{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_13485/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_13485","id":"gutenberg_13485","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13485","summary":null,"tags":["Aesthetics","Art -- Philosophy","Category: Art","Category: Philosophy & Ethics"],"text":"AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF\nOUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.\n\nby\n\nFrances Reynolds\n\n1785\n\nWith an Introduction by James L. Clifford\n\n\n\nThe Augustan Reprint Society\n\n\nFrances Reynolds \n\n_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, \nand of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc._\n(1785)\n\nWith an Introduction by James L. Clifford\n\nPublication 27\n\nLos Angeles\nWilliam Andrews Clark Memorial Library\nUniversity of California\n1951\n\n\n_GENERAL EDITORS_\n\nH. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_\nRICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_\nEDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_\nJOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_\n\n_ASSISTANT EDITORS_\n\nW. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_\n\n_ADVISORY EDITORS_\n\nEMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_\nBENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_\nLOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_\nCLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_\nJAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_\nARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_\nSAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_\nERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_\nJAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_\nH.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nSince the early nineteenth century it has been known that Frances\nReynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay on\ntaste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistent\nsearch failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lost\npieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover.\n\nIn 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscripts\nof Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copy\nof an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of\nthe Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay.\nThe date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; it\ncontained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there was\nattached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) of\nJohnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay.\n\nOnly one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. James\nNorthcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II,\n116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript,\ngives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are general\nstatements such as \"Dress is the strong indication of the moral\ncharacter\" or \"The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in the\nmoral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to the\ncorruption of moral excellence.\" Unfortunately none of these excerpts\nappears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas are\nsimilar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretch\nof the imagination could they be considered to come from the same\npiece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearly\nfifteen years.\n\nRecently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attribution\na certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistaken\nin the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years after\nthe events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy of\nthe first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted from\nanother anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In any\nevent he was not quoting from the final version which she wished the\nworld to see.\n\nThe story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can at\nlast be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hitherto\nunpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All that\nwe know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorous\ncriticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some of\nher verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781:\n\n    There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety\n    of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I\n    say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion.\n\n    They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many\n    of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are\n    not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader;\n    the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and\n    smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very\n    elegant and curious work.[1]\n\nBut Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote again\non 8 April 1782:\n\n    Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very\n    forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the\n    sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any\n    profit from it; it seems not born to be popular.\n\n    Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and\n    without more attention than will be willingly bestowed,\n    is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily\n    understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the\n    different beauty of different ages.\n\n    I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed\n    no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be\n    published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth\n    your acceptance.[2]\n\nIn passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously not\nbeen associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely because\nthe available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnson\nwrote \"The Ideas of Beauty,\" obviously referring to the second section\nof the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G.B. Hill, printed \"The plans\nof Burnaby.\" To this Hill added a note; \"Burnaby, I conjecture, was a\ncharacter in the book,\" with the result that scholars have fruitlessly\nbeen searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One more\nexample of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts!\n\nEvidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans,\nfor we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, as\nappears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hoping\nin vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead and\nprint the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted upon\nfor aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784:\n\n    I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business\n    commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the\n    printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk\n    together about it.[3]\n\nOn 30 April he commented further: \"Mr. Allen has looked over the\npapers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds.\"\nSomething, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 May\nthere came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote:\n\"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside the\nthought of printing them.\"\n\nBut Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up her\nproject. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeased\nher critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250\ncopies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. With\nJohnson gone, \"The Queen of the Bluestockings\" must have appeared the\nnext best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by the\ndedication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay may\nbe gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July\n1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that \"the slightest hint\" of\ndisapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would \"consign the work to\noblivion\"; then continued:\n\n    I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might\n    to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a\n    motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd\n    to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence,\n    which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or\n    twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I\n    had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print\n    that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was\n    his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say,\n    that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person\n    was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to\n    the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of\n    getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him\n    for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion\n    which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives\n    besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this\n    change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too\n    great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con\n    too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens\n    literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere,\n    he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly\n    corresponded with yours![4]\n\nNot that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was a\nminor consideration. She concluded:\n\n    If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr.\n    Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I\n    have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is\n    also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part\n    he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that\n    objection, is another apology for my printing it.