{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1497/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1497","id":"gutenberg_1497","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1497","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Justice -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy","Political science -- Early works to 1800","Utopias -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"THE REPUBLIC\n\nBy Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\nNote: See also \u201cThe Republic\u201d by Plato, Jowett, eBook #150\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n THE REPUBLIC.\n PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.\n BOOK I.\n BOOK II.\n BOOK III.\n BOOK IV.\n BOOK V.\n BOOK VI.\n BOOK VII.\n BOOK VIII.\n BOOK IX.\n BOOK X.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\n\nThe Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of\nthe Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer\napproaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist;\nthe Politicus or Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of\nthe State are more clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the\nSymposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other\nDialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same\nperfection of style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or\ncontains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not\nof one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or\na greater wealth of humour or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in\nany other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and\nspeculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is\nthe centre around which the other Dialogues may be grouped; here\nphilosophy reaches the highest point (cp, especially in Books V, VI,\nVII) to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks,\nlike Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of\nknowledge, although neither of them always distinguished the bare\noutline or form from the substance of truth; and both of them had to be\ncontent with an abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He\nwas the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in\nhim, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of future\nknowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology, which\nhave supplied so many instruments of thought to after-ages, are based\nupon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition,\nthe law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the\ndistinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion,\nbetween means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the\ndivision of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible\nelements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and\nunnecessary\u2014these and other great forms of thought are all of them to\nbe found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato.\nThe greatest of all logical truths, and the one of which writers on\nphilosophy are most apt to lose sight, the difference between words and\nthings, has been most strenuously insisted on by him (cp. Rep.; Polit.;\nCratyl. 435, 436 ff), although he has not always avoided the confusion\nof them in his own writings (e.g. Rep.). But he does not bind up truth\nin logical formulae,\u2014logic is still veiled in metaphysics; and the\nscience which he imagines to \u2018contemplate all truth and all existence\u2019\nis very unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to\nhave discovered (Soph. Elenchi, 33. 18).\n\nNeither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a\nstill larger design which was to have included an ideal history of\nAthens, as well as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of\nthe Critias has given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in\nimportance to the tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as\na fact to have inspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth\ncentury. This mythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the\nwars of the Athenians against the Island of Atlantis, is supposed to be\nfounded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood\nin the same relation as the writings of the logographers to the poems\nof Homer. It would have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim. 25 C),\nintended to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge\nfrom the noble commencement of the Timaeus, from the fragment of the\nCritias itself, and from the third book of the Laws, in what manner\nPlato would have treated this high argument. We can only guess why the\ngreat design was abandoned; perhaps because Plato became sensible of\nsome incongruity in a fictitious history, or because he had lost his\ninterest in it, or because advancing years forbade the completion of\nit; and we may please ourselves with the fancy that had this imaginary\nnarrative ever been finished, we should have found Plato himself\nsympathising with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. Laws,\niii. 698 ff.), singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis,\nperhaps making the reflection of Herodotus (v. 78) where he\ncontemplates the growth of the Athenian empire\u2014\u2018How brave a thing is\nfreedom of speech, which has made the Athenians so far exceed every\nother state of Hellas in greatness!\u2019 or, more probably, attributing the\nvictory to the ancient good order of Athens and to the favor of Apollo\nand Athene (cp. Introd. to Critias).\n\nAgain, Plato may be regarded as the \u2018captain\u2019 (\u2018arhchegoz\u2019) or leader\nof a goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the\noriginal of Cicero\u2019s De Republica, of St. Augustine\u2019s City of God, of\nthe Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary\nStates which are framed upon the same model. The extent to which\nAristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the\nPolitics has been little recognised, and the recognition is the more\nnecessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself. The two\nphilosophers had more in common than they were conscious of; and\nprobably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle.\nIn English philosophy too, many affinities may be traced, not only in\nthe works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great original writers\nlike Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That there is a\ntruth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to\nherself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been\nenthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek\nauthors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato\nhas had the greatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first\ntreatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke,\nRousseau, Jean Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like\nDante or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is\nprofoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church\nhe exercised a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of\nLiterature on politics. Even the fragments of his words when \u2018repeated\nat second-hand\u2019 (Symp. 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of\nmen, who have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the\nfather of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many\nof the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the\nunity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes,\nhave been anticipated in a dream by him.\n\nThe argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of\nwhich is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old\nman\u2014then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and\nPolemarchus\u2014then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by\nSocrates\u2014reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and\nhaving become invisible in the individual reappears at length in the\nideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the\nrulers is to be education, of which an outline is drawn after the old\nHellenic model, providing only for an improved religion and morality,\nand more simplicity in music and gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry,\nand greater harmony of the individual and the State. We are thus led on\nto the conception of a higher State, in which \u2018no man calls anything\nhis own,\u2019 and in which there is neither \u2018marrying nor giving in\nmarriage,\u2019 and \u2018kings are philosophers\u2019 and \u2018philosophers are kings;\u2019\nand there is another and higher education, intellectual as well as\nmoral and religious, of science as well as of art, and not of youth\nonly but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to be realized in\nthis world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds the\ngovernment of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again declining\ninto democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but regular\norder having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When \u2018the wheel\nhas come full circle\u2019 we do not begin again with a new period of human\nlife; but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end.\nThe subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and\nphilosophy which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of\nthe Republic is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is\ndiscovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer,\nas well as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is\nsent into banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is\nsupplemented by the revelation of a future life.\n\nThe division into books, like all similar divisions (Cp. Sir G.C. Lewis\nin the Classical Museum, vol. ii. p 1.), is probably later than the age\nof Plato. The natural divisions are five in number;\u2014(1) Book I and the\nfirst half of Book II down to the paragraph beginning, \u2018I had always\nadmired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus,\u2019 which is introductory;\nthe first book containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical\nnotions of justice, and concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues,\nwithout arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a\nrestatement of the nature of justice according to common opinion, and\nan answer is demanded to the question\u2014What is justice, stripped of\nappearances? The second division (2) includes the remainder of the\nsecond and the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly\noccupied with the construction of the first State and the first\neducation. The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and\nseventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject\nof enquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles of\ncommunism and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea\nof good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the\neighth and ninth books (4) the perversions of States and of the\nindividuals who correspond to them are reviewed in succession; and the\nnature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny are further analysed in\nthe individual man. The tenth book (5) is the conclusion of the whole,\nin which the relations of philosophy to poetry are finally determined,\nand the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has now been\nassured, is crowned by the vision of another.\n\nOr a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first\n(Books I - IV) containing the description of a State framed generally\nin accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in\nthe second (Books V - X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an\nideal kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the\nperversions. These two points of view are really opposed, and the\nopposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic, like\nthe Phaedrus (see Introduction to Phaedrus), is an imperfect whole; the\nhigher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the\nHellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens. Whether\nthis imperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan;\nor from the imperfect reconcilement in the writer\u2019s own mind of the\nstruggling elements of thought which are now first brought together by\nhim; or, perhaps, from the composition of the work at different\ntimes\u2014are questions, like the similar question about the Iliad and the\nOdyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a distinct\nanswer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of publication,\nand an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding to a\nwork which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no\nabsurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a\ntime, or turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would\nbe more likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing.\nIn all attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic\nwritings on internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single\nDialogue being composed at one time is a disturbing element, which must\nbe admitted to affect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws,\nmore than shorter ones. But, on the other hand, the seeming\ndiscrepancies of the Republic may only arise out of the discordant\nelements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single\nwhole, perhaps without being himself able to recognise the\ninconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after\nages which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for\nthemselves. They do not perceive the want of connexion in their own\nwritings, or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough to\nthose who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and\nphilosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more\ninconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well\nworn and the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too,\nis the growth of time; and some of the greatest creations of the human\nmind have been wanting in unity. Tried by this test, several of the\nPlatonic Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be\ndefective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at\ndifferent times or by different hands. And the supposition that the\nRepublic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in\nsome degree confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the\nwork to another.\n\nThe second title, \u2018Concerning Justice,\u2019 is not the one by which the\nRepublic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and,\nlike the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore\nbe assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked\nwhether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the\nconstruction of the State is the principal argument of the work. The\nanswer is, that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same\ntruth; for justice is the order of the State, and the State is the\nvisible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society.