{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_14357/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_14357","id":"gutenberg_14357","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14357","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Eucken, Rudolf, 1846-1926","Philosophy"],"text":"RUDOLF EUCKEN\n\nA Philosophy of Life\n\nby\n\nABEL J. JONES, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.\n\n     Formerly Member of the University of Jena, Scholar of Clare\n     College, Cambridge, and Assistant Lecturer at the University\n     College, Cardiff\n\nLondon: T. C. & E. C. Jack\n67 Long Acre, W.C., and Edinburgh\nNew York: Dodge Publishing Co.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe name of Eucken has become a familiar one in philosophical and\nreligious circles. Until recent years the reading of his books was\nconfined to those possessing a knowledge of German, but of late several\nhave been translated into the English language, and now the students of\nphilosophy and religion are agog with accounts of a new philosopher who\nis at once a great ethical teacher and an optimistic prophet. There is\nno doubt that Eucken has a great message, and those who cannot find time\nto make a thorough study of his works should not fail to know something\nof the man and his teachings. The aim of this volume is to give a brief\nand clear account of his philosophical ideas, and to inspire the reader\nto study for himself Eucken's great works.\n\nProfessor Rudolf Eucken was born in 1846, at Aurich in Frisia. He\nattended school in his native town, and then proceeded to study at the\nUniversities of G\u00f6ttingen and Berlin. In 1874 he was invited to the\nProfessorship of Philosophy at the University of Jena, and here he has\nlaboured for thirty-eight years; during this period he has been listened\nto and admired by many of the more advanced students of philosophy of\nall countries and continents.\n\nHis earliest writings were historical in character, and consisted mainly\nof learned essays upon the classical and German philosophers.\n\nFollowing upon these appeared valuable studies in the history of\nphilosophy, which brought out, too, to some extent, Eucken's own\nphilosophical ideas.\n\nHis latest works have been more definitely constructive. In _Life's\nBasis and Life's Ideal_, and _The Truth of Religion_, he gives\nrespectively a full account of his philosophical system, and of his\nideas concerning religion.\n\nSeveral smaller works contain his ideas in briefer and more popular\nform.\n\nAs a lecturer he is charming and inspiring. He is not always easy to\nunderstand; his sentences are often long, florid, and complex.\nSometimes, indeed, he is quite beyond the comprehension of his\nstudents--but when they do not understand, they admire, and feel they\nare in the presence of greatness. His writings contain many of the\nfaults of his lectures. They are often laboured and obscure, diffuse and\nverbose.\n\nBut these faults are minor in character, compared with the greatness of\nhis work. There is no doubt that his is one of the noblest attempts ever\nmade to solve the great question of life. Never was a philosophy more\nimbued with the spirit of battle against the evil and sordid, and with\nthe desire to find in life the highest and greatest that can be found in\nit.\n\nI have to thank Professor Eucken for the inspiration of his lectures and\nbooks, various writers, translators, and friends for suggestions, and\nespecially my wife, whose help in various ways has been invaluable.\n\nPassages are quoted from several of the works mentioned in the\nBibliography, especially from Eucken's \"The Truth of Religion,\" with the\nkind permission of Messrs. Williams & Norgate--the publishers.\n\nABEL J. JONES.\n\nCARDIFF.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER\n\n   I. THE PROBLEM OF LIFE\n\n  II. HAS THE PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?\n\n III. ANOTHER SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\n  IV. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND THE ETERNAL\n\n   V. THE \"HIGH\" AND THE \"LOW\"\n\n  VI. THE ASCENT TO FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY\n\n VII. THE PERSONAL AND THE UNIVERSAL\n\nVIII. RELIGION: HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE\n\n  IX. CONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION\n\n      BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n      INDEX\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE PROBLEM OF LIFE\n\n\nBefore we proceed to outline Eucken's philosophical position, it will be\nwell if we can first be clear as to the special problem with which he\nconcerns himself. Philosophers have at some time or other considered all\nthe problems of heaven and earth to be within their province, especially\nthe difficult problems for which a simple solution is impossible. Hence\nit is, perhaps, that philosophy has been in disrepute, especially in\nEnglish-speaking countries, the study of the subject has been very\nlargely limited to a small class of students, and the philosopher has\nbeen regarded as a dreamy, theorising, and unpractical individual.\n\nMany people, when they hear of Eucken, will put him out of mind as an\nordinary member of a body of cranks. From Eucken's point of view this is\nthe most unfortunate thing that can happen, for his message is not\ndirected to a limited number of advanced students of philosophy, but is\nmeant for all thinking members of the human race.\n\nThe problem he endeavours to solve is far from being one of mere\ntheoretical interest; on the contrary it has to do with matters of\nimmediate practical concern to the life of the individual and of the\ncommunity. To ignore him will be to fail to take account of one of the\nmost rousing philosophies of modern times.\n\nThe apathy that exists in regard to the subject of philosophy is not\neasy to explain. It is not that philosophising is only possible to the\ngreatest intellects; it is indeed natural for the normal mind to do so.\nIn a quiet hour, when the world with its rush and din leaves us to\nourselves and the universe, we begin to ask ourselves \"Why\" and \"How,\"\nand then almost unconsciously we philosophise. Nothing is more natural\nto the human mind than to wonder, and to wonder is to begin to\nphilosophise.\n\nPerhaps philosophers have been largely to blame for the indifference\nshown; their terms have often been needlessly difficult, their language\nobscure, and their ideas abstruse. Too often, too, their abstract\nspeculations have caused them to ignore or forget the actual experience\nof mankind.\n\nThose who have quarrelled with philosophy for these or other reasons\nwill do well to lay their prejudices aside when they start a study of\nEucken, for though he has some of the faults of his class, he has many\nstriking and exceptional excellences.\n\nPhilosophers in general set out to solve the riddle of the universe.\nThey differ in their statement of the problem, in the purpose of the\nattempt, and in their methods of attempting the solution. Some will\nwonder how this marvellous universe ever came into existence, and will\nconsider the question of the existence of things to be the problem of\nphilosophy. Others in observing the diversity of things in the universe\nwonder what is behind it all; they seek to go beyond mere appearances,\nand to investigate the nature of that behind the appearances, which they\ncall the reality. In their attempts to solve one or both of these\nproblems, thinkers are led to marvel how it is that we get to know\nthings at all; they are tempted to investigate the possibility of\nknowledge, and are in this way side-tracked from the main problem.\nOthers in their investigations are struck with amazement at the\nintricate organisation of the human mind; they leave the riddle of the\nuniverse to study the processes of human thought, and examine as far as\nthey are able the phenomena of consciousness. Then thought itself claims\nthe attention of other philosophers; they seek to find what are the laws\nof valid thought, what rules must be followed in order that through\nreasoning we may arrive at correct conclusions. Others become attracted\nto an investigation of the good in the universe, and their question\nchanges from \"What is?\" to \"What ought to be?\" Others interest\nthemselves in the problem of the beautiful, and endeavour to determine\nthe essence of the beautiful and of its appreciation. In this way the\nsubject of philosophy separates out into a number of branches. The study\nof the beautiful is called \u00c6sthetics; of the good, Ethics; of the laws\nof thought, Logic; of the mind processes, Psychology; of the possibility\nof knowledge, the Theory of knowledge; while the deeper problems of the\nexistence of things, of reality and unity in the universe, are generally\nincluded under Metaphysics.\n\nIt need hardly be pointed out that all these branches are very closely\nrelated, and that a discussion of any one of them involves to some\nextent a reference to the others. One cannot, for example, attempt to\nsolve the great question of reality without touching upon the\npossibility of knowledge, without some reference to the processes of the\nhuman mind, and the standards of the validity of thought, of the good,\nand of the beautiful.\n\nIt is however essential, if one is to appreciate a philosopher, to\nunderstand clearly what his main problem is. Therein lies frequently the\ndifferences among philosophers--that is, in the special emphasis laid on\none problem, and the attention to, or neglect of other aspects. To fail\nto be clear on this matter frequently means to misunderstand a\nphilosopher.\n\nAnd it would seem that many critics have failed to appreciate the work\nof Eucken to the extent they should, because they have expected him to\ndeal in detail with problems which it is not his intention to discuss,\nand have failed to appreciate what special problem it is that he\nattempts to solve.\n\nEucken's special problem is that of the reality in the universe, of the\nunity there exists in the diversity of things. In so far as he makes\nthis his problem, he is at one with other philosophers in investigating\nwhat may perhaps be considered to be the most profound problem that the\nhuman mind has ever conceived. The fact that distinguishes Eucken from a\nlarge number of other thinkers is that he starts where they leave off.\nAt a rule, philosophers begin their investigation with a consideration\nof matter, and proceed by slow degrees to attempt to explain the reality\nat the basis of it. Some never get further, and dispense with the\nquestion of human life and thought as mere aspects or manifestations of\nthe material world. But the problem of life is for Eucken the one\nproblem--he seeks to find the reality beneath the superficialities of\nhuman existence, and he has little to say concerning the world of\nmatter. And, after all, it is the problem of life that urgently calls\nfor solution, for upon the solution that is accepted, the life of the\nindividual is to a large extent based. It is, of course, very\ninteresting to meditate and speculate upon the material world, its\norigin and evolution, but the question is very largely one of mere\ntheoretical interest--a kind of game or puzzle for studious minds. It is\nthe question of life itself that is ultimately of practical interest to\nevery human soul. And this is the problem that Eucken would solve. Hence\nthose who expect to find a closely reasoned philosophy on matter and its\nmanifestations must look elsewhere, for Eucken has little for them.\nEucken's philosophy is a philosophy of life, and he only touches\nincidentally those aspects of philosophy that are not immediately\nconcerned with his special problem. He refuses to be allured from the\nmain problem by subsidiary investigations, and perhaps rightly so, for\none problem of such magnitude would seem to be enough for one human mind\nto attempt. Eucken is a philosopher who lays foundations and deals with\nbroad outlines and principles; it must be left to his many disciples to\nfill in any gaps that exist on this account, by attempting to solve the\nsubsidiary problems with which Eucken cannot for the present concern\nhimself.\n\nIf Eucken's problem differs fundamentally from that of most other\nphilosophers, perhaps the purpose of his investigations is still a more\nstriking characteristic. He is anxious to solve the riddle of the\nuniverse in order that there may be drawn from the solution an\ninspiration which shall help the human race to concentrate its energies\nupon the highest ideals of life. The desire to find a meaning which will\nexplain, and at the same time infuse zest and gladness into every\ndepartment of life has become a passion with him, and in finding that\nmeaning, his great endeavour is to prove the truth of human freedom and\npersonality. He wishes to solve the riddle in order that man may become\na better man, the world a better world. His aim is definitely an\nethical aim, and his purpose a practical one of the noblest order, and\nnot one of mere intellectual interest.\n\nThere is much, too, that is original in his methods--this will become\nevident in the chapters that follow. He begins with an inquiry into the\nsolutions that have been offered. After careful investigation he finds\nthey all fail to satisfy the conditions which a solution should satisfy.\nHis discussions of these theories are most illuminating, and those who\ndo not agree with his conclusions cannot fail to admire his masterly\ntreatment.\n\nHaving arrived at this conclusion, he searches the story of the past,\nstudies the conditions of the present, and gazes into the maze of the\nfuture, and finds revealed in them all an eternal something, unaffected\nby time, which was, is, and ever shall be--the eternal, universal,\nspiritual his, which then must be the great reality.\n\nUpon this basis he builds a system of philosophy, which he considers to\nbe more satisfactory than the solutions already offered; with which\ncontention, there is little doubt, the majority of his readers will be\ninclined to agree.\n\nAfter the brief statement of Eucken's special problem, of the purpose\nand methods of his investigation, we can proceed to outline his theories\nin greater detail, beginning in the next chapter with his discussion of\nthe solutions that have in the past been offered and accepted.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nHAS THE PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?\n\n\nWhat is the meaning, the value, and purpose of life, and what is the\nhighest and the eternal in life--the great reality? This is the question\nthat Eucken would solve. Before attempting a solution of his own, he\nexamines those that have already been offered. His discussion of these\ntheories is remarkable for the fairness, breadth of view, sympathy,\ninsight, and accurate knowledge that is shown. There is no superficial\ncriticism, neither does he concern himself with the inessential details\nof the theories.\n\nJest-books tell us of a defendant against whom a claim for compensation\nwas made by a complainant who alleged that the former's dog had bitten\nhim. The defence was, first, that the dog was lame, blind, and\ntoothless; second, that it had died a week before; and third, that the\ndefendant never possessed a dog. A sensible judge would wish to be\nsatisfied in regard to the third statement before wasting time\ndiscussing the others; if it proved to be true, then the case would be\nat an end. The defences of philosophical systems are often similar, and\nthe critic is tempted to waste time discussing details when he should go\nto the root of the matter. Eucken does not fall into this error. His\nspecial method is to seek the idea or ideas which lie at the root of the\nproposed solution; if these are unsatisfactory, then he does not\nconsider it necessary to discuss them further. Hence his work is free\nfrom the flippant and superficial argument so common to-day; he makes a\nfair and serious endeavour to find out the truth (if any) that is at the\nbasis of the proposed solutions, and does not hesitate to give them\ntheir due meed of praise even though he considers them to be ultimately\nunsatisfactory.\n\nBefore a solution can be regarded as a satisfactory one, Eucken holds\nthat it should satisfy certain conditions. It should offer an\nexplanation for life which can be a firm basis for life, it must admit\nof the possibility of human freedom, and must release the human being\nfrom sordid motives--unless it satisfy these conditions, then it cannot\nbe accepted as final.\n\nThe solutions of the problem of life that have been offered he considers\nto be five--Religion and Immanental Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism and\nIndividualism, the first two regarding the invisible world as the\nreality in life, the others laying emphasis on man's life in the present\nworld. The reader will perhaps wonder how his choice has fallen upon\nthese systems of thought and these alone. The explanation is a simple\none: he considers it necessary to deal only with those theories which\ncan form, and have formed, bases for a whole system of life. Mere\ntheoretical ideas of life, especially negative ideas such as those of\nagnosticism and scepticism, do not form such a basis, but the five\nchosen for discussion can, and have to some extent, posed as complete\ntheories of life, upon which a system of life can be built.\n\nHas _Religion_ solved the question? If it has, then it must have done so\nin that which must be considered its highest form--in Christianity.\nChristianity has attempted the solution by placing stress upon a higher\ninvisible world, a world in sharp contrast with the mere world of sense,\nand far superior to it. It unites life to a supernatural world, and\nraises mankind above the level of the natural world. It has brought out\nwith great clearness the contrast between the higher world and the world\nof sin, and has shown the need for a break with the evil in the world.\nIt has given to man a belief in freedom, and in the necessity for a\ncomplete change of heart. It has proved a source of deliverance from the\nfeeling, of guilt, and a comfort in suffering. Indeed, considering all\nthe facts, there seems to be no doubt that, of all the solutions\noffered, religion has been the most powerful factor in the history of\nmankind.\n\nIts influence would continue for the present and future, were it not\nthat doubt has been cast upon its very foundations, and had not\ncircumstances arisen to take men's minds away from thoughts of a higher\nand invisible world, and to concentrate them to a greater extent than\nformerly upon the world of sense. The progress of the natural sciences\nhas done much to bring about the change. Christianity made man the\ncentre of the universe, for whom all things existed, but the sciences\nhave insisted upon a broader view of the universe, and have deposed man\nfrom his throne, and given him a much humbler position. Then as the\nconception of law became more prominent, and scientists became more and\nmore inclined to explain all things as the result of natural laws, the\nidea of a personal God in constant communion with, and supervision over\nmankind, fell into disfavour.\n\nAnd the study of history has caused questions to be raised. Some\nhistorians have endeavoured to show that the idea of an overworld is\nmerely the characteristic of a certain stage in the evolution of\nmankind, and that the ideas of religion are, after all, little more than\nthe mental construction of a God upon the image of man's own self.\nHistory has attacked the doctrinal form of religion, and has endeavoured\nto show that religions have been very largely coloured and influenced by\nthe prevailing ideas of the time; and the question naturally arises as\nto whether there is anything more in religion than these temporary\nelements.