuously. The serious\nexercises of life are better than the comic, because they proceed from\nthe better part of man. The slave may enjoy bodily pleasures to the\nfull, but a slave is not called happy (VI.).\n\nWe have thus shown that Happiness consists in exercise or actual living\naccording to excellence; naturally, therefore, according to the highest\nexcellence, or the excellence of the best part of man. This best part\nis the Intellect (_Nous_), our most divine and commanding element; in\nits exercise, which is theoretical or speculative, having respect to\nmatters honourable, divine, and most worthy of study. Such\nphilosophical exercise, besides being the highest function of our\nnature, is at the same time more susceptible than any mode of active\neffort, of being prosecuted for a long continuance. It affords the\npurest and most lasting pleasure; it approaches most nearly to being\nself-sufficing, since it postulates little more than the necessaries of\nlife, and is even independent of society, though better _with_ society.\nPerfect happiness would thus be the exercise of the theorizing\nintellect, continued through a full period of life. But this is more\nthan we can expect. Still, we ought to make every effort to live\naccording to this best element of our nature; for, though small in\nbulk, it stands exalted above the rest in power and dignity, and, being\nthe sovereign element in man, is really The Man himself (VII.).\n\nNext, yet only second, come the other branches of excellence: the\nactive social life of a good citizen. Exercises according to this\nbranch of virtue are the natural business of man, for it is bound up\nwith our whole nature, including body as well as mind, our appetites,\nand our passions, whereas the happiness of intellect is separate.\nActive social virtue postulates conditions of society and external aids\nin considerable measure; but the life of intellect requires only the\nminimum of these, and is even impeded by much of them.\n\nThat perfect happiness is to be found in the philosophical life only,\nwill appear farther when we recollect that the gods are blest and happy\nin the highest degree, and that this is the only mode of life suitable\nto them. With the gods there can be no scope for active social virtues;\nfor in what way can they be just, courageous, or temperate? Neither\nvirtuous practice nor constructive art can be predicated of the gods;\nwhat then remains, since we all assume them to live, and therefore to\nbe in act or exercise of some kind; for no one believes them to live in\na state of sleep, like Endymion. There remains nothing except\nphilosophical contemplation. This, then, must be the life of the gods,\nthe most blest of all; and that mode of human life which approaches\nnearest to it will be the happiest. No other animal can take part in\nthis, and therefore none can be happy. In so far as the gods pay\nattention to human affairs, they are likely to take pleasure in the\nphilosopher, who is most allied to themselves. A moderate supply of\ngood health, food, and social position, must undoubtedly be ensured to\nthe philosopher; for, without these, human nature will not suffice for\nthe business of contemplation. But he will demand nothing more than a\nmoderate supply, and when thus equipped, he will approach nearer to\nhappiness than any one else. Aristotle declares this confidently,\nciting Solon, Anaxagoras, and other sages, as having said much the same\nbefore him (VIII.).\n\nIn the concluding chapter, Aristotle gives the transition from Ethics\nto Politics. Treatises on virtue may inspire a few liberal minds; but,\nfor the mass of men, laws, institutions, and education are necessary.\nThe young ought to be trained, not merely by paternal guidance\ndirecting in the earliest years their love and hatred, but also by a\nscheme of public education, prescribed and enforced by authority\nthroughout the city. Right conduct will thus be rendered easier by\nhabit; but still, throughout life, the mature citizen must continue\nunder the discipline of law, which has force adequate to correction,\nand, being impersonal, does not excite aversion and hatred. Hence the\nneed for a system of good public training. Nowhere is this now\nestablished and enforced; hardly anywhere, except in Sparta, is it even\nattempted. Amid such public neglect, it becomes the duty of an\nindividual to contribute what he can to the improvement of those that\nhe is concerned in, and for that purpose to acquire the capacities\nqualifying him for becoming a lawgiver. Private admonition will\ncompensate to a certain extent for the neglect of public interference,\nand in particular cases may be even more discriminating. Bat how are\nsuch capacities to be acquired? Not from the Sophists, whose method is\ntoo empirical; nor from practical politicians, for they seem to have no\npower of imparting their skill. Perhaps it would be useful to make a\ncollection of existing laws and constitutions. Aristotle concludes with\nsketching the plan of his own work on Politics.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Aristotelian doctrines are generally summed up in such points as\nthese:--The theory of Good; Pleasure; the theory of Virtue; the\ndoctrine of the Will, distinguishing voluntary from involuntary; Virtue\na Habit; the doctrine of the MEAN; the distinction between the Moral\nVirtues and the Intellectual Virtues; Justice, distributive, and\ncommutative; Friendship; the Contemplative Life.\n\nThe following are the indications of his views, according to the six\nleading subjects of Ethics.\n\nI. and II.--It is characteristic of Aristotle (as is fully stated in\nAppendix B.) to make the judgment of the wisest and most cultivated\nminds, the standard of appeal in moral questions. He lays down certain\ngeneral principles, such as the doctrine of the Mean, but in the\napplication of these (which is everything), he trusts to the most\nexperienced and skilled advisers that the community can furnish.\n\nIII.--On the theory of Happiness, or the Summum Bonum, it is needless\nto repeat the abstract of the tenth book.\n\nIV.--In laying down the Moral Code, he was encumbered with the too wide\nview of Virtue; but made an advance in distinguishing virtue proper\nfrom excellence in general.\n\nV.--He made Society tutelary to the individual in an excessive degree.\nHe had no clear conception of the province of authority or law; and did\nnot separate the morality of obligation from the morality of reward and\nnobleness.\n\nVI.--His exclusion of Theology from morality was total.\n\nTHE STOICS.\n\nThe Stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy, recognized and\nconspicuous at Athens during the three centuries preceding the\nChristian era, and during the century or more following. Among these\nfour sects, the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between the\nStoics and the Epicureans. The Stoical system dates from about 300\nB.C.; it was derived from the system of the Cynics.\n\nThe founder of the system was ZENO, from Citium in Cyprus (he lived\nfrom 340--260 B.C.), who derived his first impulse from Krates the\nCynic. He opened his school in a building or porch, called the _Stoa\nPoecile_ ('Painted Portico') at Athens, whence the origin of the name\nof the sect. Zeno had for his disciple CLEANTHES, from Assos in the\nTroad (300--220 B.C.), whose _Hymn to Jupiter_ is the only fragment of\nany length that has come down to us from the early Stoics, and is a\nremarkable production, setting forth the unity of God, his omnipotence,\nand his moral government. CHRYSIPPUS, from Soli in Cilicia (290--207\nB.C.), followed Cleanthes, and, in his voluminous writings, both\ndefended and modified the Stoical creed. These three represent the\n_first_ period of the system. The _second_ period (200--50 B.C.)\nembraces its general promulgation, and its introduction to the Romans.\nChrysippus was succeeded by ZENO of Sidon, and DIOGENES of Babylon;\nthen followed ANTIPATER, of Tarsus, who taught PANAETIUS of Rhodes (d.\n112 B.C.), who, again, taught POSIDONIUS of Apamea, in Syria. (Two\nphilosophers are mentioned from the native province of St. Paul,\nbesides Chrysippus--ATHEKODOEUS, from Cana in Cilicia; and ARCHEDEMUS,\nfrom Tarsus, the apostle's birthplace. It is remarked by Sir A. Grant,\nthat almost all the first Stoics were of Asiatic birth; and the system\nitself is undeniably more akin to the oriental mind than to the Greek.)\nPosidonius was acquainted with Marius and Pompey, and gave lessons to\nCicero, but the moral treatise of Cicero, _De Officiis_, is derived\nfrom a work of Panaetius. The _third_ period of Stoicism is Roman. In\nthis period, we have Cato the Younger, who invited to his house the\nphilosopher Athenodorus; and, under the Empire, the three Stoic\nphilosophers, whose writings have come down to us--SENECA (6 B.C.-65\nA.D.), EPICTETUS (60-140 A.D.), who began life as a slave, and the\nEmperor MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS (121-180 A.D.). Stoicism prevailed\nwidely in the Roman world, although not to the exclusion of Epicurean\nviews.\n\nThe leading Stoical doctrines are given in certain phrases or\nexpressions, as 'Life according to Nature' (although this phrase\nbelongs also to the Epicureans), the ideal 'Wise Man,' 'Apathy,' or\nequanimity of mind (also an Epicurean ideal), the power of the 'Will,'\nthe worship of 'Duty,' the constant 'Advance' in virtue, &c. But\nperspicuity will be best gained by considering the _Moral_ system under\nfour heads--the Theology; the Psychology or theory of mind; the theory\nof the Good or human happiness; and the scheme of Virtue or Duty.\n\nI.--The THEOLOGICAL doctrines of the Stoics comprehended their system\nof the Universe, and of man's position in it. They held that the\nUniverse is governed by one good and wise God, together with inferior\nor subordinate deities. God exercises a moral government; under it the\ngood are happy, while misfortunes happen to the wicked. According to\nEpictetus, God is the father of men; Antoninus exults in the beautiful\narrangement of all things. The earlier Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus,\nentertained high reverence for the divination, prophecy, and omens that\nwere generally current in the ancient world. They considered that these\nwere the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased to make known\nbeforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes. (Herein lay one\namong the marked points of contrast between Stoics and Epicureans.)\nThey held this foreordination even to the length of fatalism, and made\nthe same replies, as have been given in modern times, to the difficulty\nof reconciling it with the existence of evil, and with the apparent\ncondition of the better and the worse individuals among mankind. They\noffered explanations such as the following: (1) God is the author of\nall things except wickedness; (2) the very nature of good supposes its\ncontrast evil, and the two are inseparable, like light and dark, (which\nmay be called the argument from Relativity); (3) in the enormous extent\nof the Universe, some things must be neglected; (4) when evil happens\nto the good, it is not as a punishment, but as connected with a\ndifferent dispensation; (5) parts of the world may be presided over by\nevil demons; (6) what we call evil may not be evil.\n\nLike most other ancient schools, the Stoics held God to be corporeal\nlike man:--Body is the only substance; nothing incorporeal could act on\nwhat is corporeal; the First Cause of all, God or Zeus, is the primeval\nfire, emanating from which is the soul of man in the form of a warm\nether.\n\nIt is for human beings to recognize the Universe as governed by\nuniversal Law, and not only to raise their minds to the comprehension\nof it, but to enter into the views of the administering Zeus or Fate,\nwho must regard all interests equally; we are to be, as it were, in\nharmony with him, to merge self in universal Order, to think only of\nthat and its welfare. As two is greater than one, the interests of the\nwhole world are infinitely greater than the interests of any single\nbeing, and no one should be satisfied with a regard to anything less\nthan the whole. By this elevation of view, we are necessarily raised\nfar above the consideration of the petty events befalling ourselves.\nThe grand effort of human reason is thus to rise to the abstraction or\ntotality of entire Nature; 'no ethical subject,' says Chrysippus,\n'could be rightly approached except from the pre-consideration of\nentire Nature, and the ordering of the whole.'\n\nAs to Immortality, the Stoics precluded themselves, by holding the\ntheory of the _absorption_ of the individual soul at death into the\ndivine essence; but, on the other hand, their doctrine of advance and\naspiration is what has in all times been the main natural argument for\nthe immortality of the soul. For the most part, they kept themselves\nundecided as to this doctrine, giving it as an alternative, reasoning\nas to our conduct on either supposition, and submitting to the pleasure\nof God in this as in all other things.\n\nIn arguing for the existence of Divine power and government, they\nemployed what has been called the argument from Design, which is as old\nas Sokrates. Man is conscious that he is in himself an intellectual or\nspiritual power, from which, by analogy, he is led to believe that a\ngreater power pervades the universe, as intellect pervades the human\nsystem.\n\nII.--In the PSYCHOLOGY of the Stoics, two questions, are of interest,\ntheir theory of Pleasure and Pain, and their views upon the Freedom of\nthe Will.\n\n1. _The theory of Pleasure and Pain_. The Stoics agreed with the\nPeripatetics (anterior to Epicurus, not specially against _him_) that\nthe first principle of nature is (not pleasure or relief from pain,\nbut) _self-preservation_ or _self-love_; in other words, the natural\nappetite or tendency of all creatures is, to preserve their existing\ncondition with its inherent capacities, and to keep clear of\ndestruction or disablement. This appetite (they said) manifests itself\nin little children before any pleasure or pain is felt, and is moreover\na fundamental postulate, pre-supposed in all desires of particular\npleasures, as well as in all aversions to particular pains. We begin by\nloving our own vitality; and we come, by association, to love what\npromotes or strengthens our vitality; we hate destruction or\ndisablement, and come (by secondary association) to hate whatever\nproduces that effect.[8] The doctrine here laid down associated, and\nbrought under one view, what was common to man, not merely with the\nanimal, but also with the vegetable world; a plant was declared to have\nan impulse or tendency to maintain itself, even without feeling pain or\npleasure. Aristotle (in the tenth Book of the Ethics) says, that he\nwill not determine whether we love life for the sake of pleasure, or\npleasure for the sake of life; for he affirms the two to be essentially\nyoked together and inseparable; pleasure is the consummation of our\nvital manifestations. The Peripatetics, after him, put pleasure down to\na lower level, as derivative and accidental; the Stoics went farther in\nthe same direction--possibly from antithesis against the growing school\nof Epicurus.\n\nThe primary _officium_ (in a larger sense than our word Duty) of man is\n(they said) to keep himself in the state of nature; the second or\nderivative _officium_ is to keep to such things as are _according to\nnature_, and to avert those that are _contrary to nature_; our\ngradually increasing experience enabled us to discriminate the two. The\nyouth learns, as he grows up, to value bodily accomplishments, mental\ncognitions and judgments, good conduct towards those around him,--as\npowerful aids towards keeping up the state of nature. When his\nexperience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and\nharmony of nature and human society, and to impress upon him the\ncomprehension of this great _ideal_, his emotions as well as his reason\nbecome absorbed by it. He recognizes this as the only true Bonum or\nHonestum, to which all other desirable things are referable,--as the\nonly thing desirable for itself and in its own nature. He drops or\ndismisses all those _prima naturae_ that he had begun by desiring. He\nno longer considers any of them as worthy of being desired in itself,\nor for its own sake.\n\nWhile therefore (according to Peripatetics as well as Stoics) the love\nof self and of preserving one's own vitality and activity, is the\nprimary element, intuitive and connate, to which all rational\npreference (_officium_) was at first referred,--they thought it not the\nless true, that in process of time, by experience, association, and\nreflection, there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment or\nnotion, a new and later light, which extinguishes and puts out of sight\nthe early beginning. It was important to distinguish the feeble and\nobscure elements from the powerful and brilliant aftergrowth; which\nindeed was fully realized only in chosen minds, and in them, hardly\nbefore old age. This idea, when once formed in the mind, was _The\nGood_--the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake. The Stoics\ncalled it the only Good, being sufficient in itself for happiness;\nother things being not good, nor necessary to happiness, but simply\npreferable or advantageous when they could be had: the Peripatetics\nrecognized it as the first and greatest good, but said also that it was\nnot sufficient in itself; there were two other inferior varieties of\ngood, of which something must be had as complementary (what the Stoics\ncalled _praeposita_ or _sumenda_). Thus the Stoics said, about the\norigin of the Idea of Bonum or Honestum, much the same as what\nAristotle says about ethical virtue. It is not implanted in us by\nnature; but we have at birth certain initial tendencies and capacities,\nwhich, if aided by association and training, enable us (and that not in\nall cases) to acquire it.\n\n2. _The Freedom of the Will_. A distinction was taken by Epictetus and\nother Stoics between things in our power and things not in our power.\nThe things in our power are our opinions and notions about objects, and\nall our affections, desires, and aversions; the things not in our power\nare our bodies, wealth, honour, rank, authority, &c., and their\nopposites. The practical application is this: wealth and high rank may\nnot be in our power, but we have the power to form an _idea_ of\nthese--namely, that they are unimportant, whence the want of them will\nnot grieve us. A still more pointed application is to death, whose\nforce is entirely in the idea.\n\nWith this distinction between things in our power and things not in our\npower, we may connect the arguments between the Stoics and their\nopponents as to what is now called the Freedom of the Will. But we must\nfirst begin by distinguishing the two questions. By things _in our\npower_, the Stoics meant, things that we could do or acquire, _if we\nwilled_: by things _not in_ our power, they meant, things that we could\nnot do or acquire if we willed. In both cases, the volition was assumed\nas a fact: the question, what determined it--or whether it was\nnon-determined, _i.e._ self-determining--was not raised in the\nabovementioned antithesis. But it was raised in other discussions\nbetween the Stoic theorist Chrysippus, and various opponents. These\nopponents denied that volition was determined by motives, and cited the\ncases of equal conflicting motives (what is known as the ass of\nBuridan) as proving that the soul includes in itself, and exerts, a\nspecial supervenient power of deciding action in one way or the other:\na power not determined by any causal antecedent, but self-originating,\nand belonging to the class of agency that Aristotle recognizes under\nthe denomination of automatic, spontaneous (or essentially irregular\nand unpredictable). Chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality\nof this supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul, but also\nthe reality of all that Aristotle called automatic or spontaneous\nagency generally. Chrysippus said that every movement was determined by\nantecedent motives; that, in cases of equal conflict, the exact\nequality did not long continue, because some new but slight motive\nslipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the other.\n(See Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, c. 23, p. 1045.) Here, we see,\nthe question now known as the Freedom of the Will is discussed: and\nChrysippus declares against it, affirming that volition is always\ndetermined by motives.\n\nBut we also see that, while declaring this opinion, Chrysippus does not\nemploy the terms Necessity or Freedom of the Will: neither did his\nopponents, so far as we can see: they had a different and less\nmisleading phrase. By Freedom, Chrysippus and the Stoics meant the\nfreedom of doing what a man willed, if he willed it. A man is free, as\nto the thing that is in his power, when he wills it: he is not free, as\nto what is not in his power, under the same supposition. The Stoics\nlaid great stress on this distinction. They pointed out how much it is\nreally in a man's power to transform or discipline his own mind: in the\nway of controlling or suppressing some emotions, generating or\nencouraging others, forming new intellectual associations, &c., how\nmuch a man could do in these ways, _if he willed it_, and if he went\nthrough the lessons, habits of conduct, meditations, suitable to\nproduce such an effect. The Stoics strove to create in a man's mind the\nvolitions appropriate for such mental discipline, by depicting the\nbeneficial consequences resulting from it, and the misfortune and shame\ninevitable, if the mind were not so disciplined. Their purpose was to\nstrengthen the governing reason of his mind, and to enthrone it as a\nfixed habit and character, which would control by counter suggestions\nthe impulse arising at each special moment--particularly all disturbing\nterrors or allurements. This, in their view, is a _free mind_; not one\nwherein volition is independent of all motive, but one wherein the\nsusceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant reason,\nso as to give predominance to the better motive against the worse. One\nof the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce, was the\nprudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony with the\nschemes of Providence: which (they said) were always arranged with a\nview to the happiness of the kosmos on the whole. The bad man, whose\nvolitions conflict with these schemes, is always baulked of his\nexpectations, and brought at last against his will to see things\ncarried by an overruling force, with aggravated pain and humiliation to\nhimself: while the good man, who resigns himself to them from the\nfirst, always escapes with less pain, and often without any at all.\n_Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt_.\n\nWe have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern times\nthe Freedom of the Will (_i.e._, that volitions are self-originating\nand unpredictable), the Stoic theorists not only denied it, but framed\nall their Ethics upon the assumption of the contrary. This same\nassumption of the contrary, indeed, was made also by Sokrates, Plato,\nAristotle, and Epicurus: in short, by all the ethical teachers of\nantiquity. All of them believed that volitions depended on causes: that\nunder the ordinary conditions of men's minds, the causes that volitions\ngenerally depended upon are often misleading and sometimes ruinous: but\nthat by proper stimulation from without and meditation within, the\nrational causes of volition might be made to overrule the impulsive.\nPlato, Aristotle, Epicurus, not less than the Stoics, wished to create\nnew fixed habits and a new type of character. They differed, indeed, on\nthe question what the proper type of character was: but each of them\naimed at the same general end--a new type of character, regulating the\ngrades of susceptibility to different motives. And the purpose of all\nand each of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will--_i.e._,\nthe theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable.\n\nIII.--We must consider next the Stoical theory of Happiness, or rather\nof the _Good_, which with them was proclaimed to be the sole,\nindispensable, and self-sufficing condition of Happiness. They declared\nthat Pleasure was no part of Good, and Pain no part of Evil; therefore,\nthat even relief from pain was not necessary to Good or Happiness.\nThis, however, if followed out consistently, would dispense with all\nmorality and all human endeavour. Accordingly, the Stoics were obliged\nto let in some pleasures as an object of pursuit, and some pains as an\nobject of avoidance, though not under the title of Good and Evil, but\nwith the inferior name of _Sumenda_ and _Rejicienda_.[9] Substantially,\ntherefore, they held that pains are an evil, but, by a proper\ndiscipline, may be triumphed over. They disallowed the direct and\nostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of\nEpicurus), but allured their followers partly by promising them the\nvictory over pain, and partly by certain enjoyments of an elevated cast\nthat grew out of their plan of life.\n\nPain of every kind, whether from the casualties of existence, or from,\nthe severity of the Stoical virtues, was to be met by a discipline of\nendurance, a hardening process, which, if persisted in, would succeed\nin reducing the mind to a state of _Apathy_ or indifference. A great\nmany reflections were suggested in aid of this education. The influence\nof exercise and repetition in adapting the system to any new function,\nwas illustrated by the Olympian combatants, and by the Lacedaemonian\nyouth, who endured scourging without complaint. Great stress was laid\non the instability of pleasure, and the constant liability to\naccidents; whence we should always be anticipating and adapting\nourselves to the worst that could happen, so as never to be in a state\nwhere anything could ruffle the mind. It was pointed out how much might\nstill be made of the worst circumstances--poverty, banishment, public\nodium, sickness, old age--and every consideration was advanced that\ncould 'arm the obdurate breast with stubborn patience, as with triple\nsteel.' It has often been remarked that such a discipline of endurance\nwas peculiarly suited to the unsettled condition of the world at the\ntime, when any man, in addition to the ordinary evils of life, might in\na moment be sent into exile, or sold into slavery.\n\nNext to the discipline of endurance, we must rank the complacent\nsentiment of _Pride_, which the Stoic might justly feel in his conquest\nof himself, and in his lofty independence and superiority to the\ncasualties of life.[10] The pride of the Cynic, the Stoic's\npredecessor, was prominent and offensive, showing itself in scurrility\nand contempt towards everybody else; the Stoical pride was a refinement\nupon this, but was still a grateful sentiment of superiority, which\nhelped to make up for the surrender of indulgences. It was usual to\nbestow the most extravagant laudation on the 'Wise Man,' and every\nStoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as\napproaching that great ideal.\n\nThe last and most elevated form of Stoical happiness was the\nsatisfaction of contemplating the Universe and God. Epictetus says,\nthat we can accommodate ourselves cheerfully to the providence that\nrules the world, if we possess two things--the power of seeing all that\nhappens in the proper relation to its own purpose--and a grateful\ndisposition. The work of Antoninus is full of studies of Nature in the\ndevout spirit of 'passing from Nature up to Nature's God;' he is never\nweary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural\nevents, and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything. Old\nage has its grace, and death is the becoming termination. This high\nstrain of exulting contemplation reconciled him to that complete\nsubmission to whatever might befall, which was the essential feature of\nthe 'Life according to Nature,' as he conceived it.\n\nIV.--The Stoical theory of Virtue is implicated in the ideas of the\nGood, now described.\n\nThe fountain of all virtue is manifestly the life according to nature;\nas being the life of subordination of self to more general\ninterests--to family, country, mankind, the whole universe. If a man is\nprepared to consider himself absolutely nothing in comparison with the\nuniversal interest, and to regard it as the sole end of life, he has\nembraced an ideal of virtue of the loftiest order. Accordingly, the\nStoics were the first to preach what is called 'Cosmopolitanism;' for\nalthough, in their reference to the good of the whole, they confounded\ntogether sentient life and inanimate objects--rocks, plants, &c.,\nsolicitude for which was misspent labour--yet they were thus enabled to\nreach the conception of the universal kindship of mankind, and could\nnot but include in their regards the brute creation. They said: 'There\nis no difference between the Greeks and Barbarians; the world is our\ncity.' Seneca urges kindness to slaves, for 'are they not men like\nourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like ourselves?'\n\nThe Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public\naffairs, but the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active\ncitizenship. Chrysippus even said that the life of philosophical\ncontemplation (such as Aristotle preferred, and accounted godlike) was\nto be placed on the same level with the life of pleasure; though\nPlutarch observes that neither Chrysippus nor Zeno ever meddled\npersonally with any public duty; both of them passed their lives in\nlecturing and writing. The truth is that both of them were foreigners\nresiding at Athens; and at a time when Athens was dependent on foreign\nprinces. Accordingly, neither Zeno nor Chrysippus had any sphere of\npolitical action open to them; they were, in this respect, like\nEpictetus afterwards--but in a position quite different from Seneca,\nthe preceptor of Nero, who might hope to influence the great imperial\npower of Rome, and from Marcus Antoninus, who held that imperial power\nin his own hands.\n\nMarcus Antoninus--not only a powerful Emperor, but also the most gentle\nand amiable man of his day--talks of active beneficence both as a duty\nand a satisfaction. But in the creed of the Stoics generally, active\nBeneficence did not occupy a prominent place. They adopted the four\nCardinal Virtues--Wisdom, or the Knowledge of Good and Evil; Justice;\nFortitude; Temperance--as part of their plan of the virtuous life, the\nlife according to Nature. Justice, as the social virtue, was placed\nabove all the rest. But the Stoics were not strenuous in requiring more\nthan Justice, for the benefit of others beside the agent. They even\nreckoned compassion for the sufferings of others as a weakness,\nanalogous to envy for the good fortune of others.\n\nThe Stoic recognized the gods (or Universal Nature, equivalent\nexpressions in his creed) as managing the affairs of the world, with a\nview to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole.\nTowards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from\nhim; but it was his duty and his strongest interest, to resign himself\nto their plans, and to abstain from all conduct tending to frustrate\nthem. Such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested to him by\nthe unreasonable appetites, emotions, fears, antipathies, &c., of daily\nlife; all claiming satisfaction at the expense of future mischief to\nhimself and others. To countervail these misleading forces, by means of\na fixed rational character built up through meditation and\nphilosophical teaching, was the grand purpose of the Stoic ethical\ncreed. The emotional or appetitive self was to be starved or curbed,\nand retained only as an appendage to the rational self; an idea\nproclaimed before in general terms by Plato, but carried out into a\nsystem by the Stoics, and to a great extent even by the Epicureans.\n\nThe Stoic was taught to reflect how much that _appears_ to be\ndesirable, terror-striking, provocative, &c., is not really so, but is\nmade to appear so by false and curable associations. And while he thus\ndiscouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in hostility\nwith others, he learnt to respect the self of another man as well as\nhis own. Epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that hurts us\neither by word or deed; and advises it upon the following very\nremarkable ground. 'Recollect that in what he says or does, he follows\nhis own sense of propriety, not yours. He must do what appears to him\nright, not what appears to you; if he judges wrongly, it is he that is\nhurt, for he is the person deceived. Always repeat to yourself, in such\na case: The man has acted on his own opinion.'\n\nThe reason here given by Epictetus is an instance, memorable in ethical\ntheory, of respect for individual dissenting conviction, even in an\nextreme case; and it must be taken in conjunction with his other\ndoctrine, that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little or no\ndamage, except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by our\nirrational susceptibilities and associations. We see that the Stoic\nsubmerges, as much as he can, the pre-eminence of his own individual\nself, and contemplates himself from the point of view of another, only\nas one among many. But he does not erect the happiness of others into a\ndirect object of his own positive pursuit, beyond the reciprocities of\nfamily, citizenship, and common humanity. The Stoic theorists agreed\nwith Epicurus in inculcating the reciprocities of justice between all\nfellow-citizens; and they even went farther than he did, by extending\nthe sphere of such duties beyond the limits of city, so as to\ncomprehend all mankind. But as to the reciprocities of individual\nfriendship, Epicurus went beyond the Stoics, by the amount of\nself-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the benefit of a\nfriend.\n\nThere is also in the Stoical system a recognition of duties to God, and\nof morality as based on piety. Not only are we all brethren, but also\nthe 'children of one Father.'\n\nThe extraordinary strain put upon human nature by the full Stoic\n_ideal_ of submerging self in the larger interests of being, led to\nvarious compromises. The rigid following out of the ideal issued in one\nof the _paradoxes_, namely.--That all the actions of the wise man are\nequally perfect, and that, short of the standard of perfection, all\nfaults and vices are equal; that, for example, the man that killed a\ncock, without good reason, was as guilty as he that killed his father.\nThis has a meaning only when we draw a line between spirituality and\nmorality, and treat the last as worthless in comparison of the first.\nThe later Stoics, however, in their exhortations to special branches of\nduty, gave a positive value to practical virtue, irrespective of the\n_ideal_.\n\nThe idea of Duty was of Stoical origin, fostered and developed by the\nRoman spirit and legislation. The early Stoics had two different\nwords,--one for the 'suitable' [Greek: kathaekon], or incomplete\npropriety, admitting of degrees, and below the point of rectitude, and\nanother for the 'right' [Greek: katorthoma], or complete rectitude of\naction, which none could achieve except the wise man. It is a\nsignificant circumstance that the 'suitable' is the lineal ancestor of\nour word 'duty' (through the Latin _officium_).\n\nIt was a great point with the Stoic to be conscious of 'advance' or\nimprovement.[11] By self-examination, he kept himself constantly\nacquainted with his moral state, and it was both his duty and his\nsatisfaction to be approaching to the ideal of the perfect man.\n\nIt is very illustrative of the unguarded points and contradictions of\nStoicism, that contentment and apathy were not to permit grief even for\nthe loss of friends. Seneca, on one occasion, admits that he was\nbetrayed by human weakness on this point. On strict Stoical principles,\nwe ought to treat the afflictions and the death of others with the same\nfrigid indifference as our own; for why should a man feel for a second\nperson _more_ than he ought to feel for himself, as a mere unit in the\ninfinitude of the Universe? This is the contradiction inseparable from\nany system that begins by abjuring pleasure, and relief or protection\nfrom pain, as the ends of life. Even granting that we regard pleasure\nand relief from pain as of no importance in our own case, yet if we\napply the same measure to others we are bereft of all motives to\nbenevolence; and virtue, instead of being set on a loftier pinnacle, is\nleft without any foundation.\n\nEPICURUS. [311--270 B.C.]\n\nEpicurus was born 341 B.C. in the island of Samos. At the age of\neighteen, he repaired to Athens, where he is supposed to have enjoyed\nthe teaching of Xenocrates or Theophrastus. In 306 B.C., he opened a\nschool in a garden in Athens, whence his followers have sometimes been\ncalled the 'philosophers of the garden.' His life was simple, chaste,\nand temperate. Of the 300 works he is said to have written, nothing has\ncome down to us except three letters, giving a summary of his views for\nthe use of his friends, and a number of detached sayings, preserved by\nDiogenes Laertius and others. Moreover, some fragments of his work on\nNature have been found at Herculaneum. The additional sources of our\nknowledge of Epicurus are the works of his opponents, Cicero, Seneca,\nPlutarch, and of his follower Lucretius. Our information from Epicurean\nwriters respecting the doctrines of their sect is much less copious\nthan what we possess from Stoic writers in regard to Stoic opinions. We\nhave no Epicurean writer on Philosophy except Inicretius; whereas\nrespecting the Stoical creed under the Roman Empire, the important\nwritings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus, afford most\nvaluable evidence.\n\nTo Epicurus succeeded, in the leadership of his school, Hermachus,\nPolystratus, Dionysius, Basilides, and others, ten in number, down to\nthe age of Augustus. Among Roman Epicureans, Lucretius (95--51 B.C.) is\nthe most important, his poem (De Rerum Natura), being the completest\naccount of the system that exists. Other distinguished followers were\nHorace, Atticus, and Lacian. In modern times, Pierre Gassendi\n(1592--1655) revived the doctrines of Epicurus, and in 1647 published\nhis 'Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri,' and a Life of Epicurus. The\nreputation of Gassendi, in his life time, rested chiefly upon his\nphysical theories; but his influence was much felt as a Christian\nupholder of Epicureanism. Gassendi was at one time in orders as a Roman\nCatholic, and professor of theology and philosophy. He established an\nEpicurean school in France, among the disciples of which were, Moliere,\nSaint Evremond, Count de Grammont, the Duke of Rochefoncalt,\nFontenelle, and Voltaire.\n\nThe standard of Virtue and Vice is referred by Epicurus to pleasure and\npain. Pain is the only evil, Pleasure is the only good. Virtue is no\nend in itself, to be sought: Vice is no end in itself, to be avoided.\nThe motive for cultivating Virtue and banishing Vice arises from the\nconsequences of each, as the means of multiplying pleasures and\naverting or lessening pains. But to the attainment of this purpose, the\ncomplete supremacy of Reason is indispensable; in order that we may\ntake a right comparative measure of the varieties of pleasure and pain,\nand pursue the course that promises the least amount of suffering.[12]\n\nIn all ethical theories that make happiness the supreme object of\npursuit, the position of virtue depends entirely upon the theory of\nwhat constitutes happiness. Now, Epicurus (herein differing from the\nStoics, as well as Aristotle), did not recognize Happiness as anything\nbut freedom from pain and enjoyment of pleasure. It is essential,\nhowever, to understand, how Epicurus conceived pleasure and pain, and\nwhat is the Epicurean scale of pleasures and pains, graduated as\nobjects of reasonable desire or aversion? It is a great error to\nsuppose that, in making pleasure the standard of virtue, Epicurus had\nin view that elaborate and studied gratification of the sensual\nappetites that we associate with the word _Epicurean_. Epicurus\ndeclares--'When we say that pleasure is the end of life, we do not mean\nthe pleasures of the debauchee or the sensualist, as some from\nignorance or from malignity represent, but freedom of the body from\npain, and of the soul from anxiety. For it is not continuous drinkings\nand revellings, nor the society of women, nor rare viands, and other\nluxuries of the table, that constitute a pleasant life, but sober\ncontemplation, such as searches out the grounds of choice and\navoidance, and banishes those chimeras that harass the mind.\n\nFreedom from pain is thus made the primary element of happiness; a\none-sided view, respected in the doctrine of Locke, that it is not the\nidea of future good, but the present greatest uneasiness that most\nstrongly affects the will. A neutral state of feeling is necessarily\nimperilled by a greedy pursuit of pleasures; hence the _dictum_, to be\ncontent with little is a great good; because little is most easily\nobtained. The regulation of the desires is therefore of high moment.\nAccording to Epicurus, desires fall into three grades. Some are\n_natural_ and _necessary_, such as desire of drink, food, or life, and\nare easily gratified. But when the uneasiness of a want is removed, the\nbodily pleasures admit of no farther increase; anything additional only\n_varies_ the pleasure. Hence the luxuries which go beyond the relief of\nour wants are thoroughly superfluous; and the desires arising from them\n(forming the _second_ grade) though _natural, are not necessary_. A\n_third_ class of desires is neither natural nor necessary, but begotten\nof vain opinion; such as the thirst for civic honours, or for power\nover others; those desires are the most difficult to gratify, and even\nif gratified, entail upon us trouble, anxiety, and peril. [This account\nof the desires, following up the advice--If you wish to be rich, study\nnot to increase your goods, but to diminish your desires--is to a\ncertain extent wise and even indispensable; yet not adapted to all\ntemperaments. To those that enjoy pleasure very highly, and are not\nsensitive in an equal degree to pain, such a negative conception of\nhappiness would be imperfect.] Epicurus did not, however, deprecate\npositive pleasure. If it could be reached without pain, and did not\nresult in pain, it was a pure good; and, even if it could not be had\nwithout pain, the question was still open, whether it might not be well\nworth the price. But in estimating the worth of pleasure, the absence\nof any accompanying pain should weigh heavily in the balance. At this\npoint, the Epicurean theory connects itself most intimately with the\nconditions of virtue; for virtue is more concerned with averting\nmischief and suffering, than with multiplying positive enjoyments.\n\nBodily feeling, in the Epicurean psychology, is prior in order of time\nto the mental element; the former was primordial, while the latter was\nderivative from it by repeated processes of memory and association. But\nthough such was the order of sequence and generation, yet when we\ncompare the two as constituents of happiness to the formed man, the\nmental element much outweighed the bodily, both as pain and as\npleasure. Bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the present; when not\nfelt, it is nothing. But mental feelings involve memory and\nhope--embrace the past as well as the future--endure for a long time,\nand may be recalled or put out of sight, to a great degree, at our\ndiscretion.\n\nThis last point is one of the most remarkable features of the Epicurean\nmental discipline. Epicurus deprecated the general habit of mankind in\nalways hankering after some new satisfaction to come; always\ndiscontented with the present, and oblivious of past comforts as if\nthey had never been. These past comforts ought to be treasured up by\nmemory and reflection, so that they might become as it were matter for\nrumination, and might serve, in trying moments, even to counterbalance\nextreme physical suffering. The health of Epicurus himself was very bad\nduring the closing years of his life. There remains a fragment of his\nlast letter, to an intimate friend and companion, Idomeneus--'I write\nthis to you on the last day of my life, which, in spite of the severest\ninternal bodily pains, is still a happy day, because I set against them\nin the balance all the mental pleasure felt in the recollection of my\npast conversations with you. Take care of the children left by\nMetrodorus, in a manner worthy of your demeanour from boyhood towards\nme and towards philosophy.' Bodily pain might thus be alleviated, when\nit occurred; it might be greatly lessened in occurrence, by prudent and\nmoderate habits; lastly, even at the worst, if violent, it never lasted\nlong; if not violent, it might be patiently borne, and was at any rate\nterminated, or terminable at pleasure, by death.\n\nIn the view of Epicurus, the chief miseries of life arose, not from\nbodily pains, but partly from delusions of hope, and exaggerated\naspirations for wealth, honours, power, &c., in all which the objects\nappeared most seductive from a distance, inciting man to lawless\nviolence and treachery, while in the reality they were always\ndisappointments, and generally something worse; partly, and still more,\nfrom the delusions of fear. Of this last sort, were the two greatest\ntorments of human existence--fear of Death, and of eternal suffering\nafter death, as announced by prophets and poets, and Fear of the Gods.\nEpicurus, who did not believe in the continued existence of the soul\nseparate from the body, declared that there could never be any rational\nground for fearing death, since it was simply a permanent extinction of\nconsciousness.[13] Death was nothing to us (he said); when death comes,\nwe are no more, either to suffer or to enjoy. Yet it was the groundless\nfear of this nothing that poisoned all the tranquillity of life, and\nheld men imprisoned even when existence was a torment. Whoever had\nsurmounted that fear was armed at once against cruel tyranny and\nagainst all the gravest misfortunes. Next, the fear of the gods was not\nless delusive, and hardly less tormenting, than the fear of death. It\nwas a capital error (Epicurus declared) to suppose that the gods\nemployed themselves as agents in working or superintending the march of\nthe Cosmos; or in conferring favour on some men, and administering\nchastisement to others. The vulgar religious tales, which represented\nthem in this character, were untrue and insulting as regards the gods\nthemselves, and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the\nhopes and fears of mankind. Epicurus believed sincerely in the gods;\nreverenced them as beings at once perfectly happy, immortal, and\nunchangeable; and took delight in the public religious festivals and\nceremonies. But it was inconsistent with these attributes, and\nrepulsive to his feelings of reverence, to conceive them as agents. The\nidea of agency is derived from human experience; we, as agents, act\nwith a view to supply some want, to fulfil some obligation, to acquire\nsome pleasure, to accomplish some object desired but not yet\nattained--in short, to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our\nimperfect happiness; the gods already _have_ all that agents strive to\nget, and more than agents ever do get; their condition is one not of\nagency, but of tranquil, self-sustaining, fruition. Accordingly,\nEpicurus thought (as Aristotle[14] had thought before him) that the\nperfect, eternal, and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the gods\nexcluded the supposition of their being agents. He looked upon them as\ntypes of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction which was\nwhat he understood by pleasure or happiness--as objects of reverential\nenvy, whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by assimilating his own\ntemper and condition to theirs, as far as human circumstances allowed.\n\nThese theological views were placed by Epicurus in the foreground of\nhis ethical philosophy, as the only means of dispelling those fears of\nthe gods that the current fables instilled into every one, and that did\nso much to destroy human comfort and security. He proclaimed that\nbeings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in themselves nor\ncaused vexation to others--neither showed anger nor favour to\nparticular persons. The doctrine that they were the working managers in\nthe affairs of the Cosmos, celestial and terrestrial, human and\nextra-human, he not only repudiated as incompatible with their\nattributes, but declared to be impious, considering the disorder,\nsufferings, and violence, everywhere visible. He disallowed all\nprophecy, divination, and oracular inspiration, by which the public\naround him believed that the gods were perpetually communicating\nspecial revelations to individuals, and for which Sokrates had felt so\npeculiarly thankful.[15]\n\nIt is remarkable that Stoics and Epicureans, in spite of their marked\nopposition in dogma or theory, agreed so far in practical results, that\nboth declared these two modes of uneasiness (fear of the gods and fear\nof death) to be the great torments of human existence, and both strove\nto remove or counterbalance them.\n\nSo far, the teaching of Epicurus appears confined to the separate\nhappiness of each individual, as dependent upon his own prudence,\nsobriety, and correct views of Nature. But this is not the whole of the\nEpicurean Ethics. The system also considered each man as in\ncompanionship with others; The precepts were shaped accordingly, first\nas to Justice, next as to Friendship. In both these, the foundation\nwhereon Epicurus built was Reciprocity: not pure sacrifice to others,\nbut partnership with others, beneficial to all. He kept the ideas of\nself and of others inseparably knit together in one complex\nassociation: he did not expel or degrade either, in order to give\nexclusive ascendancy to the other. The dictate of Natural Justice was\nthat no man should hurt another: each was bound to abstain from doing\nharm to others; each, on this condition, was entitled to count on\nsecurity and relief from the fear that others would do harm to him.\nSuch double aspect, or reciprocity, was essential to social\ncompanionship: those that could not, or would not, accept this\ncovenant, were unfit for society. If a man does not behave justly\ntowards others, he cannot expect that they will behave justly towards\nhim; to live a life of injustice, and expect that others will not find\nit out, is idle. The unjust man cannot enjoy a moment of security.\nEpicurus laid it down explicitly, that just and righteous dealing was\nthe indispensable condition to every one's comfort, and was the best\nmeans of attaining it.\n\nThe reciprocity of Justice was valid towards all the world; the\nreciprocity of friendship went much farther; it involved indefinite and\nactive beneficence, but could reach only to a select few. Epicurus\ninsisted emphatically on the value of friendship, as a means of\nhappiness to both the persons so united. He declared that a good friend\nwas another self, and that friends ought to be prepared, in case of\nneed, to die for each other. Yet he declined to recommend an\nestablished community of goods among the members of his fraternity, as\nprevailed in the Pythagorean brotherhood: for such an institution (he\nsaid) implied mistrust. He recommended efforts to please and to serve,\nand a forwardness to give, for the purpose of gaining and benefiting a\nfriend, and he even declared that there was more pleasure in conferring\nfavours than in receiving them; but he was no less strenuous in\ninculcating an intelligent gratitude on the receiver. No one except a\nwise man (he said) knew how to return a favour properly.[16]\n\nVirtue and happiness, in the theory of Epicurus, were thus inseparable.\nA man could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and\nthe fear of gods instilled by the current fables, which disturbed all\ntranquillity of mind; until he had banished those factitious desires\nthat pushed him into contention for wealth, power, or celebrity; nor\nunless he behaved with justice to all, and with active devoted\nfriendship towards a few. Such a mental condition, which he thought it\nwas in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and\ncompanionship, constituted virtue; and was the sure as well as the only\nprecursor of genuine happiness. A mind thus undisturbed and purified\nwas sufficient to itself. The mere satisfaction of the wants of life,\nand the conversation of friends, became then felt pleasures; if more\ncould be had without preponderant mischief, so much the better; but\nNature, disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices, required no\nmore to be happy. This at least was as much as the conditions of\nhumanity admitted: a tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous, non-competitive\nfruition, which approached most nearly to the perfect happiness of the\nGods.[17]\n\nThe Epicurean theory of virtue is the type of all those that make an\nenlightened self-interest the basis of right and wrong. The four\ncardinal virtues were explained from the Epicurean point of view.\n_Prudence_ was the supreme rule of conduct. It was a calculation and\nbalancing of pleasures and pains. Its object was a judicious selection\nof pleasures to be sought. It teaches men to forego idle wishes, and to\ndespise idle fears. _Temperance_ is the management of sensual\npleasures. It seeks to avoid excess, so as on the whole to extract as\nmuch pleasure as our bodily organs are capable of affording.\n_Fortitude_ is a virtue, because it overcomes fear and pain. It\nconsists in facing danger or enduring pain, to avoid greater possible\nevils. _Justice_ is of artificial origin. It consists in a tacit\nagreement among mankind to abstain from injuring one another. The\nsecurity that every man has in his person and property, is the great\nconsideration urging to abstinence from injuring others. But is it not\npossible to commit injustice with safety? The answer was, 'Injustice is\nnot an evil in itself, but becomes so from the fear that haunts the\ninjurer of not being able to escape the appointed avengers of such\nacts.'\n\nThe Physics of Epicurus were borrowed in the main from the atomic\ntheory of Democritus, but were modified by him in a manner subservient\nand contributory to his ethical scheme. To that scheme it was essential\nthat those celestial, atmospheric, or terrestrial phenomena that the\npublic around him ascribed to the agency and purposes of the gods,\nshould be understood as being produced by physical causes. An eclipse,\nan earthquake, a storm, a shipwreck, unusual rain or drought, a good or\na bad harvest--and not merely these, but many other occurrences far\nsmaller and more unimportant, as we may see by the eighteenth chapter\nof the Characters of Theophrastus--were then regarded as visitations of\nthe gods, requiring to be interpreted by recognized prophets, and to be\nappeased by ceremonial expiations. When once a man became convinced\nthat all these phenomena proceeded from physical agencies, a host of\nterrors and anxieties would disappear from the mind; and this Epicurus\nasserted to be the beneficent effect and real recommendation of\nphysical philosophy. He took little or no thought for scientific\ncuriosity as a motive _per se_, which both Democritus and Aristotle put\nso much in the foreground.\n\nEpicurus adopted the atomistic scheme of Democritus, but with some\nimportant variations. He conceived that the atoms all moved with equal\nvelocity in the downward direction of gravity. But it occurred to him\nthat upon this hypothesis there could never occur any collisions or\ncombinations of the atoms--nothing but continued and unchangeable\nparallel lines. Accordingly, he modified it by saying that the line of\ndescent was not exactly rectilinear, but that each atom deflected a\nlittle from the straight line, and each in its own direction and\ndegree; so that it became possible to assume collisions, resiliences,\nadhesions, combinations, among them, as it had been possible under the\nvariety of original movements ascribed to them by Democritus. The\nopponents of Epicurus derided this auxiliary hypothesis; they affirmed\nthat he invented the individual deflection of each atom, without\nassigning any cause, and only because he was perplexed by the mystery\nof man's _free-will_. But Epicurus was not more open to attack on this\nground than other physical philosophers. Most of them (except perhaps\nthe most consistent of the Stoic fatalists) believed that some among\nthe phenomena of the universe occurred in regular and predictable\nsequence, while others were essentially irregular and unpredictable;\neach philosopher devised his hypothesis, and recognized some\nfundamental principle, to explain the first class of phenomena as well\nas the second. Plato admitted an invincible Erratic necessity;\nAristotle introduced Chance and Spontaneity; Democritus multiplied\nindefinitely the varieties of atomic movements. The hypothetical\ndeflexion alleged by Epicurus was his way, not more unwarranted than\nthe others, of providing a fundamental principle for the unpredictable\nphenomena of the universe. Among these are the mental (including the\nvolitional) manifestations of men and animals; but there are many\nothers besides; and there is no ground for believing that the mystery\nof free-will was peculiarly present to his mind. The movements of a man\nor animal are not exclusively subject to gravitation and other general\nlaws; they are partly governed by mental impulses and by forces of the\norganism, intrinsic and peculiar to himself, unseen and unfelt by\nothers. For these, in common with many other untraceable phenomena in\nthe material world, Epicurus provides a principle in the supplementary\nhypothesis of deflexion. He rejected the fatalism contained in the\ntheories of some of the Stoics, and admitted a limited range of empire\nto chance, or irregularity. But he maintained that the will, far from\nbeing among the phenomena essentially irregular, is under the influence\nof motives; for no man can insist more strenuously than he does (see\nthe Letter to Menoecens) on the complete power of philosophy,--if the\nstudent could be made to feel its necessity and desire the attainment\nof it, so as to meditate and engrain within himself sound views about\nthe gods, death, and human life generally,--to mould our volitions and\ncharacter in a manner conformable to the exigencies of virtue and\nhappiness.\n\nWhen we read the explanations given by Epicurus and Lucretius of what\nthe Epicurean theory really was, and compare them with the numerous\nattacks made upon it by opponents, we cannot but remark that the title\nor formula of the theory was ill chosen, and was really a misnomer.\nWhat Epicurus meant by Pleasure was, not what most people meant by it,\nbut something very different--a tranquil and comfortable state of mind\nand body; much the same as what Democritus had expressed before him by\nthe phrase [Greek: euthymia]. This last phrase would have expressed\nwhat Epicurus aimed at, neither more nor less. It would at least have\npreserved his theory from much misplaced sarcasm and aggressive\nrhetoric.\n\nTHE NEO-PLATONISTS.\n\nPLOTINUS (A.D. 205--70), PORPHYRY, &c.\n\nConstructed with reference to the broken-down state of ancient society,\nand seeking its highest aim in a regeneration of humanity, the\nphilosophical system of Neo-Platonism was throughout ethical or\nethico-religious in spirit; yet its ethics admits of no great\ndevelopment according to the usual topics. A pervading ethical\ncharacter is not incompatible with the absence of a regular ethical\nscheme; and there was this peculiarity in the system, that its end,\nthough professedly moral, was to be attained by means of an\nintellectual regimen. In setting up its ideal of human effort, it was\nleast of all careful about prescribing a definite course of external\nconduct.\n\nThe more strictly ethical views of PLOTINUS, the chief representative\nof the school, are found mainly in the first of the six Enneads into\nwhich Porphyry collected his master's essays. But as they presuppose\nthe cosmological and psychological doctrines, their place in the works,\nas now arranged, is to be regarded as arbitrary. The soul having fallen\nfrom its original condition, and, in consequence and as a penalty,\nhaving become united with a material body, the one true aim recognized\nfor human action is, to rise above the debasing connection with matter,\nand again to lead the old spiritual life. For those that have sunk so\nfar as to be content with the world of sense, wisdom consists in\npursuing pleasure as good, and shunning pain as evil: but the others\ncan partake of a better life, in different degrees. The first step in\nreformation is to practise virtue in the affairs of life, which means\nto subject Sense and the lower desires to Reason. This is done in the\nfourfold form of the common cardinal virtues, called _political_ by\nPlotinus, to mark the sphere of action where they can be exerted, and\nis the virtue of a class of men capable of a certain elevation, though\nignorant of all the rest that lies above them. A second step is made\nthrough the means of the [Greek: katharseis] or _purifying_ virtues;\nwhere it is sought to root out, instead of merely moderating, the\nsensual affections. If the soul is thus altogether freed from the\ndominion of sense, it becomes at once able to follow its natural bent\ntowards good, and enters into a permanent state of calm. This is virtue\nin its true meaning--becoming like to the Deity, all that went before\nbeing merely a preparation. The pure and perfect life of the soul may\nstill be described as a field whereon the four virtues are exercised,\nbut they now assume a far higher meaning than as political virtues,\nhaving relation solely to the contemplative life of the Nous.\n\nHappiness is unknown to Plotinus as distinct from perfection, and\nperfection in the sense of having subdued all material cravings (except\nas regards the bare necessities of life), and entered upon the\nundisturbed life of contemplation. If this recalls, at least in name,\nthe Aristotelian ideal, there are points added that appear to be echoes\nof Stoicism. Rapt in the contemplation of eternal verities, the\npurified soul is indifferent to external circumstances: pain and\nsuffering are unheeded, and the just man can feel happy even in the\nbull of Phalaris. But in one important respect the Neo-Platonic\nteaching is at variance with Stoical doctrine. Though its first and\nlast precept is to rid the soul from the bondage of matter, it warns\nagainst the attempt to sever body and soul by suicide. By no forcible\nseparation, which would be followed by a new junction, but only by\nprolonged internal effort is the soul so set free from the world of\nsense, as to be able to have a vision of its ancient home while still\nin the body, and to return to it at death. Small, therefore, as is the\nconsideration bestowed by Neo-Platonism on the affairs of practical\nlife, it has no disposition to shirk the burden of them.\n\nOne other peculiar aim, the highest of all, is proposed to the soul in\nthe Alexandrian philosophy. It is peculiar, because to be understood\nonly in connexion with the metaphysics and cosmology of the system. In\nthe theory of Emanation, the primordial One or Good emits the Nous\nwherein the Ideas are immanent; the Nous, in turn, sends forth the\nSoul, and the Soul, Matter or nature; the gradation applying to man as\nwell as to the Universe. Now, to each of these principles, there is a\ncorresponding subjective state in the inner life of man. The life of\nsense answers to nature or the material body; the virtue that is\nfounded upon free-will and reason, to the soul; the contemplative life,\nas the result of complete purification from sense, to the Nous or\nSphere of Ideas; finally, to the One or Good, supreme in the scale of\nexistence, corresponds the state of Love, or, in its highest form,\n_Ecstasy_. This peculiar elevation is something far above the highest\nintellectual contemplation, and is not reached by thought. It is not\neven a mere intuition of, but a real union or contact with, the Good.\nTo attain it, there must be a complete withdrawal into self from the\nexternal world, and then the subject must wait quietly till perchance\nthe state comes on. It is one of ineffable bliss, but, from the nature\nof man, transitory and rare.\n\nSCHOLASTIC ETHICS.\n\nABAELARD (1079-1142) has a special treatise on the subject of Ethics,\nentitled _Scito te ipsum_. As the name implies, it lays chief stress\nupon the Subjective element in morality, and, in this aspect, is\nconsidered to supply the idea that underlies a very large portion of\nmodern ethical speculation. By nature a notoriously independent\nthinker, Abaelard claimed for philosophy the right of discussing\nethical questions and fixing a natural moral law, though he allowed a\ncorrective in the Christian scheme. Having this position with reference\nto the church, he was also much less under the yoke of philosophical\nauthority than his successors, from living at a time when Aristotle was\nnot yet supreme. Yet, with Aristotle, he assigns the attainment of the\nhighest good as the aim of all human effort, Ethics showing the way;\nand, with the schoolmen generally, pronounces the highest good to be\nGod. If the highest good in itself is God, the highest human good is\nlove to God. This is attained by way of virtue, which is a good Will\nconsolidated into a habit. On the influence of habit on action his view\nis Aristotelian. His own specialty lies in his judging actions solely\nwith reference to the intention _(intentio)_ of the agent, and this\nintention with reference to conscience _(conscientia)_. All actions, he\nsays, are in themselves indifferent, and not to be called good or evil\nexcept from the intention of the doer. _Peccatum_, is properly only the\naction that is done with evil intent; and where this is present, where\nthe mental consent _(consensus)_ is clearly established, there is\n_peccatum_, though the action remains unexecuted. When the _consensus_\nis absent, as in original sin, there is only _vitium_; hence, a life\nwithout _peccata_ is not impossible to men in the exercise of their\nfreedom, however difficult it may be.\n\nThe supremacy assigned by him to the subjective element of conscience\nappears in such phrases as, there is no sin except against conscience;\nalso in the opinion he pronounces, that, though in the case of a\nmistaken moral conviction, an action is not to be called good, yet it\nis not so bad as an action objectively right but done against\nconscience. Thus, without allowing that conscientious persecutors of\nChristians act rightly, he is not afraid, in the application of his\nprinciple, to say that they would act still more wrongly if through not\nlistening to their conscience, they spared their victims. But this\nmeans only that by following conscience we avoid sinning; for virtue in\nthe full sense, it is necessary that the conscience should have judged\nrightly. By what standard, however, this is to be ascertained, he\nnowhere clearly says. _Contemptus Dei_, given by him as the real and\nonly thing that constitutes an action bad, is merely another subjective\ndescription.\n\nST. BERNARD of Clairvaux (1091-1153), the strenuous opponent of\nAbaelard, and the great upholder of mysticism against rationalism in\nthe early scholastic period when the two were not yet reconciled, gave\nutterance, in the course of his mystical effusions, to some special\nviews of love and disinterestedness.\n\nThere are two degrees of Christian virtue, Humility and Charity or\nLove. When men look into themselves, and behold the meanness that is\nfound there, the fitting state of mind is, first, humility; but soon\nthe sense of their very weakness begets in them charity and compassion\ntowards others, while the sense also of a certain human dignity raises\nwithin them feelings of love towards the author of their being. The\ntreatise _De Amore Dei_ sets forth the nature of this love, which is\nthe highest exercise of human powers. Its fundamental characteristic is\nits disinterestedness. It has its reward, but from meriting, not from\nseeking. It is purely voluntary, and, as a free sentiment, necessarily\nunbought; it has God for its single object, and would not be love to\nGod, if he were loved for the sake of something else.\n\nHe distinguishes various degrees of love. There is, first, a natural\nlove of self for the sake of self. Next, a motion of love towards God\namid earthly misfortunes, which also is not disinterested. The third\ndegree is different, being love to God for his own sake, and to our\nneighbour for God's sake. But the highest grade of all is not reached,\nuntil men come to love even themselves only by relation to God; at this\npoint, with the disappearance of all special and interested affection,\nthe mystic goal is attained.\n\nJOHN of SALISBURY (d. 1180) is the last name to be cited in the early\nscholastic period. He professed to be a practical philosopher, to be\nmore concerned about the uses of knowledge than about knowledge itself,\nand to subordinate everything to some purpose; by way of protest\nagainst the theoretic hair-splitting and verbal subtleties of his\npredecessors. Even more than in Ethics, he found in Politics his proper\nsphere. He was the staunchest upholder of the Papal Supremacy, which,\nafter long struggles, was about to be established at its greatest\nheight, before presiding at the opening of the most brilliant period of\nscholasticism.\n\nIn the _Policraticus_ especially, but also in his other works, the\nfoundations and provisions of his moral system are found. He has no\ndistinction to draw in Ethics between theology and philosophy, but uses\nScripture and observation alike, though Scripture always in the final\nappeal. Of philosophizing, the one final aim, as also of existence, is\nHappiness; the question, of questions, how it is to be attained.\nHappiness is not pleasure, nor possession, nor honour, but consists in\nfollowing the path of virtue. Virtue is to be understood from the\nconstitution of human nature. In man, there is a lower and a higher\nfaculty of Desire; or, otherwise expressed, there are the various\naffections that have their roots in sense and centre in self-love or\nthe desire of self-preservation, and there is also a natural love of\njustice implanted from the beginning. In proportion as the _appetitus\njusti_, which consists in will, gains upon the _appetitus commodi_, men\nbecome more worthy of a larger happiness. Self-love rules in man, so\nlong as he is in the natural state of sin; if, amid great conflict and\nby divine help, the higher affection gains the upper hand, the state of\ntrue virtue, which is identical with the theoretic state of belief, and\nalso of pure love to God and man, is reached.\n\nBy the middle of the thirteenth century, the schoolmen had before them\nthe whole works of Aristotle, obtained from Arabian and other sources.\nWhereas, previous to this time, they had comprehended nearly all the\nsubjects of Philosophy under the one name of Dialectics or Logic,\nalways reserving, however, Ethics to Theology, they were now made aware\nof the ancient division of the sciences, and of what had been\naccomplished in each. The effect, both in respect of form and of\nsubject-matter, was soon apparent in such compilations or more\nindependent works as they were able to produce after their commentaries\non the Aristotelian text. But in Ethics, the nature of the subject\ndemanded of men in their position a less entire submission to the\ndoctrines of the pagan philosopher; and here accordingly they clung to\nthe traditional theological treatment. If they were commenting on the\nEthics of Aristotle, the Bible was at hand to supply his omissions; if\nthey were setting up a complete moral system, they took little more\nthan the ground-work from him, the rest being Christian ideas and\nprecepts, or fragments borrowed from Platonism and other Greek systems,\nnearly allied in spirit to their own faith.\n\nThis is especially true, as will be seen, of Thomas Aquinas. His\npredecessors can be disposed of in a few words. ALEXANDER of HALES (d.\n1245) was almost purely theological. BONAVENTURA (1221-74) in his\ndouble character of rigid Franciscan and mystic, was led far beyond the\nAristotelian Ethics. The mean between excess and defect is a very good\nrule for the affairs of life, but the true Christian is bound besides\nto works of supererogation: first of all, to take on the condition of\npoverty; while the state of mystic contemplation remains as a still\nhigher goal for the few. ALBERT THE GREAT (1193-1280), the most learned\nand complete commentator of Aristotle that had yet appeared, divide the\nwhole subject of Ethics into _Monastica, Oeconomica_, and _Politica_.\nIn this division, which is plainly suggested by the Aristotelian\ndivision of Politics in the large sense, the term _Monastica_ not\ninaptly expresses the reference that Ethics has to the conduct of men\nas individuals. Albert, however, in commenting on the Nicomachean\nEthics, adds exceedingly little to the results of his author beyond the\nincorporation of a few Scriptural ideas. To the cardinal virtues he\nappends the _virtutes adjunctae_, Faith, Hope, and Charity, and again\nin his compendious work, _Summa Theologiae_, distinguishes them as\n_infusae_, the cardinal being considered as _acquisitae_.\n\nBesides his commentaries on the Aristotelian works (the Ethics\nincluded) and many other writings, THOMAS AQUINAS (1226-74) left two\nlarge works, the _Summa philosophica_ and the famous _Summa\nTheologiae_. Notwithstanding the prominence assigned to theological\nquestions, the first is a regular philosophical work; the second,\nthough containing the exposition of philosophical opinions, is a\ntheological textbook. Now, as it is in the Summary for theological\npurposes that the whole practical philosophy of Aquinas is contained,\nit is to be inferred that he regarded the subject of Ethics as not on\nthe same level with other departments of philosophy. Moreover, even\nwhen he is not appealing to Scripture, he is seen to display what is\nfor him a most unusual tendency to desert Aristotle, at the really\ncritical moments, for Plato or Plotinus, or any other authority of a\nmore theological cast.\n\nIn the (unfinished) _Summa Theologiae_, the Ethical views and cognate\nquestions occupy the two sections of the second part--the so-called\n_prima_ and _secunda secundae_. He begins, in the Aristotelian fashion,\nby seeking an ultimate end of human action, and finds it in the\nattainment of the highest good or happiness. But as no created thing\ncan answer to the idea of the highest good, it must be placed in God.\nGod, however, as the highest good, can only be the object, in the\nsearch after human happiness, for happiness in itself is a state of the\nmind or act of the soul. The question then arises, \"what sort of act?\"\nDoes it fall under the Will or under the Intelligence? The answer is,\nNot under the will, because happiness is neither desire nor pleasure,\nbut _consecutio_, that is, a possessing. Desire precedes _consecutio_,\nand pleasure follows upon it; but the act of getting possession, in\nwhich lies happiness, is distinct from both. This is illustrated by the\ncase of the miser having his happiness in the mere possession of money;\nand the position is essentially the same as Butler's, in regard to our\nappetites and desires, that they blindly seek their objects with no\nregard to pleasure. Thomas concludes that the _consecutio_, or\nhappiness, is an act of the intelligence; what pleasure there is being\na mere accidental accompaniment.\n\nDistinguishing between two phases of the intellect--the theoretic and\nthe practical--in the one of which it is an end to itself, but in the\nother subordinated to an external aim, he places true happiness in acts\nof the self-sufficing theoretic intelligence. In this life, however,\nsuch a constant exercise of the intellect is not possible, and\naccordingly what happiness there is, must be found, in great measure,\nin the exercise of the practical intellect, directing and governing the\nlower desires and passions. This twofold conception of happiness is\nAristotelian, even as expressed by Thomas under the distinction of\nperfect and imperfect happiness; but when he goes on to associate\nperfect happiness with the future life only, to found an argument for a\nfuture life from the desire of a happiness more perfect than can be\nfound here, and to make the pure contemplation, in which consists\nhighest bliss, a vision of the divine essence face to face, a direct\ncognition of Deity far surpassing demonstrative knowledge or mortal\nfaith--he is more theologian than philosopher, or if a philosopher,\nmore Platonist than Aristotelian.\n\nThe condition of perfect happiness being a theoretic or intellectual\nstate, the _visio_, and not the _delectatio_, is consistently given as\nits central fact; and when he proceeds to consider the other questions\nof Ethics, the same superiority is steadily ascribed to the\nintellectual function. It is because we _know_ a thing to be good that\nwe wish it, and knowing it, we cannot help wishing. Conscience, as the\nname implies, is allied to knowledge. Reason gives the law to will.