\nThe one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of\nthe State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In\nHegelian phraseology the state is the reality of which justice is the\nidea. Or, described in Christian language, the kingdom of God is\nwithin, and yet developes into a Church or external kingdom; \u2018the house\nnot made with hands, eternal in the heavens,\u2019 is reduced to the\nproportions of an earthly building. Or, to use a Platonic image,\njustice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through the\nwhole texture. And when the constitution of the State is completed, the\nconception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or\ndifferent names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the\nindividual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and\npunishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which\ncommon honesty in buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is\nbased on the idea of good, which is the harmony of the world, and is\nreflected both in the institutions of states and in motions of the\nheavenly bodies (cp. Tim. 47). The Timaeus, which takes up the\npolitical rather than the ethical side of the Republic, and is chiefly\noccupied with hypotheses concerning the outward world, yet contains\nmany indications that the same law is supposed to reign over the State,\nover nature, and over man.\n\nToo much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and\nmodern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether\nof nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings,\nand indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element\nwhich was not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows\nunder the author\u2019s hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of\nwriting; he has not worked out the argument to the end before he\nbegins. The reader who seeks to find some one idea under which the\nwhole may be conceived, must necessarily seize on the vaguest and most\ngeneral. Thus Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied with the ordinary\nexplanations of the argument of the Republic, imagines himself to have\nfound the true argument \u2018in the representation of human life in a State\nperfected by justice, and governed according to the idea of good.\u2019\nThere may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly\nbe said to express the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may\nas well speak of many designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded\nfrom the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the\nassociation of ideas, and which does not interfere with the general\npurpose. What kind or degree of unity is to be sought after in a\nbuilding, in the plastic arts, in poetry, in prose, is a problem which\nhas to be determined relatively to the subject-matter. To Plato\nhimself, the enquiry \u2018what was the intention of the writer,\u2019 or \u2018what\nwas the principal argument of the Republic\u2019 would have been hardly\nintelligible, and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp. the\nIntroduction to the Phaedrus).\n\nIs not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to\nPlato\u2019s own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the\nState? Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or \u2018the day\nof the Lord,\u2019 or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the \u2018Sun of\nrighteousness with healing in his wings\u2019 only convey, to us at least,\ntheir great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals\nto us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of\ngood\u2014like the sun in the visible world;\u2014about human perfection, which\nis justice\u2014about education beginning in youth and continuing in later\nyears\u2014about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers\nand evil rulers of mankind\u2014about \u2018the world\u2019 which is the embodiment of\nthem\u2014about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in\nheaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired\ncreation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven\nwhen the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of\ntruth, and of fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a\nwork of philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane; it\neasily passes from ideas to myths and fancies, from facts to figures of\nspeech. It is not prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and\nought not to be judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of\nhistory. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole;\nthey take possession of him and are too much for him. We have no need\ntherefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is\npracticable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came\nfirst into the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas\nhas nothing to do with their truth; and the highest thoughts to which\nhe attains may be truly said to bear the greatest \u2018marks of\ndesign\u2019\u2014justice more than the external frame-work of the State, the\nidea of good more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the\norganisation of ideas has no real content; but is only a type of the\nmethod or spirit in which the higher knowledge is to be pursued by the\nspectator of all time and all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and\nseventh books that Plato reaches the \u2018summit of speculation,\u2019 and\nthese, although they fail to satisfy the requirements of a modern\nthinker, may therefore be regarded as the most important, as they are\nalso the most original, portions of the work.\n\nIt is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has\nbeen raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the\nconversation was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will\ndo as well as any other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a\nwriter who, like Plato, is notoriously careless of chronology (cp.\nRep., Symp., 193 A, etc.), only aims at general probability. Whether\nall the persons mentioned in the Republic could ever have met at any\none time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian\nreading the work forty years later, or to Plato himself at the time of\nwriting (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one of his own\ndramas); and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a\nquestion having no answer \u2018which is still worth asking,\u2019 because the\ninvestigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in\nPlato; it would be useless therefore to waste time in inventing\nfar-fetched reconcilements of them in order to avoid chronological\ndifficulties, such, for example, as the conjecture of C.F. Hermann,\nthat Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of\nPlato (cp. Apol. 34 A), or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato\nintentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of\nhis Dialogues were written.\n\nThe principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus,\nThrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in\nthe introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first\nargument, and Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the\nfirst book. The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and\nAdeimantus. Among the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus,\nthe sons of Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown\nCharmantides\u2014these are mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who\nonce interrupts, where, as in the Dialogue which bears his name, he\nappears as the friend and ally of Thrasymachus.\n\nCephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in\noffering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost\ndone with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He\nfeels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger\naround the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to\nvisit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the\nconsciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the\ntyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his\nindifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of\ncharacter. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because\ntheir whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges\nthat riches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to\ndishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by\nSocrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed\nupon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young\nand old alike, should also be noted. Who better suited to raise the\nquestion of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the\nexpression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by\nCephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic,\nnot only of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the\nexaggeration of Cicero in the De Senectute. The evening of life is\ndescribed by Plato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest\npossible touches. As Cicero remarks (Ep. ad Attic. iv. 16), the aged\nCephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows,\nand which he could neither have understood nor taken part in without a\nviolation of dramatic propriety (cp. Lysimachus in the Laches).\n\nHis \u2018son and heir\u2019 Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness of\nyouth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and\nwill not \u2018let him off\u2019 on the subject of women and children. Like\nCephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents the\nproverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than\nprinciples; and he quotes Simonides (cp. Aristoph. Clouds) as his\nfather had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say; the\nanswers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of\nSocrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like\nGlaucon and Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting\nthem; he belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is\nincapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree\nthat he does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that\njustice is a thief, and that the virtues follow the analogy of the\narts. From his brother Lysias (contra Eratosth.) we learn that he fell\na victim to the Thirty Tyrants, but no allusion is here made to his\nfate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were of\nSyracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to Athens.\n\nThe \u2018Chalcedonian giant,\u2019 Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard\nin the Phaedrus, is the personification of the Sophists, according to\nPlato\u2019s conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He\nis vain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond\nof making an oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable\nSocrates; but a mere child in argument, and unable to foresee that the\nnext \u2018move\u2019 (to use a Platonic expression) will \u2018shut him up.\u2019 He has\nreached the stage of framing general notions, and in this respect is in\nadvance of Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending\nthem in a discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with\nbanter and insolence. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him\nby Plato were really held either by him or by any other Sophist is\nuncertain; in the infancy of philosophy serious errors about morality\nmight easily grow up\u2014they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers\nin Thucydides; but we are concerned at present with Plato\u2019s description\nof him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the\ncontest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The pompous and empty\nSophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of\ndialectic, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and\nweakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but\nhis noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the\nthrusts of his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats,\nor put \u2018bodily into their souls\u2019 his own words, elicits a cry of horror\nfrom Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as\nthe process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete\nsubmission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems\nto continue the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent\ngood-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one\nor two occasional remarks. When attacked by Glaucon he is humorously\nprotected by Socrates \u2018as one who has never been his enemy and is now\nhis friend.\u2019 From Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle\u2019s Rhetoric\nwe learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man\nof note whose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his\nname which was made by his contemporary Herodicus (Aris. Rhet.), \u2018thou\nwast ever bold in battle,\u2019 seems to show that the description of him is\nnot devoid of verisimilitude.\n\nWhen Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents,\nGlaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy\n(cp. Introd. to Phaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight\nthe two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the\ntwo friends Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. But on a nearer\nexamination of them the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be\ndistinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can \u2018just never\nhave enough of fechting\u2019 (cp. the character of him in Xen. Mem. iii.\n6); the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love;\nthe \u2018juvenis qui gaudet canibus,\u2019 and who improves the breed of\nanimals; the lover of art and music who has all the experiences of\nyouthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily\nbelow the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty; he\nturns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and yet does not\nlose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be\ntermed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom\na state of simplicity is \u2018a city of pigs,\u2019 who is always prepared with\na jest when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever\nready to second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the\nridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music, or in the lovers of\ntheatricals, or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of\ndemocracy. His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates,\nwho, however, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother\nAdeimantus. He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been\ndistinguished at the battle of Megara (anno 456?)...The character of\nAdeimantus is deeper and graver, and the profounder objections are\ncommonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and\ngenerally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the argument further.\nGlaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth;\nAdeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In\nthe second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall\nbe considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks\nthat they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their\nconsequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the\nbeginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens\nhappy, and is answered that happiness is not the first but the second\nthing, not the direct aim but the indirect consequence of the good\ngovernment of a State. In the discussion about religion and mythology,\nAdeimantus is the respondent, but Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest,\nand carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and\ngymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who volunteers\nthe criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of argument, and\nwho refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and\nchildren. It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more\nargumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions\nof the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater part of the sixth\nbook, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of\nthe idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. Glaucon resumes his\nplace of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty in apprehending\nthe higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits in the\ncourse of the discussion. Once more Adeimantus returns with the\nallusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious\nState; in the next book he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues\nto the end.