{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_14120/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_14120","id":"gutenberg_14120","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14120","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought","Priestley, Joseph, 1733-1804. Letters to a philosophical unbeliever"],"text":"Attributed to Matthew Turner (d. 1788?) and William Hammon.\n\nTranscribed by the Freethought Archives\n\nNOTE: Irregularities in orthography and punctuation have been\nreproduced without emendation from the first edition of 1782.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nANSWER TO DR. PRIESTLEY'S LETTERS TO A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER.\n\nPART I.\n\n\n\nLONDON.\nMDCCLXXXII\n\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENT.\n\n\nThe Editor of this publication has more in object to answer Dr. Priestley\nthan to deliver his own sentiments upon Natural Religion, which however\nhe has no inclination to disguise: but he does not mean to be answerable\nfor them farther, than as by reason and nature he is at present\ninstructed. The question here handled is not so much, whether a\nDeity and his attributed excellences exist, as whether there is any\nNatural or Moral proof of his existence and of those attributes.\nRevealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore Christians at least\nneed take no offence. Doubts upon Natural Religion have not hitherto\nbeen looked upon as attacks upon Revelation, but rather as corroborations\nof it. What the Editor believes as a Christian (if he is one is\ntherefore another affair, nor does he reckon himself so infallible or\nincapable of alteration in his sentiments, as not at another time to\nadopt different ones upon more reflexion and better information;\ntherefore, though he has at present little or no doubt of what he\nasserts (taken upon the principles laid down) he shall hold himself\ntotally freed from any necessity of defending the contents of this\npublication if brought into controversy; and as he has no desire of\nmaking converts, hopes he shall not himself be marked out as an object\nof persecution.\n\nSpeculative points have always been esteemed fair matters for a free\ndiscussion. The religion established in this country is not the\nreligion of Nature, but the religion of Moses and Jesus, with whom the\nwriter has nothing to do. He trusts therefore he shall not be received\nas a malevolent disturber of such common opinions as are esteemed to\nkeep in order a set of low wretches so inclinable to be lawless. At\nleast, if he attempts to substitute better foundations for morality,\nmalevolence can be no just charge. Truth is his aim; and no professors\nof religion will allow their system to be false. Or if he should be\nthought too bold a speculator, such of the ecclesiastics as will be his\nopponents may rather laugh at him than fear him. They have a thousand\nways of making their sentiments go down with the bulk of mankind, to\none this poor writer has. They are an army ready marshalled for the\nsupport of their own thesis; they are in the habit of controversy;\npulpits are open to them as well as the press; and while the present\nauthor will be looked upon as a miracle of hardiness for daring to put\nhis name to what he publishes, they can without fear or imputation lift\nup their heads; and should they even be known to transgress the bounds\nof good sense or politeness, they will only be esteemed as more zealous\nlabourers in their own vocation.\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY ADDRESS.\n\n\nDr. Priestley,\n\nYour Letters addressed to a Philosophical Unbeliever I perused, not\nbecause I was a Philosopher or an Unbeliever; it were presumption to\ngive myself the former title, and at that time I certainly did not\ndeserve the latter; but as I was acquainted with another, who in\nreality, as far as I and others who know him can judge, deserves the\ntitle of a Philosopher and is neither ashamed nor afraid of that of an\nUnbeliever, I conceived them apt to be sent to my friend, and when I\npresented them to him, he said he was the person whom he should suppose\nyou meant to address, if you had a particular person in view; but he\nhad too much understanding of the world, though much abstracted from\nthe dregs of it, not to conceive it more probable that you meant your\nLetters to be perused by thinking men in general, Believers and\nUnbelievers, to confirm the former in their creed, and to convert the\nlatter from their error. You shall speedily know the effect they have\nhad in both ways. For myself I must inform you that I was brought up a\nBeliever from my infancy; a Theist, if a Christian is such; for I\nsuppose the word will be allowed, though the equivalent term of Deist\nis so generally reprobated by Christians; I had before my eyes the\nexample of a most amiable parent; a moral man, a Christian undoubtedly;\nwho, when I have been attending upon him, as much from affection as\nfrom duty upon a sick and nearly dying bed, has prayed I might be\nstedfast in the faith he held, in accents still sounding in my\nintellectual ear; a parent, whom for his virtues and love of his\noffspring, like a Chinese, I am tempted to worship, and I could exclaim\nwith the first of poets,\n\n          _\"Erit ille mihi semper Deus.\"_\n\nWith such habits of education then, such fervent advice and such\nreverence for my instructor, what can have turned me from my belief;\nfor I confess I am turned? Immorallity it is not; that I assert has not\npreceded my unbelief, and I trust never will follow it; there has not\nindeed yet been time for it to follow; whether it is a probable\nconsequence will presently be discussed; but it is _thought_, free\nthought upon the subject; when I began freely to think I proceeded\nboldly to doubt; your Letters gave me the cause for thinking, and my\nscepticism was exchanged for conviction; not entirely by the perusal of\nyour Letters; for I do not think they would quite have made me an\nAtheist! but by attention to that answer from my friend, which I have\nhis permission to subjoin.\n\nIn mentioning that doubts arose by reading your very Letters, which\nwere written to eradicate all doubts, let me not accuse you of being\nunequal to the task assumed. I mean no such charge. You have in my\nopinion been fully equal to the discussion, and have bandied the\nargument ably, pleasingly and politely. I am certain from the extracts\nyou have made from Dr. Clarke, the first of other Divines, I should\nhave been converted from my superstition by his reasoning, even without\nperusal of an answer: I pay you however the compliment of having only\nbrought me to doubt, and I find I am not the only person who have been\nled to disbelieve by reading books expressly written to confirm the\nBeliever. Stackhouse's Comment upon the Bible, and Leland's View of\nDeistical Writers have perhaps made as many renegado's in this country\nas all the allurements of Mahometanism has in others. What can be said\nto this? They were both undoubtedly men of abilities, and meant well to\nthe cause they had to support. All that I shall observe upon the matter\nis, that what cannot bear discussion cannot be true. Reasoning in other\nsciences is the way to arrive at truth: the learned for a while may\ndiffer, but argument at last finds its force, and the controversy\nusually ends in general conviction. Reasoning upon the science of\ndivinity will equally have its weight, and all men of letters would\nlong ago have got rid of all superstitious notions of a Deity, but that\nmen of letters are frequently men of weak nerves; such as Dr. Johnson\nis well known to be, that great triumph to religionists; it requires\ncourage as well as sense to break the shackles of a pious education;\nbut if merely a resolve to reason upon their force can break them, what\ncan we observe in conclusion but\n\n          _\"Magnus est veritas et prevalebit.\"_\n\nThat religion or belief of a Deity cannot bear the force of argument is\nwell known by Divines in general, is manifest by their annexing an idea\nof reproach to the very term of arguing upon the subject. These arguers\nthey call Free-thinkers, and this appellation has obtained, in the\nunderstanding of pious believers, the most odious disgrace. Yet we\ncannot argue without thinking; nor can we either think or argue to any\npurpose without freedom. Therefore free-thinking, so far from being a\ndisgrace, is a virtue, a most commendable quality. How absurd, and how\ncruel it is in the professors of divinity, to address the understanding\nof men on the subject of their belief, and to upbraid those very men\nwho shall exercise their understanding in attending to their arguments!\nNo tyranny is greater than that of ecclesiastics. These chain down our\nvery ideas, other tyrants only confine our limbs. They invite us to the\nargument, yet damn us to eternal punishment for the use of reason on\nthe subject. They give to man an essence distinct from his corporeal\nappearance and this they call his soul, a very ray and particle of the\nDivine Being; the principal faculty of this soul they allow to be that\nof reasoning, and yet they call reason a dark lanthorn, an erroneous\nvapour, a false medium, and at last the very instrument of another\nfancied Being of their own to lead men into their own destruction.\n_\"In the image of himself made he man.\"_ A favourite text with\ntheologians; but surely they do not mean that this God Almighty of\ntheirs has got a face and person like a man. No; that they exclaim\nagainst, and, when we push them for the resemblance, they confess\nit is in the use of reason; it is in the soul.\n\nI am aware that I am not here to mix questions of Christianity with the\ngeneral question of a Divinity; subjects of a very distinct enquiry,\nand which in the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever are very\ncarefully separated. The subject of revelation is indeed promised\nafterwards to be taken up, provided the argument in favour of Natural\nReligion meets with a good reception. How, Dr. Priestley, you can judge\nof that reception I am at a loss to know, otherwise than by the number\nof editions you publish. It is then in the sum total just as much as if\nyou had said, \"provided this book sells well I will write another.\" Yet\nit may be sold to many such readers as I have been, though you will\nhardly call such reception good. You that have wrote so much, to whom\nit is so easy to write more, who profess a belief of revelation, such a\nlaborious enquirer, and so great a master of the art of reasoning,\nshould rather have engaged at once to prove in a subsequent publication\nthe truth of revealed religion in arguments, as candid and as fairly\ndrawn as those you have used in proof of a Deity independent of\nrevelation. Different as I am in qualifications from you, not very\nlearned, far from industrious, unused to publish, I do now promise\nthat when you shall have brought into light your intended letters in\nbehalf of revelation I will answer them. I hope you will take it as an\nencouragement to write that you are sure you shall have an answer. I\nmean you should, and I am sure I shall think myself greatly honoured if\nyou will descend so far as to reply to my present answer. I know you\nhave been used in controversies to have the last word, and in this I\nshall not baulk your ambition; for notwithstanding any defect of my\nplea in favour of atheism I mean to join issue upon your replication,\nand by no means, according to the practice and language of the lawyers,\nto put in a rejoinder. Should your arguments be defectively answered by\nme, should your learning and your reasoning be more conspicuous than\nmine, I shall bear your triumph without repining.\n\nI declare I am rather pleased there are so few atheists than at all\nanxious to make more. I triumph in my superior light. I am like the Jew\nor the Bramin who equally think themselves privileged in their superior\nknowledge of the Deity. With me and with my friend the comparison holds\nby way of contrast, for we are so proud in our singularity of being\natheists that we will hardly open our lips in company, when the\nquestion is started for fear of making converts, and so lessening our\nown enjoyment by a numerous division of our privilege with others. It\nhas indeed often been disputed, whether there is or ever was such a\ncharacter in the world as an atheist. That it should be disputed is to\nme no wonder. Every thing may be, and almost every thing has been\ndisputed. There are few or none who will venture openly to acknowledge\nthemselves to be atheists. I know none among my acquaintance, except\nthat one friend, to whom as a Philosophical Unbeliever I presented your\nLetters, and to whose answer I only mean this address as an\nintroduction. I shall therefore not enter here into the main argument\nof Deity or no Deity. My address is only preliminary to the subject;\nbut I do not therefore think myself precluded from entering into some\nconsiderations that may be thought incidental to it. I mean such\nconsiderations as whether immorality, unhappiness or timidity\nnecessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism.\nBut as to the question whether there is such an existent Being as an\natheist, to put that out of all manner of doubt, I do declare upon my\nhonour that I am one. Be it therefore for the future remembered, that\nin London in the kingdom of England, in the year of our Lord one\nthousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared\nhimself an atheist. When my friend returned me your Letters, addressing\nme with a grave face he said, \"I hope, if you have any doubts, these\nLetters will have as good effect upon you as they have had upon me.\"\nMy countenance brightened up and I replied, \"You are then, my friend,\nconvinced ?\" \"Yes, he said, I am convinced; that is, I am most\nthoroughly convinced there is no such thing as a God.\" Behold then,\nif we are to be believed, two atheists instead of one.\n\nAnother question has been raised \"whether a society of atheists can\nexist?\" In other words \"whether honesty sufficient for the purposes\nof civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of\na Deity?\" Bayle has handled that question well. [Footnote: _Pensees\nsur la Comete_.] Few who know how to reason (and it is in vain to speak\nor think of those who lay reason out of the case) can fail to be convinced\nby the arguments of Bayle. I shall discuss the question no farther\nthan as it is necessarily included in the discussion of some of those\nsupposed results of atheism, such as I have before mentioned in the\ninstances of immorality, unhappiness and timidity. In my argument\nupon this subject I shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule.\nControversies are apt to be acrimonious. You, Sir, have certainly shewn\ninstances to the contrary. You have charity beyond your fellows in the\necclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right\nin fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed\nyourself. To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of\nagreeing with another person. You have candour enough to allow it\npossible that an atheist may be a moral man. Where is that other\necclesiastic who will allow the same? Your answerers ought also to\nhold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject.\nI am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule\nis the test of truth. I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is,\nit can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at.\nTo use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule,\nbut still it may be ridiculed. Just ridicule is a sufficient test\nof truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon\nthe principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not.\nBoldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do\nhold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where\ntruth is the object of inquiry. Therefore when I am asked, whether\nthere is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly\nanswer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I\nadopt my friend's answer by the publication of it.\n\nThat mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is\nalso another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for\nthough I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief\nwould ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself\nintitled to enter into it. I have a right to truth, and to publish\ntruth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. That society which\nsuffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well\nthink that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should\nrather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism\nbeing found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such\na society.\n\nI come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an\nanswer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither\nanticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. I hold myself open\nto be convinced, and if I am convinced I shall say so, which is equally\nanswering as if I denied the force of your observations. In that sense\nonly I promise an answer. If I believe I shall say, I do; but I shall\nnot believe and tremble, confident as I am, that if I act an honest\npart in life, whether there be a Deity and a future existence or not,\nwhatever reason I may have to rejoice in case such ideas be realised, I\ncan upon such an issue have none to tremble. I look upon myself to have\nmore reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so. Dr. Priestley or\nany other Doctor can put his name boldly to a book in favour of Theism,\nloudly call the supporters of a contrary doctrine to the argument, and\nif no answer is produced, assert their own reasoning to be unanswerable.\nIn that sense their sort of reasoning has been frequently unanswerable.\nHere however is an instance of a poor unknown individual, making\nexperience of the candour of the ecclesiastics and the equity of\nthe laws of England, for he ventures to subscribe his publication with\nhis name as well as Dr. Priestley does his Letters, to which this\npublication is an answer. Perhaps he may have cause to repent of his\nhardiness, but if he has, he is equally resolved to glory in his\nmartyrdom, as to suffer it. Whatever advantage religion has had in the\nenumeration of it's martyrs, the cause of atheism may boast the same.\nAs to the instances of the professors of any particular form of\nreligion, or modification of that form, such as Christians or sects of\nChristians, suffering martyrdom for their belief, I shall no more allow\nthem to be martyrs for theism than Pagans similarly suffering for their\nbelief, shall I call martyrs for atheism. Theism very likely has had\nit's martyrs. I can instance one I think in Socrates, and I shall\nmention Vanini as a martyr for atheism. The conduct of those two great\nmen in their last moments may be worth attending to. The variety of\nother poor heretical wretches, who have been immolated at the shrine of\nabsurdity for all the possible errors of human credence, let them have\ntheir legendary fame. I put them out of the scale in this important\ninquiry.\n\nNot that I really think the argument to be much advanced by naming the\ngreat supporters of one opinion or of another. In mathematics,\nmechanics, natural philosophy, in literature, taste, and politics the\nsentiments of great men of great genius are certainly of weight. There\nare some subjects capable of demonstration, many indeed which the\ningenuity of one man can go farther to illustrate than that of another.\nThe force of high authority is greater in the three former sciences\nthan in the latter. Theism and Atheism I hold to be neither of them\nstrictly demonstrable. You, Dr. Priestley, agree with me in that. Still\nI hold the question capable of being illustrated by argument, and I\nshould hold the authority of great men's names to be of more weight in\nthis subject, were I not necessarily forced to consider that all\neducation is strongly calculated to support the idea of a Deity; by\nthis education prejudice is introduced, and prejudice is nothing else\nthan a corruption of the understanding. Certain principles, call them,\nif you please, data, must be agreed upon before any reasoning can take\nplace. Disputants must at least agree in the ideas which they annex to\nthe language they use. But when prejudice has made a stand,\nargumentation is set at so wide a distance, through a want of fixt data\nto proceed upon, that attention is in vain applied to the dispute.\nBesides, the nature of the subject upon which this prejudice takes\nplace, is such, that the finest genius is nearly equally liable to an\nundue bias with the most vulgar. To question with boldness and\nindifference, whether an individual, all-forming, all-seeing and\nall-governing Being exists, to whom, if he exists, we may possibly be\nresponsible for our actions, whose intelligence and power must be\ninfinitely superior to our own, requires a great conquest of former\nhabitude, a firmness of nerves, as well as of understanding; it will\ntherefore be no great wonder, if such men as Locke and Newton can be\nnamed among the believers in a Deity. They were christians as well as\ntheists, so that their authority goes as far in one respect as in the\nother. But if the opinions of men of great genius are to have weight,\nwhat is to be said of modern men of genius? You, Sir, are of opinion\nthat the world is getting wiser as well as better. There is all the\nreason in the world it should get wiser at least, since wisdom is only\na collection of experience, and there must be more experience as the\nworld is older. Modern Philosophers are nearly all atheists. I take the\nterm atheist here in the popular sense. Hume, Helvetius, Diderot,\nD'Alembert. Can they not weigh against Locke and Newton, and even more\nthan Locke and Newton, since their store of knowledge and learning was\nat hand to be added to their own, and among them are those who singly\npossessed equal science in mathematics as in metaphysics? It is not\nimpossible, perhaps not improbable, from his course of learning and\ninquiries, that if Dr. Priestley had not from his first initiation into\nscience been dedicated for what is called the immediate service of God,\nhe himself might have been one of the greatest disprovers of his\npretended divinity.\n\nIn England you think, Sir, that atheism is not prevalent among men of\nfree reasoning, though you acknowledge it to be much so in other\ncountries. It is not the first time it has been observed that the\ngreater the superstition of the common people the less is that of men\nof letters. In the heart of the Papal territories perhaps is the\ngreatest number of atheists, and in the reformed countries the greatest\nnumber of deists. Yet it is a common observation, especially by\ndivines, that deism leads to atheism, and I believe the observation is\nwell founded. I hardly need explain here, that by deism in this sense\nis meant a belief in the existence of a Deity from natural and\nphilosophical principles, and a disbelief in all immediate revelation\nby the Deity of his own existence. Such is the force of habit, that it\nis by degrees only, that even men of sense and firmness shake off one\nprejudice after another. They begin by getting rid of the absurdities\nof all popular religions. This leaves them simple deists, but the force\nof reasoning next carries them a step farther, and whoever trusts to\nthis reasoning, devoid of all fear and prejudice, is very likely to end\nat last in being an atheist. Nor do I admit it to be an argument either\nfor Revelation or Natural Religion, that the same turn for speculation\nthat would convert a christian into a theist, will carry him on to be\nan atheist, though I know the argument has been often used. If upon\nsick beds or in dying moments men revert to their old weakness and\nsuperstitions, their falling off may afford triumph to religionists;\nfor my part I care not so much for the opinions of sick and dying men,\nas of those who at the time are strong and healthy. But in the opinion\nof the one or the other I put no great stress. My faith is in\nreasoning, for though ridicule is not a complete test of truth,\nreasoning I hold certainly to be so. I own belief may be imprest on the\nmind otherwise than by the force of reason. The mind may be diseased.\nAll I shall say is that though I have formerly believed many things\nwithout reason, and even many against it, as is very common, I hope I\nshall never more. My mind (I was going to say, thank God) is sane at\npresent, and I intend to keep it so. I am aware that at the expression\njust used some will exclaim in triumph, that the poor wretch could not\nhelp thinking of his God at the same time he was denying him. The\nobservation would hold good, if it were not that we often speak and\nwrite unpremeditately and though what is in this manner unpremeditately\nexpressed upon a revision should be certainly expunged, yet I chuse to\nleave the expression to shew the force of habit.\n\nIn fear lies the origin of all fancied deities, whether sole or\nnumberless.\n\n          _Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor._\n\nBut the great debasement of the human mind is evidenced in the instance\nof attributing a merit to belief, which has come at last to be stiled a\nvirtue, and is dignified by the name of faith, that most pitiful of all\nhuman qualities. When the apostle spoke of faith, hope and charity, he\nmight as well have exclaimed the least of the three is faith, as the\ngreatest is charity.