\n\nAfter a long disquisition about the passions and the whole appetitive\nside of human nature, over which Reason is called to rule, he is\nbrought to the subject of virtue. He is Aristotelian enough to describe\nvirtue as _habitus_--a disposition or quality (like health) whereby a\nsubject is more or less well disposed with reference to itself or\nsomething else; and he takes account of the acquisition of good moral\nhabits (_virtutes acquisitae_) by practice. But with this he couples,\nor tends to substitute for it, the definition of Augustin that virtue\nis a good quality of mind, _quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur_, as\na ground for _virtutes infusae_, conferred as gifts upon man, or rather\non certain men, by free grace from on high. He wavers greatly at this\nstage, and in this respect his attitude is characteristic for all the\nschoolmen.\n\nSo again in passing from the general question of Virtue to the virtues,\nhe puts several of the systems under contribution, as if not prepared\nto leave the guidance of Aristotle, but feeling at the same time the\nnecessity of bridging over the distance between his position and\nChristian requirements. Understanding Aristotle to make a co-ordinate\ndivision of virtues into Moral and Intellectual, he gives reasons for\nsuch a step. Though virtue, he says, is not so much the perfecting of\nthe operation of our faculties, as their employment by the will for\ngood ends, it may be used in the first sense, and thus the intellectual\nvirtues will be the habits of intelligence that procure the truest\nknowledge. The well-known division of the cardinal virtues is his next\ntheme; and it is established as complete and satisfactory by a twofold\ndeduction. But a still higher and more congenial view is immediately\nafterwards adopted from Plotinus. This is the Neo-Platonic description\nof the four virtues as _politicae, purgatoriae_, and _purgati animi_,\naccording to the scale of elevation reached by the soul in its efforts\nto mount above sense. They are called by Thomas also _exemplares_, when\nregarded at once as the essence of the Deity, and as the models of\nhuman perfections.\n\nThis mystical division, not unsupported by philosophical authority,\nsmooths the way for his account of the highest or _theological_\nvirtues. These bear upon the vision of Deity, which was recognized\nabove as the highest good of humanity, and form an order apart. They\nhave God for their object, are altogether inspired by God (hence called\n_infusae_), and are taught by revelation. Given in connection with the\nnatural faculties of intellect and will, they are exhibited in the\nattainment of the supernatural order of things. With intellect goes\n_Faith_, as it were the intellect applied to things not intelligible;\nwith Will go Hope and Charity or Love: Hope being the Will exercised\nupon things not naturally desired, and Love the union of Will with what\nis not naturally brought near to us.\n\nAquinas then passes to politics, or at least the discussion of the\npolitical ideas of law, right, &c.\n\nComing now to _modern_ thinkers, we begin with\n\n\nTHOMAS HOBBES. [1588-1679.]\n\nThe circumstances of Hobbes's life, so powerful in determining the\nnature of his opinions, had an equally marked effect on the order and\nnumber of expositions that he gave to the psychological and political\nparts of his system. His ethical doctrines, in as far as they can be\ndissociated from, his politics, may be studied in no less than three\ndistinct forms; either in the first part of the Leviathian (1651); or\nin the De Cive (1647), taken along-with the _De Homine_ (1658); or in\nthe Treatise of Human Nature (1650, but written ten years earlier),\ncoupled with the De Corpore Politico (also 1650). But the same result,\nor with only unimportant variations, being obtained from all, we need\nnot here go beyond the first-mentioned.\n\nIn the first part of the Leviathan, then, bearing the title _Of Man_,\nand designed to consider Man as at once the _matter_ and _artificer_ of\nthe Commonwealth or State, Hobbes is led, after discussing Sense,\nImagination, Train of Imaginations, Speech, Reason and Science, to take\nup, in chapter sixth, the Passions, or, as he calls them, the Interior\nbeginnings of voluntary motions. Motions, he says, are either vital and\nanimal, or voluntary. Vital motions, _e.g._, circulation, nutrition,\n&c., need no help of imagination; on the other hand, voluntary motions,\nas going and speaking--since they depend on a precedent thought of\nwhither, which way, and what--have in the imagination their first\nbeginning. But imagination is only the relics of sense, and sense, as\nHobbes always declares, is motion in the human organs communicated by\nobjects without; consequently, visible voluntary motions begin in\ninvisible internal motions, whose nature is expressed by the word\n_Endeavour_. When the endeavour is towards something causing it, there\nis Appetite or Desire; endeavour 'fromward something' is Aversion.\nThese very words, and the corresponding terms in Greek, imply an\nactual, not--as the schoolmen absurdly think--a metaphorical motion.\nPassing from the main question, he describes Love and Hate as Desire\nand Aversion when the object is present. Of appetites, some are born\nwith us, others proceed from experience, being of particular things.\nWhere we neither desire nor hate, we contemn [he means, disregard].\nAppetites and aversions vary in the same person, and much more in\ndifferent persons.\n\nThen follows his definition of _good_,--the object of any man's\nappetite or desire, as evil is the object of his hate and aversion.\nGood and evil are always merely relative, either to the person of a\nman, or in a commonwealth to the representative person, or to an\narbitrator if chosen to settle a dispute. Good in the promise is\n_pulchrum_, for which there is no exact English term; good in the\neffect, as the end desired, is _delightful_; good as the means, is\n_useful_ or _profitable_. There is the same variety of evil.\n\nHis next topic is Pleasure. As sense is, in _reality_, motion, but, in\n'_apparence_,' light or sound or odour; so appetite, in reality a\nmotion or endeavour effected in the heart by the action of objects\nthrough the organs of sense, is, in 'apparence,' delight or trouble of\nmind. The emotion, whose _apparence_ (_i.e._, subjective side) is\npleasure or delight, seems to be a corroboration of vital motion; the\ncontrary, in the case of molestation. Pleasure is, therefore, the sense\nof good; displeasure, the sense of evil. The one accompanies, in\ngreater or less degree, all desire and love; the other, all aversion\nand hatred. Pleasures are either of _sense_; or of the _mind_, when\narising-from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of the\nends or consequence of things, irrespective of their pleasing the\nsenses or not. For these mental pleasures, there is the general name\n_joy_. There is a corresponding division of displeasure into _pain_ and\n_grief_.\n\nAll the other passions, he now proceeds to show, are these _simple_\npassions--appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief,\ndiversified in name for divers considerations. Incidental remarks of\nethical importance are these. _Covetousness_, the desire of riches, is\na name signifying blame, because men contending for them are displeased\nwith others attaining them; the desire itself, however, is to be blamed\nor allowed, according to the means whereby the riches are sought.\n_Curiosity_ is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in\nthe continual generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of\nany carnal pleasure. _Pity_ is grief for the calamity of another,\narising from the imagination of the like calamity befalling one's self;\nthe best men have, therefore, least pity for calamity arising from\ngreat wickedness. _Contempt_, or little sense of the calamity of\nothers, proceeds from security of one's own fortune; 'for that any man\nshould take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of\nhis own, I do not conceive it possible.'\n\nHaving explained the various passions, he then gives his theory of the\nWill. He supposes a _liberty_ in man of doing or omitting, according to\nappetite or aversion. But to this liberty an end is put in the state of\n_deliberation_ wherein there is kept up a constant succession of\nalternating desires and aversions, hopes and fears, regarding one and\nthe same thing. One of two results follows. Either the thing is judged\nimpossible, or it is done; and this, according as aversion or appetite\ntriumphs at the last. Now, the last aversion, followed by omission, or\nthe last appetite, followed by action, is the act of _Willing_. Will\nis, therefore, the last appetite (taken to include aversion) in\ndeliberating. So-called Will, that has been forborne, was _inclination_\nmerely; but the last inclination with consequent action (or omission)\nis Will, or voluntary action.\n\nAfter mentioning the forms of speech where the several passions and\nappetites are naturally expressed, and remarking that the truest signs\nof passion are in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and\nends or aims otherwise known to belong to a man,--he returns to the\nquestion of good and evil. It is _apparent_ good and evil, come at by\nthe best possible foresight of all the consequences of action, that\nexcite the appetites and aversions in deliberation. _Felicity_ he\ndefines continual success in obtaining the things from time to time\ndesired; perpetual tranquillity of mind being impossible in this life,\nwhich is but motion, and cannot be without desire and fear any more\nthan without sense. The happiness of the future life is at present\nunknown.\n\nMen, he says at the close, _praise_ the goodness, and _magnify_ the\ngreatness, of a thing; the Greeks had also the word [Greek:\nmakarismos], to express an opinion of a man's felicity.\n\nIn Chapter VII., Of the Ends of Discourse, he is led to remark on the\nmeaning of _Conscience_, in connection-with the word _Conscious_. Two\nor more men, he says, are conscious of a thing when they know it\ntogether (_con-scire_.) Hence arises the proper meaning of conscience;\nand the evil of speaking against one's conscience, in this sense, is to\nbe allowed. Two other meanings are metaphorical: when it is put for a\nman's knowledge of his own secret facts and thoughts; and when men give\ntheir own new opinions, however absurd, the reverenced name of\nconscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak\nagainst them. [Hobbes is not concerned to foster the moral independence\nof individuals.]\n\nHe begins Chapter VIII. by defining Virtue as something that is valued\nfor eminence, and that consists in comparison, but proceeds to consider\nonly the intellectual virtues--all that is summed up in the term of a\n_good wit_--and their opposites. Farther on, he refers difference of\nwits--discretion, prudence, craft, &c.--to difference in the passions,\nand this to difference in constitution of body and of education. The\npassions chiefly concerned are the desires of power, riches, knowledge,\nhonour, but all may be reduced to the single desire of power.\n\nIn Chapter IX. is given his Scheme of Sciences. The relation in his\nmind between Ethics and Politics is here seen. Science or Philosophy is\ndivided into Natural or Civil, according as it is knowledge of\nconsequences from the accidents of natural bodies or of politic bodies.\nEthics is one of the ultimate divisions of Natural Philosophy, dealing\nwith consequences from the _passions_ of men; and because the passions\nare _qualities_ of bodies, it falls more immediately under the head of\nPhysics. Politics is the whole of the second main division, and deals\nwith consequences from the institution of commonwealths (1) to the\nrights and duties of the Sovereign, and (2) to the duty and right of\nthe Subject.\n\nEthics, accordingly, in Hobbes's eyes, is part of the science of man\n(as a natural body), and it is always treated as such. But subjecting,\nas he does, so much of the action of the individual to the action of\nthe state, he necessarily includes in his Politics many questions that\nusually fall to Ethics. Hence arises the necessity of studying for his\nEthics also part of the civil Philosophy; though it happens that, in\nthe Leviathan, this requisite part is incorporated with the Section\ncontaining the Science of Man.\n\nChapter X. is on Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness. A man's\n_power_ being his present means to obtain some future apparent good, he\nenumerates all the sources of original and acquired power. The _worth_\nof a man is what would be given for the use of his power; it is,\ntherefore, never absolute, but dependent on the need and judgment of\nanother. _Dignity_ is the value set on a man by the state. _Honour_ and\n_dishonour_ are the manifestation of value. He goes through all the\nsigns of honour and dishonour. _Honourable_ is any possession, action,\nor quality that is the sign of power. Where there is the opinion of\npower, the justice or injustice of an action does not affect the\nhonour. He clearly means a universally accepted opinion of power, and\ncites the characters of the pagan deities. So, too, before times of\ncivil order, it was held no dishonour to be a pirate, and even still,\nduels, though unlawful, are honourable, and will be till there be\nhonour ordained for them that refuse. Farther on, he distinguishes\n_Worthiness_, (1) from worth, and (2) from merit, or the possession of\na particular ability or desert, which, as will be seen, presupposes a\nright to a thing, founded on a promise.\n\nChapter XI. bears the title, Of the difference of Manners; by manners\nbeing meant, not decency of behaviour and points of the 'small morals,'\nbut the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in\npeace and unity. Felicity of life, as before, he pronounces to be a\ncontinual progress of desire, there being no _finis ultimus_ nor\n_summum bonum_. The aim of all men is, therefore, not only to enjoy\nonce and for an instant, but to assure for over the way of future\ndesire. Men differ in their way of doing so, from diversity of passion\nand their different degrees of knowledge. One thing he notes as common\nto all, a restless and perpetual desire of power after power, because\nthe present power of living well depends on the acquisition of more.\nCompetition inclines to contention and war. The desire of ease, on the\nother hand, and fear of death or wounds, dispose to civil obedience. So\nalso does desire of knowledge, implying, as it does, desire of leisure.\nDesire of praise and desire of fame after death dispose to laudable\nactions; in such fame, there is a present delight from foresight of it,\nand of benefit redounding to posterity; for pleasure to the sense is\nalso pleasure in the imagination. Unrequitable benefits from an equal\nengender secret hatred, but from a superior, love; the cheerful\nacceptation, called _gratitude_, requiting the giver with honour.\nRequitable benefits, even from equals or inferiors, dispose to love;\nfor hence arises emulation in benefiting--'the most noble and\nprofitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his\nvictory, and the other revenged by confessing it.' He passes under\nreview other dispositions, such as fear of oppression, vain-glory,\nambition, pusillanimity, frugality, &c., with reference to the course\nof conduct they prompt to. Then he comes to a favourite subject, the\nmistaken courses whereinto men fall that are ignorant of natural causes\nand the proper signification of words. The effect of ignorance of the\ncauses of right, equity, law, and justice, is to make custom and\nexample the rule of actions, as with children, or to induce the setting\nof custom against reason, and reason against custom, whereby the\ndoctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen,\nand by the sword. Again, taking up ignorance of the laws of nature, he\nis led on to the subject of natural Religion, and devotes also the\nwhole of Chapter XII. to Religion and kindred topics.\n\nIn Chapter XIII., he deals with the natural condition of Mankind, as\nconcerning their Felicity and Misery. All men, he says, are by nature\nequal. Differences there are in the faculties of body and mind, but,\nwhen all is taken together, not great enough to establish a steady\nsuperiority of one over another. Besides even more than in strength,\nmen are equal in _prudence_, which is but experience that comes to all.\nPeople indeed generally believe that others are not so wise as\nthemselves, but 'there is not ordinarily a greater sign of equal\ndistribution of anything than that every person is contented with his\nshare.'\n\nOf this equality of ability, the consequence is that two men desiring\nthe exclusive possession of the same thing, whether for their own\nconservation or for delectation, will become enemies and seek to\ndestroy each other. In such a case, it will be natural for any man to\nseek to secure himself by anticipating others in the use of force or\nwiles; and, because some will not be content with merely securing\nthemselves, others, who would be content, will be driven to take the\noffensive for mere self-conservation. Moreover, men will be displeased\nat being valued by others less highly than by themselves, and will use\nforce to extort respect.\n\nThus, he finds three principal causes of quarrel in the nature of\nman--_competition, diffidence_ (distrust), and _glory_, making men\ninvade for gain, for safety, and for reputation. Men will accordingly,\nin the absence of any power to keep them in awe, be in a constant state\nof war; by which is meant, not actual fighting, but the known\ndisposition thereto, and no assurance to the contrary.\n\nHe proceeds to draw a very dismal picture of the results of this state\nof enmity of man against man--no industry, no agriculture, no arts, no\nsociety, and so forth, but only fear and danger of violent death, and\nlife solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. To those that doubt the\ntruth of such an 'inference made from the passions,' and desire the\nconfirmation of experience, he cites the wearing of arms and locking of\ndoors, &c., as actions that accuse mankind as much as any words of his.\nBesides, it is not really to accuse man's nature; for the desires and\npassions are in themselves no sin, nor the actions proceeding from\nthem, until a law is made against them. He seeks further evidence of an\noriginal condition of war, in the actual state of American savages,\nwith no government at all, but only a concord of small families,\ndepending on natural lust; also in the known horrors of a civil war,\nwhen there is no common power to fear: and, finally, in the constant\nhostile attitude of different governments.\n\nIn the state of natural war, the notions of right and wrong, justice\nand injustice, have no place, there being no law; and there is no law,\nbecause there is no common power. Force and fraud are in war the two\ncardinal virtues. Justice is no faculty of body and mind like sense and\npassion, but only a quality relating to men in society. Then adding a\nlast touch to the description of the state of nature,--by saying of\nproperty, that 'only that is every man's that he can get, and for so\nlong as he can keep it,'--he opens up, at the close of the chapter, a\nnew prospect by allowing a possibility to come out of so evil a\ncondition. The possibility consists partly in the passions that incline\nto peace--viz., fear of death, desire of things necessary to commodious\nliving, and hope by industry to obtain them; partly in reason, which\nsuggests convenient articles of peace and agreement, otherwise called\nthe Laws of Nature.\n\nThe first and second Natural Laws, and the subject of contracts, take\nup Chap. XIV. First comes a definition of _Jus Naturale_ or Right of\nNature--the liberty each man has of using his own power, as he will\nhimself, for the preservation of his own nature or life. Liberty\nproperly means the absence of external impediments; now a man may\nexternally be hindered from doing all he would, but not from using what\npower is left him, according to his best reason and judgment. A Law of\nNature, _lex naturalis_ is defined, a general rule, found out by\nreason, forbidding a man to do what directly or indirectly is\ndestructive of his life, or to omit what he thinks may best preserve\nit. Right and Law, though generally confounded, are exactly opposed,\nRight being liberty, and Law obligation.\n\nIn the natural state of war, every man, being governed by his own\nreason, has a right to everything, even to another's body. But because\nthus no man's life is secure, he finds the First and fundamental law of\nnature, or general rule of reason, to be _to seek peace and follow it,\nif possible_: failing which, we may defend ourselves by all the means\nwe can. Here the law being 'to endeavour peace,' from this follows the\nSecond law, that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth\nas for peace and self-defence he shall think it necessary, to _lay down\nthis right to all things_; and be contented with so much liberty\nagainst other men as he would allow other men against himself. This is\nthe same as the Gospel precept, Do to others, &c.\n\nLaying down one's right to anything is divesting one's self of the\nliberty of hindering another in the exercise of his own original right\nto the same. The right is _renounced_, when a man cares not for whose\nbenefit; _transferred_, when intended to benefit some certain person or\npersons. In either case the man is _obliged_ or _bound_ not to hinder\nthose, in whose favour the right is abandoned, from the benefit of it;\nit is his _duty_ not to make void his own voluntary act, and if he\ndoes, it is _injustice_ or _injury_, because he acts now _sine Jure_.\nSuch conduct Hobbes likens to an intellectual absurdity or\nself-contradiction. Voluntary signs to be employed in abandoning a\nright, are words and actions, separately or together; but in all bonds,\nthe strength comes not from their own nature, but from the fear of evil\nresulting from their rupture.\n\nHe concludes that not all rights are alienable, for the reason that the\nabandonment, being a voluntary act, must have for its object some good\nto the person that abandons his right. A man, for instance, cannot lay\ndown the right to defend his life; to use words or other signs for that\npurpose, would be to despoil himself of the end--security of life and\nperson--for which those signs were intended.\n\n_Contract_ is the mutual transferring of right, and with this idea he\nconnects a great deal. First, he distinguishes transference of right to\na thing, and transference of the thing itself. A contract fulfilled by\none party, but left on trust to be fulfilled by the other, is called\nthe _Covenant_ of this other, (a distinction he afterwards drops), and\nleaves room for the keeping or violation of faith. To contract he\nopposes _gift, free-gift_, or _grace_, where there is no mutual\ntransference of right, but one party transfers in the hope of gaining\nfriendship or service from another, or the reputation of charity and\nmagnanimity, or deliverance from the merited pain of compassion, or\nreward in heaven.\n\nThere follow remarks on signs of contract, as either express or by\ninference, and a distinction between free-gift as made by words of the\npresent or past, and contract as made by words past, present, or\nfuture; wherefore, in contracts like buying and selling, a promise\namounts to a covenant, and is obligatory.\n\nThe idea of _Merit_ is thus explained. Of two contracting parties, the\none that has first performed merits what he is to receive by the\nother's performance, or has it as _due_. Even the person that wins a\nprize, offered by free-gift to many, merits it. But, whereas, in\ncontract, I merit by virtue of my own power and the other contractor's\nneed, in the case of the gift, I merit only by the benignity of the\ngiver, and to the extent that, when he has given it, it shall be mine\nrather than another's. This distinction he believes to coincide with\nthe scholastic separation of _merilum congrui_ and _merilum condigni_.\n\nHe adds many more particulars in regard to covenants made on mutual\ntrust. They are void in the state of nature, upon any reasonable\nsuspicion; but when there is a common power to compel observance, and\nthus no more room for fear, they are valid. Even when fear makes them\ninvalid it must have arisen after they were made, else it should have\nkept them from being made. Transference of a right implies\ntransference, as far as may be, of the means to its enjoyment. With\nbeasts there is no covenant, because no proper mutual understanding.\nWith God also none, except through special revelation, or with his\nlieutenant in his name. Anything vowed contrary to the law of nature is\nvowed in vain; if the thing vowed is commanded by the law of nature,\nthe law, not the vow, binds. Covenants are of things possible and\nfuture. Men are freed from them by performance, or forgiveness, which\nis restitution of liberty. He pronounces covenants extorted by fear to\nbe binding alike in the state of mere nature and in commonwealths, if\nonce entered into. A former covenant makes void a later. Any covenant\nnot to defend one's self from force by force is always void; as said\nabove, there is no transference possible of right to defend one's self\nfrom death, wounds, imprisonment, &c. So no man is obliged to accuse\nhimself, or generally to give testimony where from the nature of the\ncase it may be presumed to be corrupted. Accusation upon torture is not\nto be reputed as testimony. At the close he remarks upon oaths. He\nfinds in human nature two imaginable helps to strengthen the force of\nwords, otherwise too weak to insure the performance of covenants. One\nof these--_pride_ in appearing not to need to break one's word, he\nsupposes too rare to be presumed upon. The other, _fear_, has reference\neither to power of spirits invisible, or of men. In the state of\nnature, it is the first kind of fear--a man's religion--that keeps him\nto his promises. An oath is therefore swearing to perform by the God a\nman fears. But to the obligation itself it adds nothing.\n\nOf the other Laws of Nature, treated in Chap. XV., the third, _that men\nperform their covenants made_, opens up the discussion of _Justice_.\nTill rights have been transferred and covenants made there is no\njustice or injustice; injustice is no other than the non-performance of\ncovenants. Further, justice (and also property) begins only where a\nregular coercive power is constituted, because otherwise there is cause\nfor fear, and fear, as has been seen, makes covenants invalid. Even the\nscholastic definition of justice recognizes as much; for there can be\nno constant will of giving to every man his own, when, as in the state\nof nature, there is no _own_. He argues at length against the idea that\njustice, _i.e._, the keeping of covenants, is contrary to reason;\nrepelling three different arguments. (1) He demonstrates that it cannot\nbe reasonable to break or keep covenants according to benefit supposed\nto be gained in each case, because this would be a subversion of the\nprinciples whereon society is founded, and must end by depriving the\nindividual of its benefits, whereby he would be left perfectly\nhelpless. (2) He considers it frivolous to talk of securing the\nhappiness of heaven by any kind of injustice, when there is but one\npossible way of attaining it, viz., the keeping of covenants. (3) He\nwarns men (he means his contemporaries) against resorting to the mode\nof injustice known as rebellion to gain sovereignty, from the\nhopelessness of gaining it and the uncertainty of keeping it. Hence he\nconcludes that justice is a rule of reason, the keeping of covenants\nbeing the surest way to preserve our life, and therefore a law of\nnature. He rejects the notion that laws of nature are to be supposed\nconducive, not to the preservation of life on earth, but to the\nattainment of eternal felicity; whereto such breach of covenant as\nrebellion may sometimes be supposed a means. For that, the knowledge of\nthe future life is too uncertain. Finally, he consistently holds that\nfaith is to be kept with heretics and with all that it has once been\npledged to.\n\nHe goes on to distinguish between justice of men or manners, and\njustice of actions; whereby in the one case men are _just_ or\n_righteous_, and in the other, _guiltless_. After making the common\nobservation that single inconsistent acts do not destroy a character\nfor justice or injustice, he has this: 'That which gives to human\nactions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or gallantness of\ncourage rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholden for the\ncontentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise.' Then he shows\nthe difference between injustice, injury, and damage; asserts that\nnothing done to a mail with his consent can be injury; and, rejecting\nthe common mode of distinguishing between _commutative_ and\n_distributive_ justice, calls the first the justice of a contractor,\nand the other an improper name for just distribution, or the justice of\nan arbitrator, _i.e._, the act of defining what is just--equivalent to\nequity, which is itself a law of nature.\n\nThe rest of the laws follow in swift succession. The 4th recommends\n_Gratitude_, which depends on antecedent grace instead of covenant.\nFree-gift being voluntary, _i.e._, done with intention of good to one's\nself, there will be an end to benevolence and mutual help, unless\ngratitude is given as compensation.\n\nThe 5th enjoins _Complaisance_; a disposition in men not to seek\nsuperfluities that to others are necessaries. Such men are _sociable_.\n\nThe 6th enjoins _Pardon_ upon repentance, with a view (like the last)\nto peace.\n\nThe 7th enjoins that punishment is to be only for correction of the\noffender and direction of others; _i.e._, for profit and example, not\nfor 'glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end.' Against\n_Cruelty_.\n\nThe 8th is against _Contumely_, as provocative of dispeace.\n\nThe 9th is against _Pride_, and enjoins the acknowledgment of the\nequality of all men by nature. He is here very sarcastic against\nAristotle, and asserts, in opposition to him, that all inequality of\nmen arises from consent.\n\nThe 10th is, in like manner, against _Arrogance_, and in favour of\n_Modesty_. Men, in entering into peace, are to reserve no rights but\nsuch as they are willing shall be reserved by others.\n\nThe 11th enjoins _Equity_; the disposition, in a man trusted to judge,\nto distribute equally to each man what in reason belongs to him.\nPartiality 'deters men from the use of judges and arbitrators,' and is\na cause of war.\n\nThe 12th enjoins the common, or the proportionable, use of things that\ncannot be distributed.\n\nThe 13th enjoins the resort to _lot_, when separate or common enjoyment\nis not possible; the 14th provides also for _natural_ lot, meaning\nfirst possession or primogeniture.\n\nThe 15th demands safe conduct for mediators.\n\nThe 16th requires that parties at controversy shall submit their right\nto _arbitration_.\n\nThe 17th forbids a man to be his own judge; the 18th, any interested\nperson to be judge.\n\nThe 19th requires a resort to witnesses in a matter of fact, as between\ntwo contending parties.\n\nThis list of the laws of nature is only slightly varied in the other\nworks. He enumerates none but those that concern the doctrine of Civil\nSociety, passing-over things like Intemperance, that are also forbidden\nby the law of nature because destructive of particular men. All the\nlaws are summed up in the one expression: Do not that to another, which\nthou wouldest not have done to thyself.\n\nThe laws of nature he regards as always binding _in foro interno_, to\nthe extent of its being desired they should take place; but _in foro\nexterno_, only when there is security. As binding _in foro interno_,\nthey can be broken even by an act according with them, if the purpose\nof it was against them. They are immutable and eternal; 'injustice,\ningratitude, &c., can never be made lawful,' for war cannot preserve\nlife, nor peace destroy it. Their fulfilment is easy, as requiring only\nan unfeigned and constant endeavour.\n\nOf these laws the science is true moral philosophy, _i.e._, the science\nof good and evil in the society of mankind. Good and evil vary much\nfrom man to man, and even in the same man; but while private appetite\nis the measure of good and evil in the condition of nature, all allow\nthat peace is good, and that justice, gratitude, _&c._, as the way or\nmeans to peace, are also good, that is to say, _moral virtues_. The\ntrue moral philosophy, in regarding them as laws of nature, places\ntheir goodness in their being the means of peaceable, comfortable, and\nsociable living; not, as is commonly done, in a mediocrity of passions,\n'as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude.'\n\nHis last remark is, that these dictates of reason are improperly called\nlaws, because 'law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath\ncommand over others.' But when considered not as mere conclusions or\ntheorems concerning the means of conservation and defence, but as\ndelivered in the word of God, that by right commands all, then they are\nproperly called laws.\n\nChapter XVI., closing the whole first part of the Leviathan, is of\nPersons, Authors, and Things Personated. The definitions and\ndistinctions contained in it add nothing of direct ethical importance\nto the foregoing, though needed for the discussion of 'Commonwealth,'\nto which he passes. The chief points under this second great head are\ntaken into the summary.\n\nThe views of Hobbes can be only inadequately summarized.\n\nI.--The Standard, to men living in society, is the Law of the State.\nThis is Self-interest or individual Utility, masked as regard for\nEstablished Order; for, as he holds, under any kind of government there\nis more Security and Commodity of life than in the State of Nature. In\nthe Natural Condition, Self-interest, of course, is the Standard; but\nnot without responsibility to God, in case it is not sought, as far as\nother men will allow, by the practice of the dictates of Reason or laws\nof Nature.\n\nII.--His Psychology of Ethics is to be studied in the detail. Whether\nin the natural or in the social state, the Moral Faculty, to correspond\nwith the Standard, is the general power of Reason, comprehending the\naims of the Individual or Society, and attending to the laws of Nature\nor the laws of the State, in the one case or in the other respectively.\n\nOn the question of the Will, his views have been given at length.\n\nDisinterested Sentiment is, in origin, self-regarding; for, pitying\nothers, we imagine the like calamity befalling ourselves. In one place,\nhe seems to say, that the Sentiment of Power is also involved. It is\nthe great defect of his system that he takes so little account of the\nSocial affections, whether natural or acquired.\n\nIII.--His Theory of Happiness, or the Summum Bonum, would follow from\nhis analysis of the Feelings and Will. But Felicity being a continual\nprogress in desire, and consisting less in present enjoyment than in\n_assuring_ the way of future desire, the chief element in it is the\nSense of Power.\n\nIV.--A Moral Code is minutely detailed under the name of Laws of\nNature, in force in the Natural State under Divine Sanction. It\ninculcates all the common virtues, and makes little or no departure\nfrom the usually received maxims.\n\nV.--The relation of Ethics to Politics is the closest imaginable. Not\neven Society, as commonly understood, but only the established civil\nauthority, is the source of rules of conduct. In the _civil_ (which to\nHobbes is the only meaning of the _social_) state, the laws of nature\nare superseded, by being supposed taken up into, the laws of the\nSovereign Power.\n\nVI.--As regards Religion, he affirms the coincidence of his reasoned\ndeduction of the laws of Nature with the precepts of Revelation. He\nmakes a mild use of the sanctions of a Future Life to enforce the laws\nof Nature, and to give additional support to the commands of the\nsovereign that take the place of these in the social state.\n\nAmong the numberless replies, called forth by the bold speculations of\nHobbes, were some works of independent ethical importance; in\nparticular, the treatises of Cumberland, Cudworth, and Clarke.\nCumberland stands by himself; Cudworth and Clarke, agreeing in some\nrespects, are commonly called the _Rational_ moralists, along with\nWollaston and Price (who fall to be noticed later).\n\nRICHARD CUMBERLAND. [1632-1718.]\n\nCumberland's' Latin work, _De Legibus Naturae, disquisitio philosophica\ncontra Hobbium instituta_, appeared in 1672. The book is important as a\ndistinctly philosophical disquisition, but its extraordinarily\ndiscursive character renders impossible anything like analysis. His\nchief points will be presented in a fuller summary than usual.\n\nI.--The STANDARD of Moral Good is given in the laws of Nature, which\nmay all be summed up in one great Law--_Benevolence to all rational\nagents_ or the endeavour to the utmost of our power to promote the\ncommon good of all. His theory is hardly to be distinguished from the\nGreatest Happiness principle; unless it might be represented as putting\nforward still more prominently the search for Individual Happiness,\nwith a fixed assumption that this is best secured through the promotion\nof the general good. No action, he declares, can be called 'morally\ngood that does not in its own nature contribute somewhat to the\nhappiness of men.' The speciality of his view is his professing not to\nmake an induction as regards the character of actions from the\nobservation of their effects, but to deduce the propriety of\n(benevolent) actions from, the consideration of the character and\nposition of rational agents in nature. Rules of conduct, all directed\nto the promotion of the Happiness of rational agents, may thus be found\nin the form of propositions impressed upon the mind by the Nature of\nThings; and these are then interpreted to be laws of Nature (summed up\nin the one great Law), promulgated by God with the natural effects of\nactions as Sanctions of Reward and Punishment to enforce them.\n\nII.--His Psychology of Ethics may be reduced to the following heads.\n\n1. The Faculty is the Reason, apprehending the exact Nature of Things,\nand determining accordingly the modes of action that are best suited to\npromote the happiness of rational agents.\n\n2. Of the Faculty, under the name of _Conscience_, he gives this\ndescription: 'The mind is conscious to itself of all its own actions,\nand both can, and often does, observe what counsels produced them; it\nnaturally sits a judge upon its own actions, and thence procures to\nitself either tranquillity and joy, or anxiety and sorrow.' The\nprincipal design of his whole book is to show 'how this power of the\nmind, either by itself, or excited by external objects, forms certain\nuniversal practical propositions, which give us a more distinct idea of\nthe happiness of mankind, and pronounces by what actions of ours, in\nall variety of circumstances, that happiness may most effectually be\nobtained.' [Conscience is thus only Reason, or the knowing faculty in\ngeneral, as specially concerned about actions in their effect upon\nhappiness; it rarely takes the place of the more general term.]\n\n3. He expressly leaves aside the supposition that we have _innate\nideas_ of the laws of Nature whereby conduct is to be guided, or of the\nmatters that they are conversant about. He has not, he says, been so\nhappy as to learn the laws of Nature by so short a way, and thinks it\nill-advised to build the doctrine of natural religion and morality upon\na hypothesis that has been rejected by the generality of philosophers,\nas well heathen as Christian, and can never be proved against the\nEpicureans, with whom lies his chief controversy. Yet he declines to\noppose the doctrine of innate ideas, because it looks with a friendly\neye upon piety and morality; and perhaps it may be the case, that such\nideas are _both_ born with us and afterwards impressed upon us from\nwithout.\n\n4. Will, he defines as 'the consent of the mind with the judgment of\nthe understanding, concerning things agreeing among themselves.'\nAlthough, therefore, he supposes that nothing but Good and Evil can\ndetermine the will, and that the will is even _necessarily_ determined\nto seek the one and flee the other, he escapes the conclusion that the\nwill is moved only by private good, by accepting the implication of\nprivate with common good as the fixed judgment of the understanding or\nright reason.\n\n5. He argues against the resolution of all Benevolence into\nself-seeking, and thus claims for man a principle of disinterested\naction. But what he is far more concerned to prove is, that benevolence\nof all to all accords best with the whole frame of nature, stands forth\nwith perfect evidence, upon a rational apprehension of the universe, as\nthe great Law of Nature, and is the most effectual means of promoting\nthe happiness of individuals, viz., through the happiness of all.\n\nIII.--Happiness is given as connected with the most full and constant\nexercise of all our powers, about the best and greatest objects and\neffects that are adequate and proportional to them; as consisting in\nthe enlargement or perfection of the faculties of any one thing or\nseveral. Here, and in his protest against Hobbes's taking affection and\ndesire, instead of Reason, as the measure of the goodness of things,\nmay be seen in what way he passes from the conception of Individual, to\nthe notion of Common Good, as the end of action. Reason affirms the\ncommon good to be more essentially connected with the perfection of man\nthan any pursuit of private advantage. Still there is no disposition in\nhim to sacrifice private to the common good: he declares that no man is\ncalled on to promote the common good beyond his ability, and attaches\nno meaning to the general good beyond the special good of _all_ the\nparticular rational agents in their respective places, from God (to\nwhom he ventures to ascribe a Tranquillity, Joy, or Complacency)\ndownwards. The happiness of men he considers as _Internal_, arising\n_immediately_ from the vigorous exercise of the faculties about their\nproper and noblest objects; and _External_, the _mediate_ advantages\nprocurable from God and men by a course of benevolent action.\n\nIV.--His Moral Code is arrived at by a somewhat elaborate deduction\nfrom the great Law of Nature enjoining Benevolence or Promotion of the\nCommon Good of all rational beings.\n\nThis Common Good comprehends the Honour of God, and the Good or\nHappiness of Men, as Nations, Families, and Individuals.\n\nThe actions that promote this Common Good, are Acts either of the\nunderstanding, or of the will and affections, or of the body as\ndetermined by the will. From this he finds that _Prudence_ (including\nConstancy of Mind and Moderation) is enjoined in the Understanding,\nand, in the Will, _Universal Benevolence_ (making, with Prudence,\n_Equity_), _Government of the Passions_, and the Special Laws of\nNature--_Innocence, Self-denial, Gratitude, &c._\n\nThis he gets from the consideration of what is contained in the general\nLaw of Nature. But the obligation to the various moral virtues does not\nappear, until he has shown that the Law of Nature, for procuring the\nCommon Happiness of all, suggests a natural law of _Universal Justice_,\ncommanding to make and preserve a _division_ of Rights, _i.e._, giving\nto particular persons Property or Dominion over things and persons\nnecessary to their Happiness. There are thus Rights of God (to Honour,\nGlory, &c.) and Rights of Men (to have those advantages continued to\nthem whereby they may preserve and perfect themselves, and be useful to\nall others).\n\nFor the same reason that _Rights_ of particular persons are fixed and\npreserved, viz., that the common good of all should be promoted by\nevery one,--two _Obligations_ are laid upon all.\n\n(1) Of GIVING: We are to contribute to others such a share of the\nthings committed to our trust, as may not destroy the part that is\nnecessary to our own happiness. Hence are obligatory the virtues (_a_)\nin regard to Gifts, _Liberality, Generosity, Compassion, &c._; (_b_) in\nregard to Common Conversation or Intercourse, _Gravity and\nCourteousness, Veracity, Faith, Urbanity, &c._\n\n(2) Of RECEIVING: We are to reserve to ourselves such use of our own,\nas may be most advantageous to, or at least consistent with, the good\nof others. Hence the obligation or the virtues pertaining to the\nvarious branches of a limited Self-Love, (_a_) with regard to our\n_essential parts_, viz., Mind and Body--_Temperance_ in the natural\ndesires concerned in the preservation of the individual and the\nspecies; (_b_) with regard to _goods of fortune--Modesty, Humility, and\nMagnanimity_.\n\nV.--He connects Politics with Ethics, by finding, in the establishment\nof civil government, a more effectual means of promoting the common\nhappiness according to the Law of Nature, than in any equal division of\nthings. But the Law of Nature, he declares, being before the civil\nlaws, and containing the ground of their obligation, can never be\nsuperseded by these. Practically, however, the difference between him\nand Hobbes comes to very little; he recognizes no kind of earthly check\nupon the action of the civil power.\n\nVI.--With reference to Religion, he professes to abstain entirely from\ntheological questions, and does abstain from mixing up the doctrines of\nRevelation. But he attaches a distinctly divine authority to his moral\nrules, and supplements earthly by supernatural sanctions.\n\nRALPH CUDWORTH. [1617-88.]\n\nCudworth's _Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality_, did\nnot appear until 1731, more than forty years after his death. Having in\na former work ('Intellectual system of the Universe') contended against\nthe 'Atheistical Fate' of Epicurus and others, he here attacks the\n'Theologick Fate' (the arbitrarily omnipotent Deity) of Hobbes,\ncharging him with reviving exploded opinions of Protagoras and the\nancient Greeks, that take away the essential and eternal discrimination\nof moral good and evil, of just and unjust.\n\nAfter piling up, out of the store of his classical and scholastic\nerudition, a great mass of testimony regarding all who had ever founded\ndistinctions of Right and Wrong upon mere arbitrary disposition,\nwhether of God or the State of men in general, he shadows forth his own\nview. Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest (if\nthey be not mere names without any signification, or names for nothing\nelse but _Willed_ or _Commanded_, but have a reality in respect of the\npersons obliged to do and to avoid them), cannot possibly be arbitrary\nthings, made by Will without nature; because it is universally true\nthat Things are what they are not by Will, but by nature. As it is the\nnature of a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles, so\nit is the nature of 'good things' to have the nature of goodness, and\nthings just the nature of justice; and Omnipotence is no more able to\nmake a thing good without the fixed nature of goodness, than to make a\ntriangular body without the properties of a triangle, or two things\nlike or equal, without the natures of Likeness and Equality. The Will\nof God is the supreme _efficient_ cause of all things, but not the\n_formal_ cause of anything besides itself. Nor is this to be understood\nas at all derogating from God's perfection; to make natural justice and\nright independent of his will is merely to set his Wisdom, which is a\nrule or measure, above his Will, which is something indeterminate, but\nessentially regulable and measureable; and if it be the case that above\neven his wisdom, and determining it in turn, stands his Infinite\nGoodness, the greatest perfection of his will must lie in its being\nthus twice determined.\n\nBy far the largest part of Cudworth's treatise consists of a general\nmetaphysical argument to establish the independence of the mind's\nfaculty of Knowledge, with reference to Sense and Experience. In Sense,\naccording to the doctrine of the old 'Atomical philosophy' (of\nDemocritus, Protagoras, &c.--but he thinks it must be referred back to\nMoses himself!), he sees nothing but _fancies_ excited in us by local\nmotions in the organs, taken on from 'the motion of particles' that\nconstitute 'the whole world.' All the more, therefore, must there exist\na superior power of Intellection and Knowledge of a different nature\nfrom sense, a power not terminating in mere seeming and appearance\nonly, but in the reality of things, and reaching to the comprehension\nof what really and absolutely is; whose objects are the immutable and\neternal essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable\nrelations to one another. These _Rationes_ or Verities of things are\n_intelligible_. only; are all comprehended in the eternal mind or\nintellect of the Deity, and from Him derived to our 'particular\nintellects.' They are neither arbitrary nor phantastical--neither\nalterable by Will nor changeable by Opinion.\n\nSuch eternal and immutable Verities, then, the moral distinctions of\nGood and Evil are, in the pauses of the general argument, declared to\nbe. They, 'as they must have some certain natures which are the actions\nor souls of men,' are unalterable by Will or Opinion. 'Modifications of\nMind and Intellect,' they are as much more real and substantial things\nthan Hard, Soft, Hot, and Cold, modifications of mere senseless\nmatter--and even so, on the principles of the atomical philosophy,\ndependent on the soul for their existence--as Mind itself stands prior\nin the order of nature to Matter. In the mind they are as\n'anticipations of morality' springing up, not indeed 'from certain\nrules or propositions arbitrarily printed on the soul as on a book,'\nbut from some more inward and vital Principle in intellectual beings,\nas such whereby these have within themselves a natural determination to\ndo some things and to avoid others.\n\nThe only other ethical determinations made by Cudworth may thus be\nsummarized:--Things called _naturally_ Good and Due are such as _the\nintellectual nature_ obliges to immediately, absolutely, and\nperpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action done or\nomitted intervening; things _positively_ Good and Due are such as are\nin themselves indifferent, but the intellectual nature obliges to them\naccidentally or hypothetically, upon condition, in the case of a\ncommand, of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful\nauthority, or of one's self, in the case of a specific promise. In a\npositive command (as of the civil ruler), what _obliges_ is only the\nintellectual nature of him that is commanded, in that he recognizes the\nlawful authority of him that commands, and so far determines and\nmodifies his general duty of obedience as to do an action immaterial in\nitself for the sake of the formality of yielding obedience to lawfully\nconstituted authority. So, in like manner, a specific promise, in\nitself immaterial and not enjoined by natural justice, is to be kept\nfor the sake of the formality of keeping faith, which _is_ enjoined.\n\nCudworth's work, in which these are nearly all the ethical allusions,\ngives no scope for a summary under the various topics.\n\nI.--Specially excluding any such External _Standard_ of moral Good as\nthe arbitrary Will, either of God or the Sovereign, he views it as a\nsimple ultimate natural quality of actions or dispositions, as included\namong the verities of things, by the side of which the phenomena of\nSense are unreal.\n\nII.--The general Intellectual Faculty cognizes the moral verities,\nwhich it contains within itself and brings rather than finds.\n\nIII.--He does not touch upon Happiness; probably he would lean to\nasceticism. He sets up no moral code.\n\nIV.--Obligation to the Positive Civil Laws in matters indifferent\nfollows from the intellectual recognition of the established relation\nbetween ruler and subject.\n\nV.--Morality is not dependent upon the Deity in any other sense than\nthe whole frame of things is.\n\nSAMUEL CLARKE. [1675-1729.]\n\nClarke put together his two series of Boyle Lectures (preached 1704 and\n1705) as 'A Discourse, concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the\nObligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the\nChristian Revelation,' in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza, &c. The burden of\nthe ethical discussion falls under the head of the Obligations of\nNatural Religion, in the second series.\n\nHe enounces this all-comprehensive proposition: 'The same necessary and\neternal different Relations that different Things bear one to another,\nand the same consequent Fitness or Unfitness of the application of\ndifferent things or different relations one to another, with regard to\nwhich the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to\nchoose to act only what is agreeable to Justice, Equity, Goodness, and\nTruth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe--ought likewise\nconstantly to determine the Wills of all subordinate rational beings,\nto govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the\npublic, in their respective stations. That is, these eternal and\nnecessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for\ncreatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an\nobligation on them so to do; even separate from the consideration of\nthese Rules being the positive Will or Command of God, and also\nantecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension of any\nparticular private and personal Advantage or Disadvantage, Reward or\nPunishment, either present or future, annexed either by natural\nconsequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or\nneglecting of these rules. In the explication of this, nearly his whole\nsystem is contained.\n\nHis first concern is to impress the fact that there are necessary and\neternal differences of ail things, and implied or consequent relations\n(proportions or disproportions) existing amongst them; and to bring\nunder this general head the special case of differences of Persons\n(e.g., God and Man, Man and Fellow-man), for the sake of the\nimplication that to different persons there belong peculiar _Fitnesses_\nand _Unfitnesses_ of circumstances; or, which is the same thing, that\nthere arises necessarily amongst them a suitableness or unsuitableness\nof certain manners of Behaviour. The counter-proposition that he\ncontends against is, that the relations among persons depend upon\n_positive constitution_ of some kind, instead of being founded\nunchangeably in _the nature and reason of things_.\n\nNext he shows how, in the rational or intellectual recognition of\nnaturally existent relations amongst things (he always means persons\nchiefly), there is contained an obligation. When God, in his\nOmniscience and absolute freedom from error, is found determining his\nWill always according to this eternal reason of things, it is very\nunreasonable and blameworthy in the intelligent creatures whom he has\nmade so far like himself, not to govern their actions by the same\neternal rule of Reason, but to suffer themselves to depart from it\nthrough negligent _misunderstanding_ or wilful _passion_. Herein lies\nobligation: a man _ought_ to act according to the Law of Reason,\nbecause he can as little refrain from _assenting_ to the reasonableness\nand fitness of guiding his actions by it, as refuse his assent to a\ngeometrical demonstration when he understands the terms. The original\nobligation of all is the eternal Reason of Things; the sanction of\nRewards and Punishments (though 'truly the most effectual means of\nkeeping creatures in their duty') is only a secondary and additional\nobligation. Proof of his position he finds in men's judgment of their\nown actions, better still in their judgments of others' actions, best\nof all in their judgment of injuries inflicted on themselves. Nor does\nany objection hold from the ignorance of savages in matters of\nmorality: they are equally ignorant of the plainest mathematical\ntruths; the need of instruction does not take away the necessary\ndifference of moral Good and Evil, any more than it takes away the\nnecessary proportions of numbers. He, then, instead of deducing all our\nseveral duties as he might, contents himself with mentioning the three\ngreat branches of them, (_a_) Duties in respect of _God_, consisting of\nsentiments and acts (Veneration, Love, Worship, &c.) called forth by\nthe consideration of his attributes, and having a character of Fitness\nfar beyond any that is visible in applying _equal_ geometrical figures\nto one another, (_b_) Duties in respect of our _Fellow-creatures:_ (1)\nJustice and Equity, the doing as we would be done by. Iniquity is the\nvery same in Action, as Falsity or Contradiction in Theory; what makes\nthe one _absurd_ makes the other _unreasonable_; 'it would be\nimpossible for men not to be as much (!) ashamed of _doing Iniquity_,\nas they are of _believing Contradictions_;' (2) _Universal Love or\nBenevolence_, the promoting the welfare or happiness of all, which is\nobligatory on various grounds: the Good being the fit and reasonable,\nthe greatest Good is the _most_ fit and reasonable; by this God's\naction is determined, and so ought ours; no Duty affords a more ample\npleasure; besides having a 'certain natural affection' for those most\nclosely connected with us, we desire to multiply affinities, which\nmeans to found society, for the sake of the more comfortable life that\nmutual good offices bring. [This is a very confused deduction of an\n_obligation_.'] (c) Duties in respect to our _Selves_, viz.,\n_self-preservation, temperance, contentment, &c._; for not being\nauthors of our being, we have no just power or authority to take it\naway directly, or, by abuse of our faculties, indirectly.\n\nAfter expatiating in a rhetorical strain on the eternal, universal, and\nabsolutely unchangeable character of the law of Nature or Right Reason,\nhe specifies the sense wherein the eternal moral obligations are\nindependent of the will of God himself; it comes to this, that,\nalthough God makes all things and the relations between them, nothing\nis holy and good because he commands it, but he commands it because it\nis holy and good. Finally, he expounds the relation of Reward and\nPunishment to the law of Nature; the obligation of it is before and\ndistinct from these; but, while full of admiration for the Stoical idea\nof the self-sufficiency of virtue, he is constrained to add that 'men\nnever will generally, and indeed 'tis not very reasonably to be\nexpected they should, part with all the comforts of life, and even life\nitself, without any expectation of a future recompense.' The 'manifold\nabsurdities' of Hobbes being first exposed, he accordingly returns, in\npursuance of the theological argument of his Lectures, to show that the\neternal moral obligations, founded on the natural differences of\nthings, are at the same time the express will and command of God to all\nrational creatures, and must necessarily and certainly be attended with\nRewards and Punishments in a future state.\n\nThe summary of Clarke's views might stand thus:--\n\nI.--The STANDARD is a certain Fitness of action between persons,\nimplicated in their nature as much as any fixed proportions between\nnumbers or other relation among things. Except in such an expression as\nthis, moral good admits of no kind of external reference.\n\nII.--There is very little Psychology involved. The Faculty is the\nReason; its action a case of mere intellectual apprehension. The\nelement of Feeling is nearly excluded. Disinterested sentiment is so\nminor a point as to call forth only the passing allusion to 'a certain\nnatural affection.'\n\nIII.--Happiness is not considered except in a vague reference to good\npublic and private as involved with Fit and Unfit action.\n\nIV.--His account of Duties is remarkable only for the consistency of\nhis attempt to find parallels for each amongst intellectual relations.\nThe climax intended in the assimilation of Injustice to Contradictions\nis a very anti-climax; if people were only '_as much_' ashamed of doing\ninjustice as of believing contradictions, the moral order of the world\nwould be poorly provided for.\n\nV.--The relation of Ethics to Politics is hardly touched. Society is\nborn of the desire to multiply affinities through mutual interchange of\ngood offices.\n\nVI.--His Ethical disquisition is only part of a Theological argument;\nand this helps to explain his assertion of the Independence as well as\nof the Insufficiency of Morality. The final outcome of the discussion\nis that Morality needs the support of Revelation. But, to get from this\nan argument for the truth of Revelation, it is necessary that morality\nshould have an independent foundation in the nature of things, apart\nfrom any direct divine appointment.\n\nWILLIAM WOLLASTON (1659-1724), author of the 'Religion of Nature\nDelineated,' is usually put into the same class of moralists with\nClarke. With him, a _bad_ action (whether of commission or omission)\ncontains the denial of a true proposition. Truth can be denied by\nactions as well as by words. Thus, the violation of a contract is the\ndenial by an action that the contract has been concluded. Robbing a\ntraveller is the denial that what you take from him is his. An action\nthat denies one or more true propositions cannot be good, and is\nnecessarily bad. A _good_ action is one whose omission would be bad or\nwhose contrary is bad, in the above sense. An _indifferent_ action is\none that can be omitted or done without contradicting any truth.\nReason, the judge of what is true and false, is the only faculty\nconcerned; but, at the same time, Wollaston makes large reference to\nthe subject of Happiness, finding it to consist in an excess of\npleasures as compared with pains. He holds that his doctrine is in\nconformity with all the facts. It affirms a progressive morality, that\nkeeps pace with and depend upon the progress of Science. It can explain\n_errors_ in morals as distinct from vice. An error is the affirmation\nby an action of a false proposition, thought to be true; the action is\nbad, but the agent is innocent.\n\nJOHN LOCKE. [1632-1704.]\n\nLocke did not apply himself to the consecutive evolution of an Ethical\ntheory; whence his views, although on the whole sufficiently\nunmistakeable, are not always reconcileable with one another.\n\nIn Book I. of the 'Essay on the Understanding' he devotes himself to\nthe refutation of Innate Ideas, whether Speculative or Practical. Chap.\nIII. is on the alleged Innate Practical Principles, or rules of Right\nand Wrong. The objections urged against these Principles have scarcely\nbeen added to, and have never been answered. We shall endeavour to\nindicate the heads of the reasoning.\n\n1. The Innate Practical Principles are for the most part not\nself-evident; they are, in this respect, not on an equal footing with\nthe Speculative Principles whose innate origin is also disputed. They\nrequire reasoning and explanation in order to be understood. Many men\nare ignorant of them, while others assent to them slowly, if they do\nassent to them; all which is at variance with their being innate.\n\n2. There is no Practical Principle universally received among mankind.\nAll that can be said of Justice is that _most men_ agree to recognize\nit. It is vain to allege of confederacies of thieves, that they keep\nfaith with one another; for this keeping of faith is merely for their\nown convenience. We cannot call that a sense of Justice which merely\nbinds a man to a certain number of his fellow-criminals, in order the\nmore effectually to plunder and kill honest men. Instead of Justice, it\nis the essential condition of success in Injustice.\n\nIf it be said in reply, that these men tacitly assent in their minds to\nwhat their practice contradicts, Locke answers, first, that men's\nactions must be held as the best interpreters of their thoughts; and if\nmany men's practices, and some men's open professions, have been\nopposed to these principles, we cannot conclude them to be Innate.\nSecondly, It is difficult for us to assent to Innate Practical\nPrinciples, ending only in contemplation. Such principles either\ninfluence our conduct, or they are nothing. There is no mistake as to\nthe Innate principles of the desire of happiness, and aversion to\nmisery; these do not stop short in tacit assent, but urge every man's\nconduct every hour of his life. If there were anything corresponding to\nthese in the sense of Right and Wrong, we should have no dispute about\nthem.\n\n3. There is no Moral rule, that may not have a reason demanded for it;\nwhich ought not to be the case with any innate principle. That we\nshould do as we would be done by, is the foundation of all morality,\nand yet, if proposed to any one for the first time, might not such an\none, without absurdity, ask a reason why? But this would imply that\nthere is some deeper principle for it to repose upon, capable of being\nassigned as its motive; that it is not ultimate, and therefore not\ninnate. That men should observe compacts is a great and undeniable\nrule, yet, in this, a Christian would give as reason the command of\nGod; a Hobbist would say that the public requires it, and would punish\nfor disobeying it; and an old heathen philosopher would have urged that\nit was opposed to human virtue and perfection.\n\nBound up with this consideration, is the circumstance that moral rules\ndiffer among men, according to their views of happiness. The existence\nof God, and our obedience to him, are manifest in many ways, and are\nthe true ground of morality, seeing that only God can call to account\nevery offender; yet, from the union of virtue and public happiness, all\nmen have recommended the practice of what is for their own obvious\nadvantage. There is quite enough in this self-interest to cause moral\nrules to be enforced by men that care neither for the supreme Lawgiver,\nnor for the Hell ordained by him to punish transgressors.\n\nAfter all, these great principles of morality are more commended than\npractised. As to Conscience checking us in these breaches, making them\nfewer than they would otherwise be, men may arrive at such a\nconscience, or self-restraining sentiment, in other ways than by an\ninnate endowment. Some men may come to assent to moral rules from a\nknowledge of their value as means to ends. Others may take up the same\nview as a part of their education. However the persuasion is come by,\nit will serve as a conscience; which conscience is nothing else than\nour own opinion of the rectitude or pravity of our actions.\n\nHow could men with serenity and confidence transgress rules stamped\nupon their inmost soul? Look at the practices of nations civilized and\nuncivilized; at the robberies, murders, rapes of an army sacking a\ntown; at the legalized usages of nations, the destruction of infants\nand of aged parents for personal convenience; cannibalism; the most\nmonstrous forms of unchastity; the fashionable murder named Duelling.\nWhere are the innate principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity,\nChastity?\n\nIf we read History, and cast our glance over the world, we shall\nscarcely find any rule of Morality (excepting such as are necessary to\nhold society together, and these too with great limitations) but what\nis somewhere or other set aside, and an opposite established, by whole\nsocieties of men. Men may break a law without disowning it; but it is\ninconceivable that a whole nation should publicly reject and renounce\nwhat every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knows to be a law.\nWhatever practical principle is innate, must be known to every one to\nbe just and good. The generally allowed breach of any rule anywhere\nmust be held to prove that it is not innate. If there be any rule\nhaving a fair claim to be imprinted by nature, it is the rule that\nParents should preserve and cherish their children. If such a principle\nbe innate, it must be found regulating practice everywhere; or, at the\nlowest, it must be known and assented to. But it is very far from\nhaving been uniformly practised, even among enlightened nations. And as\nto its being an innate truth, known to all men, that also is untrue.\nIndeed, the terms of it are not intelligible without other knowledge.\nThe statement, 'it is the duty of parents to preserve their children,'\ncannot be understood without a Law; a Law requires a Lawmaker, and\nReward or Punishment. And as punishment does not always follow in this\nlife, nothing less than a recognition of Divine Law will suffice; in\nother words, there must be intuitions of God, Law, Obligation,\nPunishment, and a Future Life: every one of which may be, and is,\ndeemed to be innate.\n\nIt is incredible that men, if all these things were stamped on their\nminds, could deliberately offend against them; still more, that rulers\nshould silently connive at such transgressions.\n\n4. The supporters of innate principles are unable to point out\ndistinctly what they are.[18] Yet, if these were imprinted on the mind,\nthere could be no more doubt about them than about the number of our\nfingers. We well know that, if men of different sects were to write out\ntheir respective lists, they would set down exactly such as suited\ntheir several schools or churches.\n\nThere is, Locke remarks, a ready, but not very material, answer to his\nobjections, namely, that the innate principles may, by Education and\nCustom, be darkened and worn out of men's minds. But this takes away at\nonce the argument from universal consent, and leaves nothing but what\neach party thinks should pass for universal consent, namely, their own\nprivate persuasion: a method whereby a set of men presuming themselves\nto be the only masters of right reason, put aside the votes and\nopinions of the rest of mankind. Thus, notwithstanding the innate\nlight, we are as much in the dark as if it did not exist; a rule that\nwill warp any way is not to be distinguished amidst its contraries. If\nthese rules are so liable to vary, through adventitious notions, we\nshould find them clearest in children and in persons wholly illiterate.\nHe grants that there are many opinions, received by men of different\ncountries, educations, and tempers, and held as unquestionable first\nprinciples; but then the absurdity of some, and the mutual\ncontradiction of others, make it impossible that they should be all\ntrue. Yet it will often happen that these men will sooner part with\ntheir lives, than suffer the truth of their opinions to be questioned.\n\nWe can see from our experience how the belief in principles grows up.\nDoctrines, with no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or\nthe authority of an old woman, may in course of time, and by the\nconcurrence of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of first truths in\nReligion and in Morality. Persons matured under those influences, and,\nlooking into their own minds, find nothing anterior to the opinions\ntaught them before they kept a record of themselves; they, therefore,\nwithout scruple, conclude that those propositions whose origin they\ncannot trace are the impress of God and nature upon their minds. Such a\nresult is unavoidable in the circumstances of the bulk of mankind, who\nrequire some foundation of principles to rest upon, and have no means\nof obtaining them but on trust from others. _Custom is it greater power\nthan Nature_, and, while we are yet young, seldom fails to make us\nworship as divine what she has inured us to; nor is it to be wondered\nat, that, when we come to mature life, and are engrossed with quite\ndifferent matters, we are indisposed to sit down and examine all our\nreceived tenets, to find ourselves in the wrong, to run counter to the\nopinions of our country or party, and to be branded with such epithets\nas whimsical, sceptical, Atheist. It is inevitable that we should take\nup at first borrowed principles; and unless we have all the faculties\nand the means of searching into their foundations, we naturally go on\nto the end as we have begun.\n\nIn the following chapter (IV.), he argues the general question of\nInnate Ideas in the case of the Idea of God.\n\nIn Book II., Chap. XXI., Locke discusses the freedom of the will, with\nsome allusions to the nature of happiness and the causes of wrong\nconduct. Happiness is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, misery the\nutmost pain; pleasure and pain define Good and Evil. In practice, we\nare chiefly occupied in getting rid of troubles; absent good does not\nmuch move us. All uneasiness being removed, a moderate portion of good\ncontents us; and some few degrees of pleasure in a succession of\nordinary enjoyments are enough to make happiness. [Epicurus, and others\namong the ancients, said as much.]\n\nMen have wrong desires, and do wrong acts, but it is from wrong\njudgments. They never mistake a present pleasure or pain; they always\nact correctly upon that. They are the victims of deceitful appearances;\nthey make wrong judgments in comparing present with future pains, such\nis the weakness of the mind's constitution in this department. Our\nwrong judgments proceed partly from ignorance and partly from\ninadvertence, and our preference of vice to virtue is accounted for by\nthese wrong judgments.\n\nChap. XXVIII. discusses Moral Relations. Good and Evil are nothing but\nPleasure and Pain, and what causes them. Moral Good or Evil is the\nconformity or unconformity of our voluntary actions to some Law,\nentailing upon us good or evil by the will and power of the Law-giver,\nto which good and evil we apply the names Reward and Punishment.\n\nThere are three sorts of Moral Rules: 1st, The Divine Law, whether\npromulgated by the Light of Nature or by Revelation, and enforced by\nrewards and punishments in a future life. This law, when ascertained,\nis the touchstone of moral rectitude. 2nd, The Civil Law, or the Law of\nthe State, supported by the penalties of the civil judge. 3rd, The Law\nof Opinion or Reputation. Even after resigning, to public authority,\nthe disposal of the public force, men still retain the power of\nprivately approving or disapproving actions, according to their views\nof virtue and vice. The being commended or dispraised by our fellows\nmay thus be called the sanction of Reputation, a power often surpassing\nin efficacy both the other sanctions.\n\nMorality is the reference of all actions to one or other of these three\nLaws. Instead of applying innate notions of good and evil, the mind,\nhaving been taught the several rules enjoined by these authorities,\ncompares any given action with these rules, and pronounces accordingly.\nA rule is an aggregate of simple Ideas; so is an action; and the\nconformity required is the ordering of the action so that the simple\nideas belonging to it may correspond to those required by the law.\nThus, all Moral Notions may be reduced to the simple ideas gained by\nthe two leading sources--Sensation and Reflection. Murder is an\naggregate of simple ideas, traceable in the detail to these sources.\n\nThe summary of Locke's views is as follows:--\n\nI.--With reference to the Standard of Morality, we have these two great\npositions--\n\nFirst, That the production of pleasure and pain to sentient beings is\nthe ultimate foundation of moral good and evil.\n\nSecondly, That morality is a system of Law, enacted by one or other of\nthree different authorities.\n\nII.--In the Psychology of Ethics, Locke, by implication, holds--\n\nFirst, That there is no innate moral sentiment; that our moral ideas\nare the generalities of moral actions. That our faculties of moral\ndiscernment are--(1) those that discern the pleasures and pains of\nmankind; and (2), those that comprehend and interpret the laws of God,\nthe Nation, and Public Opinion. And (3) he counts that the largest\nshare in the formation of our Moral Sentiments is due to Education and\nCustom.\n\n[We have seen his views on Free-will, p. 413.]\n\nAs regards the nature of Disinterested Action, he pronounces no\ndefinite opinion. He makes few attempts to analyze the emotional and\nactive part of our nature.\n\nIII.--His Summum Bonum is stated generally as the procuring of Pleasure\nand the avoiding of Pain.\n\nIV.--He has no peculiar views on the Moral Code, or on the enforcements\nof Morality.\n\nV.--The connexion of Ethics with Politics is, in him, the assimilating\nof Morality to Law.\n\nVI.--With reference to Theology, he considers that, by the exercise of\nthe Reason, we may discover the existence and attributes of God, and\nour duties to him; his ascertained will is the highest moral rule, the\ntrue touchstone of Moral Rectitude.\n\nJOSEPH BUTLER. [1692-1752.]\n\nButler's Ethical System may be found--First, in a short Dissertation on\nVirtue, appended to the Analogy; secondly, and chiefly, in his first\nthree Sermons, entitled 'Human Nature;' thirdly, in other Sermons, as\n(V.) on Compassion, and (XL) on Benevolence. Various illustrations of\nEthical doctrine are interspersed through the Analogy, as in Part I.,\nChap. 2, entitled 'the government of God by rewards and punishments.'\n\nThe Dissertation on Virtue is intended to vindicate, in man, the\nexistence of a moral nature, apart from both Prudence and Benevolence.\n\nA moral government supposes a moral nature in man, or a power of\ndistinguishing right from wrong. All men and all systems agree as to\nthe fact of moral perceptions.\n\nAs characteristics of these moral perceptions, it is to be\nnoted--First, they refer to voluntary actions. Secondly, they are\naccompanied with the feelings of good or of ill desert, which good or\nill desert is irrespective of the good of society. Thirdly, the\nperception of ill desert has regard to the capacities of the agent.