\n\nTo this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commenting\nthat \"having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies,\"\nshe was \"not a competent judge of any work on subjects of that\nnature,\" yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers would\nlike it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party to\nfurther dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matter\nrested for almost three more years.\n\nThe wish to have some of the copies read by the general public proved\ntoo strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs.\nMontagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of a\nletter, of Johnson's:\n\n    It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter\n    particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for\n    the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr.\n    Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I\n    do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the\n    testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be\n    highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to\n    a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word,\n    inadequate to the\n    praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his\n    expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures\n    also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed\n    verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the\n    year 82. they begin\n\n    Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own\n    imagination....[5]\n\nIt was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcote\nshe finally made active preparations to have the work published. As\nMiss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February,\n\n    I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a\n    Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent\n    in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps\n    towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so\n    incongruous.[6]\n\nIn preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revised\nher essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for general\nreaders she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which she\nchanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one was\nto Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; the\nothers concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead she\nagain asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied:\n\n    I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3\n    letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of\n    the crime of forgery ... I believe the tenderness of sentiment\n    Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do\n    him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his\n    friend you may with propriety publish the letters.[7]\n\nMrs. Montagu concluded, \"I wish some name that would do more honour to\nyour work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented to\nthe publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, will\ncertainly be esteemed an honour....\"\n\nSometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted,\nthis time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in the\nBodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date for\nthe reprinting is established by the fact that the three letters\nof Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted without\ncomment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_.\n\nJust where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters is\nnot certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks had\noriginally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that Sir\nJoshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University.\nThere would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also to\nhave secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June\n1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprising\nlady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The important\npoint is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the\n_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connection\nwith the piece.\n\nFor this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, with\nnumerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no major\nalterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are such\nas a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted that\non pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minor\nchanges in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the later\nprinting. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an errata\nlist, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which were\nmistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometrical\nillustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I.\n\nThe _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the most\nexciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenth\ncentury being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absolute\nclassical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Most\nof the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, Adam\nSmith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste.\nAnd if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of the\ndiscussions, it is at least one of the liveliest.\n\nIn brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligent\namateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has given\nmuch thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of the\nideas are derivative, with echoes of the \"moral sense\" of Hutcheson,\nthe \"line of grace\" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. The\nthree divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, the\norigin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow the\ncustomary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the piece\nis no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresh\narguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completely\ncoherent or logical, they do represent original thinking.\n\nTwentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas:\nwitness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste,\nbecause their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametrically\nopposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionally\nmuddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption.\nWhile the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has been\nblemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yet\ninstead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take it\nfor granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achieved\nin taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner of\nRousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect of\nthe arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebted\nto Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York.)\n\nThe cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps be\ntraced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time \"instinct\"\nor \"impulsion,\" the moral force driving man toward perfection, is a\npotentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force that\nis created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of her\nmathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained by\nthe few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea of\na Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea in\nthe human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed.\nFinally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet art\nwhich exhibits these rules can corrupt.\n\nIt is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack of\nsustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at every\nturn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ contains\nmuch of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses the\nvisual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights.\nShe divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, but\nmakes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-human\nobjects--flowers, animals, etc.--are seen as exhibiting male or female\nattributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphic\napproach she is attempting to develop a \"philosophical\" basis for the\npathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beauty\nin the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measure\nof beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material and\nthe divine, she points to the concentration in the next century on\nhuman values.\n\nWhen discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, Samuel\nMonk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow the\ncoming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds'\nextension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean\n\"form,\" and the extension of internal virtue to mean \"disposition,\"\n\"object,\" or content. In developing this form-content division, she\nstumbles on a key criticism of associationism: \"From association of\nideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty,\nand displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it is\nsome _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, is\nassociated.\" This notion that associationism leads away from the\nwork of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form and\ndisposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aesthetic\npleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain of\nColeridge's basic ideas.