\n\nOne enthusiast cries out _un Roi_ and another _un Dieu_. The reality of\nthe king I admit, because I feel his power. Against my feeling and my\nexperience I cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built all\nargument. But not all the wondrous works of the creation, as I hear the\nvisible operations of nature called, convince me in the least of the\nexistence of a Deity. By nature I mean to express the whole of what I\nsee and feel, that whole, I call self-existent from all eternity; I\nadmit a principle of intelligence and design, but I deny that principle\nto be extraneous from itself. My creed in fine is the same with that of\nthe Roman poet;\n\n          _\"Deus est ubicunque movemur.\"_\n\nIf then I am admitted to explain my deity in this sense, I am not an\natheist, nor can any one else in the world be such. The _vis naturae_,\nthe perpetual industry, intelligence and provision of nature must be\napparent to all who see, feel or think. I mean to distinguish this\nactive, intelligent and designing principle, inherent as much in matter\nas the properties of gravity or any elastic, attractive or repulsive\npower, from any extraneous foreign force and design in an invisible\nagent, supreme though hidden lord and maker over all effects and\nappearances that present themselves to us in the course of nature. The\nlast supposition makes the universe and all other organised matter a\nmachine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another Being, which\nother Being is called God; and my theory makes a God of this universe,\nor admits no other God or designing principle than matter itself and\nits various organisations.\n\nThe inquiry is said to be important. But why is it so! All truth is\nimportant. It is a question of little importance, merely whether a man\nhad a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the\nexistence of such a Deity as theologians wish to establish, because\nappearances in the world go against it. Supposing however that it was\ngranted, that the question, whether there is a Deity or not, was as\nlittle important as other truths, yet the question becomes important\nwith this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such\nas a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and\npunishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily\nfollow may well be queried. As to a particular providence you give up\nthe reality of it, and I give it up too. But I cannot give up the\nargument, that if there were a God with all his allowed attributes of\nwisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to\ncounteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend\nthe interposition. Though the Deity should not interfere unless there\nbe a worthy cause, agreeable to the Horation rule,\n\n          _\"Nec Deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;\"_\n\nYet surely from the same principles it should follow that the Deity\nought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. Here however arises\nanother dilemma, for if the Deity has really those attributes of power\nand justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous\ninterpositions. A particular providence must indeed prove one of these\ntwo principles, either that God was imperfect in his design, or that\ninert matter is inimical to the properties of God. If that wished for\ninterposition of the Deity is put off to a future existence, I cannot\nhelp observing, that future day has been already a long while waited\nfor in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the\nDeity. He wants justice, or he wants the power, or the will to do good\nand be just. That a future state of rewards and punishments may however\nexist without a Deity, you, Dr. Priestley, allow to be no impossibility.\nIt may indeed be argued with apparent justness, that a principle of\nreviviscence may as well be admitted as a principle of production in\nthe first instance: and as to rewards and punishments, judgement may be\nrendered, as well as now, by Beings less than Deities. For my part I\nfirmly wish for such a future state, and though I cannot firmly believe\nit, I am resolved to live as if such a state were to ensue. This seems,\nI own, like doubting, and doubting may be said to be a miserable state\nof anxiety. \"Better be confident than unhinged; better confide in\nignorance than have no fixed system.\" So it may be argued; but I think\nthe result will be as people feel. Those who do not feel bold enough,\nto be satisfied with their own thoughts, may abandon them and adopt the\nthoughts of others. For my part I am content with my own; and not the\nless so because they do not end in certainty upon matters, from the\nnature of them, beyond the complete reach of human intelligence.\n\nThere is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which\nis or ought to be the end or aim of our being. I mean self-happiness;\nbut fortunately for mankind, such is by nature our construction, that\nwe cannot individually be happy unless we join also in promoting the\nhappiness of others. Should immorality, timidity or other base\nprinciples arise from atheism it tends immediately, I will own, to the\nunhappiness of mankind. If it is asked me, \"why am I honest and\nhonourable?\" I answer, because of the satisfaction I have in being so.\n\"Do all people receive that satisfaction?\" No, many who are ill\neducated, ill-exampled and perverted, do not. I do, that is enough for\nme. In short, I am well constructed, and I feel I can therefore act an\nhonest and honourable part without any religious motive. Did I\nperceive, that belief in a Deity produced morality or inspired courage,\nI might be prompted to confess, that the contrary would ensue from\natheism. But the bulk of the world has long believed, or long pretended\nto believe in a Deity, yet morality and every commendable quality seem\nat a stand. The believer and the unbeliever we often see equally base,\nequally immoral. Superstition is certainly only the excess of religion.\nThat evidently is attended often with immorality and cowardice. I am\ntempted to say, from observation, that the belief of a Deity is apt to\ndrive mankind into vice and baseness; but I check myself in the\nassertion, upon considering that very few indeed are those who really\nbelieve in a Deity out of such as pretend to do so. It is impossible\nfor an intellectual being to believe firmly in that of which he can\ngive no account, or of which he can form no conception. I hold the\nDeity, the fancied Deity, at least, of whom with all his attributes\nsuch pompous descriptions are set forth to the great terror of old\nwomen and the amusement of young children, to be an object of which we\nform (as appears when we scrutinise into our ideas) no conception and\ntherefore can give no account. It is said, after all this, that men do\nstill believe in such a Deity, I then do say in return, they do not\nmake use of their intellects. The moment we go into a belief beyond\nwhat we feel, see and understand, we might as well believe in\nwill-with-a-whisp as in God. But I would fix morality upon a better\nbasis than belief in a Deity. If it has indeed at present no other\nbasis, it is not morality, it is selfishness, it is timidity; it is the\nhope of reward, it is the dread of punishment. For a great and good\nman, shew me one who loves virtue because he finds a pleasure in it,\nwho has acquired a taste for that pleasure by considering what and\nwhere happiness is, who is not such a fool as to seek misery in\npreference to happiness, whose honour is his Deity, whose conscience\nis his judge. Put such a man in combat against the superstitious son\nof Spain or Portugal, it were easy to say who would shew the truest\ncourage. The question might be more voluminously discussed, but I feel\nalready proof of conviction; if you, Dr. Priestley, do not, perhaps\nsome other readers may. I have nothing to do with men of low minds.\nThey will always have their religion or pretence of it, but I am\nmistaken if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern\ntheir morals than the gospel or the pulpit.\n\nAfter all, atheism may be a system only for the learned. The ignorant of\nall ages have believed in God. The answer of a Philosophical Unbeliever\nthough written in the vulgar tongue may probably not reach the vulgar.\nIf argument had prevailed they were long converted from their\nsuperstitious belief. The sentiments of atheistical philosophers have\nlong been published. If mischief therefore could ensue to society from\nsuch free discussions, that mischief society must long have felt. I\nthink truth should never be hid, but few are those who mind it. I will\ntherefore take upon myself but little importance though I have presumed\nto preface an answer from a Philosophical Unbeliever to Letters which\nyou, Dr. Priestley have written. If you deem that answer detrimental to\nthe interests of society, you will recollect that you invite the\nproposal of objections and promise to answer all as well as you can. If\nyou should happen to be exasperated by the freedom of the language or\nthe contrariety of the sentiment, this answer will gain weight in\nproportion as you lose in the credit of a tolerant Divine. Therefore if\nyou reply at all, reply with candour and with coolness; heed the matter\nand not the man, though I subscribe my name, and am\n\n     Reverend Sir,\n     Your friend, admirer, and humble servant,\n     WILLIAM HAMMON.\n\n_Oxford-Street, No._ 418.\n_Jan._ 1, 1782.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n               ANSWER FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER.\n\n\nIt is the general fashion to believe in a God, the maker of all things,\nor at least to pretend to such a belief, to define the nature of this\nexisting Deity by the attributes which are given to him, to place the\nfoundation of morality on this belief, and in idea at least, to connect\nthe welfare of civil society with the acknowledgement of such a Being.\nFew however are those, who being questioned can give any tolerable\ngrounds for their assertions upon this subject, and hardly any two\namong the learned agree in their manner of proving what each will\nseparately hold to be indisputably clear. The attributes of a Deity are\nmore generally agreed upon, though less the subject of proof, than his\nexistence. As to morality, those very people who are moral will not\ndeny, they would be so though there were not a God, and there never yet\nhas been a civil lawgiver, who left crimes to be punished by the author\nof the universe; not even the profanation of oaths upon the sacredness\nof which so much is built in society, and which yet is said to be a\nmore immediate offence against the Deity than any other that can be\nnamed.\n\nThe method which Dr. Priestley has taken to prove the existence of\na God, is by arguing from _effect_ to _cause_. He explodes that other\npretended proof _a priori_ which has so much raised the fame of\nDr. Clarke among other theologians. As to the attributes of the Deity,\nDr. Priestley is not quite so confident in his proofs there; and the\nmost amiable one, the most by mortals to be wished for, the _benevolence_\nof God he almost gives up, or owns at least there is not so much proof\nof it as of his other attributes. His observations are divided into\nseveral Letters, this is one answer given to the whole; for it would be\nto no purpose to reply to topics upon which the writers are agreed.\nWhat therefore is not contradicted here, Dr. Priestley may in general\ntake to be allowed; but to obviate doubts and to allow his argument\nevery force, it may be fairer perhaps to recite at full length what in\nthis answer is allowed to be true, what is denied as false, what meant\nto be exposed as absurd, and what rejected as assertions without proof,\ninadmissible or inconclusive. The conclusion will contain some\nobservations upon the whole.\n\n\n    TRUISMS.\n\n    1. \"Effects have their adequate causes.\"\n\n    2. \"Nothing begins to exist without a cause foreign to itself.\"\n\n    3. \"No being could make himself, for that would imply that he\n    existed and did not exist at the same time.\"\n\n    4. If one horse, or one tree, had a cause, all had.\"\n\n    5. Something must have existed from all eternity.\n\n    6. \"Atoms cannot be arranged, in a manner expressive of the most\n    exquisite design, without competent intelligence having existed\n    somewhere.\"\n\n    7. \"The idea of a supreme author is more pleasing to a virtuous\n    mind, than that of a blind fate and fatherless deserted world.