\nFourthly, Prudence, or regard to ourselves, is a fair subject of moral\napprobation, and imprudence of the contrary. Our own self-interest\nseems to require strengthening by other men's manifested pleasure and\ndispleasure. Still, this position is by no means indisputable, and the\nauthor is willing to give up the words 'virtue' and 'vice,' as\napplicable to prudence and folly; and to contend merely that our moral\nfaculty is not indifferent to this class of actions. Fifthly, Virtue is\nnot wholly resolvable into Benevolence (that is, the general good, or\nUtility[19]). This is shown by the fact that our approbation is not in\nproportion to the amount of happiness flowing from an action [he means\n_immediately_ flowing, which does not decide the question]. We\ndisapprove of falsehood, injustice, and unprovoked violence, even\nalthough more happiness would result from them than from the contrary.\nMoreover, we are not always judges of the whole consequences of acting.\nUndoubtedly, however, benevolence is our duty, if there be no moral\nprinciple to oppose it.\n\nThe title 'Human Nature,' given to Butler's chief Ethical exposition,\nindicates that he does not take an _a priori_ view of the foundations\nof Ethics, like Cudworth and Clarke, but makes them repose on the\nconstitution of the human mind.\n\nIn Sermon first, he lays out the different parts of our Emotional and\nActive nature, including Benevolence, Self-love, Conscience. The\nrecognition of these three as distinct, and mutually irresolvable, is\nthe Psychological basis of his Ethics.[20]\n\nThe existence of pure or disinterested Benevolence is proved by such\nfacts, as Friendship, Compassion, Parental and Filial affections,\nBenevolent impulses to mankind generally. But although the object of\nbenevolence is the public good, and of self-love private good, yet the\ntwo ultimately coincide. [This questionable assertion must trammel any\nproof that the author can give of our possessing purely disinterested\nimpulses.]\n\nIn a long note, he impugns the theory of Hobbes that Benevolent\naffection and its pleasures are merely a form of the love of Power. He\nmaintains, and with reason, that the love of power manifests its\nconsequences quite as much in cruelty as in benevolence.\n\nThe second argument, to show that Benevolence is a fact of our\nconstitution, involves the greatest peculiarity of Butler's Psychology,\nalthough he was not the first to announce it. The scheme of the human\nfeelings comprehends, in addition to Benevolence and Self-Love, a\nnumber of passions and affections tending to the same ends as these\n(some to the good of our fellows, others to our own good); while in\nfollowing them we are not conscious of seeking those ends, but some\ndifferent ends. Such are our various Appetites and Passions. Thus,\nhunger promotes our private well-being, but in obeying its dictates we\nare not thinking of that object, but of the procuring of _food_.\nCuriosity promotes both public and private good, but its direct and\nimmediate object is _knowledge_.\n\nThis refined distinction appears first in Aquinas; there is in it a\npalpable confusion of ideas. If we regard the final impulse of hunger,\nit is not toward the food, but towards the appeasing of a pain and the\ngaining of a pleasure, which are certainly identical with self, being\nthe definition of self in the last resort. We associate the food with\nthe gratification of these demands, and hence food becomes an end to\nus--one of the _associated_ or _intermediate_ ends. So the desire of\nknowledge is the desire of the pleasure, or of the relief from pain,\naccruing from knowledge; while, as in the case of food, knowledge is to\na great degree only an instrument, and therefore an intermediate and\nassociated end. So the desire of esteem is the desire of a pleasure, or\nelse of the instrument of pleasure.\n\nIn short, Butler tries, without effect, to evade the general principles\nof the will--our being moved exclusively by pleasure and pain. Abundant\nreference has been already made to the circumstances that modify in\nappearance, or in reality, the operation of this principle. The\ndistinction between self-love and the particular appetites, passions,\nand affections, is mainly the distinction between a great aggregate of\nthe reason (the total interests of our being) and the separate items\nthat make it up.\n\nThe distinction is intended to prepare the way for the setting forth of\nConscience,[21] which is called a 'principle of reflection in men,\nwhereby they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own\nactions.' This principle has for its result the good of society; still,\nin following it, we are not conscious of aiming at the good of society.\nA father has an affection for his children; this is one thing. He has\nalso a principle of reflection, that urges him with added force and\nwith more steady persistency than any affection, which principle must\ntherefore be different from mere affection.\n\nButler's analysis of the human feelings is thus: I.--Benevolence and\nSelf-love. II.--The particular Appetites, Passions, and Affections,\noperating in the same direction as Benevolence and Self-love, but\nwithout intending it. III.--Conscience, of which the same is to be\nsaid.\n\nHis reply to the objection,--against our being made for\nBenevolence,--founded on our mischievous propensities, is, that in the\nsame way there are tendencies mischievous to ourselves, and yet no one\ndenies us the possession of self-love. He remarks farther that these\nevil tendencies are the abuse of such as are right; ungovernable\npassion, reckless pursuit of our own good, and not pure malevolence,\nare the causes of injustice and the other vices.\n\nIn short, we are made for pursuing both our own good and the good of\nothers; but present gratifications and passing inclinations interfere\nalike with both objects.\n\nSermons II., III., are meant to establish, from our moral nature, the\nSupremacy of Conscience.\n\nOur moral duties may be deduced from the scheme of our nature, which\nshows the design of the Deity. There may be some difficulties attending\nthe deduction, owing to the want of uniformity in the human\nconstitution. Still, the broad feelings of the mind, and the purpose of\nthem, can no more be mistaken than the existence and the purpose of the\neyes. It can be made quite apparent that the single principle called\nconscience is intended to rule all the rest.\n\nBut, as Conscience is only one part of our nature, there being two\nother parts, namely, (1) Benevolence and Self-love, and (2) the\nparticular Appetites and Passions, why are they not all equally\nnatural, and all equally to be followed?\n\nThis leads to an inquiry into the meanings of the word Nature.\n\nFirst, Nature may mean any prompting whatever; anger and affection are\nequally natural, as being equally part of us.\n\nSecondly, it may mean our strongest passion, what most frequently\nprevails with us and shows our individual characters. In this sense,\nvice may be natural.\n\nBut, thirdly, we may reclaim against those two meanings, and that on\nthe authority both of the Apostle Paul and of the ancient sages, and\ndeclare that the proper meaning of following nature is following\nConscience, or that superior principle in every man which bears\ntestimony to its own supremacy. It is by this faculty, natural to a\nman, that he is a moral agent, a law to himself.\n\nMen may act according to their strongest principle, and yet violate\ntheir nature, as when a man, urged by present gratification, incurs\ncertain ruin. The violation of nature, in this instance, may be\nexpressed as _disproportion_.\n\nThere is thus a difference in _kind_ between passions; self-love is\nsuperior to temporary appetite.\n\nPassion or Appetite means a tendency towards certain objects with no\nregard to any other objects. Reflection or Conscience steps in to\nprotect the interests that these would lead us to sacrifice. Surely,\ntherefore, this would be enough to constitute superiority. Any other\npassion taking the lead is a case of usurpation.\n\nWe can hardly form a notion of Conscience without this idea of\nsuperiority. Had it might, as it has right, it would govern the world.\n\nWere there no such supremacy, all actions would be on an equal footing.\nImpiety, profaneness, and blasphemy would be as suitable as reverence;\nparricide would justify itself by the right of the strongest.\n\nHence human nature is made up of a number of propensities in union with\nthis ruling principle; and as, in civil government, the constitution is\ninfringed by strength prevailing over authority, so the nature of man\nis violated when the lower faculties triumph over conscience. Man has a\nrule of right within, if he will honestly attend to it. Out of this\narrangement, also, springs Obligation; the law of conscience is the law\nof our nature. It carries its authority with it; it is the guide\nassigned by the Author of our nature.\n\nHe then replies to the question, 'Why should we be concerned about\nanything out of or beyond ourselves?' Supposing we do possess in our\nnature a regard to the well-being of others, why may we not set that\naside as being in our way to our own good.\n\nThe answer is, We cannot obtain our own good without having regard to\nothers, and undergoing the restraints prescribed by morality. There is\nseldom any inconsistency between our duty and our interest. Self-love,\nin the present world, coincides with virtue. If there are any\nexceptions, all will be set right in the final distribution of things.\nConscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always\nlead us the same way.\n\nSuch is a brief outline of the celebrated 'Three Sermons on Human\nNature.' The radical defect of the whole scheme lies in its\nPsychological basis. Because we have, as mature human beings, in\ncivilized society, a principle of action called Conscience, which we\nrecognize as distinct from Self-love and Benevolence, as well as from\nthe Appetites and Passions, Butler would make us believe that this is,\nfrom the first, a distinct principle of our nature. The proper reply is\nto analyze Conscience; showing at the same time, from its very great\ndiscrepancies in different minds, that it is a growth, or product,\ncorresponding to the education and the circumstances of each, although\nof course involving the common elements of the mind.\n\nIn his Sermons on Compassion (V., VI.), he treats this as one of the\nAffections in his second group of the Feelings (Appetites, Passions,\nand Affections); vindicates its existence against Hobbes, who treated\nit as an indirect mode of self-regard; and shows its importance in\nhuman life, as an adjunct to Rational Benevolence and Conscience.\n\nIn discussing Benevolence (Sermon XII.) Butler's object is to show that\nit is not ultimately at variance with Self-love. In the introductory\nobservations, he adverts to the historical fact, that vice and folly\ntake different turns in different ages, and that the peculiarity of his\nown age is 'to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to\nself-interest' than formerly. He accommodates his preaching of virtue\nto this characteristic of his time, and promises that _there shall be\nall possible concessions made to the favourite passion_.\n\nHis mode of arguing is still the same as in the sermons on Human\nNature. Self-love does not comprehend our whole being; it is only one\nprinciple among many. It is characterized by a _subjective_ end, the\n_feeling_ of happiness; but we have other ends of the objective kind,\nthe ends of our appetites, passions, and affections--food, injury to\nanother, good to another, &c. The total happiness of our being includes\nall our ends. Self-love attends only to one interest, and if we are too\nengrossed with that, we may sacrifice other interests, and narrow the\nsphere of our happiness. A certain disengagement of mind is necessary\nto enjoyment, and the intensity of pursuit interferes with this. [This\nis a true remark, but misapplied; external pursuit may be so intense as\nnearly to do away with subjective consciousness, and therefore with\npleasure; but this applies more to _objective_ ends,--wealth, the\ninterest of others--than to self-love, which is in its nature\nsubjective.]\n\nNow, what applies to the Appetites and Affections applies to\nBenevolence; it is a distinct motive or urgency, and should have its\nscope like every other propensity, in order to happiness.\n\nSuch is his reasoning, grounded on his peculiar Psychology. He then\nadduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others\nis a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its\nconsequences.\n\nIn summary, Butler's views stand thus:--\n\nI.--His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called\nby him Reflection, or Conscience. He assumes such an amount of\nuniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all\nquestions that arise.\n\nII.--His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind\nalready brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and\nprimitive element of our constitution.\n\nHe has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the\nproblem of Liberty and Necessity.\n\nHe maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that\nDisinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider\nfact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others. We\nhave seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its\nplausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends\nof our being.\n\nIII.--With regard to the Summum Bonum, or the theory of Happiness, he\nholds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must\ngive way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance\nof conscience. In short, virtue is happiness, even in this world; and,\nif there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another\nworld. This is in fact the Platonic view. Men are not to pursue\nhappiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love, and\nwould be a failure; they are to pursue virtue, including the good of\nothers, and the greatest happiness will ensue to each.\n\nIt is a remarkable indication of the spirit of Butler's age, or of his\nestimate of it, that he would never venture to require of any one a\nsingle act of uncompensated self-sacrifice.\n\nIV.--The substance of the Moral Code of Butler is in no respect\npeculiar to him. He gives no classification of our duties. His means\nand inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon.\n\nV.--The relationship of Ethics to Politics and to Theology needs no\nremark.\n\nFRANCIS HUTCHESON. [1694-1747.]\n\nHutcheson's views are to be found in his 'Inquiry into the Ideas of\nBeauty and Virtue,' his 'Treatise on the Passions,' and his posthumous\nwork, 'A System of Moral Philosophy.' The last-mentioned, as the\ncompletest exposition of his Ethics, Speculative and Practical, is\nfollowed here.\n\nThere are three books; the first treating of Human Nature and\nHappiness; the second, of Laws of Nature and Duties, previous to Civil\nGovernment and other adventitious states; the third, of Civil Polity.\n\nIn Book I., Chap. I., Hutcheson states that the aim of Moral Philosophy\nis to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest\nhappiness and perfection of men, by the light of human nature and to\nthe exclusion of revelation; thus to indicate the rules of conduct that\nmake up the Law of Nature. Happiness, the end of this art, being the\nstate of the mind arising from its several grateful perceptions or\nmodifications, the natural course of the inquiry is to consider the\nvarious human powers, perceptions, and actions, and then to compare\nthem so as to find what really constitutes happiness, and how it may be\nattained. The principles that first display themselves in childhood are\nthe external senses, with some small powers of spontaneous motion,\nintroducing to the mind perceptions of pleasure and pain, which\nbecoming forthwith the object of desire and aversion, are our first\nnotions of natural good and evil. Next to Ideas of Sensation, we\nacquire Concomitant ideas of Sensation from two or more senses\ntogether--number, extension, &c. Ideas of consciousness or reflection,\nwhich is another natural power of perception, complete the list of the\nmaterials of knowledge; to which, when the powers of judging and\nreasoning are added, all the main acts of the understanding are given.\nThere are still, however, some finer perceptions, that may be left over\nuntil the will is disposed of.\n\nUnder the head of Will, he notes first the facts of Desire and\nAversion, being new motions of the soul, distinct from, though arising\nout of, sensations, perceptions, and judgments. To these it is common\nto add Joy and Sorrow, arising in connexion with desire, though they\npartake more of sensations than of volitions. Acts of the will are\n_selfish_ or _benevolent_, according as one's own good, or (as often\nreally in fact happens) the good of others is pursued. Two _calm_\nnatural determinations of the will are to be conceded; the one an\ninvariable constant impulse towards one's own highest perfection and\nhappiness; the other towards the universal happiness of others, when\nthe whole system of beings is regarded without prejudice, and in the\nabsence of the notion that their happiness interferes with our own.\nThere are also _turbulent_ passions and appetites, whose end is their\nsimple gratification; whereupon the violence and uneasiness cease. Some\nare selfish--hunger, lust, power, fame; some benevolent--pity,\ngratitude, parental affection, &c.; others may be of either\nkind--anger, envy, &c. In none of them is there any reference in the\nmind to the greatest happiness of self or others; and that they stand\nso often in real opposition to the calm motions, is sufficient proof of\ntheir distinct character, _e.g._, the opposition of lust and calm\nregard for one's highest interest.\n\nIn Chapter II., he takes up some finer powers of perception, and some\nother natural determinations of the will. Bound up with seeing and\nhearing are certain other powers of perception or senses--Beauty,\nImitation, Harmony, Design, summed up by Addison under the name of\nImagination, and all natural sources of pleasure. The two grateful\nperceptions of Novelty and Grandeur may be added to the list of natural\ndeterminations or senses of pleasure. To attempt to reduce the natural\nsense of Beauty to the discernment of real or apparent usefulness is\nhopeless. The next sense of the soul noted is the Sympathetic, in its\ntwo Phases of Pity or Compassion and Congratulation. This is\nfellow-feeling on apprehending the state of others, and proneness to\nrelieve, without any thought of our own advantage, as seen in children.\nPity is stronger than congratulation, because, whether for ourselves or\nothers, the desire to repel evil is stronger than to pursue good.\nSympathy extends to all the affections and passions; it greatly\nsubserves the grand determination of the soul towards universal\nhappiness.\n\nOther finer senses have actions of men for their objects, there being a\ngeneral determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers,--a\nuniversal impulse to action, bodily and intellectual. In all such\naction there is real pleasure, but the grand source of human happiness\nis the power of perceiving the _moral_ notions of actions and\ncharacters. This, the _Moral Sense_, falls to be fully discussed later.\nDistinct from our moral sense is the _Sense of Honour or Shame_, when\nwe are praised or condemned by others. The _Sense of Decency or\nDignity_, when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental\npowers in ourselves or others, is also natural, and distinct from the\nmoral sense. Some would allow a natural Sense of the Ridiculous in\nobjects or events. There follow some remarks on the tendency to\nassociate perceptions. In addition also to the natural propensity\ntowards action, there is a tendency in repeated action to become Habit,\nwhereby our powers are greatly increased. Habit and Customs can raise,\nhowever, no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the\noriginal actions.\n\n_Sexual_ desire, wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years,\ndoes not, in man, end in mere sensual pleasure, but involves a natural\nliking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners, whereupon grow\nup esteem and love. Mankind have a universal desire of _offspring_, and\nlove for their young; also an affection, though weaker, for all\nblood-relations. They have, further, a natural impulse to _society_\nwith their fellows, as an immediate principle, and are not driven to\nassociate only by indigence. All the other principles already\nmentioned, having little or no exercise in solitude, would bring them\ntogether, even without family ties. Patriotism and love of country are\nacquired in the midst of social order.\n\n_Natural Religion_ inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of\nthe benevolent order of the world, and is soon diffused among all. The\nprinciples now enumerated will be found, though in varying proportions,\namong all men not plainly monstrous by accident, &c.\n\nChapter III. treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and\nBenevolent Affections. The question now is to find some order and\nsubordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover\nthe ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning. He\nnotices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading\nprinciple of action, and specially the system that, allowing the\nexistence of particular disinterested affections, puts the\nself-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all\nother kinds of enjoyments. But, he asks, is there not also a _calm\ndetermination_ towards the good of others, without reference to private\ninterest of any kind? In the case of particular desires, which all\nnecessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified, it is\nno proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy\nof success and stops uneasiness. On the other hand, to desire the\nwelfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor\nvirtue. What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating\nultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either\nalone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) 'the immediate\ncause of moral approbation.' Now, anything to be had from men could not\nraise within us such affections, or make us careful about anything\nbeyond external deportment. Nor could rewards from God, or the wish for\nself-approbation, create such affections, although, on the supposition\nof their existence, these may well help to foster them. It is\nbenevolent _dispositions_ that we morally approve; but dispositions are\nnot to be raised by will. Moreover, they are often found where there\nhas been least thought of cultivating them; and, sometimes, in the form\nof parental affection, gratitude, &c., they are followed so little for\nthe sake of honour and reward, that though their absence is condemned,\nthey are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all. He then rebuts\nthe idea that generous affections are selfish, because by _sympathy_ we\nmake the pleasures and pains of others our own. Sympathy is a real\nfact, but has regard only to the distress or suffering beheld or\nimagined in others, whereas generous affection is varied toward\ndifferent characters. Sympathy can never explain the immediate ardour\nof our good-will towards the morally excellent character, or the\neagerness of a dying man for the prosperity of his children and\nfriends. Having thus accepted the existence of purely disinterested\naffections, and divided them as before into calm and turbulent, he puts\nthe question, Whether is the selfish or benevolent principle to yield\nin case of opposition? And although it appears that, as a fact, the\nuniversal happiness is preferred to the individual in the order of the\nworld by the Deity, this is nothing, unless by some determination of\nthe soul we are made to comply with the Divine intentions. If by the\ndesire of reward, it is selfishness still; if by the desire, following\nupon the sight, of moral excellence, then there must necessarily exist\nas its object some determination of the will involving supreme moral\nexcellence, otherwise there will be no way of deciding between\nparticular affections. This leads on to the consideration of the Moral\nFaculty.\n\nBut, in the beginning of Chapter IV., he first rejects one by one these\nvarious accounts of the reason of our approbation of moral\nconduct:--pleasure by sympathy; pleasure through the moral sense;\nnotion of advantage to the agent, or to the approver, and this direct\nor imagined; tendency to procure honour; conformity to law, to truth,\nfitness, congruity, &c.; also education, association, &c. He then\nasserts a natural and immediate determination in man to approve certain\naffections and actions consequent on them; or a natural sense of\nimmediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality\nperceivable by our other senses, or by reasoning. It is a sense not\ndependent on bodily organs, but a settled determination of the soul. It\nis a sense, in like manner as, with every one of our powers--voice,\ndesigning, motion, reasoning, there is bound up a taste, sense, or\nrelish, discerning and recommending their proper exercise; but superior\nto all these, because the power of moral action is superior. It can be\ntrained like any other sense--hearing, harmony, &c.--so as to be\nbrought to approve finer objects, for instance the general happiness\nrather than mere motions of pity. That it is meant to control and\nregulate all the other powers is matter of immediate consciousness; we\nmust ever prefer moral good to the good apprehended by the other\nperceptive powers. For while every other good is lessened by the\nsacrifices made to gain it, moral good is thereby increased and\nrelished the more. The _objects_ of moral approbation are primarily\naffections of the will, but, all experience shows, only such as tend to\nthe happiness of others, and the moral perfection of the mind\npossessing them. There are, however, many degrees of approbation; and,\nwhen we put aside qualities that approve themselves merely to the sense\nof decency or dignity, and also the calm desire of private good, which\nis indifferent, being neither virtuous nor vicious, the gradation of\nqualities morally approved may be given thus: (1) Dignified abilities\n(pursuit of sciences, &c.), showing a taste above sensuality and\nselfishness. (2) Qualities immediately connected with virtuous\naffections--candour, veracity, fortitude, sense of honour. (3) The kind\naffections themselves, and the more as they are fixed rather than\npassionate, and extensive rather than narrow; highest of all in the\nform of universal good-will to all. (4) The disposition to desire and\nlove moral excellence, whether observed in ourselves or others--in\nshort, true piety towards God. He goes on to give a similar scale of\nmoral turpitude. Again, putting aside the indifferent qualities, and\nalso those that merely make people despicable and prove them\ninsensible, he cites--(1) the gratification of a narrow kind of\naffection when the public good might have been served. (2) Acts\ndetrimental to the public, done under fear of personal ill, or great\ntemptation. (3) Sudden angry passions (especially when grown into\nhabits) causing injury. (4) Injury caused by selfish and sensual\npassions. (5) Deliberate injury springing from calm selfishness. (6)\nImpiety towards the Deity, as known to be good. The worst conceivable\ndisposition, a fixed, unprovoked original malice is hardly found among\nmen. In the end of the chapter, he re-asserts the supremacy of the\nmoral faculty, and of the principle of pure benevolence that it\ninvolves. The inconsistency of the principles of self-love and\nbenevolence when it arises, is reduced in favour of the second by the\nintervention of the moral sense, which does not hold out future rewards\nand pleasures of self-approbation, but decides for the generous part by\n'an immediate undefinable perception.' So at least, if human nature\nwere properly cultivated, although it is true that in common life men\nare wont to follow their particular affections, generous and selfish,\nwithout thought of extensive benevolence or calm self-love; and it is\nfound necessary to counterbalance the advantage that the selfish\nprinciples gain in early life, by propping up the moral faculty with\nconsiderations of the surest mode of attaining the highest private\nhappiness, and with views of the moral administration of the world by\nthe Deity.\n\nBut before passing to these subjects, he devotes Chapter V. to the\nconfirmation of the doctrine of the Moral Sense, and first from the\nSense of Honour. This, the grateful sensation when we are morally\napproved and praised, with the reverse when we are censured, he argues\nin his usual manner, involves no thought of private interest. However\nthe facts may stand, it is always under the impression of actions being\nmoral or immoral, that the sense of honour works. In defence of the\ndoctrine of a moral sense, against the argument from the varying\nmorality of different nations, he says it would only prove the sense\nnot uniform, as the palate is not uniform in all men. But the moral\nsense is really more uniform. For, in every nation, it is the\nbenevolent actions and affections that are approved, and wherever there\nis an error of fact, it is the reason, not the moral sense, that is at\nfault. There are no cases of nations where moral approval is restricted\nto the pursuit of private interest. The chief causes of variety of\nmoral approbation are three: (1) Different notions of happiness and the\nmeans of promoting it, whereby much that is peculiar in national\ncustoms, &c., is explained, without reflecting upon the moral sense.\n(2) The larger or more confined field on which men consider the\ntendencies of their actions--sect, party, country, &c. (3) Different\nopinions about the divine commands, which are allowed to over-ride the\nmoral sense. The moral sense does not imply innate complex ideas of the\nseveral actions and their tendencies, which must be discovered by\nobservation and reasoning; it is concerned only about inward affections\nand dispositions, of which the effects may be very various. In closing\nthis part of his subject, he considers that all that is needed for the\nformation of morals, has been given, because from the moral faculty and\nbenevolent affection all the special laws of nature can be deduced. But\nbecause the moral faculty and benevolence have difficulty in making way\nagainst the selfish principles so early rooted in man, it is needful to\nstrengthen these foundations of morality by the consideration of the\nnature of the highest happiness.\n\nWith Chapter VI. accordingly he enters on the discussion of Happiness,\nforming the second half of his first book. The supreme happiness of any\nbeing is the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature\ndesires or is capable of; but, in case of their being inconsistent, the\nconstant gratification of the higher, intenser, and more durable\npleasures is to be preferred.\n\nIn Chapter VII., he therefore directly compares the various kinds of\nenjoyment and misery, in order to know what of the first must be\nsurrendered, and what of the second endured, in aiming at highest\nattainable happiness. Pleasures the same in kind are preferable,\naccording as they are more intense and enduring; of a different kind,\nas they are more enduring and dignified, a fact decided at once by our\nimmediate sense of dignity or worth. In the great diversity of tastes\nregarding pleasures, he supposes the ultimate decision as to the value\nof pleasures to rest with the possessors of finer perceptive powers,\nbut adds, that good men are the best judges, because possessed of\nfuller experience than the vicious, whose tastes, senses, and appetites\nhave lost their natural vigour through one-sided indulgence. He then\ngoes through the various pleasures, depreciating the pleasures of the\npalate on the positive side, and sexual pleasure as transitory and\nenslaving when pursued for itself; the sensual enjoyments are,\nnotwithstanding, quite proper within due limits, and then, perhaps, are\nat their highest. The pleasures of the _imagination_, knowledge, &c.,\ndiffer from the last in not being preceded by an uneasy sensation to be\nremoved, and are clearly more dignified and endurable, being the proper\nexercise of the soul when it is not moved by the affections of social\nvirtue, or the offices of rational piety. The _sympathetic_ pleasures\nare very extensive, very intense, and may be of very long duration;\nthey are superior to all the foregoing, if there is a hearty affection,\nand are at their height along with the feeling of universal good will.\n_Moral_ Enjoyments, from the consciousness of good affections and\nactions, when by close reflexion we have attained just notions of\nvirtue and merit, rank highest of all, as well in dignity as in\nduration. The pleasures of _honour_, when our conduct is approved, are\nalso among the highest, and when, as commonly happens, they are\nconjoined with the last two classes, it is the height of human bliss.\nThe pleasures of _mirth_, such as they are, fall in best with virtue,\nand so, too, the pleasures of _wealth_ and _power_, in themselves\nunsatisfying. Anger, malice, revenge, &c., are not without their uses,\nand give momentary pleasure as removing an uneasiness from the subject\nof them; but they are not to be compared with the sympathetic feelings,\nbecause their effects cannot long be regarded with satisfaction. His\ngeneral conclusion is, that as the highest personal satisfaction is had\nin the most benevolent dispositions, the same course of conduct is\nrecommended alike by the two great determinations of our nature,\ntowards our own good and the good of others. He then compares the\nseveral sorts of pain, which, he says, are not necessarily in the\nproportion of the corresponding pleasures. Allowing the great misery of\nbodily pain, he yet argues that, at the worst, it is not to be compared\nfor a moment to the pain of the worst wrong-doing. The imagination,\ngreat as are its pleasures, cannot cause much pain. The sympathetic and\nmoral pains of remorse and infamy are the worst of all.\n\nIn Chapter VIII. the various Tempers and Characters are compared in\npoint of happiness or misery. Even the private affections, in due\nmoderation, promote the general good; but that system is the best\npossible where, along with this, the generous affections also promote\nprivate good. No natural affection is absolutely evil; the evil of\nexcess in narrow generous affection lies in the want of proportion; in\ncalm extensive good-will there can be no excess. The social and moral\nenjoyments, and those of honour, being the highest, the affections and\nactions that procure them are the chief means of happiness; amid human\nmischances, however, they need support from a trust in Providence. The\nunkind affections and passions (anger, &c.) are uneasy even when\ninnocent, and never were intended to become permanent dispositions. The\nnarrow kind of affections are all that can be expected from the\nmajority of men, and are very good, if only they are not the occasion\nof unjust partiality to some, or, worse, ill-grounded aversion to\nothers. The rest of the chapter is taken up in painting the misery of\nthe selfish passions when in excess--love of life, sensual pleasure,\ndesire of power, glory, and ease. He has still one 'object of affection\nto every rational mind' that he must deal with before he is done with\nconsidering the question of highest happiness. This is the Deity, or\nthe Mind that presides in the Universe.\n\nChapter IX., at great length, discusses the first part of the\nsubject--the framing of primary ideas regarding the Divine Nature. He\nproves the existence of an original mind from design, &c., in the\nworld; he then finds this mind to be benevolent, on occasion of which\nhe has to deal with the great question of Evil, giving reasons for its\nexistence, discovering its uses, narrowing its range as compared with\ngood, and finally reducing it by the consideration and proof of\nimmortality; he ends by setting forth the other attributes of\nGod--providence, holiness, justice, &c.\n\nIn Chapter X., he considers the Affections, Duty, and Worship to be\nexercised towards God. The moral sense quite specially enjoins worship\nof the Deity, internal and external; internal by love and trust and\ngratitude, &c., external by prayer, praise, &c. [He seems to ascribe to\nprayer nothing beyond a subjective efficacy.] In the acknowledgment of\nGod is highest happiness, and the highest exercise of the moral\nfaculty.\n\nIn Chapter XI., he closes the whole book with remarks on the Supreme\nHappiness of our Nature, which he makes to consist in the perfect\nexercise of the nobler virtues, especially love and resignation to God,\nand of all the inferior virtues consistent with the superior; also in\nexternal prosperity, so far as virtue allows. The moral sense, and the\ntruest regard for our own interest, thus recommend the same course as\nthe calm, generous determination; and this makes up the supreme\ncardinal virtue of Justice, which includes even our duties to God.\nTemperance in regard to sensual enjoyments, Fortitude as against evils,\nand Prudence, or Consideration, in regard to everything that solicits\nour desires, are the other virtues; all subservient to Justice. In no\nstation of life are men shut out from the enjoyment of the supreme\ngood.\n\nBook II. is a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties\nof life, so far as they follow from the course of life shown above to\nbe recommended by God and nature as most lovely and most advantageous;\nall adventitious states or relations among men aside. The three first\nchapters are of a general nature.\n\nIn Chapter I., he reviews the circumstances that increase the moral\ngood or evil of actions. Virtue being primarily an affair of the will\nor affections, there can be no imputation of virtue or vice in action,\nunless a man is free and able to act; the necessity and impossibility,\nas grounds of non-imputation, must, however, have been in no way\nbrought about by the agent himself. In like manner, he considers what\neffects and consequents of his actions are imputable to the agent;\nremarking, by the way, that the want of a proper degree of good\naffections and of solicitude for the public good is morally evil. He\nthen discusses the bearing of ignorance and error, vincible and\ninvincible, and specially the case wherein an erroneous conscience\nextenuates. The difficulty of such cases, he says, are due to\nambiguity, wherefore he distinguishes three meanings of Conscience that\nare found, (1) the moral faculty, (2) the judgment of the understanding\nabout the springs and effects of actions, upon which the moral sense\napproves or condemns them, (3) our judgments concerning actions\ncompared with the _law_ (moral maxims, divine laws, &c.).\n\nIn Chapter II., he lays down general rules of judging about the\nmorality of actions from the affections exciting to them or opposing\nthem; and first as to the degree of virtue or vice when the ability\nvaries; in other words, morality as dependent on the _strength_ of the\naffections. Next, and at greater length, morality as dependent on the\n_kind_ of the affections.\n\nHere he attempts to fix, in the first place, the degree of benevolence,\nas opposed to private interest, that is necessary to render men\nvirtuous, or even innocent, in accordance with his principle that there\nis implanted in us a very high standard of necessary goodness,\nrequiring us to do a public benefit, when clear, however burdensome or\nhurtful the act may be to ourselves; in the second place, the\nproportion that should be kept between the narrower and the more\nextensive generous affections, where he does not forget to allow that,\nin general, a great part of human virtue must necessarily lie within\nthe narrow range. Then he gives a number of special rules for\nappreciating conduct, advising, _for the very sake of the good to\nothers that will result therefrom_, that men should foster their\nbenevolence by the thought of the advantage accruing to themselves here\nand hereafter from their virtuous actions; and closes with the\nconsideration of the cases wherein actions can be imputed to other than\nthe agents.\n\nIn Chapter III., he enters into the general notion of Rights and Laws,\nand their divisions. From _right_ use of such affection or actions as\nare approved by the moral faculty from their relation to the general\ngood, or the good of particular persons consistently with the general\ngood, he distinguishes the _right_ of a man to do, possess, demand,\n&c., which exists when his doing, possessing, &c. tend to the good of\nsociety, or to his own, consistent with the rights of others and the\ngeneral good, and when obstructing him would have the contrary\ntendency. He proceeds to argue, on utilitarian principles, that the\nrights that seem to attend every natural desire are perfectly valid\nwhen not against the public interest, but never valid when they are\nagainst it.\n\nChapter IV. contains a discussion upon the state of Nature, maintaining\nthat it is not a state of anarchy or war, but full of rights and\nobligations. He points out that independent states in their relation to\none another are subject to no common authority, and so are in a state\nof nature. Rights belong (1) to individuals, (2) to societies, (3) to\nmankind at large. They are also natural, or adventitious, and again\nperfect or imperfect.\n\nChapter V. Natural rights are antecedent to society, such as the right\nto life, to liberty, to private judgment, to marriage, &c. They are of\ntwo kinds--perfect and imperfect.\n\nChapter VI. Adventitious rights are divided into Real and Personal (a\ndistinction chiefly of legal value.) He also examines into the nature\nand foundation of private property.\n\nChapter VII. treats of the Acquisition of property, Hutcheson, as is\nusual with moralists, taking the _occupatio_ of the Roman Law as a\nbasis of ownership. Property involves the right of (1) use, (2)\nexclusive use, (3) alienation.\n\nChapter VIII. Rights drawn from property are such as mortgages,\nservitudes, &c., being rights of what may be called partial or\nimperfect ownership.\n\nChapter IX. discusses the subject of contracts, with the general\nconditions required for a valid contract.\n\nChapter X. Of Veracity. Like most writers on morals, Hutcheson breaks\nin upon the strict rule of veracity by various necessary, but\nill-defined, exceptions. Expressions of courtesy and etiquette are\nexempted, so also artifices in war, answers extorted by unjust\nviolence, and some cases of peculiar necessity, as when a man tells a\nlie to save thousands of lives.\n\nChapter XI. Oaths and Vows.\n\nChapter XII. belongs rather to Political Economy. Its subject is the\nvalues of goods in commerce, and the nature of coin.\n\nChapter XIII. enumerates the various classes of contracts, following\nthe Roman Law, taking up _Mandatum, Depositum_, Letting to Hire, Sale,\n&c.\n\nChapter XIV. adds the Roman _quasi-contracts_.\n\nChapter XV. Rights arising from injuries or wrongs _(torts)_. He\ncondemns duelling, but admits that, where it is established, a man may,\nin some cases, be justified in sending or accepting a challenge.\n\nChapter XVI. Rights belonging to society as against the individual. The\nperfect rights of society are such as the following:--(1) To prevent\nsuicide; (2) To require the producing and rearing of offspring, at\nleast so far as to tax and discourage bachelors; (3) To compel men,\nthough not without compensation, to divulge useful inventions; (4) To\ncompel to some industry, &c.\n\nChapter XVII. takes up some cases where the ordinary rights of property\nor person are set aside by some overbearing necessity.\n\nChapter XVIII. The way of deciding controversies in a state of nature\nby arbitration.\n\nBook III.--Civil Polity, embracing Domestic and Civil Rights.\n\nChapter I. _Marriage_. Hutcheson considers that Marriage should be a\nperpetual union upon equal terms, 'and not such a one wherein the one\nparty stipulates to himself a right of governing in all domestic\naffairs, and the other promises subjection.' He would allow divorce for\nadultery, desertion, or implacable enmity on either side. Upon defect\nof children, some sort of concubinage would be preferable to divorce,\nbut leaving to the woman the option of divorce with compensation. He\nnotices the misrepresentations regarding Plato's scheme of a community\nof wives; 'Never was there in any plan less provision made for sensual\ngratification.'\n\nChapter II. The Rights and Duties of Parents and Children.\n\nChapter III. The Rights and Duties of Masters and Servants.\n\nChapter IV. discusses the Motives to constitute Civil Government. If\nmen were perfectly wise and upright, there would be no need for\ngovernment. Man is naturally sociable and political [Greek: xon\npolitikon].\n\nChapter V. shows that the natural method of constituting civil\ngovernment is by consent or social compact.\n\nChapter VI. The Forms of Government, with their respective advantages\nand disadvantages.\n\nChapter VII. How far the Rights of Governors extend. Their lives are\nmore sacred than the lives of private persons; but they may\nnevertheless be lawfully resisted, and, in certain cases, put to death.\n\nChapter VIII. The ways of acquiring supreme Power. That government has\nmost divine right that is best adapted to the public good: a divine\nright of succession to civil offices is ridiculous.\n\nChapter IX. takes up the sphere of civil law. (1) To enforce the laws\nof nature; (2) To appoint the form &c., of contracts and dispositions,\nwith a view to prevent fraud; (3) To require men to follow the most\nprudent methods of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; (4) To\nprescribe rules in matters morally indifferent, where uniformity is\nadvantageous. Opinions should be tolerated; all except Atheism, and the\ndenial of moral obligation.\n\nChapter X. The Laws of Peace and War, belonging now to the subject of\nInternational Law.\n\nChapter XI. (concluding the work) discusses some cases connected with\nthe duration of the 'Politick Union.'\n\nThis bare indication of topics will suffice to give an idea of the\nworking out of Hutcheson's system. For summary:--I.--The Standard,\naccording to Hutcheson, is identical with the Moral Faculty. It is the\nSense of unique excellence in certain affections and in the actions\nconsequent upon them. The object of approval is, in the main,\nbenevolence.\n\nII.--His division of the feelings is into calm and turbulent, each of\nthese being again divided into self-regarding and benevolent. He\naffirms the existence of pure Disinterestedness, a _calm_ regard for\nthe most extended well-being. There are also _turbulent_ passions of a\nbenevolent kind, whose end is their simple gratification. Hutcheson has\nthus a higher and lower grade of Benevolence; the higher would\ncorrespond to the disinterestedness that arises from the operation of\n_fixed ideas_, the lower to those affections that are generated in us\nby pleasing objects.\n\nHe has no discussion on the freedom of the will, contenting himself\nwith mere voluntariness as an element in moral approbation or censure.\n\nIII.--The Summum Bonum is fully discussed. He places the pleasures of\nsympathy and moral goodness (also of piety) in the highest rank, the\npassive sensations in the lowest. Instead of making morality, like\nhealth, a neutral state (though an indispensable condition of\nhappiness), he ascribes to it the highest positive gratification.\n\nIV.--In proceeding upon Rights, instead of Duties, as a basis of\nclassification, Hutcheson is following in the wake of the\njurisconsults, rather than of the moralists. When he enters into the\ndetails of moral duties, he throws aside his 'moral sense,' and draws\nhis rules, most of them from Roman Law, the rest chiefly from manifest\nconvenience.\n\nV. and VI.--Hutcheson's relation to Politics and Theology requires no\ncomment.\n\nBERNARD DE MANDEVILLE. [1670-1733.]\n\nMANDEVILLE was author of 'The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices,\nPublic Benefits' (1714). This work is a satire upon artificial society,\nhaving for its chief aim to expose the hollowness of the so-called\ndignity of human nature. Dugald Stewart considered it a recommendation\nto any theory of the mind that it exalted our conceptions of human\nnature. Shaftesbury's views were entitled to this advantage; but,\nobserves Mandeville, 'the ideas he had formed of the goodness and\nexcellency of our nature, were as romantic and chimerical, as they are\nbeautiful and amiable.' Mandeville examined not what human nature\n_ought to be_, but what it really _is_. In contrast, therefore, to the\nmoralists that distinguish between a higher and a lower in our nature,\nattributing to the higher everything good and noble, while the lower\nought to be persecuted and despised, Mandeville declares the fancied\nhigher parts to be the region of vanity and imposture, while the\nrenowned deeds of men, and the greatness of kingdoms, really arise from\nthe passions usually reckoned base and sensual. As his views are\nscattered through numerous dissertations, it will be best to summarize\nthem under a few heads.\n\n1. _Virtue and Vice_. Morality is not natural to man; it is the\ninvention of wise men, who have endeavoured to infuse the belief, that\nit is best for everybody to prefer the public interest to their own.\nAs, however, they could bestow no _real_ recompense for the thwarting\nof self-interest, they contrived an _imaginary_ one--honour. Upon this\nthey proceeded to divide men into two classes, the one abject and base,\nincapable of self-denial; the other noble, because they suppressed\ntheir passions, and acted for the public welfare. Man was thus won to\nvirtue, not by force, but by flattery.\n\nIn regard to praiseworthiness, Shaftesbury, according to Mandeville,\nwas the first to affirm that virtue could exist without self-denial.\nThis was opposed to the prevailing opinion, and to the view taken up\nand criticised by Mandeville. His own belief was different. 'It is not\nin feeling the passions, or in being affected with the frailties of\nnature, that vice consists; but in indulging and obeying the call of\nthem, contrary to the dictates of reason.'\n\n2. _Self-love_. 'It is an admirable saying of a worthy divine, that\nthough many discoveries have been made in the world of self-love, there\nis yet abundance of _terra incognita_ left behind.' There is nothing so\nsincere upon earth as the love that creatures bear to themselves. 'Man\ncentres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates, but for his\nown sake.' Nay, more, we are naturally regardless of the effect of our\nconduct upon others; we have no innate love for our fellows. The\nhighest virtue is not without reward; it has a satisfaction of its own,\nthe pleasure of contemplating one's own worth. But is there no genuine\nself-denial? Mandeville answers by a distinction: mortifying one\npassion to gratify another is very common, but this not self-denial;\nself-inflicted pain without any recompense--where is that to be found?\n\n'Charity is that virtue by which part of that sincere love we have for\nourselves is transferred pure and unmixed to others (not friends or\nrelatives), whom we have no obligation to, nor hope or expect\nanything-from.' The counterfeit of true charity is _pity_ or\n_compassion_, which is a fellow-feeling for the sufferings of others.\nPity is as much a frailty of our nature as anger, pride, or fear. The\nweakest minds (_e.g._, women and children) have generally the greatest\nshare of it. It is excited through the eye or the ear; when the\nsuffering does not strike our senses, the feeling is weak, and hardly\nmore than an imitation of pity. Pity, since it seeks rather our own\nrelief from a painful sight, than the good of others, must be curbed\nand controlled in order to produce any benefit to society.\n\nMandeville draws a nice distinction between self-love, and, what he\ncalls, _self-liking_. 'To increase the care in creatures to preserve\nthemselves, Mature has given them an instinct, by which _every\nindividual values itself above its real worth_.' The more mettlesome\nand spirited animals (_e.g._, horses) are endowed with this instinct.\nIn us, it is accompanied with an apprehension that we do overvalue\nourselves; hence our susceptibility to the confirmatory good opinion of\nothers. But if each were to display openly his own feeling of\nsuperiority, quarrels would inevitably arise. The grand discovery\nwhereby the ill consequences of this passion are avoided is\n_politeness_. 'Good manners consists in flattering the pride of others,\nand concealing our own.' The first step is to conceal our good opinion\nof ourselves; the next is more impudent, namely, to pretend that we\nvalue others more highly than ourselves. But it takes a long time to\ncome to that pitch; the Romans were almost masters of the world before\nthey learned politeness.\n\n3. _Pride, Vanity, Honour_. Pride is of great consequence in\nMandeville's system. 'The moral virtues are the political offspring\nwhich flattery begot upon pride.' Man is naturally innocent, timid, and\nstupid; destitute of strong passions or appetites, he would remain in\nhis primitive barbarism were it not for pride. Yet all moralists\ncondemn pride, as a vain notion of our own superiority. It is a subtle\npassion, not easy to trace. It is often seen in the humility of the\nhumble, and the shamelessness of the shameless. It simulates charity;\n'pride and vanity have built more hospitals than all the virtues\ntogether.' It is the chief ingredient in the chastity of women, and in\nthe courage of men. Less cynical moralists than Mandeville have looked\nwith suspicion on posthumous fame; 'so silly a creature is man, as\nthat, intoxicated with the fumes of vanity, he can feast on the thought\nof the praises that shall be paid his memory in future ages, with so\nmuch ecstasy as to neglect his present life, nay court and covet death,\nif he but imagines that it will add to the glory he had acquired\nbefore.' But the most notable institution of pride is the love of\nhonour. Honour is a 'chimera,' having no reality in nature, but a mere\ninvention of moralists and politicians, to keep men close to their\nengagements, whatever they be. In some families it is hereditary, like\nthe gout; but, luckily, the vulgar are destitute of it. In the time of\nchivalry, honour was a very troublesome affair; but in the beginning of\nthe 17th century, it was melted over again, and brought to a new\nstandard; 'they put in the same weight of courage, half the quantity of\nhonesty, and a very little justice, but not a scrap of any other\nvirtue.' The worst thing about it is duelling; but there are more\nsuicides than duels, so that at any rate men do not hate others more\nthan themselves. After a half-satirical apology for duelling, he\nconcludes with one insurmountable objection; duelling is wholly\nrepugnant to religion, adding with the muffled scepticism\ncharacteristic of the 18th century, 'how to reconcile them must be left\nto wiser heads than mine.'\n\n4. _Private vices, public benefits_. Mandeville ventures to compare\nsociety to a bowl of punch. Avarice is the souring, and prodigality the\nsweetening of it. The water is the ignorance and folly of the insipid\nmultitude, while honour and the noble qualities of man represent the\nbrandy. To each of these ingredients we may object in turn, but\nexperience teaches that, when judiciously mixed, they make an excellent\nliquor. It is not the good, but the evil qualities of men, that lead to\nworldly greatness. Without luxury we should have no trade. This\ndoctrine is illustrated at great length, and has been better remembered\nthan anything else in the book; but it may be dismissed with two\nremarks. (1) It embodies an error in political economy, namely, that it\nis spending and not saving that gives employment to the poor. If\nMandeville's aim had been less critical, and had he been less delighted\nwith his famous paradox, we may infer from the acuteness of his\nreasoning on the subject, that he would have anticipated the true\ndoctrine of political economy, as he saw through the fallacy of the\nmercantile theory. (2) He employs the term, luxury, with great\nlatitude, as including whatever is not a bare necessary of existence.\nAccording to the fashionable doctrine of his day, all luxury was called\nan evil and a vice; and in this sense, doubtless, vice is essential to\nthe existence of a great nation.\n\n5. _The origin of society_. Mandeville's remarks on this subject are\nthe best he has written, and come nearest to the accredited views of\nthe present day. He denies that we have any natural affection for one\nanother, or any natural aversion or hatred. Each seeks his own\nhappiness, and conflict arises from the opposition of men's desires. To\nmake a society out of the raw material of uncivilized men, is a work of\ngreat difficulty, requiring the concurrence of many favourable\naccidents, and a long period of time. For the qualities developed among\ncivilized men no more belong to them in a savage state, than the\nproperties of wine exist in the grape. Society begins with _families_.\nIn the beginning, the old savage has a great wish to rule his children,\nbut has no capacity for government. He is inconstant and violent in his\ndesires, and incapable of any steady conduct. What at first keeps men\ntogether is not so much reverence for the father, as the common danger\nfrom wild beasts. The traditions of antiquity are full of the prowess\nof heroes in killing dragons and monsters. The second step to society\nis the danger men are in from one another. To protect themselves,\nseveral families would be compelled to accept the leadership of the\nstrongest. The leaders, seeing the mischiefs of dissension, would\nemploy all their art to extirpate that evil. Thus they would forbid\nkilling one another, stealing one another's wives, &c. The third and\nlast step is the invention of letters; this is essential to the growth\nof society, and to the corresponding, expansion of law.[22]\n\nI.--Mandeville's object being chiefly _negative_ and _dialectical_, he\nhas left little of positive ethical theory. Virtue he regards as _de\nfacto_ an arbitrary institution of society; what it ought to be, he\nhardly says, but the tendency of his writings is to make the good of\nthe whole to be preferred to private interest.\n\nII.--He denies the existence of a moral sense and of disinterestedness.\nThe motive to observe moral rules is pride and vanity fomented by\npoliticians. He does not regard virtue as an independent end, even by\nassociation, but considers that pride in its naked form is the ever\npresent incentive to good conduct.\n\nV.--The connexion of virtue with society is already fully indicated.\n\nIn France, the name of HELVETIUS (author of _De l'esprit, De l'homme_,\n&c., 1715-71) is identified with a serious (in contrast to Mandeville),\nand perfectly consistent, attempt to reduce all morality to direct\nSelf-interest. Though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the\nfacts, Helvetius was by no means the 'low and loose moralist' that he\nhas been described to be; and, in particular, his own practice\ndisplayed a rare benevolence.\n\nDAVID HUME. [1711-1776.]\n\nThe Ethical views of Hume are contained in '_An Enquiry concerning the\nPrinciples of Morals_.'\n\nIn an Introductory Section (I.) he treats of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF\nMORALS.\n\nAfter describing those that profess to deny the reality of the\ndistinction of Right and Wrong, as disingenuous disputants, useless to\nreason with,--he states the great problem of Morals to be, whether the\nfoundation is REASON or SENTIMENT; whether our knowledge of moral\ndistinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction, or by an\nimmediate feeling or finer internal sense.\n\nSpecious arguments may be urged on both sides. On the side of Reason,\nit may be contended, that the justice and injustice of actions are\noften a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences; whereas\nif they appealed at once to a sense, they would be as unsusceptible of\ntruth or falsehood as the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion,\nor the brilliancy of wit.\n\nIn reply, the supporters of Sentiment may urge that the character of\nvirtue is to be _amiable_, and of vice to be _odious_, which are not\nintellectual distinctions. The end of moral distinctions is to\ninfluence the feelings and determine the will, which no mere assent of\nthe understanding can do. Extinguish our _feelings_ towards virtue and\nvice, and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives.\n\nThe arguments on both sides have so much force in them, that we may\nreasonably suspect that Reason and Sentiment both concur in our moral\ndeterminations. The final sentence upon actions, whereby we pronounce\nthem praiseworthy or blameable, may depend on the feelings; while a\nprocess of the understanding may be requisite to make nice\ndistinctions, examine complicated relations, and ascertain matters of\nfact.\n\nIt is not the author's intention, however, to pursue the subject in the\nform of adjudicating between these two principles, but to follow what\nhe deems a simpler method--to analyze that complication of mental\nqualities, called PERSONAL MERIT: to ascertain the attributes or\nqualities that render a man an object of esteem and affection, or of\nhatred and contempt. This is a question of fact, and not of abstract\nscience; and should be determined, as similar questions are, in the\nmodern physics, by following the experimental method, and drawing\ngeneral maxims from a comparison of particular instances.\n\nSection II. is OF BENEVOLENCE.\n\nHis first remark on Benevolence is, that it is identified in all\ncountries with the highest merits that human nature is capable of\nattaining to.\n\nThis prepares the way for the farther observation, that in setting\nforth the praises of a humane, beneficent man, the one circumstance\nthat never fails to be insisted on is the happiness to society arising\nthrough his good offices. Like the sun, an inferior minister of\nprovidence, he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world.\nMay we not therefore conclude that the UTILITY resulting from social\nvirtues, forms, at least, a _part_ of their merit, and is one source of\nthe approbation paid to them. He illustrates this by a number of\ninteresting examples, and defers the enquiry--_how large_ a part of the\nsocial virtues depend on utility, and for what reason we are so much\naffected by it.\n\nSection III. is on JUSTICE. That Justice is useful to society, and\nthence derives _part_ of its merit, would be superfluous to prove. That\npublic utility is the _sole_ origin of Justice, and that the beneficial\nconsequences are the _sole_ foundation of its merit, may seem more\nquestionable, but can in the author's opinion be maintained.\n\nHe puts the supposition, that the human race were provided with such\nabundance of all external things, that without industry, care, or\nanxiety, every person found every want fully satisfied; and remarks,\nthat while every other social virtue (the affections, &c.) might\nflourish, yet, as property would be absent, mine and thine unknown,\nJustice would be useless, an idle ceremonial, and could never come into\nthe catalogue of the virtues. In point of fact, where any agent, as\nair, water, or land, is so abundant as to supply everybody, questions\nof justice do not arise on that particular subject.\n\nSuppose again that in our present necessitous condition, the mind of\nevery man were so enlarged and so replete with generosity that each\nshould feel as much for his fellows as for himself--the _beau id\u00e9al_ of\ncommunism--in this case Justice would be in abeyance, and its ends\nanswered by Benevolence. This state is actually realized in\nwell-cultivated families; and communism has been attempted and\nmaintained for a time in the ardour of new enthusiasms.\n\nReverse the above suppositions, and imagine a society in such want\nthat the utmost care is unable to prevent the greater number from\nperishing, and all from the extremes of misery, as in a shipwreck\nof a siege; in such circumstances, justice is suspended in favour of\nself-preservation; the possibility of good order is at an end, and\nJustice, the means, is discarded as useless. Or, again, suppose a\nvirtuous man to fall into a society of ruffians on the road to swift\ndestruction; his sense of justice would be of no avail, and\nconsequently he would arm himself with the first weapon he could seize,\nconsulting self-preservation alone. The ordinary punishment of\ncriminals is, as regards them, a suspension of justice for the benefit\nof society. A state of war is the remission of justice between the\nparties as of no use or application. A civilized nation at war with\nbarbarians must discard even the small relics of justice retained in\nwar with other civilized nations. Thus the rules of equity and justice\ndepend on the condition that men are placed in, and are limited by\ntheir UTILITY in each separate state of things. The common state of\nsociety is a medium between the extreme suppositions now made: we have\nour self-partialities, but have learnt the value of equity; we have few\nenjoyments by nature, but a considerable number by industry. Hence we\nhave the ideas of Property; to these Justice is essential, and it thus\nderives its moral obligation.\n\nThe poetic fictions of the Golden Age, and the philosophic fictions of\na State of Nature, equally adopt the same fundamental assumption; in\nthe one, justice was unnecessary, in the other, it was inadmissible.\nSo, if there were a race of creatures so completely servile as never to\ncontest any privilege with us, nor resent any infliction, which is very\nmuch our position with the lower animals, justice would have no place\nin our dealings with them. Or, suppose once more, that each person\npossessed within himself every faculty for existence, and were isolated\nfrom every other; so solitary a being would be as incapable of justice\nas of speech. The sphere of this duty begins with society; and extends\nas society extends, and as it contributes to the well-being of the\nindividual members of society.\n\nThe author next examines the _particular laws_ embodying justice and\ndetermining property. He supposes a creature, having reason, but\nunskilled in human nature, to deliberate with himself how to distribute\nproperty. His most obvious thought would be to give the largest\npossessions to the most virtuous, so as to give the power of doing good\nwhere there was the most inclination. But so unpracticable is this\ndesign, that although sometimes conceived, it is never executed; the\ncivil magistrate knows that it would be utterly destructive of human\nsociety; sublime as may be the ideal justice that it supposes, he sets\nit aside on the calculation of its bad consequences.\n\nSeeing also that, with nature's liberality, were all her gifts equally\ndistributed, every one would have so good a share that no one would\nhave a title to complain; and seeing, farther, that this is the only\ntype of perfect equality or ideal justice--there is no good ground for\nfalling short of it but the knowledge that the attempt would be\npernicious to society. The writers on the Law of Nature, whatever\nprinciples they begin with, must assign as the ultimate reason of law\nthe necessities and convenience of mankind. Uninstructed nature could\nnever make the distinction between _mine_ and _yours_; it is a purely\nartificial product of society. Even when this distinction is\nestablished, and justice requires it to be adhered to, yet we do not\nscruple in extraordinary cases to violate justice in an individual case\nfor the safety of the people at large.\n\nWhen the interests of society require a rule of justice, but do not\nindicate any rule in particular, the resort is to some _analogy_ with a\nrule already established on grounds of the general interest.\n\nFor determining what is a man's property, there may be many statutes,\ncustoms, precedents, analogies, some constant and inflexible, some\nvariable and arbitrary, but all professedly terminating in the\ninterests of human society. But for this, the laws of property would be\nundistinguishable from the wildest superstitions.\n\nSuch a reference, instead of weakening the obligations of justice,\nstrengthens them. What stronger foundations can there be for any duty\nthan that, without it, human nature could not subsist; and that,\naccording as it is observed, the degrees of human happiness go on\nincreasing?\n\nEither Justice is evidently founded on Utility, or our regard for it is\na simple instinct like hunger, resentment, or self-preservation. But on\nthis last supposition, property, the subject-matter, must be also\ndiscerned by an instinct; no such instinct, however, can be affirmed.\nIndeed, no single instinct would suffice for the number of\nconsiderations entering into a fact so complex. To define Inheritance\nand Contract, a hundred volumes of laws are not enough; how then can\nnature embrace such complications in the simplicity of an instinct. For\nit is not laws alone that we must have, but authorized interpreters.\nHave we original ideas of pr\u00e6tors, and chancellors, and juries?\n\nInstincts are uniform in their operation; birds of a species build\ntheir nests alike. The laws of states are uniform to about the same\nextent as houses, which must have a roof and walls, windows and\nchimneys, because the end in view demands certain essentials; but\nbeyond these, there is every conceivable diversity.\n\nIt is true that, by education and custom, we blame injustice without\nthinking of its ultimate consequences. So universal are the rules of\njustice, from the universality of its end, that we approve of it\nmechanically. Still, we have often to recur to the final end, and to\nask, What must become of the world if such practices prevail? How could\nsociety subsist under such disorders?\n\nThus, then, Hume considers that, by an inductive determination, on the\nstrict Newtonian basis, he has proved that the SOLE foundation of our\nregard to justice is the support and welfare of society: and since no\nmoral excellence is more esteemed, we must have some strong disposition\nin favour of general usefulness. Such a disposition must be a part of\nthe humane virtues, as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation\nof fidelity, justice, veracity, and integrity.\n\nSection IV. relates to POLITICAL SOCIETY, and is intended to show that\nGovernment, Allegiance, and the Laws of each State, are justified\nsolely by Utility.\n\nIf men had _sagacity_ to perceive, and _strength of mind_ to follow\nout, distant and general interests, there had been no such thing as\ngovernment. In other words, if government were totally useless, it\nwould not be. The duty of Allegiance would be no duty, but for the\nadvantage of it, in preserving peace and order among mankind.\n\n[Hume is here supposing that men enter into society on equal terms; he\nmakes no allowance for the exercise of the right of the stronger in\nmaking compulsory social unions. This, however, does not affect his\nreasoning as to the source of our approbation of social duty, which is\nnot usually extended to tyranny.]\n\nWhen political societies hold intercourse with one another, certain\nregulations are made, termed Laws of Nations, which have no other end\nthan the advantage of those concerned.\n\nThe virtue of Chastity is subservient to the utility of rearing the\nyoung, which requires the combination of both parents; and that\ncombination reposes on marital fidelity. Without such a utility, the\nvirtue would never have been thought of. The reason why chastity is\nextended to cases where child-bearing does not enter, is that _general\nrules_ are often carried beyond their original occasion, especially in\nmatters of taste and sentiment.\n\nThe prohibition of marriage between near relations, and the turpitude\nof incest, have in view the preserving of purity of manners among\npersons much together.\n\nThe laws of good manners are a kind of lesser morality, for the better\nsecuring of our pleasures in society.\n\nEven robbers and pirates must have their laws. Immoral gallantries,\nwhere authorized, are governed by a set of rules. Societies for play\nhave laws for the conduct of the game. War has its laws as well as\npeace. The fights of boxers, wrestlers, and such like, are subject to\nrules. For all such cases, the common interest and utility begets a\nstandard of right and wrong in those concerned.\n\nSection V. proceeds to argue WHY UTILITY PLEASES. However powerful\neducation may be in forming men's sentiments, there must, in such a\nmatter as morality, be some deep natural distinction to work upon. Now,\nthere are only two natural sentiments that Utility can appeal to: (1)\nSelf-Interest, and (2) Generosity, or the interests of others.\n\nThe deduction of morals from Self-Love is obvious, and no doubt\nexplains much. An appeal to experience, however, shows its defects. We\npraise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries, where our own\ninterests are out of the question. Even when we have a private interest\nin some virtuous action, our praise avoids that part of it, and prefers\nto fasten on what we are not interested in. When we hear of the details\nof a generous action, we are moved by it, before we know when or where\nit took place. Nor will the force of imagination account for the\nfeeling in those cases; if we have an eye solely to our own _real_\ninterest, it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary\ninterest.\n\nBut another view may be taken. Some have maintained that the public\ninterest is our own interest, and is therefore promoted by our\nself-love. The reply is that the two are often opposed to each other,\nand still we approve of the preference of the public interest. We are,\ntherefore, driven to adopt a more public affection, and to admit that\nthe interests of society, _on their own, account_, are not indifferent\nto us.\n\nHave we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity or\nbenevolence? Or to conceive that the very aspect of happiness, joy,\nprosperity, gives pleasure; while pain, suffering, sorrow, communicate\nuneasiness? Here we have an unmistakeable, powerful, universal\nsentiment of human nature to build upon.\n\nThe author gives an expanded illustration of the workings of\nBenevolence or Sympathy, which well deserves to be read for its merits\nof execution. We must here content ourselves with stating that it is on\nthis principle of disinterested action, belonging to our nature, that\nhe founds the chief part of our sentiment of Moral Approbation.\n\nSection VI. takes into the account QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES. We\npraise in individuals the qualities useful to themselves, and are\npleased with the happiness flowing to individuals by their own conduct.\nThis can be no selfish motive on our part. For example, DISCRETION, so\nnecessary to the accomplishing of any useful enterprise, is commended;\nthat measured union of enterprise and caution found in great\ncommanders, is a subject of highest admiration; and why? For the\nusefulness, or the success that it brings. What need is there to\ndisplay the praises of INDUSTRY, or of FRUGALITY, virtues useful to the\npossessor in the first instance? Then the qualities of HONESTY,\nFIDELITY, and TRUTH, are praised, in the first place, for their\ntendency to the good of society; and, being established on that\nfoundation, they are also approved as advantageous to the individual's\nown self. A part of our blame of UNCHASTITY in a woman is attached to\nits imprudence with reference to the opinion regarding it. STRENGTH OF\nMIND being to resist present care, and to maintain the search of\ndistant profit and enjoyment, is another quality of great value to the\npossessor. The distinction between the _Fool_ and the _Wise_ man\nillustrates the same position. In our approbation of all such\nqualities, it is evident that the happiness and misery of others are\nnot indifferent spectacles to us: the one, like sunshine, or the\nprospect of well-cultivated plains, imparts joy and satisfaction; the\nother, like a lowering cloud or a barren landscape, throws a damp over\nthe spirits.\n\nHe next considers the influence of bodily endowments and the goods of\nfortune as bearing upon the general question.\n\nEven in animals, one great source of _beauty_ is the suitability of\ntheir structure to their manner of life. In times when bodily strength\nin men was more essential to a warrior than now, it was held in so much\nmore esteem. Impotence in both sexes, and barrenness in women, are\ngenerally contemned, for the loss of human pleasure attending them.\n\nAs regards fortune, how can we account for the regard paid to the rich\nand powerful, but from the reflexion to the mind of prosperity,\nhappiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the gratification of every\nappetite. Rank and family, although they may be detached from wealth\nand power, had originally a reference to these.\n\nIn Section VII., Hume treats of QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO\nOURSELVES. Under this head, he dilates on the influence of\nCHEERFULNESS, as a social quality: on GREATNESS OF MIND, or Dignity of\nCharacter; on COURAGE; on TRANQUILLITY, or equanimity of mind, in the\nmidst of pain, sorrow, and adverse fortune; on BENEVOLENCE in the\naspect of an agreeable spectacle; and lastly, on DELICACY of Taste, as\na merit. As manifested to a beholder, all these qualities are engaging\nand admirable, on account of the immediate pleasure that they\ncommunicate to the person possessed of them. They are farther\ntestimonies to the existence of social sympathy, and to the connexion\nof that with our sentiment of approbation towards actions or persons.