{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_12956/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_12956","id":"gutenberg_12956","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12956","summary":null,"tags":["Buddhism","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Hindu philosophy","Hinduism","India","India -- Religion","Philosophy"],"text":"nikhilam anujachittaM j\u00f1\u00e2nas\u00fbtrair naverya@h\n sajabhiva kusum\u00e2n\u00e2M k\u00e2landhhrair vidhatte/\n sa laghum api mamaitaM prAchyavij\u00f1\u00e2natantuM\nupah@rtamatibhakty\u00e2 modat\u00e2M mai g@rh\u00eetv\u00e2//\n\nMay He, who links the minds of all people,\nthrough the apertures of time, with new threads\nof knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased\nto accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered,\nthough it be small, with the greatest devotion.\n\n\n\nA HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nSURENDRANATH DASGUPTA\n\n\n\nVOLUME I\n\nFirst Edition: Cambridge, 1922\n\n\n\nDEDICATION\n\nThe work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly\ndedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages\nof India, who, for the first time in history, formulated\nthe true principles of freedom and devoted themselves\nto the holy quest of truth and the final assessment\nand discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of\nman through their concrete lives, critical thought,\ndominant will and self-denial.\n\n\n\nNOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF\nTRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT\nAND P\u00c2LI WORDS\n\n\nThe vowels are pronounced almost in the same way\nas in Italian, except that the sound of _a_ approaches\nthat of _o_ in _bond_ or _u_ in _but_, and _\u00e2_ that of _a_ as in _army_.\nThe consonants are as in English, except _c_, _ch_ in church;\n_@t_, _@d_, _@n_ are cerebrals, to which English _t_, _d_, _n_ almost\ncorrespond; _t_, _d_, _n_ are pure dentals; _kh_, _gh_, _ch_, _jh_,\n_@th_, _@dh_, _th_, _dh_, _ph_, _bh_ are the simple sounds plus an\naspiration; _\u00f1_ is the French _gn_; _@r_ is usually pronounced\nas _ri_, and _s'_, _@s_ as _sh_.\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nThe old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided\ndevelopments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and\nscience so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important\nachievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal\nof all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated\nthe point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex\ngrowth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced.\n\nIt is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent\nkingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch\nthat the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of\nspiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were\nregarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the\npolitical changes through which India passed.\n\nThe Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who\noccupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled\nthe minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes\nor the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order\nwhich never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after\na passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it\nis mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and\ncivilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other\ncountries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who\nwish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture\nthat they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical\nthought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in\nIndia has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of\nopinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract.\nIt is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples\nshould become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics\nof the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its\nspecial features.\n\nBut it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of India\n\nviii\n\nthat Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past\nthoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in\nmodern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms\nto the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and\nsolutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our\nown times may throw light on the course of the process of the future\nreconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features\nof Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full\nsignificance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as\nthe discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern\nphilological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of\nre-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been\nundertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few\nexceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of\nthese scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and\nhistory than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in\nthe way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and\ntranslations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the\npresence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical\nliterature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to\nthose who are not familiar with the texts themselves.\n\nA work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the\nchief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study\nof a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested\nin philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination\nor time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time\ninterested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books\n_The Study of Patanjali_ and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian\nSystems of Thought_ I have attempted to interpret the S\u00e4mkhya and Yoga\nsystems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view\nof their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with\nthe important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks\nto show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard\nto the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to\nthe original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or P\u00e2li\ntechnical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide\n\nix\n\nfor further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed\nessential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual\ncourse of the thoughts.\n\nIn Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the\ndifferent topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern\nwork of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large\nnumber of works on each system and these have been knit together and\ngiven a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people\nunacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I\nconsidered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts\nin order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what\nmight appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the\nthoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange\nthem in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly\nfaithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very\nfew places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of\nEnglish philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those\nwere approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term.\nIn all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made\ndangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is\ndifficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire\nsome sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to\ntake those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with\nsuch meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which\nthey are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I\nhope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for\nunfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But\nI may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places\nwhere condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also\nsometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without\nits dark and uncomfortable corners.\n\nThough I have begun my work from the Vedic and Br\u00e2hma@nic stage, my\ntreatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the\nevolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the\nlater Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.\n\nx\n\n\nMore is found in the Br\u00e2hmanas, but I do not think it worth while to\nelaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt\nwith the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject have\nalready been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details\nwill certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant\ncurrent flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currents\nof thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems\nin the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It\nwill be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of\nan inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive\ncharacter of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha\nin the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required\nin philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of\ntheories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early\nBuddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to\ndecide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic;\nand the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in\nvery elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also\nhave in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right\nor wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering\ninto any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the\nsystems are different in some cases from those offered by some European\nscholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are\nacquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may\nbe in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of\nLogic (Navya-Ny\u00e2ya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the\ncontributions of this school consist in the invention of technical\nexpressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude\nand absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these\nare almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however\nincorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view\nI could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not\nbe very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the\ndifferent Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but\nconsists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in\nthe writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the\n\nxi\n\ntexts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a\ndifference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that\na reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the\nopinions of modern writers have been incorporated.\n\nIt gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness\nto the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar,\nBengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the\npublication of both volumes of the present work.\n\nThe name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for\nthe magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes.\nUp till now he has made a total gift of about \u00a3300,000, of which those\ndevoted to education come to about \u00a3200,000. But the man himself is far\nabove the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy\nand friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable\nBodhisattva--one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many\nother scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the\nencouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and\nresearches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are\ntoo deep for utterance.\n\nI am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge\nUniversity Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the\nproofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in\nmany places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the\ntransliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the\nwhole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me\nwith his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition\nof the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its\ntreatment to repeated discussions with him.\n\nI also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N.K. Siddhanta,\nM.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie\nfor the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My\nobligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press\nfor the honour they have done me in publishing this work.\n\nTo scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my\nbook and who may be impressed with its inevitable\n\nxii\n\nshortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:\n\n  Pram\u00e2@nasiddh\u00e2ntaviruddham atra\n  Yatki\u00f1ciduktam matim\u00e2ndyado@s\u00e2t\n  M\u00e2tsaryyam uts\u00e2ryya tad\u00e2ryyacitt\u00e2@h\n  Pras\u00e2dam \u00e2dh\u00e2ya vis'odhayantu. [Footnote ref 1]\n\n\nS.D.\n\nTRINITY COLLEGE,\nCAMBRIDGE.\n\n_February_, 1922.\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill\nfeeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through\nthe dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and\nmisstatements.]\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY.....................................................1\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE VEDAS, BR\u00c2HMA@NAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY\n\n 1 The Vedas and their antiquity.................................10\n 2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind......................10\n 3 Classification of the Vedic literature........................11\n 4 The Sa@mhit\u00e2s.................................................12\n 5 The Br\u00e2hma@nas................................................13\n 6 The \u00c2ra@nyakas................................................14\n 7 The @Rg-Veda, its civilization................................14\n 8 The Vedic gods................................................16\n 9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism........................17\n10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Praj\u00e2pati, Vis'vakarma.....19\n11 Brahma........................................................20\n12 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma............21\n13 Cosmogony--Mythological and Philosophical.....................23\n14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of \u00c2tman............................25\n15 Conclusion....................................................26\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE EARLIER UPANI@SADS (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)\n\n 1 The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature...............28\n 2 The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence..........30\n 3 Br\u00e2hma@nas and the Early Upani@sads...........................31\n 4 The meaning of the word Upani@sad.............................38\n 5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads..............38\n 6 Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times..................39\n 7 The Upani@sads and their interpretations......................41\n 8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures........42\n 9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method..............44\n10 The \u00c2tman doctrine............................................45\n11 Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads............................48\n12 The World.....................................................51\n13 The World-Soul................................................52\n14 The Theory of Causation.......................................52\n15 Doctrine of Transmigration....................................53\n16 Emancipation..................................................58\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nGENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?......62\n2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature...........................65\n3 The Indian systems of Philosophy...............................67\n4 Some fundamental points of agreement...........................71\n 1 _The Karma theory_.........................................71\n 2 _The Doctrine of Mukti_....................................74\n 3 _The Doctrine of Soul_.....................................75\n5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic\n Faith in the end...............................................75\n6 Unity in Indian S\u00e2dhana (philosophical, religious and ethical\n endeavours)....................................................77\n\nxiv\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nBUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n 1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha.................78\n 2 Buddha: his Life...............................................81\n 3 Early Buddhist Literature......................................82\n 4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism............84\n 5 The Khandhas...................................................93\n 6 Avijj\u00e2 and \u00c2sava...............................................99\n 7 S\u00eela and Sam\u00e2dhi..............................................100\n 8 Kamma.........................................................106\n 9 Upani@sads and Buddhism.......................................109\n10 The Schools of Therav\u00e2da Buddhism.............................112\n11 Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nism....................................................125\n12 The Tathat\u00e2 Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.)...............129\n13 The M\u00e2dhyamika or the S\u00fbnyav\u00e2da school--Nihilism..............138\n14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism.145\n15 Sautr\u00e2ntika theory of Perception..............................151\n16 Sautr\u00e2ntika theory of Inference...............................155\n17 The Doctrine of Momentariness.................................158\n18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal\n Efficiency (Arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva)..................................163\n19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems\n diverged........................................................164\n20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought.............166\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE JAINA PHILOSOPHY\n\n 1 The Origin of Jainism.........................................169\n 2 Two Sects of Jainism..........................................170\n 3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains...............171\n 4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains.....................172\n 5 Life of Mah\u00e2v\u00eera..............................................173\n 6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.......................173\n 7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anek\u00e2ntav\u00e2da).............175\n 8 The Doctrine of N\u00e2yas.........................................176\n 9 The Doctrine of Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da......................................179\n10 Knowledge, its value for us...................................181\n11 Theory of Perception..........................................183\n12 Non-Perceptual knowledge......................................185\n13 Knowledge as Revelation.......................................186\n14 The J\u00eevas.....................................................188\n15 Karma Theory..................................................190\n16 Karma, \u00c2srava and Nirjar\u00e2.....................................192\n17 Pudgala.......................................................195\n18 Dharma, Adharma, \u00c2k\u00e2s'a.......................................197\n19 K\u00e2la and Samaya...............................................198\n20 Jaina Cosmography.............................................199\n21 Jaina Yoga....................................................199\n22 Jaina Atheism.................................................203\n23 Mok@sa (emancipation).........................................207\n\nxv\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE KAPILA AND THE P\u00c2TA\u00d1JALA S\u00c2@MKHYA (YOGA)\n\n 1 A Review......................................................208\n 2 The Germs of S\u00e2@mkhya in the Upani@sads.......................211\n 3 S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga Literature..................................212\n 4 An Early School of S\u00e2@mkhya...................................213\n 5 S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2, S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtra, V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra and Vij\u00f1\u00e2na\n Bhiksu..........................................................222\n 6 Yoga and Pata\u00f1jali............................................226\n 7 The S\u00e2@mkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa..........238\n 8 Thought and Matter............................................241\n 9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances.............................242\n10 The Gunas.....................................................243\n11 Prak@@rti and its evolution...................................245\n12 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.......247\n13 Mahat and Ahamk\u00e2ra............................................248\n14 The Tanm\u00e2tras and the Param\u00e2\u00f1us...............................251\n15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy.............254\n16 Change as the formation of new collocations...................255\n17 Causation as Satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da (the theory that the effect\n potentially exists before it is generated by the movement\n of the cause)...................................................257\n18 S\u00e2@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism..............................258\n19 Buddhi and Purusa.............................................259\n20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.......261\n21 Sorrow and its Dissolution....................................264\n22 Citta.........................................................268\n23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).......................270\n24 The Yoga Meditation...........................................271\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE NY\u00c2YA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY\n\n1 Criticism of Buddhism and S\u00e2@mkhya from the Ny\u00e2ya standpoint...274\n2 Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras...................................276\n3 Does Vais'e@sika represent an old school of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2?..........280\n4 Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras...........................285\n5 Philosophy in the Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras.................................294\n6 Philosophy of Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras and Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras..............301\n7 The Vais'e@sika and Ny\u00e2ya Literature...........................305\n8 The main doctrine of the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy..........310\n9 The six Pad\u00e2rthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, S\u00e2m\u00e2nya, Vis'e@sa,\n Samav\u00e2ya........................................................313\n10 The Theory of Causation.......................................319\n11 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).................323\n12 Proof of the Existence of Is'vara.............................325\n13 The Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika Physics.................................326\n14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pram\u00e2@na)............................330\n15 The four Pram\u00e2@nas of Ny\u00e2ya...................................332\n16 Perception (Pratyak@sa).......................................333\n17 Inference.....................................................343\n18 Upam\u00e2na and S'abda............................................354\n19 Negation in Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika.................................355\n20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for\n the seeker of Salvation.........................................360\n21 The Doctrine of Soul..........................................362\n22 \u00ces'vara and Salvation.........................................363\n\nxvi\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nM\u00ceM\u00c2@MS\u00c2 PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n1 A Comparative Review...........................................367\n2 The M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 Literature........................................369\n3 The Parata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya doctrine of Ny\u00e2ya and the\n Svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya doctrine of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2..........................372\n4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception........................375\n5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception.......................378\n6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of\n Perception......................................................379\n7 The Nature of Knowledge........................................382\n8 The Psychology of Illusion.....................................384\n9 Inference......................................................387\n10 Upam\u00e2na, Arth\u00e2patti...........................................391\n11 S'abda-pram\u00e2@na...............................................394\n12 The Pram\u00e2@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi)..................397\n13 Self, Salvation, and God......................................399\n14 M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as Philosophy and Mim\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as Ritualism..............403\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VED\u00c2NTA\n\n\n1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than\n the Dialectic of Controversy....................................406\n2 The philosophical situation: a Review..........................408\n3 Ved\u00e2nta Literature.............................................418\n4 Ved\u00e2nta in Gau@dap\u00e2da..........................................420\n5 Ved\u00e2nta and Sa@nkara (788-820 A.D.)............................429\n6 The main idea of the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy........................439\n7 In what sense is the world-appearance false?...................443\n8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena..................445\n9 The Definition of Aj\u00f1\u00e2na (nescience)...........................452\n10 Aj\u00f1\u00e2na established by Perception and Inference................454\n11 Locus and Object of Aj\u00f1\u00e2na, Aha@mk\u00e2ra and Anta@hkara@na.......457\n12 Anirv\u00e2cyav\u00e2da and the Ved\u00e2nta dialectic.......................461\n13 The Theory of Causation.......................................465\n14 Ved\u00e2nta theory of Perception and Inference....................470\n15 \u00c2tman, J\u00eeva, Is'vara, Ekaj\u00eevav\u00e2da and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2da....474\n16 Ved\u00e2nta theory of Illusion....................................485\n17 Ved\u00e2nta Ethics and Ved\u00e2nta Emancipation.......................489\n18 Ved\u00e2nta and other Indian systems..............................492\n\nINDEX............................................................495\n\n1\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\nThe achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are\nbut very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate\nthat the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body\nof Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who\nare well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and\nare not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought\nto write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does\nnot appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and\nprivate individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of\nphilosophical works in Sanskrit and P\u00e2li have been published, as well as\ntranslations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little\nsystematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their\nvalue. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of\nIndian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated.\nIndian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical\nterms are so different from those of European thought, that they can\nhardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult\nfor a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical\nthought in its true bearing from translations. P\u00e2li is a much easier\nlanguage than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of P\u00e2li is helpful in\nunderstanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its\nsemi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult\nlanguage. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary\nSanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse\nparts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily\nunderstand the Vedas. the Upani@sads, the Pur\u00e2nas, the Law Books and\nthe literary works, and is also well acquainted with European\nphilosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand\neven small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the\ndialectical Ved\u00e2nta. This is due to two reasons, the use of\ntechnical terms and of great condensation in expression, and\nthe hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The\n\n2\n\ntendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous\nmanner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninth\ncentury onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise\nexpressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a result\nof that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. These\nterms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader\nwho wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in\nolden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do\nso with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself\nhad got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to\npopularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the\nchosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become\nfit students (_adhik\u00e2r\u00ee_) of philosophy, under the direction of a\nteacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote\ntheir whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the\nrebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy\nwere allowed to study it.\n\nAnother difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes\nthe same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in\ndifferent systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical\nterm with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary\nwill enlighten him much about the matter [Footnote ref 1]. He will have\nto pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the\ndoctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions\nof similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very\npuzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to\nknow all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and\nso it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and\nrefutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions.\nThere are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some\nof the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the\n_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, and the _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ of\nHaribhadra with the commentary of Gu@naratna; but the former is very\nsketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding\nof the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the\nsystems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical\nphilosophical terms called Ny\u00e2yakos'a has been prepared by M.M.\nBh\u00eem\u00e2c\u00e2rya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.]\n\n3\n\nam afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible.\nGu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned,\nand it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems,\nand also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it\nseldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines\nor discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any\nof the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book\nwhich could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and\npsychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for\na good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature,\neven though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical\nterms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian\nphilosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical\nterms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their\nmodes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The\ntechnical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are\nof inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite\nmeaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting\nor misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think\nwell-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered\nphilosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation.\nThe art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher\ncannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly\nformed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days\nof Buddhist philosophy in the P\u00e2li literature, this difficulty is greatly\nfelt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and\ntheir repetition in different places in more or less different senses\nheighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be\nconveyed.\n\nBut is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be\nwritten? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose\nbeyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have\nany philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor\nFrank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his _History of Philosophy_\n[Footnote ref 1], \"A universal history of philosophy would include\nthe philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: New York, 1914, p. 3.]\n\n4\n\nhave produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a\nfew can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the\nmythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus,\nEgyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical\ndoctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot\nthrough with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to\nthe study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the\nancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests.\"\nThere are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and\nuntrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters.\nIt is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views,\nfor what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If\nthey are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately\nabout the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have\nto go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of\nthe chapters.\n\nThere is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt\nto write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given\nfrom two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian\nphilosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the\nsystems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials\ndirectly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared\nby specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some\ntruth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems\nthe literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more\nor less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of\ntwenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly\nbe made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own\nundertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the\noriginal texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those\nsources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited\nand I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most\nimportant. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems\nand diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many\ninteresting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused\nin a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness.\nThere are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and\n\n5\n\nthese would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the\npresent one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the\npresent attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more\ncompetent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called\nimpossible on account of its imperfections.\n\nIn the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and\naccurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible\nto write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially\nvalid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first\nsight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very\nobscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates\nand to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers.\nAs most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their\nmutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The\nspecial nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth\nchapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous\ncourse of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not\npossible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at\na particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a\nlater time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state,\nbut only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to\nthe original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history\nhas in Western countries often brought forth the development of more\ncoherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types\nremained the same, their development through history made them more and\nmore coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent\nin the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through\nthe criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side\nthe parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more\ndifferentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development\nhas been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have\nbeen lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be\nmade out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made\nin the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I\nhave never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest\nshould be subordinated to the chronological. It is no\n\n6\n\ndoubt true that more definite chronological information would be\na very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little\nchronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming\na general notion about the growth and development of the different\nsystems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the\ndevelopment of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe,\ndefinite chronological knowledge would be considered much more\nindispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is\nindispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which\nsucceeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when\nwe are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with\nregard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin\nhas rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as\nbest I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier\nstages of some of the systems, but though the various features of\nthese systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable,\nyet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the\nwhole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates\nof the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately,\nas is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the\nsame thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system,\nand tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more\ndeterminate forms.\n\nThe earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of\nhymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in\nsome of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000\nB.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term.\nIt is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical\nquestions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms\nof poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the\nBr\u00e2hmaf@nas and the \u00c2ra@nyakas written mostly in prose, which followed\nthe Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to\nestablish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which\nindulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This\nlatter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might\nappear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what\nlittle of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying\nto express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency\n\n7\n\nexisted and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose\nand verse called the Upani@sads, which contain various sorts of\nphilosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some\npluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but\nutterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real\nand indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with\nthem. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this\nliterature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began\nwith the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe\nthat Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of\nits vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D.\nThe earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to\nbe sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina\nphilosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier\ndays, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it\ndoes not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with\nother systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai@s@nava\nthought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu\nwriters or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and\nGu@naratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The\nnon-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain\nextent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is\ndifficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there\nhave been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds,\nJaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less\ndiffering from one another as Buddhist thought did.\n\nThe first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy\nand the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox\nHindu thought are the S\u00e2@mkhya, the Yoga, the Ny\u00e2ya, the Vais'e@sika,\nthe Mim\u00e2@ms\u00e2 (generally known as P\u00fbrva Mim\u00e2@ms\u00e2), and the Ved\u00e2nta (known\nalso as Uttara Mim\u00e2@ms\u00e2). Of these what is differently known as S\u00e2@mkhya\nand Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vais'e@sika and\nthe Ny\u00e2ya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times\nthe similarity of the former with Mim\u00e2@ms\u00e2 was greater than that\nwith Ny\u00e2ya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the\nsame systems. Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika have therefore been treated\n\n8\n\ntogether. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began\nto grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably\nhad their early beginnings at the time of the Upani@sads. But at\nthat time their interest was probably concentrated on problems\nof morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were\nassociated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works\ntreating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most\nimportant early works is the _Bhagavadg\u00e2t\u00e2_. This book is rightly\nregarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is\nwritten in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical\nproblems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which\ngives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upani@sads\nthan to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth\ncentury onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic\nideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious\ncreeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and\npluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different\nschools of Vai@s@nava philosophy. Most of the Vai@s@nava thinkers wished\nto show that their systems were taught in the Upani@sads, and thus\nwrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote\ncommentaries on the _Brahmas\u00fbtra_, the classical exposition of the\nphilosophy of the Upani@sads. In addition to the works of these Vai@s@nava\nthinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a\nmore eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old\nas the Upani@sads. They are known as the S'aiva and Tantra thought, and are\ndealt with in the second volume of this work.\n\nWe thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought\ncan be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is\nextremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the\nsystems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have\nbeen made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far\nthey are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during\nthe earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are\ntraceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop\nside by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they\nwere first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an\nunbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of\nHindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now\n\n9\n\ncare to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of\nany system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new\nproblems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently\nwith its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the\nphilosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus\nthough it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of\nS\u00e2@mkhya, Yoga, and M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 were prior to Buddhism yet they have been\ntreated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these\nsystems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the\nVais'e@sika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been\ntreated later, partly on account of its association with Ny\u00e2ya, and\npartly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much\nlater date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of\nold philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have\nbeen of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems\nand their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be\nsatisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn\nmy materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the\nliterature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study\nof any particular system of thought.\n\nIn my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources\nas accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar\nmodes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to\nthe adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian\nideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the\nmodern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed.\nThis only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes\nof rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian\nthought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present\nattempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might\nsay that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are\nessentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main\ndifference is often the difference of the point of view from which the\nsame problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries.\nMy own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical\ndevelopment will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second\nvolume of the present work.\n\n10\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nTHE VEDAS, BR\u00c2HMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY\n\nThe Vedas and their antiquity.\n\nThe sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the\nearliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed\ndifficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came\ninto existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them\ncan be proved to be incontestably true. Max M\u00fcller supposed the date to\nbe 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and B\u00e2l Ga@ng\u00e2dhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The\nancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary,\nreligious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from\nmouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus\ngenerally believed that they were never composed by men. It was\ntherefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the\nsages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the\n\"seers\" (_mantradra@s@t\u00e2_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some\ntime had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to\nlook upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had,\ntheoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed\nto have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of\neach creation.\n\n\nThe place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.\n\nWhen the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing\nprevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins,\nwho got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their\npreceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through\nthe course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations\nat all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes\nin the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such\nwas the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as\nthe highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at\nall times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus\nat birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old\n\n11\n\nVedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day\nare the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses\ntwo or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an\nordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of\nimage-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular\nobligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites.\nThus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes,\nbut not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies.\nEven at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money\nfor the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals.\nMost of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas\nbase upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority.\nSystems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas,\nbut the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others\nand maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone\nwas the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their\nviews. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious\ncustoms and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be\nbut mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to\nbe obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in\nthe inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal\ntransactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority\nfrom the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to\nsay that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the\npast, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all\nliteratures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may\nsay that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox\nHindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the\nVedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.\n\n\nClassification of the Vedic literature.\n\nA beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study\nof later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused\nwhen he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and\nsubjects having the same generic name \"Veda\" or \"S'ruti\" (from\n_s'ru_ to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any\n\n12\n\nparticular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending\nover a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature\nrepresents the total achievements of the Indian people in different\ndirections for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a\ndiversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from\nthe points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out\nfour different types, namely the Sa@mhit\u00e2 or collection of verses (_sam_\ntogether, _hita_ put), Br\u00e2hma@nas, \u00c2ra@nyakas (\"forest treatises\")\nand the Upani@sads. All these literatures, both prose and verse,\nwere looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought\nalmost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by\nheart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and\nwere hence called _s'ruti_ (literally anything heard)[Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe Sa@mhit\u00e2s.\n\nThere are four collections or Sa@mhit\u00e2s, namely @Rg-Veda, S\u00e2ma-Veda,\nYajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the @Rg-Veda is probably the\nearliest. The S\u00e2ma-Veda has practically no independent value, for\nit consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the\n@Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and\nmay thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains\nin addition to the verses taken from the @Rg-Veda many original prose\nformulas. The arrangement of the verses of the S\u00e2ma-Veda is solely with\nreference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents\nof the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were\nactually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore\ncalled the Veda of Yajus--sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted\nwith the arrangement in the @Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses are\ngenerally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them.\nThus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the\nFire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth\ncollection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form\nconsiderably later than the @Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor\nMacdonell says, \"It is not only entirely different from the _Rigveda_\nbut represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the\n_Rigveda_ deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: P\u00e2@nini, III. iii. 94.]\n\n13\n\ncomparatively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the _Atharva-Veda_\nis, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon\nworld, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower\ngrades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These\ntwo, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most\nimportant of the four Vedas [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\n\nThe Br\u00e2hma@nas. [Footnote ref 2]\n\nAfter the Sa@mhit\u00e2s there grew up the theological treatises called the\nBr\u00e2hma@nas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They\nare written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the\ndifferent rituals to those who are not already familiar with them.\n\"They reflect,\" says Professor Macdonell, \"the spirit of an age in\nwhich all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice,\ndescribing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its\norigin and significance.\" These works are full of dogmatic assertions,\nfanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the\nfield of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably\nnever so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed.\nBut when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation\nto generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus\nthere came about the necessity of the distribution of the different\nsacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We may\nassume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming\nestablished, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious\nminds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking\nwas thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result\nwas the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: A.A. Macdonell's _History of Sanskrit Literature_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Weber (_Hist. Ind. Lit_., p. 11, note) says that the word\nBr\u00e2hma@na signifies \"that which relates to prayer _brahman_.\" Max Muller\n(_S.B.E._, I.p. lxvi) says that Br\u00e2hma@na meant \"originally the sayings\nof Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more\nspecial sense of Brahman-priests.\" Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p. xxii)\nsays that the Brh\u00e2ma@nas were so called \"probably either because\nthey were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman)\ngenerally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative\nutterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial\nlore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests.\" But\nin view of the fact that the Br\u00e2hma@nas were also supposed to be as\nmuch revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view\nis the correct one.]\n\n14\n\nsystem, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now\ngenerally believed that the close of the Br\u00e2hma@na period was not later\nthan 500 B.C.\n\n\nThe \u00c2ra@nyakas.\n\nAs a further development of the Br\u00e2hma@nas however we get the \u00c2ra@nyakas\nor forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who\nhad retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate\nsacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could\nnot be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols\nwere supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant\nthe sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find\nthat amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas\nbegan to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of\ntruth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an\nillustration from the beginning of the B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka we find that\ninstead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (_as'vamedha_)\nthere are directions for meditating upon the dawn (_U@sas_) as the head\nof the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and\nso on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation\nor meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials\nof sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable\nof bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of\nVedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic\nmeditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus\nwe find that the \u00c2ra@nyaka age was a period during which free thinking\ntried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered\nit for a long time. It was thus that the \u00c2ra@nyakas could pave the way\nfor the Upani@sads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the\nVedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upani@sads the source\nof all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.\n\n\nThe @Rg-Veda, its civilization.\n\nThe hymns of the @Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a\nsingle hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They\nwere composed probably at different periods by different sages,\nand it is not improbable that some of them were composed\n\n15\n\nbefore the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed\ndown from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions\nthat were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the\ncollection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was\nprobably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms\nto which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect\nthe civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity\nbefore and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long\nvanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is\ngenuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive\nsociety which produced it--the oldest book of the Aryan race.\nThe principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the\ncultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe,\nand watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals.\n\"The chief food consists,\" as Kaegi says, \"together with bread,\nof various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many\nsorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots,\nis little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and\nfamily gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important\npart than eating [Footnote ref 1].\" The wood-worker built war-chariots\nand wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups.\nMetal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The\nwomen understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing;\nthey manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men\nand covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a\ntribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families\nforming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of\nthe family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases\nelectoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the\nwill of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and\nlaw, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, \"the hymns\nstrongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people\nwere persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the\nworld were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the\nrealm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious,\nwas punished and the sin expiated.\"[Footnote ref 2] Thus it is only right\nand proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 18.]\n\n16\n\nof civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans\nmore manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and\ndominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular\nones. Thus Kaegi says, \"The whole significance of the Rigveda\nin reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly\nbeen pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents\nto us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest\nbeginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its\nrelation to man [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\n\nThe Vedic Gods.\n\nThe hymns of the @Rg-Veda were almost all composed in\npraise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary\nimportance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally\nin giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god.\nThe gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse\npowers of nature or forming their very essence. They have\ntherefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the\nGreek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the\nPur\u00e2@nas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the\nthunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods\nassociated with them are also similar in character. The same\nepithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few\nspecific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later\nmythological compositions of the Pur\u00e2@nas the gods lost their\ncharacter as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual\npersonalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow\nlike the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted\nwith them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the\ncharacters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers\nof nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as\nKaegi has it, as one that \"lies concealed in the softer wood, as\nin a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early\nmorning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness.\nThe sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests\npour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing\nlike a horse--he whom men love to see increasing like their own\nprosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 26.]\n\n17\n\nchanging colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he\npresents to all sides his front.\n\n   \"All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light,\n   His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance,\n   The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream,\n   So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease.\"\n\n[Footnote ref 1] R.V.I. 143. 3.\n\nThey would describe the wind (V\u00e2ta) and adore him and say\n\n   \"In what place was he born, and from whence comes he?\n   The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring,\n   The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure:\n   His rushing sound we hear--what his appearance, no one.\"\n\n[Footnote ref 2] R.V.X. 168. 3, 4.\n\nIt was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth\nhere, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven\nbeyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and\nimagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a\nfew abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some\ndual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the\nterrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.\n\n\nPolytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.\n\nThe plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer\nto think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent\nreader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple\nprimitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe\ntheir origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in\na polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance\nor shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not.\nThe Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon\nexcited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck\nwith wonder that \"the rough red cow gives soft white milk.\" The appearance\nor the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic\nsage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:\n\n   \"Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it\n   That downward turned he falls not downward?\n   The guide of his ascending path,--who saw it?\"\n\n[Footnote Ref 1] R.V. IV. 13. 5.\n\nThe sages wonder how \"the sparkling waters of all rivers flow\ninto one ocean without ever filling it.\" The minds of the Vedic\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_, p. 38.]\n\n18\n\npeople as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and\nfresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to\naccord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude\nof gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They\nhypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed\nthem or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or\naesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion\nor admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the\ntime. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has called\nHenotheism or Kathenotheism: \"a belief in single gods, each in turn\nstanding out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of\nas specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special\nconcerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they\nascribe the most power in the matter,--to whose department if I\nmay say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind\nof the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything\nthat can be said of a divine being;--he is the highest, the only\ngod, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however,\nno offence or depreciation of any other god [Footnote ref 1].\" \"Against\nthis theory it has been urged,\" as Macdonell rightly says in his _Vedic\nMythology_ [Footnote ref 2], \"that Vedic deities are not represented as\n'independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into\nmore frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even\nthe mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus\nVaru@na and S\u00fbrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varu@na and\nthe As'vins submit to the power of Vi@s@nu (I. 156)....Even when a\ngod is spoken of as unique or chief (_eka_), as is natural enough in\nlaudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic\nforce, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context\nor even by the same verse [Footnote Ref 3]. \"Henotheism is therefore an\nappearance,\" says Macdonell, \"rather than a reality, an appearance\nproduced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism,\nby the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the\nconstant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest\nor singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness\nand to ignore other gods, and by the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Ibid._ p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other\nreferences to Henotheism.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 16, 17.]\n\n19\n\ngrowing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35)\neach of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine [Footnote ref 1].\"\nBut whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration\nof the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this\nstage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic,\nbut one which had a tendency towards them both, although it\nwas not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them.\nThe tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a\nmonotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different\ndeities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side\nwas a tendency towards polytheism.\n\nGrowth of a Monotheistic tendency; Praj\u00e2pati, Vis'vakarma.\n\nThis tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and\nhighest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme\nLord of all beings (Praj\u00e2pati), not by a process of conscious\ngeneralization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind,\nable to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and\nphysical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived.\nThus the epithet Praj\u00e2pati or the Lord of beings, which\nwas originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized\nas a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said\nin R.V.x. 121 [Footnote Ref 2]:\n\n  In the beginning rose Hira@nyagarbha,\n  Born as the only lord of all existence.\n  This earth he settled firm and heaven established:\n  What god shall we adore with our oblations?\n  Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding\n  All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;\n  Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal:\n  What god shall we adore with our oblations?\n  Who by his might alone became the monarch\n  Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,\n  Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal:\n  What god shall we adore with our oblations?\n  Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,\n  The ocean and the distant stream exhibit;\n  Whose arms extended are these spreading regions:\n  What god shall we adore with our oblations?\n  Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,\n  Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;\n  Who measured out the air's extended spaces:\n  What god shall we adore with our oblations?\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.]\n\n20\n\nSimilar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vis'vakarma\n(All-creator) [Footnote ref 1]. He is said to be father and procreator of\nall beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters.\nIt is to him that the sage says,\n\n  Who is our father, our creator, maker,\n  Who every place doth know and every creature,\n  By whom alone to gods their names were given,\n  To him all other creatures go to ask him [Footnote ref 2]\n                                          R.V.x.82.3.\n\n\nBrahma.\n\nThe conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory\nfor the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in\nthe @Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The\nmeanings that S\u00e2ya@na the celebrated commentator of the Vedas\ngives of the word as collected by Haug are: (_a_) food, food offering,\n(_b_) the chant of the s\u00e2ma-singer, (_c_) magical formula or text,\n(_d_) duly completed ceremonies, (_e_) the chant and sacrificial gift\ntogether, (_f_) the recitation of the hot@r priest, (_g_) great. Roth\nsays that it also means \"the devotion which manifests itself as\nlonging and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the\ngods.\" But it is only in the S'atapatha Br\u00e2hma@na that the conception\nof Brahman has acquired a great significance as the\nsupreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods.\nThus the S'atapatha says, \"Verily in the beginning this (universe)\nwas the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having\ncreated the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this\n(terrestrial) world, V\u00e2yu the air, and S\u00fbrya the sky.... Then the\nBrahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up\nto the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again\ninto these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these\ntwo, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and\nthat again which has no name and which one knows by its form,\n'this is (of a certain) form,' that is form: as far as there are Form\nand Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed\nare the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows\nthese two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force [Footnote\nref 3]. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the\nUniverse and is identified with Praj\u00e2pati, Puru@sa and Pr\u00e2@na\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's _Sanskrit\nTexts_, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Kaegi's translation.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Br\u00e2hmana _S.B.E._\nvol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.]\n\n21\n\n(the vital air [Footnote ref 1]). In another place Brahman is described as\nbeing the Svayambh\u00fb (self-born) performing austerities, who offered\nhis own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self,\nand thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over\nall creatures [Footnote ref 2]. The conception of the supreme man (Puru@sa)\nin the @Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the\nworld with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining\nthree parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the\npresent, past and future [Footnote ref 3].\n\n\nSacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.\n\nIt will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic\ntendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices.\nOn the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually\ngrowing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth\ncontributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant\nposition, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics\nof the sacrifice as an institution which could give the\ndesired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not\ndictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian\nor Vai@s@nava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived\nas Haug notes \"to be a kind of machinery in which every\npiece must tally with the other,\" the slightest discrepancy in the\nperformance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring\nof the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils\nemployed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw\ncontrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole\nsacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed.\nEven if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results\nmight follow. Thus when Tva@s@t@r performed a sacrifice for the\nproduction of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy\nIndra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object\nwas reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if\nthe sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest\ndetail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition\nof the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not\nby the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice.\nThe performance of the rituals invariably produced certain\nmystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _S.B.E._ XLIII. pp.59,60,400 and XLIV. p.409.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Ibid_., XLIV, p. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 3: R.V.x.90, Puru@sa S\u00fbkta.]\n\n22\n\nby the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of\na natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed\nto have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of\nthe world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed\nby the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says \"as an invisible thing at\nall times and is like the latent power of electricity in an\nelectrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable\napparatus in order to be elicited.\" The sacrifice is not offered\nto a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare\non earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by\nthe sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated\nand interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though\nin each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings,\nthe gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice\nor in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it.\nSacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even\nto the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank\nby means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only\nkind of duty, and it was also called _karma_ or _kriy\u00e2_ (action) and\nthe unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good\nor for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of\nsacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or\ngaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others)\nwere destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that\nthe first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature\nunder the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the\nuse of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This word\nwas also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the \"'order'\nin the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious\nworld as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]\" and its unalterable law of\nproducing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it\nis here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises\nsuch a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present\nday. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic\nhymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex\nsystem of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course\ntowards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate\nreality of the universe.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]\n\n23\n\n\nCosmogony--Mythological and philosophical.\n\nThe cosmogony of the @Rg-Veda may be looked at from two\naspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological\naspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says,\n\"The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production,\nthe work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other\nrepresents it as the result of natural generation [Footnote ref. 1].\"\nThus in the @Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, \"what was\nthe wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven\nand earth [Footnote ref. 2]?\" The answer given to this question in\nTaittir\u00eeya-Br\u00e2hma@na is \"Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from\nwhich the heaven and earth were made [Footnote ref 3].\" Heaven and Earth\nare sometimes described as having been supported with posts [Footnote\nref 4]. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and\nparentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dak@sa.\n\nUnder this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn\n[Footnote ref 5] attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already\nnoticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever\nhas been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become\ndiffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and\nall beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere;\nfrom his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from\nhis ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which\nthe Sun is called the soul (_\u00e2tman_) of all that is movable and\nall that is immovable [Footnote ref 6]. There are also statements to the\neffect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the\nsages [Footnote ref 7]. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the\nsupreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hira@nyagarbha [Footnote\nref 8]). In some passages it is said \"Brahma@naspati blew forth these\nbirths like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent\nsprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the\nexistent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions\nsprang, thereafter, from Utt\u00e2napada [Footnote ref 9].\" The most remarkable\nand sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: R.V.x. 81. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11; also R.V. II. 15 and IV.\n56.]\n\n[Footnote 5: R.V.x. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 6: R.V.I. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 7: R.V.I. 164. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 8: R.V.X. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Muir's translation of R.V.x. 72; Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.\nv.p. 48.]\n\n24\n\nwith regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world\nare found is the 129th hymn of R.V.x.\n\n1. Then there was neither being nor not-being.\n   The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it.\n   What covered all? and where? by what protected?\n   Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?\n\n2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;\n   Of day and night there was yet no distinction.\n   Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported,\n   Other than It was none, nor aught above It.\n\n3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden;\n   The universe was undistinguished water.\n   That which in void and emptiness lay hidden\n   Alone by power of fervor was developed.\n\n4. Then for the first time there arose desire,\n   Which was the primal germ of mind, within it.\n   And sages, searching in their heart, discovered\n   In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.\n\n6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely\n   From what and how this universe has risen?\n   And whether not till after it the gods lived?\n   Who then can know from what it has arisen?\n\n7. The source from which this universe has risen,\n   And whether it was made, or uncreated,\n   He only knows, who from the highest heaven\n   Rules, the all-seeing lord--or does not He know [Footnote ref 1]?\n\nThe earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the\nS'atapatha Br\u00e2hma@na (x. 5. 3.I) which says that \"in the beginning\nthis (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent;\nin the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did\nnot exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been\ndeclared by the Rishi (@Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither\nthe non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither\nexistent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to\nbecome manifest,--more defined, more substantial: it sought after\na self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency [Footnote\nref 2].\" In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of\nthe universe were comprehended within the god Skambha [Footnote ref 3].\n\nThus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang\nforth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 90. R.V.x. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Eggeling's translation of _S'.B., S.B.E._ vol. XLIII. pp.\n374, 375.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _A.V._ x. 7. 10.]\n\n25\n\nquestion whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which\ncould think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the\nmystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being;\nand which could think that it was the primal One which by its\ninherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first\nmanifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang\nforth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the\nBr\u00e2hma@nas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally\nrequires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the\nstarting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined\nwith the theory of creation, so that Praj\u00e2pati is sometimes\nspoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said\nto have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.\n\n\nEschatology; the Doctrine of \u00c2tman.\n\nThere seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could\nbe separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could\nexist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the\ndoctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the S'atapatha\nBr\u00e2hma@na it is said that those who do not perform rites with\ncorrect knowledge are born again after death and suffer death\nagain. In a hymn of the @Rg-Veda (X. 58) the soul (_manas_) of a man\napparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the\ntrees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there\nis also the belief in the existence of another world, where the\nhighest material joys are attained as a result of the performance\nof the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath\nwhere the evil-doers are punished. In the S'atapatha\nBr\u00e2hma@na we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the\nevil-doers, but let the good go by [Footnote ref 1]; it is also said\nthere that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance,\nand receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad.\nIt is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to\nthe destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he\nperforms or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of\nthe later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys\nor suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world\naccording to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the\nmoral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _S.B._ I. 9.3, and also Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_,\npp. 166, 167.]\n\n26\n\nmore often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good\nworks. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection\nof the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad\nworks when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or\norder, which we have already seen was gradually growing with\nthe conception of @rta, and the unalterable law which produces\nthe effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the\ndoctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the\n@Rg-Veda are _manas_, _\u00e2tman_ and _asu_. The word _\u00e2tman_ however\nwhich became famous in later Indian thought is generally used\nto mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought\nand emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as\ndwelling in the heart[Footnote ref 1]. It is however difficult to\nunderstand how \u00e2tman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man\ngoing out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence\nor reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one\npassage in the @Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and\ndeeper passes from the vital breath (_asu_) to the blood, and thence\nto \u00e2tman as the inmost self of the world; \"Who has seen how\nthe first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was\nborn from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital\nbreath, the blood, the Self (_\u00e2tman_) of the world? Who went to\nask him that knows it [Footnote ref 2]?\" In Taitt\u00eerya \u00c2ra@nyaka I. 23,\nhowever, it is said that Praj\u00e2pati after having created his self (as\nthe world) with his own self entered into it. In Taitt\u00eerya Br\u00e2hma@na\nthe \u00e2tman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows\nhim is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the\npre-Upani@sad Vedic literature \u00e2tman probably was first used to\ndenote \"vital breath\" in man, then the self of the world, and then\nthe self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces\nof a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent\nsupreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which\nmakes a man sinless and pure.\n\n\nConclusion.\n\nLooking at the advancement of thought in the @Rg-Veda we\nfind first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which\nnot only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]\n\n[Footnote 2: R.V.i. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on \u00c2tman in\n_Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_.\n\n27\n\nconstruction made of them, but sought to explain it as having\nemanated from one great being who is sometimes described as\none with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as\nbeing separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother\nof philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express\ndoubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation--\"Who\nknows whether this world was ever created or not?\" Secondly\nthe growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable\nnature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their\neffects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities\nas being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the\ntendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple\ncharacter and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some\nquarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable\nfrom his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another\nworld according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the\nsoul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be reborn\non earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may\nbe regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of\ntransmigration. The self (_\u00e2tman_) is spoken of in one place as the\nessence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Br\u00e2hma@nas\nand the \u00c2ra@nyakas we see that \u00e2tman has begun to mean the\nsupreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus\napproached the great \u00c2tman doctrine of the Upani@sads.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nTHE EARLIER UPANI@SADS [Footnote ref 1]. (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)\n\nThe place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature.\n\nThough it is generally held that the Upani@sads are usually\nattached as appendices to the \u00c2ra@nyakas which are again attached\nto the Br\u00e2hma@nas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as\nseparate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases\nthat subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Br\u00e2hma@na\nare introduced into the \u00c2ra@nyakas and the \u00c2ra@nyaka materials\nare sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upani@sad teaching.\nThis shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by\nthe \"Nir@naya-S\u00e2gara\" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 \u00cds\u00e2, 2 Kena,\n3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 M\u00e2@n@dukya, 7 Taittir\u00eeya, 7 Aitareya,\n9 Ch\u00e2ndogya, 10 B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka, 11 S'vet\u00e2s'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki,\n13 Maitrey\u00ee, 14 Kaivalya, 15 J\u00e2b\u00e2la, 16 Brahmabindu, 17 Ha@msa,\n18 \u00c2ru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 N\u00e2r\u00e2ya@na, 21 N\u00e2r\u00e2ya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa,\n23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtan\u00e2da, 25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikh\u00e2,\n27 Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee, 28 B@rhajj\u00e2b\u00e2la, 29 N@rsi@mhap\u00fbrvat\u00e2pin\u00ee,\n30 N@rsi@mhottarat\u00e2pin\u00ee, 31 K\u00e2l\u00e2gnirudra, 32 Sub\u00e2la, 33 K@surik\u00e2,\n34 Yantrik\u00e2, 35 Sarvas\u00e2ra, 36 Nir\u00e2lamba, 37 S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajras\u00fbcik\u00e2,\n39 Tejobindu, 40 N\u00e2dabindu, 41 Dhy\u00e2nabindu, 42 Brahmavidy\u00e2, 43 Yogatattva,\n44 Atmabodha, 45 N\u00e2radaparivr\u00e2jaka, 46 Tris'ikhibr\u00e2hma@na, 47 S\u00eet\u00e2,\n48 Yogac\u00fb@dama@ni, 49 Nirv\u00e2na, 50 Ma@ndalabr\u00e2hma@na, 51 Dak@si@n\u00e2m\u00fbrtti,\n52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Trip\u00e2dvibh\u00fbtimah\u00e2n\u00e2rya@na, 55 Advayat\u00e2raka,\n56 Ramarahasya, 57 R\u00e2map\u00fbrvat\u00e2pin\u00ee, 58 R\u00e2mottarat\u00e2pin\u00ee, 59 V\u00e2sudeva,\n60 Mudgala, 61 S\u00e2@n@dilya, 62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mah\u00e2, 65 S'\u00e2r\u00eeraka,\n66 Yogas'ikh\u00e2, 67 Turiy\u00e2t\u00eeta, 68 Sa@mny\u00e2sa, 69 Paramaha@msaparivr\u00e2jaka,\n70 Ak@sam\u00e2l\u00e2, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ek\u00e2k@sara, 73 Annap\u00fbrn\u00e2, 74 S\u00fbrya, 75 Aksi,\n76 Adhy\u00e2tma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 S\u00e2vitr\u00ee, 79 \u00c2tman, 80 P\u00e2'supatabrahma,\n81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadh\u00fbta, 83 Tripur\u00e2r\u00e2pini, 84 Dev\u00ee, 85 Tripur\u00e2,\n86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bh\u00e2van\u00e2, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali,\n90 Bhasmaj\u00e2b\u00e2la, 91 Rudr\u00e2k@saj\u00e2b\u00e2la, 92 Ga@napati, 93 J\u00e2b\u00e2ladars'ana,\n94 T\u00e2ias\u00e2ra, 95 Mah\u00e2vakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Pr\u00e2@n\u00e2gnihotra,\n98 Gop\u00e2lap\u00fbrvat\u00e2pin\u00ee, 99 Gop\u00e2lottarat\u00e2pin\u00ee, 100 K@r@s@na, 101 Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya,\n102 Var\u00e2ha, 103 S'\u00e2thy\u00e2yan\u00eeya, 104 Hayagr\u00eeva, 105 Datt\u00e2treya, 106 Garu@da,\n107 Kalisantara@na, 108 J\u00e2b\u00e2li, 109 Saubh\u00e2gyalak@sm\u00ee, 110 Sarasvat\u00eerahasya,\n111 Bahvrca, 112 Muktika.\n\nThe collection of Upani@sads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother,\ncontained 50 Upani@sads. The Muktika Upani@sad gives a list of 108\nUpani@sads. With the exception of the first 13 Upani@sads most of them are\nof more or less later date. The Upani@sads dealt with in this chapter are\nthe earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the\npurport of these, there are others which deal with the S'aiva, S'\u00e2kta,\nthe Yoga and the Vai@s@nava doctrines. These will be referred to in\nconnection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The\nlater Upani@sads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this\nchapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upani@sads were\ncomposed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.]\n\n29\n\nprocess of development and they were probably regarded as parts\nof one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter.\nDeussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be\nfound in this, that the Br\u00e2hma@nas were intended for the householders,\nthe \u00c2ra@nyakas for those who in their old age withdrew\ninto the solitude of the forests and the Upani@sads for those who\nrenounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.\nWhatever might be said about these literary classifications the\nancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani@sads as being\nof an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature\nas dictating the path of knowledge (_j\u00f1\u00e2na-m\u00e2rga_) as opposed\nto the path of works (_karma-m\u00e2rga_) which forms the content\nof the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the\northodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the\nVeda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain\nactions (_vidhi_) or prohibitions against committing certain others\n(_ni@sedha_). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted\nthat the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to\npraise the performance of the commandments and to blame the\ncommission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue\nwhy any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no\nreason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails\nto find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that\nthe Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions\nto show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs\ntherefore to that of the Karma-m\u00e2rga or the performance of Vedic\nduties of sacrifice, etc. The Upani@sads however do not require\nthe performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth\nand reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man.\nReaders of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong\ncontroversy on this point between the adherents of the Ved\u00e2nta\n(_Upani@sads_) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy\nto the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle\nthat the Upani@sads should not be regarded as an exception, but\nthat they should also be so interpreted that they might also be\nheld out as commending the performance of duties; but the\nformer dissociate the Upani@sads from the rest of the Vedic literature\nand assert that they do not make the slightest reference to\nany Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which\nreveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.\n\n30\n\nS'a@nkara the most eminent exponent of the Upani@sads holds that\nthey are meant for such superior men who are already above\nworldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties\nhave ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be\nsuch a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an\nascetic, for him the Upani@sads have been revealed for his ultimate\nemancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the\nVedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer\ncare for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final\nemancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the\nUpani@sads [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.\n\nThe Upani@sads are also known by another name Ved\u00e2nta, as\nthey are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (_veda-anta_,\nend); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upani@sads,\nthe Ved\u00e2nta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student\nknows that in language the Upani@sads approach the classical\nSanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination\nof the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they\nthus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their\nVedic names which they took from the name of the different\nschools or branches (_s'\u00e2kh\u00e2_) among which the Vedas were studied\n[Footnote ref 2]. Thus the Upani@sads attached to the Br\u00e2hma@nas\nof the Aitareya and Kau@s\u00eetaki schools are called respectively\nAitareya and Kau@s\u00eetaki Upani@sads. Those of the T\u00e2@n@dins and\nTalavak\u00e2ras of the S\u00e2ma-veda are called the Ch\u00e2ndogya and Talavak\u00e2ra\n(or Kena) Upani@sads. Those of the Taittir\u00efya school of the Yajurveda\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This is what is called the difference of fitness\n(_adhik\u00e2ribheda_). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to\nhear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sads\nhave no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.]\n\n[Footnote 2: When the Sa@mhit\u00e2 texts had become substantially fixed,\nthey were committed to memory in different parts of the country and\ntransmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the\npractical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the\nmatter of prose compositions, the Br\u00e2hma@nas. These however were\ngradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the\nspecial tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited.\nThus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of\nthe texts of the Br\u00e2hma@nas even of the same Veda among different people.\nThese different schools were known by the name of particular S'\u00e2kh\u00e2s\n(e.g. Aitareya, Kau@s\u00eetaki) with which the Br\u00e2hma@nas were associated\nor named. According to the divergence of the Br\u00e2hma@nas of the different\nS'\u00e2kh\u00e2s there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the\nUpani@sads associated with them.]\n\n31\n\nform the Taittir\u00eeya and Mah\u00e2n\u00e2raya@na, of the Ka@tha school\nthe K\u00e2@thaka, of the Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee school the Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee. The\nB@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka Upani@sad forms part of the S'atapatha Br\u00e2hma@na\nof the V\u00e2jasaneyi schools. The \u00ces'\u00e2 Upani@sad also belongs to the\nlatter school. But the school to which the S'vet\u00e2s'vatara belongs\ncannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption\nwith regard to these Upani@sads is that they represent the\nenlightened views of the particular schools among which they\nflourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number\nof Upani@sads of a comparatively later age were attached to the\nAtharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the\nVedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which\nthey dealt [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIt may not be out of place here to mention that from the\nfrequent episodes in the Upani@sads in which the Brahmins are\ndescribed as having gone to the K@sattriyas for the highest knowledge\nof philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the\nUpani@sad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the\nBr\u00e2hma@nas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical\nspeculations amongst the people in P\u00e2li works, it may be\ninferred that among the K@sattriyas in general there existed earnest\nphilosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted\nan important influence in the formation of the Upani@sad doctrines.\nThere is thus some probability in the supposition that though the\nUpani@sads are found directly incorporated with the Br\u00e2hma@nas\nit was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas\nalone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either\nset the Upani@sad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance\nto their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved\ntheir culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.\n\n\nBr\u00e2hma@nas and the Early Upani@sads.\n\nThe passage of the Indian mind from the Br\u00e2hmanic to the\nUpani@sad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the\nhistory of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic\nhymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were\ndeveloped, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of\nthe Upani@sads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, \u00c2tman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc.\nThere were however some exceptions such as the M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkya, J\u00e2b\u00e2la,\nPai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc.]\n\n32\n\nsystems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis'vakarman or\nHira@nyagarbha into the \u00e2tman and the Brahman of the Upani@sads\nseems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing\nto admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the \u00e2tman\ndoctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout\nthe earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis'vakarman,\nHira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such a\nnature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sad\nideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubt\noccurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the association\nthat come along with it are widely different from that of the\npuru@sa of the Puru@sas\u00fbkta of the @Rg-Veda.\n\nWhen the @Rg-Veda describes Vis'vakarman it describes him\nas a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events,\nto whom they pray for worldly benefits. \"What was the position, which\nand whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis'vakarman\nproduced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The\none god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every\nside arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth,\nshapes them with his arms and with his wings....Do thou, Vis'vakarman,\ngrant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest,\nand the lowest, and the middle...may a generous son remain here\nto us [Footnote ref 2]\"; again in R.V.X. 82 we find \"Vis'vakarman is\nwise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of\nintuition....He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows\nall spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names,\nto him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3].\"\nAgain about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R.V.I. 121, \"Hira@nyagarbha arose\nin the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He\nestablished the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our\noblation?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the\nearth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who\nproduced the great and brilliant waters!--to what god, etc.? Praj\u00e2pati,\nno other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we\nobtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we\nbecome masters of riches [Footnote ref 4].\" Speaking of the puru@sa the\n@Rg-Veda\n\n\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17.\nHira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the\nfirst created being. The phrase Sarv\u00e2hamm\u00e2n\u00ee Hira@nyagarbha which\nDeussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word\nBrahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 16, 17.]\n\n33\n\nsays \"Purusha has a thousand heads...a thousand eyes, and a thousand\nfeet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it]\nby a space of ten fingers....He formed those aerial creatures, and\nthe animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1],\" etc. Even that\nfamous hymn (R.V.x. 129) which begins with \"There was then neither\nbeing nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above\" ends with saying\n\"From whence this creation came into being, whether it was\ncreated or not--he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably\nknows or does not know.\"\n\nIn the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed,\nand the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside\nbut in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position\nof the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed\ntheism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality\nand that everything else was far below it. There is no relation\nhere of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are\noffered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true\nself of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of\nphilosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest.\nThis change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does\nnot carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophical\ndiscussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter\nof direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has\nbeen grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the\napparently meaningless speculations of the Br\u00e2hma@nas this doctrine\ncould have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable\nto be believed.\n\nOn the strength of the stories of B\u00e2l\u00e2ki Ga'rgya and Aj\u00e2tas'atru\n(B@rh. II. i), S'vetaketu and Prav\u00e2ha@na Jaibali (Ch\u00e2. V. 3 and B@rh.\nVI. 2) and \u00c2ru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Ch\u00e2. V. 11) Garbe thinks\n\"that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the\ndoctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence\non the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin\nin the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]\" and that \"it took\nits rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3].\" This\nif true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads away\nfrom the influence of the Veda, Br\u00e2hma@nas and the \u00c2ra@nyakas. But do\nthe facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe\nhimself\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Garbe's article, \"_Hindu Monism_,\" p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.\n\n34\n\nself has produced. In the story of B\u00e2l\u00e2ki G\u00e2rgya and Aj\u00e2tas'atru\n(B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, B\u00e2l\u00e2ki G\u00e2rgya is a boastful man\nwho wants to teach the K@sattriya Aj\u00e2tas'atru the true Brahman,\nbut fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this\nAj\u00e2tas'atru replies (following Garbe's own translation) \"it is\ncontrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction\nfrom a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to\nhim [Footnote ref l].\" Does this not imply that in the natural order of\nthings a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the\nK@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a\nK@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning\nof the conversation, Aj\u00e2tas'atru had promised to pay B\u00e2l\u00e2ki one\nthousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people\nused to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. The\nsecond story of S'vetaketu and Prav\u00e2ha@na Jaibali seems to be fairly\nconclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines,\nthe way of the gods (_devay\u00e2na_) and the way of the fathers\n(_pit@ry\u00e2na_) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is without\nany relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge\nof Brahman as the true self.\n\nThe third story of \u00c2ru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Ch\u00e2. V. 11)\nis hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to\nknow what the Brahman and the self were, went to Udd\u00e2laka\n\u00c2ru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied\nthem to the K@sattriya king As'vapati Kaikeya who was studying\nthe subject. But As'vapati ends the conversation by giving them\ncertain instructions about the fire doctrine (_vaisv\u00e2nara agni_) and\nthe import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the\ntrue self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are\nonly the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructing\nthe Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were\ndiscussing and instructing the \u00e2tman knowledge. I am thus led\nto think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the\nBrahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been\ntoo hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have\nbeen shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references\ngiven by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Garbe's article, \"_Hindu Monism_,\" p. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 2: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya\nspeaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidy\u00e2_.]\n\n35\n\njust examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, that\nthe K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in the\nreligio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirers\nwere so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman\nor in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and\nbirth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence for\nthinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyas\nor that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the\nBr\u00e2hma@nas and the \u00c2ra@nyakas which were the productions of\nthe Brahmins.\n\nThe change of the Br\u00e2hma@na into the \u00c2ra@nyaka thought is\nsignified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to\ntheir symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded\nas being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we\nfind in the B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice\nthe visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated\nupon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the\neye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul,\nand so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good\ncan its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is\nmost significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is\nthe most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere\nanimal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place\nof an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material\nsubstances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals\nlost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side\nby side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the\nBrahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic\nmeditations were taking the place of gross matter and\naction involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only\nchosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from\nthe body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but\neven arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that\nthe meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive\nof great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing\nvalue in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances\nand imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth\n[Footnote ref 3].\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Winternitz's _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I.\npp. 197 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The story of Maitry\u00ee and Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalikya (B@rh. II. 4)\nand that of Satyak\u00e2ma son of Jab\u00e2l\u00e2 and his teacher (Ch\u00e2. IV. 4).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ch\u00e2. V. II.]\n\n36\n\nThe Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya\n\u00c2ra@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Pr\u00e2@na [Footnote\nref 1], the Udg\u00eetha of the S\u00e2maveda was identified with Om, Pr\u00e2@na,\nsun and eye; in Ch\u00e2ndogya II. the S\u00e2man was identified with Om, rain,\nwater, seasons, Pr\u00e2@na, etc., in Ch\u00e2ndogya III. 16-17 man was\nidentified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation;\nlaughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras;\nand asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with\nsacrificial fees (_dak@si@n\u00e2_). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic\nIndians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision\nof thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the\n\u00c2ra@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things\nwhich to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of\ninstrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure\nidentity. Thus in Ait. \u00c2ra@n. II. 1. 3 we find \"Then comes the origin\nof food. The seed of Praj\u00e2pati are the gods. The seed of the gods\nis rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The\nseed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of\ncreatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed\nof the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done\nis this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2].\"\n\nThe word Brahman according to S\u00e2ya@na meant mantras\n(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great.\nHillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new,\n\"as not having hitherto existed,\" and as \"coming into being from\nthe fathers.\" It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forth\nat the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma\njuice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite,\nendures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its\nguardian (R.V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22.\n9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the\nconjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can\nbe called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as\nthe magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of\nthe hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I am\ndisposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the\nmeaning as we find it in many passages in the \u00c2ra@nyakas and the\nUpani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ait. \u00c2ra@n. II 1-3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Keith's _Translation of Aitareya \u00c2ranyaka_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, _E.R.E._.]\n\n37\n\n\"magical force\" and \"great,\" transition between which is\nrather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by\nmeditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still\nremained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages\nof the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon this\ngreat force \"Brahman\" as being identified with diverse symbols,\nnatural objects, parts and functions of the body.\n\nWhen the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its\nactual performance in the external world to certain forms of\nmeditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories\nof sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions\nwas regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing\ncould be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations\nof the Pa\u00f1c\u00e2gnividy\u00e2 are so much referred to in the Upani@sads\nas a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that\nthe real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations.\nWhen the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is\nreally ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they\nthought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the\ngods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a\nman if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for\nthe gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIn the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of\nthe gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, V\u00e2yu (wind) to\nblow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman\nthat all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The\nwhole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic power\nof sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was being\nabstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power.\nThere are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after the\nnature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only\nimperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power\nof the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with\nbodily and mental functions and with various symbolical\nrepresentations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea\nthat these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found\ninadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of\nthe inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman\noriginated.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]\n\n38\n\n\nThe meaning of the word Upani@sad.\n\nThe word Upani@sad is derived from the root _sad_ with the prefix\n_ni_ (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the\nact of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to\nhim. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, \"The history\nand the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that\nUpani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting\nof pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher\n[Footnote ref 1].\" Deussen points out that the word means \"secret\" or\n\"secret instruction,\" and this is borne out by many of the passages of\nthe Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used\nin this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find that\ngreat injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication\nof the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a\nstudent or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires\nproves himself deserving to hear them. S'ankara however, the\ngreat Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word from\nthe root _sad_ to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it\ndestroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the\nright knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the\nword Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems that\nDeussen's meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3].\n\n\nThe composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.\n\nThe oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these we\nhave some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in\nclassical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad the\nmore archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads have\nan almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to\nIndian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart.\nWe can read and read them over again without getting tired.\nThe lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm\napart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word\nUpani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of \"secret\ndoctrine or instruction\"; the Upani@sad teachings were also intended\nto be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of\nhigh morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Max Muller's _Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E._ vol.\nI.p. lxxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _S. B.E._ vol. I, p lxxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]\n\n39\n\nemancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression,\nwhen it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and\nattraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we\nfind that even when other forms of prose and verse had been\nadapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of composition\nhad not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sads\nwere compiled by 500 B C., they continued to be written even so\nlate as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The\nearliest and most important are probably those that have been\ncommented upon by S'ankara namely B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka, Ch\u00e2ndogya,\nAitareya, Taittiriya, \u00ces'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mundaka and\nM\u00e2nd\u00fbkya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connection\nthat the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regard\nto their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of\nthem are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of\nthe self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon\nthe practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S'iva, of Visnu and\nthe philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be\nrespectively called the Yoga, S'aiva, Visnu and S'\u00e2r\u00eera Upani@sads.\nThese in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.\n\n\nRevival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.\n\nHow the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is an\ninteresting story D\u00e2ra Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor\nShah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmir\nin 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who\nundertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775\nAnquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, received\na manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the\nFrench resident in Faizabad at the court of Shuj\u00e2-uddaulah.\nAnquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802.\nThis translation though largely unintelligible was read by\nSchopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer\nhimself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kaus\u00eetaki is also one of the earliest.\nMax M\u00fcller and Schroeder think that Maitr\u00e2y@an\u00ee also belongs to the\nearliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later\nproduction. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In\nthe first period he includes B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka, Ch\u00e2ndogya, Taittir\u00eeya,\nAitareya, Kaus\u00eetaki and Kena. In that second he includes K\u00e2@thaka, \u00cds'\u00e2,\nS'vet\u00e2s'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r\u00e2yana, and in the third period he\nincludes Pras'na, Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee and M\u00e2n@d\u00fbkya. The rest of the Upani@sads\nhe includes in the fourth period.]\n\n40\n\nwrites in the preface to his _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_\n[Footnote ref 1], \"And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker\nof the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to\nus through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which\nthis still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe\nthat the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less\ndeeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth\ncentury: if, I say, the reader has also already received and\nassimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best\nof all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express\nthe opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected\naphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as\na consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though\nthe converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads\nis by no means the case.\" Again, \"How does every line display\nits firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every\nsentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole\nis pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole\nworld there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial\nand so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace\nof my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]\" Through\nSchopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention in\nGermany and with the growth of a general interest in the study\nof Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as\nwell.\n\nThe study of the Upani@sads has however gained a great\nimpetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who\nnot only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and\npublished them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma\nSamaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were\nderived directly from the Upani@sads.\n\n______________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada\n(\u00ad_S.B.E._ I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) \"that Schopenhauer should\nhave spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that\nhe should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the\npantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought\nto light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate\nreception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could\nsay in their favour.\"]\n\n41\n\n\nThe Upani@sads and their interpretations.\n\nBefore entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it may\nbe worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse\nand even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the\nUpani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past\ntimes. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concluding\nportion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the\nVed\u00e2nta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that\nthe highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the\nVedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively\nsubservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its\njudicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the\napparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge\nof ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having\nbeen once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only to\nunravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers\nof Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it\npresents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths\nare discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in\nthose cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue\nand character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no\nfinality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as\nmuch as comes before the purview of our reason and experience\nat the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious\nthat any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be\nshould have any right to say anything regarding the highest\ntruths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons\nthat he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary\nfor him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that they\nsupported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus\nit was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their\nprincipal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show that\nthey alone represented the true Ved\u00e2nta doctrines. Any one\nwho should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any\nparticular school might say that in following that school he was\nfollowing the Ved\u00e2nta.\n\nThe difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is\nabsolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of\ndiverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads\n\n42\n\nwhich are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each\ninterpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own\ndoctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried\nto repress others or explain them away. But comparing the\nvarious systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the\ninterpretation offered by S'a@nkara very largely represents the view\nof the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, though\nthere are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other\nsystems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Ved\u00e2nta\nis generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara and\nS'a@nkara's system of thought is called the Ved\u00e2nta system, though\nthere are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing\nthe true Ved\u00e2nta doctrines.\n\nUnder these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter\nof the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute\nclaims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not as\na systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of\nthought--the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were\nstill in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S'a@nkara,\nor rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of\nby far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a\nmodern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients\nthat all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take the\ntexts independently and separately and determine their meanings,\nthough keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they\nappear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of\nthe thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thus\nfind in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.\n\n\nThe quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.\n\nThe fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sads\nis that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable\nreality which is identical with that which underlies\nthe essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy in\nParmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the\nsame tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the\nreality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.\n\n43\n\nno systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations\nor compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes.\nThere are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there\nis no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual\nreader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm\nof the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness\nin search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature\nof Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?\n\nWe have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhit\u00e2\nthere were people who had risen to the conception of a single\ncreator and controller of the universe, variously called Praj\u00e2pati,\nVis'vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But this\ndivine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the\nnature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objects\nof nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various\npsychological functions in man were tried, but none could render\nsatisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages\nin the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there was\na supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the\nuniverse. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with\nany of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity\nat all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest and\nthe results that were achieved.\n\nWhen we look merely to this quest we find that we have not\nyet gone out of the \u00c2ra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (_prat\u00eeka_)\nforms of worship. _Pr\u00e2@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the most\nessential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are\nrelated to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the\neye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This\nrecognition of the superiority of pr\u00e2@na brings us to the meditations\non pr\u00e2@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results.\nSo also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting\ncharacters of omnipresence and eternality _\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_ (space) is\nmeditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and \u00c2ditya (sun)\nare meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the\nvisible material representation of Brahman as the pervading V\u00e2yu,\nor the sun and the immaterial representation as \u00e2k\u00e2s'a, manas or\npr\u00e2@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes\nfor actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest\nafter the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought\n\n44\n\nwhich shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic\nassociations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice\nyet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of\nBrahman.\n\nNext to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the\nhistory of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to\nidentify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon,\nlightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of\nthese could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is\nindeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are\ntiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original\nas well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how\ntoilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations\ncould be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to\nundergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of\nBrahman.\n\n\nUnknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.\n\nIt is indeed true that the magical element involved in the\ndischarge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic\nworship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity.\nThe minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship\ndeities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the\nidea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman.\nThey tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many\nsymbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They\ndid not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a\ndim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls\nwhich could not be translated into permanent terms. But this\nwas enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be\nsatisfied with anything short of the highest.\n\nThey found that by whatever means they tried to give a\npositive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman,\nthey failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not\npoint out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance\nto that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not\nlike aught that we find in experience. Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya said \"He\nthe \u00e2tman is not this, nor this (_neti neti_). He is inconceivable,\nfor he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed,\nuntouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke\n\n45\n\nof the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1].\" He is\n_asat_, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be\nunderstood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is\nbeing, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by\nhim. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever\nwe can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the\nunlimited, the basis of all. \"That which is inaudible, intangible,\ninvisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal,\nwithout beginning or end, greater than the great (_mahat_), the fixed.\nHe who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2].\"\nSpace, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms\ntheir essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet\nthe smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no\ncharacterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial\nto him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He\nis independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which\nrules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical\nuniverse. When B\u00e2hva was questioned by Va@skali, he expounded\nthe nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence--\"Teach\nme,\" said Va@skali, \"most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman.\"\nB\u00e2hva however remained silent. But when the question was put\nforth a second or third time he answered, \"I teach you indeed but\nyou do not understand; the \u00c2tman is silence [Footnote ref 3].\" The way\nto indicate it is thus by _neti neti_, it is not this, it is not this.\nWe cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited\nby conceptual thought.\n\n\nThe \u00c2tman doctrine.\n\nThe sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involved\nin the equation \u00c2tman=Brahman. We have already seen that the\nword \u00c2tman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand\nthe ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital\nbreath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the word\nBrahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word\n\u00c2tman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all\nmisinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as an\nadjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced;\nit is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on _Brahmas\u00fbtra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen,\n_Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156.]\n\n46\n\nUpani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one\nand the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self\nof man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses.\nThus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical\nparts of man) he is called _annamaya_. But behind the sheath of\nthis body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath\nwhich is called the self as vital breath (_pr\u00e2@namaya \u00e2tman_).\nBehind this again there is the other self \"consisting of will\" called\nthe _manomaya \u00e2tman_. This again contains within it the self\n\"consisting of consciousness\" called the _vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya \u00e2tman_. But\nbehind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the\n_\u00e2nandamaya \u00e2tman_). The texts say: \"Truly he is the rapture;\nfor whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could\nlive, who could breathe if this space (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) was not bliss? For\nit is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible,\nSelf-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he\nreally becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference,\nbetween himself and this \u00c2tman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nAgain in another place we find that Praj\u00e2pati said: \"The self\n(_\u00e2tman_) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and\ngrief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations\nare true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired;\nhe gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnote\nref 2].\" The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and\nVirocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self\nfrom Praj\u00e2pati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look\ninto a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could\nfind. They answered: \"We see, this our whole self, even to the\nhair, and to the nails.\" And he said, \"Well, that is the self, that\nis the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman.\" They went\naway pleased, but Praj\u00e2pati thought, \"There they go away,\nwithout having discovered, without having realized the self.\"\nVirocana came away with the conviction that the body was the\nself; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and\npestered with doubts and came back to Praj\u00e2pati and said, \"just\nas the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed\nwhen the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the\nbody is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when\nthe body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in\none eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ch\u00e2. VIII. 7. 1.]\n\n47\n\nwhen the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory.\"\nPraj\u00e2pati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and\nsaid, \"He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this\nis the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman.\" Indra departed\nbut was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came\nback and said \"that though the dream self does not become blind\nwhen the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is\nso injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by\nits destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it\nsuffered and as if it wept--in this I see no good.\" Praj\u00e2pati gave a\nstill higher instruction: \"When a man, fast asleep, in total\ncontentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the\ndeathless, the fearless, this is Brahman.\" Indra departed but was\nagain filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said \"the\nself in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does\nhe know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost.\nI see no good in this.\" And now Praj\u00e2pati after having given a\ncourse of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as\nthe self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and\nhaving found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this\nwas not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking,\nultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the\nfull truth about the self, and said \"this body is the support of the\ndeathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected\nby pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot\nget rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not\ntouch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nAs the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable\nessence in man as was beyond the limits of any change.\nThis inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure\nsubject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is\nthe seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all\nknowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows\nbut is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump\nof salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through\nentirely of savour; as in truth this \u00c2tman has no inner or outer,\nbut consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is\nnot an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman\nis thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who\nhas reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ch\u00e2. VIII. 7-12.]\n\n48\n\nson, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it\nand by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest _par\nexcellence_, our inmost \u00c2tman. All limitation is fraught with pain;\nit is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man\nreceives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe,\nwho live, if that bliss had not filled this void (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_)? It is he\nwho behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless\nsupport in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable\none, then has he attained peace.\n\n\nPlace of Brahman in the Upani@sads.\n\nThere is the \u00e2tman not in man alone but in all objects of the\nuniverse, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this \u00e2tman.\nThere is nothing outside the \u00e2tman, and therefore there is no\nplurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay\nis known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of\nblack iron is known, so when this \u00e2tman the Brahman is known\neverything else is known. The essence in man and the essence\nof the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.\n\nNow a question may arise as to what may be called the nature\nof the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But\nwe must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so\nmuch a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers\nwho are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not\nnotice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and\nnature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity\nattracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all\nBrahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it\nreturn. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered\ninto it as its inner controller (_antary\u00e2min_). Here is thus a glaring\ndualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller,\nthough in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that\nthese are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known\neverything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made\nfor the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as\nS'a@nkara the great professor of Ved\u00e2nta does by explaining away\nthe dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the\nreal in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that\nthe fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in\nthe entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The\n\n49\n\nworld is his body, yet he is the soul within. \"He creates all,\nwills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and\nunaffected [Footnote ref 1].\" He is below, above, in the back, in front,\nin the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2].\" These\nrivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return\nback into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know\nthat they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the\nBeing do not know that they have come from the Being...That which\nis the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self\nthou art O S'vetaketu [Footnote ref 3].\" \"Brahman,\" as Deussen points out,\n\"was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe\nas the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the\nuniverse on Brahman and its essential identity with him was\nrepresented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman.\"\nThus it is said in Mund. I.I. 7:\n\n  As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),\n  As the plants shoot forth on the earth,\n  As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,\n  So from the imperishable all that is here.\n  As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,\n  In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,\n  So, my dear sir, from the imperishable\n  Living beings of many kinds go forth,\n  And again return into him [Footnote ref 4].\n\nYet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest\nteaching of the Upani@sads is \"That art thou.\"\n\nAgain the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the \"inner\ncontroller\" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as\nthe \u00e2tman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the\nresult of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a\ntheistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing\naloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it\nis said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and\nearth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguished\nagain in the famous verse of S'vet\u00e2s'vatara [Footnote ref 6]:\n\n  Two bright-feathered bosom friends\n  Flit around one and the same tree;\n  One of them tastes the sweet berries,\n  The other without eating merely gazes down.\n\n______________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ch\u00e2. III. 14. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ch\u00e2. VI. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Deussen's translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p.\n164.]\n\n[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]\n\n[Footnote 6: S'vet\u00e2s'vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. i, 1, also Deussen's\ntranslation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 177.]\n\n50\n\nBut in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional\nuse of the word _\u00ces'a_ or _\u00ces'\u00e2na_, there seems to be no doubt\nthat theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement\nof a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted\nposition of the \u00e2tman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in\nKau@s\u00eetaki Upani@sad 3. 9, \"He is not great by good deeds nor low\nby evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he\nwants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants\nto lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the\nmaster of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (_\u00e2tman_).\"\nThus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are\nagain other passages which regard Brahman as being at once\nimmanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that\neternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose\nbranches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it\nand no one can transcend it. This is that, \"...from its fear the fire\nburns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, V\u00e2yu and Death\nthe fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nIf we overlook the different shades in the development of the\nconception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the main\ncurrents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has\nfound expression in the majority of the texts is this that the\n\u00c2tman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this\neverything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is\nto be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that\nidentifies the universe with the \u00c2tman or Brahman. The third\ncurrent is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord\ncontrolling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the\nmelting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked\nout, that the later exponents of Ved\u00e2nta, S'a@nkara, R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja,\nand others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to\ndevelop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it\nis that the doctrine of M\u00e2y\u00e2 which is slightly hinted at once in\nB@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka and thrice in S'vet\u00e2s'vatara, becomes the foundation\nof S'a@nkara's philosophy of the Ved\u00e2nta in which Brahman\nalone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2].\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]\n\n51\n\n\nThe World.\n\nWe have already seen that the universe has come out of\nBrahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back\nto it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as\nrepresented to experience could not be denied. S'a@nkara held\nthat the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accorded\na reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely\nrelatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon\nas the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however\nremains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not\nprobably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to\nthe phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the\nhighest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior\nworld, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this\nreality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only\nreality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding\nthat this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it\nis maintained in him and it will return back to him.\n\nThe world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the\norganic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants,\nanimals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many\ncreated fire (_tejas_), water (_ap_) and earth (_k@siti_). Then the\nself-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their\ncombination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So all\nother things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding\nof the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold\ndivision of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later\ndistinction (especially in the S\u00e2@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimal\nsubstances (_tanm\u00e2tra_) and gross elements, and the theory that each\ngross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And\nin Pras'na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their\nsubtler natures, e.g. earth (_p@rthiv\u00ee_), and the subtler state of earth\n(_p@rthiv\u00eem\u00e2tra_). In the Taittir\u00eeya, II. 1, however, ether (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_)\nis also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements,\nair, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding\ndirectly from the one which directly preceded it.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ch\u00e2. VI.11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _ibid._ VI.2,3,4.]\n\n52\n\n\nThe World-Soul.\n\nThe conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the\nsoul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V.X. 121. I,\nwhere he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation\nfrom the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred\nto in the S'vet\u00e2s'vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange\nthat this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads.\nIn the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical\ncharacter is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier\nproducts in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance\nfrom the point of view of the development of the theory of\nBrahman or \u00c2tman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the\nPuru@sa, nor the Vis'vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played an\nimportant part in the earlier development of the Upani@sads\nleads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directly\ndeveloped from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Veda\nspeculations. The passages in S'vet\u00e2s'vatara clearly show how from\nthe supreme eminence that he had in R.V.X. 121, Hira@nyagarbha\nhad been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen\nin explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbha\ndoctrine of the Upani@sads says that the \"entire objective universe is\npossible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This\nsubject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in\nall individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For\nthe individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues\nto exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal\nknowing subject also (_hira@nyagarbha_) by whom it is sustained.\nSpace and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly\nnot in space and does not belong to time, and therefore\nfrom an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it\nhas no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1].\" This\nhowever seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbha\ndoctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance\nin the Upani@sads.\n\n\n\nThe Theory of Causation.\n\nThere was practically no systematic theory of causation in the\nUpani@sads. S'a@nkara, the later exponent of Ved\u00e2nta philosophy,\nalways tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201.]\n\n53\n\nas mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in\nreality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did\non the strength of a series of examples in the Ch\u00e2ndogya\nUpani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is\nspoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot,\nthe jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many\ndiversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the\npot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of\nname and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which\nin its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot,\nplate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable\nBrahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer\nchange as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only\nan unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman,\nthe real _par excellence_.\n\nIt seems however that though such a view may be regarded\nas having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfect\nmanner, there is also side by side the other view which looks\nupon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the\ncause itself through the action and combination of the elements\nof diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have\nbeen spoken of in one place as the product of the combination\nof the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real\nchange produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we\nshall see hereafter) the Pari@n\u00e2ma theory of causation advocated\nby the S\u00e2@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nDoctrine of Transmigration.\n\nWhen the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body\nthey supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath\nto the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts\nof the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in\nthe recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our\nown, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the\nhuman soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration\nhad but little developed at the time.\n\nIn the Upani@sads however we find a clear development in\nthe direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one\nthe Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ch\u00e2. VI. 2-4.]\n\n54\n\nthe doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine\nof transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the\nidea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that\nthose who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the\ndigging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers\n(_pit@ry\u00e2na_), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke,\nthen into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches\nthe moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his\ngood deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke,\nmist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation\nof food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is\nborn again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense\nin the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnote\nref 1].\n\nThe other way is the way of gods (_devay\u00e2na_), meant for those\nwho cultivate faith and asceticism (_tapas_). These souls at death\nenter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright\nhalf of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into\nBrahman never to return. Deussen says that \"the meaning of\nthe whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions\nof ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright\nand radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of\nlights'\" (_jyoti@s\u00e2@m jyoti@h_) [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine\nof transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of\nhis deeds (_karma_) by passing through the other worlds and without\nreference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods,\nthe _Y\u00e2nas_. Thus Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya says, \"when the soul becomes\nweak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with\nwhich it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses\ngo towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and\ncentres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye\nturns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become\none (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses)\nbecome one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become\none (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with\nhim), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he\ndoes not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not\nthink, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the\nsenses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ch\u00e2. V. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335.]\n\n55\n\ntip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out.\nWhen he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any\nother part of the body, the vital function (_pr\u00e2@na_) follows and all\nthe senses follow the vital function (_pr\u00e2@na_) in coming out. He\nis then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes\nout. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (_praj\u00f1\u00e2_)\naccompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade\nof grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so\nthis self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a\nseparate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a\nsmall bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul\nafter destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a\nnewer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods,\nof Praj\u00e2pati or Brahma or of any other being....As he acts and\nbehaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds,\nvirtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full\nof desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as\nthe work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being\nattached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he\nwas attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the\nend) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this\nworld for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those who\nhave desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has\nfreed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in\nhimself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains\nBrahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are\nin his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and\nattains Brahma here\" (B@rh. IV. iv. 1-7).\n\nA close consideration of the above passage shows that the\nself itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer\nframe by its own activity when it reached the end of the present\nlife. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all\nsenses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge,\nwork and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the\nbody at the time of death is only for the building of a newer\nbody either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which\nthus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories.\nThus it is said that \"he is of the essence of understanding,\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference\nhere to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other\nworlds.]\n\n56\n\nof the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of\nthe essence of the five elements (which would make up the\nphysical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires,\nof the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of\nthe essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma,\nof the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this\n(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)\" (B@rh. IV. iv. 5).\nThe self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral\nand psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which\ncompose the physical world. The whole process of his changes\nfollows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills\nand whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts\nthe fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and\nits fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral\nand psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of\nthe physical world on the other.\n\nThe self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse\npsychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements\nholds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The\nroot of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition\nof it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and\nact, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing\nacts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing\nkarma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the\nfruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But\nthere is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ry\u00e2na\ntheory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part\nin the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in\nthis world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the\nself itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no\nrebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of\nthis doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth\nand not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between\ndesires and rebirth--for it is said that whatever a man desires he\nwills, and whatever he wills he acts.\n\nThus it is said in another place \"he who knowingly desires is\nborn by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose\ndesires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his\ndesires vanish here\" (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires\nis effected by the right knowledge of the self. \"He who knows\n\n57\n\nhis self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desire\nwill he trouble the body,...even being here if we know it, well if\nwe do not, what a great destruction\" (B@rh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). \"In\nformer times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what\nshall we do with sons since this our self is the universe\" (B@rh. IV.\niv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which\nwe find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought\ncan be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is worked\nout on the principle of desire (_k\u00e2ma_) and karma only serves as\nthe link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by\nthe person.\n\nIt is interesting to note in this connection that consistently\nwith the idea that desires (_k\u00e2ma_) led to rebirth, we find that\nin some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a\nwoman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of\nman, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth\nelsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is\nsaid, \"It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is\nbut the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of\nhis body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put\nin a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes\npart of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore\ndoes not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within\nherself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be\nprotected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth)\nbut when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he\nis taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that\nthe continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This\nis his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative\nfor performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after\nrealizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going\naway he is born again that is his third birth\" (Aitareya, II. 1-4)\n[Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to\nthe sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called k\u00e2ma, whatever\nwas the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the\ndesire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh.\nIV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any\nother desire.\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See also Kau@s\u00eetaki, II. 15.]\n\n58\n\n\nEmancipation.\n\nThe doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection\nis that of emancipation (_mukti_). Already we know that the\ndoctrine of Devay\u00e2na held that those who were faithful and performed\nasceticism (_tapas_) went by the way of the gods through\nsuccessive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth.\nThis could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (_pit@ry\u00e2na_)\nwhere the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and\nthen had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful\nand perform _s'raddh\u00e2_ had a distinctly different type of goal from\nthose who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general\naltruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development\nin the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means\nin the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attains\nwhen he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The\nceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are\nignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all\npassions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes\nBrahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.\n\n  He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,\n  For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,\n  For him all doubts are solved,\n  And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions\nand antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is\nignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is\nfalse. We \"do not know\" but are \"pure knowledge\" ourselves.\nWe are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do\nnot suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not\na new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but\nit always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always\nemancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and\nseem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because\nwe do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the\ntrue knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is\nemancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only\nso long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural\nand only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature\nand essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352.]\n\n59\n\nis called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in\nour own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing\nnecessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore\nthe only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge,\nall illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha\nUpani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas,\nthe son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice.\nNaciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with\nhim, said, \"O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget\nhis anger against me.\" This being granted Naciketas asked the\nsecond boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be\nmade known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said,\n\"There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death\nof man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know\ninstructed by thee. This is my third boon.\" Yama said, \"It was\ninquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand\nit. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not\ncompel me to this.\" Naciketas said, \"Even by the gods was it\ninquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy\nto understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like\nthee. There is no other boon like this.\" Yama said, \"Choose sons\nand grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of\ncattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide\nexpanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest.\nOr if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth\nand far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make\nthee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult\nto gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure;\nthose fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments;\nthe like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give\nthem to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death.\"\nNaciketas replied, \"All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and\nthey only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the\ndance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could\nobtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as\nlong as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said.\"\nYama said, \"One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is\nhe who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses\nthe object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire,\nhast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is\n\n60\n\nwhat is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good),\nare known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals.\nBelieving that this world exists and not the other, the careless\nyouth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast\nasked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness\nis transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what\nis not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him\nwhom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee\nO Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to\nBrahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains\nwhatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die;\nhe is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is\nnot slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle,\ngreater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere.\nThinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among\nfleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot\nbe gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It\ncan be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals\nits own nature [Footnote ref 1].\" So long as the Self identifies itself\nwith its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the\nfruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the\nhighest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle\nof the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have\ndesires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth\nof himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome\nof the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents\nof the gross body (_annamaya ko@sa_), the vital functions (_pr\u00e2@namaya\nko@sa_) of life, the will and desire (_manomaya_) and the\nthoughts and ideas (_vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya_), and so long as he keeps himself\nin these spheres and passes through a series of experiences\nin the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences\nare willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers\npleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from\nthese into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he\nis one with his experience and there is no change and no movement.\nWhat this state is cannot be explained by the use of\nconcepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is\nnot any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some\nparts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]\n\n61\n\nwhatever one knows as this and this (_neti neti_). In this infinite\nand true self there is no difference, no diversity, no _meum_ and\n_tuum_. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence\nwill dissolve like salt in water. \"Just as a lump of salt when put\nin water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately\nbut in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so,\nMaitrey\u00ee, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting\nonly of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal\nexistences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge\"\n(B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the\nprocesses of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it\nretires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a\nstate of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and\npure blessedness.\n\n62\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nGENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS\nOF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nIn what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?\n\nIt is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy\nin the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have\nbeen written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came\none after another and offered their independent speculations\non philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in\nchronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon\nthe influence of one school upon another or upon the general\nchange from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy.\nHere in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had\ntheir beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and\nit is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began,\nor to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many\ndivergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these\nwere formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed\nor arranged.\n\nThe systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant\nhalf-sentences (_s\u00fbtras_) which did not elaborate the subject in\ndetail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads\nof memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already\nthoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences\nwere like lecture hints, intended for those who had had\ndirect elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed\ndifficult to guess from the s\u00fbtras the extent of their significance,\nor how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were\noriginally intended by them. The s\u00fbtras of the Ved\u00e2nta system,\nknown as the S'\u00e2r\u00eeraka-s\u00fbtras or Brahma-s\u00fbtras of B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na\nfor example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise\nto more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one\nof which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high\nesteem and respect in which these writers of the s\u00fbtras were held\nby later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to\n\n63\n\noffer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of\nthe existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of\nthe system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of\nthese systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since\nthe foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or\nother of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought\nup in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence\nof their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school\nto which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of\nfree-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish,\nIndia had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary\nviews of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained\nand expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other\nrival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish\nthe superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an\nexample, the Ny\u00e2ya system of philosophy consisting of a number\nof half-sentences or s\u00fbtras is attributed to Gautama, also called\nAk@sap\u00e2da. The earliest commentary on these s\u00fbtras, called the\n_V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana bh\u00e2@sya_, was written by V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana. This work was\nsharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nn\u00e2ga, and to answer these\ncriticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary\ncalled the _Bh\u00e2@syav\u00e2ttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original\nforce of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of\nthe school. At this V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called\n_V\u00e2rttika-t\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ on this second commentary, where he tried\nto refute all objections against the Ny\u00e2ya system made by other\nrival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary,\ncalled _Ny\u00e2ya-t\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, had another commentary called\n_Ny\u00e2ya-t\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2-paris'uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. This\ncommentary had another commentary called _Ny\u00e2ya-nibandha-prak\u00e2s'a_\nwritten by Varddham\u00e2na the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This\nagain had another commentary called _Varddha-m\u00e2nendu_ upon it by\nPadman\u00e2bha Mis'ra, and this again had another named\n_Ny\u00e2ya-t\u00e2tparyama@n@dana_ by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana, V\u00e2caspati, and Udayana are indeed very great,\nbut even they contented themselves by writing commentaries\non commentaries, and did not try to formulate any\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nn\u00e2ga after V\u00e2caspati's\n_T\u00e2tparyat\u00eek\u00e2_ (p. I) and not Dignn\u00e2ga as it is generally spelt.]\n\n64\n\noriginal system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of\nIndia after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_.\n\nAs a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents\nand troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared.\nIts adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and\nsubtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the\ndefects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was\noriginally formulated in the s\u00fbtras had probably but few problems\nto solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of\nother schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems\nin which the original views were more or less involved but to\nwhich no attention had been given before.\n\nThe contributions of the successive commentators served to\nmake each system more and more complete in all its parts, and\nstronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully\nagainst the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system\nin the s\u00fbtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if\nwe take it along with its developments down to the beginning\nof the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man\nstrong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible\nto write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is\nnecessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in\nall the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of\nhistory from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote\nref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems\nwhich had their importance only so long as they lived and were\nthen forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each\nsystem grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents\nthrough all the successive ages of history, and a history of this\ngrowth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system\nis therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth\nit attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose\nselfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest\none or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be\ncarried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments\ngiven by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations\nof the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]\n\n65\n\n\nGrowth of the Philosophic Literature.\n\nIt is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated,\nand what were the influences that led to it. We know that a\nspirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the\nearliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final\nessence or truth was the \u00e2tman, that a search after it was our\nhighest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we\ncan only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything\nelse and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we\nwant (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuing\nin circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha\nwho closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated\nsixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be\ntraced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably\ngoing on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference\nto these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there\nwere different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than\nthose of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records.\nIt seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated\namong the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad\ncircles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic\nand heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these\nsages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably\ndiscussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time\nwhen some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama\nor Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various\ntopics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified\nand arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and\nrecorded it in s\u00fbtras. These s\u00fbtras were intended probably for\npeople who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus\ncould easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained\nin the aphorisms. The s\u00fbtras thus contain sometimes\nallusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in\nwhich they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed\nof the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and\nconveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken\nchain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however\nfree to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Brahmaj\u00e2la-sutta, D\u00eegha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]\n\n66\n\nviews or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary\nviews with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult\nto maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools\noften made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems\nunthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent\nof a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with\nthe other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to\noffer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize\nthem into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications\ngenerally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any\nserious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers,\nfor the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations\nof the older teachers and never contradicted them. They\nwould only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things\nonly in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent.\nIt is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system\nby treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately.\nThis would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except\nwhen there is a specially new development, the system is to be\ninterpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators\ntreating their contributions as forming one whole.\n\nThe fact that each system had to contend with other rival\nsystems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark\nupon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always\nwritten in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to\nbe always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever\nhe has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections\nput forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects\nof the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It\nis thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections\nand their answers that the writer can wend his way to his\ndestination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are\nreferred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the\nviews can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit\nstyle of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different\nfrom literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity,\nleading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems,\nthat a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid\nof an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not\nwidely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced\n\n67\n\nwork of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular\nsystem are expressed in such close interconnection with\nthe views of other systems that these can hardly be understood\nwithout them. Each system of India has grown (at least in\nparticular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth\nof other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian\nphilosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual\nopposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at\nwhich they ceased to grow and came to a stop--a purpose for\nwhich a work like the present one may only be regarded as\nforming a preliminary introduction.\n\nBesides the s\u00fbtras and their commentaries there are also independent\ntreatises on the systems in verse called _k\u00e2rik\u00e2s_, which\ntry to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct\nmanner; the _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ may be mentioned as a work of this\nkind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations,\ncommentaries, or general observations on any system written in\nverses called the v\u00e2rttikas; the _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_, of Kumarila or the\n_V\u00e2rttika_ of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these\nof course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition\nto these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose\nin which the writers either nominally followed some selected\ns\u00fbtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class\nthe _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example\nand of the latter the _Pras'astap\u00e2da bh\u00e2@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ of\nMadhus\u00fbdana Sarasvat\u00ee or the _Ved\u00e2nta-paribh\u00e2@s\u00e2_ of Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra.\nThe more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in\nwhich the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly\nforcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers\nand genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate\nthem. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India\nbegins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically\nends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some\nminor publications are seen to come out.\n\n\nThe Indian Systems of Philosophy.\n\nThe Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes,\nnamely, the _n\u00e2stika_ and the _\u00e2stika_. The n\u00e2stika (_na asti_ \"it is\nnot\") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible\n\n68\n\nnor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are\nprincipally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka.\nThe \u00e2stika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, S\u00e2@mkhya,\nYoga, Ved\u00e2nta, M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika, generally known\nas the six systems (_@sa@ddars'ana_ [Footnote ref 1]).\n\nThe S\u00e2@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical K\u00e2pila, but the\nearliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga\nsystem is attributed to Pata\u00f1jali and the original s\u00fbtras are called\nthe _P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala Yoga s\u00fbtras_. The general metaphysical position\nof these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and\nthe final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this\nthat the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_\u00ces'vara_) as distinct\nfrom \u00c2tman and lays much importance on certain mystical\npractices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement\nof liberation, whereas the S\u00e2@mkhya denies the existence of\n\u00ces'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture\nare sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and\nthereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system\nof S\u00e2@mkhya associated with K\u00e2pila and the Yoga system\nassociated with Pata\u00f1jali are but two divergent modifications of\nan original S\u00e2@mkhya school, of which we now get only references\nhere and there. These systems therefore though generally counted\nas two should more properly be looked upon as two different\nschools of the same S\u00e2@mkhya system--one may be called the\nK\u00e2pila S\u00e2@mkhya and the other P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala S\u00e2@mkhya.\n\nThe P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 (from the root _man_ to think--rational\nconclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy.\nIt is a systematized code of principles in accordance with\nwhich the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The word \"_dars'ana_\" in the sense of true philosophic\nknowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ of Ka@n\u00e2da\n(IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas\n(400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions \"_ditthi_\" (Sanskrit--dr@sti\nfrom the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra\n(fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of\nphilosophy (_sarvadars'anav\u00e2cyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I.).\nRatnak\u00eertti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the\nsame sense (\"_Yadi n\u00e2ma dars'ane dars'ane n\u00e2n\u00e2prak\u00e2ram sattvatak-@sanam\nuktamasti._\" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya tracts_, p.20).\nM\u00e2dhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy,\n_Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word \"_mata_\" (opinion or view) was also\nfreely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word\nto denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call\nthose who held heretical views \"_tairthika._\" The words \"siddha,\"\n\"_j\u00f1\u00e2nin_,\" etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are\nused rather in the sense of \"seers\" or \"perfects.\"]\n\n69\n\nThe Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices,\nand people often disputed as to the relation of words in a\nsentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the\ngeneral drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view\nwith regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may\nbe applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact\nnature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex\nVedic context. The M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 formulated some principles according\nto which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions\nfor all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it\nindulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul,\nperception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in\norder that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite\norder of the universe and its relation to man or the position and\nnature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and\nestablished. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is\nbut secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a\nrational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical\nutility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary\ndiscussions in the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 that it may be called a system of\nphilosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of\nthe import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this\nday. The s\u00fbtras of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara\nwrote a bh\u00e2@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kum\u00e2rila Bha@t@ta\nand his pupil Prabh\u00e2kara, who criticized the opinions of his master\nso much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm,\nand to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the views\nof Kum\u00e2rila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may not\nbe out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts without\nany reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated\nby the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2.\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kum\u00e2rila could not understand the\nmeaning of a Sanskrit sentence \"_Atra tunoktam tatr\u00e2pinoktam iti\npaunaraktam_\" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of\ntwo combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tun\u00e2uktam_ (said by\nthe particle _tu_) and _tatr\u00e2pi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not\nsaid also there) and _tatra apin\u00e2 uktam_ (said there by the particle\n_api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, \"Not\nspoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice.\" This puzzled\nKum\u00e2rila, when Prabh\u00e2kara taking the second meaning pointed out to him\nthat the meaning was \"here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_\nand so it is indicated twice.\" Kum\u00e2rila was so pleased that he called\nhis pupil \"Guru\" (master) at this.]\n\n70\n\n\nThe _Ved\u00e2nta s\u00fbtras_, also called Uttara M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, written by\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_, form the\noriginal authoritative work of Ved\u00e2nta. The word Ved\u00e2nta means\n\"end of the Veda,\" i.e. the Upani@sads, and the _Ved\u00e2nta s\u00fbtras_ are\nso called as they are but a summarized statement of the general\nviews of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or\nadhy\u00e2yas and each adhy\u00e2ya is divided into four p\u00e2das or chapters.\nThe first four s\u00fbtras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hs\u00fbtr\u00ee_\nare (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth\nand decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth,\n(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads.\nThe whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to\njustifying the position of the Ved\u00e2nta against the attacks of the\nrival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in\ndealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are\ndevoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual\nUpani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus\nlimited to the first four s\u00fbtras and the first and second chapters\nof the second book. The other portions are like commentaries\nto the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological\nviews of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_\nwas probably written by Baudh\u00e2yana, which however is not\navailable now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that\nof the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\ntogether with all the commentaries and other works that follow\nhis views are popularly known as Ved\u00e2nta philosophy, though\nthis philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddh\u00e2dvaitav\u00e2da\nschool of Ved\u00e2nta philosophy (i.e. the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy\nof the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic\nphilosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, R\u00e2m\u00e2yatas,\netc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma\ns\u00fbtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as\nR\u00e2m\u00e2nuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'r\u00eeka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have\nwritten independent commentaries on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_ to show\nthat the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of\nthe Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_. These\ndiffered largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations\nof the same s\u00fbtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by\nthe name of Ved\u00e2nta as these are also claimed to be the real\ninterpretations intended by the Ved\u00e2nta (Upani@sads)\n\n71\n\nand the _Ved\u00e2nta s\u00fbtras_. Of these the system of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja has\ngreat philosophical importance.\n\nThe _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sap\u00e2da,\nand the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ attributed to Ka@n\u00e2da, called also Ul\u00fbka,\nrepresent the same system for all practical purposes. They are\nin later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor\nimportance. So far as the s\u00fbtras are concerned the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_\nlay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while\nthe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics.\nIn addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies\nof their own, which however may generally be looked upon\nlargely as modifications of the S\u00e2@mkhya and Ved\u00e2nta systems,\nthough their own contributions are also noteworthy.\n\n\nSome fundamental Points of Agreement.\n\nI. _The Karma Theory._\n\nIt is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the\nC\u00e2rv\u00e2ka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental\npoints of importance. The systems of philosophy in India\nwere not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the\nhuman mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in\nabstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of\nthe religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the\npostulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found\nto be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be\ntheir differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general\npostulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summum\nbonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in\nthorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them\nat this stage.\n\nFirst, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems\nagree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual\nleaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to\nordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good\nor bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot\nbe enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual\nhas to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to\nsuffer them.\n\nThe Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent\nat the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic\n\n72\n\ndetails, exactly according to the directions without the slightest\nerror even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical\nvirtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately\nor after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the\nKarma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain\nmystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects\nwithout the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible\nagents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed,\nthe action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called\nthe _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _ap\u00fbrva_ (new), that by it the desired\nobject will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modus\noperandi_ of the _ap\u00fbrva_ is unknown. There is also the notion\nprevalent in the Sa@mhit\u00e2s, as we have already noticed, that he\nwho commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he\nwho performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures.\nThese were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, the\ninviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements\nwhich built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well\nestablished but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said\nthat according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad\nbirths.\n\nTo notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma\ndoctrine as established in the \u00e2stika systems we find that it was\nbelieved that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generally\nrequired some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the\nmerited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate\nand prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in\nhis next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely\nwicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The\nnature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of\npleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for\nhim by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined\nfor him by his action are such that they are possible to be\nrealized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a\ngoat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world\nprocess, so there is no time at which any person first began his\nactions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past\nlives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of\nlife exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever\nhe has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,\n\n73\n\nthe special instincts of that life (technically called _v\u00e2san\u00e2_) come\nforth. In accordance with these v\u00e2san\u00e2s the person passes through\nthe painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by\nhis action. The length of life is also determined by the number\nand duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying\nactions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for\ngiving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those\nactions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the\nperson attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But\neven such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through\nthe pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the\nactions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds\nof actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_),\nwhite-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) as\nmost of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as'ukl\u00e2k@r@s@na_),\ni.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not\nassociated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person\ncan so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action\nthat he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits.\nHe has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which\nhave ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true\nknowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed,\nand as his acts are only of the as'ukl\u00e2k@r@s@na type no fresh karma\nfor ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all\nkarma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.\n\nThe Jains think that through the actions of body, speech\nand mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced.\nThe passions of a man act like a viscous substance that\nattracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and\nsticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul\nduring the infinite number of past lives is technically called\n_k\u00e2rmas'ar\u00eera_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth\nto birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens\nand exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment\nof pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being\nexpended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by\nhis activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of\nsuffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated\nin the soul produces a kind of coloration called _les'y\u00e2_, such as\nwhite, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The\n\n74\n\nidea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably\nsuggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from\npassions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct,\nhis actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is\nthen annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously\nearned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect\nand be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict\nadherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and\nwhen all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the\nperson rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of\ncontemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities\nhaving ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top\nof the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.\n\nBuddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma\ntheory which however being intimately connected with their\nmetaphysics will be treated later on.\n\n\n2. _The Doctrine of Mukti_.\n\nNot only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the\ninequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case\nof different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births\nand rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the\nbasis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the\nhappenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that\nthis beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths,\nthis running on from beginningless time has somewhere\nits end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or\nin some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma\nleads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of\nall such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should\nfind within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys,\nneither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied\nby the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and\nbelieved that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they\ngenerally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could\nbe realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all\naction, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the\nconnection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous,\nartificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched\nby the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance\n\n75\n\nand passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless\ntime that we connect it with these. The realization of this\ntranscendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless\ncycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did\nnot admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final\nrealization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate\ndissolution called Nirv\u00e2@na, the nature of which we shall discuss\nlater on.\n\n\n3. _The Doctrine of Soul_.\n\nAll the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence\nof a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or j\u00eeva.\nAs to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences\nof view. Thus while the Ny\u00e2ya calls it absolutely\nqualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity,\nS\u00e2@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness,\nthe Ved\u00e2nta says that it is that fundamental point of unity\nimplied in pure consciousness (_cit_), pure bliss (_\u00e2nanda_), and pure\nbeing (_sat_). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied\nin its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not\nform a real part of it. The _summum bonum_ of life is attained\nwhen all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self\nis thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous\nconnections with it are absolutely dissociated.\n\n\nThe Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the\nOptimistic Faith in the end.\n\nThough the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been\nequally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be\nconsidered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest\nutterance in S\u00e2@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable\nchain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as\nnearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the\nmeshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures\nare but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is\npainful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are\nanxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated\nwith pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped\nwhen we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All\nour experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting.\nSorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the\n\n76\n\nworld. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable\nappears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as\npainful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness\nto sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin\nis like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of\ndisturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot\nbe removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes,\nfor the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot\nalso be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually\nbeing forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to\nanother life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of\nit is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge\nwhich uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self\nis intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures,\nthat leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment\nof pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through\nthe highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion\ntowards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech\nfrom all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self\nshines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived.\nWhen this is once done the self can never again be associated\nwith passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately\ndissociated from _citta_ which contains within it the root of all\nemotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever\nconquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this\nconnection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion\nto intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed\nperson may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti\nas the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic\ncreed of each system have developed from the logical necessity\npeculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency\nto shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through\nright performance and right understanding. It is only when a\nman rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for\naspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which\nall worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only\nshrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as\nsorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from\nall ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation.\nIn fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some\n\n77\n\nideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental\nfact from which not only her philosophy but many of the\ncomplex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically\ndeduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember\nthat we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The\npessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic\nconfidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of\nemancipation.\n\n\nUnity in Indian S\u00e2dhana (philosophical, religious\nand ethical endeavours).\n\nAs might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon\nthe general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed\nfor the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled,\nno injury to life in any form should be done, and that all\ndesire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are\nalmost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very\nhigh degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare\nhis mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment\nof his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with\nregard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are\nindeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the\nmeans to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially\nthe same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only\nin later times that devotion (_bhakti_) is seen to occupy a more\nprominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus\nit was that though there were many differences among the various\nsystems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and\nthe means fur the attainment of the goal (_s\u00e2dhana_) being fundamentally\nthe same, there was a unique unity in the practical s\u00e2dhana\nof almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been\nuniversal in India and this uniformity of s\u00e2dhana has therefore\nsecured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.\n\n78\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nBUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY\n\nMany scholars are of opinion that the S\u00e2@mkhya and the Yoga\nrepresent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also\nsuggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them.\nIt may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the\nsystematic S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had\ndecidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known\nto every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the\nBuddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of\nthe systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is\ntherefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different\nsystems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It\nseems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism\nfirst.\n\n\nThe State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.\n\nIt is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different\nphilosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before\nBuddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and\nthese have already been briefly described. But these were not the\nonly ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse\natheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the\nworld and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought\nthat \"time\" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these\nhad sprung forth by their own nature (_svabh\u00e2va_), others that\neverything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable\ndestiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or\nthrough matter combinations in general. References to diverse\nkinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no\ndetailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad\ntype of materialists the two schools of C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas (Dh\u00fbrtta\nand Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature,\nthough the time in which these flourished cannot rightly\nbe discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S'vet\u00e2s'vatara, I. 2, _k\u00e2la@h svabh\u00e2bo niyatiryad@rcch\u00e2\nbhut\u00e2ni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Lok\u00e2yata (literally, that which is found among people in\ngeneral) seems to have been the name by which all carv\u00e2ka doctrines\nwere generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lok\u00e2yatas.]\n\n79\n\nprobable however that the allusion to the materialists contained\nin the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The\nC\u00e2rv\u00e2kas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any\nother holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life\nand consciousness were the products of the combination of matter,\njust as red colour was the result of mixing up white with\nyellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses\n(_madas'akti_). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as\nthere is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So\nlong as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything\nwill end with death, for when at death the body is burnt\nto ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in\nthe validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can\nbe directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the\ndistribution of the middle term (_hetu_) has not depended upon\nsome extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy\nthe validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case\nany inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and\nthere is no certitude about it. They were called C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka because\nthey would only eat but would not accept any other religious or\nmoral responsibility. The word comes from _carv_ to eat. The\nDh\u00fbrtta C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas held that there was nothing but the four\nelements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the\nresult of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no\nvirtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas held that there was\na soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with\nthe destruction of the body. The original work of the C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas\nwas written in s\u00fbtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna\nquote two s\u00fbtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be\nfound in Jayanta's _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, M\u00e2dhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_\nand Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_. _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ gives\nan account of a man called C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.\n\nSide by side with the doctrine of the C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka materialists we\nare reminded of the \u00c2j\u00eevakas of which Makkhali Gos\u00e2la, probably\na renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mah\u00e2v\u00eera and a contemporary\nof Buddha and Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, was the leader. This was a thorough-going\ndeterminism denying the free will of man and his moral\nresponsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of\nMakkhali's system is this, that \"there is no cause, either proximate\nor remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They\n\n80\n\nbecome so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's\nown efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends\non any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy,\nor human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due\nto fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nAnother sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught\nthat there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no\nother world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any\nformer lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that\nwe can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to\nan end at death [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThere were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the\nsacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any\nperson could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad\nteaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and\nbeing, and all else but name and form which pass away but do\nnot abide. That which permanently abides without change is the\nreal and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions\nthat there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes\ninto being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some\nunknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably\ncome to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in\nthe country and these were accepted partly on the strength of\ntraditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue\nof the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they\ngave to those who performed them. But these had no rational\nbasis behind them on which they could lean for support. These\nwere probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the\nnebulous S\u00e2@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain\nsections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting\na new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which\nthenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity\nto come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless,\nwas the only real, how could it offer scope for further new\nspeculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of\ninterest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse\nof circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the\ndirection to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala-sutta_, _D\u00eegha_, II. 20. Hoernl\u00e9's article on\nthe \u00c2j\u00eevakas, E.R.E.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala-sutta_, II. 23.]\n\n81\n\nforce of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that\nwas inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into\naccount the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha,\nwe shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic\ncontribution to philosophy.\n\n\nBuddha: his Life.\n\nGautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C.\nin the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in\nthe now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana,\na prince of the S\u00e2kya clan, and his mother Queen Mah\u00e2m\u00e2y\u00e2.\nAccording to the legends it was foretold of him that he would\nenter upon the ascetic life when he should see \"A decrepit old\nman, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk.\" His father tried\nhis best to keep him away from these by marrying him and\nsurrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions,\nissuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four\nthings, which filled him with amazement and distress, and\nrealizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to\nforsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to\nimmortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his \"Great\nRenunciation\" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled\non foot to R\u00e2jag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvel\u00e2, where in\ncompany with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of\nextreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length\nthat his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless\nand was believed to be dead. After six years of this great\nstruggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by\nthe way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course\nof life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter\nthe Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in\ntravelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to\nall who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha\nrealized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered\ninto Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained\nnirv\u00e2na [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this\ngreat teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in\nother countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will\nprobably take yet many years more before even the materials for\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2nasuttanta_, _D\u00eegha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]\n\n82\n\nsuch a study can be collected. But from what we now possess\nit is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and\nsubtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate\nthe debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization\nof India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding\ncenturies.\n\n\nEarly Buddhist Literature.\n\nThe Buddhist P\u00e2li Scriptures contain three different collections:\nthe Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the\ndiscipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally\nto the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a\nscholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious\nhistory of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates\nfor the collection or composition of the different parts of the\naforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were\nhowever composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very\nprobable that almost the whole of the canonical works were\ncompleted before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during\nthe reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine\n(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals\nonly with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks.\nThe subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that\nof the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma.\nBuddhaghos@a in his introduction to _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, the commentary\non the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, says that the Abhidhamma is so called\n(_abhi_ and _dhamma_) because it describes the same Dhammas as are\nrelated in the suttas in a more intensified (_dhamm\u00e2tireka_) and\nspecialized (_dhammavisesatthena_) manner. The Abhidhammas\ndo not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but\nthey deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found\nin the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features\nof the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement\nof the former leads one to attain meditation (_sam\u00e2dhi_) whereas\nthe latter leads one to attain wisdom (_pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2sampadam_). The force\nof this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the\nsuttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is\nnot to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in\nenumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a\ntechnical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned\n\n85\n\ninsight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving\nfor following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow.\nThe Abhidhamma known as the _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ differs from the\nother Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views\nof the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed\nin the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the\nopponents are often shown to be based on contradictory\nassumptions.\n\nThe suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nik\u00e2yas.\nThese are (1) _D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya_, called so on account of the length\nof the suttas contained in it; (2) _Majjhima Nik\u00e2ya_ (middling\nNik\u00e2ya), called so on account of the middling extent of the\nsuttas contained in it; (3) _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ (Nik\u00e2yas relating\nto special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being\ndelivered owing to the meetings (_sa@myoga_) of special persons which\nwere the occasions for them; (4) _A@nguttara Nik\u00e2ya_, so called because\nin each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion\nincrease by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) _Khuddaka Nik\u00e2ya_ containing\n_Khuddaka p\u00e2@tha, Dhammapada, Ud\u00e2na, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nip\u00e2ta,\nVim\u00e2na-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragath\u00e2, Ther\u00eegath\u00e2, J\u00e2taka, Niddesa,\nPa@tisambhid\u00e2magga, Apad\u00e2na, Buddhava@msa, Cary\u00e2pi@taka._\n\nThe Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@th\u00e2na, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dh\u00e2tukath\u00e2,\nPuggalapa\u00f1\u00f1atti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka_ and _Kath\u00e2vatthu_.\nThere exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts\nof the above works known as atthakath\u00e2. The work known as\n_Milinda Pa\u00f1ha_ (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is\nof considerable philosophical value.\n\nThe doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature\nis generally now known as Sthavirav\u00e2da or Therav\u00e2da. On the\norigin of the name Therav\u00e2da (the doctrine of the elders)\n_D\u00eepava@msa_ says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council)\nand collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera V\u00e2da [Footnote ref\n2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this P\u00e2li literature\ndeveloped much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the\nwriter of _Visuddhimagga_ (a compendium of therav\u00e2da doctrines)\nand the commentator of _D\u00eeghanik\u00e2ya, Dhammasa@nga@ni_, etc.\n\nHindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced\nby the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but\nit does not appear that P\u00e2li Buddhism had any share in it. I\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthas\u00e2lini_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _D\u00eepava@msa_, p. 31.]\n\n84\n\nhave not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could\nbe considered as being acquainted with P\u00e2li.\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally\nin four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (_gu@na_), (3) cause\n(_hetu_) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (_nissatta nijj\u00eeva_ [Footnote\nref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important,\nfrom the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist\nphilosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all\nreality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena\nand these were called dhammas. The question arises that\nif there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the\nphenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing\naway and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find\nout \"What being what else is,\" \"What happening what else\nhappens\" and \"What not being what else is not.\" The phenomena\nare happening in a series and we see that there being\ncertain phenomena there become some others; by the happening\nof some events others also are produced. This is called\n(_pa@ticca-samupp\u00e2da_) dependent origination. But it is difficult to\nunderstand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as\n_Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started\nbefore attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition\nare the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away\nand are born again; and they do not know the path of escape\nfrom this decay, death and misery.\n\nHow to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay\nand death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay\nand death, depending on what do they come? As he thought\ndeeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay\nand death can only occur when there is birth (_j\u00e2ti_), so they depend\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could\ntake the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the\n_Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not\nrepresent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the\ntwelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and\nas it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter\ninto conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew\nmy attention to this fact.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Atthas\u00e2tin\u00ee_, p. 38. There are also other senses in which\nthe word is used, as _dhamma-desan\u00e2_ where it means religious teaching.\nThe _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyap\u00fbrvak\u00e2 dharmm\u00e2_, i.e.\nDharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]\n\n85\n\non birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth\ndepend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if\nthere were previous existence (_bhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does\nthis existence depend, or what being there is there _bhava_. Then it\noccurred to him that there could not be existence unless there\nwere holding fast (_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did up\u00e2d\u00e2na\ndepend? It occurred to him that it was desire (_ta@nh\u00e2_) on which up\u00e2d\u00e2na\ndepended. There can be up\u00e2d\u00e2na if there is desire (_tanh\u00e2_) [Footnote ref\n3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it\noccurred to him that there must be feeling (_vedan\u00e2_) in order that\nthere may be desire. But on what does vedan\u00e2 depend, or rather\nwhat must be there, that there may be feeling (_vedan\u00e2_)? To this\nit occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (_phassa_)\nin order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no\nsense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact\ndepend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts,\nthere are the six fields of contact (_\u00e2yatana_) [Footnote ref 5]. But on\nwhat do the six \u00e2yatanas depend? It occurred to him that\nthere must be the mind and body (_n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa_) in order that there\nmay be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does\nn\u00e2mar\u00fbpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness\n(_vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na_) there could be no n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa [Footnote ref 8].\nBut what being there would there\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrak\u00eertti in his\n_M\u00e2dhyam\u00eeka v@rtti,_ p. 565 (La Vall\u00e9e Poussin's edition) as the deed\nwhich brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutth\u00e2payali\nk\u00e2yena v\u00e2c\u00e2 manas\u00e2 ca_).]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 385, up\u00e2d\u00e2nantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrak\u00eertti\nin explaining up\u00e2d\u00e2na says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast\nto the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastuni\nsat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjan\u00e2ya vi@dhapan\u00e2ya up\u00e2d\u00e2namup\u00e2datte tatra\ntatra pr\u00e2rthayate_). _M\u00e2dhyam\u00eeka v@rtti_, p. 565.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Candrak\u00eertti describes t@r@s@n\u00e2 as\n_\u00e2svadan\u00e2bhinandan\u00e2dhyavas\u00e2nasth\u00e2n\u00e2d\u00e2tmapriyar\u00fbpairviyogo m\u00e2 bh\u00fbt,\nnityamaparity\u00e2go bhavediti, yeyam pr\u00e2rthan\u00e2_--the desire that there\nmay not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which\nare dear to us. _Ibid._ 565.]\n\n[Footnote 4: We read also of phass\u00e2yatana and phassak\u00e2ya. _M. N._ II. 261,\nIII. 280, etc. Candrak\u00eertti says that _@sa@dbhir\u00e2yatanadv\u00e2rai@h\nk@rtyaprak@riy\u00e2@h pravarttante praj\u00f1\u00e2yante. tann\u00e2mar\u00fbpapratyaya@m\n@sa@d\u00e2yatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`c\u00e2yatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`ak\u00e2y\u00e2@h\npravarttante. M.V._ 565.]\n\n[Footnote 5: \u00c2yatana means the six senses together with their objects.\n\u00c2yatana literally is \"Field of operation.\" Sa@l\u00e2yatana means six senses\nas six fields of operation. Candrak\u00eertti has _\u00e2yatanadv\u00e2rai@h_.]\n\n[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa\nas mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly\ncorrect. The four skandhas are called n\u00e2ma in each birth. These together\nwith r\u00fbpa (matter) give us n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa (mind and body) which being developed\nrender the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there\nmay be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govind\u00e2nanda, the commentator on\nS'a@nkara's bh\u00e2sya on the _Brahma s\u00fbtras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different\ninterpretation of Namar\u00fbpa which may probably refer to the Vij\u00f1anavada\nview though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think\nthe momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras\nof attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first\nvij\u00f1ana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana,\nand the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama)\nare produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen\nand blood called r\u00fbpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with\nGovindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum\nwhile r\u00fbpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vij\u00f1a\u00f1a\nentered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through\nthe association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274,\n275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vij\u00f1a\u00f1a into the womb compare\n_D N_ II. 63.]\n\n86\n\nbe vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na. Here it occurred to him that in order that there\nmight be vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na there must be the conformations (_sa@nkh\u00e2ra_) [Footnote\nref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkh\u00e2ras? Here it occurred\nto him that the sa@nkh\u00e2ras can only be if there is ignorance\n(_avijj\u00e2_). If avijj\u00e2 could be stopped then the sa@nkh\u00e2ras will be\nstopped, and if the sa@nkh\u00e2ras could be stopped vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na could be\nstopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].\n\nIt is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha\nactually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence\nsometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and\ndeath (_jar\u00e2marana_) could not have happened if there was no\nbirth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the\ndifficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word\nhere. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce\nproper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical\nmethod and he had often to use the same word in more or less different\nsenses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather\nelastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning\nwhich we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. p. 87,\n\"_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_,\" sa@nkhara means that which synthesises\nthe complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action.\nMr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used\nin a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkh\u00e2ta khandha\n(viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkh\u00e2ta\nkhandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental\nstates in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty\n_cittasamprayuktasa@msk\u00e2ra_, it also counts thirteen\n_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning\nattachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the\ncommentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. ii. 19), also interprets\nthe word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ as\nattachment, antipathy and infatuation.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevan\u00e2\n(lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness\nand miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at\nthe prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All\nthese make up suffering and are the results of j\u00e2ti (birth). _M. V._\n(B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bh\u00e2sya counted all the terms from\njar\u00e2, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing\nthe entirety of duhkhaskandha.]\n\n87\n\nenunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka says that just\nas an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort\ncollects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of\nthis life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes\nanother existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been\nbefore or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove\nthe doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy\nexcept the C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas believed in it and so little is known to us of\nthe C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka s\u00fbtras that it is difficult to say what they did to\nrefute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does\nnot criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an\ninfinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of\na few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them\nin the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the\nBuddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth\nmight be due, had to fall back upon another existence (_bhava_).\nIf bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrak\u00eertti takes\nit to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only\ntake place on account of the works of a previous existence which\ndetermined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note\n\"as a man does so will he be born\" (_Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate_,\nBrh IV. iv. 5). Candrak\u00eertti's interpretation of \"bhava\"\nas Karma (_punarbhavajanakam karma_) seems to me to suit\nbetter than \"existence.\" The word was probably used rather\nloosely for _kammabhava_. The word bhava is not found in the\nearlier Upani@sads and was used in the P\u00e2li scriptures for the\nfirst time as a philosophical term. But on what does this\nbhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence\nif people had not betaken themselves to things or works they\ndesired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance\nwith desire is called up\u00e2d\u00e2na. In the Upani@sads we read,\n\"whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work\" (_Yatkraturbhavati\ntatkarmma kurute_, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to\nthe thing depends upon desire {_t@r@s@n\u00e2_}, it is said that in order\nthat there may be up\u00e2d\u00e2na there must be tanh\u00e2. In the Upani@sads\nalso we read \"Whatever one desires so does he betake\nhimself to\" (_sa yath\u00e2k\u00e2mo bhavati tatkraturbhavati_). Neither\nthe word up\u00e2d\u00e2na nor t@rs@n\u00e2 (the Sanskrit word corresponding\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu\nphilosophical works such as the Ny\u00e2ya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]\n\n88\n\nto ta@nh\u00e2) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained\nin them are similar to the words \"_kratu_\" and \"_k\u00e2ma_.\" Desire\n(ta@nh\u00e2) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact.\nSense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote\nref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the\nwhole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together)\ncalled n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads\nbut there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and\nnames as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable\nreality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Visuddhimagga_ says that by\n\"Name\" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation\n(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by \"Form\"\nthe four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote\nref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical\nchanges, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So\nform also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like\nthe cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and\neffectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or\ncollection of material for the production of Name and Form; \"but just\nas when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound;\nand when the sound comes into existence it does not come from\nany such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the\ncardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the\nsame way all the elements of being both those with form and\nthose without, come into existence after having previously been\nnon-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5].\"\nN\u00e2mar\u00fbpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and\nbody, but only the sense functions and the body which are found\nto operate in the six doors of sense (_sa@l\u00e2yatana_). If we take\nn\u00e2mar\u00fbpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend\nupon the vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared\nin the _Milinda Pa\u00f1ha_ with a watchman at the middle of\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The word \u00e2yatana is found in many places in the earlier\nUpani@sads in the sense of \"field or place,\" Ch\u00e2. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9.\n10, but @sa@d\u00e2yatana does not occur.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Candrak\u00eertti interprets n\u00e2ma as _Vedan\u00e2dayo'\nr\u00fbpi@nas'catv\u00e2ra@h skandh\u00e2statra tatra bhave n\u00e2mayant\u00eeli n\u00e2ma. saha\nr\u00fbpaskandhena ca n\u00e2ma r\u00fbpam ceti n\u00e2mar\u00fbpamucyate._ The four skandhas\nin each specific birth act as name. These together with r\u00fbpa make\nn\u00e2mar\u00fbpa. _M. V._ 564.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 185, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 185-186, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]\n\n89\n\nthe cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref\n1]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_ also says that consciousness means\nthat which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics\nwe must say that it knows (_vij\u00e2nana_), goes in advance (_pubba@ngama_),\nconnects (_sandh\u00e2na_), and stands on n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa (_n\u00e2mar\u00fbpapada@t@th\u00e2nam_).\nWhen the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense\nare discerned (_\u00e2rammana-vibh\u00e2vana@t@th\u00e2ne_) and it goes first as the\nprecursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only\nby the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of\n(mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2].\nBuddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the _Milinda Pa\u00f1ha_\nwe have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states\nof consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between\nthe previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears\nas connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it\nis lost; but there are the four aggregates as n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa, it stands on\nn\u00e2ma and therefore it is said that it stands on n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa. He further\nasks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or\ndifferent from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows\nitself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those\nin truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected\nheat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that\nthe sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness\ntakes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So\nthough it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different\nfrom them [Footnote ref 3].\n\nTo go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that j\u00e2ti (birth)\nis the cause of decay and death, _jar\u00e2mara@na_, etc. J\u00e2ti is the\nappearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote\nref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines j\u00e2ti, I cannot think of any\nbetter rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already\n\n________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Pa\u00f1ha_\n(628).]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 112...]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 113, _Yath\u00e2 hi r\u00fbp\u00e2d\u00eeni up\u00e2d\u00e2ya pa\u00f1\u00f1att\u00e2\nsuriy\u00e2dayo na atthato r\u00fbp\u00e2d\u00eehi a\u00f1\u00f1e honti ten' eva yasmin samaye\nsuriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tej\u00e2-sa@nkh\u00e2tam r\u00fbpa@m p\u00eeti eva@m\nvuccam\u00e2ne pi na r\u00fbp\u00e2dihi a\u00f1\u00f1o suriyo n\u00e2ma atthi. Tath\u00e2 cittam\nphass\u00e2dayo dhamme up\u00e2d\u00e2ya pa\u00f1\u00f1apiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi\na\u00f1\u00f1am eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva\ntasmin samaye phass\u00e2dihi atthato a\u00f1\u00f1ad eva hot\u00ee ti_.]\n\n[Footnote 4: \"_J\u00e2tirdehajanma pa\u00f1caskandhasamud\u00e2ya@h,_\" Govind\u00e2nanda's\n_Ratnaprabh\u00e2_ on S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya, II. ii. 19.]\n\n90\n\nsuggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnote\nref 1]. Up\u00e2d\u00e2na is an advanced t@r@s@n\u00e2 leading to positive clinging\n[Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@n\u00e2 (desire) which again is\nthe result of vedan\u00e2 (pleasure and pain). But this vedan\u00e2 is of course\nvedan\u00e2 with ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_), for an Arhat may have also vedan\u00e2\nbut as he has no avidy\u00e2, the vedan\u00e2 cannot produce t@r@s@n\u00e2 in turn. On\nits development it immediately passes into up\u00e2d\u00e2na. Vedan\u00e2 means\npleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads\nto t@r@s@n\u00e2 (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact\n(_spars'a_). Prof. De la Vall\u00e9e Poussin says that S'r\u00eel\u00e2bha distinguishes\nthree processes in the production of vedan\u00e2. Thus first there is the\ncontact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge\nof the object, and then there is the vedan\u00e2. Depending on _Majjhima\nNik\u00e2ya_, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in\nthe case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing,\nso here also vedan\u00e2 takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they\nare \"produits par un m\u00eame complexe de causes (_s\u00e2magr\u00ee_) [Footnote\nref 3].\"\n\nSpars'a is produced by @sa@d\u00e2yatana, @sa@d\u00e2yatana by n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa,\nand n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa by vij\u00f1\u00e2na, and is said to descend in the womb\nof the mother and produce the five skandhas as n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa, out\nof which the six senses are specialized.\n\nVij\u00f1\u00e2na in this connection probably means the principle or\ngerm of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the\nfive elements of the new body there. It is the product of the\npast karmas (_sa@nkh\u00e2ra_) of the dying man and of his past\nconsciousness too.\n\nWe sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last\nthoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next\n\n_______________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabh\u00e2_ on S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya, II.\nii. 19, explains \"bhava\" as that from which anything becomes, as merit\nand demerit (_dharm\u00e2di_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's\n_Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in\n_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the\nactive side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side).\nAnd the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of \"_kammabhava_\"\nor Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vall\u00e9e Poussin in his _Th\u00e9oric des Douze Causes_,\np. 26, says that _S'\u00e2listambhas\u00fbtra_ explains the word \"up\u00e2d\u00e2na\" as\n\"t@r@s@n\u00e2vaipulya\" or hyper-t@r@s@n\u00e2 and Candrak\u00eertti also gives the\nsame meaning, _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmd\u00e2nanda explains \"up\u00e2d\u00e2na\"\nas prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@n\u00e2 (desire), i.e. the active\ntendency in pursuance of desire. But if up\u00e2d\u00e2na means \"support\" it would\ndenote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _up\u00e2d\u00e2nam\npa\u00f1caskandhalak@sa@nam...pa\u00f1cop\u00e2d\u00e2naskandh\u00e2khyam up\u00e2d\u00e2nam. M.V._ XXVII. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Poussin's _Th\u00e9orie des Douze Causes_, p. 23.\n\n91\n\nbirth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vij\u00f1\u00e2na produced in the\nwomb is determined by the past vij\u00f1\u00e2na of the previous existence is\naccording to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image,\nlike the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple,\nlike the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress\nof a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life,\nso death also is but a similar change; there is no great break,\nbut the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being.\nNew skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale\npans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp\nis lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the\nvij\u00f1\u00e2na resulting from his previous karmas and vij\u00f1\u00e2nas enters\ninto the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which\nthe next skandhas are to be matured. This vij\u00f1\u00e2na thus forms\nthe principle of the new life. It is in this vij\u00f1\u00e2na that name\n(_n\u00e2ma_) and form (_r\u00fbpa_) become associated.\n\nThe vij\u00f1\u00e2na is indeed a direct product of the sa@msk\u00e2ras and\nthe sort of birth in which vij\u00f1\u00e2na should bring down (_n\u00e2mayati_)\nthe new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@msk\u00e2ras [Footnote\nref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and the\ninstillation of the vij\u00f1\u00e2na as the beginning of the new life\n(_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just\nat the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that\nthey are said to be simultaneous. If the vij\u00f1\u00e2na had not entered\nthe womb then no n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].\n\nThis chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus\navidy\u00e2 and sa@msk\u00e2ra of the past life produce the vij\u00f1\u00e2na, n\u00e2marupa,\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the\nplants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said \"make your\nresolution, 'May I be a cakravartt\u00ee king in a next existence,'\"\n_Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"_sa ced\u00e2nandavij\u00f1\u00e2na@m m\u00e2tu@hkuk@sim n\u00e2vakr\u00e2meta, na tat\nkalalam kalalatv\u00e2ya sannivartteta_,\" _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka,\nS'\u00e2r\u00eera_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a \"upap\u00eeduka sattva\" which\nconnects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character\nis changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is\nin a pure condition one can remember even the previous births;\ncharacter, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental\nqualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the\ncombination of many elements, so is the foetus.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from\n_D\u00eegha_, II. 63, \"si le vij\u00f1\u00e2na ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel\nla namarupa s'y constituerait-il?\" Govind\u00e2nanda on S'a@nkara's commentary\non the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness\n(vij\u00f1\u00e2na) of the foetus is produced by the sa@msk\u00e2ras of the previous\nbirth, and from that the four elements (which he calls n\u00e2ma) and from that\nthe white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus\n(_kalala-budbud\u00e2vasth\u00e2_} is produced.]\n\n92\n\n@sa@d\u00e2yatana, spars'a, vedan\u00e2, t@r@s@n\u00e2, up\u00e2d\u00e2na and the bhava\n(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava\nproduces the j\u00e2ti and jar\u00e2mara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].\n\nIt is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain\nextending in three sections over three lives are all but the\nmanifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally\ndetermine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_\nsays \"each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite\nterm 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences\nof birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the\nmind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@n\u00e2_), grasping\n(_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accounted\nfor also. In the same manner when craving, grasping\nand (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance\nand the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;\nand when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even\nthe fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are\naccounted for. And thus:\n\nFive causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'\n\nFive causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up\nthe Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkh\u00e2ra and\nvi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na, 2. vedan\u00e2 and tanh\u00e2, 3. bhava and j\u00e2ti) and the four\ngroups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the\nPresent, one causal group in the Present and one resultant\ngroup in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref\n2].\"\n\nThese twelve interdependent links (_dv\u00e2das'\u00e2@nga_) represent\nthe pa@ticcasamupp\u00e2da (_prat\u00e2tyasamutp\u00e2da_) doctrines (dependent\norigination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to\ncycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamupp\u00e2da or prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da has\nbeen differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref\n4].\n\n___________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early P\u00e2li\ntexts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavil\u00e2sin\u00ee_ on _Mah\u00e2nid\u00e2na\nsuttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance\nand the actions of the mind belong to the past; \"birth,\" \"decay and death\"\nto the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as\ntri@k\u00e2@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24.\nTwo in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle \"_sa\nprat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2do dv\u00e2das'\u00e2@ngastrik\u00e2@n@daka@h p\u00fbrv\u00e2par\u00e2ntayordve dve\nmadhye@s@tau_.\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of\n_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]\n\n[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list\ngiven in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijj\u00e2 and sa@nkh\u00e2ra\nhave been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it\nhas been said that \"Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes\nnot beyond.\"]\n\n[Footnote 4: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]\n\n93\n\nSamutp\u00e2da means appearance or arising (_pr\u00e2durbhd\u00e2va_) and prat\u00eetya\nmeans after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two we\nfind, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending\non which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and\npaccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in\nthe same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also\nused in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijj\u00e2 is the\npaccaya of sa@nkh\u00e2ra it is meant that avijj\u00e2 is the ground (_@thiti_)\nof the origin of the sa@nkh\u00e2ras, is the ground of their movement,\nof the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), of\ntheir ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their\nintelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause\nand of their function as the ground with reference to those which\nare determined by them. Avijj\u00e2 in all these nine ways is\nthe ground of sa@nkh\u00e2ra both in the past and also in the future,\nthough avijj\u00e2 itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote\nref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot\nthink of anything else but succession, but when we take the\npaccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the\ncause as ground. Thus when avijj\u00e2 is said to be the ground\nof the sa@nkh\u00e2ras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems\nreasonable to think that the sa@nkh\u00e2ras were in some sense\nregarded as special manifestations of avijj\u00e2 [Footnote ref 2]. But as this\npoint was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would\nbe unwise to proceed further with it.\n\n\nThe Khandhas.\n\nThe word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree\nand is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We\nhave seen that Buddha said that there was no \u00e2tman (soul). He said\nthat when people held that they found the much spoken of soul,\nthey really only found the five khandhas together or any one of\nthem. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical\nstates which are immediate with us and are divided into five\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhid\u00e2magga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima\nNik\u00e2ya_, I. 67, _sa@nkh\u00e2ra...avijj\u00e2nid\u00e2n\u00e2 avijj\u00e2samuday\u00e2 avijj\u00e2j\u00e2tik\u00e2\navijj\u00e2pabhav\u00e2_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmit\u00e2 (egoism), r\u00e2ga (attachment),\ndve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidy\u00e2 we find also\nthat all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth\nof avidy\u00e2 (_pa\u00f1caparv\u00ee avidy\u00e2_).]\n\n[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Ch\u00e2ndogya, II. 23 (_trayo\ndharmaskandh\u00e2@h yaj\u00f1a@h adhyayanam d\u00e2nam_) in the sense of branches\nand in almost the same sense in Maitr\u00ee, VII. II.]\n\n94\n\nclasses: (1) r\u00fbpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense\ndata, etc., (2) vedan\u00e2 (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent),\n(3) sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkh\u00e2ra (synthetic\nmental states and the synthetic functioning of compound\nsense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts),\n(5) vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nAll these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)\nand when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself,\nfor he only perceives one or more of these. The word r\u00fbpa in r\u00fbpakhandha\nstands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense\ndata [Footnote ref 2]. But \"r\u00fbpa\" is also used in the sense of pure\norganic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_,\nI.p. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_, III. 86. R\u00fbpaskandha according\nto _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the five\nsensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense\nperceptions _vij\u00f1apti_).\n\nThe elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by defining\nr\u00fbpa as \"_catt\u00e2ro ca mah\u00e2bh\u00fbt\u00e2 catunna\u00f1ca mah\u00e2bhntanam\nup\u00e2d\u00e2ya r\u00fbpam_\" (the four mah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas or elements and that\nproceeding from the grasping of that is called r\u00fbpa) [Footnote ref 3].\nBuddhagho@sa explains it by saying that r\u00fbpa means the four mah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas\nand those which arise depending (_niss\u00e2ya_) on them as\na modification of them. In the r\u00fbpa the six senses including\ntheir affections are also included. In explaining why the four\nelements are called mah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas, Buddhagho@sa says: \"Just as a\nmagician (_m\u00e2y\u00e2k\u00e2ra_) makes the water which is not hard appear\nas hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;\njust as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself\nappear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves\nblue make themselves appear as blue (_n\u00eelam up\u00e2d\u00e2 r\u00fbpam_),\nnot yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red\nor white (od\u00e2tam up\u00e2d\u00e2r\u00fbpam), so on account of their similarity\nto the appearances created by the magician they are called\nmah\u00e2bh\u00fbta [Footnote ref 4].\"\n\nIn the _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ we find that the Buddha says, \"O\nBhikkhus it is called r\u00fbpam because it manifests (_r\u00fbpyati_); how\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_, III. 86, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 299.]\n\n95\n\ndoes it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and\nas thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the\nsun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called r\u00fbpa\n[Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nIf we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above\nfor our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand\nwhat is meant by r\u00fbpa, I think we find that that which manifested\nitself to the senses and organs was called r\u00fbpa. No distinction\nseems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells,\netc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as\nsensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance\nof the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses\nbut the sense-data and the sensations were \"r\u00fbpa.\" Under certain\nconditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism\ndid not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and\nmind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that\nsuch an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads\nnor in the S\u00e2@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic.\nThe four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and\nwere therefore called r\u00fbpa; the forms of affection that appeared\nwere also called r\u00fbpa; many other mental states or features\nwhich appeared with them were also called r\u00fbpa [Footnote ref 2]. The\n\u00e2yatanas or the senses were also called r\u00fbpa [Footnote ref 3]. The\nmah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations,\nand they together with all that appeared in association with them were\ncalled r\u00fbpa and formed the r\u00fbpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials,\nsense-data, senses and sensations).\n\nIn _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ (III. 101) it is said that \"the four\nmah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication\nof the r\u00fbpakkhandha (_r\u00fbpakkhandhassa pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2pan\u00e2ya_). Contact\n(sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of\nfeelings (_vedan\u00e2_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya\nfor the communication of the sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2kkhandha; sense-contact is\nalso the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the\nsa@nkh\u00e2rakkhandha. But n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa is the hetu and the paccaya for\nthe communication of the vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2nakkhandha.\" Thus not only feelings\narise on account of the sense-contact but sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 and sa@nkh\u00e2ra\nalso arise therefrom. Sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 is that where specific knowing or\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_, III. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]\n\n96\n\nconceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive\nknowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.\n\nMrs. Rhys Davids writing on sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 says: \"In editing the\nsecond book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification\ndistinguishing between sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 as cognitive assimilation on occasion\nof sense, and sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of\nnaming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition\n(_patigha-sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on\noccasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the\nimpact of impressions; of external things as different, we might\nsay. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or\nname (_adhivach\u00e2n\u00e2-sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_\n(mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who\nis thoughtful: \"What are you thinking of?\" one perceives through\nhis speech.' Thus there are two stages of sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2-consciousness,\n1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they\nare by naming [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nAbout sa@nkh\u00e2ra we read in _Sa@myutta Nik\u00e2ya_ (III. 87) that it\nis called sa@nkh\u00e2ra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is\nthat which conglomerated r\u00fbpa as r\u00fbpa, conglomerated sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2\nas sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2, sa@nkh\u00e2ra as sa@nkh\u00e2ra and consciousness (_vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na_)\nas consciousness. It is called sa@nkh\u00e2ra because it synthesises\nthe conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a\nsynthetic function which synthesises the passive r\u00fbpa, sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2,\nsa@nkh\u00e2ra and vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na elements. The fact that we hear of 52\nsa@nkh\u00e2ra states and also that the sa@nkh\u00e2ra exercises its synthetic\nactivity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show\nthat probably the word sa@nkh\u00e2ra is used in two senses, as mental\nstates and as synthetic activity.\n\nVi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa,\nas we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage\nat which the intellectual process started and also the final\nresulting consciousness.\n\nBuddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology\nsays that \"consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) with\nits object (_\u00e2ramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_)\nand volition (_cetan\u00e2_) come in. This contact is like the pillars of\na palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it\n(_dabbasambh\u00e2rasadis\u00e2_). But it should not be thought that contact\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]\n\n97\n\nis the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole\nconsciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comes\nfirst and that comes after, so we can take contact in association\nwith feeling (_vedan\u00e2_), conceiving (_sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_) or volition (_cetan\u00e2_);\nit is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends\nobjects it is called contact.\" \"There is no impinging on one side\nof the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes\nconsciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and\nvisual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; or\nit has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment,\nowing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object.\nFor it is said in the Commentary:--\"contact in the four planes of\nexistence is never without the characteristic of touch with the\nobject; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors.\nFor to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the\ncharacteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.'\nBut to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic\nof touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is\nquoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent\nthe eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact.\nAnd as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or\ntwo hands were to clap against each other; one hand would\nrepresent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision\ncontact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the\nfunction of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the\nunion of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its\neffect is feeling (_vedan\u00e2_); though it is generated by the objects\nit is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing\n(_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste\nof an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only\npartially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching,\nof perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere\ncoordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling\nalone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste\nof an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states\nare like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of\ndiverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king,\nbreaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup\nand curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]\n\n98\n\nwhether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of\nvarious excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord,\nexpert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting\nof the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object\nby the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the\nfood, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and\nas the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according\nto his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys\nthe taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or\nexperience is its function [Footnote ref 1].\"\n\nThe special feature of sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 is said to be the recognizing\n(_paccabhi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_) by means of a sign (_abhi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2nena_). According to\nanother explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion\nof the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work of\nvolition (_cetan\u00e2_) is said to be coordination or binding together\n(_abhisandahana_). \"Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes\na double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said\n'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking\nfifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was\nexceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his\nstrength and said \"Take your sickles\" and so forth, pointed out\nthe portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers,\netc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be\nthus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral\nstates which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five\nstrong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort\nby the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of\nvolition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2].\"\nIt seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkh\u00e2ra was\nseparately designated as cetan\u00e2 (volition).\n\n\"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to\nall the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself\nthat that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the\nfragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the\npollen, so one could not say that the r\u00fbpa was 'I' or that the\nvedan\u00e2 was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is\nnowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'.\"\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Samyutta Nik\u00e2ya_, III. 130.]\n\n99\n\n\nAvijj\u00e2 and \u00c2sava.\n\nAs to the question how the avijj\u00e2 (ignorance) first started\nthere can be no answer, for we could never say that either\nignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1].\nIts fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes\nin its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we\ncan never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements\nwhich bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by\ncertain others. This mutual determination can only take place\nin and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for\nthere is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority\nin time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into\nbeing of the \u00e2savas or depravities that the avijj\u00e2 came into\nbeing, and that through the destruction of the depravities (_\u00e2sava_)\nthe avijj\u00e2 was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These \u00e2savas are classified in\nthe _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ as k\u00e2m\u00e2sava, bhav\u00e2sava, di@t@th\u00e2sava and avijj\u00e2sava.\nK\u00e2m\u00e2sava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst\nafter the qualities associated with the senses; bhav\u00e2sava means\ndesire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@th\u00e2sava\nmeans the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal\nor non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not\ncome to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are\ndifferent; avijj\u00e2sava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its\nextinction and its means of extinction. _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ adds\nfour more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of\nanterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior\nand posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3].\nK\u00e2m\u00e2sava and bhav\u00e2sava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for\nthey are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].\n\n________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.\nXVII.), p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _M. N._ I.p. 54. Childers translates \"\u00e2sava\" as \"depravities\"\nand Mrs Rhys Davids as \"intoxicants.\" The word \"\u00e2sava\" in Skr. means\n\"old wine.\" It is derived from \"su\" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the\nmeaning that he gives to it is \"_cira p\u00e2riv\u00e2sika@t@thena_\" (on account\nof its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the\neye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra.\nAs those wines which are kept long are called \"\u00e2savas\" so these are also\ncalled \u00e2savas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that\nBuddhagho@sa gives is that they are called \u00e2sava on account of their\nproducing sa@ms\u00e2radukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 48.\nContrast it with Jaina \u00e2srava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it\ndifficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have\ntranslated it as \"depravities,\" after Childers.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 371.]\n\n100\n\n\nThe di@t@th\u00e2savas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical\nviews stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines.\nThe k\u00e2mas\u00e2vas stand in the way of one's entering into\nthe way of Nirv\u00e2@na (_an\u00e2g\u00e2mimagga_) and the bhav\u00e2savas and\navijj\u00e2savas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final\nemancipation. When the _Majjhima Nik\u00e2ya_ says that from the\nrise of the \u00e2savas avijj\u00e2 rises, it evidently counts avijj\u00e2 there as\nin some sense separate from the other \u00e2savas, such as those of\nattachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge\nabout sorrow.\n\nThe afflictions (_kilesas_) do not differ much from the \u00e2savas\nfor they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar\nto us, such as covetousness (_lobha_), anger or hatred (_dosa_),\ninfatuation (_moha_), arrogance, pride or vanity (_m\u00e2na_), heresy\n(_di@t@thi_), doubt or uncertainty (_vicikicch\u00e2_), idleness (_th\u00eena_),\nboastfulness (_udhacca_), shamelessness (_ahirika_) and hardness of heart\n_anottapa_); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the \u00e2savas.\nIn spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha,\ndosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are\nassociated with the vedan\u00e2kkhandha, sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2kkhandha, sa@nkh\u00e2rakkhandha\nand vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2nakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds\nof actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nS\u00eela and Sam\u00e2dhi.\n\nWe are intertwined all through outside and inside by the\ntangles of desire (_ta@nh\u00e2 ja@t\u00e2_), and the only way by which these\nmay be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (_s\u00eela_),\nconcentration (_sam\u00e2dhi_) and wisdom (_pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_). S\u00eela briefly means\nthe desisting from committing all sinful deeds (_sabbap\u00e2passa\nakara@nam_). With s\u00eela therefore the first start has to be made,\nfor by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires\nand thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances.\nThis serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance\nof the s\u00eela would lead one to the first two successive\nstages of sainthood, viz. the sot\u00e2pannabh\u00e2va (the stage in which\none is put in the right current) and the sakad\u00e2g\u00e2mibh\u00e2va (the\nstage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Sam\u00e2dhi\nis a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old\nkilesas are destroyed and the ta@nh\u00e2 or desire is removed and\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Dhammasa@nga@ni,_ p. 180.]\n\n101\n\nby it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It\ndirectly brings in pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 (true wisdom) and by pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 the saint\nachieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an\narhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (_pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_) is right knowledge about the\nfour \u00e2riya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause\nof destruction.\n\nS\u00eela means those particular volitions and mental states, etc.\nby which a man who desists from committing sinful actions\nmaintains himself on the right path. S\u00eela thus means 1. right\nvolition (_cetan\u00e2_), 2. the associated mental states (_cetasika_),\n3. mental control (_sa@mvara_) and 4. the actual non-transgression\n(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind\nby the preceding three s\u00eelas called av\u00eetikkama. Sa@mvara is\nspoken of as being of five kinds, 1. P\u00e2@timokkhasa@mvara (the\ncontrol which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the\ncontrol of mindfulness), 3. \u00d1\u00e2nasa@mvara (the control of knowledge),\n4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara\n(the control of active self-restraint). P\u00e2@timokkhasa@mvara\nmeans all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means\nthe mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good\nassociations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when\nlooking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness\n(_sati_) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to\nthink of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it\nas may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by\nwhich one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the\nproper adherence to s\u00eela all our bodily, mental and vocal activities\n(_kamma_) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (_sam\u00e2dh\u00e2nam,\nupadh\u00e2ra@na@m, pati@t@th\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe sage who adopts the full course should also follow a\nnumber of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting,\ndining, etc., which are called the dh\u00fbta@ngas or pure disciplinary\nparts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of s\u00eela and the dh\u00fbtangas help the\nsage to adopt the course of sam\u00e2dhi. Sam\u00e2dhi as we have seen means\nthe concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (_kusalacittekaggat\u00e2\nsam\u00e2dhi@h_) together with its states upon one particular\nobject (_ek\u00e2ramma@na_) so that they may completely cease to\nshift and change (_samm\u00e2 ca avikkhipam\u00e2n\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 4].\n\n_______________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga Nid\u00e2n\u00e2dikath\u00e2_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga-s\u00eelaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, II.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85.]\n\n102\n\n\nThe man who has practised s\u00eela must train his mind first\nin particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire\nthe chief concentration of meditation called jh\u00e2na (fixed and\nsteady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind\nfor the acquirement of jh\u00e2nasam\u00e2dhi eventually lead to it\nand are called upac\u00e2ra sam\u00e2dhi (preliminary sam\u00e2dhi) as distinguished\nfrom the jh\u00e2nasam\u00e2dhi called the appan\u00e2sam\u00e2dhi (achieved sam\u00e2dhi)\n[Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he\nhas to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive\ndesires for eating and drinking (_\u00e2h\u00e2re pa@tikk\u00fblasa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_) by\nemphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated\nin seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations\nas various nauseating bodily elements. When a man\ncontinually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting\nassociations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment\nto them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil,\nonly awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows\nwill come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the\nidea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements,\nk@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase\nof a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called\ncatudh\u00e2tuvavatth\u00e2nabh\u00e2van\u00e2 (the meditation of the body as being\nmade up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to\nhabituate his mind to think again and again (_anussati_) about the\nvirtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following\nthe Buddha), the gods and the law (_dhamma_) of the Buddha, about\nthe good effects of s\u00eela, and the making of gifts (_c\u00e2g\u00e2nussati_),\nabout the nature of death (_mara@n\u00e2nussati_) and about\nthe deep nature and qualities of the final extinction\nof all phenomena (_upasam\u00e2nussati_) [Footnote ref 4].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow\nwhat appears to me to be the main line of division showing the\ninterconnection of jh\u00e2na (Skr. _dhy\u00e2na_) with its accessory stages\ncalled parikammas (_Visuddhimagga,_ pp. 85 f.).]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic\nattitude, \"_Ima\u00f1 ca pana \u00e2h\u00e2re pa@tikulasa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no\nrasata@nh\u00e2ya cittam pa@til\u00eeyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so,\nkant\u00e2ranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado \u00e2h\u00e2ra@m \u00e2h\u00e2reti\ny\u00e2vad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natth\u00e2ya_,\" p. 347. The mind of him who\ninspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from\nall desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off\nfrom them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food\nwithout any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to\nsustain himself in crossing a forest.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294.]\n\n103\n\n\nAdvancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations\ncalled the upac\u00e2ra sam\u00e2dhi we come to those other\nsources of concentration and meditation called the appan\u00e2sam\u00e2dhi\nwhich directly lead to the achievement of the highest sam\u00e2dhi.\nThe processes of purification and strengthening of the mind\ncontinue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts\nwhich lead the mind to its final goal Nibb\u00e2na. In the first part\nof this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and\nnotice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and\nthink how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are,\nand from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies\nand convince himself that they being in essence the same as the\ndead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called\nasubhakamma@t@th\u00e2na or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our\nbodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the\nbody as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter\ninto the first jh\u00e2na by leading his mind away from his body.\nThis is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness\nabout the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration\nthe sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling\n(_pass\u00e2sa_) and the exhaling (_\u00e2ss\u00e2sa_) of his breath, so that instead\nof breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be\naware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to\nmark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his\nmind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole\nprocess of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course.\nThis is called the anap\u00e2nasati or the mindfulness of inhalation\nand exhalation [Footnote ref 3]\n\nNext to this we come to Brahmavih\u00e2ra, the fourfold meditation\nof metta (universal friendship), karu@n\u00e2 (universal pity),\nmudit\u00e2 (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and\nupekkh\u00e2 (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his\nfriend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to\nthe meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking\nhow he should himself like to root out all misery and become\nhappy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully,\nand then pass over to the idea that other beings would also\nhave the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think\nthat his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga,_ VI.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 239-266.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ pp. 266-292.]\n\n104\n\nconnected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself\nto such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any\ndifference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others.\nHe should never become angry with any person. Should he at any\ntime feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on\nhim by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling\nhis sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He\nshould think that if he should allow himself to be affected by\nanger, he would spoil all his s\u00eela which he was so carefully practising.\nIf anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury,\nshould he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he\nwere finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself\nindulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas\nare momentary (_kha@nikatt\u00e2_); that there no longer existed the\nkhandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction\nof any injury being only a joint product, the man who was\ninjured was himself an indispensable element in the production\nof the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and\nthere could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible\nand of being angry with him. If even after thinking\nin this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by\nindulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through\nhis bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man\nby being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not\nto him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to\nfree his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself\nin an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called\nthe mett\u00e2-bh\u00e2vana. In the meditation of universal pity (_karu@n\u00e2_)\nalso one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and\nfoes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for\nthose who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither\nacquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to\nNibb\u00e2na, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote\nref 2].\n\nWe next come to the jh\u00e2nas with the help of material things\nas objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of\nconcentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour,\nyellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space\n(_par\u00eecchinn\u00e2k\u00e2sa_). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth\nand concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 314-315.]\n\n105\n\nwith eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds\nthat even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his\nmind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to\nconcentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.\n\nIn the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jh\u00e2nam_)\nthe mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding\nit with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse\nrelations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive\nmeditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in\nwhich the mind does not move in the object in relational terms\nbut becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without\nany quivering. This state is called vic\u00e2ra (steadily moving). The\nfirst stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's _Visuddhimagga_\nto the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas\nthe second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the\nleast quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with\na buoyant exaltation (_p\u00eeti_) and a steady inward bliss called sukha\n[Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first\njh\u00e2na roots out five ties of avijj\u00e2, kamacchando (dallying with\ndesires), vy\u00e2p\u00e2do (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor),\nuddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicch\u00e2 (doubt).\nThe five elements of which this jh\u00e2na is constituted are vitakka,\nvic\u00e2ra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).\n\nWhen the sage masters the first jh\u00e2na he finds it defective\nand wants to enter into the second meditation (_dutiyam jh\u00e2nam_),\nwhere there is neither any vitakka nor vic\u00e2ra of the first jh\u00e2na,\nbut the mind is in one unruffled state (_ekodibh\u00e2vam_). It is a\nmuch steadier state and does not possess the movement which\ncharacterized the vitakka and the vic\u00e2ra stages of the first jh\u00e2na\nand is therefore a very placid state (_vitakka-vic\u00e2rakkhobha-virahe@na\nativiya acalat\u00e2 suppasannat\u00e2 ca_). It is however associated\nwith p\u00eeti, sukha and ekaggat\u00e2 as the first jh\u00e2na was.\n\nWhen the second jh\u00e2na is mastered the sage becomes disinclined\ntowards the enjoyment of the p\u00eeti of that stage and becomes\nindifferent to them (_upekkhako_). A sage in this stage sees the\nobjects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all\nthe \u00e2savas of the sage become loosened (kh\u00ee@n\u00e2sava). The\nenjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Where there is p\u00eeti there is sukha, but where there is sukha\nthere may not necessarily be p\u00eeti. _V\u00eesuddhimagga_, p. 145.]\n\n106\n\nmind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes\nto turn back to the enjoyment of p\u00eeti again. The two characteristics\nof this jh\u00e2na are sukha and ekaggat\u00e2. It should however\nbe noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here,\nthe mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it\n(_atimadhhurasukhe sukhap\u00e2ramippatte pi tatiyajjh\u00e2ne upekkhako,\nna tattha sukh\u00e2bhisangena \u00e2ka@d@dhiyati_) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth\nball (_pa@thav\u00ee_) is however still the object of the jh\u00e2na.\n\nIn the fourth or the last jh\u00e2na both the sukha (happiness) and\nthe dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment\nand antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by\nsupreme and absolute indifference (_upekkh\u00e2_) which was slowly\ngrowing in all the various stages of the jh\u00e2nas. The characteristics\nof this jh\u00e2na are therefore upekkh\u00e2 and ekaggat\u00e2. With the\nmastery of this jh\u00e2na comes final perfection and total extinction\nof the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an\narhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas,\nno rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and\nsufferings--Nibb\u00e2na.\n\n\nKamma.\n\nIn the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that \"a fool who is blinded\nwith the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he\nthinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he\ncomes again and again within my grasp.\" In the Digha Nik\u00e2ya\nalso we read how P\u00e2y\u00e2si was trying to give his reasons in support\nof his belief that \"Neither is there any other world, nor are there\nbeings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or\nresult of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3].\" Some of his\narguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell\nus that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that\nif the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed\nin it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at\nthe earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions\nwe do not find at the time of the death of any person that\nhis soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of\nthe departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments\nwith apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nik\u00e2ya_, I.p. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp.\n167-168.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 349; _D. N._ II. pp. 317\nff.]\n\n107\n\nP\u00e2y\u00e2si's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine\nof rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the\nUpani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In\nthe _Milinda Pa\u00f1ha_, we find N\u00e2gasena saying \"it is through a\ndifference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some\nlong lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some\nhandsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some\nrich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree,\nsome wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1].\" We have seen in\nthe third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the\nUpani@sad sages.\n\nBut karma could produce its effect in this life or any\nother life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation.\nBut \"when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise\nwithout covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then\ninasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted,\npulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent\nand not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2].\"\nKarma by itself without craving (_ta@nh\u00e2_) is incapable of bearing good\nor bad fruits. Thus we read in the _Mah\u00e2satipa@t@th\u00e2na sutta_, \"even\nthis craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and\nself-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit,\nthe craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed\nlife) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote\nref 3].\" \"Craving for things visible, craving for things audible,\ncraving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in\nmemory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear,\nthat are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it\ndwell [Footnote ref 4].\" Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual\ngratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes.\nAnd this is the first \u00e2rya satya (noble truth).\n\nThe cessation of sorrow can only happen with \"the utter\ncessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving\nit up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5].\"\n\nWhen the desire or craving (_ta@nh\u00e2_) has once ceased the\nsage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after\nthat will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 216-217.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 341.]\n\n108\n\nfruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma\nfinds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all\nignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there\nis nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the\neffects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as\nMoggall\u00e2na did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma\nan arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of\nhis desire [Footnote ref 1].\n\nKammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and\nmind (_k\u00e2yika_, _v\u00e2cika_ and _m\u00e2nasika_). The root of this kamma\nis however volition (_cetan\u00e2_) and the states associated with it\n[Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into\nthe forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there\neven after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for\nhe could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives\nan order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually\ncarried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (_v\u00e2cika_)\nand not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether\ncarried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (_m\u00e2nasika_)\n[Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of\nall bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case\nof an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.\n\nKammas are divided from the point of view of effects into\nfour classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity,\n(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those\nwhich are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of\nboth purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor\nbad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which\ncontribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].\n\nFinal extinction of sorrow (_nibb\u00e2na_) takes place as the natural\nresult of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have\ntried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and\nvarious interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vall\u00e9e\nPoussin has pointed out that in the P\u00e2li texts Nibb\u00e2na has\nsometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation,\nas an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].\n\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp,\n221 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See _Atthas\u00e2lin\u00ee_, p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Vall\u00e1e Poussin's article in the _E. R.E._ on\nNirv\u00e2@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalms\nof the early Buddhists_, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; _D\u00eegha_,\nII. 15; _Ud\u00e2na_, VIII.; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109.]\n\n109\n\nMr Schrader, in discussing Nibb\u00e2na in _Pali Text Society Journal_,\n1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become\nidentified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space\n(_\u00e2k\u00e2sa_) or consciousness (_vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na_) attained to a state in which\nthey had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having\nreally lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of\nNibb\u00e2na seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit\nof the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task\nto explain Nibb\u00e2na in terms of worldly experience, and there\nis no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that\nit is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly\nexperiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive\nor negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not\nexist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to\nthink of a Tath\u00e2gata as existing eternally (_s'\u00e2s'vata_) or not-existing\n(_as'\u00e2s'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as not\nexisting or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any\none who seeks to discuss whether Nibb\u00e2na is either a positive\nand eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation,\ntakes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical.\nIt is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for\nwe want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to\ngive any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as\nillegitimate.\n\nLater Buddhistic writers like N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna and Candrak\u00eertti\ntook advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted\nit as meaning the non-essential character of all existence.\nNothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence\nor non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There\nis no difference between the worldly stage (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_) and Nibb\u00e2na,\nfor as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during\nthe sa@ms\u00e2ra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibb\u00e2na.\n\n\nUpani@sads and Buddhism.\n\nThe Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was \u00e2nanda\n(bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly\npresupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was\nthe self (_att\u00e2_) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that\nthe self(_\u00e2tman_) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we\nare allowed\n\n\n\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]\n\n[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]\n\n110\n\nto make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could\nconceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss,\nbecause it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed\nbeen anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he\nwho carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the\nreason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is\neternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal\nwas sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the\nUpani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that\nwhich is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self\n[Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the\nUpani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads\ndoubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often\nidentify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is\nfound in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a\npermanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence\nwhich was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered\nthat this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined\nas this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (_neti\nneti_) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could\nnowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our\nchanging experiences. All were but changing phenomena and\ntherefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self\nwas not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me\nas my self [Footnote ref 3].\n\nThe true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental\nexperience as it were, for they said that it could not\nbe described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out\nas \"there,\" behind all the changing mental categories. The\nBuddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But\nhow was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken\nof as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the\nBuddha was that what people perceived there when they said\nthat they perceived the self was but the mental experiences\neither individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did\nnot know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise\nmen, and considered himself to be endowed with form (_r\u00fbpa_)\nor found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nik\u00fbya_, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Ch\u00e2ndogya, VIII. 7-12.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45.]\n\n111\n\nexperienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or\nexperienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought\nin the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of\nexperiences that he considered as the perception of the self\n[Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline\nor systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an\nexperience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only\nabiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this\nimmutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge.\nThe first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow.\nIgnorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates,\nignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance\nabout the means of bringing about this extinction represent\nthe fourfold ignorance (_avijj\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidy\u00e2, which\nis equivalent to the P\u00e2li word avijj\u00e2, occurs in the Upani@sads also,\nbut there it means ignorance about the \u00e2tman doctrine, and it is\nsometimes contrasted with vidy\u00e2 or true knowledge about the self\n(_\u00e2tman_) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth\nwas the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was\nnothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence\nwas sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of\nBuddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways\nrepresented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the\nright comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (_\u00e2riya\nsacca_)--sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of\nsorrow, and the means thereto.\n\nThere is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no\nself, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we\nmay ordinarily be led to suppose.\n\nThus it is said in the _Visuddhimagga_ \"inasmuch however\nas ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming\ninto existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty\nof a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,--...or\nin other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and\nsimilarly with reference to Karma and the rest--therefore is it\nto be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with\na twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5].\"\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Samyutta Nik\u00e2ya_, II. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nik\u00e2ya_, I.p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ch\u00e2. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where\nvidy\u00e2 and avidy\u00e2 have been used in a different and rather obscure sense,\nI's'\u00e2 9-11.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nik\u00e2ya_, III. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 5 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.\nXVII.), p. 175.]\n\n112\n\n\nThe Schools of Therav\u00e2da Buddhism.\n\nThere is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the\nBuddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death.\nSerious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst\nthe successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about\nhis doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined\nupon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Ves\u00e2li\ndecided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas,\nthey in their turn held another great meeting (Mah\u00e2sa@ngha) and\ncame to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus\ncame to be called as the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to\nVasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas seceded in\n400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise\nfirst to the three schools Ekavyavah\u00e2rikas, Lokottarav\u00e2dins, and\nKukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rut\u00eeyas. In the course of the\nnext one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the\nPraj\u00f1aptiv\u00e2dins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The\nTherav\u00e2da or the Sthavirav\u00e2da school which had convened the\ncouncil of Ves\u00e2li developed during the second and first century B.C.\ninto a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas,\nMah\u00ees'\u00e2sakas, K\u00e2s'yap\u00eeyas, Sa@nkr\u00e2ntikas (more well known as\nSautr\u00e2ntikas) and the V\u00e2tsiputtr\u00eeyas which latter was again split up\ninto the Dharmottar\u00eeyas, Bhadray\u00e2n\u00eeyas, Sammit\u00eeyas and Chann\u00e2garikas.\nThe main branch of the Therav\u00e2da school was from\nthe second century downwards known as the Hetuv\u00e2dins or\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins [Footnote ref 2]. The _Mah\u00e2bodhiva@msa_ identifies the\nTherav\u00e2da school with the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins. The commentator of the\n_Kath\u00e2vatthu_ who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime\nin the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of\nBuddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little.\nVasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The _Mah\u00e2va@msa_ differs from _D\u00eepava@msa_ in holding that\nthe Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas, but it was\nthe Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded\nindependently of them. The _Mah\u00e2bodhiva@msa_, which according to\nProfessor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.--1000 A.D., follows the\nMahava@msa in holding the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas to be the first seceders\nand Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.\n\nVasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of\nP\u00e2@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ by\nMrs Rhys Davids.]\n\n[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys\nDavids's translation of _Kath\u00e2vatthu_, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]\n\n113\n\ncertain schools, of the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas, Lokottarav\u00e2dins,\nEkavyavah\u00e2rikas, Kakkulikas, Praj\u00f1aptiv\u00e2dins and Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins, but\nthese accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical\nimportance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the\nMah\u00e2sa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with\nmind (_citta_) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the\nPraj\u00f1aptiv\u00e2dins held that there was no agent in man, that there was\nno untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man,\n(3) that the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins believed that everything existed. From\nthe discussions found in the _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ also we may know the\nviews of some of the schools on some points which are not always\ndevoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found\nby which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It\nis quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism\nwere not so many different systems but only differed from one\nanother on some points of dogma or practice which were considered\nas being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now\nappear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their\nliteratures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises.\nThese schools are however not very important for a history of later\nIndian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any\nof the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism\nwith which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct\ncontact, are the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins including the Sautr\u00e2ntikas and\nthe Vaibh\u00e2@sikas, the Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra or the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins and the\nM\u00e2dhyamikas or the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins. We do not know which of the\ndiverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools,\nthe Sautr\u00e2ntika, Vaibh\u00e2@sika, Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra and the M\u00e2dhyamika\nschools. But as these schools were most important in relation\nto the development of the different systems in Hindu thought,\nit is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can\nabout these systems of Buddhistic thought.\n\nWhen the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in\ngeneral terms such as \"the Buddhists say\" without calling them\nthe Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins or the Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ras and the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins,\nthey often refer to the Sarv\u00fbstiv\u00fbdins by which they mean\nboth the Sautr\u00fbntikas and the Vaibh\u00fb@sikas, ignoring the difference\nthat exists between these two schools. It is well to\nmention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the\nHindu writers were acquainted with the Therav\u00fbda doctrines\n\n114\n\nas expressed in the P\u00e2li works. The Vaibh\u00e2@sikas and the Sautr\u00e2ntikas\nhave been more or less associated with each other. Thus\nthe _Abhidharmakos'as'\u00e2stra_ of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibh\u00e2@sika\nwas commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautr\u00e2ntika. The\ndifference between the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas and the Sautr\u00e2ntikas that\nattracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former\nbelieved that external objects were directly perceived, whereas\nthe latter believed that the existence of the external objects could\nonly be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1].\nGu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary\n_Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2 on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ says that the Vaibh\u00e2sika\nwas but another name of the \u00c2ryasammit\u00eeya school. According to\nGu@naratna the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas held that things existed for four moments,\nthe moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of\ndecay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out\nin Vastlbandhu's _Abhidharmakos'a_ that the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas believed\nthese to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination\nwith the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent\nmanifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation\nof Yas'omitra on _Abhidharmakos'a k\u00e2rik\u00e2_, V. 25). The self called\npudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was\nformless and was produced along with its object by the very\nsame conditions (_arthasahabh\u00e2s\u00ee ekasam\u00e2gryadh\u00eenah_). The Sautr\u00e2ntikas\naccording to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but\nonly the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past,\nthe future, annihilation, dependence on cause, \u00e2k\u00e2s'a and pudgala\nare but names (_sa@mj\u00f1\u00e2m\u00e2tram_), mere assertions (_pratij\u00f1\u00e2m\u00e2tram_),\nmere limitations (_samv@rtam\u00e2tram_) and mere phenomena (_vyavah\u00e2ram\u00e2tram_).\nBy pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal\nand all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly\nperceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the\ndiversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all\ncompounded things are momentary (_k@sa@nik\u00e2h sarvasa@msk\u00e2r\u00e2h_).\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: M\u00e2dhav\u00e2c\u00e2rya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II.\n_S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amala\u00f1anda's commentary\n(on _Bh\u00e2mat\u00ee_) _Ved\u00e2ntakalpataru_, p 286. \"_vaibh\u00e2@sikasya b\u00e2hyo'rtha@h\npratyak@sa@h, sautr\u00e2ntikasya j\u00f1\u00e2nagat\u00e2k\u00e2ravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_.\" The\nnature of the inference of the Sautr\u00e2ntikas is shown thus by\nAmal\u00e2nanda (1247-1260 A.D.) \"_ye yasmin satyapi k\u00e2d\u00e2citk\u00e2@h te\ntadatirikt\u00e2pek@s\u00e2@h_\" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain\nunvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other\nthings in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)\n_Ved\u00e2ntakalpataru_, p. 289.]\n\n115\n\nThe atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are\nbeing destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always\nimply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is\nintended to be signified by that word (_any\u00e2poha@h s'abd\u00e2rtha@h_).\nSalvation (_mok@sa_) comes as the result of the destruction of the\nprocess of knowledge through continual meditation that there\nis no soul [Footnote ref 1].\n\nOne of the main differences between the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins, Sautr\u00e2ntikas\nand the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas or the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins appears to\nrefer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest\nwith Buddhist philosophy. Thus _Abhidharmakos'a_ (v. 24...)\ndescribes the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins as those who maintain the universal\nexistence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjav\u00e2dins\nare those \"who maintain that the present elements and\nthose among the past that have not yet produced their fruition,\nare existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and\nof those among the past that have already produced fruition.\"\nThere were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatr\u00e2ta,\nGho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatr\u00e2ta maintained\nthat when an element enters different times, its existence\nchanges but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd\nor a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes\nthough the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that \"when\nan element appears at different times, the past one retains its\npast aspects without being severed from its future and present\naspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without\ncompletely losing its past and future aspects,\" just as a man in\npassionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love\nother women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra\nheld that an entity is called present, past and future according\nas it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having\nonce produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva\nmaintained the view that just as the same woman may\nbe called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be\ncalled present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the\npreceding or the succeeding moment.\n\nAll these schools are in some sense Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins, for they\nmaintain universal existence. But the Vaibh\u00e2@sika finds them all\ndefective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatr\u00e2ta's\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_, pp. 46-47.]\n\n116\n\nview is only a veiled S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is\na confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence\nof all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and\nthat of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would\nsuppose that all the three times were found together and included\nin one of them. The Vaibh\u00e2@sika finds himself in agreement\nwith Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time\ndepends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the\ntime when an entity does not actually produce its function it is\nfuture; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having\nproduced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence\nof the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks\nthat if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could\nnot have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in\npast times could not have produced its effects in the present\ntime. The Sautr\u00e2ntika however thought that the Vaibh\u00e2@sika's\ndoctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence,\nfor according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference\nappeared in it. The true view according to him was,\nthat there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity,\nthe entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared\nfrom non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to\nexist. He objected to the Vaibh\u00e2@sika view that the past is to\nbe regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing\nabout the present on the ground that in that case there should\nbe no difference between the past and the present, since both\nexerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present\nand future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we\nshould have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We\ncan know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent\nones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply\nthat the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is\nmade between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why\nefficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another\nwould be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference\nbetween efficiency and the entity, you at once find that\nthere is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the\nmoment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing\nof the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the\nsame way in which we knew it when it was present. We are\n\n117\n\nnever attracted to past passions as the Vaibh\u00e2@sika suggests, but\npast passions leave residues which become the causes of new\npassions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].\n\nAgain we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of\nthe V\u00e2tsiputtr\u00eeyas and the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins as represented by\nVasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of\nthe existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument of\nVasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though\nit is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining\ncause of perception, no such cause can be found which\nmay render the inference of the existence of soul necessary.\nIf soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and\nmust be something different from the elements or entities of a\npersonal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging\nbeing would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_)\nwhich alone determines or proves existence. The\nsoul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a\nmere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are\nonly the elements of a personal life. But the V\u00e2tsiputtr\u00eeya\nschool held that just as fire could not be said to be either the\nsame as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is\nseparate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which has\na separate existence, though we could not say that it was\naltogether different from the elements of a personal life or the\nsame as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements\nof personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence\ncannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must\nbe an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise\nan action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist.\nTo this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a\nperson) does not represent an unity. \"It is only an unbroken\ncontinuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which\nsimple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the\nname Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned,\nand is based on an analogy with their own experience,\nbut their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving\nfrom one place to another. This movement, though regarded as\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished\ntranslation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by\nmy esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful\nto him that he allowed me to utilize it.]\n\n118\n\nbelonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions\nin different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,'\n'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions\nin new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta\ncognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place\nin the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments,\nthese former moments coming in close succession being called\nDevadatta).\"\n\nThe problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty,\nfor the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces\nits recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of\nthe remembered object under certain conditions of attention,\netc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or\nviolent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of\nmemory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind\nand nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying\nthat he was such and such in such and such a life, he only\nmeant that his past and his present belonged to one and the\nsame lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say\n\"this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this\nobject,\" we know that the fire is not identical at any two\nmoments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is\nthe same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be\nknown by descriptions such as \"this venerable man, having this\nname, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating\nsuch food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such\nan age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away\nhaving reached an age.\" Only so much description can be\nunderstood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the\nindividual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of\nsensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the\nformer moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual\nis thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere\nthing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be\ngrasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect.\nThis becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other\nfields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we\nsometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but\nwhat really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc.,\nfictitiously unified as milk; and \"just as milk and water are\n\n119\n\nconventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some\ncolour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation\n'individual' but a common name for the different elements\nof which it is composed.\"\n\nThe reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question\nwhether the \"living being is identical with the body or not\" is\njust because there did not exist any living being as \"individual,\"\nas is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living\nbeing did not exist, because in that case the questioner would\nhave thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was\nalso denied. In truth the \"living being\" is only a conventional\nname for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe only book of the Sammit\u00eeyas known to us and that by\nname only is the _Sammit\u00eeyas'\u00e2stra_ translated into Chinese between\n350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however\nprobably lost [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe Vaibh\u00e2@sikas are identified with the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins who\naccording to _D\u00eepava@msa_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu,\nbranched off from the Mah\u00ees'\u00e2sakas, who in their turn had\nseparated from the Therav\u00e2da school.\n\nFrom the _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins\nbelieved that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment\nwas not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual\nprocess, (3) that consciousness or even sam\u00e2dhi was nothing but\n\n________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of\n_A@s@tamakos'asth\u00e2nanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendix\nto the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky,\n_Bulletin de l' Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vall\u00e9e Poussin has collected some of the\npoints of this doctrine in an article on the Sammit\u00eeyas in the _E. R.E._\nHe there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avy\u00e2khy\u00e2_ the Sammit\u00eeyas have\nbeen identified with the V\u00e2ts\u00eeputtr\u00eeyas and that many of its texts were\nadmitted by the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as\nfollows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirv\u00e2na can fall away; (2) there is\nan intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antar\u00e2bhava_; (3)\nmerit accrues not only by gift (_tyag\u00e2nvaya_) but also by the fact of the\nactual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given\n(_paribhog\u00e2nvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a\ndeclaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5)\nthey believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from\nwhich it can be said to be either different or non-different. \"The pudgala\ncannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it\ntransmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden;\nit cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory\nconstituents.\" This pudgala doctrine of the Sammit\u00eeyas as sketched by\nProfessor De la Vall\u00e9e Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala\ndoctrine of the Sammit\u00eeyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have\nnoticed above.]\n\n120\n\na flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1].\nThe Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins or Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins have a vast Abhidharma literature\nstill existing in Chinese translations which is different from the\nAbhidharma of the Therav\u00e2da school which we have already mentioned\n[Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _J\u00f1\u00e2naprasth\u00e2na S'\u00e2stra_ of\nK\u00e2ty\u00e2yan\u00eeputtra which passed by the name of _Mah\u00e2 Vibh\u00e2@s\u00e2_ from which\nthe Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins who followed it are called Vaibh\u00e2@sikas [Footnote ref\n3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa.\n2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'\u00e2riputtra. 3. _Dh\u00e2tuk\u00e2ya_ by P\u00fbr@na.\n4. _Praj\u00f1aptis'\u00e2stra_ by Maudgaly\u00e2yana. 5. _Vij\u00f1\u00e2nak\u00e2ya_ by Devak@sema.\n6. _Sa@ng\u00eetiparyy\u00e2ya_ by S\u00e2riputtra and _Prakara@nap\u00e2da_ by Vasumitra.\nVasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibh\u00e2@sika [Footnote\nref 4] system in verses (_k\u00e2rik\u00e2_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_,\nto which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name\n_Abhidharma Kos'abh\u00e2@sya_ in which he pointed out some of the defects\nof the Vaibh\u00e2@sika school from the Sautr\u00e2ntika point of view [Footnote\nref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and\nlater on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautr\u00e2ntika and called his\nwork _Abhidharmakos'a vy\u00e2khy\u00e2_; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu\nwrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Ny\u00e2y\u00e2nus\u00e2ra_ (Chinese translations of which\nare available) on strict Vaibh\u00e2@sika lines. We hear also of other\nVaibh\u00e2@sika writers such as Dharmatr\u00e2ta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and\nBhadanta, the writer of _Sa@myukt\u00e2bhidharmas'\u00e2stra_ and _Mah\u00e2vibh\u00e2@s\u00e2_.\nDi@nn\u00e2ga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibh\u00e2@sika\nor a Sautr\u00e2ntika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu,\nwrote his famous work _Pram\u00e2@nasamuccaya_ in which he\nestablished Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana\nthe celebrated commentator of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_; but we regret\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kath\u00e2vatthu_, p. xix,\nand Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Mah\u00e2vyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da, viz.\nM\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da and \u00c2ryyasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks\nof \u00c2ryyam\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da and M\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da. In his time he found\nit prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu\nsays (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Param\u00e2rtha, in his life of Vasubandhu,\nsays that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra,\nwho studied it there.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that K\u00e2ty\u00e2yan\u00eeputtra's work\nwas probably a compilation from other Vibh\u00e2@s\u00e2s which existed before the\nChinese translations and Vibh\u00e2@s\u00e2 texts dated 383 A.D.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]\n\n[Footnote 5: The Sautr\u00e2ntikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the\nVaibh\u00e2@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines\nas given in the Suttapi@taka.]\n\n121\n\nto say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit,\nnor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into\nany of the modern European or Indian languages.\n\nThe Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at\nCalcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins\nfrom the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mah\u00e2vibh\u00e2@s\u00e2s'\u00e2stra_,\netc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch,\nwhich is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.\n\nThe Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins admitted the five skandhas, twelve\n\u00e2yatanas, eighteen dh\u00e2tus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of\npratisa@mkhy\u00e2nirodha apratisa@mkhy\u00e2nirodha and \u00e2k\u00e2s'a, and the\nsa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of r\u00fbpa\n(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)\n[Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together\n(sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the\nr\u00fbpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite\nthings or collocations--_sambh\u00fbyak\u00e2ri_). The r\u00fbpa dharmas are\neleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14\ncittaviprayukta sa@msk\u00e2ra dharmas (non-mental composite things);\nadding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five\ndharmas. R\u00fbpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the\nsense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or\ncollocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell,\ntaste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum\nis known as param\u00e2@nu, which is the minutest form of r\u00fbpa. It\ncannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is\nindivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible.\nBut yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary\nflash into being. The simple atoms are called _dravyaparam\u00e2@nu_\nand the compound ones _sa@mgh\u00e2taparam\u00e2@nu_. In the words of\nProf. Stcherbatsky \"the universal elements of matter are manifested\nin their actions or functions. They are consequently more\nenergies than substances.\" The organs of sense are also regarded\nas modifications of atomic matter. Seven such param\u00e2@nus combine\ntogether to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form\nonly that they become perceptible. The combination takes\nplace in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta\nUniversity.]\n\n[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins in his bh\u00e2@sya on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ II. 2 notices some\nof the categories mentioned by Sogen.]\n\n122\n\nothers around it. The point which must be remembered in connection\nwith the conception of matter is this, that the qualities\nof all the mah\u00e2bh\u00fbtas are inherent in the param\u00e2@nus. The special\ncharacteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth),\nviscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging\nto fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to\nform each of the elements; the difference between the different\nelements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special\ncharacteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics\nthough present remained only in a potential form. The\nmutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of\nearth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of\nthings is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth.\nThe four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely,\n(1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as\nactivity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as _dh@rti_ or\nattraction, _sa@mgraha_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and\n_vy\u00fbhana_ or clustering and collecting). These combine together\nnaturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction\nbetween the Vaibh\u00e2@sika Sarv\u00e2stivadins and other forms of Buddhism\nis this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded\nas permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary\nonly in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly,\nowing to their constant change of combination. Avidy\u00e2 is not\nregarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of\nprat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual,\nbut is rather identical with \"moha\" or delusion and\nrepresents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidy\u00e2,\nwhich through sa@msk\u00e2ra, etc., produces n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa in the case of\na particular individual, is not his avidy\u00e2 in the present existence\nbut the avidy\u00e2 of his past existence bearing fruit in the present\nlife.\n\n\"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when\nit becomes an effect, having changed its state.\" For example,\nclay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the\nname clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in\nthe case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kum\u00e2raj\u00eeva's Chinese version of\n\u00c2ryyadeva's commentary on the _M\u00e2dhyamika s'\u00e2stra_ (chapter XX. K\u00e2rik\u00e2 9).]\n\n123\n\nthe interaction of mental and material things. The substratum\nof \"vij\u00f1\u00e2na\" or \"consciousness\" is regarded as permanent and\nthe aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver.\nIt must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a\npermanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a\nsubstratum formed of them.\n\nThe sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow,\nred, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of\nappearance (_sa@msth\u00e2na_) of long, short, round, square, high, low,\nstraight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_k\u00e2yendriya_) has for\nits object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness,\nroughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These\nqualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by\nthe objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted\nunder it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch\nwhich excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of\nwind becomes active in our body and predominates over other\nenergies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which\nexcites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire\nbecomes active and predominates over the other energies. The\nindriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse\nthought (_vij\u00f1\u00e2na_); each of the five senses is an agent without\nwhich none of the five vij\u00f1\u00e2nas would become capable of perceiving\nan external object. The essence of the senses is entirely\nmaterial. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal\nsense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal\nsenses consists of a combination of param\u00e2@nus, which are extremely\npure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is\nthe flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from\none another with respect to the manner and form of their respective\natomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is\nperformed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed\non our person which is designated as avij\u00f1apti r\u00fbpa. It is called\nr\u00fbpa because it is a result or effect of r\u00fbpa-contact; it is called\navij\u00f1apti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy\nis bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is\nthe only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma\ndone by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered\nas twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that as\nactivity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.\n\n124\n\nthat due to body-motion (_k\u00e2yika karma_) and speech (_v\u00e2cika\nkarma_). Both these may again be latent (_avij\u00f1apti_) and patent\n(_vij\u00f1apti_), giving us the k\u00e2yika-vijn\u00f1pti karma, k\u00e2yik\u00e2vij\u00f1apti\nkarma, v\u00e2cika-vij\u00f1apti karma and v\u00e2cik\u00e2vij\u00f1apti karma. Avij\u00f1apti\nr\u00fbpa and avij\u00f1apti karma are what we should call in modern\nphraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding\nto each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity\nthere is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself\nin future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but\nare similar to those which are known, they are called avij\u00f1apti.\n\nThe mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it\nwills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vij\u00f1\u00e2na\nbecause it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be\nof three kinds: (1) svabh\u00e2va nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination),\n(2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present,\npast and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination\nreferring only to the past). The senses only possess the\n_svabh\u00e2va nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovij\u00f1\u00e2na.\nEach of the vij\u00f1\u00e2nas as associated with its specific sense discriminates\nits particular object and perceives its general characteristics;\nthe six vij\u00f1\u00e2nas combine to form what is known as the\nVij\u00f1\u00e2naskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). There\nare forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta\ndharmas \u00e2k\u00e2s'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction,\nestablishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance\n(_n\u00eer\u00fbp\u00e2khya_, non-r\u00fbpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhy\u00e2\nnirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused\nby the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my\nattention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because\nthey are non-existent but because the conditions which would\nhave made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta\ndharma, pratisa@mkhy\u00e2 nirodha, is the final deliverance from\nbondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These\nare called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation\nthey are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution.\nThe eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right\nviews, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood,\nright effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist H\u00eenay\u00e2na\nthinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as\nSatyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as\nthose preached by N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit\nand I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]\n\n125\n\n\nMah\u00e2y\u00e2nism.\n\nIt is difficult to say precisely at what time Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nism took\nits rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mah\u00e2sa@nghikas\nseparated themselves from the Therav\u00e2dins probably some time in\n400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those\nelements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be\nlabelled as Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na were gradually on the way to taking their\nfirst inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works\nwhich are regarded as various Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras, some of which\nare probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others\nas late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtras, also\ncalled the Vaipulyas\u00fbtras, are generally all in the form of instructions\ngiven by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or\ncompilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and\nwere probably written by those who seceded from the Therav\u00e2da\nschool.\n\nThe word H\u00eenay\u00e2na refers to the schools of Therav\u00e2da, and\nas such it is contrasted with Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. The words are generally\ntranslated as small vehicle (_h\u00eena_ = small, _y\u00e2na_ = vehicle) and great\nvehicle (_mah\u00e2_ = great, _y\u00e2na_ = vehicle). But this translation by\nno means expresses what is meant by Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na and H\u00eenay\u00e2na\n[Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtr\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_ gives\n\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these s\u00fbtras are found in\nCandrak\u00eertti's commentary on the _M\u00e2dhyam\u00eeka k\u00e2rik\u00e2s_ of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna; some of\nthese are the following: _A@s@tas\u00e2hasrik\u00e2praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_ (translated into\nChinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atas\u00e2hasrik\u00e2praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2, Gaganaga\u00f1ja,\nSam\u00e2dhis\u00fbtra, Tath\u00e2gataguhyas\u00fbtra, D@r@dh\u00e2dhy\u00e2s'ayasa\u00f1codan\u00e2s\u00fbtra,\nDhy\u00e2yitamu@s@tis\u00fbtra, Pit\u00e2putrasam\u00e2gamas\u00fbtra, Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtra,\nM\u00e2radamanas\u00fbtra, Ratnak\u00fb@tas\u00fbtra, Ratnac\u00fb@d\u00e2parip@rcch\u00e2s\u00fbtra,\nRatnameghas\u00fbtra, Ratnar\u00e2s`is\u00fbtra, Ratn\u00e2karas\u00fbtra,\nR\u00e2@s@trap\u00e2laparip@rcch\u00e2s\u00fbtra, La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra, Lalitavistaras\u00fbtra,\nVajracchedik\u00e2s\u00fbtra, Vimalak\u00eerttinirdes'as\u00fbtra, S'\u00e2listambhas\u00fbtra,\nSam\u00e2dhirajasutra, Sukh\u00e2vat\u00eevy\u00fbha, Suvar@naprabh\u00e2sas\u00fbtra,\nSaddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),\nAmit\u00e2yurdhy\u00e2nas\u00fbtra, Hastik\u00e2khyas\u00fbtra, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The word Y\u00e2na is generally translated as vehicle, but a\nconsideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to\nsuggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle\n(_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_, pp. 24, 319;\n_Sam\u00e2dhir\u00e2jas\u00fbtra_, p. 1; _Karu@n\u00e2pu@ndar\u00eeka_, p. 67; _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_,\npp. 68, 108, 132). The word Y\u00e2na is as old as the Upani@sads where we read\nof Devay\u00e2na and Pit@ry\u00e2na. There is no reason why this word should be\ntaken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ of S'r\u00e2vakay\u00e2na\n(career of the S'r\u00e2vakas or the Therav\u00e2din Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhay\u00e2na\n(the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha\ny\u00e2na (career of the Buddhas), Ekay\u00e2na (one career), Devay\u00e2na (career of\nthe gods), Brahmay\u00e2na (career of becoming a Brahm\u00e2), Tath\u00e2gatay\u00e2na\n(career of a Tath\u00e2gata). In one place _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ says that ordinarily\ndistinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career,\nbut these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_, p. 68).]\n\n126\n\nus the reason why one school was called H\u00eenay\u00e2na whereas the\nother, which he professed, was called Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. He says that,\nconsidered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion,\nthe instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the H\u00eenay\u00e2na\noccupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mah\u00e2\n(great) Y\u00e2na, and hence it is branded as H\u00eena (small, or low).\nThis brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction\nbetween H\u00eenay\u00e2na and Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. The ultimate good of an\nadherent of the H\u00eenay\u00e2na is to attain his own nirv\u00e2@na or salvation,\nwhereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na\ncreed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the\nsalvation of all beings. So the H\u00eenay\u00e2na goal was lower, and in\nconsequence of that the instructions that its followers received,\nthe attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were\nnarrower than that of the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na adherents. A H\u00eenay\u00e2na man\nhad only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this\ncould be done in three lives, whereas a Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na adherent was\nprepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain\nsalvation. So the H\u00eenayana adherents required only a short period\nof work and may from that point of view also be called _h\u00eena,_ or\nlower.\n\nThis point, though important from the point of view of the\ndifference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point\nof view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nists\nwhich distinguishes them from the H\u00eenay\u00e2nists from the\nphilosophical point of view. The Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nists believed that all\nthings were of a non-essential and indefinable character and\nvoid at bottom, whereas the H\u00eenay\u00e2nists only believed in the\nimpermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than\nthat.\n\nIt is sometimes erroneously thought that N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna first\npreached the doctrine of S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da (essencelessness or voidness\nof all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras\neither definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we\ntake some of those s\u00fbtras which were in all probability earlier than\nN\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna, we find that the doctrine which N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna expounded\n\n127\n\nwith all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted\nas an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subh\u00fbti saying to\nthe Buddha that vedan\u00e2 (feeling), samj\u00f1\u00e2 (concepts) and the\nsa@msk\u00e2ras (conformations) are all m\u00e2y\u00e2 (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All\nthe skandhas, dh\u00e4tus (elements) and \u00e2yatanas are void and absolute\ncessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void\nis not different from the skandhas, dh\u00e2tus and \u00e2yatanas, and this\nabsolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge\n(_praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in\nreality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal\n(_s'\u00e2s'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'\u00e2s'vata_) but pure void. It should\nbe the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the \"thatness\"\n(_tathat\u00e2_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_)\nhas to establish himself in all the virtues (_p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_), benevolence\n(_d\u00e2nap\u00e2ramit\u00e2_), the virtue of character (_s'\u00eelap\u00e2ramit\u00e2_), the virtue\nof forbearance (_k@s\u00e2ntip\u00e2ramit\u00e2_), the virtue of tenacity and strength\n(_v\u00eeryyap\u00e2ramit\u00e2_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhy\u00e2nap\u00e2ramit\u00e2_).\nThe saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he will\nhelp an infinite number of souls to attain nirv\u00e2@na. In reality,\nhowever, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation;\nand the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid\nof this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for\nall illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage.\nThe saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his\nwork on the strength of his p\u00e2ramit\u00e2s, though in reality there\nis no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who\nis to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true praj\u00f1ap\u00e2ramit\u00e2 is\nthe absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@h\nsarvadharm\u00e2@n\u00e2m sa praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2 ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4].\n\nThe Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that\nof S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da or the M\u00e2dhyamika doctrine and Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da.\nThe difference between S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da and Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da (the theory\nthat there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)\nis not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them\nagree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything\nis only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But\nwhile the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins were more busy in showing this\nindefinableness of all phenomena, the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins, tacitly accepting\n\n_______________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _A@s@tes\u00e2hasiih\u00e2praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramita_, p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]\n\n128\n\nthe truth preached by the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins, interested themselves in\nexplaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of\nbeginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_v\u00e2san\u00e2_).\n\nAs'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher\nof a new type of idealism (_vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da_) known as the Tathat\u00e2\nphilosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in\nAs'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotp\u00e2das'\u00e2stra_ as being made from\n_La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, we should think of the _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_ as\nbeing one of the early works of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins [Footnote ref 1].\nThe greatest later writer of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da school was Asa@nga\n(400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abh\u00fbmi s\u00fbtra,\nMah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtra, Upades'a, Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nasamparigraha s'\u00e2stra, Yog\u00e2c\u00e2rabh\u00fbmi\ns'\u00e2stra_ and _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtr\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_. None of these works excepting the\nlast one is available to readers who have no access to the\nChinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are\nin all probability lost. The Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da school is known to\nHindu writers by another name also, viz. Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra, and it does\nnot seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yog\u00e2c\u00e2rabh\u00fbmi\ns'\u00e2stra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu,\na younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Param\u00e2rtha (499-569) tells\nus, at first a liberal Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din, but was converted to Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da,\nlate in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who\nwrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins,\n_Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\n[Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of\nMah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirv\u00e2@na, Saddharmapu@n@dar\u00eeka,\nPraj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2, Vimalak\u00eertti_ and _S'r\u00eem\u00e2l\u00e2si@mhan\u00e2da_, and\ncompiled some Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras, such as _Vij\u00f1\u00e2nam\u00e2trasiddhi,\nRatnatraya_, etc. The school of Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da continued for at\nleast a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in\npossession of any work of great fame of this school after him.\n\nWe have already noticed that the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da formed the fundamental\nprinciple of all schools of Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. The most powerful\nexponent of this doctrine was N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account\nof whose system will be given in its proper place. N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2s (verses) were commented upon by \u00c2ryyadeva, a disciple\nof his, Kum\u00e2raj\u00eeva (383 A.D.). Buddhap\u00e2lita and Candrak\u00eertti\n(550 A.D.). \u00c2ryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fbshana thinks that _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2na_ belongs to\nabout 300 A.D.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Takakusu's \"A study of the Param\u00e2rtha's life of Vasubandhu,\"\n_J.R.A.S_. 1905.]\n\n129\n\nleast three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastab\u00e2laprakara@nav@rtti_\nand _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called\n_Hastab\u00e2laprakara@nav@rtti_ \u00c2ryyadeva says that whatever depends\nfor its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory;\nall our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions\nand notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded\nas mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent\non others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man\nshould feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal\nappearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he says\nthat just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection\nof a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself\ncolourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination\n(_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touch\nof imagination (_kalpan\u00e2_) in it is the pure reality.\n\nIt does not seem however that the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins could produce\nany great writers after Candrak\u00eertti. References to S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da\nshow that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers\nuntil the time of the great M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 authority Kum\u00e2rila who\nflourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins\nwere no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.\n\n\nThe Tathata\u00e2 Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].\n\nAs'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya\nwho spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of\nIndia and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably\nconverted to Buddhism by P\u00e2r@sva who was an important\nperson in the third Buddhist Council promoted,\naccording to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere\nand according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: \u00c2ryyadeva's _Hastab\u00e2laprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by\nDr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_\nwere published by Mah\u00e2mahop\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya Harapras\u00e2da s'\u00e2str\u00ee in the Bengal\nAsiatic Society's journal, 1898.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an\nEnglish translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of\n_S'raddhotp\u00e2das`\u00e2stra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which\nappears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence\nto show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]\n\n[Footnote 3: T\u00e2ran\u00e2tha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple\nof N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner,\npp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote\nthe _Buddhacaritak\u00e2vya_, of great poetical excellence, and the\n_Mah\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ras'\u00e2stra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical\ninstrument called R\u00e2stavara that he might by that means convert the\npeople of the city. \"Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious,\ninducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-\u00e2tmanness\nof life.\" Suzuki, p. 35.]\n\n130\n\n\nHe held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished\n--the aspect as thatness (_bh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2_) and the aspect as the cycle\nof birth and death (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_). The soul as bh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2 means\nthe oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadh\u00e2tu_). Its essential\nnature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account\nof the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious\nmemory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_)\nappear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could\novercome this sm@rti \"the signs of individuation would disappear and\nthere would be no trace of a world of objects.\" \"All things in their\nfundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot\nbe adequately expressed in any form of language. They\npossess absolute sameness (_samat\u00e2_). They are subject neither to\ntransformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul\"\n--thatness (_bh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2_). This \"thatness\" has no attribute and\nit can only be somehow pointed out in speech as \"thatness.\"\nAs soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is\nspoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor\nthat which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor\nthat which is thought of, \"this is the stage of thatness.\" This\nbh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2 is neither that which is existence, nor that which is\nnon-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence,\nnor that which is not at once existence and non-existence;\nit is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is\nat once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity\nand plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is\nbeyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept\nin the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended\nby any kind of particularization or distinction. It is\nonly by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of\nthe comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that\nwe can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the\nparticularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call\nit negation, \"s'\u00fbnyat\u00e2,\" in this sense. The truth is that which\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate \"_sm@rti_\" in the sense of v\u00e2san\u00e2\nin preference to Suzuki's \"confused subjectivity\" because sm@rti in the\nsense of v\u00e2san\u00e2 is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works\nas _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_. The word \"subjectivity\" seems to be too European a\nterm to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]\n\n131\n\nsubjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_) is\nalso void (_s'\u00fbnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negated\nnor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure\nsoul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and\ncompletely holds all things within it. On that account it may be\ncalled affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it,\nbecause it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory\n(_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the\ntruth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.\n\n\"The soul as birth and death (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_) comes forth from\nthe Tath\u00e2gata womb (_tath\u00e2gatagarbha_), the ultimate reality.\nBut the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other.\nThough they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus\nwhen the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation\nit is called the all-conserving mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_).\nIt embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment.\nEnlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is\nfree from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient\nmemory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all\n(_dharmadh\u00e2tu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmak\u00e2ya of all\nTath\u00e2gatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.\n\n\"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental\ntruth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any\nreal origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary\ncreation of the perceivers under the influence of the\ndelusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be\nlacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) prevails\nthere from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of\nsm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which\nthey have never been emancipated. But when they are divested\nof this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation,\nviz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have\nany reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation\nwith the one soul, for they are not self-existent.\n\n\"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted\nphenomenal experience as praj\u00f1\u00e2 (wisdom) and karma\n(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand\nthat when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma,\ndisciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and\naccomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the _\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_)\n\n132\n\nwhich implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down\nand the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and\nthe pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmak\u00e2ya will manifest\nitself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are\nmere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is\nidentical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore\nignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense\nit is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the\nwater and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here\nthe water can be said to be both identical and non-identical\nwith the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the\nwater remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of\nthe waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise\nwhen the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and\nclean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_), the waves\nof mentality (_vij\u00f1\u00e2na_) make their appearance. These three (i.e.\nthe mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence,\nand they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is\nannihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the\nessence of the wisdom remains unmolested.\" The truth or the\nenlightenment \"is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity\nor by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in\nthe phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they\nneither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear\nnor are destroyed.\" It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both\naffectional (_kles'\u00e2vara@na_) and intellectual (_j\u00f1ey\u00e2vara@na_), as well\nas from the mind (i.e. _\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) which implicates itself with\nbirth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal,\ncalm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms\nand unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form\nof a tath\u00e2gata or in some other forms, in order that all beings\nmay be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.\n\n\"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its\nrelation with enlightenment _a priori_.\" But enlightenment _a priori_\nis spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as\nnon-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses\nits significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation\nas enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations\nof non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance\nof the mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_), by the avidy\u00e2karma (ignorant\n\n133\n\naction), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of an\nego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world\nwhich does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned\nby the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena\narise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation);\nbeing affected by the external world the mind becomes\nconscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.\nThe second phenomenon is succession. Following upon\nintelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well\nas disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states.\nThe third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and\nsuccession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there\narises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment\nto names or ideas (_sa@mj\u00f1\u00e2_), etc. By clinging the mind\nhypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things.\nThe fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). On\naccount of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations\nof deeds, productive of individuality. \"The sixth phenomenon\nis the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering\narises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of\nits freedom.\" All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through\navidy\u00e2.\n\nThe relation between this truth and avidy\u00e2 is in one sense\na mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds\nof pottery which though different are all made of the same clay\n[Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (_an\u00e2srava_) and ignorance\n(_avidy\u00e2_) and their various transient forms all come from one and the\nsame entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all\neternity abiding in Nirv\u00e2@na.\n\nIt is by the touch of ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) that this truth assumes\nall the phenomenal forms of existence.\n\nIn the all-conserving mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) ignorance manifests\nitself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that\nwhich represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and\nthat which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (_manas_).\nFive different names are given to the ego (according to its different\nmodes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness\n(_karmavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) in the sense that through the agency of\nignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare Ch\u00e2ndogya, VI. 1. 4.]\n\n134\n\nawakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (_prav@rttiivij\u00f1\u00e2na_)\nin the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there\nevolves that which sees an external world. The third name is\nrepresentation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (_manas_}\nrepresents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror\nreflects the images of all description, it is even so with the\nrepresentation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance,\nwith the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously\nand without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness,\nin the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled\nas well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the\nsense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness\nof attention (_manask\u00e2ra_) it (_manas_) retains all experiences and\nnever loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well\nas evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution,\npainful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present\nor in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously\nrecollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things\nto come. Therefore the three domains (_k\u00e2maloka_, domain of\nfeeling--_r\u00fbpaloka_, domain of bodily existence--_ar\u00fbpaloka_, domain\nof incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the\nmind (i.e. _\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_ which is practically identical with\n_bh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2_). Since all things, owing the principle of their\nexistence to the mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_), are produced by sm@rti,\nall the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations\nof the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from\nall attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion\nthat all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized\nand established only through ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) and memory\n(_sm@rti_), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They\narise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When\nthe mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but\nwhen the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.\nBy ego-consciousness (_manovij\u00f1\u00e2na_) we mean the ignorant mind\nwhich by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of\nI and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of\nsense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness,\nbecause it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the\nprejudices (_\u00e2srava_), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing\nin the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes\n\n135\n\noblivious of the principle of sameness (_samat\u00e2_) that underlies all\nthings which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no\nsign of becoming.\n\nNon-enlightenment is the _raison d'\u00e9tre_ of sams\u00e2ra. When\nthis is annihilated the conditions--the external world--are also\nannihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also\nannihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation\nof the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled\nsea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing\nthe waves have been annihilated.\n\nIn describing the relation of the interaction of avidy\u00e2 (ignorance),\nkarmavij\u00f1\u00e2na (activity-consciousness--the subjective mind),\nvi@saya (external world--represented by the senses) and the tathat\u00e2\n(suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of\nthese elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, \"By perfuming we mean\nthat while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no\nodour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet\nacquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance\nwith which they are perfumed. Suchness (_tathat\u00e2_) is likewise\na pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming\npower of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to\ndo with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the\nwork of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.\nDetermined by suchness ignorance becomes the _raison d'\u00e9tre_ of\nall forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness\nand produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance.\nOn account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood.\nOn account of its being misunderstood an external world\nof subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming\npower of memory, various modes of individuation are produced.\nAnd by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer\nas the result miseries mentally as well as bodily.\" Again \"suchness\nperfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming\nthe individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of\nbirth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirv\u00e2na. This\nlonging and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn\nperfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we\nare enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves\nof suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and\nwe also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing\n\n136\n\nbut the illusory manifestations of the mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) and\nhave no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand\nthe truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform\nthose actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We\nshould neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By\nvirtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable\n\u00e2sa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As\nignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) is no longer\ndisturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no\nlonger disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world\nis annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition\nof defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all\nannihilated, it is said that we attain Nirv\u00e2@na and that various\nspontaneous displays of activity are accomplished.\" The Nirv\u00e2@na\nof the tathat\u00e2 philosophy is not nothingness, but tathat\u00e2 (suchness\nor thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance\nwhich produces all the diversity of experience.\n\nTo the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession\nof suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it\nthat there are some who do not believe in it, while others do,\nAs'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in\npossession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle\nof individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such\nmanifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and\nhence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle\nin one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love\n(_maitr\u00ee_) and compassion (_karu@n\u00e2_) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas,\nis caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe\nin nirv\u00e2@na, to cultivate the root of merit (_kus'alam\u00fbla_), to habituate\noneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence\nof this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving\ninstructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced\nto practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and\nenter into Nirv\u00e2@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming\npower in them that they may be affected by the good wishes\nof the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path\nof virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas\nand sometimes seeing them, \"all beings thereby acquire (spiritual)\nbenefits (_hitat\u00e2_)\" and \"entering into the sam\u00e2dhi of purity, they\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]\n\n137\n\ndestroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating\ninsight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness\n(_samat\u00e2_) of the universe (_sarvaloka_) and to see innumerable Buddhas\nand Bodhisattvas.\"\n\nThere is a difference between the perfuming which is not in\nunison with suchness, as in the case of s'r\u00e2vakas (therav\u00e2din\nmonks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only\ncontinue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state\nof non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness.\nBut those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with\nsuchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow\nthemselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma.\nThe incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from\nall eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one\nat once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma\n(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption.\nFor this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great\nwisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadh\u00e2tu (universe),\nthe true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its\nown nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the\npure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called\nthe tath\u00e2gatagarbha or the dharmak\u00e2ya. It may be objected that\nsince thatness or suchness has been described as being without\ncharacteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing\nall merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits,\nit is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all\nobjects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being\nof one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization\nor of dualistic character. \"Though all things in their\n(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are\nfree from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment\nthere originates a subjective mind (_\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na_) that becomes\nconscious of an external world.\" This is called ignorance or\navidy\u00e2. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly\npure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign\nto suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is\ncalled universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to\nillumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever,\nthough the stage of the perfuming of avidy\u00e2 comes to an end with\nthe Buddhas when they attain to nirv\u00e2@na. All Buddhas while at\n\n138\n\nthe stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (_mah\u00e2karu@n\u00e2_) for all\nbeings, practise all virtues (_p\u00e2ramit\u00e2s_) and many other meritorious\ndeeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a\nuniversal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless\nnumbers of _kalpas_, recognize truthfully and adequately the\nprinciple of equality (_samat\u00e2_)among people; and do not cling\nto the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is\nmeant by the activity of tathat\u00e2. The main idea of this tathat\u00e2\nphilosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent \"thatness\" is\nat once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidy\u00e2 veils\nit or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the\npure thatness also perfumes the avidy\u00e2 there is a striving for the\ngood as well. As the stage of avidy\u00e2 is passed its luminous\ncharacter shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only\nillusorily appeared as the many of the world.\n\nThis doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view\nof an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than\nthat of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_. Considering the\nfact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early\nlife, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in\nthis interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably\nwith the Ved\u00e2nta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_\nadmitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas\n(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self\n(_\u00e2tman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality\nas the ultimate truth. N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's M\u00e2dhyamika doctrines which\neclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more\nfaithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\ncreed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe M\u00e2dhyamika or the S'\u00fbntav\u00e2da school.--Nihilism.\n\nCandrak\u00eertti, the commentator of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's verses known as\n\"_M\u00e2dhyamika k\u00e2rik\u00e2_,\" in explaining the doctrine of dependent\norigination (_prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da_) as described by N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna starts\nwith two interpretations of the word. According to one the word\nprat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da means the origination (_utp\u00e2da_) of the nonexistent\n(_abh\u00e2va_) depending on (_prat\u00eetya_) reasons and causes\n\n________________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of\nAs'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotp\u00e2da S'\u00e2stra_, I had to depend entirely on\nSuzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]\n\n139\n\n(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation prat\u00eetya\nmeans each and every destructible individual and prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da\nmeans the origination of each and every destructible individual.\nBut he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does\nnot suit the context in which the P\u00e2li Scriptures generally speak\nof prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da (e.g. _cak@su@h prat\u00eetya r\u00fbp\u00e2ni ca utpadyante\ncak@survij\u00f1\u00e2nam_) for it does not mean the origination of each and\nevery destructible individual, but the originating of specific\nindividual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in\nconnection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.\n\nThe first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example\nif we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept,\nwe see that there cannot be any contact between visual\nknowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be\nintelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we\ninterpret the maxim of prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da as this happening that\nhappens, that would not explain any specific origination. All\norigination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor\nby others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason.\nFor if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself.\nTo suppose that it is originated by others would also mean\nthat the origination was of a thing already existing. If again\nwithout any further qualification it is said that depending on\none the other comes into being, then depending on anything any\nother thing could come into being--from light we could have darkness!\nSince a thing could not originate from itself or by others,\nit could not also be originated by a combination of both of them\ntogether. A thing also could not originate without any cause,\nfor then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore\nto be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this\nso-called dependent origination (_prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da_) it was referred\nto as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and\nsenses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is\nnot thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance\n(_avidy\u00e2_). The only thing which is not lost (_amo@sadharma_) is\nnirv\u00e2@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena\n(_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) are false and are lost with their appearances\n(_sarvasa@msk\u00e2r\u00e2s'ca m@r@s\u00e2mo@sadharm\u00e2@na@h_).\n\nIt is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances\n\n140\n\nare false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no\ngood or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the\ncase, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion\nshould be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the\nnihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence\nof the people that things are true. Those who are really\nwise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly\nthey do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with\nthe question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus\nthere are neither works nor cycles of births (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_) and also he\ndoes not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of\nany of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnak\u00fb@tas\u00fbtra that\nhowsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness\n(_citta_); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist,\nand what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and\nas such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which\nhas no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction.\nHe who through his false knowledge (_viparyy\u00e2sa_) does not comprehend\nthe falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be\nreal, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_). Like all\nillusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm\nof rebirth and sorrow.\n\nIt may again be objected that if there is nothing true\naccording to the nihilists (_s'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins_), then their statement that\nthere is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti\nin replying to this says that with s'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins the truth is absolute\nsilence. When the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2din sages argue, they only accept for\nthe moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with\nthem in their own manner to help them to come to a right\ncomprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite\nof all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances,\nthat they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that\nwe call \"our experience\" is but false illusion inasmuch as these\nphenomena have no true essence.\n\nWhen the doctrine of prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da is described as \"this\nbeing that is,\" what is really meant is that things can only be\nindicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have\nno essence or true nature. Nihilism (_s'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da_) also means just\nthis. The true meaning of prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da or s'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da is\nthis, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that\n\n141\n\nappear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither\nproduced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They\nare merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (_s'\u00fbnya_)\ndoes not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of\nposition. It simply means that none of the appearances have any\nintrinsic nature of their own (_ni@hsvabh\u00e2vatvam_).\n\nThe Madhyamaka or S'\u00fbnya system does not hold that anything\nhas any essence or nature (svabh\u00e2va) of its own; even\nheat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat\nand the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions,\nand what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the\nnature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the\ntrue essence or nature of anything which does not depend on\nanything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed\nout which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it\nexists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot\naffirm the essence of other things to it (_parabh\u00e2va_). If we\ncannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently\nassert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first\nbelieves in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are\nnot so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (_abh\u00e2va_),\nbut in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot\nspeak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].\n\nIt is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process\ngoing on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of\nchange could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we\ncan hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things;\nfor those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment\nafter they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to\njustify a process. That which appears as being neither comes\nfrom anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed\nalso does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere,\nand so a process (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot\nbe that when the second moment arose, the first moment had\nsuffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the\nsecond, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact\nthere being no relation between the two, the temporal determination\nas prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a\nself which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _M\u00e2dhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. pp. 93-100.]\n\n142\n\nmay search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if\nthe soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression,\nfor that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character\nand takes up another at the same identical moment which is\ninconceivable [Footnote ref 1].\n\nBut then again the question arises that if there is no process,\nand no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what\nis then the nirv\u00e2@na which is described as the final extinction of\nall afflictions (_kles'a_)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does\nnot agree to such a definition of nirv\u00e2@na. Nirv\u00e2@na on the Madhyamaka\ntheory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that\nwhich cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased\nor as anything which is produced (_aniruddham anntpannam_}. In\nnirv\u00e2@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease\nto exist in nirv\u00e2@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they\nnever existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirv\u00e2@na cannot be any positive thing or\nany sort of state of being (_bh\u00e2va_), for all positive states or things\nare joint products of combined causes (_sa@msk@rta_) and are liable to\ndecay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since\nwe cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a\nnegative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are\ncommunicated as being in a state of change and process coming\none after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth\ncan be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be\nproduced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be\ndetermined as existent or non-existent. Nirv\u00e2@na is merely the\ncessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (_prapa\u00f1caprav@rtti_). It\ncannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for\nthese conceptions belong to phenomena (_na c\u00e2prav@rttimatram\nbh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2veti parikalpitum p\u00e2ryyate evam na bh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2vanirv\u00e2@nam_,\nM.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known,\nand even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to\nappear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon,\na mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].\n\nIt is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any\nbondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like\nthe mirage, the dream, the m\u00e2y\u00e2, and the magic without any real\nnature (_ni@hsvabh\u00e2va_). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. pp.162 and 201.]\n\n143\n\none is trying to win a real nirv\u00e2@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false\negoism that is to be considered as avidy\u00e2. When considered deeply it is\nfound that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence.\nThus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_), there\nwould have been no conformations (_sa@msk\u00e2ras_), and if there were\nno conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so\non; but it cannot be said of the ignorance \"I am generating the\nsa@msk\u00e2ras,\" and it can be said of the sa@msk\u00e2ras \"we are being\nproduced by the avidy\u00e2.\" But there being avidy\u00e2, there come the\nsa@mskar\u00e2s and so on with other categories too. This character of\nthe prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da is known as the coming of the consequent\ndepending on an antecedent reason (_het\u00fbpanibandha_).\n\nIt can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence\non conglomeration or combination (_pratyayopanibandh_).\nIt is by the combination (_samav\u00e2ya_) of the four elements, space\n(_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) and consciousness (_vij\u00f1\u00e2na_) that a man is made. It is\ndue to earth (_p@rthiv\u00ee_) that the body becomes solid, it is due to\nwater that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is\ndigestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due\nto \u00e2k\u00e2s'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vij\u00f1\u00e2na that\nthere is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination\nthat we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think\nthat they have done any of the functions that are considered to be\nallotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or\nsouls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and\nattachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come\nthe sa@msk\u00e2ras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness\n(_r\u00e2ga, dve@sa, moha_); from these proceed the vij\u00f1\u00e2na and\nthe four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name\nand form (_n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa_), from these proceed the senses (_@sa@dayatana_),\nfrom the coming together of those three comes contact (_spars'a_);\nfrom that feelings, from that comes desire (_tr@s@n\u00e2_) and so on.\nThese flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence\nor truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2].\nThe phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or\nnon-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism\n(_s'\u00e2s'vatav\u00e2da_) or nihilism (_ucchedav\u00e2da_), and it is for this reason\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _M\u00e2dhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]\n\n[Footnote: _Ibid._ pp. 209-211, quoted from _S\u00e2listambhas\u00fbtra_.\nV\u00e2caspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bh\u00e2mat\u00ee_ on\nS'a@nkara's _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_.]\n\n144\n\nthat this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (_madhyamaka_) [Footnote\nref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth\n(_samv@rtisatya_) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true\nreality (_param\u00e2rthasatya_) in them or anything else. Morality\nplays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any\nother Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's\n_Suk@rllekha_ as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from\nthe Tibetan translation.\n\n6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (_as\u00e2ra_) give according to\nthe moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there\nis no better friend than giving.\n\n7. Exhibit morality (_s'\u00eela_) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless,\nfor morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of\nthe moving and immovable.\n\n8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality,\npatience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having\nreached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina\nprince.\n\n9. View as enemies, avarice (_m\u00e2tsaryya_), deceit (_s'\u00e2@thya_), duplicity\n(_m\u00e2y\u00e2_), lust, indolence (_kaus\u00eedya_), pride (_m\u00e2na_), greed (_r\u00e2ga_),\nhatred (_dve@sa_) and pride (_mada_) concerning family, figure, glory,\nyouth, or power.\n\n15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door\nfor anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall\nattain the degree of an an\u00e2g\u00e2min (a saint who never suffers rebirth).\n\n21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her,\naccording to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.\n\n24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the\nsix senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the\nwise praise the first as the greater hero.\n\n29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly\nconditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour,\nblame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.\n\n37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend,\ncareful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you\nmust) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.\n\n40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity,\njoy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you\n(certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (_brahmavih\u00e2ra_).\n\n41. By the four dhy\u00e2nas completely abandoning desire (_k\u00e2ma_), reflection\n(_vic\u00e2ra_), joy (_pr\u00eeti_), and happiness and pain (_sukha, du@hkha_) you\nwill obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.\n\n49. If you say \"I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am\nnot endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in\nme; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four\naggregates.\"\n\n50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _M\u00e2dhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 160.]\n\n145\n\nnature (_prak@rti_), not from themselves (_svabh\u00e2v\u00e2t_), nor from the Lord\n(_\u00ees'vara_), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from\nignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) and desire (_t@r@s@n\u00e2_).\n\n51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (_s'\u00eelabratapar\u00e2mars'a_),\nwrong views (_mithy\u00e2d@r@s@ti_) and doubt (_vicikits\u00e2_) are the three\nfetters.\n\n53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality,\nthe highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one\nrules (of the _pr\u00e2timok@sa_) are combined perfectly in these three.\n\n58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (_anitya_) without\nsubstance (_an\u00e2tma_) without help (_as'ara@na_) without protector\n(_an\u00e2tha_) and without abode (_asth\u00e2na_) thou O Lord of men must become\ndiscontented with this worthless (_as\u00e2ra_) kadali-tree of the orb.\n\n104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish\nand subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no\nother higher necessity than this.\n\n105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity\nof the quieting and the subduing nirv\u00e2@na not subject to age, death or\ndecay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.\n\n107. Where there is no wisdom (_praj\u00f1\u00e2_) there is also no contemplation\n(_dhyana_), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but\nknow that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a\ngrove.\n\n\nUncompromising Idealism or the School\nof Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism.\n\nThe school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\nor Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers\nof Hindu thought as Kum\u00e2rila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great\nextent with the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2dins whom we have already described.\nAll the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary\nconstructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the\nso-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We\nconstruct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists\nby itself (_nirmmitapratimohi_) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions\ninvolved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions\n(_khy\u00e2ti vij\u00f1\u00e2na_), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions\n(_vastuprativikalpavij\u00f1\u00e2na_). The two functions however mutually\ndetermine each other and cannot be separately distinguished\n(_abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke_). These functions are set to work\non account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent\nin them in relation to the world of appearance\n(_an\u00e2dik\u00e2la-prapa\u00f1ca-v\u00e2sanahetuka\u00f1ca_) [Footnote ref 2].\n\nAll sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, pp. 21-22.]\n\n[Footnote 2 _Ibid._ p. 44.]\n\n146\n\nunmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped\n(_abh\u00fbta-parikalpa-v\u00e2san\u00e2-vaicitra-nirodha_)\n[Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge\nis without any essence or truth (_nihsvabh\u00e2va_) and is but a\ncreation of m\u00e2y\u00e2, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which\nmay be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the\nmind (_svacitta_), which has been accustomed to create imaginary\nappearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement\nthese creations take place as subject and object has no\nappearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence\nand extinction (_utp\u00e2dasthitibha@ngavarjjam_) and is called the\n\u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na. The reason why this \u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na itself is said to be\nwithout origination, existence, and extinction is probably this,\nthat it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all\nthe phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence\nin the sense in which the term is used and we could not\naffirm any special essence of it.\n\nWe do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing\nexternal but of our own mind (_svacitta_), and there is also the\nbeginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world\nof appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which\ntakes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also\nthe instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account\nof these four reasons there are produced in the \u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na (mind)\nthe ripples of our sense experiences (_prav@rttivij\u00f1ana_) as in a lake,\nand these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas\ncalled _pa\u00f1chavij\u00f1\u00e2nak\u00e2ya_ thus appear in a proper synthetic\nform. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either\nidentical or different from the \u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na just as the waves cannot\nbe said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As\nthe ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the \u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na\nis also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (_v@rtti_). As\ncitta it collects all movements (_karma_) within it, as manas it\nsynthesizes (_vidh\u00eeyate_) and as vij\u00f1\u00e2na it constructs the fivefold\nperceptions (_vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2n vij\u00e2n\u00e2ti d@rs'yam kalpate pa\u00f1cabhi@h_) [Footnote\nref 2].\n\nIt is only due to m\u00e2y\u00e2 (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their\ntwofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as\nan appearance (_samv@rtisatyat\u00e2_) whereas in the real aspect we could\nnever say whether they existed (_bh\u00e2va_) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Pa\u00f1c\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., pp. 50-55.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtr\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_, pp. 58-59.]\n\n147\n\n\nAll phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (_sadasanta@h\nm\u00e2yopam\u00e2@h_). When we look deeply into them we find that\nthere is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even\nall negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the\nultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which\nthe positive and negative are one and the same (_bh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2vasam\u00e2nat\u00e2_)\n[Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no\nname and no substance had been described in the La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra\nas thatness (_tathat\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in\nanother place in the _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ as voidness (_s'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_) which is one\nand has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place\nit is also designated as tath\u00e2gatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].\n\nIt may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified\nultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic \u00e2tman or Brahman\nlike the tathat\u00e2 doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavat\u00e2ra\nthat R\u00e2va@na asks the Buddha \"How can you say that\nyour doctrine of tath\u00e2gatagarbha was not the same as the \u00e2tman\ndoctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics\nalso consider the \u00e2tman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading\nand unchanged?\" To this the Buddha is found to reply\nthus--\"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those\nheretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction\nof a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance\nin anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that\nI say that all things are in reality the tath\u00e2gatagarbha. This\nshould not be regarded as \u00e2tman. Just as a lump of clay is made\ninto various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature\nof all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics\n(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_) that is variously described as\nthe garbha or the nair\u00e2tmya (essencelessness). This explanation of\ntath\u00e2gatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to\nattract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously\ninclined to believe in the \u00e2tman doctrine [Footnote ref 5].\"\n\nSo far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned,\nthe idealistic Buddhists (_vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins_) agreed to the doctrine of\nprat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da with certain modifications. There was with\nthem an external prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da just as it appeared in the\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtr\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_, p. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 80-81.]\n\n148\n\nobjective aspect and an internal prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da. The external\nprat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da (dependent origination) is represented in the\nway in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the\nco-operation of diverse elements--the lump of clay, the potter,\nthe wheel, etc. The internal (_\u00e2dhy\u00e2tmika_) prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da\nwas represented by avidy\u00e2, t@r@s@n\u00e2, karma, the skandhas, and the\n\u00e2yatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].\n\nOur understanding is composed of two categories called the\n_pravichayabuddhi_ and the\n_vikalpalak@sa@nagrah\u00e2bhinives'aprati@s@thapik\u00e2buddhi_. The\npravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either\nof the following four ways, that they are either this or the other\n(_ekatv\u00e2nyaiva_); either both or not both (_ubhay\u00e2nubhaya_), either\nare or are not (_astin\u00e2sti_), either eternal or non-eternal (_nity\u00e2nitya_).\nBut in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second\ncategory consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it\nconstructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by\nits own constructive activity--_parikalpa_) in a logical order of diverse\nrelations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who\nknows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there\nis no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only\nin the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of\nsmoothness (_sneha_) that constructs the water as an external substance;\nit is the sense construction of activity or energy that\nconstructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction\nof movement that constructs the external substance of air.\nIn this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the\nreal (_mithy\u00e2saty\u00e2bhinives'a_) five skandhas appear. If these were\nto appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal\nrelations, and if they appeared in succession there could be\nno connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them\ntogether. In reality there is nothing which is produced or\ndestroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up\nthings as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as\nperceivers. It is simply a convention (_vyavah\u00e2ra_) to speak of things\nas known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere\nspeech-construction (_v\u00e2gvikalpa_) and unreal. In speech one could not\nspeak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p. 87, compare the term \"vyavah\u00e2rika\" as\nused of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same\nsense by S'a@nkara.]\n\n149\n\nrelation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;\nthe real truth (_paramartha_) can never be referred to by such\nspeech-construction.\n\nThe nothingness (_s'\u00fbnyata_) of things may be viewed from\nseven aspects--(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence\nhave no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot\nbe determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms\nof others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference\nto an \"other\" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable\n(_laksanas'\u00fbnyata_); (2) that they have no positive essence\n(_bh\u00e2vasvabh\u00e2vas'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_), since they spring up from a natural\nnon-existence (_svabh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2votpatti_); (3) that they are of an unknown\ntype of non-existence (_apracaritas'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_), since all the skandhas\nvanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected\nthough non-existent (_pracaritas'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_), for their skandhas\nhave no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but\nyet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none\nof the things can be described as having any definite nature,\nthey are all undemonstrable by language (_nirabhilapyas'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_);\n(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that\nwhich is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires\nwhich pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent\nin the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and\ntime in which they are not (_itaretaras'\u00fbnyat\u00e2_).\n\nThere is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal\nnor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a m\u00e2y\u00e2; the\ntwo kinds of negation (_nirodha_) are \u00e2k\u00e2s'a (space) and nirvana;\nthings which are neither existent nor non-existent are only\nimagined to be existent by fools.\n\nThis view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of\nthis school, that the reality is called the tath\u00e2gatagarbha (the\nwomb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal\nappearances of the clusters (_skandhas_), elements (_dh\u00e2tus_), and\nfields of sense operation (_\u00e2yatanas_) only serve to veil it with\nimpurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a\nuniversal soul as the reality. But the _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ attempts to\nexplain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to\nthe tath\u00e2gatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of\nfalse bait to attract those who are afraid of listening\nto the nair\u00e2tmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p. 80.\n\n150\n\n\nThe Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold\nknowledge of (1) _svacittad@rs'hyabh\u00e2van\u00e2_, (2)\n_utp\u00e2dasthitibha@ngavivarjjanat\u00e2_,\n(3) _b\u00e2hyabh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2vopalak@sa@nat\u00e2_ and\n(4) _svapraty\u00e2ryyaj\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2dhigam\u00e2bhinnalak@sa@nat\u00e2_. The first means\nthat all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind.\nThe second means that as things have no essence there is no origination,\nexistence or destruction. The third means that one should\nknow the distinctive sense in which all external things are said\neither to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely\nlike the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire\n(_v\u00e2san\u00e2_) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us\nto the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the\nnature of all things.\n\nThe four dhy\u00e2nas spoken of in the _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ seem to be\ndifferent from those which have been described in connection with\nthe Therav\u00e2da Buddhism. These dhy\u00e2nas are called (1) _b\u00e2lopac\u00e2rika_,\n(2) _arthapravichaya_, (3) _tathat\u00e2lambana_ and (4) _tath\u00e2gata_.\nThe first one is said to be that practised by the s'r\u00e2vakas\nand the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the\ndoctrine that there is no soul (_pudgalanair\u00e2tmya_), and that everything\nis transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all\nthings in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on\ntill all conceptual knowing ceases (_\u00e2sa@mj\u00f1\u00e2nirodh\u00e2t_); we have\nwhat is called the v\u00e2lopac\u00e2rika dhy\u00e2na (the meditation for beginners).\n\nThe second is the advanced state where not only there is\nfull consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the\ncomprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics\nmay be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that\nappears. This is called the _arthapravicayadhy\u00e2na_, for the sage\nconcentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out\n(_pravichaya_) the nature of all things (_artha_).\n\nThe third dhy\u00e2na, that in which the mind realizes that the\nthought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances,\nis itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness\n(_tathat\u00e2_). This dhy\u00e2na is called _tathat\u00e2lambana_, because it has for\nits object tathat\u00e2 or thatness.\n\nThe last or the fourth dhy\u00e2na is that in which the lapse of\nthe mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness\nand incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;\n\n151\n\nand nirv\u00e2na is that in which all root desires (_v\u00e2san\u00e2_) manifesting\nthemselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge\nand perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This\ncannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot\nbe called destruction, for only compounded things (_sa@msk@rta_)\nsuffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or\ndestruction. This nirv\u00e2na is different from that of the s'r\u00e2vakas\nand the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state\nnirv\u00e2@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics\nof all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to\nthings and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)\nof all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is\nsaid that the world is m\u00e2y\u00e2 or illusion, what is meant to be\nemphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena\nthat seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere\nconstructions of tainted imagination, and the tathat\u00e2 or thatness\nis nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or\nnature of the imagination (_vikalpa_) tainted with the associations\nof beginningless root desires (_v\u00e2san\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathat\u00e2 has\nno separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the\ncourse of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore\nalso spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind\n(_cittavimukta_), for here there is no construction of imagination\n(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_) [Footnote ref 3].\n\n\nSautr\u00e2ntika Theory of Perception.\n\nDharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmak\u00eertti's [Footnote ref 4]\n(about 635 A.D.) _Ny\u00e2yabindu_, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological\nwork, describes right knowledge (_samyagj\u00f1\u00e2na_) as an\ninvariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Lank\u00e2vataras\u00fbtra_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 3: This account of the Vij\u00f1anavada school is collected mainly\nfrom _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, as no other authentic work of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\nschool is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be\nhad in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka v\u00e2rttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya,\nII. ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2nas\u00fbtralamk\u00e2ra_ deals more with the duties\nconcerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysics\nof the system.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Dharmak\u00eertti calls himself an adherent of Vij\u00f1anav\u00e2da in his\n_Sant\u00e2n\u00e2ntarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Ny\u00e2yabindu_ seems\nrightly to have been considered by the author of _Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2@tippani_\n(p. 19) as being written from the Sautr\u00e2ntika point of view.]\n\n152\n\ndesires to have (_samyagj\u00f1\u00e2nap\u00fbrvik\u00e2 sarvapuru@s\u00e2rthasiddhi_) [Footnote\nref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any\nknowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right\nknowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one\ncan practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arth\u00e2dhigati_).\nThe process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual\npresentation and ends with the attainment of the thing\nrepresented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it\n(_arth\u00e2dhigam\u00e2t sam\u00e2pta@h pram\u00e2@navy\u00e2p\u00e2rah_). Thus there are\nthree moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:\n(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,\nand (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with\nour endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference\nis also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical\nneed by representing the presence of objects in certain connections\nand helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation\nis direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly\nthrough the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the\nrealization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed\nin philosophical works only because knowledge is sought\nby men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to\nthe realization of the object represented by it could not be called\nright knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the\nperception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,\nare not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization\nof such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt\nthat since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived\nat the moment of perception was not the same as that\nwhich was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents\nwhich started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself\nrealized by the realization of other existents of the same series\n(_n\u00eel\u00e2dau ya eva sant\u00e2na@h paricchinno nilaj\u00f1\u00e2nena sa eva tena\npr\u00e2pita@h tena nilaj\u00f1\u00e2nam pram\u00e2@nam_) [Footnote ref 2].\n\nWhen it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent\nof the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding\nof any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of\n_Ny\u00e2yaybindu_, Vin\u00eetadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in\n_Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2tippan\u00ee_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutik\u00e2_ of Dharmmottara,\nbut their texts are not available to us.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2@tippan\u00ee_, p. 11.]\n\n153\n\nthat right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise\nof any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences,\ndesire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with\nit is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the\nobject of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right\nknowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object.\nRight knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the\nobject of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it\nis not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in\nconnection with our achieving the object presented by perception.\n\nPerception (_pratyaks'a_) has been defined by Dharmak\u00eertti as\na presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated\nby any names or relations (_kalpan\u00e2_) and which is not erroneous\n(_kalpan\u00e2po@dhamabhr\u00e2ntam_) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not\nindeed represent the actual nature (_svar\u00fbpa_) of perception, but only\nshows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything\nmay be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception\nis not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that\nif one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it,\nhe will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him\nby his perception (_tasm\u00e2dgr\u00e2hye arthe vastur\u00fbpe yadaviparyastam\ntadabhr\u00e2ntamiha veditavyam_}. It is said that a right perception\ncould not be associated with names (_kalpan\u00e2_ or _abhil\u00e2pa_). This\nqualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not\ndirectly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing\nonly when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being\nthe same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded\nas being produced by the object of perception. The senses present\nthe objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also\nmust of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are\nwhen they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work\nof recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced\nby the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of\nprevious experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the _Pram\u00e2nasamucaya_ (not\navailable in Sanskrit) of Di@nn\u00e2ga (500 A.D.) was \"_Kalpan\u00e2podham_.\"\nAccording to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa\nj\u00f1\u00e2na_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses\nthat constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate\nknowledge (_savikalpa j\u00f1\u00e2na_), as formed by the conceptual activity of\nthe mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before,\ncannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to\nthe senses.]\n\n154\n\nto the sense\n(_p\u00fbrvad@r@s@t\u00e2parad@r@s@ta\u00f1c\u00e2rthamek\u00eekurvadvij\u00f1\u00e2namasannihitavi@sayam\np\u00fbrvad@r@s@tasy\u00e2sannihitatv\u00e2t_). In all illusory perceptions it is the\nsense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological\ncauses. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the\nobject correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through\nthe senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those\nfeatures which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity of\nknowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented\nby it (_arthena saha yats\u00e2r\u00fbpyam s\u00e2d@rs'yamasya j\u00f1\u00e2nasya tatpram\u00e2@namiha_).\nBut the objection here is that if our percept is only\nsimilar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which\nis different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes\ninvalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which\nappears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their\nsameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi s\u00e2r\u00fbpyam\ntasya vas'\u00e2t_) and our perception of the object becomes possible.\nIt is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of\nhaving perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between\nthe notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and\nthe indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of\ncausation but of a determinant and a determinate\n(_vyavasth\u00e2pyavyavasth\u00e2pakabh\u00e2vena_). Thus it is the same cognition\nwhich in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object\nof perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the\npercept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h ki\u00f1cidr\u00fbpam pram\u00e2@nam ki\u00f1citpram\u00e2@naphalam\nna virudhyate_). It is on account of this similarity\nwith the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the\ndefinite awareness (_vyavasth\u00e2panaheturhi s\u00e2r\u00fbpyam_), so that by\nthe determinate we know the determinant and thus by the\nsimilarity of the sense-datum with the object {_pram\u00e2@na_) we come\nto think that our awareness has this particular form as \"blue\"\n(_pram\u00e2@naphala_). If this sameness between the knowledge and its\nobject was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from\nthe awareness (_s\u00e2r\u00fbpyamanubh\u00fbtam vyavasth\u00e2panahetu@h_). The\nobject generates an awareness similar to itself, and\nit is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization\nof the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting\nthe _Ny\u00e2yabindu, Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2, Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2@tippan\u00ee_ (St Petersburg,\n1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception\nare available to us. _Ny\u00e2yabindu_ is probably one of the earliest works in\nwhich we hear of the doctrine of _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ (practical fulfilment\nof our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded\nas a criterion of existence, as Ratnak\u00eertti's works and the profuse\nreferences by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word\n_arthakriy\u00e2_ is found in Candrak\u00eertti's commentary on N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna and also\nin such early works as _Lalitavistara_ (pointed out to me by Dr E.J.\nThomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no\nphilosophical significance there.]\n\n155\n\n\nSautr\u00e2ntika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].\n\nAccording to the Sautr\u00e2ntika doctrine of Buddhism as described\nby Dharmak\u00eertti and Dharmmottara which is probably the\nonly account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to\nus in Sanskrit, inference (_anum\u00e2na_) is divided into two classes,\ncalled sv\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na (inferential knowledge attained by a person\narguing in his own mind or judgments), and par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na (inference\nthrough the help of articulated propositions for convincing\nothers in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the\nvalidity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of\nthe external world. Inference copied external realities as much\nas perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception\nof blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing\nperceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also,\nso far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the\nexternal fact thus inferred (_s\u00e2r\u00fbpyavas'\u00e2ddhi tann\u00eelaprat\u00eetir\u00fbpam\nsidhyati_).\n\nThe reason by which an inference is made should be such\nthat it may be present only in those cases where the thing to\nbe inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not\nexist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint\nconditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) between\nthe reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is\nnot enough that the reason should be present in all cases where\nthe thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not\nexist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the\nabove case. This law (_niyama_) is essential for establishing the\nunfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This\nunfailing natural connection (_svabh\u00e2vapratibandha_) is found in two types\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: As the _Pram\u00e2@nasamuccaya_ of Di\u00f1n\u00e2ga is not available in\nSanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except\nwhat can be got from the _Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2_ of Dharmmottara.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _tasm\u00e2t niyamavatorev\u00e2nvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h\nyena pratibandho gamyeta s\u00e2dhanyasa s\u00e2dhyena. Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2_, p. 24.]\n\n156\n\nof cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained\nin the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where\nthe reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred\nis a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines\nmay come to think that pines are called trees because they are\ntall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small\npine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness\nforms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being\na species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the\nspecies being identical with the nature of the genus, one could\ninfer the latter from the former but not _vice versa_; this is called\nthe unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (_t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya_).\nThe second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect\nwhich stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke\nthe fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of\nthese inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected\nwith the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no\ninference is warrantable.\n\nThis natural indissoluble connection (_svabh\u00e2vapratibandha_),\nbe it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the\ngenus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is\nthe ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabh\u00e2vapratibandha\ndetermines the inseparability of connection (avin\u00e2bh\u00e2vaniyama) and\nthe inference is made not through a series of premisses, but\ndirectly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection\n[Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe second type of inference known as par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na\nagrees with sv\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na in all essential characteristics; the\nmain difference between the two is this, that in the case of\npar\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na, the inferential process has to be put verbally in\npremisses.\n\nPandit Ratn\u00e2karas\u00e2nti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century\nA.D., wrote a paper named _Antarvy\u00e2ptisamarthana_ in which\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _na hi yo yatra svabh\u00e2vena na pratibaddha@h sa tam\napratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicarat\u00eeti n\u00e2sti\ntayoravyabhic\u00e2raniyama. Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2_, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only\npossible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions,\nviz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thing\nabout which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the\nli@nga in those cases where the s\u00e2dhya oc probandum existed), and\n(3) vipak@s\u00e2sattva (its non-existence in all those places where the s\u00e2dhya\ndid not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism,\ne.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike\na lake.]\n\n157\n\nhe tried to show that the concomitance is not between those\ncases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which\npossess the s\u00e2dhya (probandum) but between that which has the\ncharacteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics\nof the s\u00e2dhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance\nis not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen,\netc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the\ncharacteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the\ncharacteristic of the s\u00e2dhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature\nof concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvy\u00e2pti_),\nwhereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing\npossessing li@nga and that possessing s\u00e2dhya, is known as outer\nconcomitance (_bahirvy\u00e2pti_) and generally accepted by the Ny\u00e2ya\nschool of thought. This antarvy\u00e2pti doctrine of concomitance is\nindeed a later Buddhist doctrine.\n\nIt may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of\nsome form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early\nas the _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of\nthe _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka\n\"was conversant with the distribution of terms\" and the process\nof conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses\nsuch as the ud\u00e2hara@na (_Yo yo aggim\u00e2 so so dh\u00fbmav\u00e2_--whatever is\nfiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dh\u00fbmav\u00e2_--this\nhill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasm\u00e2dayam aggim\u00e2_--therefore\nthat is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the\nmethod of the arguments which are found in the _Kath\u00e2vatthu_ as\nfollows:\n\n\"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@th\u00e2pan\u00e2_).\nOpponent. Yes.\n\nAdherent. Is _C D_? (_p\u00e2pan\u00e2_).\nOpponent. No.\n\nAdherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.\nThat _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.\nHence your first answer is refuted.\")\n\nThe antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @th\u00e2pan\u00e2,\nbecause the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally\nestablished for the purpose of refutation.\n\nThe consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed\np\u00e2pan\u00e2 because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion\n\n158\n\nis termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the\nopponent. Next:\n\n  \"If _D_ be derived of _C_.\n  Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.\n  But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.\n  (therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is\n  wrong.\"\n\nThis is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted\nwith the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the\nconsequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major\nin the latter method we get\n\n  \"If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.\n  But _A_ is _B_.\n  Therefore _C_ is _D_.\n\nBy this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished\n[Footnote ref 1].\"\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Momentariness.\n\nRatnak\u00eertti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of\nall existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the\nmethod of agreement in presence (_anvayavy\u00e2pti_), and then by the\nmethod of difference by proving that the production of effects\ncould not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent\nand hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness\nas the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of\nproducing anything (_arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_). The form of the first\ntype of argument by anvayavy\u00e2pti may be given thus: \"Whatever\nexists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example\nthe jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing\nare existents and are therefore momentary.\" It cannot\nbe said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an\nexistent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain\neffects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these\nare all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing\nno effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible,\nfor those which are done now could not be done again in the\nfuture; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kath\u00e2vatthu_\n(_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]\n\n159\n\nproduce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one\nmight as well expect that there should not be any effect even at\nthe present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing\nanything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce\nat one moment and does not produce at another, this\ncontradiction will prove the supposition that the things were\ndifferent at the different moments. If it is held that the nature\nof production varies at different moments, then also the thing at\nthose two moments must be different, for a thing could not have\nin it two contradictory capacities.\n\nSince the jug does not produce at the present moment the\nwork of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do\nso, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the\nfuture, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the\ncapacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two\nmoments (_s'akt\u00e2s'aktasvabhavatay\u00e2 pratik@sa@nam bheda@h_). The\ncapacity of producing effects (_arthakriy\u00e2s'akti_), which is but the\nother name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness\n(_k@sa@nikatvavy\u00e2pta_).\n\nThe Ny\u00e2ya school of philosophy objects to this view and says\nthat the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect\nproduced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded\nas existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect\ncannot be known, until that has produced another effect and\nthat another _ad infinitum_. Since there can be no being that has\nnot capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can\ndemonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible\nto know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects\nas the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were\nmomentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe\nthe change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be\nany means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this\nRatnakirtti replies that capacity (_sa\u00e2marthya_) cannot be denied,\nfor it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation\nof any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in\nabsence, does not require any permanent observer, for under\ncertain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the\nconcomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions\nthere is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This\nknowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within\n\n160\n\nitself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment,\nand this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.\n\nThe Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) is\nindeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that\nin all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of\nbeing;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and\neven if this capacity should require further capacity to produce\neffects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that\nthe existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing\nthe shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l].\nThough things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between\nthings only so long as their apparent forms are not different\n(_atadr\u00fbpapar\u00e2v@rttayoreva s\u00e2dhyas\u00e2dhanayo@h pratyak@se@na\nvy\u00e2ptigraha@n\u00e2t_). The vy\u00e2pti or concomitance of any two things\n(e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not\non identity.\n\nAnother objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness\nis this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other\ncollocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect\n(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnak\u00eertti\nreplies that the seed does not exist before and produce the\neffect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special\neffectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both\nthe collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot.\nHow a special seed-moment became endowed with such special\neffectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which\npreceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnak\u00eertti wishes to\ndraw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals\na number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number\nof effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has\nbeing is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.\n\nIt is not important to enlarge upon the second part of\nRatnak\u00eertti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production\nof effects could not be explained if we did not suppose\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites\nwas known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh\ncentury. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly\n(_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p. 22):\n\n\"_m\u00fblak@satikar\u00eem\u00e2huranavasth\u00e2m hi d\u00fb@sa@nam.\nm\u00fblasiddhau tvarucy\u00e2pi n\u00e2navasth\u00e2 niv\u00e2ryate._\"\n\nThe infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive\nat the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence\nvicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress\nthough one may not be willing to have it.]\n\n161\n\nall things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute\nthe doctrines of Ny\u00e2ya than an elaboration of the Buddhist\nprinciples.\n\nThe doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary\nof the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all\ndharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all\nstrictly momentary (_k@sa@nika_--i.e. existing only for one moment)\nwas not emphasized in early P\u00e2li literature. As'vagho@sa in his\n_S'raddhotp\u00e2das'\u00e2stra_ speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki's\ntranslation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation\nof the khandhas as kha@nika in his _Visuddhimagga._ But from the\nseventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together\nwith the doctrine of arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva received great attention at\nthe hands of the Sautr\u00e2ntikas and the Vaibh\u00e2@sikas. All the\nNy\u00e2ya and Ved\u00e2nta literature of this period is full of refutations\nand criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account\navailable of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of\nRatnak\u00eertti. Some of the general features of his argument in\nfavour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it\nmay be found in any of the important Ny\u00e2ya works of this period\nsuch as _Nynyamanjari, T\u00e2tparyya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ of V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra, etc.\n\nBuddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent.\nWith the development of this doctrine they gave great\nemphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and\nthe next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is\nmomentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived\nfrom the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied\nthe existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as\nself is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies\nmanifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these\ndissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones\nappear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker.\nApart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot\ndiscover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of\nthese ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of\nself at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product\nas it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any\nparticular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every\nmoment there is no such thing as a permanent self.\n\nThe fact that I remember that I have been existing for\n\n162\n\na long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been\nexisting for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I\nperceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that\n\"this book\" is the same as \"that book\" (i.e. the book arising in\nmemory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident\nthat the \"that book\" of memory refers to a book seen in the\npast, whereas \"this book\" refers to the book which is before\nmy eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence\nis thus due to a confusion between an object of memory\nreferring to a past and different object with the object as perceived\nat the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not only\nof all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but\nalso of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of\nself-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions\narising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But\nsince memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception\nto another object of the present moment, identity cannot\nbe proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects\nof the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet\nthings appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.\nOur hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we\nhave the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old\nhairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave\nthe impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that\nthough things are destroyed every moment, others similar to\nthese often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment\nand so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce\nthe impression that it is one and the same thing which has been\npersisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as the\nflame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as\nif we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so\nall our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects\naround us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are\nbeing generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the\nobjects of the succeeding moments are similar to those\nof the preceding moments, it appears to us that things\nhave remained the same and no destruction has taken place.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See pratyabhij\u00f1\u00e2nir\u00e2sa of the Buddhists, _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, V.S.\nSeries, pp. 449, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also\n_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_ V.S. edition, p. 450.]\n\n163\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine\nof Causal Efficiency (Arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva).\n\nIt appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from\nthe Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse\ncharacteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a\nconglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect,\ndetermine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or\nas inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the\nelements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the\nconglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of\nthese characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic,\nthe conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or\nbeing of things means the work that any conglomeration does or\nthe influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in\nSanskrit is called _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ which literally translated\nmeans--the power of performing actions and purposes of some\nkind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the\nperformance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means\nthat a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency).\nThat which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_.\nAny change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding\nchange of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapa\u00f1ha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition,\npp. 24, 28 and _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the\npaper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnak\u00eertti in _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya\ntracts_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word \"arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva\" is different\nfrom the meaning of the word as we found in the section \"sautr\u00e2ntika\ntheory of perception.\" But we find the development of this meaning both\nin Ratnak\u00eertti as well as in Ny\u00e2ya writers who referred to this doctrine.\nWith Vin\u00eetadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word \"_arthakr\u00eey\u00e2siddhi_\"\nmeant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire\n(_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m d\u00e2rup\u00e2k\u00e2di\ntasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of\nman such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment).\nWith Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later\n_arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable\nand desirable objects (_heyop\u00e2dey\u00e2rthavi@say\u00e2_). But with Ratnak\u00eertti\n(950 A.D.) the word _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ has an entirely different sense.\nIt means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as\nsuch it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence\n_sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_ pp. 20, 21, that\nthough in different philosophies there are different definitions of\nexistence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted\ndefinition of existence as _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ (efficiency of causing any\naction or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnak\u00eertti refer to the\nBuddhist doctrine of _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ they usually refer to this\ndoctrine in Ratnak\u00eertti's sense.]\n\n164\n\nwhich is produced now was never produced before, and cannot\nbe repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once\nproduced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in\nus by objects at different moments of time may be similar but\ncannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect\nand each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming\ninto being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things\nwere permanent there would be no reason why they should be\nperforming different effects at different points of time. Any\ndifference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself\nor its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting\nthat the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place.\nThe existence of a jug for example is known by the power it\nhas of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power\nthen we could not have said that it existed. We can have no\nnotion of the meaning of existence other than the impression\nproduced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power\nexerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should\nhold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production\nof impressions or effects there should be some other\npermanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed\neven when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power\nof producing effects and define each unit of such power as\namounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be\ndifferent units of power at different moments, there should also\nbe as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as\nmomentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.\nThis definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of\nmomentariness shown by Ratnak\u00eertti.\n\n\nSome Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.\n\nWe cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy\nwithout briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems\nwhich were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical\ncircles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of\ncause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and the\npart (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to the\nspecific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and\nthe substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the\n\n\n165\n\nrelation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktim\u00e2n_). Thus\non the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone\nwas permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent\nillusions due to ignorance, S\u00e2@mkhya held that there was no\ndifference between cause and effect, except that the former was\nonly the earlier stage which when transformed through certain\nchanges became the effect. The history of any causal activity is\nthe history of the transformation of the cause into the effects.\nBuddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor\neffect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary\nexistence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary\nantecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality\nwhich undergoes the change, but one change is determined by\nanother and this determination is nothing more than \"that\nhappening, this happened.\" On the relation of parts to whole,\nBuddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According\nto it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the\nindividual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and\nthus there is no such thing as \"whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists\nhold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone\nwhich come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there\nis no such thing as fingerness (_a@ngulitva_) as the abstract universal\nof the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we\nknow that the Sautr\u00e2ntika Buddhists did not believe in the existence\nof any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a\nsubstance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation.\nIn the external world there are as many individual simple units\n(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each\nunit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective\nworld. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the\nassemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there\nare no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of\nsensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next\nmoment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation\nas that of inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_) in which relation the attributes\nare said to exist in the substance, for since there are no\nseparate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation\nof inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not\n\n166\n\nbelieve in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the\npower.\n\n\nBrief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.\n\nIn the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid\nto the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What\nwas sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation\nof sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of _pa@ticcasamupp\u00e2da_\nwas offered only to explain how sorrow came in and\nnot with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The\ndiscussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether\nthe world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tath\u00e2gata\nexisted after death or not, were considered as heresies in early\nBuddhism. Great emphasis was laid on s\u00eela, sam\u00e2dhi and pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2\nand the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas\nhardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in\nthe Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with\nenumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na\nscriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the\nnon-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached.\nThis doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nag\u00e2rjuna,\n\u00c2ryyadeva, Kum\u00e2raj\u00eeva and Candrak\u00eertti, is more or less a corollary\nfrom the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not\nsay whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a\nTath\u00e2gata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was\nno permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only\nlegitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to\nthink of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These\nappearances appear as being mutually related but apart from\ntheir appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality.\nThe Tathat\u00e2 doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated\nbetween the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all\ndhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the\nbackground of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called\ntathat\u00e2, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent\nentity could exist. The Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da doctrine which also\ntook its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the\nS'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da doctrine and the Tathat\u00e2 doctrine; but when carefully\nexamined it seems to be nothing but S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da, with an attempt\nat explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was\n\n167\n\nnon-essential how did it originate? Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da proposes to give an\nanswer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind\ngenerated by the beginningless v\u00e2san\u00e2 (desire) of the mind. The\ndifficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathat\u00e2 doctrine that\nthere must be some reality which is generating all these ideas\nappearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\ndoctrine. The Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins could not admit the existence of such\na reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not\nproperly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was\nsome sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of\nheresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the\ndoctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality\nassumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da\nliterature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we\nare not in a position to judge what answers Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da could give\non the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the\nsame time and the difficulty of conceiving s'\u00fbnya (void), tathat\u00e2,\n(thatness) and the \u00e2layavij\u00f1\u00e2na of Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da is more or less\nthe same.\n\nThe Tathat\u00e2 doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with\nhim. But the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da and the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da doctrines which\noriginated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably\ntill the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da\ndoctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu\nphilosophy, after Kum\u00e2rila and S'a@nkara. From the third or\nthe fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of\nsystematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu\nlogicians. Di@nn\u00e2ga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably\nstarted these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines\nof the great Hindu logician V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana, in his Pram\u00e2@nasamuccaya.\nIn association with this logical activity we find the\nactivity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins\n(known also as Vaibh\u00e2@sikas) and the Sautr\u00e2ntikas. Both the\nVaibh\u00e2@sikas and the Sautr\u00e2ntikas accepted the existence of the\nexternal world, and they were generally in conflict with the\nHindu schools of thought Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika and S\u00e2@mkhya which\nalso admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu\n(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school.\nWe have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist\nthinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),\n\n168\n\nDharmmak\u00eertti (writer of Ny\u00e2yabindu 635 A.D.), Vin\u00eetadeva and\nS'\u00e2ntabhadra (commentators of Ny\u00e2yabindu), Dharmmottara\n(commentator of Ny\u00e2yabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnak\u00eertti (950 A.D.),\nPa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratn\u00e2kara S'\u00e2nti, some of whose contributions\nhave been published in the _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts_, published\nin Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhist\nwriters were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature\nof perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and\nthe doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_) as demonstrating\nthe nature of existence. On the negative side they were\ninterested in denying the ontological theories of Ny\u00e2ya and\nS\u00e2@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation,\nrelation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These\nproblems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautr\u00e2ntika and\nnon-Vaibh\u00e2@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of\ncourse agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence\nof a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their\ndoctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between\nHindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought\ntill the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by the\nBuddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world.\nFor Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the\nVed\u00e2nta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanent\nexternal world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of the\nexternal world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent\nbackground in the Brahman, which was the only reality\nbehind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautr\u00e2ntikas\nadmitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel\nwith Ny\u00e2ya and S\u00e2@mkhya was with regard to their doctrine\nof momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the\ndifferent ontological problems were in accordance with their\ndoctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not\nhear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this\ntime the disputes were mainly between the different systems of\nHindu philosophers, viz. Ny\u00e2ya, the Ved\u00e2nta of the school of\nS'a@nkara and the Theistic Ved\u00e2nta of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja, Madhva, etc.\n\n169\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nTHE JAINA PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nThe Origin of Jainism.\n\nNotwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical\nnotions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders\nof monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance\nin outward appearance, and some European scholars\nwho became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples\nof Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot\nof Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina\nliterature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it\nhas now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong\nand Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist\nworks frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their\nold name Nigantha and their leader N\u00e2taputta Varddham\u00e2na\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of\nthe Jains mention as contemporaries of Mah\u00e2v\u00eera the same kings\nas reigned during Buddha's career.\n\nThus Mah\u00e2v\u00eera was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike\nBuddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder\nof the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed\nafterwards became the seer and the last prophet (T\u00efrtha@nkara) of\nJainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor P\u00e2rs'va, the last T\u00eertha@nkara but\none, is said to have died 250 years before Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, while P\u00e2rs'va's\npredecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera's Nirv\u00e2@na. The story in _Uttar\u00e2dhyayanas\u00fbtra_ that a\ndisciple of P\u00e2rs'va met a disciple of Mah\u00e2v\u00eera and brought about\nthe union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mah\u00e2v\u00eera\nseems to suggest that this P\u00e2rs'va was probably a historical person.\n\nAccording to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion\nis eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one\nof the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable\nTirthankaras. In the present period the first T\u00eertha@nkara was\n@R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardham\u00e2na Mah\u00e2v\u00eera. All\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]\n\n170\n\nT\u00eertha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they\nneither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet\nthey are regarded as \"Gods\" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref\n1].\n\n\nTwo Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThere are two main sects of Jains, S'vet\u00e2mbaras (wearers of\nwhite cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally\nagreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets\npeculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as\nthe T\u00eertha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera was not removed from the womb of Devanand\u00e2 to that\nof Tris'al\u00e2 as the S'vet\u00e2mbaras contend, thirdly that a monk\nwho owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa,\nfourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras\ndeny the canonical works of the S'vet\u00e2mbaras and assert that\nthese had been lost immediately after Mah\u00e2v\u00eera. The origin of\nthe Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabh\u00fbti (A.D. 83) by the\nS'vet\u00e2mbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vet\u00e2mbara church,\nof which there had already been previous to that seven other\nschisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that\nthey themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and\nthat under Bhadrab\u00e2hu, the eighth sage after Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, the last\nT\u00eertha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaph\u00e2lakas with laxer\nprinciples, from which developed the present sect of S'vet\u00e2mbaras\n(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times\nfrom the S'vet\u00e2mbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of\ntheir own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history,\nthough there is practically no difference about the main creed.\nIt may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit\nworks of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than\nthose of the S'vet\u00e2mbaras, if we except the canonical books of\nthe latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed\nin later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from\none another only in minute details of conduct. These were called\n_gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha,\nwhich had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See \"_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459\"\nof J. Burgess, and B\u00fbhler's \"Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathur\u00e2,\"\nin _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on\nJainism, _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in\n_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]\n\n171\n\npreserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mah\u00e2v\u00eera\n(_sthavir\u00e2vali, pa@t@t\u00e2vali, gurv\u00e2vali_) and also many legends about\nthem such as those in the _Kalpas\u00fbtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ of\nHemacandra, etc.\n\n\nThe Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.\n\nAccording to the Jains there were originally two kinds of\nsacred books, the fourteen P\u00fbrvas and the eleven A@ngas. The\nP\u00fbrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were\ngradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now\nthe oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these\nare _\u00c2c\u00e2ra, S\u00fbtrak@rta, Sth\u00e2na, Samav\u00e2ya Bhagavat\u00ee, J\u00f1\u00e2tadharmakath\u00e2s,\nUp\u00e2sakadas'\u00e2s, Antak@rtadas'\u00e2s Anuttaraupap\u00e2tikadas'\u00e2s,\nPras'navy\u00e2kara@na, Vip\u00e2ka_. In addition to these there are the twelve\n_Up\u00e2@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prak\u00eer@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six\n_Chedas\u00fbtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _N\u00e2nd\u00ee_ and _Anuyogadv\u00e2ra_\nand four _M\u00fblas\u00fbtras_ (_Uttar\u00e2dhyayana, \u00c2vas'yaka,\nDas'avaik\u00e2lika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however\nassert that these original works have all been lost, and that the\npresent works which pass by the old names are spurious. The\noriginal language of these according to the Jains was Ardham\u00e2gadh\u00ee,\nbut these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best\nto call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Pr\u00e2krit and that\nof the later works Jaina Mah\u00e2r\u00e2@s@tr\u00ee. A large literature of glosses\nand commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And\nbesides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain\nsystematic expositions of their faith in Pr\u00e2krit and Sanskrit.\nMany commentaries have also been written upon these independent\ntreatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Um\u00e2sv\u00e2ti's\n_Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important\nlater Jaina works on which this chapter is based are\n_Vis'e@s\u00e2vas'yakabh\u00e2@sya_, Jaina _Tarkav\u00e2rttika_, with the commentary\nof S'\u00e2nty\u00e2c\u00e2ryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.),\n_Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2dama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), _Ny\u00e2y\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ of\nSiddhasena Div\u00e2kara (533 A.D.), _Par\u00eek@s\u00e2mukhas\u00fbtralaghuv@rtti_ of\nAnantav\u00eeryya (1039 A.D.), _Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da_ of Prabh\u00e2candra\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Aupap\u00e2tika, R\u00e2japras'n\u00eeya, J\u00eev\u00e2bhigama, Praj\u00f1\u00e2pan\u00e2,\nJambudv\u00eepapraj\u00f1apti, Candrapraj\u00f1apti, S\u00fbryapraj\u00f1apti, Niray\u00e2vali,\nKalp\u00e2vata@msik\u00e2, Pu@spik\u00e2, Pu@spac\u00fblik\u00e2, V@r@s@nida@s\u00e2s_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mst\u00e2ra, \u00c2turapraty\u00e2khy\u00e2na, Bhakt\u00e2parij\u00f1\u00e2,\nTa@ndulavaiy\u00e2l\u00ee, Ca@n@d\u00e2v\u00eeja, Devendrastava, Ga@niv\u00eeja, Mah\u00e2praty\u00e2khy\u00e2na,\nV\u00eerastava_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Nis'\u00eetha, Mah\u00e2nis'\u00eetha, Vyavah\u00e2ra, Das'as'rutaskandha,\nB@rhatkalpa, Pa\u00f1cakalpa_.]\n\n172\n\n(825 A.D.), _Yogas'\u00e2stra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and\n_Pram\u00e2@nanayatattv\u00e2lok\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_ of Deva S\u00fbri (1086-1169 A.D.).\nI am indebted for these dates to Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na's _Indian Logic_.\n\nIt may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular\nliterature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and\nPr\u00e2krit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. _Samar\u00e2icca-kah\u00e2,\nUpamitabhavaprapa\u00f1ca-kath\u00e2_ in Pr\u00e2krit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ of\nSomadeva and Dhanap\u00e2la's _Tilakama\u00f1jar\u00ee_); Jaina Sanskrit poems\nboth in the Pur\u00e2@na and K\u00e2vya style and hymns in Pr\u00e2krit and\nSanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina\ndramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works,\noriginal treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature\nof India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics,\npoetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic\ndeserve special notice [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nSome General Characteristics of the Jains.\n\nThe Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less\nthan a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in\nSouthern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces,\nEastern R\u00e2jput\u00e2na and the Punjab. The head-quarters of\nthe S'vet\u00e2mbaras are in Gujarat and Western R\u00e2jput\u00e2na, but they\nare to be found also all over Northern and Central India.\n\nThe outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to\nbare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl,\na stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover\nhis mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. The\noutfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The\nDigambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms\nof peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_c\u00e2mara_) [Footnote\nref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out.\nThe latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is\nregarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks\nare very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend\nthe rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating,\nstudying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of\ntheir clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The\nlaymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]\n\n[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]\n\n173\n\nby taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are\nrequired to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in\nthe up\u00e2s'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist\nvih\u00e2ras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any\nliving being has been in monastic life carried out to its very\nlast consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a\ngreat measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being,\nnot even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully\nwithout hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living\nbeing thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture,\netc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nLife of Mah\u00e2v\u00eera.\n\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of\nthe J\u00f1\u00e2ta clan and a native of Vais'\u00e2li (modern Besarh, 27 miles\nnorth of Patna). He was the second son of Siddh\u00e2rtha and Tr\u00ees'al\u00e2.\nThe S'vet\u00e2mbaras maintain that the embryo of the T\u00eertha@nkara\nwhich first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanand\u00e2\nwas then transferred to the womb of Tr\u00ees'al\u00e2. This story the\nDigambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents\nwere the worshippers of P\u00e2rs'va and gave him the name Varddham\u00e2na\n(V\u00eera or Mah\u00e2v\u00eera). He married Yas'od\u00e2 and had a daughter\nby her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission\nof his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After\ntwelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained\nomniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to\npreach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)\nsome years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].\n\n\nThe Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.\n\nA thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and\nto undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or\npan, etc.), and we have seen that the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upani@sad held\nthat since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent,\nthat alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state\nwere but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Hoernl\u00e9's translation of _Uv\u00e2sagadas\u00e2o_, Jacobi, _loc.\ncit_., and Hoernl\u00e9's article on the \u00c2j\u00eevakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vet\u00e2mbaras,\nhowever, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it\neighteen years later.]\n\n174\n\ndemonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g.\nthe clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere\nillusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_n\u00e2ma-r\u00fbpa_) [Footnote ref\n1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities,\nhave no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere\nphantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.\n\nThe Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived\nand that there is no unchanging substance behind them.\nWhat we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we\nperceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities\nwe do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads\nregard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent\nand unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance,\nas there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities\ndo not imply that there are substances to which they adhere,\nfor the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither\nbe perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the\nmomentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of\nquality as a new existence.\n\nThe Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and\npossibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solution\nto offer. They held that it was not true that substance\nalone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances.\nFurther it was not true as the Buddhists said that\nthere was no permanent substance but merely the change of\npassing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views\nand are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain\nsome elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in\nexperience. Experience shows that in all changes there are\nthree elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear\nto remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated;\n(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities\nof things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not\nchanging. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump\nhas been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is\npermanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have\nbeen lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in\nit which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form,\nhas generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Ch\u00e2ndogya, VI. 1.]\n\n175\n\nanother form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a\nthing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus\nwhen a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific\nqualities which come under the connotation of the word \"gold\"\nare seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed,\nand with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some\nnew ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to\nthis, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the\npermanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in\nspite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then is\nneither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing\nqualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is\ntestified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit,\nwhich is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and\ngaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent\n(_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utp\u00e2da_) and loss of\nsome old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref.1]. The solution of Jainism is\nthus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on\ngrounds of common-sense experience.\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anek\u00e2ntav\u00e2da).\n\nThis conception of being as the union of the permanent and\nchange brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anek\u00e2ntav\u00e2da or\nwhat we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism\nof the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists.\nThe Jains regarded all things as _anek\u00e2nta_ (_na-ek\u00e2nta_), or in\nother words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely,\nas all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and\nlimitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence\nas a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocation\nof atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_),\ni.e. a gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term and\nnot in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is a\ncollocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space or\ntime (_k\u00e2la_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one\nand the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a\ncomposite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote: 1: See _Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of\nJainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]\n\n176\n\nnot a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms\nonly in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of\nearth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone.\nIts being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense\nthat it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It\nis made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied\ngold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again\nmade up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered\nand shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yaj\u00f1adatta.\nIts being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only\ntrue in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug\nand not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner\nthe Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a\ncertain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite\nnumber of qualities (_anantadharm\u00e2tmaka@m vastu_), each of which\ncan only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing\nas a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of\naffirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities\nfrom infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted\nsenses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation\nriches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such\nan affirmation is possible as when we say \"the poor man has no\nriches.\" The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in\na negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be\naffirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very\nsame thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints\nfrom which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)\ncan be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing\nin relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref\n2].\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Nayas.\n\nIn framing judgments about things there are two ways open\nto us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics\nof anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when\nwe say \"this is a book\" we do not look at its characteristic\nqualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or\ncharacteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.\n211. etc., and also _Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_, and _Vis'e@s\u00e2valyaka bh\u00e2@sya_,\npp. 895-923.]\n\n177\n\nthe thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and\nregard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist\nview); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book\nseparately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible\nand the book apart from these cannot be found. These two\npoints of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _pary\u00e2yanaya_\n[Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms,\nand paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important\nfor our purposes, the other three being important rather from the\npoint of view of grammar and language had better be omitted\nhere. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya,\nsa@mgraha-naya and vyavah\u00e2ra-naya.\n\nWhen we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point\nof view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may\nhold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are\nempty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say,\nI have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer\nI looked at the book from the widest and most general point of\nview as a \"thing,\" whereas in the second I looked at it in its\nspecial existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of\na book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was\nreading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling\non loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy,\nwhereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose\nsheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view,\nin which we do not consider them from the point of view of their\nmost general characteristic as \"being\" or as any of their special\ncharacteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically\ncalled the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably\nproceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most\ngeneral as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may\nlay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other\nones. This is the point of view from which according to the\nJains the Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience.\n\nSa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the\nmost general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual\nthings from their most general and fundamental aspect as \"being.\"\nThis according to the Jains is the Ved\u00e2nta way of looking at things.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2dama@njar\u00ee_, pp. 171-173.]\n\n178\n\n\nThe vyavah\u00e2ra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence\nof things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical\nexperience of the thing, which unifies within it some general\nas well as some special traits, which has been existing from past\ntimes and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes\nall the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand\nways. Thus a \"book\" has no doubt some general traits, shared\nby all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are\ncontinually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but\nyet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will\nexist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics,\ngo to make up the essence of the \"book\" of our everyday experience,\nand none of these can be separated and held up as being\nthe concept of a \"book.\" This according to the Jains is the\nS\u00e2@mkhya way of looking at things.\n\nThe first view of pary\u00e2ya-naya called _@rjus\u00fbtra_ is the Buddhist\nview which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the\npast or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration\nof characteristics which may be said to produce effects at\nany given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations\nof new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as\nthe true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or\naspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.\nThe above four represent only a broad classification of these. The\nJains hold that the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika, the Ved\u00e2nta, the S\u00e2@mkhya,\nand the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize\nexperience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards\nthe interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely\ntrue to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error\n(_nay\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many\npoints of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations\nfrom any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and\nunder limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may\nbe made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or\njudgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore\nbe absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of pary\u00e2ya-naya, which represent\ngrammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya,\nsamabhir\u00fb@dha-naya_, and _evambh\u00fbla-naya_. See _Vis'e@s\u00e2vas'yaka\nbh\u00e2@sya_, pp. 895-923.]\n\n179\n\nthings may be held to be true from other points of view. The\ntruth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable\nfrom the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness\ntherefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _sy\u00e2t_\n(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative,\nmade somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations\nand not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment\nwhich is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely\nfalse. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.\nThis brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe Doctrine of Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da.\n\nThe doctrine of Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da holds that since the most contrary\ncharacteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing,\naffirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded\nas absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _sy\u00e2dasti_ or\n\"may be it is\" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense;\nall affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense\n(_sy\u00e2davaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some\nsense (_sy\u00e2dasti sy\u00e2nn\u00e2sti_); all affirmations are true as well as\nindefinite (_sy\u00e2dasti c\u00e2vaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as\nwell as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite\nin some sense (_sy\u00e2dasti sy\u00e2nn\u00e2sti sy\u00e2davaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may\nsay \"the jug is\" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to\nsay explicitly that \"may be (sy\u00e2t) that the jug is,\" otherwise if\n\"being\" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being,\nit might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a\ncloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined\nby the form of the jug. \"The jug is\" does not mean absolute\nexistence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the\nform of the jug, \"The jug is\" thus means that a limited kind of\nexistence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence\nin general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence\n\"the jug is\" might as well mean \"the clay is,\" \"the tree is,\" \"the\ncloth is,\" etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the\nnegation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic\n(such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined\nby the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue,\ngolden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@s\u00e2vas'yaka bh\u00e2@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and\n_Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2dama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 170, etc.]\n\n180\n\nthe infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those\nconstituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined.\nWhat we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the\nrest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view\nthe judgment \"the jug is\" may mean affirmation of being, looked\nat from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being\n(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment \"the jug is\" one may\nsay, may be it is an affirmation of being (_sy\u00e2dasti_), may be it is a\nnegation of being (_sy\u00e2nn\u00e2sti_); or I may proceed in quite another\nway and say that \"the jug is\" means \"this jug is here,\" which\nnaturally indicates that \"this jug is not there\" and thus the judgment\n\"the jug is\" (i.e. is here) also means that \"the jug is not\nthere,\" and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug\nis true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us\nin saying that \"may be that in some sense the jug is,\" and \"may\nbe in some sense that the jug is not.\" Combining these two\naspects we may say that in some sense \"may be that the jug is,\"\nand in some sense \"may be that the jug is not.\" We understood\nhere that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics\nconstituting being, we may say \"the jug is,\" but if we put emphasis\non the other side, we may as well say \"the jug is not.\" Both the\naffirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is\nput on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try\nto comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments\nregarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence\nof the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for\nhow can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet\nsuch is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all\naffirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are\nthus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four\nagain we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that\nthe jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and\nis unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.\nThus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its\nnature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of\nthem any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ng\u00ee_\nholds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each\nfrom its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2dama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166,\netc.]\n\n181\n\npoint of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality\nis such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional,\nand holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or\nsenses (_up\u00e2dhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation\nwhich is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or\ncontradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of\nany judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly\npermanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing\nand gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent\nand changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also\nonly relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite,\nthe three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense\nor other in all their permutations for any and every kind of\njudgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation,\nand all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of\nthe naya doctrine with the sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da doctrine is therefore this,\nthat for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as\nmany alternatives as are indicated by sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da. The validity of\nsuch a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne\nin mind when making any judgment according to any naya,\nthe naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely\naccording to any particular naya without any reference to\nother nayas as required by the sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da doctrine the nayas are\nwrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such\njudgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas\n(_nay\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nKnowledge, its value for us.\n\nThe Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Ny\u00e2yabindu_\nsays that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in\nwhich they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them\nto attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found\nto be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the\ntask of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagj\u00f1\u00e2na_ or\n_pram\u00e2@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us\nto attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the\nabove view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da and\nsaptabha@ng\u00ee probably occurs in Bhadrab\u00e2hu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary\n_S\u00fbtrak@rt\u00e2nganiryukti_.