\n\nThus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive\nstages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden\ntime, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his\nlife by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of\nthe Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher,\nwho know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them,\nand desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like\nCephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one\nanother. Neither in the Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato,\nis a single character repeated.\n\nThe delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent.\nIn the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is\ndepicted in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of\nPlato, and in the Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the\nold enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well\nas to argue seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the\nSophists abates; he acknowledges that they are the representatives\nrather than the corrupters of the world. He also becomes more dogmatic\nand constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or\nthe speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage Plato\nhimself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who\nhad passed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and\nnot to be always repeating the notions of other men. There is no\nevidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a perfect\nstate were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he certainly\ndwelt on the nature of the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen.\nMem.; Phaedo); and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty\nyears of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the\nnature of family relations, for which there is also some positive\nevidence in the Memorabilia (Mem.) The Socratic method is nominally\nretained; and every inference is either put into the mouth of the\nrespondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates.\nBut any one can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation\ngrows wearisome as the work advances. The method of enquiry has passed\ninto a method of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the\nsame thesis is looked at from various points of view. The nature of the\nprocess is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as\na companion who is not good for much in an investigation, but can see\nwhat he is shown, and may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more\nfluently than another.\n\nNeither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the\nimmortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in\nthe Republic (cp. Apol.); nor is there any reason to suppose that he\nused myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction,\nor that he would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek\nmythology. His favorite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made\nof the daemonium, or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as\na phenomenon peculiar to himself. A real element of Socratic teaching,\nwhich is more prominent in the Republic than in any of the other\nDialogues of Plato, is the use of example and illustration \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u2018Let us apply the test of common instances.\u2019 \u2018You,\u2019\nsays Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, \u2018are so unaccustomed to\nspeak in images.\u2019 And this use of examples or images, though truly\nSocratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of\nan allegory or parable, which embodies in the concrete what has been\nalready described, or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus\nthe figure of the cave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions\nof knowledge in Book VI. The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory\nof the parts of the soul. The noble captain and the ship and the true\npilot in Book VI are a figure of the relation of the people to the\nphilosophers in the State which has been described. Other figures, such\nas the dog, or the marriage of the portionless maiden, or the drones\nand wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form links of connexion\nin long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions.\n\nPlato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him\nas \u2018not of this world.\u2019 And with this representation of him the ideal\nstate and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance,\nthough they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To\nhim, as to other great teachers both philosophical and religious, when\nthey looked upward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and\nevil. The common sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or\nhas only partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the\nsterner judgement of the multitude at times passes into a sort of\nironical pity or love. Men in general are incapable of philosophy, and\nare therefore at enmity with the philosopher; but their\nmisunderstanding of him is unavoidable: for they have never seen him as\nhe truly is in his own image; they are only acquainted with artificial\nsystems possessing no native force of truth\u2014words which admit of many\napplications. Their leaders have nothing to measure with, and are\ntherefore ignorant of their own stature. But they are to be pitied or\nlaughed at, not to be quarrelled with; they mean well with their\nnostrums, if they could only learn that they are cutting off a Hydra\u2019s\nhead. This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most\ncharacteristic features of Socrates in the Republic. In all the\ndifferent representations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato,\nand amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always\nretains the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after\ntruth, without which he would have ceased to be Socrates.\n\nLeaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic,\nand then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic\nideal of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of\nPlato may be read.\n\nBOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene\u2014a festival in\nhonour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is\nadded the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole\nwork is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the\nfestival to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates,\nand another; this we learn from the first words of the Timaeus.\n\nWhen the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained,\nthe attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor\nis the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the\nnarrative. Of the numerous company, three only take any serious part in\nthe discussion; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to\nthe torch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The\nmanner in which the conversation has arisen is described as\nfollows:\u2014Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the\nfestival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who\nspeedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and\nwith playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only\nthe torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which\nto Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of\nCephalus, Polemarchus\u2019 father, now in extreme old age, who is found\nsitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. \u2018You should come\nto me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time\nof life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for\nconversation.\u2019 Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the\nold man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be\nattributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in\nwhich the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies\nSocrates, but the world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old\nage because you are rich. \u2018And there is something in what they say,\nSocrates, but not so much as they imagine\u2014as Themistocles replied to\nthe Seriphian, \u201cNeither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I\nhad been a Seriphian, would ever have been famous,\u201d I might in like\nmanner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor\nyet a bad rich man.\u2019 Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care\nabout riches, a quality which he ascribes to his having inherited, not\nacquired them, and would like to know what he considers to be the chief\nadvantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in\nthe world below grows upon you, and then to have done justice and never\nto have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, and never to\nhave deceived anyone, are felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates,\nwho is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the\nmeaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No\nmore than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to\nput back into the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which\nI borrowed of him when he was in his right mind? \u2018There must be\nexceptions.\u2019 \u2018And yet,\u2019 says Polemarchus, \u2018the definition which has\nbeen given has the authority of Simonides.\u2019 Here Cephalus retires to\nlook after the sacrifices, and bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously\nremarks, the possession of the argument to his heir, Polemarchus...\n\nThe description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is,\nhas touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition\nof justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards\npursues respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding\nmythus of the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The\nportrait of the just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to\nthe long discourse which follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our\nperplexity about the nature of justice, there is no difficulty in\ndiscerning \u2018who is a just man.\u2019 The first explanation has been\nsupported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind to show\nthat the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts, which\nhave no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.\n\n...He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he\nmean that I was to give back arms to a madman? \u2018No, not in that case,\nnot if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that\nyou were to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.\u2019\nEvery act does something to somebody; and following this analogy,\nSocrates asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does,\nand to whom? He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm\nto enemies. But in what way good or harm? \u2018In making alliances with the\none, and going to war with the other.\u2019 Then in time of peace what is\nthe good of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts,\nand contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships\nis the just man of more use than any other man? \u2018When you want to have\nmoney safely kept and not used.\u2019 Then justice will be useful when money\nis useless. And there is another difficulty: justice, like the art of\nwar or any other art, must be of opposites, good at attack as well as\nat defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then justice is a\nthief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero,\nwho was \u2018excellent above all men in theft and perjury\u2019\u2014to such a pass\nhave you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget\nthat the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of\nenemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends to be\ninterpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our\nfriends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer\nis, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil\nto our seeming and real evil enemies\u2014good to the good, evil to the\nevil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will\nonly make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than\nthe art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold?\nThe final conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just\nreturn evil for evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man,\nPeriander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398-381)...\n\nThus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to\nbe inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is\nset aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an\napproach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar\nwords are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when\nthe questioning spirit is stirred within him:\u2014\u2018If because I do evil,\nThou punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?\u2019\nIn this both Plato and Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian\n(?) theologians. The first definition of justice easily passes into the\nsecond; for the simple words \u2018to speak the truth and pay your debts\u2019 is\nsubstituted the more abstract \u2018to do good to your friends and harm to\nyour enemies.\u2019 Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule of\nlife for plain men, but they both fall short of the precision of\nphilosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which\nnot only arises out of the conflict of established principles in\nparticular cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is\nprior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The\n\u2018interrogation\u2019 of moral ideas; the appeal to the authority of Homer;\nthe conclusion that the maxim, \u2018Do good to your friends and harm to\nyour enemies,\u2019 being erroneous, could not have been the word of any\ngreat man, are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic\nSocrates.\n\n...Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but\nhas hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a\npause and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with\na roar. \u2018Socrates,\u2019 he says, \u2018what folly is this?\u2014Why do you agree to\nbe vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?\u2019 He then\nprohibits all the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates\nreplies that he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to\nsay 2 x 6, or 3 x 4, or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At first Thrasymachus is\nreluctant to argue; but at length, with a promise of payment on the\npart of the company and of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open\nthe game. \u2018Listen,\u2019 he says, \u2018my answer is that might is right, justice\nthe interest of the stronger: now praise me.\u2019 Let me understand you\nfirst. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger\nthan we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of\nbeef is also for our interest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is\nindignant at the illustration, and in pompous words, apparently\nintended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to\nbe that the rulers make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says\nSocrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a mistake\u2014then the interest\nof the stronger is not his interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this\nspeedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the word\n\u2018thinks;\u2019\u2014not the actual interest of the ruler, but what he thinks or\nwhat seems to be his interest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped\nby the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and apparent interests\nmay differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain\nwhat he thinks to be his interest.\n\nOf course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new\ninterpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not\ndisposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates,\nhis adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does\nin fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for\nhe affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite\nready to accept the new position, which he equally turns against\nThrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or\nscience has an interest, but this interest is to be distinguished from\nthe accidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the\ngood of the things or persons which come under the art. And justice has\nan interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of\nthose who come under his sway.\n\nThrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he\nmakes a bold diversion. \u2018Tell me, Socrates,\u2019 he says, \u2018have you a\nnurse?\u2019 What a question! Why do you ask? \u2018Because, if you have, she\nneglects you and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught\nyou to know the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds\nand rulers never think of their own interest, but only of their sheep\nor subjects, whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use,\nsheep and subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation\nof life the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, especially\nwhere injustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing\nfrom the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of\ntemples. The language of men proves this\u2014our \u2018gracious\u2019 and \u2018blessed\u2019\ntyrant and the like\u2014all which tends to show (1) that justice is the\ninterest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and\nalso stronger than justice.\u2019\n\nThrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument,\nhaving deluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the\nothers will not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest\nrequest that he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate.\n\u2018And what can I do more for you?\u2019 he says; \u2018would you have me put the\nwords bodily into your souls?\u2019 God forbid! replies Socrates; but we\nwant you to be consistent in the use of terms, and not to employ\n\u2018physician\u2019 in an exact sense, and then again \u2018shepherd\u2019 or \u2018ruler\u2019 in\nan inexact,\u2014if the words are strictly taken, the ruler and the shepherd\nlook only to the good of their people or flocks and not to their own:\nwhereas you insist that rulers are solely actuated by love of office.\n\u2018No doubt about it,\u2019 replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is\nnot the reason, that their interest is not comprehended in their art,\nand is therefore the concern of another art, the art of pay, which is\ncommon to the arts in general, and therefore not identical with any one\nof them? Nor would any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the\nhope of reward or the fear of punishment;\u2014the reward is money or\nhonour, the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man worse\nthan himself. And if a State (or Church) were composed entirely of good\nmen, they would be affected by the last motive only; and there would be\nas much \u2018nolo episcopari\u2019 as there is at present of the opposite...\n\nThe satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and\napparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced.\nThere is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind\ndo not like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay.\n\n...Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more\nimportant\u2014that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as\nyou and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but\nif we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to\ndecide for us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual\nadmissions of the truth to one another.\n\nThrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than\nperfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by\nSocrates to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue\nand justice vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the\nattitude of one whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his\nopponents. At the same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus\nis finally enclosed. The admission is elicited from him that the just\nman seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust only, but not over the\njust, while the unjust would gain an advantage over either. Socrates,\nin order to test this statement, employs once more the favourite\nanalogy of the arts. The musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort,\ndoes not seek to gain more than the skilled, but only more than the\nunskilled (that is to say, he works up to a rule, standard, law, and\ndoes not exceed it), whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at\nexcess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of the good, and the\nunskilled on the side of the evil, and the just is the skilled, and the\nunjust is the unskilled.\n\nThere was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the\nday was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first\ntime in his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that\ninjustice was stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and\nSocrates now proceeds to the consideration of this, which, with the\nassistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes to clear up; the latter is at\nfirst churlish, but in the judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored\nto good-humour: Is there not honour among thieves? Is not the strength\nof injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice\nabsolute weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot\nstand; two men who quarrel detract from one another\u2019s strength, and he\nwho is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not\nwickedness therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,\u2014a\nremnant of good is needed in order to make union in action\npossible,\u2014there is no kingdom of evil in this world.\n\nAnother question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the\nhappier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence\nor virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the\nsoul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which\nhappiness is attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be\ninseparable, the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier\nhas disappeared.\n\nThrasymachus replies: \u2018Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the\nfestival of Bendis.\u2019 Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your\nkindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet\nnot a good entertainment\u2014but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too\nmany things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our\nenquiry, and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and\nfolly; and then the comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the\nsum of all is that I know not what justice is; how then shall I know\nwhether the just is happy or not?...\n\nThus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing\nto the analogy of the arts. \u2018Justice is like the arts (1) in having no\nexternal interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is\nto happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.\u2019 At this\nthe modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is\nwriting in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral and\nintellectual faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early\nenquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up\nthe void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the arts and\nthe virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw\nthe points of agreement in them and not the points of difference.\nVirtue, like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an\nart and a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a\nstatue; and there are many other figures of speech which are readily\ntransferred from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these\nperplexities; or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis\nof them. The contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and\nhad not yet fully realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle,\nthat \u2018virtue is concerned with action, art with production\u2019 (Nic.\nEth.), or that \u2018virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose,\u2019\nwhereas \u2018art requires knowledge only\u2019. And yet in the absurdities which\nfollow from some uses of the analogy, there seems to be an intimation\nconveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in the reductio\nad absurdum that \u2018justice is a thief,\u2019 and in the dissatisfaction which\nSocrates expresses at the final result.\n\nThe expression \u2018an art of pay\u2019 which is described as \u2018common to all the\narts\u2019 is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it\nemployed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is\nsuggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to\ndoing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be\nnoted in the words \u2018men who are injured are made more unjust.\u2019 For\nthose who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed\nor ill-treated.\n\nThe second of the three arguments, \u2018that the just does not aim at\nexcess,\u2019 has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form.\nThat the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic\nsentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern\nwriters who speak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to\nlaw. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an\nethical one, and even finds a mythological expression in the conception\nof envy (Greek). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion,\nstill linger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the\nfine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.\n\n\u2018When workmen strive to do better than well,\nThey do confound their skill in covetousness.\u2019 (King John. Act. iv. Sc.\n2.)\n\n\nThe harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with one\nanother, a harmony \u2018fairer than that of musical notes,\u2019 is the true\nHellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.\n\nIn what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus,\nPlato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord\nand dissolution, just touching the question which has been often\ntreated in modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the\nnegative nature of evil. In the last argument we trace the germ of the\nAristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end,\nwhich again is suggested by the arts. The final reconcilement of\njustice and happiness and the identity of the individual and the State\nare also intimated. Socrates reassumes the character of a\n\u2018know-nothing;\u2019 at the same time he appears to be not wholly satisfied\nwith the manner in which the argument has been conducted. Nothing is\nconcluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always,\nis to enlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application\nto human life.\n\nBOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on\ncontinuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner\nin which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the\nquestion \u2018Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.\u2019 He begins by\ndividing goods into three classes:\u2014first, goods desirable in\nthemselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their\nresults; thirdly, goods desirable for their results only. He then asks\nSocrates in which of the three classes he would place justice. In the\nsecond class, replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves\nand also for their results. \u2018Then the world in general are of another\nmind, for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of\ngoods which are desirable for their results only. Socrates answers that\nthis is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks\nthat Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer,\nand proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in\nthemselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the\nworld is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the\nnature and origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view\njustice as a necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the\nreasonableness of this view.\n\n\u2018To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As\nthe evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the\nsufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have\nneither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the\nimpossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact\nif he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have\ntwo rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them\ninvisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one\nwill do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the\nworld as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear\nfor themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts (Cp.\nGorgias.)\n\n\u2018And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the\nunjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily\ncorrecting them; having gifts of money, speech, strength\u2014the greatest\nvillain bearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the\njust in his nobleness and simplicity\u2014being, not seeming\u2014without name or\nreward\u2014clothed in his justice only\u2014the best of men who is thought to be\nthe worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would\nrather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice\u2014they\nwill tell you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound, will\nhave his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified (literally\nimpaled)\u2014and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming to\nbeing. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to appearance\nas the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler; he can marry\nwhere he likes, trade where he likes, help his friends and hurt his\nenemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship the gods better,\nand will therefore be more loved by them than the just.