\n\nSection VIII. brings forward the QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO\nOTHERS. These are GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; the WIT or INGENUITY that\nenlivens social intercourse; MODESTY, as opposed to impudence,\narrogance, and vanity; CLEANLINESS, and GRACEFUL MANNER; all which are\nobviously valued for the pleasures they communicate to people\ngenerally. Section IX. is the CONCLUSION. Whatever may have been\nmaintained in systems of philosophy, he contends that in common life\nthe habitual motives of panegyric or censure are of the kind described\nby him. He will not enter into the question as to the relative shares\nof benevolence and self-love in the human constitution. Let the\ngenerous sentiments be ever so weak, they still direct a preference of\nwhat is serviceable to what is pernicious; and on these preferences a\nmoral distinction is founded. In the notion of morals, two things are\nimplied; a sentiment common to all mankind, and a sentiment whose\nobjects comprehend all mankind; and these two requisites belong to the\nsentiment of humanity or benevolence.\n\nAnother spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of\nforce to moral sentiment, is Love of Fame. The pursuit of a character,\nname, and reputation in the world, leads to a habit of surveying our\nown actions, begets a reverence for self as well as others, and is thus\nthe guardian of every virtue. Humanity and Love of Reputation combine\nto form the highest type of morality yet conceived.\n\nThe nature of moral _approbation_ being thus solved, there remains the\nnature of _obligation_; by which the author means to enquire, if a man\nhaving a view to his own welfare, will not find his best account in the\npractice of every moral virtue. He dwells upon the many advantages of\nsocial virtue, of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindness, of\ntruth and honesty; but confesses that the rule that 'honesty is the\nbest policy' is liable to many exceptions. He makes us acquainted with\nhis own theory of Happiness. How little is requisite to supply the\n_necessities_ of nature? and what comparison is there between, on the\none hand, the cheap pleasures of conversation, society, study, even\nhealth, and, on the other, the common beauties of nature, with\nself-approbation; and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and\nexpense?\n\nThus ends the main treatise; but the author adds, in an Appendix, four\nadditional dissertations.\n\nThe first takes up the question started at the outset, but postponed,\nhow far our moral approbation is a matter of _reason_, and how far of\n_sentiment_. His handling of this topic is luminous and decisive.\n\nIf the utility of actions be a foundation of our approval of them,\n_reason_ must have a share, for no other faculty can trace the results\nof actions in their bearings upon human happiness. In Justice\nespecially, there are often numerous and complicated considerations;\nsuch as to occupy the deliberations of politicians and the debates of\nlawyers.\n\nOn the other hand, reason is insufficient of itself to constitute the\nfeeling of moral approbation or disapprobation. Reason shows the means\nto an end; but if we are otherwise indifferent to the end, the\nreasonings fall inoperative on the mind. Here then a _sentiment_ must\ndisplay itself, a delight in the happiness of men, and a repugnance to\nwhat causes them misery. Reason teaches the consequences of actions;\nHumanity or Benevolence is roused to make a distinction in favour of\nsuch as are beneficial.\n\nHe adduces a number of illustrations to show that reason alone is\ninsufficient to make a moral sentiment. He bids us examine Ingratitude,\nfor instance; good offices bestowed on one side, ill-will on the other.\nReason might say, whether a certain action, say the gift of money, or\nan act of patronage, was for the good of the party receiving it, and\nwhether the circumstances of the gift indicated a good intention on the\npart of the giver; it might also say, whether the actions of the person\nobliged were intentionally or consciously hurtful or wanting in esteem\nto the person obliging. But when all this is made out by reason, there\nremains the sentiment of abhorrence, whose foundations must be in the\nemotional part of our nature, in our delight in manifested goodness,\nand our abhorrence of the opposite.\n\nHe refers to Beauty or Taste as a parallel case, where there may be an\noperation of the intellect to compute proportions, but where the\nelegance or beauty must arise in the region of feeling. Thus, while\n_reason_ conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood, _sentiment_ or\nemotion must give beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.\n\nAppendix No. II. is a discussion of SELF-LOVE. The author adverts first\nto the position that benevolence is a mere pretence, a cheat, a gloss\nof self-love, and dismisses it with a burst of indignation. He next\nconsiders the less offensive view, that all benevolence and generosity\nare resolvable in the last resort into self-love. He does not attribute\nto the holders of this opinion any laxity in their own practice of\nvirtue, as compared with other men. Epicurus and his followers were no\nstrangers to probity; Atticus and Horace were men of generous\ndispositions; Hobbes and Locke were irreproachable in their lives.\nThese men all allowed that friendship exists without hypocrisy; but\nconsidered that, by a sort of mental chemistry, it might be made out\nself-love, twisted and moulded by a particular turn of the imagination.\nBut, says Hume, as some men have not the turn of imagination, and\nothers have, this alone is quite enough to make the widest difference\nof human characters, and to stamp one man as virtuous and humane, and\nanother vicious and meanly interested. The analysis in no way sets\naside the reality of moral distinctions. The question is, therefore,\npurely speculative.\n\nAs a speculation, it is open to these objections. (1) Being contrary to\nthe unprejudiced notions of mankind, it demands some very powerful aid\nfrom philosophy. On the face of things, the selfish passions and the\nbenevolent passions are widely distinguished, and no hypothesis has\never yet so far overcome the disparity as to show that the one could\ngrow out of the other; we may discern in the attempts that love of\n_simplicity_, which has done so much harm to philosophy.\n\nThe Animals are susceptible of kindness; shall we then attribute to\nthem, too, a refinement of self-interest? Again, what interest can a\nfond mother have in view who loses her health in attendance on a sick\nchild, and languishes and dies of grief when relieved from the slavery\nof that attendance?\n\n(2) But farther, the real simplicity lies on the side of independent\nand disinterested benevolence. There are bodily appetites that carry us\nto their objects before sensual enjoyment; hunger and thirst have\neating and drinking for their end; the gratification follows, and\nbecomes a secondary desire. [A very questionable analysis.] So there\nare mental passions, as fame, power, vengeance, that urge us to act, in\nthe first instance; and when the end is attained, the pleasure follows.\nNow, as vengeance may be so pursued as to make us neglect ease,\ninterest, and safety, why may we not allow to humanity and friendship\nthe same privileges? [This is Butler, improved in the statement.]\n\nAppendix III. gives some farther considerations with regard to JUSTICE.\nThe point of the discussion is to show that Justice differs from\nGenerosity or Beneficence in a regard to distant consequences, and to\nGeneral Rules. The theme is handled in the author's usual happy style,\nbut contains nothing special to him. He omits to state what is also a\nprime attribute of Justice, its being indispensable to the very\nexistence of society, which cannot be said of generosity apart from its\ncontributing to justice.\n\nAppendix IV. is on some VERBAL DISPUTES. He remarks that, neither in\nEnglish nor in any other modern tongue, is the boundary fixed between\nvirtues and talents, vices and defects; that praise is given to natural\nendowments, as well as to voluntary exertions. The epithets\n_intellectual_ and _moral_ do not precisely divide the virtues; neither\ndoes the contrast of _head_ and _heart_; many virtuous qualities\npartake of both ingredients. So the sentiment of _conscious worth_, or\nof its opposite, is affected by what is not in our power, as well as by\nwhat is; by the goodness or badness of our memory, as well as by\ncontinence or dissoluteness of conduct. Without endowments of the\nunderstanding, the best intentions will not procure esteem.\n\nThe ancient moralists included in the virtues what are obviously\nnatural endowments. Prudence, according to Cicero, involved sagacity or\npowers of judgment. In Aristotle, we find, among the virtues, Courage,\nTemperance, Magnanimity, Modesty, Prudence, and manly Openness, as well\nas Justice and Friendship. Epictetus puts people on their guard against\nhumanity and compassion. In general, the difference of voluntary and\ninvoluntary was little regarded in ancient ethics. This is changed in\nmodern times, by the alliance of Ethics with Theology. The divine has\nput all morality on the footing of the civil law, and guarded it by the\nsame sanctions of reward and punishment; and consequently must make the\ndistinction of voluntary and involuntary fundamental.\n\nHume also composed a dialogue, to illustrate, in his light and easy\nstyle, the great variety, amounting almost to opposition, of men's\nmoral sentiments in different ages. This may seem adverse to his\nprinciple of Utility, as it is to the doctrine of an Intuitive Sense of\nRight and Wrong. He allows, however, for the different ways that people\nmay view Utility, seeing that the consequences of acting are often\ndifficult to estimate, and people may agree in an end without agreeing\nin the means. Still, he pays too little attention to the sentimental\nlikings and dislikings that frequently overbear the sense of Utility;\nscarcely recognizing it, except in one passage, where he dwells on the\nsuperstitions that mingle with a regard to the consequences of actions\nin determining right.\n\nWe shall now repeat the leading points of Hume's system, in the usual\norder.\n\nI.--The Standard of Right and Wrong is Utility, or a reference to the\nHappiness of mankind. This is the ground, as wall as the motive, of\nmoral approbation.\n\nII.--As to the nature of the Moral Faculty, he contends that it is a\ncompound of Reason, and Humane or Generous Sentiment.\n\nHe does not introduce the subject of Free-will into Morals.\n\nHe contends strongly for the existence of Disinterested Sentiment, or\nBenevolence; but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and\nuncompensated self-sacrifice. He does not seem to see that as far as\nthe approbation of benevolent actions is concerned, we are anything but\ndisinterested parties. The good done by one man is done to some others;\nand the recipients are moved by their self-love to encourage\nbeneficence. The regard to our own benefactor makes all benefactors\ninteresting.\n\nIII.--He says little directly bearing on the constituents of Human\nHappiness; but that little is all in favour of simplicity of life and\ncheap pleasures. He does not reflect that the pleasures singled out by\nhim are far from cheap; 'agreeable conversation, society, study,\nhealth, and the beauties of nature,' although not demanding\nextraordinary wealth, cannot be secured without a larger share of\nworldly means than has ever fallen to the mass of men in any community.\n\nIV.--As to the substance of the Moral Code, he makes no innovations. He\ntalks somewhat more lightly of the evils of Unchastity than is\ncustomary; but regards the prevailing restraints as borne out by\nUtility.\n\nThe inducements to virtue are, in his view, our humane sentiments, on\nthe one hand, and our self-love, or prudence, on the other; the two\nclasses of motives conspiring to promote both our own good and the good\nof mankind.\n\nV.--The connexion of Ethics with Politics is not specially brought out.\nThe political virtues are moral virtues. He does not dwell upon the\nsanctions of morality, so as to distinguish the legal sanction from the\npopular sanction. He draws no line between Duty and Merit.\n\nVI.--He recognizes no relationship between Ethics and Theology. The\nprinciple of Benevolence in the human mind is, he thinks, an adequate\nsource of moral approbation and disapprobation; and he takes no note of\nwhat even sceptics (Gibbon, for example) often dwell upon, the aid of\nthe Theological sanction in enforcing duties imperfectly felt by the\nnatural and unprompted sentiments of the mind.\n\nRICHARD PRICE. (1723-1791.)\n\nPrice's work is entitled, 'A Review of the principal questions in\nMorals; particularly those respecting the Origin of our Ideas of\nVirtue, its Nature, Relation to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter,\nand Sanctions.' In the third edition, he added an Appendix on 'the\nBeing and Attributes of the Deity.'\n\nThe book is divided into ten chapters.\n\nChapter I. is on the origin of our Ideas of Right and Wrong. The\nactions of moral agents, he says, give rise in us to three different\nperceptions: 1st, Right and Wrong; 2nd, Beauty and Deformity; 3rd, Good\nor Ill Desert. It is the first of these perceptions that he proposes\nmainly to consider.\n\nHe commences by quoting Hutcheson's doctrine of a Moral Sense, which he\ndescribes as an _implanted_ and _arbitrary_ principle, imparting a\nrelish or disrelish for actions, like the sensibilities of the various\nsenses. On this doctrine, he remarks, the Creator might have annexed\nthe same sentiments to the opposite actions. Other schemes of morality,\nsuch as Self-love, Positive Laws and Compacts, the Will of the Deity,\nhe dismisses as not meeting the true question.\n\nThe question, as conceived by him, is, 'What is the power within us\nthat perceives the distinctions of Right and Wrong?' The answer is, The\nUNDERSTANDING.\n\nTo establish this position, he enters into an enquiry into the distinct\nprovinces of Sense and of Understanding in the origin of our ideas. It\nis plain, he says, that what judges concerning the perceptions of the\nsenses, and contradicts their decisions, cannot itself be sense, but\nmust be some nobler faculty. Likewise, the power that views and\ncompares the objects of all the senses cannot be sense. Sense is a mere\ncapacity of being passively impressed; it presents _particular_ forms\nto the mind, and is incapable of discovering general truths. It is the\nunderstanding that perceives order or proportion; variety and\nregularity; design, connexion, art, and power; aptitudes, dependence,\ncorrespondence, and adjustment of parts to a whole or to an end. He\ngoes over our leading ideas in detail, to show that mere sense cannot\nfurnish them. Thus, Solidity, or Impenetrability, needs an exertion of\nreason; we must compare instances to know that two atoms of matter\ncannot occupy the same space. _Vis Inertic\u00e6_ is a perception of the\nreason. So Substance, Duration, Space, Necessary Existence, Power, and\nCausation involve the understanding. Likewise, that all Abstract Ideas\nwhatsoever require the understanding is superfluously proved. The\nauthor wonders, therefore, that his position in this matter should not\nhave been sooner arrived at.\n\nThe tracing of Agreement and of Disagreement, which are functions of\nthe Understanding, is really the source of simple ideas. Thus, Equality\nis a simple idea originating in this source; so are Proportion,\nIdentity and Diversity, Existence, Cause and Effect, Power, Possibility\nand Impossibility; and (as he means ultimately to show) Right and\nWrong.\n\nAlthough the author's exposition is not very lucid, his main conclusion\nis a sound one. Sense, in its narrowest acceptation, gives particular\nimpressions and experiences of Colour, Sound, Touch, Taste, Odour, &c.\nThe Intellectual functions of Discrimination and Agreement are\nnecessary as a supplement to Sense, to recognize these impressions as\ndiffering and agreeing, as Equal or Unequal; Proportionate or\nDisproportionate; Harmonious or Discordant. And farther, every abstract\nor general notion,--colours in the abstract, sweetness, pungency,\n&c.--supposes these, powers of the understanding in addition to the\nrecipiency of the senses.\n\nTo apply this to Right and Wrong, the author begins by affirming [what\ngoes a good way towards begging the question] that right and wrong are\nsimple ideas, and therefore the result of an _immediate_ power of\nperception in the human mind. Beneficence and Cruelty are indefinable,\nand therefore ultimate. There must be some actions that are in the last\nresort an end in themselves. This being assumed, the author contends\nthat the power of immediately perceiving these ultimate ideas is the\nUnderstanding. Shaftesbury had contended that, because the perception\nof right and wrong was immediate, therefore it must reside in a special\nSense. The conclusion, thinks Price, was, to say the least of it,\nhasty; for it does not follow that every immediate perception should\nreside in a special sensibility or sense. He puts it to each one's\nexperience whether, in conceiving Gratitude or Beneficence to be right,\none feels a sensation merely, or performs an act of understanding.\n'Would not a Being purely intelligent, having happiness within his\nreach, approve of securing it for himself? Would he not think this\nright; and would it not be right? When we contemplate the happiness of\na species, or of a world, and pronounce on the actions of reasonable\nbeings which promote it, that they are _right_, is this judging\nerroneously? Or is it no determination of the judgment at all, but a\nspecies of mental taste [as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson supposed]? [As\nagainst a moral sense, this reasoning may be effective; but it\nobviously assumes an end of desire,--happiness for self, or for\nothers--and yet does not allow to that end any share in making up the\nsense of right and wrong.] Every one, the author goes on to say, must\ndesire happiness for himself; and our rational nature thenceforth must\napprove of the actions for promoting happiness, and disapprove of the\ncontrary actions. Surely the understanding has some share in the\nrevulsion that we feel when any one brings upon himself, or upon\nothers, calamity and ruin. A being flattered with hopes of bliss and\nthen plunged into torments would complain _justly_; he would consider\nthat violence had been done to a perception of the human\n_understanding_.\n\nHe next brings out a metaphysical difficulty in applying right and\nwrong to actions, on the supposition that they are mere effects of\nsensation. All sensations, as such, are modes of consciousness, or\nfeelings, of a sentient being, and must be of a nature different from\ntheir causes. Colour is in the mind, not an attribute of the object;\nbut right and wrong are qualities of actions, of objects, and therefore\nmust be ideas, not sensations. Then, again, there can be nothing true\nor untrue in a sensation; all sensations are alike just; while the\nmoral rectitude of an action is something absolute and unvarying.\nLastly, all actions have a nature, or character; something truly\nbelonging to them, and truly affirmable of them. If actions have no\ncharacter, then they are all indifferent; but this no one can affirm;\nwe all strongly believe the contrary. Actions are not indifferent. They\nare good or bad, better or worse. And if so, they are declared such by\nan act of _judgment_, a function of the understanding.\n\nThe author, considering his thesis established, deduces from it the\ncorollary, that morality is _eternal and immutable_. As an object of\nthe Understanding, it has an invariable essence. No will, not even\nOmnipotence, can make _things_ other than they are. Right and wrong, as\nfar as they express the real characters of actions, must immutably and\nnecessarily belong to the actions. By action, is of course understood\nnot a bare external effect, but an effect taken along with its\nprinciple or rule, the motives or reasons of the being that performs\nit. The matter of an action being the same, its morality reposes upon\nthe end or motive of the agent. Nothing can be obligatory in us that\nwas not so from eternity. The will of God could not make a thing right\nthat was not right in its own nature.\n\nThe author closes his first chapter with a criticism of the doctrine of\nProtagoras--that man is the measure of all things--interpreting it as\nanother phase of the view that he is combating.\n\nAlthough this chapter is but a small part of the work, it completes the\nauthor's demonstration of his ethical theory.\n\nChapter II. is on 'our Ideas of the Beauty and Deformity of Actions.'\nBy these are meant our pleasurable and painful sentiments, arising from\nthe consideration of moral right and wrong, expressed by calling some\nactions amiable, and others odious, shocking, vile. Although, in this\naspect of actions, it would seem that the reference to a sense is the\nsuitable explanation, he still contends for the intervention of the\nUnderstanding. The character of the Deity must appear more amiable the\nbetter it is _known_ and _understood_. A reasonable being, without any\nspecial sensibilities, but knowing what order and happiness are, would\nreceive pleasure from the contemplation of a universe where order\nprevailed, and pain from a prospect of the contrary. To _behold_ virtue\nis to admire her; to _perceive_ vice is to be moved to condemnation.\nThere must always be a consideration of the circumstances of an action,\nand this involves intellectual discernment.\n\nThe author now qualifies his doctrine by the remark, that to some\nsuperior beings the intellectual discernment may explain the whole of\nthe appearances, but inferior natures, such as the human, are aided by\n_instinctive determinations_. Our appetites and passions are too strong\nfor reason by itself, especially in early years. Hence he is disposed\nto conclude that 'in contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have\nboth _a perception of the understanding_ and _a feeling of the heart;'_\nbut that this feeling of the heart, while partly instinctive, is mainly\na sense of congruity and incongruity in actions. The author therefore\nallows something to innate sense, but differs from Shaftesbury, who\nmakes the whole a matter of intuitive determination.\n\nChapter III. relates to the origin of our Desires and Affections, by\nwhich he means more especially Self-love and Benevolence. His position\nhere is that Self-love is the essence of a Sensible being, Benevolence\nthe essential of an Intelligent being. By the very nature of our\nsensitive constitution, we cannot but choose happiness for self; and it\nis only an act of intellectual consistency to extend the same measure\nto others. The same qualification, however, is made as to the\ninsufficiency of a mere intellectual impulse in this matter, without\nconstitutional tendencies. These constitutional tendencies the author\nconsiders as made up of our Appetites and Passions, while our\nAffections are founded on our rational nature. Then follow a few\nobservations in confirmation of Butler's views as to the disinterested\nnature of our affections.\n\nChapter IV. is on our Ideas of good and ill Desert. These are only a\nvariety of our ideas of right and wrong, being the feelings excited\ntowards the moral Agent. Our reason determines, with regard to a\nvirtuous agent, that he ought to be the better for his virtue. The\nground of such determination, however, is not solely that virtuous\nconduct promotes the happiness of mankind, and vice detracts from it;\nthis counts for much, but not for all. Virtue is in itself rewardable;\nvice is of essential demerit. Our understanding recognizes the absolute\nand eternal rectitude, the intrinsic fitness of the procedure in both\naspects.\n\nChapter V. is entitled 'Of the Reference of Morality to the Divine\nNature; the Rectitude of our Faculties; and the Grounds of Belief.' The\nauthor means to reply to the objection that his system, in setting up a\ncriterion independent of God, is derogatory to the Divine nature. He\nurges that there must be attributes of the Deity, independent of his\nwill; as his Existence, Immensity, Power, Wisdom; that Mind supposes\nTruth apart from itself; that without moral distinctions there could be\nno Moral Attributes in the Deity. Certain things are inherent in his\nNature, and not dependent on his will. There is a limit to the universe\nitself; two infinities of space or of duration are not possible. The\nnecessary goodness of the divine nature is a part of necessary truth.\nThus, morality, although not asserted to depend on the will of the\nDeity, is still resolvable into his nature. In all this, Price avowedly\nfollows Cudworth.\n\nHe then starts another difficulty. May not our faculties be mistaken,\nor be so constituted as to deceive us? To which he gives the reply,\nmade familiar to us by Hamilton, that the doubt is suicidal; the\nfaculty that doubts being itself under the same imputation. Nay, more,\na being cannot be made such as to be imposed on by falsehood; what is\nfalse is nothing. As to the cases of actual mistake, these refer to\nmatters attended with some difficulty; and it does not follow that we\nmust be mistaken in cases that are clear.\n\nHe concludes with a statement of the ultimate grounds of our belief.\nThese are, (1) Consciousness or Feeling, as in regard to our own\nexistence, our sensations, passions, &c.; (2) Intuition, comprising\nself-evident truths; and (3) Deduction, or Argumentation. He discusses\nunder these the existence of a material world, and affirms that we have\nan Intuition that it is _possible_.\n\nChapter VI. considers Fitness and Moral Obligation, and other\nprevailing forms of expression regarding morality. Fitness and\nUnfitness denote Congruity or Incongruity, and are necessarily a\nperception of the Understanding.\n\nThe term Obligation is more perplexing. Still, it is but another name\nfor _Rightness_. What is Right is, by that very fact, obligatory.\nObligation, therefore, cannot be the creature of law, for law may\ncommand what is morally wrong. The will of God enforced by rewards and\npunishments cannot make right; it would only determine what is\n_prudent_. Rewards and punishments do not make obligation, but suppose\nit. Rectitude is a LAW, the authoritative guide of a rational being. It\nis Supreme, universal, unalterable, and indispensable. Self-valid and\nself-originated, it stands on immovable foundations. Being the one\nauthority in nature, it is, in short, the Divine authority. Even the\nobligations of religion are but branches of universal rectitude. The\nSovereign Authority is not the mere result of his Almighty Power, but\nof this conjoined with his necessary perfections and infinite\nexcellence.\n\nHe does not admit that obligation implies an obliger.\n\nHe takes notice of the objection that certain actions may be right, and\nyet we are not bound to perform them; such are acts of generosity and\nkindness. But his answer throws no farther light on his main doctrine.\n\nIn noticing the theories of other writers in the same vein, as\nWollaston, he takes occasion to remark that, together with the\nperception of conformity or fitness, there is a simple immediate\nperception urging us to act according to that fitness, for which no\nfarther reason can be assigned. When we compare innocence and eternal\nmisery, we are struck with the idea of unsuitableness, and are inspired\nin consequence with intense repugnance.\n\nChapter VII. discusses the Heads or Divisions of Virtue; under which he\nenquires first what are virtuous actions; secondly, what is the true\nprinciple or motive of a virtuous agent; and thirdly, the estimate of\nthe degrees of virtue.\n\nHe first quotes Butler to show that all virtue is not summed up in\nBenevolence; repeating that there is an intrinsic rectitude in keeping\nfaith; and giving the usual arguments against Utility, grounded on the\nsupposed crimes that might be committed on this plea. He is equally\nopposed to those that would deny disinterested benevolence, or would\nresolve beneficence into veracity. He urges against Hutcheson, that,\nthese being independent and distinct virtues, a distinct sense would be\nnecessary to each; in other words, we should, for the whole of virtue,\nneed a plurality of moral senses.\n\nHis classification of Virtue comprehends (1) Duty to God, which he\ndilates upon at some length. (2) Duty to Ourselves, wherein he\nmaintains that our sense of self-interest is not enough for us. (3)\nBeneficence, the Good of others. (4) Gratitude. (5) Veracity, which he\ninculcates with great earnestness, adverting especially to impartiality\nand honesty in our enquiries after truth. (6) Justice, which he treats\nin its application to the Rights of Property. He considers that the\ndifficulties in practice arise partly from the conflict of the\ndifferent heads, and partly from the different modes of applying the\nsame principles; which he gives as an answer to the objection from the\ngreat differences of men's moral sentiments and practices. He allows,\nbesides, that custom, education, and example, may blind and deprave our\nintellectual and moral powers; but denies that the whole of our notions\nand sentiments could result from education. No amount of depravity is\nable utterly to destroy our moral discernment.\n\nChapter VIII. treats of Intention as an element in virtuous action. He\nmakes a distinction between Virtue in the Abstract and Virtue in\nPractice, or with reference to all the circumstances of the agent. A\nman may do abstract wrong, through mistake, while as he acts with his\nbest judgment and with upright intentions, he is practically right. He\ngrounds on this a powerful appeal against every attempt at dominion\nover conscience. The requisites of Practical Morality are (1) Liberty,\nor Free-will, on which he takes the side of free-agency. (2)\nIntelligence, without which there can be no perception of good and\nevil, and no moral agency. (3) The Consciousness of Rectitude, or\nRighteous Intention. On this he dwells at some length. No action is\nproperly the action of a moral agent unless designed by him. A virtuous\nmotive is essential to virtue. On the question--Is Benevolence a\nvirtuous motive? he replies: Not the Instinctive benevolence of the\nparent, but only Rational benevolence; which he allows to coincide with\nrectitude. Reason presiding over Self-love renders it a virtuous\nprinciple likewise. The presence of Reason in greater or less degree is\nthe criterion of the greater or less virtue of any action.\n\nChapter IX. is on the different Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the\nmodes of estimating them; the Difficulties attending the Practice of\nVirtue; the use of Trials, and the essentials of a good or a bad\nCharacter. The considerations adduced are a number of perfectly\nwell-known maxims on the practice of morality, and scarcely add\nanything to the elucidation of the author's Moral Theory. The\nconcluding chapter, on Natural Religion, contains nothing original.\n\nTo sum up the views of Price:--\n\nI.--As regards the Moral Standard, he asserts that a perception of the\nReason or the Understanding,--a sense of fitness or congruity between\nactions and the agents, and all the circumstances attending them,--is\nwhat determines Right and Wrong.\n\nHe finds it impracticable to maintain his position without sundry\nqualifications, as we have seen. Virtue is naturally adapted to\n_please_ every observing mind; vice the contrary. Right actions must be\n_grateful_, wrong ungrateful to us. To _behold_ virtue is to _admire_\nher. In contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have _both_ a\nperception of the understanding and a feeling of the heart. He thus\nre-admits an element of feeling, along with the intellect, in some\nundefined degree; contending only that _all morality_ is not to be\nresolved into feeling or instinct. We have also noticed another\nsingular admission, to the effect that only superior natures can\ndiscover virtue by the understanding. Reason alone, did we possess it\nin a high degree, would answer all the ends of the passions. Parental\naffection would be unnecessary, if parents were sufficiently alive to\nthe reasons of supporting the young, and were virtuous enough to be\nalways determined by them.\n\nUtility, although not the _sole_ ground of Justice, is yet admitted to\nbe _one_ important reason or ground of many of its maxims.\n\nII.--The nature of the Moral Faculty, in Price's theory, is not a\nseparate question from the standard, but the same question. His\ndiscussion takes the form of an enquiry into the Faculty:--'What is the\npower within us that perceives the distinctions of Right and Wrong?'\nThe two questions are mixed up throughout, to the detriment of\nprecision in the reasoning.\n\nWith his usual facility of making concessions to other principles, he\nsays it is not easy to determine how far our natural sentiments may be\naltered by custom, education, and example: while it would be\nunreasonable to conclude that all is derived from these sources. That\npart of our moral constitution depending on instinct is liable to be\ncorrupted by custom and education to almost any length; but the most\ndepraved can never sink so low as to lose all moral discernment, all\nideas of just and unjust; of which he offers the singular proof that\nmen are never wanting in resentment when they are _themselves_ the\nobjects of ill-treatment.\n\nAs regards the Psychology of Disinterested Action, he provides nothing\nbut a repetition of Butler (Chapter III.) and a vague assertion of the\nabsurdity of denying disinterested benevolence.\n\nIII.--On Human Happiness, he has only a few general remarks. Happiness\nis an object of essential and eternal value. Happiness is the _end_,\nand the _only_ end, conceivable by us, of God's providence and\ngovernment; but He pursues this end in subordination to rectitude.\nVirtue tends to happiness, but does not always secure it. A person that\nsacrifices his life rather than violate his conscience, or betray his\ncountry, gives up all possibility of any present reward, and loses the\nmore in proportion as his virtue is more glorious.\n\nNeither on the Moral Code, nor in the relations of Ethics to Politics\nand to Theology, are any further remarks on Price called for.\n\nADAM SMITH. [1723-90.]\n\nThe 'Theory of the Moral Sentiments' is a work of great extent and\nelaboration. It is divided into five Parts; each part being again\ndivided into Sections, and these subdivided into Chapters.\n\nPART I. is entitled, OF THE PROPRIETY OF ACTION. _Section I._ is, _'Of\nthe Sense of Propriety.'_ Propriety is his word for Rectitude or Right.\n\nChapter I., entitled, 'Of Sympathy,' is a felicitous illustration of\nthe general nature and workings of Sympathy. He calls in the experience\nof all mankind to attest the existence of our sympathetic impulses. He\nshows through what medium sympathy operates; namely, by our placing\nourselves in the situation of the other party, and imagining what we\nshould feel in that case. He produces the most notable examples of the\nimpressions made on us by our witnessing the actions, the pleasurable\nand the painful expression of others; effects extending even to\nfictitious representations. He then remarks that, although on some\noccasions, we take on simply and purely the feelings manifested in our\npresence,--the grief or joy of another man, yet this is far from the\nuniversal case: a display of angry passion may produce in us hostility\nand disgust; but this very result may be owing to our sympathy for the\nperson likely to suffer from the anger. So our sympathy for grief or\nfor joy is imperfect until we know the cause, and may be entirely\nsuppressed. We take the whole situation into view, as well as the\nexpression of the feeling. Hence we often feel for another person what\nthat person does not feel for himself; we act out our own view of the\nsituation, not his. We feel for the insane what they do not feel; we\nsympathize even with the dead.\n\nChapter II. is 'Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy.' It contains\nillustrations of the delight that we experience in the sympathy of\nothers; we being thereby strengthened in our pleasures and relieved in\nour miseries. He observes that we demand this sympathy more urgently\nfor our painful emotions than for such as are pleasurable; we are\nespecially intolerant of the omission of our friends to join in our\nresentments. On the other hand, we feel pleasure in the act of\nsympathizing, and find in that a compensation for the pain that the\nsight of pain gives us. Still, this pleasure may be marred if the other\nparty's own expression of grief or of joy is beyond what we think\nsuitable to the situation.\n\nChapter III. considers 'the manner of our judging of the propriety of\nother men's affections by their consonance with our own,' The author\nillustrates the obvious remark, that we approve of the passions of\nanother, if they are such as we ourselves should feel in the same\nsituation. We require that a man's expression and conduct should be\nsuitable to the occasion, according to our own standard of judging,\nnamely, our own procedure in such cases.\n\nChapter IV. continues the subject, and draws a distinction between two\ncases; the case where the objects of a feeling do not concern either\nourselves or the person himself, and the case where they do concern one\nor other. The first case is shown in matters of taste and science,\nwhere we derive pleasure from sympathy, but yet can tolerate\ndifference. The other case is exemplified in our personal fortunes; in\nthese, we cannot endure any one refusing us their sympathy. Still, it\nis to be noted that the sympathizer does not fully attain the level of\nthe sufferer; hence the sufferer, aware of this, and desiring the\nsatisfaction of a full accord with his friend, tones down his own\nvehemence till it can be fully met by the other; which very\ncircumstance is eventually for his own good, and adds to, rather than\ndetracts from, the tranquillizing influence of a friendly presence. We\nsober down our feelings still more before casual acquaintance and\nstrangers; and hence the greater equality of temper in the man of the\nworld than in the recluse.\n\nChapter V. makes an application of these remarks to explain the\ndifference between the Amiable and the Respectable Virtues. The soft,\nthe gentle, and the amiable qualities are manifested when, as\nsympathizers, we enter fully into the expressed sentiments of another;\nthe great, the awful and respectable virtues of self-denial, are shown\nwhen the principal person concerned brings down his own case to the\nlevel that the most ordinary sympathy can easily attain to. The one is\nthe virtue of giving much, the other of expecting little.\n\n_Section II._ is '_Of the Degrees of the different passions which are\nconsistent with propriety_.' Under this head he reviews the leading\npassions, remarks how far, and why, we can sympathize with each.\n\nChapter I. is on the Passions having their origin in the body. We can\nsympathize with hunger to a certain limited extent, and in certain\ncircumstances; but we can rarely tolerate any very prominent expression\nof it. The same limitations apply to the passion of the sexes. We\npartly sympathize with bodily pain, but not with the violent expression\nof it. These feelings are in marked contrast to the passions seated in\nthe imagination: wherein our appetite for sympathy is complete;\ndisappointed love or ambition, loss of friends or of dignity, are\nsuitable to representation in art. On the same principle, we can\nsympathize with danger; as regards our power of conceiving, we are on a\nlevel with the sufferer. From our inability to enter into bodily pain,\nwe the more admire the man that can bear it with firmness.\n\nChapter II. is on certain Passions depending on a peculiar turn of the\nImagination. Under this he exemplifies chiefly the situation of two\nlovers, with whose passion, in its intensity, a third person cannot\nsympathize, although one may enter into the hopes of happiness, and\ninto the dangers and calamities often flowing from it.\n\nChapter III. is on the Unsocial Passions. These necessarily divide our\nsympathy between him that feels them and him that is their object.\nResentment is especially hard to sympathize with. We may ourselves\nresent wrong done to another, but the less so that the sufferer\nstrongly resents it. Moreover, there is in the passion itself an\nelement of the disagreeable and repulsive; its manifestation is\nnaturally distasteful. It may be useful and even necessary, but so is a\nprison, which is not on that account a pleasant object. In order to\nmake its gratification agreeable, there must be many well known\nconditions and qualifications attending it.\n\nChapter IV. gives the contrast of the Social Passions. It is with the\nhumane, the benevolent sentiments, that our sympathy is unrestricted\nand complete. Even in their excess, they never inspire aversion.\n\nChapter V. is on the Selfish Passions. He supposes these, in regard to\nsympathy, to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial.\nWe sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with\ngreat joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our\nenvy) or with small troubles.\n\n_Section III_. considers _the effects of prosperity and adversity upon\nthe judgments of mankind regarding propriety of action_.\n\nChapter I. puts forward the proposition that our sympathy with sorrow,\nalthough more lively than our sympathy with joy, falls short of the\nintensity of feeling in the person concerned. It is agreeable to\nsympathize with joy, and we do so with the heart; the painfulness of\nentering into grief and misery holds us back. Hence, as he remarked\nbefore, the magnanimity and nobleness of the man that represses his\nwoes, and does not exact our compassionate participation.\n\nChapter II. inquires into the origin of Ambition, and of the\ndistinction of Ranks. Proceeding upon the principle just enounced, that\nmankind sympathize with joy rather than with sorrow, the author\ncomposes an exceedingly eloquent homily on the worship paid to rank and\ngreatness.\n\nChapter III., in continuation of the same theme, illustrates the\ncorruption of our moral sentiments, arising from this worship of the\ngreat. 'We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more\nstrongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise\nand the virtuous.' 'The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments\nof that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are\ncommonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a\nwarrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator.'\n\nPART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND\nPUNISHMENT. It consists of three Sections.\n\n_Section I_. is, _Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit_.\n\nChapter I. maintains that whatever appears to be the proper object of\ngratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that whatever appears to be\nthe proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment. The\nauthor distinguishes between gratitude and mere love or liking; and,\nobversely, between resentment and hatred. Love makes us pleased to see\nany one promoted; but gratitude urges us to be ourselves the instrument\nof their promotion.\n\nChapter II. determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment,\nthese being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment\nrespectively. 'These, as well as all the other passions of human\nnature, seem proper, and are approved of, _when the heart of every\nimpartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them_, when every\nindifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.'\nIn short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of\nall impartial persons.\n\nThis view is in accordance with the course taken by the mind in the two\ncontrasting situations. In sympathizing with the joy of a prosperous\nperson, we approve of his complacent and grateful sentiment towards the\nauthor of his prosperity; we make his gratitude our own: in\nsympathizing with sorrow, we enter into, and approve of, the natural\nresentment towards the agent causing it.\n\nChapter III. remarks that where we do not approve of the conduct of the\nperson conferring the benefit, we have little sympathy with the\ngratitude of the receiver; we do not care to enter into the gratitude\nof the favourites of profligate monarchs.\n\nChapter IV. supposes the case of our approving strongly the conduct and\nthe motives of a benefactor, in which case we sympathize to a\ncorresponding degree with the gratitude of the receiver.\n\nChapter V. sums up the analysis of the Sense of Merit and of Demerit\nthus:--The sense of Merit is a compound sentiment, made up of two\ndistinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent\n(constituting the propriety of the action), and an indirect sympathy\nwith the gratitude of the recipient. The sense of Demerit includes a\ndirect antipathy to the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect\nsympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.\n\n_Section II_. is _Of Justice and Beneficence_.\n\nChapter I. compares the two virtues. Actions of a beneficent tendency,\nfrom proper motives, seem alone to require a reward; actions of a\nhurtful tendency, from improper motives, seem alone to deserve\npunishment. It is the nature of Beneficence to be free; the mere\nabsence of it does not expose to punishment. Of all the duties of\nbeneficence, the one most allied to perfect obligation is gratitude;\nbut although we talk of the debt of gratitude (we do not say the debt\nof _charity_), we do not punish ingratitude.\n\nResentment, the source of punishment, is given for defence against\npositive evil; we employ it not to extort benefits, but to repel\ninjuries. Now, the injury is the violation of Justice. The sense of\nmankind goes along with the employment of violence to avenge the hurt\ndone by injustice, to prevent the injury, and to restrain the offender.\nBeneficence, then, is the subject of reward; and the want of it is not\nthe subject of punishment. There may be cases where a beneficent act is\ncompelled by punishment, as in obliging a father to support his family,\nor in punishing a man for not interfering when another is in danger;\nbut these cases are immaterial exceptions to the broad definition. He\nmight have added, that in cases where justice is performed under\nunusual difficulties, and with unusual fidelity, our disposition would\nbe not merely to exempt from punishment, but to reward.\n\nChapter II. considers the sense of Justice, Remorse, and the feeling of\nMerit.\n\nEvery man is recommended by nature to his own care, being fitter to\ntake care of himself than of another person. We approve, therefore, of\neach one seeking their own good; but then it must not be to the hurt of\nany other being. The primary feeling of self-preservation would not of\nitself, however, be shocked at causing injury to our fellows. It is\nwhen we pass out of this point of view, and enter into the mental state\nof the spectator of our actions, that we feel the sense of injustice\nand the sting of Remorse. Though it may be true that every individual\nin his own breast prefers himself to mankind, yet he dares not look\nmankind in the face, and avow that he acts on this principle. A man is\napproved when he outstrips his fellows in a fair race; he is condemned\nwhen he jostles or trips up a competitor unfairly. The actor takes home\nto himself this feeling; a feeling known as Shame, Dread of Punishment,\nand Remorse.\n\nSo with the obverse. He that performs a generous action can realize the\nsentiments of the by-stander, and applaud himself by sympathy with the\napprobation of the supposed impartial judge. This is the sense of\nMerit.\n\nChapter III. gives reflections upon the utility of this constitution of\nour nature. Human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual\nassistance, and are exposed to mutual injuries. Society might exist\nwithout love or beneficence, but not without mutual abstinence from\ninjury. Beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building;\nJustice the main pillar that supports it. It is for the observance of\nJustice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert, and those\nterrors of mental punishment, growing out of our sympathy with the\ndisapprobation of our fellows. Justice is necessary to the existence of\nsociety, and we often defend its dictates on that ground; but, without\nlooking to such a remote and comprehensive end, we are plunged into\nremorse for its violation by the shorter process of referring to the\ncensure of a supposed spectator [in other words, to the sanction of\npublic opinion].\n\n_Section III.--Of the influence of Fortune upon the sentiments of\nmankind, with regard to the Merit and the Demerit of actions_.\n\nEvery voluntary action consists of three parts:--(1) the Intention or\nmotive, (2) the Mechanism, as when we lift the hand, and give a blow,\nand (3) the Consequences. It is, in principle, admitted by all, that\nonly the first, the Intention, can be the subject of blame. The\nMechanism is in itself indifferent. So the Consequences cannot be\nproperly imputed to the agent, unless intended by him. On this last\npoint, however, mankind do not always adhere to their general maxim;\nwhen they come to particular cases, they are influenced, in their\nestimate of merit and demerit, by the actual consequences of the\naction.\n\nChapter I. considers the causes of this influence of Fortune. Gratitude\nrequires, in the first instance, that some pleasure should have been\nconferred; Resentment pre-supposes pain. These passions require farther\nthat the object of them should itself be susceptible of pleasure and\npain; they should be human beings or animals. Thirdly, It is requisite\nthat they should have produced the effects from a design to do so. Now,\nthe absence of the pleasurable consequences intended by a beneficent\nagent leaves out one of the exciting causes of gratitude, although\nincluding another; the absence of the painful consequences of a\nmaleficent act leaves out one of the exciting causes of resentment;\nhence less gratitude seems due in the one, and less resentment in the\nother.\n\nChapter II. treats of the extent of this influence of Fortune. The\neffects of it are, first, to diminish, in our eyes, the merit of\nlaudable, and the demerit of blameable, actions, when they fail of\ntheir intended effects; and, secondly, to increase the feelings of\nmerit and of demerit beyond what is due to the motives, when the\nactions chance to be followed by extraordinary pleasure or pain.\nSuccess enhances our estimate of all great enterprises; failure takes\noff the edge of our resentment of great crimes.\n\nThe author thinks (Chapter III.) that final causes can be assigned for\nthis irregularity of Sentiments. In the first place, it would be highly\ndangerous to seek out and to resent mere bad intentions. In the next\nplace, it is desirable that beneficent wishes should be put to the\nproof by results. And, lastly, as regards the tendency to resent evil,\nalthough unintended, it is good to a certain extent that men should be\ntaught intense circumspection on the point of infringing one another's\nhappiness.\n\nPART III. is entitled OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR\nOWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY.\n\nChapter I. is 'Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of\nSelf-disapprobation.' Having previously assigned the origin of our\njudgments respecting others, the author now proceeds to trace out our\njudgments respecting ourselves. The explanation is still the same. We\napprove or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that the\nimpartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it.\n\nTo a solitary human being, moral judgments would never exist. A man\nwould no more think of the merit and demerit of his sentiments than of\nthe beauty or deformity of his own face. Such criticism is exercised\nfirst upon other beings; but the critic cannot help seeing that he in\nhis turn is criticised, and he is thereby led to apply the common\nstandard to his own actions; to divide himself as it were into two\npersons--the examiner or judge, and person examined into, or judged of.\nHe knows what conduct of his will be approved of by others, and what\ncondemned, according to the standard he himself employs upon others;\nhis concurrence in this approbation or disapprobation is\nself-approbation or self-disapprobation. The happy consciousness of\nvirtue is the consciousness of the favourable regards of other men.\n\nChapter II. is 'Of the love of Praise, and of Praise-worthiness; the\ndread of Blame, and of Blame-worthiness;' a long and important chapter.\nThe author endeavours to trace, according to his principle of sympathy,\nthe desire of Praise-worthiness, as well as of Praise. We approve\ncertain conduct in others, and are thus disposed to approve the same\nconduct in ourselves: what we praise as judges of our fellow-men, we\ndeem praise-worthy, and aspire to realize in our own conduct. Some men\nmay differ from us, and may withhold that praise; we may be pained at\nthe circumstance, but we adhere to our love of the praise-worthy, even\nwhen it does not bring the praise. When we obtain the praise we are\npleased, and strengthened in our estimate; the approbation that we\nreceive confirms our self-approbation, but does not give birth to it.\nIn short, there are two principles at work within us. We are pleased\nwith approbation, and pained by reproach: we are farther pleased if the\napprobation coincides with what we approve when we are ourselves acting\nas judges of other men. The two dispositions vary in their strength in\nindividuals, confirming each other when in concert, thwarting each\nother when opposed. The author has painted a number of striking\nsituations arising out of their conflict. He enquires why we are more\npained by unmerited reproach, than lifted up by unmerited approbation;\nand assigns as the reason that the painful state is more pungent than\nthe corresponding pleasurable state. He shows how those men whose\nproductions are of uncertain merit, as poets, are more the slaves of\napprobation, than the authors of unmistakeable discoveries in science.\nIn the extreme cases of unmerited reproach, he points out the appeal to\nthe all-seeing Judge of the world, and to a future state rightly\nconceived; protesting, however, against the view that would reserve the\ncelestial regions for monks and friars, and condemn to the infernal,\nall the heroes, statesmen, poets, and philosophers of former ages; all\nthe inventors of the useful arts; the protectors, instructors, and\nbenefactors of mankind; and all those to whom our natural sense of\npraise-worthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and most\nexalted virtue.\n\nChapter III. is 'On the influence and authority of Conscience;' another\nlong chapter, occupied more with moral reflections of a practical kind\nthan with the following out of the analysis of our moral sentiment.\nConceding that the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator does\nnot of itself always support a man, he yet asserts its influence to be\ngreat, and that by it alone we can see what relates to ourselves in the\nproper shape and dimensions. It is only in this way that we can prefer\nthe interest of many to the interest of one; the interest of others to\nour own. To fortify us in this hard lesson two different schemes have\nbeen proposed; one to increase our feelings for others, the other to\ndiminish our feelings for ourselves. The first is prescribed by the\nwhining and melancholy moralists, who will never allow us to be happy,\nbecause at every moment many of our fellow-beings are in misery. The\nsecond is the doctrine of the Stoics, who annihilate self-interest in\nfavour of the vast commonwealth of nature; on that the author bestows a\nlengthened comment and correction, founded on his theory of regulating\nthe manifestations of joy or grief by the light of the impartial judge.\nHe gives his own panacea for human misery, namely, the power of nature\nto accommodate men to their permanent situation, and to restore\ntranquillity, which is the one secret of happiness.\n\nChapter IV. handles Self-Deceit, and the Origin and Use of General\nRules. The interference of our passions is the great obstacle to our\nholding towards ourselves the position of an impartial spectator. Prom\nthis notorious fact the author deduces an argument against a special\nmoral faculty, or moral sense; he says that if we had such a faculty,\nit would surely judge our own passions, which are the most clearly laid\nopen to it, more correctly than the passions of others.\n\nTo correct our self-partiality and self-deceit is the use of general\nrules. Our repeated observations on the tendency of particular acts,\nteach us what is fit to be done generally; and our conviction of the\npropriety of the general rules is a powerful motive for applying them\nto our own case. It is a mistake to suppose, as some have done, that\nrules precede experience; on the contrary, they are formed by finding\nfrom experience that all actions of a certain kind, in certain\ncircumstances, are approved of. When established, we appeal to them as\nstandards of judgment in right and wrong, but they are not the original\njudgments of mankind, nor the ultimate foundations of moral sentiment.\n\nChapter V. continues the subject of the authority and influence of\nGeneral Rules, maintaining that they are justly regarded as laws of the\nDeity. The grand advantage of general rules is to give steadiness to\nhuman conduct, and to enable us to resist our temporary varieties of\ntemper and disposition. They are thus a grand security for human\nduties. That the important rules of morality should be accounted laws\nof the Deity is a natural sentiment. Men have always ascribed to their\ndeities their own sentiments and passions; the deities held by them in\nspecial reverence, they have endowed with their highest ideal of\nexcellence, the love of virtue and beneficence, and the abhorrence of\nvice and injustice. The researches of philosophical inquiry confirmed\nmankind in the supposition that the moral faculties carry the badge of\nauthority, that they were intended as the governing principles of our\nnature, acting as the vicegerents of the Deity. This inference is\nconfirmed by the view that the happiness of men, and of other rational\ncreatures, is the original design of the Author of nature, the only\npurpose reconcilable with the perfections we ascribe to him.\n\nChapter VI. is on the cases where the Sense of Duty should be the sole\nmotive of conduct; and on those where it ought to join with other\nmotives. Allowing the importance of religion among human motives, he\ndoes not concur with the view that would make religious considerations\nthe sole laudable motives of action. The sense of duty is not the only\nprinciple of our conduct; it is the ruling or governing one. It may be\na question, however, on what occasions we are to proceed strictly by\nthe sense of duty, and on what occasions give way to some other\nsentiment or affection. The author answers that in the actions prompted\nby benevolent affections, we are to follow out our sentiments as much\nas our sense of duty; and the contrary with the malevolent passions. As\nto the selfish passions, we are to follow duty in small matters, and\nself-interest in great. But the rules of duty predominate most in cases\nwhere they are determined with exactness, that is, in the virtue of\nJustice.\n\nPART IV. OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION.\n\nChapter I. is on the Beauty arising out of Utility. It is here that the\nauthor sets forth the dismal career of 'the poor man's son, whom heaven\nin the hour of her anger has curst with ambition,' and enforces his\nfavourite moral lesson of contentment and tranquillity.\n\nChapter II. is the connexion of Utility with Moral Approbation. There\nare many actions possessing the kind of beauty or charm arising from\nutility; and hence, it may be maintained (as was done by Hume) that our\nwhole approbation of virtue may be explained on this principle. And it\nmay be granted that there is a coincidence between our sentiments of\napprobation or disapprobation, and the useful or hurtful qualities of\nactions. Still, the author holds that this utility or hurtfulness is\nnot the foremost or principal source of our approbation. In the first\nplace, he thinks it incongruous that we should have no other reason,\nfor praising a man than for praising a chest of drawers. In the next\nplace, he contends at length that the usefulness of a disposition of\nmind is seldom the first ground of our approbation. Take, for example,\nthe qualities useful to ourselves--reason and self-command; we approve\nthe first as just and accurate, before we are aware of its being\nuseful; and as to self-command, we approve it quite as much for its\npropriety as for its utility; it is the coincidence of our opinion with\nthe opinion of the spectator, and not an estimate of the comparative\nutility, that affects us. Regarding the qualities useful to\nothers--humanity, generosity, public spirit and justice--he merely\nrepeats his own theory that they are approved by our entering into the\nview of the impartial spectator. The examples cited only show that\nthese virtues are not approved from self-interest; as when the soldier\nthrows away his life to gain something for his sovereign. He also puts\nthe case of a solitary human being, who might see fitness in actions,\nbut could not feel moral approbation.\n\nPART V. THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL SENTIMENTS.\n\nThe first chapter is a pleasing essay on the influence of custom and\nfashion on manners, dress, and in Fine Art generally. The second\nchapter makes the application to our moral sentiments. Although custom\nwill never reconcile us to the conduct of a Nero or a Claudius, it will\nheighten or blunt the delicacy of our sentiments on right and wrong.\nThe fashion of the times of Charles II. made dissoluteness reputable,\nand discountenanced regularity of conduct. There is a customary\nbehaviour that we expect in the old and in the young, in the clergyman\nand in the military man. The situations of different ages and countries\ndevelop characteristic qualities--endurance in the savage, humanity and\nsoftness in the civilized community. But these are not the extreme\ninstances of the principle. We find particular usages, where custom has\nrendered lawful and blameless actions, that shock the plainest\nprinciples of right and wrong; the most notorious and universal is\ninfanticide.\n\nPART VI. THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.\n\n_Section I_. is on _Prudence_, and is an elegant essay on the _beau\nid\u00e9al_ of the prudential character. _Section II_. considers _character\nas affecting other people_. Chapter I. is a disquisition on the\ncomparative priority of the objects of our regard. After self, which\nmust ever have the first place, the members of our own family are\nrecommended to our consideration. Remoter connexions of blood are more\nor less regarded according to the customs of the country; in pastoral\ncountries clanship is manifested; in commercial countries distant\nrelationship becomes indifferent. Official and business connexions, and\nthe association of neighbourhood, determine friendships. Special\nestimation is a still preferable tie. Favours received determine and\nrequire favours in return. The distinction of ranks is so far founded\nin nature as to deserve our respect. Lastly, the miserable are\nrecommended to our compassion. Next, as regards societies (Chap. II.),\nsince our own country stands first in our regard, the author dilates on\nthe virtues of a good citizen. Finally, although our effectual good\noffices may not extend beyond our country, our good-will may embrace\nthe whole universe. This universal benevolence, however, the author\nthinks must repose on the belief in a benevolent and all-wise governor\nof the world, as realized, for example, in the meditations of Marcus\nAntoninus.\n\n_Section III. Of Self-command_. On this topic the author produces a\nsplendid moral essay, in which he describes the various modes of our\nself-estimation, and draws a contrast between pride and vanity. In so\nfar as concerns his Ethical theory, he has still the same criterion of\nthe virtue, the degree and mode commended by the impartial spectator.\n\nPART VII. OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\nOn this we need only to remark that it is an interesting and valuable\ncontribution to the history and the criticism of the Ethical\nsystems.[23]\n\nThe Ethical theory of Adam Smith may be thus summed up:--\n\nI.--The Ethical Standard is the judgment of an impartial spectator or\ncritic; and our own judgments are derived by reference to what this\nspectator would approve or disapprove.\n\nProbably to no one has this ever appeared a sufficient account of Right\nand Wrong. It provides against one defect, the self-partiality of the\nagent; but gives no account whatever of the grounds of the critic's own\njudgment, and makes no provision against his fallibility. It may be\nvery well on points where men's moral sentiments are tolerably\nunanimous, but it is valueless in all questions where there are\nfundamental differences of view.\n\nII.--In the Psychology of Ethics, Smith would consider the moral\nFaculty as identical with the power of Sympathy, which he treats as the\nfoundation of Benevolence. A man is a moral being in proportion as he\ncan enter into, and realize, the feelings, sentiments, and opinions of\nothers.\n\nNow, as morality would never have existed but for the necessity of\nprotecting one human being against another, the power of the mind that\nadopts other people's interests and views must always be of vital\nmoment as a spring of moral conduct; and Adam Smith has done great\nservice in developing the workings of the sympathetic impulse.\n\nHe does not discuss Free-will. On the question of Disinterested\nConduct, he gives no clear opinion. While denying that our sympathetic\nimpulses are a refinement of self-love, he would seem to admit that\nthey bring their own pleasure with them; so that, after all, they do\nnot detract from our happiness. In other places, he recognizes\nself-sacrifice, but gives no analysis of the motives that lead to it;\nand seems to think, with many other moralists, that it requires a\ncompensation in the next world.\n\nIII.--His theory of the constituents of Happiness is simple, primitive,\nand crude, but is given with earnest conviction. Ambition he laughs to\nscorn. 'What, he asks, can be added to the happiness of the man who is\nin health, out of debt, and has a clear conscience?' Again, 'the chief\npart of happiness consists in the consciousness of being beloved,\nhence, sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute to happiness.' But\nwhat he dwells upon most persistently, as the prime condition of\nhappiness, is Contentment, and Tranquillity.\n\nIV.--On the Moral Code, he has nothing peculiar. As to the means and\ninducements to morality, he does not avail himself of the fertility of\nhis own principle of Sympathy. Appeals to sympathy, and the cultivation\nof the power of entering into the feelings of others, could easily be\nshown to play a high part in efficacious moral suasion.\n\nV.--He affords little or no grounds for remarking on the connexion of\nMorality with Politics. Our duties as citizens are a part of Morality,\nand that is all.\n\nVI.--He gives his views on the alliance of Ethics with Religion. He\ndoes not admit that we should refer to the Religious sanction on all\noccasions. He assumes a benevolent and all-wise Governor of the world,\nwho will ultimately redress all inequalities, and remedy all\noutstanding injustice. What this Being approves, however, is to be\ninferred solely from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for him\nis to be shown, not by frivolous observances, sacrifices, ceremonies,\nand vain supplications, but by just and beneficent actions. The author\nstudiously ignores a revelation, and constructs for himself a Natural\nReligion, grounded on a benevolent and just administration of the\nuniverse.\n\nIn Smith's Essay, the purely scientific enquiry is overlaid by\npractical and hortatory dissertations, and by eloquent delineations of\ncharacter and of beau-ideals of virtuous conduct. His style being thus\npitched to the popular key, he never pushes home a metaphysical\nanalysis; so that even his favourite theme, Sympathy, is not\nphilosophically sifted to the bottom.\n\nDAVID HARTLEY. [1705-1757.]\n\nThe 'Observations on Man' (1749) is the first systematic effort to\nexplain the phenomena of mind by the Law of Association. It contains\nalso a philosophical hypothesis, that mental states are produced by the\n_vibration_ of infinitesimal particles of the nerves. This analogy,\nborrowed from the undulations of the hypothetical substance \u00e6ther, has\nbeen censured as crude, and has been entirely superseded. But, although\nan imperfect analogy, it nevertheless kept constantly before the mind\nof Hartley the double aspect of all mental phenomena, thus preventing\nerroneous explanations, and often suggesting correct ones. In this\nrespect, Aristotle and Hobbes are the only persons that can be named as\nequally fortunate.\n\nThe ethical remarks contained in the 'Observations,' relate only to the\nsecond head of summary, the Psychology of Ethics. We shall take, first,\nthe account of disinterestedness, and, next, of the moral sense.\n\n1. _Disinterestedness_. Under the name _Sympathy_, Hartley includes\nfour kinds of feelings:--(1) Rejoicing at the happiness of\nothers--Sociality, Good-will, Generosity, Gratitude; (2) Grieving for\nthe misery of others--Compassion, Mercy; (3) Rejoicing at the misery of\nothers--Anger, Jealousy, Cruelty, Malice; and (4) Grieving for the\nhappiness of others--Emulation, Envy. All these feelings may be shown\nto originate in association. We select as examples of Hartley's method,\nBenevolence and Compassion. Benevolence is the pleasing affection that\nprompts us to act for the benefit of others. It is not a primitive\nfeeling; but grows out of such circumstances as the following. Almost\nall the pleasures, and few, in comparison, of the pains, of children,\nare caused by others; who are thus, in the course of time, regarded\nwith pleasure, independently of their usefulness to us. Many of our\npleasures are enjoyed along with, and are enhanced by, the presence of\nothers. This tends to make us more sociable. Moreover, we are taught\nand required to put on the appearance of good-will, and to do kindly\nactions, and this may beget in us the proper feelings. Finally, we must\ntake into account the praise and rewards of benevolence, together with\nthe reciprocity of benefits that we may justly expect. All those\nelements may be so mixed and blended as to produce a feeling that shall\nteach us to do good to others without any expectation of reward, even\nthat most refined recompense--the pleasure arising from a beneficent\nact. Thus Hartley conceives that he both proves the existence of\ndisinterested feeling, and explains the manner of its developement.\n\nHis account of _Compassion_ is similar. In the young, the signs and\nappearances of distress excite a painful feeling, by recalling their\nown experience of misery. In the old, the connexion between a feeling\nand its adjuncts has been weakened by experience. Also, when children\nare brought up together, they are often annoyed by the same things, and\nthis tends powerfully to create a fellow-feeling. Again, when their\nparents are ill, they are taught to cultivate pity, and are also\nsubjected to unusual restraints. All those things conspire to make\nchildren desire to remove the sufferings of others. Various\ncircumstances increase the feeling of pity, as when the sufferers are\nbeloved by us, or are morally good. It is confirmatory of this view,\nthat the most compassionate are those whose nerves are easily\nirritable, or whose experience of affliction has been considerable.\n\n2.--_The Moral Sense_. Hartley denies the existence of any moral\ninstinct, or any moral judgments, proceeding upon the eternal relations\nof things. If there be such, let instances of them be produced prior to\nthe influence of associations. Still, our moral approbation or\ndisapprobation is disinterested, and has a factitious independence. (1)\nChildren are taught what is right and wrong, and thus the associations\nconnected with the idea of praise and blame are transferred to the\nvirtues inculcated and the vices condemned. (2) Many vices and virtues,\nsuch as sensuality, intemperance, malice, and the opposites, produce\n_immediate_ consequences of evil and good respectively. (3) The\nbenefits, immediate or (at least) obvious, flowing from the virtues of\nothers, kindle love towards them, and thereafter to the virtues they\nexhibit. (4) Another consideration is the _loveliness of virtue_,\narising from the suitableness of the virtues to each other, and to the\nbeauty, order, and perfection of the world. (5) The hopes and fears\nconnected with a future life, strengthen the feelings connected with\nvirtue. (6) Meditation upon God and prayer have a like effect. 'All the\npleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition (pride and\nvanity), self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy (affection towards\nGod), as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of\nour natures, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral\nsense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the\nfear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense, therefore,\ncarries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of\nall the rest, and the ultimate result from them; and employs the whole\nforce and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular\npart of it that rebels against the determinations and commands of the\nconscience or moral judgment.'\n\nHartley's analysis of the moral sense is a great advance upon Hobbes\nand Mandeville, who make self-love the immediate constituent, instead\nof a remote cause, of conscience. Our moral consciousness may thus be\ntreated as peculiar and distinguishable from other mental states, while\nat the same time it is denied to be unique and irresolvable.\n\nTHOMAS REID.[24] [1710-96.]\n\nReid's Ethical views are given in his Essays on the Active Powers of\nthe Mind.\n\nESSAY III., entitled THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION, contains (Part III.) a\ndisquisition on the _Rational Principles of Action_ as opposed to what\nReid calls respectively _Mechanical_ Principles (Instinct, Habit), and\n_Animal_ Principles (Appetites, Desires, Affections).\n\nThe Rational Principles of Action are Prudence, or regard to our own\ngood on the whole, and Duty, which, however, he does not define by the\nantithetical circumstance--the 'good of others.' The notion of Duty, he\nsays, is too simple for logical definition, and can only be explained\nby synonymes--_what we ought_ to do; what is fair and honest; what is\napprovable; the professed rule of men's conduct; what all men praise;\nthe laudable in itself, though no man praise it.\n\nDuty, he says, cannot be resolved into Interest. The language of\nmankind makes the two distinct. Disregard of our interest is folly; of\nhonour, baseness. Honour is more than mere reputation, for it keeps us\nright when we are not seen. This principle of Honour (so-called by men\nof rank) is, in vulgar phrase, honesty, probity, virtue, conscience; in\nphilosophical language, the moral sense, the moral faculty, rectitude.\n\nThe principle is universal in men grown up to years of understanding.\nSuch a testimony as Hume's may be held decisive on the reality of moral\ndistinctions. The ancient world recognized it in the leading terms,\n_honestum_ and _utile_, &c.\n\nThe abstract notion of Duty is a relation between the action and the\nagent. It must be voluntary, and within the power of the agent. The\nopinion (or intention) of the agent gives the act its moral quality.\n\nAs to the Sense of Duty, Reid pronounces at once, without hesitation,\nand with very little examination, in favour of an original power or\nfaculty, in other words, a Moral Sense. Intellectual judgments are\njudgments of the external senses; moral judgments result from an\ninternal moral sense. The external senses give us our intellectual\nfirst principles; the moral sense our moral first principles. He is at\npains to exemplify the deductive process in morals. It is a question of\nmoral reasoning, Ought a man to have only one wife? The reasons are,\nthe greater good of the family, and of society in general; but no\nreason can be given why we should prefer greater good; it is an\nintuition of the moral sense.\n\nHe sums up the chapter thus:--'That, by an original power of the mind,\nwhich we call _conscience_, or the _moral faculty_, we have the\nconceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit,\nof duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and\nthat, by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to\nbe right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals\nare the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to\nrely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or\nof our other natural faculties.' Hamilton remarks that this theory\nvirtually founds morality on intelligence.