\n\nAnd this is not all. In the present age the current of human activity is\nstrong. Man is beginning to accomplish things in the material world, and\nis becoming anxious to accomplish more. His railways cover the lands,\nhis ships sail the seas, and his aeroplanes fly through the air. He has\nacquired a taste for this world, a zest for the conquest and the\nutilising for his own pleasure and benefit of the world of nature. And\nwhen this occurs, the overworld sinks into the background--he is\nsatisfied with the present, and feels no need, except under special\ncircumstances, of a higher world. The sense world at present makes a\nstrong appeal--and the stronger it becomes, the less he listens to the\ncall of an overworld.\n\nThe sciences, history, and the special phases of human activity have\ndrawn attention from a higher, invisible world, and have cast doubts\nupon its very existence.\n\nAs a result of this, \"Religion (in the traditional form), despite all it\nhas effected, is for the man of to-day a question rather than an answer.\nIt is itself too much of a problem to interpret to us the meaning of our\nlife, and make us feel that it is worth the living.\"\n\nIn these words Eucken states his conviction that Christianity in its\northodox forms cannot solve the problem of the present. This, however,\nis not all he has to say concerning religion. He is, in truth, a great\nbeliever in religion, and as will be seen, he believes that later it\nwill again step forth in a changed form as \"the fact of facts\" to wield\na power perhaps greater than ever before.\n\nAs in the case of religion, _Immanent Idealism_ is a theory that gives\nlife an invisible basis, but the invisible has been regarded as that\nwhich lies at the root of the present world, and not as a separate\nhigher world outside our own. The Divine it considers not as a personal\nbeing apart from the world, but as a power existing in and permeating\nit, that indeed which gives to the world its truth and depth. Man\nbelongs to the visible world, but inwardly he is alive to the presence\nof a deeper reality, and his ambition must be to become himself a part\nof this deeper whole. If by turning from his superficial life he can set\nhimself in the depths of reality, then a magnificent life, with the\nwidest prospects, opens out before him. \"He may win the whole of\ninfinity for his own, and set himself free from the triviality of the\nmerely human without losing himself in an alien world.\" And if he does\nso, he is led to place greater emphasis upon the high ideals of life\nthan upon material progress. He learns to value the beautiful far above\nthe merely useful; the inner life above mere existence, a genuine\nspiritual culture above the mere perfecting of natural and social\nconditions. There is brought into view a new and deeper life in which\nthe emphasis is placed upon the good, the beautiful, and the true. In\nthis way idealism has inspired many men to put forth their energies for\nthe highest aims, has lifted the individual above the narrowness of a\nlife devoted to himself alone, and has produced characters of\nexceptional beauty and strength. It claims, indeed, to be able to shape\nthe world of man more satisfactorily than religion can, for it has no\nneed for doctrines of the Divine, the Divine being immediately present\nin the world. But despite its great influence in the past, its power\nhas of late been considerably weakened.\n\nThe question of the existence of a deeper invisible reality in the world\nhas become as problematic as the doctrines of religion.\n\nTo be a whole-hearted believer in the older forms of idealism it is\nnecessary that the universe be regarded as ultimately reasonable and\nharmonious, and there must be a belief in the possibilities of great\ndevelopment on the part of the human being. But a serious study of\nthings reveals to us the fact that the universe is not entirely\nreasonable and harmonious. If it were, then man's effort towards the\nideal would be helped by the whole universe, but that is far from being\nthe case; progress means fight, and difficult fight; there is definite\nopposition to the efforts of man to raise himself. Moreover, there is\nevil in the world, let pantheists and others say what they will. Eucken\nrefuses to close his eyes to, or to explain away, opposition, pain, and\nevil--the world is far from being wholly reasonable and harmonious, and\nidealists must acknowledge this fact. The natural sciences, too, by\nemphasising the reign of law, tend to limit more and more the\npossibilities of the human being, ultimately robbing him of all\nfreedom--hence of all possibility of creation. And how can one be an\nenthusiastic devotee of idealism if he is led to doubt man's power to\naim at, fight towards, or even choose the highest?\n\nIdealism was at its height in those red-letter days when a high state of\nculture had been attained, and great personalities produced masterpieces\nin art, music, and literature. The progress of the sciences and of man's\nnatural activity has directed the spirit of the age towards material\nprogress; the ideals of mankind tend to become external and\nsuperficial, and the interest in the invisible world falls to a minimum.\n\nTo some extent, too, idealism breathes of aristocracy--a most unpopular\ncharacteristic in a democratic age. Experience shows that man is raised\nabove himself only in rare cases, and that the great things in the\nrealms of art, music, and literature are very largely the monopoly of\nthe few, and these mainly of the leisured classes. Hence the appeal of\nidealism to certain types of men and women must necessarily be a feeble\none.\n\nThen, again, there is the general indifference of mankind to lofty aims;\nthis militates against the power of idealism even more than in the case\nof religion, for while in the latter there is the idea of a personal God\nwho is pleased or displeased urging men to renewed effort, the teachings\nof idealism may appear to be mere abstractions, and can, as such,\npossess little driving-power for the ordinary mind.\n\nIdealism, too, seems to be a mere compromise between religion and a life\ndevoted to sense experience, and like most compromises it lacks the\nenthusing power of the original ideas.\n\nFinally, the whole theory leaves us in uncertainty--\"that which was\nintended to give a firm support, and to point out a clear course to our\nlife, has itself become a difficult problem.\"\n\nBut Eucken has more to say concerning idealism, even though in a\ndifferent form from the theories of the past. Indeed, his philosophy is\ngenerally classed amongst the idealisms. Eucken makes a great endeavour,\nhowever, to avoid the difficulties and objections to the idealistic\nposition; later we shall see that a great measure of success has crowned\nhis efforts.\n\nHaving discussed the two solutions that place special stress on the\ninvisible world, he proceeds to deal with the theories which emphasise\nthe relation of the life of man to the material world.\n\nHe first treats of _Naturalism_, that solution of the problem that makes\nthe sense experience of surrounding nature the basis of life,\nsubordinating even the life of the soul to the level of the natural,\nmaterial world.\n\nNature in the early ages had been superficially explained, often in the\nlight of religious doctrine. Man gave to nature a variety of\nexplanations and of colouring, depending largely upon his ideas of the\nplace of nature in relation to himself and to the invisible world. But\nsuch anthropomorphic explanations could not long survive the progress of\nthe sciences, for a scientific comprehension of nature could only be\nattained by getting rid of all human colouring, and by investigating\nnature entirely by itself, out of all relation to the human soul. Man\nthen investigated nature more and more as an object apart from himself.\n\nThe first result of these investigations was to impress upon him the\nreality of nature as something independent, and to increase on a very\nlarge scale his knowledge of, and control over nature. When man began to\nformulate and understand nature, he began, too, to invent machines to\nprofit from the knowledge he gained. Hence followed a marvellously\nfruitful period of human activity, an activity which at first\nstrengthened man in his own soul, and gave him increased consciousness\nof independence and power. While he was compelled to admit the greatness\nof the natural world, he became more and more convinced that he himself\nwas far greater, for could he not put the laws of nature to his own use\nand profit? Hence the gain to man at this stage of the development of\nthe sciences was very great, for he had come to appreciate more than\nbefore the superiority of the human soul over the material world. Hence\nresulted a more robust type of life, \"a life energetic, masculine,\npressing forward unceasingly.\" Matters, however, were not destined to\nremain long at this stage. As man's knowledge of the processes of nature\nincreased further, a twofold result followed. On the one hand, the sense\nworld of nature became increasingly absorbing in interest; on the other\nhand, laws were formulated and nature was conceived of as being a chain\nof cause and effect, a combination of mechanical elements whose\ninteractions were according to law, and could be foretold with the\nutmost precision.\n\nThese two factors worked in the same direction, namely, that of\nrendering less necessary the conception of a spiritual world. The\ninterest of mankind became so concentrated upon material things that the\ninterest in the invisible decreased, while the mechanical, soulless\nelements with their ceaseless actions and reactions in definite order,\nand according to inviolable law, were held sufficient to account for the\nphenomena of nature. The keynote was \"relation to environment\"; a\nconstantly changing environment, changing according to law, called for\nceaseless readjustment, and the adaptation to environment was held to be\nthe stimulus to all activity in the natural world.\n\nThe later development of biology, and the doctrine of the evolution of\nspecies, gradually extended this conception of nature to include man\nhimself.\n\nWhat he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be\nbut the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as\nunder the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no room for, and no\nneed of, the conception of free, originative thought. Thought was\nsimply an answer to the demand that the sense world was making, entirely\ndependent upon the external stimulus, just as any other activity was\nentirely dependent on an external stimulus. So thought came to be\nregarded as resulting from mere sense impression, which latter\ncorresponded to the external stimulus. It is obvious that the idea of\nthe freedom of the human soul, and of human personality as previously\nunderstood, had to go. Man was simply the result of the interaction of\nnumerous causes--and like the rest of nature, involved no independent\nspiritual element. Everything that was previously regarded as spiritual\nwas interpreted as a mere adjunct to, or a shadow of, the sense world.\nSuch a conception accounted for the whole of nature and of man, and so\nbecame an explanation of the universe, a philosophy.\n\nIn such a theory self-preservation becomes the aim of life, the struggle\nfor existence the driving-power, and adaptation to environment the means\nto the desired end. Hence it comes about that only one standard of value\nremains, that of usefulness, for that alone can be regarded as valuable\nwhich proves to be useful towards the preservation and enjoyment of the\nnatural life. The ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true, lose\nthe glory of their original meaning, and become comparatively barren\nconceptions. Hence at a stroke the spiritual world is wiped away, the\nsoul of man is degraded from its high position, the great truths of\nreligion are cast aside as mere illusions.\n\nThe naturalistic explanation possesses the apparent advantage of being a\nvery simple one, and hence attracts the human mind with great force in\nthe early stages of mental culture. All the difficulties of the\nconception of a higher world are absent, for the naturalistic position\ndoes not admit of its existence. It gives, too, some purpose to life,\neven though that purpose is not an ideal one.\n\nEucken is not reluctant to give the theory all the credit it deserves,\nand he is prepared to admit that it fulfils to some extent the\nconditions which he holds a satisfactory solution should fulfil.\n\nHe goes, however, immediately to the root of the matter, and finds that\nthe very existence of the theory of naturalism in itself is an eloquent\ndisproof of the theory. The existence of a comprehensive scientific\nconception involves an activity which is far superior to nature itself,\nfor it can make nature the object of systematic study. An intellect\nwhich is nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions can get little\nbeyond such sense impressions, whereas the highly developed scientific\nconception of nature that obtains to-day is far beyond a mere collection\nof sense impressions. Nature, indeed, is subdued and mastered by man;\nwhy then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered? To\nproduce from the phenomena of nature a scientific conception of nature\ndemands the activity of an independent, originative power of thought,\nwhich, though it may be conditioned by, and must be related to, sense\nimpressions, is far above mere sense impressions.\n\nNaturalism, in directing attention to the things that are experienced,\nfails to take proper account of the mind that experiences them; it\npostulates nature without mind, when only by the mind processes can man\nbecome aware of nature, and construct a naturalistic scheme of life. \"To\na thorough-going naturalism, naturalism itself is logically impossible.\"\nHence the impossibility of the naturalistic theory as an explanation of\nlife.\n\nThen it fails to provide a high ideal for life, and to release man from\nsordid motives. It gives no place for love, for work for its own sake,\nfor altruistic conduct, or for devotion to the high ideals of life. The\naim of life is limited to this world--man has but to aim at the\nenjoyment and preservation of his own life. The mechanical explanation\nof life, too, does away with the possibility of human freedom and\npersonality, and it is futile to urge man to greater efforts when\nsuccess is impossible. It is a theory which does justice merely to a\nlife of pleasure and pain, its psychology has no soul, and its political\neconomy bases the community upon selfishness.\n\nIn this way Eucken disproves the claim of naturalism; in doing so he\npoints out that a satisfactory solution must take account of the life of\nnature in a way which religion and idealism have failed to do.\n\nOf late years _Socialism_ and _Individualism_ have come into prominence\nas theories of life. Eucken attributes the movements in the first\ninstance to the receding into the background of the idea of an overworld\nwhich gave meaning and value to life. When doubt was thrown upon\nreligion and idealism, when confidence in another world was shaken, man\nlost to an extent his moral support. Where could he turn now for a firm\nbasis to life? He might, of course, turn from the invisible world to the\nworld of sense, to nature. But the first result of this is to make man\nrealise that he is separate from nature, and again he fails to find\nsupport. He is an alien in the world of nature, and disbelieves the\nexistence of a higher world. When both are denied him he turns naturally\nto his fellow-men--here at least he can find community of interest--here\nat least he is among beings of his own type. Hence he confines his\nattention to the life of humanity, and in this, the universe of\nmankind, he hopes to find an explanation of his own life, and a value\nfor it.\n\nThe progress of humanity, then, must become the aim of life--all our\nstrength and effort must be focussed upon human nature itself. But an\nimmediate difficulty arises. Where are we to find Man? \"Is it in the\nsocial community where individual forces are firmly welded together to\nform a common life, or among individuals as they exist for themselves in\nall their exhaustless diversity?\" If we put the community first, then\nthe social whole must be firmly rooted in itself and be independent of\nthe caprice of its members. The duty of the individual is to subordinate\nhimself to the community--this means socialism. If, on the other hand,\nthe great aim is to develop the individual and to give him the maximum\nof opportunity to unfold his special characteristics, we arrive at an\nopposing theory--that of individualism.\n\nIn the history of society we find an age of socialistic ideas followed\nby one of individualistic ideas, and vice versa, and there is much that\nis valuable in each, in that it tends to modify and disprove the other's\nextreme position.\n\nThe present wave in the direction of _socialism_ arises, to an extent,\nin reaction from the extremely individualistic position of previous\nages. Man is now realising that the social relations of life are of\nimportance as well as the character of his own life. He realises the\ninterdependence of members of a community, and the conception of the\nState as a whole, a unit, instead of a mere sum of individuals, grows\nup. The modern industrial development and the organisation of labour\nhave, too, emphasised the fact that the value of the individual depends\nlargely upon his being a part of society. His work must be in\nco-operation with the work of others to produce the best effect; for in\nsuch co-operation it produces effects which reach far beyond his own\nindividual capacity. Hence his life appears to receive value from the\nsocial relations, and the social ideal is conceived. The development of\nthe individual no longer becomes the aim but rather the development of\nthe community. In setting out the development of society as his aim, the\nindividual makes considerable sacrifices. All that is distinctly\nindividual must go, in character, in work, in science, and art, and that\nwhich is concerned with the common need of society must receive\nattention. This means undoubtedly a limitation of the life of the\nindividual, and often entails a considerable sacrifice; but the\nsacrifice is made because of the underlying belief that in the sum of\nindividual judgments there is reason, and that in the opinion of the\nmajority there is truth. This socialistic culture finds in the present\ncondition of society, plenty of problems to hand, and in its treatment\nof these problems a vigorous socialistic type of life is developed. The\nmost pressing problem is concerned with the distribution of material and\nspiritual goods. Material goods and the opportunity for spiritual\nculture that go with them have been largely a monopoly of the\naristocracy. Now arises a demand for a more equal distribution, and this\nis felt to be a right demand, not only from the point of view of\njustice, but also for the sake of spiritual culture itself. So it is\nthat the movement for the social amelioration of the masses starts. The\nwelfare of humanity is its aim, and all things, religion, science, and\nart, must work towards this end, and are only of value in so far as they\ncontribute towards it.\n\nNow it is a fundamental principle of a logical socialistic system that\ntruth must be found in the opinions of the masses, and the average\nopinion of mankind must be the final arbiter of good and evil. The\ntendency of the masses as such is to consider material advancement the\nmost cherished good. Hence, inevitably, a thorough-going socialism must\nbecome materialistic, even though at an earlier stage it was actuated by\nthe desire for opportunities of spiritual culture.\n\nA genuinely socialistic culture, too, makes the individual of value only\nas a member of society. This, Eucken affirms, is only true in the most\nprimitive societies. As civilisation progresses, man becomes conscious\nof himself, and an inner life, which in its interests is independent of,\nand often opposed to society, develops. His own thought becomes\nimportant to man, and as his life deepens, religion, science, art, work\n&c., become more and more a personal matter.