\"\n\n    8. \"The condition of mankind is in a state of melioration, as far as\n    misery arises from ignorance, for as the world grows older it must\n    grow wiser, if wisdom arises from experience.\"\n\n    9. \"All moral virtue is only a modification of benevolence.\"\n\n    10. \"Virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice.\"\n\n    11. \"No instance of any revival.\"\n\n    12. \"Atheists are not to think themselves quite secure with respect\n    to a future life.\"\n\n    13. \"Thought might as well depend upon the construction of the\n    brain, as upon any invisible substance extraneous to the brain.\"\n\n    14. \"If the works of God had a beginning, there must have been a\n    time when he was inactive.\"\n\n    15. \"Where happiness is wanting in the creation I would rather\n    conclude the author had mist of his design than that he wanted\n    benevolence.\"\n\n\n    FALSE ASSERTIONS.\n\n    1. \"A cause needs not be prior to an effect.\"\n\n    2. \"If the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow that\n    it had no cause.\"\n\n    3. \"A cause may be cotemporary with the effect.\"\n\n    4. \"An atheist must believe he was introduced into the world without\n    design.\"\n\n\n    ABSURDITIES.\n\n    1. \"A general mass of sensation consisting of various elements\n    borrowed from the past and the future.\"\n\n    2. \"Since sensation is made up of past, present, and future, the\n    infant feeling for the moment only, the man recollecting what is\n    past and anticipating the future, and as the present sensation must\n    therefore in time bear a less proportion to the general mass of\n    sensation than it did, so at last all temporary affections, whether\n    of pain or pleasure become wholly inconsiderable.\"\n\n    3. \"The great book of nature and the book of revelation both lie\n    open before us.\"\n\n    4. \"A conclusion above our comprehension.\"\n\n    5. \"A whole eternity already past.\"\n\n    6. \"Since a finite Being cannot be infinitely happy, because he must\n    then be infinite in knowledge and power; and as all limitation of\n    happiness must consist in degree of happiness or mixture of misery,\n    the Deity can alone determine which mode of limitation is best.\"\n\n    7. \"We have reason to be thankful for our pains and distress.\"\n\n    8. \"If the divine Being had made man at first as happy as he can be\n    after all the feelings and ideas of a painful and laborious life, it\n    must have been in violation of all general laws and by a constant\n    and momentary interference of the Deity.\"\n\n    9. \"It is better the divine agency should not be very conspicuous.\"\n\n    10. \"If good prevails on the whole, creation being infinite,\n    happiness must be infinite, and God comprehending the whole, will\n    only perceive the balance of good, and that will be happiness\n    unmixed with misery.\"\n\n    11. \"If a man is happy in the whole he is infinitely happy in the\n    whole of his existence.\"\n\n    12. \"Although all things fall alike to all men and no distinction is\n    made between the righteous and the wicked, and even though the\n    wicked derive an advantage from their vices, yet this is consistent\n    with a state of moral government by a Being of infinite wisdom and\n    power.\"\n\n    13. \"As ploughing is the means of having a harvest, though God has\n    predetermined whether there should be a harvest or not, so prayer is\n    the means of obtaining good from God, although that good is\n    predetermined upon; it is therefore no more absurd to pray than to\n    plough.\"\n\n    14. \"Notwithstanding happiness is the necessary consequence of\n    health, yet man's happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal\n    feelings.\"\n\n    15. \"Evil is necessarily connected with and subservient to good,\n    although in the next world there will be all good and no evil.\"\n\n    16. \"By reason we can discover the necessary existence of a Deity,\n    yet to be a sceptic on that subject is the first step to be a\n    Christian, because reason not sufficiently proving it we fly to\n    revealed truth.\"\n\n    17. \"The power, which a man has by the comprehensiveness of his mind\n    to enjoy the future, has no apparent limits.\"\n\n    18. \"It is of no avail in the argument concerning the existence of a\n    Deity, that we have no conception of him, since it does not imply\n    impossibility of his existence that we have no idea at all upon the\n    subject.\"\n\n\n    INADMISSIBLE OR INCONCLUSIVE.\n\n    1. \"The question of the existence of a Deity is important.\"\n\n    2. \"A Theist has a higher sense of personal dignity than an\n    atheist.\"\n\n    3. \"The conduct of an atheist must give concern to those who are not\n    so.\"\n\n    4. \"An atheist believes himself to be, at his death, for ever\n    excluded from returning life.\"\n\n    5. \"There are more atheists than unbelievers in revelation.\"\n\n    6. \"Men of letters may have the same bias to incredulity as others\n    to credulity, because they are subject to a wrong association of\n    ideas, as well as other persons though in a less degree.\"\n\n    7. \"Whoever first made a thing, for example a chair or a table, must\n    have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use.\"\n\n    8. \"If a table had a designing cause, the tree from whence the wood\n    came, and the man who made the table must have had a designing\n    cause, which comprehended all the powers and properties of trees and\n    men.\"\n\n    9. \"All the visible universe, as far as we can judge, bears the\n    marks of being one work, and therefore must have had a cause of\n    infinite power and intelligence.\"\n\n    10. \"We might as well say a table had no cause, as that the world\n    had none.\"\n\n    11. \"A Being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending\n    itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea\n    of any bounds to it's knowledge or power.\"\n\n    12. \"A series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back\n    _ad infinitum_.\"\n\n    13. \"Our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of\n    the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from\n    arrangement.\"\n\n    14. \"The actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last\n    to an _originally existent and intellectual Being_, because if the\n    immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity,\n    he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that\n    being we call God.\"\n\n    15. \"God must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can\n    act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because\n    his works are every where.\"\n\n    16. \"As no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least\n    none can annihilate himself) so God is unchangeable, for no Being\n    God made can change him and no other Being can exist but what God\n    made.\"\n\n    17. \"Two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would\n    coincide, therefore there can only be one God.\"\n\n    18. \"Nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could\n    not have proceeded from each other from all eternity.\"\n\n    19. \"That happiness is the design of the creation because health is\n    designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as\n    evident as that the design of the Mill-wright must have been, that\n    his machine should not be obstructed.\"\n\n    20. \"As a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of\n    health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation\n    happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure\n    answered.\"\n\n    21. \"Pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check\n    and exterminate itself.\"\n\n    22. \"As our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and\n    procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting\n    to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being.\n\n    23. \"Our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy\n    to old age.\"\n\n    24. \"A future moral distribution is probable, because God is\n    infinitely powerful and wise.\"\n\n    25. \"Since reverence, gratitude, obedience, confidence are duties to\n    men, so they are to God; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to\n    God.\"\n\n    26. \"Prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no\n    argument against prayer to the Deity.\"\n\n    27. \"A wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for,\n    but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a\n    future state.\"\n\n    28. \"As we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for\n    what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the\n    course of nature as our original production..\"\n\n    29. \"A gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout\n    people.\"\n\n\n\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS.\n\n\nDr. Priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work\nthat it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered.\nIt is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each\nassertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary\nreferences. Dr. Priestley will be able to know what are his own\nsentiments and what not without recurring to his printed Letters.\nThere has been also another difficulty in classing the several exceptions\nunder the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is\ninadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. Nice distinctions\ncannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main\nargument which is to be answered.\n\nThe first and principal assertion is, that effects have their adequate\ncause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it\ntherefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the English language\nis given the name of God. This proposition is true, provided the\nuniverse is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession\nand without a proof. This _original Being_ he advances in another place\nto be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and\nwhich could not have been a Being, like a man or a table, incapable of\ncomprehending, itself, for such existences would require another\nsuperior Being. But if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if\nit is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an\nintelligent Being, and there or no where is the Deity sought after.\nSuch a Being we may properly speak of and reason upon. The whole is\nsubjected to our sensations and our experience. But of his own\n_uncaused Being_ Dr. P. says we cannot properly speak. Is not that\nalone an argument of there being no such thing? His friend Dr. Clarke\nsays, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. Now this\ndiscovered Deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea.\nSo far at least it is allied to the impossible.\n\nAs to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies\nthe former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must\nbe certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to\ncall that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day\nmay be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though\na son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he\nmay be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from\nexperience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life\nto come. But if it is contended that our experience relates only to\nfinite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must\nat the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on\nexperience. This Dr. P. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning\nabout a Deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending\nitself, though nobody is capable of comprehending it, and of which we\ntherefore can have no experience. Yet he will assert, that _thinking_\npersons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. This is odd language for a\nreasoner. When another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a God in\ntheir own way, Dr. Priestley can readily see his fallacies and\nabsurdities. Dr. Clarke, the former great champion of God Almighty, is\nmade very light of. He thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of\na Deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go\nto prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into\nthe heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd\nto suppose no Deity as two and two did not make four. It would indeed\nbe absurd, says Dr. Priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a\n_caused_ existence, for God is the name we give for the cause of the\nuniverse, which in such case must exist. It is only denying that the\nuniverse is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away.