\u2019\n\nI was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already\nunequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had\nbeen omitted:\u2014\u2018Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards;\nparents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And\nother advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as\nwealthy marriages and high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and\nHesiod of fat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees\ntoppling with fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just.\nAnd the Orphic poets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of\nMusaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival, with garlands on\ntheir heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal\ndrunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity in the\nthird and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough and\nmake them carry water in a sieve: and in this life they attribute to\nthem the infamy which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just\nwho are supposed to be unjust.\n\n\u2018Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and\nprose:\u2014\u201cVirtue,\u201d as Hesiod says, \u201cis honourable but difficult, vice is\neasy and profitable.\u201d You may often see the wicked in great prosperity\nand the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant\nprophets knock at rich men\u2019s doors, promising to atone for the sins of\nthemselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and\nfestive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy\ngood or bad by divine help and at a small charge;\u2014they appeal to books\nprofessing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the\nminds of whole cities, and promise to \u201cget souls out of purgatory;\u201d and\nif we refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us.\n\n\u2018When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his\nconclusion? \u201cWill he,\u201d in the language of Pindar, \u201cmake justice his\nhigh tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?\u201d Justice, he\nreflects, without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin;\ninjustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of\ntruth and lord of happiness. To appearance then I will turn,\u2014I will put\non the show of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I\nhear some one saying that \u201cwickedness is not easily concealed,\u201d to\nwhich I reply that \u201cnothing great is easy.\u201d Union and force and\nrhetoric will do much; and if men say that they cannot prevail over the\ngods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets,\nwho acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not\nsin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are\nonly unpunished, still they have no further reward, while the wicked\nmay be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the\nworld below? Nay, says the argument, there are atoning powers who will\nset that matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of the gods, tell\nus; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.\n\n\u2018How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good\nmanners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both\nworlds. Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling\nat the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will\nnot be angry with others; for he knows also that more than human virtue\nis needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is\nincapable of injustice.\n\n\u2018The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes,\npoets, instructors of youth, have always asserted \u201cthe temporal\ndispensation,\u201d the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught\nin early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul,\nand unseen by any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others\nto be our guardians, but every one would have been the guardian of\nhimself. This is what I want you to show, Socrates;\u2014other men use\narguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus\nthat \u201cmight is right;\u201d but from you I expect better things. And please,\nas Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let the just be thought unjust\nand the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of\njustice\u2019...\n\nThe thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by\nGlaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachus\u2014not right is the\ninterest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker.\nStarting from the same premises he carries the analysis of society a\nstep further back;\u2014might is still right, but the might is the weakness\nof the many combined against the strength of the few.\n\nThere have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which\nhave a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power\nis the foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to\ngovern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power;\nor that war is the natural state of man; or that private vices are\npublic benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from\ntheir partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates\nbetween good and evil, and the motives of actions and the origin of\ninstitutions may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis\naccording to the character or point of view of a particular thinker.\nThe obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and\nsometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and has become\na sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or\nmore generally of governments, is one of the forms under which this\nnatural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not\nsome accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from\nsome alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be\nattended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of\nself-love. We know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not\ntherefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive\nor principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that\nopinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to be like\nhimself. And theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of\nthe State, which is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected\nand enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion),\nany more than they describe the origin of society, which is to be\nsought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man.\nNor do they represent the average character of individuals, which\ncannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a\ncounteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories\nappear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more\nconscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make\na man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier\nview of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.\n\nThe two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy\nwhen they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily\nsupposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt\nto frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal\nmust always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of\nhuman life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true\nas a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise\nan ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because \u2018some one\nhas made the discovery\u2019 that no such ideal was ever realized. And in a\nfew exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of\nhumanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery.\nThis may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which\nthe utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain\ncases to prefer.\n\nNor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally\nwith the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not\nexpressing his own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize\none of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea\ngradually in a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting\nSocrates for the first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation.\nLastly, (3) the word \u2018happiness\u2019 involves some degree of confusion\nbecause associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious\npleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind.\n\nGlaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the\nhappiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX\nis the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that\nis \u2018the homage which vice pays to virtue.\u2019 But now Adeimantus, taking\nup the hint which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show\nthat in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of\nrewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to\nsuch arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional\nmorality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of \u2018justifying the\nways of God to man.\u2019 Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether\nthe morality of actions is determined by their consequences; and both\nof them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the\nclass of goods not desirable for themselves only, but desirable for\nthemselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their\nattempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their\ncondemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of\nGreece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the\nnature of things.\n\nIt has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon\nand Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not\nmore truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by\nSocrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being,\nfirst in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new\nanswer to his old question (Protag.), \u2018whether the virtues are one or\nmany,\u2019 viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In\nseeking to establish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met\nby the fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the\ntwo opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency\nin this than was inevitable in his age and country; there is no use in\nturning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from\nsome other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does\nnot give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor can\nhe be judged of by our standard.\n\nThe remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the\nsons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what\nimmediately follows:\u2014First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether\nindirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation\nof the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the\nStoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first\nhe dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man\nto his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He\ntoo will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract\njustice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful\nillustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for\njustice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to the\nindividual. His answer in substance amounts to this,\u2014that under\nfavourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness\nwill coincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may\nbe left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of\ninconsistency, when in the tenth book he claims to have got rid of the\nrewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those\nwhich exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher \u2018who retires\nunder the shelter of a wall\u2019 can hardly have been esteemed happy by\nhim, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude\nof moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking whether he\nwill be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident\nwhich attends him. \u2018Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his\nrighteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.\u2019\n\nSecondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character\nof Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the\nindividual. First ethics, then politics\u2014this is the order of ideas to\nus; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of\nthought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early\nages he is not ONE, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is\nprior to him; and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law\nof his country or the creed of his church. And to this type he is\nconstantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of\nparty spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for\nhim.\n\nThirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the\nindividual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early\nGreek speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of\ninfluence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual\naction of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are\nsometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human\naction, whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower\nethics to the standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen\nonly coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be\nattained by legislation acting upon them from without, but, if at all,\nby education fashioning them from within.\n\n...Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, \u2018inspired offspring of the\nrenowned hero,\u2019 as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not\nunderstand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice\nwhile their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own\narguments. He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of\ndeserting justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition,\nthat having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters\nfirst and then go on to the smaller, that is, he must look for justice\nin the State first, and will then proceed to the individual.\nAccordingly he begins to construct the State.\n\nSociety arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his\nsecond a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the\npossibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together\non the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take\nthe liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There\nmust be first a husbandman, secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to\nwhich may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are\nrequired to make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man\nwill do one thing better than many; and business waits for no man.\nHence there must be a division of labour into different employments;\ninto wholesale and retail trade; into workers, and makers of workmen\u2019s\ntools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this\nwill have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very\nlarge. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate\nexports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the\ntaste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must\nhave a market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers\nwill never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted\nin vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be\ncomplete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the\ncitizens with one another justice and injustice will appear.