\n\nAll such deepening of culture, and of creative spiritual activity, is a\npersonal matter. From this deepening and enriching of the inner life of\nthe individual proceeds creative spiritual activity, which attempts\nspiritual tasks as an end in themselves, and which gradually builds up a\nkingdom of truth and spiritual interest which immeasurably transcends\nmere human standards. All these are historical facts of experience; the\nsocialistic system finds no place and no explanation for them, and\nconsequently it cannot be regarded as a sufficiently comprehensive\nexplanation of the problem. To a man who has once realised these\nindividual experiences, the merely human, socialistic system becomes\nintolerable.\n\nAgain, if considerations of social utility limit creative activity, the\ncreations of such activity must be meagre in nature. Spiritual\ncreativeness is most fruitful when it is concerned with tasks that are\nattempted for their intrinsic value, and is not fettered by the thought\nof their usefulness to society.\n\nIt is, too, a dangerous thing to look for truth in the opinion of the\nmajority, for this is such a changing phenomenon that only a part, at\nmost, can be permanent truth. The course of history has taught us, too,\nthat great ideas have come to individuals and have been rejected by the\nmasses for long periods of time.\n\nThe immediate effect of the failure of socialism is the encouragement of\n_individualism_, for indeed some of the arguments against the former are\narguments in favour of the latter. Individualism opens up a new life, a\nlife which is free, joyous, and unconventional.\n\nBut can individualism give a meaning and value to life as a whole? Man\ncannot from his own resources produce a high ideal which compels him to\nfight for higher development, and it is not possible for him from an\nindividualistic standpoint to regard himself as a manifestation of a\nlarger life. His whole life must be spent in the improvement of his own\ncondition. Even in the case of strongly marked personalities, they can\nnever get beyond themselves and their own subjective states, for they\nmust always live upon themselves, and eternally reflect upon their own\ndoings.\n\nBut such a view of life cannot satisfy man; he is a contemplative being,\nand he must find some all-inclusive whole, of which he is a part. If he\nfails to find it, life for him must become a blank, and he must fall a\nprey to boredom and satiety. Man's life is not to be confined to his own\nparticular sphere, his life must extend far beyond that--he must concern\nhimself with the infinite in the universe; \"He must view life--nay,\nmore, he must live it--in the light of this larger whole.\" A life based\nupon individualism then, will seem, even in the case of strong\npersonalities, to be extremely narrow. How much more so will this be\ntrue of the ordinary man, who takes little interest in his own\nindividuality, or pleasure in its development?\n\nThus it is that both forms of humanistic culture--socialism and\nindividualism--fail to give a real meaning to life. \"Socialistic culture\ndirects itself chiefly to the outward conditions of life, but in care\nfor these it neglects life itself.\" Individualistic culture, on the\nother hand, endeavours to deal with life itself, but fails to see life\nas a whole, or as possessing any real inwardness.\n\nBoth types of culture are apt to deceive themselves in regard to their\nown emptiness, because, unconsciously, they make more out of man than is\nconsistent with their assumptions. \"They presuppose a spiritual\natmosphere as a setting for our human life and effort. In the one case,\nthis cementing of a union between individuals appears to set free the\nsprings of love and truth; in the other, each single unit seems to have\nbehind it the background of a spiritual world whose development is\nfostered by means of its individual labour.\" In this way life acquires\nin both cases a meaning, but it does so only by departing from both\npositions, and taking up what is, at least partly, an idealistic\nposition.\n\nThe theories, too, can only be made really plausible by idealising man\nto an unwarrantable extent. The socialist assumes that a change of\nmaterial surroundings will be immediately followed by a change in the\ncharacter of man, and that men will work happily together for the sake\nof the community. The individualist asks us to believe that man is\nnaturally noble and highminded, and cares only for the higher and better\nthings. But experience, says Eucken, does not justify us in placing so\nmuch faith in humanity. \"Do we not see the great masses of our\npopulation possessed by a passion that sweeps all before it, a reckless\nspirit of aggressiveness, a disposition to lower all culture to the\nlevel of their interests and comprehension--evincing the while a defiant\nself-assertion? And on the side of individualism, what do we see? Paltry\nmeanness in abundance, embroidered selfishness, idle self-absorption,\nthe craving to be conspicuous at all costs, repulsive hypocrisy, lack of\ncourage despite all boastful talk, a lukewarm attitude towards all\nspiritual tasks, but the busiest industry when personal advantage is\nconcerned.\"\n\nThe theories of socialism and individualism can never be adequate\nexplanations of the great problem of life, for life cannot have a real\nmeaning if man cannot strive towards some lofty aim far higher than\nhimself, and such a goal the two humanistic theories do not provide for\nhim.\n\nReligion, Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, Individualism, while calling\nattention to important facts in life, all fail in themselves to form\nadequate theories to explain life. We have given the main outlines of\nEucken's arguments, but such a brief summary cannot do justice to his\nexcellent evaluations of these theories--these the reader may find in\nhis own works.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nANOTHER SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\nThe result of the inquiry into the solutions of the problem offered in\nthe past is to show that they are all inadequate to explain and to give\nan ideal to the whole of life. Perplexed as to the truth of the\nexistence of a higher world, man looked to the natural world for a firm\nbasis to life. Here he failed to find rest--rather, indeed, he found\nless security than he had previously felt, for did not naturalism make\nof him a mere unconscious mechanism, and deny the very existence of his\nsoul? Then he turned to humanity, and the opposing tendencies of\nsocialism and individualism came into evidence. Each hindered the other,\neach shook his traditional beliefs, and each failed to give him a\nsatisfactory goal for life. Socialism concerned itself with external\nsocial relations, but it gave life no soul. Then individualism confined\nman to his own resources, and there resulted an inner hollowness which\nbecame painfully evident. Socialism and individualism fail to provide a\nsure footing. Instead of finding certainty, man has fallen into a still\ndeeper state of perplexity.\n\nWhat shall he do? Must he once again leave the realistic systems of\nNaturalism, Socialism, and Individualism, and return to the older\nsystems of Religion and Idealism? Was he not wrong in giving up the\nthought of a higher invisible world? Has not the restriction of life to\nthe visible world robbed life of its greatness and dignity? This it\ncertainly has done, and there is little wonder that the soul of mankind\nis already revolting, and shows a tendency once again to look towards\nreligion and idealism for a solution of life.\n\nBut the educated mind can never again take up exactly the same position\nas it once did in regard to religion and idealism. The great realistic\ntheories have made too great a change in the standard of life, and in\nman himself, to make it possible for him to revert simply to the old\nconditions, and the older orthodox doctrines of religion can never again\nbe accepted as a mere matter of course. But the great question has again\ncome to the forefront--is there a higher world, or is the fundamental\ntruth of religion a mere illusion? This is the question that calls for\nanswer to-day, an answer which must be different, as man is different,\nfrom the answers that were given in the past. A satisfactory answer is\nimpossible without understanding clearly the relation between the Old\nand the New, and without taking account of the great, if partial, truths\nthat the realistic schemes of life have taught mankind.\n\nTo accept unreservedly Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism is\nimpossible, for these rob life of its deeper meaning. To return to the\nolder doctrines without reserve is equally impossible.\n\nShall we ignore the question? This would be a fatal mistake. Some throw\nthemselves into the rush of work, and endeavour to forget the deeper\nproblems of life--but \"the result is a life all froth and shimmer,\nlacking inward sincerity, a life that can never in itself satisfy them,\nbut only keep up the appearance of doing so.\" There must be some\ndecision; for is not society being more and more broken up into small\nsections, possessing the most variable standards of life, and\nevaluating things in a diversity of ways? Such an inward schism must\nweaken any effort on the part of humanity to combine for ideal ends.\nPerhaps he of narrow vision, who sees nothing in life but sensuous\npleasure, is happy--but it is the happiness of the lower world. Perhaps,\ntoo, he of the superficial mind is happy, who sees no deep\ncontradictions in the solutions offered, and is prepared to accept one\nto-day and another tomorrow--but his happiness is that of the feeble\nmind.\n\nWhat then can be done? Shall we despair? Never! The question is far too\nurgent. To despair is to accept a policy that spells disaster to the\nhuman race. The immediate environment is powerless to give life any real\nmeaning. We must probe deeper into the eternal--and it is from such\ninvestigations that Eucken outlines a new theory of life.\n\nBut before we proceed to deal with Eucken's contribution to the problem,\nit will be profitable to stay awhile to consider how it is that we can\nobtain truth at all, and what are the tests that we can apply to truth\nwhen we think we have attained it. It is the problem of the possibility\nof knowledge, really, that we have to discuss in brief. Eucken himself\ndoes not pay much direct attention to this difficult question, for, as\nhas been already pointed out, he refuses to be drawn from his main\nproblem. It is impossible, however, to appreciate Eucken without\nunderstanding clearly the position he takes up in this matter.\n\nWhat is truth? How can we know?--these are entrancing problems for the\nprofound thinker, and have been written upon frequently and at great\nlength. But we can do little more at present than give the barest\noutline of the positions that have been taken up. Every search for truth\nmust assume a certain position in this matter; in studying Eucken's\nphilosophy it is of the first importance--more so perhaps than in the\ncase of most other philosophers--to keep in mind clearly from the outset\nthe position he implicitly assumes.\n\nThe simplest theory of knowledge is that of _Empiricism_, which holds\nthat all knowledge must be gained through experience of the outside\nworld, and of our mental states. We see a blue wall, we obtain through\nour eyes an impression of blueness, and are able to make a statement:\n\"This wall is blue.\" This, of course, is one of the simplest assertions\nthat can be made, and consists merely in assigning a term--\"blue\"--the\nmeaning of which has already been agreed upon, to a colour that we\nappear to see on a wall. The test of the truth of this assertion is a\nsimple one--it is true if it corresponds with fact. If the same\nassertion is made in regard to a red wall, then it is obviously untrue.\nOur sense impressions give rise to a great variety of such expressions.\nWe state \"the wall is blue\" as a result of an impression obtained\nthrough the organs of sight; then we speak of a pungent smell, a sweet\ntaste, a harsh sound, or a rough stone, on account of impressions\nreceived respectively through the organs of smell, taste, hearing, and\ntouch. But, of course, all such assertions are superficial in\ncharacter--there is little more in them than the application of a\nconventional term to an observed phenomenon, they avail us little in\nsolving the mysteries of the universe.\n\nStrictly speaking, this is for the empiricist the limit of possible\nknowledge, but he would be a poor investigator who would be content with\nthis and no more. The empiricist tries to go a distinct step in advance\nof this. The scientist observing the path of a planet travelling round\nthe sun, finds that its course is that of an ellipse. He studies the\npath of a second planet, and finds that this also travels along an\nelliptical orbit. Later he finds that all planets he is able to observe\ntravel in the same kind of path--then he hazards a general statement,\nand says, \"All planets travel round their suns in elliptical orbits.\"\nBut now he has left the realm of certainty for that of uncertainty.\nThere may be innumerable planets which he cannot observe that take a\ndifferent course. He hazards the general statement, because he assumes\n(sometimes without knowing that he does so) that nature is uniform and\nconstant, that it will do to-day as it did yesterday, and does in\ninfinite space as it does in the visible universe.\n\nThe knowledge that is possible to the empiricist, then, is merely that\nwhich is derived from direct experience, and simple summations or\ngeneralisations into a single assertion of a number of similar\nassertions, all of which were individually derived from experience. This\nis the position scientists as such, and believers in the theory of\nnaturalism, take up as to the possibility of the knowledge of truth to\nthe human mind. They are entirely consistent, therefore, when they\narrive ultimately at the agnostic position, and contend that our\nknowledge must necessarily be confined to the world of experience, and\nthat nothing can be known of the world beyond. But they are\nfundamentally wrong in overestimating the place of the sense organs, and\nforgetting that while these have a part to play in life, they do not\nconstitute the whole of life.\n\nA far more satisfactory theory is that of _Rationalism_. It\nis a theory that admits that the human mind has some capacity for\nworking upon the data presented to it by the sense organs. Man is\nno longer quite so helpless a creature as empiricism would make\nhim. He is able to weigh and consider the facts that are presented\nto the mind. The method rationalism uses to arrive at truth is that\nof logical deduction, and the test of truth is that the steps in the\nprocess are logically sound. We may start from the data \"All dogs\nare animals\" and \"Carlo is a dog,\" and arrive very simply at the\nconclusion \"Carlo is an animal.\" The conclusion is correct because\nwe have reasoned in accordance with the laws of logic, with the laws\nof valid thought. All logical reasoning is, of course, not so simple\nas the example given, but it may be stated generally that when there\nis no logical fallacy, a correct conclusion may be arrived at,\nprovided, too--and herein lies the difficulty--provided that the\npremises are also true. These premises may be in themselves general\nstatements--how is their truth established? They may be, and often\nare, the generalisations of the empirical sciences, and must then\npossess the same degree of uncertainty that these generalisations\npossess. Some philosophers have contended that certain general ideas\nare innate, but few would be found nowadays to accept such a\ncontention. At other times mere definitions of terms may serve as\npremises. One might state as a premise the definition \"A straight\nline is the shortest distance between two points,\" and the further\nstatement that \"AB is a straight line between A and B,\" and conclude\nthat the line AB represents the shortest distance between two points A\nand B. In a manner similar to this Euclid built his whole mathematical\nsystem upon the basis of definitions and postulates, a system the\ncomplexity and thoroughness of which has caused all students of\nmathematics at one time or another to marvel and admire. But, of\ncourse, a definition is little more than assigning a definite term to\na definite thing. It is when we begin to consider the premises that are\nnecessary for arriving at the profound truths of the universe that we\nfind the weakness of rationalism. How are we going to be provided with\npremises for this end? Shall we begin by saying \"There is a God\" or\n\"There is no God\"? How is the pure reasoning faculty to decide upon the\npremises in the matter of the great Beyond? We may weigh the arguments\nfor and against a certain position, and we may think that the probability\nlies in a certain direction, but to decide finally and with certainty\nby mere cold logical reasoning is impossible. We may bring out into\nprominence through logical reasoning truths that were previously only\nimplicit, but to arrive at absolute truth with regard to the invisible\nworld, through intellect alone, has long been admitted to be an\nimpossibility. The illusion of those who would believe that truth which\nwas not already implied in the premises could ever be obtained by mere\nintellectual reasoning has long since been dispelled.\n\nPerhaps it comes as a shock to the reader who has always insisted upon a\nclear intellectual understanding and a rigid reasoning upon all things,\nto find within what narrow limits, after all, the intellect itself has\nto work--it can do little more than make more or less certain\ngeneralisations concerning the world of experience, and then to argue\nfrom these, or from definitions that it itself has framed. Of course\nsome of the ancient philosophers did try through a course of rigid\nreasoning to solve the great problems, and for a long time it was\ncustomary to expect that all philosophers should proceed in the same\nway.\n\nModern philosophers, of whom William James, Bergson, and Eucken are\nconspicuous examples, have appreciated the futility of such a task, and\nhave sought other means of solving the problem. The mistake in the past\nhas been to forget that the intelligence is but one aspect of human\nlife, and that the experience of mankind is far more complicated a\nmatter than that of mere intellect, and not to be solved by intellect\nalone. Intellect has to play a definite part in human life, but it does\nnot constitute the whole of life. Life itself is far greater than\nintellect, and to live is a far more important thing than to know. The\ngreat things are life and action; knowledge is ultimately useful in so\nfar as it contributes to the development of life and the perfection of\naction. Philosophers have for too long a period made knowledge an aim in\nitself, and have neglected to take proper account of the experiences of\nmankind. Their intellectual abstractions have tended to leave actual\nlife more and more out of consideration, with the result that they have\nbeen baffled at every turn. The more we think about it, the more we\nbecome convinced that the mysterious universe in which we live will only\ndivulge just enough of its secrets to enable us to act, and this it\ngives us with comparatively little trouble on our part. If we consider\nan ordinary piece of wood, we find it is hard and offers a certain\nresistance, and our knowledge of these elementary facts enables us to\nput it to use, but we shall never really solve the mysteries of its\nformation and growth. These lead of course to very interesting\nspeculations, but their solution seems to be as far off as ever. We can\nknow little but that which we require for life. The making of life and\naction the basis of truth rather than trusting to the intellect alone,\nis the great new departure in modern philosophy.