\nDr. Priestley, for the sake of making Dr. Clarke absurd, will readily\nallow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he\nseems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's\ndifficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is\nthe term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two\nand two, and that to deny the Deity is at least not so absurd as to say\nthat two and two do not make four.\n\nDr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from\nthe mind except space and duration. He allows then at least, that there\nis no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing\ncan be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without\nabsurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the\nexistence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind.\nYet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude\nthe idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This\nDeity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms\nwhich but ill agree together.\n\nThe infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a\nproperty more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other\nproperties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The\nproperties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and\npower, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity,\nand independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to\nhim but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most\ndesireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence,\nDr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the\nhappiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude\nhe mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that\nhe wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to\nconclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted\nbenevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved\nthe Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot\nwant the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his\nargument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want\nbenevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows\nthat misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and\nhappiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence\nis in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant\nthan evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable\nof proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are\nnot so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice,\nhappiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions.\nThat lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof\nin the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant,\nthat good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof\nneither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet\nDr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is\nunquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author\nhimself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who\nwill pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile\nconclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is\nabsurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the\nrest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into\nimaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and\nworship them. God is said to have made man in the image of himself. If\nhe has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his\nown image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so\ndiffers the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or\nanthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not\nthe one or the other.\n\nThe admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly\nconclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how\nDr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies\nthe fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world.\nAt last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects\nof one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain\nis necessary for happiness. But if pain is, as he says, in this world\nnecessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter?\nHe answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough\nfor a future supply of happiness. If it is objected, why have we not\nhad pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of\nage, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? He\ncan only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of God are\ninscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to\n_Candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the\nquestion, \"if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they\nnot always be so? Take a view of human existence, and who can even\nallow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? Dr.\nPriestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making\nit depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another\nplace that human sensations are a mass collected from the past, present\nand future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less\nproportion to the other two. It would indeed be a short but lame way of\nproving that \"happiness is the design of the creation\" because health\nis designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule.\"\nMany a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better\nstudy health than virtue. If the mill-wright make a poor machine he is\na poor workman; God in like manner designing health and introducing\nsickness is but a poor physician. In another place Dr. Priestley having\nconsidered, that he had asserted that human sensations arise from ideas\nof the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to\nalter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more\nintellectual than corporeal. But it is rather extraordinary to assert\nat the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of\nhealth, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal\nfeelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious\nfancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting\ninfinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the\nDeity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be\ndiminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to\nbe taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to\ndetermine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he\nwishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen\ntheir degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To\nconclude he asks, \"how it is possible to teach children caution, but by\nfeeling pain?\" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps\nbe possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity.\nIt was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children\nknowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute\nhe allows of omnipotence.\n\nNext he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their\noffspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the\nDeity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not\nfor the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be\ninfinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal\nhappiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his\nbenevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love\nof justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders.\n\nAfter observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley\nallows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From\nthence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the\ncourse of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be\nre-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though\nthere be no God, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature.\nThis allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a God,\nand that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a Deity. His farther\nargument on this head is, that \"things usually happen in a state of\nnature that are proper. A future state is proper. (To carry on the\nsupposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the\nuniverse.) It is therefore probable.\" This is an argument perhaps more\nof wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it.\nIt is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give\nencouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds\ndo so, the argument of the Deity's existence is independent of such\nconsiderations. It were better to seek another support for morality\nthan a belief in God; for the moral purpose in believing a Deity (an\ninvisible Being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter\ntake cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by\nconsidering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so\nambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but\nhave their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral\npurpose depends. If this is not an argument against the morality of a\nDeity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though\nmoral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much\nas any other.\n\nIt is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary\nfitness of things, and that this forms morality. \"His will could not\nbe biassed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality,\nbecause necessarily fit.\" Then comes infinite power, and yet no\nmorality in the world or a very small portion of it. We cannot to any\npurpose, do what we will, argue against experience. That it must be,\nyet that it is not. What must be, will be. If it is not, there is no\n_must_ in the case.\n\nIt is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than\nvice. This also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the\nuniverse, unless it be for a moral government by chance. Virtue ought\nto be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral\ngovernor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. If virtue tends to\nhappiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that\na sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. The latter end\nof a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an\nunrighteous one. But let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as\ncertain of happiness in his latter end as any other. Let another life\nbe desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent\nit. Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of Mr. Hume,\nwho most indubitably was an atheist. But if an atheist be not so good\nas a Theist, Dr. Priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than\na sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than\nnone at all. A Theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic;\nan atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may\nventure to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves\nto him to draw his belief aside.\n\nStill every thing is as God intended it--so asserts Dr. Priestley; and\ntherefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his\nintention. The Theist exclaims in triumph, \"He that made the eye, must\nhe not see?\" But who made the eye? Or grant that God made the eye,\nwhich can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark?\nIt is again asserted, \"the power which formed an eye had something in\nview as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. If any Being\nformed any eye, grant it. But if the eye exists necessarily as a part\nof nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter,\nnecessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different.\n\nIt is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude\ndesign from the universe. He places that design in the energy of\nnature, which Dr. Priestley gives to some other extraneous Being. It is\nrather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging\nof his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself\nquite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and\nyet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded\nfor ever from life.\n\nAs to the immutability of the Deity, it is difficult to guess how that\nis proved, except by the argument of _Lucus a non lucendo_, because\nevery thing is changing here; therefore the Deity never changes; which\nis neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_,\nmerely applicable to the Deity.\n\nFrom the imperial infinite intelligence of the Deity an argument is\nformed of his unity. Dr. Priestley says, \"that two _infinite_\nintelligent Beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be\none such Being.