{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_13940/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_13940","id":"gutenberg_13940","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13940","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","China -- Civilization","China -- Foreign relations","China -- Politics and government","Nobel Prizes in Literature"],"text":"THE PROBLEM OF CHINA\n\nBY\n\nBERTRAND RUSSELL\n\nO.M., F.K.S.\n\n_London_\nGEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD\nRUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET\nFIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922\nSECOND IMPRESSION 1966\n\nPRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN\nBY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY\nUNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED\nWOKING AND LONDON\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nCHAPTER\n\n      FOREWORD\n   I. QUESTIONS\n  II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY\n III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS\n  IV. MODERN CHINA\n   V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION\n  VI. MODERN JAPAN\n VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914\nVIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR\n  IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE\n   X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST\n  XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED\n XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTER\nXIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA\n XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA\n  XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA\n      APPENDIX\n      INDEX\n\n\n     The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Sh\u00fb (Heedless), the Ruler of\n     the Northern Ocean was H\u00fb (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre\n     was Chaos. Sh\u00fb and H\u00fb were continually meeting in the land of\n     Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how\n     they might repay his kindness, and said, \"Men all have seven\n     orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and\n     breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try\n     and make them for him.\" Accordingly they dug one orifice in him\n     every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.--[_Chuang\n     Tze_, Legge's translation.]\n\n\n\n\nThe Problem of China\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nQUESTIONS\n\n\nA European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and\nreflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very\npuzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe\nwill not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important\naffinities with those of China, but they have also important\ndifferences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems,\neven if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance,\nsince the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the\nhuman race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by\nthe development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive\nfactor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it\nimportant, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there\nshould be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China,\neven if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give.\n\nThe questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally\ninto three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these\ngroups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is\nintimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the\ncultural questions are the most important, both for China and for\nmankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less\nequanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that\nend. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for\npractical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations\nas for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed\nbusiness community has long been a commonplace of novelists and\nmoralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up\nthe pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded\nas an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the\nartist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to\noneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to\nsurvive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause\nmisery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all\nforeign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of\nus?\n\nChina has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid\nprocess of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed\nin almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits\nquite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to\nstrike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the\nwhole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the\nCelestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would\nventure to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in\nwhich we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we\nare worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be\nfruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a\nsuperior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to\nexploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an \"inferior\"\nrace. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior\nto ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate\nknowledge of China, would take the same view.\n\nIn comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask\noneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard\nto home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I\nultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more\ndesirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see\nrealized in the world? Different people will answer these questions\ndifferently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade\na man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be\ncontent merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that\nthe reader may feel likewise.\n\nThe main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not\nmerely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive\nhappiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of\nknowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry\nlists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no\nappreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature,\nincomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a\nthing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be\nsaid, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on\nthis topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak\nof art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do\nnot mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of\ncourse these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the\nalmost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian\npeasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates\nfolk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the\nPuritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy\nof life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we\nhave lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of\nus live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of\nChinese civilization.\n\nIn judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of\ngood or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has\nin promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good\nthings which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect,\nalso, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we\nendeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread\noppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not\nstrong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy\nby means of their own merits and exertions alone.\n\nThese general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in\nconsidering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and\ncommercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of\ncertain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in\nChina one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a\nsociety which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously,\nupon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for\nexample, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come\nunder Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have\nsecured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we\nbrought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a\nlife full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite\nachievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and\nunless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the\nless familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed\nalways make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to\ntake as a matter of course.\n\nThe culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change\nis needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable\nultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our\neconomic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if\nthe Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our\ncivilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able\nto achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a\nvery splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are,\nhowever, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The\nfirst danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining\nnothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more\nto the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations\nwhich now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that\nthey may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression,\ninto an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except\narmaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in\nChina. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with\npolitical and economic questions; and it is through their influence that\ndangers arise.\n\nChina is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on\nthe one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering\nthe effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan\nmust count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for\nJapan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers.\nNevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has\nambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore\ndistinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or\nmore white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China\nmay recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth\npossibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may\ncontrol China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese\nwill be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I\nbelieve that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the\nJapanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the\nnature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I\nshall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the\nrelations of China and Japan.\n\nTo understand the problem of China, we must first know something of\nChinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then\nsomething of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next,\nit is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic\nrelations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of\n1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of\n1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is\npossible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war,\nand to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan\nhad not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant\nforeign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to\nunderstand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation\nthey were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence\nthe West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made\npeople in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to\napprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.\n\nPolitical considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain\nwhat is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost\nmore important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly\nthe most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the\nresources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the\nwhite races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only\nthe whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power\nin the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the\nchances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced\nnations.\n\nThe Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the\nconflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have\nguaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it\nfar more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far\nEastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China\npreserve any shadow of independence without a great development of\nnationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate\nnationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to\npatriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found\nonly one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world;\nit thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is\nessentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The \"civilized\"\nnations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their\nbombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other\nwithin the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism\nhas kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being\ngoaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and\nleave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and\nrapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a\nslender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than\ndespair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some\ntolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that\nare worse.\n\nOur Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a\npsychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism,\nour militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our\nimperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from\na superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its\nown sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has\nbecome somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have\nnever taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more\nindolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally\naccepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have\nbeen aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like\nChina, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has\nbeen governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to\nintroduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might\nhave had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not\nmany) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that\nWestern push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot\nnow take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me\nfar less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than\nthose produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of\nEurope and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with\nour civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe\nthat those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The\nChinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of\nlife which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the\nworld happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife,\nexploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency\ndirected to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this\nconsummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some\nof that wisdom for which it despises the East.\n\nIt was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how\nprofound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks\nare attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as\nJapan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after\nday, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy,\ngay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of\neverything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand\nand no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay\nat death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the\nindifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of\nloud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a\ngreat silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed\nthat none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so\ninsistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the\nendless information of the well-informed.\n\nOne night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there\nwere no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of\npoplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and\nfound on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads,\nwandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled\ntogether surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others\nsilently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up\ngnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women,\nand children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they\nundoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow\nintimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew\nthat they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a\nboat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had\nheard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in the\ncountry they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer\nhunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings\nwould be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia,\nunexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of\nWesternizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia\nis so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet\nare lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the\ntheorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them\ninto actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not\nbelieve that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of\nindustrialism and forced labour.\n\nNevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions\nof the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly\npopular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the\nsleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen\nthem, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that\npatient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and\nunspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar\nintellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are\ninspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to\ntorture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or\ntheory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants,\nprotected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we\nhad to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I\nheard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the\nsound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a\nterrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale.\n\nIt was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nCHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY\n\n\nWhere the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early\nhistory is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon\nthe question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not\ncomposed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of\nprinces whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or\nwarning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors,\nwhose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. \"The age\nof Yao and Shun,\" in Chinese literature, means what \"the Golden Age\"\nmean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the\nChinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks\nof the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a\nfairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other\npart of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream,\ntoo swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon\nits bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly\nalters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive\ntorrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have\ninspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human\nsacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of\nsuperstition. Yao and Shun, and Y\u00fc (the latter's successor), were all\noccupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of\nthe engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state\nof belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows\nwhat was expected of an Emperor:--\n\n     He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and\n     thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely\n     courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these\n     qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and\n     extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and\n     virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the\n     nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also\n     regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became\n     brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the\n     myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were\n     transformed. The result was universal concord.[1]\n\nThe first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history\nis that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to\ndoubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier\ntimes, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the\nChou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in\n1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of\nnominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this\ntime, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of\nFrance during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at\nits lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each\nstrong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over\nsubordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting\nfor centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which\ntemporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians\nalways attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of\neunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention.\n\nWhat distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which\nfluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious\nprerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven\nat the winter solstice. The early Chinese used \"Heaven\" as synonymous\nwith \"The Supreme Ruler,\" a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles\nmaintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct\ntranslation of the Emperor's title would be \"Son of God.\" The word\n\"Tien,\" in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the\nlatter sense has become rare. The expression \"Shang Ti,\" which means\n\"Supreme Ruler,\" belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both\nterms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the\nGod of the Old Testament.[4]\n\nAs time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while \"Heaven\"\nremained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The\nEmperor alone had the privilege of worshipping \"Heaven,\" and the rites\ncontinued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in\n1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in\nPeking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual\nsacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official\nsurvival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be\ncalled religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never\nhad any connection with the State.\n\nThe history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C.,\nbecause with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is\na chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.\n\nOne of the odd things about the history of China is that after the\nEmperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one\ncomes to a ruler who is known as the \"First Emperor,\" Shih Huang Ti. He\nacquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221\nB.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable\nfor three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns,\nthe destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The\ndestruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by\nmany subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up\nagain whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang\nTi was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all\nChina in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his\nson, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word \"China\"\nis probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese\nput the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with\nwhat is now China proper.\n\nThe destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as\nappears from his calling himself \"First Emperor,\" disliked being\nreminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore\nhistory was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong\nforce in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of\nthe preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a\nvigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not\nof pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and\nradicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that--\n\n     All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own\n     family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office\n     of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit\n     themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian\n     classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go\n     before the local civil and military authorities so that they may\n     be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the\n     Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses\n     exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity\n     to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their\n     relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict,\n     those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent\n     to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are\n     those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture\n     and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws\n     and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier,\n     op. cit. i. p. 203.)\n\nIt will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The\nChinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other\nhand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of\nold-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to\ndestroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6]\nsays:--\n\n     No radical change can take place in China without encountering\n     the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then\n     than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical\n     change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the\n     worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was\n     good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their\n     children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to\n     support their contention and these they freely quoted to show\n     that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the\n     government to such an extent that something had to be done to\n     silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on\n     the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any\n     rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as\n     were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or\n     Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature\n     under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not\n     of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still,\n     this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a\n     number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was\n     subsequently buried alive.\n\nThis passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is\nanxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship\nof the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has\na tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have\nexcelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China,\nwhich perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made\nprogress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with\na favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary\npedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come\ndown to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was\nsomewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two\nyears, in 191. B.C.\n\nAfter a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit\nhis capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206\nB.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly\ncoeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in\nNorthern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact\nwith India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their\nrelations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well\nas upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism.\nRelations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk,\nand continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little\nimportance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164\na treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8]\nMarcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which\nstands for Antoninus.\n\nIt was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense\nprestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European\narmies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to\nthink that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as\nephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military\nsuperiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are\ntempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere\ndelusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of\nthe universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with\nthe campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han\ndynasty, says:--\n\n     The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the\n     history of the world when they have grouped around the people of\n     Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the\n     expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these\n     voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of\n     these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the\n     Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same\n     time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that\n     of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who\n     wrote the history of their little world while they believed that\n     they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole.\n\nIn our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is\nliable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the\ncivilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if\nwe are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion.\n\nAfter the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of\ndisorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this\ndynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest\nextent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire\nof Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a\ngreat part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis\nand his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in\nChina, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis\ndestroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When\nMerv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people\nwere killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the\ncorpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur,\nshortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have\ntheir heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one\nof women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have\nescaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill\nany that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and\nKieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these\nmassacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of\nJenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of\ncausing death were more merciful than those that have been employed\nsince the Armistice.\n\nKublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through\nMarco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the\nfirst Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the\nSung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat\nabated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital\nfrom Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which\nstill surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory\nwhich is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical\ninstruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this\nobservatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the\nsuppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in\naccordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If\nso, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty\nsecured to the world.\n\nKublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in\nthe history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two\nsuccessive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by\nstorms, and partly by Japanese valour.\n\nAfter Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways,\nand lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370,\nand was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until\nthe Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways,\nand were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having\ncontributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the\npigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution.\n\nThe persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be\nattributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its\nextent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and\nincompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and\nwere less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a\nbarren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a\nvery sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after\ncenturies of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary,\nconquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose\ntheir ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and\nwent on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived\nthe Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of\nbarbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved\nfrom this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the\nwhite men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is\nlost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national\nindependence.\n\nIn spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese\ncivilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of\nBuddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as\nlong, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the\nworld. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with\nan almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the\neighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50\nmillions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is\nsaid to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at\nvarious times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of\nindividuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a\nmore or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different\nmethods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons\nbetween different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam\nWeale[14] says:--\n\n     The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the\n     restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million\n     persons, which is less than the number given in the first census\n     of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai\n     Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably\n     a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the\n     amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the\n     toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was\n     so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the\n     population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less\n     stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now,\n     however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of\n     the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population\n     had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the\n     no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145\n     millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled,\n     and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812)\n     it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842)\n     it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk\n     to 261 millions.\n\nI do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year\nBook for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):--\n\n     The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations\n     has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates\n     of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree.\n     The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the\n     census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910,\n     the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the\n     Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a\n     Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is\n     pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as\n     approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not\n     individuals were counted.\n\nThe estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is\ngiven, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population\nof Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at\nvarious other dates are given as follows (p. 2):\n\nA.D.                      A.D.\n1381   59,850,000            / 143,125,225\n1412   66,377,000        1760--203,916,477\n1580   60,692,000        1761  205,293,053\n1662   21,068,000        1762  198,214,553\n1668   25,386,209        1790  155,249,897\n     / 23,312,200            / 307,467,200\n1710 --27,241,129        1792- 333,000,000\n1711   28,241,129            / 362,467,183\n1736  125,046,245        1812--360,440,000\n    / 157,343,975        1842  413,021,000\n1743  149,332,730        1868  404,946,514\n    \\ 150,265,475        1881  380,000,000\n1753  103,050,600        1882  381,309,000\n                         1885  377,636,000\n\nThese figures suffice to show how little is known about the population\nof China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year\n(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr.\nPutnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21\nmillions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But\nno one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased\nfrom 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and\n1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or\ndiminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or\nany of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate.\nWhat is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than\nguess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be\nabout 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As\nfor the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume\nthat it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely\nthat it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed\ncan be said with confidence as to the population of China in former\ntimes; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to\nbe distrusted.\n\nThere are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization\nwhich give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select\nas the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet\nin writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion\namong the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by\nexamination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system\ndistinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a\nstage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is\ntherefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I\nhave enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other\ncountries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each\nof the three.\n\n1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but\nsymbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it\nmeans that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of\ndifferent signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no\nsuch thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files,\ncatalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible;\nthat foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be\nwritten down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be\nrepresented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a\nmovement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers;\nand I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to\ntake her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that\nthey have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other\nargument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where\nreading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to\ndecide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the\nmovement for phonetic writing deserves support.\n\nThere are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European,\nwhich can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which\nsomething of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably\ntraceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a\nsound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the\nChinese system ourselves as regards numerals; \"1922,\" for example, can\nbe read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different\nsounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese\ncharacters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of\ndialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese,\nwithout knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in\nJapanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an\nEnglishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the\nspoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from\nLatin.\n\nThe advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which\nenables it to be a means of communication between different places and\ndifferent times. But since the spoken language changes from place to\nplace and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is\nmore fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing\nspoken sounds than by one which does.\n\nSpeaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method\nof writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably\npassed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a\nsymbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian\nhieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic\nwriting can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of\nthe ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced\ncivilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact\nthat the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of\nhomonyms.\n\nAs to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the\nmentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in\nan article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore),\nfor February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on \"Some Anthropological\nProblems of China.\" He says (p. 327):--\n\n     Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as\n     a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something\n     inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The\n     accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental\n     formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world\n     culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a\n     fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical\n     users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own\n     virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical\n     civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and\n     inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized\n     portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the\n     most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the\n     same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks;\n     up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient\n     Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and\n     their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks\n     and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially\n     explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language\n     which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any\n     solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened\n     to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No\n     other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would\n     give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do....\n\n     The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the\n     alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in\n     the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final\n     truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already\n     protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries.\n     It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it\n     represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this\n     language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the\n     spirit remains to be determined.\n\nWithout committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which\nis impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that\nthe Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of \"alphabetical civilization\"\nas merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to\njudge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the\ndistinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt\nthat this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind\nindicated in the above quotation.\n\n2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social\ninfluence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions\nand on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of\nBuddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature.\nUnlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about\nwhose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have\nbeen less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes\nhim from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics,\nwhich has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little\nreligious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in\nthe countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and\nadministered the Empire.\n\nConfucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than\nto that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical\nstatesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues\nhe sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed\nto secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a\npeaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was\nessentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former\nages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic\nmonotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved\na shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to\nrender as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress\nupon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the\nfollowing definition of wisdom: \"To cultivate earnestly our duty towards\nour neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining\nalways a due reserve.\"[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an\n_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship,\nwhich was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's\nneighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when\nhe was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike\nthe Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was\njustified if he governed very badly. The following passage from\nProfessor Giles[17] illustrates this point:--\n\n     The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by\n     adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a\n     punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in\n     his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his\n     divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an\n     example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under\n     the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the\n     feudal princes asked an official, saying, \"Have not the people of\n     the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?\" \"Perhaps\n     the ruler himself,\" was the reply, \"may have done very wrong....\n     If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits\n     are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and\n     what can the people do but get rid of him?\"\n\nThis very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout\nChinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent.\n\nFilial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the\nweakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system\ndeparts seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated\nagainst public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the\ntyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted\nwith problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the\nConfucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and\naccordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China\npraising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to\nconstruct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which\nConfucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit\nis illustrated by the following story:[18]\n\n     One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high\n     level of morality which prevailed in his own State. \"Among us\n     here,\" he said, \"you will find upright men. If a father has\n     stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him.\" \"In my\n     part of the country,\" replied Confucius, \"there is a different\n     standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will\n     shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found.\"\n\nIt is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus\nand his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.\n\nChao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to\nfilial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the\nindigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare\nin China as in other countries.\n\nThe worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without\nchildren, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no\ndescendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has\nmade the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great\nbiological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to\nChina, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this\nrespect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the\npreservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization\nhad been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the\nChinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family\nbecame less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen\nuntil our own day.\n\nWhatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is\ncertainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both,\nof course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to\nthe practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's\nloyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a\nvery primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to\nmilitarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the\ninterests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing\nthe interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore\nfamily feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out\nby the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.\n\nApart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code\nof civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It\ntaught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral\ncode was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that\nonly a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with\npersonal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It\nwas not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more\nimperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he\nmust exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension\nof the kind which children learn when they are taught to \"behave.\" He\nmust not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must\n\"save face,\" and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries;\nhe must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love\nor hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all\nhis actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century,\nbut perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the\nguillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have\noccurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them\nless terrible for the participants, and making all who were not\nimmediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack\nyour adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and\nwon a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette;\nso Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and\nfought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in\nChina are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the\nscourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian\nethics.[20]\n\nConfucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century\nA.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust\naside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of\nConfucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall\nof the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured\nConfucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were\nstruggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and\nappealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of\ndrinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists\nof the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but\nthe Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were\nultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many\ncenturies, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion\nbut not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and\npractised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the\nbelief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all\nothers must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be\nvery little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic\nlingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was\nreligion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable\nthat religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding\nethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.\n\n3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive\nexamination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and\nunsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its\nhold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the\npresent President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book\non _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the\neducational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues:\n\n     In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of\n     moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during\n     the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the\n     Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was\n     composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was\n     considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that\n     in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who\n     were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total\n     enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high\n     as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of\n     \"elections\" through which able and virtuous men were recommended\n     by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public\n     offices. College training and local elections supplemented each\n     other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest\n     emphasis.\n\n     Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never\n     been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the\n     introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-ch\u00fc system,\n     must be held responsible. The \"election\" system furnished no\n     fixed standard for the recommendation of public service\n     candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic\n     class from which alone were to be found eligible men.\n     Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the\n     elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the\n     competitive examination system in their place. The examinations\n     were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they\n     were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the\n     introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and\n     stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some\n     useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese\n     education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite\n     of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary\n     attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in\n     family education and in private schools.\n\nAlthough the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in\nexaminations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed,\nsuch as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the\nChinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful\nthrough the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was\npurely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality.\nThe system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu\n(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects\nof modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23]\nsays:\n\n     In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit\n     of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form\n     of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This\n     was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of\n     Chinese composition, called the \"Essay,\" or the \"Eight Legs,\"\n     which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature,\n     was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named,\n     because after the introduction of the theme the writer was\n     required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two\n     members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The\n     theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five\n     Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or\n     any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his\n     school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of\n     Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity\n     with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as\n     passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers.\n     To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a\n     man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time\n     qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was\n     absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to\n     recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was\n     not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect\n     or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary\n     development of a nation. With her \"Eight Legs,\" China long ago\n     reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely\n     on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this\n     rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have\n     been so long venerated.\n\nThese are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no\ndoubt, as a modern system, the \"Eight Legs\" deserve all the hard things\nthat he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one\nconsiders the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was\nprobably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil,\nthe examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China.\nAmong its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the\npossibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of\nadministrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the\npreservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest.\nBut, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away\nto meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to\nperish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce\nand cruel system which they miscall civilization.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient\nHistory of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives\nmuch useful critical information about early China.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and\nits Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire G\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Chine_, Paris,\n1920, vol. i. p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press,\n1914), p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and\nShanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are\nallusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i.\np. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus\ndescribes the greatness of the early Tang Empire:\n\n\"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the\nillustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes\nof China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign\nof ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung\n(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever\nseen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of\ncivilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the\nmost progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on\nthe face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines\nof Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along\nthese mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the\ninner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the\nHindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and\nMagadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the\nByzantine Empire and the Court of Persia.\"]\n\n[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin,\nLtd., pp. 13, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in\nChinese to my own name was \"Lo-Su.\" There is a word \"Lo,\" and a word\n\"Su,\" for both of which there are characters; but no combination of\ncharacters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _\u00e0 propos_\nof the phrase \"maintaining always a due reserve,\" the following\nfootnote: \"Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be\nequivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to\nhave meant 'no familiarity.'\"]\n\n[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even\nmore emphatic. \"The best soldiers,\" says Lao-Tze, \"do not fight.\"\n(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead,\nand his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident\noccurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles\nare impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above\nthe ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. \"O my revered\nfather-in-law,\" he prayed, \"do not destroy my faith that miracles are\nimpossible.\" Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and\nthe son-in-law's faith revived.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking,\n1920.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nCHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS\n\n\nIn order to understand the international position of China, some facts\nconcerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was\nfor many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and\nfertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people.\nAristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the\nbeginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of\nofficials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as\nin England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly\nreligious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was\nimported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that\ncountry to master the theology of the new religion in its native home,\nbut in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey\npractically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the\nseventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again.\n(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument\ndiscovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth\ncenturies Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at\nCourt, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in\nrectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese\ncalendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the\nwalls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels\nbetween different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both\nChina and Japan.\n\nIn the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in\nChina, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a\npermanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time\nwas Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a\npatron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens\nof his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King\nGeorge III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it\nall, but some extracts must suffice. It begins:\n\n     You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless,\n     impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our\n     civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing\n     your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent\n     offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial:\n     the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful\n     humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.\n\nHe goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing\nwith an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be\ngratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for:\n\n     If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills\n     you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and\n     code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if\n     your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our\n     civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and\n     customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy\n     might become, nothing would be gained thereby.\n\n     Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to\n     maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the\n     State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have\n     no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O\n     King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater\n     devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission\n     to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your\n     country hereafter.\n\nHe can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels\nthat they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange:\n\n\"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and\nlacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to\nimport the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own\nproduce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire\nproduces are absolute necessities to European nations and to\nyourselves,\" the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to\ncontinue.\n\nHe would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but \"I do not forget\nthe lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by\nintervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of\nthe usages of our Celestial Empire.\" He concludes with the injunction:\n\"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!\"\n\nWhat I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this\ndocument has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the\nworld, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The\nEmpire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger\npopulation; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had\nnot fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by\nabsorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the\nJapanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China.\nThe view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the\nGreat, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of\nChina, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty\nyears. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything\nneeded for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade\nupon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things\nwhich they would do better without.\n\nUnfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect,\nnamely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at\nleast the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would\nnot have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is\na museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be\nseen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to\nimpress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to the\nChinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact\nthat Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and\nall the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not\nmake us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and\nRobert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by\ngiving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an\nEnglishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman.\nTherefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung\nis absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to\ndemonstrate this proposition.\n\nOur first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese\nGovernment endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with\nthe cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade,\nas well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and\nScandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on\nChina, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose\nartistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been\nabout equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that\nof Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the\nsuperiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the\nriver Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at\nHong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British\ndiplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an\nindemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the\nFrench took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under\nChinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to\nJapan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions\nwould have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany\nand Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support\nof Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between\nChina and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the\nimportant rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the\nRusso-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution.\n\nThe next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in\nShantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of\nit; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few\nconverts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in\nChristian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval\nbase there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung,\nwhich, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with\nthe Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese\npossession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its\nrestitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did\nnot, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the\nGerman Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills,\nsince it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China.\nThus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and\nto hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the\nBoxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the\nGermans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in\nevery respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur,\nthe British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the\nYangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the\npolicy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door.\n\nThe Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans\nknow about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of\nPeking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of\nPeking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall,\nfilled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a\nbare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is\nadministered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no\npowers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and\ntraitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the\nJapanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their\ncrimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the\nAmericans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of\ncommunicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of\nChien Lung is completed.\n\nOut of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The\nAmericans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they\nstill had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on\nhigher education, partly in colleges in China under American control,\npartly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities.\nThe gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the\nfriendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is\nincalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any\nsigns of following suit.\n\nTo understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is\nfaced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which,\nChina has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which\nhave been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no\nexperience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in\nlater days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps\nof paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a\nprerogative which every single one of them exercises.\n\nThe best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At\nthe end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty\nwhich provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports\nand not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the\nwhole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a\nschedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be\ncalculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only\nbeen revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the\nschedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in\nthe tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is\npractically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties\ninvolving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with\ntwelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the\ntariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.\n\nWhen foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it\nmust be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese\nthe usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign\nStates.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no\ntime-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other\ncommercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to\nfind a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no\nmotive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised\nfree trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we\nforced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But\nno other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have\nabandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.\n\nThe import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for\nthe sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all\nexports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce,\nand is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is\ndesperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should\nconsider the tax indispensable.\n\nThere is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time\nof the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs\nbarriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with\nthe internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending\ngoods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the\npayment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is\ngenerally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours\nforeign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of\ninternal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the\nground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal\ncustoms in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export\ntariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But\nthere were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all\ncould be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not\nchiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should\nbe added that internal customs are collected by the provincial\nauthorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies\nand civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong\nenough to stop these abuses.\n\nThe administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the\nChinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the\nservice, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of\nany other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials\nis in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures)\nthere were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000\nwere non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who,\nby the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties\nexceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the\npresent system. The Chinese have the appointment of the\nInspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to\ntheir country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent,\nso that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern\nbureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the\nChinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful\neducative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an\nefficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical\nand intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their\nslaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs\nhas much to recommend it during the early stages.[30]\n\nAt the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence\nin the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact\nthat the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue\nderivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities,\nso that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of\nChinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the\nCustoms administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese\npolitics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_\nGovernment. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in the\nNorth.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an\nartificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary\ninstincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal\nreform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting\nto introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue,\nwhich interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of\nreconstruction.\n\nThere is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was\naccepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the\nsecurity acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the\nemployment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the\nCustoms, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government,\nand the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards\nthe Customs.\n\nThe Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to\nChina. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities\nof interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect.\nThe way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three\ntelegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year.\n\nOn January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram\nfrom its Peking correspondent:\n\n     It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be\n     rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a\n     substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen,\n     while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and\n     simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the\n     Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all\n     records by \u00a31,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the\n     Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to\n     liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very\n     few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the\n     Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a\n     Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible\n     prospect of the removal of this difficulty.\n\nI venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed\nif the Manchu Empire were restored.\n\nAs to the \"splendid salt surplus,\" there are two telegrams from the\nPeking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd,\nrespectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government\nartificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as\nfollows:--\n\n     Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is\n     happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the\n     Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet\n     faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to\n     the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of\n     gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if\n     $3,000,000 (about \u00a3400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately\n     forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the\n     revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has\n     been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic\n     Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for\n     immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the\n     traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate.\n\nThe second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:--\n\n     The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a\n     serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in\n     my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near\n     Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of\n     Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in\n     the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate\n     the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and\n     Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the\n     Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do\n     not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The\n     Reorganization Loan of \u00a325,000,000 is secured on the salt\n     revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the\n     department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In\n     various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not,\n     the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections\n     and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the\n     foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so\n     large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have\n     considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points\n     on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is\n     another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the\n     amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers\n     would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any\n     active form of intervention in this country. In view of the\n     extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present\n     interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000\n     (\u00a311,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been\n     dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on\n     January 28th remains unsolved.\n\nIt is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting\npunishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the\nWashington Conference should attempt to interfere!\n\nIt is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon\nthemselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials.\nThis inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a\nman's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is\nexpected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore\ncan only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the\nfamily system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China\nrealizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of\nhonesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no\nvery extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with\nWestern nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese\nnationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will\nbegin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for\nthe better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think,\nbut it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for\ngood in China will be at an end.\n\nI have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did\nto China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in\nmodern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem.\nBefore considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of\nmodern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is\nnot prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But\nbefore passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social\nand political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in\nChina would be unintelligible.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining\nhis attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says:\n\"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the\nSky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly\nconversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point\nwhich you soldiers and people should understand.\" (Giles, op. cit. p.\n252.)]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly\nbuilt by the Empress Dowager.]\n\n[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap.\nvii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.]\n\n[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington\nConference.]\n\n[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained\npossession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the\npolicy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly\nsatisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.]\n\n[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on\nMr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be\nallowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did\nnot deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_\nassumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of\nthe Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption\nwhich it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had\nconfused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was\ndealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not\nprint either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to\nconclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nMODERN CHINA\n\n\nThe position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar,\nbecause in population and potential strength China is the greatest\nnation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of\nthe least. The international problems raised by this situation have been\nbrought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington\nConference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it\nis as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts\nand principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try\nto give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which\nit may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese,\nthough as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic\ndevelopment, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as\nour own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we\nshall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon\nChina a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses\nhave been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason\nhas been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the\nGreat Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst\nis Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger\ninterests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan\nand have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America\nstands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened.\nFourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination\nby foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers\nbecome Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very\nessence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak,\ninternationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be\na disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only\nultimate solution.\n\nAfter these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter,\nnamely, the present internal condition of China.\n\nAs everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries,\ndecided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many\ncauses led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of\nChinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a\nwarlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon\nthe Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails\nand Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike\ncompromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were\nrejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This\ncharacteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in\ncommon.\n\nThe Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but\ndifferences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the\nmore civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained\ninwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous\nforeign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time,\ndestroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful\npeople the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which\nlasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have\ndiminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as\nterrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful\nwhether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded\n(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China\nby Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising\n(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for\na better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family.\nBut things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after\nthe Boxer movement that the revolution broke out.\n\nThe revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit\nto ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the\nCanton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected\nprovisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the\ndynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its\nCommander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme.\nHe made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on\ncondition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen.\nYuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is\ncalled a \"strong man,\" _i.e._ a believer in blood and iron, not likely\nto be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North\nhas always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan\nShih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in\nthe way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he\nhad every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic\ncorps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must\nbe admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of\nhis policy and methods.\n\nA Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave\nplace to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine\nthe permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the\nParliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament\nwished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but\nhe had the preponderance in military strength. Under these\ncircumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon\noverthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament\n(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by\nunconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to\na revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After\nthis, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of\nChina. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of\nprovinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His r\u00e9gime might\nhave lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor,\nand was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart,\nit was said.\n\nSince then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military\ngovernors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government\nwhen his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the\npopulations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been\ncivil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to\ndetermine which of various rival generals should govern various groups\nof provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but\nthis has lost most of its constitutional significance.\n\nThe military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are\ncalled Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit\ndepredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule.\nThey intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and\nadministered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally\nappointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the\nsoldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt,\nand is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such\nportions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to\nsurrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the\nJapanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be\nprolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met\nthere for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely\ncivil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially\nrepresent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal\nGovernment was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt\ntreasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars,\nto secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to\nChang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool\nof Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to\nMongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he\nwould undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at\nMukden ever since.[32]\n\nIn the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government\nof a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect.\nCanton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism,\nsucceeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its\nNorthern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government\nunder the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two\nprovinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a\nmoment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has\nbeen checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the\nneighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes\ndesigns of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33]\nIn all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the\nsupport of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the\n_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity\nwhich it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This\nopposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical\nreform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of a\ncommon type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of the\nrailways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded\nwith the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the\nchange of Government has made ratification impossible. The new\nGovernment, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of\nthem, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or\nless similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The\nAmerican Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the\nBritish Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have\nlost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because\nwe, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is\nvigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement\nlapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital.\n\nThe anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend\nof China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a\nmistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in\nmagnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to\na single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ of\nNovember 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: \"The Peril of\nChina. A dozen rival Governments.\" But in Europe there are much more\nthan a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those\nof China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in\nChina, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of\ndestruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has\nbeen incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period.\nYou may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that\nyou will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being\nfought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which\nthey are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the\ninhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the\naverage, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole.\n\nIt is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes\npossible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing\na very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into\nprovinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the\nrevolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was\nattempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful\nworking of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population\nwithout much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in\nIreland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now\nfavour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not\nmuch except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty\nof getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The\nCentral Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find\nthe money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad\nenough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But\nit is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan\nwithout exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese\nindependence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find\na way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign\nassistance.