\n\nOne of the theories of knowledge that springs from laying emphasis upon\nlife and action is that of _Pragmatism_, of which the late Professor\nWilliam James was one of the greatest exponents. Pragmatists contend\nthat the test of truth is its value for life--if the fact obtained is\nthe most useful and helpful for life, then it is the true one. Suppose\nwe are endeavouring to solve the great question, \"Is there a God?\" We\nweigh the arguments for and against, but find it difficult to arrive at\na definite conclusion, because the arguments on both sides seem equally\nplausible. How are we to decide? We cannot postpone the decision\nindefinitely--we are forced to make a choice, for upon our decision\ndepends our aim and ideals in life. We are faced with a \"forced option,\"\nand must choose one or the other. We ask ourselves the question, \"Which\nwill be of the greatest help to our lives--to believe that there is, or\nthat there is not a God?\" and we decide or will to believe the option\nthat will help life most. It is a striking theory, but space forbids our\ndiscussing it in detail.\n\nThe position Eucken adopts is that of _Activism_. In common with\npragmatism it makes truth a matter of life and action rather than of\nmere intellect, and considers fruitfulness for action a characteristic\nof truth. He differs from the pragmatic position in that he contends\nthat truth is something deeper than mere human decision, that truth is\ntruth, not merely because it is useful, that reality is independent of\nour experience of it, and that truth is gained intuitively through a\nlife of action.\n\nThe riddle of the universe is solved for Eucken through life and action.\nWhile continual contemplation and thought is apt to paralyse us, \"action\nis the best defensive weapon against the dangers and trials of human\nexistence.\" \"Doubt is not cured by meditation, but by action.\" He\nbelieves that we can attain certainty through action of much that cannot\nbe justified on rational grounds. If we wish to understand the vital\ntruths of life we must concentrate our souls on a good purpose--the\nactivity that follows will bring its revelation. The problems of life\nare solved by the life process itself. By acting in a certain way, man\ncomes into intimate relationship with the great reality of life, and\nthen he comes to know, not so much _about_ reality, as _within_ reality.\nThe ant in whom such complex instincts are developed, knows probably\nnothing at all _about_ its little world, but knows everything necessary\n_within_ its little world. It does not err, it does the right thing at\nthe right time, and that because it is in tune with its universe, hence\nacts from pure instinct in the right way. If intellect were to enter\ninto the case, its actions might become less reliable, and it would\nblunder far oftener. In the case of man, his thinking capacity often\nmilitates against successful instinctive and habitual actions--the\nmoment we start to consider, we hesitate and are lost. In the same way,\nif the soul of man is brought into tune with the great reality, it has\nbut to act, and though it may never know all _about_ reality and be able\nto frame abstract theories of the universe, still it may know _with_ or\n_within_ reality, and be thus enabled to act in the best way under\nvarious circumstances. This is the theory of activism; it lays great\nstress upon action, and upon intuition through action, and while it does\nnot ignore the intellect, it holds that when the intellect fails there\nis a possibility of the practical problem of life being solved through a\nlife of action, when life is directed towards the highest ideals. The\ndanger of an activistic position, of course, is to undervalue the\nreasoning powers of man. Some critics hold that Eucken does this; the\nreader must judge for himself, but in doing so it will be well to\nremember that before trusting to intuitive revelation, Eucken demands\nthe setting of one's face towards the highest and best.\n\nIn the next chapter we can follow Eucken in his search for the great\nreality in life.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE PAST, PRESENT, AND THE ETERNAL\n\nIn investigating the problem of human life, Eucken lays great stress\nupon the history of man in past ages--this is one of the special aspects\nof his philosophy. The fact is, of course, not surprising; he who would\nexplain the life of man would be unwise to ignore the records of the\npast life of the human race. The thinker who examines the present only,\nis apt to be narrow in his ideas, to fail to look upon events in their\nproper perspective, and to be unduly affected by the spirit of the age\nin which he lives--the student of history avoids these pitfalls.\n\nMoreover, man does not become aware of the depth of his own soul, until\nhe has \"lived into\" the experience of the past. This is what the\nprofound investigator of history does; he lives again the life of the\nhero, he feels with him as he felt upon special occasions, and in this\nway there is revealed to him a profundity and greatness of human\nexperience, of which he would have been largely unaware if he had\ntrusted to his own experience alone, and to the superficial examination\nhe is able to make of the experiences of those living men with whom he\ncomes into contact. In this way he is able in a sense to appropriate the\nexperience of the greatest personalities unto himself, and enrich\nconsiderably the contents of his own soul.\n\nThrough a study of history, too, we become aware of the intimate\nconnection that exists between the present and the past. The present\nmoment is a very transient thing; its roots are in the past, its hopes\nin the future. \"If all depends on the slender thread of the fleeting\nmoment of the present, which illumines and endures merely for a\ntwinkling of an eye, but to sink into the abyss of nothingness, then all\nlife would mean a mere exit into death.... Without connection there is\nno content of life.\" We are apt to look on the past as something dead,\nbut it exists in living evidence in our souls to-day. It oppresses us or\nstimulates us to action, it tyrannises over us or inspires us to higher\nthings. It has been customary to look upon the past as irrevocable.\nRecent writers, of whom Maeterlinck and Eucken are striking instances,\nhave endeavoured to show how the past can be remoulded and changed. The\npast depends upon what we make of it to-day; if we despise our evil\nconduct in former days, then the past itself is changed and conquered.\nThe mistake that is made is to regard the past as a thing complete in\nitself; what appears to be finished is really only completing itself,\nand we must take a view of the whole of a thing, and not merely the\nparts that have already manifested themselves. Through such\nconsiderations we become more and more aware of the ultimate connection\nbetween the past and present, and of the part the present can play in\nthe remaking of the past.\n\nOur investigations of history leads us, too, to differentiate between\nthe temporary and the eternal in the realm of thought. We find at a\ncertain period of history a trend of thought that can largely be\naccounted for by the special conditions of life at the time, and which\ndisappears at a later age. But in addition to this we become aware of\ntruths that have found a place in the thoughts of various ages and\ncountries, and we are led to regard these as the eternal\ntruths--expressions of an eternal ever-present reality. This eternal\npresent we find to be something independent of time, something that\nbreaks the barriers between the past, present, and future. \"Thought,\"\nsays Eucken, \"does not drift along with time; as certainly as it strives\nto attain truth it must rise above time, and its treatment must be\ntimeless.\" The beliefs of any age are too much coloured by the special\ncircumstances of that age to express the whole of truth, yet beneath the\nbeliefs of the ages there is often an underlying truth, and this\nunderlying truth is the eternal truth, which is not affected by time,\nand at the basis of which is the eternal reality.\n\nThis eternal truth persisting through a variety of temporary and more or\nless correct expressions of it is to be observed in a marked manner in\nthe moral ideas of mankind. What a variety of ethical doctrines have\nbeen expounded and believed, yet how striking the similarity that\nbecomes apparent when they are further examined! In practice, the\nstandard of morality has often been based on mere utility, but it has\ntaken a higher and more absolute basis in the mind of man. Ideas\nconcerning morality have generally been nobler than can be accounted for\nby environment, and by the subjective life of the individual. Why this\nultimate consistency in the moral aspirations of the ages, why a\ncategorical imperative, and why does conscience exist in the human\nbeing?--these facts cannot be accounted for if there is no deeper basis\nfor life than the life of humanity at any definite period of time.\n\nThe unchangeable laws of logic, too, are instances of the eternal truth.\nThe principles of the validity of thought are entirely independent of\nindividuals, of the passage of time, and of the environment of man. \"Our\nthought cannot advance in the definite work of building up science\nwithout producing and employing a definite logical structure, with fixed\nprinciples; these principles are immanent in the work of thought, they\nare above all the caprice and all the differences of the individuals.\"\nWhence again this consistency in a changeable and subjective world?\n\nThe marvellous influence that ideas have exerted upon man again points\nto the persistence and power of the eternal. Is it not strange how it is\nthat man often serves but as a mere instrument for the realisation of an\nidea, and how he is often carried away by an idea to do things which are\nagainst his own personal interests and desires? And when he and his\ngeneration have passed beyond human sight, we often find a new\ngeneration direct their endeavours in the same way, and we wonder what\nis behind such a continuity in the struggles of mankind.\n\nThe history of great personalities in the realms of literature, art, and\nscience show in a remarkable way how men have risen above the influences\nof their time, and beyond the cramping tiredness of the mere flesh.\nCould a great thinker like Aristotle be entirely conditioned by flesh\nand environment? And what of the great artists and poets who have\nconquered the chains of mortal finitude and breathed of higher worlds?\nEvery one of them is a convincing testimony of the possibility of\nmankind transcending the material, and taking unto itself of the\nresources of a deeper world.\n\nThen the dissatisfaction of the ages with their limited knowledge of\ntruth cannot but tell of a great eternal something that stirs at the\nbasis of the human soul. The people of to-day find the various systems\nof the day inadequate; they search for something higher, and the mere\nfact that they search beyond matter and the mere subjective human\nqualities is in itself a testimony to the existence of a world higher\nthan the material and subjective.\n\nWhat is it that makes it possible for one human being to \"live into\" the\nexperience of others who lived long ago, and for the present to conquer\nand alter the past? How can we account for the eternal trait in thought,\nfor the unchanging laws of logic, for the consistency of moral ideals,\nand their transcendence over flesh and immediate circumstances? What is\nthe force behind the idea, and how can we account for the continuous\nstruggle of mankind in certain directions? And, finally, what is it that\nmakes it possible for men to rise beyond themselves, to shake away the\nshackles of matter and vicinity, and to delve deep into the profounder\nworld?\n\nIf we can find what it is that makes all this possible, then surely we\nhave found the greatest thing in the world--the reality. And Eucken's\nanswer is clear and definite. It must be something that persists, is\neternal and independent of time, and it must extend beyond the\nindividual to a universal whole. This must be \"the Universal Spiritual\nLife,\" which, though eternal, reveals itself in time, and though\nuniversal, reveals itself in the individual man, and forms the source\nfrom which the spiritual in man \"draws its power and credentials.\"\n\nThis, then, is the result of Eucken's search for reality--he has found\nit to exist in a Universal Spiritual Life. Of course he has not arrived\nat his conclusion by a system of rigid proof; it has already been\npointed out how impossible it is to arrive at the greater truths of life\nin such a manner.\n\nHe has done, however, that which can be reasonably expected in such\ncases. To begin with, he has given us a striking analysis of the\nessential characteristics of human life, and he has found there a\nyearning and a void. He has given us a masterly discussion of eternal\ntruth as contrasted with the temporary expressions of it. He has taught\nus how the present can overcome the past, and how man can ascend beyond\nthe subjective and material. And he has led us to feel that reality must\nlie in the eternal that appears to be at the basis of the highest and\ngreatest in man.\n\nMoreover, he has given a fair and thorough treatment of the solutions\nthat have been offered in the past. He has shown how inadequate they are\nto explain life. He has shown how the modern solutions \"cannot perform\ntheir own tasks without drawing incessantly upon another kind of\nreality, one richer and more substantial.\" This in itself shows \"beyond\npossibility of refutation that they do not fill the whole of life.\" He\nhas demonstrated how the acceptance of these systems depends upon an\nimplicit acceptance of a higher life. \"The naturalistic thinker ascribes\nunperceived to nature, which to him can be only a coexistence of\nsoulless elements, an inner connection and a living soul. Only thus can\nhe revere it as a higher power, as a kind of divinity; only thus can he\npass from the fact of dependence to a devotional surrender of his\nfeelings. The socialist bases human society, with its motives mixed with\ntriviality and passion, on an invisible community, an ideal humanity....\nThe individualist in his conception exalts the individual to a height\nfar more lofty than is justified by the individual as he is found in\nexperience.\" All these assume more or less unconsciously the existence\nof that \"something higher\" which they attempt to deny.\n\nSo far, then, we have seen how Eucken proves the inadequacy of the\nrealistic conceptions of life, and how they really depend for their\nacceptance upon the assumption of a Universal Spiritual Life. We have\nstill to see how he attempts to prove that basing human life upon an\neternal spiritual life satisfies the conditions he himself has laid down\nfor a satisfactory solution of the problem. He has to show that the\ntheory gives a satisfactory explanation of human life, that it gives a\nfirm basis for life, that it releases man from being governed by low\nmotives, and admits of the possibility of human personality, freedom,\nand creation. We shall see in the chapters that follow that he makes a\nconvincing case for accepting the belief in the Universal Spiritual Life\nas the basis of human life and endeavour.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE \"HIGH\" AND THE \"LOW\"\n\nEucken makes the recognition of the existence of a Universal Spiritual\nLife the starting-point of his constructive work. He takes up a position\nwhich he calls the n\u00f6ological position. Many theories take up a\nmaterialistic position; they assert the reality of the material world,\nand endeavour to explain the world of matter as something independent of\nthe human mind. Other theories assert the superiority of mind over\nmatter, and endeavour to examine the mind as though it were independent\nof the material world. These two types of theories have been in\ncontinual conflict; the one has attempted to prove that thought is\nentirely conditioned by sense impressions received from the material\nworld, the other regards the phenomena of nature as really nothing other\nthan processes of the mind.\n\nEucken finds reality existing in the spiritual life, which while neither\nmaterial nor merely mental, is superior to both, admits the existence\n(in a certain sense) of both, and does away with the opposition between\nthe rival types of theories. Eucken does not minimise or ignore the\nexistence of the natural world. The question for him is not the\nindependent existence of the worlds of nature and mind--this he admits;\nhe is concerned rather with the superiority of the spiritual life over\nthe merely material and mental.\n\nThe natural life of man has been variously viewed in different ages. The\nwriter of the Pentateuch described man as made in the image of God, and\nthe natural man was exalted on this account. Some of the old Greek\nphilosophers, too, found much in nature that was divine. Christianity\ntook a different view of the matter--it exalted the spirit, and\nemphasised the baseness of the material. The growth of the sciences made\nman again a mere tool of laws and methods, but it considered matter as\nsuperior to mind, mind being entirely dependent upon impressions\nreceived from matter. The question continually recurs--which is the\nhigh, which is the low? Shall nature triumph over spirit, or spirit over\nnature?\n\nPantheism replies to the question by denying that there is anything high\nas distinguished from the low. There is but one; and that one--the whole\nuniverse--is God. There is no evil in the world, says pantheism,\neverything is good--if we could understand things as they really are we\nshould find no oppositions in the universe, and no contradictions in the\nnature of things. The world as it is, is the best of all possible\nworlds--there is perfect harmony, though we fail to appreciate it. Other\noptimistic theories, too, deny the existence of evil and pain, and try\nto explain our ideas of sin to be mere \"points of view.\" If we could see\nthe whole, they tell us, we should see how the parts harmonise, but now\nwe only see some of the parts and fail to appreciate the harmony. In\nthis way they try to explain away as unreal the phenomena of evil and\npain.\n\nBut Eucken has no patience with such theories. For him the oppositions\nand contradictions of life are too real and persistent. The antagonisms\n\"stir us with disgust and indignation.\" Evil cannot be considered\ntrivial, and must not be glossed over; it is in the world, and the more\ndeeply we appreciate the fact the better it will be for the human soul.\n\nMan in his lower stages of development is just a child of nature, and\nhis standards of life are those of the lower world. He seeks those\nthings that satisfy the senses, he attempts the satiation of the lower\ncravings. In the realm of morals his standard is utility--that is good\nwhich helps him to obtain more pleasure and to avoid pain. In social\nlife his conduct is dictated by custom--this is the highest appeal. The\ndevelopment of man along the lines of nature ends at this point--and if\nnothing more is to happen, then he must remain at a low level of\ndevelopment. Matter and mind cannot take him beyond--the mind as such\nonly helps towards the further satisfaction of the lower demands of man.\n\nBut there is something far greater in highly developed manhood than the\npetty and selfish. Man is capable of conceiving and adopting higher\nstandards of morality than those of utility and pleasure, and it is the\nspiritual life that enables him to do this. It is the spiritual that\nfrees the individual from the slavery of the sense world--from his\nselfishness and superficial interests--that teaches him to care less for\nthe things of the flesh, and far more for the beautiful, the good, and\nthe true, and that enables him to pursue high aims regardless of the\nfact that they may entail suffering and loss in other directions. This,\nthen, is the \"High\" in the world; the natural life is the \"Low.