\" Two parallels will never coincide. That is one of the\nfirst axioms of Euclid, in whom Dr. Priestley believes as much as in\nhis bible. If the Beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must\ncertainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it\ndoes not seem to be necessary that they should.\n\nThe ubiquity of God is proved in this short way: \"God made every thing,\nGod controuls every thing. No power can act but where it is. Therefore\nGod is present every where.\" The workman must certainly be present at\nhis work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. If\nall the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other\nsuch existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the Deity, it\nmay be argued he is in all places where matter is. Space, empty space\nwill still exist without him. In this mode of proof Dr. Priestley must,\ncontrary to the Newtonian system argue for a _Plenum_, before he proves\nthe ubiquity. He cannot exclude space from his mind, nor can he exclude\ngravity from matter. Yet can he admit matter as well as space to be\neternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of God.\" \"If God's\nworks had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_\ninactive.\" He seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there\nallows it could have an end. The argument would be fairer in concluding\n\"he must have been inactive _or doing something else_.\"\n\nThe Deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter\nof it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material\nhimself. They see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to\nbe so complete a master of another. However Dr. Priestley and other\narguers for a Deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not\nmatter, is a space that matter may occupy. Therefore if God is not\nmatter, and also is not space, he is nothing. Dr. Priestley allows\nmatter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity\nand others equally eternal. He says directly, that matter cannot exist\nwithout it's perpetually corresponding powers. The adjustment of those\npowers he places in the Deity. But as we never see matter without the\nadjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this\ndrives him at last to say, the Deity must also have created matter,\naccording to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with\nhimself. Ideas absurd and irreconcileable!\n\nDiscoursing upon the hypothesis of \"a fortuitous concourse of atoms\"\nDr. Priestley asks, \"what reason we have to think that small masses of\nmatter can have power without communication _ab extra_?\" Let this\nquestion be returned, \"have we not reason to think so from attraction\nthe most common property in matter.\" To get rid of this difficulty he\nwill not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most\nsimple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal.\nA magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without\nits magnetic power. He concludes there must be some original existent\nBeing. He shall be allowed many original existent Beings if it pleases\nhim. A man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other.\nHe is superior to other animals in this world. In like manner there may\nbe allowed superior Beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet\nthose superior Beings not have made man.\n\nDr. Priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external\nforce. That does not seem quite necessary. Motion may as well be\nasserted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural\nstate and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be\nits natural state. Hume thought so and Hume was no great fool,\nnotwithstanding Dr. Priestley makes so light of him. In fact matter\nnever is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state\nof rest. Nor has Dr. Priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity\nand electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior Being, and\nnot originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis\nof a Deity. He absolutely says matter could not have had those powers\nwithout a communication from a superior and intelligent Being. If\nmatter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it\nmust be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a\nBeing therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. Whoever\nfinds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little\ndifficulty in Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other\npowers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at\nleast have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another.\n\nIt has always been a doubt with Theists, whether they can better prove\ntheir God's existence by moral or physical considerations. Dr.\nPriestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter\nproof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause\nand effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. He\nmakes great reference to the works of art. Theists are always for\nturning their God into an overgrown man. Anthropomorphites has long\nbeen a term applied to them. They give him hands and eyes nor can they\nconceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. In which, as before\nhas been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world\nbody and the space which bodies occupy. But granting this great workman\nto have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition,\nthat whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table,\nmust have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. Dr. Priestley\nspeaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been\n_capable_ of comprehending it. The nature and use of things are often\nfound out after they are made and by different persons than the makers\nof them. Neither is there any analogy between the works of art, as a\ntable or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. Therefore there can be\nno arguing from one to another by analogy. Hume observes that the\nformer works are done by reason and design, and the latter by\ngeneration and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes,\nit is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. At least\nafter all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked,\nwhether there is not some difference between a table and the world? The\nDoctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of\nany argument of analogy between men and metals, which he does not at\nother times scruple to make?\n\nA _gratis_ assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects;\nthen because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been\ncaused. His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, \"because\nevery thing was caused there must have been something that was not\ncaused.\" The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect\nis not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is\nHume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher.\nLet others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked,\nwhy may not there have been an infinity of causes?\n\nAnother argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any\nthing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that\ninvisible power is what he calls God. Apply this argument to gravity,\nand the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is\nGod. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of\nnature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary\nto account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for\nthem, although this person or another cannot tell which?\n\nIf nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material\nnature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one\nimmediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be\nobjectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary;\nand so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one.\nThis universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of\nanother, and so on. Where is the absurdity of that? If the universe is\napplied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed\nby one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one\nhand. But this Deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all\nother worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of\ndesign that all other worlds and universes are one work with this.\n\nDr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a\ncause of the Deity. He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his\nreasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea\non the subject; that is, how God could exist without a prior cause. At\nthe same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we\ncannot reason about him. Why then all his own reasoning? We make a\nDeity ourselves, fall down and worship him. It is the molten calf over\nagain. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now we\nworship idols of our imagination; before of our hands. \"Still we must\nnecessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;\" that is, when our reason\ndrives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily\nstop finitely in our career. Not content with this conclusion he adds,\nthat we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he\nowns that it is not an object of our conceptions. But even the Theist's\nargument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite\ncause. The argument is, \"because there is a man, and man has\nintelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely\nsuperior intelligence.\" Would it not be nearly as well to argue,\n\"because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man.\"\n\nWhat is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be\ncarried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of\nthe course of nature is tired. If this eternal series could not exist,\na Deity might with some propriety be said to follow. Put the argument\ninto a syslogistic form.\n\n\"The universe shews design;\"\n\n\"It is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;\"\n\n\"Therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe.\"\n\nDeny the second assertion and the problem is destroyed. So far from its\nbeing difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing\nin the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid\nto think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to\ndwell upon. It is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more\nevident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each\nother by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered,\nthat it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley\ngoes on to say, \"that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any\nmore than the cause of a sound can be a sound.\" Experience shews us all\nsound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man\nthan that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all\nmen must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue\nupon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An\nargument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one\nhorse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more\nconsonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as\none is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from\nall eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some\ninvisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into\nlife, without any body's knowing how or where.\n\nIt is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most\ncapital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be\nbuilt upon experience, or analogy to experience. Yet will many of these\nreasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for\nthe probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any\nrevival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at\npleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see\nnew beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience;\nand experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has\neternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been\neternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that\nwe must say he came from God? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes\npompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown\nBeing. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to\nthe manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism.\n\nThe following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well\nlinked together to prove the weight and force of experience in\nreasoning, but it proves nothing more. \"Chairs and tables are made by\nmen or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and\nwe cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves,\nbecause that is against experience. No one will say one table might\nmake another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come\ninto being without an adequate cause.\" Yet for this adequate cause we\nare at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret\ninvisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature.\n\nDr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of\nall his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to\nmultiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_\nin the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking\nthe very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he\ngives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe\nthink as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he\ninclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds,\nthat if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of\nother works of design that we must look out for its author as much as\nthat of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same\nauthor.\n\nEvery difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is\nas well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual\nquestion to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence\nof things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon\nherself, \"why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new\nappearances?\" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the\nsupporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is\nconstantly in action, and that every change which animals and\nvegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest\nand undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this\nterrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an\nalteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive\nheat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of\nanimals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing,\nand which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things\ntaking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe\nshall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species,\nwhatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a\nbeginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not\nthe reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as\nits first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of\nthe sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So\nfar this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable\ndifficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual\nmutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of\nnature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are\nnot more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the\nshort space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of\nno importance to the whole mass of matter, though Beings of some\nparticular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term\nof their duration under that form.\n\nIf it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the\nDeity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is\nno more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the\nEnergy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing\nthem, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his\ncrimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good\natheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good\nDeist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If\nnecessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this\nanswer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a\ncharge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The\nknowledge of a God and even the belief of a providence are found but\ntoo slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out\nas licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this\ncreed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior\nexercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to God. It may\nmake men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform\nsomething of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue,\nrestore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. Lust being\nthe source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among\nidolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and\nanthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists,\nand neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a\ncurb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their\nperverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the\nremonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a\nfortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be\nthe difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and\nthe Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their\nactions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may\nmake men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them.\nA great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When\ndid it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise\nfewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired\nwithout poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in\nhuman actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is\nthe natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for\ncertain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever\nfaith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his\nmind.\n\nBut it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time\nat least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superstitious, and\ncriminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious\npersuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon\nothers of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of\ndanger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and\nfew indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their\nfaith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a\nvitious passion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making\nmen virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact;\nit is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of\nhis scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history\nand the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still\nplunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded\nof the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that God\npunishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that\nreligion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon\nthrough the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that\nthose who hold up a belief in God as a sufficient proof and character\nof a good life are most egregiously mistaken.\n\nSome Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some\natheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with\nthe Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are\nthose worshipers of a God, instead of having a high sense of personal\ndignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading\neven the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be\na link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and\ndreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and\nwithout intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the\nmeanest and most humble Theist.\n\nAnother argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is\ngenerally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life\nhave inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists?\nBut granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and\nthat the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a\nGod was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the\nmind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite\nclear if there is no God (by which term let it again be noticed, is\nmeant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material\nuniverse and yet no part of the material system) that the world in\nwhich man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of\nnature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection\nof the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be\nspared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is\nmost generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his\nopinion; that the being of a God is capable of being proved by reason,\nis not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of\nreason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive\nat almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity\nand his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But\nthe learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves,\nwhether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt\nprinciples of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so\nmany great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have\nconfidently denied the being of a God, whose arguments the learned Dr.\nCudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with\nall the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was\nnever doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to\natheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be\nthe common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism\ncannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold\nsuch a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and\nconvincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners,\nwho yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they\nreason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be\nasked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that\nsame man asserts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue,\nand say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues\nhas a conception or not of the subject. \"Having no ideas includes no\nimpossibility,\" therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue\nabout an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea\nof the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether\nhe has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any.\nReason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined God is\nrepresented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant,\nat another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall\nthen such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has\nmade, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course\nof nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine\nshew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed\nmiracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every\nthousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing\nmiracle, that such a Being as the depicted God, the author of nature\nand all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in\ndoubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is\nnot the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great\nluminaries of religion a proof, that no God, or no _such_ God at least,\nexists. Hear the admirable words of the author of \"The System of\nNature;\" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses\ndroits, ses titres, son existence meme?_\n\nDr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and\nagainst a Godhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, \"the\nDeity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in\nthe universe are made by him.\" Are all things in the universe infinite?\nWhy an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that\nwhatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any\ngreat objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that\nwhatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore\ncannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot\naccording to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal\nalso. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions\nwith those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is,\nto refute the arguments of former asserters of a Deity as well as to\nestablish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he\nenters upon the subject of space. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having\nasserted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing\nelse should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that space\nat least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an\nattribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a\nsyllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.)\nwhere he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be\nan attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the\nDeity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon\nhimself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so.\nExclude the Deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and\nimmense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this\nrespect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not\nadopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific\nreasoner.\n\nThe only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have\nhad no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none.\nDr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence\nof the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who\nheld that Fate controuled the Gods. Necessity is therefore the first\nGod. Why then any other God than Necessity? What more has Helvetius\nsaid than that?\n\nIt is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a God and his\npower infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other\nanimals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy.\nOr take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against\nhis power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the\nevidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of\nthem by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are\ncontinually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances\nmay be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in\naddition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley\nthinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's\nobservations upon miracles. _\"Which is more likely, that the relater of\na miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related\nshould have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?\"_\nLet the force of this observation be considered and believe in the\nhistory of miracles who can! To give a finishing stroke to poor\nMr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only\nmotive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious\nenquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, \"What gloomy\nprospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!\" If so,\nhow much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that\nlast scene!\n\nThe honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that\ningenious and satisfactory work intitled \"The System of Nature,\" does\ncredit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought\ntherefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he\nseems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius.\nThe words he imputes to him are, \"that nature has no object, because\nnature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts\nnecessarily.\" In the same way nature might have an object though it\nacted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is\na necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of\nthat passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large\nfor himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader\nmay accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument,\nand as the conclusion of this answer.\n\n\"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the\nworld, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such,\nand does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one\nreply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol,\nand on which they found their notions of those qualities in God, are in\na similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence\nwith the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them,\nthat constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute\nwisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also\nour mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is\nhurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or\nmalice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature.\n\nSome pretend that the supremely wise God can derive goodness and\nhappiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to\nundergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity,\nor on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say,\nthat they judge of God's conduct by analogy, and that from the present\nappearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his\nfuture wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his\nwant of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will\nalways want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this\nworld, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? This\nkind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced\nimagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination,\nadopted an opinion that God is good, cannot admit that he will consent\nto let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand\nhypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is\ninsufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting\nand transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If God can have been\nunjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least,\nfrom his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice\nthen is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who\ncan give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable\nin a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his\ndeviation from those qualities in this?\n\nIn spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that\nbeneficence which men suppose in God, they continue to call him good.\nWhen we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities\nthat so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these\nills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom\nthe depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest\nblessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so\nfrivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as\naffect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual\nexistence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which\naffect us, even but for a time, in a painful manner, are as certainly\nevil to us. To vindicate God's visiting mankind with these evils some\ntell us, that he is just, and that they are chastisements inflicted on\nmankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble\nmortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal\nBeing who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him,\nto diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful\nsensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the\nall-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who\nhas received from God his being and his temper, act against the\ninclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and\ndisorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can\nhave of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But\ntheologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good\nthings he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and\nthat without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures\nas his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the\nsmallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking\nabuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into\nan abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under\nthe empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled? \"This misery,\nsay you, is but for a time.\" Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust\nfor a time. \"He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own\nbenefit.\" But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at\nall? \"He does it, perhaps to try them\" But, if he knows all things,\nwhat occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why\nneed he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him?\nOmnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having\nneither equals nor rivals. But if this God is jealous of his glory, his\ntitles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to\noffend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which\nhis pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his\ntitles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of\npunishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never\nhave permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have\nbeen efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking.\n\"But, say you, he makes man free.\" Alas? why did he present him with a\ngift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free\nagency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of\nhis worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a\npresent worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the\npretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God\nought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it,\neverlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory\ncrimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be\ncalled good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and\ndangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom\nhe before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder\nof his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called\njust and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the\noffence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of\nvengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly\noffended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him,\nespecially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should\nwe consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such\nconfusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants,\nall his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his\nwill and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that\ntheir God is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as\nincomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in\nreply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in God, are\nqualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they\nbear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But,\npray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection,\nunless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my\nfellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of God is not the\nsame with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it,\ncomprehend and explain it to others?\"\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\n\n\nPrevious to this publication the editor sent the following Letter\nto Dr. Priestley.\n\n\n\"Reverend Sir,\n\nHad you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments\nrespecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a God\nthan you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have\nappeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a\nreply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man\nwho enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation\nwith my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to\nstand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to\nhave in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in\nphilosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and\ndisappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has\nto dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and\npillories of the courts of Law.\n\nI accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask\nyour friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least,\nmaintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his\nattributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but\nthen it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may\ncertainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well\nwith lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a\npoor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which\npeople in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution\ncould ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry,\nwill at least bear the expences of it.\n\n     I am,\n     Reverend Sir,\n     Your most humble obedient servant,\n     WILLIAM HAMMON.\n\nOct. 23. 1781.\n\n_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._\n\n\nTo this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came\nto hand.\n\n\nTHE END.","title":"Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":18291}