\n\nIt is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme,\nand may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of\nconsolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has\ngreat weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite\npossibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are,\nat the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the\nothers. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been\nalready mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in\nJapanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China.\nWu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is\nan able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he\nestablished his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a\nblow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to\nterms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself\nwith Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his\nauthority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see\nAppendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a\nbreathing-space is all that is needed.\n\nThe economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few\nregions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking\nhas nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to\nthe fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built\nround a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far\nas I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in\nthe whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government\nemployment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and\nthe work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long\nand the pay infinitesimal.\n\nSeventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in\nagriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while\nwheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34]\nThe rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only\njust sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived\nin China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to\ndrought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably,\nas the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned,\nforeigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the\nChinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those\nwho died of it shared this view.\n\nMost of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide\ntheir holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely\nsufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the\nrainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It\nwould of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more\nscientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by\nafforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly\nimproved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation.\nBut in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually\nsupposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their\nfamilies continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of\npopulation, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the\ngood done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of\nmore children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the\nend, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher\nstandard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And\npopular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there\nis a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these\ndifficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of\ncompetent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary\neducation.\n\nApart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional\nlife of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual.\nBoth depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have\nopened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we\nhad not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our\nintercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background;\none is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners\nas such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that\nintercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but\napparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where\nunreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations.\nThe Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable\nintellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum\nof common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether\nprivately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of\nenriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets.\n\nIn the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters,\nwith streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops\nfull of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese\npart of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the\nrich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through\na gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered\nbeauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and\nSunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression,\nhalf-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety,\nspaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and\ndisease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always\nmade me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life\nwould not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for\nthe poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life\nbrings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At\nany rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do\nnot think it would be true.\n\nShanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of\nShanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there\nis so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of\nwhich is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over\nChina, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port,\nis almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are\ndivided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route\nfrom Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which\nhas long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From\nPeking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned\nby the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern\nbank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it\nonly runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of\nthe railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the\nimportance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong.\n\nIn the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower\nYangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of\nindustrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are\nmostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number\nof cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the\nemployer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern\nChina the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is\nan inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long\nhours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it\nliterally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is\nnot the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China\nwill not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and\neducation enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in\nChina, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid\nand cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible\nmethod by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is\nin sight.\n\nThe intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that\nwhich it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been\npractically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many\ncenturies the country has been governed by the successful candidates in\ncompetitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of\nprestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the\nold traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now\nteaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and\npublic opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have\nintellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including\nChang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly\ntoo stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes\ntheir r\u00e9gime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i.e._ of\nthose who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at\nhome--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for\nlearning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation,\nbecause the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their\noutlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will\nprobably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers will\nallow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action.\n\nIt is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of\nYoung China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a\nmodern education, and I should like to give some idea of their\nmentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two\ngenerations: the older men, who had fought their way with great\ndifficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian\nprejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and\ncolleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded\npeople ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight\nagainst the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to\n50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of\nthe rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had,\npainfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the\nbeliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science\nand a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and\nmiraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you\nsome idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in\nbecoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort,\ntheir forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative.\nBut this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they\nhave achieved in their own minds.\n\nIt must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our\nculture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate\nChinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen\namong the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization\neven when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal\ncandour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the\nindustrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When\nthey become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to\nspread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire\nthe front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings\nalong the railways \"So-and-so's opinion is the best.\" In all this they\ndiffer greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from\nAmerica; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were\nsoaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling\nactivity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the\nprejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new\nset, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to\nconsider any proposition honestly on its merits.\n\nThe younger men, however, have something more than the first generation\nof modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have\nretained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the\npioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This\nmay be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more\nthan that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with\nWestern ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them\nwithout a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without\nbeing torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn\nWestern knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made\nthe process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still\nhave reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their\npredecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing\npractically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese\nreverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I\nsee the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them\npractical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in\nthe directions in which it ought to move.\n\nThere is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that\nis the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then\ndetailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the\nConfucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial\nsociety. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and\nbroadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West,\nhave now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical\nefficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be\ntaken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of\nsome new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can\nexterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to\nbe horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our\ngod; we say to it, \"Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee.\" And\nso it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the\nopposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing\nreally necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee,\nForestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the\nBritish Legation in January 1919 on \"Some National Aspects of Forestry\nin China.\"[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of\nforestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are\nsuitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e.g_. for\nrailway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that\nthe floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely\nprevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were\nreafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most\nreforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject\nfor ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because\nConfucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will\nbe cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory\nas it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions\nas the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper\nrelations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that\nsome Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not\nconsidered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in\nthe West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true\neverywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are\nmost eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial\nprocesses might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our\ntheoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry\nis already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning\nto be a marked improvement.\n\nIt is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook\nand that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most\nmodern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims\nto replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's\nmorals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they\ndare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference\nof morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because\nwe are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_.\nWhat we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about\ngovernment, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the\nChinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring\nthe mechanistic outlook.\n\nPerhaps it is not clear what I mean by \"the mechanistic outlook.\" I mean\nsomething which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the\nY.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese\noutlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is\nthe habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our\nscientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy.\nThe essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who\nhas this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of\nperception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other\npeople to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual\nis not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously\nassailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is\ntoo apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the\nclass-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the\nmystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in\ntheir Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except\nas potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the\nspread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a\nlife against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is\nas old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent\nforms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to\nprotest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a\nfable[38]:--\n\n     Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to\n     protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water,\n     and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real\n     nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.\n\n     One day Po Lo appeared, saying: \"I understand the management of\n     horses.\"\n\n     So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and\n     put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them\n     by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that\n     two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and\n     thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and\n     trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the\n     fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them\n     were dead.\n\n     The potter says: \"I can do what I will with clay. If I want it\n     round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square.\"\n\n     The carpenter says: \"I can do what I will with wood. If I want it\n     curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line.\"\n\n     But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and\n     wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and\n     line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in\n     managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with\n     clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same\n     mistake.\n\nAlthough Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the\nchief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this\nfable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and\ntolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the\nWest. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to\nsee whether they \"drink water and fling up their heels over the\nchampaign,\" and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits.\nUnlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the\nforeigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into\ntrousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as\na rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of\ncutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his\ntitle, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about \u00a3600,000), and\nhe remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his\netiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with\na Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter\nyou or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature\nor a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate\nperception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of\npictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk\nswooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his\nclaws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All\nthese pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one\nfeels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I can\nperhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality,\nunfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing\ntheir best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of\nwhich our Western world has far too little. Together with their\nexquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite\nextraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton\nand cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake\nof the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems\ntranslated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_,\nand it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects\nin which the Chinese are our superiors:--\n\n    Business men boast of their skill and cunning\n    But in philosophy they are like little children.\n    Bragging to each other of successful depredations\n    They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body.\n    What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth\n    Who saw the wide world in a jade cup,\n    By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth:\n    On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability?\n\nI wish I could hope that some respect for \"the Master of Dark Truth\"\nwould enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as\nthat is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of\nsolving the Far Eastern question.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p.\n14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says that\nit \"killed twenty million people,\" which is the more usual estimate, cf.\n_China of the Chinese_ by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the\npopulation was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt\nthat 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.]\n\n[Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more\nsubservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by\nWu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.]\n\n[Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to\nhave made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton\nGovernment was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng\nChiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_,\nApril 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See\nAppendix.]\n\n[Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product,\nespecially in Manchuria.]\n\n[Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the\nbirth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether\nthe birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet\nby my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union\nMedical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the\naverage number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while\nthe infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show\nthat the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of\nstatistics, generalizations about the population question in China must\nbe received with extreme caution.]\n\n[Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr.\nBland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian.\nContrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 of\nColeman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybody\nexcept Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin\nreported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable to\nestimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _Peking\nLeader_.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray),\np. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts of\nTaoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nJAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION\n\n\nFor modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order\nto understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know\nsomething of that country, to which we must now turn our attention.\n\nIn reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the\npersistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the\ncenturies. Japanese history practically begins with a \"Restoration\" by\nno means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from\nKorea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese\ncivilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through\nthe occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won\nfavour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to\nChina in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The\nJapanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism\nnationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it,\nwith a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the\nadherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some\nvicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign\nreligion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than\nShinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief\nreligion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable\nto find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of\npeasant origin, had a much higher opinion of \"the way of the gods\"\n(which is what \"Shinto\" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the\nrevival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief\nin that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the\npopulation. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned,\nBuddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto.\n\nThe object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to\nrestore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of\n645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the\ngood old days. What the object was of those who established the\ngovernment of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that\nmay be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and\ninternal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low\nebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great\nfeudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government\nfell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made\nintelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved\nimitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese\nEmperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from\nthe Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a\nvigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so.\n\nThe similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of\n645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is\nset forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:--\n\n     In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled\n     on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends\n     who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for\n     purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some\n     of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the\n     British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they\n     certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the\n     four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization\n     with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the\n     sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they\n     were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their\n     rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these\n     despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan\n     they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their\n     effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place\n     Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world.\n\nThe two students who went to China in 608 A.D. \"rendered even more\nillustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have\ndone. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked\nback to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration,\nand the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two\nNational Doctors.\"\n\nPolitically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately\nfollowing was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and\nRichelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the\nsovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy.\nThe movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably\nwith about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date,\nthere was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned,\nbut innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly,\nin 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past,\nbut what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just\nthe opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious\nmixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies.\n\nThroughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems\nto see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds,\nnamely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China\non the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government,\nand civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which\nwent on in medi\u00e6val Europe between the Church, which represented ideas\nderived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to\npreserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa,\nHenry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization\nover rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in\nJapan.\n\nAfter 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries,\nbut gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So\nlong as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power)\nit continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study\nof Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve\nrespect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who\nremained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were\nso degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it\nwould have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them\nand the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly\nfrom the medi\u00e6val Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour,\nalthough the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even\ngreater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the\nsecular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado\nand his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of\nthe Restoration.\n\nThe Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the\nnominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of\npower to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of\ntheir infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some\nmonastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented\nthe military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of\nthe Emperor. The word \"Shogun\" merely means \"General\"; the full title of\nthe people whom we call \"Shogun\" is \"Sei-i-Tai Shogun,\" which means\n\"Barbarian-subduing great General\"; the barbarians in question being the\nAinus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the\nform which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto\nYoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But\nbefore long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the\nMikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the\nactual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This\nlasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened\nthat Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the\nMinamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun\nhimself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished\nat the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the\npractice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister\nand his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government,\nbut the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their\nsuccessors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter.\n\nWhat the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the\nTeutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity,\noriginally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming\nat the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both\nignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted\nthe future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions\nof peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to\nundergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of\nwarlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching\ndoctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism\nbecame national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became\nimportant feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was\nready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and\nbattles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history.\n\nThe Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years'\nexperience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country\ncompletely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and\nclosely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the\nPortuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final\nexpulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is\ninstructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought\nwith them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated\nthe former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually\nno Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were\nengaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island,\nKyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed\nthan were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island\n(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and\nwere throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing\nmerchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their\nlarger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread\nof Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and\ntheir guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The\nPortuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to\nmake converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese\nbegan to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the\nPortuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping\nthe Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had\nbeen able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a\nPapal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit\nmonopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards\nfrom Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican\nand Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the\nJesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled\nfuriously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the\nJapanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought\nagainst the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the\nextent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their\nnational independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _San\nFelipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast\nof Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his\nharbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank,\nwhich they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000\ncrowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in\nJapan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had\nthe Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after\ntrying reason in vain, attempted intimidation.\n\n     He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast\n     extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him\n     how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the\n     sway of a single man.... \"Our Kings,\" said this outspoken seaman,\n     \"begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer\n     _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and\n     when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who\n     combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not\n     much trouble in accomplishing the rest.\"[44]\n\nAs Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the\nPortuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech.\nMoreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with\nJapan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans,\nFranciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain,\nWill Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally\ngave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the\nJapanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms,\nthey began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian\nnations.\n\nMeanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and\nIyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the\nquasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of\ninternal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly two\nand a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central\nGovernment to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to\nthe foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between\nthem had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about\n300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to\nbe subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account\nof their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical\nposition. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began\nin 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had\ngreat power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during\nits rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to\nChristianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the\nmovements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may\nbe, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible\nwithout losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more\nanti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in\n1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in\nthe most vigorous terms:--\n\n     So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold\n     as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip\n     himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great\n     Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with\n     their heads.[45]\n\nThe persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly\ncruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political\nmotives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with\nthe King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no\nforeign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of\nChristians against the newly established central power. Economic\nexploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart\nfrom political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if\nthere had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the\npower of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese\narmies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the\nJapanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of\nstrategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest\ncities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population\nof Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would\ntherefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any\nexpedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have\nbeen easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing.\nBut we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world\nshowing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II.\nMoreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe,\nwhere they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the\ninmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of\nEuropean Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their\nreports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The\nJapanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the\nwhite men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel\nconvinced that it was unwise.\n\nFor over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's\nsquadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace\nand almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanese\nhistory, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of\nfire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy\nuntil they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see\nanother period of isolation.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's\n_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period is\npublished by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was\npublished earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Century\nof Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in\ncollaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_,\n1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II\nrespectively.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Murdoch I. p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nMODERN JAPAN\n\n\nThe modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the\nhistory of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would\nhave supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan\nto a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is\nalmost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration\nin 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has\nrisen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great\nWar has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading\nstatesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the\nbeginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with\never-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders\nand followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To\nrealize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining\nthe sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time\nof the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific\nknowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in\nthe Book of Joshua.\n\nThe transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been\nduly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an\nimmense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so\nlittle change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has\nbrought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to\nthat which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to\ntend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has\nsynchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most\nanachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for\nsocial psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily\ninteresting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been\neffected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than\nappears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends\nto national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and\nWestern elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people\nsuggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but\nthis may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon.\n\nThroughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two\nseparate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially\npre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more\nanalogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is\nno part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to\ngive an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that\ncountry, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good\nbooks on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative\nis McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_\n1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared\nin the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course\ninvaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning\nrealization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the\ncherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to\nsay about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan.\n\nBefore, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the\nCentral Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of\nhis own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful\nof the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at\nvarious times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been\nin the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during\nits first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse,\nexcept for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era\nwas inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the\ncountry to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the\nTokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed\nJapan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics\nand possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces\nand their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore\nfirst outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which\nJapan has played in international affairs.\n\nWhat happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to\npower, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end\nof the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to\nhave been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy\npersonage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with\ncontempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was\noften kept in great poverty.\n\n     Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of\n     early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the\n     Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a\n     Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no\n     aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were\n     in the habit of referring to the Shogun as \"His Majesty,\" and on\n     their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the\n     Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to\n     examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the\n     Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was\n     regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the\n     autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of\n     the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western\n     Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing\n     with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the\n     throne.\n\n     In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the\n     relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be\n     sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by\n     Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne,\n     throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the\n     Heavenly Gods.[46]\n\nWhat happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very\ndifferent forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado\nhad had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the\nancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun\nfor yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial\ntreaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never\nwillingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren\nonce more (p. 33):--\n\n     The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of\n     Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the\n     expression \"Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!\" (Kinno!\n     Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in\n     enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific\n     attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not\n     be hastily arrived at. The cry, \"Away with the barbarians!\" was\n     directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers,\n     but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general\n     unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in\n     armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years\n     previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had\n     been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising\n     gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the\n     students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those\n     men who were to be foremost in the Restoration.\n\nThis passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan\ndown to the present day.\n\nThe Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the\nWest, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch,\nin his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:--\n\n\n\n     In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development\n     most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at\n     fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the\n     solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and\n     facile formula of \"imitation.\" But the Japanese still retain\n     their own unit of social organization, which is not the\n     individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the\n     resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central\n     and local, to certain European systems is not the result of\n     imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is\n     merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who\n     overthrew the Tokugawa r\u00e9gime in 1868, and abolished the feudal\n     system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new\n     equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe\n     for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or\n     twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the\n     administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan\n     by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645\n     A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding\n     fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten\n     Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of\n     officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from\n     China and established in the seventh century.... The present\n     administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was\n     neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor\n     adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity\n     that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies.\n\nThe outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of\nthe Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the\nforeigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and\nsecured the support of the country by being the champions of\nnationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted\nwhich has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan\nfrom being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the\ngreatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central\nGovernment was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created,\nChina and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a\nprotectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and\ncommerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and\nworship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and\nby professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation\nof Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern\nJapan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of\npreventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little\npamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese\nand philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few\nEuropeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New\nReligion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He\npoints out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism,\nto the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very\nancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on\nobscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto\nhas been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as\nto suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to\nBuddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not\none which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has\nbeen developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado.\n\nProfessor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the\nMikado until some time after the Restoration:--\n\n     The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its\n     sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the\n     beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of\n     living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been\n     assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was\n     the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have\n     been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long\n     centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the\n     Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another,\n     generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate.\n     At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of\n     the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the\n     Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling\n     their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest\n     against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign\n     (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there\n     have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was\n     set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in\n     another.\n\nThis last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely\ncredible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of\nsuperstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a\nrevolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the\nmidst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and\ninstantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there\nis a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign\never has been.\n\nThe civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China.\nReligion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied\nfrom Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D.,\nwhereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to\nsomewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese\npride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that\nthe Romans were descended from \u00c6neas. To quote Professor Chamberlain\nagain:--\n\n     The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the\n     fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what\n     happened in the sixth century must be received with caution.\n     Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the\n     certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy\n     does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient\n     circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national\n     mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of\n     the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who\n     strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in\n     Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will\n     starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary\n     on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the\n     absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon.\n\nThis question of fictitious early history might be considered\nunimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to\nbelieve the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of\nthe whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought\nand free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:--\n\n     Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit,\n     was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it\n     is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the\n     popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where\n     they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change\n     all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado\n     descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun,\n     and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims\n     the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and\n     constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense\n     popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and\n     low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as\n     public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might\n     say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the\n     Imperial family, is to be alone honoured.\n\nAll this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese\npolitics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of\nthe Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu,\nand has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented\npolitically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes\nmiscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no\nconstitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of\nthe Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are\nomnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them\nthe Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have\ninvariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the\nMikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves\ntake office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and\nMarine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The\nGenro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so\nuntil the Mikado is captured by some other clique.\n\nFrom a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom\nin the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were\na democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists\nof Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there\nis a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to\ndominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly\nthere is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and\nmaking the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the\nMinisters of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and\nthe Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy\nin Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy.\nThere is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and\nanti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese\nindustrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as\nChauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed\nthere have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has\nsaved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed\nif the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of\nthese occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after\nthe Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of\nJapanese politics.[50]\n\nIn 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to\nimpartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea,\nand Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian\nGovernment was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated\nmen and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the\nSiberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it\nhad already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it\nwould be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a\nprolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed\nsecretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the\nrestoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations\nto both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government,\nfaced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse\nthe invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of\nneutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace,\nled Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to\nalienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the\npeace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they\nwould absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact\nresolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was\nknown to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The\nRussians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the\nindemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese\ndemands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed\nup and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese\nannounced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted\nthe Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus\nthe Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious,\nbecause they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could\nyield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter\nin the belief that the Government would never give way about the\nindemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots,\nfurious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the\nnominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the\nreal power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision\nof the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view;\nthere is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could\nnot have been made without trickery.\n\nForeigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in\nwhich the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as\ndemocratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that\nMarquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889,\ntook Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all\ntheir Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great\nBritain has been copied. But there were many points in which the\nJapanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin\nwith, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan\nthere is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about\n25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter\ncompared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than\nthat of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from\npre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the\nDiet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not\ncollectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine\nmust be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister,\nbut from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of\ncourse, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the\nReichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet\nrefuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be\napplied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted\ntemporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the\nGerman Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace,\nit is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it,\nsince this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect.\nTo understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in\nconjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was\nissued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the\nConstitution as follows[51]:--\n\n     Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that \"The Empire\n     of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors\n     unbroken for ages eternal.\"\n\n     \"By reigned over and governed,\" wrote Marquis Ito in his\n     _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, \"it is meant that\n     the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of\n     the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects.\"\n\n     Article 3 of the Constitution states that \"the Emperor is sacred\n     and inviolate.\" Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is\n     peculiarly Japanese. He says, \"The Sacred Throne was established\n     at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The\n     Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent\n     above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable.\n     He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no\n     power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no\n     irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither\n     be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion.\"\n\n     Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises\n     the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary\n     power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes,\n     prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not\n     sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The\n     Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war,\n     makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and\n     commutation of punishments.\n\n     As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article\n     55, says: \"The respective Ministers of State shall give their\n     advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it.\"\n\n     Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in\n     framing it. \"When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of\n     his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities\n     belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a\n     Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the\n     Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of\n     State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included\n     by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is\n     only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to\n     the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But\n     the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open\n     answers from them before the public, and it may also present\n     addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.\n\n     \"The Minister President of State is to make representations to\n     the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to\n     His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State,\n     every branch of the administration being under control of the\n     said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his\n     responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the\n     other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for\n     the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint\n     responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the\n     Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike\n     personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one\n     of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the\n     Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of\n     control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the\n     latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some\n     countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate\n     body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct\n     of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint\n     responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the\n     power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme\n     power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be\n     approved of according to our Constitution.\"\n\nIn spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first\nfour years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the\nGovernment. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by\nMarquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen\nof the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with\nintroducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished\nto preserve Japanese independence _vis-\u00e0-vis_ the Western Powers, but\ndid not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own\naccount. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen.\nTheir ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of\nthe 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness.\nBut when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an\nearlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The\nPrussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous\nat the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by\nglutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and\nFrance. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war\nagainst China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the\nhitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government\nhas never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the\nTreaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant\ninternational crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo.\nMarquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was\nafterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was\npowerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome,\nuntil at last he was murdered in Korea.\n\nSince the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a\nconsistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The\nnature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two\nchapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed\ntowards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant\nas the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the\npresent system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess.\nAn unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing\nsystem, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe\nthat Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be.\nDiplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal\nregime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive\nelement in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan\nto be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact\neverything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover,\nindustry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot\nemigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the\nmainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore\nthe only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into\nindustrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing\nfood abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because\nJapan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot\nobtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with\nAmerica and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong\nnavy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very\nsimilar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy\nrequires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets\nrequires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long\nhours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most\nof the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day\nand got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization\nis in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to\nspread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very\nmarked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of\nthe Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable\nof adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are\nvigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism\nand Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of\nmyth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a\nlikelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and\nprosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict\nbetween the proletarians on the one side and the employers and\nbureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with\nagrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.\n\nThe problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for\nthe growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop\nindustry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control\nChinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic\ninterests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a\nlarge army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for\nwage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners\nmeans growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial\npiety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a\ncontinually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which\nthe fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with\nthe risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within,\nthere will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.\n\nFrom all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a\ndiminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent\nto the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is\nfundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which\npatriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to\nemerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place,\ninvolving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but\nideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free\nthought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct.\nWithout these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that\nremains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 48: \"What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village\npriests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully\nselected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true\naboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of\nBuddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which\ndisregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight.\" (Murdoch, I,\np. 173 n.)]\n\n[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted.\nMurdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: \"At present, 1910, the War Office and\nAdmiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire.\nWhen a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on\ntho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to\nregard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of\nparty politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of\nthe Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but\nare the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial\nMajesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are\ntitles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments\nshowered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the\ngreat sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military\nman is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom\npolicy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious,\nalbeit semi-contemptuous, condescension.\"]\n\n[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit.\nchaps, xii. and xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.]\n\n[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.]\n\n[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, \"The Socialist and Labour\nMovements in Japan,\" published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an\naccount of what is happening in this direction.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from\nits correspondent in Tokyo, _\u00e0 propos_ of the funeral of Prince\nYamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:--\n\n\"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of\nexpenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which\nwas introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as\nthe spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last\nyear, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not\nrender true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the\nhighest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic\ninstitutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that\nthe introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the\nresolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the\nincident.\"]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nJAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914\n\n\nBefore going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is\nnecessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking\nof the \"Yellow Races,\" as though China and Japan formed some kind of\nunity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead\none to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in\ncomparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the\nChinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities;\nbut the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very\nsmall. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the\nscale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a\nhairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit\nthe Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan\ndescent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest\nimportance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and\nChinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more\nimportant than a common racial origin.\n\nIt is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived\nfrom China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as\nChinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of\nthe sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which\nare the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported\nalong with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the\nirruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different\nhistories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar\nhad developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of\nthe First Emperor (_c._ 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land\nempire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese,\nMongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an\nisland kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea\nand occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at\nwar with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal\nchivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative\nproblems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines\nof Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China\nwas still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in\none of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But\nnaturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that\nwhich befel them in their own country.\n\nIn old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue\none finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged,\nwhich has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised\nwhere conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were\nin feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on\nthe contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and\nimmemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a\ndifferent set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and\ncompromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves\nplunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in\ndeveloping the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the\nsituation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been\nschooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal\nanarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated\nthe previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like\nour thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our\nmechanism but dislike our thought.\n\nFrom some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a\nunity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and\nIndia contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are\neasily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with\nmodern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely\nthan in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and\ninvulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong\nas to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if\nRussia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German\norganizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of\npossibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for\npower and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal\nmentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon\nAsiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it\nconflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those\nPowers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both\nare likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the\nessential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent.\n\nIt results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two\nsomewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as\nthe champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the\nother hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers,\nand to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are\ninefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to\nChina and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has\ninspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of\nKorea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a\nmember of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of\nthe Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great\nPowers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in\nAsia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who\nhappen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in\nthe Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: \"There are three hundred million\nnatives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great\nBritain.\"[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable\nEnglishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived\nfrom the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply\nan intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the\nintensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may\nbe, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before\nthe Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57]\nquotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the\nfollowing list of white men's sins:--\n\n     (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that\n     all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization.\n\n     (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests,\n     but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors.\n\n     (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession\n     is made to them they demand and take more.\n\n     (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races\n     in greatness and wickedness.\n\n     (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of\n     everything, will adopt any measures to gain it.\n\nThis enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have\nsupposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be\nunlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They\nargue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as\npossible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed\nby Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been\nequalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his\nwildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he\nwants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards\nJapan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is\nto be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the\nmatter very simply in an address given in 1913:--\n\n     The white races regard the world as their property and all other\n     races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the\n     r\u00f4le of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they\n     please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy,\n     and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white\n     races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny,\n     and woe to them.[58]\n\nIt would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that\nJapan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the\neminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the\nJapanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us.\n\nThe Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal\naffairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without\nfirst consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had\ninfringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war\ncaused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and\ndecisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to\noppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the\nBoxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the\nfruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and\nFrance, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for\nthemselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans\npresumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow\nPeril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese\nwar inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese\nhad established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have\nconstituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for\nnothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called\nDairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the\nChinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting\nPort Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having\naccomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The\nRusso-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the\nAnglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this\nAlliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the\ncorner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War,\nwhen the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided\nthat, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once,\nthe other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally\ninspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the\nRussian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from\ncalling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and\nRussia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of\nPortsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance\nserved its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese\nwar. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to\nacquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus\ncurbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an\nEntente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded\nwith France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which\ndefeated Germany could not have been created.\n\nWithout the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia\nalone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her\nstrength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to\ngreatness was due to our support.\n\nThe war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all\ninterference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called\nDairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun.\nThis part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been\ncalled the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437\nmiles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen\nas the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely\nnaval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to\nWestern models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a\ntreaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910\nthey annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists\nwith every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be\nfully the equals of the white men.\n\nThe Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a\nmonopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was\npractically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China\nby means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr.\nPooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how\nthe South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:--\n\n\"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs\nPauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways\nnorthwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for\nthe work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan\nprotested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol\nannexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that\n'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the\nneighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any\nbranch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that\nrailway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and\nRussia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without\nRussian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the\nRussian rights, the projected line could not be built without her\nconsent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in\ntone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was\nobviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task!\n\n\"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the\nclause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to\nHsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to\nbuild the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further,\nalthough by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were\nspecificially excluded from participation in railway construction north\nof the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British\nNote the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and\nChinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the\nagreement.\n\n\"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in\nManchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902\nand by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of\nthe bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from\nseeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze.\nHer reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but\nwith no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State\nDepartment at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her\naction was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which\nassigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway\n(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining\nthereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III\nand IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is\ndeclared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or\nexclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty\nor inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the\nsecond is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct\nany general measures common to all countries which China may take for\nthe development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'\n\n\"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to\nbuild a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of\nChinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not\na measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of\nManchuria.'\n\n\"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling\nin China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such\nflagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and\npledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since\nrecovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its\nsubjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as\nthe protest from Tokio....\n\n\"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men\nrailway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other\nprojected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the\nimportant Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was\nused equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the\nNewchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in\n1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with\nRussia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was\nconstrued to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration\nwithin the railway zone.'\"\n\nJapan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover\nthe whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has\nbeen nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or\nby loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired\nvast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and\nhave used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the\nprovinces through which they run.\n\nAfter the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and\nagreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting\nManchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution.\nRussia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims\nat the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated.\nHence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the\nsupport of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far\nEastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international\nquestions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party\naiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They\nhave continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions,\nas they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China\npolitically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several\ntimes in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was\nobtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution\nactually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was\nprevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems\nthat the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the\nunion of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South.\nMoreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor\nof China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic,\nthough it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of\nsome southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions\nof Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation\ngives the gist[62]:--\n\n     It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on\n     December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived,\n     with the usual rider \"for the sake of the peace of the Far East.\"\n     This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese\n     Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd\n     categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances\n     would Japan recognize a republican form of government in\n     China.... In connection with the peace conference held at\n     Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a\n     trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to\n     Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the\n     dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the\n     Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with\n     the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for\n     Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria\n     against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for\n     Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by\n     Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese\n     protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining\n     concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr.\n     Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian\n     Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of\n     day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied\n     their authenticity.\n\nThe British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the\nManchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the\nday. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was\nstrongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as\nstrongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the\ninfluence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to\nmake themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would\ndoubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war\ncame, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told\nin a separate chapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen &\nUnwin, 1920, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.]\n\n[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Page 66.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nJAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR\n\n\nThe most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is\nJapanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but\nafter 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach\nin the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their\nnew armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The\nChinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to\nhave been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at\nissue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time\nthere would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one\nside rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely\nvictorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure\npossession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in\nManchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending\nChina. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by\nthe Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of\nManchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse\nafter the Great War.\n\nThe nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have\nthe civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy.\nBut the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways,\nthe industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military\ncontrol. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were\ndispleasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be.\n(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.\n\nShantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China\ncould easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to\nturn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese,\nwho undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese\nremaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they\npresented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the\nChinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented\nin January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with\nShantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms\nJapan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese\nprovince, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain\nspecified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be\nopened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted\nto any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria\nand Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a\nprotectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for\nJapanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial\nenterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron\nand steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim\na sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand,\nthat China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except\nJapan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that\nJapanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed\nby the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be\nadministered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely\nJapanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least\n50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese\narsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and\nemploying Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to\nconstruct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan\nshould have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and\nfinally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda\nin China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.\n\nThese demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese\nindependence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and\nindustry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British\nposition in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we\nhad no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands\nconstituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an\nuproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action\nagainst them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were\nexplained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no\ntime to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret\nagreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan\nwanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the\nterms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the\nTwenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan\ncommunicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus\ndefinitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr.\nLloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.