\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Pram\u00e2@na-naya-tattv\u00e2lok\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_ (Benares), p. 16; also\n_Par\u00eek@s\u00e2-mukha-s\u00fbira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]\n\n182\n\nsay that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The\nvalidity (_pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directly\nhelps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad\nfor us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can\nadapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what\nis good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that\nlead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence\nof full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an\nobject by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection.\nFor we are not concerned with how a cognition is\nproduced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes.\nIt is enough for us to know that external objects under certain\nconditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyat\u00e2_) that we can\nhave knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they\ngenerate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under\ncertain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions\nwe do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the\nspecial fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible\ndoes not concern us. Those conditions which confer such\na special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but\nlittle to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the\nacquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by\nknowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.\n\nKnowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well\nas the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to\nsuppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of\nexternal objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate,\nand that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other\ncharacteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual\nexperience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@s\u00e2_), and\nthat therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity\nof the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa\nj\u00f1\u00e2na_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand\nreveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives\na correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of\ntheir characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our\nimmediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Pram\u00e2@na-naya-tattv\u00e2lok\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra,_ p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Par\u00ee@sa-mukha-s\u00fbtra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the\nconcluding v@rtti of ch. II.]\n\n183\n\nOf course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to\nus the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us\nthe nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the\nattainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if\nknowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been\nimpossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that\nit is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for\nserving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted\nit should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents\nthings in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a\nbadly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion\nconsists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake\nwhere it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is\nno untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this,\nthat the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a\nsnake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing\nis what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake\nwas later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore\nconsists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True\nknowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful\nrepresentation of its object as is never afterwards found to be\ncontradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association\nwith the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and\ndistinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attained\notherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then\ncalled non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]).\n\n\nTheory of Perception.\n\nThe main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the\ntheory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the\nJains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the external\nobjects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of\ncolour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul\n\n________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or\nother kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually\nexist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When\nI mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its\nrelationing with the \"this\" as \"this is a snake\" does not exist, for the\nsnake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called\n_satkhy\u00e2ti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-v\u00e2rttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti\nby S'anty\u00e2c\u00e2rya, Pram\u00e2@nanayatattv\u00e2lok\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra, ch. I.,\n_Par\u00eeks\u00e2-mukha-s\u00fbtra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]\n\n184\n\nfrom within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it\nbefore. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2din\nBuddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge\nof external objects by perception is gained through the senses.\nThe exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished\nfrom the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which\nalone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive\nsenses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are\nonly aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the\nfive senses, it is better to say that it is the \"self\" which gains\nof itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with\nthose exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account\nof the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself\nbefore. The process of external perception does not thus involve\nthe exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise\nof the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with\nthe particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch\nwith all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge\nwhich is generated in the soul through that part of it which is\nassociated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example,\nI look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge\nof rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and\nhence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the\nrose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into\nmyself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge\nof rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this\nhappens in association with the eye; I say that I see through\nthe visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have\nonly a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As\nexperience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable\nto assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding\nin a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas\n(mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the\nhypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve\nits purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu \u00e2tm\u00e2 ca\nindriyam...anupahatacak@sur\u00e2dides'e@su eva \u00e2tmana@h\nkarmak@sayopas'amaslen\u00e2sthagitagav\u00e2k@satuly\u00e2ni cak@sur\u00e2d\u00eeni\nupakara@n\u00e2ni. Jaina-V\u00e2ttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places,\nhowever, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as\nsenses, and living beings are often classified according to the number\nof senses they possess. (See _Pram\u00e2@nam\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2._ See also\n_Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2-dhigamas\u00fbtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to\nthe sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to\nadmitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate\ncategory of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like\nwindows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the\nsense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination;\nfor it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that\nthe veil which as observing it is removed.]\n\n185\n\nthat the veil of ignorance upon the \"self\" regarding the object has\nbeen removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the\nkarma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence\nof the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense\norgans, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists\nand many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence\nof any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa\n(determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct\nrevelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials\nwere necessary for the development of determinate\nperceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who\nregarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of\nindeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception.\nThe determinate stage with them is the result of the application\nof mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence\ndoes not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nNon-Perceptual Knowledge.\n\nNon-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa\nin this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the\nlatter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function\nin determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction\nthey could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge\nwas that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us\nclearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.\nParok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory,\netc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.\n\nRegarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to\nhave five propositions, such as: (1) \"the hill is fiery,\" (2) \"because\nof smoke,\" (3) \"wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the\nkitchen,\" (4) \"this hill is smoky,\" (5) \"therefore it is fiery,\" called\nrespectively _pratij\u00f1\u00e2, hetu, drs@t\u00e2nta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except\nfor the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two\npropositions which actually enter into the inferential process\n(_Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]\n\n186\n\ninference we do not proceed through the five propositions as\nabove. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected\nwith the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabh\u00e2va_) or as invariable\nantecedence (_kramabh\u00e2va_) will from the mere statement\nof the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the\nconclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of\nfive propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child\nthan for representing the actual state of the mind in making an\ninference [Footnote ref 1].\n\nAs regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the\nauthority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give\nus right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who\nhave lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and\nright knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all\nignorance [Footnote ref 2].\n\n\nKnowledge as Revelation.\n\nThe Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of\nanything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.\nThat which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vy\u00e2pti_) some of the Jaina logicians\nlike the Buddhists prefer _antarvy\u00e2pti_ (between smoke and fire) to\nbahirvy\u00e2pt\u00ee (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).\nThey also divide inference into two classes, sv\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na for one's own\nself and _par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na_ for convincing others. It may not be out of\nplace to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrab\u00e2hu\nin his Das'avaik\u00e2likaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for\nmaking an inference; (1) _Pratij\u00f1\u00e2_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the\ngreatest virtue), (2) _Pratij\u00f1\u00e2vibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the\ngreatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because\nthose who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious\nto do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only\npersons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_\n(but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina\nscriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins),\n(6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those\nwho despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve\nhonour), (7) _D@r@s@\u00e2nta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as\nthey do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects),\n(8) _\u00c2s'a@nk\u00e2 (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats,\nfor they cook for them), (9) _\u00c2s'a@nk\u00e2prati@sedha_ (this cannot be,\nfor the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be\nsaid that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_\n(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na's _Indian\nLogic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually\nadopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these\nare irrelevant. When V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana in his _Ny\u00e2yas\u00fbtrabh\u00e2@sya_, I. 1. 32,\nsays that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as\nagainst the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he\nprobably had this Jaina view in his mind.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkav\u00e2rttika_, and _Par\u00eek@s\u00e2mukhas\u00fbtrav@rtti_, and\n_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]\n\n187\n\nwhich could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was\nwith them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically\neach unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect\nthey supposed that there was a succession of different units of\neffect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of\nnew substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.\nThe Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect\nmay be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert\nonly that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding\nexperience. When we have a unit of experience we\nsuppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so,\nthe theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect\nproduced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time,\nand that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience\nshows that not all of an object is found to be changing\nevery moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is\nfound to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings\nor bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face\nof such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes\nevery moment and that new things are being renewed at each\nsucceeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and\nunfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the\nconception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence\nassociated with change--_pary\u00e2ya_ (acquirement of new qualities\nand the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other\nsystems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one\nparticular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh\nexperience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths\nindicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and\nlimitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of\n_arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting\non their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they\nbecame one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable\nabstract speculations which went directly against experience.\nThus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor\nthe external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which\nreveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies\nat the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself\nas the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my\nown self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge\n\n188\n\nin us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the\nrise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it.\nThe rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective\ncollocations of things which somehow have the special fitness\nthat they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment.\nLooked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred\nin ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us\nas modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character\nof the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent\nof the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious\nand an unconscious element in knowledge as S\u00e2@mkhya does. Nor\nshould knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it\nreveals, as the Sautr\u00e2ntikas think, for then by copying the materiality\nof the object, knowledge would itself become material.\nKnowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the\nself revealing all objects by itself. But the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 view that the\nvalidity (_pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself\n_svata@hpr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically\nthe validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence\n(sa@mv\u00e2da) with facts. But in those cases where by previous\nknowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced\nthere may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without\nreference to objective facts (_pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nyamutpattau parata eva\nj\u00f1aptau svak\u00e2rye ca svata@h paratas'ca. abhy\u00e2s\u00e2nabhy\u00e2s\u00e2pek@say\u00e2_) [Footnote\nref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But\nthat it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis,\nfor knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This\nbrings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.\n\n\nThe J\u00eevas.\n\nThe Jains say that experience shows that all things may be\ndivided into the living (_j\u00eeva_) and the non-living (_aj\u00eeva_). The\nprinciple of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most\nerroneous to think that life is either the product or the property\nof the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that\nthe body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is\ndirectly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things\nare. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Jaina V\u00e2rttika,_ p. 60.]\n\n189\n\na description. This is directly against the view of the great\nM\u00eem\u00e2@msa authority Prabh\u00e2kara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state\nis possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite\nknowledge (_ananta-j\u00f1\u00e2na_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite\npower (_ananta-v\u00eerya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily\nhowever, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-j\u00eeva_)\nall the other j\u00eevas (_sa@ms\u00e2rin_) have all their purity and power\ncovered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating\nin them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number.\nThey are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable\nspace-points in our mundane world (_lok\u00e2k\u00e2s`a_), have a limited\nsize (_madhyama-parim\u00e2@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_)\nnor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _j\u00eeva_ is called\n_Jiv\u00e2stik\u00e2ya_. The word _astik\u00e2ya_ means anything that occupies\nspace or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and\ncontract themselves according to the dimensions of the body\nwhich they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and\nsmaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to\nthe Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it\nlives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot,\nwherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel\nit. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained\nas being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines\nthe whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The\nJains divide the j\u00eevas according to the number of sense-organs\nthey possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess\nonly the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that\nof worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste.\nNext come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell.\nThe next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in\naddition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all\nthe five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely\nmen, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these\nan inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@nda,_ p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _j\u00f1\u00e2na_.\nDars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see\na cloth. J\u00f1\u00e2na means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the\ncloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it\nwas prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and\nthen j\u00f1\u00e2na. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all\nthings as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]\n\n190\n\ncalled rational (_sa@mj\u00f1in_) while the lower animals have no reason\nand are called _asamjnin_.\n\nProceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains\nregard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated\nby souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of\nsouls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;\nthey live and die and are born again in another elementary body.\nThese elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case\nthey are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants.\nOf some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other\nplants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all\nthe functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common.\nPlants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they\nexist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants\nof which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and\ninvisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world.\nThe whole universe is full of minute beings called _nigodas_; they\nare groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters,\nhaving respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme\npains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with\nthem like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply\nof souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an\ninfinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to\nreplace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the\nsouls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to\nthe present. Thus it is evident the sa@ms\u00e2ra will never be empty\nof living beings. Those of the _nigodas_ who long for development\ncome out and continue their course of progress through successive\nstages [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nKarma Theory.\n\nIt is on account of their merits or demerits that the j\u00eevas are\nborn as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already\nnoticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul\nis the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of\nthe pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter.\nThose which obscure right knowledge of details (_j\u00f1\u00e2na_) are\ncalled _j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2vara@n\u00eeya_, those which obscure right perception\n(_dars'ana_) as in sleep are called _dars'an\u00e2varan\u00eeya_, those which\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._, and\n_Lokaprak\u00e2s'a_, VI. pp. 31 ff.]\n\n191\n\nobscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and\npain are _vedan\u00eeya_, and those which obscure the right attitude of the\nsoul towards faith and right conduct _mohan\u00eeya_ [Footnote ref 1]. In\naddition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma\nwhich determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body\nwith its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality,\ncaste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the\nsoul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good\naction when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called\n(1) _\u00e2yu@ska karma_, (2) _n\u00e2ma karma_, (3) _gotra karma_, (4) _antar\u00e2ya\nkarma_. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually\nproducing certain subtle karma matter which in the first\ninstance is called _bh\u00e2va karma_, which transforms itself into _dravya\nkarma_ and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming\ninto contact with the passions (_ka@s\u00e2ya_) of the soul. These act like\nviscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This\nmatter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided\ninto eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the\ncause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma\nmatter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as\ngolden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are\ncalled the _les'y\u00e2s_. The feelings generated by the accumulation of\nthe karma-matter are called _bh\u00e2va-les'y\u00e2_ and the actual coloration\nof the soul by it is called _dravya-les'y\u00e2_. According as any karma\nmatter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it\ngives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge\nthat we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc.,\nis but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which\nthe particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind\nof knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge\nof a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our\nknowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that\nkind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All\nknowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from\nwithin, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be\ngenerating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n\n[Footnote 1: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matij\u00f1\u00e2na_\n(ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernatural\ncognition), (4) _mana@hpary\u00e2ya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-j\u00f1\u00e2na_\n(omniscience).]\n\n192\n\n\nAfter the effect of a particular karma matter (_karma-varga@n\u00e2_)\nis once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul.\nThis process of purging off the karmas is called _nirjar\u00e2_. If no\nnew karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging\noff of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as\nit is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma\nmatter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and\nbinding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to\ncontinue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth.\nAfter the death of each individual his soul, together with\nits karmic body (_k\u00e2rma@nas'ar\u00eera_), goes in a few moments to the\nplace of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding\nor contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.\n\nIn the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its\nproper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the\n_audayika_ state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented\nfrom taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and\nthis is said to be the _aupas'amika_ state of the soul. When karma\nis not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul\nis said to be in the _k@s\u00e2yika_ state, and it is from this state that\nMok@sa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary\ngood men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized,\nand some active (_k@s\u00e2yopas'amika_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nKarma, \u00c2srava and Nirjar\u00e2.\n\nIt is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all\nthe experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths\nin diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects.\nThe karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter\n(_karma-varga@n\u00e2_}. The influx of these karma particles into the\nsoul is called \u00e2srava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by\nbody, mind, and speech. The \u00e2sravas represent the channels or\nmodes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the\nchannels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains\ndistinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The stages through which a developing soul passes are\ntechnically called _gu@nasth\u00e2nas_ which are fourteen in number. The\nfirst three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next\nfive stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in\nthe next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his\nkarmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he\nstill practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation\n(see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse).]\n\n193\n\nenter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds\nof \u00e2sravas, bh\u00e2v\u00e2srava and karm\u00e2srava. Bh\u00e2v\u00e2srava means the\nthought activities of the soul through which or on account of\nwhich the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra\nsays that bh\u00e2v\u00e2srava is that kind of change in the soul (which\nis the contrary to what can destroy the karm\u00e2srava), by which\nthe karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karm\u00e2srava, however, means the\nactual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These\nbh\u00e2v\u00e2sravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion\n(_mithy\u00e2tva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pram\u00e2da_),\nthe activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions\n(_ka@s\u00e2yas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ek\u00e2nta_\n(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed),\n_vipar\u00eeta_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_\n(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit),\n_sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _aj\u00f1\u00e2na_ (want of any\nbelief due to the want of application of reasoning powers).\nAvirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@ms\u00e2_), falsehood (_an@rta_),\nstealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have\nthings which one does not already possess (_parigrah\u00e2k\u00e2@nk@s\u00e2_).\nPram\u00e2da or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation\n(_vikath\u00e2_), passions (_ka@s\u00e2ya_), bad use of the five senses\n(_indriya_), sleep (_nidr\u00e2_), attachment (_r\u00e2ga_) [Footnote ref 3].\n\nComing to dravy\u00e2srava we find that it means that actual influx\nof karma which affects the soul in eight different manners\nin accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight\ndifferent kinds, namely j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2vara@n\u00eeya, dars'an\u00e2vara@n\u00eeya, vedan\u00eeya,\nmohan\u00eeya, \u00e2yu, n\u00e2ma, gotra and antar\u00e2ya. These actual\ninfluxes take place only as a result of the bh\u00e2v\u00e2srava or the reprehensible\nthought activities, or changes (_pari@n\u00e2ma_) of the soul.\nThe states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas\nis called bh\u00e2vabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the\nactual impure connections of the karmas is technically called\ndravyabandha. It is on account of bh\u00e2vabandha that the actual\nconnection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4].\nThe actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, edited\nby S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardham\u00e2napur\u00e2@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by\nGhoshal.]\n\n194\n\nof dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with\noil. Thus Gunaratna says \"The influx of karma means the\ncontact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the\nparticular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of\ndust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of\nthe soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes\nso completely covered with them that in some sense when looked\nat from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a\nmaterial body during its sa@ms\u00e2ra stage [Footnote ref 1].\" From one\npoint of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _p\u00e2pa_\n(good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is of\nfour kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration of\nbondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubh\u00e2ga_) and extension (_prades'a_).\nThe nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already\nmentioned, namely the j\u00f1anavaraniya karma which obscures the\ninfinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail,\ndars'an\u00e2vara@n\u00eeya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge\nof the soul, vedan\u00eeya karma which produces the feelings of\npleasure and pain in the soul, mohan\u00eeya karma, which so infatuates\nsouls that they fail to distinguish what is right from\nwhat is wrong, \u00e2yu karma, which determines the tenure of any\nparticular life, n\u00e2ma karma which gives them personalities, gotra\nkarma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding\nfor the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance\nof right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay\nof any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be\nintense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle\nof division, anubh\u00e2ga. Prades'a refers to the different parts of\nthe soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The\nduration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due\nto the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the\ndifferent classification of karmas as j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2varan\u00eeya, etc., are due to\nthe nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnote\nref 3].\n\nCorresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bh\u00e2v\u00e2srava and\ndravy\u00e2srava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush,\nby actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the\nactual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are\nrespectively called bh\u00e2vasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Varddham\u00e2@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_\nS'I. 35.]\n\n195\n\n\nThe bh\u00e2vasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness,\nabstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects\nof desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order\nto avoid injury to insects (_\u00eery\u00e2_), gentle and holy talk (_bh\u00e2@sa_),\nreceiving proper alms (_e@sa@n\u00e2_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints of\nbody, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness,\nhumility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint,\npenance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss,\nand supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@s\u00e2_ consisting of\nmeditation about the transient character of the world, about our\nhelplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence,\nabout our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the\ndifference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness\nof our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx\nof karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those\nkarmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter\nand the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining\ntrue knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles\nof the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _par\u00ee@sahajaya_ consisting of the\nconquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and\nof feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _c\u00e2ritra_ or right\nconduct.\n\nNext to this we come to nirjar\u00e2 or the purging off of the\nkarmas or rather their destruction. This nirjar\u00e2 also is of two\nkinds bh\u00e2vanirjar\u00e2 and dravyanirjar\u00e2. Bh\u00e2vanirjar\u00e2 means that\nchange in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are\ndestroyed. Dravyanirjar\u00e2 means the actual destruction of these\nkarma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by\npenances before their time of fruition, called savip\u00e2ka and avip\u00e2ka\nnirjar\u00e2s respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@sa\nor liberation is effected.\n\n\nPudgala.\n\nThe _aj\u00eeva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgal\u00e2stik\u00e2ya, dharmastik\u00e2ya,\nadharm\u00e2stik\u00e2ya, \u00e2k\u00e2s'\u00e2stik\u00e2ya, k\u00e2la, pu@nya, p\u00e2pa_. The word _pudgala_\nmeans matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astik\u00e2ya_\nin the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the\nBuddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]\n\n196\n\nwhich are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two\nstates, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such\nas the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things\nare ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The\nsmallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_).\nThe atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell,\nand colour. The formation of different substances is due to the\ndifferent geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination\nof the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement\nand to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic\nspace (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place by\nsimple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades'a_) whereas\nin others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive\nforce (_oja@hprades'a_) (_Praj\u00f1\u00e2panop\u00e2@ngas\u00fbtra_, pp. 10-12).\nTwo atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscous\nand the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or\ndryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that\nthere was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded\nthe contact as essential and as testified by experience. These\ncompounds combine with other compounds and thus produce\nthe gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to\nconstant change (_pari@n\u00e2ma_) by which they lose some of their\nold qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are four\nelements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these\nare alike in character. The perception of grossness however\nis not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the\natoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the\nperception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise\n(as the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of\na similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined\natoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given\nin the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing\nappears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have\nall acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the\ndars'anavara@n\u00eeya and j\u00f1\u00e2navara@n\u00eeya veil, there arises in the soul\nthe perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness\n(_sam\u00e2na-r\u00fbpat\u00e2_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of\natoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow)\nis technically called _tiryaks\u00e2m\u00e2nya_. This s\u00e2m\u00e2nya or generality\nis thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity\n\n197\n\n(as maintained by the Naiy\u00e2yikas) but represents only the accession\nof similar qualities by a similar development of qualities\nof atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of\nqualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and\nto continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing\nto be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the\ndeveloping tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the\nrelative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to\nthe Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of\nsome old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as\na whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This\nsameness of qualities in time is technically called _\u00fbrdhvas\u00e2m\u00e2nya_\n[Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of\nview of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be\nregarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from\nthe point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal.\n\n\nDharma, Adharma, \u00c2k\u00e2s'a.\n\nThe conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is\nabsolutely different from what they mean in other systems of\nIndian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell,\nsound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe\n(_lok\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astik\u00e2ya_\nis therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying\ncircumstance or cause which makes motion possible,\nlike water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition\nor circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent\nor passive (_ud\u00e2s\u00eena_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_)\ncause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if\nthe fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its\nmotion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but\nif they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of\ndharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_)\nin the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the\nliberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there\nbecause there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2].\nAdharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da_, pp. 136-143;\n_Jainatarkav\u00e2rttika_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]\n\n198\n\nhelps j\u00eevas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance\ncould move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if\nthere were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two\ncategories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on\naccount of their notion that the inner activity of the j\u00eeva or the\natoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other\nextraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed\ninto actual exterior motion. Moreover since the j\u00eevas\nwere regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be\nfound to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which\nwas undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required\nfor its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent\nin the region of the liberated souls.\n\nThe category of \u00e2k\u00e2s'a is that subtle entity which pervades\nthe mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region of\nliberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all other\nsubstances such as dharma, adharma, j\u00eeva, pudgala. It is not a\nmere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness,\nbut a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate\nit. On account of its pervasive character it is called\n_\u00e2k\u00e2s'\u00e2stik\u00e2ya_ [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nK\u00e2la and Samaya.\n\nTime (_k\u00e2la_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles\nwhich never mix with one another, but which help the happening\nof the modification or accession of new qualities and the change\nof qualities of the atoms. K\u00e2la does not bring about the changes\nof qualities, in things, but just as \u00e2kas'a helps interpenetration\nand dharma motion, so also k\u00e2la helps the action of the transformation\nof new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments,\nhours, days, etc., is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of the\nunchangeable k\u00e2la in so many forms. K\u00e2la thus not only aids the\nmodifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as\nmoments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments,\nhours, etc., are its pary\u00e2yas. The unit of samaya is the time\nrequired by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]\n\n199\n\n\nJaina Cosmography.\n\nAccording to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning\nor end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced\nas results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts,\n_\u00fbrdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and\n_adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe\n(_lok\u00e2kas'a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement\npossible. Beyond the lok\u00e2kas'a there is no dharma and therefore\nno movement, but only space (_\u00e2kas'a_). Surrounding this lokak\u00e2s'a\nare three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over\nthe \u00fbrdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokak\u00e2s'a and (there being\nno dharma) remains motionless there.\n\n\nJaina Yoga.\n\nYoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation).\nThis yoga consists of j\u00f1ana (knowledge of reality as it is), s'raddh\u00e2\n(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from\ndoing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@ms\u00e2_ (not\ntaking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _s\u00fbn@rta_\n(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_\n(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya\n(abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and\nbody), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnote\nref 1].\n\nThese strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent\non attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary\nhouseholders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra,\nthat ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should\nfollow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from\na good family, should follow the customs of the country and so\nforth. These are just what we should expect from any good and\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra.\nThese are: _\u00ceryy\u00e2_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and\nilluminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken\nwhile walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which\nmay be lying on the way), _bhas\u00e2_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all\nbeings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner),\n_d\u00e2nasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions\nwhen taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily\nrefuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_\n(to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold\nall people to be the same in mind), _v\u00e2ggupti_ (absolute silence), and\n_k\u00e2yagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds\nof caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]\n\n200\n\nhonest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon\nthe virtues of ahi@ms\u00e2, s\u00fbn@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the\nroot of all these is ahi@ms\u00e2. The virtues of s\u00fbn@rta, asteya and\nbrahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries\nof ahi@ms\u00e2. Ahi@ms\u00e2 may thus be generalized as the fundamental\nethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be\npassed in accordance with the standard of ahi@ms\u00e2; s\u00fbn@rta, asteya\nand brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression\nleads to hi@ms\u00e2 (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice\nof these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this\nis called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling\nfor the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues\naccording to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called\nmah\u00e2brata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a\nhouseholder according to the anubrata standard would be mere\ncessation from adultery, whereas according to mah\u00e2brata it would\nbe absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts.\nAhi@ms\u00e2 according to a householder, according to anubrata,\nwould require abstinence from killing any animals, but according\nto mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to\nprevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to\nany living being in any way.\n\nMany other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all\nof which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@ms\u00e2. These\nare (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted area\nand thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places),\n(2) _bhogopabhogam\u00e2na_ (to desist from drinking liquors, taking\nflesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and\nvegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding\ntime and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of\n(a) _apadhy\u00e2na_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries,\nkilling of one's enemies, etc.), (b) _p\u00e2popades'a_ (desisting from\nadvising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing\nof so many insects), (c) _hi@msopak\u00e2rid\u00e2na_ (desisting from\ngiving implements of agriculture to people which will lead\nto the injury of insects), (d) _pram\u00e2dacara@na_ (to desist\nfrom attending musical parties, theatres, or reading\nsex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) _s'ik@s\u00e2padabrata_\nconsisting of (a) _s\u00e2mayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beings\nequally), (b) des'\u00e2vak\u00e2s'ikabrata (gradually to practise\nthe _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_\n\n200\n\n(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibh\u00e2gabrata (to\nmake gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called\n_atic\u00e2ra_, should be carefully avoided.\n\nAll perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to\nknow the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the\nsoul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can\nbe removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is\npure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on\naccount of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are\nburnt (_dhy\u00e2n\u00e2gnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. The\nsoul is itself the sa@ms\u00e2ra (the cycle of rebirths) when it is\noverpowered by the four ka@s\u00e2yas (passions) and the senses. The four\nka@s\u00e2yas are _krodha_ (anger), _m\u00e2na_ (vanity and pride), _m\u00e2y\u00e2_\n(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed).\nThese ka@s\u00e2yas cannot be removed except by a control of the\nsenses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind\n(_mana@hs'uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one can\nproceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when\nthe mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should\nmake every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism\n(_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment\nand antipathy (_r\u00e2gadvc@sa_) can be removed only by the\npurification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that\nman loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin\n(sage) that he should be free from them and become independent\nin the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon\nall beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquest\nover r\u00e2ga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictest\nasceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this\nsamatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of\nmeditation (_bh\u00e2van\u00e2_):\n\nWe should think of the transitoriness (_anityat\u00e2_) of all things,\nthat what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day,\nwhat it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are\ntransitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure,\nwealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles\nin a whirlwind.\n\nAll, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will\nby their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of\nmisery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in\n\n201\n\nwhatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we\nfind that it fails us. This is called as'ara@nabh\u00e2van\u00e2 (the meditation\nof helplessness).\n\nSome are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits\nof the karma done in another life. We are all different from one\nanother by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and\nby all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate\non these aspects is called ekatvabh\u00e2van\u00e2 and anyatvabh\u00e2van\u00e2.\n\nTo think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh,\nblood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as'ucibh\u00e2van\u00e2\n(meditation of the impurity of the body).\n\nTo think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal\nfriendship and compassion and the passions are removed,\nthen only will good {_s'ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contrary\nI commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil\nwill befall me, is called \u00e2sravabh\u00e2van\u00e2 (meditation of the befalling\nof evil). By the control of the \u00e2srava (inrush of karma)\ncomes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the\ndestruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to n\u00eerjar\u00e2\n(decay and destruction of karma matter).\n\nAgain one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas\n(virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_s\u00fbn@rta_), purity\n(_s'auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_aki\u00f1canat\u00e2_),\nasceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks'\u00e2nti_), mildness\n(_m\u00e2rdava_), sincerity (_@rjut\u00e2_), and freedom or emancipation from\nall sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of the\nhighest goal. These are the only supports to which we can\nlook. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called\ndharmasv\u00e2khy\u00e2tat\u00e2bh\u00e2van\u00e2.\n\nAgain one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also\nof the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the\ndiverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabh\u00e2van\u00e2_\nand _bodhibh\u00e2van\u00e2_.\n\nWhen by the continual practice of the above thoughts man\nbecomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings,\nand becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a\nmind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should\ntake to the performance of dhy\u00e2na or meditation by deep concentration.\nThe samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhy\u00e2na\nare interdependent, so that without dhy\u00e2na there is no samatva\n\n203\n\nand without samatva there is no dhy\u00e2na. In order to make the\nmind steady by dhy\u00e2na one should think of _maitr\u00ee_ (universal\nfriendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of\nmen), _karu@n\u00e2_ (universal compassion) and _m\u00e2dhyastha_ (indifference\nto the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any\nnote of sinners). The Jaina dhy\u00e2na consists in concentrating\nthe mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The\ndhy\u00e2na however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to\nmaking the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed\ntowards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the\nfinal extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete\ncourse of moral discipline which leads to the purification\nof the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu\nyoga of Pata\u00f1jali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nJaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe Naiy\u00e2yikas assert that as the world is of the nature of\nan effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and\nthis agent is \u00ces'vara (God). To this the Jain replies, \"What does\nthe Naiy\u00e2yika mean when he says that the world is of the nature\nof an effect\"? Does he mean by \"effect,\" (1) that which is made\nup of parts (_s\u00e2vayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a\nnon-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as\nhaving been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vik\u00e2ritvam_).\nAgain, what is meant by being \"made up of parts\"? If it\nmeans existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_s\u00e2m\u00e2nya_)\nexisting in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence\ndestructible, but these the Naiy\u00e2yikas regard as being partless and\neternal. If it means \"that which has parts,\" then even \"space\"\n(_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) has to be regarded as \"effect,\" but the Naiy\u00e2yika regards\nit as eternal.\n\nAgain \"effect\" cannot mean \"coinherence of the causes of a\nthing which were previously non-existent,\" for in that case one\ncould not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the\nelements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.\n\nAgain if \"effect\" means \"that which is regarded by anyone as\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:_Yogas'\u00e2stra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in\n_Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874,\nand _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_.]\n\n204\n\nhaving been made,\" then it would apply even to space, for when\na man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in\nthe hollow which he dug.\n\nIf it means \"that which is liable to change,\" then one could\nsuppose that God was also liable to change and he would require\nanother creator to create him and he another, and so on _ad\ninfinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to\nchange with reference to his creative activity.\n\nMoreover, we know that those things which happen at some\ntime and do not happen at other times are regarded as \"effects.\"\nBut the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things\ncontained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are \"effects,\" then\nthat would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and\nthought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these\nare contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue\nof that. And even atoms would be \"effects,\" for they also undergo\nchanges of colour by heat.\n\nLet us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a\nwhole is an \"effect.\" And every effect has a cause, and so the\nworld as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the\ncause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is\nargued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human\ncausation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human\nbeings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly\nan effect of the type of effects produced by human beings\nbut is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because\nwater-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in\ninferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.\nIf it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the\ninference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce\nsuch an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing\nold houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced\nby intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which\nwe do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects,\nand the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is\nsaid that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been\nmade by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer\nthe agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having\nbeen made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have\na vicious circle (_anyony\u00e2s'raya_).\n\n205\n\n\nAgain, even if we should grant that the world was created by\nan agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have\nnever seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held\nthat we should consider the general condition of agency only,\nnamely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that\nthis is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind\nof body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such\nas the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that\nthese had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it\nis said that these are also made by God, then you have an\nargument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter which\nyou sought to prove.\n\nLet it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists.\nDoes his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in\nthat case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the\nworld, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does\nhe produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible,\nfor there cannot be any knowledge and will without a\nbody. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any\nother kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there\ncannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that\nhe is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that\nhe can be all-creator.\n\nLet us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless\nGod can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take\nto creation through a personal whim? In that case there would\nbe no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it\nin accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then\nhe is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it\nthrough mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose\nthere should have been only happiness in the world and nothing\nelse. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they\nsuffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious\nactions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such\na blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took\nto creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things\nwithout a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain\npeople and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism\non behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took\nplace simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of\n\n206\n\nadmitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came\ninto being out of its own nature.\n\nIt is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help\nof any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create\nthis world. This is against all experience.\n\nAdmitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists,\nyou could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to\nqualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has\nno body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.\nBut this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production\nof diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied\na nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then\nthere could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction.\nDestruction and creation cannot be the result of one\nunchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character\nof knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which\nknowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not\naware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is\nomniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any\nknowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any\nperception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot\nhave any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition\nof a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this\nalso is not true, for this implication would only be justified if\nthere were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions\nalso. Even without an omniscient God you could explain\nall things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of\nkarma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods\ntoo. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be\nquarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of\na miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and\nwife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can\nco-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if\nthere were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate\nthat in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think\nhis nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever\nway one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it\nis absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense\nwith the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp.\n115-124.]\n\n207\n\n\nMok@sa (emancipation).\n\nThe motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) is\nthe avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the\nstate of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is\nalso a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantaj\u00f1\u00e2na_) and infinite\nperception (_anantadars'ana_). In the sa@ms\u00e2ra state on account\nof the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn\nout imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and\nthat time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s'ruta_),\nsupernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and direct\nknowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hpary\u00e2ya_).\nIn the state of release however there is omniscience\n(_kevala-j\u00f1\u00e2na_) and all things are simultaneously known to the\nperfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@ms\u00e2ra stage the soul always\nacquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though\nremaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage\nthe changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus\nit is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance\nas well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change\nmeaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.\n\nIt may not be out of place to mention here that though the\nkarmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways\nyet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action\n(_anantav\u00eerya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and\ninfinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time\nby the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this\npower man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated.\nIf man had not this anantav\u00eerya in him he might have been eternally\nunder the sway of the accumulated karma which secured\nhis bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of this\nindomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and\nproduce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his\nhighest good.\n\n208\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE KAPILA AND THE P\u00c2TA\u00d1JALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nA Review.\n\nThe examination of the two ancient N\u00e2stika schools of\nBuddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince\nus that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in\ncircles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain\npractices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the\nwise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some\nof the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two n\u00e2stika schools\nof Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the\npoint of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two N\u00e2stika schools\nappear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial\ndisciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with\nthe K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the\ntaking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals\nat the sacrifices.\n\nThe doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination\nof rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical\npower of producing the desired effect--a shower of rain, the\nbirth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices\nwere enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as\nfor the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas\nwere the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate\na detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a\ncertain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses\nin such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired\nby the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define\ntruth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic\nculture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with\nwhich we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth\nof Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published\nby the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other\nIndian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority.\nThe system has been treated in detail in those two works.]\n\n209\n\nobjects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends upon\nthe test of experience [Footnote ref l].\n\nIt is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though\nprobably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial\ncreed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental\nprinciples which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at\nleast tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see\nthat Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being\ndue to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that\nwhich could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme\ndid the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in\nformulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2].\nTurning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of\nknowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what\nis good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an\naccount of things that on proceeding according to its directions\nwe may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct\nestimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good\nand avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes\nwere produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not\ncarry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in\nthe world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so\nfar that they had even denied the existence of any permanent\nsoul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute\nview of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening\nof events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true\nonly in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense,\nwhich we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions,\nwhich lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the\nassemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new\nqualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this\ncommon-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary\nexperience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands for\nfinding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but\nabsolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 of\nKum\u00e2rila and Prabh\u00e2kara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them\nis determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior\nto the doctrine of _arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva._ But the later Buddhists sought\nto prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of\n_arthakriy\u00e2k\u00e2ritva_.]\n\n210\n\nwould answer, \"yes, this is true from this point of view, but\nuntrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such\na point of view and untrue from another.\" But such an answer\ncannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement,\nan absolute judgment.\n\nThe main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism\nfrom the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to\nformulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of\nsentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was\nbusy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles\nor maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances\nof sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean\nsacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions\nwere here considered bad or good according as they brought\nabout our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial\ncreed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal\ndegradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth\nshould not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The\nsacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the\nother world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned\ntheir backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and\nunchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever\ndissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken,\nwas realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for\nthe moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial\ncreed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed\nonly if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of\nkarma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its\nfruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit\nof sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of\nsacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however,\nkarma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were\ntaken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or\nabsolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no\nnarrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness\nor destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not\nsacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions\nperformed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth\nor reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.\n\nSuch an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads\n\n211\n\nwhich had anticipated the new systems in all these\ndirections. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew\ntheir suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the\nUpani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own\nrational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were\nthus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas,\nit was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp\nsuch germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to\nharmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial\ncreed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent\nand well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are\nindeed fulfilled in the S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may\nbe discovered in the Upani@sads.\n\n\nThe Germs of S\u00e2@mkhya in the Upani@sads.\n\nIt is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number\nof texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the\ninfinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing\nforms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the\nearliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice,\nand also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result\n[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears\nas the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived\ntheir powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages\nfor personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of\ndevelopment the conception of Brahman reached a superior level\nin which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored,\nand the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the\nonly Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the\nmonistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was\nanother line of thought which was developing alongside of it,\nwhich regarded the world as having a reality and as being made\nup of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara\nand particularly in Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee from which it appears\nthat the S\u00e2mkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and\nmany of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the\ndate of Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee has not yet been definitely settled, and the details\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, \"Brahman\" (_E. R.E._).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This\nhas been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other\nIndian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]\n\n212\n\nfound there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion\nof the S\u00e2@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is\nnot improbable that at this stage of development it also gave\nsome suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga\nphilosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all\nthe results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it\nunites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the\ndoctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of\nrelativism of the Jains.\n\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga Literature.\n\nThe main exposition of the system of S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga in\nthis section has been based on the _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_, the _S\u00e2@mkhya\ns\u00fbtras_, and the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ of Pata\u00f1jali with their commentaries\nand sub-commentaries. The _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ (about\n200 A.D.) was written by \u00ces'varak@r@s@na. The account of S\u00e2@mkhya\ngiven by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and\nthis has been treated separately. V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra (ninth century\nA.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumud\u00ee_. But\nbefore him Gaudap\u00e2da and R\u00e2j\u00e2 wrote commentaries on the\n_S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ [Footnote ref 1]. N\u00e2r\u00e2yanat\u00eertha wrote his _Candrik\u00e2_ on\nGaudap\u00e2da's commentary. The _S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtras_ which have been commented\non by Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabh\u00e2@sya_) of the\nsixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author\nafter the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the\nfifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the\n_S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtras_. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhiksu wrote also another elementary\nwork on S\u00e2@mkhya known as _S\u00e2@mkhyas\u00e2ra_. Another short work\nof late origin is _Tattvasam\u00e2sa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two\nother works on S\u00e2m@khya, viz S\u00eem\u00e2nanda's _S\u00e2mkhyatattvavivecana_\nand Bh\u00e2v\u00e2ga@nes'a's _S\u00e2@mkhyatattvay\u00e2th\u00e2rthyad\u00eepana_ (both later\nthan Vij\u00f1\u00e2nabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been\nfreely consulted. Pata\u00f1jali's _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.)\nwas commented on by V\u00e2ysa (400 A.D.) and Vy\u00e2sa's bh\u00e2sya\ncommented on by V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_,\nby Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century\n_Bhojav@rtti_, and by N\u00e2ges'a (seventeenth century) _Ch\u00e2y\u00e2vy\u00e2khy\u00e2_.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I suppose that R\u00e2j\u00e2's commentary on the _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_ was the same\nas _R\u00e2jav\u00e2rttika_ quoted by V\u00e2caspati. R\u00e2j\u00e2's commentary on the _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_\nhas been referred to by Jayanta in his _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p. 109. This book\nis probably now lost.]\n\n213\n\nAmongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may\nmention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories\nof the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_\nby Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published\nby the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation\nto other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published,\nand my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication\nwith the Calcutta University.\n\nGu@naratna mentions two other authoritative S\u00e2@mkhya works,\nviz. _M\u00e2@tharabh\u00e2@sya_ and _\u00c2treyatantra_. Of these the second is\nprobably the same as Caraka's treatment of S\u00e2@mkhya, for we know\nthat the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it\nwas called \u00c2treyasa@mhit\u00e2 or \u00c2treyatantra. Nothing is known\nof the M\u00e2tharabh\u00e2sya [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nAn Early School of S\u00e2@mkhya.\n\nIt is important for the history of S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy that\nCaraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been\ndealt with in any of the modern studies of S\u00e2@mkhya, should\nbe brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.\nAccording to Caraka there are six elements (_dh\u00e2tus_), viz. the\nfive elements such as \u00e2k\u00e2s'a, v\u00e2yu etc. and cetan\u00e2, called also\npuru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to\nbe twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five\nconative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold\nprak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mk\u00e2ra and the five elements)[Footnote ref\n2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence\nis proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses\nthere cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with\nthem. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate\nsensing (_\u00fbha_) and conceiving (_vic\u00e2ra_) before definite understanding\n(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the\ncombination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with\na preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following\nthree sections at the time of first reading.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrap\u00e2@ni, the\ncommentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested,\nthe two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatirikta\u00f1cod\u00e2s\u00eena@m\npuru@samavyaktatvas\u00e2dharmy\u00e2t avyakt\u00e2y\u00e2m prak@rt\u00e2veva prak@sipya\navyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@n\u00e2ti._ Harin\u00e2tha Vis'\u00e2rada's edition of\n_Caraka, S'\u00e2r\u00eera_, p. 4.]\n\n214\n\nof air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with\na preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance\nof earth. Caraka does not mention the tanm\u00e2tras at all [Footnote ref 1].\nThe conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriy\u00e2rtha_) or gross matter,\nthe ten senses, manas, the five subtle bh\u00fbtas and prak@rti, mahat\nand aha@mk\u00e2ra taking place through rajas make up what we call\nman. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases.\nAll karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance,\nlife and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also\nthe puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death,\nbondage, or salvation. If the \u00e2tman were not regarded as cause,\nall illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a\npermanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one\nothers would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _param\u00e2tman_,\nis beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in\nitself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it\nthrough its connection with the sense organs and manas. By\nignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa\nand the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action,\ncannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects\nare due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but\nall destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which\nis eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the\navyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category.\nThe vik\u00e2ra or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra,\nwhereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setraj\u00f1a\n(_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setraj\u00f1am@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta\nand cetan\u00e2 are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested\nprak@rti or cetan\u00e2 is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is\nderived the ego (_aha@mk\u00e2ra_) and from the aha@mk\u00e2ra the five\nelements and the senses are produced, and when this production\nis complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time\nof pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return\nback to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the\ntime of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_),\nall the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mk\u00e2ra,\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter,\nis referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having\neight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadh\u00e2tuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat,\naha@mk\u00e2ra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming\npart of the prak@rti we hear of indriy\u00e2rth\u00e2, the five sense objects\nwhich have evolved out of the prak@rti.]\n\n215\n\netc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of\ndissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and\ntamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer\nthis revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in\nassociation with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself\ntakes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish,\nundetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will\nand reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive,\nyet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are\nassociated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains\nare felt by the conglomeration (_r\u00e2s'i_), and not by the \u00e2tman presiding\nover it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and\npain comes desire (_t@r@s@n\u00e2_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and\nfrom desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete\ncessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association\nof the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the\nmanas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when\nthere is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns\nthat \"all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves,\nbut are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do\nnot belong to me the self,\" the self transcends all. This is the last\nrenunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally\nextinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence\nof the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote\nref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this\nstate the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any\ncharacteristic. This state is spoken of by the S\u00e2@mkhyas as their\ngoal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are\nrooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be\nenjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary\nprevious to Cakrap\u00e2@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve\nback into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth they\nbecome manifest again. See Cakrap\u00e2@ni on s'\u00e2r\u00eera, I. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabh\u00fbta, it is not in any\nsense like the Brahman of Ved\u00e2nta which is of the nature of pure being,\npure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like\nabsolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_),\nresembling N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's Nirv\u00e2@na. Thus Caraka\nwrites:--_tasmi@ms'caramasanny\u00e2se sam\u00fbl\u00e2h@hsarvavedan\u00e2@h\nasa@mj\u00f1\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2navij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2 niv@rtti@m y\u00e2ntyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m\nbrahmabh\u00fbto bh\u00fbt\u00e2tm\u00e2 nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabh\u00e2vebhya@h cihna@m\nyasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavid\u00e2@m brahma tacc\u00e2k@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka,\nS'\u00e2r\u00eera_ 1. 98-100.]\n\n216\n\nthe state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours\nin the shape of association with good people, abandoning\nof desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed\nattention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)\nthus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and\nthis will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self.\nAs the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or\ncharacter, this state can only be described as absolute cessation\n(_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@s\u00e2_).\n\nThe main features of the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka\nare thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera\nof this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed\nwhich generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanm\u00e2tras are\nnot mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of\nthe mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of\nemancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute\nexistence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is\nno consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the\nconglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mk\u00e2ra etc.\n6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).\n\nThis account of S\u00e2@mkhya agrees with the system of S\u00e2@mkhya\npropounded by Pa\u00f1cas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of\n\u00c2suri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the\nMah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata XII. 219. Pa\u00f1cas'ikha of course does not describe\nthe system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what\nlittle he says it may be supposed that the system of S\u00e2@mkhya\nhe sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pa\u00f1cas'ikha\nspeaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all\nS\u00e2@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa\n(_purus\u00e2vasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination\nof the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases\nwith death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a\ndiscussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as\nthe postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility.\nThe same discussion occurs in Pa\u00f1cas'ikha also, and the proofs\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:\n(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,\n(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to\nremember.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty\nin accepting Pa\u00f1cas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine.\nThis may probably be due to the fact that the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrines sketched\nin _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]\n\n217\n\nfor the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again\nPa\u00f1cas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions\nof the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the\nelement of \"cetas.\" They are mutually independent, and by such\nindependence carry on the process of life and work. None of the\nphenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our\nsuffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa\nis realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these\nphenomena. The gu@nas described by Pa\u00f1cas'ikha are the different\nkinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.\nThe state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as\nCaraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the\nlast state is described as being like that when all rivers lose\nthemselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any\ncharacteristic)--a term reserved for prak@rti in later S\u00e2@mkhya.\nThis state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation\nwhich is also called the doctrine of complete destruction\n(_samyagbadha_).\n\nGu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of\n_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of S\u00e2@mkhya, the\nMaulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these\nthe doctrine of the Maulikya S\u00e2@mkhya is said to be that which\nbelieved that there was a separate pradh\u00e2na for each \u00e2tman\n(_maulikyas\u00e2@mkhy\u00e2 hy\u00e2tm\u00e2nam\u00e2tm\u00e2nam prati p@rthak pradh\u00e2nam\nvadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine\nI have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this\nrepresents the earliest systematic doctrine of S\u00e2@mkhya.\n\nIn _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ XII. 318 three schools of S\u00e2@mkhya are\nmentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the\nschool I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five\n(the well-known orthodox S\u00e2@mkhya system) and those who\nadmitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a\nsupreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth\nprinciple. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the\nform of S\u00e2@mkhya advocated in the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_. The schools of\nS\u00e2@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here\ndenounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of\nS\u00e2@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_, p. 99.]\n\n218\n\nother chapters of the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self\napart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon\nday; it is said that as R\u00e2hu (the shadow on the sun during an\neclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be\nseen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'ar\u00eeri@na@h_) are spoken of as\nmanifesting from prak@rti.\n\nWe do not know anything about \u00c2suri the direct disciple\nof Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of\nS\u00e2@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same\nform in the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ and has been attributed there to Pa\u00f1cas'ikha\nis probably the earliest form of S\u00e2@mkhya available to us\nin a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the\nschool of Maulikya S\u00e2@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka\n(78 A.U.) does not refer to the S\u00e2@mkhya as described by \u00ces'varak@r@s@na\nand referred to in other parts of _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ is a definite\nproof that \u00ces'varak@r@s@na's S\u00e2@mkhya is a later modification, which\nwas either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as\nan authoritative old S\u00e2@mkhya view.\n\nWassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyav\u00e2sin altered\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks\nthat Vindhyav\u00e2sin was a title of \u00ces'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe\nholds that the date of \u00ces'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a\nvery plausible view that \u00ces'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his k\u00e2rik\u00e2s to\nanother work, which was probably written in a style different\nfrom what he employs. The seventh verse of his _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_ seems to\nbe in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to \u00c2suri is quoted by Gu@naratna\n(_Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when\nbuddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience.\nIt is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Takakusu's \"A study of Param\u00e2rtha's life of Vasubandhu,\" _J.\nR.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be\nextremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions \u00ces'varak@r@s@na and\nVindhyav\u00e2sin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2,_\npp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyav\u00e2sin (p. 104) in\nanu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to \u00ces'varak@r@s@n\u00e2. It\nappears that \u00ces'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _S\u00e2@mkhya\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2_ and another an independent work on S\u00e2@mkhya, a line from which,\nquoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:\n\n  \"_Pratiniyat\u00e2dhyavas\u00e2ya@h s'rotr\u00e2disamuttha adhyak@sam_\" (p. 108).\n\nIf V\u00e2caspati's interpretation of the classification of anum\u00e2na in his\n_Tattvakaumud\u00ee_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _S\u00e2@mkhya\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2_ then \u00ces'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyav\u00e2sin\nwhose views on anum\u00e2na as referred to in _S'lokav\u00e2rttika,_ p. 393, are\naltogether different. But V\u00e2caspati's own statement in the\n_T\u00e2tparyya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not\nfaithful.]\n\n219\n\n_Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2sya_ of Pata\u00f1jali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1].\nThe subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which\nfrustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned\nwith the strictly technical part of S\u00e2@mkhya, and it is just possible\nthat the book from which Pata\u00f1jali quoted the passage, and which\nwas probably paraphrased in the \u00c2ry\u00e2 metre by \u00ces'varak@r@s@na\nwas not a S\u00e2@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the\nverse is not one of the strictly technical parts of S\u00e2@mkhya, yet\nsince such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of\nIndian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard\nagainst certain objections against the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine of\nprak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the\nverse of a S\u00e2@mkhya book which was paraphrased by \u00ces'varak@r@s@na.\n\nThe earliest descriptions of a S\u00e2@mkhya which agrees with\n\u00ces'varak@r@s@na's S\u00e2@mkhya (but with an addition of \u00ces'vara) are to be\nfound in Pata\u00f1jali's _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ and in the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata;_ but we\nare pretty certain that the S\u00e2@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched\nhere was known to Pata\u00f1jali, for in _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ I. 19 a reference is\nmade to a view of S\u00e2@mkhya similar to this.\n\nFrom the point of view of history of philosophy the S\u00e2@mkhya\nof Caraka and Pa\u00f1cas'ikha is very important; for it shows a\ntransitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and\nthe orthodox S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine as represented by \u00ces'varak@r@s@na.\nOn the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and\nthat effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that\nthe puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Ny\u00e2ya,\nand on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer\nthan the orthodox S\u00e2@mkhya.\n\nWe hear of a _Sa@s@titantras'\u00e2stra_ as being one of the oldest S\u00e2@mkhya\nworks. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit\u00e2_ as\ncontaining two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote\nref 2]. A quotation from _R\u00e2jav\u00e2rttika_ (a work about which there is no\ndefinite information) in V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra's commentary on the S\u00e2@mkhya\nk\u00e2rika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra because\nit dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference\nfrom puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of\npuru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Pata\u00f1jali's Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya, IV. I. 3.\n_Atisannikar@s\u00e2dativiprakar@s\u00e2t m\u00fbrttyantaravyavadh\u00e2n\u00e2t\ntamas\u00e2v@rtatv\u00e2t indriyadaurvaly\u00e2datipram\u00e2d\u00e2t,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit\u00e2,_ pp. 108, 110.]\n\n220\n\nthe categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_,\nnine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the\neight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].\n\nBut the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya\nSa@mhit\u00e2_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the S\u00e2@mkhya\nof the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit\u00e2_ was of\na theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pa\u00f1car\u00e2tra\nVai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit\u00e2_ says that Kapila's\ntheory of S\u00e2@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhiksu, the\ngreatest expounder of S\u00e2@mkhya, says in many places of his work\n_Vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2m@rta Bh\u00e2@sya_ that S\u00e2@mkhya was originally theistic, and that\nthe atheistic S\u00e2@mkhya is only a _prau@dhiv\u00e2da_ (an exaggerated\nattempt to show that no supposition of \u00ces'vara is necessary to\nexplain the world process) though the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ points out\nthat the difference between S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the\nformer is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy\nbetween the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original\n_Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit\u00e2_ was\nsubsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is\ncorroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among\nthe important S\u00e2@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddh\u00e2ra_\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs,\nand the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karik\u00e2_ of Is'varakr@sna, but I\nhave omitted them in my account of S\u00e2mkhya as these have little\nphilosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five,\nviz. avidy\u00e2 (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa\n(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo,\nmoha, mah\u00e2moha, tamisr\u00e2_, and _andhat\u00e2misra_. These are of nine kinds\nof tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti\nwill herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary\nto meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's\nlife (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time\n(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bh\u00e2gya_), and\nthe contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of\ncauses, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of\nprotecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things\nearned by enjoyment (_par\u00e2para_), increase of desires leading to greater\ndisappointments (_anuttam\u00e2mbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others\n(_uttam\u00e2mbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations\nwith those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The\nsiddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of\nscriptures (_t\u00e2ra_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sut\u00e2ra_),\n(3) proper reasoning (_t\u00e2rat\u00e2ra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas\nwith the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field\n(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice\n(_sad\u00e2mudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and\nmodam\u00e2na lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a.\nThe twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses\nand seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the\nabsence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis\nand the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the\nachievement of the S\u00e2@mkhya goal.]\n\n221\n\n(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the\nearlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before V\u00e2caspati's time.\n\nIf we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya\nSa@mhit\u00e2_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was\ncomposed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it\nhas to be assumed that Kapila's S\u00e2@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It\nseems probable that his disciple \u00c2suri tried to popularise it. But it\nseems that a great change occurred when Pa\u00f1cas'ikha the disciple of\n\u00c2suri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine\ndiffered from the traditional one in many important respects. It\nis said in _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ (70) that the literature was divided by\nhim into many parts (_tena bahudh\u00e2k@rtam tantram_). The exact\nmeaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that\nthe original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises.\nIt is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas\naccepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential\nparts as the S\u00e2@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption\nthat Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are\na few other points of difference between the Kapila and the\nP\u00e2ta\u00f1jala S\u00e2@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may\nbe ventured is that Pa\u00f1cas'ikha probably modified Kapila's\nwork in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this\nsupposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of\nS\u00e2@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but\nwhich is kept in a modified form by the P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala school of S\u00e2@mkhya,\nsecond an atheistic one as represented by Pa\u00f1cas'ikha, and\na third atheistic modification as the orthodox S\u00e2@mkhya system.\nAn important change in the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine seems to have\nbeen introduced by Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his\ntreatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this\ninterpretation of S\u00e2@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical\none, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system\nof the accepted Kapila and the P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala school of S\u00e2@mkhya. But\nit must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was\napplied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then\nthey were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase\nand decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyad\u00eepik\u00e2_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam pr\u00e2hah s'ar\u00eeramth m\u00e2nav\u00e2h s\u00e2@mkhyam\nsa@mkhy\u00e2tmakatv\u00e2cca kapil\u00e2dibhirucyate. Matsyapur\u00e2na_, IV. 28.]\n\n222\n\ntotality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation\nof the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su\nand the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga\nphilosophy compiled by Pata\u00f1jali and commented on by Vy\u00e2sa,\nV\u00e2caspati and Vij\u00f1@ana Bhik@su, agree with the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine\nas explained by V\u00e2caspati and Vij\u00f1ana Bhik@su in most points I\nhave preferred to call them the Kapila and the P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala schools\nof S\u00e2@mkhya and have treated them together--a principle which\nwas followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_.\n\nThe other important S\u00e2@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudap\u00e2da\nare Sanaka, Sananda, San\u00e2tana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is\nknown about their historicity or doctrines.\n\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2, S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtra, V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra and\nVij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su.\n\nA word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation\nof the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga system. The _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ is\nthe oldest S\u00e2@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by\nlater writers. The _S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtra_ was not referred to by any\nwriter until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth\ncentury A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who\nmade allusions to a number of S\u00e2@mkhya works, did not make any\nreference to the _S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtra_, and no other writer who is known\nto have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any\nreference to the _S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtra_. The natural conclusion therefore\nis that these s\u00fbtras were probably written some time after\nthe fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to\nprove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is\nsaid at the end of the _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ of \u00ces'varak@r@s@na that the\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2s give an exposition of the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine excluding\nthe refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the\nparables attached to the original S\u00e2@mkhya works--the\n_@Sa@s@titantras'\u00e2stra_. The _S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtras_ contain refutations\nof other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable\nthat these were collected from some earlier S\u00e2@mkhya work which is\nnow lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition\nof the _@Sa@s@titantras'\u00e2stra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddh\u00e2ra_ as mentioned by\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume\nof the present work.]\n\n223\n\nG\u00fb@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to\nsuppose that the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine found in the s\u00fbtras differs in\nany important way from the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine as found in the\n_S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_. The only point of importance is this, that the\n_S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute\npure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved\nin the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of\nthe gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence,\nthey were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form\nthe category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some\nsense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in\nthe _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_. This is, however, a case of omission and not\nof difference. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su, the commentator of the _S\u00e2@mkhya\ns\u00fbtra_, was more inclined to theistic S\u00e2@mkhya or Yoga than\nto atheistic S\u00e2@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in\nhis _S\u00e2mkhyapravacanabh\u00e2@sya, Yogav\u00e2rttika_, and _Vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2m@rtabhasya_\n(an independent commentary on the Brahmas\u00fbtras of\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2yana on theistic S\u00e2@mkhya lines). Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhiksu's own\nview could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he\nagreed more with the views of the S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine of the\nPura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said\nto be merged in the end in \u00ces'vara, by whose will the creative\nprocess again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya.\nHe could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the\n_S\u00e2@mkhya s\u00fbtras_, but he remarked that these were used only with\na view to showing that the S\u00e2@mkhya system gave such a rational\nexplanation that even without the intervention of an \u00ces'vara it could\nexplain all facts. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su in his interpretation of S\u00e2@mkhya\ndiffered on many points from those of V\u00e2caspati, and it is difficult\nto say who is right. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su has this advantage that\nhe has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points\non which V\u00e2caspati remained silent. I refer principally to the\nnature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most\nimportant thing in S\u00e2@mkhya. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su described the\ngu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but V\u00e2caspati and\nGau@dap\u00e2da (the other commentator of the _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_)\nremained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their\ninterpretations which would militate against the interpretation of\nVij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite\nexplanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely\n\n224\n\ncame forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation\nof their nature.\n\nSince no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any\nother work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter\nmay not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka\nnor the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. But\nBhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known\nof the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early\ndocuments. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su\nin giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_\nspeaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and\ndullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as\nbeing light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and\ncausing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. V\u00e2caspati\nmerely paraphrases this statement of the _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_ but does not enter\ninto any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in well\nwith all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible\nthat this view might not have been known before, and when the\noriginal S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness\nas to the conception of the gu@nas.\n\nThere are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation\ndiffers from that of V\u00e2caspati. The most important of these may\nbe mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of\nthe buddhi states with the puru@sa. V\u00e2caspati holds that there is\nno contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that\na reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by\nvirtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed\ninto consciousness. But this view is open to the objection\nthat it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the\nexperiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection\nin the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience\n(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any\nactual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of\nV\u00e2caspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space\nand time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific\nkind of fitness (_yogyat\u00e2_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it\nremains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi,\nand as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed\nto a person. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su differs from V\u00e2caspati and says that\nif such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no\n\n225\n\nreason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time\nof emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all,\nfor the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it,\nand he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in\nthe buddhi for ever. Vij\u00f1ana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a\nreal contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive\nstate. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not\nnecessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on\naccount of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change\nmeans the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers\nchanges, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there\nis the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when\nthe puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears\nas a conscious state. The second, is the difference between\nV\u00e2caspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual\nprocess. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the\ndeterminate qualities of things without any intervention of manas,\nwhereas V\u00e2caspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the\nsense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate\nsense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is\nthe stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at\nthe next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association\nby which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified\nby the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the\nindeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and\nconceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.\nBhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is\ndirectly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate\nposition to manas as being only the faculty of desire,\ndoubt, and imagination.\n\nIt may not be out of place to mention here that there are\none or two passages in V\u00e2caspati's commentary on the _S\u00e2@mkhya\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mk\u00e2ra_)\nas producing the subjective series of the senses and the\nobjective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will,\nbut he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not\nnecessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view\nwith regard to the evolution of the tanm\u00e2tras from the mahat;\nfor contrary to the view of _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ and Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su etc.\nV\u00e2caspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mk\u00e2ra and\n\n226\n\nfrom aha@mk\u00e2ra the tanm\u00e2tras [Footnote ref 1]. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su however\nholds that both the separation of aha@mk\u00e2ra and the evolution of the\ntanm\u00e2tras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more\nreasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some\nother minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between\nV\u00e2caspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical\nimportance.\n\n\nYoga and Pata\u00f1jali.\n\nThe word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such\nas yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection,\nand the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the\nother senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was\nused in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as\nthe S'atapatha Br\u00e2hmana and the B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2].\nThe word has another derivative \"yugya\" in later Sanskrit literature\n[Footnote ref 3].\n\nWith the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the\n@Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very\nmuch valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow\nof celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues\nand considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].\n\nAs these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force\nof the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of\na spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally\napplied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control\nof the senses [Footnote ref 5].\n\nIn P\u00e2@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical\nmeaning, and he distinguished this root \"_yuj sam\u00e2dhau_\" (_yuj_\nin the sense of concentration) from \"_yujir yoge_\" (root _yujir_ in\nthe sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as\na verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological\nderivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.\n9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]\n\n[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German\nJoch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10;\nTaitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Br\u00e2h, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;\nS'atap. Br\u00e2h. XI. 5. 8. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriy\u00e2@ni hay\u00e2n\u00e2hu@h vi@say\u00e2te@sugocar\u00e2n_.\nThe senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.\nMaitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriy\u00e2@nyasya hay\u00e2@h_ the conative senses are its\nhorses.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from\n_yuja sam\u00e2dhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule \"Tadasya brahmacaryam,\"\nV.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which\npassed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time\n(P\u00e2@nini as Goldst\u00fbcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with\nthese had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by\nthe name of Yoga.]\n\n227\n\n\nIn the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_, we find that the word yoga has been\nused not only in conformity with the root \"_yuj-sam\u00e2dhau_\" but\nalso with \"_yujir yoge_\" This has been the source of some confusion\nto the readers of the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2._ \"Yogin\" in the sense\nof a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded\nwith extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of\nthis word lies in this that the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ tried to mark out a\nmiddle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction\non the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action\nof a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently\nfrom _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the\nbest parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet\nabstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.\n\nKau@tilya in his _Arthas'\u00e2stra_ when enumerating the philosophic\nsciences of study names S\u00e2@mkhya, Yoga, and Lok\u00e2yata. The\noldest Buddhist s\u00fbtras (e.g. the _Satipa@t@th\u00e2na sutta_) are fully\nfamiliar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus\ninfer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical\nmethod of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.\n\nAs regards the connection of Yoga with S\u00e2@mkhya, as we find\nit in the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ of Pata\u00f1jali, it is indeed difficult to come to\nany definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted\nnotice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not\nprobably developed any systematic form of pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2ma (a system\nof breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we\ncome to Maitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee that we find that the Yoga method had attained\na systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in\nwhich the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vet\u00e2s'vatara and\nthe Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three\nUpani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga\nmethods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya tenets, though the S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not\nappear there as related to each other or associated as parts of\nthe same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the\nMaitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee in the conversation between S'\u00e2ky\u00e2yana and B@rhad\nratha where we find that the S\u00e2@mkhya metaphysics was offered\n\n228\n\nin some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,\nand it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the\nS\u00e2@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the\nwork of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently\nsystematized by Pata\u00f1jali. Thus S'\u00e2ky\u00e2yana says: \"Here some\nsay it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes\ninto bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when\nthe fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the\nmind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief,\ncertainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but\nmind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in\nhis imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating\nhe enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and\nhe binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a\nman being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,\nbut he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man\nstand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of\nliberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening\nof the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness.\nAll desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a\nverse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together\nwith the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called\nthe highest state [Footnote ref 1].'\"\n\nAn examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'\u00e2@n@dilya, Yogatattva,\nDhy\u00e2nabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtan\u00e2da, Var\u00e2ha, Ma@n@dala\nBr\u00e2hma@na, N\u00e2dabindu, and Yogaku@n@dal\u00fb, shows that the Yoga\npractices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but\nnone of these show any predilection for the S\u00e2@mkhya. Thus the\nYoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana, however, in his bh\u00e2@sya on _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_, I. i 29,\ndistinguishes S\u00e2@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The S\u00e2@mkhya holds\nthat nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any\nchange in the pure intelligence (_niratis'ay\u00e2@h cetan\u00e2@h_). All changes\nare due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects.\nYoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa.\nDo@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma.\nThe intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non\nbeing can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last\nview is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya,_ It is\ncloser to Ny\u00e2ya in its doctrines. If V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's statement is correct,\nit would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in\ncreation was borrowed by S\u00e2@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the\nsame s\u00fbtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between S\u00e2@mkhya\nand Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being \"_abhautika._\" Curiously\nenough V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana quotes a passage from _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya,_ III. 13, in his\nbh\u00e2@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]\n\n229\n\nS'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;\nthey grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which\nwas supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through\nconstant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also\nassociated with healing and other supernatural powers. The\nYogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the\nMantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and R\u00e2jayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some\ncases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Ved\u00e2ntism\nwith these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in\nthe development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also\nvery great, but we have to leave out these from our present\nconsideration as they have little philosophic importance and as\nthey are not connected with our present endeavour.\n\nOf the P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala school of S\u00e2@mkhya, which forms the subject of\nthe Yoga with which we are now dealing, Pata\u00f1jali was probably\nthe most notable person for he not only collected the different\nforms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which\nwere or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all\non the S\u00e2@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which\nthey have been handed down to us. V\u00e2caspati and Vij\u00f1\u00e2na\nBhik@su, the two great commentators on the _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_, agree\nwith us in holding that Pata\u00f1jali was not the founder of Yoga,\nbut an editor. Analytic study of the s\u00fbtras brings the conviction\nthat the s\u00fbtras do not show any original attempt, but a\nmasterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented\nby fitting contributions. The systematic manner also\nin which the first three chapters are written by way of definition\nand classification shows that the materials were already in\nexistence and that Pata\u00f1jali systematized them. There was\nno missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of\nother systems, except as far as they might come in by way of\nexplaining the system. Pata\u00f1jal is not even anxious to establish\nthe system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts\nas he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists\noccur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are\ndescribed in the first three chapters, and this part is separated\nfrom the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaig\u00ee@savya wrote \"_Dh\u00e2ran\u00e2s'\u00e2stra_\" which\ndealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Pata\u00f1jali.\nHe mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the\nnose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory\nwhere concentration is to be made. See V\u00e2caspati's _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ or\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's bh\u00e2@sya on _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_, III. ii. 43.]\n\n230\n\ncriticized; the putting of an \"_iti_\" (the word to denote the conclusion\nof any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to\ndenote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course\nanother \"_iti_\" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the\nconclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis\nseems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a\nhand other than that of Pata\u00f1jali who was anxious to supply\nsome new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for\nthe strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of\nview, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the\nsupposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a\nmarked change (due either to its supplementary character or\nto the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last\nchapter as compared with the style of the other three.\n\nThe s\u00fbtras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what\nhas already been said in the second chapter and some of the\ntopics introduced are such that they could well have been\ndealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar\ndiscussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter\nis also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 s\u00fbtras,\nwhereas the average number of s\u00fbtras in other chapters is between\n51 to 55.\n\nWe have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date\nof this famous Yoga author Pata\u00f1jali. Weber had tried to connect\nhim with K\u00e2pya Pata@mchala of S'atapatha Br\u00e2hma@na [Footnote ref l]; in\nK\u00e2ty\u00e2yana's _Varttika_ we get the name Pata\u00f1jali which is explained\nby later commentators as _patanta@h a\u00f1jalaya@h yasmai_ (for\nwhom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed\ndifficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of\nnames. There is however another theory which identifies the\nwriter of the great commentary on P\u00e2@nini called the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_\nwith the Pata\u00f1jali of the _Yoga s\u00fbtra_. This theory has been\naccepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of\nsome Indian commentators who identified the two Pata\u00f1jalis.\nOf these one is the writer of the _Pata\u00f1jalicarita_ (R\u00e2mabhadra\nD\u00eek@s\u00eeta) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth\ncentury. The other is that cited in S'ivar\u00e2ma's commentary on\n_V\u00e2savadatt\u00e2_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century.\nThe other two are king Bhoja of Dh\u00e2r and Cakrap\u00e2@nidatta,\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]\n\n231\n\nthe commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh\ncentury A.D. Thus Cakrap\u00e2@ni says that he adores the Ahipati\n(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech\nand body by his _P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ and the revision of\n_Caraka._ Bhoja says: \"Victory be to the luminous words of\nthat illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his\ngrammar, by writing his commentary on the Pata\u00f1jala and by\nproducing a treatise on medicine called _R\u00e2jam@rg\u00e2@nka_ has like the\nlord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech,\nmind and body.\" The adoration hymn of Vy\u00e2sa (which is considered\nto be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also\nbased upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that\nthe later Indian commentators might have made some confusion\nbetween the three Pata\u00f1jalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor,\nand the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as\n_P\u00e2ta\u00f1jalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivad\u00e2sa in his\ncommentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of\nmetals.\n\nProfessor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore\nin a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian\nand the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these\ncommentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great\ncommentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta,\nV\u00e2mana, Jay\u00e2ditya, N\u00e2ges'a, etc. are silent on this point.\nThis is indeed a point against the identification of the two\nPata\u00f1jalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later\nage. And if other proofs are available which go against such\nan identification, we could not think the grammarian and the\nYoga writer to be the same person.\n\nLet us now see if Pata\u00f1jali's grammatical work contains anything\nwhich may lead us to think that he was not the same\nperson as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the\nphilosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Pata\u00f1jalis\ndiffers and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that\ndravya is described in _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ in one place as being the\nunity of species and qualities (_s\u00e2m\u00e2nyavis'e@s\u00e2tmaka_), whereas\nthe _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also\nspecific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on\neither side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally\nantagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by\n\n232\n\nVy\u00e2@di and V\u00e2japy\u00e2yana (Vy\u00e2@di holding that words denoted\nqualities or dravya and V\u00e2japy\u00e2yana holding that words denoted\nspecies [Footnote ref 1]). Even P\u00e2@nini had these two different ideas in\n\"_j\u00e2ty\u00e2khy\u00e2y\u00e2mekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasy\u00e2m_\" and\n\"_sar\u00fbp\u00e2namekas'e@samekavibhaktau_,\" and Pata\u00f1jali the writer of\nthe _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show\nthat he opposes the view of _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_, though we must remember\nthat even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard\nto the writer of the s\u00fbtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya\nis spoken of in the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ as that object which is the\nspecific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is\nof its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--\"_yat\ns\u00e2sn\u00e2l\u00e2@ngulakakudakhuravi@s\u00e2@nyarthar\u00fbpam_,\" we are reminded of\nits similarity with \"_ayutasiddh\u00e2vayavabhed\u00e2nugata@h sam\u00fbha@h dravyam_\"\n(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the\n_Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2sya_. So far as I have examined the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ I have\nnot been able to discover anything there which can warrant us\nin holding that the two Pata\u00f1jalis cannot be identified. There\nare no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even\nin these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians\nthat are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable\nfor us to judge anything about the personal views\nof the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the\nwriter of the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ knew most of the important points of\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer\nto the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the S\u00e2@mkhya dictum of ex\nnihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the\nidea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of\nchange _vik\u00e2ra_ as production of new qualities _gu@n\u00e2ntar\u00e2dh\u00e2na_\n(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133).\nWe may add to it that the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_ agrees with the Yoga\nview as regards the Spho@tav\u00e2da, which is not held in common\nby any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this\nexternal similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin\ntheir works in a similar manner (_atha yog\u00e2nus'\u00e2sanam_ and\n_athas'\u00e2bd\u00e2nus'\u00e2sanam_)--\"now begins the compilation of the\ninstructions on Yoga\" (_Yoga s\u00fbtr\u00e2_)--and \"now begins the compilation\nof the instructions of words\" (_Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya_).\n\nIt may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Pata\u00f1jali's _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]\n\n233\n\nwhich Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the\n_Yoga s\u00fbtra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive,\nas they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Pata\u00f1jalis\ncannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the\nYoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed\nBuddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which,\nas I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they\nwere written by Pata\u00f1jali it cannot be inferred that because\nV\u00e2caspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2na-v\u00e2di\ntype, we are to infer that the s\u00fbtras refer to Vasubandhu or\neven to N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the s\u00fbtras\nhad been developing long before the time of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna.\n\nThus we see that though the tradition of later commentators\nmay not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two\nPata\u00f1jalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative\ncritical study of the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ and the text of the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya,_\nwhich can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga\ns\u00fbtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Pata\u00f1jali.\n\nPostponing our views about the time of Pata\u00f1jali the Yoga\neditor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing\nthe other work _Kit\u00e2b P\u00e2tanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for\nour consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous\none and he translates it along with another book called _S\u00e2nka_\n(S\u00e2@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the\nform of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that\nthis book was not the present _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ of Pata\u00f1jali, though it\nhad the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation\nand for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation.\nThe book was called by Alberuni _Kit\u00e2b P\u00e2tanjal_, which is to\nbe translated as the book of P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala, because in another place,\nspeaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when\ntranslated stands as \"the author of the book of P\u00e2tanjal.\" It\nhad also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes\nmany extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It\ntreats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in\nthe _Yoga s\u00fbtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist\nreference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapram\u00e2@nakam tad\u00e2 kim sy\u00e2t_\n(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya, as Bhoja, who had\nconsulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count\nit as s\u00fbtra.]\n\n234\n\nfar as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by\nAlberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change\nfrom what we find in the _Yoga s\u00fbtra_. Following the idea of God\nin Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless\nemancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and\nshows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they\ncould obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name\nof God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of\nwhich the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives\nhim and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical\nwith worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it\nuninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption\nwith him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga s\u00fbtra._\nThe idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the\neight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation\non the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation\ncorresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yoga\ns\u00fbtra._ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation,\nof which the first is the _abhy\u00e2sa_ (habit) of Pata\u00f1jali, and the\nobject of this abhy\u00e2sa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second\nstands for vair\u00e2gya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek\nhis favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga s\u00fbtra,_ I. 23 and\nI. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of ras\u00e2yana\nor alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the\nsame as in the _Yoga s\u00fbtra,_ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated\nstate is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being\none with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvam\u00fbla\nav\u00e2ks'\u00e2kha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branches\nbelow), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure\nBrahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different\ndoctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of\ninterpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga s\u00fbtras_\nspeak of Is'v\u00e2ra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient,\nand the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the\nobstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice\nare removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of\nconcentration. The commentator Vy\u00e2sa notes that he is the best object,\nfor being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills\nthat he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No\nargument is given in the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ of the existence of God.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]\n\n235\n\nobject of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the\nroots.\n\nThe difference of this system from that of the _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ is:\n(1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance\nthat he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption\nin him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and\nthe niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the\nYoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any\nconnection with God as we find in the _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ has been lost\nsight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in\nGod; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance\nof Yoga as control of mental states (_citta@rttinirodha_) is lost\nsight of, and (7) ras\u00e2yana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the\nmeans of salvation.\n\nFrom this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification\nof the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Pata\u00f1jali's _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ in\nthe direction of Ved\u00e2nta and Tantra, and as such it\nprobably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga\ndoctrine of the s\u00fbtras entered into a new channel in such a way\nthat it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments\nof Ved\u00e2nta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author\nmentions ras\u00e2yana as a means of salvation, it is very probable\nthat he flourished after N\u00e2garjuna and was probably the same\nperson who wrote _P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala tantra_, who has been quoted by\nS'ivad\u00e2sa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of\nby N\u00e2ges'a as \"_Carake_ Pata\u00f1jali@h.\" We can also assume with some\ndegree of probability that it is with reference to this man that\nCakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with\nthe writer of the _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrap\u00e2@ni\nby his line \"_p\u00e2ta\u00f1jalamah\u00e2bh\u00e2@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_\"\nrefers to this work which was called \"P\u00e2ta\u00f1jala.\" The commentator\nof this work gives some description of the lokas, dv\u00eepas and\nthe s\u00e2garas, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the\n_Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably\nwritten at a time when the _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ was not written\nor had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of S\u00e2@mkhya, gives\na list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama,\nbut it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of _P\u00e2s'upatadars'ana_ in\n_Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_.]\n\n236\n\nalso described the book as being very famous at the time, and\nBhoja and Cakrap\u00e2@ni also probably confused him with Pata\u00f1jali\nthe grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book\nof Pata\u00f1jali was probably written by some other Pata\u00f1jali within\nthe first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not\nbe improbable that when _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ quotes in III. 44 as \"_iti_\nPata\u00f1jali@h,\" he refers to this Pata\u00f1jali.\n\nThe conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitr\u00e2ya@na\nUpani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2ma,\npraty\u00e2h\u00e2ra, dhy\u00e2na, dhara@n\u00e2, tarka and sam\u00e2dhi [Footnote ref 1].\nComparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ we find\nthat two new elements have been added, and tarka has been\nreplaced by \u00e2sana. Now from the account of the sixty-two\nheresies given in the _Brahmaj\u00e2la sutta_ we know that there were\npeople who either from meditation of three degrees or through\nlogic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external\nworld as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the\nassociation of this last mentioned logical school with the Sam\u00e2dhi\nor Dhy\u00e2na school as belonging to one class of thinkers called\ns'\u00e2s'vatav\u00e2da, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in\nsam\u00e2dhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in\nMaitr\u00e2ya@n\u00ee Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine,\nwhen the S\u00e2@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being\ngrafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion\ndid not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The\nsubstitution of \u00e2sana for tarka in the list of Pata\u00f1jali shows that\nthe Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya.\nThe introduction of ahi@ms\u00e2 (non-injury), satya (truthfulness),\nasteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha\n(want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment)\nas niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is\ndeemed impossible (for the first time in the s\u00fbtras), probably\nmarks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the\nBuddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitr\u00ee,\nkaru@n\u00e2, mudit\u00e2, upek@s\u00e2 is also equally significant, as we do not\nfind them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other\nliterature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation.\nBeginning from the _\u00c2c\u00e2r\u00e2@ngas\u00fbtra, Uttar\u00e2dhyayanas\u00fbtra_,\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2mah praty\u00e2h\u00e2rah dhy\u00e2nam dhara@n\u00e2 tarkah sam\u00e2dhih\nsa@da@nga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]\n\n237\n\nthe _S\u00fbtrak@rt\u00e2@ngas\u00fbtra,_ etc., and passing through Um\u00e2svati's\n_Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigamas\u00fbtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'\u00e2stra_ we find that\nthe Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the\nbasis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the\nopinion expressed in Alberuni's _P\u00e2tanjal_ that these cannot give\nsalvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from\nthe Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its\nthoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection\nwith the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the\nsame as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely\nsuffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the\npath to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics\nof the sa@ms\u00e2ra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination,\ndecease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of\nsimilarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism.\nAvidy\u00e2 is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidy\u00e2 should\nnot be confused with the Ved\u00e2nta avidy\u00e2 of S'a@nkara, as it is an\navidy\u00e2 of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion\nnor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the\nrange of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidy\u00e2 is the ignorance\nof the four sacred truths, as we have in the s\u00fbtra\n\"_anity\u00e2s'ucidu@hkh\u00e2n\u00e2tmasu nityas'ucidu@hkh\u00e2tmakhy\u00e2tiravidy\u00e2_\" (II. 5).\n\nThe ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_).\n\"This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be\nourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds\nof existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts\noff being for us at least [Footnote ref 2].\" This is true as much of\nBuddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in\nthe Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has\nnever been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu\nliterature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things\nin this section is to show that the _Yoga s\u00fbtras_ proper (first three\nchapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of\nBuddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between\nthe Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Yoga s\u00fbtra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yath\u00e2cikits\u00e2s'\u00e2stra@m\ncaturvy\u00fbha@m rogo rogahetuh \u00e2rogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi\ns'\u00e2stram caturvy\u00fbhameva; tadyath\u00e2 sa@ms\u00e2ra@h, sa@ms\u00e2rahetu@h mok@sa@h\nmok@sop\u00e2ya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@ms\u00e2ro heya@h, pradh\u00e2napuru@sayo@h\nsa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasy\u00e2tyantik\u00ee niv@rttirh\u00e2na@m hanop\u00e2ya@h\nsamyagdar`sanam, Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_, II. 15]\n\n[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1].]\n\n238\n\na stage that they would not like to borrow from one another.\nAs this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed\nto think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yoga\ns\u00fbtras_ must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there\nis no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the\ngrammarian Pata\u00f1jali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may\ntake them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe S\u00e2@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa.\n\nThe S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles,\nsouls and _prak@rti_, the root principle of matter. Souls are\nmany, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities.\nThey do not contract or expand according as they occupy a\nsmaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are\nnot contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But\nthe relation between body or rather the mind associated with it\nand soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the\nmind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are\nmany, and had it not been so (the S\u00e2@mkhya argues) with the\nbirth of one all would have been born and with the death of one\nall would have died [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension,\nand yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly\ngrasp in order to understand the S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy. Unlike\nthe Jaina soul possessing _anantaj\u00f1\u00e2na, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_,\nand _anantav\u00eeryya_, the S\u00e2@mkhya soul is described as being\ndevoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute\npure consciousness (_cit_). The S\u00e2@mkhya view differs from\nthe Ved\u00e2nta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to\nbe of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_\u00e2nanda_) [Footnote ref\n3]. Bliss with S\u00e2@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it\nbelongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul;\nsecondly, according to Ved\u00e2nta the individual souls (_J\u00eeva_) are\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other\nIndian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour\nof this identification seems to be that both the Pata\u00f1jalis as against\nthe other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _spho@ta_ which was\ndenied even by S\u00e2@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my _Study\nof Patanjali_, Appendix I.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_, 18.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvaprad\u00eepik\u00e2,_ IV.]\n\n239\n\nbut illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the\nBrahman, but according to S\u00e2@mkhya they are all real and many.\n\nThe most interesting feature of S\u00e2@mkhya as of Ved\u00e2nta is\nthe analysis of knowledge. S\u00e2@mkhya holds that our knowledge\nof things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things\nare indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind,\nthe coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in\nsome sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature\nlike the external things. The sense-data and images come and go,\nthey are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things,\nand as such ought to be considered as in some sense material,\nbut the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest.\nThese images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious,\nif there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection\nwith which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted\nas the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the\nUpani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite\nconsciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas,\nand the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not\ndetect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle\nwhich has no change, no form, but which is like a light which\nillumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes.\nThe self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our \"self\"\nbut we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other\nthings, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The\nJains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and\nevery act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the\nveil. S\u00e2@mkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image\nof knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent\nprinciple, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle\nmatter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms\nor images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance,\nand thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed\nin darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves,\nthe pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated.\nSo it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic\nof self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would\nbe blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumud\u00ee_ 5; _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, IV. 22;\n_Vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2m@rtabh\u00e2@sya_, p. 74; _Yogav\u00e2rttika_ and _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_,\nI. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya,_ I. 6, 7.]\n\n240\n\nso far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the\nsame as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens\nthese knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious.\nThis principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot indeed be\nseparately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle in\nall our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference.\nThis principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality,\nno impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes\nplace in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it,\nand produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes\nof knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item\nof knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is\nbut a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the\nprinciple of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge\ncarries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness,\nit is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness.\nKnowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a\nparticular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation\nof the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening,\npure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is\nconcerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind\nknowledge-stuff.\n\nThe Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent\nparts, and had held that the coming together of these\nbrought about the conscious states. This coming together was\nto them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity\nor coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary\ncollocation. With S\u00e3@mkhya however the self, the pure _cit_, is\nneither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent.\nComing into touch with it gives unity to all the movements\nof the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise\nhave remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into\nconnection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted\nas the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and\nmay thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the\nexpression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is important to note that S\u00e2@mkhya has two terms to denote\nthe two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of\nawareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the form\nof the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition\ntakes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]\n\n241\n\nknowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a\nsystem of experience. This principle of intelligence is called\npuru@sa. There is a separate puru@sa in S\u00e2@mkhya for each individual,\nand it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Ved\u00e2nta\n\u00e2tman however is different from the S\u00e2@mkhya puru@sa in this that\nit is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being,\nand pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory m\u00e2y\u00e2 it\nappears as many.\n\n\nThought and Matter.\n\nA question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are\nmade up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter\nare, why then should the puru@sa illuminate it and not external\nmaterial objects. The answer that S\u00e2@mkhya gives is that the\nknowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects\nin this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance\nof a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), which\nresembles the light of puru@sa, and is thus fit for reflecting and\nabsorbing the light of the puru@sa. The two principal characteristics\nof external gross matter are mass and energy. But it\nhas also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed\nby our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has\nagain the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able\nto catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendent\nprinciple of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic\nof external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to\nboth gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is\nat its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity\nof translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the\nintelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the\ngross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that\nthought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of\nthought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour,\nand other characteristics of the thing which has been made its\nobject. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter\ndid not possess some of the essential substances of which the\ncopy was made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which is\nso predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination\nin matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some\nsuch notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in\n\n242\n\nthought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have\nmovement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images\ndo not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent\nand plastic element of thought (_sattva_) in association with\nmovement (_rajas_) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation\nof all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction\n(_tamas_) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses\nthings in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)\nholds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness,\nand actual knowledge comes before our view as though\nby the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the\nlight of the puru@sa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its\nstores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture\nor idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates\nthat in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests\nitself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both\nthought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a\nplasticity of intelligence-stuff (_sattva_), energy-stuff (_rajas_), and\nmass-stuff (_tamas_), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last\ntwo are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.\n\n\nFeelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1].\n\nAnother question that arises in this connection is the position\nof feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. S\u00e2mkhya\nholds that the three characteristic constituents that we have\nanalyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most\ninteresting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that\nwe think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we\nshould analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped\nsensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its\nappearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and\nwe find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image.\nEven in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of\nknowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down\nthe scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of\nmatter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling\nwhich never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale\nof evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there\ncomes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_, 12, with Gau@dp\u00e2da and N\u00e2r\u00e2ya@nat\u00eertha.]\n\n243\n\nreactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark\nthe earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the\npoint of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in\nordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain\nstage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at\na certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with\nmatter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves,\nthe ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross\nmatter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in\ntaking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross\nmatter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed\nto take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and\nmatter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances\nwhich are in essence but three types of feeling entities.\nThe three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we\nhave noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations\nof three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings\nthat we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that\nwe call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither\nsorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression\n(_vi@s\u00e2da_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of\nmanifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as\nshining (_prak\u00e2s'a_), energy (_prav@rtti_), obstruction (_niyama_), there\nare three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as\nthe ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross\nmatter and thought by their varying modifications.\n\n\nThe Gu@nas [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThese three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically\ncalled _gu@na_ in S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy. Gu@na in Sanskrit has three\nmeanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These\nentities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it\nmay be mentioned in this connection that in S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy\nthere is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each\nand every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What\nwe call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance\nof a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, II. 18; Bh\u00e2v\u00e2ga@nes'a's\n_Tattvay\u00e2th\u00e2rthyad\u00eepana_, pp. 1-3; _Vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2m@rtabh\u00e2@sya_,\np. 100; _Tattvakaumud\u00ee_, 13; also Gau@dap\u00e2da and N\u00e2r\u00e2ya@nat\u00eertha, 13.]\n\n244\n\nsignifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; any\nobject we see seems to possess many qualities, but the S\u00e2@mkhya\nholds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality,\nhowever fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding\nsubtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a\nquality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects\nbut also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities\nwere thus called gu@nas probably to suggest that they are the\nentities which by their various modifications manifest themselves\nas gu@nas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be\ncalled gu@nas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes\nby which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and\nmatter. These may also be called gu@nas as things of secondary\nimportance, because though permanent and indestructible, they\ncontinually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual\ngroupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably\nconstant like the souls (_puru@sa_). Moreover the object of the\nworld process being the enjoyment and salvation of the puru@sas,\nthe matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of\nprimary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined\nto justify the name gu@na as applied to these subtle entities, it\nshould be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or\nsubtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gu@nas are\ninfinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics\nas described above they have been arranged in three classes or types\ncalled _sattva_ (intelligence-stuff), _rajas_ (energy-stuff) and _tamas_\n(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in\ncertain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the\n_sattva-gu@nas_ and those which behave as units of activity are called\nthe _rajo-gu@nas_ and those which behave as factors of obstruction,\nmass or materiality are called _tamo-gu@nas_. These subtle gu@na\nsubstances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number\nof sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a\nlarger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and\nsattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result\nof this, different substances with different qualities come into being.