\"\n\nBut what is the relation of the natural to the spiritual life? In the\nfirst place, the spiritual cannot be derived from the natural, inasmuch\nas the former is immensely superior to the latter, and that not merely\nin degree, but in its very essence. The spiritual is entirely on a\nhigher plane of reality, and there cannot be transition from the natural\nto the spiritual world. The natural has its limitations, and beyond\nthese cannot go. So far as the natural world is concerned man can never\nrise above seeking for pleasure, and making expediency and social\napprobation the standards of life, hence there is little wonder that\nthose ethical teachers who make nature their basis, deny the possibility\nof action that is unselfish and free. \"The Spiritual Life,\" however, as\nEucken says, \"has an independent origin, and evolves new powers and\nstandards.\"\n\nNeither do the two aspects run together in life in parallel lines. On\nthe contrary, the spiritual life cannot manifest itself at all until a\ncertain stage of development is reached in nature. It would seem\nimpossible to conceive of the animal rising above its animal instincts\nand tendencies; its whole life is conditioned by its animal nature and\nits environment. Man stands at the junction of the stages between the\npurely natural and the purely spiritual. On the one hand, he is a member\nof the animal world, he has its instincts, its desires and its\nlimitations; on the other hand, he has within him the germ of\nspirituality. He belongs to both worlds, the natural and the spiritual.\nHe cannot shake off the natural and remain a man--to separate the two\nmeans death to man as we know him. But there is a great difference\nbetween his position in the natural world and his position in the\nspiritual world. He seems to be the last word in the world of nature, he\nhas reached heights far beyond those reached by any other flesh and\nblood. He is, so far as we know, the culminating point of natural\nevolution--the final possibility in the natural world. But the stage of\nnature only represents the first stage in the development of the\nuniverse.\n\nThere is an infinitely higher stage of life, the spiritual life. And if\nman is the final point of progress in the world of nature, he is, in his\nprimitive state, only at the threshold of the spiritual world. But he\nis not an entire stranger to the spiritual--the germ is in him, and the\nspiritual is consequently not an alien world for him. If the spiritual\nwere something entirely foreign it would be vain to expect much progress\nthrough mere impulses from without. On the contrary, it is the spiritual\nthat makes man really great, and is the most fundamental part of his\nnature.\n\nThe two stages of life, then, are present in man--the natural and the\nspiritual; the former highly developed, the latter, at first, in an\nundeveloped state.\n\nNow the great aim of the universe is to pass gradually from the natural\nto the spiritual plane of life. This does not mean that the latter is\nthe product of the former stage, for this is not the case. It means that\nthe deeper reality in life is the spiritual, and that the spiritual\ndevelops through the natural in its own particular way. And this\nparticular way is not a mere development but a _self_-development. The\naim of the spiritual is to develop its own self through the human being.\nIn this way man is given the possibility of developing a self--a\npersonality in a very real sense.\n\nThus we arrive at some idea of the relation there exists between the\nspiritual and the natural, and of the place of the spiritual and the\nnatural in man. The spiritual is neither the product nor an attribute of\nthe natural. Man is the border creature of the two worlds; he represents\nthe ultimate possibility of the one, and possesses potentialities in\nregard to the other. The great object of his life must be to develop,\nthrough making use of and conquering the life of nature, his higher self\ninto a free, spiritual, and immortal personality. The progressive stages\nin this direction must be dealt with in the next chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE ASCENT TO FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY\n\n\nIn the previous chapter we found that man in his primitive stage is\nlargely a creature of the lower world. His desires are those of the\nanimal kingdom, his ideal is utility, and social approbation his God. At\nthis stage he is a mere nothing, no better than a slave to his passions\nand to the opinions of his fellow-beings. He possesses neither freedom\nnor personality--for he is but a tool in the hands of other impulses and\nforces. There is no controlling self--he is not a lord in his own\nkingdom. Some men do not get beyond this very low level, but for ever\nremain mere shuttlecocks driven hither and thither by more or less\ncontradictory impulses.\n\nThe germ of the higher world that resides within him may sometimes make\nitself felt, but \"so long as there is a confused welter of higher and\nlower impulses, ... so long is there an absence of anything essentially\nnew and lofty.\"\n\nMan's aspirations for things that are higher, are at the outset very\nsluggish and vague, for a being that is so much dominated by the natural\nworld is apt to concentrate its attention upon it and to remain\ncontented with it.\n\nBut there comes a time in the lives of perhaps most men when a distinct\nfeeling of dissatisfaction is felt with the life of natural impulse and\nof convention. The man feels--perhaps in a vague way at first--that\nthere is something too merely animal in the sense world, or that there\nis an intolerable emptiness and hypocrisy in a life of slavish devotion\nto the opinions of society. Perhaps he feels that his passions govern\nhim, and not he his passions. The higher life stirs within him, and he\nbegins to question the rightness of things. He learns to appreciate for\nthe first time that the natural impulses may not be the noblest, and\nthat custom may not be an ideal guide. His soul is astir with the\nproblem of life--the result very largely depends upon the solutions that\nare presented to him. Perhaps the naturalistic solution is made to\nappeal to him, and he is taught to trust nature and it will lead him\naright. Or maybe the pantheistic theory is accepted by him, and he is\nled to believe that the world as it is is entirely good, and that he has\nbut to live his life from day to day, and not worry himself about the\nultimate end and purpose of things. Or other optimistic theories of life\nthat deny the existence of evil may influence him. All these solutions\nmay give him temporary peace of mind, and perhaps indeed form efficient\nstumbling-blocks to any further spiritual progress.\n\nBut the spiritual beginnings within us often show remarkable vitality.\nThey may under certain conditions lead us to appreciate the existence of\na distinct opposition in the world--the opposition between the lower\nworld and the higher self. Man finds that the natural is often low,\nevil, and sordid, and at this stage the higher spiritual world makes a\nstrong appeal to him. By degrees he comes to feel the demands of the\nlower world to be a personal insult to him. What is the lower material\nworld that it should govern him, and he a _man_? The claims of pleasure\nand utility to be standards of conduct strike him as arrogant, and he\nrevolts against the assumption that higher aims can have no charm for\nhim. His previous acceptance without consideration of the moral\nstandard of the community he now looks upon as a sign of weakness on his\npart--for is he not himself, a person with the power of independent\njudgment and evaluation? It is the first great awakening of the\nspiritual life in man, when his whole soul is in revolt against the low,\nsordid, and conventional. What shall he do? There is only one course\nthat is worthy of his asserting personality--he must break with the\nworld. Henceforth he sees two worlds in opposition--the world of the\nflesh on the one hand, the world of the spirit on the other, and he\narrays himself on the side of the higher in opposition to the lower.\nWhen he does this the spiritual life in him makes the first substantial\nmovement in its onward progress--this movement Eucken calls the\n_negative movement_. It does not mean that the man must leave the world\nof work and retire into the seclusion of a monastery--that means\nshirking the fight, and is a policy of cowardice. Neither does it mean a\nwild impatience with the present condition of the world--it means rather\nthat man is appreciating in a profound way the oppositions that exist,\nand is casting his lot on the side of right. He renounces everything\nthat hinders him from fighting successfully, then goes forth into the\nthick of the battle. The break must be a definite one and made in a\ndetermined manner. \"Without earnestness of renunciation the new life\nsinks back to the old ... and loses its power to stimulate to new\nendeavour. As human beings are, this negation must always be a sharp\none.\"\n\nThe negative movement, then, is the first substantial step in the\nprogress of the spiritual life. The man's self breaks out into\ndiscontent with nature, and this is the first step to the union of self\nto the higher reality in life. The break with the world is in itself of\ncourse but a negative process. This must attain a positive significance.\nIf the self breaks away from one aspect of life, it must identify itself\nmore intimately with another. This occurs when the individual sets out\ndefinitely on a course of life in antagonism to the evil in the world.\n\nWhen this takes place, there arises within him a _new immediacy_ of\nexperience. Hitherto the things that were his greatest concern, and that\nappealed to him most, were the pleasures of the natural world. But these\nthings appeal to him no longer as urgent and immediate--but as being of\na distinctly secondary character. A new immediacy has arisen; it is the\nfacts of the spiritual world that now appeal to him as urgent and\nimmediate. \"All that has hitherto been considered most immediate, as the\nworld of sense, or even the world of society, now takes a second place,\nand has to make good its claim before this spiritual tribune.... That\nwhich current conceptions treat as a Beyond ... is now the only world\nwhich exists in its own right, the only true and genuine world which\nneither asks nor consents to be derived from any outside source.\"\n\nThis new immediacy is the deepest possible immediacy, it is an immediacy\nof experience where the self comes into contact with its own vital\nprinciple--the Universal Spiritual Life--and brings about a fundamental\nchange in the life of the individual. The inner life is no longer\ngoverned by sense impressions and impulses, but the outward life is\nlived and viewed from the standpoint of the inward life.\n\nBut a new immediacy is not all that follows in the train of the negative\nmovement--on the contrary, the highest possible rewards are gained, for\nfreedom, personality, and immortality are all brought within the range\nof possibility.\n\nOnce a human being decides for the highest he is on the highroad to\ncomplete freedom. The freedom is not going to be won in a moment, but\nmust be fought for by the individual through the whole course of his\nlife. His body is always with him, and will at times attempt to master\nhim--he must fight continually to ensure conquest. Difficulties will\narise from various quarters, but he is not going to depend only upon his\nown resources. All his activity involves in the first place the\nrecognition of the spiritual world, but more than this, he appropriates\nunto himself of the spiritual world--this in itself is an act of\ndecision. And the more we appropriate unto ourselves of the Universal\nSpiritual Life, the more we decide for the higher world, the freer we\nbecome. Indeed, \"it is this appropriation ... of the spiritual life that\nfirst awakens within the soul an inward certitude, and makes possible\nthat perfect freedom ... so indispensable for every great creative\nwork.\" By continually choosing and fighting for the progress of the\nUniversal Spiritual Life, it comes to be our own in virtue of our deed\nand decision. Hence man has attained freedom--the lower world no longer\nmakes successful appeal. He has become a part of the spiritual world,\nand his actions are no longer dictated by anything external, but are the\ndirect outcome of his own self. He has freely chosen the highest, and\ncontinually reaffirms his choice--this is perfect freedom.\n\nMan gains for himself, too, a personality in the true sense of the term.\nEucken does not mean by personality \"mere self-assertion on the part of\nan individual in opposition to others.\" He means something far deeper\nthan this. \"A genuine self,\" says Eucken, \"is constituted only by the\ncoming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent\nconcentration in the individual.\" Following a life of endeavour in the\nhighest cause, and continual appropriation of the spiritual life, he\narrives at a state of at-one-ness with the universal life. \"Man does not\nmerely enter into some kind of relation with the spiritual life, but\nfinds his own being in it.\" The human being is elevated to a self-life\nof a universal kind, and this frees him from the ties and appeals of the\nworld of sense and selfishness. It is a glorious conception of human\npersonality, infinitely higher than the undignified conceptions of\nnaturalism and determinism.\n\nAnd if man wins a glorious personality, he may gain immortality too.\nUnfortunately, Eucken has not yet dealt fully with this question, but he\nis evidently of the opinion that the spiritual personalities are\nimmortal. As concentration points or foci of the spiritual life, he\nbelieves that the developed personalities are at present and in prospect\npossessors of a spiritual realm. But there will be no essential or\nsudden change at death. That which is immortal is involved in our\npresent experience. Those who have developed into spiritual\npersonalities, who have worked in fellowship with the great Universal\nLife, and become centre-points of spirituality, have thus risen supreme\nover time and pass to their inheritance. Those who have not done so, but\nhave lived their lives on the plane of nature, will have nothing that\ncan persist.\n\nHence it is that the negative movement leads to freedom, personality,\nand immortality; the neglect to make the movement consigns the\nindividual to slavery, makes a real \"self\" impossible, and at death he\nhas nought that a spiritual realm can claim. The choice is an\nall-important one; for, as a recent writer puts it, \"In this choice, the\npersonality chooses or rejects itself, takes itself for its life-task,\nor dies of inanition and inertia.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE PERSONAL AND THE UNIVERSAL\n\n\nIn the last chapter the ascent of the human being from serfdom to\nfreedom and personality was traced. In doing so it was necessary to make\nfrequent reference to the Universal Spiritual Life.\n\nWhen we turn to consider the characteristics of the Universal Spiritual\nLife, many problems present themselves. How can we reconcile freedom and\npersonality with the existence of an Absolute? What is the nature of\nthis Absolute, and in what way is the human related to it? What place\nshould religion play in the life of the spiritual personality? These\nare, of course, some of the greatest and most difficult problems that\never perplexed the mind of man, and we can only deal briefly with\nEucken's contribution to their solution.\n\nCan a man choose the highest? This is the form in which Eucken would\nstate the problem of freedom. His answer, as already seen, is an\naffirmative one. The personality chooses the spiritual life, and\ncontinually reaffirms the decision. This being so, it is now no longer\npossible to consider the human and the divine to be entirely in\nopposition. And the more the spiritual personality develops, so much the\nless does the opposition obtain, until a state of spirituality is\narrived at when all opposition of will ceases--then we attain perfect\nfreedom. \"We are most free, when we are most deeply pledged--pledged\nirrevocably to the spiritual presence, with which our own being is so\nradically and so finally implicated.\" Thus freedom is obtained in a\nsense through self-surrender, but it is through this same self-surrender\nthat we realise spiritual absoluteness. Hence it is that perfect freedom\ncarries with it the strongest consciousness of dependence, and human\nfreedom is only made possible through the absoluteness of the spiritual\nlife in whom it finds its being.\n\nEnglish philosophers have dealt at length with the question of the\npossibility of reconciling the independence of personality and the\nexistence of an Absolute. From Eucken's point of view the difficulty is\nnot so serious. When he speaks of personality he does not mean the mere\nsubjective individual in all his selfishness. Eucken has no sympathy\nwith the emphasis that is often placed on the individual in the low\nsubjective sense, and is averse from the glorification of the individual\nof which some writers are fond. Indeed, he would prefer a naturalistic\nexplanation of man rather than one framed as a result of man's\nindividualistic egoism. The former explanation admits that man is\nentirely a thing of nature; the latter, from a selfish and proud\nstandpoint, claims for man a place in a higher world. There is nothing\nthat is worthy and high in the low desires of Mr. Smith--the mere\nsubjective Mr. Smith. But if through the mind and body of Mr. Smith the\nAbsolute Spirit is realising itself in personality--then there is\nsomething of eternal worth--there is spiritual personality. There will\nbe opposition between the sordidness of the mere individual will and the\ndivine will, but that is because the spiritual life has not been gained.\nWhen the highest state of spiritual personality has been reached, then\nman is an expression--a personal realisation of the Absolute, is in\nentire accord with the absolute, indeed becomes himself divine.\n\nThis does not rob the term personality of its meaning, for each\npersonality does, in some way, after all, exist for itself. Each\nindividual consciousness has a sanctity of its own. But the\nbeing-for-self develops more and more by coming into direct contact with\nthe Universal Spiritual Life.\n\nHere, then, we arrive at something that appears to be a paradox. We have\nthe phenomenon of a being that is free and existing for itself, yet in\nsome way dependent upon an absolute spiritual life. We have, too, the\nphenomenon of a human being becoming divine. How is it really possible\nthat self-activity can arise out of dependence? Eucken does not attempt\nto explain, but contends that an explanation cannot be arrived at\nthrough reasoning. We are forced to the conclusion, we realise through\nour life and action that this is the real state of affairs, and in this\ncase the reality proves the possibility. \"This primal phenomenon,\" he\nsays, \"overflows all explanation. It has, as the fundamental condition\nof all spiritual life, a universal axiomatic character.\" Again he says,\n\"The wonder of wonders is the human made divine, through God's superior\npower.\" \"The problem surpasses the capacity of the human reason.\" For\ntaking up this position, Eucken is sharply criticised by some writers.\n\nWhen we approach the problem of the nature of the Absolute in itself,\nthe main difficulty that arises is whether God is a personal being. God,\nsays Eucken, is \"an Absolute Spiritual Life in all its grandeur, above\nall the limitations of man and the world of experience--a Spiritual Life\nthat has attained to a complete subsistence in itself, and at the same\ntime to an encompassing of all reality.\" The divine is for Eucken the\nultimate spirituality that inspires the work of all spiritual\npersonalities. When in our life of fight and action we need inspiration,\nwe find \"in the very depths of our own nature a reawakening, which is\nnot a mere product of our activity, but a salvation straight from God.