\n\nChina negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured\ncertain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an\nultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on\nthe Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth\ngroup was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In\nthis form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United\nStates immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the\nagreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore\nstill able to do something to further the objects for which we were\nsupposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In\n1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination,\nit became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the\nIshii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which \"the Government of the\nUnited States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China,\nparticularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous.\" The\nrest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68]\n\nI come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69]\nIn this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing\ndiplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the\ndeclaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off\ndiplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all\nneutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in\nPeking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He\ninduced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of\nexpostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then,\non March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of\ndeclaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected\nwith these events deserve some study.\n\nIn view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese\nhad not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English,\nFrench and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for\nreasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been\nsome suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should\nparticipate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor.\nThese suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of\nJapan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear\nthat China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent.\nWhen, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in\nTokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies,\nViscount Ishii said that \"Japan considered developments in China as of\nparamount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan\ncould not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient\nChinese army such as would be required for her active participation in\nthe war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of\nthe economic activities of 400,000,000 people.\"[70] Accordingly the\nproposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the\nJapanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their\nsympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they\nfilled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing\nthem of cowardice and military incompetence.[71]\n\nBut when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the\nsituation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience\nto Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had\nalways been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing\nto take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic\nrelations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no\n_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American\nGovernment, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was\nignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were\nbound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged\nChina to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and\nGreat Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued\nsupport of Japan.\n\nIn May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was\ninviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan\nconcluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks.\nThis treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the\nassistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that \"the vital\ninterests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China\nfrom the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having\nhostile designs against Russia or Japan.\" The last article provided that\n\"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of\nthe High Contracting Parties.\"[72] That is to say, the treaty was not\ncommunicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of\nArticle 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that \"The High\nContracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting\nthe other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the\nprejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement,\"\none of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all\nPowers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese\nEmpire.\n\nOn February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to\nsever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with\nJapan containing the following words:--\n\n     His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the\n     request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they\n     will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of\n     Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north\n     of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being\n     understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual\n     peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims\n     to the German islands south of the equator.\n\nThe French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by\nNotes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February\n19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian\nAmbassadors stating, among other things, that \"the Imperial Japanese\nGovernment proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace\nnegotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special\ninterests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands\nbelonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.\"\nThe French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:--\n\n     The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the\n     Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the\n     Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung\n     and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It\n     also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese\n     Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed\n     before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.\n\n     M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support\n     to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations\n     with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance.\n     The consequences in China should be the following:\n\n     First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and\n     consuls;\n\n     Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave\n     Chinese territory;\n\n     Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the\n     ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the\n     disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and\n     Portugal;\n\n     Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in\n     China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she\n     possesses in certain ports of China.\n\nThe Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian\nAmbassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:--\n\n     In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,\n     under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is\n     charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it\n     can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of\n     Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual\n     surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung\n     and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in\n     the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74]\n\nIt will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no\n_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the\nprevious year.\n\nAfter these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's\nparticipation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the\nhope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope\nbeing realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest\nignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the\nChinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last\ndays of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished\nby the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917.\n\nMeanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into\nthe war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has\nbeen one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the\nrevolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with\nat this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in\nestablishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his\nsuccessor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine\nconstitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had\ndismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was\nresumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations,\nand, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan\nChih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his\nCabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese\nParliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic\nrelations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.\n\nOn the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It\nwas President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking\noff diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign;\nbut on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented\na Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of\nnational unity was more important than entry into the war, and\nsuggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What\nhad happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never\nhave become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by\nthe Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to\ninstigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat\nSen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration\nof war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd\nGeorge on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on\nMay 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration\nof war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to\ncoerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved\nimpossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to\ncompel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the\nMembers of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act\nas a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of\nconstitutional government. After these various illegalities, the\nmilitary autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their\nnumber, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu\nEmperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more\nagreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North,\nsometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient\nunconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to\ndeclare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and\nagainst militarism.\n\nOf course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the\nwar, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of\nthe European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We\nwished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living\nin China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German\ntrade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was\nduly carried out--not only public property, but private property also,\nso that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to\nthe claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till\nafter the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in\novercrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of\nhardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities\ninsisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew\nto be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the\nArmistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took\nupon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless\npersecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have\nbeen much greater.\n\nThe confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of\nVersailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the\nbelligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side\ntwo statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to\nthe Declaration of War: \"We shall, I feel confident, conduct our\noperations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with\nproud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be\nfighting for\"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over,\nafter a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for\nratification of the Versailles Treaty: \"Through the Treaty, we will yet\nget very much of importance.... In violation of all international law\nand treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of\nGerman-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that.\"[77] The\nEuropean Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to\nenter the war for righteousness.\n\nWe have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration\nof war. What Japan gained was somewhat different.\n\nThe Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government,\nwas completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist\nJapanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the\nwar, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--for\nJapan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of\nTsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal\nelements in the North were against the clique which had seized the\nCentral Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were\nconcluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially\npublished, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese\nwere enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and\nMongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of\nthe Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and\ngenerally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the\nexcuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.\n\nAfter this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they\nplaced loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_\nabout \u00a325,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were\nas willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of\nvictory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting\nin the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies\nof Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For\nvarious reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until\nafter the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace\nnegotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were\ncompelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed\neverything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have\njoined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on\nthis subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the\nmost interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of\nVersailles, \"Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights,\ntitle, and privileges\" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although\nPresident Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice,\nAmerica refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise\nthe issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles\nresisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally,\nencouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign\nthe Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province\nas a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to\na proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had\nannexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in\nthe war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.\n\nMeanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public\nopinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20\nwas in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly\nejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the\nYoung China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu\nleaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking\nGovernment has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always\nfor American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her\nposition in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might\nre-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference\nwas announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a\nview to having the question settled before the opening of the\nConference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory\nconcessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional\nevacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of\nEngland and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the\nAmerican Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I\nunderstand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with\nAmerica. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount\nto much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years.\nOn this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington\nConference.\n\nThere is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not\nto concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great\nimportance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was\nconsidered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference,\nto pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks,\nwith their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence.\nTheir existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a\nquarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves\nin unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia\nhas been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the\nCzecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after\na time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake\nBaikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern\nRepublic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is\npractically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have\nlaunched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern,\netc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military\noccupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province,\nthough they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.\n\nIn the early days of the Bolshevik r\u00e9gime the Russians lost Northern\nManchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly\nof Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of\nthe Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects\nwith the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail\nbetween Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme\nannoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that\nletters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead\nof a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with\nthe Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is\nthe reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile,\nvarious Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and\nendeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which\nled to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon\nall Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a\nwar with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the\nopportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position\nin Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking,\nOuter Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany\ncombined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.\n\nThe Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger\nChinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have\na good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in\nAsia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As\nthey were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the\nagreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset\nimpartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For\nAmerica, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are\neconomic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far\nEast, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political\nfreedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage\nbeneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may\nbecome strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This,\nhowever, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering,\nbecause everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is\ntreated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But\nwhat part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet\nimpossible to say.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of\nJapan?_ pp. 174-5, says: \"This paragraph concerns the iron and steel\nmills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the\nUpper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people.\nThe Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty\nmiles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections.\nThe ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500\nfeet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700\nyears. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained\nfrom Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand\nminers dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is\ncapable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five\ncenturies....\n\n\"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart\nof China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special\ntrade domain.\"\n\nMr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this\nmatter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv.\nSee below, pp. 232-3.]\n\n[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_,\nOctober 20, 1921.]\n\n[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley,\n_Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.]\n\n[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to\nthe United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: \"When Viscount Kato sent China\na Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what\npurported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only\ncontained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was\ndirectly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese\nAlliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can.\nOutside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably\nfoolish\" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).]\n\n[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the\nnegotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy\nand the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.]\n\n[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung\nquestion are printed in S.G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii\nand ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp.\n214-6.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and\nofficial history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in\nChina_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and\nthe Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and\n_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director\nof International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff;\nColeman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.]\n\n[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which contains\nthis note (p. 346) as well as the other \"documents relative to the\nnegotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of\nthe German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea\nIslands north of the Equator.\"]\n\n[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration\nof war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book,\n\"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China,\" should be read by anyone who\nstill thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything\nexcept money-grubbing.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.]\n\n[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an\narticle on \"China's Finances in 1918\" in _China in_ 1918, published\nearly in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the\ncomments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China and\nJapan_.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese\nquestions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr.\nY. Soyeda's pamphlet \"Shantung Question and Japanese Case,\" League of\nNations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's\narguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.]\n\n[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's\n_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.]\n\n[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's\n_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., \"The Student Movement.\"]\n\n[Footnote 83: \"Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest\nagainst the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China\nRailway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares\nthat it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel\ndue deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make\ndemands consistent with those rights\" (_Daily Herald_, December 22,\n1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the \"Russian\nlabouring masses,\" but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What\nRussia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the\nBolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs\nof the capitalists.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE\n\n\nThe Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at\nWashington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the\nFar Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be\ndealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual\ndecisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their\neffect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.\n\nIn the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been\nbrought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact\nbetween America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general\nalliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of\nAmerica and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing\nfor international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The\nsituation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as\nregards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in\nthe reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem\nto have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan.\nIt may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more\nliberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of\nWei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive\nbut for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us,\nand secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the\nterms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as\nRussia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that\ndate.\n\nOne very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement\nnot to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified\nexceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between\nAmerica and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America.\nWithout a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring\nnaval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of\nthe Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a\nfirst-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo\nthis intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve\nthe peace with Japan.\n\nVarious small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision\nof the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The\nforeign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have\ninsisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the\nChinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they\ndesired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service,\nthough the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one\nof the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put\ntheir postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as\nthey have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels\nsent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese\nimportation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy\nin Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature\nof their penetration of China.[84]\n\nOf course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and\nintegrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these\nare mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.\n\nFrom the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was\nthe Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end\nof 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of\nTsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the\nShantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands,\nthey had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings\nin Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and\nthrough it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse\nwas needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands,\nand claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the\nresulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of\nVersailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The\nWashington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the\nquestion afresh.\n\nAt first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all\ntheir own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the\nConference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation\nwith China. This point was important, because, ever since the\nLansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to\nrecognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese\nProtectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary\nto establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered\nwith in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to\nthe Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before\nthe Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between\nthe Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however,\nwas not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a\ndeadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock,\nof course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no\nlonger prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old\ndays. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some\ndisposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was\nroused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution\nmore or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would\nprobably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work\nof the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly\nurged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less\nstrongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between\nChina and Japan.\n\nBy this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the\nprivate property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as\nregards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the\nnegotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they\nwould have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back\nthe railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of\na patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese\nrefused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were\ncompelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid\nin fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway\nwas valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs\nor improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be\nhanded over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty.\nUntil the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese\nretain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic\nmanager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the\nother Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.\n\nIt is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years\nhence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years\nhence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both\nMr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to\nthis compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have\nsome responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that\ncase, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete\ncontrol of the Shantung railway.\n\nOn the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than\nmight have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new\ninternational situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with\nthem in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary\nto consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington,\nsince the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.\n\nThe question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at\nWashington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is\nsecure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both\ntogether, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will\nnot raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See\nAppendix.)\n\nThe Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions\nin Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain\nunchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check\nthem. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the\nFar Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any\nnear future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have\ndecided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A\nconference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place\nat Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the\neffect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached.\nBut on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The\nTimes_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official\naccounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The\nTimes_ as follows:--\n\n     The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given\n     out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen\n     Conference.\n\n     It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly\n     expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government\n     decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place\n     on August 26th last year.\n\n     The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic\n     principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of\n     Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military\n     establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in\n     Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on\n     foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that\n     the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as\n     possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable.\n     Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of\n     the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the\n     Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis\n     agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair\n     Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and\n     territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be\n     speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the\n     affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of\n     property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be\n     met.\n\n     The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be\n     relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had\n     progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved,\n     would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita\n     that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable\n     period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed\n     the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that\n     the preparations for the relief of the said division might be\n     dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate\n     despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the\n     withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should\n     fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.\n\n     Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out\n     within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed\n     arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the\n     same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by\n     Japan.\n\n     Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a\n     sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely\n     ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought\n     up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not\n     only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but\n     declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to\n     Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the\n     Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring\n     the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government\n     instructed its delegates to quit Dairen.\n\nThe Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below\nthe above. It is as follows:--\n\n     On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with\n     the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen.\n     Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian\n     Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty,\n     but when the question of military evacuation was reached the\n     Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued\n     Japanese intervention.\n\n     Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the\n     negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far\n     Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The\n     Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be\n     signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese\n     military evacuation.\n\n     On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum\n     demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an\n     hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement\n     with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far\n     Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far\n     Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note\n     promising evacuation if \"not prevented by unforeseen\n     circumstances.\" The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum.\n     On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken\n     up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops\n     remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th.\n\nReaders will believe one or other of these official statements according\nto their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial\nwill assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part,\nI believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqu\u00e9\nit is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese\nunwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all\nthat they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day,\nwhich would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to\nevacuate Egypt.\n\nIt will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the\nSenate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese\nfelt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with\nat Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will\nnaturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of\nthe Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China.\nThis result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the\nassembled peacemakers.[85]\n\nIt will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia.\nThis is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France.\nAnother reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic\ncapitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs.\nMorgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their\narmaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America\nlook rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to\ncompute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent\nyears by means of their armies. England and America already possessed\ncoal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation\nfrom the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending\nto show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the\nauthenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently,\nbelieved them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that\nFrance and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese\nAlliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become\nanything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa\nhave sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the\n\"civilized\" nations should grow weary of suicide.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the\nEastern Question._]\n\n[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of\nthe Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic\nmission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more\nhigh-minded set of men in any country. And although they were\ncommunists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they\nshowed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies\nhave affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nPRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST\n\n\nThe Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to\nguess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference,\nand still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will\nendeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying\nthe issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I\nregard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively\nthe interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an\nattempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests\nand desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86]\n\nI begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the\ndominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of\npeace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise\nand virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The\npessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the\noptimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American\npublic opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality,\nathletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main\ningredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the\nFar East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur,\nwhether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to\nexplain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious\nhypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western\nPowers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength\nof the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr.\nGladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his\nsleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there.\nThis attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been\nsomewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard\nShaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as\nit was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an\nattitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England\nof the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment\nthan any other Power (except Russia). But the development from\nGladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors\nis one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development\nis bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to\nestimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United\nStates, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of\nidealism.\n\nNor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It\nis apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of\nlive-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less\npugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the\ncontemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical\nphilanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle\nof a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are\nuseful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by\nany others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort\nof world.\n\nAll this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington\nConference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the\nfriction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that,\nhitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst\nenemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power\nto promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if\nthere were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to\nsee our Government making friends with America and abandoning the\nmilitaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done\nin a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the\nfuture good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state\nJapan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than\nAmerica's.\n\nIt should be observed, in the first place, that the present American\npolicy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while\nclearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American\ninterests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal\nto our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand\nthat it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that\nAmerica will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in\nhaving.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very\npliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the\nseas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the\ncost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of\nAmerican interests. To take next the question of China: American\nambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country\nshould be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The\npolicy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so\nrich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of\nthe universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal\npolicy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting\na liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.\n\nIn fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices\nare involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight\nwhatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In\nthe matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to\ndiscriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed\nby a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a\ndiscrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President\nultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least\ntwo-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view\nof treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the\nway, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and\nto this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against\n\"shaking hands with murder.\" It cannot therefore be said that America is\n_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that\nAmerica adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial\ninterests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.\n\nI could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself\nwith one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American\nweekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):--\n\n     On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an\n     obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large\n     banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated\n     the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in\n     fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an\n     emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with\n     intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious\n     effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese\n     Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new\n     international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese\n     Government an amount which would cover the loan in default,\n     together with other obligations already in arrears, and still\n     others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had\n     also received the full and energetic support of the Department of\n     State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were\n     at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece;\n     having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they\n     came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to\n     save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government\n     would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus\n     prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American\n     financial protectorate.\n\nIt should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated\nnegotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the\nterms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very\nadequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_\nconcludes:--\n\n     If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the\n     consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers,\n     those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to\n     take full advantage of the situation.\n\nThere is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington\nConference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the\nconnivance of the British but not of the American Government, to\nestablish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international\ncontrol over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17,\n1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed \"International Control of China,\" I\nfind it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish\ninternational control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the\n_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: \"We suspect the motives which led to the\nsuggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly\noppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid.\" He adds:\n\"International control will not do. China must be given time and\nopportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or\nexaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing\nthrough.\" These are wise words, with which every true friend of China\nmust agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by\nthe way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the\nfollowing (p. 728):--\n\n     Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: \"The\n     international bankers have a scheme for the international control\n     of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a\n     sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese\n     Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the\n     Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the\n     Morgan Company, should be paid out of it.\" Mr. Lamont, on hearing\n     this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: \"Simpson's\n     statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks\n     about resisting the control of the international banks he is\n     fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the\n     Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full\n     opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny.\"\n\nSagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be\ndue to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had\nnothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and\none of China's best friends as \"this man Simpson.\"\n\nI do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive,\nand I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European\nradical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control\nreads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a\nGovernment which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control,\nfor, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would\nbe impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic\nas not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not,\nalthough emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though\nthis were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the\nChinese.\n\nIn the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr.\nBrailsford entitled \"A New Technique of Peace,\" which I fear is\nprophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was\nwritten. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far\nEast, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign\ncommerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good\nsubstituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually\nincreasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the\nchief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the\nspread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization\nfor the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such\n_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the\ngradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one\nday, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man\nthroughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret\nsociety. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is.\nIt will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be\ntold that it is done in order that China may have \"good\" government. The\ndefinition of the word \"good\" is difficult, but the definition of \"good\ngovernment\" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat\ndividends to capitalists.\n\nThe Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They\nhave a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human\nhappiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if\nthey are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce\nsomething immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that\nwe call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will\nbe able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul\nof the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her\nsalvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When\nAmerica went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of\nintervening to insist on \"good government,\" but fortunately abstained.\nNow-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans\nrecognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with\nblindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is\nthat they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank\nGod that they are not as this publican.\n\nSo much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of\nJapan.\n\nJapan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that\nJapan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not\nsuit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United\nStates squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of\nWestern aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only\ntwo ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to\nfight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and\ndeveloped a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled\non the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern\nmorals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was\nhorrified, and called the Japanese \"yellow monkeys.\" However, they began\nto be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured\nTsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with\nthe other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by\nthe West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good\nqualities would have saved them from being regarded as \"niggers.\"\n\nPeople who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the\nintensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought\ninto contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the\nhighest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy\nwhite men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke\nwould venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated\nin this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that\nwhite men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese,\nis important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured\nraces in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from\nretaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general\nwill suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be\nre-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the\nsurvival of civilizations of a different type from that of the\nindustrial West.\n\nThe civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of\nthe West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in\nits mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the\nAnglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being,\nis successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular\nsupport for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely\neconomic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a medi\u00e6val way. The\nmorality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic.\nFilial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado\nis the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of\nsuperstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century\ntheories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe\nthe Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels\npromoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in\none sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt.\n\nJapan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a\nproposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until\nit is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view\nthat the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially\nnationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the\nState religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and\npropagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto\nreligion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is\nnot a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism,\nChristianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to\nappeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is\nbelieved by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for\nmarriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is\nconsidered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a\nuniversal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like\nthe Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples\nthe priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of\nEnglish Archdeacons.\n\nThe Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their\nsense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but\nthey have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to\nindustrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful\nas Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has\nhitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any\nnation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our\ngratitude.\n\nThe Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard\nworking, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them\nhave the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and\nincapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means\nuniversal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of\nquite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a\nwhole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest\nrespect.\n\nThe growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of\nSocialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are\noften theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour\norganizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In\nJapan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety\nof socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time,\nif Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a\npolitical force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists\nresemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the\nnational superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but\nnot so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an\nAmerican who is in a position to judge.\n\nThe real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families.\nBy the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly\nresponsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They\ntherefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the\nForeign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the\nevacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to\nkeep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy.\nSome part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable\nin this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real\nParliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless\nthe existing r\u00e9gime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the\nWashington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung\nbut also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal\ngovernment of Japan would probably have been excellent.\n\nThe Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that\nthe Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the\nGovernment regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The\nargument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States\nwill not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in\nthe Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented\nwith the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then\nBushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield\nin preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi,\nas he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will\nlead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be\nincapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This,\nof course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and\nthe Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A\nwar might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of\nJapan.\n\nOne is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany\nin the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial\nempire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the\nJapanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners;\nso do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused\nour hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with\nAmerica in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by\nour alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese,\nsimilarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French\nsympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has\nbrought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors\nlargely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it\nis very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons\nare so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them\nfurther, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case\nof Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed\nat hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in\nEastern Asia.\n\nThe conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but,\nas often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper\npassions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America\nbelieves in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to\npersuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an\nextension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt\nfutile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and\nculture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a\ndelusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese,\nprofoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve\ntheir own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and\nin this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice\nis even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese\nare determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the\nwhite man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan.\nThus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic\nconflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the\nAmericans.\n\nUnfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong\nthrough impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China\nthe same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then\nthey could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the\nchampions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude,\nand would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to\nthem. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do;\nthey do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only\nto be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore\nbehaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this\nsame behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the\nworst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them,\nthey would have found many champions in the United States; as it is,\nthey have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible\nfor them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best\nAmericans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese\npolicy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not\nachieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a\ngreat misfortune for mankind.\n\nA war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in\nitself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would\ndestroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to\nWestern culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide\nmilitaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided.\nIf it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will\nonly become more liberal if the present r\u00e9gime is discredited by\nfailure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the\ninterests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint\ndiplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only\nShantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate\nneighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of\nactual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance\nwith Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an\nencouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan\nhas been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only\npermitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese\nat an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our\nAlliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the\nending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.\n\nWe come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency\nin Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True,\nmillions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not\nmean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still\nable to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the\nJapanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik\npropaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the\neffectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from\nEurope. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except\nthe younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of\ndeveloping industry without passing through the stage of private\ncapitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are\nmore and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as\nit has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China,\nfor the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State,\nwhereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to\nfederalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very\ngreat deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the\nauthorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed\npersonal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all\nothers where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful\npractical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is\nthe breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these\nreasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much\nprogress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the\nsame thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved\nsuccessful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were\nprobably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury.\nThe Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively\nBolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy,\ncarried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less\ncorrupt than the officials of the Tsar's r\u00e9gime, and who moreover, like\nthe Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of\nmankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course,\nadds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and\ngives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon\nspent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist r\u00e9gime\nunder some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his\nlife.\n\nIt is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation\ndevelops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain\nManchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control\nof Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be\nuseless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed,\nbut it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America\nor with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the\nsupposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years,\nrecover the position which she held in relation to China before the\nRusso-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an\ninstinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for\ncenturies. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the\nlast seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.\n\nThe hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way\nregrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as\nmuch as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover,\nthe Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be\nable to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with\nAsiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking\nnations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong\nfor defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore,\non the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be\ndesirable In the interests of mankind as a whole.\n\nWhat, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for\nChina would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone.\nThe anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end\nsome system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending\nof Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of\nsome system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably\nquite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in\nthe seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in\nthe nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through\nyears of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their\ndevelopment, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference\nwithout grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China.\nWestern political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but\nhave not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place.\nThe problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult\none, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the\nChinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we\ndo not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution\nsuitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution\nslowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely\nimposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable.\n\nThere is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the\nWashington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable\nchance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_\nis to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made\nconcessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four\nPowers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to\nexploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium\nas regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will\ntherefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only\npeople who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As\nthey consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set\nto work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers\nare the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must\nbe so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish\ncolleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth\nof the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China\nfor sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of\nAmerica, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust\nmagnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of\nradical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by\nsome Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom.\n\nBut it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace\nand freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England,\nFrance, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so\nfar as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the\npeace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no\nmeans always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous\ncompetition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing\nthe principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the\ndomination everywhere shall be American, because America is the\nstrongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's\ninterest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese\ninterests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for\nthe sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable\ngovernment in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people,\nand an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will\nnot wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own\nrailways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic\nindependence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the\nform of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will\nkeep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American\ncontrol, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or\nRadical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard\nof hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the\nUnited States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In\nshort, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to\n\"God's own country,\" except that it will not be allowed to keep the\nwealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give\nto the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that\nwhich they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination\nof the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be\nperfect.\n\nThe ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy\ncompetition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive\ncompetition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded\nin diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced\nindustrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between\nworkers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow\nraces.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap\nAsiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to\nwhite labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of\nindustrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an\nobvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any\nperson who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every\nother individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per\nhead. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who\neither produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the\nothers; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an\nopposition between the general interest and the individual interest of\nthe wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British\nDominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial\nconflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole\nquestion of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for\ncenturies to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since\nSocialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this\nmatter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.\n\nThe concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by\nmeans of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is\nobviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except\nthrough the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run,\nChina will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands\nof foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into\nsubmission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe,\nattempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot\nsee, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result\nof the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect\nthat, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the\nMarxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and\nthe West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as\nthe champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be\nfighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive\ncivilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed,\nthe war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any\nsort would survive it.\n\nTo sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big\nfinanciers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest.\nNo doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due\nto popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But\nnot many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a\nfew are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the\ninterests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic\nimmigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social\ninterests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system\nmakes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to\nthe interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also\nto nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is\nseldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by\naccident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the\npresent system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the\nweak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of\nWashington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little\nfreedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the\npresent system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is\nproduction for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation\nproduces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them.\nHence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in\ninternal labour problems and in international relations. The development\nof Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the\nChinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the\nthings they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs\nfor foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply\nthese goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish\npursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will\nbe regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the\nconsumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will\ncease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to\nexploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not\npossible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present\nAmerican policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not\nsecure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only\ninternational Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of\nrevolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure\nuntil international Socialism is established throughout the world.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of\nIndia, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking,\nBritish interests are allied with American finance, as against the\npacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.]\n\n[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington\nConference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there\nagreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the\nnavy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy\nis unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government\nhas been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of\nreluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram\nin _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.]\n\n[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_,\npublished by the Rationalist Press Association.]\n\n[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist\nand Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by\nthe _Japan Chronicle_.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.]\n\n[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is\nillustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for\nApril 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: \"A deputation of\nshipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime\nMinister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp\ninstead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by\nblack labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation\nreached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and\nturned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to\nblithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from\nthe room, he pushed his way through the deputation....\" I do not\ngenerally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I\ndeplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments,\nassuming that the phrase \"black labour be damned\" is meant to confer a\nblessing.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nCHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED\n\n\nThere is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a\nclose contact between our civilization and that which is native to the\nCelestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact\nwill breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or\nwhether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that\nof America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the\npast proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt,\nRome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, medi\u00e6val Europe from\nthe Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these\ncases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of\nChina, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case\nagain. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from\nus, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the\nChinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear\nwe are unteachable.\n\nI propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of\nthe questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three\nfollowing chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal\ncondition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the\nhopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult\nsituation.\n\nWith the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I\ncannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact\nafter such a long period of separate development as has marked those of\nChina and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is\nsurprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is\nnot more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth\nwhile to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two\ncivilizations.\n\nWestern Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life,\nwhich I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish\nreligion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an\noutcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and\nGalileo as representing these three elements, which have remained\nsingularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive\nliterature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more\nurbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical\nbelief, which its friends call \"faith\"; moral fervour, with the\nconception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our\nnationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power\nand the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly\nbe, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive\nalso the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been\nacquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our\nmentality.\n\nNo one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the\ndevelopment of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese\npainting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its\nhistory, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia\ncontributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the\nGreeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by\nthe rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so\nthe original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow\nRiver. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch\nfar either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this\nsimilarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little\nin common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the\nEgyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to\nthe sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should\nregard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute\neverything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the\ndifferences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and\nBabylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do\nnot think science can, at present, account wholly for national\ncharacter. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not\nthe whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant\nindividuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses,\nMahomet, and Confucius.\n\nThe oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. \"Lao\nTze\" is not really a proper name, but means merely \"the old\nphilosopher.\" He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of\nConfucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He\nheld that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way\nor manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that\nwe ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to\nconform to it. \"Tao\" means \"way,\" but used in a more or less mystical\nsense, as in the text: \"I am the Way and the Truth and the Life.\" I\nthink he fancied that death was due to departing from the \"way,\" and\nthat if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal,\nlike the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere\nmagic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life.\nBut I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist\nphilosophy from the first.\n\nLao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but\nhis ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more\ninteresting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one\nof freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences\nwith Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they\ncontrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called \"the pure\nmen of old.\" There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao,\nbecause in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some\nsense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife\nin the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of\nhumour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by\nChuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who \"understood the management of\nhorses,\" and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their\nrestraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with\nWestern mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature\nand art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present\nday. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance\nof a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so\nthat Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the\nChinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in\nPeking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in\nthe theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement\nat its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor\nof a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician.\nIn Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due\nto the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man\nshould always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments\n(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate\nthem in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement,\nwhich led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue\nin their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful,\nmakes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at\nbeing exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration\nfor the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of\npassion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first\nall the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and\ndignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who\nhave lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best.\n\nThe Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from\nthe favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that\nI am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are\nlargely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern\nis to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When\none compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of\nsome other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even\nif they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers,\nis one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to\na powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly\nhas succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners\nand perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is\nquite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been\nprovided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the\nhumblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of\nwhite men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot\ndemean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard\nthis as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the\nChinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors.\n\nThere is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional\ncivilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from\nIndia in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a\ndefinite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant\noutlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man\nadopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity\nand Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man\ncan accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man\nmay be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is\nincompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both\nBuddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental\ndifference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any\nindividual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both.\nBuddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It\nhas mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a\nmessage to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as\nnatural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive\npessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of\nall this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world,\nwanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at\nall. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or\nreligious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of\nthese two religions in China has been that the more religious and\ncontemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active\nadministrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the\nofficial teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were\nexamined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has\nbeen in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been\nlacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western\nnations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very\nclosely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the\npopulation has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that\nsubject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations\nhave had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and\nresources.\n\nComparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in\nChina most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other\ntwo elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is\npractically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but\nthroughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it\nis not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion \"sin.\"\nExcept quite recently, through European influence, there has been no\nscience and no industrialism.\n\nWhat will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization\nwith the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome,\nbut of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to\ndissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural\ncontact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political\nand economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural\nquestion as far as I can in isolation.\n\nThere is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not\nsimply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist\nWestern aggression, but because a very large number of people consider\nlearning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a\nhigh value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only\nof the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that\nWestern knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to\nuniversities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or\neconomics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to\nChina, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or\npoliticians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook,\nespecially in the educated classes.\n\nThe traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had\nceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This\nwas not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack\nof new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the\nstimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily\nkeen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of\nlibraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human\nmaterial. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in\nscience, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore\nthe spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the\nChurch put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese\ncould get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within\nthe next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It\nis quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with\nfresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the\nenthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the\nrenaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy.\n\nIt is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese,\nthat the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring\nwealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an\nethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are\nnot by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me\nthat they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them\nthink there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The\nhabit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and\nsome of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they\nwere looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and\nbefore long they will realize that they must work out their own\nsalvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults\nand kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will\nmake the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours.\n\nThe distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the\nscientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just\nconception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to\nsee gradually uniting.\n\nLao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as \"production without\npossession, action without self-assertion, development without\ndomination.\" I think one could derive from these words a conception of\nthe ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted\nthat they are very different from the ends which most white men set\nbefore themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly\nsought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a\nphilosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to\nGermany.\n\nBut, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with\nChinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese\npractice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is,\nof course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of\nthe three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to\nthe heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of\nmoney--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the\nEnglish or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful\nmen make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny.\n\nNevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and\ndomination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese\npractice. There is much less desire than among the white races to\ntyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is\nquite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on\nwhich are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the\nworld could ever be \"too proud to fight,\" that nation would be China.\nThe natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness,\nshowing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they\ncould be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire\nfreedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may\ncompel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their\nvirtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have\nbeen an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is\nextraordinarily slight.\n\nAlthough there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the\nChinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a\npoet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by\nMr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make a\nhero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their\npacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that\nthey do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--as\ntheir pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations of\ndifferent kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a\npreconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which\ndominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our\nactive impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with\nus; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The\ncultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their\nearliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how\nlittle progress there has been, they will say: \"Why seek progress when\nyou already enjoy what is excellent?\" At first, this point of view seems\nto a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own\nwisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call\nprogress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable\ngoal.