\n\nMoral Approbation is the affection and esteem accompanying our judgment\nof a right moral act. This is in all cases pleasurable, but most so,\nwhen the act is our own. So, obversely, for Moral Disapprobation.\n\nRegarding Conscience, Reid remarks, first, that like all other powers\nit comes to maturity by insensible degrees, and may be a subject of\nculture or education. He takes no note of the difficulty of determining\nwhat is primitive and what is acquired. Secondly, Conscience is\npeculiar to man; it is wanting in the brutes. Thirdly, it is evidently\nintended to be the director of our conduct; and fourthly, it is an\nActive power and an Intellectual power combined.\n\nESSAY IV. is OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS, which we pass by, having\nnoticed it elsewhere. ESSAY V. is OF MORALS.\n\nChapter I. professes to enumerate the axiomatic first principles of\nMorals. Some of these relate (A) to virtue in general: as (1) There are\nactions deserving of praise, and others deserving blame; (2) the\ninvoluntary is not an object of praise or blame; (3) the unavoidable is\nnot an object of praise or blame; (4) omission may be culpable; (5) we\nought to inform ourselves as to duty; (6) we should fortify ourselves\nagainst temptation. Other principles relate (B) to particular virtues:\n(1) We should prefer a greater good to a less; (2) we should comply\nwith the intention of nature, apparent in our constitution; (3) no man\nis born for himself alone; (4) we should judge according to the rule,\n'Do to others,' &c.; (5) if we believe in God, we should venerate and\nsubmit to him. A third class of principles (C) settle the preference\namong opposing virtues. Thus, unmerited generosity should yield to\ngratitude, and both to justice.\n\nChapter II. remarks upon the growth and peculiar advantages of Systems\nof Morals. Chapter III. is on Systems of Natural Jurisprudence. The\nfour subsequent chapters of the Essay he states to have been composed\nin answer to the Ethical doctrines of Hume.\n\nChapter IV. enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral\npurpose in the agent. He decides in the affirmative, replying to\ncertain objections, and more especially to the allegation of Hume, that\njustice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue. This last question\nis pursued at great length in Chapter V., and the author takes occasion\nto review the theory of Utility or Benevolence, set up by Hume as the\nbasis of morals. He gives Hume the credit of having made an important\nstep in advance of the Epicurean, or Selfish, system, by including the\ngood of others, as well as our own good, in moral acts. Still, he\ndemands why, if Utility and Virtue are identical, the same name should\nnot express both. It is true, that virtue is both agreeable and useful\nin the highest degree; but that circumstance does not prevent it from\nhaving a quality of its own, not arising from its being useful and\nagreeable, but arising from its being virtue. The common good of\nsociety, though a pleasing object to all men, hardly ever enters into\nthe thoughts of the great majority; and, if a regard to it were the\nsole motive of justice, only a select number would ever be possessed of\nthe virtue. The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a\nnotion of moral obligation; and no act can be called an act of justice\nunless prompted by the motive of justice.\n\nThen, again, good music and good cookery have the merit of utility, in\nprocuring what is agreeable both to ourselves and to society, but they\nhave never been denominated moral virtues; so that, if Hume's system be\ntrue, they have been very unfairly treated.\n\nReid illustrates his positions against Hume to a length unnecessary to\nfollow. The objections are exclusively and effectively aimed at the two\nunguarded points of the Utility system as propounded by Hume; namely,\nfirst, the not recognizing moral rules as established and enforced\namong men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to\nindividuals the power of reference to ultimate ends; and, secondly, the\nnot distinguishing between obligatory, and non-obligatory, useful acts.\n\nReid continues the controversy, with reference to Justice, in Chapter\nVI., on the Nature and Obligation of a Contract; and in Chapter VII.\nmaintains, in opposition to Hume, that Moral approbation implies a\nJudgment of the intellect, and is not a mere feeling, as Hume seems to\nthink. He allows the propriety of the phrase 'Moral Sentiment,' because\n'Sentiment' in English means judgment accompanied with feeling.\n[Hamilton dissents, and thinks that sentiment means the higher\nfeelings.] He says, if a moral judgment be no real judgment, but only a\nfeeling, morals have no foundation but the arbitrary structure of the\nmind; there are no immutable moral distinctions; and no evidence for\nthe moral character of the Deity.\n\nWe shall find the views of Reid substantially adopted, and a little\nmore closely and concisely argued, by Stewart.\n\nDUGALD STEWART. [1753-1828.]\n\nIn his 'Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind,' Stewart introduces\nthe Moral Faculty in the same way as Reid. BOOK SECOND is entitled OUR\nRATIONAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. Chapter I., on Prudence or\nSelf-love, is unimportant for our present purpose, consisting of some\ndesultory remarks on the connexion of happiness with steadiness of\npurpose, and on the meanings of the words 'self-love' and\n'selfishness.'\n\nChapter II. is on the Moral Faculty, and is intended to show that it is\nan original principle of the mind. He first replies to the theory that\nidentifies Morality with Prudence, or Self-love. His first argument is\nthe existence in all languages of different words for _duty_ and for\n_interest_. Secondly, The emotions arising from, the contemplation of\nright and wrong are different from those produced by a regard to our\nown happiness. Thirdly, although in most instances a sense of duty, and\nan enlightened regard to our own happiness, would suggest to us the\nsame line of conduct, yet this truth is not obvious to mankind\ngenerally, who are incapable of appreciating enlarged views and remote\nconsequences. He repeats the common remark, that we secure our\nhappiness best by not looking to it as tho one primary end. Fourthly,\nmoral judgments appear in children, long before they can form the\ngeneral notion of happiness. His examples of this position, however,\nhave exclusive reference to the sentiment of pity, which all moralists\nregard as a primitive feeling, while few admit it to be the same as the\nmoral sense.\n\nHe then takes notice of the Association Theory of Hartley, Paley, and\nothers, which he admits to be a great refinement of the old selfish\nsystem, and an answer to one of his arguments. He maintains,\nnevertheless, that the others are untouched by it, and more especially\nthe third, referring to the amount of experience and reflection\nnecessary to discover the tendency of virtue to promote our happiness,\nwhich is inconsistent with the early period when our moral judgments\nappear. [It is singular that he should not have remarked that the moral\njudgments of that early age, if we except what springs from the\nimpulses of pity, are wholly communicated by others.] He quotes Paley's\nreasoning against the Moral Sense, and declares that he has as\ncompletely mis-stated the issue, as if one were to contend that because\nwe are not born with the knowledge of light and colours, therefore the\nsense of seeing is not an original part of the frame. [It would be easy\nto retort that all that Paley's case demanded was the same power of\n_discrimination_ in moral judgments, as the power of discriminating\nlight and dark belonging to our sense of sight.]\n\nChapter III. continues the subject, and examines objections. The first\nobjection taken up is that derived from the influence of education,\nwith which he combines the farther objection (of Locke and his\nfollowers) arising from the diversity of men's moral judgments in\nvarious nations. With regard to education, he contends that there are\nlimits to its influence, and that however it may modify, it cannot\ncreate our judgments of right and wrong, any more than our notions of\nbeauty and deformity. As to the historical facts relating to the\ndiversity of moral judgments, he considers it necessary to make full\nallowance for three circumstances--I.--Difference of situation with\nregard to climate and civilization. II.--Diversity of speculative\nopinions, arising from difference of intellectual capacity; and,\nIII.--The different moral import of the same action under different\nsystems of behaviour. On the first head he explains the indifference to\ntheft from there being little or no fixed property; he adduces the\nvariety of sentiments respecting Usury, as having reference, to\ncircumstances; and alludes to the differences of men's views as to\npolitical assassination. On the second head he remarks, that men may\nagree on _ends_, but may take different views as to means; they may\nagree in recognizing obedience to the Deity, but differ in their\ninterpretations of his will. On the third point, as regards the\ndifferent moral import of the same action, he suggests that Locke's\ninstance of the killing of aged parents is merely the recognized mode\nof filial affection; he also quotes the exceeding variety of ceremonial\nobservances.\n\nChapter IV. comments farther on the objections to the reality and\nimmutability of moral distinctions and to the universal diffusion of\nthe moral faculty. The reference is, in the first instance, to Locke,\nand then to what he terms, after Adam Smith, the licentious\nmoralists--La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville. The replies to these\nwriters contain nothing special to Stewart.\n\nChapter V. is the Analysis of our Moral Perceptions and Emotions. This\nis a somewhat singular phrase in an author recognizing a separate\ninborn faculty of Right. His analysis consists in a separation of the\nentire fact into three parts:--the perception of an action as right or\nwrong; (2) an emotion of pleasure or pain, varying according to the\nmoral sensibility: (3) a perception of the merit or demerit of the\nagent. The first is of course the main question; and the author gives a\nlong review of the history of Ethical doctrines from Hobbes downwards,\ninterspersing reflections and criticisms, all in favour of the\nintuitive origin of the sense. As illustrative parallels, he adduces\nPersonal Identity, Causation, and Equality; all which he considers to\nbe judgments involving simple ideas, and traceable only to some\nprimitive power of the mind. He could as easily conceive a rational\nbeing formed to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to\none right angle, as to believe that there would be no injustice in\ndepriving a man of the fruits of his labours.\n\nOn the second point--the pleasure and pain accompanying right and\nwrong, he remarks on the one-sidedness of systems that treat the sense\nof right and wrong as an intellectual judgment purely (Clarke, &c.), or\nthose that treat it as a feeling purely (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and\nHume). His remarks on the sense of Merit and Demerit in the agent are\ntrivial or commonplace.\n\nChapter VI. is 'Of Moral Obligation.' It is needless to follow him on\nthis subject, as his views are substantially a repetition of Butler's\nSupremacy of Conscience. At the same time, it may be doubted whether\nButler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the\ncommand of the Deity, a point peculiarly insisted on by Stewart. His\nwords are these:--\n\n'According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our\nbelief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how; it may\nbe asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two\nanswers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we\nshould conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the\nuniverse; or that a rational self-love should induce us, from motives\nof prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to\nthe Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition\nWe reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into\nour sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral\nobligation.\n\n'The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence,\nalthough not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which\nsufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour. Among others it\nleads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves\nfrom all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be\nconducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and\ncompletely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral\nattributes.\n\n'But farther, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the\nnotions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional\nmotives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some\nprevious obligation.\n\n'In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to\nour situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future\nstate be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or\nhow shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The\ntruth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced\nfrom our natural notions of right and wrong; of merit and demerit; and\nfrom a comparison between, these and the general course of human\naffairs.'\n\nIn a chapter (VII.) entitled 'certain principles co-operating with our\nmoral powers,' he discusses (1) a regard to character, (2) Sympathy,\n(3) the Sense of the Ridiculous, (4) Taste. The important topic is the\nsecond, Sympathy; which, psychologically, he would appear to regard as\ndetermined by the pleasure that it gives. Under this head he introduces\na criticism of the Ethical theory of Adam Smith; and, adverting to the\ninadequacy of the theory to distinguish the _right_ from the _actual_\njudgments of mankind, he remarks on Smith's ingenious fiction 'of _an\nabstract man_ within the breast;' and states that Smith laid much\ngreater stress on this fiction in the last edition of the Moral\nSentiments published before his death. It is not without reason that\nStewart warns against grounding theories on metaphorical expressions,\nsuch as this of Smith, or the Platonic Commonwealth of the Soul.\n\nIn Book IV. of the Active Powers, Stewart discusses our Duties to\nMen,--both our fellow-creatures and ourselves. Our duties to our\nfellows are summed up in Benevolence, Justice, and Veracity. He devotes\na chapter to each. In Chapter I., on Benevolence, he re-opens the\nconsideration of the Ethical systems founded on Benevolence or Utility,\nand argues against them; but merely repeats the common-place\nobjections--the incompetency of individuals to judge of remote\ntendencies, the pretext that would be afforded for the worst conduct,\nand each one's consciousness that a sense of _duty_ is different from\nenlightened benevolence.\n\nChapter II. is on Justice; defined as the disposition that leads a man,\nwhere his own interests or passions are concerned, to act according to\nthe judgment he would form of another man's duty in his situation. He\nintroduces a criticism on Adam Smith, and re-asserts the doctrine of an\ninnate faculty, explained as the _power of forming_ moral ideas, and\nnot as the innate possession of ideas. For the most part, his\nexposition is didactic and desultory, with occasional discussions of a\ncritical and scientific nature; as, for example, some remarks on Hume's\ntheory that Justice is an artificial virtue, an account of the basis of\nJurisprudence, and a few observations on the Right of Property.\n\nIn Chapter III., on Veracity, he contends that considerations of\nutility do not account for the whole force of our approbation of this\nvirtue. [So might any one say that considerations of what money can\npurchase do not account for the whole strength of avarice].\n\nIn Chapter IV. he deals with Duties to ourselves, and occupies the\nchapter with a dissertation on Happiness. He first gives an account of\nthe theories of the Stoics and the Epicureans, which connect themselves\nmost closely with the problem of Happiness; and next advances some\nobservations of his own on the subject.\n\nHis first remark is on the influence of the Temper, by which he means\nthe Resentful or Irascible passion, on Happiness. As against a\ncensorious disposition, he sets up the pleasure of the benevolent\nsentiments; he enjoins candour with respect to the motives of others,\nand a devoted attachment to truth and virtue for their intrinsic\nexcellence; and warns us, that the causes that alienate our affections\nfrom our fellow-creatures, suggest gloomy and Hamlet-like conceptions\nof the order of the universe.\n\nHe next adverts to the influence of the Imagination on Happiness. On\nthis, he has in view the addition made to our enjoyments or our\nsufferings by the respective predominance of hope or of fear in the\nmind. Allowing for constitutional bias, he recognizes, as the two great\nsources of a desponding imagination, Superstition and Scepticism, whose\nevils he descants upon at length. He also dwells on the influence of\ncasual associations on happiness, and commends this subject to the care\nof educators; giving, as an example, the tendency of associations with\nGreece and Rome to add to the courage of the classically educated\nsoldier.\n\nHis third position is the Influence of our Opinions on Happiness. He\nhere quotes, from Ferguson, examples of opinions unfavourable to\nHappiness; such as these: 'that happiness consists in having nothing to\ndo,' 'that anything is preferable to happiness,' 'that anything can\namuse us better than our duties.' He also puts forward as a happy\nopinion the Stoical view, 'I am in the station that God has assigned\nme.' [It must be confessed, however, that these prescriptions savour of\nthe Platonic device of inculcating opinions, not because of their\ntruth, but because of their supposed good consequences otherwise: a\nproceeding scarcely compatible with an Ethical system that proclaims\nveracity as superior to utility. On such a system, we are prohibited\nfrom looking to anything in an opinion but its truth; we are to suffer\nfor truth, and not to cultivate opinions because of their happy\nresults.]\n\nStewart remarks finally on the influence of the Habits, on which he\nnotices the power of the mind to accommodate itself to circumstances,\nand copies Paley's observations on the _setting_ of the habits.\n\nIn continuation of the subject of Happiness, he presents a\nclassification of our most important pleasures. We give the heads,\nthere being little to detain us in the author's brief illustration of\nthem. I.--The pleasures of Activity and Repose; II.--The pleasures of\nSense; III.--The pleasures of the Imagination; IV.--The pleasures of\nthe Understanding; and V.--The pleasures of the Heart, or of the\nvarious benevolent affections. He would have added Taste, or Fine Art,\nbut this is confined to a select few.\n\nIn a concluding chapter (V.), he sums up the general result of the\nEthical enquiry, under the title, 'the Nature and Essence of Virtue.'\nNo observation of any novelty occurs in this chapter. Virtue is doing\nour duty; the intentions of the agent are to be looked to; the\nenlightened discharge of our duty often demands an exercise of the\nReason to adjudge between conflicting claims; there is a close\nrelationship, not defined, between Ethics and Politics.\n\nThe views of Stewart represent, in the chief points, although not in\nall, the Ethical theory that has found the greatest number of\nsupporters.\n\nI.--The Standard is internal, or intuitive--the judgments of a Faculty,\ncalled the Moral Faculty. He does not approve of the phrase 'Moral\nSense,' thinking the analogy of the senses incorrect.\n\nII.--As regards Ethical Psychology, the first question is determined by\nthe remarks on the Standard.\n\nOn the second question, Free-will, Stewart maintains Liberty.\n\nOn the third question, he gives, like many others, an uncertain sound.\nIn his account of Pity, he recognizes three things, (1) a painful\nfeeling, (2) a selfish desire to remove the cause of the uneasiness,\n(3) a disposition grounded on benevolent concern about the sufferer.\nThis is at best vague. Equally so is what he states respecting the\npleasures of sympathy and benevolence (Book II., Chapter VII.). There\nis, he says, a pleasure attached to fellow-feeling, a disposition to\naccommodate our minds to others, wherever there is a benevolent\naffection; and, in all probability, the pleasure of sympathy is the\npleasure of loving and of being beloved. No definite proposition can be\ngathered from such loose allegations.\n\nIII.--We have already abstracted his chapter on Happiness.\n\nIV.--On the Moral Code, he has nothing peculiar.\n\nV.--On the connexion with Religion, we have seen that he is strenuous\nin his antagonism to the doctrine of the dependence of morality on the\nwill of God. But, like other moralists of the same class, he is careful\nto add:--'Although religion can with no propriety be considered as the\nsole foundation of morality, yet when we are convinced that God is\ninfinitely good, and that he is the friend and protector of virtue,\nthis belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of\nevery branch of our duty.' He has (Book III.) elaborately discussed the\nprinciples of Natural Religion, but, like Adam Smith, makes no\nreference to the Bible, or to Christianity. He is disposed to assume\nthe benevolence of the Deity, but considers that to affirm it\npositively is to go beyond our depth.\n\nTHOMAS BROWN. [1778-1820.]\n\nBrown's Ethical discussion commences in the 73rd of his _Lectures_. He\nfirst criticises the multiplicity of expressions used in the statement\nof the fundamental question of morals--'What is it that constitutes the\naction _virtuous_?' 'What constitutes the _moral obligation_ to perform\ncertain actions?' 'What constitutes the _merit_ of the agent?'--These\nhave been considered questions essentially distinct, whereas they are\nthe very same question. There is at bottom but one emotion in the case,\nthe emotion of approbation, or of disapprobation, of an agent acting in\na certain way.\n\nIn answer then to the question as thus simplified, 'What is the ground\nof moral approbation and disapprobation?' Brown answers--a simple\nemotion of the mind, of which no farther explanation can be given than\nthat we are so constituted. Thus, without using the same term, he sides\nwith the doctrine of the Innate Moral Sense. He illustrates it by\nanother elementary fact of the mind, involved in the conception of\ncause and effect on his theory of that relation--the belief that the\nfuture will resemble the past. Excepting a teleogical reference to the\nSupreme Benevolence of the Deity, he admits no farther search into the\nnature of the moral sentiment.\n\nHe adduces, as another illustration, what he deems the kindred emotion\nof Beauty. Our feeling of beauty is not the mere perception of forms\nand colours, or the discovery of the uses of certain combinations of\nforms; it is an emotion arising from these, indeed, bat distinct from\nthem. Our feeling of moral excellence, in like manner, is not the mere\nperception of different actions, or the discovery of the physical good\nthat these may produce; it is an emotion _sui generis_, superadded to\nthem.\n\nHe adverts, in a strain of eloquent indignation, to the objection\ngrounded on differences of men's moral judgment. There are\nphilosophers, he exclaims, 'that can turn away from the conspiring\nchorus of the millions of mankind, in favour of the great truths of\nmorals, to seek in some savage island, a few indistinct murmurs that\nmay seem to be discordant with the total harmony of mankind.' He goes\non to remark, however, that in our zeal for the immutability of moral\ndistinctions, we may weaken the case by contending for too much; and\nproposes to consider the species of accordance that may be safely\nargued for.\n\nHe begins by purging away the realistic notion of Virtue, considered as\na self-existing entity. He defines it--a term expressing the relation\nof certain actions to certain emotions in the minds contemplating them;\nits universality is merely co-extensive with these minds. He then\nconcedes that all mankind do not, at every moment, feel precisely the\nsame emotions in contemplating the same actions, and sets forth the\nlimitations as follows;--\n\nFirst, In moments of violent passion, the mind is incapacitated for\nperceiving moral differences; we must, in such cases appeal, as it\nwere, from Philip drunk to Philip sober.\n\nSecondly, Still more important is the limitation arising from the\ncomplexity of many actions. Where good and evil results are so blended\nthat we cannot easily assign the preponderance, different men may form\ndifferent conclusions. Partiality of views may arise from this cause,\nnot merely in individuals, but in whole nations. The legal permission\nof theft in Sparta is a case in point. Theft, as theft, and without\nrelation to the political object of inuring a warlike people, would\nhave been condemned in Sparta, as well as with us. [The retort of Locke\nis not out of place here; an innate moral sentiment that permits a\nfundamental virtue to be set aside on the ground of mere state\nconvenience, is of very little value.] He then goes on to ask whether\nmen, in approving these exceptions to morality, approve them because\nthey are immoral? [The opponents of a moral sense do not contend for an\n_immoral_ sense.] Suicide is not commended because it deprives society\nof useful members, and gives sorrow to relations and friends; the\nexposure of infants is not justified on the plea of adding to human\nsuffering.\n\nAgain, the differences of cookery among nations are much wider than the\ndifferences of moral sentiment; and yet no one denies a fundamental\nsusceptibility to sweet and bitter. It is not contended that we come\ninto the world with a knowledge of actions, but that we have certain\nsusceptibilities of emotion, in consequence of which, it is impossible\nfor us, in after life, unless from counteracting circumstances, to be\npleased with the contemplation of certain actions, and disgusted with\ncertain other actions. When the doctrine is thus stated, Paley's\nobjection, that we should also receive from nature the notions of the\nactions themselves, falls to the ground. As well might we require an\ninstinctive notion of all possible numbers, to bear out our instinctive\nsense of proportion.\n\nA third limitation must be added, the influence of the principle of\nAssociation. One way that this operates is to transfer, to a whole\nclass of actions, the feelings peculiar to certain marked individuals.\nThus, in a civilized country, where property is largely possessed, and\nunder complicated tenures, we become very sensitive to its violation,\nand acquire a proportionably intense sentiment of Justice. Again,\nassociation operates in modifying our approval and disapproval of\nactions according to their attendant circumstances; as when we\nextenuate misconduct in a beloved person.\n\nThe author contends that, notwithstanding these limitations, we still\nleave unimpaired the approbation of unmixed good as good, and the\ndisapprobation of unmixed evil as evil. His further remarks, however,\nare mainly eloquent declamation on the universality of moral\ndistinctions.\n\nHe proceeds to criticise the moral systems from Hobbes downwards. His\nremarks (Lecture 76) on the province of Reason in Morality, with\nreference to the systems of Clarke and Wollaston, contain the gist of\nthe matter well expressed.\n\nHe next considers the theory of Utility. That Utility bears a certain\nrelation to Virtue is unquestionable. Benevolence means good to others,\nand virtue is of course made up, in great part, of this. But then, if\nUtility is held to be the _measure_ of virtue, standing in exact\nproportion to it, the proposition is very far from true; it is only a\nsmall portion of virtuous actions wherein the measure holds.\n\nHe does not doubt that virtuous actions do all tend, in a greater or\nless degree, to the advantage of the world. But he considers the\nquestion to be, whether what we have _alone in view_, in approving\ncertain actions, be the amount of utility that they bring; whether we\nhave no other reason for commending a man than for praising a chest of\ndrawers.\n\nConsider this question first from the point of view of the agent. Does\nthe mother, in watching her sick infant, think of the good of mankind\nat that moment? Is the pity called forth by misery a sentiment of the\ngeneral good? Look at it again from the point of view of the spectator.\nIs his admiration of a steam-engine, and of an heroic human action, the\nsame sentiment? Why do we not worship the earth, the source of all our\nutilities? The ancient worshippers of nature always gave it a soul in\nthe first instance.\n\nWhen the supporter of Utility arbitrarily confines his principles to\nthe actions of living beings, he concedes the point in dispute; he\nadmits an approvableness peculiar to _living and voluntary agents_, a\ncapacity of exciting moral emotions not commensurate with any utility.\nHume says, that the sentiments of utility connected with human beings\nare mixed with affection, esteem, and approbation, which do not attach\nto the utility of inanimate things. Brown replies, that these are the\nvery sentiments to be accounted for, the moral part of the case.\n\nBut another contrast may be made; namely, between the utility of virtue\nand the utility of talent or genius, which we view with very different\nand unequal sentiments; the inventors of the printing press do not\nrouse the same emotions as the charities of the Man of Ross.\n\nStill, he contends, like the other supporters of innate moral\ndistinctions, for a pre-established harmony between the two attributes.\nUtility and virtue are so intimately related, that there is perhaps no\naction generally felt by us as virtuous, but what is generally\nbeneficial. But this is only discovered by reflecting men; it never\nenters the mind of the unthinking multitude. Nay, more, it is only the\nDivine Being that can fully master this relationship, or so prescribe\nour duties that they shall ultimately coincide with the general\nhappiness.\n\nHe allows that the immediate object of the _legislator_ is the general\ngood; but then his relationship is to the community as a whole, and not\nto any particular individual.\n\nHe admits, farther, that the good of the world at large, if not the\n_only_ moral object, _is_ a moral object, in common with the good of\nparents, friends, and others related to us in private life. Farther, it\nmay be requisite for the moralist to correct our moral sentiments by\nrequiring greater attention to public, and less to private, good; but\nthis does not alter the nature of our moral feelings; it merely\npresents new objects to our _moral discrimination_. It gives an\nexercise to our reason in disentangling the complicated results of our\nactions.\n\nHe makes it also an objection to Utility, that it does not explain\n_why_ we feel approbation of the useful, and disapprobation of the\nhurtful; forgetting that Benevolence is an admitted fact of our\nconstitution, and may fairly be assigned by the moralist as the source\nof the moral sentiment.\n\nHis next remarks are on the Selfish Systems, his reply to which is the\nassertion of disinterested Affections. He distinguishes two modes of\nassigning self-interest as the sole motive of virtuous conduct. First,\nit may be said that in every so-called virtuous action, we see some\ngood to self, near or remote. Secondly, it may be maintained that we\nbecome at last disinterested by the associations of our own interest.\n\nHe calls in question this alleged process of association. Because a\nman's own cane is interesting to him, it does not follow that every\nother man's cane is interesting. [He here commits a mistake of fact;\nother men's walking canes are interesting to the interested owner of a\ncane. It may not follow that this interest is enough to determine\nself-sacrifice.]\n\nIt will be inferred that Brown contends warmly for the existence of\nDisinterested Affection, not merely as a present, but as a primitive,\nfact of our constitution. He does not always keep this distinct from\nthe Moral Sentiment; he, in fact, mixes the two sentiments together in\nhis language, a thing almost inevitable, but yet inconsistent with the\nadvocacy of a distinct moral sentiment.\n\nHe includes among the Selfish Systems the Ethical Theory of Paley,\nwhich he reprobates in both its leading points--everlasting happiness\nas the motive, and the will of God as the rule. On the one point, this\ntheory is liable to all the objections against a purely selfish system;\nand, on the other point, he makes the usual replies to the founding of\nmorality on the absolute will of the Deity.\n\nBrown next criticises the system of Adam Smith. Admitting that we have\nthe sympathetic feeling that Smith proceeds upon, he questions its\nadequacy to constitute the moral sentiment, on the ground that it is\nnot a perpetual accompaniment of our actions. There must be a certain\n_vividness_ of feeling or of the display of feeling, or at least a\nsufficient cause of vivid feeling, to call the sympathy into action. In\nthe numerous petty actions of life, there is an absence of any marked\nsympathy.\n\nBut the essential error of Smith's system is, that it assumes the very\nmoral feelings that it is meant to explain. If there were no antecedent\nmoral feelings, sympathy could not afford them; it is only a mirror to\nreflect what is already in existence. The feelings that we sympathize\nwith, are themselves moral feelings already; if it were not so, the\nreflexion of them from a thousand breasts would not give them a moral\nnature.\n\nBrown thinks that Adam Smith was to some extent misled by an ambiguity\nin the word sympathy; a word applied not merely to the participation of\nother men's feelings, but to the further and distinct fact of the\n_approbation_ of those feeling's.\n\nAlthough siding in the main with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Brown\nobjects to their designation Moral Sense, as expressing the innate\npower of moral approbation. If 'Sense' be interpreted merely as\nsusceptibility, he has nothing to say, but if it mean a primary medium\nof perception, like the eye or the ear, he considers it a mistake. It\nis, in his view, an _emotion_, like hope, jealousy, or resentment,\nrising up on the presentation of a certain class of objects. He farther\nobjects to the phrase 'moral ideas,' also used by Hutcheson. The moral\nemotions are more akin to love and hate, than to perception or\njudgment.\n\nBrown gives an exposition of Practical Ethics under the usual heads:\nDuties to Others, to God, to Ourselves. Duties to others he classifies\nthus:--I.--_Negative_, or abstinence from injuring others in Person,\nProperty, Affections, Character or Reputation, Knowledge (veracity),\nVirtue, and Tranquillity; II. _Positive_, or Benevolence; and\nIII.--Duties growing out of our _peculiar ties_--Affinity, Friendship,\nGood offices received, Contract, and Citizenship.\n\nTo sum up\n\nI.--As regards the Standard, Brown contends for an Innate Sentiment.\n\nII.--The Faculty being thus determined, along with the Standard, we\nhave only to resume his views as to Disinterested action. For a full\naccount of these, we have to go beyond the strictly Ethical lectures,\nto his analysis of the Emotions. Speaking of love, he says that it\nincludes a desire of doing good to the person loved; that it is\nnecessarily pleasurable because there must be some quality in the\nobject that gives pleasure; but it is not the mere pleasure of loving\nthat makes us love. The qualities are delightful to love, and yet\nimpossible not to love. He is more explicit when he comes to the\nconsideration of Pity, recognizing the existence of sympathy, not only\nwithout liking for the object, but with positive dislike. In another\nplace, he remarks that we desire the happiness of our fellows simply as\nhuman beings. He is opposed to the theory that would trace our\ndisinterested affections to a selfish origin. He makes some attempt to\nrefer to the laws of Association, the taking in of other men's\nemotions, but thinks that there is a reflex process besides.\n\nAlthough recognizing in a vague way the existence of genuine\ndisinterested impulses, he dilates eloquently, and often, on the\ndeliciousness of benevolence, and of all virtuous feelings and conduct.\n\nWILLIAM PALEY. [1743-1805].\n\nThe First Book of Paley's 'Moral and Political Philosophy' is entitled\n'PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS' it is in fact an unmethodical account of\nvarious fundamental points of the subject. He begins by defining Moral\nPhilosophy as '_that science which teaches men their duty, and the\nreasons of it_. The ordinary rules are defective and may mislead,\nunless aided by a scientific investigation. These ordinary rules are\nthe Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.\n\nHe commences with the Law of Honour, which he views in its narrow\nsense, as applied to people of rank and fashion. This is of course a\nvery limited code.\n\nThe Law of the Land also must omit many duties, properly compulsory, as\npiety, benevolence, &c. It must also leave unpunished many vices, as\nluxury, prodigality, partiality. It must confine itself to offences\nstrictly definable.\n\nThe Scriptures lay down general rules, which have to be applied by the\nexercise of reason and judgment. Moreover, they pre-suppose the\nprinciples of natural justice, and supply new sanctions and greater\ncertainty. Accordingly, they do not dispense with a scientific view of\nmorals.\n\n[The correct arrangement of the common rules would have been (1) the\nLaw of the Land, (2) the Laws of Society generally, and (3) the\nScriptures. The Law of Honour is merely one application of the\ncomprehensive agency of society in punishing men, by excommunication,\nfor what it prohibits.]\n\nThen follows his famous chapter on the MORAL SENSE.\n\nIt is by way of giving an effective statement of the point in dispute\nthat he quotes the anecdote of Caius Toranius, as an extreme instance\nof filial ingratitude, and supposes it to be put to the wild boy caught\nin the woods of Hanover, with the view of ascertaining whether he would\nfeel the sentiment of disapprobation as we do. Those that affirm an\ninnate moral sense, must answer in the affirmative; those that deny it,\nin the negative.\n\nHe then recites the arguments on both sides.\n\nFor the moral sense, it is contended, that we approve examples of\ngenerosity, gratitude, fidelity, &c., on the instant, without\ndeliberation and without being conscious of any assignable reason; and\nthat this approbation is uniform and universal, the same sorts of\nconduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries; which\ncircumstances point to the operation of an instinct, or a moral sense.\n\nThe answers to these allegations are--\n\nFirst, The _Uniformity_ spoken of is not admitted as a fact. According\nto the authentic accounts of historians and travellers, there is\nscarcely a single vice that, in some age or country of the world, has\nnot been countenanced by public opinion. The murder of aged parents,\ntheft, suicide, promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, and unmentionable\ncrimes have been tolerated and approved. Among ourselves, Duelling is\nviewed with the most opposite sentiments; forgiveness of injuries is\naccounted by some people magnanimity, and by others meanness. In these,\nand in many other instances, moral approbation follows the fashions and\ninstitutions of the country, which institutions have themselves grown\nout of local circumstances, the arbitrary authority of some chieftain,\nor the caprice of the multitude.\n\nSecondly, That, although, after allowing for these exceptions, it is\nadmitted that some sorts of actions are more approved than others, the\napprobation being general, although not universal, yet this may be\naccounted for, without supposing a moral sense, thus:--\n\nHaving experienced a particular line of conduct as beneficial to\nourselves, for example, telling the truth, a sentiment of approbation\ngrows up in consequence, and this sentiment thereupon arises whenever\nthe action is mentioned, and without our thinking of the consequences\nin each instance. The process is illustrated by the love of money,\nwhich is strongest in the old, who least of all think of applying it to\nits uses. By such means, the approval of certain actions is commenced;\nand being once commenced, the continuance of the feeling is accounted\nfor by authority, by imitation, and by all the usages of good society.\nAs soon as an entire society is possessed of an ethical view, the\ninitiation of the new members is sure and irresistible. The efficacy of\nImitation is shown in cases where there is no authority or express\ntraining employed, as in the likings and dislikings, or tastes and\nantipathies, in mere matters of indifference.\n\nSo much in reply to the alleged uniformity. Next come the positive\nobjections to a Moral Instinct.\n\nIn the first place, moral rules are not absolutely and universally\ntrue; they bend to circumstances. Veracity, which is a natural duty, if\nthere be any such, is dispensed with in case of an enemy, a thief, or a\nmadman. The obligation of promises is released under certain\ncircumstances.\n\nIn the next place, the Instinct must bear with it the _idea_ of the\nactions to be approved or disapproved; but we are not born with any\nsuch ideas.\n\nOn the whole, either there exist no moral instincts, or they are\nundistinguishable from prejudices and habits, and are not to be trusted\nin moral reasonings. Aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians\nare meant to be slaves; so do our modern slave-traders. This instance\nis one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to\ndo with the rise of a moral sentiment. And every system built upon\ninstincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and\npractices than to reform either.\n\nAgain: supposing these Instincts to exist, what is their authority or\npower to punish? Is it the infliction of remorse? That may be borne\nwith for the pleasures and profits of wickedness. If they are to be\nheld as indications of the will of God, and therefore as presages of\nhis intentions, that result may be arrived at by a surer road.\n\nThe next preliminary topic is HUMAN HAPPINESS.\n\nHappiness is defined as the excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasures are\nto be held as differing only in _continuance_, and in _intensity_. A\ncomputation made in respect of these two properties, confirmed by the\ndegrees of cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment observable among\nmen, is to decide all questions as to human happiness.\n\nI.--What Human Happiness does not consist in.\n\nNot in the pleasures of Sense, in whatever profusion or variety\nenjoyed; in which are included sensual pleasures, active sports, and\nFine Art.\n\n1st, Because they last for a short time. [Surely they are good for the\ntime they do last.] 2ndly, By repetition, they lose their relish.\n[Intermission and variety, however, are to be supposed.] 3rdly, The\neagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all\nothers.\n\nPaley professes to have observed in the votaries of pleasure a restless\ncraving for variety, languor under enjoyment, and misery in the want of\nit. After all, however, these pleasures have their value, and may be\ntoo much despised as well as too much followed.\n\nNext, happiness does not consist in the exemption from pain (?), from\nlabour, care, business, and outward evils; such exemption leaving one a\nprey to morbid depression, anxiety, and hypochondria. Even a pain in\nmoderation may be a refreshment, from giving a stimulus to pursuit.\n\nNor does it consist in greatness, rank, or station. The reason here is\nderived, as usual, from the doctrine of Relativity or Comparison,\npushed beyond all just limits. The illustration of the dependence of\nthe pleasure of superiority on comparison is in Paley's happiest style.\n\nII.--What happiness does consist in. Allowing for the great\ndifficulties of this vital determination, he proposes to be governed by\na reference to the conditions of life where men appear most cheerful\nand contented.\n\nIt consists, 1st, In the exercise of the social affections. 2ndly, The\nexercise of our faculties, either of body or of mind, in the pursuit of\nsome engaging end. [This includes the two items of occupation and\nplot-interest.] 3rdly, Upon the prudent constitution of the habits; the\nprudent constitution being chiefly in moderation and simplicity of\nlife, or in demanding few stimulants; and 4thly, In Health, whose\nimportance he values highly, but not too highly.\n\nThe consideration of these negative and positive conditions, he thinks,\njustifies the two conclusions: (1) That happiness is pretty equally\ndistributed amongst the different orders of society; and (2) That in\nrespect of this world's happiness, vice has no advantage over virtue.\n\nThe last subject of the First Book is VIRTUE. The definition of virtue\nis '_the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and\nfor the sake of everlasting happiness_.'\n\nIf this were strictly interpreted according to its form, it would mean\nthat three things go to constitute virtue, any one of which being\nabsent, we should not have virtue. Doing good to mankind alone is not\nvirtue, unless coupled with a divine requirement; and this addition\nwould not suffice, without the farther circumstance of everlasting\nhappiness as the reward. But such is not his meaning, nor is it easy to\nfix the meaning. He unites the two conditions--Human Happiness and the\nWill of the Deity--and holds them to coincide and to explain one\nanother. Either of the two would be a sufficient definition of virtue;\nand he would add, as an explanatory proposition and a guide to\npractice, that the one may be taken as a clue to the other. In a double\ncriterion like this, everything depends upon the manner of working it.\nBy running from one of the tests to another at discretion, we may evade\nwhatever is disagreeable to us in both.\n\nBook II., entitled MORAL OBLIGATION, is the full development of his\nviews. Reciting various theories of moral right and wrong, he remarks,\nfirst, that they all ultimately coincide; in other words, all the\ntheorists agree upon the same rules of duty--a remark to be received\nwith allowances; and next, that they all leave the matter short; none\nprovide an adequate _motive_ or inducement. [He omits to mention the\ntheory of the Divine Will, which is partly his own theory].\n\nIn proceeding to supply this want, he asks first 'what is meant by\nbeing obliged to do a thing;' and answers, '_a violent motive resulting\nfrom the command of another_.' The motive must be violent, or have some\ndegree of force to overcome reluctance or opposing tendencies. It must\nalso result from the _command_ of another; not the mere offer of a\ngratuity by way of inducement. Such is the nature of Law; we should not\nobey the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments depended on our\nobedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, do what is\nright, or obey God.\n\nHe then resumes the general question, under a concrete case, 'Why am I\nobliged to keep my word?' The answer accords with the above\nexplanation;--Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely,\nthe rewards and punishments of a future life), resulting from the\ncommand of God. Private happiness is the motive, the will of God the\nrule. [Although not brought out in the present connexion, it is implied\nthat the will of God intends the happiness of mankind, and is to be\ninterpreted accordingly.]\n\nPreviously, when reasoning on the means of human happiness, he declared\nit to be an established conclusion, that virtue leads to happiness,\neven in this life; now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of\nthat conclusion. His words are, 'They who would establish a system of\nmorality, independent of a future state, must look out for some other\nidea of moral obligation, _unless they can show_ that virtue conducts\nthe possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater\nshare of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.' He does not\nmake the obvious remark that _human_ authority, as far as it goes, is\nalso a source of obligation; it works by the very same class of means\nas the divine authority.\n\nHe next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the WILL OF\nGOD. There are two sources--the express declarations of Scripture, when\nthey are to be had; and the design impressed on the world, in other\nwords, the light of nature. This last source requires him, on his\nsystem, to establish the Divine Benevolence; and he arrives at the\nconclusion that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures,\nand accordingly, that the method of coming at his will concerning any\naction is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to\ndiminish the general happiness.\n\nHe then discusses UTILITY, with a view of answering the objection that\nactions may be useful, and yet such as no man will allow to be right.\nThis leads him to distinguish between the _particular_ and the\n_general_ consequences of actions, and to enforce the necessity of\nGENERAL RULES. An assassin, by knocking a rich villain on the head, may\ndo immediate and particular good; but the liberty granted to\nindividuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society,\nwould render human life unsafe, and induce universal terror. 'Whatever\nis expedient is right,' but then it must be expedient on the whole, in\nthe long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as\nimmediate and direct. When the _honestum_ is opposed to the _utile_,\nthe _honestum_ means the general and remote consequences, the _utile_\nthe particular and the near.\n\nThe concluding sections of Book II. are occupied with the consideration\nof RIGHT and RIGHTS. A Right is of course correlative with an\nObligation. Rights are Natural or Adventitious; Alienable or\nInalienable; Perfect or Imperfect. The only one of these distinctions\nhaving any Ethical application is Perfect and Imperfect. The Perfect\nRights are, the Imperfect are not, enforced by Law.\n\nUnder the 'general Rights of mankind,' he has a discussion as to our\nright to the flesh of animals, and contends that it would be difficult\nto defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature,\nand that it reposes on the text of Genesis ix. 1, 2, 3.\n\nAs regards the chief bulk of Paley's-work, it is necessary only to\nindicate his scheme of the Duties, and his manner of treating them.\n\nBook III. considers RELATIVE DUTIES. There are three classes of these.\nFirst, Relative Duties that are _Determinate_, meaning all those that\nare strictly defined and enforced; those growing out of Promises,\nContracts, Oaths, and Subscriptions to Articles of Religion. Secondly,\nRelative Duties that are _Indeterminate_, as Charity, in its various\naspects of treatment of dependents, assistance to the needy, &c.; the\nchecks on Anger and Revenge; Gratitude, &c. Thirdly, the Relative\nDuties growing _out of the Sexes_.\n\nBook IV. is DUTIES TO OURSELVES, and treats of Self-defence,\nDrunkenness, and Suicide.\n\nBook V. comprises DUTIES TOWARDS GOD.\n\nBook VI. is occupied with Politics and Political Economy. It discusses\nthe Origin of Civil Government, the Duty of Submission to Government,\nLiberty, the Forms of Government, the British Constitution, the\nAdministration of Justice, &c.\n\nThe Ethical Theory of Paley may be briefly resumed thus:--\n\nI.--The Ethical Standard with him is the conjoined reference to the\nWill of the Deity, and to Utility, or Human Happiness. He is unable to\nconstruct a scheme applicable to mankind generally, until they are\nfirst converted to a belief in Revelation.\n\nII.--The Psychology implied in his system involves his most\ncharacteristic features.\n\n1. He is unmistakeable in repudiating Innate Moral Distinctions, and on\nthis point, and on this only, is he thoroughly at one with the\nUtilitarians of the present day.\n\n2. On the Theory of Will he has no remarks. He has an utter distaste\nfor anything metaphysical.\n\n3. He does not discuss Disinterested Sentiment; by implication, he\ndenies it. 'Without the expectation of a future existence,' he says,\n'all reasoning upon moral questions is vain.' He cannot, of course,\nleave out all reference to generosity. Under 'Pecuniary Bounty' he\nmakes this remark--'They who rank pity amongst the original impulses of\nour nature, rightly contend, that when this principle prompts us to the\nrelief of human misery, it indicates the Divine intention and our duty.\nWhether it be an instinct or a habit (?), it is, in fact, a property of\nour nature, which God appointed, &c.' This is his first argument for\ncharity; the second is derived from the original title of mankind,\ngranted by the Deity, to hold the earth in common; and the third is the\nstrong injunctions of Scripture on this head. He cannot, it seems,\ntrust human nature with a single charitable act apart from the\nintervention of the Deity.\n\nIII.--He has an explicit scheme of Happiness.\n\nIV.--The Substance of his Moral Code is distinguished from, the current\nopinions chiefly by his well-known views on Subscription to Articles.\nHe cannot conceive how, looking to the incurable diversity of human\nopinion on all matters short of demonstration, the legislature could\nexpect the perpetual consent of a body of ten thousand men, not to one\ncontroverted proposition, but to many hundreds.\n\nHis inducements to the performance of duty are, as we should expect, a\nmixed reference to Public Utility and to Scripture.\n\nIn the Indeterminate Duties, where men are urged by moral\nconsiderations, to the exclusion of legal compulsion, he sometimes\nappeals directly to our generous sympathies, as well as to\nself-interest, but usually ends with the Scripture authority.\n\nV.--The relation of Ethics to Politics is not a prominent feature in\nPaley. He makes moral rules repose finally, not upon human, but upon\nDivine Law. Hence (VI.) the connexion of his system with Theology is\nfundamental.\n\nJEREMY BENTHAM. [1748-1832.]\n\nThe Ethical System of Jeremy Bentham is given in his work, entitled 'An\nIntroduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,' first\npublished in 1789. In a posthumous work, entitled Deontology, his\nprinciples were farther illustrated, chiefly with reference to the\nminor morals and amiable virtues.\n\nIt is the first-named work that we shall here chiefly notice. In it,\nthe author has principally in view Legislation; but the same common\nbasis, Utility, serves, in his judgment, for Ethics, or Morals.\n\nThe first chapter, entitled 'THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY,' begins\nthus:--'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign\nmasters, _pain_ and _pleasure_. It is for them alone to point out what\nwe ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one\nhand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of\ncauses and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all\nwe do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to\nthrow off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.\nIn words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he\nwill remain subject to it all the while. The _principle of utility_\nrecognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that\nsystem, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the\nhand of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal\nin sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness\ninstead of light.'\n\nHe defines Utility in various phrases, all coming to the same\nthing:--the tendency of actions to promote the happiness, and to\nprevent the misery, of the party under consideration, which party is\nusually the community where one's lot is cast. Of this principle no\nproof can be offered; it is the final axiom, on which alone we can\nfound all arguments of a moral kind. He that attempts to combat it,\nusually assumes it, unawares. An opponent is challenged, to say--(1) if\nhe discards it wholly; (2) if he will act without any principle, or if\nthere is any other that he would judge by; (3) if that other be really\nand distinctly separate from utility; (4) if he is inclined to set up\nhis own approbation or disapprobation as the rule; and if so, whether\nhe will force that upon others, or allow each person to do the same;\n(5) in the first case, if his principle is not despotical; (6) in the\nsecond case, whether it is not anarchical; (7) supposing him to add the\nplea of reflection, let him say if the basis of his reflections\nexcludes utility; (8) if he means to compound the matter, and take\nutility for part; and if so, for what part; (9) why he goes so far,\nwith Utility, and no farther; (10) on what other principle a meaning\ncan be attached to the words '_motive_ and _right_.\n\nIn Chapter II., Bentham discusses the PRINCIPLES ADVERSE TO UTILITY. He\nconceives two opposing grounds. The first mode of opposition is direct\nand constant, as exemplified in _Asceticism_. A second mode may be only\noccasional, as in what he terms the principle of _Sympathy and\nAntipathy_ (Liking and Disliking).\n\nThe principle of Asceticism means the approval of an action according\nto its tendency to diminish happiness, or obversely. Any one\nreprobating in any shape, pleasure as such, is a partisan of this\nprinciple. Asceticism has been adopted, on the one hand, by certain\nmoralists, from the spur of philosophic pride; and on the other hand,\nby certain religionists, under the impulse of fear. It has been much\nless admitted into Legislation than into Morals. It may have\noriginated, in the first instance, with hasty speculators, looking at\nthe pains attending certain pleasures in the long run, and pushing the\nabstinence from such pleasures (justified to a certain length on\nprudential grounds) so far as to fall in love with pain.\n\nThe other principle, Sympathy and Antipathy, means the unreasoning\napprobation or disapprobation of the individual mind, where fancy,\ncaprice, accidental liking or disliking, may mix with a regard to human\nhappiness. This is properly the negation of a principle. What we expect\nto find in a principle is some _external_ consideration, warranting and\nguiding our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; a basis that\nall are agreed upon.\n\nIt is under this head that Bentham rapidly surveys and dismisses all\nthe current theories of Right and Wrong. They consist all of them, he\nsays, in so many contrivances for avoiding an appeal to any external\nstandard, and for requiring us to accept the author's sentiment or\nopinion as a reason for itself. The dictates of this principle,\nhowever, will often unintentionally coincide with utility; for what\nmore natural ground of hatred to a practice can there be than its\nmischievous tendency? The things that men suffer by, they will be\ndisposed to hate. Still, it is not constant in its operation; for\npeople may ascribe the suffering to the wrong cause. The principle is\nmost liable to err on the side of severity; differences of taste and of\nopinion are sufficient grounds for quarrel and resentment. It will err\non the side of lenity, when a mischief is remote and imperceptible.\n\nThe author reserves a distinct handling for the Theological principle;\nalleging that it falls under one or other of the three foregoing. The\nWill of God must mean his will as revealed in the sacred writings,\nwhich, as the labours of divines testify, themselves stand in need of\ninterpretation. What is meant, in fact, is the _presumptive_ will of\nGod; that is, what is presumed to be his will on account of its\nconformity with another principle. We are pretty sure that what is\nright is conformable to his will, but then this requires us first to\nknow what is right. The usual mode of knowing God's pleasure (he\nremarks) is to observe what is our own pleasure, and pronounce that to\nbe his.\n\nChapter III.--ON FOUR SANCTIONS OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE whereby\nmen are stimulated to act right; they are termed, _physical, political,\nmoral_, and _religious_. These are the Sanctions of Right.\n\nThe _physical_ sanction includes the pleasures and pains arising in the\nordinary course of nature, unmodified by the will of any human being,\nor of any supernatural being.\n\nThe _political_ sanction is what emanates from the sovereign or supreme\nruling power of the state. The punishments of the Law come under this\nhead.\n\nThe _moral_ or _popular_ sanction results from the action of the\ncommunity, or of the individuals that each person comes in contact\nwith, acting without any settled or concerted rule. It corresponds to\npublic opinion, and extends in its operation beyond the sphere of the\nlaw.\n\nThe _religious_ sanction proceeds from the immediate hand of a superior\ninvisible being, either in the present, or in a future life.\n\nThe name Punishment is applicable only to the three last. The suffering\nthat befalls a man in the course of nature is termed a _calamity_; if\nit happen through imprudence on his part, it may be styled a punishment\nissuing from the physical sanction.\n\nChapter IV. is the VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE\nMEASURED. A pleasure or a pain is determined to be greater or less\naccording to (1) its _intensity_, (2) its _duration_, (3) its\n_certainty_ or _uncertainty_, (4) its _propinquity_ or _remoteness_;\nall which are obvious distinctions. To these are to be added (5) its\n_fecundity_, or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations\nof its own kind; that is pleasures if it be pleasure, pains if it be\npain. Finally (6) its _purity_, or the chance of its being unmixed with\nthe opposite kind; a pure pleasure has no mixture of pain. All the six\nproperties apply to the case of an individual person; where a plurality\nare concerned, a new item is present, (7) the _extent_, or the number\nof persons affected. These properties exhaust the meaning of the terms\nexpressing good and evil; on the one side, happiness, convenience,\nadvantage, benefit, emolument, profit, &c.; and, on the other,\nunhappiness, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, mischief, and the like.\n\nNext follows, in Chapter V., a classified enumeration of PLEASURES AND\nPAINS. In a system undertaking to base all Moral and Political action\non the production of happiness, such a classification is obviously\nrequired. The author professes to have grounded it on an analysis of\nhuman nature, which analysis itself, however, as being too\nmetaphysical, he withholds.\n\nThe simple pleasures are:--1. The pleasures of sense. 2. The pleasures\nof wealth. 3. The pleasures of skill. 4. The pleasures of amity. 5. The\npleasures of a good name. 6. The pleasures of power. 7. The pleasures\nof piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of\nmalevolence. 10. The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of\nimagination. 12. The pleasures of expectation. 13. The pleasures\ndependent on association. 14. The pleasures of relief.\n\nThe simple pains are:--1. The pains of privation. 2. The pains of the\nsenses. 3. The pains of awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The\npains of an ill name. 6. The pains of piety. 7. The pains of\nbenevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The pains of the memory.\n10. The pains of the imagination. 11. The pains of expectation. 12. The\npains dependent on association.\n\nWe need not quote his detailed subdivision and illustration of these.\nAt the close, he marks the important difference between\n_self-regarding_ and _extra-regarding_; the last being those of\nbenevolence and of malevolence.\n\nIn a long chapter (VI.), he dwells on CIRCUMSTANCES INFLUENCING\nSENSIBILITY. They are such as the following:--1. Health. 2. Strength.\n3. Hardiness. 4. Bodily imperfection. 5. Quantity and Quality of\nknowledge. 6. Strength of intellectual powers. 7. Firmness of mind. 8.\nSteadiness of mind. 9. Bent of inclination. 10. Moral sensibility. 11.\nMoral biases. 12. Religious Sensibility. 13. Religious biases. 14.\nSympathetic Sensibility. 15. Sympathetic biases. 16. Antipathetic\nsensibility. 17. Antipathetic biases. 18. Insanity. 19. Habitual\noccupations. 20. Pecuniary circumstances. 21. Connexions in the way of\nsympathy. 22. Connexions in the way of antipathy. 23. Radical frame of\nbody. 24. Radical frame of mind. 25. Sex. 26. Age. 27. Rank. 28.\nEducation. 29. Climate. 30. Lineage. 31. Government. 32. Religious\nprofession.\n\nChapter VII. proceeds to consider HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL. Right and\nwrong, good and evil, merit and demerit belong to actions. These have\nto be divided and classified with a view to the ends of the moralist\nand the legislator. Throughout this, and two other long chapters, he\ndiscusses, as necessary in apportioning punishment, the _act_ itself,\nthe _circumstances_, the _intention_, and the _consciousness_--or the\nknowledge of the tendencies of the act. He introduces many subdivisions\nunder each head, and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards\npenal legislation.\n\nIn Chapter X., he regards pleasures and pains in the aspect of MOTIVES.\nSince every pleasure and every pain, as a part of their nature, induce\nactions, they are often designated with reference to that circumstance.\nHunger, thirst, lust, avarice, curiosity, ambition, &c., are names of\nthis class. There is not a complete set of such designations; hence the\nuse of the circumlocutions, _appetite for, love of, desire of_--sweet\nodours, sounds, sights, ease, reputation, &c.\n\nOf great importance is the _Order of pre-eminence among motives_. Of\nall the varieties of motives, Good-will, or Benevolence, taken in a\ngeneral view, is that whose dictates are surest to coincide with\nUtility. In this, however, it is taken for granted that the benevolence\nis not so confined in its sphere, as to be contradicted by a more\nextensive, or enlarged, benevolence.\n\nAfter good-will, the motive that has the best chance of coinciding with\nUtility is Love of Reputation. The coincidence would be perfect, if\nmen's likings and dislikings were governed exclusively by the principle\nof Utility, and not, as they often are, by the hostile principles of\nAsceticism, and of Sympathy and Antipathy. Love of reputation is\ninferior as a motive to Good-will, in not governing the secret actions.\nThese last are affected, only as they have a chance of becoming public,\nor as men contract a habit of looking to public approbation in all they\ndo.\n\nThe desire of Amity, or of close personal affections, is placed next in\norder, as a motive. According as we extend the number of persons whose\namity we desire, this prompting approximates to the love of reputation.\n\nAfter these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion,\nwhich, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly\nspeak of them in common. Were the Being, who is the object of religion,\nuniversally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise\nand powerful, and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the\nnotions of his wisdom and power, the dictates of religion would\ncorrespond, in all cases, with Utility. But while men call him\nbenevolent in words, they seldom mean that he is so in reality. They do\nnot mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent;\nthey do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that\nbenevolence has a meaning. The dictates of religion are in all\ncountries intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to\nutility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of the writings\nheld for sacred by each sect. These dictates, however, gradually\napproach nearer to utility, because the dictates of the moral sanction\ndo so.\n\nSuch are the four Social or Tutelary Motives, the antagonists of the\nDissocial and Self-regarding motives, which include the remainder of\nthe catalogue.\n\nChapter XI. is on DISPOSITIONS. A man is said to be of a mischievous\ndisposition, when he is presumed to be apt to engage rather in actions\nof an _apparently_ pernicious tendency, than in such as are apparently\nbeneficial. The author lays down certain Rules for indicating\nDisposition. Thus, 'The strength of the temptation being given, the\nmischievousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise, is as\nthe apparent mischievousness of the act,' and others to a like effect.\n\nChapter XII.--OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the\nconcluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects. He\ndefines the shapes that bad consequences may assume. The mischief may\nbe _primary_, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or\n_secondary_, by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals.\nThe evil in this last case may be either actual pain, or danger, which\nis the chance of pain. Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a\nnumber of assignable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like\nsituation of risk.\n\nHe then proceeds to the theory of PUNISHMENT (XIII., XIV., XV.), to the\nclassification of OFFENCES (XVI.), and to the Limits of the Penal\nBranch of Jurisprudence (XVII.). The two first subjects--Punishments\nand Offences--are interesting chiefly in regard to Legislation. They\nhave also a bearing on Morals; inasmuch as society, in its private\nadministration of punishments, ought, no less than the Legislator, to\nbe guided by sound scientific principles.\n\nAs respects Punishment, he marks off (1) cases where it is\n_groundless_; (2) where it is _inefficacious_, as in Infancy, Insanity,\nIntoxication, &c.; (3) cases where it is _unprofitable_; and (4) cases\nwhere it is _needless_. It is under this last herd that he excludes\nfrom punishment the dissemination of what may be deemed pernicious\nprinciples. Punishment is needless here, because the end can be served\nby reply and exposure.\n\nThe first part of Chapter XVII. is entitled the 'Limits between Private\nEthics and the Art of Legislation;' and a short account of it will\ncomplete the view of the author's Ethical Theory.\n\nEthics at large, is defined the art of directing men's actions to the\nproduction of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part\nof those whose interest is in view, Now, these actions may be a man's\nown actions, in which case they are styled the _art of self-government_,\nor _private ethics_. Or they may be the actions of other agents, namely,\n(1) Other human beings, and (2) Other Animals, whose interests Bentham\nconsiders to have been disgracefully overlooked by jurists as well as\nby mankind generally.\n\nIn so far as a man's happiness depends on his own conduct, he may be\nsaid to _owe a duty to himself_; the quality manifested in discharge of\nthis branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is PRUDENCE. In so far\nas he affects by his conduct the interests of those about him, he is\nunder _a duty to others_. The happiness of others may be consulted in\ntwo ways. First, negatively, by forbearing to diminish it; this is\ncalled PROBITY. Secondly, in a positive way, by studying to increase\nit; which is expressed by BENEFICENCE.\n\nBut now the question occurs, how is it that under Private Ethics (or\napart from legislation and religion) a man can be tinder a motive to\nconsult other people's happiness? By what obligations can he be bound\nto _probity_ and _beneficence_? A man can have no _adequate_ motives\nfor consulting any interests but his own. Still there are motives for\nmaking us consult the happiness of others, namely, the purely social\nmotive of Sympathy or Benevolence, and the semi-social motives of Love\nof Amity and Love of Reputation. [He does not say here whether Sympathy\nis a motive grounded on the pleasure it brings, or a motive\nirrespective of the pleasure; although from other places we may infer\nthat he inclines to the first view.]\n\nPrivate Ethics and Legislation can have but the same end, happiness.\nTheir means, the actions prompted, must be nearly the same. Still they\nare different. There is no case where a man ought not to be guided by\nhis own, or his fellow-creatures', happiness; but there are many cases\nwhere the legislature should not compel a man to perform such actions.\nThe reason is that the Legislature works solely by Punishment (reward\nis seldom applied, and is not properly an act of legislation). Now,\nthere are cases where the punishment of the political sanction ought\nnot to be used; and if, in any of these cases, there is a propriety of\nusing the punishments of private ethics (the moral or social sanction),\nthis circumstance would indicate the line of division.\n\nFirst, then, as to the cases where punishment would be _groundless_. In\nsuch cases, neither legislation nor private ethics should interfere.\n\nSecondly. As to cases where it would be _inefficacious_, where\npunishment has no deterring motive power,--as in Infancy, Insanity,\noverwhelming danger, &c.,--the public and the private sanctions are\nalso alike excluded.\n\nThirdly. It is in the cases where Legislative punishment would be\n_unprofitable_, that we have the great field of Private Ethics.\nPunishment is unprofitable in two ways. First, when the danger of\ndetection is so small, that nothing but enormous severity, on\ndetection, would be of avail, as in the illicit commerce of the sexes,\nwhich has generally gone unpunished by law. Secondly, when there is\ndanger of involving the innocent with the guilty, from inability to\ndefine the crime in precise language. Hence it is that rude behaviour,\ntreachery, and ingratitude are not punished by law; and that in\ncountries where the voice of the people controls the hand of the\nlegislature, there is a great dread of making _defamation_, especially\nof the government, an offence at law.\n\nPrivate Ethics is not liable to the same difficulties as Legislation in\ndealing with such offences.\n\nOf the three departments of Moral Duty--Prudence, Probity, and\nBeneficence--the one that least requires and admits of being enforced\nby legislative punishment is the first--_Prudence_. It can only be\nthrough some defect of the understanding, if people are wanting in duty\nto themselves. Now, although a man may know little of himself, is it\ncertain the legislator knows more? Would it be possible to extirpate\ndrunkenness or fornication by legal punishment? All that can be done in\nthis field is to subject the offences, in cases of notoriety, to a\nslight censure, so as to cover them with a slight shade of artificial\ndisrepute, and thus give strength and influence to the moral sanction.\n\nLegislators have, in general, carried their interference too far in\nthis class of duties; and the mischief has been most conspicuous in\nreligion. Men, it is supposed, are liable to errors of judgment; and\nfor these it is the determination of a Being of infinite benevolence to\npunish them with an infinity of torments. The legislator, having by his\nside men perfectly enlightened, unfettered, and unbiassed, presumes\nthat he has attained by their means the exact truth; and so, when he\nsees his people ready to plunge headlong into an abyss of fire, shall\nhe not stretch forth his hand to save them?\n\nThe second class of duties--the rules of _Probity_, stand most in need\nof the assistance of the legislator. There are few cases where it\n_would_ be expedient to punish a man for hurting himself, and few where\nit _would not_ be expedient to punish a man for hurting his neighbour.\nAs regards offences against property, private ethics presupposes\nlegislation, which alone can determine what things are to be regarded\nas each man's property. If private ethics takes a different view from\nthe legislature, it must of course act on its own views.\n\nThe third class of duties--_Beneficence_--must be abandoned to the\njurisdiction of private ethics. In many cases the beneficial quality of\nan act depends upon the disposition of the agent, or the possession by\nhim of the extra-regarding motives--sympathy, amity, and reputation;\nwhereas political action can work only through the self-regarding\nmotives. In a word these duties must be _free_ or _voluntary_. Still,\nthe limits of law on this head might be somewhat extended; in\nparticular, where a man's person is in danger, it might be made the\nduty of every one to save him from mischief, no less than to abstain\nfrom bringing it on him.\n\nTo resume the Ethics of Bentham. I.--The Standard or End of Morality is\nthe production of Happiness, or Utility.\n\nBentham is thus at one in his first principle with Hume and with Paley;\nhis peculiarity is to make it fruitful in numerous applications both to\nlegislation and to morals. He carries out the principle with an\nunflinching rigour, and a logical force peculiarly his own.\n\nII.--His Psychological Analysis is also studied and thorough-going.\n\nHe is the first person to provide a classification of pleasures and\npains, as an indispensable preliminary alike to morals and to\nlegislation. The ethical applications of these are of less importance\nthan the legislative; they have a direct and practical bearing upon the\ntheory of Punishment.