\n\nHere follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their\ndays in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their\nown clothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food\nis meal and flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best\nof terms with each other, and take care not to have too many children.\n\u2018But,\u2019 said Glaucon, interposing, \u2018are they not to have a relish?\u2019\nCertainly; they will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and\nfruits, and chestnuts to roast at the fire. \u2018\u2019Tis a city of pigs,\nSocrates.\u2019 Why, I replied, what do you want more? \u2018Only the comforts of\nlife,\u2014sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.\u2019 I see; you want not\nonly a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more complex\nframe we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts must\ngo to work\u2014every conceivable instrument and ornament of luxury will be\nwanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks,\nbarbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for\nthe animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is\nthe source. To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part\nof our neighbour\u2019s land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is\nthe origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other\npolitical evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a\ncamp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again\nour old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The\nart of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural\naptitude for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who\nhave this aptitude\u2014dogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and\nstrong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage,\nsuch natures, whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. But\nthese spirited natures are apt to bite and devour one another; the\nunion of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears\nto be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both\nqualities. Who then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an\nanswer. For dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your\ndog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing;\nand philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness.\nThe human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which\nwill make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without\neducation?\n\nBut what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned\nsort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music\nincludes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false.\n\u2018What do you mean?\u2019 he said. I mean that children hear stories before\nthey learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have\nat most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early\nlife is very impressible, and children ought not to learn what they\nwill have to unlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a\ncensorship of nursery tales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of\nthem are very improper, as we may see in the great instances of Homer\nand Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus\nand Saturn, which are immoral as well as false, and which should never\nbe spoken of to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in\na mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some\nunprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their\nfathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel\nby hearing or seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall\nthey listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of\nZeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales\nmay possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are\nincapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to\nbe allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not book-makers;\nwe only lay down the principles according to which books are to be\nwritten; to write them is the duty of others.\n\nAnd our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not\nas the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the\npoets to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has\ntwo casks full of destinies;\u2014or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus\nto break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of\nPelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to\ndestroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was\njust, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was\nevil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will\nallow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great\nprinciple\u2014God is the author of good only.\n\nAnd the second principle is like unto it:\u2014With God is no variableness\nor change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change\nin God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By\nanother?\u2014but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities\nof mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By\nhimself?\u2014but he cannot change for the better; he will hardly change for\nthe worse. He remains for ever fairest and best in his own image.\nTherefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of Here begging\nin the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowl about at\nnight in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which\nmothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But\nsome one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a\nform in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the\nlie in the soul, or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form\nof lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in\ncertain exceptional cases\u2014what need have the gods of this? For they are\nnot ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their\nenemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is\nabsolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by\nword or sign. This is our second great principle\u2014God is true. Away with\nthe lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis\nagainst Apollo in Aeschylus...\n\nIn order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato\nproceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division\nof labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually\nthis community increases; the division of labour extends to countries;\nimports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and\nretailers sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers.\nThese are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive\nState, introducing the elements of political economy by the way. As he\nis going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally\ncomes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of\nprimitive life\u2014an idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence\non the imagination of mankind, but he does not seriously mean to say\nthat one is better than the other (Politicus); nor can any inference be\ndrawn from the description of the first state taken apart from the\nsecond, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We should\nnot interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in\ntoo literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we\ncompare the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of\nmodern treatises on philosophy, we are compelled to say with\nProtagoras, that the \u2018mythus is more interesting\u2019 (Protag.)\n\nSeveral interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in\na treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings\nof Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills\nand Bequests; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato\u2019s), Value and Demand;\nRepublic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of\nRetail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of\nthe Republic. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a\nsystem, and never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the\ngreat motive powers of the State and of the world. He would make retail\ntraders only of the inferior sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he\nremarks, quaintly enough (Laws), that \u2018if only the best men and the\nbest women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to\ncarry on retail trade, etc., then we should knew how pleasant and\nagreeable all these things are.\u2019\n\nThe disappointment of Glaucon at the \u2018city of pigs,\u2019 the ludicrous\ndescription of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and\nthe afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the\nnature of the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of\noffering some almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to\nbe celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to\nhis mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In\nspeaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a\nchild must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet\nthis is not very different from saying that children must be taught\nthrough the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds\ncan only develope gradually, and that there is much which they must\nlearn without understanding. This is also the substance of Plato\u2019s\nview, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat\ndifferently from modern ethical writers, respecting truth and\nfalsehood. To us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable\nunless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the\ncommunication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist\nthat the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not\nbe \u2018falsely true,\u2019 i.e. speak or act falsely in support of what was\nright or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by\nrequiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a\ndangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone\nand for great objects.\n\nA Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question\nwhether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to\nbe conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing\nbeyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false\ndid not seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men\nonly began to suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them\nto be immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration of their\nmorality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which\nthey are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are\ntold of them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps\nmore than in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the\nhistorical with the moral; and some have refused to believe in religion\nat all, unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of\nthe record. The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst\nthe most important of all facts; but they are frequently uncertain, and\nwe only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we\nplace ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show that the\ndifference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not\nso great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him\nin placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and,\ngenerally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which\nnecessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also\nthat changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day;\nand are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism\nwould condemn.\n\nWe note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology,\nsaid to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before\nChrist by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of\nPlato, and here, as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was\nrejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men\nhave reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by\nfictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art\nof interpretation; and by a natural process, which when once discovered\nwas always going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And\nso without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two\nforms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and\nthe customary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the\nreligion of the philosopher, who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas,\nbut did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be\nseen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the\nantagonism between the popular and philosophical religion, never so\ngreat among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only\nfelt like the difference between the religion of the educated and\nuneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed\ninto the \u2018royal mind\u2019 of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became\nthe knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more\nwonderful transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of\nStoics and neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries before and\nafter Christ. The Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by\nthe spirit of philosophy; having lost their ancient meaning, they were\nresolved into poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than\nat the time of their decay, when their influence over the world was\nwaning.\n\nA singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the\nlie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic\ndoctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in\nthe soul is a true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the\ndeception of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is\ndeceived has no power of delivering himself. For example, to represent\nGod as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with\nappearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with\nProtagoras that \u2018knowledge is sensation,\u2019 or that \u2018being is becoming,\u2019\nor with Thrasymachus \u2018that might is right,\u2019 would have been regarded by\nPlato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of\nthe greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John),\n\u2018he who was blind\u2019 were to say \u2018I see,\u2019 is another aspect of the state\nof mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further\ncompared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for the\ndifference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is\nopposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur\nin a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of\naccommodation,\u2014which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in\ncertain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had\nhimself raised about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is\nalso contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but\nmankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or\nfalse. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or\neducation, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional\neducation of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the\nattack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also\nmaking for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and\nat the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below he alludes\nto the \u2018Chronique Scandaleuse\u2019 of the gods.