\n\nIt is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West\nwith what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek\nknowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge may\nprove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three\nmotives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our\nreligion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic,\nand has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and\nthe missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the\nworld; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese\nhave no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say \"religions are\nmany, but reason is one,\" and with that they are content to let us go\nour way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different\nfrom those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking\nconcessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get\ntheir claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good\nsoldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not\nworth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their\nreasonableness.\n\nI think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that\nEuropeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine\nourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we\nstill practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we\nare firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are\nimmeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation\nlike the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to\nthem is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound\nmistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is\nmiserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier\nbecause the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook\nthan our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils,\nbut fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of\nbeauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In\nthis respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years.\nI do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but\nfor that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to\nbe fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable\nminimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of\nthat contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all\nthe other nations of antiquity have perished.\n\nWhen I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I\nthought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn\nfrom them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found\nthis attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who\ngo only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese\ndo not excel in the things we really value--military prowess and\nindustrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the\nsimple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than\nin the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where\nsuch things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for\nour scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance\nand contemplative peace of mind.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p.\n187.]\n\n[Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is\nof doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three\ncenturies after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nTHE CHINESE CHARACTER\n\n\nThere is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable,\nfull of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be\nthat a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this\nopinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I\nwas working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have\ntalked to English people, and they answered me much as English people\nwould have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not\nwholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the \"Subtle\nOriental\": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an\nEnglishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as\nmany comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the\ngame is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is\ndeceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in\nLondon.\n\nOne of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of\nsecuring the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China,\nboth those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many\nyears. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a\nsingle Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the\nChinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their\noutlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils:\nthe beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the\nanarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at\nfirst a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to\nbe reformed.\n\nBut the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable\nmisfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the\nforeigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of\nsoda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the\nbewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt\nall the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really\nwise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to\nlose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that\nmay come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a\nmansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?\n\nThe Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have\nto put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for\nthese evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the\ncapacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure\nin sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes,\nare more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted;\nthey find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened\nby a joke.\n\nI remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in\nchairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very\nsevere. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes\nto let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their\npipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in\nthe world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought,\nthey would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order\nto increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying\nwhether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place.\nWell-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the\nuniverse moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they\nmight have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows\n_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own\ninterest.\n\nOne comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion\nthat China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten\nwhat constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in\nPeking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are\nplaces full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging\nup coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing\npoetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in\n_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence,\nwill tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can\nconceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a\nChinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will\ntell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an\nancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the\nworld, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook\nthat strikes the Westerner as barbaric.\n\nThe Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet\ndignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education.\nThey are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their\npride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military\nweakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider\nefficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation.\nI think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the\ngreatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A\nWesterner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on\ntraditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to\nfeel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact,\nthe logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical\nWesterner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his\nenvironment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as\ndelicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the\ncontrast between China and the English-speaking world.\n\nWe in the West make a fetish of \"progress,\" which is the ethical\ncamouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked,\nfor instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the\nquestion strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and\ntherefore great \"progress.\" What we believe to be a love of progress is\nreally, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the\nfeeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of\nthis pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he\nhas acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia,\ncompelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the\nfeasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the\nthought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may\nsuit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations\n\"progressive.\"\n\nThere are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common\nthan among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a\nbetter form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power.\nIt is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread\nfailing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore\nmoney is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a\nmeans to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money,\nare often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military\ngovernors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole\npurpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a\nsuitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life\nquietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose\npower does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that\nsuch politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed\nto their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin\nwhole continents in order to win an election campaign.\n\nThe corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than\none would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the\nGreat Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is\ndone by our own \"efficient\" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities\nof a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are\nperformed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt,\nand stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been\nwholly lost in the rest of the world.\n\nThe laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign\npressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he\nmight be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a\nrule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech\nand a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the\nherd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men\nstill think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the\nconclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the\nWest, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil.\nSelf-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in\nChina, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few\nleading financiers.\n\nThe business of \"saving face,\" which often strikes foreigners in China\nas ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity\nin the sphere of social manners. Everybody has \"face,\" even the humblest\nbeggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if\nyou are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a\nChinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because\nyour words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute\nan offence.\n\nOnce I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as\nindustrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words\nthat I should have used to English students in the same circumstances.\nBut I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily,\nwhich surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the\nmost modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are\naccustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what\nis more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I\nwere Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer\nfrom the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful.\nWhether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall\nnot venture to decide.\n\nThe Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in\ntheir habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to\nits ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be\ntaken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it\nis customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to\ncause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his\ntitle, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of\nseveral million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably\nin the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was\nnominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again,\nwithout being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.\n\nPublic opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It\nwas, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu\nparty in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was\naccepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most\nwidespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the\nstudents in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great\npreponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when\nthey came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight.\nIn the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking\nand change the Government almost without firing a shot.\n\nThe same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers'\nstrike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The\nGovernment, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left\nits teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce\npayment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government,\naccompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and\npolice, and many teachers and students were more or less severely\nwounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in\nChina is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for\nrevolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in\ncorrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to\nextort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing\nthe few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated\nin panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the\ninterests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public\nfeeling.\n\nNothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience.\nThe educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize\nacutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are\naware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to\nnaught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South.\nThey know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy\neyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its\ncoal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by\ndeveloping a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new\nreactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts\nof \"civilized\" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit\ntamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in\ncenturies. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and\nthen by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors.\nChinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations\nthe invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.\n\nManchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for\ncolonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their\nsurplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the\nJapanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status\nof Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be\nrecovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese\nderive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of\ntheir national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their\nunrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which\nmerely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military\nmethods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall\nhave exhausted itself in internecine combats.\n\nChina is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one\nthat has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the\nEgyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have\nperished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There\nhave been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science.\nBut Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science\nwill not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as\nmuch of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had\nnot been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people.\nWhat is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness\nto oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they\nsee to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its\nscience, they do wish to adopt.\n\nThe old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and\nliterature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the\nspiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who\nhave had a European or American education realize that a new element, is\nneeded to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization\nto supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like\nours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are\nnot goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new\ncivilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to\ncreate.\n\nSo far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese\ncharacter; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad\nsides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced\nso much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should\nprefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as\nwell as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is\nless admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the\nbalance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across,\nand am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the\nGreat Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer\npressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese.\nWith some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and\ncallousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry,\nadmitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible\nremedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of\nChina's greatest virtues.\n\nThe callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon.\nThey have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one\nper cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other\nninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the\nAustrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw\nmaterials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those\nwhom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese\nwould not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the\nphilanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions\nwere dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few\ndollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by\nwhite men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and\nthat little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the\nefforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own\nconsciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present\nbirth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are\nbound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive\nthrough one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.\n\nFamines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of\nagriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale.\nEducated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts\nto keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness\nhas a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of\nthe problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so\nexplained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt,\nnine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls.\nThe spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain\nin the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable.\nTheir history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show\nthat they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty;\nbut of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be\nsaid that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an\nextent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.\n\nCowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that\nthey are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between\nrival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that\nfirst discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the\nChinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is\ninvolved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a\nserious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese\nare said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers.\nNevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons,\nthe French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous\npeople, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure\ntorture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races\nwould find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of\nstolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage,\nthey have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their\nreadiness to commit suicide.\n\nAvarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is\nhard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all\nexcept a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption.\nFor the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk\nof death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the\nfact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I\nthink this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an\nhonest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as\neconomic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China\nthan it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any\nChinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more\ncorrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that\nchanged industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we\nare--which is not saying much.\n\nI have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when\nthey appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat\nsluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are\ncapable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of\nthis myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was\na case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But\ntheir history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this\nelement in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it\nimpossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of\nthem becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or\ndevoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I\nsuppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite\nof their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And\nmany emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic\nlove, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the\nWest.\n\nTo sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the\nforeigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient\ncivilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away,\nunder the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American\nfinanciers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude\nimitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who\nhave had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty\nin native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not\nobey the laws of perspective.\n\nThe obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved;\nit must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may\nbe preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is\nsupreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these\nqualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle\ndisputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be\nseen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force\nit to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to\nwhich Japan has been driven.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish\na very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See \"The Shanghai Printed\nMatter Bye-Law.\" Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16,\n1922.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nHIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA\n\n\nChina, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of\nculture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient\nbeauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content\nto be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend\nto be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European\ntourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is\napt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive\nand non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who\nregards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a\ncountry with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do\nnot view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire\nwhat is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting\nsurvival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the\nfirst step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher\neducation, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and\nappreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western\nfollies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and\none of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch.\n\nThere is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of\nthe classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more\nintelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional\nstudy of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in\nthe eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have\nsecured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning\nreading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form\nthe majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given.\nEvery child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the\nclassical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at\nthe same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of\nthese schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who\nare taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns\none finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which\nis very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably\nthose who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the\npopulation.\n\nThe establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on\nmodern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old\nexamination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has\ndone much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary\neducation. The following statistics showing the increase in the number\nof schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's\n_China Awakened_, p. 4:--\n\n                         1910        1914       1917       1919\n\nNumber of Schools       42,444     59,796    128,048    134,000\nNumber of Teachers     185,566    200,000    326,417    326,000\nNumber of Students   1,625,534  3,849,554  4,269,197  4,500,000\n\nConsidering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil\nwar, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is\nvery remarkable.\n\nThere are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing\nto the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has\nbeen impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small\nscale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable\ngovernment.\n\nThe traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be\nonly elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the\nolder texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope,\nwithin the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest\nrenaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China\nfor many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions,\neven in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the\ninnocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one\nalmost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the\nVacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern\nworld, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some\neleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and\nagainst the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the\nsame as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one\nis driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of\nspecialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that\nthe ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more\naccount of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern\nlanguages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view,\nso far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China.\n\nThe second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the\nmissionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As\neveryone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired\nthrough the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their\nown account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual\nloss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded\n(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the\nsurplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American\nuniversities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself,\nboth politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts\nin China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have\ncome to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the\nGreat Powers.\n\nOne may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I\nsaw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking),\nthe Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller\nHospital), and the so-called Peking University.\n\nTsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western\nhills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American\nstyle, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has\nan atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a\n(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the\nAmerican College President. The teachers are partly American, partly\nChinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the\nlatter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of\nevery virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality,\nexactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the\nteaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was\nthorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American\ninstitutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English.\nChinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the\nmost skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot\nunderstand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European\nlanguage is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful\nthroughout the Far East.\n\nThe students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and\nphilosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is\ncommonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards\nto America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China\nthey become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute\ngreatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty\nand technical intelligence.\n\nThe Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing\nan interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with\nEuropean utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese,\nbut the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy,\nthough perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most\nmodern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the\nStandard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to\nanyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College\nteaches many things besides medicine--English literature, for\nexample--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order\nto produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European\nlevel, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary\nfor medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound\nknowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to\nChina, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent.\n\nThe so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have\nto suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so\nat least I was told) had already established a university in Peking,\nfully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the\nMethodist missionaries decided to give the name \"Peking University\" to\ntheir schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name\nto \"Government University.\" The case is exactly as if a collection of\nold-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the\ndoctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to\nabandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question\nof extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be\nabandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it\nsometimes gives rise.\n\nReturned students (_i.e._ students who have been at foreign\nuniversities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a\n\"Returned Students' Club,\" a charming place. It is customary among\nEuropeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason.\nThere are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in\nparticular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as\nequals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was\nthat America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other\ncountry; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than\nthose returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman\nwho wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem\nromantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which\nconservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to\nthose of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it\nis useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is\nreminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English country\ngentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the\nrefrain: \"Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels,\" while\nthe Englishman keeps saying: \"Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is\nstill, thank God, the British yeoman.\"\n\nAlthough the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole\nadmirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the\nneeds of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national\ntemperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans\nultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always\nmissionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is what\nthey are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? \"Clean\nliving, clean thinking, and pep,\" I think an American would reply. This\nmeans, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness\nfor beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as\nbeing easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for\nthe leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardened\nold cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are \"_aimer et\npenser_.\" Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with\n\"pep.\" The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate\nboth. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the\nlives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth\nsaving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether\nsatisfactory.\n\nThe best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established\nschools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction.\nIn these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European or\nAmerican, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One\ncan never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by\nwhite men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously\nin the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration\nof China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned.\nModern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they\nare not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other\ncountry, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely,\nand his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility\nto exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really\nbeautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used\nto have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking\nGovernment University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for\nkeenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the\nScience Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came\nacross them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire\nWestern knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices.\nThey wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not\ncapitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best\namong their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans,\nbut quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely\nChinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government\nUniversity, leave much to be desired from the point of view of\ninstruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is\nnot sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline.\nBut these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the\nprofoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students.\nMost of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the\nGovernment--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to part\nwith all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and\nplunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared with\nEurope, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is\nunhappily divided.\n\nThe students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a\npowerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in\n1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr.\nTyau in his chapter on \"The Student Movement.\" And what they did was not\nmerely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):--\n\n     Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the\n     Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the\n     Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to\n     the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters.\n     For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures\n     showing them the real situation, internally as well as\n     externally; but especially by establishing free schools and\n     maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too\n     high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also\n     teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with\n     the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that\n     fifty thousand children are benefited by such education.\n\nOne thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards\nmodern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality\nbetween men and women. The position of women in Peking Government\nUniversity is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to\nexaminations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the\nuniversity. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective\nwomen teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive\ninstitution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would\nhorrify most British head mistresses.\n\nThere is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary\neducation, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls\ntend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as\nthe boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet\nin Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner\nspeeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt\nco-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter\nshould receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not\nripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the\nsphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having\nimagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I\nrealized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried\nout in China.\n\nEducation controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot\ngive what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions\nof centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European\nsuperstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people.\nIt is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that\nthere is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and\nfor that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to\nbuild a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its\nbest days.\n\nWhile I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher\npay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many\nmonths. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation\nto the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who\nclubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The\nincident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a\nrevolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the\nteachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them\nall that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of\nbandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and\nEuropean intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may\nsay broadly that the old traditional education, with the military\ngovernors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for\nConservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions\nstand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically\nthough not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone\nstands for intellectual freedom.\n\nThe Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by\nforeigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire\nmilitary strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to\nadvance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who\nquite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That\nis why the West regards them as uncivilized.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in\npurely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and\nNanking Teachers' Training College.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from _Who's Who of\nAmerican Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596\nChinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items\nare: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in\nGovernment service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three\nmembers of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical\npractitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and\nreligious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese\nholding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400\n_(ib.)._ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America\nin the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese\nuniversity students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a\nclassification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are:\nMedicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22;\nnatural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified\nseparately), 19.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nINDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA\n\n\nChina is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial\npossibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as\nnearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the\nnext few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this\ndevelopment as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties\nare very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will\ntherefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the\npossibilities of the near future.\n\nWe may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's\nindustrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then\nthe mines, before going on to other matters.\n\nWhen railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of\nOxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to\nthem, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a\nshort line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the\nCentral Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In\n1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was\naccomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then\nthought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for\nconcessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important\nline from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a\nHankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far\nas Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with\nthe Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung\nRailway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the\nsouth. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the\nYangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and\nmanaged by foreign officials of the respective countries which had\nobtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware\nthat some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated\nbeyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the\nChinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of\nmost of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to\nrealize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem\nwas how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow\nline and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the\nhelp of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the\nhands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow\nline was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was\nconstructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the\nbig main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the\nManchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway.\nThe first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be\nregarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong\nenough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more\nor less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the\nagreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--five\nyears hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost\nto China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important\nrailways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of\nthe situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity.\n\nPutnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as I\nthink--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. At\nWashington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and\nto concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early\nin 1919, he said[100]:--\n\n     _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of\n     the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution\n     of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of\n     popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being\n     carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left\n     behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia\n     with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method.\n     Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited\n     the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put\n     into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted\n     economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this\n     grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all\n     intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_,\n     subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is\n     that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new\n     technique,_ which ... she will eventually extend into the very\n     heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and\n     Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily\n     arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped._ The method of\n     doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and\n     accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on\n     Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must\n     be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board;\n     that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese\n     citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard;\n     and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered\n     simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section\n     by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_.\n\nIf the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this\nreform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--will\nhave been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect\nJapan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her\npromises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of\nJapanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese.\nTherefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the\nShantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it.\n\nIt must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan\nRailway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by\nforeigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably\nmanaged. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which\nrefer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027\nkilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial\nrailways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres.\nTotal, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are\nmainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be\nregarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably\nrecovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer\nthe importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign\nrailway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr.\nTyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in\n1918:--\n\nName of Line.    Kilometres    Year        Per cent, earned\n                 Operated.     Completed.  on Investment.\n\nPeking-Mukden      987          1897          22.7\nPeking-Hankow     1306          1905          15.8\nShanghai-Nanking   327          1908           6.2\nTientsin-Pukow    1107          1912           6.2\nPeking-Suiyuan     490          1915           5.6\n\nSubsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less\nprosperous.\n\nI cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway\nadministration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the\nevils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed\nby different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was\nno uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to\nanother. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially\nto open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of\nwhich would probably be enormous.\n\nMines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows\nforeign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its\nindustries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent\nof foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far\nfrom satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attach\u00e9 at\nPeking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards\nChina's mineral resources:--\n\n     China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good\n     supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial\n     development. To indicate how little China has developed its\n     marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917,\n     14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now\n     20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer\n     resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918,\n     produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that\n     China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an\n     additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native\n     methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of\n     pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel\n     industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence\n     it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished\n     steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony\n     and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable\n     progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores\n     during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its\n     mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's\n     welfare.[102]\n\nThe _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of\ncoal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103]\nComparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000\ntons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident\nthat great progress was made during those three years, and there is\nevery reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been\nmaintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_\ndevelopment, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, and\nhas set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of\nChina. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first,\nthat only industrial development can support the growing population,\nwhich cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the\nmainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for\nimperialism.\n\nThe Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at\nShanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for\nshipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each\nfor the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:--\n\n     For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly\n     supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from\n     America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited\n     in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by\n     virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home\n     consumption).\n\nConsidering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs\nexplanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to\nunderstand modern politics.\n\nThe _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with\npolitics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principal\niron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and\nmost important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and\nCoal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of\nthe third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in\nsight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50,000,000 tons, derived\nchiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of\niron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as\n603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_\nproceeds: \"Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the\nagreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which\nenforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government\nundertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to\ncompel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources.\" It should\nbe added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical\nadviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be\nsold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price,\nleaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106]\n\nThe second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shan\nmines. All that is said about these is as follows: \"Tungling district on\nthe Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work\nthese mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in\n1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of \u00a352,000, and the mines were\ntransferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation.\"\nThese mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their\ncapacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were\nsold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is\n$20,000,000, which is considerably more than \u00a352,000. This was the only\none of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was not\nin Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published.\n\nNext comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. \"The concession which\nwas granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be\nworked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain\n60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan\nof operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of\n170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of\nsteel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000\ntons a year.\"\n\nThe fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, \"worked in conjunction\nwith the Hengshan Colliery by the railway.\" I presume it is to be sold\nback to China along with the railway.\n\nThe fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, \"one of the most\npromising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the\nJapanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and\nJapanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines.\nThe seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of\nPenhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine.\" It will be\nobserved that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result\nof the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds:\n\"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka\nironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at\nOsaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron.\"\n\nIt will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have\nallowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they\ncan only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely\nimperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of\ntheir own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their\nnational independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that\nmake them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that\nthe chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order\nto be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand,\nsays nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese\ndid not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are\nawake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later\nto the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue\nour survey of facts.\n\nIt may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly\nagricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are\ncrops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the\nthird country in the world, India being the first and the United States\nthe second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture,\nbut industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence,\nand it is industry that is our present topic.\n\nTo quote Mr. Tyau: \"At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was\nofficially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since\nthen no official returns for the whole country have been published ...\nbut perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the\npresent number of factory operatives and mine workers.\"[108] Of course,\nthe hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as\nspecially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the\nwages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value,\nbut is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as\nindustry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr.\nTyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes,\nthe policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr.\nTyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent\nto which he has come under American influence, as well as that of\nconservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young\nChinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped\nthat the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will\nmake the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of\nAmerica and Japan.\n\nThere is room for the development of a great textile industry in China.\nThere are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise\nis needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire.\n\nShipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably\ndevelop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in\nnative hands.\n\nThe total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under \u00a3200,000,000\n(630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is\nbetter, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency\nfluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The\ntael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its\nvalue fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ gives\nimports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and\n214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as\n577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in\npounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124\nmillions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the\nforeign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is\nincreasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how\nlittle the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as\nrevolutions and civil wars.\n\nCertain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways\nand mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national\nindependence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is\nobviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new\nlines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled,\nin the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire\na power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope\nthat the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act\nupon it.\n\nIn regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent,\nsince undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and\ndevelopment by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It\nshould therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any\ninterest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the\nsecurity of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of\nextra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to\naccept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its\nvalidity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows,\nsuch matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear\nChina, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if\nnot, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese,\nit would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It\nwould be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely\nChinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological\nand mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the\nright (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) to\nwork minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in\nspite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers\nshould be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point\ncompatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized,\nexcept where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is\nclear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as\nopportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible\nto say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established\nin China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign\naggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions\nconnected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last\nchapter.\n\nIt is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the\nChinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as\nmodern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially\nhonest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But\ntheir successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extend\nbeyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or\nlater through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from\nmy own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very\nquickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with\nConfucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in\nbusiness methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung\nand other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the\nhighest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The\nChinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to\ncommerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly\nintroducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore,\nevery reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse,\nthat the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout\nthe next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development\nshould be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But\nthat is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese\nindependence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit.\npp. 183 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp.\n45-6.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in\nthe figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated\nby some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p.\n51.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of\ncoal production.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.]\n\n[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is\nnothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine\npointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure\nwhere moth and rust doth corrupt, that \"moth and rust do not get at Mr.\nRockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and\nsteal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth.\" See Upton\nSinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Page 237.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Page 218.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nTHE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA\n\n\nIn this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint\nof a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms,\nin what order, I should advocate in that case.\n\nTo begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts,\nand cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China\nhas had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate,\nbecause it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist\nRussia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of\nRussians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate,\nbecause it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own\neconomic interests; the friction between Japan and America was\nfortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference,\nthough momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the\nlong run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing\nto oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China\nbecomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned\nascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to\nChina; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the\nGreat Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible,\nin the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of\nChinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their\nown energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.\n\nThe problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain\ncultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in\nthis book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it\nwould not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had\nto descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a\nnation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they\nadopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and\nthey will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must\nbe to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with\nsafety.\n\nFirst of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the\nbigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude\nwhich is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow\nthem to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated\nChinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal\ntuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has\nproved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to\nforeign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is\ncapable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United\nStates. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong\nenough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong\nenough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too\nstrongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive.\nBut with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely\nnecessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought,\nnot as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western\nskill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved,\npolitical independence will have little value.\n\nThe three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of\nan orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control;\n(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued\nconcurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the\nabove order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have\nto take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the\npolitical anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are\nalso unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good\ngovernment is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and\neducation are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the\npriority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because,\nunless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have\nacquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to\noust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought\nto be taken in the above order.\n\n1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of\nwriting, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A\nbattle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is\nusually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities,\nthe most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls\nhim \"the Liberal leader,\" may well prove no more satisfactory than\n\"Liberal\" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he\nwins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all\nChina; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case,\nto depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to\ndepend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive\nelements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.\n\nSo far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best\nthing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint\nprogramme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of\nmilitary usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice\nof cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which\nall the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in\npublic opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able,\nsooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some\npowerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere\nmilitary force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in\nfavour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the\nscales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such\na policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous\npropaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers,\nand if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded\nsoldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the\nfinancial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will\nnot lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of\nChinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not\naccept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from\nthem would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may\nnot mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it\nwould be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to\nraise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese\nmerchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich\nChinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the\nGovernment.\n\nWhen the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt\nthat it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of\nautonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few\nthings except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways.\nProvincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally\nrecognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more\nscope.\n\nWhile a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed\nupon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of\nConstitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will\nbe necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country\nto unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective\ndecisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members.\nThis society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very\nrigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest\nfailure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The\nsociety must make itself obviously the champion of the national\ninterests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to\nforeign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or\ncondemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in\nthe army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and\nhonesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the\nrespect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is\norganized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political\nproblems with which China is faced.\n\nSooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign\nrights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty\nPorts, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves\nfrom extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was\nin Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the\nJapanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of\nChinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in\ngeneral. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet\nRussia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by\nthe Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's\nresources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions\nby purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable\nopportunity.\n\n2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in\nChap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to\nconsider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought\nto be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to\nbe purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not\nState-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to\nbe carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not\nbe much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly\ngovernment; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to\nlend on good security, without exacting any part in the management.\nEvery possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a\nmonopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.\n\nGiven good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be\ndesirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State\nSocialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country\nwhich is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place,\nit is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the\nsecond place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the\nforeign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in\nthe third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital\nindustries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is\nperhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by\nundertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent\nthe growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can\nacquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop\nChinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening\npower of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both\noppressed and misled.\n\nBut if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change\nin Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family\nethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which\nalready exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at\npresent rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these\nrequisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize\nthat they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State\nSocialism must fail.\n\nFor industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should\nlearn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I\nthink more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards\nthe latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import\nskilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to\nChinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be\ndesired to develop.\n\n3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive\nChinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the\npopulation cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a\ngood in itself, but is also essential for developing political\nconsciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China.\nThe Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state\nof the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary\neducation. Until it has been established for some time, China must be,\nin fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses\ncannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government,\nit is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast\npopulation could be borne by the nation without a considerable\nindustrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is\nmainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for\nthe Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American\nmillionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese\neducation, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why\nindustrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of\neducation.\n\nFor the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be\nsufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There\nis, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are\nbeing trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed\na great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese\neducators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.\n\nChinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education\nas in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to\nhave foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will\nsoon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too\nnumerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and\nmines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission\nschools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to\nbecome de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western\ncivilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national\nlife, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes\nthem more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and\nwomen who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans\nin general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese\nare, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of\ncourse their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates\nagainst national self-respect in those whom they teach.\n\nThose who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some\ntime to come, need a period of residence in some European or American\nuniversity. But for the great majority of university students it is far\nbetter, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned\nstudents have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from\nwhich they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A\nsociety such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all\nreally progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties,\nas things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students\nreturned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this\ndifficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university\neducation, but at present the difficulty would be serious.\n\nTo overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring\nleadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be\naimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As\nregards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have\nenormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill\ncould carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the\nrequisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example\npersonally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide\nculture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his\nwritings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese.\nHe is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but\nby no means a slavish admirer of our ways.\n\nThe practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be\nneeded would probably demand different gifts from those required in an\nintellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be\ncombined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl\nMarx.\n\nThe aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the\nworld. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is\npossible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to\ndevelop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known.\nThis is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the\npreservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific\ntemper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a\nknowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical\nproblems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one\ndue to the internal condition of China, and the other to its\ninternational situation. In the former class come education, democracy,\nthe diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of\nfamines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong\ngovernment, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties\nand the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a\nmodel), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to\ndefend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand\nWestern science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western\nphilosophy of life.\n\nIf the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would,\nas soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression,\nembark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the\ncampaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps\nemulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their\nmaterial resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at\nhome and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the\nWest achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by\nthe lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but\nwould have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great\nmilitary nations of the modern world will bring about their own\ndestruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become,\nwith every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If\nChina joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if\nChinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made\nChina capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of\nforeign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn\naside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and\ndevote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better\neconomic system--then China will have played the part in the world for\nwhich she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope\nin the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see\ninspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is\nrealizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover\nof mankind.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in\nTyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\nWhile the above pages were going through the Press, some important\ndevelopments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated\nChang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated\ntowards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of\nManchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to\nbe supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not\nunlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in\nChinese politics.\n\nFor the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his\nintentions become important. The British in China have, for some years,\nbefriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in\nour newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of\nthe reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the\nrestoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the\nSouth could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it\nin his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking\ncorrespondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that \"Wu-Pei-Fu declares\nthat if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national\ninterests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any\nobstructionists.\"\n\nOn May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that \"Wu-Pei-Fu is lending\nhis support to the unification movements, and has found common ground\nfor action with Chen Chiung Ming,\" who is Sun's colleague at Canton and\nis engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to\nconquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional.\nThe programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in\nthe same telegram as follows:\n\n     Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall\n     be elected by the people; District police shall be created under\n     District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil\n     governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to\n     the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and\n     paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and\n     _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible\n     for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall\n     agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the\n     Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes\n     shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a\n     stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses,\n     the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under\n     the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries\n     established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the\n     people on the land.\n\nThis is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of\nit will ever be carried out.\n\nMeanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been\nstated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and\nChang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu.\nSun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that\nWu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation\nthan Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate\nSun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a\npast record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the\nCanton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our\nnewspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely\nunfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May\n15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:\n\n     I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China,\n     which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble.\n     Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms\n     are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and\n     opium-smoking are rife.\n\nNevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had\nwon a brilliant victory, capturing \"the most important stronghold in\nKiangsi,\" together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.\n\nThe situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived\nby mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the\nvictory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will\nbe strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped\nalso that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not\nbe seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of\nthat country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above,\nthere can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with\nhim; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more\nlikely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There\nis certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang\nfor the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But\nit is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still\nproblematical.\n\n_June_ 21, 1922.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\nAcademy, Imperial, 44\nAdams, Will, 94\nAfghanistan, 175\nAinu, 117\nAmerica, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff\n  and naval policy, 161-2\n  and trade with Russia, 162-3\n  and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244\n  and Japan, 167 ff.\nAmericanism, 221\nAncestor-worship, 39\nAn Fu Party, 145, 205, 243\nAnglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175\nAnnam, 52\nArnold, Julean, 231\nArt, 11, 12, 28, 189\nAustralia, 181\n\nBackhouse, 49\nBalfour, 152, 153\nBenthamites, 80\nBirth-rate--\n  in China, 73\n  in Japan, 116\nBismarck, 112, 130\nBland, 49, 77 n, 107\nBolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245\nBolshevism, 82\n  in China, 175, 194, 204\nBooks, burning of, 24 ff.\nBoxer rising, 53, 54, 227\n  indemnity, 54, 217\nBrailsford, 166\nBuddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190\n  in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169\nBurma, 52\nBushido, 172\n\nCanada, 181\nCanton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207\nCapitalism, 179\nCassel agreement, 69\nChamberlain, Prof. B.H.,  103, 105\nChangchun, 124\nChang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253\nChao Ki, 40\nChen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5\nChen, Eugene, 133 n.\nCheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232\nChien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff.\nChi Li, Mr., 37\nChina--\n  early history, 21 S ff.\n  derivation of name, 24\n  population, 31-4\n  Year Book, 32\n  produce, 72\n  influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104\n  and the war, 134 ff.\n  Post Offices, 150\nChinese--\n  character of, 199-213\n  love of laughter, 188-9, 200\n  dignity, 202\n  pacifism, 195, 213\n  callousness, 209\n  cowardice, 210\n  avarice, 211\n  patience, 206\n  excitability, 212\nChingkiang, 60\nChinlingchen mine, 234\nChita, 146, 154\nChoshu, 99, 101, 102, 106\nChou dynasty, 22\nChristianity in Japan, 92 ff.\nChuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192\nChu Fu Tze, 43\nChu Hsi, 46\nCivilization--\n  alphabetical, 37\n  Chinese, 187 ff.\n  European, 186\nCoal in China, 132 n., 231 ff.\nColeman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n.\nColour prejudice, 168, 173\n  and labour, 181 ff.\nConfucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208\nConfucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190\n  in Japan, 118\nConsortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244\nCordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n.\nCotton, 76, 235\n  industry in Osaka, 114\nCustoms--\n  Chinese, 55 ff.,\n  on exports, 56\n  internal, 56-7\n\nDairen, 123\n  Conference at, 154 ff.\nDenison, 129\nDewey, Professor, 69, 224\n  Mrs., 224\nDiet, Japanese, 109 ff.\nDutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100\n\nEducation, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff.\n  statistics of, 215\n  classical, 215-7\n  European and American, 217-21\n  modern Chinese, 221 ff.\n  of women, 223-4\nEfficiency, creed of, 17\n\"Eight Legs,\" 45, 46\nEmperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205\n  \"First,\" 24 ff.\nEmpress Dowager, 52 n.\nExamination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76\n\n\"Face,\" 204\nFamines in China, 72, 210\nFar Eastern Republic, 140, 154\nFederalism in China, 70, 244\nFeudalism--\n  in China, 24, 26\n  in Japan, 89 ff.\nFilial Piety, 39 ff., 61\n  and patriotism, 41\n  in Japan, 118, 169\nForeign Trade statistics, 236-7\nForestry, 80\nFourteen Points, 53\nFrance, 52, 53, 123\n  and Shantung, 137-8\n  and Japan, 157\nFukien, 132\n\nGalileo, 186\nGenoa Conference, 146\nGenro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128\nGeorge III, 49\nGermany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172\n  property in China during war, 141 ff.\nGiles, Lionel, 82 n.\nGiles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n.\nGladstone, 157, 160\nGleason, 132 n., 134 n.\nGobi desert, 31\nGompers, 163\nGreat Britain--\n  and China, 52 ff.\n  and Shantung, 137\nGreat Wall, 24\nGreeks, 186\nGuam, 150\n\nHan dynasty, 27\nHanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3\nHart, Sir Robert, 57\nHayashi, 133 n.\nHearn, Lafcadio, 99\nHeaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43\n  Temple of, 23, 24\nHideyoshi, 87, 93, 94\nHirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n.\nHong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207\nHsu Shi-chang, President, 44\nHughes, Premier, 181 n.\nHughes, Secretary, 152, 153\nHung Wu, Emperor, 45\nHuns, 24, 27, 31\nHu Suh, 250\n\nIchimura, Dr., 121\nIdeograms, 34 ff.\nImmigration, Asiatic, 181 ff.\nImperialism. 82\nIndia, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120\nIndustrialism, 186\n  in China, 75, 76, 212,\n  226-39, 245 ff.\n  in Japan, 114\nInouye, 88\nIntelligentsia in China, 76\nIron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff.\n  Japanese control of, 232 ff.\nIshii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii\n  Agreement.\nIto, 88. 109 ff\nlyeyasu, 91, 94, 95\n\nJapan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175\n  early history, 86 ff.\n  constitution, 109 ff.\n  war with China, 113, 122, 130\n  war with Russia, 108, 123, 130\n  clan loyalty, 118\n  loyalty to Allies, 136\n  hegemony in Asia, 120\n  loans to China in 1918, 143\n  Socialism in, 114, 170\nJenghis Khan, 28 ff.\nJews, 186\n\nKang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n.\nKara Korum, 30\nKato, 133 n.\nKiangnan Dock, 232\nKiaochow, 53,  131, 151\nKieff, 29\nKoo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164\nKorea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124\nKublai Khan, 29, 30\nKyoto, 96\nKyushu, 92, 94\n\nLama Religion, 43\nLamont, 165\nLansing, 144\nLansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151\nLao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194\nLegge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n.\nLenin, 180, 250,\nLennox, Dr., 73 n.\nLiterati, 25, 26, 38 ff.\nLi Ung Bing, 26, 45\nLi Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff.\nLi Yuen, 28 n.\nLloyd George, 133, 140, 157\nLouis XIV., 51\nLouis, Saint, 29\n\nMacao, 62\nMacartney, 49\nMalthus, 73\nManchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64\nManchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207\nManila, 93\nMarco Polo, 29\nMarcus Aurelius, 27\nMarx, 250\nMasuda, 93\nMcLaren, 98, 103 n.\nMechanistic Outlook, 81 ff.\nMerv, 29\nMikado, 87, 99, 106\n  worship of, 98, 103, 168-9\nMilitarism, 16, 42, 43 n.\nMillard, 134 n., 143, 151 n.\nMinamoto Yoritomo, 90\nMines, 230 ff.\nMing dynasty, 30\nMissionaries, 196\n  Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n.\n  in Japan, 92 ff.\nMongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43\nMongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154\nMorgan, J.P., 157, 165\nMorphia, 150\nMoscow, 29\nMukden, 130\nMurdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n.\n\nNationalism, 16\nNestorianism, 48\nNicolaievsk, 155\nNietzsche, 84, 194\nNishapur, 29\nNobunaga, 94\nNorthcliffe, Lord, 77 n.\n\nObservatory, Peking, 30, 49\nOkuma, 120, 122\nOpen Door, 55, 162, 179\nOpium, 52\n\nPanama Tolls, 162\nPeking, 30, 34, 52, 72\n  Legation Quarter, 54\n  Union  Medical  College, 73, 219\n  Government University, 217 n., 222\n  Girls' High Normal School, 224\nPenhsihu mine, 234\nPerry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167\nPersia, 27, 29, 175\nPhonetic writing, 35\nPlato, 186\nPo Chui, 195\nPo Lo, 83\nPooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n.\nPope, The, 29, 169\nPort Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175\nPortsmouth, Treaty  of, 108-9, 125\nPortuguese, 92 ff.\nProgress, 13, 196, 202\nPutnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228\n\nRailways, 226 ff.\n  nationalization of, 228 ff.\n  statistics of, 230\n  Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227\n  Fa-ku-Men, 124\n  Hankow-Canton, 227\n  Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229\n  Peking-Hankow, 227\n  Shantung, 151 ff., 227\n  Siberian, 146, 227\n  South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126\n  Tientsin-Pukow, 227\nReid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142\nReinsch, 134 n., 135, 136\nRestoration in Japan, 87, 97 8.\nRevolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff.\n  and Japan, 128 ff.\nRockefeller Hospital, 218\nRome, 27, 51\nRoosevelt, 108\nRousseau, 42\nRussia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff.\n  war with Japan, 108,123, 130\n  secret treaty with Japan, 136\n  and Shantung, 138-9\n\nSalt tax, 59, 60\n_San Felipe_, 93\nSato, Admiral, 172\nSatsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106\nScience, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193\nShank, Mr., 69\nShantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178\n  secret treaties concerning, 137\n  in Versailles Treaty, 144\n  and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff.\nShaw, Bernard, 160\nSherfesee, 80\nShih Huang Ti,  _See_ Emperor, \"First\"\nShi-King, 25\nShinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169\nShogun, The, 90, 99 ff.\nShu-King, 21, 22 n., 25\nSimpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale\nSocialism, 64, 181 ff.\n  State, 180, 246\n  in Japan, 114, 170\n  in China, 222, 236\nSoyeda, 144 n.\nSpaniards in Japan, 93\nStudent Movement, 223, 243\nStudents--\n  returned, 17, 193, 219\n  statistics of, 220 n.\nSummer Palace, 52\nSung dynasty, 30, 45\nSun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6\nSupreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven\n\nTaiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65\nTai-tsung, 28 n.\nTang dynasty, 28, 44\nTaochung iron mine, 234\nTaoism, 43, 187 ff.\nTartars, 27, 31\nTayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3\nTeachers' strike, 206, 225\nTenny, Raymond P., 33\nTibet, 31, 43\nTing, Mr. V.K., 73 n.\nTokugawa, 99\nTong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n.\nTrade Unionism, 180-1\n  in Japan, 114-5\nTreaty Ports, 74\nTsing-hua College, 217\nTsing-tau, 131, 151\nTuan Chih-jui, 140 ff.\nTuangkuan Shan mines, 233\nTuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206\nTwenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234\nTyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235\n\nUnited States. _See_ America.\n\nVersailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151\nVladivostok, 146, 154\nVolga, 18\nVoltaire, 221\n\nWaley, 84, 195\nWar, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff.\nWashington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178\nWei-hai-wei, 54, 149\nWhite men, virtues of, 121\nWilliam II., 122\nWilson, President, 140, 142\nWomen, position  of, in  China, 223-4\nWoosung College, 239\nWu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3\n\nYamagata, Prince, 115 n.\nYangtze, 52, 132\nYao and Shun, 21, 22\nYellow River, 21, 187\nY.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222\nYoung China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250\nY\u00fc, 22\nYuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135","title":"The Problem of China","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":72388}