\n\nOne other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extreme\nmoralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insisted\nthat taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aesthetic\nconcepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: \"Of this I\nam certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; that\nvirtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and they\nin her.\" And the next chapter begins: \"Taste seems to be an inherent\nimpulsive tendency of the soul towards true good.\" On the other\nhand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because such\nencouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--the\ndesire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissed\nas of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement will\nimperil the many. \"Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing\nprinciples of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well known\nthat their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on\nthe community in general....\"\n\nTo conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_\nis worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflicting\neighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic concepts\nhave been formed.\n\n  James L. Clifford\n  Columbia University\n\n\n\n\nNotes to the Introduction\n\n\n1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possession\nof Professor F.W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluable\naid in the present investigation.\n\n2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R.W.\nChapman.\n\n3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey.\n\n4. Original in Huntington Library.\n\n5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.\n\n6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.\n\n7. Original in possession of Professor F.W. Hilles.\n\n\n\n\nAN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF\nOUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c.\n\n\n\n    Sunt certi denique fines,\n  Quos ultra citraqu\u00e8 nequit consistere rectum.\n    HOR.\n\n\n\nTo Mrs. MONTAGU.\n\n\nMADAM,\n\nWere I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, to\ndedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine this\nto be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moral\nexcellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very name\nis synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for taking\nthis liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, to\nwith to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affords\nme, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of that\nperfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid,\nto their better comprehending my meaning.\n\nThe influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character,\nnot only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this public\navowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourable\ntestimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured to\ninculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. And\nI may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging the\nstrongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in its\npraise, is true pleasure, true happiness.\n\nI am, Madam,\n\n    Your obliged,\n\n      Most obedient,\n\n  And most humble, servant,\n\n  The AUTHOR.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nA SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c.\n\n\nThe mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (in\nconjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature,) placed in the\ncentral point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energetic\npowers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, like\nrays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point of\nperfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptibly\nimbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibition\nalone enabled to approach it.\n\nBut, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mind\nto perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetually\nimpeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. which\ninduce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powers\ngenerally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature and\nperfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, and\nwhich, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mental\nfaculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_.\n\n\n[Illustration:\n           SUBLIMITY.\n               |\n             GRACE\n               |\n        BEAUTY | TRUTH\n               |\n  COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM\n               |\n            NATURE]\n\n\nOn meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages\nor degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths,\nor mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, the\ngraceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kind\nof diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c.\nwhich I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him to\nrefer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate his\ncomprehension of my meaning.\n\nAnd here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical and\nabsurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogous\nto the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers,\nparticularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the latter\nsuggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced to\nmathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on the\nAdvancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of science\nvery much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectual\nperfection, or taste.\n\n[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d.]\n\n[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, and\nChap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th.]\n\nIt could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by such\nconductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I must\naver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exact\nstate it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that any\nthing similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; nor\nhave I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of the\nopinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a single\nthought in my treatise. But to return from my digression.\n\nIn the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature,\nor the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in a\nstraight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placed\ndemonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and,\nmidway; I have placed common sense and common form, half deriving\ntheir existence from pure nature, and half from its highest\ncultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction which\nwould itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed with\nall that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby made\nmediocrity, i.e. _common sense_.\n\nThe intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle,\ni.e. at the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where I\nhave placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if they\nprogress,) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refining\nas they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point,\n_sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid,\nor cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have before\nobserved, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmost\npower of rules, &c.) from that limit up to the ultimate point of\nsublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or\ntaste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades,\ncheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in this\nideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of common\nsense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partake\nof the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sense\npartakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object or\ngeneral form of the ideal region, and its perception is the general\nlimit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain to\nthe point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! the\nalpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source of\nnature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment of\nsublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; the\norigin and the end!\n\n[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motion\nof grace as well as of a flame.]\n\nHaving thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, I\npropose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout the\ngreat characteristic line of intellectual power.\n\nThe first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of our\nintellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as I\nhave observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity,\nand we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which is\nperceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior and\ninferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are so\nanalogous, that they unite in one.\n\n\nSection 1. _Common Sense and common Form_.\n\nPerfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense and\nof common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is the\nadventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from,\nwhat is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, these\ndefects being distributed in, small portions throughout the general\ncommon form and common mind, they constitute an object, whether\nvisible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely,\nthat of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, as\nexperience gives the general idea of the common and true appearance\nof the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightened\nphilosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, or\nwhat is an unusual appearance in that form.