\n\nHe lays down, as the constituents of the Moral Faculty, Good-will or\nBenevolence, the love of Amity, the love of Reputation, and the\ndictates of Religion--with a view to the Happiness of others; and\nPrudence--with a view to our own happiness. He gives no special account\nof the acquired sentiment of Obligation or Authority--the\ncharacteristic of Conscience, as distinguished from other impulses\nhaving a tendency to the good of others or of self. And yet it is the\npeculiarity of his system to identify morality with law; so that there\nis only one step to connecting conscience with our education under the\ndifferent sanctions--legal and ethical.\n\nHe would of course give a large place to the Intellect or Reason in\nmaking up the Moral Faculty, seeing that the consequences of actions\nhave to be estimated or judged; but he would regard this as merely\nco-operating with our sensibilities to pleasure and pain.\n\nThe Disinterested Sentiment is not regarded by Bentham. as arising from\nany disposition to pure self-sacrifice. He recognizes _Pleasures_ of\nBenevolence and _Pains_ of Benevolence; thus constituting a purely\ninterested motive for doing good to others. He describes certain\npleasures of Imagination or Sympathy arising through Association--the\nidea of plenty, the idea of the happiness of animals, the idea of\nhealth, the idea of gratitude. Under the head of Circumstances\ninfluencing Sensibility, he adverts to Sympathetic Sensibility, as\nbeing the propensity to derive _pleasure from the happiness, and pain\nfrom the unhappiness, of other sensitive beings_. It cannot but be\nadmitted, he says, that the only interest that a man at all times, and\non all occasions, is sure to find _adequate_ motives for consulting, is\nhis own. He has no metaphysics of the Will. He uses the terms _free_\nand _voluntary_ only with reference to spontaneous beneficence, as\nopposed to the compulsion of the law.\n\nIII.--As regards Happiness, or the Summum Bonum, he presents his\nscientific classification of Pleasures and Pains, without, however,\nindicating any plan of life, for attaining the one and avoiding the\nother in the best manner. He makes no distinction among pleasures and\npains excepting what strictly concerns their value as such--intensity,\nduration, certainty, and nearness. He makes happiness to mean only the\npresence of pleasure and the absence of pain. The renunciation of\npleasure for any other motive than to procure a greater pleasure, or\navoid a greater pain, he, disapprovingly, terms asceticism.\n\nIV.--It being the essence of his system to consider Ethics as a Code of\nLaws directed by Utility, and he being himself a law reformer on the\ngreatest scale, we might expect from him suggestions for the\nimprovement of Ethics, as well as for Legislation and Jurisprudence.\nHis inclusion of the interests of the lower animals has been mentioned.\nHe also contends for the partly legislative and partly ethical\ninnovation of Freedom of Divorce.\n\nThe inducements to morality are the motives assigned as working in its\nfavour.\n\nV.--The connexions of Ethics with Politics, the points of agreement and\nthe points of difference of the two departments, are signified with\nunprecedented care and precision (Chap. XVII.)\n\nVI.--As regards the connexions with Theology, he gives no uncertain\nsound. It is on this point that he stands in marked contrast to Paley,\nwho also professes Utility as his ethical foundation.\n\nHe recognizes religion as furnishing one of the Sanctions of morality,\nalthough often perverted into the enemy of utility. He considers that\nthe state may regard as offences any acts that tend to diminish or\nmisapply the influence of religion as a motive to civil obedience.\n\nWhile Paley makes a conjoined reference to Scripture and to Utility in\nascertaining moral rules, Bentham insists on Utility alone as the final\nappeal. He does not doubt that if we had a clear unambiguous statement\nof the divine will, we should have a revelation of what is for human\nhappiness; but he distrusts all interpretations of scripture, unless\nthey coincide with a perfectly independent scientific investigation of\nthe consequences of actions.\n\nSIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. [1765-1832.]\n\nIn the 'Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Philosophy chiefly\nduring the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' Mackintosh advocates\na distinct Ethical theory. His views and arguments occur partly in the\ncourse of his criticism of the other moralists, and partly in his\nconcluding General Remarks (Section VII.).\n\nIn Section I., entitled PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, he remarks on the\nuniversality of the distinction between Right and Wrong. On no subject\ndo men, in all ages, coincide on so many points as on the general rules\nof conduct, and the estimable qualities of character. Even the grossest\ndeviations may be explained by ignorance of facts, by errors with\nrespect to the consequences of actions, or by inconsistency with\nadmitted principles. In tribes where new-born infants are exposed, the\nabandonment of parents is condemned; the betrayal and murder of\nstrangers is condemned by the very rules of faith and humanity,\nacknowledged in the case of countrymen.\n\nHe complains that, in the enquiry as to the foundation of morals, the\ntwo distinct questions--as to the Standard and the Faculty--have seldom\nbeen fully discriminated. Thus, Paley opposes Utility to a Moral Sense,\nnot perceiving that the two terms relate to different subjects; and\nBentham repeats the mistake. It is possible to represent Utility as the\n_criterion_ of Right, and a Moral Sense as the _faculty_. In another\nplace, he remarks that the schoolmen failed to draw the distinction.\n\nIn Section V., entitled 'Controversies concerning the Moral Faculty and\nthe Social Affections,' and including the Ethical theories coming\nbetween Hobbes and Butler, namely, Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, &c.,\nhe gives his objections to the scheme that founds moral distinctions\nsolely on the Reason. Reason, as such, can never be a motive to action;\nan argument to dissuade a man from drunkenness must appeal to the pains\nof ill-health, poverty, and infamy, that is, to Feelings. The influence\nof Reason is indirect; it is merely a channel whereby the objects of\ndesire are brought into view, so as to operate on the Will.\n\nThe abused extension of the term Reason to the moral faculties, he\nascribes to the obvious importance of Reason in choosing the means of\naction, as well as in balancing the ends, during which operation the\nfeelings are suspended, delayed, and poised in a way favourable to our\nlasting interests. Hence the antithesis of Reason and Passion.\n\nIn remarking upon Leibnitz's view of Disinterested Sentiment, and the\ncoincidence of Virtue with Happiness, he sketches his own opinion,\nwhich is that although every virtuous _act_ may not lead to the greater\nhappiness of the agent, yet the _disposition_ to virtuous acts, in its\nintrinsic pleasures, far outweighs all the pains of self-sacrifice that\nit can ever occasion. 'The whole sagacity and ingenuity of the world\nmay be fairly challenged to point out a case in which virtuous\ndispositions, habits, and feelings are not conducive in the highest\ndegree to the happiness of the individual; or to maintain that he is\nnot the happiest, whose moral sentiments and affections are such as to\nprevent the possibility of any unlawful advantage being presented to\nhis mind.'\n\nSection VI. is entitled 'Foundations of a more Just Theory of Ethics,'\nand embraces a review of all the Ethical writers, from Butler\ndownwards. The most palpable defect in Butler's scheme, is that it\naffords no answer to the question, 'What is the distinguishing quality\nof right actions?' in other words, What is the Standard? There is a\nvicious circle in answering that they are commanded by Conscience, for\nConscience itself can be no otherwise defined than as the faculty that\napproves and commands right actions. Still, he gives warm commendation\nto Butler generally; in connexion with him he takes occasion to give\nsome farther hints as to his own opinions. Two positions are here\nadvanced: 1st, The moral sentiments, in their mature state, are a class\nof feelings with no other objects than _the dispositions to voluntary\nactions_, and _the actions flowing from these dispositions_. We approve\nsome dispositions and actions, and disapprove others; we desire to\ncultivate them, and we aim at them for _something in themselves_. This\nposition receives light from the doctrine above quoted as to the\nsupreme happiness of virtuous dispositions. His second position is that\nConscience _is an acquired principle_; which he repeats and unfolds in\nsubsequent places.\n\nHe finds fault with Hume for ascribing Virtue to qualities of the\nUnderstanding, and considers that this is to confound admiration with\nmoral approbation. Hume's general Ethical doctrine, that Utility is a\nuniform ground of moral distinction, he says can never be impugned\nuntil some example be produced of a virtue generally pernicious, or a\nvice generally beneficial. But as to the theory of moral approbation,\nor the nature of the Faculty, he considers that Hume's doctrine of\nBenevolence (or, still better, Sympathy) does not account for our\napprobation of temperance and fortitude, nor for the _supremacy_ of the\nMoral Faculty over all other motives.\n\nHe objects to the theory of Adam Smith, that no allowance is made in it\nfor the transfer of our feelings, and the disappearing of the original\nreference from the view. Granting that our approbation began in\nsympathy, as Smith says, certain it is, that the adult man approves\nactions and dispositions as right, while he is distinctly aware that no\nprocess of sympathy intervenes between the approval and its object. He\nrepeats, against Smith, the criticism on Hume, that the sympathies have\nno _imperative_ character of supremacy. He further remarks that the\nreference, in our actions, to the point of view of the spectator, is\nrather an expedient for preserving our impartiality than a fundamental\nprinciple of Ethics. It nearly coincides with the Christian precept of\ndoing unto others as we would they should do unto us,--an admirable\npractical maxim, but, as Leibnitz has said truly, intended only as a\ncorrection of self-partiality. Lastly, he objects to Smith, that his\nsystem renders all morality relative to the pleasure of our coinciding\nin feeling with others, which is merely to decide on the Faculty,\nwithout considering the Standard. Smith shrinks from Utility as a\nstandard, or ascribes its power over our feelings to our sense of the\nadaptation of means to ends.\n\nHe commends Smith for grounding Benevolence on Sympathy, whereas\nButler, Hutcheson, and Hume had grounded Sympathy on Benevolence.\n\nIt is in reviewing Hartley, whose distinction it was to open up the\nwide capabilities of the principle of Association, that Mackintosh\ndevelops at greatest length his theory of the derived nature of\nConscience.\n\nAdverting to the usual example of the love of money, he remarks that\nthe benevolent man might begin with an interested affection, but might\nend with a disinterested delight in doing good. Self-love, or the\nprinciple of permanent well-being, is gradually formed from the\nseparate appetites, and is at last pursued without having them\nspecially in view. So Sympathy may perhaps be the transfer, first, of\nour own personal feelings to other beings, and next, of their feelings\nto ourselves, thereby engendering the social affections. It is an\nancient and obstinate error of philosophers to regard these two\nprinciples--Self-love and Sympathy--as the _source_ of the impelling\npassions and affections, instead of being the last results of them.\n\nThe chief elementary feelings that go to constitute the moral\nsentiments appear to be Gratitude, Pity, Resentment, and Shame. To take\nthe example of Gratitude. Acts of beneficence to ourselves give us\npleasure; we associate this pleasure with the benefactor, so as to\nregard him with a feeling of complacency; and when we view other\nbeneficent beings and acts there is awakened within us our own\nagreeable experience. The process is seen in the child, who contracts\ntowards the nurse or mother all the feelings of complacency arising\nfrom repeated pleasures, and extends these by similarity to other\nresembling persons. As soon as complacency takes the form of _action_,\nit becomes (according to the author's theory, connecting conscience\nwith will), a part of the Conscience. So much for the development of\nGratitude. Next as to Pity. The likeness of the outward signs of\nemotion makes us transfer to others our own feelings, and thereby\nbecomes, even more than gratitude, a source of benevolence; being one\nof the first motives to impart the benefits connected with affection.\nIn our sympathy with the sufferer, we cannot but approve the actions\nthat relieve suffering, and the dispositions that prompt them. We also\nenter into his Resentment, or anger towards the causes of pain, and the\nactions and dispositions corresponding; and this sympathetic anger is\nat length detached from special cases and extended to all wrong-doers;\nand is the root of the most indispensable compound of our moral\nfaculties, the 'Sense of Justice.'\n\nTo these internal growths, from Gratitude, Pity, and Resentment, must\nbe added the education by means of well-framed penal laws, which are\nthe lasting declaration of the moral indignation of mankind. These laws\nmay be obeyed as mere compulsory duties; but with the generous\nsentiments concurring, men may rise above duty to _virtue_, and may\ncontract that excellence of nature whence acts of beneficence flow of\ntheir own accord.\n\nHe next explains the growth of Remorse, as another element of the Moral\nSense. The abhorrence that we feel for bad actions is extended to the\nagent; and, in spite of certain obstacles to its full manifestation,\nthat abhorrence is prompted when the agent is self.\n\nThe theory of derivation is bound to account for the fact, recognized\nin the language of mankind, that the Moral Faculty is ONE. The\nprinciple of association would account for the fusion of many different\nsentiments into one product, wherein the component parts would cease to\nbe discerned; but this is not enough. Why do these particular\nsentiments and no others coalesce in the total--Conscience. The answer\nis what was formerly given with reference to Butler; namely, while all\nother feelings relate to outward objects, the feelings brought together\nin conscience, contemplate exclusively _the dispositions and actions of\nvoluntary agents_. Conscience is thus an acquired faculty, but one that\nis _universally and necessarily_ acquired.\n\nThe derivation is farther exemplified by a comparison with the feelings\nof Taste. These may have an original reference to fitness--as in the\nbeauty of a horse--but they do not attain their proper character until\nthe consideration of fitness disappears. So far they resemble the moral\nfaculty. They differ from it, however, in this, that taste ends in\npassive contemplation or quiescent delight; conscience looks solely to\nthe acts and dispositions of voluntary agents. This is the author's\nfavourite way of expressing what is otherwise called the authority and\nsupremacy of conscience.\n\nTo sum up:--the principal constituents of the moral sense are\nGratitude, Sympathy (or Pity), Resentment, and Shame; the secondary and\nauxiliary causes are Education, Imitation, General Opinion, Laws and\nGovernment.\n\nIn criticising Paley, he illustrates forcibly the position, that\nReligion must pre-suppose morality.\n\nHis criticism of Bentham gives him an opportunity of remarking on the\nmodes of carrying into effect the principle of Utility as the Standard.\nHe repeats his favourite doctrine of the inherent pleasures of a\nvirtuous disposition, as the grand circumstance rendering virtue\nprofitable and vice unprofitable. He even uses the Platonic figure, and\ncompares vice to mental distemper. It is his complaint against Bentham\nand the later supporters of Utility, that they have _misplaced_ the\napplication of the principle, and have encouraged the too frequent\nappeal to calculation in the details of conduct. Hence arise\nsophistical evasions of moral rules; men will slide from general to\nparticular consequences; apply the test of utility to actions and not\nto _dispositions_; and, in short, take too much upon themselves in\nsettling questions of moral right and wrong. [He might have remarked\nthat the power of perverting the standard to individual interests is\nnot confined to the followers of Utility.] He introduces the saying\nattributed to Andrew Fletcher, 'that he would lose his life to _serve_\nhis country, but would not do a base thing to _save_ it.'\n\nHe farther remarks on the tendency of Bentham and his followers to\ntreat Ethics too _juridically_. He would probably admit that Ethics is\nstrictly speaking a code of laws, but draws the line between it and the\njuridical code, by the distinction of dispositions and actions. We may\nhave to approve the author of an injurious action, because it is\nwell-meant; the law must nevertheless punish it. Herein Ethics has its\nalliance with Religion, which looks at the disposition or the heart.\n\nHe is disappointed at finding that Dugald Stewart, who made\napplications of the law of association and appreciated its powers, held\nback from, and discountenanced, the attempt of Hartley to resolve the\nMoral Sense, styling it 'an ingenious refinement on the Selfish\nsystem,' and representing those opposed to himself in Ethics as\nderiving the affections from 'self-love.' He repeats that the\nderivation theory affirms the disinterestedness of human actions as\nstrongly as Butler himself; while it gets over the objection from the\nmultiplication of original principles; and ascribes the result to the\noperation of a real agent.\n\nIn replying to Brown's refusal to accept the derivation of Conscience,\non the ground that the process belongs to a time beyond remembrance, he\naffirms it to be a sufficient theory, if the supposed action\n_resembles_ what we know to be the operation of the principle where we\nhave direct experience of it.\n\nHis concluding Section, VII., entitled General Remarks, gives some\nfarther explanations of his characteristic views. He takes up the\nprinciple of Utility, at the point where Brown bogled at it; quoting\nBrown's concession, that Utility and virtue are so related, that there\nis _perhaps_ no action generally felt to be virtuous that is not\nbeneficial, and that every case of benefit willingly done excites\napprobation. He strikes out Brown's word 'perhaps,' as making the\naffirmation either conjectural or useless; and contends that the two\nfacts,--morality and the general benefit,--being co-extensive, should\nbe reciprocally tests of each other. He qualifies, as usual, by not\nallowing utility to be, on all occasions, the immediate incentive of\nactions. He holds, however, that the main doctrine is an essential\ncorollary from the Divine Benevolence.\n\nHe then replies specifically to the question, 'Why is utility not to be\nthe sole end present to the mind of the virtuous agent?' The answer is\nfound in the limits of man's faculties. Every man is not always able,\non the spur of the moment, to calculate all the consequences of our\nactions. But it is not to be concluded from this, that the calculation\nof consequences is impracticable in moral subjects. To calculate the\ngeneral tendency of every sort of human action is, he contends, a\npossible, easy, and common operation. The general good effects of\ntemperance, prudence, fortitude, justice, benevolence, gratitude,\nveracity, fidelity, domestic and patriotic affections, may be\npronounced with as little error, as the best founded maxims of the\nordinary business of life.\n\nHe vindicates the rules of sexual morality on the grounds of\nbenevolence.\n\nHe then discusses the question, (on which he had charged Hume with\nmistake), 'Why is approbation confined to voluntary acts?' He thinks it\nbut a partial solution to say that approbation and disapprobation are\nwasted on what is not in the power of the will. The full solution he\nconsiders to be found in the mode of derivation of the moral sentiment;\nwhich, accordingly, he re-discusses at some length. He produces the\nanalogies of chemistry to show that compounds may be totally different\nfrom their elements. He insists on the fact that a derived pleasure is\nnot the less a pleasure; it may even survive the primary pleasure.\nSelf-love (improperly so called) is intelligible if its origin be\nreferred to Association, but not if it be considered as prior to the\nappetites and passions that furnish its materials. And as the pleasure\nderived from low objects may be transferred to the most pure, so\nDisinterestedness may originate with self, and yet become as entirely\ndetached from that origin as if the two had never been connected.\n\nHe then repeats his doctrine, that these social or disinterested\nsentiments prompt the will as the means of their gratification. Hence,\nby a farther transfer of association, the voluntary acts share in the\ndelight felt in the affections that determine them. We then desire to\nexperience _beneficent volitions_, and to cultivate the dispositions to\nthese. Such dispositions are at last desired for their own sake; and,\nwhen so desired, constitute the Moral Sense, Conscience, or the Moral\nSentiment, in its consummated form. Thus, by a fourth or fifth stage of\nderivation from the original pleasures and pains of our constitution,\nwe arrive at this highly complex product, called our moral nature.\n\nNor is this all. We must not look at the side of indignation to the\nwrong-doer. We are angry at those who disappoint our wish for the\nhappiness of others; we make their resentment our own. We hence approve\nof the actions and dispositions for punishing such offenders; while we\nso far sympathize with the culprit as to disapprove of excess of\npunishment. Such moderated anger is the sense of Justice, and is a new\nelement of Conscience. Of all the virtues, this is the one most\n_directly_ aided by a conviction of general interest or utility. All\nlaws profess it as their end. Hence the importance of good criminal\nlaws to the moral education of mankind.\n\nAmong contributary streams to the moral faculty, he enumerates courage,\nenergy, and decision, properly directed.\n\nHe recognizes 'duties to ourselves,' although condemning the expression\nas absurd. Intemperance, improvidence, timidity are morally wrong.\nStill, as in other cases, a man is not truly virtuous on such points,\ntill he loves them for their own sake, and even performs them without\nan effort. These prudential qualities having an influence on the will,\nresemble in that the other constituents of Conscience. As a final\nresult, all those sentiments whose object is a state of the will become\nintimately and inseparably blended in the unity of Conscience, the\narbiter and judge of human actions, the lawful authority over every\nmotive to conduct.\n\nIn this grand coalition of the public and the private feelings, he sees\na decisive illustration of the reference of moral sentiments to the\nWill. He farther recognizes in it a solution of the great problem of\nthe relation of virtue to private interest. Qualities useful to\nourselves are raised to the rank of virtues; and qualities useful to\nothers are converted into pleasures. In moral reasonings, we are\nenabled to bring home virtuous inducements by the medium of\nself-interest; we can assure a man that by cultivating the disposition\ntowards other men's happiness he gains a source of happiness to\nhimself.\n\nThe question, Why we do not morally approve involuntary actions, is now\nanswered. Conscience is associated exclusively with the dispositions\nand actions of voluntary agents. Conscience and Will are co-extensive.\n\nA difficulty remains. 'If moral approbation involve no perception of\nbeneficial tendency, how do we make out the coincidence of the two?' It\nmight seem that the foundation of morals is thus made to rest on a\ncoincidence that is mysterious and fantastic. According to the author,\nthe conclusive answer is this. Although Conscience rarely contemplates\nanything so distant as the welfare of all sentient beings, yet in\ndetail it obviously points to the production of happiness. The social\naffections all promote happiness. Every one must observe the tendency\nof justice to the welfare of society. The angry passions, as ministers\nof morality, remove hindrances to human welfare. The private desires\nhave respect to our own happiness. Every element of conscience has thus\nsome portion of happiness for its object. All the affections contribute\nto the general well-being, although it is not necessary, nor would it\nbe fit, that the agent should be distracted by the contemplation of\nthat vast and remote object.\n\nTo sum up Mackintosh:--\n\nI.--On the Standard, he pronounces for Utility, with certain\nmodifications and explanations. The Utility is the remote and final\njustification of all actions accounted right, but not the immediate\nmotive in the mind of the agent. [It may justly be feared, that, by\nplacing so much stress on the delights attendant on virtuous action, he\ngives an opening for the admission of _sentiment_ into the\nconsideration of Utility.]\n\nII.--In the Psychology of Ethics, he regards the Conscience as a\nderived or generated faculty, the result of a series of associations.\nHe assigns the primary feelings that enter into it, and traces the\ndifferent stages of the growth. The distinctive feature of Conscience\nis its close relation to the Will.\n\nHe does not consider the problem of Liberty and Necessity.\n\nHe makes Disinterested Sentiment a secondary or derived feeling--a\nstage on the road to Conscience. While maintaining strongly the\ndisinterested character of the sentiment, he considers that it may be\nfully accounted for by derivation from our primitive self-regarding\nfeelings, and denies, as against Stewart and Brown, that this gives it\na selfish character.\n\nHe carries the process of associative growth a step farther, and\nmaintains that we re-convert disinterestedness into a lofty\ndelight--the delight in goodness for its own sake; to attain this\ncharacteristic is the highest mark of a virtuous character.\n\nIII.---His Summum Bonum, or Theory of Happiness, is contained in his\nmuch iterated doctrine of the deliciousness of virtuous conduct, by\nwhich he proposes to effect the reconciliation of our own good with the\ngood of others--prudence with virtue. Virtue is 'an inward fountain of\npure delight;' the pleasure of benevolence, 'if it could become lasting\nand intense, would convert the heart into a heaven;' they alone are\nhappy, or truly virtuous, that do not need the motive of a regard to\noutward consequences.\n\nHis chief Ethical precursor in this vein is Shaftesbury; but he is\neasily able to produce from Theologians abundant iterations of it.\n\nIV.--He has no special views as to the Moral Code. With reference to\nthe inducements to virtue, he thinks he has a powerful lever in the\ndelights that the virtuous disposition confers on its owner.\n\nV.--His theory of the connexion of Ethics and Politics is stated in his\naccount of Bentham, whom he charges with making morality too judicial.\n\nVI.--The relations of Morality to Religion are a matter of frequent and\nspecial consideration in Mackintosh.\n\nJAMES MILL. [1783-1836.]\n\nThe work of James Mill, entitled the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' is\ndistinguished, in the first glace, by the studied precision of its\ndefinitions of all leading terms, giving it a permanent value as a\nlogical discipline; and in the second place, by the successful carrying\nout of the principle of Association in explaining the powers of the\nmind. The author endeavours to show that the moral feelings are a\ncomplex product or growth, of which the ultimate constituents are our\npleasurable and painful sensations. We shall present a brief abstract\nof the course of his exposition, as given in Chapters XVII.--XXIII. of\nthe Analysis.\n\nThe pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed, it is important\nto take notice of their Causes, both immediate and remote, by whose\nmeans they can be secured or avoided. We contract a habit of passing\nrapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause; and, as in the\ntypical case of money, these causes are apt to rank higher in\nimportance, to take a greater hold on the mind, than the sensations\nthemselves. The mind is not much interested in attending to the\nsensation; that can provide for itself. The mind is deeply interested\nin attending to the cause.\n\nThe author next (XIX.) considers the Ideas of the pleasurable\nsensations, and of the causes of them. The Idea of a pain is not the\nsame as the pain; it is a complex state, containing, no doubt, an\nelement of pain; and the name for it is Aversion. So the name for an\nidea of pleasure is Desire. Now, these states extend to the causes of\npains and pleasures, though in other respects indifferent; we have an\naversion for a certain drug, but there is in this a transition highly\nillustrative of the force of the associating principle; our real\naversion being to a bitter sensation, and not to the visible appearance\nof the drug.\n\nAlluding (XX.) to the important difference between past and future time\nin our ideas of pleasure and pain, he defines Hope and Fear as the\ncontemplation of a pleasurable or of a painful sensation, as future,\nbut not certain.\n\nWhen the immediate causes of pleasurable and painful sensations are\nviewed as past or future, we have a new series of states. In the past,\nthey are called Love and Hatred, or Aversion; in the future, the idea\nof a pleasure, as certain in its arrival, is Joy--as probable, Hope;\nthe idea of future pain (certain) is not marked otherwise than by the\nnames Hatred, Aversion, Horror; the idea of the pain as probable is\nsome form of dread.\n\nThe _remote_ causes of our pleasures and pains are more interesting\nthan the immediate causes. The reason is their wide command. Thus,\nWealth, Power, and Dignity are causes cf a great range of pleasures:\nPoverty, Impotence, and Contemptibility, of a wide range of pains. For\none thing, the first are the means of procuring the services of our\nfellow-creatures; this fact is of the highest consequence in morals, as\nshowing how deeply our happiness is entwined with the actions of other\nbeings. The author illustrates at length the influence of these remote\nand comprehensive agencies; and as it is an influence entirely the\nresult of association, it attests the magnitude of that power of the\nmind.\n\nBut our fellow-creatures are the subjects of affections, not merely as\nthe instrumentality set in motion by Wealth, Power, and Dignity, but in\ntheir proper personality. This leads the author to the consideration of\nthe pleasurable affections of Friendship, Kindness, Family, Country,\nParty, Mankind. He resolves them all into associations with our\nprimitive pleasures. Thus, to take the example of Kindness, which will\nshow how he deals with the disinterested affection;--The idea of a man\nenjoying a train of pleasures, or happiness, is felt by everybody to be\na pleasurable idea; this can arise from nothing but the association of\nour own pleasures with the idea of his pleasures. The pleasurable\nassociation composed of the ideas of a man and of his pleasures, and\nthe painful association composed of the idea of a man and of his pains,\nare both Affections included under one name Kindness; although in the\nsecond case it has the more specific name Compassion.\n\nUnder the other heads, the author's elucidation is fuller, but his\nprinciple is the same.\n\nHe next goes on (XXII.) to MOTIVES. When the idea of a Pleasure is\nassociated with an action of our own as the cause, that peculiar state\nof mind is generated, called a motive. The idea of the pleasure,\nwithout the idea of an action for gaining it, does not amount to a\nmotive. Every pleasure may become a motive, but every motive does not\nend in action, because there may be counter-motives; and the strength\nattained by motives depends greatly on education. The facility of being\nacted on by motives of a particular kind is a DISPOSITION. We have, in\nconnexion with all our leading pleasures and pains, names indicating\ntheir motive efficacy. Gluttony is both motive and disposition; so Lust\nand Drunkenness; with the added sense of reprobation in all the three.\nFriendship is a name for Affection, Motive, and Disposition.\n\nIn Chapter XXIII., the author makes the application of his principles\nto Ethics. The actions emanating from ourselves, combined with those\nemanating from our fellow-creatures, exceed all other Causes of our\nPleasures and Pains. Consequently such actions are objects of intense\naffections or regards.\n\nThe actions whence advantages accrue are classed under the four titles,\nPrudence, Fortitude, Justice, Benevolence. The two first--Prudence and\nFortitude [in fact, Prudence]--express acts useful to ourselves in the\nfirst instance, to others in the second instance. Justice and\nBenevolence express acts useful to others in the first instance, to\nourselves in the second instance. We have two sets of association with\nall these acts, one set with them as our own, another set with them as\nother people's. With Prudence (and Fortitude) as our own acts, we\nassociate good to ourselves, either in the shape of positive pleasure,\nor as warding off pain. Thus Labour is raised to importance by numerous\nassociations of both classes. Farther, Prudence, involving the\nforesight of a train of consequences, requires a large measure of\nknowledge of things animate and inanimate. Courage is defined by the\nauthor, incurring the chance of Evil, that is danger, for the sake of a\npreponderant good; which, too, stands in need of knowledge. Now, when\nthe ideas of acts of Prudence and acts of Courage have been associated\nsufficiently often with beneficial consequences, they become\npleasurable ideas, or Affections, and they have also, from the nature\nof the case, the character of Motives. In short, there is nothing in\nprudential conduct that may not be explained by a series of\nassociations, grounded on our pleasurable and painful sensations, on\nthe ideas of them, and on the ideas of their causes.\n\nThe real difficulty attaches to Justice and to Beneficence.\n\nAs to Justice. Men, in society, have found it essential for mutual\nbenefit, that the powers of Individuals over the general causes of good\nshould be fixed by certain rules, that is, Laws. Acts done in\naccordance with these rules are Just Acts; although, when duly\nconsidered, they are seen to include the main fact of beneficence, the\ngood of others. To the performance of a certain class of just acts, our\nFellow-creatures annex penalties; these, therefore, are determined\npartly by Prudence; others remain to be performed voluntarily, and for\nthem the motive is Beneficence.\n\nWhat then is the source of the motives towards Beneficence? How do the\nideas of acts, having the good of our fellows for their end, become\nAffections and Motives? In the first place, we have associations of\npleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of fellow-creatures, and\nhence, with such acts of ours as yield them pleasure. In the second\nplace, those are the acts for procuring to ourselves the favourable\nDisposition of our Fellow-men, so that we have farther associations of\nthe pleasures flowing from such favourable dispositions. Thus, by the\nunion of two sets of influences--two streams of association--the Idea\nof our beneficent acts becomes a pleasurable idea, that is, an\nAffection, and, being connected with actions of ours, is also a Motive.\nSuch is the genesis of Beneficent or Disinterested impulses.\n\nWe have next a class of associations with other men's performance of\nthe several virtues. The Prudence and the Fortitude of others are\ndirectly beneficial to them, and indirectly beneficial to us; and with\nboth these consequences we have necessarily agreeable associations. The\nJustice and the Beneficence of other men are so directly beneficial to\nthe objects of them, that it is impossible for us not to have\npleasurable associations with acts of Justice and Beneficence, first as\nconcerns ourselves in particular, and next as concerns the acts\ngenerally. Hence, therefore, the rise of Affections and Motives in\nfavour of these two virtues. As there is nothing so deeply interesting\nto me as that the acts of men, regarding myself immediately, should be\nacts of Justice and Beneficence, and the acts regarding themselves\nimmediately, acts of Prudence and Fortitude; it follows that I have an\ninterest in all such acts of my own as operate to cause those acts in\nothers. By similar acts of our own, by the manifestation of\ndispositions to perform those acts, we obtain their reciprocal\nperformance by others. There is thus a highly complex, concurring\nstimulus to acts of virtue,--a large aggregate of influences of\nassociation, the power at bottom being still our own pleasurable and\npainful sensations. We must add the ascription of Praise, an influence\nremarkable for its wide propagation and great efficacy over men's\nminds, and no less remarkable as a proof of the range of the\nassociating principle, especially in its character of Fame, which, in\nthe case of future fame, is a purely ideal or associated delight.\nEqually, if not more, striking are the illustrations from Dispraise.\nThe associations of Disgrace, even when not sufficient to restrain the\nperformance of acts abhorred by mankind, are able to produce the\nhorrors of Remorse, the most intense of human sufferings. The love of\npraise leads by one step to the love of Praiseworthiness; the dread of\nblame, to the dread of Blameworthiness.\n\nOf these various Motives, the most constant in operation, and the most\nin use in moral training, are Praise and Blame. It is the sensibility\nto Praise and Blame--the joyful feelings associated with the one, and\nthe dread associated with the other--that gives effect to POPULAR\nOPINION, or the POPULAR SANCTION, and, with reference to men generally,\nthe MORAL SANCTION.\n\nThe other motives to virtue, namely, the association of our own acts of\nJustice and Beneficence, as cause, with other men's as effects, are\nsubject to strong counteraction, for we can rarely perform such acts\nwithout sacrifice to ourselves. Still, there is in all men a certain\nsurplus of motive from this cause, just as there is a surplus from the\nassociation of acts of ours, hostile to other men, with a return of\nhostility on their part.\n\nThe best names for the aggregate Affection, Motive, and Disposition in\nthis important region of conduct, are _Moral Approbation_ and\n_Disapprobation_. The terms Moral Sense, Sense of Right and Wrong, Love\nof Virtue and Hatred of Vice, are not equally appropriate. Virtue and\nMorality are other synonyms.\n\nIn the work entitled, 'A Fragment on Mackintosh,' there are afforded\nfarther illustrations of the author's derivation of the Moral\nSentiment, together with an exposition and defence of Utility as the\nstandard, in which his views are substantially at one with Bentham. Two\nor three references will be sufficient.\n\nIn the statement of the questions in dispute in Morals, he objects to\nthe words 'test' and 'criterion,' as expressing the standard. He\nconsiders it a mistake to designate as a 'test' what is the thing\nitself; the test of Morality is Morality. Properly, the thing testing\nis one thing; the thing tested another thing. The same objection would\napply to the use of the word Standard; so that the only form of the\nfirst question of Ethics would be, What _is_ morality? What does it\nconsist in? [The remark is just, but somewhat hypercritical. The\nillustration from Chemical testing is not true in fact; the test of\ngold is some essential attribute of gold, as its weight. And when we\nwish to determine as to a certain act, whether it is a moral act, we\ncompare it with what we deem the essential quality of moral\nacts--Utility, our Moral Instinct, &c.--and the operation is not\nimproperly called testing the act. Since, therefore, whatever we agree\nupon as the essence of morality, must be practically used by us as a\ntest, criterion, or standard, there cannot be much harm in calling this\nessential quality the standard, although the designation is to a\ncertain extent figurative.]\n\nThe author has some additional remarks on the derivation of our\nDisinterested feelings: he reiterates the position expressed in the\n'Analysis,' that although we have feelings directly tending to the good\nof others, they are nevertheless the growth of feelings that are rooted\nin self. That feelings should be detached from their original root is a\nwell known phenomenon of the mind.\n\nHis illustrations of Utility are a valuable contribution to the defence\nof that doctrine. He replies to most of the common objections.\nMackintosh had urged that the reference to Utility would be made a\ndangerous pretext for allowing exceptions to common rules. Mill\nexpounds at length (p. 246) the formation of moral rules, and retorts\nthat there are rules expressly formed to make exceptions to other\nrules, as justice before generosity, charity begins at home, &c.\n\nHe animadverts with great severity on Mackintosh's doctrines, as to the\ndelight of virtue for its own sake, and the special contact of moral\nfeelings with the will. Allowance being made for the great difference\nin the way that the two writers express themselves, they are at one in\nmaintaining Utility to be the ultimate standard, and in regarding\nConscience as a derived faculty of the mind.\n\nThe author's handling of Ethics does not extend beyond the first and\nsecond topics--the STANDARD and the FACULTY. His Standard is Utility.\nThe Faculty is based on our Pleasures and Pains, with which there are\nmultiplied associations. Disinterested Sentiment is a real fact, but\nhas its origin in our own proper pleasures and pains.\n\nMill considers that the existing moral rules are all based on our\nestimate, correct or incorrect, of Utility.\n\nJOHN AUSTIN. [1790-1859.]\n\nAustin, in his Lectures on 'The Province of Jurisprudence determined,'\nhas discussed the leading questions of Ethics. We give an abstract of\nthe Ethical part.\n\nLECTURE I. Law, in its largest meaning, and omitting metaphorical\napplications, embraces Laws set by God to his creatures, and Laws set\nby man to man. Of the laws set by man to man, some are established by\n_political_ superiors, or by persons exercising government in nations\nor political societies. This is law in the usual sense of the word,\nforming the subject of Jurisprudence. The author terms it _Positive\nLaw_. There is another class of laws not set by political superiors in\nthat capacity. Yet some of these are properly termed laws, although\nothers are only so by a close Analogy. There is no name for the laws\nproper, but to the others are applied such names as '_moral_ rules,'\n'the _moral_ law,' '_general_ or _public opinion_,' 'the law of\n_honour_ or of _fashion_.' The author proposes for these laws the name\n_positive morality_. The laws now enumerated differ in many important\nrespects, but agree in this--that all of them are set _by_ intelligent\nand rational beings _to_ intelligent and rational beings. There is a\nfigurative application of the word 'law,' to the uniformities of the\nnatural world, through which, the field of jurisprudence and morals has\nbeen deluged with muddy speculation.\n\nLaws properly so called are _commands_. A command is the signification\nof a desire or wish, accompanied with the power and the purpose to\ninflict evil if that desire is not complied with. The person so desired\nis _bound_ or _obliged_, or placed under a _duty_, to obey. Refusal is\ndisobedience, or violation of duty. The evil to be inflicted is called\na _sanction_, or an _enforcement of obedience_; the term _punishment_\nexpresses one class of sanctions.\n\nThe term sanction is improperly applied to a Reward. We cannot say that\nan action is _commanded_, or that obedience is _constrained_ or\n_enforced_ by the offer of a reward. Again, when a reward is offered, a\n_right_ and not an obligation is created: the imperative function\npasses to the party receiving the reward. In short, it is only by\nconditional _evil_, that duties are _sanctioned_ or _enforced_.\n\nThe correct meaning of _superior_ and _inferior_ is determined by\ncommand and obedience.\n\nLECTURE II. The _Divine Laws_ are the known commands of the Deity,\nenforced by the evils that we may suffer here or hereafter for breaking\nthem. Some of these laws are _revealed_, others _unrevealed_. Paley and\nothers have proved that it was not the purpose of Revelation to\ndisclose the whole of our duties; the Light of Nature is an additional\nsource. But how are we to interpret this Light of Nature?\n\nThe various hypotheses for resolving this question may be reduced to\ntwo: (1) an Innate Sentiment, called a Moral Sense, Common Sense,\nPractical Reason, &c.; and (2) the Theory of Utility.\n\nThe author avows his adherence to the theory of Utility, which he\nconnects with the Divine Benevolence in the manner of Bentham. God\ndesigns the happiness of sentient beings. Some actions forward that\npurpose, others frustrate it. The first, God has enjoined; the second,\nHe has forbidden. Knowing, therefore, the tendency of any action, we\nknow the Divine command with respect to it.\n\nThe tendency of an action is all its consequences near and remote,\ncertain and probable, direct and collateral. A petty theft, or the\nevasion of a trifling tax, may be insignificant, or even good, in the\ndirect and immediate consequences; but before the full tendency can be\nweighed, we must resolve the question:--What would be the probable\neffect on the general happiness or good, if _similar_ acts, or\nomissions, were general or frequent?\n\nWhen the theory of Utility is correctly stated, the current objections\nare easily refuted. As viewed by the author, Utility is not the\n_fountain_ or _source_ of our duties; this must be commands and\nsanctions. But it is the _index_ of the will of the law-giver, who is\npresumed to have for his chief end the happiness or good of mankind.\n\nThe most specious objection to Utility is the supposed necessity of\ngoing through a calculation of the consequences of every act that we\nhave to perform, an operation often beyond our power, and likely to be\nabused to forward our private wishes. To this, the author replies\nfirst, that supposing utility our only index, we must make the best of\nit. Of course, if we were endowed with a moral sense, a special organ\nfor ascertaining our duties, the attempt to displace that invincible\nconsciousness, and to thrust the principle of utility into the vacant\nseat, would be impossible and absurd.\n\nAccording to the theory of Utility, our conduct would conform to\n_rules_ inferred from the tendencies of actions, but would not be\ndetermined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility.\nUtility would be the ultimate, not the immediate test. To preface each\nact or forbearance by a conjecture and comparison of consequences were\nboth superfluous and mischievous:--superfluous, inasmuch as the result\nis already embodied in a known rule; and mischievous, inasmuch as the\nprocess, if performed on the spur of the occasion, would probably be\nfaulty.\n\nWith the rules are associated _sentiments_, the result of the Divine,\nor other, command to obey the rules. It is a gross and flagrant error\nto talk of _substituting_ calculation for sentiment; this is to oppose\nthe rudder to the sail. Sentiment without calculation were capricious;\ncalculation without sentiment is inert.\n\nThere are cases where the _specific_ consequences of an action are so\nmomentous as to overbear the rule; for example, resistance to a bad\ngovernment, which the author calls an _anomalous_ question, to be tried\nnot by the rule, but by a direct resort to the ultimate or\npresiding-principle, and by a separate calculation of good and evil.\nSuch was the political emergency of the Commonwealth, and the American\nrevolution. It would have been well, the author thinks, if utility had\nbeen the sole guide in both cases.\n\nThere is a second objection to Utility, more perplexing to deal with.\nHow can we know fully and correctly all the consequences of actions?\nThe answer is that Ethics, as a science of observation and induction,\nhas been formed, through a long succession of ages, by many and\nseparate contributions from many and separate discoverers. Like all\nother sciences, it is progressive, although unfortunately, subject to\nspecial drawbacks. The men that have enquired, or affected to enquire,\ninto Ethics, have rarely been impartial; they have laboured under\nprejudices or sinister interests; and have been the advocates of\nforegone conclusions. There is not on this subject _a concurrence or\nagreement of numerous and impartial enquirers_. Indeed, many of the\nlegal and moral rules of the most civilized communities arose in the\ninfancy of the human mind, partly from caprices of the fancy (nearly\nomnipotent with barbarians), and partly from an imperfect apprehension\nof general utility, the result of a narrow experience. Thus the\ndiffusion and the advancement of ethical truth encounter great and\npeculiar obstacles, only to be removed by a better general education\nextended to the mass of the people. It is desirable that the community\nshould be indoctrinated with sound views of property, and with the\ndependence of wealth, upon the true principle of population, discovered\nby Malthus, all which they are competent to understand.\n\nThe author refers to Paley's Moral Philosophy as an example of the\nperverting tendency of narrow and domineering interests in the domain\nof ethics. With many commendable points, there is, in that work, much\nignoble truckling to the dominant and influential few, and a deal of\nshabby sophistry in defending abuses that the few were interested in\nupholding.\n\nAs a farther answer to the second objection, he remarks, that it\napplies to every theory of ethics that supposes our duties to be set by\nthe Deity. Christianity itself is defective, considered as a system of\nrules for tho guidance of human conduct.\n\nHe then turns to the alternative of a Moral Sense. This involves two\nassumptions.\n\nFirst, Certain sentiments, or feelings of approbation or\ndisapprobation, accompany our conceptions of certain human actions.\nThese feelings are neither the result of our reflection on the\ntendencies of actions, nor the result of education; the sentiments\nwould follow the conception, although we had neither adverted to the\ngood or evil tendency of the actions, nor become aware of the opinions\nof others regarding them. This theory denies that the sentiments known\nto exist can be produced by education. We approve and disapprove of\nactions _we know not why_.\n\nThe author adapts Paley's supposition of the savage, in order to\nexpress strongly what the moral sense implies. But we will confine\nourselves to his reasonings. Is there, he asks, any evidence of our\nbeing gifted with such feelings? The very putting of such a question\nwould seem a sufficient proof that we are not so endowed. There ought\nto be no more doubt about them, than about hunger or thirst.\n\nIt is alleged in their favour that our judgments of rectitude and\ndepravity are immediate and voluntary. The reply is that sentiments\nbegotten by association are no less prompt and involuntary than our\ninstincts. Our response to a money gain, or a money loss, is as prompt\nas our compliance with the primitive appetites of the system. We begin\nby loving knowledge as a means to ends; but, in time, the end is\ninseparably associated with the instrument. So a moral sentiment\ndictated by utility, if often exercised, would be rapid and direct in\nits operation.\n\nIt is farther alleged, as a proof of the innate character of the moral\njudgments, that the moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike.\nThe argument may be put thus:--No opinion or sentiment resulting from\nobservation and induction is held or felt by all mankind: Observation\nand induction, as applied to the same subject, lead different men to\ndifferent conclusions. Now, the judgments passed internally on the\nrectitude or pravity of actions, or the moral sentiments, are precisely\nalike with all men. Therefore, our moral sentiments are not the result\nof our inductions of the tendencies of actions; nor were they derived\nfrom others, and impressed by authority and example. Consequently, the\nmoral sentiments are instinctive, or ultimate and inscrutable facts.\n\nTo refute such an argument is superfluous; it is based on a groundless\nassertion. The moral sentiments of men have differed to infinity. With\nregard to a few classes of actions, the moral judgments of most, though\nnot of all, men have been alike. With regard to others, they have\ndiffered, through every shade or degree, from slight diversity to\ndirect opposition.\n\nBut this is exactly what we should expect on the principle of utility.\nWith regard to some actions, the dictates of utility are the same at\nall times and places, and are so obvious as hardly to admit of mistake\nor doubt. On the other hand, men's positions in different ages and\nnations are in many respects widely different; so that what was useful\nthere and then is useless or pernicious here and now. Moreover, since\nhuman tastes are various, and human reason is fallible, men's moral\nsentiments often widely differ in the same positions.\n\nHe next alludes to some prevailing misconceptions in regard to utility.\nOne is the confusion of the _test_ with the _motive_. The general good\nis the test, or rather the index to the ultimate measure or test, the\nDivine commands; but it is not in all, or even in most cases, the\nmotive or inducement.\n\nThe principle of utility does not demand that we shall always or\nhabitually attend to the general good; although it does demand that we\nshall not pursue our own particular good by means that are inconsistent\nwith that paramount object. It permits the pursuit of our own pleasures\nas pleasure. Even as regards the good of others, it commonly requires\nus to be governed by partial, rather than by general benevolence; by\nthe narrower circle of family and friends rather than by the larger\nhumanity that embraces mankind. It requires us to act where we act\n_with the utmost effect_; that is, within the sphere best known to us.\nThe limitations to this principle, the adjustment of the selfish to the\nsocial motives, of partial sympathy to general benevolence, belong to\nthe detail of ethics.\n\nThe second misconception of Utility is to confound it with a particular\nhypothesis concerning the Origin of Benevolence, commonly styled the\n_selfish system_. Hartley and some others having affirmed that\nbenevolence is not an ultimate fact, but an emanation from self-love,\nthrough the association of ideas, it has been fancied that these\nwriters dispute the _existence_ of disinterested benevolence or\nsympathy. Now, the selfish system, in its literal import, is flatly\ninconsistent with obvious facts, but this is not the system contended\nfor by the writers in question. Still, this distortion has been laid\nhold of by the opponents of utility, and maintained to be a necessary\npart of that system; hence the supporters of utility are styled\n'selfish, sordid, and cold-blooded calculators.' But, as already said,\nthe theory of utility is not a theory of _motives_; it holds equally\ngood whether benevolence be what it is called, or merely a provident\nregard to self: whether it be a simple fact, or engendered by\nassociation on self-regard. Paley mixed up Utility with self-regarding\n_motives_; but his theory of these is miserably shallow and defective,\nand amounted to a denial of genuine benevolence or sympathy.\n\nAustin's Fifth LECTURE is devoted to a full elucidation of the meanings\nof Law. He had, at the outset, made the distinction between Laws\nproperly so called, and Laws improperly so called. Of the second class,\nsome are closely allied to Laws proper, possessing in fact their main\nor essential attributes; others are laws only by metaphor. Laws proper,\nand those closely allied to them among laws proper, are divisible into\nthree classes. The first are the _Divine Law_ or Laws. The second is\nnamed _Positive Law_ or Positive Laws; and corresponds with\nLegislation. The third he calls _Positive Morality_, or positive moral\nrules; it is the same as Morals or Ethics.\n\nReverting to the definition of Law, he gives the following three\nessentials:--1. Every law is a _command_, and emanates from a\n_determinate_ source or another. 2. Every sanction is an eventual evil\n_annexed to a command_. 3. Every duty supposes a _command_ whereby it\nis created. Now, tried by these tests, the laws of God are laws proper;\nso are positive laws, by which are meant laws established by monarchs\nas supreme political superiors, by subordinate political superiors, and\nby subjects, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.\n\nBut as regards Positive Morality, or moral rules, some have so far the\nessentials of an _imperative_ law or rule, that they are rules set by\nmen to men. But they are not set by men as political superiors, nor by\nmen as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights; in this respect\nthey differ from positive laws, they are not clothed with legal\nsanctions.\n\nThe most important department of positive morality includes _the laws\nset or imposed by general opinion_, as for example the laws of honour,\nand of fashion. Now these are not laws in the strict meaning of the\nword, because the authors are an _indeterminate_ or uncertain aggregate\nof persons. Still, they have the closest alliance with Laws proper,\nseeing that being armed with a sanction, they impose a duty. The\npersons obnoxious to the sanction generally do or forbear the acts\nenjoined or forbidden; which is all that can happen under the highest\ntype of law.\n\nThe author then refers to Locke's division of law, which, although\nfaulty in the analysis, and inaptly expressed, tallies in the main with\nwhat he has laid down.\n\nOf Metaphorical or figurative laws, the most usual is that suggested by\nthe fact of _uniformity_, which is one of the ordinary consequences of\na law proper. Such are the laws of nature, or the uniformities of\nco-existence and succession in natural phenomena.\n\nAnother metaphorical extension is to a model or pattern, because a law\npresents something as a guide to human conduct. In this sense, a man\nmay set a law to himself, meaning a plan or model, and not a law in the\nproper sense of a command. So a _rule_ of art is devoid of a sanction,\nand therefore of the idea of duty.\n\nA confusion of ideas also exists as to the meaning of a sanction.\nBentham styles the evils arising in the course of nature _physical_\nsanctions, as if the omission to guard against fire were a sin or an\nimmorality, punished by the destruction of one's house. But although\nthis is an evil happening to a rational being, and brought on by a\nvoluntary act or omission, it is not the result of a law in the proper\nsense of the term. What is produced _naturally_, says Locke, is\nproduced _without the intervention of a law_.\n\nAustin is thus seen to be one of the most strenuous advocates of\nUtility as the Standard, and is distinguished for the lucidity of his\nexposition, and the force of his replies to the objections made against\nit.\n\nHe is also the best expounder of the relationship of Morality to Law.\n\nWILLIAM WHEWELL. [1794-1866.]\n\nDr. Whewell's chief Ethical works are, 'Elements of Morality, including\nPolity,' and 'Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England.'\n\nWe may refer for his views to either work. The following abstract is\ntaken from the latest (4th) edition of his Elements (1864).\n\nIn the Preface he indicates the general scope of the work. Morality has\nits root in the Common Nature of Man; a scheme of Morality must conform\nto the _Common Sense_ of mankind, in so far as that is consistent with\nitself. Now, this Common Sense of Mankind has in every age led to two\nseemingly opposite schemes of Morality, the one making _Virtue_, and\nthe other making _Pleasure_, the rule of action. On the one side, men\nurge the claims of Rectitude, Duty, Conscience, the Moral Faculty; on\nthe other, they declare Utility, Expediency, Interest, Enjoyment, to be\nthe proper guides.\n\nBoth systems are liable to objections. Against the scheme of Pleasure,\nit is urged that we never, in fact, identify virtue as merely useful.\nAgainst the scheme of Virtue, it is maintained that virtue is a matter\nof opinion, and that Conscience varies in different ages, countries,\nand persons. It is necessary that a scheme of Morality should surmount\nboth classes of objections; and the author therefore attempts a\nreconciliation of the two opposing theories.\n\nHe prepares the way by asking, whether there are any actions, or\nqualities of actions, universally approved; and whether there are any\nmoral rules accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as universally\nvalid? The reply is that there are such, as, for example, the virtues\ntermed Veracity, Justice, Benevolence. He does not enquire _why_ these\nare approved; he accepts the fact of the approval, and considers that\nhere we have the basis of a Moral System, not liable to either of the\nopposing objections above recited.\n\nHe supposes, however, that the alleged agreement may be challenged,\n_first_, as not existing; and _next_, as insufficient to reason from.\n\n1. It may be maintained that the excellence of the three virtues named\nis not universally assented to; departures from them being allowed both\nin practice and in theory. The answer is, that the principles may be\nadmitted, although the interpretation varies. Men allow Fidelity and\nKindness to be virtues, although in an early stage of moral progress\nthey do not make the application beyond their own friends; it is only\nat an advanced stage that they include enemies. The Romans at first\nheld stranger and enemy to be synonymous; but afterwards they applauded\nthe sentiment of the poet, _homo sum_, &c. Moral principles must be\nwhat we approve of, when we speak in the name of the whole human\nspecies.\n\n2. It may be said that such principles are too vague and loose to\nreason from. A verbal agreement in employing the terms _truthful, just,\nhumane_, does not prove a real agreement as to the actions; and the\nparticulars must be held as explaining the generalities.\n\nThe author holds this objection to be erroneous; and the scheme of his\nwork is intended to meet it. He proceeds as follows:--\n\nHe allows that we must fix what is meant by _right_, which carries with\nit the meaning of Virtue and of Duty. Now, in saying an action is\nright, there is this idea conveyed, namely, that we render such a\n_reason_ for it, as shall be _paramount_ to all other considerations.\nRight must be the _Supreme_ Rule. How then are we to arrive at this\nrule?\n\nThe supreme rule is the authority over _all_ the faculties and\nimpulses; and is made up of the partial rules according to the separate\nfaculties, powers, and impulses. We are to look, in the first instance,\nto the several faculties or departments of the mind; for, in connexion\nwith each of these, we shall find an irresistible propriety inherent in\nthe very nature of the faculty.\n\nFor example, man lives in the society of fellow-men; his actions derive\ntheir meaning from this position. He has the faculty of Speech, whereby\nhis actions are connected with other men. Now, as man is under a\nsupreme moral rule, [this the author appears to assume in the very act\nof proving it], there must be a rule of right as regards the use of\nSpeech; which rule can be no other than truth and falsehood. In other\nwords, veracity is a virtue.\n\nAgain, man, as a social being, has to divide with others the possession\nof the world, in other words, to possess Property; whence there must be\na rule of Property, that is, each man is to have his own. Whence\nJustice is seen to be a virtue.\n\nThe author thinks himself at one with the common notions of mankind in\npronouncing that the Faculty of Speech, the Desire of Possessions, and\nthe Affections, are properly regulated, not by any extraneous purposes\nor ends to be served by them, but by Veracity, Justice, and Humanity,\nrespectively.\n\nHe explains his position farther, by professing to follow Butler in the\ndoctrine that, through the mere contemplation of our human faculties\nand springs of action, we can discern certain relations which must\nexist among them by the necessity of man's moral being. Butler\nmaintains that, by merely comparing appetite with conscience as springs\nof action, we see conscience is superior and ought to rule; and Whewell\nconceives this to be self-evident, and expresses it by stating that\n_the Lower parts of our nature are to be governed by the Higher_. Men\nbeing considered as social beings, capable of mutual understanding\nthrough speech, it is self-evident that their rule must include\nveracity. In like manner, it is self-evident from the same\nconsideration of social relationship, that each man should abstain from\nviolence and anger towards others, that is, _love his fellow men_.\n\nRemarking on the plea of the utilitarian, that truth may be justified\nby the intolerable consequences of its habitual violation, he urges\nthat this is no reason against its being intuitively perceived; just as\nthe axioms of geometry, although intuitively felt, are confirmed by\nshowing the incongruities following on their denial. He repeats the\ncommon allegation in favour of _\u00e0 priori_ principles generally, that no\nconsideration of evil consequences would give the sense of\n_universality_ of obligation attaching to the fundamental moral maxims;\nand endeavours to show that his favourite antithesis of _Idea_ and\n_Fact_ conciliates the internal essence and the external conditions of\nmorality. The Idea is invariable and universal; the Fact, or outward\ncircumstances, may vary historically and geographically. Morality must\nin some measure be dependent on Law, but yet there is an Idea of\nJustice above law.\n\nIt very naturally occurred to many readers of Whewell's scheme, that in\nso far as he endeavours to give any reason for the foundations of\nmorality, he runs in a vicious circle. He proposes to establish his\nsupreme universal rule, by showing it to be only a summing up of\ncertain rules swaying the several portions or departments of our\nnature--Veracity, Justice, &c., while, in considering the obligation of\nthese rules, he assumes that man is a moral being, which is another way\nof saying that he is to be under a supreme moral rule. In his latest\nedition, the author has replied to this charge, but so briefly as to\ncast no new light on his position. He only repeats that the Supreme\nrule of Human Action is given by the constitution and conditions of\nhuman nature. His ethical principle may be not unfairly expressed by\nsaying, that he recognizes a certain intrinsic fitness in exercising\nthe organ of speech according to its social uses, that is, in promoting\na right understanding among men; and so with Justice, as the fitness of\nproperty, and Humanity, as the fitness of the Affections. This fitness\nis intuitively felt. Human happiness is admitted to be a consequence of\nthese rules; but happiness is not a sufficient end in itself; morality\nis also an end in itself. Human happiness is not to be conceived or\nadmitted, except as containing a moral element; in addition to the\ndirect gratifications of human life, we must include the delight of\nvirtue. [How men can be compelled to postpone their pleasurable sense\nof the good things of life, till they have contracted a delight in\nvirtue for its own sake, the author does not say. It has been the great\nobject of moralists in all ages, to impart by _education_ such a state\nof mind as to spoil the common gratifications, if they are viciously\nprocured; the comparatively little success of the endeavour, shows that\nnature has done little to favour it.]\n\nThe foregoing is an abstract of the Introduction to the 4th Edition of\nthe Elements of Morality. We shall present the author's views\nrespecting the other questions of Morality in the form of the usual\nsummary.\n\nI.--As regards the Standard, enough has been already indicated.\n\nII.--The Psychology of the Moral Faculty is given by Whewell as part of\na classification of our Active Powers, or, as he calls them, Springs of\nAction. These are: I.--The _Appetites_ or Bodily Desires, as Hunger and\nThirst, and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify\nthe senses. II.--The _Affections_, which are directed to persons; they\nfall under the two heads Love and Anger. III.--The _Mental Desires_,\nhaving for their objects certain abstractions. They are the desire of\nSafety, including Security and Liberty; the desire of Having, or\nProperty; the desire of Society in all its forms--Family Society and\nCivil Society, under which is included the need of Mutual\nUnderstanding; the desire of Superiority; and the Desire of Knowledge.\nIV.--The _Moral Sentiments_. Our judgment of actions as right or wrong\nis accompanied by certain Affections or Sentiments, named Approbation\nand Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem; these are the Moral\nSentiments. V.--The _Reflex Sentiments_, namely, the desires of being\nLoved, of Esteem or Admiration, of our own Approval; and generally all\nsprings of action designated by the word _self_--for example,\nself-love.\n\nWith regard to the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, in particular, the\nauthor's resolution of Morality into Moral Rules, necessarily supposes\nan exercise of the Reason, together with the Affections above\ndescribed. He expressly mentions 'the _Practical_ Reason, which guides\nus in applying Rules to our actions, and in discerning the consequences\nof actions.' He does not allow Individual Conscience as an ultimate or\nsupreme authority, but requires it to be conformed to the Supreme Moral\nRules, arrived at in the manner above described.\n\nOn the subject of Disinterestedness, he maintains a modification of\nPaley's selfish theory. He allows that some persons are so far\ndisinterested as to be capable of benevolence and self-sacrifice,\nwithout any motive of reward or punishment; but 'to require that all\npersons should be such, would be not only to require what we certainly\nshall not find, but to put the requirements of our Morality in a shape\nin which it cannot convince men.' Accordingly, like Paley, he places\nthe doctrine that 'to promote the happiness of others will lead to our\nown happiness,' exclusively on the ground of Religion. He honours the\nprinciple that 'virtue _is_ happiness,' but prefers for mankind\ngenerally the form, 'virtue _is the way_ to happiness.' In short, he\nplaces no reliance on the purely Disinterested impulses of mankind,\nalthough he admits the existence of such.\n\nIII.--He discusses the Summum Bonum, or Happiness, only with reference\nto his Ethical theory. The attaining of the objects of our desires\nyields Enjoyment or Pleasure, which cannot be the supreme end of life,\nbeing distinguished from, and opposed to, Duty. Happiness is Pleasure\nand Duty combined and harmonized by Wisdom. 'As moral beings, our\nHappiness must be found in our Moral Progress, and in the consequences\nof our Moral Progress; we must be happy by being virtuous.'\n\nHe complains of the moralists that reduce virtue to Happiness (in the\nsense of human pleasure), that they fail to provide a measure of\nhappiness, or to resolve it into definite elements; and again urges the\nimpossibility of calculating the whole consequences of an action upon\nhuman happiness.\n\n_IV_.--With respect to the Moral Code, Whewell's arrangement is\ninterwoven with his derivation of moral rules. He enumerates five\nCardinal Virtues as the substance of morality:--BENEVOLENCE, which\ngives expansion to our _Love_; JUSTICE, as prescribing the measure of\nour _Mental Desires_; TRUTH, the law of _Speech_ in connexion with its\npurpose; PURITY, the control of the _Bodily Appetites_; and ORDER\n(obedience to the Laws), which engages the _Reason_ in the\nconsideration of Rules and Laws for defining Virtue and Vice. Thus the\nfive leading branches of virtue have a certain parallelism to the five\nchief classes of motives--Bodily Appetites, Mental Desires, Love and\nits opposite, the need of a Mutual Understanding, and Reason.\n\nAs already seen, he considers it possible to derive every one of these\nvirtues from the consideration of man's situation with reference to\neach:--_Benevolence_, or Humanity, from our social relationship;\n_Justice_, from the nature of Property; _Truth_, from, the employment\nof Language for mutual Understanding; _Purity_, from considering the\nlower parts of our nature (the Appetites) as governed by the higher;\nand _Order_, from the relation of Governor and Governed. By a\nself-evident, intuitive, irresistible consideration of the\ncircumstances of the case, we are led to these several virtues in the\ndetail, and their sum is the Supreme Rule of Life.\n\nNot content with these five express moral principles, he considers that\nthe Supreme Law requires, as adjuncts, two other virtues; to these he\ngives the names EARNESTNESS, or Zeal, and MORAL PURPOSE, meaning that\neverything whatsoever should be done for _moral ends_.\n\nV.--The relation of Ethics to Politics in Whewell's system is one of\nintimacy, and yet of independence. The Laws of States supply the\nmaterials of human action, by defining property, &c., for the time\nbeing; to which definitions morality must correspond. On the other\nhand, morality supplies the Idea, or ideal, of Justice, to which the\nLaws of Society should progressively conform themselves. The Legislator\nand the Jurist must adapt their legislation to the point of view of the\nMoralist; and the moralist, while enjoining obedience to their\ndictates, should endeavour to correct the inequalities produced by\nlaws, and should urge the improvement of Law, to make it conformable to\nmorality. The Moral is in this way contrasted with the _Jural_, a\nuseful word of the author's coining. He devotes a separate Book,\nentitled 'Rights and Obligations,' to the foundations of Jurisprudence.\nHe makes a five-fold division of Rights, grounded on his classification\nof the Springs of Human Action; Rights of _Personal Security, Property,\nContract, Marriage, Government_; and justifies this division as against\nothers proposed by jurists.\n\nVI.--He introduces the Morality of Religion as a supplement to the\nMorality of Reason. The separation of the two, he remarks, 'enables us\nto trace the results of the moral guidance of human Reason consistently\nand continuously, while we still retain a due sense of the superior\nauthority of Religion.' As regards the foundations of Natural and\nRevealed Religion, he adopts the line of argument most usual with\nEnglish Theologians.\n\nJAMES FREDERICK FERRIER. [1808-64.]\n\nIn his 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy' (Remains, Vol. I.), Ferrier has\nindicated his views on the leading Ethical controversies.\n\nThese will appear, if we select his conclusions, on the three following\npoints:--The Moral Sense, the nature of Sympathy, and the Summum Bonum.\n\n1. He considers that the Sophists first distinctly broached the\nquestion--What is man by nature, and what is he by convention or\nfashion?\n\n'This prime question of moral philosophy, as I have called it, is no\neasy one to answer, for it is no easy matter to effect the\ndiscrimination out of which the answer must proceed. It is a question,\nperhaps, to which no complete, but only an approximate, answer can be\nreturned. One common mistake is to ascribe more to the natural man than\nproperly belongs to him, to ascribe to him attributes and endowments\nwhich belong only to the social and artificial man. Some\nwriters--Hutcheson, for example, and he is followed by many others--are\nof opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which\ndiscriminates between right and wrong, just as he has naturally a sense\nof taste, which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and a sense of\nsight, which discriminates between red and blue, or a sentient\norganism, which distinguishes between pleasure and pain. That man has\nby nature, and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a\nconscience is not to be denied. That lie has within him by birthright\nsomething out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe; and\nwhat this is I shall endeavour by-and-by to show when I come to speak\nof Sokrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the\nSophists. But that the man is furnished by nature with a conscience\nready-made, just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational\napparatus, this is a doctrine in which I have no faith, and which I\nregard as altogether erroneous. It arises out of the disposition to\nattribute more to the natural man than properly belongs to him. The\nother error into which inquirers are apt to fall in making a\ndiscrimination between what man is by nature, and what he is by\nconvention, is the opposite of the one just mentioned. They sometimes\nattribute to the natural man less than properly belongs to him. And\nthis, I think, was the error into which the Sophists were betrayed.\nThey fall into it inadvertently, and not with any design of embracing\nor promulgating erroneous opinions.'\n\n2. With reference to SYMPATHY, he differs from Adam Smith's view, that\nit is a native and original affection of the heart, like hunger and\nthirst. Mere feeling, he contends, can never take a man out of self.