\n\nBOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to\nbanish fear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or\nwho believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the\nworld below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may\nbe reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor\nmust they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the\ndepressing words of Achilles\u2014\u2018I would rather be a serving-man than rule\nover all the dead;\u2019 and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions,\nthe senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength\nand youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke,\nor the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors\nand horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the\nrest of their Tartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have\ntheir use; but they are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can\nwe admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes:\u2014Achilles,\nthe son of Thetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up\nand down the sea-shore in distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the\ngods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated\nat the loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him;\nand therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men\nof note; they should be the concern of inferior persons only, whether\nwomen or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the\ngods; as when the goddesses say, \u2018Alas! my travail!\u2019 and worst of all,\nwhen the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector,\nor sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a\ncharacter of God, if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be\nimitated by them. Nor should our citizens be given to excess of\nlaughter\u2014\u2018Such violent delights\u2019 are followed by a violent re-action.\nThe description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the\nclumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us. \u2018Certainly not.\u2019\n\nTruth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we\nwere saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a\nmedicine. But this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of\nstate; the common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any\nmore than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor\nto his captain.\n\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists\nin self-control and obedience to authority. That is a lesson which\nHomer teaches in some places: \u2018The Achaeans marched on breathing\nprowess, in silent awe of their leaders;\u2019\u2014but a very different one in\nother places: \u2018O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the\nheart of a stag.\u2019 Language of the latter kind will not impress\nself-control on the minds of youth. The same may be said about his\npraises of eating and drinking and his dread of starvation; also about\nthe verses in which he tells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here,\nor of how Hephaestus once detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a\nsimilar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard in the words:\u2014\u2018Endure,\nmy soul, thou hast endured worse.\u2019 Nor must we allow our citizens to\nreceive bribes, or to say, \u2018Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend\nkings;\u2019 or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he\nshould get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them; or the\nmeanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his\nrequiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or\nhis insolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead\nPatroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other\nriver-god Spercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector\nround the walls, and slaying the captives at the pyre: such a\ncombination of meanness and cruelty in Cheiron\u2019s pupil is\ninconceivable. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and Theseus are\nequally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were not the sons\nof gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than\nthe gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes\nthat such things are done by those who have the blood of heaven flowing\nin their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.\n\nEnough of gods and heroes;\u2014what shall we say about men? What the poets\nand story-tellers say\u2014that the wicked prosper and the righteous are\nafflicted, or that justice is another\u2019s gain? Such misrepresentations\ncannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition\nof justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry.\n\nThe subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows\nstyle. Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to\ncome; and narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a\ncomposition of the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. The\nfirst scene in Homer is of the last or mixed kind, being partly\ndescription and partly dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the\n\u2018oratio obliqua,\u2019 the passage will run thus: The priest came and prayed\nApollo that the Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe return if\nAgamemnon would only give him back his daughter; and the other Greeks\nassented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on\u2014The whole then becomes\ndescriptive, and the poet is the only speaker left; or, if you omit the\nnarrative, the whole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles\u2014which\nof them is to be admitted into our State? \u2018Do you ask whether tragedy\nand comedy are to be admitted?\u2019 Yes, but also something more\u2014Is it not\ndoubtful whether our guardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather,\nhas not the question been already answered, for we have decided that\none man cannot in his life play many parts, any more than he can act\nboth tragedy and comedy, or be rhapsodist and actor at once? Human\nnature is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians have\ntheir own business already, which is the care of freedom, they will\nhave enough to do without imitating. If they imitate they should\nimitate, not any meanness or baseness, but the good only; for the mask\nwhich the actor wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to\nplay the parts of women, quarrelling, weeping, scolding, or boasting\nagainst the gods,\u2014least of all when making love or in labour. They must\nnot represent slaves, or bullies, or cowards, drunkards, or madmen, or\nblacksmiths, or neighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding\nrivers, or a raging sea. A good or wise man will be willing to perform\ngood and wise actions, but he will be ashamed to play an inferior part\nwhich he has never practised; and he will prefer to employ the\ndescriptive style with as little imitation as possible. The man who has\nno self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and anything;\nsounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his whole performance will\nbe imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive style there\nare few changes, but in the dramatic there are a great many. Poets and\nmusicians use either, or a compound of both, and this compound is very\nattractive to youth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar. But\nour State in which one man plays one part only is not adapted for\ncomplexity. And when one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen\noffers to exhibit himself and his poetry we will show him every\nobservance of respect, but at the same time tell him that there is no\nroom for his kind in our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and\nwill not depart from our original models (Laws).\n\nNext as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,\u2014the subject, the\nharmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the\nfirst. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the\nmixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as\nour citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial\nharmonies, such as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain\u2014the Dorian\nand Phrygian, the first for war, the second for peace; the one\nexpressive of courage, the other of obedience or instruction or\nreligious feeling. And as we reject varieties of harmony, we shall also\nreject the many-stringed, variously-shaped instruments which give\nutterance to them, and in particular the flute, which is more complex\nthan any of them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town,\nand the Pan\u2019s-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of\nmusic, and will now make a purgation of metres. These should be like\nthe harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There are four\nnotes of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre, 3/2, 2/2,\n2/1, which have all their characteristics, and the feet have different\ncharacteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must\nask Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a\nmartial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms,\nwhich he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another,\nassigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the\ngeneral principle that the style is to conform to the subject and the\nmetre to the style; and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul\nshould be reflected in them all. This principle of simplicity has to be\nlearnt by every one in the days of his youth, and may be gathered\nanywhere, from the creative and constructive arts, as well as from the\nforms of plants and animals.\n\nOther artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or\nunseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to\nthe law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in\nour city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians\nmust grow up, not amid images of deformity which will gradually poison\nand corrupt their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they\nwill drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of\nall these influences the greatest is the education given by music,\nwhich finds a way into the innermost soul and imparts to it the sense\nof beauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious; but\nwhen reason arrives, then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as\nthe friend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we\nacquire the elements or letters separately, and afterwards their\ncombinations, and cannot recognize reflections of them until we know\nthe letters themselves;\u2014in like manner we must first attain the\nelements or essential forms of the virtues, and then trace their\ncombinations in life and experience. There is a music of the soul which\nanswers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest object of a\nmusical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the\nlatter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter\nof temperance, and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of\nbodily pleasure. Enough has been said of music, which makes a fair\nending with love.\n\nNext we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the\nsoul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if\nwe educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her\ncharge, and need only give a general outline of the course to be\npursued. In the first place the guardians must abstain from strong\ndrink, for they should be the last persons to lose their wits. Whether\nthe habits of the palaestra are suitable to them is more doubtful, for\nthe ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy sort of thing, and if left off\nsuddenly is apt to endanger health. But our warrior athletes must be\nwide-awake dogs, and must also be inured to all changes of food and\nclimate. Hence they will require a simpler kind of gymnastic, akin to\ntheir simple music; and for their diet a rule may be found in Homer,\nwho feeds his heroes on roast meat only, and gives them no fish\nalthough they are living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which\ninvolve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he\nnowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections\nand Corinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and\nIonian melodies are to music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and\nintemperance prevail the town quickly fills with doctors and pleaders;\nand law and medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a\nState take an interest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful\nstate of education than to have to go abroad for justice because you\nhave none of your own at home? And yet there IS a worse stage of the\nsame disease\u2014when men have learned to take a pleasure and pride in the\ntwists and turns of the law; not considering how much better it would\nbe for them so to order their lives as to have no need of a nodding\njustice. And there is a like disgrace in employing a physician, not for\nthe cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, but because a man has by\nlaziness and luxury contracted diseases which were unknown in the days\nof Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus\nafter he has been wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of\na heating nature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the\ndamsel who gives him the drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him.\nThe truth is that this modern system of nursing diseases was introduced\nby Herodicus the trainer; who, being of a sickly constitution, by a\ncompound of training and medicine tortured first himself and then a\ngood many other people, and lived a great deal longer than he had any\nright. But Asclepius would not practise this art, because he knew that\nthe citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and\ntherefore he adopted the \u2018kill or cure\u2019 method, which artisans and\nlabourers employ. \u2018They must be at their business,\u2019 they say, \u2018and have\nno time for coddling: if they recover, well; if they don\u2019t, there is an\nend of them.\u2019 Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who\ncan afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides\u2014that \u2018when a\nman begins to be rich\u2019 (or, perhaps, a little sooner) \u2018he should\npractise virtue\u2019? But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent\nwith an ordinary occupation, and yet consistent with that practice of\nvirtue which Phocylides inculcates? When a student imagines that\nphilosophy gives him a headache, he never does anything; he is always\nunwell. This was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised no\nsuch art. They were acting in the interest of the public, and did not\nwish to preserve useless lives, or raise up a puny offspring to\nwretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly cured; and if a man was\nwounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then let him eat and\ndrink what he liked. But they declined to treat intemperate and\nworthless subjects, even though they might have made large fortunes out\nof them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a\nthunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie\u2014following\nour old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes, or that he\nwas not the son of a god.