\nThough attached to one another when united in different proportions,\nthey mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined\nresultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is\nhowever\n\n245\n\none and only one stage in which the gu@nas are not compounded\nin varying proportions. In this state each of the gu@na\nsubstances is opposed by each of the other gu@na substances, and\nthus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in\nwhich none of the characters of the gu@nas manifest themselves.\nThis is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics\nthat it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It\nis a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which\nis as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium\nof the gu@nas is called prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which\ncannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose,\nbut it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the\nearliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications\ntake place.\n\n\nPrak@rti and its Evolution.\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya believes that before this world came into being there\nwas such a state of dissolution--a state in which the gu@na compounds\nhad disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their\nmutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prak@rti. Then\nlater on disturbance arose in the prak@rti, and as a result of that a\nprocess of unequal aggregation of the gu@nas in varying proportions\ntook place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold.\nPrak@rti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the\ngu@nas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate,\ndifferentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gu@nas are\nalways uniting, separating, and uniting again [Footnote ref 2]. Varying\nqualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one\nanother and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve\nfrom the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or\nqualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce\nthe world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies\nnever coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy\nthere is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter,\nresistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestation\nto sattva. The particular gu@na which happens to be predominant\nin any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and\nothers become latent, though their presence is inferred by their\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Yogav\u00e2rttika,_ II. 19, and _Pravacanabh\u00e2@sya,_ I. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Kaumud\u00ee_ 13-16; _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_ II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also\n_Yogav\u00e2rttika,_ IV. 13,14.]\n\n246\n\neffect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy\nlatent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a\nmoving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is\npartially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of\nthe gu@nas in different proportions presuppose the state of prak@rti\nas the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to\nconscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are\nexactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass,\nand the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium\nis once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural\naffinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other\nreals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there\narises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different\nmoments. When one gu@na is preponderant in any particular\ncollocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series\nbeginning from the first disturbance of the prak@rti to the final\ntransformation as the world-order, is subject to \"a definite law\nwhich it cannot overstep.\" In the words of Dr B.N.Seal [Footnote ref 1],\n\"the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated\n(_vai@samya_) within the undifferentiated (_s\u00e2my\u00e2vasth\u00e2_) of the\ndeterminate (_vies'a_) within the indeterminate (_avis'esa_) of the\ncoherent (_yutasiddha_) within the incoherent (_ayutasiddha_). The\norder of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the\nparts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate,\nless coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated,\nmore determinate, more coherent whole.\" The meaning of such\nan evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in\nthe shape of the evolving collocations of gu@na reals take place\nwithin the body of the prak@rti. Prak@rti consisting of the infinite\nreals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not\nmean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or\nthat the totality of the gu@nas in the prak@rti has been unhinged\nfrom a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast\nnumber of gu@nas constituting the worlds of thought and matter\nhas been upset. These gu@nas once thrown out of balance begin to\ngroup themselves together first in one form, then in another, then\nin another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of\naggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way\nthat the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones,\nso that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_,\n1915, p.7.]\n\n247\n\nFor the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this\nsecond stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the\nreals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first\nstage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the\nsecond stage is made good by a refilling from the prak@rti. So also,\nas the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals\nof the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage\nis made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the\nfirst stage from the prak@rti. Thus by a succession of refillings the\nprocess of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where\nthere is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical\nand physical changes of qualities in things which had already\nevolved. Evolution (_tattv\u00e2ntarapari@n\u00e2ma_) in S\u00e2@mkhya means the\ndevelopment of categories of existence and not mere changes of\nqualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental).\nThus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent\ncategory of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated\nand coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus\nit is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation\nof new stages as integrated in previous stages (_sa@ms@rstaviveka_).\n\n\nPralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.\n\nBut how or rather why prak@rti should be disturbed is the most\nknotty point in S\u00e2@mkhya. It is postulated that the prak@rti or the\nsum-total of the gu@nas is so connected with the puru@sas, and there\nis such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prak@rti,\nthat all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake\nof the diverse puru@sas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and\nsufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them\nto absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world\ninto the quiescent state (_pralaya_) of prak@rti takes place when the\nkarmas of all puru@sas collectively require that there should be\nsuch a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment\nthe gu@na compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backward\nmovement (_pratisa\u00f1cara_) till everything is reduced, to the gu@nas in\ntheir elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition\nbrings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a\nmere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense\nactivity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of\nnew things and qualities (_visad@rs'a-pari@n\u00e2ma_); this course of new\n\n248\n\nproduction being suspended, the activity here repeats the same\nstate (_sad@rs'a-pari@n\u00e2ma_) of equilibrium, so that there is no change\nor new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension\nof the teleology or purpose of the gu@nas, or an absolute break of\nthe course of gu@na evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it\nhas been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated\nkarmas of puru@sas, and since there is still the activity of the\ngu@nas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production,\nis also a stage of the sa@ms\u00e2ra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation)\nis of course quite different, for in that stage the movement\nof the gu@nas ceases forever with reference to the liberated soul.\nBut still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium?\nThe S\u00e2@mkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental\n(non-mechanical) influence of the puru@sa [Footnote ref 1]. This\ninfluence of the puru@sa again, if it means anything, means that there\nis inherent in the gu@nas a teleology that all their movements or\nmodifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the\npurposes of the puru@sas. Thus when the karmas of the puru@sas had demanded\nthat there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period\nthere was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose\nof the prak@rti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable\nworld for the experiences of the puru@sas by which its quiescent\nstate is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the\ninherent teleology of the prak@rti, which demands that a state of\npralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should\nbegin. Since there is a purpose in the gu@nas which brought\nthem to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes\nthat it also may be broken up again when the purpose\nso demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prak@rti brought\nabout the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative\nwork again, and it is this natural change in the prak@rti that may\nbe regarded from another point of view as the transcendental\ninfluence of the puru@sas.\n\n\nMahat and Aha@mk\u00e2ra.\n\nThe first evolute of the prak@rti is generated by a preponderance\nof the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state\nfrom which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a\nstate in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the\ndisturbance of the equilibrium of prak@rti for new creation takes place by\nthe will of \u00ces'vara (God).]\n\n249\n\nwithin it the minds (_buddhi_) of all puru@sas which were lost in the\nprak@rti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution\nof prak@rti to serve the puru@sas is thus manifested by the separating\nout of the old buddhis or minds (of the puru@sas) which hold within\nthemselves the old specific ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) inherent in them\nwith reference to each puru@sa with which any particular buddhi\nis associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This\nstate of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi)\nor all the puru@sas is therefore called _buddhitattva._ It is a state\nwhich holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals.\nThe individual buddhis of individual puru@sas are on one\nhand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated\nwith their specific puru@sas. When some buddhis once begin to\nbe separated from the prak@rti, other buddhi evolutions take\nplace. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation\nof buddhis is effected for the service of the puru@sas,\nall the other direct transformations that take place from the\nprak@rti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being\nonce created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations\nof prak@rti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance,\nwhich thus have exactly the same composition as the\nfirst buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prak@rti becomes\nbuddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded\nas the most universal stage, which comprehends within it\nall the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of\nwhich the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of\nview it has the widest and most universal existence comprising\nall creation, and is thus called _mahat_ (the great one). It is called\n_li@nga_ (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the\nground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished\nfrom the prak@rti which is called _ali@nga,_ i.e. of which no\nli@nga or characterise may be affirmed.\n\nThis mahat-tatva being once produced, further modifications\nbegin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of\nundulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance\nand tama preponderance. This state when the mahat\nis disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of\ntamas, rajas and sattva's called _aha@mk\u00e2ra,_ and the above three\ntendencies are respectiviy called _t\u00e2masika aha@mk\u00e2ra_ or _bh\u00fbt\u00e2di_,\n_r\u00e2jasika_ or _taijasa aha@m\u00e2ra,_ and _vaik\u00e2rika aha@mk\u00e2ra._ The r\u00e2jasika\naha@mk\u00e2ra cannot make a new preponderance by itself; it only\n\n250\n\nhelps (_sahak\u00e2ri_) the transformations of the sattva preponderance\nand the tamas preponderance. The development of the former\npreponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more\nand more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember\nthat buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva\npreponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on\nthe line of sattva development could only take place when the\nbuddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first\ndevelopment of the buddhi on this line is called _s\u00e2ttvika_ or _vaik\u00e2rika\naha@mk\u00e2ra_. This aha@mk\u00e2ra represents the development\nin buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather \"mine,\"\nand must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi the\nfunction of which is a mere understanding and general datun as\nthisness.\n\nThe ego or aha@mk\u00e2ra (_abhim\u00e2na-dravya_) is the specific expression\nof the general consciousness which takes experience as mine.\nThe function of the ego is therefore called _abhim\u00e2na_ (self-assertion).\nFrom this again come the five cognitive senses of vision,\ntouch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech,\nhandling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative\nsense; the _pr\u00e2@nas_ (bio-motor force) which help both conation and\ncognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual\naha@mk\u00e2ras and senses are related to the individual buddhis\nby the developing sattva determinations from which they had come\ninto being. Each buddhi with its own group of aka@mk\u00e2ra (ego)\nand sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar\nother buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as\nknowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different\nfor each individual, but so far as a general mind (_k\u00e2ra@na buddhi_)\napart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of\nall buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi\nis separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated\nignorance (_avidy\u00e2_). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aha@mk\u00e2ra\nand the senses are so related that though they are different\nfrom buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the\nbuddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We\nmust again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling,\nfor as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to aha@mk\u00e2ra, the deficiency\nof buddhi is made good by prak@rti; again as aha@mk\u00e2ra\npartially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency\n\n251\n\nis made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the\nchange and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good\nand kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state\nand finally from prak@rti.\n\n\nThe Tanm\u00e2tras and the Param\u00e2@nus [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped\nby the liberated rajas of aha@mk\u00e2ra, in order to make itself preponderant,\nand this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming\nthe sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi,\nis called _bh\u00fbt\u00e2di._ From this bh\u00fbt\u00e2di with the help of rajas are\ngenerated the _tanm\u00e2tras,_ the immediately preceding causes of the\ngross elements. The bh\u00fbt\u00e2di thus represents only the intermediate\nstage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas\nreals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanm\u00e2tras.\nThere has been some controversy between S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga\nas to whether the tanm\u00e2tras are generated from the mahat or from\naha@mk\u00e2ra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that\nevolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing\ndifferentiation in integration within the evolving whole.\nThus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation\nwhich takes place within the mahat but through its stage as\nbh\u00fbt\u00e2di. Bh\u00fbt\u00e2di is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid\nof all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass.\nThe second stadium tanm\u00e2tra represents subtle matter, vibratory,\nimpingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These \"potentials\"\narise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units\nin different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution\nof the original energy (_rajas_). The tanm\u00e2tras possess something\nmore than quantum of mass and energy; they possess\nphysical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of\nimpact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of\nviscous and cohesive attraction [Footnote ref. 2].\n\nIn intimate relation with those physical characters they also\npossess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch,\ncolour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the\ntranslations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely\nindebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given\nin Ray's _Hindu Chemistry._ The credit of explaining S\u00e2@mkhya physics,\nin the light of the text belongs entirely to him.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]\n\n252\n\nof the peculiar forms which these \"potentials\" assume in particles\nof gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other\nwords, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar\ntransformations by new groupings or collocations before they can\nact as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest\nparticles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (_at\u00eendriya_\nbut not _anudbh\u00fbta_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nOf the tanmatras the _s'abda_ or _\u00e2k\u00e2s'a tanm\u00e2tra_ (the sound-potential)\nis first generated directly from the bh\u00fbt\u00e2di. Next\ncomes the _spars'a_ or the _v\u00e2yu tanm\u00e2tra_ (touch-potential) which is\ngenerated by the union of a unit of tamas from bh\u00fbt\u00e2di with the\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'a tanm\u00e2tra. The _r\u00fbpa tanm\u00e2tra_ (colour-potential) is generated\nsimilarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bh\u00fbt\u00e2di; the\n_rasa tanm\u00e2tra_ (taste-potential) or the _ap tunm\u00e2tra_ is also similarly\nformed. This ap tanm\u00e2tra again by its union with a unit of tamas\nfrom bh\u00fbt\u00e2di produces the _g\u00e2ndha tanm\u00e2tra_ (smell-potential) or\nthe _k@siti tanm\u00e2tra_ [Footnote ref 2]. The difference of tanm\u00e2tras or\ninfra-atomic units and atoms (_param\u00e2@nu_) is this, that the tanm\u00e2tras\nhave only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be\ngrouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence\nas atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses.\nIt is important in this connection to point out that the classification\nof all gross objects as k@siti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is\nnot based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view\nof the five senses through which knowledge of them could be\nbrought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a\nparticular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are\nsaid to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be\ngrasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of\nthese five elements, the existence of the five potential states or\ntanm\u00e2tras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five\ngross forms.\n\nThe five classes of atoms are generated from the tanm\u00e2tras as\nfollows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter\nfrom bh\u00fbt\u00e2di generates the \u00e2k\u00e2sa-atom. The touch-potentials combine\nwith the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanm\u00e2tras and\natoms were explained in literatures other than S\u00e2@mkhya; for some account\nof it see Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]\n\n253\n\nv\u00e2yu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials\nand sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The\ntaste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials\nand sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the\nsmell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate\nthe earth-atom. The \u00e2k\u00e2s'a-atom possesses penetrability, the v\u00e2yu-atom\nimpact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat\nand light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom\ncohesive attraction. The \u00e2k\u00e2sa we have seen forms the transition\nlink from the bh\u00fbt\u00e2di to the tanm\u00e2tra and from the tanm\u00e2tra to\nthe atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at\nthis stage. S\u00e2@mkhya distinguishes between a k\u00e2ra@na-\u00e2k\u00e2s'a and\nk\u00e2ry\u00e2k\u00e2s'a. The k\u00e2ra@na-\u00e2k\u00e2s'a (non-atomic and all-pervasive)\nis the formless tamas--the mass in prak@rti or bh\u00fbt\u00e2di; it is\nindeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness\n(_\u00e2vara@n\u00e2bh\u00e2va_) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is first\nassociated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential;\nthe atomic \u00e2k\u00e2s'a is the result of the integration of the\noriginal mass-units from bh\u00fbt\u00e2di with this sound-potential (_s'abda\ntanm\u00e2tra_). Such an \u00e2k\u00e2s'a-atom is called the k\u00e2ry\u00e2k\u00e2s'a; it is\nformed everywhere and held up in the original k\u00e2ra@na \u00e2k\u00e2s'a as\nthe medium for the development of v\u00e2yu atoms. Being atomic\nit occupies limited space.\n\nThe aha@mk\u00e2ra and the five tanm\u00e2tras are technically called\n_avis'e@sa_ or indeterminate, for further determinations or\ndifferentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of\nexistence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called\n_vis'e@sa,_ i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined\nas to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course\nof evolution which started in the prak@rti reaches its furthest limit\nin the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms\non the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having\natomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due\nto spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction\nof new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are\nnot such that a newer category of existence could be formed by\nthem which was substantially different from the combined atoms.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal in describing this \u00e2k\u00e2s'a says \"\u00c2k\u00e2s'a\ncorresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and\nin others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle).\" Ray's _History\nof Hindu Chemistry_, p. 88.]\n\n254\n\nThe changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things\ncertainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it\nwill be better to enquire about the principle of causation according\nto which the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended\nor interpreted.\n\n\nPrinciple of Causation and Conservation of Energy [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe question is raised, how can the prak@rti supply the deficiencies\nmade in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes\nfrom them? When from mahat some tanm\u00e2tras have evolved, or\nwhen from the tanm\u00e2tras some atoms have evolved, how can the\ndeficiency in mahat and the tanm\u00e2tras be made good by the\nprak@rti?\n\nOr again, what is the principle that guides the transformations\nthat take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk,\nchanges into curd, and so on? S\u00e2@mkhya says that \"as the total\nenergy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving,\ncause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same\nultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes\nin a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes,\nand this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the\ngu@nas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the\n(material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production\nor rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the\nunmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (_udbh\u00fbta-v@rtti_)\nin the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary\nto call forth the so-called material cause into activity [Footnote ref 2].\"\nThe appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure\nof the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the\nsculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality\nand the concomitant conditions (_sahak\u00e2ri-s'akti_) or efficient cause\n(_nimitta-k\u00e2ra@na_, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical\nhelp or instrumental help to this passage or the transition [Footnote ref\n3]. The refilling from prak@rti thus means nothing more than this, that\nby the inherent teleology of the prak@rti, the reals there are so\ncollocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat\nhave been collocated to form the bh\u00fbt\u00e2di or the tanm\u00e2tras.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ and _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, IV. 3; _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_,\nIV. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ray, _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 73.]\n\n255\n\n\nYoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of\ntransformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of\nmaterial causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the\nsum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the\nsum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens\nis that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs\nthe relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of\nenergy together with a fresh collocation(_gu@nasannives'avis'e@sa_).\nAs the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one\nfield to another of the same or lower level has only to remove\nthe obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself\nto the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes\n(such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any\ncollocation against its transformation into any other collocation,\nthe energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding\nmanner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the\nenergy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a\nstate of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this\nbarrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a\ncorresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for\nthe formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed\nfrom the prak@rti, guided by the constant will of \u00ces'vara, the reals\nin equilibrium in the state of prak@rti leave their state of arrest\nand evolve themselves into mahat, etc.\n\n\nChange as the formation of new collocations.\n\nIt is easy to see from what we have already said that any\ncollocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form,\nunless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the\npresent collocation could be removed by some other extraneous\ninstrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation\nof the five atoms of k@siti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The\ndifference between one thing and another is simply this, that its\ncollocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms\nis different from that in another. The formation of a collocation\nhas an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that\ncollocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that\nthese barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other\ninfinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier\nis removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the\n\n256\n\nformation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers\ncould be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing.\nAnd it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by\nwhich they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of\nany other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the\nline of evolution follows \"a definite law which cannot be overstepped\"\n(_pari@n\u00e2makramaniyama_) or in other words there are\nsome natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the\nevolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those\nlines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows\nin countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of\ncountries (_des'\u00e2pabandha_); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy\nseason only, this is limitation of season or time (_k\u00e2l\u00e2pabandha_);\ndeer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (_\u00e2k\u00e2r\u00e2pabandha_);\ncurd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes\n(_nimitt\u00e2pabandha_). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that\npath which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural\nobstructions [Footnote ref 1].\n\nChange is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least\nto the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and\nchanging places in any and every object. At each moment the\nwhole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms\nat any moment is different from what it was at the previous\nmoment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived\nas _dharmapari@n\u00e2ma_ or changes of _dharma_ or quality; but perceived\nor unperceived the changes are continually going on. This\nchange of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by\nvirtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new,\nand these are respectively called the _lak@sa@napari@n\u00e2ma_ and\n_avasth\u00e2pari@n\u00e2ma_. At every moment every object of the world is\nundergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future,\nas new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state\nwe call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent\nagain it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential,\nmanifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future,\npresent and past [Footnote ref 2].\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya, Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_ and _Yogav\u00e2rttika,_ III. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 2: It is well to note in this connection that S\u00e2@mkhya-yoga does\nnot admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind\ngrasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind\n(_buddhi-nirm\u00e2@na_). The time required by an atom to move its own measure\nof space is called a moment (_k@sa@na_) or one unit of time. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na\nBhik@su regards one unit movement of the gu@nas or reals as a moment. When\nby true wisdom the gu@nas are perceived as they are both the illusory\nnotions of time and space vanish. _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya, Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_, and\n_Yogav\u00e2rttika_, III. 52 and III. 13.]\n\n257\n\n\nCausation as Satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da (the theory that the effect potentially\nexists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).\n\nThe above consideration brings us to an important aspect of\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya view of causation as _satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da_. S\u00e2@mkhya holds\nthat there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent;\ncausation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due\nto certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already\nheld in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means\nan internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and\nthis exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of\nthe barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of\nsuch a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation--the\neffect. This doctrine is called _satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da,_ i.e.\nthat the k\u00e2rya or effect is _sat_ or existent even before the causal\noperation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in\nthe sesarnum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk, The\ncausal operation (_k\u00e2rakaiy\u00e2p\u00e2ra_) only renders that manifest\n(_\u00e2virbh\u00fbta_) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition\n(_tirohita_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe Buddhists also believed in change, as much as S\u00e2@mkhya\ndid, but with them there was no background to the change;\nevery change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was\npast, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There\nwere only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and\nqualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance.\nS\u00e2@mkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas,\nbut it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions\nof the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals\nchange constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable.\nThe effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came\ninto being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory\nof causation and also on account of their doctrine of s'\u00fbnya, they\nwere called _vain\u00e2s'ikas_ (nihilists) by the Ved\u00e2ntins. This doctrine\nis therefore contrasted to S\u00e2@mkhya doctrine as _asatk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da._\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattvakaumud\u00ee,_ 9.]\n\n258\n\nThe jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and\nthat from one point of view satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da is true and from another\nasatk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da. The S\u00e2@mkhya view that the cause is continually\ntransforming itself into its effects is technically called _pari@n\u00e2mav\u00e2da_\nas against the Ved\u00e2nta view called the _vivarttav\u00e2da_: that\ncause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but\nillusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form--mere\nMaya [Footnote ref. 1].\n\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.\n\nGranted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite\nnumber of reals produce all the world and its transformations;\nwhence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of\ncause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which\nprevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the\nfirst disturbance of the equilibrium of the prak@rti? S\u00e2@mkhya\ndenies the existence of \u00ces'vara (God) or any other exterior influence,\nand holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which\nguides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands\nthat the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that\nthey may render some service to the souls either in the direction\nof enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a\ntendency that prak@rti is disturbed, and the gu@nas develop on two\nlines--on the mental plane, _citta_ or mind comprising the sense\nfaculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is\nin fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one\nhand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the\nbuddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective\nthings. It is this tendency to be of service to the puru@sas\n(_puru@s\u00e2rthat\u00e2_) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains\nall disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and\nfinally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain\nliberation from the association of prak@rti and its gratuitous service,\nwhich causes us all this trouble of sa@ms\u00e2ra.\n\nYoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Both the Ved\u00e2nta and the S\u00e2@mkhya theories of causation are\nsometimes loosely called _satk\u00e2ryyav\u00e2da._ But correctly speaking as some\ndiscerning commentators have pointed out, the Ved\u00e2nta theory of causation\nshould be called satk\u00e2ra@nav\u00e2da for according to it the _k\u00e2ra@na_ (cause)\nalone exists (_sat_) and all _k\u00e2ryyas,_ (effects) are illusory appearances\nof the k\u00e2ra@na; but according to S\u00e2@mkhya the k\u00e2ryya exists in\na potential state in the k\u00e2ra@na and is hence always existing and real.]\n\n259\n\nprak@rti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe,\nhow can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best\nservice to the puru@sas, how can it remove its own barriers and\nlend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prak@rti\nequilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the\nevolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to\ntheir bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones?\nThere must be some intelligent Being who should help the course\nof evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony\nmay be attained. This Being is \u00ces'vara. \u00ces'vara is a puru@sa who\nhad never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His\nbody is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by\nignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent\nwish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of\nthe reals by which the evolution of the gu@nas may best serve the\ndouble interest of the puru@sa's experience (_bhoga_) and liberation\n(_apavarga_) should be removed. It is according to this permanent\nwill of \u00ces'vara that the proper barriers are removed and the\ngu@nas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the\nservice of the best interests of the puru@sas. \u00ces'vara has not created\nthe prak@rti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prak@rti in its\nquiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order\nby which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order\nof the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of \u00ces'vara\nin Yoga and its denial by S\u00e2@mkhya marks the main theoretic\ndifference between the two according to which the Yoga and\nS\u00e2@mkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara S\u00e2@mkhya (S\u00e2@mkhya with\n\u00ces'vara) and Nir\u00ees'vara S\u00e2@mkhya (Atheistic S\u00e2@mkhya) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nBuddhi and Puru@sa.\n\nThe question again arises that though puru@sa is pure intelligence,\nthe gu@nas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how\ncan the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover,\nthe puru@sa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of\nimpurity and what service or need can such a puru@sa have of\nthe gu@nas? This difficulty is anticipated by S\u00e2@mkhya, which has\nalready made room for its answer by assuming that one class of\nthe gu@nas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and\nthe intelligence of the puru@sa to a very high degree, so much so\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee,_ IV. 3; _Yogav\u00e2rttika,_ I. 24; and\n_Pravavanabh\u00e2sya,_ V. 1-12.]\n\n260\n\nthat it can reflect the intelligence of the puru@sa, and thus render\nits non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent.\nThus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional\noperations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the\nbuddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue\nof the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi, these appear as if\nthey are intelligent. The self (puru@sa) according to S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga\nis not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its\nexistence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and\ngrounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly\nnoticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through\nbeginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing\nstates of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes\nare further so associated with the reflection of the puru@sa in the\nbuddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the puru@sa.\nThis association of the buddhi with the reflection of the puru@sa\nin the buddhi has such a special fitness (_yogyat\u00e2_) that it is interpreted\nas the experience of the puru@sa. This explanation of\nV\u00e2caspati of the situation is objected to by Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su.\nVij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su says that the association of the buddhi with the\nimage of the puru@sa cannot give us the notion of a real person\nwho undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore\nthat when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puru@sa,\nit is then superimposed upon the puru@sa, and we have the notion\nof an abiding person who experiences [Footnote ref 1]. Whatever may be the\nexplanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puru@sa\nis somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of _cit_ on\nbuddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puru@sa cannot\nrealize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own.\nBuddhi resembles puru@sa in transparency, and the puru@sa fails to\ndifferentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as\na result of this non-distinction the puru@sa becomes bound down\nto the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the\nbuddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction\nof puru@sa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi\nis what is meant by _avidy\u00e2_ (non-knowledge) in S\u00e2@mkhya, and is\nthe root of all experience and all misery [Footnote ref 2].\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_ and _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, I. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 2: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with\nS\u00e2@mkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things\n(e.g. the snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it is\ntherefore called the _akhy\u00e2ti_ (non-apprehension) theory of illusion\nwhich must be distinguished from the _anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti_ (misapprehension)\ntheory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending\none (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). _Yogav\u00e2rttika,_ I. 8.]\n\n261\n\n\nYoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the\npuru@sa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself\nand the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of\nbuddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference\nbut positively false knowledge, that we take the puru@sa to be\nthat which it is not (_anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti_). It takes the changing,\nimpure, sorrowful, and objective prak@rti or buddhi to be the\nchangeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks\nbuddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and\ncapable of giving us happiness. This is the avidy\u00e2 of Yoga.\nA buddhi associated with a puru@sa is dominated by such an\navidy\u00e2, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated\nwith the same puru@sa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidy\u00e2.\nIf in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged\nin the prak@rti, and the avidy\u00e2 also sleeps with it. When at the\nbeginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated\nwith the puru@sas emerge, the old avidy\u00e2s also become manifest\nby virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the\npuru@sas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus\nproceeds the course of sa@ms\u00e2ra. When the avidy\u00e2 of a person\nis rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to\nattach itself to the puru@sa and is forever dissociated from it, and\nthis is the state of mukti.\n\n\nThe Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.\n\nIt has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have\nevolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the puru@sa.\nWhat is the process of this experience? S\u00e2@mkhya (as explained\nby V\u00e2caspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes\ninto touch with external objects. At the first moment of this\ntouch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars\nof the thing cannot be noticed. This is called _nirvikalpa\npratyak@sa_ (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by\nthe function of the _sa@mkalpa_ (synthesis) and _vikalpa_ (abstraction\nor imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in\nall its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates,\nand associates the sense-data received through the senses, and\n\n262\n\nthus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized\nby the puru@sa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the\nexperience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamk\u00e2ra,\nand buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other\ntimes as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su\ndiffers from this view of V\u00e2caspati, and denies the synthetic\nactivity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi\ndirectly comes into touch with the objects through the senses.\nAt the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate,\nbut at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate [Footnote ref 1].\nIt is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced\nto a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire,\ndoubt and imagination.\n\nBuddhi, including ahamk\u00e2ra and the senses, often called _citta_\nin Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame\nof a lamp, it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure\nsattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content\nto another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi\nand puru@sa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being\ninterpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the\npuru@sa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of\nconsciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour.\nThe buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its\nfunctions that the life of the body is kept up; for the S\u00e2@mkhya\ndoes not admit any separate prana v\u00e2yu (vital breath) to keep the\nbody living. What are called _v\u00e2yus_ (bio-motor force) in Ved\u00e2nta\nare but the different modes of operation of this category of\nbuddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements\nperforms the life-functions and sense-functions of the body.\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes\nplace through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc., are modified\nby the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are\nhowever perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme\nof the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external\nobjects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they\nare reflected, like trees in a lake\n\n  \"_tasmims'ca darpane sph\u00e2re samasta vastudrstayah\n  im\u00e2st\u00e2h pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrum\u00e2h_\" _Yogavarttika_, I. 4.\n\nThe buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by\nthe senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the\nexternal objects and assumes their forms: \"_indriy\u00e2nyeva pran\u00e2lik\u00e2\ncittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadv\u00e2r\u00e2 b\u00e2hyavastus\u00fbparaktasya\ncittasyendryasahityenaiv\u00e2rthakarah parin\u00e2mo bhavati_\" _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, I.\nVI. 7. Contrast _Tattvakaumud\u00ee_, 27 and 30.]\n\n263\n\n\nApart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or\nrather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions\n(_sa@msk\u00e2ras_) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies\nof all past lives (_v\u00e2san\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 1]. These sa@msk\u00e2ras are revived\nunder suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births\nin their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the\nsame citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected\nwithin itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different\nanimal lives. It is knotted with these v\u00e2san\u00e2s like a net. If a man\npasses into a dog life by rebirth, the v\u00e2san\u00e2s of a dog life, which\nthe man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of\nbirths, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of\na dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes\nattached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival\nof the v\u00e2san\u00e2 suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be\nany collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and\ntendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was\nborn as man.\n\nThe sa@msk\u00e2ras represent the root impressions by which any\nhabit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in\nwhich he took delight for some time, or any passions which were\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The word sa@msk\u00e2ra is used by P\u00e2@nini who probably preceded\nBuddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguished\nfrom generating a new quality (_Sata utkar@s\u00e2dh\u00e2na@m sa@msk\u00e2ra@h_, K\u00e2s'ila\non P\u00e2@nini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and\n(3) adornment (P\u00e2@nini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the word\nsa@nkh\u00e2ra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing,\nperfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas\n(collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkh\u00e2ra stands for almost anything\nof which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many\ndiversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of\naggregation (_samav\u00e2ya_ of P\u00e2@nini) is prominent. The word _sa@mskaroti_\nis used in Kau@s\u00eetaki, II. 6, Ch\u00e2ndogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and\nB@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet\ncome across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The\nmeaning of sa@msk\u00e2ra in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means\nthe impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects\nexperienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative\nexist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be\nreproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word v\u00e2san\u00e2 (_Yoga s\u00fbtra_, IV. 24)\nseems to be a later word. The earlier Upanis@sads do not mention it and\nso far as I know it is not mentioned in the P\u00e2li pi@takas.\n_Abhidh\u00e2nappad\u00eepik\u00e2_ of Moggall\u00e2na mentions it, and it occurs in\nthe Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root \"_vas_\" to stay. It is\noften loosely used in the sense of sa@msk\u00e2ra, and in _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ they\nare identified in IV. 9. But v\u00e2san\u00e2 generally refers to the tendencies of\npast lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which\ncan find scope in this life. But sa@msk\u00e2ras are the sub-conscious states\nwhich are being constantly generated by experience. V\u00e2san\u00e2s are innate\nsa@msk\u00e2ras not acquired in this life. See _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya, Tattv\u00e2vais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_\nand _Yogav\u00e2rttika_, II. 13.]\n\n264\n\nengrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might\nnot now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced\nbefore has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the\ncitta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without\nany such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of\nany undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its\nroots as already left in the citta in the form of sa@msk\u00e2ras should\nbe eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary\ntendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own\nsa@msk\u00e2ra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable\nsa@msk\u00e2ras.\n\nApart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (ce@s@t\u00e2)\nby which the conative senses are brought into relation to their\nobjects. There is also the reserved potent power (s'akti) of citta,\nby which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue\nto persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved\nin the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga\nmethod of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state\nof mind to the exclusion of others.\n\nMerit or demerit (_pu@nya, p\u00e2pa_) also is imbedded in the citta\nas its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and\ngiving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.\n\n\nSorrow and its Dissolution [Footnote ref 1].\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all\nexperience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain\nsubstance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations,\nall intellectual operations are fraught with some degree\nof painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure,\nwe had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited\nit, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the\nfear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much\ngreater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the\nkeenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his\ncapacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full\nof sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that\nall is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by\nordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences\nthrough the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Tattavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee and Yogav\u00e2rttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumud\u00ee,\nI.]\n\n265\n\neradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or\nthe final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures\nlead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing\nsorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately;\nhe must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the\npleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according\nto the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve\nthe sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also\nsome pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded\nas desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures\nthat he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow.\nPhilosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes,\nwhat is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is\nuprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to\nphilosophy to find out the means of doing it.\n\nThe way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical\nenquiry of the S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1]. All experiences are\nsorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences\nmay be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after\ndeath we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puru@sa\nare associated with each other, the sufferings will continue.\nCitta must be dissociated from puru@sa. Citta or buddhi, S\u00e2@mkhya\nsays, is associated with puru@sa because of the non-distinction\nof itself from buddhi [Footnote ref 2]. It is necessary therefore that in\nbuddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the\nnature of puru@sa; when this true conception of puru@sa arises in\nthe buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from\nand quite unrelated to puru@sa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As\na result of that, buddhi turns its back on puru@sa and can no\nlonger bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected\nwith sorrow, and thus the puru@sa remains in its true\nform. This according to S\u00e2@mkhya philosophy is alone adequate\nto being about the liberation of the puru@sa. Prak@rti which was\nleading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils\nits final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the\ncessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow\n{_du@hkhabahla@h sa@ms\u00e2rah heya@h_).]\n\n[Footnote 2: The word _citta_ is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is\nthe repository of all sub-conscious states. S\u00e2mkhyn generally uses, the\nword buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they\nemphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.]\n\n266\n\npuru@sa from prak@rti. This final purpose being attained the\nprak@rti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom\nthis right knowledge was generated; for other puru@sas however\nthe bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences\nfrom one birth to another in an endless cycle.\n\nYoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient.\nIn order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true\nknowledge differentiating puru@sa and buddhi should arise, but it\nis necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all\nits samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived\nagain. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest\nstate, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puru@sa. This is\nthe _kevala_ (oneness) state of existence after which (all sa@msk\u00e2ras,\nall avidy\u00e2 being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any\nlonger to hold on to the puru@sa, and like a stone hurled from a\nmountain top, gravitates back into the prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. To\ndestroy the old sa@msk\u00e2ras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a\ngraduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should\nbe so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher\nand better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler\nstates, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin\nadvances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and\ntry for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the\nstate when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity.\nAt this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puru@sa, and\nfinal liberation takes place.\n\nKarmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1) _s'ukla_ or\nwhite (_pu@nya_, those that produce happiness), (2) _k@r@s@na_ or black\n(_p\u00e2pa_, those that produce sorrow), (3) _s'ukla-k@r@s@na_ (_pu@nya-p\u00e2pa_,\nmost of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious\nas they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many\ninsects), (4) _as'ukl\u00e2k@r@s@na_ (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and\nmeditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains).\nAll external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the\nworld and avoid taking the lives of insects [Footnote ref 2]. All karmas\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Both S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a\n_Kaivalya_ (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been\nabsolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at\nthis state puru@sa remains for ever alone without any association\nwith buddhi, see _S\u00e2@mkhya k\u00e2rik\u00e2_, 68 and _Yoga s\u00fbtras_, IV. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ and _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_, IV. 7.]\n\n267\n\nproceed from the five-fold afflictions (_kles'as_), namely _avidy\u00e2,\nasmit\u00e2, r\u00e2ga, dve@sa_ and _abhinives'a_.\n\nWe have already noticed what was meant by avidy\u00e2. It consists\ngenerally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it\nas permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge\nwhile remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other\nfour forms of asmit\u00e2, etc. Asmit\u00e2 means the thinking of worldly\nobjects and our experiences as really belonging to us--the\nsense of \"mine\" or \"I\" to things that really are the qualities or\ntransformations of the gu@nas. R\u00e2ga means the consequent attachment\nto pleasures and things. Dve@sa means aversion or antipathy\nto unpleasant things. Abhinives'a is the desire for life or love of\nlife--the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our\nexperiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family\nto be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are\nattached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any\nmischief that might befall them, and also because we love our\nlife and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all\nproceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidy\u00e2, which consists\nin the false identification of buddhi with puru@sa. These five,\navidy\u00e2, asmit\u00e2, r\u00e2ga, dve@sa and abhinives'a, permeate our buddhi,\nand lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together\nwith the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as\na particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth\nto birth, and it is hard to get rid of them [Footnote ref 1]. The karma in\nthe aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of\nit is called _karm\u00e2s'aya_. (the bed of karma for the puru@sa to lie in).\nWe perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (_kles'a_) of\nthe buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or\nmodification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the\nteleology of the prak@rti and the removal of obstacles in the course\nof its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of\n\u00ces'vara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous\none pleasure.\n\nThe karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate,\nand when the time for giving their fruits comes, such\na life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for\nhim according to the evolution of prak@rti as shall make it possible\nfor him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_ and _Tattvavais'\u00e2rad\u00ee_, II. 3-9.]\n\n268\n\npresent life thus determines the particular kind of future birth\n(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (_\u00e2yu@s_) and the\npainful or pleasurable experiences (_bhoga_) destined for that life.\nExceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce\ntheir effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has\ndone certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which\nhe requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which\nhe requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain\nin abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first\nand then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good\nactions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions,\nall his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot\nagain be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those\nkarmas which have already ripened. This is the _j\u00eevanmukti_ stage,\nwhen the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering\nmundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already\nripened (_ti@s@thati sa@msk\u00e2ravas'\u00e2t cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'ar\u00eera@h_).\n\n\nCitta.\n\nThe word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature\nin the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Pata\u00f1jali in\nhis _Yoga s\u00fbtra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint or\nsteadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may\nbe brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against\na mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct.\nThe citta which has the concentration of the former type is called\n_k@sipta_ (wild) and of the latter type _pram\u00fb@dha_ (ignorant). There\nis another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which\nconcentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining\nsteady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to\nanother thing and so on. This is called the _vik@sipta_ (unsteady)\nstage of mind (_cittabh\u00fbmi_). As distinguished from these there is\nan advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on\nan object for a long time. This is the _ek\u00e2gra_ (one-pointed) stage.\nThere is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes\nare absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti,\nand is called the _nirodha_ (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of\nYoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.\n\nThe cittas have five processes (_v@rtti_), (1) _pram\u00e2@na_ [Footnote ref 1]\n(valid\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S\u00e2@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any\ncognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on\ncorrespondence with external facts or objects (_svata@h pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya@m\nsvata@h apr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya@m_). The contribution of S\u00e2@mkhya to the doctrine\nof inference is not definitely known. What little V\u00e2caspati says on the\nsubject has been borrowed from V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana such as the _p\u00fbrvavat, s'e@savat_\nand _s\u00e2m\u00e2nyatodr@s@ta_ types of inference, and these may better be\nconsulted in our chapter on Ny\u00e2ya or in the T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ of V\u00e2caspati.\nS\u00e2@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the\nground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds\nof inference \"_m\u00e2tr\u00e2nimittasa@myogivirodhisahac\u00e2ribhi@h.\nSvasv\u00e2mibadhyagh\u00e2t\u00e2dyai@h s\u00e2@mkhy\u00e2n\u00e2@m saptadh\u00e2num\u00e2_\" (_T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, p.\n109). S\u00e2@mkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I.I. V) is\n\"_sambandh\u00e2dekasm\u00e2t pratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranum\u00e2nam_.\"]\n\n269\n\ncognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference\nand scriptural testimony), (2) _viparyaya_ (false knowledge, illusion,\netc.), (3) _vikalpa_ (abstraction, construction and different kinds of\nimagination), (4) _nidr\u00e2_ (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which\ntamas tends to predominate), (5) _sm@rti_ (memory).\n\nThese states of mind (_v@rtti_) comprise our inner experience.\nWhen they lead us towards s\u00e2@msara into the course of passions\nand their satisfactions, they are said to be _kli@s@ta_ (afflicted or\nleading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they\nare called _akli@s@ta_ (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards\nsa@msara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of\nmind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states,\nand whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation)\nmust be regarded as good.\n\nThis draws attention to that important characteristic of citta,\nthat it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes\ntowards bad (s\u00e2@msara). It is like a river, as the _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya\nsays, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the\ngood. The teleology of prak@rti requires that it should produce\nin man the s\u00e2@msara as well as the liberation tendency.\n\nThus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts\nand bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts,\nand in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad\nthoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore\nnever lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is\nas strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather\nremarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows\nthat our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic\nattraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an\ninnate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation\n[Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S\u00e2@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction\nof three kinds of sorrows, _\u00e2dhy\u00e2tmika_ (generated internally by the\nillness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind),\n_\u00e2dhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by\nother men, beasts, etc.) and _\u00e2dhidaivika_ (generated by the injuries\ninflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours\n(_puru@s\u00e2rtha_).]\n\n270\n\nis of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but\nstill the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible\ntendency of the mind. Man has power (_s'akti_) stored up in his\ncitta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may\ngradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the\nother. He must succeed in this, since prak@rti wants liberation for\nher final realization [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nYoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).\n\nThe purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on\nthe gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation,\nso that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more\nweakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind\ncan be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should\nbe purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin\nshould practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (_ahi@ms\u00e2_),\nabsolute and strict truthfulness (_satya_), non-stealing (_asteya_),\nabsolute sexual restraint (_brahmacarya_) and the acceptance of\nnothing but that which is absolutely necessary (_aparigraha_).\nThese are collectively called _yama_. Again side by side with these\nabstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions\nand inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the\nhabit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the\nbody unmoved and remaining silent in speech (_tapas_), the study\nof philosophy (_sv\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya_) and meditation on \u00ces'vara\n(_\u00ces'varapra@nidh\u00e2na_). These are collectively called _niyamas_.\nTo these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as\n_pratipak@sa-bh\u00e2van\u00e2, maitr\u00ee, karu@n\u00e2, mudit\u00e2_ and _upek@s\u00e2_.\nPratipak@sa-bh\u00e2van\u00e2 means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish\nmotive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought\n(self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope.\nMost of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations\nwith our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere\nabstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should\nhabituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with\nour fellow-beings. The practice of maitr\u00ee means to think of\nall beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to\nthink this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one\nshould practise karu@n\u00e2 or kindly feeling for sufferers, mudit\u00e2\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See my \"_Yoga Psychology_,\" _Quest_, October, 1921.]\n\n271\n\nor a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upek@s\u00e2\nor a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others.\nThe last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note\nof the vices of vicious men.\n\nWhen the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures\n(_vair\u00e2gya_) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances\nof Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross\nand made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may\nattain liberation by a constant practice (_abhy\u00e2sa_) attended with\nfaith, confidence (_s'raddh\u00e2_), strength of purpose and execution\n(_v\u00eerya_) arid wisdom (_praj\u00f1\u00e2_) attained at each advance.\n\n\nThe Yoga Meditation.\n\nWhen the mind has become pure the chances of its being\nruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such\na stage the yogin takes a firm posture (_\u00e2sana_) and fixes his mind\non any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should\nfix it on \u00ces'vara, for in that case \u00ces'vara being pleased removes\nmany of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for\nhim to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice,\nand can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration\n(_sam\u00e2dhi_) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying\nconcentration namely _vitarka, vic\u00e2ra, \u00e2nanda_ and _asmit\u00e2_. Of\nthese vitarka and vic\u00e2ra have each two varieties, _savitarka, nirvitarka,\nsavic\u00e2ra, nirvic\u00e2ra_ [Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates on\nobjects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka\nstage; when on the five tanm\u00e2tras with a remembrance of their\nqualities it is called savic\u00e2ra, and when it is one with the tanm\u00e2tras\nwithout any notion of their qualities it is called nirvic\u00e2ra.\nHigher than these are the \u00e2nanda and the asmit\u00e2 states. In the\n\u00e2nanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions\nof the senses causing pleasure. In the asmit\u00e2 stage buddhi\nconcentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications.\nIn all these stages there are objects on which the mind\nconsciously concentrates, these are therefore called the _sampraj\u00f1\u00e2ta_\n(with knowledge of objects) types of sam\u00e2dhi. Next to this comes\nthe last stage of sam\u00e2dhi called the _asampraj\u00f1\u00e2ta_ or nirodha\nsam\u00e2dhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: V\u00e2caspati, however, thinks that \u00e2nanda and asmit\u00e2 have also\ntwo other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su.]\n\n272\n\nlong in this stage the old potencies (sa@msk\u00e2ras) or impressions\ndue to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards\nthe objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner\nthinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the\nnirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the\nbuddhi becomes as pure as the puru@sa, and after that the citta not\nbeing able to bind the puru@sa any longer returns back to prak@rti.\n\nIn order to practise this concentration one has to see that\nthere may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a\nquiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles\nis, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This\nhas to be stopped by the practice of _pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2ma_. Pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2ma\nconsists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then\ngiving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for\nhours, days, months and even years. When there is no need\nof taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained\nsteady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.\n\nThe process of practising concentration is begun by sitting\nin a steady posture, holding the breath by pr\u00e2@n\u00e2y\u00e2ma, excluding\nall other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (_dh\u00e2ra@n\u00e2_).\nAt first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same\nthought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called\n_dhy\u00e2na._ After sufficient practice in dhy\u00e2na the mind attains the\npower of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one\nwith its object and there is no change or repetition. There is\nno consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind\nbecomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called\n_sam\u00e2dhi_ [Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages of\nsam\u00e2dhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of sam\u00e2dhi, he passes\non to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards\nhe attains miraculous powers (_vibh\u00fbti_) and his faith and hope\nin the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them\nmany temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even\nthough the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax.\nHis wisdom (_praj\u00f1\u00e2_) also increases at each step. Praj\u00f1\u00e2 knowledge\nis as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _sam\u00e2dhi_ cannot properly be\ntranslated either by \"concentration\" or by \"meditation.\" It means that\npeculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes\none with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing\nstates.]\n\n273\n\ncertain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] praj\u00f1\u00e2\nhas no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the\ntanm\u00e2tras, the gu@nas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their\nsubtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies\n(_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) of the praj\u00f1\u00e2 wisdom grow in strength the potencies of\nordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain\nalways in his praj\u00f1\u00e2 wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this praj\u00f1\u00e2 that\nit leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to sa@ms\u00e2ra.\nThe final praj\u00f1\u00e2s which lead to liberation are of seven kinds,\nnamely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and\nmisery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and\nroots of sa@ms\u00e2ra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more\nof it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of\ndirect cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge\nin the shape of a discrimination of puru@sa from prak@rti has been\nunderstood. The other three are not psychological but are rather\nmetaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are\nas follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and\nemancipation (_bhoga_ and _apavarga_) has been realized. (6) The\nstrong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gu@nas drives\nthem into prak@rti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops.\n(7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gu@nas\nbecome merged in the prak@rti and remain there for ever. The\npuru@sa having passed beyond the bondage of the gu@nas shines\nforth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in\nthis S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prak@rti. It\nis thus a state of pure intelligence. What the S\u00e2@mkhya tries to\nachieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected\ndiscipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the\n_K\u00e2rik\u00e2_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky),\nextreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ\n(e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object\n(e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by\nwalls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight),\nbeing mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown\ninto a lake).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet the\nreal nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What\nappears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic\n(m\u00e2y\u00e2):\n\n  \"_Gun\u00e2n\u00e2@m parama@m r\u00fbpam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati\n  Yattu d@rs@tipatham pr\u00e2ptam tanm\u00e2yeva sutucchakam._\"\n\n  _Vy\u00e2sabh\u00e2@sya_, IV. 13.\n\nThe real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only by _praj\u00f1\u00e2._]\n\n274\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE NY\u00c2YA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nCriticism of Buddhism and S\u00e2@mkhya from the\nNy\u00e2ya standpoint.\n\nThe Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of\nsubstance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of\nthings, on the ground that all collocations are momentary;\neach group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to\nanother group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation\nrepresenting milk generates the collocation of curd\nit is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming\nthe cause-collocation and the _modus operandi_ is unintelligible;\nthe elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately\ngenerate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on\nsuch a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine\nof momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence\non the part of the cause-elements and their coordination\nand manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment.\nThe supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the\nresult of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is\nagainst our universal uncontradicted experience that specific\nelements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are\nthe cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the\nwhiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness,\nblackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump\nstate should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in\nthe iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience.\nMoreover there would be no difference between material (_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_,\ne.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_\nand _sahak\u00e2ri_, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in\nforming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and\nthere was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental\ncauses, as such.\n\nAgain at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is\nbrought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its\n\n275\n\neffect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the\ncause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence\nto produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the\nmoment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that\ncausal elements remain and when they are properly collocated\nthe effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we\nperceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is\nperceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as\nfuture and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.\n\nThe S\u00e2@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized\nstates of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds\nwithin it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is\nalready existent even before the causal movement for the production\nof the effect, is also baseless. S\u00e2@mkhya says that the\noil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and\nthat it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the\nstone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists\nonly in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in\na potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of\nclay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it\nto say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never\ncarry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug.\nWhat is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was\nin a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest\nor actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state\nof the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state\nof the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is\nmeant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of\nwhich the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does\nnot mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump\nof clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it\ncan expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the\npotter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the\neffect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said\nthat the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of S\u00e2@mkhya\nthat the substance and attribute have the same reality is also\nagainst all experience, for we all perceive that movement and\nattribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again\nS\u00e2@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different\n\n276\n\nfrom intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi\nnon-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss\nthat the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on\nbuddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul\n(_\u00e2tman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why\nS\u00e2@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge,\nfeeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in\norder to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double\nreflection. Again S\u00e2@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where\nis the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again\nand will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become\nbound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by\nthe infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as\nS\u00e2@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa\nashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure\n(_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance\n(_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what\nimpudence could S\u00e2@mkhya think of these as material substances?\nAgain their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mk\u00e2ra, the tanm\u00e2tras,\nis all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor\nby reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders.\nThe phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction\nin the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other\nsystems. (See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_ pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)\n\n\nNy\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras.\n\nIt is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Ny\u00e2ya are\nto be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars\ntrying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use\nin sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between\nthe adherents of different schools of thought trying to\ndefeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in\nthe days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded\neven then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by\nthe name _v\u00e2kov\u00e2kya_. Mr Bodas has pointed out that \u00c2pastamba\nwho according to B\u00fchler lived before the third century B.C. used the\nword Ny\u00e2ya in the sense of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 [Footnote ref 1]. The word Ny\u00e2ya\nderived\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1 _\u00c2pastamba,_ trans. by B\u00fchler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and\nBodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the Bombay\nBranch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]\n\n277\n\nfrom the root _n\u00ee_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentences\nand words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning\nand not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of\nwords (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing\nout the particular kind of compound in which the words entered\ninto combination) were called Ny\u00e2ya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the\nstrength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the _vidy\u00e2_ (sciences) as \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee\n(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge\nby further scrutiny), _tray\u00ee_ (the three Vedas), _v\u00e2rtt\u00e2_ (the sciences\nof agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and _da@n@dan\u00eeti_ (polity), and the\nenumeration of the philosophies as S\u00e2@mkhya, Yoga, Lok\u00e2yata\nand \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee, supposes that the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ was not in existence\nin Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to\nNy\u00e2ya as \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee only suggests that the word Ny\u00e2ya was not a familiar\nname for \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana in thinking that V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana distinguishes Ny\u00e2ya\nfrom the \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee in holding that while the latter only means\nthe science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.\nWhat appears from V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's statement in _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ I.i. 1\nis this that he points out that the science which was known in his\ntime as Ny\u00e2ya was the same as was referred to as \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee by\nKau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Ny\u00e2yavidy\u00e2 with \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee,\nbut justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories\nsuch as _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt) etc., though these were already contained\nwithin the first two terms _pram\u00e2@na_ (means of cognition) and\n_prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its\nspecial and separate branches (_p@rthakprasth\u00e2na_) were treated,\nNy\u00e2yavidy\u00e2 would simply become metaphysics (_adhy\u00e2tmavidy\u00e2_)\nlike the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Ny\u00e2ya as the means of determining\nthe right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon\nby V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana and is sanctioned by V\u00e2caspati in his\n_Ny\u00e2yav\u00e2rttikat\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the\nword Ny\u00e2ya (_pram\u00e2@nairarthapar\u00eek@sa@nam_--to scrutinize an object by\nmeans of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word\n\u00e2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception\nand scriptures). V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana of course points out that so far as\nthis logical side of Ny\u00e2ya is concerned it has the widest scope for\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: K\u00e2lid\u00e2sa's _Kum\u00e2rasambhava \"Udgh\u00e2to pra@navay\u00e2s\u00e2m\nny\u00e2yaistribhirud\u00eera@nam_,\" also Mallin\u00e2tha's gloss on it.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's \"_The early history of Indian Philosophy,\"\nIndian Antiquary_, 1918.]\n\n278\n\nitself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences\n[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Ny\u00e2ya\nis like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its\ncapacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the\nway to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that\nthe metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this\nseems to me to be a very probable view. In fact V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana himself\ndesignates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasth\u00e2na (separate\nbranch). But I do not find that any statement of V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana or\nKau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made\nafter Kau@tilya. V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana has no doubt put more stress on the\nimportance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that\nseems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or\n_adhy\u00e2tmavidy\u00e2_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of\nthe mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of\nthe dharmas'\u00e2stras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend\nany support to it, and V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana had to seek the support of\nKau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya\nwas not satisfied by counting \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee as one of the four\nvidy\u00e2s but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side\nwith S\u00e2@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably\neven in Kau@tilya's time Ny\u00e2ya was composed of two branches,\none as adhy\u00e2tmavidy\u00e2 and another as a science of logic or rather\nof debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external,\nand it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added\nto increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might\nnot attract sufficient attention. Mah\u00e2mahop\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya Harapras\u00e2da\nS'\u00e2str\u00ee in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_\n1905 says that as V\u00e2caspati made two attempts to collect the\n_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_, one as _Ny\u00e2yas\u00fbci_ and the other as _Ny\u00e2yas\u00fbtroddh\u00e2ra_,\nit seems that even in V\u00e2caspati's time he was not certain as to\nthe authenticity of many of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_. He further points\nout that there are unmistakable signs that many of the s\u00fbtras\nwere interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China\nand Japan that Mirok mingled Ny\u00e2ya and Yoga. He also\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which\none is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abh\u00eepsan jih\u00e2san\nv\u00e2 karma \u00e2rabhate ten\u00e2nena sarve pr\u00e2@nina@h sarv\u00e2@ni karm\u00e2@ni sarv\u00e2s'ca\nvidy\u00e2@h vy\u00e2pt\u00e2@h tad\u00e2s'ray\u00e2s'ca ny\u00e2ya@h pravarttate_ (all those which\none tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all\nbeings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana,\nand all these depend on Ny\u00e2ya). _V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana bh\u00e2s'ya_, I.i. 1.]\n\n279\n\nthinks that the s\u00fbtras underwent two additions, one at the hands\nof some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who\nput in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These\nsuggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but\nwe have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such\nadditions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs\nof the interpolation of many of the s\u00fbtras makes the fixing of\nthe date of the original part of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ still more difficult,\nfor the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and\nProf. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ on the\nbasis of references to S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da naturally loses its value, except\non the supposition that all references to S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da must be later\nthan N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras_\nwritten before N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna also held the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da doctrine.\n\nThe late Dr S.C. Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na in _J.R.A.S._ 1918 thinks\nthat the earlier part of Ny\u00e2ya was written by Gautama about\n550 B.C. whereas the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ of Ak@sap\u00e2da were written\nabout 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Ny\u00e2ya in the\nsense of logic in _Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata_ I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be\nregarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any\nreasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment\nof the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sap\u00e2da was made\nto fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sap\u00e2da wrote his _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which does\nnot require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na\nhas proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced\na step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part\nof the Ny\u00e2ya. Goldst\u00fccker says that both Pata\u00f1jali (140 B.C.)\nand K\u00e2ty\u00e2yana (fourth century B.C.) knew the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ [Footnote ref\n1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Ny\u00e2ya in some form as \u00c2nv\u00eek@sik\u00ee\nin 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say\nthat the Ny\u00e2ya existed in some form as early as the fourth\ncentury B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think\nthat at least some of the present s\u00fbtras were written some time\nin the second century A.D. Bodas points out that B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na's\ns\u00fbtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Ny\u00e2ya.\nOn this ground he thinks that _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ were written before\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2yana's _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_, whereas the Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras were\nwritten later. Candrak\u00e2nta Tark\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra also contends in his\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Goldst\u00fccker's _P\u00e2@nini_, p. 157.]\n\n280\n\nedition of Vais'e@sika that the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ were earlier than the\nNy\u00e2ya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes\none of the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_, but the whole foundation of his medical\nphysics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The\n_La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra s\u00fbtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier\nthan 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are\nother weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing\nthat the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].\n\nIt is certain that even the logical part of the present _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by\nthinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which\nthe s\u00fbtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_)\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana says that this s\u00fbtra was written to refute the views\nof those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The\n_Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference,\nwhich do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Ny\u00e2ya\ndoctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].\n\n\nDoes Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2?\n\nThe Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Ny\u00e2ya by tradition\nthat it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed\nto represent an old school of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, older than that represented\nin the _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras._ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable\nway. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes\na _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra._ An examination of Caraka's _S\u00fbtrasth\u00e2na_ (I.35-38)\nleaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some\ncompendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the _Bh\u00e2@s\u00e2pariccheda_\nbefore him. _Caraka s\u00fbtra_ or _k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas\nare those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc.,\ncognition, and those which begin with the gu@na \"_para_\" (universality)\nand end with \"_prayatna_\" (effort) together with the sense-qualities\n(_s\u00e2rth\u00e2_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known\nenumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found\nin the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra_ (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'\u00e2r\u00eera_, 39.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See the next section.]\n\n[Footnote 3: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's Bh\u00e2@sya on the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras,_ I.i.32. This is\nundoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in\n_Das'avaik\u00e2likaniryukti_ as noted before.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ IX. ii. 1-2,\n4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]\n\n281\n\nheaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_),\nelasticity (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);\nin one part of the s\u00fbtra the enumeration begins with \"para\"\n(universality) and ends in \"prayatna,\" but buddhi (cognition)\ncomes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in\nprayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list\nand is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's\ns\u00fbtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the\nVais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and\ncompendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.\n_Bh\u00e2@s\u00e2pariccheda_ (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation\nfrom some very old k\u00e2rik\u00e2s which are referred to by Vis'van\u00e2tha\nas being collected from \"_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_\"--(from\nvery ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of s\u00e2m\u00e2nya\nand vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate\ncategories as in later Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though\nslightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition\none finds in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra_ that s\u00e2m\u00e2nya (generality) and\nvi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's s\u00fbtras were\ntherefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were\nundergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning\nto be written on them.\n\nThe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist\ndoctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is\nno reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the\nargument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an\nobject of inference or revealed to us by our notion of \"I.\" There\nis also no other reference to any other systems except to some\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 doctrines and occasionally to S\u00e2@mkhya. There is no\nreason to suppose that the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 doctrines referred to allude\nto the _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which the\nnature of inference has been treated shows that the Ny\u00e2ya\nphraseology of \"_p\u00fbrvavat_\" and \"_s'e@savat_\" was not known. _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate\ncause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vet\u00e2s'vatara Upani@sad refers to\nthose who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Professor Vanam\u00e2l\u00ee Ved\u00e2ntat\u00eertha's article in _J.A.S.B._,\n1908.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that s\u00e2m\u00e2nya is that which produces\nunity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. S\u00e2m\u00e2nya and\nvis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra_ (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]\n\n282\n\nsystems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient\nview [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of\nthe work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these\ns\u00fbtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability\nare pre-Buddhistic.\n\nThe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra_ begins with the statement that its object\nis to explain virtue, \"dharma\" This is we know the manifest duty\nof M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini\nbegins his _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_ by defining \"dharma\". This at first\nseems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description\nof the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as\nthat which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and\nsays that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate\nthis. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions\n(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives\nbestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us\nthrough our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must\nbe regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].\nThe fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma\nand after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions\nand also the _ad@r@s@ta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit\naccruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many\nof our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book\nby saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce\nany direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows\nthat Ka@n\u00e2da's method of explaining dharma has been by showing\nthat physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and\nactions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a\ngood number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption\nof ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S'vet\u00e2s'vatara I.i.2]\n\n[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kal\u00e2pa\nVy\u00e2kara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories\nby Ka@n\u00e2da in his _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_, after having proposed to describe\nthe nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while\nintending to go to the mountain Himavat (Him\u00e2laya).\n\n\"_Dnarma@m vy\u00e2khy\u00e2tuk\u00e2masya @sa@tpad\u00e2rthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantuk\u00e2masya\ns\u00e2garagamanopamam_.\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: The sutra \"_Tadvacan\u00e2d \u00e2mn\u00e2yasya pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nyam_ (I.i.3 and\nX.ii.9) has been explained by _Upask\u00e2ra_ as meaning \"The Veda being the\nword of \u00ces'vara (God) must be regarded as valid,\" but since there is no\nmention of \u00ces'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later\nNy\u00e2ya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. S\u00fbtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of\nVI.ii.1.]\n\n283\n\ndescription of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but\nis the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these\ncannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on\nthe supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance\nof Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards\nmagnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies,\nV. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion\nof air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations\nhave taken place), and the original movement of the\nmind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement\nof the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the\nassimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the\nmovement and development of the foetus as enumerated in\n_Upaskara_) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is\nsaid to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the\nannihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths\nVais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)\nand the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded\non drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience\nare due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all\nlife-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or\nthe construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air,\ndeath and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena\nby which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2),\nin fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.\nKa@n\u00e2da's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding\nsubstances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of\nmetaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to\nthis, Ka@n\u00e2da does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or\nsinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_),\nfasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house\nof the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_),\nsacrifice (_yaj\u00f1a_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial\nsprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the\nprescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)\n(VI. ii. 2).\n\nHe described what is pure and what is impure food, pure\nfood being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary\nbeing impure, and he says that the taking of pure food\nleads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how\n\n284\n\nfeelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta.\nThroughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@n\u00e2da is busy in showing\nthe special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference\nto our chapter on M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 will show that the later M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\nwriters agreed with the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their\nviews regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points\nin which M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 differs from Ny\u00e2ya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity\nof the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief\nin any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according\nto Kum\u00e2rila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.\nOf these the first and the second points do not form any subject\nof discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no \u00ces'vara is mentioned,\nand as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we\nmay assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2. The\nfact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due\nto the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the\n_Vais`e@sika s\u00fbtras._ It is probable that Ka@n\u00e2da believed that the\nVedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.\n1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never\nwritten by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in\nthe days of the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras,_ the view was probably what is\nrepresented in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras._ As there is no reference to\n\u00ces`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions\nin accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all\natomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was\nas atheistic or non-theistic as the later M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 philosophers.\nAs regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one\nof the main points of quarrel between the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika and\nthe M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@n\u00e2da gives reasons\nin favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33\ntill the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the\neternality of sound, which is the distinctive M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 view as we know\nfrom the later M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question\nof the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Ny\u00e2ya view is\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The last two concluding s\u00fbtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my\nopinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upask\u00e2ra_ (II. ii.\n36 by adding an \"_api_\" to the s\u00fbtra and thereby changing the issue, and\nII. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination \"samkhyabhava\" as\ns\u00e2@mkhya and bhava instead of s\u00e2@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion\nis the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound\nas we find in the later Ny\u00e2ya Vais'e@sika view.]\n\n285\n\nthat the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the\nseat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally\nthis is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika\nIII. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its\nactivity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this\ninference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the\nactivity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no\ncertainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is\nsuggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted\non the authority of the scriptures (_\u00e2gama_). To this the final\nVais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self\nin our feeling as \"I\" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend\non the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus\nthe inference of the existence of the self is only an additional\nproof of what we already find in perception as \"I\" (_aham_) (III. ii.\n10-18, also IX. i. 11).\n\nThese considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika\nrepresented a school of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 thought which supplemented\na metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.\n\n\nPhilosophy in the Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras.\n\nThe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining\nvirtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is\nthat by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs'reyasa_)\nare attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the\nVedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and\nsalvation. Then it turns back to the second s\u00fbtra and says that\nsalvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special\nexcellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of\nsubstance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_s\u00e2md\u00e2nya_),\nparticularity (_vis'e@sa_), and inherence (_samav\u00e2yay_) [Footnote ref 1].\nThe dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and\nmind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure,\nseparations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to\nspecies [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Upask\u00e2ra_ notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate\ndifferences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this\nsystem is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same\nelement has specific features of difference.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_),\nliquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_),\nmerit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.\nThese are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums.\nIt must be noted that \"_gu@na_\" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not\nsubtle reals or substances as in S\u00e2@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would\nbe akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]\n\n286\n\ndownward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal\nmovement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma\nare that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,\nand possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other\ndravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily\nproduced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or\nits effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by\nthe effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses\nkarma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.\nGu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are\nnot by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is\ndevoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one\nobject, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of\ncontact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)\nof (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material\ncause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma\nis the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion\n(_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be\nproduced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect\nof dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce\nkarma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact\nand disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma\nnot being connected with more than one thing is not produced\nby more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many\ncontacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many\ncolours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and\ncontact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In\ndenying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the\ncause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].\n\nIn the second chapter of the first book Ka@n\u00e2da first says that\nif there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause\neven though there may not be the effect. He next says that\ngenus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See\n_Upaskara_ I.i. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the\nmovement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]\n\n[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different\nfrom the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action\nwhich is the cause of rebirth.]\n\n287\n\nbeing (_bh\u00e2va_) indicates continuity only and is hence\nonly a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action\nmaybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate\ndifferences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).\nIn connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being\n(_satt\u00e2_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other\ngenera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or\nspecies. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it\nis different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them,\nand has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something\nis and must be regarded as a category existing as one\nidentical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal\nnature as being it has no special characteristics in the\ndifferent objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of\nthingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gu@natva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)\nare also categories which are separate from universal being\n(_bh\u00e2va_ or _satt\u00e2_) for they also have no separate genus or species\nand yet may be distinguished from one another, but bh\u00e2va or\nbeing was the same in all.\n\nIn the first chapter of the second book Ka@n\u00e2da deals with\nsubstances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,\ncolour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire,\ncolour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be\nfound in ether (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_). Liquidity is a special quality of water\nbecause butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids\nonly when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote\nref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by\ntouch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred\nfrom the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred\nfrom touch possesses motion and quality, and does not\nitself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)\nand is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of\ninference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics\ncalled _s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato d@r@s@ta_. The name of air \"_v\u00e2yu_\" is derived\nfrom the scriptures. The existence of others different from us\nhas (_asmadvis'i@s@t\u00e2n\u00e2@m_) to be admitted for accounting for the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is\nimportant for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It\nshould be noted that the word \"_adravyatvena_\" in II. i. 13 has been\ninterpreted by me as \"_adravyavattvena_.\"]\n\n288\n\ngiving of names to things (_sa@mj\u00f1\u00e2karma_). Because we find\nthat the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented\nby us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in\none thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied\nspace, would not lead us to infer the existence of \u00e2k\u00e2s'a\n(ether). \u00c2k\u00e2s'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance\nin which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a\nquality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,\nthere must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this\nsubstance is \u00e2k\u00e2s'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As\nbeing is one so \u00e2k\u00e2s'a is one [Footnote ref 2].\n\nIn the second chapter of the second book Ka@n\u00e2da tries to\nprove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,\nand coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the\nnotion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is\none like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because\nthe notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space\nsupplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much\nnearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have\ndiverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the\nsun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound\nis eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises\nwhen a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features\ncoming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered,\nor when some such attribute is seen which resembles some\nother attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way\nbut appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely\ngrasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question\nwhether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons\nto show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with\na number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.\n\nThe first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the\ninference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must\nbe some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact\nof the senses and their object inheres.\n\nThe knowledge of sense-objects (_indriy\u00e2rtha_) is the reason by\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have differed from _Upask\u00e2ra_ in interpreting\n\"_sa@mj\u00f1\u00e2karma_\" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while\n_Upask\u00e2ra_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upask\u00e2ra's interpretation\nseems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for\nthe existence of God.]\n\n[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's\n_Upask\u00e2ra._]\n\n289\n\nwhich we can infer the existence of something different from the\nsenses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The\ntypes of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of\nsome things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence\nof some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the\nexistence of some things from the existence of others. In all\nthese cases inference is possible only when the two are known to\nbe connected with each other (_prasiddhip\u00fbrvakatv\u00e2t apades'asya_) [Footnote\nref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have\n_anapades'a_ (fallacious middle) and _sandigdha_ (doubtful middle);\nthus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it\nhas a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of\nsoul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses\nand objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of\nthe existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way\nin which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.\nby virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In\nthe second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only\nwhen there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects\nproves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance\nand eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity\nof production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it\nmay also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).\n\nThe soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling\nof the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections\npleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance\nand eternal can be proved after the manner of v\u00e2yu. An objector\nis supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his\nsoul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _s\u00e2m\u00e2nyatod@r@s@ta_\ninference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition\nto infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but\nthat this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of\nsoul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But\nthe Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to\nwhich the expression \"I\" may be applied, there is no need of\nfalling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the\nmethods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.\nThere is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference\nare only pointed out as the basis.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@n\u00e2da was probably not\naware of Gautama's terminology.]\n\n290\n\nthen it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences\nas \"I am Yaj\u00f1adatta\" or \"I am Devadatta,\" what is the\ngood of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference\nlending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.\nWhen we say that Devadatta goes or Yaj\u00f1adatta goes,\nthere comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yaj\u00f1adatta the\nbody alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think\nthat the notion of \"I\" refers to the self and not to anything else.\nAs there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,\npain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many\nby special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on\nthe strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIn the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that\nwhich is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered\neternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can\nonly take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything\nas non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that\nalso proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal\nis ignorance (_avidy\u00e2_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing\nwhich is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_v\u00e2yu_) is not perceived to\nhave colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not\nthe actuality of colour (_r\u00fbpasamsk\u00e2ra_--i.e. in air there is only\ncolour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only\nwhen there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote\nref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also\nexplained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the\nquality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they\nabide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The\nnumber etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the\neye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upask\u00e2ra_. I\nthink the three s\u00fbtras \"_Sukhaduhkhaj\u00f1ananispattyavis'esadekatmyam,\"\n\"vyavasthato nana,\"_ and _\"vastras\u00e2marthyat ca\"_ originally meant that\nthe self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also\nbecause of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures,\nthey are regarded as many.]\n\n[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upask\u00e2ra,_\nwhich regards this s\u00fbtra \"_avidya_\" to mean that we do not know of any\nreasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]\n\n[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of\n_udbh\u00fbtar\u00fbpavattva_ and _anudbh\u00fbtar\u00fbpavattva_. The word _samsk\u00e2ra_ in\nVais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection\n(_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome\n(_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upask\u00e2ra_ IV. i. 7.]\n\n291\n\nare perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,\nand sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,\netc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile\nsense) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIn the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the\nearth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There\ncannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the\nthree, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one\nof them acts as the central radicle (_upa@s@tambhaka_). Bodies are of\ntwo kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise\nproduced by the combination of the atoms in accordance\nwith special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due\nto special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to\nbe admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been\ngiven names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and\nalso on account of the authority of the Vedas.\n\nIn the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed.\nTaking the example of threshing the corn, it is said\nthat the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the\nsoul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due\nto its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of\nthe flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is\nnot due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the\nhand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the\nsoul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of\nheaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.\nThings may have an upward or side motion by specially directed\nmotions (_nodanavis'e@sa_) which are generated by special kinds of\nefforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.\nThe movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown\ncause (_adr@s@tak\u00e2ranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion by\nspecially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia\n(_vegasamsk\u00e2ra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls\ndown through heaviness.\n\nThe second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the _Upask\u00e2ra_ of S'ankara\nMis'ra on the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ of Ka@n\u00e2da. It must be noted here\nthat the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental\nrelativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental\nrelativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or\ntouched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend\non the visual or the tactual sense.]\n\n292\n\nof certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical\nimportance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained\nas being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@tak\u00e2ritam_) and no explanation\nis given as to the nature of this unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_).\nIt is however said that with the absence of _ad@r@s@ta_ there is no contact\nof body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore\nmok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the\nself, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind\nis in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes\nsteady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, \u00e2k\u00e2s'a are\nregarded as inactive.\n\nThe whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts\nare made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account\nof the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain\nVedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities\nof things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta,\nhow dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa\ntakes place as a result of the work of the soul.\n\nIn the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal\nthings are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The\nchange of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning\nin the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size\nis visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many\ncauses [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those\nthat have great size. The same thing may be called great and small\nrelatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and\nmahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The\neternal size of _parima@n@dala_ (round) belongs to the atoms. \u00c2k\u00e2s'a\nand \u00e2tman are called _mah\u00e2n_ or _paramamah\u00e2n_ (the supremely\ngreat or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure\nit is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being\nof the measure \"supremely great\" (paramamahat), Atomic size\n(parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and\nthe supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether\n(\u00e2k\u00e2s'a) are regarded as eternal.\n\nIn the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity\nand separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from\nother qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;\nthe appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: I have differed from the _Upask\u00e2ra_ in the interpretation of\nthis s\u00fbtra.]\n\n293\n\nneither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekap@rthaktva_).\nThe notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.\nContact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the\neffect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither\ncontact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist\nindependently (_yutasiddhyabh\u00e2v\u00e2t_). In the eighth book it is said\nthat soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension\nof qualities, action, generality, and particularity\nperception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the\ncause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the\ncause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book\nnegation is described; non-existence (_asat_) is defined as that to\nwhich neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things\nmay become non-existent and that which is existent in one\nway may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind\nof non-existence which is different from the above kinds of\nexistence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly\nperceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the\nmind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also\nmade in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the\nyogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).\n\nIn the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the\nmiddle term is described. It is said that anything connected\nwith any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary\nor as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason).\nThe main point is the notion \"this is associated with this,\" or\n\"these two are related as cause and effect,\" and since this may\nalso be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism\nfrom propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal\ncognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidy\u00e2_) is\ndue to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation\ndue to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite\nof this is true knowledge (_vidy\u00e2_). In the tenth it is said that\npleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to\ndoubt and certainty.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Upask\u00e2ra_ here explains that it is intended that the senses\nare produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the\ns\u00fbtras.]\n\n[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _pr\u00e2gabh\u00e2va_\n(negation before production), _dhvams\u00e2bh\u00e2va_ (negation after destruction),\nand _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), have\nbeen described. The fourth one is _s\u00e2m\u00e2ny\u00e2bh\u00e2va_ (general negation).]\n\n294\n\n\nA dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for\nbecause of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.\nKarma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact\nis also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which\ninheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production\nof the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of\nfire is also a cause.\n\nWorks according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they\nhave no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the\nVedas direct them, they have validity.\n\n\nPhilosophy in the Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ begin with an enumeration of the sixteen\nsubjects, viz. means of right knowledge (_pram\u00e2@na_), object of right\nknowledge (_prameya_), doubt (_sa@ms'aya_), purpose (_prayojana_),\nillustrative instances (_d@r@s@t\u00e2nta_), accepted conclusions (_siddh\u00e2nta_),\npremisses (_avayava_), argumentation (_tarka_), ascertainment (_nir@naya_),\ndebates (_v\u00e2da_), disputations (_jalpa_), destructive criticisms\n(_vita@n@d\u00e2_), fallacy (_hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_), quibble (_chala_), refutations\n(_j\u00e2ti_), points of opponent's defeat (_nigrahasth\u00e2na_), and hold that\nby a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (_nihs'reyasa_), is\nattained. In the second s\u00fbtra it is said that salvation (_apavarga_)\nis attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge\n(_mithy\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na_), defects (_do@sa_), endeavours (_prav@rtti_, birth\n(_janma_), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said\nto be of four kinds, perception (_pratyak@sa_), inference (_anum\u00e2na_),\nanalogy (_upamana_), and testimony (_s'abda_). Perception is defined\nas uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names\nproceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three\nkinds, from cause to effect (_p\u00fbrvavat_), effect to cause (_s'e@savat_),\nand inference from common characteristics (_s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato d@r@s@ta_).\nUpam\u00e2na is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known\nthing.\n\nS'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (\u00e2pta)\n[Footnote ref 2].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_, supplemented here and there with the views of V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana, the\ncommentator. This follows the order of the s\u00fbtras, and tries to present\ntheir ideas with as little additions from those of later day Ny\u00e2ya as\npossible. The general treatment of Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two\nsystems in the light of later writers and commentators.]\n\n[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana says that an \u00e2rya, a\n@r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an \u00e2pta (reliable authority).]\n\n295\n\nSuch a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced\nand which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge\nare said to be self (_\u00e2tman_), body, senses, sense-objects,\nunderstanding (_buddhi_), mind (_manas_}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths,\nenjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and\nsalvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (_prayatna_), pleasure, pain, and\nknowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which\nupholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain\nas arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];\nthe five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap,\ntejas, v\u00e2yu and \u00e2k\u00e2s'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are\nthe qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the\nobjects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot\noccur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (_manas_).\nEndeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and\nbody. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead\nmen to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref\n2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called _apavarga_ [Footnote ref 3].\nDoubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting\nopinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That\nfor attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work\nis called _prayojana_.\n\nIllustrative example (_d@r@s@t\u00e2nta_) is that on which both the\ncommon man and the expert (_par\u00eek@saka_) hold the same opinion.\nEstablished texts or conclusions (_siddh\u00e2nta_) are of four kinds,\nviz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called\nthe _sarvatantrasiddh\u00e2nta_; (2) those which are held by one school\nor similar schools but opposed by others called the _pratitantrasiddh\u00e2nta_;\n(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally\nfollow called _adhikara@nasiddh\u00e2nta_; (4) those of the opponent's views\nwhich are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute\nthe consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and\nbring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (_abhyupagamasiddh\u00e2nta_)\n[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Here I have followed V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's meaning.]\n\n[Footnote 2: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana comments here that when one finds all things full\nof misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated\nwith pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]\n\n[Footnote 3: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in\nsalvation, but only cessation from pain.]\n\n[Footnote 4: I have followed V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's interpretation here.]\n\n296\n\n(1) _pratij\u00f1\u00e2_ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);\n(2) _hetu_ (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the\nstrength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples\nor negative instances); (3) _ud\u00e2hara@na_ (positive or negative\nillustrative instances); (4) _upanaya_ (corroboration by the instance);\n(5) _nigamana_ (to reach the conclusion which has been proved).\nThen come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, v\u00e2da, jalpa, vita@n@d\u00e2,\nthe fallacies (hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa), chala, j\u00e2ti, and nigrahasth\u00e2na, which\nhave been enumerated in the first s\u00fbtra.\n\nThe second book deals with the refutations of objections\nagainst the means of right knowledge (pram\u00e2na). In refutation\nof certain objections against the possibility of the happening\nof doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there\nwas always a difference between the two things regarding which\ndoubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating\ncharacteristics between the two things are not noted.\nCertain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object\nto the validity of the pram\u00e2@na in general and particularly of\nperceptions on the ground that if they were generated before\nthe sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter,\nand if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they\ncould not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two\nhappened together then there would be no notion of succession\nin our cognitions. To this the Ny\u00e2ya reply is that if there were\nno means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of\nknowledge by means of which the objector would refute all\nmeans of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any\nmeans of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no\nmeans of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds\nof sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous\nexistence of those different kinds of musical instruments,\nso from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence\nof those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as\ninstruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition\nof other things may themselves be the objects of right\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Yath\u00e2pas'c\u00e2tsiddhena s'abdena p\u00fbrvasiddham \u00e2todyamanum\u00eeyate\ns\u00e2dhyam ca \u00e2todyam s\u00e2dhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hy\u00e2todye svanata@h\nanum\u00e2nam bhavat\u00eeti, v\u00ee@n\u00e2 v\u00e2dyate ve@nu@h p\u00fbryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na\n\u00e2todyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tath\u00e2 p\u00fbrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam\npas'c\u00e2tsiddhena upalabdhihetun\u00e2 pratipadyate. V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana bh\u00e2@sya,_ II.\ni. 15.]\n\n297\n\nknowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which\nare instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere\ninstruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.\nThe means of right knowledge (pram\u00e2@na) do not require\nother sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of\na lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves\nas well.\n\nComing to the question of the correctness of the definition\nof perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact\nof the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we\nperceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception\nof the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we\ncan pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not\nmerely the parts collected together, for were it so one could\nsay that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].\nSome objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is\nwrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this\nthe Ny\u00e1ya answer is that there is always such a difference in the\nspecific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular\neffect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular\ncause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of\ntime on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time\ndid not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible.\nThe past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have\nperceived things as being done in the past or as going to be\ndone in the future. The validity of analogy (upam\u00e1na) as a\nmeans of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved.\nThe four pram\u00e2@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Here the s\u00fbtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later\ninterpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Ny\u00e2ya doctrine\nof perception, but against the wording of the definition\nof perception as given in the,_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_, II. i. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who\nrejected the existence of wholes (avayav\u00ee). On this subject a later\nBuddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),\n_Avayavinir\u00e2kara@na_ in _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts_, may be referred\nto.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _P\u00fbrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'\u00eeghrataram srotas\u00e2\nbahutaraphenaphalapar@nak\u00e2s@th\u00e2divahana\u00f1copalabham\u00e2na@h p\u00fbr@natvena,\nnadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhim\u00e2tre@na. V@atsy\u00e2yana\nbh\u00e2@sya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river\nis not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater\naugmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current\nlarge quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,\nassociated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of\nwater, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].\n\n298\n\nare quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arth\u00e2patti (implication),\naitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood\nin terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is\nalso understood--if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere\nwe understand that the same contains eight gallons of\ncorn as well) and abh\u00e2va (non-existence) as separate pram\u00e2@nas\nfor the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arth\u00e2patti,\nsambhava and abh\u00e2va are included within inference.\n\nThe validity of these as pram\u00e2@nas is recognized, but they are\nsaid to be included in the four pram\u00e2@nas mentioned before. The\ntheory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity\nproved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to\nrefer to class-notions (_j\u00e2ti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specific\nposition of the limbs (_\u00e2k@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested.\nClass (_j\u00e2ti_} is defined as that which produces the notion\nof sameness (_sam\u00e2naprasav\u00e2tmik\u00e2 j\u00e2ti@h_).\n\nThe third book begins with the proofs for the existence of\nthe self or \u00e2tman. It is said that each of the senses is associated\nwith its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity\nin us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and\nproduced the perception of the total object as distinguished from\nthe separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there\nwould be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there\nwere no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize\nthings as having seen them before; the two images produced by\nthe eyes in visual perception could not also have been united\ntogether as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover\nif there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour\nfruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness\nbelonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,\nfor the experience of one could not be recognized by another.\nIf it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected\nby manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose\nas self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this\nentity the knower would require some instrument by which it\nwould co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is\nadmitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the\nsense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: According to V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana, in the two eyes we have two different\nsenses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which\nworks in both eyes.]\n\n299\n\nsenses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.\nAnother argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants\nshow signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy\nand this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in\nprevious lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,\nand no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments\nand desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is\nargued that desires in infants are due to their experience in\nprevious existences.\n\nThe body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense\nis material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally\nthe view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation\nis also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three,\nfire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye,\nand touch which are made respectively by the four elements of\nearth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements\nof which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made\nby earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive\nquality of earth, viz. smell.\n\nAgainst the S\u00e2@mkhya distinction of _buddhi_ (cognition) and\n_cit_ (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between\nthe _buddhi_ and _cit_. We do not find in our consciousness two\nelements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness,\nbut only one, by whichever name it may be called. The S\u00e2@mkhya\nepistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in\ncognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition\nof contacts of manas with the senses, \u00e2tman and external\nobjects. The Buddhist objection against the S\u00e2@mkhya explanation\nthat the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external\nworld just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may\nlie near it, that there were really momentary productions of\ncrystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at\ndifferent times is refuted by Ny\u00e2ya; for it says that it cannot be\nsaid that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to\nin those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.\nIn the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no\ncoming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that S\u00e2@mkhya did not believe that the\nsenses were constituted of the gross elements. But the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga view\nrepresented in _\u00c2treya-sa@mhit\u00e2_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika\nor constituted of the gross elements.]\n\n300\n\nthe old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The\ncontact of manas with soul (_\u00e2tman_) takes place within the body\nand not in that part of \u00e2tman which is outside the body; knowledge\nbelongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for\neven when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions\ndestroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.\nDesire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of\nthese can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).\nManas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again\nif it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be\nborne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of\nanother. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given\nas follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign,\n(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor\nand the possessed or master and servant, or things which\nare generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of\nhusband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition,\n(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover\nand covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that\nwhich caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such\nas that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection,\n(19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does\nnot belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body\nas due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected by\nthe manas being permanently separated from the soul (\u00e2tman)\nthrough the destruction of karma.\n\nIn the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa\n(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all\nother defects such as r\u00e2ga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy).\nAs against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by\ndestruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the\nprocess of origination. \u00ces'vara is regarded as the cause of the\nproduction of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for\nman is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.\nA reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all\nthings have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for then\nno-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.\n\nThe doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted\non the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ III. ii. 44.]\n\n301\n\nThe doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'\u00fbnyav\u00e2din Bauddhas)\nthat all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to\nother things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are\nmerely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are\nthen refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like\nthe fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.\nEven though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means\nsorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented\nby many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for\npleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless\nsleep, so there is no affliction (_kles'a_) in the man who attains\napavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all\nefforts (_prav@rtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless\nwith us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then\nthere are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism\n(_aha@mk\u00e2ra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects\n(_do@sa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about the\nnature of atoms (_a@nus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussion\nis then introduced against the doctrine of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2dins\nthat nothing can be regarded as having any reality when\nseparated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as\nleading to right knowledge.\n\nThe whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition\nis devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations\n(_nigrahasth\u00e2na_) and futilities (_j\u00e2ti_).\n\n\n\nCaraka, Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras and Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras.\n\nWhen we compare the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ with the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_\nwe find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes\nhave met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large\namount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art\nfor defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was\nprobably originally compiled from some other existing treatises\nwhich were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering\nthemselves fit to hold their own in debates with their\nopponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana notes that this is the salvation of him who has\nknown Brahman, IV. i. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 2: A reference to the _Suvar@naprabh\u00e2sa s\u00fbtra_ shows that the\nBuddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving\ntheir voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to\nthe worship of Sarasvat\u00ee (goddess of learning), who they supposed would\nhelp them in bringing readily before their mind all the information\nand ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]\n\n302\n\nwe compare the futilities (j\u00e2ti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to\ndisputations as found in the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ with those that are\nfound in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There\nare no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the\n_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ and _Caraka-sa@mhit\u00e2_ which have treated of these\nmatters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.\nd@r@s@t\u00e2nta, prayojana, pratij\u00f1\u00e2 and vita@n@d\u00e2) follows very closely\nthe definitions given of those in the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_. There are\nothers such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasth\u00e2na, etc.,\nwhere the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are\nsome other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. _prati@s@th\u00e2pan\u00e2,\njij\u00f1\u00e2s\u00e2, vyavas\u00e2ya, v\u00e2kyado@sa, v\u00e2kyapras'a@ms\u00e2, upalambha,\nparih\u00e2ra, abhyanuj\u00f1\u00e2_, etc.) which are not found in the\n_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities\n(j\u00e2ti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasth\u00e2na) mentioned in\nthe _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms which\nare found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. _aupamya_ in\n_Caraka, upam\u00e2na_ in _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra, arth\u00e2patti_ in _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ and\n_arthapr\u00e2pti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anything\nabout the Ny\u00e2ya work on this subject, and it is plain that the\ntreatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is much\nsimpler and less technical than what we find in the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_.\nIf we leave out the varieties of j\u00e2ti and nigrahasth\u00e2na of the\nfifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the\ntreatment of Caraka and that of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_. It seems therefore\nin a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation\nto some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation\nwas earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ represents\na later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had\nnecessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied\nin this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.\nIt does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have\nbeen earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing\nthrough the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrines\nwhich could be attributed to the Sautr\u00e2ntika Buddhists, the\nVij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhists, the nihilists, the S\u00e2@mkhya, the C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka,\nand some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division\nof inference (_anum\u00e2na_) as _p\u00fbrvavat, s'e@savat and s\u00e2m\u00e2nyatod@r@s@ta_.]\n\n303\n\nfurther allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ as we have already\nseen had argued only against the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, and ultimately agreed\nwith them on most points. The dispute with M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 in the\n_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question\nof the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the\nself-validity of knowledge (_svata@h pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nyav\u00e2da_)and the akhy\u00e2ti\ndoctrine of illusion of the M\u00eem\u00e2@msists, which form the two chief\npoints of discussion between later M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 and later Ny\u00e2ya,\nare never alluded to in the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_. The advocacy of Yoga\nmethods (_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be\nan alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in\nkeeping with the general tendency of the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_, and the\nJapanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mah\u00e2mahop\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya\nHarapras\u00e2da S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.\n\nThe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional\nknowledge as produced by the close proximity of the\nself (\u00e2tman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they\nalso adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived\nunder special conditions of sa@msk\u00e2ra (conglomeration etc.).\nThe reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity\n(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost\nthe same with Vais'e@sika as with Ny\u00e2ya. The _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_\ngive a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring\nin the questions of sa@msk\u00e2ra or udbh\u00fbtar\u00fbpavattva which Vais'e@sika\ndoes. On the question of inference Ny\u00e2ya gives three\nclassifications as p\u00fbrvavat, s'e@savat and sam\u00e2nyatod@r@s@ta, but no\ndefinition. The _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ do not know of these classifications,\nand give only particular types or instances of inference\n(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made\nwhen a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation\nof inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind\nof effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and\nso on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference\nwithout reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vy\u00e2pti\n(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _s\u00e2dhya_ (probandum)) which became\nso important in later Ny\u00e2ya has never been properly formulated\neither in the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sika\nsutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance\nbetween hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhip\u00fbrvakatv\u00e2t apades'asya_),\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]\n\n304\n\nbut the technical vy\u00e2pti is not known, and the connotation of\nthe term _prasiddhip\u00fbrvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be more\nloose than the term _vy\u00e2pti_ as we know it in the later Ny\u00e2ya. The\n_Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate\npram\u00e2@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.\nWith _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ s'abda as a pram\u00e2@na applies not only to the\nVedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana says that trustworthy persons may be of three\nkinds _@r@si, \u00e2rya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upam\u00e2na which is\nregarded as a means of right cognition in Ny\u00e2ya is not even\nreferred to in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_. The _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ know of\nother pram\u00e2@nas, such as _arth\u00e2patti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but\ninclude them within the pram\u00e2@nas admitted by them, but the\n_Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The\n_Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abh\u00e2va) through\nthe perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.\n1-10). The _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abh\u00e2va as\nnon-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another\nto \"bring the clothes which are not marked,\" he finds that marks\nare absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that\nabsence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though\nthere is thus an agreement between the Ny\u00e2ya and the _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ about the acceptance of abh\u00e2va as being due to perception,\nyet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma,\nvis'e@sa_ and _samav\u00e2ya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska\ndiscussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ take much pains to prove\nthe materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have\nbeen important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this\nquestion in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.\nThe _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ do not mention the name of \"\u00ces'vara,\" whereas\nthe _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological\ngrounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self\nin the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of\nsense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pram\u00e2@nas is Caraka.\nBut he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from\nNy\u00e2ya and calls _arth\u00e2patti arthapr\u00e2pti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]\n\n[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's\ncommentary.]\n\n[Footnote 3: The _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of\nj\u00e2ti as \"_sam\u00e2naprasav\u00e2tmik\u00e2 j\u00e2ti@h_\" (II. ii. 71).]\n\n305\n\nVaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact\nof knowledge. Both the Ny\u00e2ya and the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ admit\nthe existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of\natomic structure in later Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The\nVai'se@sika calls salvation _ni@hs'reyasa_ or _mok@sa_ and the Ny\u00e2ya\n_apavarga_. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of\nconnection with body; the apavarga with Ny\u00e2ya is cessation of\npain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between\nthe Vais'e@sika and Ny\u00e2ya are said to lie with regard to theory of the\nnotion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.\nThus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which\ncognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment\nthere is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness,\nthen from a sense of relativeness--apek@s\u00e2buddhi--notion\nof two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two\nthings); again, the doctrine of pilup\u00e2ka (changes of qualities by\nheat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Ny\u00e2ya held)\nwas held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiy\u00e2yikas did not admit [Footnote ref\n2]. But as the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ are silent on these points, it is not\npossible to say that such were really the differences between early\nNy\u00e2ya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between\nthe later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of\nNy\u00e2ya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of\nPras'astap\u00e2da (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Ny\u00e2ya from\nthe time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost\nthe same system with slight variations only. I have therefore\npreferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found\nfrom the sixth century onwards.\n\n\nThe Vais'e@sika and Ny\u00e2ya Literature.\n\nIt is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ by Ka@n\u00e2da, also called Aul\u00fbkya the son of Ul\u00fbka, though\nthere is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Professor Vanam\u00e2l\u00ee Ved\u00e2ntat\u00eertha quotes a passage from\n_Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another\npassage from a Ny\u00e2ya writer Bh\u00e2sarvaj\u00f1a, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914,\nto show that the old Naiy\u00e2yikas considered that there was an element\nof happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the\nVais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found\nin the Ny\u00e2ya or the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_, unless the cessation of pain\nwith Ny\u00e2ya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss\nor happiness.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See M\u00e2dhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aul\u00fbkyadars'ana_.]