\n\nBut, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it is\nonly to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree of\nunusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with my\nopinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that its\nblemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but,\nwhen held at a distance, i.e. in abstract idea, it is still a white,\nlike a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularly\ncheckered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placed\nat a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white;\nand, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on this\nmezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degree\nof transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of any\nof the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to the\ngeneral common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is more\nopposite to common sense than intellectual excellence.\n\nAnd, (to continue my allusion,) as those tints, or blemishes, which\nobscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, so\nmust the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes that\ntinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character of\nmediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, or\nbeauty, result.\n\nCommon sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusive\nbeauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externally\nand internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceive\nwhat is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it,\n_good_.\n\nOn a line with common form and common sense I place common ease of\nbody and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to the\ndegree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call\n_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity.\n\n\nSection 2. _Beauty and Truth_.\n\nI mean that beauty which is demonstrable truth, and that truth which\nis demonstrable beauty. _Exactitude. Completion. The just medium. The\nsatisfactory rest of the mind. Perfection_. A point, indeed, in which\nthe mind cannot rest! It must go forward or backward. If the latter,\nit relapses into the dominion of error; if the former, if assumes\nthe charms of _design_, or _intention_. The artist, arrived at the\nultimate limit of rules, or demonstrable truth, stands, as it were,\nbetween the visible and invisible world; between that of sense and\nintellect; the common and the uncommon; and his productions will be a\nconjunction of both. He looks back through all the variety of common\nnature, and reviews, through the medium of truth and beauty, the\nvarious objects it exhibits; and on its spotless ground, i.e. the\nabstract idea of nature without defects, can only exist in idea,\nhe arranges those objects, objects, so as they may best produce the\neffects he aims at in his art. He does not attempt to obliterate\nany character in the common circle of nature; but, following her\nown oeconomy, he endeavours, by juxtaposition, &c. to make each\nsubservient to each in creating delight, and giving beauty to the\n_whole_. But, to descend from the abstract general idea to the\nparticular idea of beauty, or idea of a particular form:\n\nWe discard every thing, that is not beauty, to compose beauty; but\nevery thing that is not beauty is not therefore deformity. The wrong\nwe see in each individual we do not call deformity: when it is so, it\nstands on the limit of the common circle, in opposition to beauty.\n\nFrom common form seem to originate beauty and deformity; and, as they\nrecede from each other in opposite directions, they become less and\nless like their parent, _common form_, but never totally unlike; for\nit is their likeness to that form that constitutes the one beauty, and\nthe other deformity; for, were there no resemblance in deformity\nto the common form, it would be a different species, and no longer\ndisgust; and none in beauty, it would no longer please.\n\nThere is no particular common form, but which, to create beauty, an\nartist, who studies the perfection of the human form, must improve in\nsome, if not in every part; to effect which, considered as mere form\nonly, rules will suffice, but, considered as grace, it must express a\nsentiment that no rules can give!\n\nThat all feel the same sentiment of admiration for that which they\nthink the most perfect, however the objects may differ, has induced\nsome to believe that beauty is an arbitrary idea, and that it exists\nonly in the imagination! But does it follow, that, because it is not\npossible for the savage or the man of taste to judge of any object\nbut as experience enables him to judge, that therefore there is no\npreeminence in that form which is beauty to the one above that which\nis beauty to the other?\n\nSomewhere there must exist, whether perceived or not, the perfection,\nor highest point of excellence of the human form respecting\nproportion; and somewhere there must exist, or does at times exist,\nthe highest excellence of its expression, i.e. the moral charm of the\nhuman countenance, _grace_.\n\nThe artist, who has only seen the beauty of his own nation, will from\nthat form his standard of perfection. But, when he comes to extend his\nenquiry, when he has viewed the beauty of other nations, particularly\nthat form and that expression which the Grecian artists (who were\nprobably on a line with the Grecian philosophers) modelled from their\nideas of beauty! he will quit his partiality for the beauty of his own\ncountry, and prefer that of the Grecian, which I imagine is preferable\nto that of the whole world! The only criterion to prove it so, I mean\nits form, would be to select from every nation the most perfect in it,\nand from that number to choose the most perfect, were this possible\nto be done, respecting the external form of beauty: it could not\nrespecting the internal expression of beauty, _grace_; for who shall\nbe the world's arbiter of the ne plus ultra of grace!\n\nThat the artists of all ages and of all nations have terminated their\nenquiries after beauty in that of the Grecian form is the highest\nproof that can be given of its superior excellence to that of all the\nworld!\n\nCommon form, as I have observed before, is so much nearer beauty than\ndeformity, that it is, in abstract idea, the model to compose beauty\nof form from. The _universal_ appearance of nature is, to every eye,\nright, fit, faultless, &c. therefore, if every part of the copy be the\nsame, particularly, I mean, in the _human_ form, beauty of form must\nresult.\n\nThe beauty of every part of the human body, forming a _perfect_ whole,\nis analogous to an instrument of music in perfect concord, and mere\nexactitude of proportion in its parts, exclusive of the idea of mind,\nwould, I imagine, have no more effect upon the spectator than the mere\nconcord of the strings of an instrument has on the hearer; it amounts\nto no more than blameless right, nor, till influenced by sentiment,\ncan it go farther.\n\nBut, as we are incapable of separating the idea of the human form from\nthe human mind, and as the touch of an instrument in perfect concord\ngives a presentiment of harmony, so does the perception of the\nconcordance of the parts of a beautiful form give a perception of\ngrace. The mind, as I have observed before, cannot rest in fixed\nperfection, the _Spotless white_; and its natural transition from\nbeauty must be into the region of grace.\n\n\nSection 3. _Grace_.\n\nThe principles, which constitute grace, genius, or taste, are one;\nwhich is denominated grace in the object, genius in the production of\nthe object, and taste in the perception of it.\n\nThe existence of grace _seems_ to depend more upon the character of\nmental than of corporeal beauty. All its motions seem to indicate and,\nto be regulated by the utmost delicacy of sentiment! I have placed it\nbetween the highest sentiment of the human mind, _sublmity_, that\nno rules can teach, and the highest sentiment that rules can teach,\n_exact beauty_, the two extremes of the vrai reel and the vrai ideal.\nGrace seems, as it were, to hang between the influence of both; the\nirregular sublime giving character and relief to the negative and\ndetermined qualities of beauty; and beauty, i.e. truth, confining\nwithin due bounds the eccentric qualities of sublimity, forming, both\nto sight and in idea, orderly variety, _the waving line_, neither\nstraight nor crooked. The waving line is the symbol, or memento, as\nI may say, of grace, wherever it is seen in whatever form, animate or\ninanimate; and may be justly styled the line of taste or grace!\n\nThe perception of grace seems not to be intirely new nor intirely\nfamiliar to us; but is, as it were, what we have had a presentiment of\nin the mind, without examining it, and which the graceful object, or\naction, &c. calls forth to our view. Being so much our own idea, we\nlike to behold it, to dwell upon it; and yet, not being a familiar\nidea, it creates a pleasing mild degree of admiration.\n\nGrace seems half celestial; for all the virtues accompany, indeed\ncompose, the perception; for none, I imagine, can have a perception of\ngrace that has none of the charms of virtue.\n\nThe sentiment of grace, caused by the motion of beauty, music, poetry,\nbeneficence, compassion, &c. may be ranked as the highest intellectual\npleasure the mind is capable of perceiving, and brings with it a sort\nof undetermined consciousness of the delicacy of our own perceptions\nin making the discovery, a degree of that glorying that Longinus\nobserves always accompanies the perception of the sublime.