\nIt is thought that overleaps this boundary; not the _feeling_ of\nsensation, but the _thought_ of one's self and one's sensations,\ngives the ground and the condition of sympathy. Sympathy has\nself-consciousness for its foundation. Very young children have little\nsympathy, because in them the idea of self is but feebly developed.\n\n3. In his chapter on the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools, he discusses at\nlength the summum bonum, or Happiness, and, by implication, the Ethical\nend, or Standard. He considers that men have to keep in view _two_\nends; the one the maintenance of their own nature, as rational and\nthinking beings; the other their happiness or pleasure. He will not\nallow that we are to do right at all hazards, irrespective of utility;\nyet he considers that there is something defective in the scheme that\nsets aside virtue as the good, and enthrones happiness in its place. He\nsums up as follows:--\n\n'We thus see that a complete body of ethics should embrace two codes,\ntwo systems of rules, the one of which we may call the fundamental or\nantecedent, or under-ground ethics, as underlying the other; and the\nother of which we may call the upper or subsequent, or above-ground\nethics, as resting on, and modified by the former. The under-ground\nethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being what he truly is,\nnamely, a creature of reason and of thought; in short, the necessity of\nbeing a man, and of preserving to himself this status. Here the end is\nvirtue, that is, the life and health of the soul, and nothing but this.\nThe above-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being a\n_happy_ man.\n\nIt is not enough for man _to be_; he must, moreover, if possible, _be\nhappy_. The fundamental ethics look merely to his being, _i.e._, his\nbeing rational; the upper ethics look principally to his being happy,\nbut they are bound to take care that in all his happiness he does\nnothing to violate his rationality, the health and virtue of the soul.'\n\n\nHENRY LONGUEVILLE/MANSEL.\n\nMr. Mansel, in his 'Metaphysics,' has examined the question of a moral\nstandard, and the nature of the moral faculty, accepting, with slight\nand unimportant modifications, the current theory of a moral sense.\n\n1. _The Moral Faculty_. That the conceptions of right and wrong are\n_sui generis_, is proved (1) by the fact that in all languages there\nare distinct terms for 'right' and 'agreeable;' (2) by the testimony of\nconsciousness; and (3) by the mutual inconsistencies of the antagonists\nof a moral sense. The moral faculty is not identical with Reason; for\nthe understanding contributes to truth only one of its elements,\nnamely, the concept; in addition, the concept must agree with the fact\nas presented in intuition. The moral sense is usually supposed to\ninvolve the perception of qualities only in so far as they are\n_pleasing_ or _displeasing_. To this representation Mr. Mansel objects.\nIn an act of moral consciousness two things are involved: a perception\nor judgment, and a sentiment or feeling. But the judgment itself may be\nfarther divided into two parts: 'the one, an individual fact, presented\nnow and here; the other, a general law, valid always and everywhere.'\nThis is the distinction between _presentative_ and _representative_\nKnowledge. In every act of consciousness there is some individual fact\npresented, and an operation of the understanding. 'A conscious act of\npure moral sense, like a conscious act of pure physical sense, if it\never takes place at all, takes place at a time of which we have no\nremembrance, and of which we can give no account.' The intuitive\nelement may be called _conscience_; the representing element is the\n_understanding_. On another point he differs from the ordinary theory.\nIt is commonly said that we immediately perceive the moral character of\nacts, whether by ourselves or by others. But this would implicate two\nfacts, neither of which we can be conscious of: (1) a law binding on a\ncertain person, and (2) his conduct as agreeing or disagreeing with\nthat law. Now, I can infer the existence of such a law only by\n_representing_ his mind as constituted like my own. We can, in fact,\nimmediately perceive moral qualities only in our own actions.\n\n2. _The Moral Standard_. This is treated as a branch of Ontology, and\ndesignated the 'Real in morality,' He declares that Kant's notion of an\nabsolute moral law, binding by its inherent power over the mind, is a\nmere fiction. The difference between inclination and the moral\nimperative is merely a difference between lower and higher pleasure.\nThe moral law can have no authority unless imposed by a superior, as a\nlaw emanating from a lawgiver. If man is not accountable to some higher\nbeing, there is no distinction between duty and pleasure. The standard\nof right and wrong is the moral _nature_ (not the arbitrary _will_) of\nGod.[25] Now, as we cannot know God--an infinite being,--so we have but\na relative conception of morality. We may have lower and higher ideas\nof duty. Morality therefore admits of progress. But no advance in\nmorality contradicts the _principles_ previously acknowledged, however\nit may vary the acts whereby those principles are carried out. And each\nadvance takes its place in the mind, not as a question to be supported\nby argument, but as an axiom to be intuitively admitted. Each principle\nappears true and irreversible so far as it goes, but it is liable to be\nmerged in a more comprehensive formula. It is an error of philosophers\nto imagine that they have an absolute standard of morals, and thereupon\nto set out _\u00e0 priori_ the criterion of a possibly true revelation. Kant\nsaid that the revealed commands of God could have no religious value,\nunless approved by the moral reason; and Fichte held that no true\nrevelation could contain any intimation of future rewards and\npunishments, or any moral rule not deducible from the principles of the\npractical reason. But revelation has enlightened the practical reason,\nas by the maxim--to love God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as\nthyself--a maxim, says Mr. Mansel, that philosophy in vain toiled\nafter, and subsequently borrowed without acknowledgment.\n\nJOHN STUART MILL.\n\nMr. J.S. Mill examines the basis of Ethics in a small work entitled\nUtilitarianism.\n\nAfter a chapter of General Remarks, he proposes (Chapter II.) to\nenquire, What Utilitarianism is? This creed holds that actions are\nright in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they\ntend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended\npleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the\nprivation of pleasure. The things included under pleasure and pain may\nrequire farther explanation; but this does not affect the general\ntheory. To the accusation that pleasure is a mean and grovelling object\nof pursuit, the answer is, that human beings are capable of pleasures\nthat are not grovelling. It is compatible with utility to recognize\nsome _kinds_ of pleasure as more valuable than others. There are\npleasures that, irrespective of amount, are held by all persons that\nhave experienced them to be preferable to others. Few human beings\nwould consent to become beasts, or fools, or base, in consideration of\na greater allowance of pleasure. Inseparable from the estimate of\npleasure is a _sense of dignity_, which determines a preference among\nenjoyments.\n\nBut this distinction in kind is not essential to the justification of\nthe standard of Utility. That standard is not the agent's own greatest\nhappiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. However\nlittle the higher virtues might contribute to one's own happiness,\nthere can be no doubt that the world in general gains by them.\n\nAnother objection to the doctrine is, that happiness is a thing\nunattainable, and that no one has a _right_ to it. Not only can men do\nwithout happiness, but renunciation is the first condition of all\nnobleness of character.\n\nIn reply, the author remarks that, supposing happiness impossible, the\nprevention of unhappiness might still be an object, which is a mode of\nUtility. But the alleged impossibility of happiness is either a verbal\nquibble or an exaggeration. No one contends for a life of sustained\nrapture; occasional moments of such, in an existence of few and\ntransitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a predominance of\nthe active over the passive, and moderate expectations on the whole,\nconstitute a life worthy to be called happiness. Numbers of mankind\nhave been satisfied with much less. There are two great factors of\nenjoyment--tranquillity and excitement. With the one, little pleasure\nwill suffice; with the other, considerable pain can be endured. It does\nnot appear impossible to secure both in alternation. The principal\ndefect in persons of fortunate lot is to care for nobody but\nthemselves; this curtails the excitements of life, and makes everything\ndwindle as the end approaches. Another circumstance rendering life\nunsatisfactory is the want of mental cultivation, by which men are\ndeprived of the inexhaustible pleasures of knowledge, not merely in the\nshape of science, but as practice and fine art. It is not at all\ndifficult to indicate sources of happiness; the main stress of the\nproblem lies in the contest with the positive evils of life, the great\nsources of physical and of mental suffering--indigence, disease, and\nthe unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of\naffection. Poverty and Disease may be contracted in dimensions; and\neven vicissitudes of fortune are not wholly beyond control.\n\nIt is unquestionably possible to do without happiness. This is the lot\nof the greater part of mankind, and is often voluntarily chosen by the\nhero or the martyr. But self-sacrifice is not its own end; it must be\nmade to earn for others immunity from sacrifice. It must be a very\nimperfect state of the world's arrangements that requires any one to\nserve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of their own;\nyet undoubtedly while the world is in that imperfect state, the\nreadiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue that can be\nfound in man. Nay, farther, the conscious ability to do without\nhappiness, in such a condition of the world, is the best prospect of\nrealizing such happiness as is attainable. Meanwhile, self-devotion\nbelongs as much to the Utilitarian as to the Stoic or the\nTranscendentalist; with the reservation that a sacrifice not tending to\nincrease the sum of happiness is to be held as wasted. The golden rule,\ndo as you would be done by, is the ideal perfection of utilitarian\nmorality. The means of approaching this ideal are, first, that laws and\nsociety should endeavour to place the interest of the individual in\nharmony with the interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education\nand opinion should establish in the mind of each individual an\nindissoluble association between his own good and the good of the\nwhole.\n\nThe system of Utility is objected to, on another side, as being too\nhigh for humanity; men cannot be perpetually acting with a view to the\ngeneral interests of society. But this is to mistake the meaning of a\nstandard, and to confound the rule of action with the motive. Ethics\ntells us what are our duties, or by what test we are to know them; but\nno system of ethics requires that the motive of every action should be\na feeling of duty; our actions are rightly done provided only duty does\nnot condemn them. The great majority of actions have nothing to do with\nthe good of the world--they end with the individual; it happens to few\npersons, and that rarely, to be public benefactors. Private utility is\nin the mass of cases all that we have to attend to. As regards\nabstinences, indeed, it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not\nto be aware that the action is one that, if practised generally, would\nbe generally injurious, and to not feel a sense of obligation on that\nground; but such an amount of regard for the general interest is\nrequired under every system of morals.\n\nIt is farther alleged against Utility, that it renders men cold and\nunsympathizing, chills the moral feelings towards individuals, and\nregards only the dry consequences of actions, without reference to the\nmoral qualities of the agent. The author replies that Utility, like any\nother system, admits that a right action does not necessarily indicate\na virtuous character. Still, he contends, in the long run, the best\nproof of a good character is good actions. If the objection means that\nutilitarians do not lay sufficient stress on the beauties of character,\nhe replies that this is the accident of persons cultivating their moral\nfeelings more than their sympathies and artistic perceptions, and may\noccur under every view of the foundation of morals.\n\nThe next objection considered is that Utility is a _godless_ doctrine.\nThe answer is, that whoever believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom\nof God, necessarily believes that whatever he has thought fit to reveal\non the subject of morals must fulfil the requirements of utility in a\nsupreme degree.\n\nAgain, Utility is stigmatized as an immoral doctrine, by carrying out\nExpediency in opposition to Principle. But the Expedient in this sense\nmeans what is expedient for the agent himself, and, instead of being\nthe same thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. It would\noften be expedient to tell a lie, but so momentous and so widely\nextended are the utilities of truth, that veracity is a rule of\ntranscendent expediency. Yet all moralists admit exceptions to it,\nsolely on account of the manifest inexpediency of observing it on\ncertain occasions.\n\nThe author does not omit to notice the usual charge that it is\nimpossible to make a calculation of consequences previous to every\naction, which is as much as to say that no one can be under the\nguidance of Christianity, because there is not time, on the occasion of\ndoing anything, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The real\nanswer is (substantially the same as Austin's) that there has been\nample time during the past duration of the species. Mankind have all\nthat time been learning by experience the consequences of actions; on\nthat experience they have founded both their prudence and their\nmorality. It is an inference from the principle of utility, which\nregards morals as a practical art, that moral rules are improvable; but\nthere exists under the ultimate principle a number of intermediate\ngeneralizations, applicable at once to the emergencies of human\nconduct. Nobody argues that navigation is not founded on astronomy,\nbecause sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack.\n\nAs to the stock argument, that people will pervert utility for their\nprivate ends, Mr. Mill challenges the production of any ethical creed\nwhere this may not happen. The fault is due, not to the origin of the\nrules, but to the complicated nature of human affairs, and the\nnecessity of allowing a certain latitude, under the moral\nresponsibility of the agent, for accommodation to circumstances. And in\ncases of conflict, utility is a better guide than anything found in\nsystems whose moral laws claim independent authority.\n\nChapter III. considers the ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF\nUTILITY.\n\nIt is a proper question with regard to a supposed moral standard,--What\nis its sanction? what is the source of its obligation? wherein lies its\nbinding force? The customary morality is consecrated by education and\nopinion, and seems to be obligatory _in itself_; but to present, as the\nsource of obligation, some general principle, not surrounded by the\nhalo of consecration, seems a paradox; the superstructure seems to\nstand better without such a foundation. This difficulty belongs to\nevery attempt to reduce morality to first principles, unless it should\nhappen that the principle chosen has as much sacredness as any of its\napplications.\n\nUtility has, or might have, all the sanctions attaching to any other\nsystem of morals. Those sanctions are either External or Internal. The\nExternal are the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure (1) from\nour fellow-creatures, or (2) from the Ruler of the Universe, along with\nany sympathy or affection for them, or love and awe of Him, inclining\nus apart from selfish motives. There is no reason why these motives\nshould not attach themselves to utilitarian morality.\n\nThe Internal Sanction, under every standard of duty, is of one uniform\ncharacter--a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense,\nattendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral\nnatures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an\nimpossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself\nwith the pure idea of duty, is _the essence of Conscience_; a complex\nphenomenon, involving associations from sympathy, from love, and still\nmore from fear; from the recollections of childhood, and of all our\npast life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and\noccasionally even self-abasement. This extreme complication is an\nobstacle to our supposing that it can attach to other objects than what\nare found at present to excite it. The binding force, however, is _the\nmass of feeling to be broken through_ in order to violate our standard\nof right, and which, if we do violate that standard, will have to be\nafterwards encountered as remorse.\n\nThus, apart from external sanctions, the ultimate sanction, under\nUtility, is the same as for other standards, namely, the conscientious\nfeelings of mankind. If there be anything innate in conscience, there\nis nothing more likely than that it should be a regard to the pleasures\nand pains of others. If so, the intuitive ethics would be the same as\nthe utilitarian; and it is admitted on all hands that a _large_\nportion of morality turns upon what is due to the interests of\nfellow-creatures.\n\nOn the other hand, if, as the author believes, the moral feelings are\nnot innate, they are not for that reason less natural. It is natural to\nman to speak, to reason, to cultivate the ground, to build cities,\nthough these are acquired faculties. So the moral faculty, if not a\npart of our nature, is a natural outgrowth of it; capable, in a certain\nsmall degree, of springing up spontaneously, and of being brought to a\nhigh pitch by means of cultivation. It is also susceptible, by the use\nof the external sanctions and the force of early impressions, of being\ncultivated in almost any direction, and of being perverted to absurdity\nand mischief.\n\nThe basis of natural sentiment capable of supporting the utilitarian\nmorality is to be found in the _social feelings of mankind_. The social\nstate is so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that he can\nhardly conceive himself otherwise than as a member of society; and as\ncivilization advances, this association becomes more firmly riveted.\nAll strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society,\ngive to each individual a stronger personal interest in consulting the\nwelfare of others. Each comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious\nof himself as a being that _of course_ pays regard to others. There is\nthe strongest motive in each person to manifest this sentiment, and,\neven if he should not feel it strongly himself, to cherish it in\neverybody else. The smallest germs of the feeling are thus laid hold\nof, and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of\neducation; and by the powerful agency of the external sanctions there\nis woven around it a complete web of corroborative association. In an\nimproving state of society, the influences are on the increase that\ngenerate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest;\nwhich, if perfect, would make him never think of anything for self, if\nthey also were not included. Suppose, now, that this feeling of unity\nwere taught as a religion, and that the whole force of education, of\ninstitutions, and of opinion, were directed to make every person grow\nup surrounded with the profession and the practice of it; can there be\nany doubt as to the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the\nHappiness morality?\n\nEven in our present low state of advancement, the deeply-rooted\nconception that each individual has of himself as a social being tends\nto make him wish to be in harmony with his fellow-creatures. The\nfeeling may be, in most persons, inferior in strength to the selfish\nfeelings, and may be altogether wanting; but to such as possess it, it\nhas all the characters of a natural feeling, and one that they would\nnot desire to be without.\n\nChapter IV. is OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY is\nsusceptible. Questions about ends are questions as to what things are\ndesirable. According to the theory of Utility, happiness is desirable\nas an end; all other things are desirable as means. What is the proof\nof this doctrine?\n\nAs the proof, that the sun is visible, is that people actually see it,\nso the proof that happiness is desirable, is that people do actually\ndesire it. No reason can be given why the general happiness is\ndesirable, beyond the fact that each one desires their own happiness.\n\nBut granting that people desire happiness as _one_ of their ends of\nconduct, do they never desire anything else? To all appearance they do;\nthey desire virtue, and the absence of vice, no less surely than\npleasure and the absence of pain. Hence the opponents of utility\nconsider themselves entitled to infer that happiness is not the\nstandard of moral approbation and disapprobation.\n\nBut the utilitarians do not deny that virtue is a thing to be desired.\nThe very reverse. They maintain that it is to be desired, and that _for\nitself_. Although considering that what makes virtue is the tendency to\npromote happiness, yet they hold that the mind is not in a right state,\nnot in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state conducive to\nthe general happiness, unless it has adopted this essential\ninstrumentality so warmly as to love it for its own sake. It is\nnecessary to the carrying out of utility that certain things,\noriginally of the nature of means, should come by association to be a\npart of the final end. Thus health is but a means, and yet we cherish\nit as strongly as we do any of the ultimate pleasures and pains. So\nvirtue is not originally an end, but it is capable of becoming so; it\nis to be desired and cherished not solely as a means to happiness, but\nas a part of happiness.\n\nThe notorious instance of money exemplifies this operation. The same\nmay be said of power and fame; although these are ends as well as\nmeans. We should be but ill provided with happiness, were it not for\nthis provision of nature, whereby, things, originally indifferent, but\nconducive to the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in\nthemselves sources of pleasure, of even greater value than the\nprimitive pleasures, both in permanency and in the extent of their\noccupation of our life. Virtue is originally valuable as bringing\npleasure and avoiding pain; but by association it may be felt as a good\nin itself, and be desired as intensely as any other good; with this\nsuperiority over money, power, or fame, that it makes the individual a\nblessing to society, while these others may make him a curse.\n\nWith the allowance thus made for the effect of association, the author\nconsiders it proved that there is in reality nothing desired except\nhappiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end\nbeyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is not desired for itself\ntill it has become such. Human nature is so constituted, he thinks,\nthat we desire nothing but what is either a part of happiness or a\nmeans of happiness; and no other proof is required that these are the\nonly things desirable. Whether this psychological assertion be correct,\nmust be determined by the self-consciousness and observation of the\nmost practised observers of human nature.\n\nIt may be alleged that, although desire always tends to happiness, yet\nWill, as shown by actual conduct, is different from desire. We persist\nin a course of action long after the original desire has faded. But\nthis is merely an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit,\nand is nowise confined to the virtuous actions. Will is amenable to\nhabit; we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or\ndesire only because we will it. But the will is the child of desire,\nand passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under the\nsway of habit. What is the result of habit may not be intrinsically\ngood; we might think it better for virtue that habit did not come in,\nwere it not that the other influences are not sufficiently to be\ndepended on for unerring constancy, until they have acquired this\nfarther support.\n\nChapter V. is ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY.\n\nThe strongest obstacle to the doctrine of Utility has been drawn from\nthe Idea of Justice. The rapid perception and the powerful sentiment\nconnected with the Just, seem to show it as generically distinct from\nevery variety of the Expedient.\n\nTo see whether the sense of justice can be explained on grounds of\nUtility, the author begins by surveying in the concrete the things\nusually denominated just. In the first place, it is commonly considered\nunjust to deprive any one of their personal liberty, or property, or\nanything secured to them by law: in other words, it is unjust to\nviolate any one's legal rights. Secondly, The legal rights of a man may\nbe such as _ought_ not to have belonged to him; that is, the law\nconferring those rights may be a bad law. When a law is bad, opinions\nwill differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it; some think\nthat no law should be disobeyed by the individual citizen; others hold\nthat it is just to resist unjust laws. It is thus admitted by all that\nthere is such a thing as _moral right_, the refusal of which is\ninjustice. Thirdly, it is considered just that each person should\nreceive what he _deserves_ (whether good or evil). And a person is\nunderstood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and\nin particular to deserve good in return for good, and evil in return\nfor evil. Fourthly, it is unjust to _break faith_, to violate an\nengagement, or disappoint expectations knowingly and voluntarily\nraised. Like other obligations, this is not absolute, but may be\noverruled by some still stronger demand of justice on the other side.\nFifthly, it is inconsistent with justice to be _partial_; to show\nfavour or preference in matters where favour does not apply. We are\nexpected in certain cases to prefer our friends to strangers; but a\ntribunal is bound to the strictest impartiality; rewards and\npunishments should be administered impartially; so likewise the\npatronage of important public offices. Nearly allied to impartiality is\nthe idea of _equality_. The justice of giving equal protection to the\nrights of all is maintained even when the rights themselves are very\nunequal, as in slavery and in the system of ranks or castes. There are\nthe greatest differences as to what is equality in the distribution of\nthe produce of labour; some thinking that all should receive alike;\nothers that the neediest should receive most; others that the\ndistribution should be according to labour or services.\n\nTo get a clue to the common idea running through all these meanings,\nthe author refers to the etymology of the word, which, in most\nlanguages, points to something ordained by _law_. Even although there\nbe many things considered just, that we do not usually enforce by law,\nyet in these cases it would give us pleasure if law could be brought to\nbear upon offenders. When we think a person bound in justice to do a\nthing, we should like to see him punished for not doing it; we lament\nthe obstacles that may be in the way, and strive to make amends by a\nstrong expression of our own opinion. The idea of legal constraint is\nthus the generating idea of justice throughout all its transformations.\n\nThe real turning point between morality and simple expediency is\ncontained in the penal sanction. Duty is what we may _exact_ of a\nperson; there may be reasons why we do not exact it, but the person\nhimself would not be entitled to complain if we did so. Expediency, on\nthe other hand, points to things that we may wish people to do, may\npraise them for doing, and despise them for not doing, while we do not\nconsider it proper to bring in the aid of punishment.\n\nThere enters farther into the idea of Justice what has been expressed\nby the ill-chosen phrase, 'perfect obligation,' meaning that the duty\ninvolves a moral right on the part of some definite person, as in the\ncase of a debt; an imperfect obligation is exemplified by charity,\nwhich gives no legal claim to any one recipient. Every such right is a\ncase of Justice, and not of Beneficence.\n\nThe Idea of Justice is thus shown to be grounded in Law; and the next\nquestion is, does the strong feeling or sentiment of Justice grow out\nof considerations of utility? Mr. Mill conceives that though the notion\nof expediency or utility does not give birth to the sentiment, it gives\nbirth to what is _moral_ in it.\n\nThe two essentials of justice are (1) the desire to punish some one,\nand (2) the notion or belief that harm has been done to some definite\nindividual or individuals. Now, it appears to the author that the\ndesire to punish is a spontaneous outgrowth of two sentiments, both\nnatural, and, it may be, instinctive; the impulse of _self-defence_,\nand the feeling of _sympathy_. We naturally resent, repel, and\nretaliate, any harm done to ourselves and to any one that engages our\nsympathies. There is nothing moral in mere resentment; the moral part\nis the subordination of it to our social regards. We are moral beings,\nin proportion as we restrain our private resentment whenever it\nconflicts with the interests of society. All moralists agree with Kant\nin saying that no act is right that could not be adopted as a law by\nall rational beings (that is, consistently with the well-being of\nsociety).\n\nThere is in Justice a rule of conduct, and a right on the part of some\none, which right ought to be enforced by society. If it is asked why\nsociety _ought_ to enforce the right, there is no answer but the\ngeneral utility. If that expression seem feeble and inadequate to\naccount for the energy of retaliation inspired by injustice, the author\nasks us to advert to the extraordinarily important and impressive kind\nof utility that is concerned. The interest involved is _security_, to\nevery one's feelings the most vital of all interests. All other earthly\nbenefits needed by one person are not needed by another; and many of\nthem can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by\nsomething else; but security no human being can possibly do without; on\nit we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of\nall and every good, beyond the passing moment. Now, this most\nindispensable of all necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot be\nhad unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in\nactive play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our\nfellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of\nour existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than\nthose concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the\ndifference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a\nreal difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of\nabsoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all\nother considerations, which constitute the distinction between the\nfeeling of right and wrong, and that of ordinary expediency and\ninexpediency.\n\nHaving presented his own analysis of the sentiment of Justice, the\nauthor proceeds to examine the _intuitive_ theory. The charge is\nconstantly brought against Utility, that it is an uncertain standard,\ndifferently interpreted by each person. The only safety, it is\npretended, is found in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakeable\ndictates of Justice, carrying their evidence in themselves, and\nindependent of the fluctuations of opinions. But so far is this from\nbeing the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as\nmuch discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to\nsociety.\n\nTo take a few instances. On the question of Punishment, some hold it\nunjust to punish any one by way of example, or for any end but the good\nof the sufferer. Others maintain that the good of the society is the\nonly admissible end of punishment. Robert Owen affirms that punishment\naltogether is unjust, and that we should deal with crime only through\neducation. Now, without an appeal to expediency, it is impossible to\narbitrate among these conflicting views; each one has a maxim of\njustice on its side. Then as to the apportioning of punishments to\noffences. The rule that recommends itself to the primitive sentiment of\njustice is an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; a rule formally\nabandoned in European countries, although not without its hold upon the\npopular mind. With many, the test of justice, in penal infliction, is\nthat it should be proportioned to the offence; while others maintain\nthat it is just to inflict only such an amount of punishment as will\ndeter from the commission of the offence.\n\nBesides the differences of opinion already alluded to, as to the\npayment of labour, how many, and irreconcileable, are the standards of\njustice appealed to on the matter of taxation? One opinion is, that\ntaxes should be in proportion to pecuniary means; others think the\nwealthy should pay a higher proportion. In point of natural justice, a\ncase might be made out for disregarding means, and taking the same sum\nfrom each, as the privileges are equally bestowed: yet from feelings of\nhumanity and social expediency no one advocates that view. So that\nthere is no mode of extricating the question but the utilitarian.\n\nTo sum up. The great distinction between, the Just and the Expedient is\nthe distinction between the essentials of well-being--the moral rules\nforbidding mankind to hurt one another--and the rules that only point\nout the best mode of managing some department of human affairs. It is\nin the higher moralities of protection from harm that each individual\nhas the greatest stake; and they are the moralities that compose the\nobligations of justice. It is on account of these that punishment, or\nretribution of evil for evil, is universally included in the idea. For\nthe carrying out of the process of retaliation, certain maxims are\nnecessary as instruments or as checks to abuse; as that involuntary\nacts are not punishable; that no one shall be condemned unheard; that\npunishment should be proportioned to the offence. Impartiality, the\nfirst of judicial virtues, is necessary to the fulfilment of the other\nconditions of justice: while from the highest form of doing to each\naccording to their deserts, it is the abstract standard of social and\ndistributive justice; and is in this sense a direct emanation from the\nfirst principle of morals, the principle of the greatest Happiness. All\nsocial inequalities that have ceased to be considered as expedient,\nassume the character, not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice.\n\nBesides the 'Utilitarianism,' Mr. Mill's chief Ethical dissertations\nare his review of Whewell's Moral Treatises (_Dissertations and\nDiscussions_, Vol. II.), and parts of his Essay on _Liberty_. By\ncollecting his views generally under the usual heads, we shall find a\nplace for some points additional to what are given in the foregoing\nabstract.\n\nI.--Enough has been stated as to his Ethical Standard, the Principle of\nUtility.\n\nII.--We have seen his Psychological explanation of the Moral Faculty,\nas a growth from certain elementary feelings of the mind.\n\nHe has also discussed extensively the Freedom of the Will, maintaining\nthe strict causation of human actions, and refuting the supposed\nfatalistic tendency of the doctrine.\n\nHe believes, as we have seen, in Disinterested impulses, but traces\nthem to a purely self-regarding origin.\n\nIII.--He does not give any formal dissertation on Human Happiness, but\nindicates many of its important conditions, as in the remarks cited\nabove, p. 702. In the chapter of the work on 'Liberty,' entitled\nIndividuality, he illustrates the great importance of special tastes,\nand urges the full right of each person to the indulgence of these in\nevery case where they do not directly injure others. He reclaims\nagainst the social tyranny prevailing on such points as dress, personal\nhabits, and eccentricities.\n\nIV.--As regards the Moral Code, he would repeal the legal and moral\nrule that makes marriage irrevocable. He would also abolish all\nrestraints on freedom of thought, and on Individuality of conduct,\nqualified as above stated.\n\nHe would impose two new moral restraints. He considers that every\nparent should be bound to provide a suitable education for his own\nchildren. Farther, for any one to bring into the world human beings\nwithout the means of supporting them, or, in an over-peopled country,\nto produce children in such number as to depress the reward of labour\nby competition, he regards as serious offences.\n\nSAMUEL BAILEY.\n\nMr. Samuel Bailey devotes the last four in his Third Series of 'Letters\non the Philosophy of the Human Mind,' to the subject of the Moral\nSentiments, or the feelings inspired in us by human conduct. He first\nsets down five facts in the human constitution, in which moral\nphenomena originate--\n\n1. Man is susceptible of pleasure and pain of various kinds and\ndegrees.\n\n2. He likes and dislikes respectively the causes of them.\n\n3. He desires to reciprocate pleasure and pain received, when\nintentionally given by other sentient beings.\n\n4. He himself expects such reciprocation from his fellows, coveting it\nin the one case, and shunning it in the other.\n\n5. He feels, under certain circumstances, more or less sympathy with\nthe pleasures and pains given to others, accompanied by a proportionate\ndesire that those affections should be reciprocated to the givers.\n\nThese rudimentary affections, states and operations of consciousness\n[he is careful to note that, besides feelings, intellectual conditions\nand processes are involved in them] are found more or less developed in\nall, or nearly all the human race. In support of the limitation now\nmade, he adduces what are given as authentic accounts of savages devoid\nof all gratitude and fellow-feeling; and then goes on to trace the\nnature and development of moral sentiment from the rudimentary powers\nand susceptibilities mentioned, in those that do possess them. In doing\nso, he follows the convenient mode of speech that takes actions for the\nobjects that excite the susceptibilities, although, in reality, the\nobjects are no other than human beings acting in particular ways.\n\nThe feelings he supposes to be modified in manner or degree, according\nas actions are (1) done by ourselves to others, or (2) done to others\nby others, or (3) done to others by ourselves; _i.e._, according as we\nourselves are the subjects, the spectators, or doers of them.\n\nFirst, then, he considers our feelings in regard to actions done to us\nby others, and the more carefully, because these lie at the foundation\nof the rest. When a fellow-creature intentionally contributes to our\npleasure, we feel the pleasure; we feel a liking to the person\nintentionally conferring it, and we feel an inclination to give him\npleasure in return. The two last feelings--liking and inclination to\nreciprocate, constitute the simplest form of moral approbation; in the\ncontrary case, dislike and resentment give the rudimentary form of\nmoral disapprobation. It is enough to excite the feelings, that the\nactions are merely _thought_ to be done by the person. They are moral\nsentiments, even although it could be supposed that there were no other\nkinds of actions in the world except actions done to ourselves; but\nthey are moral sentiments in the purely selfish form. That, for moral\nsentiment, mere liking and disliking must be combined with the desire\nto reciprocate good and evil, appears on a comparison of our different\nfeelings towards animate and inanimate causes of pleasure and pain;\nthere being towards inanimate objects no desire of reciprocation. To a\nfirst objection, that the violent sentiments, arising upon actions done\nto ourselves, should not get the temperate designation of moral\napprobation and disapprobation, he replies, that such extremes as the\npassions of gratitude and resentment must yet be identified in their\norigin with our cooler feelings, when we are mere spectators or actors.\nA second objection, that the epithet _moral_ is inapplicable to\nsentiments involving purely personal feeling, and destitute of\nsympathy, he answers, by remarking that the word _moral_, in\nphilosophy, should not eulogistically be opposed to _immoral_, but\nshould be held as neutral, and to mean 'relating to conduct, whatever\nthat conduct may be.' He closes the first head with the observation,\nthat in savage life the violent desire of reciprocation is best seen;\ngenerally, however, as he gives instances to show, in the form of\nrevenge and reciprocation of evil.\n\nIn the second place, he considers our feelings when we are spectators\nof actions done to others by others. These form the largest class of\nactions, but to us they have a meaning, for the most part at least,\nonly as they have an analogy to actions done to ourselves. The variety\nof the resulting feelings, generally less intense than when we are the\nsubjects of the actions, is illustrated first by supposing the persons\naffected to be those we love; in this case, the feelings are analogous\nto those already mentioned, and they may be even more intense than when\nwe ourselves are personally affected. If those affected are indifferent\nto us, our feelings are less intense, but we are still led to feel as\nbefore, from a natural sympathy with other men's pains and\npleasures--always supposing the sympathy is not (as often happens)\notherwise counteracted or superseded; and also from the influence of\nassociation, if that, too, happen not to be countervailed. Of sympathy\nfor human beings in general, he remarks that a certain measure of\ncivilization seems required to bring it properly out, and he cites\ninstances to prove how much it is wanting in savages. In a third case,\nwhere the persons affected are supposed to be those we hate, we are\ndispleased when they are made to rejoice, and pleased when they suffer,\nunless we are overcome by our habitual associations with good and evil\nactions. Such associations weigh least with rude and savage peoples,\nbut even the most civilized nations disregard them in times of war.\n\nHe takes up, in the third place, actions done by ourselves to others.\nHere, when the action is beneficent, the peculiarity is that an\nexpectation of receiving good in return from our neighbours takes the\nplace of a desire to reciprocate; we consider ourselves the proper\nobject of grateful thoughts, &c., on the part both of receiver and of\nspectators. We are affected with the gratification of a benevolent\ndesire, with self-complacency, and with undefined hopes. When we have\ninflicted injury, there is the expectation of evil, and a combination\nof feelings summed up in the word Remorse. But Remorse, like other\nsentiments, may fail in the absence of cultivation of mind or under\nspecial circumstances.\n\nHaving considered the three different kinds of actions separately, he\nnext remarks that the sentiment prevailing in each case must be liable\nto a reflex influence from the other cases, whereby it will be\nstrengthened or intensified; thus we come to associate certain\nintensities of moral sentiment with certain kinds of action, by\nwhomsoever or to whomsoever performed. He also notes, that in the first\nand third cases, as well as in the second, there is a variation of the\nsentiment, according as the parties affected are friends, neutrals, or\nenemies. Finally, a peculiar and important modification of the\nsentiments results from the outward manifestations of them called forth\nfrom the persons directly or indirectly affected by actions. Such are\nlooks, gestures, tones, words, or actions, being all efforts to gratify\nthe natural desire of reciprocating pleasure or pain. Of these the most\nnotable are the verbal manifestations, as they are mostly\nirrepressible, and can alone always be resorted to. While relieving the\nfeelings, they can also become a most powerful, as they are often the\nonly, instrument of reward and punishment. Their power of giving to\nmoral sentiments greater precision, and of acting upon conduct like\nauthoritative precepts, is seen in greatest force when they proceed\nfrom, bodies of men, whether they are regarded as signs of material\nconsequences or not. He ends this part of the subject by defending,\nwith Butler, the place of resentment in the moral constitution.\n\nHe proceeds to inquire how it is that not only the perfection of moral\nsentiment that would apportion more approbation and disapprobation\naccording to the real tendencies of actions, is not attained, but men's\nmoral feelings are not seldom in extreme contrariety with the real\neffects of human conduct. First, he finds that men, from partial views,\nor momentarily, or from caprice, may bestow their sentiments altogether\nat variance with the real consequences of actions. Next there is the\ndifficulty, or even impossibility, of calculating all the consequences\nfar and near; whence human conduct is liable to be appreciated on\nwhimsical grounds or on no discernible grounds at all, and errors in\nmoral sentiment arise, which it takes increased knowledge to get rid\nof. In the third place, it is a fact that our moral sentiments are to a\nvery great extent derived from tradition, while the approbation and\ndisapprobation may have originally been wrongly applied. The force of\ntradition he illustrates by supposing the case of a patriarchal family,\nand he cannot too strongly represent its strength in overcoming or at\nleast struggling against natural feeling. The authoritative precept of\na superior may also make actions be approved or disapproved, not\nbecause they are directly perceived or even traditionally held to be\nbeneficial or injurious, but solely because they are commanded or\nprohibited. Lastly, he dwells upon the influence of superstition in\nperverting moral sentiment, finding, however, that it operates most\nstrongly in the way of creating false virtues and false vices and\ncrimes.\n\nThese circumstances, explaining the want of conformity in our moral\nsentiments to the real tendencies of actions, he next employs to\naccount for discrepancies in moral sentiment between different\ncommunities. Having given examples of such discrepancies, he supposes\nthe case of two families, endowed with the rudimentary qualities\nmentioned at the beginning, but placed in different circumstances.\nUnder the influence of dissimilar physical conditions, and owing to the\ndissimilar personal idiosyncracies of the families, and especially of\ntheir chiefs, there will be left few points of complete analogy between\nthem in the first generation, and in course of time they will become\ntwo races exceedingly unlike in moral sentiment, as in other respects.\nHe warns strongly against making moral generalizations except under\nanalogous circumstances of knowledge and civilization. Most men have\nthe rudimentary feelings, but there is no end to the variety of their\nintensity and direction. As a highest instance of discrepant moral\nsentiment, he cites the fact that, in our own country, a moral stigma\nis still attached to intellectual error by many people, and even by men\nof cultivation.\n\nHe now comes to the important question of the test or criterion that is\nto determine which of these diverse sentiments are right and which\nwrong, since they cannot all be right from the mere fact of their\nexistence, or because they are felt by the subjects of them to be\nright, or believed to be in consonance with the injunctions of\nsuperiors, or to be held also by other people. The foregoing review of\nthe _genesis_ of moral sentiments suggests a direct and simple answer.\nAs they arise from likings and dislikings of actions that cause, or\ntend to cause, pleasure and pain, the first thing is to see that the\nlikings and dislikings are well founded. Where this does not at once\nappear, examination of the real effects of actions must be resorted to;\nand, in dubious cases, men in general, when unprejudiced, allow this to\nbe the natural test for applying moral approbation and disapprobation.\nIf, indeed, the end of moral sentiment is to promote or to prevent the\nactions, there can be no better way of attaining that end. And, as a\nfact, almost all moralists virtually adopt it on occasion, though often\nunconsciously; the greatest happiness--principle is denounced by its\nopponents as a _mischievous_ doctrine.\n\nThe objection that the criterion of consequences is difficult of\napplication, and thus devoid of practical utility, he rebuts by\nasserting that the difficulty is not greater than in other cases. We\nhave simply to follow effects as far as we can; and it is by its\nascertainable, not by its unascertainable, consequences, that we\npronounce an action, as we pronounce an article of food or a statute,\nto be good or bad. The main effects of most actions are already very\nwell ascertained, and the consequences to human happiness, when\nunascertainable, are of no value. If the test were honestly applied,\nethical discrepancies would tend gradually to disappear.\n\nHe starts another objection:--The happiness-test is good as far as it\ngoes, but we also approve and disapprove of actions as they are just or\ngenerous, or the contrary, and with no reference to happiness or\nunhappiness. In answering this argument, he confines himself to the\ncase of Justice. To be morally approved, a just action must in itself\nbe peculiarly pleasant or agreeable, irrespective of its other effects,\nwhich are left out: for on no theory can pleasantness or agreeableness\nbe dissociated from moral approbation. Now, as Happiness is but a\ngeneral appellation for all the agreeable affections of our nature, and\nunable to exist except in the shape of some agreeable emotion or\ncombinations of agreeable emotions; the just action that is morally\ncommendable, as giving naturally and directly a peculiar kind of\npleasure independent of any other consequences, only produces one\nspecies of those pleasant states of mind that are ranged under the\ngenus happiness. The test of justice therefore coincides with the\nhappiness-test. But he does not mean that we are actually affected\nthus, in doing just actions, nor refuse to accept justice as a\ncriterion of actions; only in the one case he maintains that, whatever\nassociation may have effected, the just act must originally have been\napproved for the sake of its consequences, and, in the other, that\njustice is a criterion, because proved over and over again to be a most\nbeneficial principle.\n\nAfter remarking that the Moral Sentiments of praise and blame may enter\ninto accidental connection with, other feelings of a distinct\ncharacter, like pity, wonder, &c., he criticises the use of the word\n_Utility_ in Morals. He avoids the term as objectionable, because the\n_useful_ in common language does not mean what is directly productive\nof happiness, but only what is instrumental in its production, and in\nmost cases customarily or recurrently instrumental. A blanket is of\ncontinual utility to a poor wretch through a severe winter, but the\nbenevolent act of the donor is not termed useful, because it confers\nthe benefit and ceases. Utility is too narrow to comprehend all the\nactions that deserve approbation. We want an uncompounded substantive\nexpressing the two attributes of _conferring_ and _conducing to_\nhappiness; as a descriptive phrase, _producing_ happiness is as\nsuccinct as any. The term useful is, besides, associated with the\nnotion of what is serviceable in the affairs and objects of common\nlife, whence the philosophical doctrine that erects utility as its\nbanner is apt to be deemed, by the unthinking, low, mean, and\nderogatory to human nature and aspirations, although its real import is\nwholly free from such a reproach. Notwithstanding, therefore, the\nconvenience of the term, and because the associations connected with it\nare not easily eradicated, whilst most of the trite objections to the\ntrue doctrine of morals turn upon its narrow meanings, he thinks it\nshould be as much as possible disused.\n\nMr. Bailey ends by remarking of the common question, whether our moral\nsentiments have their origin in Reason, or in a separate power called\nthe Moral Sense, that in his view of man's sensitive and intellectual\nnature it is easily settled. He recognizes the feelings that have been\nenumerated, and, in connexion with them, intellectual processes of\ndiscerning and inferring; for which, if the Moral Sense and Reason are\nmeant as anything more than unnecessary general expressions, they are\nmerely fictitious entities. So, too, Conscience, whether as identified\nwith the moral sense, or put for sensibility in regard to the moral\nqualities of one's own mind, is a mere personification of certain\nmental states. The summary of Bailey's doctrine falls within the two\nfirst heads.\n\nI.--The Standard is the production of Happiness. [It should be\nremarked, however, that happiness is a wider aim than morality;\nalthough all virtue tends to produce happiness, very much that produces\nhappiness is not virtue.]\n\nII.--The Moral Faculty, while involving processes of discernment and\ninference, is mainly composed of certain sentiments, the chief being\nReciprocity and Sympathy. [These are undoubtedly the largest\ningredients in a mature, self-acting conscience; and the way that they\ncontribute to the production of moral sentiment deserved to be, as it\nhas been, well handled. The great omission in Mr. Bailey's account is\nthe absence of the element of _authority_, which is the main instrument\nin imparting to us the sense of obligation.]\n\n\nHERBERT SPENCER.\n\nMr. Spencer's ethical doctrines are, as yet, nowhere fully expressed.\nThey form part of the more general doctrine of Evolution which he is\nengaged in working out; and they are at present to be gathered only\nfrom scattered passages. It is true that, in his first work, _Social\nStatics_ he presented what he then regarded as a tolerably complete\nview of one division of Morals. But without abandoning this view, he\nnow regards it as inadequate--more especially in respect of its basis.\n\nMr. Spencer's conception of Morality as a science, is conveyed in the\nfollowing passages in a letter written by him to Mr. Mill; repudiating\nthe title anti-utilitarian, which Mr. Mill had applied to him:--\n\n'The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly classing me\nwith Anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as an\nAnti-utilitarian. My dissent from the doctrine of Utility as commonly\nunderstood, concerns not the object to be reached by men, but the\nmethod of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end\nto be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end.\nThe Expediency-Philosophy having concluded that happiness is a thing to\nbe achieved, assumes that Morality has no other business than\nempirically to generalize the results of conduct, and to supply for the\nguidance of conduct nothing more than its empirical generalizations.\n\nBut the view for which I contend is, that Morality properly so\ncalled--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine\n_how_ and _why_ certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain\nother modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be\naccidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of\nthings; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to\ndeduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what\nkinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds\nto produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be\nrecognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective\nof a direct estimation of happiness or misery.\n\n'Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its early\nstages, planetary Astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated\nobservations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and\nplanets; from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be\nempirically predicted, with an approach to truth, that certain of the\nheavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times. But the\nmodern science of planetary Astronomy consists of deductions from the\nlaw of gravitation--deductions showing why the celestial bodies\n_necessarily_ occupy certain places at certain times. Now, the kind of\nrelation which thus exists between ancient and modern Astronomy, is\nanalogous to the kind of relation which, I conceive, exists between the\nExpediency-Morality, and Moral Science properly so-called. And the\nobjection which I have to the current Utilitarianism, is, that it\nrecognizes no more developed form of morality--does not see that it has\nreached but the initial stage of Moral Science.\n\n'To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that,\ncorresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral\nScience, there have been, and still are, developing in the race,\ncertain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral\nintuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility,\ngradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite\nindependent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I\nbelieve the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to\nhave arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all\nantecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developed\nnervous organizations--just as I believe that this intuition, requiring\nonly to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has\npractically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of\nexperience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility organised\nand consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have\nbeen producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued\ntransmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of\nmoral intuition--certain emotions responding to right and wrong\nconduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of\nutility. I also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the\nexact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions\ninterpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to\nthe demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough\nconclusions interpreted and verified by them.'\n\nThe relations between the Expediency-Morality, and Moral Science,\nconceived by Mr. Spencer to be, the one transitional, and the other\nultimate, are further explained in the following passage from his essay\non 'Prison-Ethics':--\n\n'Progressing civilization, which is of necessity a succession of\ncompromises between old and new, requires a perpetual re-adjustment of\nthe compromise between the ideal and the practicable in social\narrangements: to which end both elements of the compromise must be kept\nin view. If it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of\nthings far too good for men as they are; it is not less true that mere\nexpediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any\nbetter than that which exists. While absolute morality owes to\nexpediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into utopian\nabsurdities; expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all\nstimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in\nascertaining what is _relatively right_; it still follows that we must\nfirst consider what is _absolutely right_; since the one conception\npresupposes the other. That is to say, though we must ever aim to do\nwhat is best for the present times, yet we must ever bear in mind what\nis abstractedly best; so that the changes we make may be _towards_ it,\nand not _away_ from it.'\n\nBy the word _absolute_ as thus applied, Mr. Spencer does not mean to\nimply a right and wrong existing apart from Humanity and its relations.\nAgreeing with Utilitarians in the belief that happiness is the end, and\nthat the conduct called moral is simply the best means of attaining it,\nhe of course does not assert that there is a morality which is absolute\nin the sense of being true out of relation to human existence. By\nabsolute morality as distinguished from relative, he here means the\nmode of conduct which, under the conditions arising from social union,\nmust be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all. He\nholds, that the laws of Life, physiologically considered, being fixed,\nit necessarily follows that when a number of individuals have to live\nin social union, which necessarily involves fixity of conditions in the\nshape of mutual interferences and limitations, there result certain\nfixed principles by which conduct must be restricted, before the\ngreatest sum of happiness can be achieved. These principles constitute\nwhat Mr. Spencer distinguishes as absolute Morality; and the absolutely\nmoral man is the man who conforms to these principles, not by external\ncoercion nor self-coercion, but who acts them out spontaneously.\n\nTo be fully understood, this conception must be taken along with the\ngeneral theory of Evolution. Mr. Spencer argues that all things\nwhatever are inevitably tending towards equilibrium; and that\nconsequently the progress of mankind cannot cease until there is\nequilibrium between the human constitution and the conditions of human\nexistence. Or, as he argues in _First Principles_ (Second Edition, p.\n512), 'The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his\nexistence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as\nfeelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter.\nAnd the establishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of\nhuman nature and social organization, such that the individual has no\ndesires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper\nsphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which\nthe individual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension of the\nliberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of political\nrestrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And\nthe ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those\nimposed by the like freedom of all, must, result from the complete\nequilibration between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by\nsurrounding conditions.'\n\nThe conduct proper to such a state, which Mr. Spencer thus conceives to\nbe the subject-matter of Moral Science, truly so-called, he proposes,\nin the Prospectus to his _System of Philosophy_, to treat under the\nfollowing heads.\n\nPERSONAL MORALS.--The principles of private conduct--physical,\nintellectual, moral, and religious--that follow from the conditions to\ncomplete individual life; or, what is the same thing, those modes of\nprivate action which must result from the eventual equilibration of\ninternal desires and external needs.\n\nJUSTICE.--The mutual limitation of men's actions necessitated by their\nco-existence as units of a society--limitations, the perfect observance\nof which constitutes that state of equilibrium forming the goal of\npolitical progress.\n\nNEGATIVE BENEFICENCE.--Those secondary limitations, similarly\nnecessitated, which, though less important and not cognizable by law,\nare yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness in various\nindirect ways: in other words--those minor self-restraints dictated by\nwhat may be called passive sympathy.\n\nPOSITIVE BENEFICENCE.--Comprehending all modes of conduct, dictated by\nactive sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving pleasure--modes of\nconduct that social adaptation has induced and must render ever more\ngeneral; and which, in becoming universal, must fill to the full the\npossible measure of human happiness.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis completes the long succession of British moralists during the\nthree last centuries. It has been possible, and even necessary, to\npresent them thus in an unbroken line, because the insular movement in\nethical philosophy has been hardly, if at all, affected by anything\ndone abroad. In the earlier part of the modern period, little of any\nkind was done in ethics by the great continental thinkers. Descartes\nhas only a few allusions to the subject; the 'Ethica' of Spinoza is\nchiefly a work of speculative philosophy; Leibnitz has no systematic\ntreatment of moral questions. The case is very different; in the new\nGerman philosophy since the time of Kant; besides Kant himself, Fichte,\nHegel, Schleiermacher, and many later and contemporary thinkers having\ndevoted a large amount of attention to practical philosophy. But unless\nit be Kant--and he not to any great extent--none of these has\ninfluenced the later attempts at ethical speculation amongst ourselves:\nnor, again with the exception of Kant, are we as yet in a position\nproperly to deal with them. One reason, for proceeding to expound the\nethical system of the founder of the later German philosophy, without\nregard to his successors, lies in the fact that he stood, on the\npractical side, in as definite a relation to the English moralists of\nlast century, as, in his speculative philosophy, to Locke and Hume.\n\nIMMANUEL, KANT. [1724-1804.]\n\nThe ethical writings of Kant, in the order of their appearance,\nare--_Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals_ (1785); _Critique of the\nPractical Reason_ (1788); _Metaphysic of Morals_ (1797, in two\nparts--(1) _Doctrine of Right_ or Jurisprudence, (2) _Doctrine of\nVirtue_ or Ethics proper). The third work contains the details of his\nsystem; the general theory is presented in the two others. Of these we\nselect for analysis the earlier, containing, as it does, in less\nartificial form, an ampler discussion of the fundamental questions of\nmorals; but towards the end it must be supplemented, in regard to\ncertain characteristic doctrines, from the second, in some respects\nmore developed, work.[26]\n\n\nIn the introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant distinguishes\nbetween the empirical and the rational mode of treating Ethics. He\nannounces his intention to depart from the common plan of mixing up the\ntwo together, and to attempt for once to set forth the _pure_ moral\nphilosophy that is implied even in the vulgar ideas of duty and moral\nlaw. Because a moral law means an absolute necessity laid on all\nrational beings whatever, its foundation is to be sought, not in human\nnature or circumstances, but _\u00e0 priori_ in the conception of pure\nreason. The most universal precept founded on mere experience is only a\npractical rule, and never a moral law. A purely rational moral\nphilosophy, or Metaphysic of Morals, will serve the double end of\nmeeting a speculative requirement, and of furnishing the only true norm\nof practice. It investigates the idea and principles of a potentially\npure Will, instead of the acts and conditions of human volition as\nknown from psychology. Not a complete Metaphysic of Morals, however,\n(which would be a Critique of the pure Practical Reason), but merely a\nfoundation for such will be given. The supreme principle of morality is\nto be established, apart from detailed application. First, common\nnotions will be analyzed in order to get at this highest principle; and\nthen, when the principle has been sought out, they will be returned\nupon by way of synthesis.\n\nIn the first of the three main sections of the work, he makes the\npassage from Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to Philosophical.\nNothing in the world, he begins, can without qualification be called\ngood, except _Will_. Qualities of temperament, like courage, &c., gifts\nof fortune, like wealth and power, are good only with reference to a\ngood will. As to a good will, when it is really such, the circumstance\nthat it can, or cannot, be executed does not matter; its value is\nindependent of the utility or fruitlessness of it.\n\nThis idea of the absolute worth of mere Will, though it is allowed even\nby the vulgar understanding, he seeks to establish beyond dispute, by\nan argument from the natural _subjection_ of Will to Reason. In a being\nwell-organized, if Conservation or Happiness were the grand aim, such\nsubjection would be a great mistake. When Instinct could do the work\nfar better and more surely, Reason should have been deprived of all\npractical function. Discontent, in fact, rather than happiness comes of\npursuit of mere enjoyment by rational calculation; and to make light of\nthe part contributed by Reason to happiness, is really to make out that\nit exists for a nobler purpose. But now, since Reason _is_ a practical\nfaculty and governs the will, its function can only be to produce a\nWill good in itself. Such a Will, if not the only good, is certainly\nthe highest; and happiness, unattainable by Reason as a primary aim,\nand subject in this life altogether to much limitation, is to be sought\nonly in the contentment that arises from the attainment by Reason of\nits true aim, at the sacrifice often of many a natural inclination.\n\nHe proceeds to develop this conception of a Will in itself good and\nestimable, by dealing with the commonly received ideas of Duty. Leaving\naside profitable actions that are plain violations of duty, and also\nactions conformed to duty, but, while not prompted directly by nature,\ndone from some special inclination--in which case it is easy to\ndistinguish whether the action is done from duty or from self-interest;\nhe considers those more difficult cases where the same action is at\nonce duty, and prompted by direct natural inclination. In all such,\nwhether it be duty of self-preservation, of benevolence, of securing\none's own happiness (this last a duty, because discontent and the\npressure of care may easily lead to the transgression of other duties),\nhe lays it down that the action is not allowed to have true moral\nvalue, unless done in the abeyance or absence of the natural\ninclination prompting to it. A second position is, that the moral value\nof an action done from duty lies not in the intention of it, but in the\nmaxim that determines it; not in the object, but in the _principle of\nVolition_. That is to say, in action done out of regard to duty, the\nwill must be determined by its _formal \u00e0 priori_ principle, not being\ndetermined by any _material \u00e0 posteriori_ motive. A third position\nfollows then from the other two; Duty is the necessity of an action out\nof respect for Law. Towards an object there may be inclination, and\nthis inclination may be matter for approval or liking; but it is Law\nonly--the ground and not the effect of Volition, bearing down\ninclination rather than serving it--that can inspire _Respect_. When\ninclination and motives are both excluded, nothing remains to determine\nWill, except Law objectively; and, subjectively, pure respect for a law\nof practice--_i.e._, the maxim to follow such a law, even at the\nsacrifice of every inclination. The conception of Law-in-itself alone\ndetermining the will, is, then, the surpassing good that is called\nmoral, which exists already in a man before his action has any result.\nConformity to Law in general, all special motive to follow any single\nlaw being excluded, remains as the one principle of Volition: I am\nnever to act otherwise, than so as to be able also to wish that my\nmaxim (_i.e._, my subjective principle of volition) should become a\nuniversal law. This is what he finds implied in the common notions of\nDuty.\n\nHaving illustrated at length this reading, in regard to the duty of\nkeeping a promise, he contrasts, at the close of the section, the all\nbut infallibility of common human reason in practice with its\nhelplessness in speculation. Notwithstanding, it finds itself unable to\nsettle the contending claims of Reason and Inclination, and so is\ndriven to devise a practical philosophy, owing to the rise of a\n'Natural Dialectic' or tendency to refine upon the strict laws of duty\nin order to make them more pleasant. But, as in the speculative region,\nthe Dialectic cannot be properly got rid of without a complete Critique\nof Reason.\n\nIn Section II. the passage is made from the popular moral philosophy\nthus arising to the metaphysic of morals. He denies that the notion of\nduty that has been taken above from common sage is empirical. It is\nproved not to be such from the very assertions of philosophers that men\nalways act from more or less refined self-love; assertions that are\nfounded upon the difficulty of proving that acts most apparently\nconformed to duty are really such. The fact is, no act _can_ be proved\nby experience to be absolutely moral, _i.e._, done solely from regard\nto duty, to the exclusion of all inclination; and therefore to concede\nthat morality and duty are ideas to be had from experience, is the\nsurest way to get rid of them altogether. Duty, and respect for its\nlaw, are not to be preserved at all, unless Reason is allowed to lay\n_absolute_ injunctions on the will, whatever experience says of their\nnon-execution. How, indeed, is experience to disclose a moral law,\nthat, in applying to all rational beings as well as men, and to men\nonly as rational, must originate _\u00e0 priori_ in pure (practical) Reason?\nInstead of yielding the principles of morality, empirical examples of\nmoral conduct have rather to be judged by these.\n\nAll supreme principles of morality, that are genuine, must rest on pure\nReason solely; and the mistake of the popular practical philosophies in\nvogue, one and all--whether advancing as their principle a special\ndetermination of human nature, or Perfection, or Happiness, or Moral\nFeeling, or Fear of God, or a little of this and a little of that--is\nthat there has been no previous consideration whether the principles of\nmorality are to be sought for in our empirical knowledge of human\nnature at all. Such consideration would have shown them to be\naltogether _\u00e0 priori_, and would have appeared as a _pure_ practical\nphilosophy or metaphysic of morals (upon the completion of which any\npopularizing might have waited), kept free from admixture of\nAnthropology, Theology, Physics, Hyperphysics, &c., and setting forth\nthe conception of Duty as purely rational, without the confusion of\nempirical motives. To a metaphysic of this kind, Kant is now to ascend\nfrom the popular philosophy, with its stock-in-trade of single\ninstances, following out the practical faculty of Reason from the\ngeneral rules determining it, to the point where the conception of Duty\nemerges.\n\nWhile things in nature work according to laws, rational beings alone\ncan act according to a conceived idea of laws, _i.e._, to principles.\nThis is to have a Will, or, what is the same, Practical Reason, reason\nbeing required in deducing actions from laws. If the Will follows\nReason exactly and without fail, actions objectively necessary are\nnecessary also subjectively; if, through subjective conditions\n(inclinations, &c.), the Will does not follow Reason inevitably,\nobjectively necessary actions become subjectively contingent, and\ntowards the objective laws the attitude of the will is no longer\nunfailing choice, but _constraint_. A constraining objective principle\nmentally represented, is a _command_; its formula is called\n_Imperative_, for which the expression is _Ought_. A will perfectly\ngood--_i.e._, subjectively determined to follow the objective laws of\ngood as soon as conceived--knows no Ought. Imperatives are only for an\nimperfect, such as is the human, will. _Hypothetical_ Imperatives\nrepresent the practical necessity of an action as a means to an end,\nbeing _problematical_ or _assertory_ principles, according as the end\nis possible or real. _Categorical_ Imperatives represent an action as\nobjectively necessary for itself, and count as _apodeictical_\nprinciples.\n\nTo the endless number of possible aims of human action correspond as\nmany Imperatives, directing merely how they are to be attained, without\nany question of their value; these are Imperatives of _Fitness_. To one\nreal aim, existing necessarily for all rational beings, viz.,\nHappiness, corresponds the Imperative of _Prudence_ (in the narrow\nsense), being assertory while hypothetical. The categorical Imperative,\nenjoining a mode of action for itself, and concerned about the form and\nprinciple of it, not its nature and result, is the Imperative of\n_Morality_. These various kinds of Imperatives, as influencing the\nwill, may be distinguished as _Rules_ (of fitness), _Counsels_ (of\nprudence), _Commands_ or _Laws_ (of morality); also as _technical,\npragmatical, moral_.