\n\n306\n\nappears from the _V\u00e2yu pur\u00e2na_ that he was born in Prabh\u00e2sa near\nDv\u00e2rak\u00e2, and was the disciple of Somas'arm\u00e2. The time of\nPras'astap\u00e2da who wrote a bh\u00e2@sya (commentary) of the _Vais'e@sika\ns\u00fbtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity\nof Pras'astap\u00e2da's bh\u00e2@sya is this that unlike other bh\u00e2@syas\n(which first give brief explanations of the text of the s\u00fbtras and\nthen continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining\nthe first brief comments), it does not follow the s\u00fbtras but\nis an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote\nref 1]. There were two other bh\u00e2@syas on the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_,\nnamely _R\u00e2va@na-bh\u00e2@sya_ and _Bhar\u00e2dv\u00e2ja-v@rtti_, but these are now\nprobably lost. References to the former are found in\n_Kira@n\u00e2val\u00eebh\u00e2skara_ of Padman\u00e2bha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabh\u00e2_\n2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bh\u00e2@sya, namely\n_Vyomavat\u00ee_ by Vyomas'ekhar\u00e2c\u00e2rya, _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_ by S'ridhara,\n_Kira@n\u00e2val\u00ee_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _L\u00eel\u00e2vat\u00ee_ S'r\u00eevats\u00e2c\u00e2rya.\nIn addition to these Jagad\u00ees'a Bha@t@t\u00e2c\u00e2rya of Navadv\u00eepa and S'a@nkara\nMis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astap\u00e2da-bh\u00e2sya_,\nnamely _Bh\u00e2syas\u00fbkti_ and _Ka@n\u00e2da-rahasya_. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425\nA.D.) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ called the\n_Upask\u00e2ra_. Of these _Ny\u00e2ya-kandal\u00ee_ of S'r\u00eedhara on account of its\nsimplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably\nthe best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a\nnative of the village of Bh\u00fbris@r@s@ti in Bengal (R\u00e2@dha). His father's\nname was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchok\u00e2 and he\nwrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes\nat the end of his work.\n\nThe _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ was written by Ak@sap\u00e2da or Gautama, and\nthe earliest commentary on it written by V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana is known\nas the _V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana-bh\u00e2@sya_. The date of V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana has not\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The bh\u00e2@sya of Pras'astap\u00e2da can hardly he called a\nbh\u00e2@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and\ncalls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories\n(_Pad\u00e2rthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya,\ngu@na, karma, s\u00e2m\u00e2nya, vis'e@sa_ and _samav\u00e2ya_ in order and without\nraising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on\nthem. Some of the doctrines which are important in later\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and\ndissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms\ncontributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of\npilup\u00e2ka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat\noccur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_\nare silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date\ndefinitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us\nafter Ka@n\u00e2da and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th\ncentury A.D.]\n\n307\n\nbeen definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he\nlived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi\nplaces him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a\n_V\u00e2rttika_ on V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana's bh\u00e2@sya to establish the Ny\u00e2ya views\nand to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nn\u00e2ga\n(about 500 A.D.) in his _Pram\u00e2@nasamuccaya_. V\u00e2caspatimis'ra\n(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Ny\u00e2yav\u00e2rttika_ of\nUdyotakara called _Ny\u00e2yav\u00e2rttikat\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ in order to make\nclear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _V\u00e2rttika_ which was sinking\nin the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings\n(_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagn\u00e2n\u00e2m_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote\na sub-commentary on the _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ called\n_T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2paris'uddhi_. Varddham\u00e2na (1225 A.D.) wrote a\nsub-commentary on that called the _Ny\u00e2yanibandhaprak\u00e2s'a_. Padman\u00e2bha\nwrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddham\u00e2nendu_ and S'a@nkara\nMis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the\n_Ny\u00e2yat\u00e2tparyama@n@dana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'van\u00e2tha\nwrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'van\u00e2thav@rtti_,\non the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_, and R\u00e2dh\u00e2mohana wrote a separate\ncommentary on the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ known as _Ny\u00e2yas\u00fbtravivara@na_.\nIn addition to these works on the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ many other\nindependent works of great philosophical value have been written\non the Ny\u00e2ya system. The most important of these in medieval\ntimes is the _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jari_ of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished\nshortly after V\u00e2caspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Ny\u00e2ya\ns\u00fbtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Ny\u00e2ya views quite\nindependently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian\nthought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than V\u00e2caspati's\n_T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another\nimportant work is Udayana's _Kusum\u00e2\u00f1jali_ in which he tries to\nprove the existence of \u00ces'vara (God). This work ought to be read\nwith its commentary _Prak\u00e2s'a_ by Varddham\u00e2na (1225 A.D.) and its\nsub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's\n_\u00c2tmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in\nwhich he tries to establish the Ny\u00e2ya doctrine of soul. In addition\nto these we have a number of useful works on Ny\u00e2ya in later\ntimes. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection\nwith the present work. _Bh\u00e2@s\u00e2pariccheda_ by Vis'van\u00e2tha with\nits commentaries _Mukt\u00e2val\u00ee, Dinakar\u00ee_ and _R\u00e2marudr\u00ee, Tarkasamgraha_\nwith _Ny\u00e2yanir@naya, Tarkabk\u00e2@s\u00e2_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with\n\n308\n\nthe commentary _Ny\u00e2yaprad\u00eepa, Saptapad\u00e2rth\u00ee_ of S'iv\u00e2ditya,\n_T\u00e2rkikarak@s\u00e2_ of Varadar\u00e2ja with the commentary _Ni@ska@n@taka_\nof Mallin\u00e2tha, _Ny\u00e2yas\u00e2ra_ of M\u00e2dhava Deva of the city of Dh\u00e2ra and\n_Ny\u00e2yasiddh\u00e2ntama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ of J\u00e2nakin\u00e2tha Bha@t@t\u00e2carya with the\n_Ny\u00e2yamanjarisara_ by Y\u00e2dav\u00e2c\u00e2rya, and _Ny\u00e2yasiddh\u00e2ntad\u00eepa_ of\nS'a@sadhara with _Prabh\u00e2_ by S'e@s\u00e2nant\u00e2c\u00e2rya.\n\nThe new school of Ny\u00e2ya philosophy known as Navya-Ny\u00e2ya\nbegan with Ga@nges'a Up\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya of Mithil\u00e2, about\n1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pram\u00e2@nas admitted by the\nNy\u00e2ya, viz. pratyak@sa, anum\u00e2na, upam\u00e2na, and s'abda, and not on any of\nthe topics of Ny\u00e2ya metaphysics. But it so happened that his\ndiscussions on anum\u00e2na (inference) attracted unusually great attention\nin Navadv\u00eepa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and\ncommentaries of commentaries were written on the anum\u00e2na\nportion of his work _Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni, and many independent\ntreatises on sabda and anum\u00e2na were also written by the scholars\nof Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home\nof Ny\u00e2ya studies. The commentaries of Raghun\u00e2tha S'iroma@ni\n(1500 A.D.), Mathur\u00e2 Bha@t@t\u00e2c\u00e2rya (1580 A.D.), Gad\u00e2dhara Bha@t@t\u00e2c\u00e2rya\n(1650 A.D.) and Jagad\u00eesa Bha@t@t\u00e2c\u00e2rya (1590 A.D.), commentaries\non S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacint\u00e2mani, had been\nvery widely read in Bengal. The new school of Ny\u00e2ya became the\nmost important study in Navadv\u00eepa and there appeared a series\nof thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject\n[Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of\nmetaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly\nin developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately\nand precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote\nref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the\nnature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke\nand fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature\nof the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there\nshould be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic\nthinking and the development of a system of highly technical\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third\nquarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Ny\u00e2ya was started\nin Mithil\u00e2 (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century\nBengal became pre-eminently the home of Ny\u00e2ya studies. See Mr\nCakravartt\u00ee's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some\nof the dates mentioned in this section.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _\u00ces'var\u00e2num\u00e2na_ of Raghunatha as well as his\n_Pad\u00e2rthatattvanir\u00fbpa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions.]\n\n309\n\nexpressions mark the development of this literature. The technical\nexpressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted\neven by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate\nand subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit\nceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the\nimportance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it\ncan hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by\nattracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.\n\nI cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that\nso far as the logical portion of the Ny\u00e2ya system is concerned,\nthough Ak@sap\u00e2da was the first to write a comprehensive account\nof it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently\nworked at this subject and had criticized the Ny\u00e2ya account\nof logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic\n_Das'avaik\u00e2likaniryukti_ of Bhadrab\u00e2hu (357 B.C.), Um\u00e2sv\u00e2ti's\n_Tattv\u00e2rth\u00e2dhigama s\u00fbtra_, _Ny\u00e2y\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_ of Siddhasena Div\u00e2kara\n(533 A.D.) M\u00e2@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) _Par\u00eek@s\u00e2mukha s\u00fbtra_, and\n_Pram\u00e2@nanayatattv\u00e2lok\u00e2la@mk\u00e2ra_ of Deva S\u00fbri (1159 A.D.) and\n_Prameyakamalam\u00e2rta@n@da_ of Prabh\u00e2candra deserve special notice.\n_Pram\u00e2@nasamuccaya_ and _Ny\u00e2yapraves'a_ of Di@nn\u00e2ga (500 A.D.),\n_Pram\u00e2@nay\u00e2rttika k\u00e2rik\u00e2_ and _Ny\u00e2yabindu_ of Dharmak\u00eertti\n(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most\ninteresting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].\nThe diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and\nBuddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on\nIndian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the\npresent volume.\n\nIt is interesting to notice that between the _V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana\nbh\u00e2@sya_ and the Udyotakara's _V\u00e2rttika_ no Hindu work on logic\nof importance seems to have been written: it appears that the\nscience of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and\nthe Buddhists; and it was Di@nn\u00e2ga's criticism of Hindu Ny\u00e2ya\nthat roused Udyotakara to write the _V\u00e2rttika_. The Buddhist and\nthe Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics\nas an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we\ncome to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of\nimportance on Ny\u00e2ya in the Buddhist style namely _Ny\u00e2yas\u00e2ra_\nof Bh\u00e2sarvaj\u00f1a. Other older Hindu works generally treated of\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na,\nfor a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]\n\n310\n\ninference only along with metaphysical and other points of Ny\u00e2ya\ninterest [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe main doctrine of the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness\ntook a common-sense view of things, and held that\nthings remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange\nthemselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues\nto remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by\nthe stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce\nan impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or\nthrough knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence\nis one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver\ndid not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.\nWhether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding\nenvironments is immaterial. Existence is the most general\ncharacteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things\nare testified by experience to be existing.\n\nAs the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and\non valid reasons, they dismissed the S\u00e2@mkhya cosmology, but\naccepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bh\u00fbtas_), earth\n(_k@siti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atoms\nare eternal; the fifth substance (_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) is all pervasive and eternal.\nIt is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading\nand thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests\nsound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows\nitself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves\nto hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf\nman though he has the \u00e2k\u00e2s'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear\non account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense\norgan [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence\nof time (_k\u00e2la_) as extending from the past through the present to the\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika referred to\nhave been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be\nacquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should\nrefer to the paper called \"The History of Navya Ny\u00e2ya in Bengal,\" by Mr.\nCakravartt\u00ee in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]\n\n[Footnote 2: I have treated Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika as the same system.\nWhatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded\nsince about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some\nminor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those\nof the other. The original character of the two systems has already\nbeen treated.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 59-64.]\n\n311\n\nendless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could\nhave no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account\nfor our time-notions associated with all changes. The S\u00e2@mkhya\ndid not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit\nof k\u00e2la is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its\nown unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms\nand their movements. The appearance of k\u00e2la as a separate entity\nis a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirm\u00e2@na) as it represents the\norder or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But\nk\u00e2la in Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by\nitself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself\nas past, present, and future. S\u00e2@mkhya regarded it as past, present,\nand future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things\nin its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The\nastronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets.\nThese must all be contrasted with the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika conception\nof kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless\nsubstance which appears as many in association with the changes\nrelated to it [Footnote ref l].\n\nThe seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance\nby virtue of which things are perceived as being on the\nright, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; k\u00e2la like dik is\nalso one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight\ndirections and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth\nsubstance is the soul _(\u00e2tman)_ which is all-pervading. There are\nseparate \u00e2tmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings\nof pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to _\u00e2tman_. Manas (mind) is\nthe ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;\nall affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are\ngenerated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the\nobjects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with\nthe senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling,\nor willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have\na separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience\nis conducted in a series, one coming after another and not\nsimultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee,_ pp. 64-66, and _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp.\n136-139. The _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ regarded time as the cause of things\nwhich suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee,_ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p. 140.]\n\n312\n\nof substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas\nthe other things such as quality (_gu@na_), action (_karma_), sameness\nor generality (_s\u00e2m\u00e2nya_), speciality or specific individuality\n(_vis'e@sa_) and the relation of inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_) cannot show\nthemselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus the\nplace of rest (_\u00e2s'ray\u00e2_) on which all the others depend (_\u00e2s'@rta_).\nDravya, gu@na, karma, s\u00e2m\u00e2nya, vis'e@sa, and samav\u00e2ya are the six original\nentities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1].\nWhen a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and\na thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way\nof right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics\nand differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any\npassions and to work in accordance with their promptings and\nattains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref\n2]. The Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to\nreduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor\ndismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands\nof the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The\nentities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying\nprinciple is that at the root of each kind of perception there\nmust be something to which the perception is due. It classified the\npercepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types\nor categories (_pad\u00e2rtha_), and held that the notion of each type\nwas due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in\nnumber--dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept \"I see a red\nbook,\" the book appears to be an independent entity on which\nrests the concept of \"redness\" and \"oneness,\" and we thus call the\nbook a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that which\nhas the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also gu@na and\nkarma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the\nsame principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with\nS\u00e2@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Abh\u00e2va_ (negation) as dependent on bh\u00e2va (position) is\nmentioned in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_. Later Ny\u00e2ya writers such as\nUdayana include _abh\u00e2va_ as a separate category, but S'r\u00eedhara a\ncontemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abh\u00e2va was not\ncounted by Pras'astap\u00e2da as it was dependent on bh\u00e2va--\"_abh\u00e2vasya\nprthaganupades'a@h bh\u00e2vap\u00e2ratantry\u00e2t na tvabh\u00e2v\u00e2t_.\" _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_,\np. 6, and _Lak@sa@n\u00e2val\u00ee_, p. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"_Tattvato j\u00f1\u00e2te@su b\u00e2hy\u00e2dhy\u00e2tmike@su vi@saye@su\ndo@sadars'an\u00e2t viraktasya sam\u00eeh\u00e2niv@rttau \u00e2tmaj\u00f1asya tadarth\u00e2ni\nkarm\u00e2nyakurvatah tatparity\u00e2gas\u00e2dhan\u00e2ni s'rutism@rtyudit\u00e2ni\nasa@nkalpitaphal\u00e2ni up\u00e2dad\u00e2nasya \u00e2tmaj\u00f1\u00e2namabhyasyata@h\nprak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati\nparipakv\u00e2tmaj\u00f1\u00e2nasy\u00e2tyantikas'ar\u00eeraviyogasya bh\u00e2v\u00e2t._\" _Ibid._ p. 7.]\n\n313\n\nwhiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika would collect \"all whiteness\" under the name\nof \"the quality of white colour\" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l].\nThey only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate\nmode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions\ncould be regarded as the modification of some other notion or\nnot; but whenever they found that there were some experiences\nwhich were similar and universal, they classed them as separate\nentities or categories.\n\n\nThe six Pad\u00e2rthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, S\u00e2m\u00e2nya,\nVis'e@sa, Samav\u00e2ya.\n\nOf the six classes of entities or categories (_pad\u00e2rtha_) we have\nalready given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to\nthe others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _r\u00fbpa_\n(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone\nand not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue,\nyellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are\nfound only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are\npermanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat\nis applied, and this, S'r\u00eedhara holds, is due to the fact that\nheat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the\nold constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour\nis also destroyed, and a new one is generated. R\u00fbpa is the general\nname for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _r\u00fbpatva_\n(colourness), and the r\u00fbpa gu@na (quality) is that on which\nrests this genus; r\u00fbpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended\nby the eye.\n\nThe second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be\napprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent\n(_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@s\u00e2ya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap\nhave taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like\nr\u00fbpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must\nbe distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are\napprehended by the tongue.\n\nThe third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be\napprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautr\u00e2ntika Buddhism, \"yo yo\nvruddh\u00e2dhy\u00e2sav\u00e2n n\u00e2s\u00e2veka@h.\" See Pa@n@dit\u00e2s'oka's _Avayavinir\u00e2karana,\nSix Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya tracts_.\n\n[Footnote 2: The word \"pad\u00e2rtha\" literally means denotations of words.]\n\n314\n\nor air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence\nof earth materials.\n\nThe fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended\nonly by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold,\nhot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and\nv\u00e2yu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of \u00e2k\u00e2s'a. Had there\nbeen no \u00e2k\u00e2s'a there would have been no sound.\n\nThe sixth is sa@mkhy\u00e2 (number), that entity of quality belonging\nto things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three,\netc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative\noscillatory state of the mind (_apek@s\u00e2buddhi_); thus when there are\ntwo jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and\nthat is another jug. This is called apek@s\u00e2buddhi; then in the\ntwo jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an\nindeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in us\nand then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs.\nThe conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a\nsimilar manner [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in\nthings by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and\nspeak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is\ncalled _parima@n@dala parim\u00e2@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate\nthe measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;\nwhen two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is not\nthe measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and\nthe _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_),\nfor then the size (_parim\u00e2@na_) of it would have been still smaller\nthan the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the\nmeasure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the\nsmall (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but\nthen the number (sa@mkhy\u00e2) of the atom should be regarded as\nbringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)\nmeasure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka)\ncompose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure \"small\"\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by\nPras'astap\u00e2da. Ny\u00e2ya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara\nMis'ra's _Upask\u00e2ra_, VII. ii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms\nas eternal as in \"param\u00e2@nus\" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The\nparima@n@dala parim\u00e2@na is thus a variety of a@nuparim\u00e2@na. The\na@nuparim\u00e2@na and the hrasvaparim\u00e2@na represent the two dimensions of\nthe measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and d\u00eergha are with reference\nto trya@nukas. See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, p. 133.]\n\n315\n\n(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure \"great\" (_mahat_)\nof the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross\ntrya@nukas we find that the \"great\" measure of the trya@nukas is\nthe cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by\nthem. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much\nbigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas\nof mahat parim\u00e2@na makes things of still more mahat parim\u00e2@na.\nThe measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat\nbut also as d\u00eergha (long) and this d\u00eergha parim\u00e2@na has to be admitted\nas coexisting with mahat parim\u00e2@na but not identical, for\nthings not only appear as great but also as long (_d\u00eergha_). Here\nwe find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation\nof \"great\" (_mahat_) and \"long\" (_d\u00eergha_) parim\u00e2@na, and hence\nthe thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater\nand longer than the individual atoms which composed them.\nNow the hrasva parim\u00e2@na of the dyads is not regarded as having\na lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct\ntype of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation\nof grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,\ngrossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the\nhrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva\nparim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of\nthe dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the\ntrya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if\nthe atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regarded\nas generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas,\nthen the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic\nthan the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should\nnot be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced\nby the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be\nregarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign\nto the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the\ncause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness\nand the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to\ngenerate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.\nBut since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to\nbe constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are\nnot found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued\nthat the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the\nmeasure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause\n\n316\n\nof the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparim\u00e2@na, hrasva\nparim\u00e2@na, mahat parim\u00e2@na, and d\u00eergha parim\u00e2@na. The parim\u00e2@na\nof \u00e2k\u00e2s'a, k\u00e2la, dik and \u00e2tman which are regarded as all-pervasive,\nis said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parim\u00e2@nas\nof the atoms, \u00e2k\u00e2s'a, k\u00e2la, dik, manas, and \u00e2tman are regarded\nas eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parim\u00e2@nas as belonging to\nnon-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.\n\nThe eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of\nthings), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things\nappear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is\nperceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation\nsuch as this jug is not this pot.\n\nThe ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by\nvirtue of which things appear to us as connected.\n\nThe tenth is _vibh\u00e2ga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na which\ndestroys the connection or contact of things.\n\nThe eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give\nrise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote\nand near.\n\nThe other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness),\n_du@hkha_ (sorrow), _icch\u00e2_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and\n_yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.\n\nThe characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of\nwhich things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness)\nbelongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@msk\u00e2ra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_\n(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,\n(2) _sthiti-sth\u00e2paka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing\ntries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bh\u00e2van\u00e2_\nis that quality of \u00e2tman by which things are constantly practised or by\nwhich things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].\n_Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy\nhappiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Pras'astap\u00e2da says that bh\u00e2van\u00e2 is a special characteristic\nof the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which\nthings seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through\nunexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India),\nrepetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the\nsa@msk\u00e2ra becomes particularly strong. See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, p. 167.\nKa@n\u00e2da however is silent on these points. He only says that by a\nspecial kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@msk\u00e2ra,\nmemory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Pras'astap\u00e2da speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality\nof the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit\nthat dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmas\u00e2marthyam_). Sacrifice etc.\ncannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate\nthe effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action\nis destroyed its power (_s\u00e2marthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be\nadmitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct\nwhich produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions\nof time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddh\u00e2_), non-injury, doing good to all\nbeings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of\nanger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,\nfasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of\nduties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by\nPras'astap\u00e2da as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to\nthese duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Pata\u00f1jali's Yoga) and\nattains Yoga by a meditation on the six pad\u00e2rthas attains a dharma\nwhich brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'r\u00eedhara refers to the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga\naccount of the method of attaining salvation (_Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 272-280).\nSee also Vallabha's _Ny\u00e2yalil\u00e2vat\u00ee_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]\n\n317\n\nthe opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a\nman to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of\nthings and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and\narranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with\ntheir merits or demerits.\n\n_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must\nbe held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There\nare five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,\n(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of\nkarmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the\nthings to which they belong to move.\n\n_S\u00e2m\u00e2nya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect\nof generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite\nof the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of\nthem are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.\nIn spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all\nperceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness,\nwhich is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na,\nand karma. This sameness is called _s\u00e2m\u00e2nya_ or _j\u00e2ti_, and it is\nregarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or\nkarma. This highest genus _satt\u00e2_ (being) is called _paraj\u00e2ti_ (highest\nuniversal), the other intermediate j\u00e2tis are called aparaj\u00e2ti (lower\nuniversals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or\nstill more intermediate j\u00e2tis such as _gotv\u00e2j\u00e2ti_ (the genus cow),\n_n\u00eelatvaj\u00e2ti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate j\u00e2tis or genera\nsometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as\n_pas'utva_ (animal j\u00e2ti) and _gotva_ (the cow j\u00e2ti); here however\ngotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a j\u00e2ti.\nThe aspect as species has no separate existence. It is j\u00e2ti which\nfrom one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.\n\n318\n\nThis j\u00e2ti or _s\u00e2m\u00e2nya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate\nindependent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and\nkarma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent\nreality of s\u00e2m\u00e2nya, but said that the sameness as cow\nwas really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception\nof cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this\nis represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who\nshould regard this sameness to be a separate and independent\nreality perceived in experience might also discover two horns\non his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika said that negation\nof non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived\nas cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained\nby the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. S\u00e2m\u00e2nya has\nthus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as\nsameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that\nobject [Footnote ref l]. This j\u00e2ti is eternal or non-destructible, for even\nwith the destruction of individuals comprehended within the j\u00e2ti, the\nlatter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThrough _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single\nsensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees\nwith any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the\nexistence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.\nThe, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated\nsouls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Pandit\u00e2s'oka says that there is no single thing\nrunning through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the\ns\u00e2m\u00e2nya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have\nknown it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action\nof cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If\nthere is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish\nj\u00e2ti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the\naction of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should\nrequire one common factor to hold them together, then these should\nrequire another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.\nWhatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent\n(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). S\u00e2m\u00e2nya is\nsuch, therefore s\u00e2m\u00e2nya is non existent. No s\u00e2m\u00e2nya can be admitted to\nexist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past\nexperiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and\ntransferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no s\u00e2m\u00e2nya\ncan be pointed out as being externally perceptible\n--_S\u00e2m\u00e2nyad\u00fbsanadikprasarit\u00e2_--in _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts_. The Vedanta\nalso does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know\nj\u00e2ti as a separate substance. So it discards j\u00e2ti. See _Ved\u00e2ntaparibh\u00e2s\u00e2_,\n_Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabh\u00e2_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's\n_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Similarity (s\u00e2drs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,\nfor it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati\ntadgatabh\u00fbyodharmavattvam_).]\n\n319\n\nis on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the\nyogins who can perceive them.\n\n_Samav\u00e2ya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation\nby virtue of which two different things such as substance and\nattribute, substance and karma, substance and s\u00e2m\u00e2nya, karana\n(cause) and k\u00e2rya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified\nthat they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.\nThis peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why\nsubstance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and j\u00e2ti in substance\nand attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they\nare one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place\nbetween two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected\nand may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put\nmy pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances\nand were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by\nvirtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samav\u00e2ya\nhowever makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and\ngu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as\none inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a\nseparate and independent category. This is not regarded as\nmany like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because\nit has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed\nbut the samav\u00e2ya relation which was never brought into being\nby anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThese six things are called the six pad\u00e2rthas or independent\nrealities experienced in perception and expressed in language.\n\nThe Theory of Causation.\n\nThe Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that\nview of things which finds expression in our language, and which\nwe tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The Ved\u00e2nta does not admit the existence of the relation of\nsamav\u00e2ya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance\nand qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-s\u00fbtrabh\u00e2@sya II. ii. 13_)\nthat if a samav\u00e2ya relation is to be admitted to connect two different\nthings, then another samav\u00e2ya would be necessary to connect it with\neither of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that\nanother, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasth\u00e2_).\nNy\u00e2ya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to\nremember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of\n_anavasth\u00e2_--_pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nik\u00ee_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question\nof the seed and the tree, or of the avidy\u00e2 and the passions), and another\n_apr\u00e2m\u00e2@nik\u00ee anavasth\u00e2_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of\nanything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]\n\n320\n\nthey admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and s\u00e2m\u00e2nya, Vis'e@sa they\nhad to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did\nnot admit that things were continually changing their qualities,\nand that everything could be produced out of everything by a\nchange of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.\nIn the production of the effect too they did not admit that the\neffect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that\nthe material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the\naccessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the\nwheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed\nthe cause, and produced the effect which was not existent\nbefore but was newly produced. This is what is called the\ndoctrine of _asatk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da_. This is just the opposite of the\nS\u00e2@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _n\u00e2bh\u00e2vo\nvidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never be\nproduced (_n\u00e2sato vidyate bh\u00e2vah_). The objection to this view is\nthat if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible\nthings as the hare's horn could also be produced. The\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything\nthat is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced\nwas non-existent [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIt is held by M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 that an unseen power resides in the\ncause which produces the effect. To this Ny\u00e2ya objects that this\nis neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for\nthere is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental\noperation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained\nby molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing\nexcept the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)\nbetween the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of\nan antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what\nsucceeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well\n(_anyath\u00e2siddhis'\u00fbnyasya niyat\u00e2p\u00fbrvavarttit\u00e2_). Unconditionality\nand invariability are indispensable for _k\u00e2ryak\u00e2ra@na-bh\u00e2va_ or\ncause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or\nadventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also\nbe invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only\ncollateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional\nupon something else (_na sv\u00e2tantrye@na_). The potter's stick is an\nunconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ny\u00e2yamu\u00f1jari_, p. 494.]\n\n321\n\nof a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment\nor accident which does not contribute to the work done, is\nnot an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be\nregarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable\nantecedents or what enters into the production of their\nco-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they\nare not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those\nof the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the\nsound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably\nprecedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and \u00e2k\u00e2s'a (ether) as the\nsubstrate and v\u00e2yu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into\nthe production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional\nantecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration\nof conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the\nconditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent\nof the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar),\nthe potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the\npotter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be\nunconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally\nall seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with\nor left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded\nas causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly\nremarks, \"In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to\ncomplete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral,\nsecondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the\nirrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of\nenergy. This test the Ny\u00e2ya would accept only in the sense of\nan operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda\neva bhautiko vy\u00e2p\u00e2ra@h karotyartha@h at\u00eendriyastu vy\u00e2paro\nn\u00e2sti._ Jayanta's Ma\u00f1jari \u00c2hnika I), but would emphatically\nreject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious\ncausal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1].\" With Ny\u00e2ya all\nenergy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Ny\u00e2ya--its\ninsisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations\nof the different causal conditions--that these operations are of\nthe nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds\nto the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy,\ni.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely\nrepudiates the S\u00e2@mkhya conception of power or productive\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]\n\n322\n\nefficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_at\u00eendriya_) and finds\nnothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements\nof operative conditions (_k\u00e2ra@na-s\u00e2magr\u00ee_), and nothing\nin the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results\nfrom the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].\nCertain general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time\n(_k\u00e2la_), the will of \u00ces'vara, destiny (_ad@r@s@ta_) are regarded\nas the common cause of all effects (_k\u00e2ryatva-prayojaka_). Those are\ncalled _s\u00e2dh\u00e2ra@na-k\u00e2ra@na_ (common cause) as distinguished from the\nspecific causes which determine the specific effects which are called\n_s\u00e2dh\u00e2ra@na k\u00e2ra@na_. It may not be out of place here to notice that\nNy\u00e2ya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanism\nof nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of\nmetaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which constitutes a\nsystem of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical\nsystems and order of nature.\n\nThe causal relation then like the relation of genus to species,\nis a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained\nonly by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in\npresence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from\na certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or identity of\nessence [Footnote ref 2].\n\nThe material cause such as the clay is technically called the\n_samav\u00e2yi-k\u00e2ra@na_ of the jug. _Samav\u00e2ya_ means as we have seen\nan intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A k\u00e2ra@na is called\n_samav\u00e2yi_ when its materials are found inseparably connected\nwith the materials of the effect. Asamav\u00e2yi-k\u00e2ra@na is that which\nproduces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of\nthe samav\u00e2yi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of\nthe colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the\ncolour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay\nin inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This\ncolour of the clay is thus called the asamav\u00e2yi cause of the jug.\nAny quality (_gu@na_) or movement which existing in the samav\u00e2ya\ncause in the samav\u00e2ya relation determines the characteristics of\nthe effect is called the asamav\u00e2yi-k\u00e2ra@na. The instrumental\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the\nAncient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_ on Buddhism.\n_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee Bh\u00e2@s\u00e2-pariccheda_, with _Mukt\u00e2val\u00ee_ and _Dinakar\u00ee_, and\n_Tarkas@mgraha_. The doctrine of Anyath\u00e2siddhi was systematically\ndeveloped from the time of Ga@nges'a.]\n\n323\n\n_nimitta_ and accessory (_sahak\u00e2ri_) causes are those which help the\nmaterial cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel\nand the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahak\u00e3ri\ncauses of the effect.\n\nWe know that the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent,\nbefore the operation of the cause in producing it, but it\nholds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in\nthe effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the\nblack colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an\nextraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay\njug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the\ncolour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important\nexception is to be found in the case of the production of\nthe parim\u00e2@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced\nby the parim\u00e2@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their\nnumber as we have already seen.\n\n\nDissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).\n\nThe doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems\nexcept the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika\nview \u00ces'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings\ndesires to bring about dissolution (_sa@mh\u00e2reccho bhavati_). Simultaneously\nwith it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and\nforming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act\n(_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further bodies, senses,\nor other products come into being. Then for the bringing about\nof the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of \u00ces'vara)\nthe separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations\nas bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to\nthe disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then\nall v\u00e2yu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated\nwith dharma, adharma and past impressions (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) remain\nsuspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that\nsouls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless,\nnon-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected\nwith bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of\nmanas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika works, but the s\u00fbtras of both the systems seem to be\nsilent on the matter.]\n\n324\n\natoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the\npart of \u00ces'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to\ngive some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.\n\nAt the time of creation, \u00ces'vara wishes to create and this desire\nof \u00ces'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal\ndesire of \u00ces'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)\nas accessory causes (_sahak\u00e2ri_) helps the disintegration of atoms\nand at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process\nof integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.\nWhen it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called\nad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this\nad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.\nAt the time of creation action first begins in the v\u00e2yu atoms by\nthe kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls\nwith the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact\nwith one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a\nsimilar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus v\u00e2yu originates.\nAfter v\u00e2yu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water\natoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth\natoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the\ngross form, the god Brahm\u00e2 and all the worlds are created by\n\u00ces'vara and Brahm\u00e2 is directed by \u00ces'vara to do the rest of the\nwork. Brahm\u00e2 thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of\nthe fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. \u00ces'vara brings\nabout this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good\nof all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they\nmay lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for\nthe attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover \u00ces'vara\narranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of\npains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in\nour ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes\nor punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Ny\u00e2ya\nbooks do not speak of the appointment of a Brahm\u00e2 as deputy\nfor supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma\naccording to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and\ncreation were brought about in accordance with the karma of\nmen, or that it may be due to a mere play (_l\u00eel\u00e2_) of \u00ces'vara.\n\u00ces'vara is one, for if there were many \u00ces'varas they might quarrel.\nThe will of \u00ces'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 48-54.]\n\n325\n\nbut also acts always among us in a general way, for without it\nour karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of\npleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the\nexterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.\nThe exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.\nTheir merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications\ntake place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire\n(_icch\u00e2_) of \u00ces'vara may thus be compared with the _icch\u00e2_ of \u00ces'vara\nas we find it in the Yoga system.\n\n\nProof of the Existence of \u00ces'vara.\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient\nto explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The\nM\u00eem\u00e2@msakas, the C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas, the Buddhists and the Jains all\ndeny the existence of \u00ces'vara (God). Ny\u00e2ya believes that \u00ces'vara\nhas fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing\natoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If\nthis be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement\nmust also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is\n\u00ces'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose,\nbut is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a\ncollocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual\nobjects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world\nbeing an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any\nother effect. The objection made against this view is that such\neffects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents\nas their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers,\noceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects\nthat we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have\na cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The\nanswer that Ny\u00e2ya gives is that the concomitance between two\nthings must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific\npeculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had\nseen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had\nthence formed the notion that \"wherever there is smoke there is\nfire\"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small\nfires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead\nus to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large\nvolumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be\nsufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?\n\n326\n\nThus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects\nare preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably\nand unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore\nbeing an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is\n\u00ces'vara. This cause we cannot see, because \u00ces'vara has no visible\nbody, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that\nwe see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are\nnot produced by any agent. To such an objection the Ny\u00e2ya\nanswer is that even they are created by God, for they are also\neffects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not\nbecause there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot\nbe seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was\nno invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point\nto it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done\nit is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate\nfor us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots\nas well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause.\nThis cause is \u00ces'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful.\nAt the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our\nfather who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nTht Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika Physics.\n\nThe four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms.\nThese have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity\n(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour,\ntaste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of\nheat. \u00c2k\u00e2s'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being\nonly as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel\nwave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination\nis only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot\nexist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric\nair however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.\n\nTwo atoms combine to form a binary molecule (_dvya@nuka_). Two,\nthree, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser molecules\nof trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the\ngenerally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed\nout by Dr B.N. Seal in his _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, that\nthe \"atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite,\" and that\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's\n_Kusum\u00e2\u00f1jali_ with _Prak\u00e2s'a_ and _\u00ces'var\u00e2num\u00e2na_ of Raghun\u00e2tha.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Kad\u00e2cit tribhir\u00e2rabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kad\u00e2cit\ncaturbhir\u00e2rabhyate kad\u00e2cit pa\u00f1cabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpan\u00e2.\nNy\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, p. 32.]\n\n327\n\nthey do so in twos, threes, or fours, \"either by the atoms falling into\ngroups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition\nof one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l].\" Of course the\natoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It\nmust however be noted in this connection that behind this\nphysical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, the\nwill of \u00ces'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony\nwith the principle of a \"moral government of the universe,\"\nso that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the\ndue disposal of the effects of karma. \"An elementary substance\nthus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer\nqualitative changes under the influence of heat (_p\u00e2kajotpatti_)\"\nThe impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into the\natoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining\nthem all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge\nreunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other\nmolecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for\nthe specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sika\nholds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then\nchange of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination,\nunder the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine\nof _p\u00eelup\u00e2ka_ (heating of atoms). Ny\u00e2ya on the other hand thinks\nthat no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities,\nbut it is the molecules which assume new characters under the\ninfluence of heat. Heat thus according to Ny\u00e2ya directly affects\nthe characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without\neffecting a change in the atoms. Ny\u00e2ya holds that the\nheat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and\nthereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is\nnot disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for\nsuch a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is\ncalled the doctrine of _pi@tharap\u00e2ka_ (heating of molecules). This\nis one of the few points of difference between the later Ny\u00e2ya\nand Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2].\n\nChemical compounds of atoms may take place between the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamh@it\u00e2_ I. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191,\n_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _V\u00e2rttika_. There is very little\nindication in the Ny\u00e2ya and _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ that they had any of\nthose differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of\nthese matters in the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ (VII. 1), the _Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtras_ are\nalmost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory\nof creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after\nV\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana.]\n\n328\n\natoms of the same bh\u00fbta or of many bh\u00fbtas. According to the\nNy\u00e2ya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same\nbh\u00fbta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the\ncompound of the same bh\u00fbta are due only to diverse collocations\nof those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no\ndifference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed,\nsince these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact\nof heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and\nheat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes\netc. in the original bh\u00fbta atoms. The change of these physical\ncharacters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances\nin contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the\nspecies of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks\nbodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms\nseparate bodies with them.\n\nPras'astap\u00e2da (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in\nthe higher compounds of the same bh\u00fbta the transformation takes\nplace (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound\nmolecules, atoms specially determined as the compound\nand not in the original atoms of the bh\u00fbta entering into the composition\nof the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd,\nthe transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined\nas milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the\nmilk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the\noriginal bh\u00fbta of which the milk is a modification. The change\nas curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule\nhas not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again in\nthe fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in\nthe Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments\nof other bh\u00fbtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth\natoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal\nheat and biomotor force v\u00e2yu to form the germ (_kalala_). But\nwhen the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the\nblood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of\nthe germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically\ndetermined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm.\nThese germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of\nthe food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1].\nThis atomic contact is called _\u00e2rambhaka-sa@myoga_.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences,_ pp. 104-108, and\n_Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 33-34, \"_S'ar\u00eer\u00e2rambhe param\u00e2nava eva k\u00e2ra@nam na\ns'ukra-s'onitasannip\u00e2ta@h kriy\u00e2vibh\u00e2g\u00e2diny\u00e2yena tayorvin\u00e2s'e sati\nutpannap\u00e2kajai@h param\u00e2@nubhir\u00e2rambh\u00e2t, na ca s'ukras'onitaparam\u00e2@n\u00fbn\u00e2@m\nkas'cidvis'e@sa@h p\u00e2rthivatv\u00e2vis'e@s\u00e2t....Pitu@h s'ukra@m m\u00e2tuh s'onita@m\ntayos sannip\u00e2t\u00e2nantara@m ja@thar\u00e2nalasambandh\u00e2t s'ukra-s'onit\u00e2rambhake@su\nparam\u00e2@nu@su p\u00fbrvar\u00fbp\u00e2divin\u00e2s'e sam\u00e2@nagu@n\u00e2ntarotpattau\ndvya@nuk\u00e2dikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatr\u00e2ntahkara@napraves'o...tatra\nm\u00e2tur\u00e2h\u00e2raraso m\u00e2tray\u00e2 sa@mkr\u00e2mate, ad@r@s@tavas'\u00e2ttatra\npunarja@thar\u00e2nalasambandh\u00e2t kalal\u00e2rambhakaparam\u00e2@nu@su\nkriy\u00e2vibh\u00e2gadiny\u00e2yena kalalas'ar\u00eere na@s@te samutpannap\u00e2kajai@h\nkalal\u00e2rambhakaparam\u00e2@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'\u00e2d\nupaj\u00e2takriyair\u00e2h\u00e2raparam\u00e2@nitbhi@h saha sambh\u00fbya\ns'ar\u00eer\u00e2ntaram\u00e2rakkyate.\"_.]\n\n329\n\n\nIn the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is\nanother kind of contact called _upa@s@tambha_. Thus in the case of\nsuch compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms\ncannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by\nthe water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the\ninfra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar\nqualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds\nare also possible where the ap, tejas, or the v\u00e2yu atoms form the\ninner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g.\ngold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding\nupa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)\nare regarded as physical mixtures.\n\nUdayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the\nstores of heat required for chemical change. But there are\ndifferences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of\ncontact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical\naction which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what\ntransforms flavour or taste.\n\nHeat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely\nsmall particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally\nwith inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through\nthe interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as\nwhen water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency\nlight rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with _parispanda_\nof the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_).\nIn other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound\nback--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the\natoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform\nthe physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine\nthem, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable\nvelocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical\ncombination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Ny\u00e2ya writer says that\np\u00e2ka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]\n\n330\n\nchanges the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates\nor changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the\nsame a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When\ngrass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of\nheat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into\nsuch forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIn the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais`e@sika system all action of matter on matter\nis thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) is\ndistinguished from all forms of motion as against the S\u00e2@mkhya\ndoctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence)\nto arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore\nto be subject to vibratory motion.\n\n\nThe Origin of Knowledge (Pram\u00e2@na).\n\nThe manner in which knowledge originates is one of the\nmost favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We\nhave already seen that S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing\nthat the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the\nobject of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was\nthen intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa.\nThe Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to\na withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence\nof the self.\n\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage\nof certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably,\nand immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_s\u00e2magr\u00ee_)\nwhich produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well\nas intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted\nand determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus\ncalled pram\u00e2@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge\n[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Ny\u00e2yabodhin\u00ee_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"_Avyabhic\u00e2rin\u00eemasandigdh\u00e2rthopalabdhi@m vidadhat\u00ee\nbodh\u00e2bodhasvabh\u00e2v\u00e2 s\u00e2magr\u00ee pram\u00e2@nam._\" _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p. 12.\nUdyotakara however defined \"pram\u00e2@na\" as upalabdhihetu (cause of\nknowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have\nfollowed, but it emphasizes the side of vy\u00e2p\u00e2ra or movement of\nthe senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with\nthem and knowledge is produced. Thus V\u00e2caspati says: \"_siddhamindriy\u00e2di,\nasiddha\u00f1ca tatsannikar@s\u00e2di vy\u00e2p\u00e2rayannutp\u00e2dayan kara@na eva carit\u00e2rtha@h\nkar@na@m tvindriy\u00e2di tatsannikar@s\u00e2di v\u00e2 n\u00e2nyatra caritarthamiti\ns\u00e2k@s\u00e2dupalabdh\u00e2veva phale vy\u00e2pr\u00eeyate._\" _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, p. 15. Thus it\nis the action of the senses as pram\u00e2@na which is the direct cause of\nthe production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken\nplace without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as\ncauses in some sense. _\"Pram\u00e2t@rprameyayo@h. pram\u00e2ne\ncaritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.\nPram\u00e2t@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhet\u00fb katha\u00f1cit.\"\nIbid._ p. 16.]\n\n331\n\nthe causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only\ntheir joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for\nsometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal\ncollocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of\ncourse the collocation or combination is not an entity separated\nfrom the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the\npreceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.\nThese involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate\ncognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions,\nthe knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in\nupam\u00e2na, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage\nof such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,\ncapacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for\nthe origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements\nall co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce\nfurther determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations\nthat is called pram\u00e2@na.\n\nNy\u00e2ya argues that in the S\u00e2@mkhya view knowledge originates\nby the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular\nstate of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does\nnot belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains\nwithin it the content and the form of the concept or the percept\n(knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however,\nneither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as\nit always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental\ncontact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance\nor appearance or illusion, then the S\u00e2@mkhya has to admit\nthat there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge\nis false. And since all knowledge is false, the S\u00e2@mkhyists have\nprecious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.\n\nThere are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine\nthat simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the\nknowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the\nrise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither\nis the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the\nknowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is\nevident that this view does not explain why knowledge should\n\n332\n\nexpress or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are\nboth but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes\nthis correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the\nobject. The doctrine of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2na v\u00e2dins, that it is knowledge\nalone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also\nirrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object\nin such a manner that knowledge as object should require\nthe knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we\nmight again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also\nrequire another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on\n_ad infinitum_. Again if pram\u00e2@na be defined as _pr\u00e2pa@na_ (capacity\nof being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being\nmomentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot\nbe realized, so there would be nothing which could be called\npram\u00e2@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of\nknowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like\nany other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same\nway as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes\nintellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent\nelement involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production\non the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena\nare produced [Footnote ref 2].\n\n\nThe four Pram\u00e2@nas of Ny\u00e2ya.\n\nWe know that the Carv\u00e2kas admitted perception (_pratyak@sa_)\nalone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the\nVais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (_anum\u00e2na_);\nS\u00e2@mkhya added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 12-26.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ga\u00f1ges'a,\na later naiy\u00e2yika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of\nour inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with\nthe activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to\nsuccessful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure\nthat if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be\nsuccessful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni_, K.\nTarkav\u00e2g\u00ees'a's edition, _Pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nyav\u00e2da_.\n\n\"The _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a pram\u00e2@na. The view\nthat Vais'e@sika only admitted two pram\u00e2@nas, perception and inference, is\ntraditionally accepted, _\"pratyak@sameka@mc\u00e2rv\u00e2k\u00e2@h ka@n\u00e2dasugatau puna@h\nanum\u00e2na\u00f1ca tacc\u00e2pi,_ etc.\" Pras'astap\u00e2da divides all cognition (_buddhi_)\nas _vidy\u00e2_ (right knowledge) and _avidy\u00e2_ (ignorance). Under _avidy\u00e2_ he\ncounts _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or\nerror), _anadhyavas\u00e2ya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who\nhad never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it\nmay be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidy\u00e2_) is of four kinds,\nperception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages\n(_\u00e2r@sa_). Interpreting the _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.\ni. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy\ncharacter of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in\nthemselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the\ntrustworthy character of their author. _Arth\u00e2patti_ (implication) and\n_anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upam\u00e2na_\n(analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as\nfaith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]\n\n333\n\nNy\u00e2ya adds a fourth, _upam\u00e2na_ (analogy). The principle on which\nthe four-fold division of pram\u00e2@nas depends is that the causal\ncollocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature\nor characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is\ndifferent. The same thing which appears to us as the object of\nour perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda\n(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge\nbeing different in each case, and the manner or conditions\nproducing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be\nadmitted that inference and s'abda are different pram\u00e2@nas, though\nthey point to the same object indicated by the perception. Ny\u00e2ya\nthus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upam\u00e2na\nwithin inference, on the ground that since the mode of production\nof knowledge is different, these are to be held as different\npram\u00e2@nas [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nPerception (Pratyak@sa).\n\nThe naiy\u00e2yikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which\nthey believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.\nThese senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic\nof that element of which they were composed. Thus the\near could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The\neye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.\nThus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects\nby going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.\nThe cognitive senses (_v\u00e2k, p\u00e2ni, p\u00e2da, p\u00e2yu_, and _upastha_) recognized\nin S\u00e2@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such\nfor the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the\ngeneral motor functions of the body.\n\nPerception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the\ncontact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error\nnot associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:\n\n  _S\u00e2magr\u00eebhed\u00e2i phalabhed\u00e2cca pram\u00e2@nabheda@h\n  Anye eva hi s\u00e2magr\u00eephale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h\n  Anye eva ca s\u00e2magr\u00eephale s'abdopam\u00e2nayo@h.    Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jari_, p. 33.]\n\n334\n\nas the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just\nat the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate\n[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,\nthe knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be\ncounted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-pram\u00e2@na_).\nThat right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact\nof the senses with the object is said to be the product of\nthe perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate\n(_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception\nis that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of\nperception in which it appears without any association with name.\nDeterminate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage\nis just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics\nand qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete\nexperience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their\ncharacteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no\nassociation of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the\nnames are connected with the percept it forms the determinate\nperception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time\nof having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known\nto me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should\nbe regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that\nproduct is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results\nfrom the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with\nthe object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is\nheld by the later naiy\u00e2yikas that we are not conscious of it\ndirectly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first\nstage without which the determinate consciousness could not\narise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage\nin the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the\nother conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.\nThe contact of the sense with the object is regarded\nas being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called\nsa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing\n(_sa@myukta-samav\u00e2ya_) in which they inhere in samav\u00e2ya (inseparable)\nrelation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in\nthe generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness\n(r\u00fbpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samav\u00e2ya relation.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ga\u00f1ges'a, a later naiy\u00e2yika of great reputation, describes\nperception as immediate awareness (_pratyak@sasya s\u00e2k@s\u00e2tk\u00e2ritvam\nlak@sa@nam_).]\n\n335\n\nThis species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samav\u00e2ya,\nfor the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour\nis in samav\u00e2ya relation, and in the specific colour there is the\ncolour universal or the generic character of colour in samav\u00e2ya\nrelation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samav\u00e2ya\nby which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory\nsense is \u00e2k\u00e2s'a and the sound exists in \u00e2k\u00e2s'a in the samav\u00e2ya\nrelation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar\nkind of contact called samaveta-samav\u00e2ya. (5) The generic\ncharacter of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived\nby the kind of contact known as samaveta-samav\u00e2ya. (6) There is\nanother kind of contact by which negation (_abh\u00e2va_) is perceived,\nnamely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so\ncalled because the eye perceives only the empty space which is\nqualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.\nThus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in\nthis case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug\nis only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along\nwith the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen\nthat Ny\u00e2ya admits not only the substances and qualities but all\nkinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly\napprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).\n\nThe most important thing about the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika theory\nof perception is this that the whole process beginning from the\ncontact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception\nof the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its\nusefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception\nand its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and\nthe objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact\nbetween which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge\nis indeed _arthaprak\u00e2s'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called\nperception when the sense factors are the instruments of its\nproduction and the knowledge produced is of the objects with\nwhich the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with\nthe objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not\nonly in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with\nthe objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.\nThe senses according to Ny\u00e2ya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have\nseen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental\n(_at\u00eendriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory\n\n336\n\nmovement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].\nThe production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,\nbut is one which is similar to the effects produced by\nthe conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When\nI perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch\nnot only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the\nuniversals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also\nwith the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The\nresult of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _\u00e2locanaj\u00f1\u00e2na_\n(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the\nmemory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character\n(_sukhas\u00e2dhanatvasm@rti_) and as a result of that I perceive the\norange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref\n2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable\nobject should also be regarded as a direct result of perception\nthrough the action of the memory operating as a concomitant\ncause (sahak\u00e2ri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand\nthe pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon\nunderstand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though\nthis perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,\nyet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,\nit must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and\nhence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive\nintermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact\nand if it appertains to the object with which the sense is\nin contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.\nSense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable\ncondition of all perceptions and not only can the senses\nbe in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals\nassociated with them but also with negation. A perception is\nerroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does\nnot possess (_atasmi@mstaditi_) and right knowledge (_pram\u00e2_) is that\nwhich presents an object with a character which it really has\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:\n\n  _Na khalvat\u00eendriy\u00e2 s'aktirasm\u00e2bhirupagamyate\n  yay\u00e2 saha na k\u00e2ryyasya sambandhaj\u00f1\u00e2nasambhava@h.\n\n  Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 2:\n\n  _Sukh\u00e2di manas\u00e2 buddhv\u00e2 kapitth\u00e2di ca cak@su@s\u00e2\n  tasya karanat\u00e2 tatra manasaiv\u00e2vagamyate...\n  ...Sambandhagraha@nak\u00e2le yattatkapitth\u00e2divi@sayamak@sajam\n  j\u00f1\u00e2nam tadup\u00e2dey\u00e2dij\u00f1\u00e2naphalamiti bh\u00e2@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam\n  sukhas\u00e2dhanatvaj\u00f1\u00e2namup\u00e2deyaj\u00f1\u00e2nam.\n\n  _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]\n\n337\n\n(_tadvati tatprak\u00e2rak\u00e2nubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of\nperceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object,\nbut it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions\nthat it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as\na different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a\ndesert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate\nstage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus\nfar there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is\nconcerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the\nsimilarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream\nthat it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes\nthat on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing\nof the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense\nis in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the\ncharacteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by\nillusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is\nno sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant\nmemories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This\ndoctrine of illusion is known as _vipar\u00eetakhy\u00e2ti_ or _anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti._ What\nexisted in the mind appeared as the object before us (_h@rdaye\nparisphurato'rthasya bahiravabh\u00e2sanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika\nas interpreted by Pras'astap\u00e2da and S'r\u00eedhara is in full agreement\nwith Ny\u00e2ya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as Vais'e@sika\ncalls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the right\nthing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion\nconsists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].\n\nI have pointed out above that Ny\u00e2ya divided perception into\ntwo classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)\naccording as it is an earlier or a later stage. V\u00e2caspati\nsays, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a\nparticular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or\n_nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the\nuniversal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Ny\u00e2yav\u00e2rttika_, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's\n_Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni,_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"_Indriye@n\u00e2locya mar\u00eec\u00een ucc\u00e2vacamuccalato nirvikalpena\ng@rh\u00eetv\u00e2 pas'c\u00e2ttatropagh\u00e2tado@s\u00e2t viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo\nbhr\u00e2nto j\u00e2yate tasm\u00e2dvij\u00f1\u00e2nasya uvabhic\u00e2ro n\u00e2rthasya,_ V\u00e2caspati's\n_T\u00e2tparyat\u00eek\u00e2_,\" p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_ p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee,_ pp. 177-181, \"_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na\ndo@sasahak\u00e2rin\u00e2 rajatasa@msk\u00e2rasacivena s\u00e2d@rs'yamanurundhat\u00e2\ns'uktik\u00e2vi@sayo rajat\u00e2dhyavas\u00e2ya@h k@rta@h._\"]\n\n338\n\nit in a subject-predicate relation as when I say \"this is an orange.\"\nThe avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with\nthe particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage,\nthe universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not\nas terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and\nattribute (_j\u00e2ty\u00e2disvar\u00fbp\u00e2vag\u00e2hi na tu j\u00e2ty\u00e2d\u00een\u00e2@m mitho\nvis'e@sa@navis'e@syabh\u00e2v\u00e2vag\u00e2h\u00eeti y\u00e2vat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks\nthat such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated\nwith name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in\nperception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do\nnot know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary\npersons, for the association of the names and relations could be\ndistinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].\nS'r\u00eedhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely\nin agreement with the above view of V\u00e2caspati. Thus S'r\u00eedhara says\nthat in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived\nbut the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory\nof other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification\nsuch as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the\nuniversals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not\nconsciously ordered as \"different from this\" or \"similar to this,\"\nwhich can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].\nV\u00e2caspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others,\nbut had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite\nsubject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Ny\u00e2ya\nwriters however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different\nopinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge\nmeans the knowledge of mere predication without any association\nwith the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.\nBut such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa\nstage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual\ncognition and not a psychological stage. They would\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _T\u00e2tparya@tik\u00e2_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91,\n\"_prathamam\u00e2locito'rtha@h s\u00e2m\u00e2nyavis'e@sav\u00e2n._\"]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p.84, \"_tasm\u00e2dvyutpannasy\u00e2pi n\u00e2madheyasmara@n\u00e2ya\np\u00fbrvame@sitavyo vinaiva n\u00e2madheyamarthapratyaya@h._\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee,_p. 189 ff., \"_ata@h savikalpakamicchat\u00e2\nnirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na s\u00e2m\u00e2nyam\u00e2tram g@rh@n\u00e2ti bhedasy\u00e2pi\npratibh\u00e2san\u00e2t n\u00e2pi svalak@sa@nam\u00e2tram s\u00e2m\u00e2ny\u00e2k\u00e2rasy\u00e2pi sa@mvedan\u00e2t\nvyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandh\u00e2n\u00e2cca, kintu s\u00e2m\u00e2nya@m\nvis'e@sa\u00f1cobhayamapi g@rh@n\u00e2ti yadi paramida@m s\u00e2m\u00e2nyamayam vis'e@sa@h\nityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantar\u00e2nusandh\u00e2navirah\u00e2t,\npi@nd\u00e2ntar\u00e2nuv@rttigraha@n\u00e2ddhi s\u00e2m\u00e2nya@m vivicyate,\nvy\u00e2v@rttigraha@n\u00e2dvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h._\"]\n\n339\n\nnot like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible\nto have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a\nquality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate\n(_vis'i@s@tavais'i@styaj\u00f1\u00e2nam prati hi vis'e@sa@nat\u00e2vacchedakaprak\u00e2ra@m\nj\u00f1\u00e2na@m k\u00e2ra@na@m_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge\nsuch as \"I see a cow,\" \"this is a cow\" or \"a cow\" can arise it must\nbe preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the\nindeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected\nwith universality or any other relations (_j\u00e2ty\u00e2diyojan\u00e2rahita@m\nvais'i@s@ty\u00e2navag\u00e2hi ni@sprak\u00e2rakam nirvikalpaka@m_) [Footnote ref 2].\nBut this stage is never psychologically experienced (_at\u00eendriya_)\nand it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic\nconception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate\nwith a subject. Thus Vis'van\u00e2tha says in his Siddh\u00e2ntamukt\u00e2val\u00ee,\n\"the cognition which does not involve relationing\ncannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know\nthe jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower,\nthe jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of\njugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the\npredicative quality (_vis'e@sa@nat\u00e2vacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'\nwhich is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the\nknowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative\nquality, the content [Footnote ref 3].\" But in order that the knowledge\nof the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at\nwhich the universal or the pure predication should be known\nand this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though\nnot testified by experience is after all logically indispensably\nnecessary. In the proposition \"It is a cow,\" the cow is an\nuniversal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be\nrelated to the particular with which it is associated.\n\nBut both the old and the new schools of Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika\nadmitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which\nthe Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary\nparticulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals\nand thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the\nperception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced\nby objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception\nconsists in the attribution of j\u00e2ti (universal), gu@na (quality),\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni_ p. 812.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Siddh\u00e2ntamukt\u00e2val\u00ee_ on _Bh\u00e2@s\u00e2pariccheda k\u00e2rik\u00e2_, 58.]\n\n340\n\nkriy\u00e2 (action), n\u00e2ma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref\n1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are\nnot different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication\nof an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the\nfalse creation of a difference where there was none. So also the\nquality is not different from the substance and to speak of a\nthing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The\nsame remark applies to action, for motion is not something different\nfrom that which moves. But name is completely different\nfrom the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified,\nand again the percept \"man with a stick\" is regarded as if it\nwas a single thing or substance, though \"man\" and \"stick\" are\naltogether different and there is no unity between them. Now\nas regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference\nof the Ny\u00e2ya ontological position with that of the Buddhists,\nfor we know that Ny\u00e2ya and Vais'e@sika believe j\u00e2ti, gu@na\nand kriy\u00e2 to be different from substance and therefore the predicating\nof them of substance as different categories related to it\nat the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as\nerroneous. As to the fourth objection V\u00e2caspati replies that the\nmemory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make\nthe perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot\nin any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated\nuntil the second stage through the joint action of memory\nis easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in\norder to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in\nmind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated\nwith it as being the same as was previously acquired, there\ncannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the\nBuddhists further object that there is no reason why one should\nidentify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which\nwas seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual\nperception. To this V\u00e2caspati says that through the help of\nmemory or past impressions (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) this can be considered\nas being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be\nthe concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 93-100, \"_Pa\u00f1ca caite kalpan\u00e2 bhavanti\nj\u00e2tikalpan\u00e2, gu@nakalpan\u00e2, kriy\u00e2kalpan\u00e2, n\u00e2makalpan\u00e2 dravyakalpan\u00e2 ceti,\nt\u00e2s'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpan\u00e2t kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpan\u00e2t\nkalpan\u00e2 ucyante._\" See Dharmak\u00eertti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.\nSee also pp. 409-410 of this book.]\n\n341\n\npresent, this perception of identity should be regarded as an\neffect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an\nobject of past experience refers to a past time and place and\nis not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with\nan object which is experienced at the present moment. It\nhas to be admitted that V\u00e2caspati's answer is not very satisfactory\nfor it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception\nwhich was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see\nthat early Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception\nas invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and\ndiffered from it only in this, that a name was associated with\nthe thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual\ndevelopment of perception as the progressive effects of causal\noperations continued through the contacts of the mind with the\nself and the object under the influence of various intellectual\n(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes,\nit does not, like Ved\u00e2nta, require that right perception should only\ngive knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation\nas well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon\nthe variety of causal collocations.\n\nMind according to Ny\u00e2ya is regarded as a separate sense\nand can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy\nand will. The later Ny\u00e2ya writers speak of three other kinds\nof contact of a transcendental nature called _s\u00e2m\u00e2nyalak@sa@na,\nj\u00f1\u00e2nalak@sa@na_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact s\u00e2m\u00e2nyalak@sa@na\nis that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a\nparticular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with all\nthe particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding\nuniversal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and\nthrough it my sense is in contact with the universal associated\nwith smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all\nsmoke in general. J\u00f1\u00e2nalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which\nwe can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving\nby any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of\nsandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only,\nbut still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact\nof the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental\ncontact (_alaukika sannikar@sa_) by virtue of which this is rendered\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, pp. 88-95.]\n\n342\n\npossible is called j\u00f1\u00e2nalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by\nthese two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].\n\nPleasures and pains (_sukha_ and _du@hkha_) are held by Ny\u00e2ya\nto be different from knowledge (j\u00f1\u00e2na). For knowledge interprets,\nconceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to\nappear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel\nthat we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot\nbe self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then\nthat experience which generates sukha in one should have generated\nthe same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should\nhave manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not\nhappen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might\nnot do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's\nsake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,\nit is evident that there must be some differences between the\npleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,\nand this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case\nwas associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha,\nThis shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge.\nSuch is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated\nby the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through\nor in association with other objects either in direct perception or\nin memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in\nthe self as a result of causal operation. It should however be\nremembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes\nin their production.\n\nThe yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most\ndistant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power\nby gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive\nthe subtlest and most distant objects directly by their\nmind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions\nof future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may\nhave the intuition that \"To-morrow my brother will come,\"\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:_Siddh\u00e2ntamukt\u00e2val\u00ee_ on _K\u00e2rik\u00e2_ 63 and 64. We must remember\nthat Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the\n_Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception\nshould be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character\nof direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception\nas the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle\n(_Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him\nas the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the\ndefinition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by\nUdyotakara as mentioned above.]\n\n343\n\nand this may happen to be true. This is called pratibh\u00e2naj\u00f1\u00e2na,\nwhich is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly\nby the mind. This is of course different from the other form\nof perception called m\u00e2nasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of\npast perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept\nvisualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive\nthat it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the\neye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual\npercept with it. According to Ved\u00e2nta this acquired perception\nis only a case of inference. The pr\u00e2tibha-pratyak@sa however is\nthat which is with reference to the happening of a future event.\nWhen a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective\ncognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to\nthe self by the mind as \"I know this pot.\" This is effected by\nthe mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition\nwhich had already been generated in the soul. This second\nreperception is called anuvyavas\u00e2ya, and all practical work can\nproceed as a result of this anuvyavas\u00e2ya [Footnote ref. l].\n\n\nInference.\n\nInference (_anum\u00e2na_) is the second means of proof (pr\u00e2m\u00e2@na)\nand the most valuable contribution that Ny\u00e2ya has made has\nbeen on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a\nthing on the strength of the mark or li\u00f1ga which is associated\nwith it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember\nthat since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire\nin yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically\ncalled li\u00f1ga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been\nmade (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term\n\"fire\" is called s\u00e2dhya. To make a correct inference it is\nnecessary that the hetu or li\u00f1ga must be present in the pak@sa,\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This later Ny\u00e2ya doctrine that the cognition of self in\nassociation with cognition is produced at a later moment must be\ncontrasted with the _triput\u00eepratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabh\u00e2kara, which\nholds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously\nin knowledge. Vyavas\u00e2ya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a,\ngives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am\naware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding\nthe former one and is called anu (after) vyavas\u00e2ya (cognition), \"_idamaha@m\nj\u00e2n\u00e2m\u00eeti vyavas\u00e2ye na bh\u00e2sate taddhakendriyasannikar@s\u00e2bh\u00e2v\u00e2t\nkintvida@mvi@sayakaj\u00f1\u00e2natvavis'i@s@tasya j\u00f1\u00e2nasya vais'i@styam\u00e2tmani\nbh\u00e2sate; na ca svaprak\u00e2s'e vyavas\u00e2ya t\u00e2d@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m\nbh\u00e2situmarhati, p\u00fbrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasy\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2t, tasm\u00e2didamaha@m\nj\u00e2n\u00e2miti na vyavas\u00e2ya@h kintu anuvyavas\u00e2yah.\" _Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni_, p. 795.]\n\n344\n\nand in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the\ns\u00e2dhya in it (sapak@sa-satt\u00e2), i.e., which are known to possess the\ns\u00e2dhya (possessing fire in the present example). The li\u00f1ga must\nnot be present in any such object as does not possess the\ns\u00e2dhya (_vipak@sa-vy\u00e2v@rtti_ absent from vipak@sa or that which does\nnot possess the s\u00e2dhya). The inferred assertion should not be\nsuch that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyak@sa_) or\nthe testimony of the s'\u00e2stra (_ab\u00e2dhita-vi@sayatva_). The li\u00f1ga\nshould not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way\ncould also be possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of any\none of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu\nas determining the inference, and thus would only make the\nhetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa or\nseeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.\nThus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible\nis fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the\npak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa is technically\ncalled _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa of the second type,\ntechnically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case\nthat sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu \"being\ncreated\" is present in the opposite of s\u00e2dhya {_vipak@sa_), namely\nnon-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality\nwhich belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type,\ntechnically called _anaik\u00e2ntika-hetu_, is found in the case that\nsound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now \"being\nan object of knowledge\" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is\npresent in things eternal (i.e. things possessing s\u00e2dhya), as well\nas in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the\ns\u00e2dhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the\ns\u00e2dhya is not absolute (_anaik\u00e2ntika_). A fallacy of the fourth\ntype, technically called _k\u00e2l\u00e2tyay\u00e2padi@s@ta_, may be found in the\nexample--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.\nHere pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is\nfallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakara@nasama_, is to be\nfound in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same\ntime for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Ny\u00e2ya did not believe in the\ndoctrine of the eternality of sound, which the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 did. Eternality\nof sound meant with M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 the theory that sounds existed as eternal\nindestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under\ncertain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of\nmovement of the vocal muscles.]\n\n345\n\nsince no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.\n\nThe Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against\ninference by the C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas, that inferential arguments are\nvalid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity\nof nature in two relations, viz. _t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya_ (essential\nidentity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and\neffect). T\u00e2d\u00e2tmya is a relation of genus and species and not\nof causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer\nthat this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related\nto each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of\nthe generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a\npine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity\n(_t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of\nsuccession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.\n\nNy\u00e2ya holds that inference is made because of the invariable\nassociation (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of\nwhich with the s\u00e2dhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions\nnoted above) with the s\u00e2dhya, and not because of such specific\nrelations as t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the\ninference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the\nessential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument\nthat it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;\nfor if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both\nways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a\npine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with\nthose of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential\nidentity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)\nwith the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.\nThe argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)\nis also really due to invariable association, for it explains the\ncase of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of\nother types of inference, where the association as cause and\neffect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is\ninferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the\nli@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted\nabove, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].\n\nWe perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was\nassociated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jari_ on anum\u00e2na.]\n\n346\n\nthat wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we\nperceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered\nthe concomitance (_vy\u00e2pti_) of smoke and fire which we had\nobserved before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,\nwhich was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we\nconcluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the\nli@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its\nconcomitance with fire (_t@rt\u00eeya-li@nga-par\u00e2mars'a) is thus the cause\n(_anumitikara@na_ or _anum\u00e2na_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The\nconcomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vy\u00e2pti._ When\nthis refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with\nthose having fire, it is called _bahirvy\u00e2pti_; and when it refers to the\nconviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any\nrelation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was\nobserved, it is called _antarvy\u00e2pti._ The Buddhists since they did\nnot admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvy\u00e2pti\nview of concomitance to bahirvy\u00e2pti as a means of inference [Footnote ref\n1].\n\nNow the question arises that since the validity of an inference\nwill depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign\n(_hetu_) with the signate (_s\u00e2dhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in\neach case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vy\u00e2ptigraha_)\nhad been correct, and the observation of concomitance\nhad been valid. The M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 school held, as we shall see in\nthe next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case\nin which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases\nI knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there\nwas fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.\nBut Ny\u00e2ya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where\nthere is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in\nall those cases where there is no fire there should not be any\nsmoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should\nbe a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire\nshould be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically\ncalled _anvayavy\u00e2pti_ and the latter _vyatirekavy\u00e2pti._ But even this\nis not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a\nhundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have\nbeen a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but\nit cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Antarvy\u00e2ptisamarthana,_ by Ratn\u00e2karas'\u00e2nti in the _Six\nBuddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]\n\n347\n\nor of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It\nmay be that one might never have observed smoke without an\nantecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even\nthat is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in\na very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass\nproduced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained\nthe same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately\nfollowed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam\nyato vin\u00e2 na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee,_\np. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of\nconcomitance (_vy\u00e2pti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But\nof course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the\nabove observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu,\nand there might be some other condition (_up\u00e2dhi_) associated\nwith the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire\nin green wood (_\u00e2rdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might\ndoubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced\nsmoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.\nBut there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged\nin them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would\nhave to be dispensed with (_vy\u00e2gh\u00e2ta_). Thus such doubts as\nlead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or\nunsettle the notion of vy\u00e2pti or concomitance at which we\nhad arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The\nBuddhists and the naiy\u00e2yikas generally agreed as to the method\nof forming the notion of concomitance or vy\u00e2pti (_vy\u00e2ptigraha_),\nbut the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance\nalways depended on a relation of cause and effect\nor of identity of essence, whereas Ny\u00e2ya held that neither the\nrelations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of\ngenus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was\nquite a number of other types of inference which could not be\nbrought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the\ntide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening\nother things would happen could certainly exist, even\nwithout the supposition of an identity of essence.\n\nBut sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often\nhave the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ on anum\u00e2na and vy\u00e2ptigraha.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_ on vy\u00e2ptigraha, and _Tattvacint\u00e2ma@ni_ of\nGa@nges'a on vy\u00e2ptigraha.]\n\n348\n\ninfer the particular cause from the effect. Ny\u00e2ya holds however\nthat though different causes are often found to produce\nthe same effect, yet there must be some difference between one\neffect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its\nother attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found\nthat it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other\neffects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy\ndownpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water\nof the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of\nthe street due to rain will be found to have such special traits\nthat it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the\nrise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street\nof a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,\nthe special manner in which the water flows by small\nrivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was\ndue to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we\nsee that Ny\u00e2ya relied on empirical induction based on uniform\nand uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists\nassumed _a priori_ principles of causality or identity of essence.\nIt may not be out of place here to mention that in later Ny\u00e2ya\nworks great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves\nassured that there was no such up\u00e2dhi (condition) associated with\nthe hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but\nthat the hetu was unconditionally associated with the s\u00e2dhya in\na relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce\nsmoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to\nproduce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition\n(_up\u00e2dhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on\naccount of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and\nso we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in\nthe concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so\nin every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the\nvalidity of vy\u00e2pti, it is necessary that we must be assured that\nthere should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned\nthe concomitance, and this must be settled by wide\nexperience (_bh\u00fbyodars'ana_).\n\nPras'astap\u00e2da in defining inference as the \"knowledge of that\n(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of\nthe reason\" described a valid reason (_li@nga_) as that which is connected\nwith the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists\nwherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases\n\n349\n\nwhere it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Ny\u00e2ya\nqualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and _vipak@s\u00e2sattva_ of\na valid reason (hetu). Pras'astap\u00e2da further quotes a verse to say\nthat this is the same as what K\u00e2s'yapa (believed to be the family\nname of Ka@n\u00e2da) said. Ka@n\u00e2da says that we can infer a cause\nfrom the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one\nthing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition\nor in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We\ncan infer by a reason because it is duly associated\n(_prasiddhip\u00fbrvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this\nassociation was according to Ka@n\u00e2da can also be understood for\nhe tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association,\nthe reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred\nor it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful\nexistence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has\nhorns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns.\nAgain if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for\nthere is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though\na cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The\nfirst fallacy is a combination of pak@s\u00e2sattva and sapak@s\u00e2sattva,\nfor not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no\nhorses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva,\nfor those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,\nit seems that when Pras'astap\u00e2da says that he is giving us the view\nof Ka@n\u00e2da he is faithful to it. Pras'astap\u00e2da says that wherever\nthere is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.\nWhen one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the\nsmoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that\nthere is fire. But with regard to Ka@n\u00e2da's enumeration of types of\ninference such as \"a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect\nfrom the cause,\" etc., Pras'astap\u00e2da holds that these are not the\nonly types of inference, but are only some examples for showing\nthe general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection\nsuch that from this that can be inferred. He then divides\ninference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics\nof one member of a class to another member of the same\nclass), and s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is\nthat where the previously known case and the inferred case is\nexactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point\nout that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of\nflesh on its neck (_s\u00e2sn\u00e2_), I can whenever I see the same hanging\n\n350\n\nmass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But\nwhen on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended\nto a different class of objects, it is called s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato d@r@s@ta.\nThus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded\nwith a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,\nnamely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with\nthe objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of\nheaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'cit\u00e2rtha_)\nis expressed in five premisses for convincing others\nwho are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then\nthe inference is called par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na. We know that the distinction\nof sv\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na (inference for oneself) and par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na\n(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.\nPras'astap\u00e2da does not make a sharp distinction of two classes\nof inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be\nconveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is\ncalled par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na. But this need not be considered as an\nentirely new innovation of Pras'astap\u00e2da, for in IX. 2, Ka@n\u00e2da\nhimself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@m\nk\u00e2ryyak\u00e2ra@nasambandhas'c\u00e2vayav\u00e2dbhavati_). The five premisses which are\ncalled in Ny\u00e2ya _pratij\u00f1\u00e2, hetu d@r@s@t\u00e2nta, upanaya,_ and _nigamana_\nare called in Vais'e@sika _pratij\u00f1\u00e2, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandh\u00e2na_,\nand _praty\u00e2mn\u00e2ya_. Ka@n\u00e2da however does not mention the name\nof any of these premisses excepting the second \"apades'a.\" Pratij\u00f1\u00e2 is\nof course the same as we have in Ny\u00e2ya, and the term nidars'ana is\nvery similar to Ny\u00e2ya d@r@s@t\u00e2nta, but the last two are entirely\ndifferent. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence\n(e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of\nan arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has\nno motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).\nHe also points out cases of the fallacy of the example\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n{Footnote 1: Dr Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na says that \"An example before the time of\nDign\u00e2ga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the\nunderstanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has\nsmoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable\nto reasoning, but Dign\u00e2ga converted it into a universal proposition, that\nis a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection\nbetween the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because\nit has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen\" (_Indian Logic_,\npp. 95, 96). It is of course true that V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana had an imperfect example\nas \"like a kitchen\" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatv\u00e2danuya@h sth\u00e2ly\u00e2divat_,\nI.i. 36), but Pras'astap\u00e2da has it in the proper form. Whether\nPras'astap\u00e2da borrowed it from Dig@nn\u00e2ga or Dig@nn\u00e2ga from Pras'astap\u00e2da\ncannot be easily settled.]\n\n351\n\n(_nidars'an\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_). Pras'astap\u00e2da's contribution thus seems to consist\nof the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of\nthe nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so\ndifferent from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable\nto suppose that he collected them from some other traditional\nVais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely\nindicates that the study of the problem of inference was being\npursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Ny\u00e2ya. There is\nno reason however to suppose that Pras'astap\u00e2da borrowed anything\nfrom Di@nn\u00e2ga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,\nfor, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astap\u00e2da's apparent innovations\nare all definitely alluded to by Ka@n\u00e2da himself, and\nProfessor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the\nquestion of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved\nthat Di@nn\u00e2ga preceded Pras'astap\u00e2da, there is no reason whatever\nto suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most\nimportant part of inference. V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana says that an inference\ncan be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through\nthe memory of the connection between the middle and the major\npreviously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it\nis the present perception of the middle or the memory of the\nconnection of the middle with the major that should be regarded\nas leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to\ninference, but that which immediately leads to inference is\n_li@ngapar\u00e2mars'a_, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the\nminor associated with the memory of its connection with the major,\nfor inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection,\nbut the present perception of the middle associated with\nthe memory of the connection (_sm@rtyanug@rh\u00eeto li@ngapar\u00e2mars'o_).\nBut he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.\nUdyotakara's criticisms of Di@nn\u00e2ga as shown by V\u00e2caspati have\nno reference to this point The doctrine of _t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya_ and _tadutpatti_\nwas therefore in all probability a new contribution to\nBuddhist logic by Dharmak\u00eertti. Dharmak\u00eertti's contention was\nthat the root principle of the connection between the middle and\nthe major was that the former was either identical in essence\nwith the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a\nmere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Pras'astap\u00e2da's bh\u00e2@sya with _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 200-255.]\n\n352\n\nthe desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. V\u00e2caspati in his refutation of\nthis view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a\nseparate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence\nsuch that there being fire there is smoke and there being\nno fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with\nperfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the\nsmoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless\nit can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated,\nit cannot be said that the smoke was immediately\npreceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of\nargument that causality can be determined, then also cause is\nknown to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke\ncan only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time\nand not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many\ncases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause\nand effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this\nmorning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of\nidentity of essence (_t\u00e2d\u00e2tmya_ as in the case of the pine and the\ntree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be\ninferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any\ninference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described\nin either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are\nnaturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when\nsuch is the case, though we may not know any further about the\nnature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former\nand not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under\ncertain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there\nmay always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate\nthe validity of inference. To this V\u00e2caspati's answer is that if\neven after observing a large number of cases and careful search\nsuch conditions (_up\u00e2dhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to take\nit for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural\nconnection between the middle and the major. The later\nBuddhists introduced the method of _Pa\u00f1cak\u00e2ra@n\u00ee_ in order to\ndetermine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions\ndetermining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the\neffect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate\nsuccession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _K\u00e2ryyak\u00e2ra@nubh\u00e2v\u00e2dv\u00e2 svabh\u00e2v\u00e2dva niy\u00e2mak\u00e2t avin\u00e2bh\u00e2vaniyamo'\ndars'an\u00e2nna na dars'an\u00e2t. T\u00e2tparya@t\u00eek\u00e2_, p. 105.]\n\n353\n\nimmediate succession the effect disappears. But this method\ncannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause\nand effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect\nrelation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better\nto accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect\nrelation [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIn early Ny\u00e2ya books three kinds of inference are described,\nnamely p\u00fbrvavat, s'e@savat, and s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato-d@r@s@ta. P\u00fbrvavat is the\ninference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from\nheavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects,\ne.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato-d@r@s@ta\nrefers to the inference in all cases other than those of\ncause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the\ntamarind from its form and colour. _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ mentions\nanother form of anum\u00e2na, namely paris'e@sam\u00e2na (_reductio ad\nabsurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)\nof any other thing (e.g. \u00e2tman), because it was already\ndefinitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any\nother part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to\nanything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of\nthese variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely\nthat of the inference of the probandum (_s\u00e2dhya_) by virtue of the\nunconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called\nthe vy\u00e2pti-niyama. In the new school of Ny\u00e2ya (Navya-Ny\u00e2ya)\na formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an\nimportant place, namely anvayavyatireki, keval\u00e2nvayi, and\nkevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the\nvy\u00e2pti has been observed by a combination of a large number of\ninstances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,\nas in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever\nthere is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire,\nthere is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one's\nown self (_sv\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na_) or for the sake of convincing others\n(_par\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na_). In the latter case, when it was necessary that\nan inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,\nlive propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namely\npratij\u00f1a (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), ud\u00e2hara@na\n(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),\nupanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: V\u00e2tsy\u00e2ya@na's bh\u00e2sya, Udyotakara's _V\u00e2rttika_ and\n_T\u00e2tparyya@t\u00eek\u00e2,_ I.i. 5.]\n\n354\n\nfire). Keval\u00e2nvayi is that type of inference, the vy\u00e2pti of which\ncould not be based on any negative instance, as in the case\n\"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge\n(_ida@m, v\u00e2cyam prameyatv\u00e2t_).\" Now no such case is known which\nis not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any\ncase where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) and\nno name (_v\u00e2cyatva_); the vy\u00e2pti here has therefore to be based\nnecessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatva\nor an object of knowledge, there is v\u00e2cyatva or name.\nThe third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances\nin agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the\ninference that earth differs from other elements in possessing\nthe specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from\nother elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident\nthat there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the\nconcomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There\nis only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our\ninference--earth differs from other elements, since it has the\nspecial qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in\nthose cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such\nspecial traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.\n\n\nUpam\u00e2na and S'abda.\n\nThe third pram\u00e2@na, which is admitted by Ny\u00e2ya and not by\nVais'e@sika, is _upam\u00e2na_, and consists in associating a thing unknown\nbefore with its name by virtue of its similarity with some\nother known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never\nseen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--\"what\nis gavaya?\" and the forester replies--\"oh, you do not\nknow it, it is just like a cow\"; after hearing this from the\nforester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to\nbe similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.\nThis knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its\nsimilarity to a known thing is called _upam\u00e2na_. If some forester\nhad pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him\nthat it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have\nknown the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would\nhave been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is\nsaid to be generated by the upam\u00e2na process when the association\nof the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer\n\n355\n\non the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown\nanimal to a known one. The naiy\u00e2yikas are thorough\nrealists, and as such they do not regard the observation of\nsimilarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind.\nSimilarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the\nassociation of the name in accordance with the perception of\nsimilarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is\ncalled _upam\u00e2na_ [Footnote ref 1].\n\nS'abda-pram\u00e2@na or testimony is the right knowledge which\nwe derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful\npersons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the\nVedas were uttered by \u00ces'vara himself. The Vedas give us\nright knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the\nutterances of the infallible \u00ces'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit\ns'abda as a separate pram\u00e2@na, but they sought to establish the\nvalidity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)\non the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible\nperson. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly\ncorroborated by the Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtras, which tacitly admit the\nvalidity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this\nwas how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.\n\n\nNegation in Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika.\n\nThe problem of negation or non-existence (_abh\u00e2va_) is of great interest\nin Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only\nfrom the point of view of perceptibility. Kum\u00e2rila [Footnote ref 2]\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ on upam\u00e2na. The oldest Ny\u00e2ya view was that\nthe instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association\nof the name \"wild ox\" to the strange animal was possible was itself\n\"upam\u00e2na.\" When Pras'astap\u00e2da held that upam\u00e2na should be treated as a\ncase of testimony (_\u00e2ptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation\nin view. But Udyotakara and V\u00e2caspati hold that it was not by the\ninstruction alone of the forester that the association of the name\n\"wild ox\" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and\nthe memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the\nperception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories\nthat lead us to this association called upam\u00e2na. What V\u00e2tsy\u00e2ya@na\nmeant is not very clear, but Di@nn\u00e2ga supposes that according to\nhim the result of upam\u00e2na was the knowledge of similarity or the\nknowledge of a thing having similarity. V\u00e2caspati of course holds that\nhe has correctly interpreted V\u00e2tsy\u00e2ya@na's intention. It is however\ndefinite that upam\u00e2na means the associating of a name to a new object\n(_sam\u00e2khy\u00e2sambandhapratipattirupam\u00e2n\u00e2rtha@h_, V\u00e2tsy\u00e2ya@na). Jayanta\npoints out that it is the preception of similarity which directly\nleads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of\nthe forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently\nit cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astap\u00e2da\nand _Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee,_ pp. 220-22, V\u00e2tsy\u00e2ya@na, Udyotakara, V\u00e2caspati and\nJayanta on _Upam\u00e2na_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Kum\u00e2rila's treatment of abh\u00e2va in the _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_,\npp. 473-492.]\n\n356\n\nand his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the\nnext chapter, hold that negation (_abh\u00e2va_) appears as an intuition\n(_m\u00e2nam_) with reference to the object negated where there are no\nmeans of ordinary cognition (_pram\u00e2@na_) leading to prove the existence\n(_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion\n\"it is not existent\" cannot be due to perception, for there is no\ncontact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when\nwe turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence\nof a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and\nthe non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see\nneither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged\nthat if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say\nthe same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even\nthen since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact,\nwhich is absent in the other case, we could never say\nthat both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and\nremember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises\nthe notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual\nperception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were\nno tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence\nat the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he\nis asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where\nhe was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware\nof the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even\nwithout perceiving the place and without any operation of the\nmemory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of\nthere being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,\nfor it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,\nand neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could\nbe regarded as a reason (_li@nga_), for the non-perception of the jug\nis related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no\nconcomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and\nits non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of\nnon-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty\nabout the notion of non-existence (_abh\u00e2va_) which was sought\nto be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be\nadmitted as cognized by a separate and independent process\nof knowledge. Ny\u00e2ya however says that the perception of\nnon-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception\nof one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.\n\n357\n\nthere is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the\nground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug\narise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and\nthere is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground\nshould be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of\nthe negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due\nto a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug\nis taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle\nthat in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact\nwith it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or\nnon-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even\nwithout any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance,\nand hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact.\nIt may be urged that if no sense-contact is required\nin apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation\nor non-existence of other places which are far away from him.\nTo this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary\nthat the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a\nthing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only\nbe taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as\nwell. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension\nof its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to\nbe apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence\nbut a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived\nbefore along with the perception of the locus of non-existence\n(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abh\u00e2va_) can thus, according\nto Ny\u00e2ya, generate its cognition just as any positive\nexistence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere\nvacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition \"is not,\"\nas position (_bh\u00e2va_) is what generates the cognition \"it is.\"\n\nThe Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold\nthat when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with\nspecific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);\nbut in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think\nthat negation could thus be associated with them in any\nrelation. There is also no relation between the negation and its\n_pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for\nwhen there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there\nis the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the\nrelation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if\n\n358\n\nthe negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,\nfor how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without\neffecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation\nis to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the\nnature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it\nwill be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it\nwill be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or\nthat particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception,\ne.g. (1) svabh\u00e2v\u00e2nupalabdhi (natural non-perception--there\nis no jug because none is perceived); (2) k\u00e2ra@n\u00e2nupalabdhi\n(non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there is\nno fire); (3) vy\u00e2pak\u00e2nupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--there\nis no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) k\u00e2ry\u00e2nupalabdhi\n(non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here,\nsince there is no smoke); (5) svabh\u00e2vaviruddhopalabdhi (perception\nof contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here because\nof fire); (6) viruddhak\u00e2ryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory\neffects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)\nvirudhavy\u00e2ptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessity\ndestructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) k\u00e2ryyaviruddhopalabdhi\n(opposition of effects--there is not here the causes\nwhich can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi\n(opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here,\nbecause of fire); (10) k\u00e2ra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--there\nis no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);\n(11) k\u00e2ra@naviruddhak\u00e2ryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--this\nplace is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it\nis full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).\n\nThere is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation,\nbut that does not prove that there is any reason for the\ncognition of negation (_heturn\u00e2bh\u00e2vasamvida@h_). All that we can\nsay is this that there are certain situations which justify the use\n(_yogyat\u00e2_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyat\u00e2\nis positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage\nas non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.\nPerception of negation thus does not prove the existence of\nnegation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions\nwhich are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive\nperception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yabindu_, p. 11, and _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 53-7.]\n\n359\n\nleads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug\n(_anupalambha@h abh\u00e2va@m vyavah\u00e2rayati_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nThe Ny\u00e2ya reply against this is that the perception of positive\nexistents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we\nhave no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said\nthat the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception\nof the ground without the jug. But is this being without\nthe jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then\nit is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even\nwhen the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over\nthe name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a\ndistinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground\nwith the jug, and the ground without it, then call it \"ground,\nwithout the jugness\" or \"the negation of jug,\" it does not matter\nmuch, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation\nis apprehended by perception as much as any positive\nexistent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;\njust as even in the perception of positive sense-objects\nthere are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of\nnegation with space and time with which it appears associated is\nthe relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality\n(_vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na_). The relation between the negation and its\npratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is\nthe other is not. The _Vais'e@sika s\u00fbtra_ (IX. i. 6) seems to take abh\u00e2va\nin a similar way as Kum\u00e2rila the Mima@msist does, though the\ncommentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika\nthe four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _pr\u00e2gabh\u00e2va_ (the\nnegation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug\nbefore it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@ms\u00e2bh\u00e2va_ (the negation\nfollowing the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is\ndestroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyony\u00e2bh\u00e2va_ (mutual\nnegation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_,\npp. 48-63.]\n\n[Footnote 2 Pras'astap\u00e2da says that as the production of an effect is the\nsign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign\nof its non-existence, S'r\u00eedbara in commenting upon it says that the\nnon-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its\nnon-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for\nhe says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses\n(_bh\u00e2vavad abh\u00e2vo'p\u00eendriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual\nsense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the\npreception of non-existence (_abh\u00e2vendriyasannikar@so'pi\nabh\u00e2vagraha@nas\u00e2magr\u00ee_), Ny\u00e2yakandal\u00ee_, pp. 225-30.]\n\n360\n\nin the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyant\u00e2bh\u00e2va_ (a negation which\nalways exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in\nother places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices\nfor the seeker of Salvation.\n\nIt is probable that the Ny\u00e2ya philosophy arose in an atmosphere\nof continued disputes and debates; as a consequence\nof this we find here many terms related to debates which we do\nnot notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are\n_tarka_, _nir@naya_, _v\u00e2da_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@d\u00e2_, _hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_, _chala_,\n_j\u00e2ti_ and _nigrahasth\u00e2na_.\n\nTarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern\nits real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of\nsome supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not\ninference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right\nconclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specific\nnature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the\nconclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two\nopposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the\ndoctrines that there is or is not an \u00e2tman, in which each of them\ntries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is\ncalled a _v\u00e2da_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants\ngive wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents.\nA jalpa is called a _vita@n@d\u00e2_ when it is only a destructive\ncriticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without\nseeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sas\nare those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Ny\u00e2ya_\ns\u00fbtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetv\u00e2bh\u00e2sas_) of the middle (hetu):\n_savyabhic\u00e2ra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_\n(tautology), _s\u00e2ddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _k\u00e2l\u00e2t\u00eeta _(inopportune).\nSavyabhic\u00e2ra is that where the same reason may prove\nopposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible\nlike the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because\nit is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha\nis that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a\njug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with\nreference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects,\nand it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]\n\n361\n\nwhere the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form\n(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of\neternality); s\u00e2dhyasama is that where the reason itself requires\nto be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,\nbut it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);\nk\u00e2l\u00e2t\u00eeta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not\ntally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that\nsound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the\ndrum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and\nthe object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour\nis simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was\nalready there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the\ncase of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the\nstick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.\nThe later Ny\u00e2ya works divide savyabhic\u00e2ra into three classes,\n(1) s\u00e2dh\u00e2ra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is\nan object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire\nis also an object of knowledge), (2) as\u00e2dh\u00e2ra@na or too restricted\n(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this\ncannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the\nsound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mh\u00e2rin or unsubsuming\n(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of\nknowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be\nfound which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion\nmay also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that in\nwhich there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite\nconclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is\nnon-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)\nis of three kinds (i) _\u00e2s'ray\u00e2siddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant\nbecause it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in\nthe sky), (2) _svar\u00fbp\u00e2siddha_ (sound is a quality because it is\nvisible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vy\u00e2pyatv\u00e2siddha_ is that\nwhere the concomitance between the middle and the consequence\nis not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because\nthere is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red\nhot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated\nwith smoke. The fallacy _b\u00e2dhita_ is that which pretends to prove\na thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot\nbecause it is a substance. We have already enumerated the\nfallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Ny\u00e2ya practice\n\n362\n\nPras'astap\u00e2da counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nn\u00e2ga also\ncounted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is\nincorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;\nbut atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmak\u00eertti counted also the\nfallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Ny\u00e2ya rightly considers that\nthe fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard\ninference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the\nintentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the\npurpose of defeating him. J\u00e2ti consists in the drawing of contradictory\nconclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with\nthe deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasth\u00e2na\nmeans the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving\nself-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is\nconclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious\nopponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating\ntricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical\nwork, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to\nemancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ that these\nhad to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant\ndisputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.\nIf the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the\npupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,\nand it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding\nonward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices\nfor the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge\nof these has therefore been enjoined in the Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra as\nbeing necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].\n\n\nThe doctrine of Soul.\n\nDh\u00fbrtta C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas denied the existence of soul and regarded\nconsciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were\nother C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas called Sus'ik@sita C\u00e2rv\u00e2kas who admitted the\nexistence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.\nThe Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.\nThe naiy\u00e2yikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics\nmainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.\nThey argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,\netc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 586-659, and _T\u00e2rkikarak@s\u00e2_ of\nVaradar\u00e2ja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallin\u00e2tha, pp. 185 ff.]\n\n363\n\nsome entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self\nis not proved according to Ny\u00e2ya merely by the notion of our\nself-consciousness, as in the case of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, for Ny\u00e2ya holds\nthat we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may\nbe erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or\nI am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot\nbe relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we\ncannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the\ninference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to\nwhich consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced\nas a result of collocations. Never has the production of\n\u00e2tman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any\ndestruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not\nlocated in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at\nthe same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with\nthe body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though\n\u00e2tman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are\nseen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation\nof bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested\nor produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness\nas a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].\n\nEven at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different\nfacial features, and this could not be due to anything else than\nthe memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and\npains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures\nand pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be\ndue to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed\nin their past lives. Since the inequality of the world\nmust have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as\nthe determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.\n\n\n\u00ces'vara and Salvation.\n\nNy\u00e2ya seeks to establish the existence of \u00ces'vara on the basis of\ninference. We know that the Jains, the S\u00e2@mkhya and the Buddhists did\nnot believe in the existence of \u00ces'vara and offered many antitheistic\narguments. Ny\u00e2ya wanted to refute these and prove the existence\nof Is'vara by an inference of the s\u00e2m\u00e2nyato-d@r@s@ta type.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:_J\u00f1\u00e2nasamav\u00e2yanibandhanamev\u00e2tmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See\n_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 432 ff.]\n\n364\n\n\nThe Jains and other atheists held that though things in the\nworld have production and decay, the world as a whole was never\nproduced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to\nthis view the Ny\u00e2ya holds that the world as a whole is also an\neffect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips\noccur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in\nnature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a\nresult of production. But even if this is not admitted by the\natheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of\nthe universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a\ndifference between the order and arrangement of human productions\n(e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;\nand therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'i@s@tat\u00e2_)\nof the universe it could not be argued that the universe was\nproduced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and\narrangement that is found in human productions that a creator\nor producer could be inferred. To this, Ny\u00e2ya answers that the\nconcomitance is to be taken between the \"order and arrangement\"\nin a general sense and \"the existence of a creator\" and not with\nspecific cases of \"order and arrangement,\" for each specific case\nmay have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar\nother specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same\nkind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard\nthe specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider\nthe concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.\nSo here, we have to consider the concomitance of \"order and\narrangement\" in general with \"the existence of a creator,\" and\nthus though the order and arrangement of the world may be\ndifferent from the order and arrangement of things produced by\nman, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would\nnot be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many\neffects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground\nwithout any creator being found to produce them, does not hold,\nfor it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created\nby a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has\na creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in\nits construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order\nand arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an\neffect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.\nJust as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,\n\n365\n\nso \u00ces'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus\nomniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not\nrequire memory; all things are perceived by him directly without\nany intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is\nalways happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the\nkarma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or\nprotects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the\nresults of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless\ncan by its will produce changes in our body and through it in\nthe external world, so \u00ces'vara also can by his will create the\nuniverse though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any\nassociation of body with \u00ces'vara is indispensable for our conception\nof him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body,\nso that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of\nour body take place, so also by his will changes and movements\nare produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].\n\nThe naiy\u00e2yikas in common with most other systems of Indian\nphilosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that\nthe small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of\nsorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarva@m\ndu@hkha@m vivekina@h_); the wise therefore is never attached to the\nso-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.\n\nThe bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithy\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na_)\nwhich consists in thinking as my own self that which\nis not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;\nwhen once the true knowledge of the six pad\u00e2rthas and\nas Ny\u00e2ya says, of the proofs (_pram\u00e2@na_), the objects of knowledge\n(_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is\nattained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can\nbe removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipak@sabh\u00e2van\u00e2_),\nnamely the true estimates of things. Thus when any\npleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but\npain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it\nwill never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction\nof false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and\nignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of\nPata\u00f1jali) are also destroyed.\n\nWith the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote:1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 190-204,_ \u00ces'var\u00e2num\u00e2na_ of Raghun\u00e2tha\nS'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusum\u00e2\u00f1jal\u00ee_.]\n\n366\n\nfulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with\nit sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment,\nactions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the\nproduction of body and its experiences. With the cessation of\nsorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all\nits qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains\nin its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika\nis neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a\nstate of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in\nits own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness\nin mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute\nhappiness (_\u00e2nanda_), though really speaking the state of mukti\ncan never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in\nits original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,\nknowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 499-533.]\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nM\u00ceM\u00c2@MS\u00c2 PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]\n\n\nA Comparative Review.\n\nThe Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from\na purely common sense point of view and did not work with any\nsuch monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our\ncommon sense experience should be considered as coming out of\nan original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the S\u00e2m@khya). Space, time,\nthe four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are\nsubstantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material\nthings as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many\nentities which have distinct and separate existence but which\nmanifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also\nkarma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even\nthe class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in\nsubstances. Knowledge (_j\u00f1\u00e2na_) which illuminates all things is\nregarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are\nother qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely\nas the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is\nalso viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other\nphysical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical\ncircumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the\ncombination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and\nthe objects of sense, knowledge (_j\u00f1\u00e2na_) is produced. Soul with\nNy\u00e2ya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.\ninhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,\nclass notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as\nwithout it the different entities being without any principle of\nrelation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an\ninfinite number of reals of three different types, which by their\ncombination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,\nqualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist\nbetween substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 see Chapter IV.]