\n\nYou can no more define grace than you can happiness. The mind cannot\nso stedfastly behold it as to investigate its real properties. Grace\nis indeed the point of happiness in the ideal region, both because it\narises spontaneously, without effort, &c. and because it seems partly\n_within_ our own power, and partly _without_ it.\n\nAs common sense, in my fundamental circle, seems diffusive truth, so\ngrace, in my ideal circle, seems diffusive sublimity; every perception\nof the former seems to be tinged, as it were, with the colour of the\nlatter.\n\n\nSection 4. _Sublimity_.\n\nWhere pure grace ends, the awe of the sublime begins, composed of the\ninfluence of pain, of pleasure, of grace, and deformity, playing into\neach other, that the mind is unable to determine which to call it,\npain, pleasure, or terror. Without a conjunction of these powers there\ncould be no sublimity.\n\nThose only who have passed through the degrees, _common sense, truth_\nand _grace_, i.e. the sentiment of grace, can have a sentiment of\nsublimity. It is the mild admiration of grace raised to _wonder_\nand _astonishment_; to a sentiment of _power_ out of _our power_ to\nproduce or control. Grace must have been as familiar to the intellect,\nin order to discover sublimity, as common sense in the common region\nmust have been to the discovery of truth and beauty. In fine, genius,\nor taste, which is the sentiment of grace, and which I have called the\ncommon sense of the ideal region, can alone discover the true sublime.\n\nIt is a pinnacle of beatitude bordering upon horror, deformity,\nmadness! an eminence from whence the mind, that dares to look farther,\nis lost! It seems to stand, or rather to waver, between certainty\nand uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point of\nterror, of undetermined fear, of undetermined power!\n\nThe idea of the supreme Being is, I imagine, in every breast, from the\nclown to the greatest philosopher, his point of sublimity!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOn the ORIGIN of our IDEAS of BEAUTY.\n\n\nIn proportion as the principles of beauty exist in the common form,\nundetermined to the common eye, so do they exist in common sense,\nundetermined to the common mind. It is cultivation that calls them\ninto view, gives them a determined form, creates the object, and the\nperception, that\n\n                     'Truth and good are one,\n  And beauty dwells in them, and they in her.'\n    AKENSIDE.\n\nBut, though all truth resolves into one truth, one beauty, one\ngood, as all colours resolve into one light; though the scientifical\nintellectual colours, classes, or leading principles of science, the\n_physical_, the _moral_, the _metaphysical_, &c. &c. resolve into\nintellectual light, beauty, or good; it is, I imagine, the moral\ntruth, that is the characteristic truth of beauty: for, were we to\nanalyse the pleasing emotions we feel at the sight of beauty, we\nshould, I imagine, find them composed of our most refined moral\naffections; and hence the universal interesting charm of beauty. And,\nas those affections refine by culture, hence the different degrees of\nthe sentiments which beauty creates in the rustic, and in the man of\ntaste. The former perceives only the physical charm of beauty, the\nfreshness of colour, the bloom of youth, &c. but, to the man of taste,\nthe physical pleases only through the medium of the moral: _the body\ncharms because the soul is seen_; beauty, in his breast, is the source\nfrom whence _endless streams of fair ideas flow_, extending throughout\nthe whole region of taste, no object of which but is more or less\nrelated to the principles of human beauty. But taste, though a subject\nalmost inseparable from that of beauty, I must forbear to enlarge upon\nin this chapter, as I propose to make it the particular subject of my\nnext.\n\nIt is but at that period, at which we begin to perceive the charms of\nmoral virtue, that we begin to perceive the real charms of beauty. It\nis true, a man may attain, by experience, the knowledge of its just\nproportions; without that concomitant sentiment. He may be unconscious\nof the characteristic moral charm resulting from the whole. And\nan artist, I imagine, by the habitual practice of the rules which\nconstitute beauty, may produce forms which charm the moral sense of\nothers, without being conscious of it himself; the utmost limit of\nthe rules of the imitative arts being so intimately united with the\nintuitive principles of taste, or refined moral sense, that the mind\nin general cannot distinguish where the one ends or the other begins.\nThe artist, who separates them, _leans on the second cause_ instead of\nthe first.\n\nAs the strongest proof that the moral sense is the governing principle\nof beauty, we may remark, that the human form, from infancy to\nold age, has its peculiar beauty annexed to it from the virtue\nor affection that nature gives it, and which it exhibits in the\ncountenance. The negative virtue, innocence, is the beauty of the\nchild. The more formed virtues, benevolence, generosity, compassion,\n&c. are the virtues of youth, and its beauty. The fixed and determined\nvirtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, &c. compose the beauty of\nmanhood. The philosophic and religious cast of countenance is the\nbeauty of old age. Now, were any of these expressions misapplied, i.e.\ncommuted, they would disgust rather than please: without congruity\nthere could be no virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of\ntaste.\n\nAnd thus the beauty of each sex is seen only through the medium of\nthe virtues belonging to each. The beauty of the masculine sex is seen\nonly through the medium of the masculine virtues; the beauty of the\nfeminine only through the medium of the feminine. The moral sense\ngives each its distinct portion of the same virtues, but draws a line\nwhich neither can pass without a diminution of their specific\nbeauty. The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would\nbe displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of\nthe rigid virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a\nwoman. However perfect the Form, if an incongruity that touches the\nwell-being of humanity mingles with the idea, the Form will not afford\nthe pleasing perception of beauty: though the eye may be capable of\nseeing its regularity, &c. so far is it from pleasing, that it is\nthe more disgusting from its semblance to virtue, because that that\nsemblance is a contradiction to her laws.\n\nMay it not be owing to these expressions, so familiar to every eye,\nthat the general sense of good taste eternally exists? They are the\nlegible characters of human excellence, no where visible but in the\nhuman countenance, every observation of which improves and confirms\nthe moral sentiment, or image of beauty, implanted by nature in the\nmind of man.\n\nThe origin of the idea of beauty is the same in every breast, savage\nand civilized. Every nation's characteristic Form or expression of\nbeauty will be a representation, or portrait, of their characteristic\nvirtue, their happiness, their good. Thus, in the opinion of the wild\nsavage, that face or form will be the most beautiful that assimilates\nwith his idea of savage virtues, corporeal strength, courage, &c.\n_perfections that are placed in bones and nerves_: as that of the most\ncultivated nations, witness the Grecians, will indicate or portray the\nmost refined mental virtues. And hence we may conclude, if there be\nany dignity, any truth, any beauty, in virtue, there must be a _real_\ndifference, _superior_ and _inferior_ characteristic power of pleasing\nin the exterior of the human form.\n\nIt is cultivation that gives birth to beauty as well as to virtue,\nby calling forth the visible object to correspond with the invisible\nintellectual object. In the face or form of an idiot, or the lowest\nrustic, there is no beauty; and, supposing a nation of idiots, and\nthat they never could improve in mental beauty, they never could, I\nimagine, improve in corporeal, even though their natural form was upon\nan equality with the rest of mankind; for, without sentiment, they\ncould not only be incapable of expressing any sentiment analogous to\nbeauty, but, wanting the surrounding influence of a moral system, i.e.\nof the general influence of education on the exterior, they could not\nsuppress or veil a semblance incongruous with beauty. What no person\nfelt no person could teach.\n\nIn cultivated nations, every precept for exterior appearance, from the\nfirst rudiments of the dancing-master to the motion of grace, has for\nits object _mind_, that is, a desire to impress upon the spectator a\nfavourable idea of our mental character; but, passed the true point of\ncultivation, they lose with the sentiment of mental excellence that of\ntrue beauty; witness the exterior artificial appearance of humanity\nin a neighbouring nation, which probably is on a par with the most\nuncultivated rustic. The one does not enough for nature, the other\ntoo much. But, as the former has an object before him, to which nature\nherself directs him, the other is receding from it; and, as it is more\nagreeable, more easy, and more natural, to the human mind, to learn\nthan to unlearn, I should sooner expect the most uncultivated nation,\nthe negro excepted, to arrive at taste in true beauty than them. The\nnegro-race seems to be the farthest removed from the line of true\ncultivation of any of the human species; their defect of form and\ncomplexion being, I imagine, as strong an obstacle to their acquiring\ntrue taste (the produce of mental cultivation) as any natural defect\nthey may have in their intellectual faculties. For if, as I have\nobserved, the total want of cultivation would preclude external\nbeauty, the total want of external beauty would preclude the power\nof cultivation. It appears to me inconceivable, that the negro-race\nsupposing their mental powers were upon a level with other nations,\ncould ever arrive at true taste, when their eye is accustomed _only_\nto objects so diametrically opposite to taste as the face and form of\nnegroes are! Our being used or not used to the object cannot make us\nperceive any similarity in the lineaments of their countenance to the\nlineaments, if I may so say, of our refined virtues and affections,\nwhich alone constitute beauty; and therefore I am induced to believe\nthat they are a lower order of human beings than the Europeans.