\"\nGod, then, is the ultimate spirituality which inspires the struggling\npersonality, and gives to it a sense of unity and confidence. Eucken\ndoes not admit that God is a personality in the sense that we are, and\ndeprecates all anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a personal being.\nIndeed, to avoid the tendency to such conceptions he would prefer the\nterm \"Godhead\" to \"God.\" Further considerations of the nature of God can\nonly lead to intellectual speculations. For an activistic philosophy,\nsuch as Eucken's philosophy is, it would seem sufficient for life and\naction to know that all attempts at the ideal in life, originate in, and\nare inspired by, the Absolute Spiritual Life, that is by God.\n\nWe cannot discuss fully the relation of human and divine without, too,\ndealing with the ever urgent problem of religion. This is a problem in\nwhich Eucken is deeply interested, and concerning which he has written\none of his greatest works--_The Truth of Religion_--a work that has been\ndescribed as one of the greatest apologies for religion ever written.\n\nWhat is religion? Most people perhaps would apply the term to a system\nof belief concerning the Eternal, usually resting upon a historical or\ntraditional basis. Others would include in the term the reverence felt\nfor the Absolute by the contemplative mind, even though that mind did\nnot believe in any of the traditional systems. Some would emphasise the\nfact that religion should concern itself with the establishment of a\nrelationship between the human and the Divine.\n\nBut Eucken does not find religion to consist in belief, nor in a mere\nattitude towards the mysteries of an overworld. In keeping with the\nactivistic tone of his whole philosophy he finds religion to be rooted\nin life, and would define religion as an action by which the human being\nappropriates the spiritual life.\n\nThe first great concern of religion must be the conservation--not of\nman, as mere man, but of the spiritual life in the human being, and it\nmeans \"a mighty concentration of the spiritual life in man.\" The\nessential basis that makes religion possible is the presence of a Divine\nlife in man--\"it unfolds itself through the seizure of this life as\none's own nature.\" Religion must be a form of activity, which brings\nabout the concentration of the spiritual life in the human soul, and\nsets forth this spiritual life as a shield against unworthy elements\nthat attempt to enter and to govern man.\n\nThe essential characteristic of religion must be the demand for a new\nworld. \"Religion is not a communication of overworld secrets, but the\ninauguration of an overworld life.\" Religion must depend upon the\ncontradiction and opposition that exists in human life, and upon the\nclear recognition of the distinction between the \"high\" and the \"low\" in\nlife. It must point to a means of attaining freedom and redemption from\nthe old world of sin and sense, and to the possibility of being elevated\ninto a new and higher world. It must, too, fight against the extremes of\noptimism and pessimism, for while it will acknowledge the presence of\nwrong, it will call attention to the possibility of deliverance. It must\nbring about a change of life, without denying the dark side of life; it\nmust show \"the Divine in the things nearest at hand, without idealising\nfalsely the ordinary situation of life.\"\n\nThe great practical effect of religion, then, must be to create a demand\nfor a new and higher world in opposition to the world of nature. For\nthis new life religion must provide an ultimate standard. \"Religion must\nat all times assert its right to prove and to winnow, for it is\nreligion--the power which draws upon the deepest source of life--which\ntakes to itself the whole of man, and offers a fixed standard for all\nhis undertakings.\" Religion must provide a standard for the whole of\nlife, for it places all human life \"under the eternity.\" It is not the\nfunction of religion to set up a special province over against the other\naspects of his life--it must transform life in its entirety, and affect\nall the subsidiary aspects.\n\nBut religion is not gained, any more than human freedom, once for all\ntime--it must be gained continually afresh, and sought ever anew. Thus\nthe fact of religion becomes a perpetual task, and leads to the highest\nactivity.\n\nEucken speaks of two types of religion--Universal and Characteristic\nReligion. The line of division between them is not easy to draw, but the\ndistinction gives an opportunity for emphasising again the essential\nelements of true religion.\n\n_Universal Religion_ is a more or less vague appreciation of the\nSpiritual, which results in a diffused, indefinite spiritual life. The\npersonality has appreciated to some extent the opposition between the\nnatural and the spiritual, and has chosen the spiritual. He adopts a new\nattitude or mood, towards the world in consequence, and that is an\nattitude of fight against the world of nature. But everything is vague;\nthe individual has not yet appreciated the spiritual world as his own,\nand feels that he is a stranger in the higher world, rather than an\nordinary fully privileged citizen. He has not yet associated himself\nclosely enough with the Universal Spirit, everything is superficial,\nthere is hunger and thirst for the higher things in life, but these have\nnot yet been satiated.\n\nSome people never get beyond this vague appreciation of the spiritual\nuntil perhaps some great trial or temptation, a long illness or sad\nbereavement falls to their lot. Then they feel the need for a religion\nthat is more satisfying than the Universal Religion with which they have\nin the past been content. They want to get nearer to God; they feel the\nneed of a personal God who is interested in their trials and troubles.\nThey are no longer satisfied with the conception of a God that is far\naway, they thirst for His presence. This feeling leads the individual to\nsearch for a more definite form of religion, in which the God is\nregarded as supremely real, and reigns on the throne of love. The\npersonality enters into the greater depths of religion, and it becomes a\nmuch more real and powerful influence in his life. He has no longer a\nmere indefinite conception of a Deity, but he thinks of God as real and\npersonal. Instead of adopting a changed attitude towards the world of\nnature, he comes to demand a new world. He is now a denizen of the\nspiritual world, and there results \"a life of pure inwardness,\" which\ndraws its power and inspiration from the infinite resources of the\nUniversal Spiritual Life in which he finds his being. This type of\nreligion Eucken calls _Characteristic Religion_.\n\nThe historical religions would seem to represent, to some extent, the\nattempts of humankind to arrive at a religion of this kind. A further\ndistinction arises between the historical forms of religion, of which\none at most, if any, can express the final truth, and the Absolute form\nof religion, which if not yet conceived, must ultimately express the\ntruth in the matter of religion.\n\nEucken is never more brilliant than he is in the examination he makes of\nthe historical forms of religion, for the purpose of formulating the\nAbsolute and final form; some account of this must be given in the next\nchapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nRELIGION: HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE\n\n\nIn examining the various historical forms of religion, Eucken, as we\nshould expect, is governed by the conclusions he has arrived at\nconcerning the solution of the great problem of life, and especially of\nthe place of religion in life.\n\nA religion which emphasised the need for a break with the world, and of\nfight and action for spiritual progress, the possibility of a new higher\nlife of freedom and of personality, and the superiority of the spiritual\nover the material, and which presented God as the ultimate spiritual\nlife, in which the human personality found its real self, would thus\nmeet with highest favour, while a form of religion that failed to do so\nwould necessarily fail to satisfy the tests that he would apply.\n\nHe does not spend time discussing various religions in detail, but deals\nwith them briefly in general, in order to show that the Christian\nreligion is far superior to all other religions, then he makes a\ncritical and very able examination of the Christian position. He\nconsiders it necessary to discuss in detail only that form of religion\nthat is undoubtedly the highest.\n\nThe historical religions he finds to be of two types--religions of law\nand religions of redemption. The religions of law portray God as a being\noutside the world, and distinct from man, One who rules the world by\nlaw, and who decrees that man shall obey certain laws of conduct that\nHe lays down. Failure to obey these laws brings its punishment in the\npresent or in a future life, while implicit obedience brings the highest\nrewards. To such a God is often attributed all the weaknesses of the\nhuman being, sometimes in a much exaggerated form--hence His reign\nbecomes one of fear to His subjects.\n\nA religion of law assumes that man is capable of himself of obeying the\nlaw, and is responsible for his mode of life; it assumes that man is\ncapable through his own energy of conquering the world of sin, and of\nleading the higher life.\n\nReligions of this type possess of course the merit of simplicity,\ntransparency, and finality. The decrees, the punishments and rewards are\ngiven with some clearness and are easily understood; there is no appeal\nand little equivocation. They served a useful purpose in the earlier\nages of civilisation, but cannot solve the problem for the complex\ncivilisation and advanced culture of the present age. They place God too\nfar from man, and attribute to man powers which he cannot of himself\npossess. The conceptions of the Deity involved in them are too\nanthropomorphic in character--too much coloured by human frailties.\n\nThe religions of law have had to give place to those of a superior\ntype--the religions of redemption. These religions appreciate the\ndifficulty there exists for humankind of itself to transcend the world\nof sin, and are of two types--one type expressing a merely negative\nelement, the other a negative and positive element.\n\nThe typical negative redemptive religion is that of Buddhism. Buddhism\nteaches us that the world is a sham and an evil; and the duty of man is\nto appreciate this fact, and to deny the world, but here the matter\nends--it ends with world-renunciation and self-renunciation. There is\nonly a negative element in such a religion, no inspiration to live and\nfight for gaining a higher world. This, of course, cannot provide a\nsatisfactory solution to the problem, for no new life with new values is\npresented to us. It is a religion devoid of hope, for it does not point\nto a higher life. \"A wisdom of world-denial, a calm composure of the\nnature, an entire serenity in the midst of the changing scenes of life,\nconstitute the summit of life.\"\n\nChristianity teaches us that the world is full of misery and suffering,\nbut the world in itself is really a perfect work of Divine wisdom and\ngoodness. \"The root of evil is not in the nature of the world, but in\nmoral wrong--in a desertion from God.\" Sin and wickedness arise from the\nmisuse and perversion of things which are not in themselves evil.\nChristianity calls for a break from the wickedness of the world. It\ncalls upon man to give up his sin, to deny, or break with, the evil of\nwhich he is guilty. But it does not expect man to do this in his own\nstrength alone--God Himself comes to his rescue. Unlike Buddhism, it\ndoes not stay at the denial of the world, but calls upon man to become a\ncitizen of a higher world. This gives a new impetus to the higher life;\nman finds a great task--he has to build a kingdom of God upon the earth.\nThis demands the highest efforts--he must fight to gain the new world,\nand must keep up the struggle to retain what he has gained. The\ninferiority of Buddhism as contrasted with Christianity is well\ndescribed by Eucken in the following words: \"In the former an\nemancipation from semblance becomes necessary; in the latter an\novercoming of evil is the one thing needful. In the former the very\nbasis of the world seems evil; in the latter it is the perversion of\nthis basis which seems evil. In the former, the impulses of life are to\nbe entirely eradicated; in the latter, on the contrary, they are to be\nennobled, or rather to be transformed. In the former, no higher world of\na positive kind dawns on man, so that life finally reaches a seemingly\nvalid point of rest, whilst upon Christian ground life ever anew ascends\nbeyond itself.\"\n\nFrom such considerations as these, Eucken comes to the conclusion that\nof the redemptive religions, which are themselves the highest type,\nChristianity is the highest and noblest form, hence his main criticism\nis concerned with the Christian religion. This does not mean that he\nfinds neither value nor truth in any other form of religion. His general\nconclusion with regard to the historical religions is that they \"contain\ntoo much that is merely human to be valued as a pure work of God, and\nyet too much that is spiritual and divine to be considered as a mere\nproduct of man.\" He finds in them all some kernel of truth, or at least\na pathway to some part of truth, but contends that no religion contains\nthe whole truth and nothing but the truth. \"As certainly,\" he says, \"as\nthere is only one sole truth, there can be only one absolute religion,\nand this religion coincides entirely in no way with any one of the\nhistorical religions.\"\n\nEucken's great endeavour in his discussion of the Christian religion is\nto bring out the distinction between the eternal substance that resides\nin it and the human additions that have been made to it in different\nages, between the elements in Christianity that are essentially divine\nand those essentially human. Divested of its human colourings and\naccretions, Christianity presents a basis of Divine and eternal truth,\nand this regarded in itself, can well claim to be the final and absolute\nreligion.\n\nThe conclusion he has come to with regard to the eternal truth as\ncontrasted with the temporary colourings of Christianity, with the\nessential as contrasted with the inessential, can best be outlined by\ntaking in turn some of the main tenets and characteristics of the\nChristian faith.\n\nEucken's conception of the negative movement is very much akin to the\nChristian idea of _conversion_. The first stage is merely a movement\naway from the world, but after a time, in the continuous process of\nnegation, the negative movement attains a positive significance; when\nthis stage is arrived at Eucken would apply the term conversion. He\nwould not limit the negative movement to one act or to one point in\ntime; the movement towards a higher world must be maintained--the\nsustaining of the negative movement being a test of the reality of\nconversion. The process of conversion is not a process to be passively\nundergone, or to originate from without, but is a movement starting in\nthe depths of one's own being.\n\nAs already pointed out, Eucken believes in _redemption_. The past is\ncapable of reinterpretation and transformation, because we can view our\npast actions in a new light and so change the whole, since the past is\nnot a closed thing, definite in itself, but a part of an incomplete\nwhole. He considers, however, that the Christian doctrine of redemption\nmakes it too much a matter of God's mercy, instead of placing stress\nupon the part that man himself must play. The possibility of redemption\nin his view follows from the presence and movement of the spiritual life\nin man, not merely from an act of the founder of Christianity, and he\navers that while traditional Christianity emphasises the need for\nredemption from evil, it does not emphasise sufficiently the necessary\nelevation to the good life that must result.\n\nClosely bound up with the Christian doctrine of redemption is that of\n_mediation_. Eucken believes that the Christian conception of mediation\nresulted from the feeling of worthlessness and impotence of man, and the\naspirations which yet burned within him after union with the Divine. The\nidea of mediation bridges the gulf, \"a mid-link is forged between the\nDivine and the human, and half of it belongs to each side; both sides\nare brought into a definite connection which could be found in no other\nway.\" Eucken acknowledges that such a mediation seems to make access to\nthe Divine easier, gives intimacy to the idea of redemption, and offers\nsupport for human frailty. But he points out that there is an\nintolerable anthropomorphism involved in the idea, that it removes the\nDivine farther away from man, and that the union of Divine and human is\nheld to obtain in one special case only--that of Christ. He urges that\nin a religion of mediation, one or other, God or Christ, must be chosen\nas the centre. \"Concerning the decision there cannot be the least doubt;\nthe fact is clear in the soul-struggles of the great religious\npersonalities, that in a decisive act of the soul the doctrinal idea of\nmediation recedes into the background, and a direct relationship with\nGod becomes a fact of immediacy and intimacy.\"\n\nSo Eucken will have nothing to do with the idea of mediation in its\ndoctrinal significance--pointing out that \"the idea of mediation glides\neasily into a further mediation.\" \"Has not the figure of Christ receded\nin Catholicism, and does not the figure of Mary constitute the centre of\nthe religious emotional life?\"\n\nHe does, however, lay great store by the help that a man may be to other\nmen in their upward path: \"The human, personality who first and foremost\nbrought eternal truth to the plane of time, and through this\ninaugurated a new epoch, remains permanently present in the picture of\nthe spiritual world, and is able permanently to exercise a mighty power\nupon the soul ... but all this is far removed from any idea of\nmediation.\"\n\nEucken believes in _revelation_, but through action, and not through\ncontemplation. To the personality struggling upward, with its aims set\ntowards the highest in life, the spiritual life reveals itself. He does\nnot confine revelation to certain periods in time, and believes that\nsuch revelation comes to all spiritual personalities.\n\nHe holds, too, that the spiritual personalities are themselves\nrevelations of the Universal Spiritual Life, and that the Spiritual Life\ndoes reveal itself most clearly in personalities.\n\nHow the revelation comes he does not discuss in any detail, but he is\nvery certain that it comes through action and fight for the highest.\n\nIt is perhaps largely due to his activistic standpoint that Eucken does\nnot deal with _prayer_. In the _Truth of Religion_, which deals very\nfully with most aspects of religion, and purports to be a complete\ndiscussion of religion, no treatment of prayer is given. He speaks of\nthe developing personality as drawing upon the resources of the\nUniversal Spiritual Life, but this appears to be in action, and not in\nprayer or communion.\n\nHe is ever suspicious of intellectual contemplation, and this leads him\nto attribute less importance than perhaps he should to _mysticism_, to\nprayer, adoration, and worship. He admits that mysticism contains a\ntruth that is vital to religion, but complains that it becomes for many\nthe whole of religion. Its proper function is to liberate the human mind\nfrom the narrowly human, and to emphasise a total-life, the great Whole.\nIt fails, however, \"because it turns this necessary portion of religion\ninto the sole content. To it, religion is nothing other than an\nabsorption into the infinite and eternal Being--an extinguishing of all\nparticularity, and the gaining of a complete calm through the suspension\nof all the wear and tear of life.