\n\n368\n\nthat these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three\ntypes of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within\nthem the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge,\nwilling, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly\nand new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations\ndid not bring about any new thing but brought about a\nphenomenon which was already there in its causes in another\nform. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them\nmerely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. S\u00e2@mkhya holds\nhowever that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness\nand that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact\nthis pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter\ninto conscious thought or experience of a person.\n\nBut this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and\nseparate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly\nbe demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has\nbeen pointed out by the Ny\u00e2ya school in a very strong and\nemphatic manner. Even S\u00e2@mkhya did not try to prove that the\nexistence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in\nexperience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the\nexistence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of\na permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states\nof knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle\ntowards virtue and emancipation. S\u00e2@mkhya had first supposed\nknowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and\nthen had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as\npuru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here\nin some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by\nthe inadequate analysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as being\nnon-intelligent and incessantly changing.\n\nNy\u00e2ya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self\non the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality,\nand therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis\nis again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances\nand attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature\nof the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was\na quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance\nin which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon\nthe self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their\nconclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious\n\n369\n\nthought. Of course it is true that S\u00e2@mkhya had approached\nnearer to this view than Ny\u00e2ya, but it had separated\nthe content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it\nthreatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite\nunwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem\nto reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification\nof the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this\ncould not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--a\ntranscendent illusion running on from beginningless\ntime. These difficulties occurred because S\u00e2@mkhya soared to a\nregion which was not directly illuminated by the light of common\nsense experience. The Ny\u00e2ya position is of course much worse\nas a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything,\nbut only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could\nnot be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on\na one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common\nsense experience that substances are different from qualities and\nactions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the\nwhole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is,\nto say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary\nthat the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought\nto the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and\nan account of experience should be given according to its verdict.\nNo construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores\nthe direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is\na relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction\nis ushered in by the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 system. The _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_\nwere written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bh\u00e2@sya_) on it was\nwritten by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made\nby Kum\u00e2rila, who preceded the great S'a@nkar\u00e2c\u00e2rya, and a disciple\nof Kum\u00e2rila, Prabh\u00e2kara.\n\n\nThe M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 Literature.\n\nIt is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew\nin India in the Br\u00e2hma@nas. This system once set up gradually\nbegan to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details\nof which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some\ngenerations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of\nIndia and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old\nrules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition\n\n370\n\nhad it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions\nand doubts became more common about the many\nintricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries\ninto them were begun in different circles by different scholars and\npriests. These represent the beginnings of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 (lit. attempts\nat rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were\ndifferent schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_\n(which are with us the foundations of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2) are only a comprehensive\nand systematic compilation of one school is evident from\nthe references he gives to the views in different matters of other\npreceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not\navailable now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has\nwritten is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it\nmay be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so\nmasterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other\nattempts that were made before him. Jaimini's _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_\nwere probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work\nof the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 system. Commentaries were written on it by\nvarious persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in _Ny\u00e2yaratn\u00e2kara_\nverse 10 of _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_), Bhavad\u00e2sa {_Pratij\u00f1as\u00fbtra_ 63}, Hari and\nUpavar@sa (mentioned in _S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_). It is probable that at least\nsome of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary\nknown as the _S'abara-bh\u00e2@sya_. It is difficult to say anything\nabout the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ng\u00e2n\u00e2tha\nJh\u00e2 would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current\nverse which speaks of King Vikram\u00e2ditya as being the son\nof S'abarasv\u00e2min by a K@sattriya wife. This bh\u00e2@sya of S'abara\nis the basis of the later M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 works. It was commented\nupon by an unknown person alluded to as V\u00e2rttikak\u00e2ra by\nPrabh\u00e2kara and merely referred to as \"yath\u00e2hu@h\" (as they say)\nby Kum\u00e2rila. Dr Ga@ngan\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2 says that Prabh\u00e2kara's commentary\n_B@rhat\u00ee_ on the _S'abara-bh\u00e2@sya_ was based upon the work\nof this V\u00e2rttikak\u00e2ra. This _B@rhat\u00ee_ of Prabh\u00e2kara had another\ncommentary on it--_@Rjuvim\u00e2l\u00e2_ by S'alikan\u00e2tha Mis'ra, who also\nwrote a compendium on the Prabh\u00e2kara interpretation of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\ncalled _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_. Tradition says that Prabh\u00e2kara\n(often referred to as Nibandhak\u00e2ra), whose views are\noften alluded to as \"gurumata,\" was a pupil of Kum\u00e2rila. Kum\u00e2rila\nBha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary\nof S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent\n\n371\n\nexposition of S'abara's bh\u00e2@sya in three parts known as _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_\n(dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's\nwork as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as\nTarkap\u00e2da), _Tantrav\u00e2rttika_ (dealing with the remaining three\nchapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and\n_@Tup@t\u00eek\u00e2_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)\n[Footnote ref 1]. Kum\u00e2rila is referred to by his later followers\nas Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tap\u00e2da, and V\u00e2rttikak\u00e2ra. The next great M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\nscholar and follower of Kum\u00e2rila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of\n_Vidhiviveka, M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2nukrama@n\u00ee_ and the commentator of _Tantrav\u00e2rttika,_\nwho became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. P\u00e2rthas\u00e2rathi\nMis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2,\nTantraratna,_ and _Ny\u00e2yaratnam\u00e2l\u00e2_ following the footprints\nof Kum\u00e2rila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kum\u00e2rila,\nthe names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _K\u00e2s'ik\u00e2_ and Somes'vara\nthe author of _Ny\u00e2yasudh\u00e2_ deserve special notice. R\u00e2mak@r@s@na\nBha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkap\u00e2da_ of\n_S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_ called the _Yuktisnehap\u00fbra@n\u00ee-siddh\u00e2nta-candrik\u00e2_ and\nSoman\u00e2tha wrote his _May\u00fbkham\u00e2lik\u00e2_ on the remaining chapters\nof _S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_. Other important current M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 works which\ndeserve notice are such as _Ny\u00e2yam\u00e2l\u00e2vistara_ of M\u00e2dhava, _Subodhin\u00ee,\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2b\u00e2laprak\u00e2s'a_ of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, _Ny\u00e2yaka@nik\u00e2_ of\nV\u00e2caspati Mis'ra, _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2paribh\u00e2@sa_ by K@r@s@nayajvan,\n_M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2ny\u00e2yaprak\u00e2s'a_ by Anantadeva, G\u00e2g\u00e2 Bha@t@ta's\n_Bha@t@tacint\u00e2ma@ni,_ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been\nconsulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all\nVedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the\nsm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals\nof Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained\nby them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance,\nproprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even\nunder the British administration is explained according to the\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 maxims. Its relations to the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy will\nbe briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with\nNy\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this\nchapter. The views of the two schools of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as propounded\nby Prabh\u00e2kara and Kum\u00e2rila on all the important topics have\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Mah\u00e2mahopadhy\u00e2ya Harapras\u00e2da S'\u00e2str\u00ee says, in his\nintroduction to _Six Buddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts_, that \"Kum\u00e2rila preceded\nSa@nkara by two generations.\"]\n\n372\n\nalso been pointed out. Prabh\u00e2kara's views however could not\nwin many followers in later times, but while living it is said that\nhe was regarded by Kum\u00e2rila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly\nany new contribution has been made to the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 philosophy\nafter Kum\u00e2rila and Prabh\u00e2kara. The _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_ deal mostly\nwith the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in\nconnection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be\ngleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and\nvague. V\u00e2rttikak\u00e2ra's views also can only be gathered from the\nreferences to them by Kum\u00e2rila and Prabh\u00e2kara. What we know\nof M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.\nIt did not develop any further after them. Works written on the\nsubject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do\nnot know of any work on M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 written in English except\nthe excellent one by Dr Ga@ng\u00e2n\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2 on the Prabh\u00e2kara\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 to which I have frequently referred.\n\n\nThe Parata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya doctrine of Ny\u00e2ya and the\nSvata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya doctrine of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2.\n\nThe doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge\n(_svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure\nof the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude\nof truth. The M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 philosophy asserts that all knowledge\nexcepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory is\nvalid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither\ndepends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other\nknowledge for its validity. But Ny\u00e2ya holds that this self-validity\nof knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.\nIt is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge\nis produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this\nknowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive\nanything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this\nvisual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is\ntrue, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kum\u00e2rila, not being able to convert\nPrabh\u00e2kara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended\nthat he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabh\u00e2kara whether his burial\nrites should be performed according to Kum\u00e2rila's views or Prabh\u00e2kara's.\nPrabh\u00e2kara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by\nhim only to rouse up Kum\u00e2rila's pointed attacks, whereas Kum\u00e2rila's views\nwere the right ones. Kum\u00e2rila then rose up and said that Prabh\u00e2kara\nwas defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was\nalive. But this has of course no historic value.]\n\n373\n\nit has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and\nhow can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In\nother words, how can my perception \"a blue thing\" guarantee\nthat what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively\nas well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not\nhave any such perception that what I have perceived as blue\nis really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot\nbe testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain\nthat knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but\nthere is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object\nfrom which we can infer that the perception is also objectively\nvalid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify\nits validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge,\nand following our perception of even a mirage we should\nnever come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions,\nand this proves that when we practically follow the\ndirections of our perception we are undecided as to its validity,\nwhich can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception\nwith what we find later on in practical experience. Again,\nevery piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations,\nand as such depends upon them for its production, and\nhence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.\nIt is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for\nvalidity always refers to objective realization of our desires and\nattempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People\nonly declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically\nin accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of\na mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with\nour perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes\nof water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of\nknowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the\nobject and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriy\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na_\nor _phalaj\u00f1\u00e2na_) just as perception or knowledge represented\nthem to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of\nknowledge (_svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_), but validity is ascertained by\n_sa@mv\u00e2da_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote\nref l].\n\nIt is easy to see that this Ny\u00e2ya objection is based on the\nsupposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective\ncollocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 160-173.]\n\n374\n\nonly be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this\ntheory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be\nexperienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;\nwe have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain\nobjective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the\nobjective world and this is experienced by us always. But that\nthe objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis\nwhich can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme\nprerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a\nphenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we\nsay that knowledge has been produced in us by the external\ncollocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted\nby experience; knowledge only photographs the\nobjective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that\nknowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is\nonly a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation\nto knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is\nnot like any other phenomena for it stands above them and\ninterprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in\nthings, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What\nwe call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the\nagreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective\nfacts never come to us directly, they are always taken\non the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty\nthan what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed\ndifferent kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but\nthese latter do not on that account generate the former, for this\nis never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact\nbefore it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes\ndifferent kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for\nexperience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and\nnot why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by\nus to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts\nare dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is\nwhat is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@ya_) of knowledge\nin its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced,\nobjects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link\nbetween the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on\nwhich knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing\nor illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent\n\n375\n\nof anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well\n(_svak\u00e2ryakara@ne svata@h pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya@m j\u00f1\u00e2nasya_). Whenever there\nis any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is\ncertain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work\n(_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in\nour mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness\nof knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with\nit the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases\nof illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which\ncarry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not\nvalid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear\nto us by later experience, and in accordance with which we\nreject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed\nitself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which\ngoaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man\nworks according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction\nthat his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper\nof mind. This is what M\u00eem\u00e2@msa means when it says that the\nvalidity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though\nits invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other\ndata (_j\u00f1\u00e2nasya pr\u00e2@m\u00e2@nyam svata@h apr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya@m parata@h_). Knowledge\nattained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory\nexperience (_b\u00e2dhakaj\u00f1\u00e2na_) comes in or when our organs etc. are\nknown to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@saj\u00f1\u00e2na). It is from\nthese that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when\nwe take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them\nnot, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of\nknowledge certified at the moment of its production need not\nbe doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find\nany defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All\nknowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently\nby itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory\nis excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon\na previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and\ncannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.\n\n\nThe place of sense organs in perception.\n\nWe have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it\ncould not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so,\nthe diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in\n\n376\n\nface of the Ny\u00e2ya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the\nground of diverse sense-contact the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 probably could not\nafford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore\naccepted the Ny\u00e2ya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge\nwith slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of\nsvata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious of\na conflict between these two different principles of the production\nof knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked\nat it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts\nof them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by\nvirtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a\nmatter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge\nare never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but\nwhen the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses\nmust have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to\nbe dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one\nknowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge\nas in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence\nof the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the\nphysical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be\noperating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred\nlater on in accordance with the nature and characteristic\nof knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge\nwhich is directly experienced from which we may proceed later\non to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it.\nThus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects\nmay later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the\nrise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us\nas original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.\n\nPrabh\u00e2kara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of\nthe senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are\nphenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always\nin the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments;\nthe cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus\nbe regarded as the material cause (_samav\u00e2yik\u00e2ra@na_); but there\nmust be some such movements or other specific associations\n(_asamav\u00e2yik\u00e2ra@na_) which render the production of this or\nthat specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist\neither in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the\ncolouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which\n\n377\n\nis the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which\nform the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself\n(e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a\nsubstance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial\ncause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put\nin the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is\neternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that\nthe immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must\ninhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again\naccepting the Ny\u00e2ya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities\nin an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some\nother substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul\nacquires would naturally require the contact of such substances.\nSince there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in\nother substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are\nthree eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and\nspace being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them.\nContact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise\nof different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind\nof atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul.\nThis atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone by\nitself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,\neffort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid\nof any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot\nlead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence\nit stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized\nby these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will\nneed the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic\nquality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous\ncharacteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know\nthat the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must\nbe one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light,\nand this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognition\nof colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly\norgan (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of\ntouch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these\norgans is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have\nto be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the\nsense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas\n\n378\n\nwith the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The\nobjects of perception are of three kinds,(1) substances, (2) qualities,\n(3) j\u00e2ti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of\nearth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic\nstates they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste,\nsmell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction,\npriority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and\neffort [Footnote ref l].\n\nIt may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that\nKum\u00e2rila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of the\nsenses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that\nthe senses may be conceived either as certain functions or\nactivities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things\nwithout coming into actual contact with them, or that they might\nbe entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref\n2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.\n\n\nIndeterminate and determinate perception.\n\nThere are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first\nstage is called _nirvikalpa_ (indeterminate) and the second _savikalpa_\n(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception\nat the first moment of the association of the senses and\ntheir objects. Thus Kum\u00e2rila says that the cognition that appears\nfirst is a mere _\u00e2locana_ or simple perception, called non-determinate\npertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling\nthe cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around\nhimself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is\npresented to consciousness; all that is present there is the\nindividual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate\nperception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist\nview which defines it as being merely the specific individuality\n(_svalak@sa@na_} and regards it as being the only valid element in\nperception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@ng\u00e2n\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2's\n_Prabh\u00e2karamim\u00e2@ms\u00e2_, pp. 35 etc.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_, see _Pratyak@sas\u00fbtra_, 40 etc., and\n_Ny\u00e2yaratn\u00e2kara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection that\nS\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Ny\u00e2ya that the senses actually went\nout to meet the objects (_pr\u00e2pyak\u00e2ritva_) but held that there was\na special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which the\nsenses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars.\nIt is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature\nof the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and P\u00e2rthas\u00e2rathi objects\nto it as being almost a different category (_tattv\u00e2ntara_).]\n\n379\n\nimpositions. But both Kum\u00e2rila and Prabh\u00e2kara think that both\nthe genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate\nstage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because\nwe do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in\ncontrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or\ndifferentia; a thing can be cognized as an \"individual\" only in\ncomparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined\ncharacters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a\nclass only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features\nin common with some other things; so we see that as other things\nare not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept\nat the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an\nindividual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the\ncharacteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived\nat the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things are\nnot remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and\nhence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first\nstage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions\nbrings the present perception in relation to past ones\nand realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It\nis thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate\nand the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case\nmemory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory\nin the determinate perception refers to those other objects of\nmemory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the\ndeterminate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet\nsince the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not\nenter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as\na valid cognition. Kum\u00e2rila also agrees with Prabh\u00e2kara in\nholding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception\nvalid [Footnote ref 2].\n\n\nSome Ontological Problems connected with the\nDoctrine of Perception.\n\nThe perception of the class (_j\u00e2ti_) of a percept in relation to\nother things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference\nbetween determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems\nof j\u00e2ti and avayav\u00e2vayav\u00ee (part and whole notion) were\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by\nS'r\u00eedhara.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_ and _S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_.]\n\n380\n\nthe subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering\ninto discussion about j\u00e2ti, Prabh\u00e2kara first introduced the\nproblem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayav\u00ee_ (whole). He argues as\nan exponent of svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nyav\u00e2da that the proof of the true\nexistence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness,\nand what is distinctly recognized in consciousness\nmust be admitted to have its existence established. Following\nthis canon Prabh\u00e2kara says that gross objects as a whole exist,\nsince they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material\ncause and their connection (_sa@myoga_) is the immaterial cause\n(_asamav\u00e2yik\u00e2ra@na_), and it is the latter which renders the whole\naltogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and\nit is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the\nwhole is perceived. Kum\u00e2rila holds that it is due to the point of\nview from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate\nwhole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical,\nbut when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing\nappears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it\nfrom the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing\nappears to be a whole of which there are parts (see _S'lokav\u00e2rttika,\nVanav\u00e2da_) [Footnote ref 1].\n\nJ\u00e2ti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is\ndifferent from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its\nentirety in each individual constituting that j\u00e2ti (_vy\u00e2s'ajyav@rtti_),\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: According to S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity\nof the universal and the particular (_s\u00e2m\u00e2nyavis'esasamud\u00e2yo dravyam,\nVy\u00e2sabh\u00e2sya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is\ndifferent from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.\nConglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts\nexist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which\nthey exist close together (_mrantar\u00e2 hi tadavayav\u00e2h_), and it is this\nlatter combination (_ayutasiddh\u00e2vayava_) which is called a dravya, but\nhere also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the\nparts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space\nbetween them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as\nPandit\u00e2s'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), it\nis the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole\noccupying space (_param\u00e2nava eva hi parar\u00fbpades'aparih\u00e2renotpann\u00e2h\nparasparasahit\u00e2 avabh\u00e2sam\u00e2n\u00e2 desavit\u00e2navanto bhavanti_). The whole\nis thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinir\u00e2karana, Six\nBuddhist Ny\u00e2ya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless\n_(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an\nobject we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the\nparts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid\nreason against it:\n\n   \"_adustakaranodbh\u00fbtaman\u00e2virbh\u00fbtab\u00e2dhakam\n   asandigda\u00f1ca vij\u00f1\u00e2nam katham mithyeti kathyate._\"\n\n_Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_, pp. 550 ff.]\n\n381\n\nbut the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the\nargument that j\u00e2ti should be denied, because it involves the conception\nof a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The\nclass character or j\u00e2ti exists because it is distinctly perceived by\nus in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal\nin the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even\nwhen one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual\nof that class (e g. cow class) comes into being, a new\nrelation of inherence is generated by which the individual is\nbrought into relation with the class-character existing in other\nindividuals, for inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_) according to Prabh\u00e2kara\nis not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced\nand not produced according as the thing in which it exists is\nnon-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Ny\u00e2ya\nholds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of\nthings in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the\nclass-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual,\nnor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of\nclass-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With\nthe destruction of an individual or its production it is a new\nrelation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the\nclass-character or j\u00e2ti has no separate existence apart from the\nindividuals as Ny\u00e2ya supposes. Apprehension of j\u00e2ti is essentially\nthe apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to\nother similar things of that class by the perception of the common\ncharacteristics. But Prabh\u00e2kara would not admit the existence of\na highest genus satt\u00e2 (being) as acknowledged by Ny\u00e2ya. He\nargues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because\nwe find that the individuals of a class possess some common\ncharacteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate\nthings of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate\nj\u00e2ti as satt\u00e2, as demanded by the naiy\u00e2yikas. That all things are\nsaid to be _sat_ (existing) is more or less a word or a name without\nthe corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience\nalways gives us concrete existing individuals, but we\ncan never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or\nbeing, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When\nwe speak of a thing as _sat_, we do not mean that it is possessed\nof any such class-characters as satt\u00e2 (being); what we mean\nis simply that the individual has its specific existence or svar\u00fbpasatt\u00e2.\n\n382\n\nThus the Ny\u00e2ya view of perception as taking only the\nthing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, (_sanm\u00e2tra-vi@sayam\npratyak@sa@m_) is made untenable by Prabh\u00e2kara, as according to\nhim the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According\nto Kum\u00e2rila however j\u00e2ti is not something different from the\nindividuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived.\nKum\u00e2rila's view of j\u00e2ti is thus similar to that held by S\u00e2@mkhya,\nnamely that when we look at an individual from one point of\nview (j\u00e2ti as identical with the individual), it is the individual that\nlays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of j\u00e2ti becomes\nlatent, but when we look at it from another point of view\n(the individual as identical with j\u00e2ti) it is the j\u00e2ti which presents\nitself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent.\nThe apprehension as j\u00e2ti or as individual is thus only a matter\nof different points of view or angles of vision from which we look\nat a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of j\u00e2ti, Kum\u00e2rila\nholds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct\nfrom the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist,\nbut only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves\n(_S'lokav\u00e2rttika, Pratyak@sas\u00fbtra_, 149, 150, _abhed\u00e2t samav\u00e2yo'stu\nsvar\u00fbpam dharmadharmi@no@h_), Kum\u00e2rila agrees with Prabh\u00e2kara\nthat j\u00e2ti is perceived by the senses (_tatraikabuddhinirgr\u00e2hy\u00e2\nj\u00e2tirindriyagocar\u00e2_).\n\nIt is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of\nPrabh\u00e2kara we find that the category of vis'e@sa admitted by the\nKa@n\u00e2da school is not accepted as a separate category by the\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 on the ground that the differentiation of eternal\nthings from one another, for which the category of vis'e@sa is\nadmitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary\nqualities of these things. The quality of p@rthaktva or specific\ndifferences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they\nconstitute, can very well serve the purposes of vis'e@sa.\n\n\nThe nature of knowledge.\n\nAll knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the\nknowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether\nperceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal\nthe self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self\nis directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded\nas perception from the point of view of self. The division\n\n383\n\nof the pram\u00e2@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anum\u00e2na (inference),\netc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with\nreference to the varying modes in which they are brought within\nthe purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining\nor revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have\nknowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the\nremembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (_sa@mvid_) that reveals\nby its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.\nIt is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of\nknowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they\nare said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather\nsay that they have the same identical reality too. The M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\nanswer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the\ncognized were not different from one another, they could not\nhave been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is\nby cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The\ncognition (_sa@mvedana_) of a person simply means that such a\nspecial kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in the\nself by virtue of which his active operation with reference to\na certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition\nis that with reference to which the active operation of the\nself has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless,\nfor they have the cognitional character by which things are\nillumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than\nthis, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are\nbelieved to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal\nto us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to\nobjects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions\nwere left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency\n(_ad@r@s@ta_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance\nof that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions\nof cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that\namount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the\noperation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordance\nwith his previous merit or demerit.\n\nThe Prabh\u00e2kara M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, in refuting the arguments of those\nwho hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized\nby some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we\ndo not experience any such double cognition and also because it\nwould lead us to a _regressus ad infinitum,_ for if a second cognition\n\n384\n\nis necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third\nand so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition,\nthen it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown\nto us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and\nreveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the\nillumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this\nself-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred\nand not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the\npresence of an object and not in the form in which it can be\napprehended by perception (_pratyak@sa_). Prabh\u00e2kara draws a\nsubtle distinction between perceptuality (_sa@mvedyatva_) and being\nobject of knowledge (_prameyatva_). A thing can only be apprehended\n(_sa@mvedyate_) by perception, whereas inference can only\nindicate the presence of an object without apprehending the\nobject itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other\ncognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence\nof knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].\n\nKum\u00e2rila also agrees with Prabh\u00e2kara in holding that perception\nis never the object of another perception and that it ends\nin the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he\nsays that every perception involves a relationship between the\nperceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as\nthe agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.\nThis is indeed different from the Prabh\u00e2kara view, that\nin one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and\nthe knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of\n_tripu@t\u00eepratyak@sa_) [Footnote ref 2].\n\n\nThe Psychology of Illusion.\n\nThe question however arises that if all apprehensions are\nvalid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot\nbe regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and\nits psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian\nphilosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called\n_satkhy\u00e2ti_ which we have described before, and of the Ved\u00e2ntists,\nwhich we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three\ndifferent theories of illusion, viz. (1) _\u00e2tmakhy\u00e2ti_, (2) _vipar\u00eetakhy\u00e2t\u00ee_\nor _anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti_, and (3) _akhy\u00e2ti_ of the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 school. The\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prabh\u00e2karam\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2,_ by Dr Ga@ngan\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _loc. cit._ pp. 26-28.]\n\n385\n\nvipar\u00eet\u00e2khy\u00e2ti or anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti theory of illusion is accepted by\nthe Ny\u00e2ya, Vais'e@sika and the Yoga, the \u00e2khy\u00e2ti theory by\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 and S\u00e2@mkhya and the \u00e2tmakhy\u00e2ti by the Buddhists.\n\nThe commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is\nthe illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece\nof silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced\nby all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard\nto its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny\nthe existence of the external world and think that there are only\nthe forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of\npast lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so\nalso in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge\nwhich must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account\nof the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates\nsometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong\nperception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called\nexternal data. For they do not exist, and even if they did\nexist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right\nperception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge\ncreates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This\nis true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception.\nNy\u00e2ya objects to the above view, and says that, if\nknowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon\nitself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception\nought to be of the form \"I am silver\" and not \"this is silver.\"\nMoreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false\nhypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming\nfrom outside and that the external as such does not exist.\n\nThe vipar\u00eetakhy\u00e2ti or the anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti theory supposes that\nthe illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we\ndo not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished\nfrom the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the\nconch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere\nis remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In\nillusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is\nnot conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it\nis merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it\nexists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before\nthat creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as\nsilver. This school agrees with the akhy\u00e2ti school that the fact\n\n386\n\nthat I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of\nillusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough\nto account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite\npositive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of\nsilver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.\n\nThe \u00e2khy\u00e2ti theory of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 holds that since the special\npeculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous\nto say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as\nthe silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized\nat all. What happens here is simply this, that only the\nfeatures common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver\nfails to apprehend the difference between these two things,\nand this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain\nweakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the\ncommon features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended,\nand the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past\ntime that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as\na result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the\nsilver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion\ntakes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a\ndual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is\ndifferent from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a\nmatter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the\ndifference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of\nthe present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception\nappears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real\nvalid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on\nthe part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver\nwould be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case\nof a real perception. Kum\u00e2rila agrees with this view as expounded\nby Prabh\u00e2kara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as\nvalid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any\nreal judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that\ndoes not matter, for it is admitted in M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 that when later\nexperience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate\nthe original perception which was self-valid at the time of its\nproduction [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 had to\nadopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition\nat the moment of its production is valid. The \u00e2khy\u00e2ti theory\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2, S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2_, and _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_,\ns\u00fbtra 2.]\n\n387\n\ntries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any\npositive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension\ndue to certain weakness of mind. So it is that\nthough illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition,\nis made up of two elements, the present perception and\nmemory, both of which are true so far as they are individually\npresent to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of\nany other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition\nis its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also,\nas in the case \"Is this a post or a man?\" what is actually perceived\nis some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this\nperception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of\nthe pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension\ninvolved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded\nas self-valid as any other cognition.\n\n\nInference.\n\nS'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation\nhas been known to exist between two things, we can have the\nidea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind\nof knowledge is called inference. Kum\u00e2rila on the basis of this\ntries to show that inference is only possible when we notice\nthat in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire)\nsubsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent\nrelation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend\nupon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary\nthat the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third\nthing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of\none thing should also be cases involving the existence of the\nother, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire),\nthough including all the cases of the existence of the other\n(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter\n(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether\nit be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of\nthe constellation of K@rttik\u00e2 with Rohi@n\u00ee, where, by the rise of the\nformer the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of\nidentity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or\na case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and\na third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of\ncases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming\n\n388\n\none whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the\none (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the\nexistence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all\nsuch cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending\nbeyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called\n_gamya_ or _vy\u00e2paka_ and the other (e.g. smoke) _vy\u00e2pya_ or _gamaka_\nand it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill,\nthe pak@sa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be\ninferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the\ngamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is\nfire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case\nof inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent\nrelation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a\nthird thing (e g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only\nin a general way that the coexisting things must have a place\nwhere they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory\nthat the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka\nthing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that\nthe same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.\nEvery case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception\nand not from any universal general proposition. Kum\u00e2rila holds\nthat the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major\nand not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of\nfire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was\nknown in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor\nof fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated\nand the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new\nknowledge (_des'ak\u00e2l\u00e2dhiky\u00e2dyuktamag@rh\u00eetagr\u00e2hitvam anum\u00e2nasya,\nNy\u00e2yaratn\u00e2kara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in\nforming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,\na third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered\nand for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough\nthat in the large number of cases where the concomitance was\nnoted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance\nfailed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances\nin which the absence of the gamya or vy\u00e2paka was marked by an\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kum\u00e2rila\nwas indebted to Di@nn\u00e2ga for this; for Di@nn\u00e2ga's main contention is that\n\"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is\nthe fiery hill that is inferred\" for otherwise inference would give us\nno new knowledge see Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and\n_T\u00e2tparya@tik\u00e2_, p. 120.]\n\n389\n\nabsence of the gamaka or vy\u00e2pya, should also be noted, for a\nknowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for\nthe forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The\nexperience of a large number of particular cases in which any two\nthings were found to coexist together in another thing in some\nrelation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure\ncreates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the\ngamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist\nin exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the\ncircle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the\nexistence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.\nIt is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases\nof cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of\ncoexistence as well.\n\nThe question arises that if no inference is possible without\na memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity\nof inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded\nas self-valid. To this Kum\u00e2rila's answer is that memory\nis not invalid, but it has not the status of pram\u00e2na, as it does\nnot bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the\nacquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence\nof two things in another was known in a number of cases,\nyet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya\nin a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the\ngamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not\nperception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the\ngamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.\n\nAs regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit\nstatement of the process of inference for convincing others\n(_p\u00e2r\u00e2rth\u00e2num\u00e2na_) both Kum\u00e2rila and Prabh\u00e2kara hold that three\npremisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three\npremisses pratij\u00f1\u00e2, hetu and d@rst\u00e2nta may quite serve the purpose\nof an anum\u00e2na.\n\nThere are two kinds of anum\u00e2na according to Kum\u00e2rila\nviz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and s\u00e2m\u00e2nyatod@r@s@tasambandha.\nThe former is that kind of inference where the permanent\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Kum\u00e2rila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance\n(_vy\u00e2pti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the\npositive ones.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"_tasm\u00e2danavagate'pi sarvatr\u00e2nvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke\nbahus'ah s\u00e2hity\u00e2vagamam\u00e2tr\u00e2deva\nvyabhic\u00e2r\u00e2dars'anasan\u00e2th\u00e2danum\u00e2notpattira@ng\u00eekartavya@h._\"\n_Ny\u00e2yaratn\u00e2kara_, p. 288.]\n\n390\n\nrelation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and\nfire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where\nthe permanent relation is observed not between two concrete\nthings but between two general notions, as in the case of movement\nand change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is\nchange of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the\nchange of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held\nthat this general notion is directly perceived like all universals\n[Footnote ref 1].\n\nPrabh\u00e2kara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the\npermanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact\nthat this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)\nis taken in connection with a third thing in which they both\nsubsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between\ntwo things is the main point, whereas in all other associations\nof time and place the things in which these two subsist\ntogether are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things\n(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that\nthough the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the\nconcomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote\nref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that\nthe concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the\npresence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any\nsmoke is seen. Prabh\u00e2kara counts separately the fallacies of the\nminor (_pak@s\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_), of the enunciation (_pratij\u00f1\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_) and of\nthe example (_d@r@s@t\u00e2nt\u00e2bh\u00e2sa_) along with the fallacies of the middle\nand this seems to indicate that the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 logic was not altogether\nfree from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke\nincludes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there\nwould be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential\ncognition. But this objection has little force with Prabh\u00e2kara,\nfor he does not admit that a pram\u00e2@na should necessarily bring\nus any new knowledge, for pram\u00e2@na is simply defined as \"apprehension.\"\nSo though the inferential cognition always pertains to\nthings already known it is yet regarded by him as a pram\u00e2@na,\nsince it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _S'lokav\u00e2rttika, Ny\u00e2yaratn\u00e2kara, S'\u00e2strad\u00eepik\u00e2,\nYuktisnehap\u00fbra@n\u00ee, Siddh\u00e2ntacandrik\u00e2_ on anum\u00e2na.]\n\n[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is\nno condition (_up\u00e2dhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabh\u00e2kara has\nnothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in\na large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say\nthat it does not exist (_prayatnen\u00e2nvi@syam\u00e2@ne aup\u00e2dhikatv\u00e2navagam\u00e2t_,\nsee _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_, p. 71).]\n\n391\n\n\nUpam\u00e2na, Arth\u00e2patti.\n\nAnalogy (_upam\u00e2na_) is accepted by M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 in a sense which\nis different from that in which Ny\u00e2ya took it. The man who\nhas seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox\n(_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with\nthe _go,_ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is not\nwithin the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya._ The\ncognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go,_ as it follows\ndirectly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the\n_gavaya,_ is called upam\u00e2na (analogy). It is regarded as a separate\npram\u00e2@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarity\nexisting in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is\nnot mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the\n_gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen,\nand what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference\nof Prabh\u00e2kara and Kum\u00e2rila on this point is that while the\nlatter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact\nof more than one object having the same set of qualities, the\nformer regards it as a distinct category.\n\n_Arth\u00e2patti_ (implication) is a new pram\u00e2@na which is admitted\nby the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta\nis alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile\nthese two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being\nin the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside\nthe house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta\noutside the house is called _arth\u00e2patti_ (presumption or\nimplication).\n\nThe exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arth\u00e2patti\ncognition is a matter on which Prabh\u00e2kara and Kum\u00e2rila\ndisagree. Prabh\u00e2kara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta\nhabitually resides in his house but yet does not find him\nthere, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired\npreviously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and\nthe cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his\nhouse. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause\nof implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta,\nand thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain\nsomewhere outside. That can only be found by implication,\nwithout the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.\nThe mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for\n\n392\n\nmaking the presumption that he is outside the house, for he\nmight also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and\nalso that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from\nhome creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is\nliving, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in\nthe presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The\nperception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate\nlink of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he\nmust then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element\nof doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist\nbeyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire\nis possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the\nhouse leads to the presumption of an external existence only\nwhen it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt\nand uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].\n\nKum\u00e2rila however objects to this explanation of Prabh\u00e2kara,\nand says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful\nby the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt\nmay as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is\ndead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life\nof Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition\nof his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed\nwhen the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not\nfollow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is\nliving. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his\nabsence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very\nfact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of\ndoubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure\nof the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about\nthe life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or\nby some other means, we may presume that he must be outside\nthe house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot\nbe any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty\nof his life associated with the perception of his absence from the\nhouse that leads us to the presumption of his external existence.\nThere is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his\nabsence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without\nthe presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates\nbetween two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_, pp. 113-115.]\n\n393\n\ncannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a\nreconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta\nmust be found outside the house.\n\nWell then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted\nas presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there\nis smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke\nin the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes\nirreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance\nof smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption\nthat there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if\nthe universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known\notherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance\nwas seen only in individual cases, and from that came the\ninference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot\nbe said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered\nany contradiction without the presumption of the universal\nproposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arth\u00e2patti\nis of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now\nwhen it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference\ncannot be served by arth\u00e2patti, the validity of inference\nas a means of proof becomes established. That being done we\nadmit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us\neither by inference or by arth\u00e2patti.\n\nSo inference also cannot serve the purpose of arth\u00e2patti, for\nin inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and\nlater on from that the s\u00e2dhya (what is to be proved); both of\nthem however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and\nit is exactly this that distinguishes arth\u00e2patti from anum\u00e2na.\nFor arth\u00e2patti takes place where, without the presumption of\nDevadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of\nDevadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is\nliving he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot\nswallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external\nexistence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot\nbe comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by\npresuming his existence outside the house. Arth\u00e2patti is thus\nthe result of arth\u00e2nupapatti or the contradiction of the present\nperception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.\n\nIt is by this arth\u00e2pattipram\u00e2@na that we have to admit that\nthere is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the\n\n394\n\nshoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices\nby which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such\nbeneficent state of existence.\n\n\nS'abda pram\u00e2@na.\n\nS'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by\nmost of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the\nJaina, Buddhist, C\u00e2rv\u00e2ka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on this\ntopic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore\nomitted to give any attention to it in connection with the\nNy\u00e2ya, and the S\u00e2@mkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority\nof the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and\nthey had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied\nit. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition\nthat they were the word of God, while others, particularly the\nM\u00eem\u00e2@msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone,\nand had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.\nTheir authority was not derived from the authority of any\ntrustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves.\nEvidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with\nus, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old\ndays of India. It was in fact the most important subject for\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, for the _M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_ were written for the purpose\nof laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.\nThe slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological\ndoctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation\nof its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to\nwriting philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much\nupon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a\nrational compendium of maxims with the help of which the\nVedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.\nBut a brief examination of the doctrine of word (_s'abda_)\nas a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as it is its very soul.\n\nS'abda (word) as a pram\u00e2@na means the knowledge that we\nget about things (not within the purview of our perception) from\nrelevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of\nwhich they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds,\nviz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.\nThe first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not\n\n395\n\nuttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in\nitself. The meanings of words are of course known to us\nbefore, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;\nbut the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the\nrelations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged\nmeans of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abda\nas a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the\nvalidity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its\nbeing uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not\nexplain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when\neven the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known,\nwe have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any\nsentence.\n\nPrabh\u00e2kara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters,\nor are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent\nletters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are\nthus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which\nserve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The\nreason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be\nfound in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the\ndenotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception\nof each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but\nleaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions\nof the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings\nabout the whole word which contains the potency of bringing\nabout the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing\na word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted\nthat the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the\npurpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate\npotencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is\nthe direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabh\u00e2kara and\nKum\u00e2rila agree on this point.\n\nAnother peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words\nhave natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of\ntheir own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their\ncomprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will\nnot understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the\nword in question is expressive of such and such a meaning,\nbut the word was all along competent to denote that meaning\nand it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to\n\n396\n\nunderstand the meaning of a word. M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 does not think\nthat the association of a particular meaning with a word is due\nto conventions among people who introduce and give meanings\nto the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative\nof themselves. It is only about proper names that convention\nis admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see\nthe bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic\ncommandments, by the performance of which such results would\narise as could not have been predicted by any other person.\nAgain all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though\nthey are ever present some manifestive agency is required by\nwhich they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists\nof the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the\nword. Ny\u00e2ya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause\nthat produces the word while M\u00eem\u00e2m@s\u00e2 thinks that it only manifests\nto the hearer the ever-existing word.\n\nThe process by which according to Prabh\u00e2kara the meanings\nof words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands\na junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the\nchild on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the\nsenior's commands comes to understand the meaning of \"cow\"\nand \"horse.\" Thus according to him the meanings of words can\nonly be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he\ndeduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things\nonly as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvit\u00e2bhidh\u00e2na\nv\u00e2da_), and no word can be comprehended as having any\ndenotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine\nholds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally\nrelated to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence,\nthus the word _g\u00e2m_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it is\nintended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine\ngenus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of\naction, viz. bringing in the sentence _g\u00e2m \u00e2naya_--bring the cow.\nKum\u00e2rila however thinks that words independently express\nseparate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence\nexpressing one connected idea (_abhihit\u00e2nvayav\u00e2da_). Thus\nin _g\u00e2m \u00e2naya_, according to Kum\u00e2rila, _g\u00e2m_ means the bovine\nclass in the accusative character and _\u00e2naya_ independently means\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: According to Ny\u00e2ya God created all words and associated them\nwith their meanings.]\n\n397\n\nbring; these two are then combined into the meaning \"bring the\ncow.\" But on the former theory the word _g\u00e2m_ means that it is\nconnected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence\nonly shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above\nsentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot\nhave any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kum\u00e2rila\nwhich is also the Ny\u00e2ya theory is called abhihit\u00e2nvayav\u00e2da [Footnote ref\n1].\n\nLastly according to Prabh\u00e2kara it is only the Veda that can\nbe called s'abda-pram\u00e2@na, and only those sentences of it which\ncontain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way\nwith these things). In all other cases the validity of words is\nonly inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the\nspeaker. But Kum\u00e2rila considers the words of all trustworthy\npersons as s'abda-pram\u00e2@na.\n\n\nThe Pram\u00e2@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).\n\nIn addition to the above pram\u00e2@nas Kum\u00e2rila admits a fifth\nkind of pram\u00e2@na, viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the\nnon-existence of a thing. Kum\u00e2rila argues that the non-existence of\na thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived\nby the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could\ncome into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some\npeople prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anum\u00e2na.\nThey say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object\nthere is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision\nof a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy\nto see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want\nof vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions\nare to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How\ncan the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?\nIt is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pram\u00e2@na\nnamely anupalabdhi.\n\nAll things exist in places either in a positive (_sadr\u00fbpa_) or in\na negative relation (_asadr\u00fbpa_), and it is only in the former case\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Prabh\u00e2karam\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2_ by Dr Ga@ng\u00e2n\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2 and S.N.\nDasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this\nconnection that M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound\nwhich consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of\nletters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was\nmanifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the\nsyllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this\nword manifestation. See V\u00e2caspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokav\u00e2rttika_\nand _Prakara@napa\u00f1cik\u00e2_. For the doctrine of anvit\u00e2bhidh\u00e2na see\nS\u00e2hkan\u00e2tha's _V\u00e2ky\u00e2rtham\u00e2t@rk\u00e2v@rtt\u00ee_.]\n\n398\n\nthat they come within the purview of the senses, while in the\nlatter case the perception of the negative existence can only be\nhad by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we\ndesignate as a separate pram\u00e2@na as anupalabdhi. Prabh\u00e2kara\nholds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the\nperception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need\nof admitting a separate pram\u00e2@na as anupalabdhi. For what is\nmeant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception\nof the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty\nspace before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought\nnot to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the\nplace is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that\nwhich is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation\nis practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of\nempty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment\nwhich we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then\nalso want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted,\nwhich amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or\nnegation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain\nthe notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best\nbe an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge,\nor in other words to substitute for the place of the external\nabsence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the\nthing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends\nin failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted\neither in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation\nor abh\u00e2va as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.\nIt is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without\nany knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next\nmoment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.\nBut this also means that the moment of the perception of the\nground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or\nits negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission\nof negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can\nthere be in the perception of \"only the ground\" if it is not meant\nthat it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified\nby the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of\nthe ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of\nthe jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.\nThe qualifying phrase that \"only the ground is perceived\" becomes\n\n399\n\nmeaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not\nspecified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the\nground. And this would require that we had already the notion\nof negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special\nmanner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also\nbe noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the\nnotion of negation immediately and not through other negations,\nand this is true not only of things of the present moment but also\nof the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we\nremember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a\nseparate pram\u00e2@na by which the absence or want of a sensible\nobject--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended.\n\n\nSelf, Salvation, God.\n\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 has to accept the existence of soul, for without it\nwho would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would\nbe the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing\nsacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is\nthus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the\nsense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many,\none in each body. Prabh\u00e2kara thinks that it is manifested to us in\nall cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence\nof self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so,\nwhy should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our\ncognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?\nKum\u00e2rila however differs from Prabh\u00e2kara about this analysis of\nthe consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even\nthough we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or\ntheir specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied\nbeings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our\ncognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the\nself as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different\nfrom the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is\npresent in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in\nmany of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that\nthe self is different from the body is this, that movement or\nwilling, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to\nthe body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be\nfound. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some\nother entity owing to the association with which the body appears\n\n400\n\nto be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge,\nfeeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived\nby others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc.,\nare perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation\nthat the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart\nthemselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body\nis made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and\nthis also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the\nvehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that\nif the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a\nmover? But M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 does not admit that movement means\natomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which\nmoves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.\nIt is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter\nmoves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an\nagent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of\nthe body. The self must also be understood as being different\nfrom the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses\nhe continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all\nthrough.\n\nThe question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabh\u00e2kara\nholds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the\ncognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor\nentering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the\nself and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in\nwhat we have already described as tripu@ti-praty\u00e2k@sa (perception\nas three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but\nknowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and\nthe object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man\nwho walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is\nregarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the\ncase of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet\nit appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not\nsoul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum,\nand appears in it as the cognitive element \"I\" which is inseparable\nfrom all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is\ncognized the self also is not cognized.\n\nKum\u00e2rila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from\nthe body is perceived by a mental perception (_m\u00e2nasa-pratyak@sa_\nas the substratum of the notion of \"I,\" or in other words the self\nperceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its\n\n401\n\nown nature shines forth in consciousness as the \"I.\" The objection\nthat the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its\nown operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabh\u00e2kara's\ntheory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet\nconsiders it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of\nlinguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet\nhe is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge,\nfor the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though\nat the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it\ndoes not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but\nreveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which\nis distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt\nknown as the substratum of \"I,\" but the knowledge of this self\ndoes not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects,\nnor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of\nobjects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition\nwhich we represent as the \"I.\" The self does not reveal itself as\nthe knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the\nmind. This is indeed different from Prabh\u00e2kara's analysis, who\nregarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition,\nboth being the result of the illumination of knowledge.\nKum\u00e2rila agrees with Prabh\u00e2kara however in holding that soul\nis not self-illuminating (_svayamprak\u00e2s'a_), for then even in deep\nsleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such\nmanifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an\nunconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had\nit been so people would not have regretted that they had missed\nsensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that\n\"I slept in bliss\" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover\nthe opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found\nwhen a man on rising from sleep says \"I slept so long without\nknowing anything not even my own self.\" The self is not\natomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head\nas well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of\nthe body which contracts and expands according to the body it\noccupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should\nbe regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This\nself must also be different in different persons for otherwise their\nindividual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot\nbe explained [Footnote ref 1].\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_, \u00e2tmav\u00e2da _S'\u00e2stra-d\u00eepik\u00e2_, \u00e2tmav\u00e2da and\nmok@sav\u00e2da.]\n\n402\n\n\nKum\u00e2rila considered the self to be merely the potency of\nknowledge (j\u00f1\u00e2nas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were\ngenerated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self\nitself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the\ntime of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas\nthe self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge\nwithout any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of\nsalvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any\nof its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge,\nwilling, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss\nor \u00e2nanda as Ved\u00e2nta supposes; but these are generated in it by\nits energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested\nof all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the\nenergy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation\nis accepted in the main by Prabh\u00e2kara also.\n\nSalvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers\nthe fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them\nand stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from\nthe performance of k\u00e2mya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for\nthe attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees\nhimself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing\nthe nitya-karmas (such as the sandhy\u00e2 prayers etc., by the performance\nof which there is no benefit but the non-performance\nof which produces sins). This state is characterized by the\ndissolution of the body and the non-production of any further\nbody or rebirth.\n\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 does not admit the existence of any God as the\ncreator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is\nmade up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the\nuniverse had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created\nit. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the\naction of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither\nis it necessary as Ny\u00e2ya supposes that dharma and adharma\nshould have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Ny\u00e2ya\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of\nmolecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy\n(_s'akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual\nmovements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and\nyet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the\nrelationing of the energy with a thing. Ny\u00e2ya strongly opposes this\ndoctrine of a non-sensible (at\u00eendriya) energy and seeks to explain all\naction by actual molecular motion.]\n\n403\n\nno one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot\nbe any contact (_sa@myoga_) or inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_) of dharma\nand adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot\nhave any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like\nthe carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the\nworld either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the\nbeginning there were no beings towards whom should he be\nactuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself\nrequire a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,\nno creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been\nrunning the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti\nor pralaya.\n\n\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as philosophy and M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as ritualism.\n\nFrom what we have said before it will be easy to see that\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence\nof the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities,\nr\u00fbpa, rasa, etc. Kum\u00e2rila's differences on the points of j\u00e2ti,\nsamav\u00e2ya, etc. and Prabh\u00e2kara's peculiarities have also been\nmentioned before. On some of these points it appears that\nKum\u00e2rila was influenced by S\u00e2@mkhya thought rather than by\nNy\u00e2ya. S\u00e2@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which\nhave tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;\nother systems have generally followed them or have differed from\nthem only on minor matters. The physics of Prabh\u00e2kara and\nKum\u00e2rila have thus but little importance, as they agree in\ngeneral with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not\nlaying any special stress on this part, because for the performance\nof sacrifices the common-sense view of Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika about\nthe world was most suitable.\n\nThe main difference of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 with Ny\u00e2ya consists of the\ntheory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the\nVeda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from\nGod, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any\nother means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity\nof all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the\nadvantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated\nto us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and\nthere being nothing to contradict them later on there would be\nnothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions\n\n404\n\ninvalid. The other pram\u00e2@nas such as perception, inference, etc.\nwere described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us\nhow dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing\nthing which could be perceived by the other pram\u00e2@nas, but\na thing which could only be produced by acting according to\nthe injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma\nand adharma therefore the s'abdapram\u00e2@na of the Veda was our\nonly source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a\nknowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them\nit would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable\nVedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution\nwhich is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be\nacknowledged by the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 as it would have endangered the\neternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on\nthat account.\n\nThe Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Br\u00e2hma@nas\n(also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are\nthree classes of injunctions (1) ap\u00fbrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and\n(3) parisa@nkhy\u00e2-vidhi. Ap\u00fbrva-vidhi is an order which enjoins\nsomething not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed\n(we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the\nsacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that\nwhere when a thing could have been done in a number of ways,\nan order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following\nsome definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn\ncould be separated even by the nails, the order that \"corn should\nbe threshed\" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the\nonly course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi\nthat which is ordered is already known as possible but only as\nan alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as\nthe only one. In ap\u00fbrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have\nremained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi.\nIn parisa@nkhy\u00e2-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but\nnot necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra \"I take\nup the rein\" (_im\u00e2m ag@rbhn\u00e2@m ras'an\u00e2@m_) which could be used in\na number of cases should not however be used at the time of\nholding the reins of an ass.\n\nThere are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic\nsentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively\nthey yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be\n\n405\n\ntaken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences\ncan however yield meanings separately by themselves they\nshould not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain\nsentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context\nof immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.\n\nThe vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma.\nThe mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities\nor powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the\ndeity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered\nthat as dharma can only be acquired by following\nthe injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as\ngiving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas\nwhich cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming\npart of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive.\nThus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which\ndescribe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction\n(called the _arthav\u00e2das_) should be interpreted as forming part\nof a vidhi-v\u00e2kya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even\nthose expressions which give reasons for the performance of\ncertain actions are to be treated as mere arthav\u00e2das and interpreted\nas praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as\nmandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.\n\nWhen a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of\nthe Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence\nis proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated\neither in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive\nforce called _ap\u00fbrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of the\nsacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This ap\u00fbrva is like\na potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the\ndesired results follow [Footnote ref 1].\n\nIt is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works\nof S'abara and Kum\u00e2rila make an elaborate research into the\nnature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great\ndetail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student\nof philosophy.\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ng\u00e2n\u00e2tha Jh\u00e2's _Prabh\u00e2karam\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2_ and M\u00e2dhava's\n_Ny\u00e2yam\u00e2l\u00e2vistara_.]\n\n406\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VED\u00c2NTA\n\n\nComprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential\nthan the Dialectic of controversy.\n\n_Pram\u00e2@na_ in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement\nby which knowledge is acquired, _pram\u00e2t\u00e2_ means the subject or\nthe knower who cognizes, _pram\u00e2_ the result of pram\u00e2@na--right\nknowledge, _prameya_ the object of knowledge, and _pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_ the\nvalidity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is\nsometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to\nits object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of\nvalidity in the mind of the subject--the knower (that his perceptions\nare true), which moves him to work in accordance with\nhis perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the\nattainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things.\nThe question wherein consists the pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya of knowledge has\nnot only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a\nmetaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge\nbased on an analysis of psychological experience, and on\nthe other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the\ntheory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify\na theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation\nof experience which the others sometimes ignored or\nsometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different\nschools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one\nanother in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently\nvery important in determining the prestige of any school\nof thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Ny\u00e2ya\nor M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 thinker in a great public debate attended by many\nlearned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at\nonce spread all over the country and he could probably secure a\nlarge number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation\nwere often undertaken by great masters all over the country\nfor the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools\nand of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore\nnot generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical\n\n407\n\nmood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to\ninflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of\nsome particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal\nvictory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the\ndebater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced\nSanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude\nof mind of these debaters and we find that most of these\ndebates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by\nexposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close\ndialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent,\nasking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that\nhis theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed\nto the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on\nIndian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an\ninterminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms\n(to thwart opponents) sometimes called _vita@n@d\u00e2_, before he can\ncome to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence.\nAll the resources of the arts of controversy find full play\nfor silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer\nis given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to\nno party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory\nof either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of\nthe different aspects from which the problem of the theory of\nknowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at\nby the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency\nof each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations\non the experience of each school, their analysis, and their\nnet contribution to philosophy. With Ved\u00e2nta we come to an\nend of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here\nto make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the\npoint of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the\nposition of the Ved\u00e2nta of the S'a@nkara school in the field of\nIndian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore\nnow try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory\nof knowledge (_pram\u00e2@nav\u00e2da_) reached by some of the main\nschools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by\nthe S'a@nkara Ved\u00e2nta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt\nto sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.\n\n408\n\n\nThe philosophical situation. A Review.\n\nBefore dealing with the Ved\u00e2nta system it seems advisable\nto review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to\nthe main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine\nthe position of the Ved\u00e2nta as taught by S'a@nkara and\nhis school.\n\nThe Sautr\u00e2ntika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is\nconcerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@s\u00e2drtka_).\nThis however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagj\u00f1\u00e2na_)\nwhich rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said\nto be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.\nSo far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned,\nit is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore\nthis does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about\nknowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or\ncontradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how\nfar our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our\nactions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get\nin our practical experience (_arthapr\u00e2dpakatva_). The perception is\nright (_abhr\u00e2nta_ non-illusory) when following its representation we\ncan get in the external world such things as were represented by\nit (_sa@mv\u00e2dakatva_). That perception alone can be right which is\ngenerated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.\nWhen I say \"this is the cow I had seen,\" what I see is the\nobject with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that\nthis is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is\nnot perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by\nthe visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which\nI see now never existed before so as to be invested with this\nor that permanent name. This association of name and permanence\nto objects perceived is called _kaipan\u00e2_ or _abhil\u00e2pa_.\nOur perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhil\u00e2pa\nassociation (_kalpan\u00e2po@dha_), for though this is taken as a part of\nour perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and\nhence its association with the object is an evident error. The\nobject as unassociated with name--the nirvikalpa--is thus what\nis perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovij\u00f1\u00e2na or\nthought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also\ndetermined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an\n\n409\n\nobject of knowledge (_gr\u00e2hya_), and by the fact of the rise\nof such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing\nrealizable or attainable in the external world. The special\nfeatures of the object undefinable in themselves as being\nwhat they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what is\nactually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1].\nThe _pram\u00e2@naphala_ (result of perception) is the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word\n\"svalak@sa@na\" of Dharmak\u00eertti between ray esteemed friend Professor\nStcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmak\u00eertti held\nthat the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception\nwas almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, \"According to your\ninterpretation svalak@sa@na mean,--the object (or idea with Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2din)\n_from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated_,\nthis I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and\nfuture has been taken away, what remains? _The present_ and the present\nis a _k@sa@na_ i.e. nothing.... The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamt\u00e2na\nor simply sa@mt\u00e2na and in every sa@mt\u00e2na there is a synthesis ek\u00eebh\u00e2va\nof moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya =\nkalpana = adhyavas\u00e2ya)...There is in the perception of a jug _something_\n(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the _idea_ of\na jug (which is always a sa@mt\u00e2na, always vikalpita), and if you take\nthe idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:\nk@sanasya j\u00f1\u00e2nena pr\u00e2payitumas'akyatv\u00e2t. This is absolutely the Kantian\nteaching about _Synthesis of Apprehension_. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a\n_transcendental_ source of knowledge, because practically speaking it\ngives no knowledge at all. This _pram\u00e2@na_ is _asatkalpa_. Kant says\nthat without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa =\nkalpan\u00e2po@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of\nintellect (kalpan\u00e2 = buddhi = synthesis = ek\u00eebh\u00e2va) they would be blind.\nEmpirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of\nDharmak\u00eertti. He is a Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2d\u00ee as I understand, because he maintains\nthe cognizability of ideas (vij\u00f1\u00e2na) alone, but the reality is an\nincognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is b\u00e2hya, it is\nartha, it is arthakriy\u00e2k@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for\nwhich he sometimes is called Sautr\u00e2ntika and this school is sometimes\ncalled Sautranta-vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da, as opposed to the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da of As'vagho@sa\nand \u00c2ry\u00e2sanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as\nit exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and param\u00e2rthasat,\nwhat would remain of Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da? But there is the perception of the jug\nas opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddh\u00e2 kalpan\u00e2), an element of\nreality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense\nknowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element\nof sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmak\u00eertti\nhas also _s'uddh\u00e2 kalpan\u00e2_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ...And very\ninteresting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anum\u00e2na, the first\nmoves from k@sa@na to sa@mt\u00e2na and the second from sa@mt\u00e2na to k@sa@na,\nthat is the reason that although bhr\u00e2nta the anum\u00e2na is nevertheless\npram\u00e2@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the\narthakriy\u00e2k@sa@na. It is bhr\u00e2nta directly and pram\u00e2@na indirectly;\npratyak@sa is pram\u00e2@na directly and bhr\u00e2nta (asatkalpa) indirectly... .\"\nSo far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are\nconcerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes\nthe interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive \"this is\nblue,\" the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative\nelement of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation\n(_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor\nStcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)\nand is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing\nonly in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving\naffirmation such as \"this is blue.\" The affirmative process\noccurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative\nelement of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N.T., p. 20) but\nthis presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative\nprocess of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot\nexpress its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other\nideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form\na part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its\nown specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature?\nDharmak\u00eertti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means\nthose specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when\nthe object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasy\u00e2rthasya\nsannidh\u00e2n\u00e2sannidh\u00e2n\u00e2bky\u00e2m j\u00f1\u00e2napratibh\u00e2sabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N.,\np. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific\ncharacteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the\nobject itself; it is the appearance of the \"blue\" in its specific\ncharacter in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative\nor ideational process, the result is the concept or idea \"this is blue\"\n(_n\u00eelasar\u00fbpa@m pratyak@samanubh\u00fbyam\u00e2na@m n\u00eelabodhar\u00fbpamavasth\u00e2pyate ...\nn\u00eelas\u00e2r\u00fbpyamasya pram\u00e2@nam n\u00eelavikalpanar\u00fbpa@m tvasya pram\u00e2@naphalam_,\nN.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue\n(_n\u00eelanirbh\u00e2sa@m hi vij\u00f1\u00e2nam_, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance\n(_yatki\u00f1cit arthasya s\u00e2k@s\u00e2tk\u00e2rij\u00f1\u00e2nam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N.T. 7) and\nthis is real (_param\u00e2rthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation is\ndifferent from the idea \"this is blue\" (_n\u00eelabodha_, N.T. 22) which is\nthe result of the former (_pram\u00e2@naphala_) through the association of\nthe affirmative process (_adhyavas\u00e2ya_) and is regarded as invalid for\nit contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is\na _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means pure\nsensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object\nand with Dharmak\u00eertti this is the only thing which is valid in perception\nand vikalpapratyaya or pram\u00e2naphala is the idea or concept which follows\nit. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the\nconstruction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage\nof the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasya\npr\u00e2payitumas'akyatv\u00e2t_, N.T. 16). N.T. = _Ny\u00e2yabindu@t\u00eek\u00e2_,\nN = _Ny\u00e2yabindu (Peterson's edition).]\n\n410\n\nideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing\nthe means which being followed the thing can be got (_yena k@rtena\nartha@h pr\u00e2pito bhavati_). Pram\u00e2@na then is the similarity of the\nknowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we\nassure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is\nperceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience.\nYet this later stage is pram\u00e2@naphala and not pram\u00e2@na which\nconsists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations),\nand which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards\nthe perceived object. The pram\u00e2@na therefore only refers\nto the newly-acquired knowledge (_anadhigat\u00e2dhigant@r_) as this is\nof use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective\nworld. This account of perception leaves out the real\nepistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated\nby the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to\nthe correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and\nits value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The\nquestion of the relation of the external world with knowledge as\ndetermining the latter is regarded as unimportant.\n\n411\n\n\nThe Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from\nthe above-mentioned Sautr\u00e2ntika Buddhists, and say that since\nwe can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone,\nwhat is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the\ndata of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that\nsensations are copies of the external world, but why should you\nsay that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come\ninto touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped\nby us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore\nbe the same as knowledge (_sahopalambhaniyam\u00e2t abhedo\nn\u00eelataddhiyo@h_); for it is in and through knowledge that external\nobjects can appear to us, and without knowledge we\nare not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is\nknowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in\nsuch a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects.\nWe all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external\nobjects, but even there we have knowledge. The question\nwhy then if there are no external objects, there should be so\nmuch diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved\nby the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption,\nthe external objects have to be admitted as possessing the\ninfinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining\nour knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in\nthe beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments\nby virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine\nthe succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge\nalone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of\nknowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire\n(_v\u00e2san\u00e2_) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines\nthe succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge,\npleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity\nas soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms\nin which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, \"I perceive a\nblue thing,\" is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously\ninterpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though\nthe cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as\nthe series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person,\nsay Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can\nhappen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory\ncognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects\n\n412\n\nbelieved to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments,\nwhatever they may be, are destroyed the next\nmoment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver\nor knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the\nknowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing\nidealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience,\ninterprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower\nand the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the\nflow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive\nobjective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought,\nNy\u00e2ya, S\u00e2@mkhya, and the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, accept the duality of soul\nand matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the\ntwo. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of\nknowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of\nknowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also\nenquired after and considered important.\n\nPram\u00e2@na is defined by Ny\u00e2ya as the collocation of instruments\nby which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being.\nThe collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge\nconsists partly of consciousness (_bodha_) and partly of material\nfactors (_bodh\u00e2bodhasvabh\u00e2va_). Thus in perception the\nproper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first\nbrings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate\nconsciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later\non combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact\netc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug.\nThe existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a\nfactor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of\ncourse be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the\nfact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the\nqualifying factor (_vis'e@sanaj\u00f1\u00e2na_ as jugness) he could not have\ncomprehended the qualified object (_vis'i@s@tabuddhi_} the jug (i.e.\nthe object which possesses jugness). In inference (_anum\u00e2@na_)\nknowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upam\u00e2na the sight\nof similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case\nof the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pram\u00e2@na;\neven by those who admitted the existence of the objective world,\nright knowledge was called pram\u00e2@na, because it was of the same\nform as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form\nof the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the\n\n413\n\nexternal object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the\nexternal world but simply enforces our convictions about the external\nworld. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions\nof the external world it is pram\u00e2@na, and so far as it determines our\nattitude towards the external world it is pram\u00e2@naphala. The\nquestion how knowledge is generated had little importance with\nthem, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of\nthe external world was the most important thing. Knowledge\nwas called pram\u00e2@na, because it was the means by which we\ncould form convictions (_adhyavas\u00e2ya_) about the external world.\nNy\u00e2ya sought to answer the question how knowledge was\ngenerated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not\na mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but\nthought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like other\ngu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations\nlike any other happening in the material world. Pram\u00e2@na\ndoes not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (_anadhigat\u00e2dhi-gant@r_)\nas the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were\ncollocations of pram\u00e2@na, knowledge was produced, no matter\nwhether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the\nknowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable\ncollocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced\nwhenever the cause of it namely the pram\u00e2@na collocation\nis present. Categories which are merely mental such as class\n(_s\u00e2m\u00e2nya_), inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_), etc., were considered as having\nas much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements.\nThe phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus\nconceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the\ncolour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of\nindeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with\nthe sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate\nconsciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than\nthe molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain\ncollocation of things ended in a certain result (_phala_). J\u00f1\u00e2na\n(knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations\n(_s\u00e2magr\u00ee_) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul,\nof manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This\nconfusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical\ndistinction between knowledge and an external event\nof the objective world. Ny\u00e2ya thus fails to explain the cause\n\n414\n\nof the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective\nworld. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities\nwhich belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded\nas a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly\nbut was inferred as that in which the qualities of j\u00f1\u00e2na, sukha\n(pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence\nas much as substances, but when any new substances were\nproduced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It\nis very probable that in Ny\u00e2ya the cultivation of the art of inference\nwas originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced\nlater by an application of the inferential method which gave\nthe introspective method but little scope for its application,\nso that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is\na jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological\nexperience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate\nthe results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it\n[Footnote ref 1].\n\nS\u00e2@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and\nmaterial events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the\ncopy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from\nthe objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent\nsort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external\nobjects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects\nmakes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances\nthough in a subtler form as that of which the objects were\nmade. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the\nform of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably\nthus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances\nof which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element,\nviz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly\ndifferent from material combinations. This element of intelligence\nis indeed different from the substances or content of\nthe knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a\nstationary light, \"the self,\" which illuminates the crowding,\nbustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in\naccordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This\nlight of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in\nconsciousness as the \"I,\" the changeless entity amidst all the\nfluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this\nelement of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ on pram\u00e2@na.]\n\n415\n\nrelates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up\ninto itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point\nof the S\u00e2@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance\nof knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of\nknowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (_puru@sa_)\nwhen it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape\nof knowledge is thus the pram\u00e2@na (instrument and process of\nknowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes\nis criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the\nexternal objects (_svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_ and _svata@h-apr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya_). The\npram\u00e2@na however can lead to a pram\u00e2 or right knowledge only\nwhen it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch\nwith buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but\nby what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact.\nIt is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion\nthe original prak@rti in S\u00e2@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same\ntranscendent touch (call it yogyat\u00e2 according to V\u00e2caspati or\nsamyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of\npuru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into\nconsciousness. The Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2din Buddhist did not make any\ndistinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (_\u00e2k\u00e2ra_)\nand did not therefore agree that the \u00e2k\u00e2ra of knowledge was\ndue to its copying the objects. S\u00e2@mkhya was however a realist\nwho admitted the external world and regarded the forms as\nall due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance\n(_sattva_) which could assume the shape of the objects.\nBut S\u00e2@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not\nthink like Ny\u00e2ya that the \u00e2k\u00e2ra of knowledge was all that knowledge\nhad to show; it held that there was a transcendent element\nwhich shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With\nNy\u00e2ya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and\nthe intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like\na physical event. With S\u00e2@mkhya however so far as the content\nand the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was\nindeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element\nof consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent\naffair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of\nconsciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.\n\nThe M\u00eem\u00e2@msist Prabh\u00e2kara agreed with Ny\u00e2ya in general\nas regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact\n\n416\n\ninduced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a\nunique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower\nand the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations,\nfor whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals\nthings--the direct apprehension that should be called the pram\u00e2@na.\nPram\u00e2@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pram\u00e2,\nthe phenomenon of apprehension. Pram\u00e2@na may also indeed\nmean the collocations so far as they induce the pram\u00e2. For\npram\u00e2 or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists,\nbut it manifests itself differently under different circumstances.\nThe validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific\nattitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective\nworld. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge,\nand it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the\nobjective field (_sa@mv\u00e2din_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate)\nmeans the whole knowledge of the object and not merely\na non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Ny\u00e2ya\nholds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes\nthe knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as\nrepresented by memory [Footnote ref 1].\n\nPrabh\u00e2kara rejected the S\u00e2@mkhya conception of a dual element\nin consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and\na material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an\nunique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the\nknower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend\nupon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_)\nexternal objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension\n(_anubh\u00fbti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world;\nknowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its\nself-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart\nfrom its self-revealing character Prabh\u00e2kara did not enquire.\n\nKum\u00e2rila declared that j\u00f1\u00e2na (knowledge) was a movement\nbrought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing\nconsciousness (_j\u00f1\u00e2tat\u00e2_) of objective things. J\u00f1\u00e2na itself\ncannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement\nnecessary for producing the j\u00f1\u00e2tat\u00e2 or consciousness of things.\nMovement with Kum\u00e2rila was not a mere atomic vibration, but\nwas a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S\u00e2@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the\nfirst moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next\nmoment, was called savikalpa.]\n\n417\n\nwas sometimes the result. J\u00f1\u00e2na was a movement and not the\nresult of causal operation as Ny\u00e2ya supposed. Ny\u00e2ya would\nnot also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it\nwould hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities,\nsuch as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment\nof a physical movement. Kum\u00e2rila accords the same\nself-validity to knowledge that Prabh\u00e2kara gives. Later knowledge\nby experience is not endowed with any special quality\nwhich should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the\nprevious movement. For what is called sa@mv\u00e2di or later testimony\nof experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The\nself is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we\ncan know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is\nthe movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances\nleading to cognition of things that is called j\u00f1\u00e2na [Footnote ref 2].\nHere Kum\u00e2rila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge\nas objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was\nbeyond sense perception and could only be inferred.\n\nThe idealistic tendency of Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism, S\u00e2@mkhya,\nand M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique\ncharacter of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in\ntouch. But Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da denied the external world, and thereby\ndid violence to the testimony of knowledge. S\u00e2@mkhya admitted\nthe external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge\nand pure intelligence; Prabh\u00e2kara ignored this difference,\nand was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge\nwas such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and\nthe known, Kum\u00e2rila however admitted a transcendent element\nof movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness,\nbut regarded this as being separate from self. But the question\nremained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of\nknowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects,\nhow far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be\nregarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative,\neither referring to one's being prompted to the objective\nworld, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the\nsuitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yaratnam\u00e2la_, svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya-nir@naya.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jari_ on Pram\u00e2@na, _S'lokav\u00e2rttika_ on\nPratyak@sa, and G\u00e2g\u00e2 Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@t\u00e2cintama@ni_ on Pratyak@sa.]\n\n418\n\nuncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether\nany absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge\nand matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded\nas the real. But the question was not asked, whether\nthere was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth,\nthe basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This\nphilosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the\nHindu mind.\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta Literature.\n\nIt is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\nwere written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the\nother Indian systems, even of the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da Buddhism (of course\naccording to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have been\nwritten very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in\nsupposing that they were written some time in the second century\nB.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dap\u00e2da revived the monistic\nteaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkya\nUpani@sad in verse called _M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkyak\u00e2rik\u00e2_. His disciple Govinda\nwas the teacher of S'a@nkara (788--820 A.D.). S'a@nkara's commentary\non the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ is the root from which sprang\nforth a host of commentaries and studies on Ved\u00e2ntism of great\noriginality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus \u00c2nandagiri, a\ndisciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary called _Ny\u00e2yanir@naya_,\nand Govind\u00e2nanda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabh\u00e2_.\nV\u00e2caspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote\nanother commentary on it called the _Bh\u00e2mati._ Amal\u00e2nanda\n(1247--1260 A.D.) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and Apyayadik@sita\n(1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngar\u00e2jadhvar\u00eendra of K\u00e2\u00f1c\u00ee wrote his\n_Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru._ Another disciple of S'a@nkara,\nPadmap\u00e2da, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it\nknown as _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2_. From the manner in which the book is\nbegun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary\non the whole of S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2sya, but it ends abruptly at the\nend of the fourth s\u00fbtra. M\u00e2dhava (1350), in his _S'a@nkaravijaya,_\nrecites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received\nS'a@nkara's permission to write a v\u00e2rttika on the bh\u00e2sya.\nBut other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara was\nformerly a great M\u00eem\u00e2@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'vara\nafter his conversion to Ved\u00e2ntism) he was not competent to write\n\n419\n\na good _v\u00e2rttika_ on the bh\u00e2@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote\na treatise called _Nai@skarmyasiddhi._ Padmap\u00e2da wrote a @t\u00eek\u00e2\nbut this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once\nseen it, recited it from memory and Padmap\u00e2da wrote it down.\nPrak\u00e2s'\u00e2tman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmap\u00e2da's _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2_\nknown as _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2vivara@na. _Akha@n@d\u00e2nanda wrote\nhis _Tattvad\u00eepana,_ and the famous N@rsi@mh\u00e2s'rama Muni (1500)\nwrote his _Vivara@nabh\u00e2vaprak\u00e2s'ik\u00e2_ on it. Amal\u00e2nanda and\nVidyas\u00e2gara also wrote commentaries on _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2,_ named\n_Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2darpa@na_ and _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2@t\u00eek\u00e2_ respectively, but\nthe _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2vivara@na_ had by far the greatest reputation.\nVidy\u00e2ra@nya who is generally identified by some with M\u00e2dhava\n(1350) wrote his famous work _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1],\nelaborating the ideas of _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2vivara@na_; Vidy\u00e2ra@nya\nwrote also another excellent work named _J\u00eevanmuktiviveka_ on\nthe Ved\u00e2nta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.)\nexcellent work _Nai@skarmyasiddhi_ is probably the earliest independent\ntreatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in his\nbh\u00e2@sya. It has been commented upon by J\u00f1\u00e2nottama Mis'ra.\nVidy\u00e2ra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known as\n_Pa\u00f1cadas'\u00ee,_ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in\nverse on Ved\u00e2nta. Another important work written in verse on\nthe main teachings of S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya is _Sa@mk@sepas'ar\u00eeraka_,\nwritten by Sarvaj\u00f1\u00e2tma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been\ncommented upon by R\u00e2mat\u00eertha. S'r\u00eehar@sa (1190 A.D.) wrote\nhis _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakh\u00e2dya_, the most celebrated work on the\nVed\u00e2nta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly\nafter S'r\u00eehar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an\nindependent work on Ved\u00e2nta dialectic known as _Tattvad\u00eepik\u00e2_\nwhich has also a commentary called _Nayanapras\u00e2din\u00ee_ written\nby Pratyagr\u00fbpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghun\u00e2tha also wrote\ncommentaries on _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakh\u00e2dya._ A work on Ved\u00e2nta\nepistemology and the principal topics of Ved\u00e2nta of\ngreat originality and merit known as _Ved\u00e2ntaparibh\u00e2@s\u00e2_ was\nwritten by Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra (about 155OA.D.). His son\nR\u00e2mak@r@sn\u00e2dhvarin wrote his _S'ikh\u00e2ma@ni_ on it and Amarad\u00e2sa his\n_Ma@niprabh\u00e2._ The _Ved\u00e2ntaparibh\u00e2@s\u00e2_ with these two commentaries\nforms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental\nprinciples of Ved\u00e2nta. Another work of supreme importance\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mh\u00e2c\u00e2rya's article in the _Indian Antiquary_,\n1916.]\n\n420\n\n(though probably the last great work on Ved\u00e2nta) is the\n_Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhus\u00fbdana Sarasvat\u00ee who followed Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra.\nThis has three commentaries known as _Gau@dabrahm\u00e2nand\u00ee_,\n_Vi@t@thales'opadhy\u00e2y\u00ee_ and _Siddhivy\u00e2khy\u00e2_. Sad\u00e2nanda\nVy\u00e2sa wrote also a summary of it known as _Advaitasiddhisiddh\u00e2ntas\u00e2ra_.\nSad\u00e2nanda wrote also an excellent elementary work\nnamed _Ved\u00e2ntas\u00e2ra_ which has also two commentaries _Subodhin\u00ee_\nand _Vidvanmanora\u00f1jin\u00ee_. The _Advaitabrahmasiddhi_ of Sad\u00e2nanda\nYati though much inferior to _Advaitasiddhi_ is important, as it\ntouches on many points of Ved\u00e2nta interest which are not dealt\nwith in other Ved\u00e2nta works. The _Ny\u00e2yamakaranda_ of \u00c2nandabodha\nBha@t@t\u00e2rak\u00e2c\u00e2ryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very\nwell, as also some other important points of Ved\u00e2nta interest.\n_Ved\u00e2ntasiddh\u00e2ntamukt\u00e2val\u00ee_ of Prak\u00e2s'\u00e2nanda discusses many of\nthe subtle points regarding the nature of aj\u00f1\u00e2na and its relations\nto cit, the doctrine of _d@r@stis@r@stiv\u00e2da_, etc., with great clearness.\n_Siddh\u00e2ntales'a by Apyayad\u00eek@sita is very important as a summary\nof the divergent views of different writers on many points of\ninterest. _Ved\u00e2ntatattvad\u00eepik\u00e2_ and _Siddh\u00e2ntatattva_ are also good\nas well as deep in their general summary of the Ved\u00e2nta system.\n_Bhedadhikk\u00e2ra_ of Nrsi@mh\u00e2s'rama Muni also is to be regarded as\nan important work on the Ved\u00e2nta dialectic.\n\nThe above is only a list of some of the most important Ved\u00e2nta\nworks on which the present chapter has been based.\n\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta in Gau@dap\u00e2da.\n\nIt is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of\nthe Ved\u00e2nta thought as contained in the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ without\nmaking any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any\nother commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\nwere first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who\nheld some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more\nthan a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\nwho not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also\ndiffered largely amongst themselves in accordance with the\ndifferent degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of\ntheir dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation\nwas the only one that was faithful to the s\u00fbtras and to\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall\ndeal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtras_.]\n\n421\n\nthe Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation\nmyself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only\njust one additional view. But however that may be, I am\nmyself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ were probably more faithful to the s\u00fbtras than the\ninterpretations of S'a\u00f1kara.\n\nThe _S'r\u00eemadbhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_, which itself was a work of the\nEk\u00e2nti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ as\nhaving the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1].\nProfessor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical\ns\u00fbtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism\nfound in the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ are not with regard to the Vij\u00f1\u00e2na-vada\nof Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da, but he regards\nthe composition of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ to be later than N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna.\nI agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidy\u00e2bh\u00fb@shana in holding that\nboth the Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra system and the system of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna evolved\nfrom the _Praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_ [Footnote ref 2]. N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's merit\nconsisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support\nof S'unyav\u00e2da; but so far as the essentials of S'unyav\u00e2da are\nconcerned I believe that the Tathat\u00e2 philosophy of As'vagho@sa\nand the philosophy of the _Praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2_ contained no less.\nThere is no reason to suppose that the works of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna were\nbetter known to the Hindu writers than the _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na s\u00fbtras_.\nEven in such later times as that of V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra, we find\nhim quoting a passage of the _S'\u00e2listambha s\u00fbtra_ to give an account\nof the Buddhist doctrine of prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2da [Footnote ref 3].\nWe could interpret any reference to S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da as pointing to\nN\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods\nwere referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in\nthe _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ to the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ clearly points out a date\nprior to that of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna; though we may be slow to believe such\nan early date as has been assigned to the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ by Telang,\nyet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back\nas the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part\nof the second century B.C. The _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ could thus be\nplaced slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: \"Brahmas\u00fbtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h\"\n_Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_. The proofs in support of the view that the\n_Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd\nvolume of the present work in the section on _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ and\nits philosophy.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Indian Antiquary_, 1915.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra's _Bh\u00e2mat\u00ee_ on S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2sya on\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtra_, II. ii.]\n\n422\n\nI do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with\nthis supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu\nwriter who held such monistic views as Gau@dap\u00e2da or S'a@nkara,\nand who interpreted the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ in accordance with those\nmonistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists\nhad been writing commentaries on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_, goes to\nshow that the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ were originally regarded as an\nauthoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that\nthe _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_, the canonical work of the Ek\u00e2nti Vai@s@navas,\nshould refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous\nto Gau@dap\u00e2da who attempted to give an exposition of the\nmonistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing\na commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent\nwork as did Gau@dap\u00e2da. I am inclined to think therefore that\nas the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a\ncoherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it\nwas dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form\nof dualism which was already developing in the later days of\nthe Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such\nUpani@sads as the S'vet\u00e2s'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya\nwas also the result of this dualistic development.\n\nIt seems that B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na, the writer of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_,\nwas probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator\nS'a@nkara. Gau@dap\u00e2da seems to be the most important\nman, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies\nof the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to\nformulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant\nthat no other k\u00e2rik\u00e2s on the Upani@sads were interpreted,\nexcept the _M\u00e2n@d\u00fbkyak\u00e2rik\u00e2_ by Gau@dap\u00e2da, who did not himself\nmake any reference to any other writer of the monistic\nschool, not even B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession\nthat the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered from\nthe Vedas by Gau@dap\u00e2da. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary\non Gau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, he says that \"he adores by\nfalling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his\nadored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made\ndreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all\npeople, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great\nchurning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart\nof the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal\n\n423\n\ngods [Footnote ref l].\" It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkara\nshould credit Gau@dap\u00e2da and not B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na with recovering the\nUpani@sad creed. Gau@dap\u00e2da was the teacher of Govinda, the\nteacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkara\nwas a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by\nhis great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control\nand modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dap\u00e2da [Footnote ref 2]. There is\nsome dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed\nby Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider\nit to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to\nteach S'a@nkara, Gau@dap\u00e2da must have been living till at least 800 A.D.\n\nGau@dap\u00e2da thus flourished after all the great Buddhist\nteachers As'vagho@sa, N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and\nI believe that there is sufficient evidence in his k\u00e2rik\u00e2s for thinking\nthat he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that\nthe teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha.\nThus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his k\u00e2rik\u00e2s he\nsays that he adores that great man (_dvipad\u00e2m varam_) who by knowledge\nas wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances\n(_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 4]. He\nthen goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des'ita_)\nthat the touch of untouch (_aspars'ayoga_--probably referring to\nNirv\u00e2@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings,\nand that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor\nfound any contradiction in it (_aviv\u00e2da@h aviruddhas'ca_).\nSome disputants hold that coming into being is of existents,\nwhereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_j\u00e2ta_)\nis of non-existents (_abh\u00fbtasya_); there are others who quarrel\nwith them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents\nare liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being\n(_advayamaj\u00e2tim_). He agrees with those who hold that there\nis no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2 he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was\nno coming into being in any way (_sarvath\u00e2 Buddhairaj\u00e2ti@h parid\u00eepita@h_).\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya on Gau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, Anand\u00e2s'rama\nedition, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Anand\u00e2s'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya on Gau@dap\u00e2da's\nk\u00e2rik\u00e2, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th\ncentury, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he\ndid not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years.\n_J.R.A.S._ 1916.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Compare _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Gau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, IV. 2, 4.]\n\n424\n\n\nAgain, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuv\u00e2di_),\nwho since they found things and could deal with them and\nwere afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of\norigination (_j\u00e2ti_). In IV. 90 he refers to _agray\u00e2na_ which we\nknow to be a name of _Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na_. Again, in IV. 98 and 99\nhe says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature.\nThese the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leaders\nknow first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances\n(_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the k\u00e2rik\u00e2s with an\nadoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref\n1].\n\nGau@dap\u00e2da's work is divided into four chapters: (i) \u00c2gama\n(scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)\nAl\u00e2tas'\u00e2nti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is\nmore in the way of explaining the M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkya Upani@sad by\nvirtue of which the entire work is known as _M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkyak\u00e2rik\u00e2_.\nThe second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts\nof Gau@dap\u00e2da's work, not particularly connected with the M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkya\nUpani@sad.\n\nIn the first chapter Gau@dap\u00e2da begins with the three apparent\nmanifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the\nexternal world while we are awake (_vis'va_ or _vais'v\u00e2nara \u00e2tm\u00e2_),\n(2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa \u00e2tm\u00e2_), (3) as the\nexperiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the _pr\u00e2j\u00f1a_ when there\nis no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure\nbliss (_\u00e2nanda_). He who knows these three as one is never\nattached to his experiences. Gau@dap\u00e2da then enumerates some\ntheories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded\nas a creation from the pr\u00e2@na (vital activity), others\nconsider creation as an expansion (_vibh\u00fbti_) of that cause\nfrom which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is\nlike dream (_svapna_) and magic (_m\u00e2y\u00e2_); others, that creation\nproceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds\nfrom time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord\n(_bhog\u00e2rtham_) or for his play only (_kri@d\u00e2rtham_), for such\nis the nature (_svabh\u00e2va_) of the Lord, that he creates, but he\ncannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Gau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2 IV. 100. In my translation I have not\nfollowed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain\naway even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in\nGau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as\nGau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2s seemed to indicate. I have followed the\nsame principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dap\u00e2da's\nphilosophy below.]\n\n425\n\n\nGau@dap\u00e2da does not indicate his preference one way or the\nother, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_),\nunrelationable (_avyavah\u00e2ryam_), ungraspable (_agr\u00e2hyam_), indefinable\n(_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_),\nthe essence as oneness with the self (_ek\u00e2tmapratyayas\u00e2ra_),\nas the extinction of the appearance (_prapa\u00f1copas'ama_),\nthe quiescent (_s'\u00e2ntam_), the good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_)\n[Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapa\u00f1ca_) would have ceased\nif it had existed, but all this duality is mere m\u00e2y\u00e2 (magic or illusion),\nthe one is the ultimately real (_param\u00e2rthata@h_). In the second chapter\nGau@dap\u00e2da says that what is meant by calling the world a\ndream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists\nin the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the\npresent. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance\nhas a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams\nthings are imagined internally, and in the experience that we\nhave when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside,\nbut both of them are but illusory creations of the self.\nWhat is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the\nmoment of perception only; external objects are supposed to\nhave two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived,\nand when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere\nimagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that\nwhich appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary\nproductions in association with the sense faculties. There is first\nthe imagination of a perceiver or soul (_j\u00eeva_) and then along with\nit the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external\nworld. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake,\nso the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.\nThere is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho,\nna cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is\nstriving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination\nfinds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare in N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's first k\u00e2rik\u00e2 the idea of\n_prapa\u00f1copas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutp\u00e2damanucchedamas'\u00e2s'vatam\nanek\u00e2rthaman\u00e2n\u00e2rthaman\u00e2gamamanirgamam ya@h prat\u00eetyasamutp\u00e2dam\nprapa\u00f1copas'amam s'ivam des'ay\u00e2m\u00e2va sambuddhastam vande vadat\u00e2mvaram_.\nCompare also N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's Chapter on _Nirv\u00e2@napar\u00eek@s\u00e2,\nP\u00fbrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapa\u00f1copas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit\nkas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhists\nwere the first to use the words _prapa\u00f1copas'aman s'ivam_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Compare N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's k@arik\u00e2, \"anirodhamanutp\u00e2dam\" in\n_M\u00e2dhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S._, p. 3.]\n\n426\n\nof unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_)\nis false; it is only the oneness (_advayat\u00e2_) that is good. There\nis no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na n\u00e2nedam\n...na p@rthag n\u00e2p@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended\nattachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the\nVedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all\nappearance (nirvikalpa@h prapa\u00f1copas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].\n\nIn the third chapter Gau@dap\u00e2da says that truth is like the\nvoid(_\u00e2k\u00e2s'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth\nand death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but\nhowsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams\n(_svapna_) and m\u00e2y\u00e2 (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed\nupon the one (_advaita_) by m\u00e2y\u00e2. The truth is immortal, it cannot\ntherefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All\nbirth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition\nof m\u00e2y\u00e2 upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream,\nas also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the\nmind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless\nstate, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything\nto be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop\nall desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any\nbirth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken\nthe mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it\nwhen distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects\nwhen it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by\nwisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless\nand still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction;\nwhen there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect\nBrahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into\nbeing, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvaj\u00f1a_).\n\nIn the fourth chapter, called the Alats'\u00e2nti, Gau@dap\u00e2da further\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Compare _M\u00e2dhyamikak\u00e2rik\u00e2, _B.T.S._, p.3 _anek\u00e2rtham\nan\u00e2n\u00e2rtham_, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Compare _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ras\u00fbtra_, p.78,\n_Advay\u00e2sams\u00e2raparinirv\u00e2@nvatsarvadharm\u00e2@h tasm\u00e2t tarhi mah\u00e2mate\nS'unyat\u00e2nutp\u00e2d\u00e2dvayani@hsvabh\u00e2valak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_;\nalso 8,46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@ty\u00e2navabodhan\u00e2t vij\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2n\u00e2m\nsvacittad@r@s@tyam\u00e2tr\u00e2navat\u00e2re@na mah\u00e2mate v\u00e2laprthagjan\u00e2@h\nbh\u00e2v\u00e2bh\u00e2vasvabh\u00e2vaparam\u00e2rthad@r@s@tidvayv\u00e2dino bhavanti_.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Compare N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, _B.T.S._ p. 196, _\u00c2k\u00e2s'am\ns'as'as'@r@nga\u00f1ca bandhy\u00e2y\u00e2@h putra eva ca asantas'c\u00e2bhivyajyante\ntath\u00e2bh\u00e2vena kalpan\u00e2_, with Gau@dap\u00e2da's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, III. 28, _Asato\nm\u00e2yay\u00e2 janma tatvato naiva j\u00e2yate bandhy\u00e2putro na tattvena m\u00e2y\u00e2ya\nv\u00e2pi j\u00e2yate_.]\n\n427\n\ndescribes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas\n(appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2].\nGau@dap\u00e2da then follows a dialectical form of argument which\nreminds us of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna. Gau@dap\u00e2da continues thus: Those who\nregard k\u00e2ra@na (cause) as the k\u00e2ryya (effect in a potential form)\ncannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it\nsuffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?\nIf it is said that things come into being from that which has no\nproduction, there is no example with which such a case may be\nillustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that\nwhich has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a\nright conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause and\neffect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect there\nis no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect.\nNothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either\nbeing, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth,\nneither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature\n(_svabh\u00e2vatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot\nbe said to have a production. All experience (_praj\u00f1apti_) is\ndependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there\nwould be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. When\nwe look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be\ndependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of\nreality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_)\ndoes not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest\nthem, for since things do not exist they are not different from\ntheir manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular\ncase that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while\nthey do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in\npresent, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with\nobjects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.\nTherefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are\never produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are\nreally traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production\nis but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is\nperceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The very name Al\u00e2ta@s\u00e2nti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare\nN\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's k\u00e2rik\u00e2, _B.T.S._, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the\n_S'ataka_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or\nentity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini,\n\"Codan\u00e2lak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah.\" Dharma is determined by the injunctions\nof the Vedas.]\n\n428\n\nproduction, for it being of the nature of absence of production it\ncould never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and\nan end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like\na magical or illusory elephant (_m\u00e2y\u00e2hast\u00ee_) and exists only as far\nas it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus\nthe appearance of production, movement and things, but the one\nknowledge (_vij\u00f1\u00e2na_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness\n(_avastutva_), the cessation (s'\u00e2ntam). As the movement of\nburning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the\nmovement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving\nand the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or\ncurved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it\ndoes not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed\nupon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess\nthem. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation\nbetween the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore\nto be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing\n(_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not\na thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all\nthe appearances are neither things nor those which are not\nthings, so neither are appearances produced from the mind\n(_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as\none thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of\nexistence (_sa@ms\u00e2ra_), but when that notion ceases there is no\nsa@ms\u00e2ra. All things are regarded as being produced from a\nrelative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing\npermanent (_s'\u00e2s'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced,\nhence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances\n(_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their\ncoming into being is like m\u00e2y\u00e2, and that m\u00e2y\u00e2 again does not\nexist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of\nseeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible.\nAs in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all\nappearances. That which appears as existing from an\nimaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not\nso in reality (_para-m\u00e2rtha_), for the existence depending on\nothers, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not\na real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist\nand not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or\nsteady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.\n\n429\n\n\nIt is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the\nM\u00e2dhyamika doctrines, as found in the N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna's k\u00e2rik\u00e2s and\nthe Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da doctrines, as found in _La@nk\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_, that it is\nneedless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dap\u00e2da assimilated all the\nBuddhist S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da and Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da teachings, and thought that\nthese held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads.\nIt is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long\nas we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and\nfor the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dap\u00e2da took\nthe smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he\nwished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations\nof the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth\nthat he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested\nthat the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable\nvij\u00f1\u00e2na or vacuity would hold good of the highest \u00e2tman of the\nUpani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the\nUpani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads\nguaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dap\u00e2da's views it was left\nfor his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta and S\u00b4a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).