\n\nBeauty is an assemblage of every human charm; yet what we call the\n_agreeable_ is often more captivating.\n\nThe agreeable, in person, is composed of beauties and defects, as is\nthe common form, but differently composed. The beauties and defects\nof the latter are blended into the idea of mediocrity; those of the\nformer are always distinct and perceptible, contrasting each other,\nthey engage the attention, and create a kind of pleasing _re-creation_\nto the mental faculties; and, in proportion as we can bring them\nto unite with our governing principles of pleasure, they create\naffection, which gives the person a more fascinating charm than beauty\nitself.\n\nIt is the mental character that is the moving principle of affection;\nand any strong peculiarity, that contradicts not the moral sense,\ni.e. that is not _unnatural_, gives the object an accessary charm, and\nraises the affection to passion. The object is at once the common and\nthe uncommon; an union, which constitutes all we call excellent, all\nwe admire!\n\nThe perception of the charms of the agreeable seem to be wrought up\nto excellence by the operation of our own powers. We ourselves\nhave blended its beauties and defects into the sentiment of beauty,\n_pleasure_; and hence, probably, the strength and durability of the\npassion which it creates. Beauty, on the contrary, is composed to our\nhands, _full_, _perfect_, and _intire_; its idea is also a compound of\nthe common and the uncommon, being at once like and unlike the general\nform; but inherently it has no contrast, and therefore affords no\nrecreation, no pleasing exercise, to the mental faculties; there is\nnothing to re-create, nothing to wish; and hence the instability\nof the passion which it inspires. Perfect beauty is, like perfect\nhappiness, lost as soon as it is attained.\n\nIt is, I imagine, to the principles of the masculine and the feminine\ncharacter, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any\nobject whatever, throughout all nature and all art that imitates\nnature; and, in objects which differ from the human form, the\nprinciples must be in the extreme, because the object is then merely\nsymbolical. Thus, the meekness of the lamb, and the high-spirited\nprancing steed; the gentle dove, and the impetuous eagle; the placid\nlake, and the swelling ocean; the lowly valley, and the aspiring\nmountain. It is the feminine character that is the sweetest, the most\ninteresting, image of beauty; the masculine partakes of the sublime.\nThus it will be found, that, in every object that is universally\npleasing, there exist principles which are analogous to those that\nconstitute beauty in the human species; and that its appearance does\nalways, in some degree, move the affections, though the mind may be\nunconscious of its similitude to any idea in which the affections are\nconcerned. But the test of the object's possessing the principles\nof beauty is when we are able to assimilate its appearance with\nsome amiable interesting affection; and, according as that affection\nprevails in the breast of the spectator, it will appear with an\nadditional power of pleasing.\n\nFrom association of ideas, any object may be pleasing, though\nabsolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is\n_then_ out of the question; it is some _real_ good or evil, with which\nthe object, but not its form, is associated.\n\nIt is observable, that those animals I have mentioned (and I imagine\nall animals that are symbolical of our affections have the same) have\na double character of beauty, or reference to the affection that is\nmoved: i.e. their form and their disposition, exactly corresponding\nwith each other. Probably on that union depends their power of\npleasing; their _form alone_, so different from human beauty, could\nnot sufficiently engage the attention, or afford the interesting\nperception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of an\nobject.\n\nEvery object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mental\npleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of our\nperceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, the\nbeauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us,\nwanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probably\nbe admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, though\nit is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing the\nthistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of the\nrose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more than\nwe can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued with\nalmost intellectual beauty.\n\nIn the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a striking\nanalogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an ocular\ndemonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate their\nparticular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of the\nhuman form, originates from mental character: witness the charm of\nthe infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of the\nhyacinth, &c. and, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip,\nthe robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.\n\nIt is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea of\nbeauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased with\nthe sight of one flower more than with another, though the mind\nis unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by the\napparent beauty of every object throughout the system of human\nperception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the same\nintellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified,\nand diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptible\ndegree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, in\nevery object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But to\nconclude.\n\nI have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, than\nthat the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception of\ntrue beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sum\nof human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerning\nbeauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but as\nmens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilates\nwith some good, and of course must be in unison.\n\nIf, in the human system, there exists a principle which constitutes\ntrue pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes human\nexcellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasure\nmust necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then must\nevery object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative to\nthe principle that constitutes human excellence, morality.\n\nWhatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the human\nsystem, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_,\nand of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the same\nidea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what was\nexcellent.\n\nAs I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by the\ndifference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference of\nthe opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine,\nas the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be their\ntaste of beauty.\n\nOf this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true\nvirtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in\nthem, and they in her.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nOn TASTE.\n\n\nTaste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towards\ntrue good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in its\nsentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge of\nwhat _is_ true good.\n\nAll the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of the\nprinciple or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be shared\nbetween the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems to\nbelong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter its\nbeauty or grace; and the stamina vit\u00e6, or radical principles of taste,\nexist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul.\n\nWhat the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably to\nperceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgust\nin the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysical\nreaders to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation so\nincongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience.\n\nYet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, if\nmy readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the grateful\nsensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i.e. their sentiment of what\nis truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c.\n&c. they will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral or\nreligious principle. Indeed, some objects (the highest in the scale of\nour perceptions of excellence) bring with them an immediate conviction\nof the truth of this assertion; witness the devotional sentiment which\nthe view of the main ocean inspires; the rising and setting sun; the\ncontemplation of the celestial orbs, &c. witness the noblest object\nof the creation, when viewed in his highest character. Does not the\nperception of human excellence immediately relate to the source of all\nexcellence?