\"\n\nEucken's discussion of _faith and doubt_ is very illuminating. He\nprotests against the conception of faith which concerns itself merely\nwith the intellectual acceptance of this or that doctrine. This narrows\nand weakens its power, confining it to one department of life; whereas\nfaith is concerned with the whole of life.\n\nFaith is for Eucken \"a conviction of an axiomatic character, which\nrefuses to be analysed into reasons, and which, indeed, precedes all\nreasons ... the recognition of the inner presence of an infinite\nenergy.\"\n\nIf faith concerns itself with, and proceeds from the whole of life, it\nwill then take account of the work of thought, and will not set itself\nin opposition to reason. But it will lead where reason fails. It is not\nlimited by intellectual limitations, though it does not underrate or\nneglect the achievements of the intellect. Faith enables life to\n\"maintain itself against a hostile or indifferent world; ... it holds\nitself fast to invisible facts against the hard opposition of visible\nexistence.\"\n\nThe vital importance of such faith to religion is clearly evident; and\nbound up with this is the significance of doubt. Doubt, too, becomes\nnow, not an intellectual matter, but a matter for the whole of life. \"If\nfaith carries within itself so much movement and struggle, it is not\nsurprising ... if faith and doubt set themselves against each other, and\nif the soul is set in a painful dilemma.\" Eucken considers it to be an\ninevitable, and indeed a necessary accompaniment of religious\nexperience, and his own words on the point are forcible and clear.\n\"Doubt ... does not appear as something monstrous and atrocious, though\nit would appear so if a perfect circle of ideas presented itself to man\nand demanded his assent as a bounden duty. For where it is necessary to\nlay hold on a new life, and to bring to consummation an inward\ntransformation, then a personal experience and testing are needed. But\nno proof is definite which clings from the beginning to the final\nresult, and places on one side all possibility of an antithesis. The\nopposite possibility must be thought out and lived through if the Yea is\nto possess full energy and genuineness. Thus doubt becomes a necessary,\nif also an uncomfortable, companion of religion; it is indispensable for\nthe conservation of the full freshness and originality of religion--for\nthe freeing of religion from conventional forms and phrases.\"\n\nEucken's views on _immortality_ have already been dealt with. He does\nnot accept the Christian conception of it, for he seems to limit the\npossibility to those in whom spiritual personalities have been\ndeveloped, and he evidently does not believe that the \"natural\nindividuality with all its egoism and limitations\" is going to persist.\n\nIn discussing the question of _miracle_, Eucken weighs the fact that a\nconviction of the possibility of miracle has been held by millions in\nvarious religions, and particularly in Christianity. He considers that\nthe question of miracle is of more importance in the Christian religion\nthan in any other, one miracle--the Resurrection--having been taken\nright into the heart of Christian doctrine. He finds, however, that the\nmiracle is entirely inconsistent with an exact scientific conception of\nnature, and means \"an overthrow of the total order of nature as this\nhas been set forth through the fundamental work of modern\ninvestigation.\" He does not consider such a position can be held without\noverwhelming evidence, and does not feel the traditional fact to have\nthis degree of certainty, or to be inexplicable in another way. He\nconsiders that the explanation of the miracle probably lies in the\npsychic state of the witnesses.\n\nEucken shows in general extreme reluctance to make a historical event a\nfoundation of belief, and this no doubt accounts to some extent for his\nattitude with regard to miracles. He points out that \"the founders of\nreligion have themselves protested against a craving after sensuous\nsigns,\" and that this protest \"is no other than the sign of spiritual\npower and of a Divine message and greatness.\" He considers that the\nbelief in, and craving for, sensuous miracle is an outcome of a\n\"mid-level of religion,\" where belief is waning and spirituality\ndeclining. While, thus, he does not believe in sensuous miracle, he\nacknowledges and lays the greatest stress on one miracle--the presence\nof the Spiritual Life in man. It is, indeed, this miracle that renders\nothers unnecessary.\n\nIn discussing the doctrine of the _Incarnation_, Eucken attempts to get\nat the inner meaning--the truth which the doctrine endeavours to\nexpress, and he finds this to consist in the fact of the ultimate union\nof the human and Divine, and this truth is one that we dare not\nrenounce. He criticises the attempt that is made in Christianity to show\nthat such union only obtained once in the course of history. Incarnation\nis not one historical event, but a spiritual process; not an article of\nbelief, but a living experience of each spiritual personality.\n\nHe considers as injurious to religion in general the Christian\nconception of the _Atonement_. He believes that the idea that is to be\nexpressed is that of the nearness of God to man in guilt and in\nsuffering. In endeavouring to express this close intimacy the idea of\nsuffering was transferred to God himself. The anthropomorphic idea of\nreconciliation and substitution thus arose, and this Eucken considers to\nhave done harm. \"The notion that God does not help us through His own\nwill and power, but requires first of all His own feeling of pity to be\nroused, is an outrage on God and a darkening of the foundation of\nreligion.\" So Eucken objects to the attempt to formulate the mystery\ninto dogma. \"All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of\nreligion becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem\nby means of human relationships, and according to human standards.\" \"It\nis sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness of\nGod in human suffering, and His help in the raising of life out of\nsuffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason.\nIndeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the less\ndoes it combine into a dogmatic speculation and the purer and more\nenergetically is it able to work.\"\n\nThe conception of the _Trinity_ is again an attempt to express the union\nof Divine and human, \"the inauguration of the Divine Nature within human\nlife.\" The dogma, however, involves ideas of a particular generation,\nand so threatens to become, and has indeed become, burdensome to a later\nage which no longer holds these ideas. Further, the doctrine of the\nTrinity has mixed up a fundamental truth of religion with abstruse\nphilosophical speculations, and this has provided a stumbling-block\nrather than a help.\n\nAt the same time, Eucken lays the greatest stress on the _personality of\nJesus_. He considers the personality of Jesus to be of more importance\nto Christianity than is the personality of its founder to any other\nreligion. \"Such a personality as Jesus is not the mere bearer of\ndoctrines, or of a special frame of mind, but is a convincing fact, and\nproof of the Divine life, a proof at which new life can be kindled over\nanew.\" And again: \"It is from this source that a great yearning has been\nimplanted within the human breast ... a longing for a new life of love\nand peace, of purity and simplicity. Such a life, with its incomparable\nnature and its mysterious depths, does not exhaust itself through\nhistorical effects, but humanity can from hence ever return afresh to\nits inmost essence, and can strengthen itself ever anew through the\ncertainty of a new, pure, and spiritual world over against the\nmeaningless aspects of nature and over against the vulgar mechanism of a\nculture merely human.\" But while he would appreciate the depth and\nrichness of the personality of Jesus, he protests against the worship of\nJesus as divine, and the making of Him the centre of religion. The\ngreatness of Christ is confined to the realm of humanity, and there is\nin all men a possibility of attaining similar heights.\n\nChristianity is, in Eucken's view, much more closely bound up with\nhistorical events than any other religion, and it thus suffers more\nsevere treatment at the hands of historical criticism than any other\nreligion. Eucken considers such historical criticism to be of great\nvalue. In Christianity as in other religions we find the eternal not in\nits pure form, but mixed with the temporal and variable, and historical\ncriticism will help in the separation of the temporal from the eternal\nelements. In so doing it does an immense service, for it frees religion\nfrom fixation to one special point of time, and enables us to regard it\nas ever developing and progressing to greater depths.\n\nEucken emphasises that the _historical basis_ of Christianity is not\nChristianity itself, is not essentially religious; and he quotes\nLessing, Kant, and Fichte to support him in his contention that a belief\nin such a historical basis is not necessary to religion, and may even\nprove harmful to it. The historical basis is, of course, useful as\nbringing out into clear relief the personality of Jesus, and the other\ngreat spiritual personalities associated in His work, and Eucken lays\nstress upon the use that history can be to Christianity in giving\nrecords of the experiences of great spiritual personalities in all ages,\nbut it is important that the history is here a means to an end, and not\nan end in itself, and that the importance lies in the spiritual\nexperience and not in the historical facts.\n\nWhen one considers how little Eucken has to say concerning worship, and\nhow little emphasis he places upon historical and doctrinal forms in\nreligion, one wonders how it is he attaches so much importance to the\nfunctions of the _Church_. He points out that a Church is necessary to\nreligion, that it seems to be the only way of making religion real and\neffective for man. \"The Church seems indispensable in order to introduce\nand to hold at hand the new world and the new life to man in the midst\nof his ordinary existence; it is indispensable in order to fortify the\nconviction and to strengthen the energy in the midst of all the opposite\ncollisions; it is indispensable in order to uphold an eternal truth and\na universal problem in the midst of the fleetingness of the moment.\" In\nthe past, however, much harm has been done to religion by the Church.\nThis has arisen from several reasons. To begin with, it tends to narrow\nreligion, which is concerned with life, to the realm of ideas, and to\ntie down religion by connecting it with a thought-system of a particular\nage. Further, the necessary mechanical routine, and the appointment of\nspecial persons to carry out this routine, tends to elevate the routine\nand these special persons to a far higher place than they should occupy.\nAgain, spiritual things have been dragged into the service of personal\nambition, and bound up with human interests. The most serious danger,\nhowever, is that religion, from being an inward matter, tends to become\nexternalised.\n\nDespite this, an organised Church cannot be dispensed with, and Eucken\npoints out what changes are necessary to make the Church effective. One\nimportant point he makes clear, namely, that as the Church must speak to\nall, and every day, and not only to spiritually distinguished souls, and\nin moments of elevated feeling, then the teaching of the Church will\nalways lag behind religion itself, and must be considered as an\ninadequate expression of it.\n\nIt is necessary that there should be no coercion with regard to men's\nattitude towards the Church, and men should be free to join this or that\nChurch, or no Church at all.\n\nThen there must be more freedom, movement, and individuality within the\nChurch. What the Church holds as a final result of the experience of\nlife cannot be expected as the confession of all, especially of the\nyoung. \"How can every man and every child feel what such a mightily\ncontrasted nature as Luther's with all its convulsive experiences felt?\"\n\nThen the Church must not so much teach this or that doctrine as point to\nthe Spiritual Life, set forth the conditions of its development, and be\nthe representative of the higher world. Thus, and thus only, Eucken\nthinks that the Church can fulfil its proper function, and avoid being a\ndanger to religion.\n\nEucken's _appreciation of Christianity_ is sincere. Viewing it from the\nstandpoint of the Spiritual Life, he finds that it fulfils the\nconditions that religion should fulfil. It is based on freedom, and on\nthe presence of the Divine in humanity, even to the extent of a complete\nunion between them. The ideal of the Christian life is a personal life\nof pure inwardness, and of an ethical character. He speaks of the \"flow\nof inner life by means of which Christianity far surpasses all other\nreligions,\" and of the \"unfathomable depth and immeasurable hope which\nare contained in the Christian faith.\"\n\nIn Christianity the life of Christ has a value transcending all time,\nand is a standard by which to judge all other lives. There is, too, in\nChristianity a complete transformation or break, which must take place\nbefore any progress or development can take place.\n\n\"There is no need of a breach with Christianity; it can be to us what a\nhistorical religion pre-eminently is meant to be--a sure pathway to\ntruth, an awakener of immediate and intimate life, a vivid\nrepresentation and realisation of an Eternal Order which all the changes\nof time cannot possess or destroy.\"\n\nAt the same time, there are changes necessary in the form of\nChristianity, if it is to answer to the demands of the age, and be the\nAbsolute Religion. It must be shorn of temporary accretions, and must\ncast aside the ideas of any one particular age which have now been\nsuperseded. No longer can it retain the primitive view of nature and the\nworld which formerly obtained, no longer must it take up a somewhat\nnegative and passive attitude, but, realising that religion is a matter\nof the whole life, must energetically work itself out through all\ndepartments of life. It must remedy wrong, not merely endure it. It must\nproceed from a narrow and subjective point of view to a cosmic one,\nwithout at the same time losing sight of the fact that religion is an\ninward and personal matter. It must take account to the full of the\nvalue of man as man, and of the possibilities latent in him, and take\naccount of his own activity in his salvation.\n\nThe Christian ideal of life must be a more joyous one, of greater\nspiritual power, and the idea of redemption must not stop short at\nredemption from evil, but must progress to a restoration to free and\nself-determining activity. Since an absolute religion is based on the\nspiritual life, the form in which it is clothed must not be too\nrigid--life cannot be bound within a rigid creed. With its form modified\nin this way, Eucken considers that Christianity may well be the Absolute\nReligion, and that not only we can be, but we _must_ be Christians if\nlife is to have for us the highest meaning and value.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nCONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION\n\n\nWe have attempted to enunciate the special problem with which Eucken\ndeals, and to follow him in his masterly criticisms of the solutions\nthat have been offered, in his further search for the reality in life,\nin his arguments and statement of the philosophy of the spiritual life,\nand finally in his profound and able investigation into the eternal\ntruth that is to be found in religion. In doing so, we have only been\nable in a few cases to suggest points of criticism, and sometimes to\nemphasise the special merits of the work. It was necessary to choose\nbetween making a critical examination of a few points, and setting forth\nin outline his philosophy as a whole. It was felt that it would be more\nprofitable for the average reader if the latter course were adopted.\nThousands who have heard the name of Eucken and have read frequent\nreferences to him are asking, \"What has Eucken really to say?\" and we\nhave attempted to give a systematic, if brief, answer to the question.\nHaving done this it will be well to mention some of the main points of\ncriticism that have been made, and to call attention again to some of\nthe remarkable aspects of the contributions he has made to philosophy\nand religion.\n\nSeveral critics complain of the obscurity of his writings, of his loose\nuse of terms, and of his tendency to use freely such indefinite and\nabstruse terms as \"The Whole,\" \"The All,\" &c., and of his tendency to\nrepeat himself. Of course, if he is guilty of these faults, and he\ncertainly is to some extent, they are merely faults of style, and do not\nnecessarily affect the truth or otherwise of his opinions. In the matter\nof clarity he is very variable; occasional sentences are brilliantly\nclear, others present considerable difficulty to the practised student.\nHis more popular works, however, are much clearer and easier to\nunderstand than the two standard treatises on _The Truth of Religion_\nand _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_. His tendency to repetition is by no\nmeans an unmixed evil, for even when he appears to be repeating himself,\nhe is very often in reality expressing new shades of meaning, which help\ntowards the better understanding of the first statements.\n\nThe slight looseness in the use of terms, and a certain inexactness of\nexpression that is sometimes apparent, must of course not be\nexaggerated; it is by no means serious enough to invalidate his main\nargument. It gives an opportunity for a great deal of superficial\ncriticism on the part of unsympathetic writers, which, however, can do\nlittle harm to Eucken's position. One has to remember that it is\ndifficult to combine the fervour of a prophet with pedantic exactness,\nand that an inspired and profound philosopher cannot be expected to\nspend much time over verbal niceties.\n\nOf course one would prefer absolute clarity and exactness, but we must\nguard against allowing the absence of these things to prejudice us\nagainst the profound truths of a philosophical position, which are not\nvitally affected by that absence.\n\nFrequent criticism is directed towards the incompleteness of Eucken's\nphilosophy. He does not introduce his philosophy with a systematic\ndiscussion of the great epistemological and ontological problems.\nPhilosophers have often introduced their work in this way, and it has\nbeen customary to expect an introduction of the kind. To do so, however,\nwould be quite out of keeping with Eucken's activistic position, as it\nwould necessarily involve much intellectual speculation, and he does not\nbelieve that the problem of life can be solved by such speculation. It\nis unfortunate that he has so little to say concerning the world of\nmatter. Beyond insisting upon the superiority of the spiritual life,\nwhich he calls the \"substantial,\" over matter, which he calls the merely\n\"existential,\" he tells us very little about the material world. Rightly\nor wrongly, thinkers are deeply interested in the merely existential, in\nthe periphery of life, in the material world, but for the solution of\nthis problem Eucken contributes little or nothing. His sole concern is\nthe spiritual world, and although we should like an elaboration of his\nviews on the mere periphery of life, we must not let the fact that he\ndoes not give it, lead us to undervalue his real contributions. Another\nserious incompleteness lies in the fact that he pays little attention to\nthe psychological implications of his theories. Until he does this, his\nphilosophy cannot be regarded as complete. Eucken, however, would be the\nlast to claim that his solution is a finished or final one; he is\ncontent if his work is a substantial contribution to the final solution.