\n\nVed\u00e2nta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be\nthe exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and\nsummarized in the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ of B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na. The Upani@sads\nform the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is\ntherefore also called sometimes the Uttara-M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 or the\nM\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished\nfrom the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 of the previous part of the Vedas and the\nBr\u00e2hma@nas as incorporated in the _P\u00fbrvam\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 s\u00fbtras_ of\nJaimini. Though these _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ were differently interpreted\nby different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary\non them now available, written by S'a@nkar\u00e2c\u00e2rya, have\nattained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and\ndeep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the\nillustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the\nphilosophy propounded by S\u00b4a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious\nfollowers, that whenever we speak of the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy\nwe mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If\nother expositions are intended the names of the exponents have\nto be mentioned (e.g. R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this\n\n430\n\nchapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Ved\u00e2nta\nphilosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's\nwork (the commentaries on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_ and the ten\nUpani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as\nfound in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are\nmore intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore\nbetter to take up the Ved\u00e2nta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara,\nbut as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare\nthat they are true to their master's philosophy.\n\nFor the other Hindu systems of thought, the s\u00fbtras (_Jaimini\ns\u00fbtra, Ny\u00e2ya s\u00fbtra,_ etc.) are the only original treatises, and no\nfoundation other than these is available. In the case of the\nVed\u00e2nta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and\nthe s\u00fbtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a\nsystematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or\nexpounder of an original system, but interpreted the s\u00fbtras\nand the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected\nand systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also\nenunciated in the s\u00fbtras of B\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na. The Upani@sads were a\npart of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the\nHindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them\nwas the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the\nhighest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most\nformidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were\nthe M\u00eema@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any\nphilosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be\ninterpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or\nthat action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman\nand demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere\nexaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing\nsome kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form.\nS'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found\nin the Br\u00e2hma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared\nby the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2, but he sought to prove that such could\nnot be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest\nand the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise\ncould attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da--the\n(sacrificial injunctions) Br\u00e2hma@nas of the Vedas--the purport of\nthe Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended\nfor ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,\n\n431\n\nand were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute\ntruth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who\nhad controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly\njoys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman\nas the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas\nwere intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not\nbegin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and\npsychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show\nby textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference\nto the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they\nwere concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he\nunderstood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that\nthe uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour\nof the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and\napparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the\ntexts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the\nS\u00e2@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas\nabout physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the\nUpani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order\nto show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it\nwas a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that\nhis opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to\ncriticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to\nbe self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the\nUpani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and\nwrong. This he did not only in his bh\u00e2sya on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\nbut also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him\nhad a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid\nwhich it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the\nUpani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted\ntestimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth.\nHis disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great\ndetail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted\neither in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that\nall the realistic categories which Ny\u00e2ya and other systems\nhad put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also\nsupplemented his philosophy by constructing a Ved\u00e2nta epistemology,\nand by rethinking elaborately the relation of the m\u00e2y\u00e2,\nthe Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant\ntopics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which\n\n432\n\nhad been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed\nfully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that\nphilosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken\nas but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our\nfaith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of\nlogic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting\nthe instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many\nlives of S'a@nkar\u00e2c\u00e2rya were written in Sanskrit such as the\n_S'a@nkaradigvijaya_, _S'a@nkara-vijaya-vil\u00e2sa_, _S'a@nkara-jaya_,\netc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700\nand 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru\nwas a Yajurvedi Br\u00e2hmin of the Taittir\u00eeya branch. Many miracles\nare related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the\nincarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and\nbecame the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in\na mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over\nto Benares and thence went to Badarik\u00e2s'rama. It is said that\nhe wrote his illustrious bh\u00e2@sya on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_ in his twelfth\nyear. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads.\nHe returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to\ntravel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other\nschools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to\nmeet Kum\u00e2rila, but Kum\u00e2rila was then at the point of death, and\nhe advised him to meet Kum\u00e2rila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana\nand converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then\ntravelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere\nhe established his Ved\u00e2nta philosophy, which from that time forth\nacquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of\nIndia.\n\nS'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudap\u00e2da and\nby writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\ntried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which\nwas intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_\n[Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_,\nthere is ample evidence that he was contending against some\nother rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held\nthat the Upani@sads partly favoured the S\u00e2@mkhya cosmology\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bh\u00e2@sya) on\nthe ten Upani@sads (\u00ces'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, M\u00e2@n@d\u00fbkya,\nAitareya, Taittir\u00eeya, B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka, and Ch\u00e2ndogya), and on the\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtra_.]\n\n433\n\nof the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual\ninterpretations of the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ is proved by the fact that\nS'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions\nwere faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring\naccording to V\u00e2caspati to the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2) and some of\nus (referring probably to those who interpreted the s\u00fbtras and\nthe Upani@sads from the Ved\u00e2nta point of view) think that the\nsoul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed\nto the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity\nof the self (_\u00e2tmaikatva_) that this S'\u00e2r\u00eeraka commentary of\nmine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja, in the introductory\nportion of his bh\u00e2@sya on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra,_ says that the views of\nBodh\u00e2yana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_\nwere summarized by previous teachers, and that he was\nfollowing this Bodh\u00e2yana bh\u00e2@sya in writing his commentary. In\nthe _Ved\u00e2rthasa@mgraha_ of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja mention is made of Bodh\u00e2yana,\nTanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bh\u00e2ruci as Ved\u00e2ntic authorities,\nand Dravi@d\u00e2c\u00e2ryya is referred to as the \"bh\u00e2@syak\u00e2ra\" commentator.\nIn Ch\u00e2ndogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology\nappeared to be different from the _Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkara\nrefers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom\nhe calls \"\u00e2c\u00e2ryya\" (_atrokta@h parih\u00e2rah \u00e2c\u00e2ryyaih_) and \u00c2nandagiri\nsays that \"\u00e2c\u00e2ryya\" there refers to Dravi@d\u00e2c\u00e2ryya. This Dravi@d\u00e2c\u00e2ryya\nis known to us from R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja's statement as being a\ncommentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here\nthat he had written a commentary on the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upani@sad.\n\nA study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ of\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2ya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought\nleaves us convinced that these s\u00fbtras were regarded by all as\ncondensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences\nof opinion were with regard to the meaning of these s\u00fbtras and\nthe Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them\nin each particular case. The _Brahma-s\u00fbtra_ is divided into four\nadhy\u00e2yas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters\nor p\u00e2das. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion\n(_adhikara@na_) which are composed of a number of s\u00fbtras, which\nraise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and\nuncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]\n\n[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bh\u00e2@sya on the _Brahma-s\u00fbtras_, I. iii. 19.]\n\n434\n\na particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these\ns\u00fbtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the\nsecond book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the\nUpani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist\nVed\u00e2nta creed does not consist in proving the Ved\u00e2nta to\nbe a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but\nin so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree\nin holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the\nonly truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer\nsome of the objections that may be made from the S\u00e2@mkhya\npoint of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some\napparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present\nany real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute\nthe S\u00e2@mkhya, Yoga, Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bh\u00e2gavata\nand S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and\nhis commentaries on the first four s\u00fbtras contain the main points\nof his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing\nthat the conclusion of the s\u00fbtras was always in strict agreement\nwith the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never\noccupied the premier position; its value was considered only\nsecondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding\nof the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot\nbe known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be\nreasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he\nshows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater.\nSo there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic\nand argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found\nin the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to\nbe used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport\nof the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus\nbound to vindicate the position of the Ved\u00e2nta as a thoroughly\nrational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on\nits rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what\nwas true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's\ninterpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict\nexperience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that\nhis interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience.\nIf he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation\nthat was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent\ncontradictions with experience could in some way be explained,\n\n435\n\nhe considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing\na philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the\nwhole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and not\nsimply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously\nappear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong\nto reason but to the scriptures.\n\nHe started with the premise that whatever may be the reason\nit is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which\nidentifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the\nsenses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification,\nfor without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal\nknower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would\nbe no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophically\nthe existence of the pure self as distinct from all other\nthings, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describe\nthe pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate\ntruth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be\ntaken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point being\ngranted, the next point is that our experience is always based\nupon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and\nthe imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc.\nupon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion.\nAll this had been said by Gau@dap\u00e2da. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dap\u00e2da's\nconclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive\nproof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the\nrefutation of other systems of thought. This being done he\nthought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his\nidea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. He\nshowed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being,\npure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This\nbeing accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must\nbe a mere magic show of illusion or m\u00e2y\u00e2. S'a@nkara never tries\nto prove that the world is m\u00e2y\u00e2, but accepts it as indisputable.\nFor, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion\nis that all else is mere illusion or m\u00e2y\u00e2. He had thus to\nquarrel on one side with the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 realists and on the other\nwith the S\u00e2@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity\nof the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The\nM\u00eem\u00e2@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be\ninterpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,\n\n436\n\nor to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that\nthe Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted\nas containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of\nactions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does not\ntherefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman,\nbut it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as\npossessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman\nshould be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a\nnature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would\nthen lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates.\nS'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was\nthat the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman.\nNo meditation or worship or action of any kind was required;\nbut one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when\nthe truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the\nultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas,\nthe karmak\u00e2@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relating\nto the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior\ntypes of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads,\nthe j\u00f1\u00e2nak\u00e2@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate\ntruth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who\nhad transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and\nwho had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly\njoy. Throughout his commentary on the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ S'a@nkara\ntried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions\nof the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices,\netc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in\nthat order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of\nthe Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural\nduties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all\ndesires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions,\nthe field of karmam\u00e2rga (the path of duties), and wanted\nto know the truth alone, they entered the j\u00f1\u00e2nam\u00e2rga (the way\nof wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Ved\u00e2nta\nwas thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer\ninclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete\nemancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending\nto study the Ved\u00e2nta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is\neternal and what is transitory (_nity\u00e2nityavastuviveka_), (2)\ndisinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of\n\n437\n\nthe after world (_ih\u00e2mutraphalabhogavir\u00e2ga_), (3) attainment of\npeace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration\nand faith (_s'amadam\u00e2dis\u00e2dhanasampat_) and desire for salvation\n(_mumuk@sutva_). The person who had these qualifications should\nstudy the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of the\ntruth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained\nemancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone\nwas the reality and all else was m\u00e2y\u00e2, all injunctions ceased to\nhave any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (_karma_) and\nthe path of wisdom (_j\u00f1\u00e2na_) were intended for different classes of\npersons or adhik\u00e2rins. There could be no joint performance of\nVedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in\nthe Upani@sads (_j\u00f1\u00e2na-karma-samuccay\u00e2bh\u00e2va@h_). As against the\ndualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured any\nkind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between\nthe Ved\u00e2nta as expounded by Gau@dap\u00e2da and as explained by\nS'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could to\ndissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition\nof the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct\ninterpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achieved\nremarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a\nhidden Buddhist (_pracchanna Bauddha_), but his influence on\nHindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded\nin later times as being almost a divine person or an\nincarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples,\nand those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding\ngenerations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a\nmuch stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara's\nphilosophy has been based on the interpretations of Ved\u00e2nta\nthought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretations\nare nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, but\nthe questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise have\nbeen raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one\ncould not treat Ved\u00e2nta as a complete and coherent system of\nmetaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections,\nwe may close this with a short description of some of the main\nfeatures of the Ved\u00e2nta thought as explained by S'a@nkara.\n\nBrahman according to S'a@nkara is \"the cause from which\n(proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world\nwhich is extended in names and forms, which includes many\n\n438\n\nagents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially\ndetermined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is\nformed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination\nof the) mind [Footnote ref 1].\" The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for the\nexistence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The\nworld must have been produced as the modification of something,\nbut in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken of\nas having been originated from something other than Brahman,\nso Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into\nbeing, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from\nsomething else, for then we should have a _regressus ad infinitum_\n(_anavasth\u00e2_). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have\ncome forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source\nthen from which this world has come into being is Brahman.\n(3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (_s\u00e2k@si_) which\nshines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition\nwhich the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self,\nand hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it,\nfor even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all\nand is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.\n\nBrahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence,\npure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of\nus all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are\nidentifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that\nwe call \"I\" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely\nwithout any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our\ntrue state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual\nself as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth\nis the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure\nblessedness, and pure being.\n\nAll creation is illusory m\u00e2y\u00e2. But accepting it as m\u00e2y\u00e2, it\nmay be conceived that God (\u00ces'vara) created the world as a mere\nsport; from the true point of view there is no \u00ces'vara who creates\nthe world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all\nexist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of\n\u00ces'vara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In\nreality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory.\nBrahman, the self, is at once the material cause (up\u00e2d\u00e2na-k\u00e2ra@na)\nas well as the efficient cause (nimitta-k\u00e2ra@na) of the world.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen's _System of\nthe Ved\u00e2nta_.]\n\n439\n\nThere is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the\neffect is but an illusory imposition on the cause--a mere illusion\nof name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and\ncall them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted\nthat they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations\nas plates and jugs are only appearances of name and\nform (_n\u00e2mar\u00fapa_). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect\nimposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent\n(_vyavah\u00e2rika_) as mere objects of name and form (_n\u00e2mar\u00fbpa_), but\nthe cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(_p\u00e2ram\u00e2rthika_)\n[Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nThe main idea of the Ved\u00e2nta philosophy.\n\nThe main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Ved\u00e3nta philosophy\nas taught by the @S'a@kara school is this, that the ultimate\nand absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as\nmany in different individuals. The world also as apart from\nus the individuals has no reality and has no other truth\nto show than this self. All other events, mental or physical,\nare but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable\ntruth underlying them all is the self. While other\nsystems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far\nthey could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude\nin practical life towards them, Ved\u00e3nta sought to reach\nbeneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final\nand ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm,\nthe subject and the object. The famous instruction of\n@S'vetaketu, the most important Ved\u00e2nta text (mah\u00e2v\u00e2kya) says,\n\"That art thou, O S'vetaketu.\" This comprehension of my self\nas the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this\nknowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances\nwill automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged\nof all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this\ntruth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for\nsalvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor\ninstructs him, \"That art thou.\" At once he becomes the truth\nitself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence;\nall ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the\n_Brahma-s\u00fbtras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his\n_System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any\nlong account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from\nthe writings of his followers.]\n\n440\n\nmany cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the\nvast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines\nforth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed\nthat when man attained salvation, he became divested of all\nworld-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests,\nand was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched\nby all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the\nidea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire\nand attachment with the world and had known the nature of\nhis self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his\nown psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all\nhis connections with the world ceased, though the world continued\nas ever the same with others. The external world was a reality\nwith them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true\nknowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which\nthe self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly\njoys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly.\nThe force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo\nthe experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits\nof past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked\nagain under the delusion of a false relationship between himself\nand the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation)\nmeant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis\nand the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded\nas an unconscious one by Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika and M\u00eema@ms\u00e2,\nand as a state of pure intelligence by S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga. But\nwith Ved\u00e2nta the case is different, for it held that the world as\nsuch has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination\nwhich lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired.\nAs soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the\nBrahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as\na field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections\nof the self with the world cease, but because the appearance\nof the world process does not represent the ultimate and\nhighest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding\ndiversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless\ntime) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real\ntruth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves\nreally are, but do not also know what the world about us is.\nWe take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing\n\n441\n\nit correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no\ndoubt true that these experiences show us an established order\nhaving its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth.\nThey are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to\nbe so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is\ncomprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one\ntruth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as\nthe absolute--the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance\nas experienced by us is thus often likened to the\nillusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment\nthe perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick\nit up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but\nas soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of\nconch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded\nby the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion\nof silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes\nso long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was\nacquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also\nvanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false\nknowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again.\nThe Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here is\ndoomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but\ndelusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even\nafter emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that\nthere was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any\nknowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by\nthe processes of which knowledge was generated. The S\u00e2@mkhya\npuru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff\nis dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\nand the Ny\u00e2ya soul is also incapable of knowing the world\nafter emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But\nthe Ved\u00e2nta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know\nthe world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception\nof this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the\nperson who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion\ncannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to\nus, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and\nindefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do\nnot know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know\nthat when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this\n\n442\n\nworld-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link\nis necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or\nmanas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell\nthe illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory\nperception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true\nknowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads held\nthat reality or truth was one, and there was \"no many\" anywhere,\nand S'a\u00f1kara explained it by adding that the \"many\" was merely\nan illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound\nto disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance\nis m\u00e2y\u00e2 (illusion). This is what S'a\u00f1kara emphasizes in expounding\nhis constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine.\nThe question is sometimes asked, how the m\u00e2y\u00e2 becomes associated\nwith Brahman. But Ved\u00e2nta thinks this question illegitimate,\nfor this association did not begin in time either with\nreference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons.\nIn fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion\ndoes not affect the unchangeable truth. M\u00e2y\u00e2 or illusion is no\nreal entity, it is only false knowledge (_avidy\u00e2_) that makes the\nappearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found.\nM\u00e2y\u00e2 or avidy\u00e2 has an apparent existence only so long as it\nlasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is\nnot a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance\nhas been brought into permanent existence, for it only has\nexistence so long as we are deluded by it (_pr\u00e2t\u00eetika-satt\u00e2_).\nM\u00e2y\u00e2 therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical\ndivision of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded\nmiddle. For the m\u00e2y\u00e2 can neither be said to be \"is\" nor\n\"is not\" (_tattv\u00e2nyatv\u00e2bhy\u00e2m anirvacan\u00eey\u00e2_). It cannot be said that\nsuch a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and\nillusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are\nperceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent\nexistence than the fact of their perception. If it has\nany creative function, that function is as illusive as its\nown nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts.\nBrahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association\nwith m\u00e2y\u00e2, for there can be no association of the real with the empty,\nthe m\u00e2y\u00e2, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.\n\n443\n\n\nIn what sense is the world-appearance false?\n\nThe world is said to be false--a mere product of m\u00e2y\u00e2. The\nfalsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved\nin the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ \"is\"\nnor _asat_ \"is not.\" Here the opposition of the \"is\" and \"is not\"\nis solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is \"is\nnot,\" since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and\nhas its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge\ndawns. It is not therefore \"is not\" in the sense that a \"castle in\nthe air\" or a hare's horn is \"is not,\" for these are called _tuccha_,\nthe absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be\n\"is\" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of\nignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is),\nbut since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). This\nis the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapa\u00f1ca_)\nthat it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Or\nrather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of\nthe world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to\nbe the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the\nbeing, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it\nwill be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist,\nand will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory\nperception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell,\nwe say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of\nillusory perception to be what we saw before us as \"this\" (this\nis silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and\nwill never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of\nsilver, the \"this\" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as\nsilver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_),\nthe Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when\nthe \"this\" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the\nsilver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the \"this\"\nbefore us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once\ndirectly realized, the conviction comes that the world never\nexisted. The negation of the world-appearance however has no\nseparate existence other than the comprehension of the identity\nof the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that\nthe world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved\nrefers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the\n\n444\n\nnegation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the\nconviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false\n(for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different\nfrom Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this\nreinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the\nworld-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself,\nand hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis,\nthat the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation\nalso as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only\nthing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The\npeculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it\nappears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though it\nis not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge\ndawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance\nis an appearance which is different from what we\nknow as real (_sadvilak@sa@na_); for the real is known to us as\nthat which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will never\nagain be falsified by later experience or other means of proof.\nA thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted;\nbut since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance\nwill be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded\nas real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the\nworld-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities\nsuch that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth.\nThe world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the\nnegation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance\nand hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but\nthe falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is\ncontradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself\nis also contradicted.\n\nBrahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous\n(_svaprak\u00e2s'a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the\nobject of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things,\nideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called _d@rs'ya_ (objects of\nconsciousness), while it is the _dra@s@t\u00e2_ (the pure consciousness\ncomprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as\nan expression of a mental state (_v@rtti_), it is said to have a form and\nit becomes d@rs'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of\nconsciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being\nmanifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithy\u00e2tvanirukti_.]\n\n445\n\nBrahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the\nUpani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines\nforth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprak\u00e2s'a\nand dra@s@t\u00e2. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any\nform or mode. The notion of _d@rs'yatva_ (objectivity) carries with\nit also the notion of _ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature as\nnon-consciousness (_aj\u00f1\u00e2natva_) and non-selfness (_an\u00e2tmatva_) which\nconsists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness.\nThe relation of consciousness (_j\u00f1\u00e2na_) to its objects cannot be\nregarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall\nsee later, it is not possible to determine the relation between\nknowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the\nconch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in\nwhich consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence.\nIn the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (_\u00e2nanda_) shines\nforth, the \u00e2nanda is not an object or form of the illuminating\nconsciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there\nis a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory\nimposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different\nfrom the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they\ndepend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves\nbut objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all\nfinite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the\nabiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever.\nThe forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited\nin themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure\nbeing runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is,\nthe pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the\nindividual appearances, there is no other class (_j\u00e2ti_) such as\ncowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different\nindividual forms are illusorily imposed (_gha@t\u00e2d\u00eekam sadarthekalpitam,\npratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@t\u00eeyam\u00e2natv\u00e2t_). So\nthis world-appearance which is essentially different from the\nBrahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it\nis imposed, is false\n(_up\u00e2d\u00e2nani@s@th\u00e2iyani\u00e2bh\u00e2vapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithy\u00e2tvasiddhi@h\n--as Citsukha has it).\n\n\nThe nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.\n\nThe world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception\nof silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly\nillusions is called _pr\u00e2tibh\u00e2sika,_ as they are contradicted by other\n\n446\n\nlater experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never\ncontradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavah\u00e2rika_\n(from _vyavah\u00e2ra_, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our\npractical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the\nBrahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance\nruns on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated\nexperience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true.\nIt is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance\nceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from\nthe ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is\nfalse and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Ved\u00e2nta it is\nsometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us,\nwe can deny that it has truth. To this the Ved\u00e2nta answers\nthat the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor\ncan it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge,\nfor we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without\na conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a\nconception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends\nwithin it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and\nindependence, which cannot be had directly from experience,\nas this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth.\nJudged from this point of view it will be evident that the true\nreality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of\nconsciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its\nmanifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the\nworld-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not\nbe contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all\nexperience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being that\nis associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor\nmerely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the\nbeing, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events\nand appearances (_ekenaiva sarv\u00e2nugatena sarvatra satprat\u00eeti@h_).\nThings are not existent because they possess the genus of being\n(_sat_) as Ny\u00e2ya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves\nbut appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis\nand ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis\n(_adhi@s@th\u00e2na_) on which the illusions appear. This being is not\ndifferent with different things but one in all appearances. Our\nperceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a\nguarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them\n\n447\n\ncould be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures)\ndid not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate\ninference, but it can do so only when its own validity\nhas been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.\nBut this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance,\nfor our present perceptions cannot prove that these\nwill never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are\nalso against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance\ncannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted\nby inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception\nin this case is contradicted by inference and we have\nhence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend\n(_upaj\u00eevya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such\ndependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely\nvalid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by\nproper examination and enquiry (_par\u00eek@s\u00e2_), which may convince\nus that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal\ntestimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and\nrealization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved\nbeyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.\nBut this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with\nany degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never\nbe contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Ved\u00e2nta also\nadmits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the\nworld-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it\ncannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when\nto the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to\nexist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the\nobjects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will\nnever be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the\nworld-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Ved\u00e2nta inference\nthat the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself\nto be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as\none dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts\nthe perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold\naspect.\n\nMoreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is\nfalse, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation\nbetween the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness\n(_d@rs'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of\n\n448\n\nconnection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been\nso there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its\nconnections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine\nany kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for\nit can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samav\u00e2ya_);\nand apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no\nother. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness,\nbut what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot\nbe that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect\nlike the j\u00f1\u00e2tat\u00e2 of M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 is produced upon the object, for such\nan effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can\nobjectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)\nassociated with the object as Prabhak\u00e2ra thinks, for there are\nmany things which are the objects of our consciousness but not\nconsidered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean\nthat the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_j\u00f1\u00e2na-k\u00e2ra@na_)\ninvolved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference\nto objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects\nof past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is\nnot present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?\nObjectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own\nforms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though\nthis may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of\ninference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does\nnot mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever\nway we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately\nand becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also\nseen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting\nbetween objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be\nadmitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all\nnothing but illusory.\n\nNow though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness\nyet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted\neven by Ved\u00e2nta that this can only take place through specific\nsense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but\nif that be so why not rather admit that this can take place\neven on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold\nexternal world without? The answer that the Ved\u00e2nta gives to\nsuch a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has\nnot to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one\n\n449\n\nflash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness;\nso it is not possible that the external reality should have to\npass through any process before consciousness could arise; what\nhappens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all\nthings as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its\nveil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or\nstate). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates\neverything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination\nof objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous\nif there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the\nreality is hidden by the veil of aj\u00f1\u00e2na (nescience). This veil is\nremoved as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a\nmental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing\nshines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory\nimpositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively,\nbut it could not be revealed as it was hidden by aj\u00f1\u00e2na which is\nremoved by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as\nthe veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The\naction of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the\nmind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding\naj\u00f1\u00e2na veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of\nthe world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the\nobject which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows\nitself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not\nbe manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the\nveil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows\nthe corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself\nis the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but\never exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell)\ntake place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the\neye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed\nto the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it\ngenerated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the\nwrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion\n\"this is silver\" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver,\nit is the _cit,_ consciousness or reality as underlying the object\nrepresented to us by \"this\" or \"_idam_\" that is the basis (_adhi@s@th\u00e2na_)\nof the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or\nnon-cognition (_aj\u00f1\u00e2na_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas\nthe right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The\n\n450\n\nbasis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my\nmental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the form\nthat the \"knowledge is silver\" but of \"this is silver.\" Objective\nphenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression\nof illumination of them as states of knowledge is made\nthrough the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould or\nstates. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge.\nPhenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as\nshadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality,\nbut this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms\nwhen the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed\nby their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification\n(_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of\nknowledge must be through the mental states there is no other\nentity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested\nthrough the states. This Ved\u00e2nta does not admit, for it holds\nthat it is necessary that before the operation of the mental\nstates can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be\nthere and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had\nthere been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge,\nthe validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to\nbe admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality\nuntouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are\nmaterial and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous\nconsciousness that seems to assume diverse forms\nin connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations\n(_up\u00e2dhi_). It manifests _aj\u00f1\u00e2na_ (nescience) and hence does not by\nitself remove the aj\u00f1\u00e2na, except when it is reflected through any\nspecific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner\nand outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness\nwhich is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal\nappearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that\nmanifests itself through the mental states. There is only one\nidentical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis\nof the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection\nthrough the mental states or v@rttis.\n\nThe phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determined\nin their various forms and manifestations but not as\nto their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of\nany relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samav\u00e2ya (inherence)\n\n451\n\nbetween them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the\ntruth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs'ya (perceived)\nhave one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but\nillusory creations on it.\n\nIt is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological\nillusion such as \"this is silver,\" the knowledge of \"this\" as a thing\nis only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived\nas a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not\nnoticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure\nconsciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics\nof any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any\nillusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere\n\"this\" can be. The answer of Ved\u00e2nta is that when the Brahman\nstands as the ground (_adhi@s@th\u00e2na_) of the world-appearance its\ncharacteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special\ncharacter as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it\nmay be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible\nbecause the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed\nto us in our objective consciousness; when I say \"the jug is,\"\nthe \"isness,\" or \"being,\" does not shine in its purity, but only as\na characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.\nIn all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines\nforth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the\nBrahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made\npossible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance\ncan serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and\nnot illusory. But the Ved\u00e2nta points out that even by illusory\nperceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory\nperception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake\ncould do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams\nmay be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical\nfunctions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions\nimbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient\nto account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced\nin actual waking life account for the dream creations.\nAccording to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in\nprevious lives and according to the impressions or potencies\n(_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of\nworld-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot\naffect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But\n\n452\n\nthe experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective\ncreation for each individual, for even before his cognition the\nphenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable\nstate of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@msk\u00e2rasya\nviyad\u00e2dyadhy\u00e2sajanakatvopapatte@h tatprat\u00eetyabh\u00e2vepi tadadhy\u00e2sasya\np\u00fbrvam sattv\u00e2t k@rtsnasy\u00e2pi vyavah\u00e2rikapad\u00e2rthasya\naj\u00f1\u00e2tasattv\u00e2bhyupagam\u00e2t_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion\nis produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@th\u00e2na_)\nand the illusory notion as silver in \"this is silver,\" but\nno such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.\nTo this Ved\u00e2nta says that similarity is not an indispensable\nfactor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a\nwhite conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye\nthrough the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the production\nof illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions\nor memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be\ndone by _ad@r@s@ta_--the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.\nIn ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of\nthis world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no\nother do@sa (defect) than the avidy\u00e2 (nescience) which constitutes\nthe appearance. Here avidy\u00e2 is the only do@sa and Brahman is the\nonly adhi@s@th\u00e2na or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the\nself-luminous as the adhi@s@th\u00e2na, the illusory creations could not\nhave been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception\nof illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@th\u00e2na.\nHence where the adhi@s@th\u00e2na is hidden by the veil of avidy\u00e2, the\nassociation with mental states becomes necessary for removing\nthe veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@th\u00e2na.\nAs soon as the adhi@s@th\u00e2na, the ground, the reality, the blissful\nself-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.\nThe disappearance of the phenomena means nothing\nmore than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.\n\n\nThe Definition of Aj\u00f1\u00e2na (nescience).\n\nAj\u00f1\u00e2na the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is\nbeginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_an\u00e2dibh\u00e2varupatve\nsati j\u00f1\u00e2nanivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself\nin all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of\nperception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no\nbeginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which\n\n453\n\nis beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive\n(_bh\u00e2var\u00fbpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation\n(_abh\u00e2va_) too, for the positivity (_bh\u00e2vatva_) does not mean here the\nopposite of abh\u00e2va (negation) but notes merely its difference from\nabh\u00e2va (_abh\u00e2va-vilak@sa@natvam\u00e2tram vivak@sitam_). Aj\u00f1\u00e2na is not\na positive entity (_bh\u00e2va_) like any other positive entity, but it is\ncalled positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abh\u00e2va_).\nIt is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the\nordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different\nboth from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes\nobjected that aj\u00f1\u00e2na is a mere illusory imagination of the moment\ncaused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless\n(_an\u00e2di_); but Ved\u00e2nta holds that the fact that it is an imagination\nor rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely\na temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have\nbeen said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground\nas well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being\nfor the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the\nground of illusion, is ever-present and the aj\u00f1\u00e2na therefore being\never associated with it is also beginningless. The aj\u00f1\u00e2na is the\nindefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different\nfrom the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is\nbeginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have\na beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine\nwhether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution\nof a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which\ncan cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the\nillusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which\nproduced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Ved\u00e2ntists\nhowever define aj\u00f1\u00e2na as the substance constituting illusion, and\nsay that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded\nas forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that\nonly a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what\nis necessary for the notion of a material cause (_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_) is this,\nthat it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of\neffects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in\nand through the effects which are produced in the time process.\nIllusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na which\nalso is unreal should be the cause of it.\n\n454\n\n\nAj\u00f1\u00e2na established by Perception and Inference.\n\nAj\u00f1\u00e2na defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor\nnegative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions\nas \"I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,\"\nor \"I do not know what you say,\" or more particularly \"I had\nbeen sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.\" Such\nperceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics,\nand which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.\nIt may be objected that the perception \"I do not know\" is not\nthe perception of the indefinite, the aj\u00f1\u00e2na, but merely the negation\nof knowledge. To this Ved\u00e2nta says that had it been the\nperception of a negation merely, then the negation must have\nbeen associated with the specific object to which it applied.\nA negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation\ngenerally appears as a substantive with the object of negation\nas a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.\nBut the perception \"I do not know or I had no knowledge\" does\nnot involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any\nspecific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless\nignorance. Such an indefinite aj\u00f1\u00e2na is positive in the sense that\nit is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive\nin the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive,\nfor it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself\nin our experience. If negation meant only a general negation,\nand if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception\nof a general negation, then even where there is a jug on\nthe ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the\nground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.\nThus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the\nnegation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without\nany specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest\nitself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge\nis thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the\nlatter is present the former cannot be, but the perception \"I do\nnot know\" can persist, even though many individual objects be\nknown to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of \"I do\nnot know\" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is\nrather better to say that it is the perception of a different category\nnamely the indefinite, the aj\u00f1\u00e2na. It is our common experience\n\n455\n\nthat after experiencing the indefinite (_aj\u00f1\u00e2na_) of a specific type\nwe launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be\nadmitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the\nperception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving\nconsciousness (_s\u00e2k@si_) is such that both the root aj\u00f1\u00e2na as well\nas its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented\nin mental states (_v@rtti-j\u00f1\u00e2na_), are comprehended by it.\nOf course when the v@rttij\u00f1\u00e2na about a thing as in ordinary\nperceptions of objects comes in, the aj\u00f1\u00e2na with regard to it is\ntemporarily removed, for the v@rttij\u00f1\u00e2na is opposed to the aj\u00f1\u00e2na.\nBut so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_s\u00e2k@si-caitanya_)\nis conceived it can comprehend both the aj\u00f1\u00e2na and the j\u00f1\u00e2na\n(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show\nthemselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or\nas unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all\npositives either as indefinite aj\u00f1\u00e2na or as states of knowledge\nor as specific kinds of aj\u00f1\u00e2na or ignorance, but it is unable to\ncomprehend a negation, for negation (_abh\u00e2va_) is not a perception,\nbut merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when\nI say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness\nwith reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a\nnegation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from\nthe Ny\u00e2ya point of view that since without the knowledge of a\nqualification (_vis'e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis'i@s@ta_) cannot be\nknown, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness\nwithout the object being known first. To this Ved\u00e2nta\nreplies that the maxim that the qualification must be known\nbefore the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as\nwell perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not\nout of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity,\nbut is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.\nEven the naiy\u00e2yikas would agree that in the expression \"there\nis no negation of a jug here,\" no separate negation can be accepted,\nfor the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions\nand differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so\nnegations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions\nand appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all\ndistinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be\naccepted that negation like position is one which appears as many\non account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the\n\n456\n\ncontent of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to\nobject that such perceptions as \"I do not know\" refer to the\nperception of an indefinite aj\u00f1\u00e2na in consciousness. So also the\nperception \"I do not know what you say\" is not the perception\nof negation, for this would require that the hearer should know\nfirst what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is\nimpossible to say \"I do not know what you say.\"\n\nSo also the cognition \"I was sleeping long and did not\nknow anything\" has to be admitted as referring to the perception\nof the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that\nduring sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the\nawakened man as \"I did not know anything so long\" is only an\ninference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and\nactive state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity\nhad ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of\nknowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no\ninvariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of\nthe senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately\npreceding state. During sleep there is a mental state\nof the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is\nby the impression (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_) of the aforesaid mental state of\naj\u00f1\u00e2na that one remembers that state and says that \"I did not\nperceive anything so long.\" The indefinite (_aj\u00f1\u00e2na_) perceived in\nconsciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere\nnegation of knowledge (_j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2bh\u00e2va_) and the two are so connected\nthat though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from\nthe perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite\nis thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as\nsuch in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened\nstate as well as in the sleeping state.\n\nThe presence of this aj\u00f1\u00e2na may also be inferred from the\nmanner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness,\nas this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness\nwhich was not known or rather known as indefinite before we\nsay \"I did not know it before, but I know it now.\" My present\nknowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite\nwhich was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just\nas the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by\nremoving the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its\nexistence\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Pa\u00f1cap\u00e2dik\u00e2vivara@na, Tattvad\u00eepana_, and\n_Advaitasiddhi_.]\n\n457\n\nis also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman\ndoes not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there\nwas no aj\u00f1\u00e2na to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself\nin its fullness. Again had it not been for this aj\u00f1\u00e2na there would\nhave been no illusion. It is the aj\u00f1\u00e2na that constitutes the substance\nof the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded\nas constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it\nis unchangeable. This aj\u00f1\u00e2na is manifested by the perceiving\nconsciousness (_s\u00e2k@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. The\nperceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which\nreflects itself in the states of avidy\u00e2 (ignorance).\n\n\nLocus and Object of Aj\u00f1\u00e2na, Aha@mk\u00e2ra, and Anta@hkara@na.\n\nThis aj\u00f1\u00e2na rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit or\nBrahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not\nopposed to the aj\u00f1\u00e2na or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed\nto the aj\u00f1\u00e2na and destroys it only when it is reflected through the\nmental states (_v@rtti_). The aj\u00f1\u00e2na thus rests on the pure cit and not\non the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to\nproduce the notion of ego \"_aham_\" or the individual soul. V\u00e2caspati\nMis'ra however holds that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na does not rest on the pure cit\nbut on the j\u00eeva (individual soul). M\u00e2dhava reconciles this view of\nV\u00e2caspati with the above view, and says that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na may be\nregarded as resting on the j\u00eeva or individual soul from this point of\nview that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the j\u00eeva\n(_Cinm\u00e2tr\u00e2s'ritam aj\u00f1\u00e2nam j\u00eevapak@sap\u00e2titv\u00e2t j\u00eev\u00e2s'ritam ucyate_\nVivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling \"I do not know\" seems\nhowever to indicate that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na is with reference to the perceiving\nself in association with its feeling as ego or \"I\"; but this\nis not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of\nthe close association of aj\u00f1\u00e2na with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of\nwhich are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha,\np. 48).\n\nThe aj\u00f1\u00e2na however does not only rest on the cit, but it has\nthe cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are\nwith reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is\nthus the entity on which the veiling action of the aj\u00f1\u00e2na is noticed;\nthe veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous\ncharacter, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on\nthe part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,\n\n458\n\nbut by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit\nseems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does\nnot shine (_n\u00e2sti na prak\u00e2s'ate iti vyavah\u00e2ra@h_) or rather there is no\nappearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is\nhidden by the aj\u00f1\u00e2na means nothing more than this, that it is\nsuch {_tadyogyat\u00e2_) that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na can so relate itself with it that\nit appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other\nstates of aj\u00f1\u00e2na-consciousness in experience. Aj\u00f1\u00e2na is thus\nconsidered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It\nis opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel\nit. The action of this aj\u00f1@ana is thus on the light of the reality\nwhich it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved\nby the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not\nonly with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness\nbut also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;\nso it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our\npleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit\nis indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the\nessence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there\nis only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal\nexperiences of pleasure. The aj\u00f1\u00e2na is one, but it seems to obstruct\nthe pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it\nmay be said that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na has many states as constituting the\nindividual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the\ndiverse individual objects of experience. These states of aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nare technically called tul\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na or avasth\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na. Any state of\nconsciousness (v@rttij\u00f1\u00e2na) removes a manifestation of the aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nas tul\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.\n\nThe most important action of this aj\u00f1\u00e2na as obstructing the\npure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated\nin the notion of the ego or aha@mk\u00e2ra. This notion of aha@mk\u00e2ra\nis a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other\nassociations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.;\nit is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed\nin the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand\nlimitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of\nthe notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set\nof previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of\nimpositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations\nheld up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with\n\n459\n\nthe true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken\nas the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion\nof the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns,\nthere are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one,\nso, here also when I say \"I perceive\", there are two distinct elements\nof the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused\ninto one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality,\nand changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which\nappears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.\nThus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other\nunreal.\n\nWe remember that this is distinctly that which Prabh\u00e2kara\nsought to repudiate. Prabh\u00e2kara did not consider the self to be\nself-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought\n(_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the\nobject of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the\nanalogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball\nand the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the\nanta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can\nnever say that these two are really different, and only have an\nillusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_)\nis like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and\nlike it does not require the assistance of anything else for the\nfulfilment of its purpose. But the Ved\u00e2nta objects to this saying\nthat according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to\ndiscover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If\nknowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as\nwell be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge\nare indeed one and the same. Kum\u00e2rila thinks this thought\n(_anubhava_), to be a movement, Ny\u00e2ya and Prabh\u00e2kara as a\nquality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other\nmovements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a\nsubstance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of\na thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything,\nif of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: According to Ny\u00e2ya the _\u00e2tman_ is conscious only through\nassociation with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).\nConsciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable\ncollocations. Thus, _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_ in refuting the doctrine of\nself-luminosity {_svaprak\u00e2s'a_) says (p.432)\n\n _sacetanas'cit\u00e2 yog\u00e2ttadyogena vin\u00e2 ja@da@h\n n\u00e2rth\u00e2vabh\u00e2sadanyaddhi caitanya@m n\u00e2ma manma@he.]\n\n460\n\nconstitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality\nof the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily\nto be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what\nelse could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the\nself, the \u00e2tman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any\nof his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.\nThe self is thus the same as vij\u00f1\u00e2na, the pure consciousness,\nwhich is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].\n\nAgain, though consciousness is continuous in all stages,\nwaking or sleeping, yet aha@mk\u00e2ra is absent during deep sleep.\nIt is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels \"I slept\nhappily and did not know anything\"; yet what happens is this,\nthat during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mk\u00e2ra are\naltogether submerged in the aj\u00f1\u00e2na, and there are only the\naj\u00f1\u00e2na and the self; on waking, this aha@mk\u00e2ra as a state of\nanta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception\nof the aj\u00f1\u00e2na in the sleep and originates the perception\n\"I did not know anything.\" This aha@mk\u00e2ra which is a mode\n(_v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidy\u00e2, and is\nmanifested as j\u00f1\u00e2nas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriy\u00e2s'akti\n(power of work). This kriy\u00e2s'akti of the aha@mk\u00e2ra is illusorily\nimposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to\nbe an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mk\u00e2ra\nitself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of\nthe anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mk\u00e2ra of a past period can\nnow be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na,\naha@mk\u00e2ra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of\nthe anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its\ncapacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of\nknowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When\nthe pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is\ncalled a j\u00eeva. It is clear from the above account that the aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nis not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But\nit cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support\nit (_\u00e2s'raya_); its own nature as the aj\u00f1\u00e2na or indefinite is perceived\ndirectly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating\nthe phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ny\u00e2yamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and\n_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _Ved\u00e2nta-paribh\u00e2@s\u00e2_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]\n\n461\n\nthese phenomenal movements can only manifest itself\nthrough these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in\nthe anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through\nthese states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mk\u00e2ra is a moment,\nis itself a beginningless system of aj\u00f1\u00e2na-phenomena containing\nwithin it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as\nmerit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the\nj\u00eeva or individual soul began his career.\n\n\nAnirv\u00e2cyav\u00e2da and the Ved\u00e2nta Dialectic.\n\nWe have already seen that the indefinite aj\u00f1\u00e2na could be\nexperienced in direct perception and according to Ved\u00e2nta there\nare only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous\nBrahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter\nhas for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by\nwhich the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all\nthe diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is\ndifferent from the category of the positive and the negative, has\nonly a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the\ntrue knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can\nbe known about the nature of this indefinite except its character\nas indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed\norder of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,\nall these are originated by this avidy\u00e2, aj\u00f1\u00e2na or m\u00e2y\u00e2 is indeed\nhardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all\nthese well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is\nsaid to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence\nbeside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle\nand to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything\nelse except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly\nappeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only\nseeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except\npure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.\nIt has been proved that whatever notions we have about the\nobjective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and\nfalse. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must\nshow this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All\ncategories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to\nbe without any conceivable notion that though apparent before\nus yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are\n\n462\n\nexamined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as\nthat they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our\nfundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by\nS'r\u00eehar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible\nwithin the limits of this chapter, to give a complete\naccount of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.\nI shall give here, only one example.\n\nLet us take the examination of the notion of difference\n(_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakh\u00e2dya_. Four explanations are\npossible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be\nperceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience\n(_svar\u00fbpa-bheda_) as Prabh\u00e2kara thinks; (2) the difference\nbetween two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other\n(_anyony\u00e2bh\u00e2va_), as some Naiy\u00e2yikas and Bh\u00e2@t@tas think; (3) difference\nmeans divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the\nVais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality\nin itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Ny\u00e2ya. Taking the first\nalternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth\nrepresent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their\nmutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the\ncloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic\nof the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated\ninto the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive\nin the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?\ni.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by\nthe senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference\nfrom something else, it is expected that something else such\nas jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also\nbe perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if\nthe perception of \"difference\" between two things has penetrated\ntogether in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction\nbecomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what\nwe perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from\nsomething else, and if that thing from which the difference is\nperceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an\nentity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents\nits difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,\nthen we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference\nfrom the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth\nitself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that\n\n463\n\nthe jug only indicates a term from which difference\nis intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,\nfor how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent\nof any association of its difference from other things,\nand is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If\nit is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation\nto other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference\nfrom the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty\ncomes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the\ncloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of\nthe jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would\nalso be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but\nidentity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character\nof the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other,\nbut this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to\nascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have\nnot, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything\nmight be the quality of everything. If there is a relation\nbetween these two, then that relation would require another\nrelation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again\nrequire another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it\nmay be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference\nto other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are\nviewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.\nBut this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely\ndifferent from the perception of difference. It should also be\nnoted that the notion of difference is also different from the\nnotions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say\nthat there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say\nthat the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear\nas difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.\nThe notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things\nfor its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different\nfrom the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is\nthe same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the\ndifference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and\nnot merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This\nshows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the\nthing perceived.\n\nAgain, in the second alternative where difference of two\n\n463\n\nthings is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we\nfind that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not\nin the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same\ndifficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of\njug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the\nresidence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require\nthat the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce\ndifference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the\ncloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth\nitself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be\nexplained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabh\u00e2va_) is explained\nas the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in\nthe jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality\nin jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;\nand there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as\nidentical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth\nwe might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for\nclothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence\nof jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness\nin the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third\nalternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics\n(_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the\nvaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence\nas can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if\nthe answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless\nvaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in the\nnegative then there being no divergence between the two divergences\nthey become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics\nas such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of\nthings are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the\nother, then apart from the differences--the natural forms--the\nthings are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvar\u00fbpat\u00e2_). If natural forms\n(_svar\u00fbpa_) mean special natural forms (_svar\u00fbpa-vis'e@sa_) then as the\nspecial natural forms or characteristics only represent difference,\nthe natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones\nwould appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there\nis no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain\ndifferences of things, for there also the questions would arise as\nto whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones\nor whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it\nexists or not, and so forth.\n\n465\n\n\nThe earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and\ndialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters\nof _Kath\u00e2vatthu_. In the great _Mah\u00e2bha@sya_ on P\u00e2@nini by Pata\u00f1jali\nalso we find some traces of it. But N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna was the man who\ntook it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all\nits subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove\nthat everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was\nnon-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and\nself-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was\nonly the void (_s'\u00fbnya_). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in\nhis refutations of Ny\u00e2ya and the Buddhist systems; but S'r\u00eehar@sa\nagain revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after\nhaving criticized the most important notions and concepts of our\neveryday life, which are often backed by the Ny\u00e2ya system, sought\nto prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we\ncannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of\nall possible definitions that the Ny\u00e2ya could give necessarily led\nto the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not\nexist though they appeared to do so; the Ved\u00e2ntic contention\nwas that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nproduces only appearances which when exposed to reason show\nthat no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other\nwords the world-appearance, the phenomena of m\u00e2y\u00e2 or aj\u00f1\u00e2na,\nare indefinable or anirvacan\u00eeya. This great work of S'r\u00eehar@sa\nwas followed by _Tattvad\u00eepik\u00e2_ of Citsukha, in which he generally\nfollowed S'r\u00eehar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the\naddition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of\nVed\u00e2nta thus followed on one side the method of S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da in\nannulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other\nVij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character\nof knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous\nultimate reality.\n\n\nThe Theory of Causation.\n\nThe Ved\u00e2nta philosophy looked at the constantly changing\nphenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the\nroot whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.\nThe theory that effects were altogether new productions caused\nby the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents,\nas well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved\n\n466\n\nand by its transformations produced the effect, are considered\ninsufficient to explain the problem which the Ved\u00e3nta had before\nit. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded\ncertain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of\nphenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.\nIn fact the concept of causation and production had in it\nsomething quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry\nafter the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and\nprimary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the\npresent moment when we wished to know what was the cause of\nthe jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect\nwas only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the\nground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If\napart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation\nof the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably\npresent at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs\nforth into being, we find that we are just where we were before,\nand are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The\nNy\u00e3ya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a\ngeneral way in associating certain groups of things of a particular\nkind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding\nmoment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the\nother also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing\nmore than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature\nof cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable\ncondition for the cause. But time, according to Ny\u00e3ya,\nis one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived\nas antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these\nagain involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time\nand of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually\ndependent upon each other (_anyony\u00e2s'raya_) neither of these can\nbe conceived independently. Another important condition is\ninvariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable\nantecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as\nan antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's\nhouse, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it\nmeans such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect,\nit becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are\nalways present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]\n\n467\n\nto the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence\nand nothing more. If invariability means the existence of\nthat at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also\nit fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence\nof the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it\nis said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated\nwith its accessory factors, then also the question remains\nthe same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.\nAgain when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a\nplurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which\nhappening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot\nalso be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular\ncause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that\nfrom a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special\nkind of effect (cf. V\u00e2tsy\u00e2yana and _Ny\u00e2yama\u00f1jar\u00ee_), for out of the\nsame clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate,\netc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then\nthe question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does\nit mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On\nthe former supposition the scattered factors being always present\nin the universe there should always be the effect; if it means\nsomething else above the specific factors, then that something always\nexisting, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation\n(_s\u00e2magr\u00ee_) be defined as the last movement of the causes\nimmediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the\nrelation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.\nMoreover if movement is defined as that which produces\nthe effect, the very conception of causation which was required\nto be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved\nin the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce\nits effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically\ninconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out\nthe real nature of the causal principle from the interminable\nseries of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics\nof the effects are indescribable and indefinable aj\u00f1\u00e2na of m\u00e2y\u00e2,\nand in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in\nthemselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all\ncarved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and\nsome day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure\nbeing, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon\n\n468\n\nwhich all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The\ntrue cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through\nall experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon\nit of aj\u00f1\u00e2na or avidy\u00e2. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that\nis regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,\netc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere\nappearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth\nis the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is\nbeing, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being\nimposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what\nis called the _satk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da_ or more properly the _satk\u00e2ra@nav\u00e2da_\nof the Ved\u00e2nta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,\nand phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this\nmuch truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being\nwhich alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the\nbeing, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called\nthe _vivarttav\u00e2da_ as distinguished from the _s\u00e2@mkhyayogapari@n\u00e2mav\u00e2da_,\nin which the effect is regarded as the real development\nof the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a\ndifferent kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but\nwhen the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called\n_pari@n\u00e2ma (k\u00e2ra@nasvalak@sa@n\u00e2nyath\u00e2bh\u00e2va@h pari@n\u00e2ma@h tadvilak@sa@no\nvivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamatt\u00e2ko'nyath\u00e2bh\u00e2va@h pari@n\u00e2ma@h\ntadvi@samasatt\u00e2ka@h vivartta@h)_. Ved\u00e2nta has as much to object\nagainst the Ny\u00e2ya as against the pari@n\u00e2ma theory of causation\nof the S\u00e2@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,\nand actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the\nlight of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate\nthings and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality\nhowever though phenomena are not identical with the cause,\nthey can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam\nvinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam k\u00e2ryyam vivartta@h)_.\n\nThis being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the\nworld, the different followers of S'a@nkara Ved\u00e2nta in explaining\nthe cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the\nm\u00e2y\u00e2, aj\u00f1\u00e2na or avidy\u00e2, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes\non them both. Thus Sarvaj@n\u00e2tmamuni, the writer of\n_Sa@nk@sepa-s'\u00e2r\u00eeraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman\nshould be regarded as the causal substance (_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_) of the\nworld-appearance, whereas Prak\u00e2s'\u00e2tman Akhan@d\u00e2nanda, and\n\n469\n\nM\u00e2dhava hold that Brahman in association with m\u00e2y\u00e2, i.e. the\nm\u00e2y\u00e2-reflected form of Brahman as \u00ces'vara should be regarded\nas the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance\nis an evolution or pari@n\u00e2ma of the m\u00e2y\u00e2 as located in \u00ces'vara,\nwhereas \u00ces'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others\nhowever make a distinction between m\u00e2y\u00e2 as the cosmical factor\nof illusion and avidy\u00e2 as the manifestation of the same entity\nin the individual or j\u00eeva. They hold that though the world-appearance\nmay be said to be produced by the m\u00e2y\u00e2 yet the\nmind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the\navidy\u00e2 with the j\u00eeva or the individual as the causal matter\n(_up\u00e2d\u00e2na_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom\nboth \u00ces'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better\nrather to think that these are all manifestations of the j\u00eeva in\nassociation with his avidy\u00e2 or aj\u00f1\u00e2na. Others however hold that\nsince in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being\nand in another materiality etc., both Brahman and m\u00e2y\u00e2 are to\nbe regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal\nmatter, up\u00e2d\u00e2na and m\u00e2y\u00e2 as the entity evolving in pari@n\u00e2ma.\nV\u00e2caspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of\nthe world-appearance through m\u00e2y\u00e2 as associated with j\u00eeva.\nM\u00e2y\u00e2 is thus only a sahak\u00e2ri or instrument as it were, by which\nthe one Brahman appears in the eye of the j\u00eeva as the manifold\nworld of appearance. Prak\u00e2s'\u00e2nanda holds however in his _Siddh\u00e2nta\nMukt\u00e2val\u00ee_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected\neven as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal\nmatter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the\nphenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the\nproduct of m\u00e2y\u00e2, which is both the instrumental and the up\u00e2d\u00e2na\n(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences\nof view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect\nthe principal Ved\u00e2nta text that the only unchangeable cause is\nthe Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only\na temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word m\u00e2y\u00e2\nwas used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and\nwonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying\nit was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began\nto be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka,\nPras'na, and Svet\u00e2s'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It\nis not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads\n\n470\n\nthe word m\u00e2y\u00e2 occurs only once in the B@rhad\u00e2ra@nyaka and once\nonly in the Pras'na. In early P\u00e2li Buddhist writings it occurs\nonly in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa\nuses it in the sense of magical power. In N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna and the _Lank\u00e2vat\u00e2ra_\nit has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara the\nword m\u00e2y\u00e2 is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle\nof creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the\nphenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.\n\nIt may also be mentioned here that Gau@dap\u00e2da the teacher\nof S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help\nof the m\u00e2y\u00e2 doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the\nspirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not\npay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or\nenquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dap\u00e2da asserts\nclearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that\nthe world does not exist in reality, that it is m\u00e2y\u00e2, and not reality.\nWhen the highest truth is realized m\u00e2y\u00e2 is not removed, for it is\nnot a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own\nairy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dap\u00e2da who compared\nthe world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects\nseen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable\nof being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and\nunreal. The \u00e2tman says Gau@dap\u00e2da is at once the cognizer and\nthe cognized, the world subsists in the \u00e2tman through m\u00e2y\u00e2.\nAs \u00e2tman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily\nfollows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expounded\nthis doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads\nand the Brahma-s\u00fbtra, but he seems to me to have done little\nmore than making explicit the doctrine of m\u00e2y\u00e2. Some of his\nfollowers however examined and thought over the concept of\nm\u00e2y\u00e2 and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable\nthereby substantially contributing to the development of\nthe Ved\u00e2nta philosophy.\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].\n\nPram\u00e2@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If\nmemory is intended to be excluded from the definition then\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra and his son R\u00e2mak@r@s@na worked out a\ncomplete scheme of the theory of Ved\u00e2ntic perception and inference.\nThis is in complete agreement with the general Ved\u00e2nta metaphysics.\nThe early Ved\u00e2ntists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory\nnature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.\nIt may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as\nworked out by Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra he was largely indebted to the M\u00eem\u00e2m@s\u00e2\nschool of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upam\u00e2na s'abda and\nanupalabdhi also Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra accepted the M\u00eem\u00e2m@s\u00e2 view. The\nVedantins, previous to Dharmar\u00e2j\u00e2dhvar\u00eendra, had also tacitly followed\nthe M\u00eem\u00e2m@s\u00e2 in these matters.]\n\n471\n\npram\u00e2@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right\nknowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge\n(_pram\u00e2_) in Ved\u00e2nta is the knowledge of an object which has not\nbeen found contradicted (_ab\u00e2dhit\u00e2rthavi@sayaj\u00f1\u00e2natva_). Except\nwhen specially expressed otherwise, pram\u00e2 is generally considered\nas being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired\n(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections\nare sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a\nfew minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive\nmoments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired\nin the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Ved\u00e2nta\nconsiders that so long as a different mental state does not arise,\nany mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as\nremaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive\none thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a\nseries of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge\nof the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge\nof the preceding moments, for so long as any mental\nstate has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as\nhaving remained unchanged all through the series of moments.\nThere is of course this difference between the same percept of a\nprevious and a later moment following in succession, that fresh\nelements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though\nthe content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned\nremains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses\nthough the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.\nWhen I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state\nrepresenting the book is not changed every second, and hence\nthere can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental\nstates in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous\none, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains\nthe same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any\nchange in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the\nsame so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains\nthe same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous\n\n472\n\naddition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the\nexternal world should be regarded as right knowledge until the\nabsolute is realized.\n\nWhen the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the\nexternal objects through the senses and becomes transformed as\nit were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has\nbeen transformed into a state (_v@rtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the\nanta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its\nknowledge, the ignorance (_aj\u00f1\u00e2na_) with reference to that object is\nremoved, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness\n(_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by\nignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object\nis thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form\nresembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes\nthat by the action of aj\u00f1\u00e2na, pure consciousness or being\nis in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of\nthe cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is\nbut the transformation of ignorance (aj\u00f1\u00e2na), the former cannot\nmanifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance\nthey are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The\ndiversified objects of the world are but transformations of\nthe principle of aj\u00f1\u00e2na which is neither real nor unreal. It\nis the nature of aj\u00f1\u00e2na that it veils its own creations. Thus\non each of the objects created by the aj\u00f1\u00e2na by its creating\n(_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (\u00e2vara@na) capacity.\nBut when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na\nthrough the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into\nthe form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil\non that particular aj\u00f1\u00e2na form--the object, and as the self-shining\ncit is shining through the particular aj\u00f1\u00e2na state, we\nhave what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is\nin reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the\naj\u00f1\u00e2na has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls\nand the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Ved\u00e2nta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The\nsame anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called m\u00e2n\u00e2s,\nbuddhi, aha@mk\u00e2ra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called\nm\u00e2n\u00e2s, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As\npresenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mk\u00e2ra, and as\nproducing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications\nor states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special\nkind of modification of aj\u00f1\u00e2na as anta@hkara@na).]\n\n473\n\netc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary\nand the partial breaking of the veil over specific aj\u00f1\u00e2na forms\nso that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the\nsubject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on\nthe subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation\n(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective\nconsciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the\nspecific mental states\n(_tattadindriyayogyavi@say\u00e2vacchinnacaitany\u00e2bhinnatvam\ntattad\u00e2k\u00e2ravi@say\u00e2vacchinnaj\u00f1\u00e2nasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam_).\nThis union in perception means that the objective has at that\nmoment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of\nthe perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na\nis called j\u00eevas\u00e2k@si.\n\nInference (_anum\u00e2na_), according to Ved\u00e2nta, is made by our\nnotion of concomitance (_vy\u00e2ptij\u00f1\u00e2na_) between two things, acting\nthrough specific past impressions (_sa@msk\u00e2ra_). Thus when I see\nsmoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke\nwith fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I\ninfer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and\nthe smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance\nrevived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between\nthe smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is\ngenerated by the perception of two things together, when no\ncase of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhic\u00e2r\u00e2j\u00f1\u00e2na_)\nregarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether\nsubjective, the Ved\u00e2ntist does not emphasize the necessity\nof perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bh\u00fbyodars'anam\nsak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so n\u00e2dara@n\u00eeya@h_). Ved\u00e2nta is\nnot anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,\nbut only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of\nconcomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the\nconcomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory\ninstance is known. It is immaterial with the Ved\u00e2nta whether this\nconcomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.\nThe method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance\n(_anvayavy\u00e2pti_) that the Ved\u00e2nta allows. So the\nVed\u00e2nta discards all the other kinds of inference that Ny\u00e2ya\nsupported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence\nwith agreement in absence), _keval\u00e2nvayi_ (by universal agreement\nwhere no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and\n\n474\n\n_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Ved\u00e2nta\nadvocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratij\u00f1a_ (the hill is fiery);\n(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@t\u00e2nta_ (as in the\nkitchen) instead of the five propositions that Ny\u00e2ya maintained [Footnote\nref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Ved\u00e2nta as\nbeing sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the\none case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,\nwe can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam\nsarvam mithy\u00e2 Brahmabhinnatv\u00e2t yedevam tadevam yath\u00e2 s'uktir\u00fbpyam_).\nFirst premiss (_pratij\u00f1\u00e2_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second\npremiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss\n(_dr@s@t\u00e2nta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote\nref 2].\n\n\n\u00c2tman, J\u00eeva, \u00ces'vara, Ekaj\u00eevav\u00e2da and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2da.\n\nWe have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous\n(_svayamprak\u00e2s'a). But what does this mean? Ved\u00e2nta\ndefines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but\nis yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati\naparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the\ncapacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness\nwithout in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever\nanything is described as an object of consciousness, its character\nas constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not\nbe present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.\nThis makes it dependent on some other such entity which can\nproduce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its\nobjects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for\nits manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug,\nthe cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness\nto manifest it, then that might again require another, and\nthat another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavasth\u00e2_). If consciousness\ndid not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,\nthen even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he\nhad seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness\n(_anubh\u00fbti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratij\u00f1\u00e2, hetu and ud\u00e2harana, or\nud\u00e2hara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Ny\u00e2ya, viz.\npratij\u00f1a, hetu, ud\u00e2hara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ved\u00e2ntic notions of the pram\u00e2na of upamana, arthapatti,\ns'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the m\u00eem\u00e2m@s\u00e2 view, do not\nrequire to be treated here separately.]\n\n475\n\nof all our world experience. This goes directly against\nthe j\u00f1\u00e2tat\u00e2 theory of Kum\u00e2rila that consciousness was not immediate\nbut was only inferable from the manifesting quality\n(_j\u00f1\u00e2tat\u00e2_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.\n\nNow Ved\u00e2nta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness\nis the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object\nof any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in\nconsciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it\nis of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The\nself itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is\nnever itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the\nperceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association\ncomprehended under the term aha@mk\u00e2ra (ego). The real self is\nidentical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.\nThis real self called the \u00e2tman is not the same as the j\u00eeva or\nindividual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences\nof worldly life. \u00ces'vara also must be distinguished from this\nhighest \u00e2tman or Brahman. We have already seen that many\nVed\u00e2ntists draw a distinction between m\u00e2y\u00e2 and avidy\u00e2. M\u00e2y\u00e2\nis that aspect of aj\u00f1\u00e2na by which only the best attributes\nare projected, whereas avidy\u00e2 is that aspect by which impure\nqualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are\nmore of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter\nveiling (_\u00e2vara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation\nof the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with m\u00e2y\u00e2 and\navidy\u00e2 (also called aj\u00f1\u00e2na) was believed respectively to explain the\nphenomenal \u00ces'vara and the phenomenal j\u00eeva or individual. This\nrelation is conceived in two ways, namely as up\u00e2dhi or pratibimba,\nand avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is\nlike the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,\nthough it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes\nthe effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The\nsun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the\nimpurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may\nbe the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of\nwater and yield different kinds of images possessing different\ncharacteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally\nhave all the appearance of reality. The other conception\nof the relation is that when we speak of \u00e2k\u00e2s'a (space) in the jug\nor of \u00e2k\u00e2s'a in the room. The \u00e2k\u00e2s'a in reality does not suffer\n\n476\n\nany modification in being within the jug or within the room. In\nreality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_)\nwithin the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited\nby the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the\n\u00e2k\u00e2s'a limited within it will remain as separate from the \u00e2k\u00e2s'a\nlimited within the room.\n\nOf the Ved\u00e2ntists who accept the reflection analogy the followers\nof N@rsi@mh\u00e2s'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected\nin the m\u00e2y\u00e2, \u00ces'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the\navidy\u00e2 the individual or j\u00eeva. Sarvaj\u00f1\u00e2tm\u00e2 however does not\ndistinguish between the m\u00e2y\u00e2 and the avidy\u00e2, and thinks that\nwhen the cit is reflected in the avidy\u00e2 in its total aspect as cause,\nwe get \u00ces'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na--a product\nof the avidy\u00e2--we have j\u00eeva or individual soul.\n\nJ\u00eeva or individual means the self in association with the ego\nand other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,\nsuffers and is affected by world-experiences. In j\u00eeva also three\nstages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na\nis submerged, the self perceives merely the aj\u00f1\u00e2na and the\nj\u00eeva in this state is called pr\u00e2j\u00f1a or \u00e2nandamaya. In the dream-state\nthe self is in association with a subtle body and is called\ntaijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a\nsubtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure\nstate is called Brahman, when associated with m\u00e2y\u00e2 it is called\n\u00ces'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as\ncontrolling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross\nelements as the ruler or controller of them it is called vir\u00e2@t\npuru@sa.\n\nThe j\u00eeva in itself as limited by its avidy\u00e2 is often spoken of\nas p\u00e2ramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and\nthe ego in the waking states as vyavah\u00e2rika (phenomenal), and\nwhen in the dream states as dream-self, pr\u00e2tibh\u00e2@sika (illusory).\n\nPrak\u00e2s'\u00e2tm\u00e2 and his followers think that since aj\u00f1\u00e2na is one\nthere cannot be two separate reflections such as j\u00eeva and \u00ces'vara;\nbut it is better to admit that j\u00eeva is the image of \u00ces'vara in the\naj\u00f1\u00e2na. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with m\u00e2y\u00e2 is\n\u00ces'vara, and this when again reflected through the aj\u00f1\u00e2na gives\nus the j\u00eeva. The manifestation of the j\u00eeva is in the anta@hkara@na\nas states of knowledge. The j\u00eeva thus in reality is \u00ces'vara and\napart from j\u00eeva and \u00ces'vara there is no other separate existence of\n\n477\n\nBrahma-caitanya. J\u00eeva being the image of \u00ces'vara is thus dependent\non him, but when the limitations of j\u00eeva are removed\nby right knowledge, the j\u00eeva is the same Brahman it always was.\n\nThose who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the\navaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible\nof things which have colour, and therefore j\u00eeva is cit limited (avacchinna)\nby the anta@hkara@na (mind). \u00ces'vara is that which is beyond\nit; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity\nof the j\u00eevas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are\nnot of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining\nor comprehending the relation of \u00ces'vara and j\u00eeva. In the\nVed\u00e2nta system \u00ces'vara has but little importance, for he is but a\nphenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more\npowerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of\nus. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and\nboth j\u00eeva and \u00ces'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some\nVed\u00e2ntists hold that there is but one j\u00eeva and one body, and\nthat all the world as well as all the j\u00eevas in it are merely his\nimaginings. These dream j\u00eevas and the dream world will\ncontinue so long as that super-j\u00eeva continues to undergo his\nexperiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary\nindividuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary\nsalvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of\nthe imaginary j\u00eevas. The cosmic j\u00eeva is alone the awakened j\u00eeva\nand all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the\ndoctrine of ekaj\u00eeva (one-soul).\n\nThe opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some\nVed\u00e2ntists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance\nhas no permanent illusion for all people, but each person\ncreates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective\ndatum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception\nof all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a\nrope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and\nagree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen\nthe same snake, though each really had his own illusion and\nthere was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory\nperception of each happens for him subjectively and has no\ncorresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must\nbe distinguished from the normal Ved\u00e2nta view which holds\nthat objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these\n\n478\n\nare illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently\nand have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison\nwith the truth or reality which is ever the same constant\nand unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance.\nAccording to the other view phenomena are not\nobjectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that\nthe jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the\nperception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion\noccurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist\nbefore. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,\nand there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore\ncalled the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2da, i.e. the theory that the\nsubjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there\nare no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.\nIn the normal Ved\u00e2nta view however the objects of\nthe world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with\nwhich the subjective perceptions are created. The objective\nphenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of aj\u00f1\u00e2na,\nbut still these phenomena of the aj\u00f1\u00e2na are there as the common\nground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective\nepistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2da has no proper\nepistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined\nby his own subjective avidy\u00e2 and previous impressions as modifications\nof the avidy\u00e2. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2da theory approaches\nnearest to the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism, only with this difference\nthat while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being\nVed\u00e2nta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable\nreality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary\nperceptions are but impositions on it.\n\nThe mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that\nboth are modifications of aj\u00f1\u00e2na. It is indeed difficult to\ncomprehend the nature of aj\u00f1\u00e2na, though its presence in consciousness\ncan be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism\nall our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and\nbecome self-contradictory and indefinable. Ved\u00e2nta explains\nthe reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these\nindefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes\nof the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue\nfrom beginningless time consists in this, that the real in\nits full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse\n\n479\n\nthat we get of it is always through manifestations of forms\nand names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,\nincomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under\ncertain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,\nand at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a\npositive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only\nthe highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms\nand names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a\ncup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being\napart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that\nis imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have\nbeing in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing\nthe characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes of\naj\u00f1\u00e2na and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our\nexperience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to\nconceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of aj\u00f1\u00e2na.\nMoreover such is the nature of aj\u00f1\u00e2nas that they are knowable\nonly by a false identification of them with the self-luminous\nBrahman or \u00e2tman. Being as such is the highest truth, the\nBrahman. The aj\u00f1\u00e2na states are not non-being in the sense of\nnothing of pure negation (_abh\u00e2va_), but in the sense that they are\nnot being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,\nthe aj\u00f1\u00e2na, and this illumination means nothing more than a\nfalse identification of being with non-being. The forms of aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nif they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness,\nand this association means an illusion, superimposition, and\nmutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these\ncannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone\nthat is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nstates in themselves as apart from the \u00e2tman we fail in a dilemma,\nfor knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and\nwhen it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus\napart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other\nkind of its existence is known to us. If aj\u00f1\u00e2na had been a non-entity\naltogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive\nentity then it would never cease to be; the aj\u00f1\u00e2na thus is a\nmysterious category midway between being and non-being and\nundefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is\ncalled _tattv\u00e2nyatv\u00e2bhy\u00e2m anirv\u00e2cya_ or undefinable and undeterminable\neither as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is\n\n480\n\na necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal\nin its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness\nit is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they\nare manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible\nas to their real nature or mutual relation, and\ncomprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness,\nbut apart from these no rational conception of them can be\nformed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the aj\u00f1\u00e2na\n(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in\nconsciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tiv\u00e2dins asserted\nthat our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence\nof avidy\u00e2 and that beyond that no objective common ground\ncould be admitted. But though this has the general assent of\nVed\u00e2nta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining\nour common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasath\u00e2_) we may\nthink that we have an objective world before us as the common\nfield of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and\noperations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be\ninterpreted in the light of the Ved\u00e2nta metaphysics.\n\nThe subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the\n\u00e2tman, the one highest reality, secondly as j\u00eeva or the \u00e2tman as\nlimited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated\nfrom the \u00e2tman, but \u00e2tman is regarded as identical with the psychosis\nthus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _j\u00eevas\u00e2k@si_ or\nperceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the j\u00eeva comprehends,\nknows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis or\nmind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidy\u00e2 manifestations,\njust as the outer world objects are exterior centres of\navidy\u00e2 phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is not\nonly the avidy\u00e2 capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences,\nbut it also contains all the tendencies and modes of\npast impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The\nanta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidy\u00e2 modes of it into\nthe j\u00eevas\u00e2k@si (j\u00eeva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and\nthese are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed\ninto experience. These avidy\u00e2 states of the anta@hkara@na\nare called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the\nv@rttiaj\u00f1\u00e2nas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed\nupon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness\nand have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The\n\n481\n\nforms of aj\u00f1\u00e2na remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only\nso long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis of\nanta@hkara@na, for the aj\u00f1\u00e2na can be destroyed by the cit only in the\nform of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the aj\u00f1\u00e2na veils the cit\nfrom manifestation. The removal of aj\u00f1\u00e2na-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na\nor the manifestation of v@rtti-j\u00f1\u00e2na is nothing but this, that\nthe anta@hkara@na states of avidy\u00e2 are the only states of aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nwhich can be superimposed upon the self-luminous \u00e2tman\n(_adhy\u00e2sa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of the\navidy\u00e2 phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity\nconsists in this that avidy\u00e2 in this form cannot be superimposed\non the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These\navidy\u00e2 phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in\nall these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond\nconsciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidy\u00e2\nphenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with the\navidy\u00e2 states and render themselves objects of consciousness or\nhave their veil of \u00e2vara@na removed. It is thus assumed that in\nordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta@hkara@na\ngoes out of the man's body (_s'ar\u00eeramadhy\u00e2t_) and coming in\ntouch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,\nand as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which\nis always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.\nThe jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested\n(though these were taking place on the background of\nthe same self-luminous Brahman or \u00e2tman as forms of the highest\ntruth of my subjective consciousness) because the aj\u00f1\u00e2na phenomena\nin these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous.\nIt was only by coming into contact with these phenomena\nthat the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into corresponding\nstates and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed\nthe anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states or\nv@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the\nv@rttis alone has the power of removing the aj\u00f1\u00e2na veiling the\ncit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,\nor the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of\nappearance and due to avidy\u00e2. And it is only from the point of\nview of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects\ncan only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together\nthrough the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects\n\n482\n\ntranslucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nwhich was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the\nobject phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected\nthrough it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The\npratyak@sa-pram\u00e2 or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the\npure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical with\nthe cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by\nit. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three\nconsciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective\nphenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the j\u00eeva\nor pram\u00e2t\u00e2, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rtti\nof the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected.\n\nPram\u00e2 or right knowledge means in Ved\u00e2nta the acquirement\nof such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by\nexperience (_ab\u00e2dhita_). There is thus no absolute definition of\ntruth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long\nas it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it\nis very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted\nby right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the\nknowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true\nabsolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness\nwhich is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The\ntruth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out\nwhether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience\nor not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to\nbe regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be\ncontradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.\n\nThe inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated\nby a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as\npleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated\nthe perceptions, \"I am happy,\" or \"I am sorry.\" In continuous\nperception of anything for a certain time as an object\nor as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the\nsame way all the while so long as any other new form is not\ntaken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new\nknowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the\nhill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na\nv@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter\nof inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the\nfire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of\n\n483\n\nmental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as\ninference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired\nperception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is\nodoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal\nwood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it\nto be odoriferous. Ved\u00e2nta does not admit the existence of the\nrelation called _samav\u00e2ya_ (inherence) or _j\u00e2ti_ (class notion); and\nso does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the\nother class called inference, and holds that both perception and\ninference are but different modes of the transformations of the\nanta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. The\nperception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@na\nv@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is\nin contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of\nthe cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in\nthe subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective\ncit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that\nthrough the v@rtti the same reality subsisting in the object and\nthe subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred,\nbeing away from contact with anta@hkara@na, has apparently\na different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness.\nThus perception is regarded as the mental state representing\nthe same identical reality in the object and the subject by\nanta@hkara@na contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced\nby words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically\nto the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta\nbefore me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge\nproduced by \"this is Devadatta\" though a verbal (_s'\u00e2bda_)\nknowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the anta@hkara@na\nv@rtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak@sa.\nThe content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same\nas the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as\nrepresented in the proposition \"this is Devadatta\" involving the\nunity of two terms \"this\" and \"Devadatta\" with a copula, but\nonly the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception\nalready experienced, the knowledge proceeding from\n\"this is Devadatta\" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa\nknowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness\nwhen the preceptor instructs \"thou art Brahman\" the\nknowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for\n\n484\n\nthough grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet\nfrom the point of view of intrinsic significance (_t\u00e2tparya_) one\nidentical reality only is indicated. Ved\u00e2nta does not distinguish\nnirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'\u00e2bda\nperception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the\ncondition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the\nsentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas\nin savikalpa perception we have a combination of different\nideas as in the sentence, \"the king's man is coming\" (_r\u00e2japuru@sa\n\u00e2gacchat\u00ee_). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is\nsignified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnote\nref 1].\n\nIt is not out of place to mention in this connection that\nVed\u00e2nta admits all the six pram\u00e2@nas of Kum\u00e2rila and considers\nlike M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 that all knowledge is self-valid (_svat@ah-pram\u00e2@na_).\nBut pram\u00e2 has not the same meaning in Ved\u00e2nta\nas in M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2. There as we remember pram\u00e2 meant the\nknowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such\nall knowledge was pram\u00e2, until practical experience showed the\ncourse of action in accordance with which it was found to be\ncontradicted. In Ved\u00e2nta however there is no reference to action,\nbut pram\u00e2 means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition\nof self-validity as given by M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 Ved\u00e2nta adds another\nobjective qualification, that such knowledge can have svata@h-pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya\nas is not vitiated by the presence of any do@sa (cause\nof error, such as defect of senses or the like). Ved\u00e2nta of course\ndoes not think like Ny\u00e2ya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence,\netc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,\nnor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the\nM\u00eem\u00e2@msists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It\nadopts a middle course and holds that absence of do@sa is a necessary\ncondition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that\nthis is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to\nbe admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,\nbut Ved\u00e2nta says that as it requires only a negative condition\nfor the absence of do@sa, the objection does not apply to it, and it\nholds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition\nfor proving the validity of knowledge like the Ny\u00e2ya,\nthen only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.\nBut since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ved\u00e2ntaparibh\u00e2@s\u00e2_ and _S'ikh\u00e2ma@ni._]\n\n485\n\nattributed to its theory of self-validity. Ved\u00e2nta was bound to\nfollow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the\npure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else\nfor establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal\nforms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance\nwould come to be valid; so it held that knowledge\ncould be regarded as valid only when there was no do@sa\npresent; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge\nwas false and had no validity, because there was the\navidy\u00e2-do@sa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was\nvalid in which there was no do@sa. Validity (pr\u00e2m\u00e2@nya) with\nM\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to\npractical action in accordance with it, but with Ved\u00e2nta it meant\ncorrectness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of\ndo@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the\ncorrectness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta Theory of Illusion.\n\nWe have already seen that the M\u00eem\u00e2@msists had asserted that\nall knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yath\u00e2rth\u00e2@h\nsarve viv\u00e2daspad\u00eebh\u00fbt\u00e2@h pratyay\u00e2@h pratyayatv\u00e2t_). Even\nillusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the\ndistinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and\nthe thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Ved\u00e2nta objects to this,\nand asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which\nis clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is\nsaid that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.\nnon-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),\nthen also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,\nand negation with M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 is nothing but the bare presence of the\nlocus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but\nthe bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception\nof the non-association of \"silver\" and \"this\" means barely\nand merely the \"silver\" and \"this.\" Even admitting for argument's\nsake that the distinction between two things or two ideas\nis not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one\ncould be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping\ndown to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive\n\n______________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ved\u00e2ntaparibh\u00e2@s\u00e2, S'ikh\u00e2ma@ni, Ma@niprabh\u00e2_ and Citsukha\non svata@hpr\u00e2ma@nya.]\n\n486\n\nconviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical\nmovement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect\nperception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated\nand comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver\nappears to be like true silver before me and this generates the\nmovement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For\nthe appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us\nto behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus\nI may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite\nthis similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as\nif it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the M\u00eema@ms\u00e2 position\nmay be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Ved\u00e2nta thinks that the illusion\nis not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon\nof illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;\nthe difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion\nis generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the\nphenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas.\nThe process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described\nthus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a\nmental state as \"thisness\" with reference to the thing before me\nis generated; then in the thing as \"this\" and in the mental state\nof the form of that \"this\" the cit is reflected. Then the avidy\u00e2\n(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence\nof the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression of\nsilver remembered through similarity is transformed into the\nappearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver\nappearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state\ngenerated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two\ntransformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal\nillusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness\n(_s\u00e2k@sicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations,\none in the avidy\u00e2 states forming the illusory objective silver\nphenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state.\nBut in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,\ntheir object being the same as the \"this\" in perception, we have\none knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of\nillusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacan\u00eeya-khy\u00e2ti_) illusory silver\nis created in every case where an illusory perception of silver\noccurs. There are three orders of reality in Ved\u00e2nta, namely the\n\n____________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha_ and _Ny\u00e2yamakaranda_ on\nakhy\u00e2ti refutation.]\n\n487\n\n_p\u00e2ram\u00e2rthika_ or absolute, _vyavah\u00e2rika_ or practical ordinary\nexperience, and _pr\u00e2tibh\u00e2sika,_ illusory. The first one represents\nthe absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due\nto do@sa. The difference between vyavah\u00e2rika and pr\u00e2tibh\u00e2sika\nis that the do@sa of the vyavah\u00e2rika perception is neither discovered\nnor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of the\npr\u00e2tibh\u00e2sika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such\nas defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of\nour ordinary experience, and thus the pr\u00e2tibh\u00e2sika experience\nlasts for a much shorter period than the vyavah\u00e2rika. But just\nas the vyavah\u00e2rika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications\nof the aj\u00f1\u00e2na, as apart from our subjective experience and\neven before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is\nalso regarded as a modification of avidy\u00e2, an undefinable creation\nof the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in the\ncase of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver\nis created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is\ncalled the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacan\u00eeya_) silver of illusion.\nHere the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same\nbut the avidy\u00e2 of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (_pari@n\u00e2ma_)\non account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.\nThe illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the point\nof view of the cit and pari@n\u00e2ma from the point of view of\navidy\u00e2, for the difference between vivartta and pari@n\u00e2ma is, that\nin the former the transformations have a different reality from\nthe cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),\nwhile in the latter case the transformations have the same reality\nas the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same\nstuff as the avidy\u00e2 whose transformations it is). But now a\ndifficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to\na coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified\nby do@sa and the object--cit as underlying the \"this\" before\nme (in the illusion of \"this is silver\"), then I ought to have the\nexperience that \"I am silver\" like \"I am happy\" and not that\n\"this is silver\"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place\nin connection with my previous notion as \"this,\" the form of\nthe knowledge also is \"this is silver,\" whereas in the notion\n\"I am happy,\" the notion of happiness takes place in connection\nwith a previous v@rtti of \"I.\" Thus though the coalescing\nof the two \"cits\" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the\n\n488\n\nknowledge takes the form of \"I am,\" and in another as \"this is\"\naccording as the previous impression is \"I\" or \"this.\" In dreams\nalso the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception\nof silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are\ngenerated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are\nimposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded\nmerely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the\nform that \"I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc.\" and not\nthat \"I remember the chariots.\" In the dream state all the senses\nare inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,\nbut the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,\ntime, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that\nsince the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to\nlast even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought\nto continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking\nstages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different\nstates on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were\ncausing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation)\nas distinguished from _b\u00e2dha_ (cessation). The illusory creation of\ndream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these\ncannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa of\nsleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications in\naccordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is\ncalled niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience\nit, whereas b\u00e2dha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation\nceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell\nthe illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this\nwas not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived\nas silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality\nwas not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective\nillusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is\ntransferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon\nit. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds\nof illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable\nsilver (_anirvacan\u00eeya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attribution\nof the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory\nsilver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion\nthat it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti_\nform of illusion as advocated by Ny\u00e2ya. Ved\u00e2nta admits that\nwhen two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present\n\n489\n\nbefore my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other\nby illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion\nis of the form of anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti; but if one of the things is not\npresent before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not\nof the anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti type, but of the anirvacan\u00eeyakhy\u00e2ti type.\nVed\u00e2nta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed\nthat all appearance of reality in the world-appearance\nwas really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous\nin all our experiences. The world appearance is an\nillusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it\nis a misattribution (_anyath\u00e2khy\u00e2ti_) of the characteristic of the\nBrahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which\nmanifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,\njust as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of\nsilver its reality.\n\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta Ethics and Ved\u00e2nta Emancipation.\n\nVed\u00e2nta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the\nstudy of Ved\u00e2nta and is instructed by the preceptor--\"Thou\nart that (Brahman),\" he attains the emancipating knowledge,\nand the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory.\nThe qualifications necessary for the study of Ved\u00e2nta are (1)\nthat the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper\naccessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of\nthe knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another,\nhe must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such\nas daily prayer, etc. called _nitya-karma_) and occasionally obligatory\nduty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son,\ncalled _naimittika-karma_) and must have avoided all actions for\nthe fulfilment of selfish desires (_k\u00e2mya-karmas_, such as the\nperformance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited\nactions (e.g. murder, etc. _ni@siddha-karma_) in such a\nway that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no\nkarma is generated by the _nitya_ and _naimittika-karma_, and as\nhe has not performed the _k\u00e2mya_ and prohibited karmas, he has\nacquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified\nhis mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of\nfitting the mind for Ved\u00e2nta instruction (called _s\u00e2dhana_) he\ncan regard himself as properly qualified for the Ved\u00e2nta instruction.\nThese virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal\n\n490\n\nand what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this\nlife and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for\nall enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge,\n(4) control over the senses by which these are restrained\nfrom everything but that which aids the attainment of right\nknowledge (_dama_), (a) having restrained them, the attainment\nof such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards\nworldly enjoyments (_uparati_), (b) power of bearing extremes\nof heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment\nof right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and\nUpani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing\nthe above qualities should try to understand correctly\nthe true purport of the Upani@sads (called _s'rava@na_), and by\narguments in favour of the purport of the Upani@sads to\nstrengthen his conviction as stated in the Upani@sads (called\n_manana_) and then by _nididhy\u00e2sana_ (meditation) which includes\nall the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth\nas one. Ved\u00e2nta therefore in ethics covers the ground of\nYoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding\nthe difference between puru@sa and prak@rti, with Ved\u00e2nta\nsalvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman\nalone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 asserts\nthat the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the\nsupreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance\nwith the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good\nand the removal of evil. But Ved\u00e2nta holds that though the\npurport of the earlier Vedas is as M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 has it, yet this\nis meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the\ngoal is clearly as the Upani@sads indicate it, namely the attainment\nof the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic\nduties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was\nbelieved by many (e.g. V\u00e2caspati Mis'ra and his followers) that\ndue performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a\ngreat keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others\nbelieved (e.g. Prak\u00e2s'\u00e2tm\u00e2 and his followers) that it served to\nbring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors,\netc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became\neasier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.\nIn the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the aj\u00f1\u00e2nas removed\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Ved\u00e2ntas\u00e2ra_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]\n\n491\n\nare only smaller states of aj\u00f1\u00e2na, whereas when the\nBrahma-knowledge dawns the aj\u00f1\u00e2na as a whole is removed.\nBrahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a\nstate of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when\nthis knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which\nat first reflects it (and which being a state is itself aj\u00f1\u00e2na\nmodification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed,\nonly the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its\nown true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece\nof wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn\nthe very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge\nwould destroy all the illusory world-appearance and\nat last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].\n\nThe mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman\nas the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss\nshines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as\nillusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but\nlimited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also\nare but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste\nof which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being\nof Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent\nbeings as the _satt\u00e2_ (being as class notion) of the naiy\u00e2yika, but\nthe concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness\nand pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (_sat_) is pure\nbliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidy\u00e2 during\nmukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the\nquestion, how the avidy\u00e2 came forth and stayed during the world-appearance.\nIt is best to remember that the category of the\nindefinite avidy\u00e2 is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation\nand destruction. Ved\u00e2nta however believes that even when the\ntrue knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a\nwhile, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it.\nThus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like\nan ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer\nacquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe\nkarmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and\nthere will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of\nperfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of\nbeginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1:_Siddh\u00e2ntales'a_.]\n\n492\n\nof the illusions subjective or objective which could make any\nknowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is\ncalled _j\u00eevanmukta_, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all\nworld-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone\nin himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the\nstage [Footnote ref 1].\n\n\n\nVed\u00e2nta and other Indian Systems.\n\nVed\u00e2nta is distinctly antagonistic to Ny\u00e2ya, and most of\nits powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it.\nS'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and\ninconsistencies in many of the Ny\u00e2ya conceptions, such as the\ntheory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samav\u00e2ya,\nthe conception of j\u00e2ti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to\nstill greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of\nS'r\u00eehar@sa, Citsukha, Madhus\u00fbdana, etc. It was opposed to M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 so\nfar as this admitted the Ny\u00e2ya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreed\nwith it generally as regards the pram\u00e2@nas of anum\u00e2na, upamiti,\narth\u00e2patti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter\nin M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2 with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting\npower of knowledge. But it differed from M\u00eem\u00e2@ms\u00e2\nin the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate\ndiscussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to\nordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties\nto perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest\nknowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties\nonly so long as he was not fit for Ved\u00e2nta instruction and\nstudies.\n\nWith S\u00e2@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Ved\u00e2nta seems to\nbe very close. We have already seen that Ved\u00e2nta had accepted\nall the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that\nwere advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Ved\u00e2nta\nand S\u00e2@mkhya was this that S\u00e2@mkhya believed, that the stuff of\nwhich the world consisted was a reality side by side with the\npuru@sas. In later times Ved\u00e2nta had compromised so far with\nS\u00e2@mkhya that it also sometimes described m\u00e2y\u00e2 as being made\nup of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Ved\u00e2nta also held that according\nto these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Pa\u00f1cadas'\u00ee_.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Ny\u00e2ya, _S'a@nkara-bh\u00e2@sya_, II.\nii.]\n\n493\n\nof the m\u00e2y\u00e2. Thus \u00ces'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure\nsattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in\nVed\u00e2nta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as S\u00e2@mkhya\nheld it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that m\u00e2y\u00e2 was\nbelieved to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it\nwas indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from\nwhat we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial\nnothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long\nas it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable\nas regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation,\nbut even then it was believed to be a combination of\npositive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals\ncomposing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged\nto it with which it could be defined. M\u00e2y\u00e2 however was undemonstrable,\nindefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a\nseparate category of the indefinite. S\u00e2@mkhya believed in the\npersonal individuality of souls, while for Ved\u00e2nta there was only\none soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the m\u00e2y\u00e2\ntransformations. There was an adhy\u00e2sa or illusion in S\u00e2@mkhya\nas well as in Ved\u00e2nta; but in the former the illusion was due\nto a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or mere\nmisattribution of characters or identities, but in Ved\u00e2nta there\nwas not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable\ncreation. Causation with S\u00e2@mkhya meant real transformation,\nbut with Ved\u00e2nta all transformation was mere appearance.\nThough there were so many differences, it is however easy to\nsee that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems\nduring the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similar\nideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested\nthemselves into the present divergences of the two systems.\nThough S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the S\u00e2@mkhya\nview could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly be\nconvinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more\nhe argues, the more we are led to suspect that the S\u00e2@mkhya\nthought had its origin in the Upani@sads. S\u00e2'a@nkara and his\nfollowers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from\nthe Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'\u00fbnya\nof N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between\npure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of\nS`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da Buddhism\n\n494\n\ncan hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth\nin the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vij\u00f1\u00e2na Bhik@su and\nothers that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to\nthink that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound of\nVij\u00f1\u00e2nav\u00e2da and S'\u00fbnyav\u00e2da Buddhism with the Upani@sad\nnotion of the permanence of self superadded.","title":"A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":213335}