\n\nNow, as to the question of the possibility of these different\nImperatives--how they can be supposed able to influence or act upon the\nWill--there is in the first case no difficulty; in wishing an end it is\nnecessarily implied that we wish the indispensable means, when this is\nin our power. In like manner, the Imperatives of Prudence are also\n_analytical_ in character (_i.e._, given by implication), if only it\nwere possible to have a definite idea of the end sought, viz.,\nhappiness. But, in fact, with the elements of happiness to be got from\nexperience at the same time that the idea requires an absolute whole,\nor maximum, of satisfaction now and at every future moment, no finite\nbeing can know precisely what he wants, or what may be the effect of\nany of his wishes. Action, on fixed principles, with a view to\nhappiness, is, therefore, not possible; and one can only follow\nempirical directions, about Diet, Frugality, Politeness, &c., seen on\nthe whole to promote it. Although, however, there is no certainty of\ncausing happiness, and the Imperatives with reference thereto are mere\ncounsels, they retain their character of analytical propositions, and\ntheir action on the will is not less possible than in the former case.\n\nTo prove the possibility of the Imperative of morality is more\ndifficult. As categorical, it presupposes nothing else to rest its\nnecessity upon; while by way of experience, it can never be made out to\nbe more than a prudential precept--_i.e._, a pragmatic or hypothetic\nprinciple. Its possibility must therefore be established _\u00e0 priori_.\nBut the difficulty will then appear no matter of wonder, when it is\nremembered (from the Critique of Pure Reason) how hard it is to\nestablish synthetic propositions _\u00e0 priori_.\n\nThe question of the possibility, however, meanwhile postponed, the mere\nconception of a categorical Imperative is found to yield the one\nformula that can express it, from its not being dependent, like a\nhypothetical Imperative, on any external condition. Besides the Law (or\nobjective principle of conduct), the only thing implied in the\nImperative being the necessity laid upon the _Maxim_ (or subjective\nprinciple) to conform to the law--a law limited by no condition; there\nis nothing for the maxim to be conformed to but the universality of a\nlaw in general, and it is the conformity alone that properly\nconstitutes the Imperative necessary. The Imperative is thus single,\nand runs: _Act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the\nsame time to become a_ _universal law_. Or, since universality of law\nas determining effects is what we understand by nature: _Act as if the\nmaxim of your action ought by your will to become the universal law of\nnature_.\n\nTaking cases of duties according to the common divisions of duties to\nourselves and to others, perfect and imperfect, he proceeds to show\nthat they may be all deduced from the single Imperative; the question\nof the _reality_ of duty, which is the same as the establishment of the\npossibility of the Imperative as a synthetic practical proposition _\u00e0\npriori_, at present altogether apart. Suppose a man tempted to commit\nsuicide, with the view of bettering his evil condition; but it is\ncontradictory that the very principle of self-conservation should lead\nto self-destruction, and such a maxim of conduct cannot therefore\nbecome a universal law of nature. Next, the case of a man borrowing\nwithout meaning to repay, has only to be turned into a universal law,\nand the thing becomes impossible; nobody would lend. Again, to neglect\na talent that is generally useful for mere ease and self-gratification,\ncan indeed be supposed a universal practice, but can never be wished to\nbe. Finally, to refuse help to others universally might not ruin the\nrace, but can be wished by no one that knows how soon he must himself\nneed assistance. Now, the rule was, that a maxim of conduct should be\n_wished_ to become the universal law. In the last two cases, it cannot\nbe wished; in the others, the maxim cannot even be conceived in\nuniversal form. Thus, two grades of duty, one admitting of merit, the\nother so strict as to be irremissible, are established on the general\nprinciple. The principle is moreover confirmed in the case of\ntransgression of duty: the transgressor by no means wishes to have his\nact turned into a general rule, but only seeks special and temporary\nexemption from a law allowed by himself to be universal.\n\nNotwithstanding this force and ease of application, a categorical\nImperative has not yet been proved _\u00e0 priori_ actually existent; and it\nwas allowed that it could not be proved empirically, elements of\ninclination, interest, &c., being inconsistent with morality. The real\nquestion is this: Is it a necessary law that all rational beings should\nact on maxims that they can wish, to become universal laws? If so, this\nmust be bound up with the very notion of the will of a rational being;\nthe relation of the will to itself being to be determined _\u00e0 priori_ by\npure Reason. The Will is considered as a power of self-determination to\nact according to certain laws as represented to the mind, existing only\nin rational beings. And, if the objective ground of self-determination,\nor _End_, is supplied by mere Reason, it must be the same for all\nrational beings. _Ends_ may be divided into _Subjective_, resting upon\nindividual _Impulses_ or subjective grounds of desire; and _Objective_,\ndepending on _Motives_ or objective grounds of Volition valid for all\nrational beings. The principles of action are, in the one case,\n_Material_, and, in the other, _Formal, i.e._, abstracted from all\nsubjective ends. Material ends, as relative, beget only hypothetical\nImperatives. But, supposed some thing, the presence of which in itself\nhas an absolute value, and which, as End-in-self, can be a ground of\nfixed laws; there, and there only, can be the ground of a possible\ncategorical Imperative, or Law of Practice.\n\nNow, such an End-in-self (not a thing with merely conditional value,--a\nmeans to be used arbitrarily) is Man and every rational being, as\n_Person_. There is no other objective end with absolute value that can\nsupply to the Reason the supreme practical principle requisite for\nturning subjective principles of action into objective principles of\nvolition. Rational Nature as End-in-self is a subjective principle to a\nman having this conception of his own being, but becomes objective when\nevery rational being has the same from the same ground in Reason. Hence\na new form (the second) to the practical Imperative: _Act so as to use\nHumanity (Human Nature) as well in your own person, as in the person of\nanother, ever as end also, and never merely as means_.\n\nTo this new formula, the old examples are easily squared. Suicide is\nusing one's person as a mere means to a tolerable existence; breaking\nfaith to others is using them as means, not as ends-in-self; neglect of\nself-cultivation is the not furthering human nature as end-in-self in\none's own person; withholding help is refusing to further Humanity as\nend-in-self through the medium of the aims of others. [In a note he\ndenies that 'the trivial, Do to others as you would,' &c., is a full\nexpression of the law of duty: it contains the ground, neither of\nduties to self; nor of duties of benevolence to others, for many would\nforego receiving good on conditions of not conferring it; nor of the\nduty of retribution, for the malefactor could turn it against his\njudge, &c.]\n\nThe universality of this principle of Human and Rational Nature as\nEnd-in-self, as also its character of objective end limiting merely\nsubjective ends, prove that its source is in pure Reason. Objectively,\nthe ground of all practical legislation is Rule and the Form of\nUniversality that enables rule to be Law (of Nature), according to\nprinciple first (in its double form); subjectively, it is End, the\nsubject of all ends being every rational being as End-in-self,\naccording to principle second. Hence follows the third practical\nprinciple of the Will, as supreme condition of its agreement with\nuniversal practical Reason--_the idea of the Will of every rational\nbeing as a Will that legislates universally_. The Will, if subject to\nlaw, has first itself imposed it.\n\nThis new idea--of the Will of every rational being as universally\nlegislative--is what, in the implication of the Categorical Imperative,\nspecifically marks it off from any Hypothetical: Interest is seen to be\nquite incompatible with Duty, if Duty is Volition of this kind. A will\nmerely subject to laws can be bound to them by interest; not so a will\nitself legislating supremely, for that would imply another law to keep\nthe interest of self-love from trenching upon the validity of the\nuniversal law. Illustration is not needed to prove that a Categorical\nImperative, or law for the will of every rational being, if it exist at\nall, cannot exclude Interest and be unconditional, except as enjoining\neverything to be done from the maxim of a will that in legislating\nuniversally can have itself for object. This is the point that has been\nalways missed, that the laws of duty shall be at once self-imposed and\nyet universal. Subjection to a law not springing from one's own will\nimplies interest or constraint, and constitutes a certain necessity of\naction, but never makes Duty. Be the interest one's own or another's,\nthe Imperative is conditional only. Kant's principle is the _Autonomy\nof the Will_; every other its _Heteronomy_.\n\nThe new point of view opens up the very fruitful conception of an\n_Empire_ or _Realm of Ends_. As a Realm is the systematic union of\nrational beings by means of common laws, so the ends determined by the\nlaws may, abstractly viewed, be taken to form a systematic whole.\nRational beings, as subject to a law requiring them to treat themselves\nand others as ends and never merely as means, enter into a systematic\nunion by means of common objective laws, _i.e._ into an (ideal) Empire\nor Realm of Ends, from the laws being concerned about the mutual\nrelations of rational beings as Ends and Means. In this Realm, a\nrational being is either Head or Member: Head, if legislating\nuniversally and with complete independence; Member, if also\nuniversally, but at the same time subject to the laws. When now the\nmaxim of the will does not by nature accord necessarily with the demand\nof the objective principle--that the will through its maxim be able to\nregard itself at the same time as legislating; universally--a practical\nconstraint is exerted by the principle, which is _Duty_, lying on every\nMember in the Realm of Ends (not on the Head) alike. This necessity of\npractice reposes, not on feeling, impulse, or inclination, but on the\nrelation between rational beings arising from the fact that each, as\nEnd-in-self, legislates universally. The Reason gives a universal\napplication to every maxim of the Will; not from any motive of\ninterest, but from the idea of the _Dignity_ of a rational being that\nfollows no law that it does not itself at the same time give.\n\nEverything in the Realm of Ends has either a _Price_ or a _Dignity_.\nSkill, Diligence, &c., bearing on human likings and needs, have a\n_Market-price_; Qualities like Wit, Fancy, &c., appealing to Taste or\nEmotional Satisfaction, have an _Affection-price_. But Morality, the\nonly way of being End-in-self, and legislating member in the Realm of\nEnds, has an intrinsic _Worth or Dignity_, calculable in nothing else.\nIts worth is not in results, but in dispositions of Will; its actions\nneed neither recommendation from a subjective disposition or taste, nor\nprompting from immediate tendency or feeling. Being laid on the Will by\nReason, they make the Will, in the execution, the object of an\nimmediate _Respect_, testifying to a Dignity beyond all price. The\ngrounds of these lofty claims in moral goodness and virtue are the\nparticipation by a rational being in the universal legislation, fitness\nto be a member in a possible Realm of Ends, subjection only to\nself-imposed laws. Nothing having value but as the law confers it, an\nunconditional, incomparable worth attaches to the giving of the law,\nand _Respect_ is the only word that expresses a rational being's\nappreciation of that. Autonomy is thus the foundation of the dignity of\nhuman and of all rational nature.\n\nThe three different expressions that have been given to the one general\nprinciple of morality imply each the others, and differ merely in their\nmode of presenting one idea of the Reason to the mind. _Universal\napplication of the Maxim of Conduct, as if it were a law of nature_, is\nthe formula of the Will as absolutely good; _universal prohibition\nagainst the use of rational beings ever as means only_, has reference\nto the fact that a good will in a rational being is an altogether\nindependent and ultimate End, an End-in-self in all; _universal\nlegislation of each for all_ recognizes the prerogative or special\ndignity of rational beings, that they necessarily take their maxims\nfrom the point of view of all, and must regard themselves, being\nEnds-in-self, as members in a Realm of Ends (analogous to the Realm, or\nKingdom of Nature), which, though merely an ideal and possible\nconception, none the less really imposes an imperative upon action.\n_Morality_, he concludes, is _the relation of actions to the Autonomy\nof the Will_, _i.e._, to possible universal legislation through its\nmaxims. Actions that can co-exist with this autonomy are _allowed_; all\nothers are not. A will, whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws\nof Autonomy, is holy, or absolutely good; the dependence of a will not\nthus absolutely good is _Obligation_. The objective necessity of an\naction from obligation is _Duty. Subjection to law_ is not the only\nelement in duty; the fact of the law being self-imposed gives\n_Dignity_.\n\nThe Autonomy of the will is its being a law to itself, without respect\nto the objects of volition; the principle of autonomy is to choose only\nin such a way as that the maxims of choice are conceived at the same\ntime as a universal law. This rule cannot be proved analytically to be\nan Imperative, absolutely binding on every will; as a synthetic\nproposition it requires, besides a knowledge of the objects, a critique\nof the subject, _i.e._, pure practical Reason, before, in its\napodeictic character, it can be proved completely _\u00e0 priori_. Still the\nmere analysis of moral conceptions has sufficed to prove it the sole\nprinciple of morals, because this principle is seen to be a categorical\nImperative, and a categorical Imperative enjoins neither more nor less\nthan this Autonomy. If, then, Autonomy of Will is the supreme\nprinciple, Heteronomy is the source of all ungenuine principles, of\nMorality. Heteronomy is whenever the Will does not give itself laws,\nbut some object, in relation to the Will, gives them. There is then\nnever more than a hypothetical Imperative: I am to do something because\nI wish something else.\n\nThere follows a division and criticism of the various possible\nprinciples of morality that can be set up on the assumption of\nHeteronomy, and that have been put forward by human Reason in default\nof the required Critique of its pure use. Such, are either _Empirical_\nor _Rational_. The Empirical, embodying the principle of _Happiness_,\nare founded on (1) _physical_ or (2) _moral feeling_; the Rational,\nembodying the principle of _perfection_, on (1) the rational conception\nof it as a possible result, or (2) the conception of an independent\nperfection (the Will of God), as the determining cause of the will. The\nEmpirical principles are altogether to be rejected, because they can\ngive no universal law for all rational beings; of the Rational\nprinciples, the first, though setting up an empty and indefinite\nconception, has the merit of at least making an appeal from sense to\npure reason. But the fatal objection to all four is their implying\nHeteronomy; no imperative founded on them can utter moral, _i.e._,\ncategorical commands.\n\nThat the absolutely good Will must be autonomous--_i.e._, without any\nkind of motive or interest, lay Commands on itself that are at the same\ntime fit to be laws for all rational beings, appears, then, from a\ndeeper consideration of even the popular conceptions of morality. But\nnow the question can no longer be put off: Is Morality, of which this\nis the only conception, a reality or a phantom? All the different\nexpressions given to the Categorical Imperatives are synthetic\npractical propositions _a priori_; they postulate a possible synthetic\nuse of the pure practical reason. Is there, and how is there, such a\npossible synthetic use? This is the question (the same as the other)\nthat Kant proceeds to answer in the Third Section, by giving, in\ndefault of a complete Critique of the faculty, as much as is necessary\nfor the purpose. But here, since he afterwards undertook the full\nCritique, it is better to stop the analysis of the earlier work, and\nsummarily draw upon both for the remainder of the argument, and the\nrather because some important points have to be added that occur only\nin the later treatise. The foregoing is a sufficient example of his\nmethod of treatment.\n\nThe synthetic use of the pure practical reason, in the Categorical\nImperative, is legitimized; Autonomy of the Will is explained; Duty is\nshown to be no phantom--through the conception of Freedom of Will,\nproperly understood. Theoretically (speculatively), Freedom is\nundemonstrable; being eternally met, in one of the (cosmological)\nAntinomies of the Pure Reason, by the counter-assertion that everything\nin the universe takes place according to unchanging laws of nature.\nEven theoretically, however, Freedom is not inconceivable, and morally\nwe become certain of it; for we are conscious of the 'ought' of duty,\nand with the 'ought' there must go a 'can.' It is not, however, as\nPhenomenon or Sensible Ens that a man 'can,' is free, has an absolute\ninitiative; all phenomena or Sensible Entia, being in space and time,\nare subject to the Natural Law of Causality. But man is also Noumenon,\nThing-in-self, Intelligible Ens; and as such, being free from\nconditions of time and space, stands outside of the sequence of Nature.\nNow, the Noumenon or Ens of the Reason (he assumes) stands higher than,\nor has a value above, the Phenomenon or Sensible Ens (as much as Reason\nstands higher than Sense and Inclination); accordingly, while it is\nonly man as Noumenon that 'can,' it is to man as Phenomenon that the\n'ought' is properly addressed; it is upon man as Phenomenon that the\nlaw of Duty, prescribed, with perfect freedom from motive, by Man as\nNoumenon, is laid.\n\n_Freedom of Will_ in Man as Rational End or Thing-in-self is thus the\ngreat Postulate of the pure Practical Reason; we can be sure of the\nfact (although it must always remain speculatively undemonstrable),\nbecause else there could be no explanation of the Categorical\nImperative of Duty. But inasmuch as the Practical Reason, besides\nenjoining a law of Duty, must provide also a final end of action in the\nidea of an unconditioned Supreme Good, it contains also two other\nPostulates: Man being a sentient as well as a rational being, Happiness\nas well as Perfect Virtue or Moral Perfection must enter into the\nSummum Bonum (not, one of them to the exclusion of the other, as the\nStoics and Epicureans, in different senses, declared). Now, since there\nis no such necessary conjunction of the two in nature, it must be\nsought otherwise. It is found in postulating _Immortality_ and _God_.\n\n_Immortality_ is required to render possible the attainment of moral\nperfection. Virtue out of _respect_ for law, with a constant tendency\nto fall away, is all that is attainable in life. The _Holiness_, or\ncomplete accommodation of the will to the Moral Law, implied in the\nSummum Bonum, can be attained to only in the course of an infinite\nprogression; which means personal Immortality. [As in the former case,\nthe _speculative_ impossibility of proving the immateriality, &c., of\nthe supernatural soul is not here overcome; but Immortality is\n_morally_ certain, being demanded by the Practical Reason.]\n\nMoral perfection thus provided for, _God_ must be postulated in order\nto find the ground of the required conjunction of Felicity. Happiness\nis the condition of the rational being in whose whole existence\neverything goes according to wish and will; and this is not the\ncondition of man, for in him observance of the moral law is not\nconjoined with power of disposal over the laws of nature. But, as\nPractical Reason demands the conjunction, it is to be found only in a\nbeing who is the author at once of Nature and of the Moral Law; and\nthis is God. [The same remark once more applies, that here what is\nobtained is a _moral_ certainty of the existence of the Deity: the\nnegative result of the Critique of the Pure _(speculative)_ Reason\nabides what it was.]\n\nWe may now attempt to summarize this abstruse Ethical theory of Kant.\n\nI---The STANDARD of morally good action (or rather Will), as expressed\nin the different forms of the Categorical Imperative, is the\npossibility of its being universally extended as a law for all rational\nbeings. His meaning comes out still better in the obverse statement:\nThe action is bad that _cannot be_, or at least _cannot be wished to\nlie_, turned unto a universal law.\n\nII.--Kant would expressly demur to being questioned as to his\nPSYCHOLOGY of Ethics; since he puts his own theory in express\nopposition to every other founded upon any empirical view of the mental\nconstitution. Nevertheless, we may extract some kind of answers to the\nusual queries.\n\nThe Faculty is the (pure Practical) Reason. The apprehension of what is\nmorally right is entirely an affair of Reason; the only element of\nFeeling is an added Sentiment of Awe or Respect for the law that Reason\nimposes, this being a law, not only for me who impose it on myself, but\nat the same time for every rational agent. The Pure Reason, which means\nwith Kant the Faculty of Principles, is _Speculative_ or _Practical_.\nAs _Speculative_, it _requires_ us to bring our knowledge (of the\nunderstanding) to certain higher unconditioned unities (Soul, Cosmos,\nGod); but there is error if these are themselves regarded as facts of\nknowledge. As _Practical_, it sets up an unconditional law of Duty in\nAction (unconditioned by motives); and in this and in the related\nconception of the Summum Bonum is contained a moral certainty of the\nImmortality (of the soul), Freedom (in the midst of Natural Necessity),\nand of God as existent.\n\nAs to the point of Free-will, nothing more need be said.\n\nDisinterested Sentiment, as _sentiment_, is very little regarded:\ndisinterested _action_ is required with such rigour that every act or\ndisposition is made to lose its character as moral, according as any\nelement of interested feeling of any kind enters into it. Kant\nobliterates the line between Duty and Virtue, by making a duty of every\nvirtue; at least he conceives clearly that there is no Virtue in doing\nwhat we are strongly prompted to by inclination--that virtue must\ninvolve self-sacrifice.\n\nIII.--His position with respect to Happiness is peculiar. Happiness is\nnot the end of action: the end of action is rather the self-assertion\nof the rational faculty over the lower man.\n\nIf the constituents of Happiness could be known--and they cannot\nbe--there would be no _morality_, but only _prudence_ in the pursuit of\nthem. To promote our own happiness is indeed a duty, but in order to\nkeep us from neglecting our other duties.\n\nNevertheless, he conceives it necessary that there should be an\nultimate equation of Virtue and Happiness; and the need of Happiness he\nthen expressly connects with the sensuous side of our being.\n\nIV.--His MORAL CODE may here be shortly presented from the second part\nof his latest work, where it is fully given. Distinguishing _Moral_\nDuties or (as he calls them) '_Virtue-duties,'_ left to be enforced\ninternally by Conscience, from _Legal_ Duties _(Rechtspflichten)_,\nexternally enforced, he divides them into two classes--(A) Duties to\n_Self_; (B) Duties to _Others_.\n\n(A) Duties to _Self_. These have regard to the one _private_ Aim or End\nthat a man can make a duty of, viz., his own _Perfection_; for his own\n_Happiness_, being provided for by a natural propensity or inclination,\nis to himself no duty. They are (a) _perfect_ (negative or restrictive)\nas directed to mere Self-Conservation; (b) _imperfect_ (positive or\nextensive) as directed to the Advancement or Perfecting of one's being.\nThe _perfect_ are concerned about Self (a), as an _Animal_ creature,\nand then are directed against--(1) _Self-destruction_, (2) _Sexual\nExcess_, (3) _Intemperance in Eating and Drinking_; (B) as a _Moral_\ncreature, and then are directed against--(1) _Lying_, (2) _Avarice_,\n(3) _Servility_. The _imperfect_ have reference to (a) _physical_, (B)\n_moral_ advancement or perfection (subjectively. _Purity_ or\n_Holiness_).\n\n(B) Duties to _Others_. These have regard to the only Aim or End of\nothers that a man can make a duty of, viz., their _Happiness_; for\ntheir _Perfection_ can be promoted only by themselves. Duties to others\n_as men_ are metaphysically deducible; and application to _special\nconditions_ of men is to be made empirically. They include (a) Duties\nof LOVE, involving _Merit_ or _Desert (i.e._, return from the objects\nof them) in the performance: (1) _Beneficence_, (2) _Gratitude_, (3)\n_Fellow-feeling_; (b) Duties of RESPECT, absolutely _due_ to others as\nmen; the opposites are the _vices_: (1) _Haughtiness_, (2) _Slander_,\n(3) _Scornfulness_. In _Friendship_, Love and Respect are combined in\nthe highest degree. Lastly, he notes _Social_ duties in human\nintercourse _(Affability_, &c.)--these being _outworks_ of morality.\n\nHe allows no special Duties to God, or Inferior Creatures, beyond what\nis contained in Moral Perfection as Duty to Self.\n\nV.--The conception of Law enters largely into Kant's theory of morals,\nbut in a sense purely transcendental, and not as subjecting or\nassimilating morality to positive political institution. The _Legality_\nof external _actions_, as well as the _Morality_ of internal\n_dispositions_, is determined by reference to the one universal moral\nImperative. The principle underlying all _legal_ or _jural_ (as opposed\nto moral or ethical) provisions, is the necessity of uniting in a\nuniversal law of freedom the spontaneity of each with the spontaneity\nof all the others: individual freedom and freedom of all must be made\nto subsist together in a universal law.\n\nVI.--With Kant, Religion and Morality are very closely connected, or,\nin a sense, even identified; but the alliance is not at the expense of\nMorality. So far from making this dependent on Religion, he can find\nnothing but the moral conviction whereon to establish the religious\ndoctrines of Immortality and the Existence of God; while, in a special\nwork, he declares further that Religion consists merely in the practice\nof Morality as a system of divine commands, and claims to judge of all\nreligious institutions and dogmas by the moral consciousness. Besides,\nthe Postulates themselves, in which the passage to Religion is made,\nare not all equally imperative,--Freedom, as the ground of the fact of\nDuty, being more urgently demanded than others; and he even goes so far\nas to make the allowance, that whoever has sufficient moral strength to\nfulfil the Law of Reason without them, is not required to subscribe to\nthem.\n\nThe modern French school, that has arisen in this century under the\ncombined influence of the Scotch and the German philosophy, has\nbestowed some attention on Ethics. We end by noticing under it Cousin\nand Jouffroy.\n\nVICTOR COUSIN. [1792-1867.]\n\nThe analysis of Cousin's ethical views is made upon his historical\nlectures _Sur les Idees du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_, as delivered in\n1817-18. They contain a dogmatic exposition of his own opinions,\nbeginning at the 20th lecture; the three preceding lectures, in the\nsection of the whole course devoted to the Good, being taken up with\nthe preliminary review of other opinions required for his eclectical\npurpose.\n\nHe determines to consider, by way of psychological analysis, the ideas\nand sentiments of every kind called up by the spectacle of human\nactions; and first he notes actions that please and displease the\nsenses, or in some way affect our interest: those that are agreeable\nand useful we naturally choose, avoiding the opposites, and in this we\nare _prudent_. But there is another set of actions, having no reference\nto our own personal interest, which yet we qualify as good or bad. When\nan armed robber kills and spoils a defenceless man, we, though\nbeholding the sight in safety, are at once stirred up to disinterested\nhorror and indignation. This is no mere passing sentiment, but includes\na two-fold judgment, pronounced then and ever after; that the action is\nin itself bad, and that it ought not to be committed. Still farther,\nour anger implies that the object of it is conscious of the evil and\nthe obligation, and is therefore responsible; wherein again is implied\nthat he is a free agent. And, finally, demanding as we do that he\nshould be punished, we pass what has been called a judgment of merit\nand demerit, which is built upon an idea in our minds of a supreme law,\njoining happiness to virtue and misfortune to crime.\n\nThe analysis thus far he claims to be strictly scientific; he now\nproceeds to vary the case, taking actions of our own. I am supposed\nentrusted by a dying friend with a deposit for another, and a struggle\nensues between interest and probity as to whether I should pay it. If\ninterest conquers, remorse ensues. He paints the state of remorse, and\nanalyzes it into the same elements as before, the idea of _good_ and\n_evil_, of an _obligatory law_, of _liberty_, of _merit_ and _demerit_;\nit thus includes the whole phenomenon of morality. The exactly opposite\nstate that follows upon the victory of probity, is proved to imply the\nsame facts.\n\nThe Moral Sentiment, so striking in its character, has by some been\nsupposed the foundation of all morality, but in point of fact it is\nitself constituted by these various judgments. Now that they are known\nto stand as its elements, he goes on to subject each to a stricter\nanalysis, taking first the judgment of _good_ and _evil_, which is at\nthe bottom of all the rest. It lies in the original constitution of\nhuman nature, being simple and indecomposable, like the judgment of the\nTrue and the Beautiful. It is absolute, and cannot be withheld in\npresence of certain acts; but it only declares, and does not\nconstitute, good and evil, these being real and independent qualities\nof actions. Applied at first to special cases, the judgment of good\ngives birth to general principles that become rules for judging other\nactions. Like other sciences, morality has its axioms, justly called\nmoral truths; if it is good to keep an oath, it is also true, the oath\nbeing made with no other purpose than to be kept. Faithful guarding as\nmuch belongs to the idea of a deposit, as the equality between its\nthree angles and two right angles to the idea of a triangle. By no\ncaprice or effort of will can a moral verity be made in the smallest\ndegree other than it is.\n\nBut, he goes on, a moral verity is not simply to be believed; it must\nalso be practised, and this is _obligation_, the second of the elements\nof moral sentiment. Obligation, like moral truth, on which it rests, is\nabsolute, immutable, universal. Kant even went so far as to make it the\nprinciple of our morality; but this was subjectivizing good, as he had\nsubjectivized truth. Before there is an obligation to act, there must\nbe an intrinsic goodness in the action; the real first truth of\nmorality is justics, _i.e._, the essential distinction of good and\nevil. It is justice, therefore, and not duty, that strictly deserves\nthe name of a principle.\n\nThe next element is _liberty_. Obligation implies the faculty of\nresisting desire, passion, &c., else there would be a contradiction in\nhuman nature. But the truest proof of liberty is to be sought in the\nconstant testimony of consciousness, that, in wishing this or that, I\nam equally able to will the contrary. He distinguishes between the\npower of willing and the power of executing; also between will and\ndesire, or passion. In the conflict between will and the tyranny of\ndesire lies liberty; and the aim of the conflict is the fulfilment of\nduty. For the will is never so free, never so much itself, as when\nyielding to the law of duty. Persons are distinguished from Things in\nhaving responsibility, dignity, intrinsic value. Because there is in me\na being worthy of respect, I am bound in duty to respect myself, and I\nhave the _right_ to be respected by you. My duty (he means, of course,\nwhat I owe to self) is the exact measure of my right. The character of\nbeing a _person_ is inviolable, is the foundation of property, is\ninalienable by self or others, and so forth.\n\nHe passes to the last element of the phenomenon of morality, the\njudgement of _merit_ and _demerit_. The judgement follows, as the agent\nis supposed free, and it is not affected by lapse of time. It depends\nalso essentially on the idea that the agent knows good from evil. Upon\nitself follow the notions of reward and punishment. Merit is the\nnatural right to be rewarded; demerit, paradox as it may appear, is the\n_right_ to be punished. A criminal would claim to be punished, if he\ncould comprehend the absolute necessity of expiation; and are there not\nreal cases of such criminals? But as there can be merit without actual\nreward, so to be rewarded does not constitute merit.\n\nIf good, he continues, is good in itself, and ought to be done without\nregard to consequences, it is no less true that the consequences of\ngood cannot fail to be happy. Virtue without happiness and crime\nwithout misfortune are a contradiction, a disorder; which are hardly\nmet with in the world, even as it is, or, where in a few cases they are\nfound, are sure to be righted in the end by eternal justice. The\nsacrifice supposed in virtue, if generously accepted and courageously\nundergone, has to be recompensed in respect of the amount of happiness\nsacrificed.\n\nOnce more, he takes up the _Sentiment_, which is the general echo of\nall the elements of the phenomenon. Its end is to make the mind\nsensible of the bond between virtue and happiness; it is the direct and\nvivid application of the law of merit. Again, he touches the states of\nmoral satisfaction and remorse, speaks of our sympathy with the moral\ngoodness of others and our benevolent feeling that arises towards\nthem--emotions all, but covering up judgments; and this is the end of\nhis detailed analysis of the actual facts of the case. But he still\ngoes on to sum up in exact expressions the foregoing results, and he\nclaims especially to have overlooked neither the part played by Reason,\nnor the function of Sentiment. The rational character of the idea of\ngood gives morality its firm foundation; the lively sentiment helps to\nlighten the often heavy burden of duty, and stirs up to the most heroic\ndeeds. Self-interest too is not denied its place. In this connexion,\nled again to allude to the happiness appointed to virtue here or at\nleast hereafter, he allows that God may be regarded as the fountain of\nmorality, but only in the sense that his will is the expression of his\neternal wisdom and justice. Religion crowns morality, but morality is\nbased upon itself. The rest of the lecture is in praise of Eclecticism,\nand advocates consideration of all the facts involved in morality, as\nagainst exclusive theories founded upon only some of the facts.\n\nLectures 21st and 22nd, compressed into one (Ed. 1846) contain the\napplication of the foregoing principles, and the answer to the\nquestion, what our duties are. Duty being absolute, truth becomes\nobligatory, and absolute truth being known by the reason only, to obey\nthe law of duty is to obey reason. But what actions are conformable to\nreason? The characteristic of reason he takes to be Universality, and\nthis will appear in the motives of actions, since it is these that\nconfer on actions their morality. Accordingly, the sign whereby to\ndiscover whether an action is duty, is, if its motive when generalized\nappear to the reason to be a maxim of universal legislation for all\nfree and intelligent beings. This, the norm set up by Kant, as\ncertainly discovers what is and is not duty, as the syllogism detects\nthe error and truth of an argument.\n\nTo obey reason is, then, the first duty, at the root of all others, and\nitself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason;\nin a sense, to remain reasonable is the sole duty. But it assumes\nspecial forms amid the diversity of human relations. He first considers\nthe relations wherein we stand to ourselves and the corresponding\nduties. That there should be any such duties is at first sight strange,\nseeing we belong to ourselves; but this is not the same as having\ncomplete power over ourselves. Possessing liberty, we must not abdicate\nit by yielding to passions, and treat ourselves as if there were\nnothing in us that merits respect. We are to distinguish between what\nis peculiar to each of us, and what we share with humanity. Individual\npeculiarities are things indifferent, but the liberty and intelligence\nthat constitute us persons, rather than individuals, demand to be\nrespected even by ourselves. There is an obligation of self-respect\nimposed upon us as moral persons that was not established, and is not\nto be destroyed, by us. As special cases of this respect of the moral\nperson in us, he cites (1) the duty of _self-control_ against anger or\nmelancholy, not for their pernicious consequences, but as trenching\nupon the moral dignity of liberty and intelligence; (2) the duty of\n_prudence_, meaning providence in all things, which regulates courage,\nenjoins temperance, is, as the ancients said, the mother of all the\nvirtues,--in short, the government of liberty by reason; (3)\n_veracity_; (4) duty towards the _body_; (5) duty of _perfecting_ (and\nnot merely keeping intact) the intelligence, liberty, and sensibility\nthat constitute us moral beings.\n\nBut the same liberty and intelligence that constitute me a moral\nperson, and need thus to be respected even by myself, exist also in\nothers, conferring rights on them, and imposing new duties of respect\non me relatively to them. To their intelligence I owe _Truth_; their\nliberty I am bound to respect, sometimes even to the extent of not\nhindering them from making a wrong use of it. I must respect also their\naffections (family, &c.) which form part of themselves; their bodies;\ntheir goods, whether acquired by labour or heritage. All these duties\nare summed up in the one great duty of _Justice_ or respect for the\nrights of others; of which the greatest violation is slavery.\n\nThe whole of duty towards others is not however comprehended in\njustice. Conscience complains, if we have only not done injustice to\none in suffering. There is a new class of duties--_consolation,\ncharity, sacrifice_--to which indeed correspond no rights, and which\ntherefore are not so obligatory as justice, but which cannot be said\nnot to be obligatory. From their nature, they cannot be reduced to an\nexact formula; their beauty lies in liberty. But in charity, he adds,\nthere is also a danger, from its effacing, to a certain extent, the\nmoral personality of the object of it. In acting upon others, we risk\ninterfering with their natural rights; charity is therefore to be\nproportioned to the liberty and reason of the person benefited, and is\nnever to be made the means of usurping power over another.\n\nJustice and Charity are the two elements composing social morality. But\nwhat is social? and on what is Society founded, existing as it does\neverywhere, and making man to be what he is? Into the hopeless question\nof its origin he refuses to enter; its present state is to be studied\nby the light of the knowledge of human nature. Its invariable\nfoundations are (1) the need we have of each other, and our social\ninstincts, (2) the lasting and indestructible idea and sentiment of\nright and justice. The need and instinct, of which he finds many\nproofs, begin society; justice crowns the work. The least consideration\nof the relations of man to man, suggest the essential principles of\nSociety--justice, liberty, equality, government, punishment. Into each\nof these he enters. Liberty is made out to be assured and developed in\nsociety, instead of diminished. Equality is established upon the\ncharacter of moral personality, which admits of no degree. The need of\nsome repression upon liberty, where the liberty of others is trenched\nupon, conducts to the idea of Government--a disinterested third party\narmed with the necessary power to assure and defend the liberty of all.\nTo government is to be ascribed, first its inseparable function of\nprotecting the common liberty (without unnecessary repression), and\nnext, beneficent action, corresponding to the duty of charity. It\nrequires, for its guidance, a rule superior to itself, i.e., law, the\nexpression of universal and absolute justice. Here follows the usual\ndistinction of positive and natural law. The sanction of law is\npunishment; the right of punishing, as was seen, depending on the idea\nof demerit. Punishment is not mere vengeance, but the expiation by the\ncriminal of violated justice; it is to be measured therefore chiefly by\nthe demerit and not by the injury only. Whether, in punishing,\nallowance should be made for correction and amelioration, is to put the\nsame case over again of charity coming in after justice.\n\nHere the philosopher stops on the threshold of the special science of\npolitics. But already the fixed and invariable principles of society\nand government have been given, and, even in the relative sphere of\npolitics, the rule still holds that all forms and institutions are to\nbe moulded as far as possible on the eternal principles supplied by\nphilosophy. The following is a summary of Cousin's views:--\n\nI.--The Standard is the judgment of good or evil in actions. Cousin\nholds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our\njudgment, and having a sort of objective existence.\n\nII.--The Moral Faculty he analyzes into four judgments: (1) good and\nevil; (2) obligation; (3) freedom of the will; and (4) merit and\ndemerit. The moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those\njudgments, and chiefly the feeling connected with the idea of merit.\n[This analysis is obviously redundant. 'Good' and 'evil' apply to many\nthings outside ethics, and to be at all appropriate, they must be\nqualified as _moral_ (i.e., _obligatory_) good and evil. The connexion\nbetween obligation and demerit has been previously explained.]\n\nIII.--In regard to the Summum Bonum, Cousin considers that virtue must\nbring happiness here or hereafter, and vice, misery.\n\nIV.--He accepts the criterion of duties set forth by Kant. He argues\nfor the existence of duties towards ourselves.\n\nV. and VI. require no remark.\n\nTH\u00c9ODORE SIMON JOUFFROY. [1796-1842.]\n\nIn the Second Lecture of his unfinished _Cours de Droit Naturel_,\nJouffroy gives a condensed exposition of the Moral Facts of human\nnature from his own point of view.\n\nWhat distinguishes, he says, one being from another, is its\nOrganization; and as having a special nature, every creature has a\nspecial end. Its end or destination is its good, or its good consists\nin the accomplishment of its end. Further, to have an end implies the\npossession of faculties wherewith to attain it; and all this is\napplicable also to man. In man, as in other creatures, from the very\nfirst, his nature tends to its end, by means of purely instinctive\nmovements, which may be called primitive and instinctive tendencies of\nhuman nature; later they are called passions. Along with these\ntendencies, and under their influence, the intellectual faculties also\nawake and seek to procure for them satisfaction. The faculties work,\nhowever, at first, in an indeterminate fashion, and only by meeting\nobstacles are driven to the concentration necessary to attain the ends.\nHe illustrates this by the case of the intellectual faculty seeking to\nsatisfy the desire of knowledge, and not succeeding until it\nconcentrates on a single point its scattered energies. This spontaneous\nconcentration is the first manifestation of Will, but is proved to be\nnot natural from the feeling of constraint always experienced, and the\nglad rebound, after effort, to tho indeterminate condition. One fact,\ntoo, remains even after every thing possible has been done, viz., that\nthe satisfaction of the primitive tendencies is never quite complete.\n\nWhen, however, such satisfaction as may be, has been attained, there\narises pleasure; and pain, when our faculties fail to attain the good\nor end they sought. There could be action, successful and unsuccessful,\nand so good and evil, without any sensibility, wherefore good and evil\nare not to be confounded with pain and pleasure; but constituted as we\nare, there is a sensible echo that varies according as the result of\naction is attained or not. Pleasure is, then, the consequence, and, as\nit were, the sign of the realization of good, and pain of its\nprivation.\n\nHe next distinguishes Secondary passions from the great primary\ntendencies and passions. These arise _apropos_ of external objects, as\nthey are found to further or oppose the satisfaction of the fundamental\ntendencies. Such objects are then called _useful_ or _pernicious_.\nFinally, he completes his account of the infantile or primitive\ncondition of man, by remarking that some of our natural tendencies,\nlike Sympathy, are entirely disinterested in seeking the good of\nothers. The main feature of the whole primitive state is the exclusive\ndomination of passion. The will already exists, but there is no\nliberty; the present passion triumphs over the future, the stronger\nover the weaker.\n\nHe now passes to consider the double transformation of this original\nstate, that takes place when reason appears. Reason is the faculty of\n_comprehending_, which is different from knowing, and is peculiar to\nman. As soon as it awakes in man, it comprehends, and penetrates to the\nmeaning of, the whole spectacle of human activity. It first forms the\ngeneral idea of _Good_ as the resultant of the satisfaction of all the\nprimary tendencies, and as the true End of man. Then, comprehending the\nactual situation of man, it resolves this idea into the idea of the\n_greatest possible_ good. All that conduces to the attainment of this\ngood, it includes under the general idea of the _Useful_; and finally,\nit constructs the general idea of _Happiness_ out of all that is common\nto the agreeable sensations that follow upon the satisfaction of the\nprimary tendencies.\n\nBut besides forming these three perfectly distinct ideas, and exploring\nthe secret of what has been passing within, the reason also comprehends\nthe necessity of subjecting to control the faculties and forces that\nare the condition of the greatest satisfaction of human nature. In the\nplace of the merely mechanical impulsion of passion, which is coupled\nwith grave disadvantages, it puts forward, as a new principle of\naction, the rational calculation of interest. The faculties are brought\ninto the service of this idea of the reason, by the same process of\nconcentration as was needful in satisfying the passions; only now\nvoluntarily instead of spontaneously. Being an idea instead of a\npassion, the new principle supplies a real _motive_, under whose\nguidance our natural power over our faculties is developed and\nstrengthened. All partial ends are merged in the one great End of\nInterest, to which the means is self-control. The first great change\nthus wrought by reason is, that it takes the direction of the human\nforces into its own hand, and although, even when by a natural\ntransformation the new system of conduct acquires all the force of a\npassion, it is not able steadily to procure for the idea of interest\nthe victory over the single passions, the change nevertheless abides.\nTo the state of Passion has succeeded the state of Egoism.\n\nReason must, however, he thinks, make another discovery before there is\na truly moral state--must from general ideas rise to ideas that are\nuniversal and absolute. There is no real equation, he holds, between\nGood and the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies, which is the\ngood of egoism. Not till the special ends of all creatures are regarded\nas elements of one great End of creation, of Universal Order, do we\nobtain an idea whose equivalence to the idea of the Good requires no\nproof. The special ends are good, because, through their realization,\nthe end of creation, which is the absolute Good, is realized; hence\nthey acquire the sacred character that it has in the eye of reason.\n\nNo sooner is the idea of Universal Order present to the reason, than it\nis recognized as an absolute law; and, in consequence, the special end\nof our being, by participation in its character of goodness and\nsacredness, is henceforth pursued as a duty, and its satisfaction\nclaimed as a right. Also every creature assumes the same position, and\nwe no longer merely concede that others have tendencies to be\nsatisfied, and consent from Sympathy or Egoism to promote their good;\nbut the idea of Universal Order makes it as much our duty to respect\nand contribute to the accomplishment of their good as to accomplish our\nown. From the idea of good-in-itself, i.e., Order, flow all duty,\nright, obligation, morality, and natural legislation.\n\nHe carries the idea of Order still farther back to the Deity, making it\nthe expression of the divine thought, and opening up the religious side\nof morality; but he does not mean that its obligatoriness as regards\nthe reason is thereby increased. He also identifies it, in the last\nresort, with the ideas of the Beautiful and the True.\n\nWe have now reached the truly moral condition, a state perfectly\ndistinct from either of the foregoing. Even when the egoistic and the\nmoral determination prescribe the same conduct, the one only counsels,\nwhile the other obliges. The one, having in view only the greatest\nsatisfaction of our nature, is personal even when counselling benefits\nto others; the other regarding only the law of Order, something\ndistinct from self, is impersonal, even when prescribing our own good.\nHence there is in the latter case _d\u00e9vouement_ of self to something\nelse, and it is exactly the _d\u00e9vouement_ to a something that is not\nself, but is regarded as good, that gets the name of virtue or moral\ngood. Moral good is voluntary and intelligent obedience to the law that\nis the rule of our conduct. As an additional distinction between the\negoistic and the moral determination, he mentions the judgment of merit\nor demerit that ensues upon actions when, and only when, they have a\nmoral character. No remorse follows an act of mere imprudence involving\nno violation of universal order.\n\nHe denies that there is any real contradiction among the three\ndifferent determinations. Nothing is prescribed in the moral law that\nis not also in accordance with some primitive tendency, and with\nself-interest rightly understood; if it were not so, it would go hard\nwith virtue. On the other hand, if everything not done from regard to\nduty were opposed to moral law and order, society could not only not\nsubsist, but would never have been formed. When a struggle does ensue\nbetween passion and self-interest, passion is blind; when between\negoism and the moral determination, egoism is at fault. It is in the\ntrue interest of Passion to be sacrificed to Egoism, and of Egoism to\nbe sacrificed to Order.\n\nHe closes the review of the various moral facts by explaining in what\nsense the succession of the three states is to be understood. The state\nof Passion is historically first, but the Egoistic and the Moral states\nare not so sharply defined. As soon as reason dawns it introduces the\nmoral motive as well as the egoistic, and to this extent the two states\nare contemporaneous. Only, so far is the moral law from being at this\nstage fully conceived, that, in the majority of men, it is never\nconceived in its full clearness at all. Their confused idea of moral\nlaw is the so-called moral _conscience_, which works more like a sense\nor an instinct, and is inferior to the clear rational conception in\neverything except that it conveys the full force of obligation. In its\ngrades of guilt human justice rightly makes allowance for different\ndegrees of intelligence. The Egoistic determination and the Moral\nstate, such as it is, once developed, passion is not to be supposed\nabolished, but henceforth what really takes place in all is a perpetual\nalternation of the various states. Yet though no man is able\nexclusively to follow the moral determination, and no man will\nconstantly be under the influence of any one of the motives, there is\none motive commonly uppermost whereby each can be characterized. Thus\nmen, according to their habitual conduct, are known as passionate,\negoistic, or virtuous.\n\nWe now summarize the opinions of Jouffroy:--\n\nI.--The Standard is the Idea of Absolute Good or Universal Order in the\nsense explained by the author. Like Cousin, he identifies the 'good'\nwith the 'true.' What, then, is the criterion that distinguishes moral\nfrom other truths? If _obligation_ be selected as the _differentia_, it\nis in effect to give up the attempt to determine what truths are\nobligatory. The idea of 'good' is obviously too vague to be a\n_differentia_. How far the idea of 'Universal Order' gets us out of the\ndifficulty may be doubted, especially after the candid admission of the\nauthor, that it is an idea of which the majority of men have never any\nvery clear notions.\n\nII.--The moral faculty is Reason; Conscience is hardly more than a\nconfused feeling of obligatoriness.\n\nSympathy is one of the primitive tendencies of our nature. Jouffroy's\nopinion on the subject is open to the objections urged against Butler's\npsychology.\n\nHe upholds the freedom of the Will, but embarrasses his argument by\nadmitting, like Reid, that there is a stage in our existence when we\nare ruled by the passions, and are destitute of liberty.\n\nIII.--The Summum Bonum is the _end_ of every creature; the passions\nought to be subordinated to self-interest, and self-interest to\nmorality.\n\nIn regard to the other points, it is unnecessary to continue the\nsummary.\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Duties strictly so called, the department of obligatory\nmorality, enforced by punishment, may be exemplified in the following\nclassified summary:--\n\nUnder the Legal Sanction, are included; (A) Forbearance from\n(specified) injuries; as (a) Intentional injury--crimes, (b) Injury not\nintentional--wrongs, repaired by Damages or Compensation. (B) The\nrendering of services; (a) Fulfilling contracts or agreements; (b)\nReciprocating anterior services rendered, though, not requested, as in\nfilial duty; (c) Cases of extreme or superior need, as parental duty,\nrelief of destitution.\n\nUnder the Popular Sanction are created duties on such points as the\nfollowing:--(1) The Etiquette of small societies or coteries. (2)\nReligious orthodoxy; Sabbath observance. (3) Unchastity; violations of\nthe etiquette of the sexes, Immodesty, and whatever endangers chastity,\nespecially in women. (4) Duties of parents to children, and of children\nto parents, beyond the requirements of the law. (5) Suicide: when only\nattempted, the individual is punished, when carried out, the relatives.\n(6) Drunkenness, and neglect of the means of self-support. (7) Gross\nInhumanity. In all these cases the sanction, or punishment, is social;\nand is either mere disapprobation or dislike, not issuing in overt\nacts, or exclusion from fellowship and the good offices consequent\nthereon.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Optional Morality, the Morality of Reward, is exemplified\nas follows:--\n\n(A) A liberal performance of duties properly so called. (_a_) The\nsupport of aged parents; this, though to a certain extent a legal duty,\nis still more a virtue, being stimulated by the approbation of one's\nfellows. The performance of the family duties generally is the subject\nof commendation. (_b_) The payment of debts that cannot be legally\nrecovered, as in the case of bankrupts after receiving their discharge.\n\nThese examples typify cases (1) where no definite law is laid down, or\nwhere the law is content with a minimum; and (2) where the law is\nrestrained by its rules of evidence or procedure. Society, in such\ncases, steps in and supplies a motive in the shape of reward.\n\n(B) Pure Virtue, or Beneficence; all actions for the benefit of others\nwithout stipulation, and without reward; relief of distress, promotion\nof the good of individuals or of society at large. The highest honours\nof society are called into exercise by the highest services.\n\nBentham's principle of the claims of superior need cannot be fully\ncarried out, (although he conceives it might, in some cases), by either\nthe legal or the popular sanction. Thus, the act of the good Samaritan,\nthe rescue of a ship's crew from drowning, could not be exacted; the\nlaw cannot require heroism. It is of importance to remark, that\nalthough Duty and Nobleness, Punishment and Reward, are in their\nextremes unmistakably contrasted, yet there may be a margin of doubt or\nambiguity (like the passing of day into night). Thus, expressed\napprobation, generally speaking, belongs to Reward; yet, if it has\nbecome a thing of course, the withholding of it operates as a\nPunishment or a Penalty.]\n\n[Footnote 3: The conditions that regulate the authoritative enforcement\nof actions, are exhaustively given in works on Jurisprudence, but they\ndo not all concern Ethical Theory. The expedience of imposing a rule\ndepends on the importance of the object compared with the cost of the\nmachinery. A certain line of conduct may be highly beneficial, but may\nnot be a fit case for coercion. For example, the law can enforce only a\n_minimum_ of service: now, if the case be such, that a minimum is\nuseless, as in helping a ship in distress, or in supporting aged\nparents, it is much, better to leave the case to voluntary impulses,\nseconded by approbation or reward. Again, an offence punished by law\nmust be, in its nature, definable; which, makes a difficulty in such\ncases as insult, and defamation, and many species of fraud. Farther,\nthe offence must be easy of detection, so that the vast majority of\noffenders may not escape. This limits the action of the law in\nunchastity.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See, on the method of Sokrates, Appendix A.]\n\n[Footnote 5: In setting forth, the Ethical End, the language of\nSokrates was not always consistent. He sometimes stated it, as if it\nincluded an independent reference to the happiness of others; at other\ntimes, he speaks as if the end was the agent's own happiness, to which,\nthe happiness of others was the greatest and most essential means. The\nfirst view, although not always adhered to, prevails in Xenophon; the\nsecond appears most in Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 6: 'What Plato here calls the Knowledge of Good, or\nReason,--the just discrimination and comparative appreciation, of Ends\nand Means--appears in the Politikus and the Euthyd\u00eamus, under the title\nof the Regal or Political Art, as employing or directing the results of\nall other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras,\nunder the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the Phil\u00eabus,\nas measure and proportion: in the Phaedrus (in regard to rhetoric) as\nthe art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all\nthe special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by\nprofessional masters. In the Republic, it is personified in the few\nvenerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose\ndirections all the rest (Guardians and Producers) arc bound implicitly\nto follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit\nobedience. In the Leges, it is defined as the complete subjection in\nthe mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason, without which, no\nspecial aptitudes are worth, having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it\nstands as a Sokratic authority under the title of Sophrosyn\u00ea or\nTemperance: and the Profitable is declared identical with, the Good, as\nthe directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and\nproceedings.' (Grote's Plato, I., 362.)]\n\n[Footnote 7: 'Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias,\nthan the manner in which. Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured,\nexorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all\nthe actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts, including\nmusic and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic--all provision for the\nmost essential wants, all protection against particular sufferings and\ndangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of\nrelief or of rescue--all the effective maintenance of public organized\nforce, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction,\nor relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and\npresented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure.\nAnd it is in this point of view, that various Platonic commentators\nextol in an especial manner the Gorgias: as recognizing an Idea of Good\nsuperhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and\npains of any human being, and incommensurable with, them; an Universal\nIdea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its\nparticulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and is\ndiscernible only by the Platonic telescope.' (Grote, _Gorgias_)]\n\n[Footnote 8: There is some analogy between the above doctrine and the\ngreat law of Self-conservation, as expounded in this volume (p. 75).]\n\n[Footnote 9: Aristotle and the Peripatetics held that there were _tria\ngenera bonorum_: (1) Those of the mind _(mens sana)_, (2) those of the\nbody, and (3) external advantages. The Stoics altered this theory by\nsaying that only the first of the three was _bonum_; the others were\nmerely _praeposita_ or _sumenda_. The opponents of the Stoics contended\nthat this was an alteration in words rather than in substance.]\n\n[Footnote 10: This also might truly be said of the Epicureans; though\nwith them it is not so much _pride_, as a quiet self-satisfaction in\nescaping pains and disappointments that they saw others enduring. See\nthe beginning of Lucretius' second book, and the last epistle of\nEpicurus to Idomeneus.]\n\n[Footnote 11: This was a later development of Stoicism: the earlier\ntheorists laid it down that there were no graduating marks below the\nlevel of wisdom; all shortcomings were on a par. _Good_ was a point,\n_Evil_ was a point; there were gradations in the _praeposita_ or\n_sumenda_ (none of which were _good_), and in the _rejecta_ or\n_rejicienda_ (none of which were _evil_), but there was no _more or\nless good_. The idea of advance by steps towards virtue or wisdom, was\nprobably familiar to Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus; the\nStoic theories, on the other hand, tended to throw it out of sight,\nthough they insisted strenuously on the necessity of mental training\nand meditation.]\n\n[Footnote 12: This theory (taken in its most general sense, and apart\nfrom differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains),\nhad been proclaimed long before the time of Epicurus. It is one of the\nvarious theories of Plato: for in his dialogue called Protagoras\n(though in other dialogues he reasons differently) we find it\nexplicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal\nspokesman, Sokrates, against the Sophist Protagoras. It was also held\nby Aristippus (companion of Sokrates along with Plato) and by his\nfollowers after him, called the Cyrenaics. Lastly, it was maintained by\nEudoxus, one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with\nAristotle. Epicurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory:\nbut he had his own way of conceiving it--his own body of doctrine\nphysical, cosmological, and theological, with which it was\nimplicated--and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains.]\n\n[Footnote 13: The soul, according to Epicurus, was a subtle but\nenergetic compound (of air, vapour, heat, and another nameless\ningredient), with its best parts concentrated in the chest, yet\npervading and sustaining the whole body; still, however, depending for\nits support on the body, and incapable of separate or disembodied\ncontinuance.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Coelo. II.a.12, p. 292, 22, 6, _5_. In the\nEthics, Aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the gods, as the\nonly process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme felicity.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Xenophon Memor. I. 1--10; IV. 3--12.]\n\n[Footnote 16: These exhortations to active friendship were not\nunfruitful. We know, even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the\nEpicurean doctrines, that the harmony among the members of the sect,\nwith common veneration for the founder, was more marked and more\nenduring than that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects.\nEpicurus himself was a man of amiable personal qualities: his\ntestament, still remaining, shows an affectionate regard, both for his\nsurviving friends, and for the permanent attachment of each, to the\nothers, as well as of all to the school. Diogenes Laertius tells\nus--nearly 200 years after Christ, and 450 years after the death of\nEpicurus--that the Epicurean sect still continued its numbers and\ndignity, having outlasted its contemporaries and rivals. The harmony\namong the Epicureans may be explained, not merely from the temper of\nthe master, but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he\nrecommended. Ambition and love of power were discouraged: rivalry among\nthe members for success, either political or rhetorical, was at any\nrate a rare exception: all were taught to confine themselves to that\nprivacy of life and love of philosophical communion, which alike\nrequired and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Consistently with this view of happiness, Epicurus\nadvised, in regard to politics, quiet submission, to established\nauthority, without active meddling beyond what necessity required.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Locke examines the Innate Principles put forth, by Lord\nHerbert in his book _De Veritate_, 1st, There is a supreme governor of\nthe world; 2nd, Worship is due to him; 3rd, Virtue, joined with Piety,\nis the best Worship; 4th, Men must repent of their sins; 5th, There\nwill be a future life of rewards and punishments. Locke admits these to\nbe such truths as a rational creature, after due explanation given\nthem, can hardly avoid attending to; but he will not allow them to be\ninnate. For, First, There are other propositions with, as good a claim\nas these to be of the number imprinted by nature on the mind.\n\nSecondly, The marks assigned are not found in all the propositions.\nMany men, and even whole nations, disbelieve some of them.\n\nThen, as to the third principle,--virtue, joined with piety, is the\nbest worship of God; he cannot see how it can be innate, seeing that it\ncontains a name, virtue, of the greatest possible uncertainty of\nmeaning. For, if virtue be taken, as commonly it is, to denote the\nactions accounted laudable in particular countries, then the\nproposition will be untrue. Or, if it is taken to mean accordance with\nGod's will, it will then be true, but unmeaning; that God will be\npleased with what he commands is an identical assertion, of no use to\nany one.\n\nSo the fourth proposition,--men must repent of their sins,--is open to\nthe same remark. It is not possible that God should engrave on men's\nminds principles couched on such uncertain words as Virtue and Sin.\nNay more, as a general word is nothing in itself, but only report as to\nparticular facts, the knowledge of rules is a knowledge of a sufficient\nnumber of actions to determine the rule. [Innate principles are not\ncompatible with Nominalism.]\n\nAccording to Lord Herbert, the standard of virtue is the _common\nnotions_ in which, all men agree. They are such, as the following,--to\navoid evil, to be temperate, in doubtful cases to choose the safer\ncourse, not to do to others what you would not wish done to yourself,\nto be grateful to benefactors, &c. _Conscience_ is what teaches us to\ncarry out those principles in practice. It excites joy over good\nactions, and produces abhorrence and repentance for bad. Upon it, our\nrepentance of mind and eternal welfare depend. (For an account of Lord\nHerbert's common notions, see Appendix B., Lord Herbert of Cherbury.)]\n\n[Footnote 19: In this respect, Butler differs from both Shaftesbury and\nHutcheson. With Shaftesbury, the main function of the moral sense is to\nsmile approval on benevolent affections, by which an additional\npleasure is thrown into the scale against the selfish affections. The\nsuperiority of the 'natural affections' thus depends on a double\npleasure, their intrinsically pleasureable character, and the\nsuperadded pleasure of reflection. The tendency of Shaftesbury is here\nto make benevolence and virtue identical, and at the same time to\nimpair the disinterested character of benevolence.]\n\n[Footnote 20: With this view, we may compare the psychology of\nShaftesbury, set forth in his 'Characteristics of Men, Manners, and\nTimes.' The soul has two kinds of affections--(1) _Self-affection_,\nleading to the 'good of the private,' such as love of life, revenge,\npleasure or aptitude towards nourishment and the means of generation,\nemulation or love of praise, indolence; and (2) _Natural affections_,\nleading to the good of the public. The natural or spontaneous\npredominance of benevolence is _goodness_; the subjection of the\nselfish by effort and training is _virtue_. Virtue consists generally\nin the proper exercise of the several affections.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Butler's definition of conscience, and his whole\ntreatment of it, have created a great puzzle of classification, as to\nwhether he is to be placed along with the upholders of a 'moral sense.'\nShaftesbury is more explicit:\n\n'No sooner does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than\nstraight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and\nacknowledged. No sooner are _actions_ viewed, no sooner the human\naffections discerned (and they are, most of them, as soon discerned as\nfelt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes the _fair_ and\n_shapely_, the _amiable_ and _admirable_, apart from the _deformed_,\nthe _foul_, the _odious_, or the _despicable_' 'In a creature capable\nof forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which\noffer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affections, but\nthe very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, and\ngratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by\nreflection, become objects. So that, by means of this _reflected\nsense_, there arises another kind of affection towards these affections\nthemselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the\nsubject of a new liking or dislike.' What this 'moral sense' approves\nis benevolence, and when its approval has been acted upon, by\nsubjecting the selfish affections, 'virtue' is attained.]\n\n[Footnote 22: It is instructive to compare Mandeville's _a priori_\nguesses with, the results of Mr. Maine's historical investigation into\nthe condition of early societies. The evidence shows that society\noriginated in the family system. Mandeville conjectured that solitary\nfamilies would never attain to government; but Mr. Maine considers that\nthere was a complete despotic government in single families. 'They have\nneither assemblies for consultation nor _themistes_, but every one\nexercises jurisdiction over his wives and children, and they pay no\nregard to one another.' The next stage is the rise of _gentes_ and\ntribes, which took place probably when a family held together instead\nof separating on the death of the patriarch. The features of this state\nwere chieftainship and _themistes_, that is, government not by laws,\nbut by _ex post facto_ decisions upon cases as they arose. This\ngradually developed into customary law, which was in its turn\nsuperseded, on the invention of writing, by written codes. Maine's\nAncient Law, Chap. V.]\n\n[Footnote 23: It is perhaps worth while to quote a sentence or two,\ngiving the author's opinion on the theory of the Moral Sense. 'Against\nevery account of the principle of approbation, which makes it depend\nupon a peculiar sentiment, distinct from every other, I would object,\nthat it is strange that this sentiment, which Providence undoubtedly\nintended to be the governing principle of human nature, should,\nhitherto have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name\nin any language. The word Moral Sense is of very late formation, and\ncannot yet be considered as making part of the English tongue. The word\napprobation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote\npeculiarly anything of this kind. In propriety of language we approve\nof whatever is entirely to our satisfaction--of the form of a building,\nof the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat. The\nword conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which\nwe approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of\nsome such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having\nacted agreeably or contrary to its directions. When love, hatred, joy,\nsorrow, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are\nall supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves\nconsiderable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising\nthat the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little\nheeded; that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it\nworth while to bestow a name upon it?']\n\n[Footnote 24: ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient\nimportance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract. The\nfollowing remark on his views is made by Professor Veitch:--'Ferguson,\nwhile holding-with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable\ninto utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a\nstep beyond both. Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises\nregarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself.' The\nfollowing is his definition of Moral Good:--'Moral good is the specific\nexcellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its\nspecific defect and wretchedness.' The 'excellence' of human nature\nconsists in four things, drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal\nvirtues: (1) _Skill_ (Wisdom); (2) _Benevolence_, the principal\nexcellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life\n(Justice); (3) _Application of mind_ (Temperance); (4) _Force_, or\nenergy to overcome obstacles (Fortitude). Regarding the _motives_ to\nvirtue, either virtue is its own reward, or divine rewards and\npunishments constitute a sanction; but, in any case, the motive is our\nown happiness. All the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or\npleasant, but, over and above, they give rise to an additional\npleasure, when they are made the subject of reflection.]\n\n[Footnote 25: 'The theory which, places the standard of morality in the\n_Divine nature_ must not be confounded with that which, places it in\nthe arbitrary will of God. God did not create morality by his will; it\nis inherent in his nature, and co-eternal with himself; nor can he be\nconceived as capable of reversing it.' The distinction here drawn does\nnot avoid the fatal objection to the simpler theory, namely, that it\ntakes away the moral character of God. The acts of a sovereign cannot,\nwith, any propriety, as Austin has shown, be termed either legal or\nillegal; in like manner, if God is a moral lawgiver, if 'he is\naccountable to no one,' then 'his duty and his pleasure are\nundistinguishable from each other,' and he cannot without\nself-contradiction be called a moral being. Even upon Mr. Mansel's own\ntheory, it is hardly correct to say that 'God did not create morality\nby his will.' Morality involves two elements--one, rules of conduct,\nthe other, an obligation to observe them. Now, the authority or\nobligatoriness of moral laws has been made to depend upon the will of\nGod, so that, prior to that will, morality could not exist. Hence the\nonly part of morality that can be co-eternal with God, is simply the\nrules of morality, without their obligatoriness, the salt without its\nsavour. The closing assertion that God cannot reverse morality, may\nmean either that it would be inconsistent with his immutability to\nreverse the laws he had himself established, or that he is compelled by\nhis nature to impose certain rules, and no others. The first\nsupposition is a truism; the second is not proved. For, since Mr.\nMansel has discarded as a fiction any 'absolute law of duty,' it is\nhard to conjecture whence he could derive any compulsory choice of\nrules. Why God commands some things in preference to others--whether\nfrom a regard to the happiness of all his creatures, or of some only;\nwhether with, a view to his own glory, or from conformity with some\nabstract notion--has been much disputed, and it is quite _conceivable_\nthat he may not adopt any of those objects.]\n\n[Footnote 26: For help in understanding Kant's peculiar phraseology and\ngeneral point of view, the reader is referred to the short exposition\nof his Speculative Philosophy in Appendix B.]","title":"Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":138294}