\n\nThe general diffusion of intellectual light, throughout mankind,\nconstitutes rationality; and the aggregated excellence, or light of\nrationality, constitutes morality. It is, I imagine, in this second\nor purified light, that taste begins to exist. It is at this period of\ncultivation that the mind begins to perceive its true good; that the\nnatural affections rectify, methodize, and refine, in a word, become\nmoral affections, through whose medium, i.e. the _moral sense_, the\nsoul perceives every object of taste.\n\nTaste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good,\nand of beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle\nof the two former, and is that in which the universal idea of taste is\ncomprised. All are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by\nno means sensible that the principles that make it pleasing, that\nconstitute a form beautiful, are those, or, to be more intelligible,\nrelate to those, that constitute man's highest excellence, his first\ninterest, his chief good. Few, indeed, even among those who possess\ntaste, if they have not accustomed themselves to investigate its\nprinciples, will readily conceive that they are thus deeply rooted\nin the mental frame. Indeed, the generality of mankind seem rather to\nthink that taste has no principles at all, or, if any, that they begin\nand end with the prevailing mode, fashion, &c. of the times; a notion\nwhich, though in the highest degree absurd, corroborates my opinion,\nthat the universal perception of taste (the true and the false) exists\nin the idea of honour.\n\nThe compound word, or phrase, _le vrai id\u00e9al_, universally adopted to\ndenote an object of taste, is the most exact and literal definition of\nits sentiment that can be conceived; for it implies the union of\nthe judgement and the imagination, without which there could be no\nsentiment of taste. The judgement, as I observed, perceives the truth\nof the object, the imagination its beauty; they may be said to relate\nto each other, in the perception of an object of taste, as a luminous\npolish does to the substance from whence it proceeds: the substance\ncan exist without its polish, but the polish cannot exist without its\nsubstance. The perception of taste seems to me, if I may so express\nmyself, to be illusive, but not erroneous; in a word, to exist in our\nidea of true honour, i.e. in the polish, lustre, or ornament, of true\nvirtue.\n\nAs the universal idea or sentiment of taste is honour, so the\nuniversal object of its perception is ornament, from the object, whose\nexcellence we contemplate as an ornament or honour to human nature, to\nevery object which in the slightest degree indicates the influence\nof that excellence. Take away the idea of that influence in the moral\nsphere, and taste is annihilated; and, in the natural sphere, take\naway the idea of divine influence, and taste cannot exist. Every\nsentiment of taste, as I observed before, ultimately relates to the\none or to the other of these principles; indeed, strictly speaking, as\nthe moral relates to the divine, it may be said ultimately to do the\nsame.\n\nIn the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call\ntaste, is chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest both\nfor internal and external advantages, wealth accelerates the last\ndegree of cultivation, by giving efficacy to the principles of true\nhonour; but it also accelerates its corruption, by giving efficacy\nto the principles of false honour, by which the true loses its\ndistinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay, by degrees, less and\nless real. Wealth becoming the object of honour, every principle of\ntrue taste must be reversed. Hence the _dire polish_ of the obdurate\nheart, repelling the force of nature. Hence avarice and profusion,\ndissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love of oeconomy,\ndomestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections,\n&c. &c. Hence the greatest evils of society: the sorrows of the\nvirtuous poor, _the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes_,\nin a word, the general corruption of morals, and, of course, of true\ntaste!\n\nThe vulgar, who are strangers to the internal principles of honour,\nalways annex their ideas of taste to the external appearances of the\nhighest rank of life, which being easily acquired, particularly that\nof dress, the prevalency of modes and fashions, however absurd,\nis universally adopted. Those of false taste adopt them to attract\nnotice; those of true taste, to avoid it. But, at this present, the\ndifficulty of avoiding singularity in dress is, I imagine, much to be\nlamented by women of taste and virtue, the prevailing mode of feminine\nattire being diametrically opposite to every principle of feminine\nexcellence; a melancholy proof of our being arrived at the last stage\nof depravity!\n\nI could expatiate largely on this subject, but it would be\ninconsistent with my plan, which the reader may perceive, throughout\nthe whole work, to be a mere outline only.\n\nThe three grand co-existing principles of taste, virtue, honour, and\nornament, run through all its perceptions. Their triple union cannot\nbe broken; but taste is nominally distinguished by the one or the\nother, according as its objects, situations, circumstances, &c. vary.\nOrnament and honour seem the public character of taste; virtue to be\nthe private and domestic, where, though unperceived by the vulgar,\nto the eye of taste[A] she appears in her highest ornament, highest\nhonour.\n\n[Footnote A: Truth can only judge itself. BACON.]\n\nTaste seems to comprize three orders or degrees in its universal\ncomprehension.\n\nThe first is composed of those objects which immediately relate to the\ndivinity, among which man claims the preeminence, when viewed in his\nhighest character: witness the inexpressible charm which the natural\nvirtuous affections of the soul inspire, when moved by some strong\nimpulse, such as parental tenderness, filial piety, friendship, &c.\n&c. &c. Do they not unite the moral sentiment to the d\u00efvine?\n\nThe second is in the immediate external effects of true taste, or\nmoral virtue, in the social sphere; the order, beauty, and honour,\nwhich every object derives from its influence; and, of course, its\nsentiment must be intimately related to moral excellence.\n\nThe third and last degree is general ornament and honour, appearing\nin fashions, arts of decoration, &c. &c. objects which seeming not\nimmediately to affect the interests of humanity, the taste they\nexhibit in this sphere appears as an uncertain light, sometimes bright\nand sometimes obscured; or rather as refracted rays of taste, broken\nby the general love of novelty and superfluity; two principles which,\nthough they are, to a certain degree, essential to exterior ornament,\nand the sentiment of true taste, are those in which taste always\nbegins to corrupt. To illustrate my meaning: true ornament seems\nequally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and every\nsentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty and\nof custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we should\nfeel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentiment\nof taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen,\nit would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment as\ndistant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour.\n\nThis sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, and\nwhich borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, is\nproperly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring of\nTaste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, and\nsometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Taste\nas Pleasure does to Happiness.\n\nEvery object of taste is relative to some principle of excellence\nfrom which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highest\nsentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highest\nobject of excellence.\n\nTrue ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: their\nprinciples throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists in\nits exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constituting\nthe _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities,\nwhich, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. The\nperception of the first relation, i.e. the adaptation of any thing\nornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, be\nlearned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation,\nthe second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moral\nrelation, is the immediate operation of taste.\n\nOrnament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense,\nbut, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and,\nif incongruously joined to an object, i.e. to one with which it can\nhave no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives the\nincongruity, become a principle of disgust.\n\nAs the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexes\ndiffer,[A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To the\nman I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. The\ntaste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of the\nlatter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; that\ninherent ornament of their sex, modesty; their tender susceptibility\nof the benevolent virtues, pity, compassion, &c. &c.\n\n[Footnote A: Vide page 23.]\n\nTaste, however, is as far removed from mere instinct as from mere\nreason. I only mean to say, that the taste of the masculine character\nis rather on the side of reason, or the understanding; that of the\nfeminine on the side of instinct, and, let me add, imagination. The\ntaste of the one and of the other seems to differ as justice does from\nmercy, as modesty from virtue, as grace from sublimity, &c. &c. And,\nas exterior feminine grace is the most perfect visible object of\ntaste, the highest degree of feminine excellence, externally and\ninternally united, must of course constitute woman, the most perfect\nexisting object of taste in the creation.