\n\nObjection has been taken to the fact that he starts upon his task with a\ndefinite bias in a certain direction. He candidly admits from the outset\nthat his aim is to find a meaning for life, and in doing this he of\ncourse tacitly assumes that life has a deep and profound meaning. Strict\nscientists aver that the investigator must set out without prejudice, to\nexamine the phenomena he observes; and Eucken's initial bias may form a\nfatal stumbling-block to the acceptance of his philosophy by these, or\nindeed, by any who are not disposed to accept this fundamental position.\nIf we deny that life has a meaning, then Eucken has little for us; but\nif we are merely doubtful on the matter, the reading of Eucken will\nprobably bring conviction.\n\nMany critics point to the far-reaching assumptions he makes. He assumes\nas axiomatic certainties and insoluble mysteries the existence of the\nspiritual life in man, the union of the human and divine, and the\nfreedom of the spiritual personalities, though in a sense dependent upon\nthe Universal Spiritual Life. This of course does not mean that he is in\nthe habit of making unjustifiable assumptions. This is far from being\nthe case; on the contrary, he takes the greatest care in the matter of\nhis speculative bases. There are some fundamental facts of life,\nhowever, which according to Eucken are proved to us by life itself; we\nfeel they must be true, but they are not truths that can be reasoned\nabout, nor proved by the intellect alone. These are the three great\nfacts mentioned above, which, while not admitting of proof, must be\nregarded as certainties.\n\nHis contention that they cannot be reasoned about has led to the further\ncharge of irrationalism. The question that has to be decided is, whether\nEucken in emphasising the fact that great truths must be solved by life\nand action, is underestimating the part that intellect must play in\nlife. The decision must be largely one of individual opinion. Many\ncritics are of the opinion that he does lay too little stress upon the\nintellectual factor in life. In actual fact, however, the fault is more\napparent than real, for Eucken does in fact reason and argue closely\nconcerning the facts of life. The charge, too, is to some extent due to\nthe fact that he continually attacks the over-emphasis on the\nintellectual that the people of his own race--the Germans--are apt to\nplace. With the glorification of the intellect he has no sympathy, for\nhe feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than\nthought--and that is action.\n\nThese are the main points of criticism that have been raised--the reader\nmust judge for himself how seriously they should be regarded. But before\narriving at a final opinion he must think again of the contributions\nEucken has indubitably made to philosophy and religion, of which we\nshall again in brief remind him.\n\nHe has given us a striking examination of the various theories of life,\nand has ably demonstrated their inadequacy. He has displayed great\nscholarship in his search for the ultimate reality. He has found this\nreality in the universal life, and has urged the need for a break with\nthe natural world in order to enter upon a higher life. He has traced\nthe progress of the spiritual life, and has given us ultimately a bold\nvindication of human personality and of the freedom of the spiritual\nbeing.\n\nHe has raised philosophy from being mere discussions concerning abstract\ntheories to a discussion of life itself. In this way philosophy becomes\nnot merely a theory concerning the universe, nor merely a theory of\nlife, but a real factor in life itself--indeed it becomes itself a life.\nThus has he given to philosophy a higher ideal, a new urgency--by his\ncontinued emphasis upon the spiritual he has given to philosophy a\nnobler and a higher mission. He has placed the emphasis in general upon\nlife, and has pointed out the inability of the intellect to solve all\nlife's problems. He has given to idealistic philosophies a possible\nrallying-point, where theories differing in detail can meet on common\nground. As one eminent writer says: \"The depth and inclusiveness of\nEucken's philosophy, the comprehensiveness of its substructure and its\nstimulating personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point\nfor the idealistic endeavour of to-day.\"\n\nAnd what does he give to religion? Many will reply that he has given us\nnothing that is not already in the Christian religion. Therein lies the\nvalue and strength of Eucken's contributions. He has given a striking\nvindication of the spiritual content of Christianity as against the\neffects of time changes. He has attempted to bring out the contrast\nbetween what is really vital, and what are merely temporary colourings\nand accretions. He makes many of the main elements of Christianity\nacceptable without the need of a historical basis or proof. Not only\ndoes he present the Christian position as a reasonable view of the\nproblem of life, but as the only solution that can really solve the\nfinal problem. He has cleared the decks of all superfluous baggage, and\nhas laid bare a firm basis for a practical, constructive endeavour.\n\nHe has given us in himself a profound believer in the inward and higher\nnature of man, and in the existence of the spiritual life. As one critic\nsays: \"The earnestness, depth and grandeur, humility and conscious\nchoice of high ideals, have raised his work far above mere intellectual\nacuteness and minuteness.\"\n\nIn Eucken we have one of the greatest thinkers of the age--some would\nsay _the_ greatest--setting his life upon emphasising the spiritual at a\ntime when the tendency is strongly in materialistic directions. He has\ngathered around him a number of able and whole-hearted disciples in\nvarious countries, and future ages may find in Eucken the greatest\nforce in the revulsion of the twentieth century (that is already making\nitself felt) from the extreme materialistic position, to take religion\nup again, and particularly the Christian religion, as the only\nsatisfying solution of humanity's most urgent problem.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nThe English reader should first read:\n\n_The Meaning and Value of Life_ (A. & C. Black), which is a good\n    introduction to Eucken's philosophy; and\n_The Life of the Spirit_ (Williams & Norgate).\n\nHe can then proceed to study Eucken's three comprehensive and important\nworks:\n\n_Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_, in which he gives a detailed presentation\n    of his philosophy (A. & C. Black).\n_The Truth of Religion_, in which he gives his ideas on religion (Williams\n    & Norgate).\n_The Problem of Human Life_, in which he makes a searching analysis of the\n    philosophies of the past (Fisher Unwin).\n\nThe student will be much helped in his study by the following books:\n\n_Eucken and Bergson_, by E. Hermann (James Clark & Co.).\n_Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life_, by Professor W.R. Boyce Gibson\n    (A. & C. Black).\n\nWhen he has studied these he will probably be anxious to read other\nworks of Eucken's, of which translations have already appeared, or are\nsoon to appear.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nAbsolute, the, 63\n---- Freedom and the, 61, 62\n---- Personality and the, 62, 63\n---- and historical religion, chap. viii.\n---- religion, Christianity as the, 72\n\nActivism, 41, 42\n\nAtonement, the, 79\n\n\nBergson, 39\n\nBuddhism, 70, 71\n\n\nCharacteristic Religion, 66, 67\n\nCharacteristics of a satisfactory solution of life, 16\n\nChrist, as mediator, 74\n---- Personality of, 80\n---- Value of life of, 83\n\nChristian Church, 81, 82\n\nChristianity, and historical bases, 80, 81\n---- Appreciation of, 83\n---- as absolute religion, 72\n---- highest form of religion, 71, 72\n\nConversion, 57, 73\n\n\nDoubt, 76\n\n\nEmpiricism, 36, 37\n\nEternal and transient in religion and Christianity, 72, 73\n---- truth contrasted with its temporary expression, 44, 45\n\nEucken, assumptions made by, 88\n---- bias, 87\n---- charge of irrationalism, 88, 89\n---- contributions to philosophy and religion, 90, 91\n---- faults of style, 86\n---- Incompleteness of philosophy of, 87\n---- Special excellences of philosophy of, 89\n\nEvil, 51\n\n\nFaith, 76\n\nFreedom, ascent to, 59\n---- and the absolute, 61, 62\n---- and naturalism, 26\n\n\nGod, is God a person? 63, 64\n---- Nature of, 63, 64\n\n\nHistorical and absolute religion, chap. viii.\n---- bases of Christianity, 80, 81\n\nHistory and philosophy, 43-49\n---- and religion, 17, 18\n\n\nIdealistic presuppositions of socialism and individualism, 31, 48\n\nIdeas, power of, 46\n\nImmanent idealism as a solution of the problem of life, 19-22\n\nImmediacy, the new, 58\n\nImmortality, 60, 77\n\nIncarnation, 78\n\nIndependence of the spiritual life, 52, 53\n\nIndividualism, and personality, 59, 62\n---- as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32\n---- idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48\n\nIrrationalism, charge of, 88, 89\n\n\nJames, William, 39, 40\n\n\nLaw, religions of, 69, 70\n\nLife, independence of the spiritual, 52\n---- spiritual, relation of, to natural life, 52-54\n---- ---- superiority over natural life, 52-54\n---- The spiritual, 14\n---- The universal spiritual, 44, 49, chaps. v., vi., vii. (vii.\n       especially).\n\n\nMaeterlinck, 44\n\nMan, natural and spiritual, 53, 54\n---- transcending the material, 46\n\nMediation, 74\n\nMediator, Christ as, 74\n\nMethods of Eucken, 14, 15\n\nMind, limits of, 52\n\nMiracle, 77\n\nMysticism, 75\n\n\nNaturalism and freedom, 26\n---- as a solution of the problem of life, 22-26\n---- its own disproof, 25\n\nNatural life, relation to spiritual life, 52-54\n---- ---- Superiority of spiritual over, 52-54\n---- man and spiritual man, 53, 54\n\nNature, limits of, 52\n---- of God, 63, 64\n\nNegative movement, the, 57, 73\n\nNew immediacy, the, 58\n\nN\u00f6ological position, the, 50\n\n\nPantheism, 20, 51, 56\n\nPast, the, not irrevocable, 44, 73\n\nPersonality and individualism, 59, 62\n---- and the absolute, 62, 63\n---- gaining of, 54, 59\n---- of Christ, 80\n---- of God, 63, 64\n\nPhilosophy and history, 43-49\n---- of life, 13\n---- problems of, 10, 11\n\nPragmatism, 40, 41\n\nPrayer, 75\n\nProblem, Eucken's special, 12-14\n\nProblems of philosophy, 10, 11\n\nPurpose of Eucken's investigation, 13\n---- of religion, 65, 66\n\n\nRationalism, 37-39\n\nRedemption, 73\n\nReligion and history, 17, 18\n---- and human activity, 18\n---- and science, 19\n---- as solution of problem of life, 16, 19\n---- Characteristic, 66, 67\n---- Christianity as highest form of, 71, 72\n---- Christianity as the absolute, 72\n---- Essential characteristics of, 65, 66\n---- Eternal and transient in, 72, 73\n---- Eucken's contributions to, 90, 91\n---- Historical and absolute, chap. viii.\n---- of law, 69, 70\n---- of redemption, 69, 70\n---- Purpose of, 65, 66\n---- Universal, 66\n---- what is it? 64, 65\n\nResurrection, the, 77\n\nRevelation, 75\n\n\nScience, and religion, 17\n\nSocialism, as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32\n---- idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48\n\nSpiritual life, 14\n---- ---- Independence of the, 52\n---- ---- Relation of, to natural life, 52-54\n---- ---- Superiority of, over material and mental, 52-54\n---- ---- The universal, 47-49, and chaps. v., vi., and vii. (vii.\n            especially)\n\nSpiritual man and natural man, 53, 54\n\n\nTrinity, the, 79\n\nTruth, 44, 45\n---- another search for, chap. iii.\n\n\nUniversal Religion, 66\n---- spiritual life, 47-49, and chaps, v., vi., and vii. (vii. especially)\n\n\n\n\n\nPrinted by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.\nEdinburgh & London\n\n\n\n\nTHE PEOPLE'S BOOKS\n\nTHE FIRST HUNDRED VOLUMES\n\nThe volumes issued (Spring 1913) are marked with an asterisk\n\nSCIENCE\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  *1. The Foundations of Science         By W.C.D. Whetham, F.R.S.\n\n  *2. Embryology--The Beginnings of Life By Prof. Gerald Leighton, M.D.\n\n  3. Biology--The Science of Life        By Prof. W.D. Henderson, M.A.\n\n  *4. Zoology: The Study of Animal Life  By Prof. E.W. MacBride, F.R.S.\n\n  *5. Botany; The Modern Study of Plants By M.C. Stopes, D. Sc., Ph. D.\n\n  6. Bacteriology                        By W.E. Carnegie Dickson, M.D.\n\n  *7. The Structure of the Earth         By the Rev. T.G. Bonney, F.R.S.\n\n  *8. Evolution                          By E.S. Goodrich, M.A., F.R.S.\n\n  9. Darwin                              By Prof. W. Garstang, M.A., D. Sc.\n\n  *10. Heredity                          By J.A.S. Watson, B. Sc.\n\n  *11. Inorganic Chemistry               By Prof. E.C.C. Baly, F.R.S.\n\n  *12. Organic Chemistry                 By Prof. J.B. Cohen, B. Sc.,\n                                         F.R.S.\n\n  *13. The Principles of Electricity     By Norman R. Campbell, M.A.\n\n  *14. Radiation                         By P. Phillips, D. Sc.\n\n  *15. The Science of the Stars          By E.W. Maunder, F.R.A.S.\n\n  16. Light, according to Modern Science By P. Phillips. D. Sc.\n\n  *17. Weather-Science                   By R.G.K. Lempfert, M.A.\n\n  *18. Hypnotism                         By Alice Hutchison, M.D.\n\n  *19. The Baby: A Mother's Book         By a University Woman.\n\n  20. Youth and Sex--Dangers and         By Mary Scharlieb, M.D., M.S.,\n      Safeguards for Boys and Girls      and G.E.C. Pritchard, M.A., M.D.\n\n  *21. Motherhood--A Wife's Handbook     By H.S. Davidson, F.R.C.S.E.\n\n  *22. Lord Kelvin                       By A. Russell, M.A., D. Sc.\n\n  *23. Huxley                            By Professor G. Leighton, M.D.\n\n  24. Sir W. Huggins and Spectroscopic   By E.W. Maunder, F.R.A.S., of\n      Astronomy                          the Royal Observatory, Greenwich.\n\n  *62. Practical Astronomy               By H. Macpherson, Jr., F.R.A.S.\n\n  *63. Aviation                          By Sydney F. Walker, R.N.,\n                                         M.I.E.E.\n\n  *64. Navigation                        By W. Hall, R.N., B.A.\n\n  *65. Pond Life                         By E.C. Ash, M.R.A.C.\n\n  *66. Dietetics                         By Alex. Bryce, M.D., D.P.H.\n\n  *94. The Nature of Mathematics         By P.G.B. Jourdain, M.A.\n\n  95. Applications of Electricity        By Alex. Ogilvie, B. Sc.\n\n  96. The Small Garden                   By A. Cecil Bartlett.\n\n  97. The Care of the Teeth              By J.A. Young, L.D.S.\n\n  *98. Atlas of the World                By J. Bartholomew, F.R.G.S\n\n\n  PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION\n\n  25. The Meaning of Philosophy          By T. Loveday, M.A.\n\n  *26. Henri Bergson                     By H. Wildon Carr.\n\n  *27. Psychology                        By H.J. Watt, M.A., Ph. D.\n\n  28. Ethics                             By Canon Rashdall, D. Litt.,\n                                         F.B.A.\n\n  29. Kant's Philosophy                  By A.D. Lindsay, M.A.\n\n  30. The Teaching of Plato              By A.D. Lindsay, M.A.\n\n  *67. Aristotle                         By Prof. A.E. Taylor, M.A., F.B.A.\n\n  *68. Nietzsche                         By M.A. M\u00fcgge, Ph. D.\n\n  *69. Eucken                            By A.J. Jones, M.A., B. Sc.,\n                                         Ph. D.\n\n  70. The Experimental Psychology        By C.W. Valentine, B.A.\n      of Beauty\n\n  71. The Problem of Truth               By H. Wildon Carr.\n\n  99. George Berkeley: the Philosophy    By G Dawes Hicks; Litt.D.\n      of Idealism\n\n  31. Buddhism                           By Prof. T.W. Rhys Davids, F.B.A.\n\n  *32. Roman Catholicism                 By H.B. Coxon.\n\n  33. The Oxford Movement                By Wilfrid P. Ward.\n\n  *34. The Bible in the Light            By Rev. W.F. Adeney, M.A., and\n       of the Higher Criticism           Rev. Prof. W.H. Bennett, Litt.D.\n\n  35. Cardinal Newman                    By Wilfrid Meynell.\n\n  *72. The Church of England             By Rev. Canon Masterman.\n\n  73. Anglo-Catholicism                  By A.E. Manning Foster.\n\n  *74. The Free Churches                 By Rev. Edward Shillito, M.A.\n\n  75. Judaism                            By Ephraim Levine, B.A.\n\n  *76. Theosophy                         By Annie Besant.\n\n\n  HISTORY\n\n  *36. The Growth of Freedom             By H.W. Nevinson.\n\n  37. Bismarck                           By Prof. F.M. Powicke, M.A.\n\n  *38. Oliver Cromwell                   By Hilda Johnstone, M.A.\n\n  *39. Mary Queen of Scots               By E. O'Neill, M.A.\n\n  *40. Cecil Rhodes                      By Ian Colvin.\n\n  *41. Julius C\u00e6sar                      By Hilary Hardinge.\n\n  History of England--\n\n  42. England in the Making              By Prof. F.J.C. Hearnshaw, LL.D.\n\n  *43. England in the Middle Ages        By E. O'Neill, M.A.\n\n  44. The Monarchy and the People        By W.T. Waugh, M.A.\n\n  45. The Industrial Revolution          By A. Jones, M.A.\n\n  46. Empire and Democracy               By G.S. Veitch, M.A.\n\n  *61. Home Rule                         By L.G. Redmond Howard.\n\n  77. Nelson                             By H.W. Wilson.\n\n  *78. Wellington and Waterloo           By Major G.W. Redway.\n\n  100. A History of Greece               By E. Fearenside, B.A.\n\n  101. Luther and the Reformation        By L.D. Agate, M.A.\n\n  102. The Discovery of the New World    By F.B. Kirkman, B.A.\n\n  *103. Turkey and the Eastern Question  By John Macdonald.\n\n  104. A History of Architecture         By Mrs. Arthur Bell.\n\n\n  SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC\n\n  *47. Women's Suffrage                  By M.G. Fawcett, LL.D.\n\n  48. The Working of the British System  By Prof. Ramsay Muir, M.A.\n      of Government to-day\n\n  49. An Introduction to Economic        By Prof. H.O. Meredith, M.A.\n      Science\n\n  50. Socialism                          By F.B. Kirkman, B.A.\n\n  79. Socialist Theories in the          By Rev. B. Jarrett, O.P., M.A.\n      Middle Ages\n\n  *80. Syndicalism                       By J.H. Harley, M.A.\n\n  81. Labour and Wages                   By H.M. Hallsworth, M.A., B. Sc.\n\n  *82. Co-operation                      By Joseph Clayton.\n\n  *83. Insurance as Investment           By W.A. Robertson, F.F.A.\n\n  *92. The Training of the Child         By G. Spiller.\n\n  105. Trade Unions                      By Joseph Clayton.\n\n  *106. Everyday Law                     By J.J. Adams.\n\n\n  LETTERS\n\n  *51. Shakespeare                       By Prof. C.H. Herford, Litt.D.\n\n  *52. Wordsworth                        By Rosaline Masson.\n\n  *53. Pure Gold--A Choice of Lyrics     By H.C. O'Neill.\n       and Sonnets\n\n  *54. Francis Bacon                     By Prof. A.R. Skemp, M.A.\n\n  *55. The Bront\u00ebs                       By Flora Masson.\n\n  *56. Carlyle                           By the Rev. L. MacLean Watt.\n\n  *57. Dante                             By A.G. Ferrers Howell.\n\n  58. Ruskin                             By A. Blyth Webster, M.A.\n\n  59. Common Faults in Writing English   By Prof. A.R. Skemp, M.A.\n\n  *60. A Dictionary of Synonyms          By Austin K. Gray, B.A.\n\n  84. Classical Dictionary               By A.E. Stirling.\n\n  *85. History of English Literature     By A. Compton-Rickett.\n\n  86. Browning                           By Prof. A.R. Skemp, M.A.\n\n  87. Charles Lamb                       By Flora Masson.\n\n  88. Goethe                             By Prof. C.H. Herford, Litt.D.\n\n  89. Balzac                             By Frank Harris.\n\n  90. Rousseau                           By H. Sacher.\n\n  91. Ibsen                              By Hilary Hardinge.\n\n  *93. Tennyson                          By Aaron Watson.\n\n  107. R.L. Stevenson                    By Rosaline Masson.\n\n  108. Shelley                           By Sydney Waterlow.\n\n  109. William Morris                    By A. Blyth Webster, M.A.","title":"Rudolph Eucken : a philosophy of life","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":26546}