\n\nThe cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation\nof taste, and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one\nin which it can appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly\nappropriated to feminine taste, and I may say it is _absolutely_\nthe only one in which it can appear in its true lustre. True taste,\nparticularly the feminine, is retired, calm, modest; it is the private\nhonour of the heart, and is, I imagine, incompatible with the love of\nfame.\n\nIn the present state of society, taste seems to be equally excluded\nfrom the highest and from the lowest sphere of life. The one seems\nto be too much encumbered with artificial imaginary necessities; the\nother too much encumbered with the real and natural necessities of\nlife, to attend to its cultivation. It is in the former that taste is\nuniversally thought to reside, which is because the idea of taste\nis inseparable from that of honour. It is that, indeed, in which the\ngeneral taste of the nation is exhibited. It is its _face_, as I may\nsay, which expresses the internal character of the heart.\n\nIn this sphere, namely, the most exalted station of mankind, what true\ntaste it does exhibit is placed in the strongest point of view; its\ncontrary principles are also the same, particularly so to those who\nhave been rightly educated at a distance from it; to such, the wrong\nwill instruct as much as the right; but sure I am, that it is not,\nat this _period_, the proper sphere for the infant mind to expand and\nimprove in. The wrong will be too familiar to the mind to disgust;\nand the right, which I imagine is chiefly confined to the _records_\nof taste in the fine arts, will be too remote (wanting the preparatory\nlove of nature and virtue) to please.\n\nIt is not, I imagine, from objects of excellence in the arts, that\nthe mind receives the first impressions of taste, though from them\nthe impressions, we have already received, may be strengthened and\nimproved. The truths they exhibit awaken the recollection of what\nhas pleased us in nature; and we exult in the confirmation of our\njudgement and taste on finding those objects represented, by genius,\nin their best and fairest light. Of course, the excellence we perceive\nin the fine arts, which is always relative to moral excellence, must\ntend to the improvement of taste.[A]\n\n[Footnote A: L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombre\ninfini d'id\u00e9es confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'\u00e0 demi;\net rien ne lui est plus agr\u00e9able, que lorsqu'on lui offre quelqu'une\nde ces id\u00e9es bien \u00e9claircie et mise dans un beau jour. BOILEAU,\nPr\u00e9face.]\n\nBut, though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing principles\nof taste, reflecting a few individuals, it is well known that their\nestablishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on the\ncommunity in general; for, in proportion to the encouragement given\nthem, as that encouragement immediately promotes two of the most\npernicious principles that can affect the human heart, the most\ndestructive of moral virtue, namely, the love of fame and the love of\nriches, the general diffusion of corruption must ensue, and of course\nthe extinction of the natural principles of taste, or relish of the\nhuman soul of what is truly beautiful, truly honourable, truly good.\n\nTo conclude. I will not presume to say, that a man without taste is\nwithout virtue; but I think I may venture to say, that it is only\nas he can have virtue without loving virtue, that he can have virtue\nwithout having taste; the definition of taste being, according to my\napprehension of its perception, the _love_ of virtue. And, as that\nlove springs from, and tends to, the source of all virtue, all good,\nmay I not add, that it is but as a man can be religious without\ndevotion, that a man can be religious without taste? the sentiment\nof devotion seeming to be, an aggregation of our most virtuous, most\nrefined, conscious, energies of soul, in the awful vertical point of\nsublimity.\n\n  'From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend,\n  Path, motive, guide, original, and end!'\n\n    JOHNSON.\n\n\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nWilliam Andrews Clark Memorial Library: University of California\nTHE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY\n\n_General Editors_\n\nH. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_\nR.C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_\nE.N. HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_\nJOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_\n\nThe society exists to make available inexpensive reprints (usually\nfacsimile reproductions) of rare seventeenth and eighteenth century\nworks.\n\nThe editorial policy of the Society continues unchanged. As in the past,\nthe editors welcome suggestions concerning publications.\n\nAll correspondence concerning subscriptions in the United States and\nCanada should be addressed to the William Andrews Clark Memorial\nLibrary, 2205 West Adams Blvd., Los Angeles 18, California.\nCorrespondence concerning editoral matters may be addressed to any of\nthe general editors. Membership fee continues $2.50 per year. British\nand European subscribers should address B.H. Blackwell, Broad Street,\nOxford, England. \n\n\nPublications for the fifth year [1950-1951]\n\n(_At least six items, most of them from the following list, will be\nreprinted.)\n\nFRANCES REYNOLDS (?): _An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste,\nand of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c._ (1785). Introduction by\nJames L. Clifford.\n\nTHOMAS BAKER: _The Fine Lady's Airs_ (1709). Introduction by John\nHarrington Smith.\n\nDANIEL DEFOE: _Vindication of the Press_ (1718). Introduction by Ortho\nClinton Williams.\n\nJOHN EVELYN: _An Apologie for the Royal Party_ (1659); _A Panegyric to\nCharles the Second_ (1661). Introduction by Geoffery Keynes.\n\nCHARLES MACKLIN: _Man of the World_ (1781). Introduction by Dougald\nMacMillan.\n\n_Prefaces to Fiction_. Selected and with an Introduction by Benjamin\nBoyce.\n\nTHOMAS SPRAT: _Poems_.\n\nSIR WILLIAM PETTY: _The Advice of W.P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the\nAdvancement of some particular Parts of Learning_ (1648).\n\nTHOMAS GRAY: _An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard_ (1751).\n(Facsimile of first edition and of portions of Gray's manuscripts of\nthe poem).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  To the Augustan Reprint Society     _Subscriber's Name and Address:_\n  _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library\n  2205 West Adams Boulevard\n  Los Angeles 18, California_\n\n  _As_ MEMBERSHIP FEE _I enclose for the years marked:_\n  The current year                         $ 2.50\n  The current & the 4th year                 5.00\n  The current, 3rd, & 4th year               7.50\n  The current, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year         10.00\n  The current, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year    11.50\n    (_Publications no. 3 & 4 are out of print_)\n\nMake check or money order payable to THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY\nOF CALIFORNIA.\n\nNOTE: _All income of the Society is devoted to defraying cost of\nprinting and mailing_.\n\n_William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_\n\n\nPUBLICATIONS OF THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY\n\n\nFirst Year (1946-1947)\n\n1. Richard Blackmore's _Essay upon Wit_ (1716), and Addison's\n_Freeholder_ No. 45 (1716).\n\n2. Samuel Cobb's _Of Poetry_ and _Discourse on Criticism_ (1707).\n\n3. _Letter to A.H. Esq.; concerning the Stage_ (1698), and Richard\nWillis' _Occasional Paper No. IX_ (1698). (OUT OF PRINT)\n\n4. _Essay on Wit_ (1748), together with Characters by Flecknoe, and\nJoseph Warton's _Adventurer_ Nos. 127 and 133. (OUT OF PRINT)\n\n5. Samuel Wesley's _Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry_ (1700) and\n_Essay on Heroic Poetry_ (1693).\n\n6. _Representation of the Impiety and Immorality of the Stage_(1704)\nand _Some Thoughts Concerning the Stage_ (1704).\n\n\nSecond Year (1947-1948)\n\n7. John Gay's _The Present State of Wit_ (1711); and a section on Wit\nfrom _The English Theophrastus_ (1702).\n\n8. Rapin's _De Carmine Pastorali_, translated by Creech (1684).\n\n9. T. Hanmer's (?) _Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet_ (1736).\n\n10. Corbyn Morris _Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit,\netc_. (1744).\n\n11. Thomas Purney's _Discourse on the Pastoral_ (1717).\n\n12. Essays on the Stage, selected, with an Introduction by Joseph Wood\nKrutch.\n\n\nThird Year (1948-1949)\n\n13. Sir John Falstaff (pseud.), _The Theatre_ (1720).\n\n14. Edward Moore's _The Gamester_ (1753).\n\n15. John Oldmixon's _Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley_\n(1712); and Arthur Mainwaring's _The British Academy_ (1712).\n\n16. Nevil Payne's _Fatal Jealousy_ (1673).\n\n17. Nicholas Rowe's _Some Account of the Life of Mr. William\nShakespear_ (1709).\n\n18. Aaron Hill's Preface to _The Creation_; and Thomas Brereton's\nPreface to _Esther_.\n\n\nFourth Year (1949-1950)\n\n19. Susanna Centlivre's _The Busie Body_ (1709).\n\n20. Lewis Theobald's _Preface to The Works of Shakespeare_ (1734).\n\n21. _Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Gradison, Clarissa, and Pamela_\n(1754).\n\n22. Samuel Johnson's _The Vanity of Human Wishes_ (1749) and Two\n_Rambler_ papers (1750).\n\n23. John Dryden's _His Majesties Declaration Defended_ (1681).\n\n24. Pierre Nicole's _An Essay on True and Apparent Beauty in Which\nfrom Settled Principles is Rendered the Grounds for Choosing and\nRejecting Epigrams_, translated by J.V. Cunningham.","title":"An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty, etc.","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":12948}