\n\nGlaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best\njudges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience\nof diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two\nprofessions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his\nown body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the\njudge controls mind by mind; and therefore his mind should not be\ncorrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to\nbe wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived\nby evil-doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and\ntherefore the judge should be of a certain age; his youth should have\nbeen innocent, and he should have acquired insight into evil not by the\npractice of it, but by the observation of it in others. This is the\nideal of a judge; the criminal turned detective is wonderfully\nsuspicious, but when in company with good men who have experience, he\nis at fault, for he foolishly imagines that every one is as bad as\nhimself. Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know virtue. This is\nthe sort of medicine and this the sort of law which will prevail in our\nState; they will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil body\nwill be left to die by the one, and the evil soul will be put to death\nby the other. And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good\nmusic which will give harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which\nwill give health to the body. Not that this division of music and\ngymnastic really corresponds to soul and body; for they are both\nequally concerned with the soul, which is tamed by the one and aroused\nand sustained by the other. The two together supply our guardians with\ntheir twofold nature. The passionate disposition when it has too much\ngymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic temper\nwhich has too much music becomes enervated. While a man is allowing\nmusic to pour like water through the funnel of his ears, the edge of\nhis soul gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited element\nis melted out of him. Too little spirit is easily exhausted; too much\nquickly passes into nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by\nfeeding and training has his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid;\nhe is like a wild beast, ready to do everything by blows and nothing by\ncounsel or policy. There are two principles in man, reason and passion,\nand to these, not to the soul and body, the two arts of music and\ngymnastic correspond. He who mingles them in harmonious concord is the\ntrue musician,\u2014he shall be the presiding genius of our State.\n\nThe next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must\nrule the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best\nguardians. Now they will be the best who love their subjects most, and\nthink that they have a common interest with them in the welfare of the\nstate. These we must select; but they must be watched at every epoch of\nlife to see whether they have retained the same opinions and held out\nagainst force and enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of\npleasure may enchant a man into a change of purpose, and the force of\ngrief and pain may compel him. And therefore our guardians must be men\nwho have been tried by many tests, like gold in the refiner\u2019s fire, and\nhave been passed first through danger, then through pleasure, and at\nevery age have come out of such trials victorious and without stain, in\nfull command of themselves and their principles; having all their\nfaculties in harmonious exercise for their country\u2019s good. These shall\nreceive the highest honours both in life and death. (It would perhaps\nbe better to confine the term \u2018guardians\u2019 to this select class: the\nyounger men may be called \u2018auxiliaries.\u2019)\n\nAnd now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we\ncould train our rulers!\u2014at any rate let us make the attempt with the\nrest of the world. What I am going to tell is only another version of\nthe legend of Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to\naccept such a story. The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers,\nthen to the soldiers, lastly to the people. We will inform them that\ntheir youth was a dream, and that during the time when they seemed to\nbe undergoing their education they were really being fashioned in the\nearth, who sent them up when they were ready; and that they must\nprotect and cherish her whose children they are, and regard each other\nas brothers and sisters. \u2018I do not wonder at your being ashamed to\npropound such a fiction.\u2019 There is more behind. These brothers and\nsisters have different natures, and some of them God framed to rule,\nwhom he fashioned of gold; others he made of silver, to be auxiliaries;\nothers again to be husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by\nhim of brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common stock,\na golden parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son,\nand then there must be a change of rank; the son of the rich must\ndescend, and the child of the artisan rise, in the social scale; for an\noracle says \u2018that the State will come to an end if governed by a man of\nbrass or iron.\u2019 Will our citizens ever believe all this? \u2018Not in the\npresent generation, but in the next, perhaps, Yes.\u2019\n\nNow let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers,\nand look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe\nagainst enemies from without, and likewise against insurrections from\nwithin. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers\nthey are to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the\nsheep; and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants.\nTheir habits and their dwellings should correspond to their education.\nThey should have no property; their pay should only meet their\nexpenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will\ntell them that they have from God, and this divine gift in their souls\nthey must not alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name\nof gold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the\nsame roof with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should\nthey ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will\nbecome householders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and\ntyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves\nand the rest of the State, will be at hand.\n\nThe religious and ethical aspect of Plato\u2019s education will hereafter be\nconsidered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more\nconveniently noticed in this place.\n\n1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave\nirony, Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about\nethics and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting\nto distinguish the better lesson from the worse, sometimes altering the\ntext from design; more than once quoting or alluding to Homer\ninaccurately, after the manner of the early logographers turning the\nIliad into prose, and delighting to draw far-fetched inferences from\nhis words, or to make ludicrous applications of them. He does not, like\nHeracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and Archilochus (Heracl.), but\nuses their words and expressions as vehicles of a higher truth; not on\na system like Theagenes of Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the\nStoics, but as fancy may dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them\nare sound, although the premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals\nto Homer add a charm to Plato\u2019s style, and at the same time they have\nthe effect of a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. To us\n(and probably to himself), although they take the form of arguments,\nthey are really figures of speech. They may be compared with modern\ncitations from Scripture, which have often a great rhetorical power\neven when the original meaning of the words is entirely lost sight of.\nThe real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from the Memorabilia\nof Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations. Great in all ages\nand countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has been\nthe art of interpretation.\n\n2. \u2018The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.\u2019\nNotwithstanding the fascination which the word \u2018classical\u2019 exercises\nover us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the\nGreek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought\noften exceeds the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus and Pindar; or\nthat rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet\nEuripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the\ntwo; in him alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a\nGreek statue, in which there is nothing to add or to take away; at\nleast this is true of single plays or of large portions of them. The\nconnection in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not\nunfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was\nunable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and\nhe had no power of disengaging or arranging them. For there is a subtle\ninfluence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to\npoetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by\npoetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own\nmeaning (Apol.); for he does not see that the word which is full of\nassociations to his own mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of\nanother; or that the sequence which is clear to himself is puzzling to\nothers. There are many passages in some of our greatest modern poets\nwhich are far too obscure; in which there is no proportion between\nstyle and subject, in which any half-expressed figure, any harsh\nconstruction, any distorted collocation of words, any remote sequence\nof ideas is admitted; and there is no voice \u2018coming sweetly from\nnature,\u2019 or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if\nthere could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and\nclearness. The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out\nof the state of language and logic which existed in their age. They are\nnot examples to be followed by us; for the use of language ought in\nevery generation to become clearer and clearer. Like Shakespere, they\nwere great in spite, not in consequence, of their imperfections of\nexpression. But there is no reason for returning to the necessary\nobscurity which prevailed in the infancy of literature. The English\npoets of the last century were certainly not obscure; and we have no\nexcuse for losing what they had gained, or for going back to the\nearlier or transitional age which preceded them. The thought of our own\ntimes has not out-stripped language; a want of Plato\u2019s \u2018art of\nmeasuring\u2019 is the rule cause of the disproportion between them.\n\n3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a\ntheory of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up\nas follows:\u2014True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and\nideal,\u2014the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or\nrepose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and\nsimple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of\ninfluences,\u2014the true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought\nup. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste, which will\nhave a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets\nare to be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of\nreason\u2014like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but\nconfined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of\nhabit; and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or\nthe forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a wide\nkindred in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of\nPericles, has an artistic as well as a political side.\n\nThere is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two\nor three passages does he even allude to them (Rep.; Soph.). He is not\nlost in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the\nPropylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have\nregarded any abstract truth of number or figure as higher than the\ngreatest of them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some influence, such\nas he hopes to inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind from\nthe works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the\nfragments of them, and find in a few broken stones the standard of\ntruth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no expression; he\nnowhere says that beauty is the object of art; he seems to deny that\nwisdom can take an external form (Phaedrus); he does not distinguish\nthe fine from the mechanical arts. Whether or no, like some writers, he\nfelt more than he expressed, it is at any rate remarkable that the\ngreatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with an almost\nentire silence about them. In one very striking passage he tells us\nthat a work of art, like the State, is a whole; and this conception of\na whole and the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences may be\nregarded, if not as the inspiring, at any rate as the regulating\nprinciples of Greek art (Xen. Mem.; and Sophist).\n\n4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better\nnot be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his\nown person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of\nevil; he is to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence,\nbecame acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore,\naccording to Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man\naccording to Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy.\nThe bad, on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge\nof virtue. It may be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection\nis well founded. In a remarkable passage of the Laws it is acknowledged\nthat the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of\ngentleness and courage in Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet\nwas afterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have\nfound that the intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence\nof it. There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an insight\ninto vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a natural\nsense independent of any special experience of good or evil.\n\n5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek\nand also very different from anything which existed at all in his age\nof the world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there\nhad been enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under\nspecial circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit\nwas certainly recognized as one of the elements on which government was\nbased. The founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors,\nwho were raised by their great actions above the ordinary level of\nhumanity; at a later period, the services of warriors and legislators\nwere held to entitle them and their descendants to the privileges of\ncitizenship and to the first rank in the state. And although the\nexistence of an ideal aristocracy is slenderly proven from the remains\nof early Greek history, and we have a difficulty in ascribing such a\ncharacter, however the idea may be defined, to any actual Hellenic\nstate\u2014or indeed to any state which has ever existed in the world\u2014still\nthe rule of the best was certainly the aspiration of philosophers, who\nprobably accommodated a good deal their views of primitive history to\ntheir own notions of good government. Plato further insists on applying\nto the guardians of his state a series of tests by which all those who\nfell short of a fixed standard were either removed from the governing\nbody, or not admitted to it; and this \u2018academic\u2019 discipline did to a\ncertain extent prevail in Greek states, especially in Sparta. He also\nindicates that the system of caste, which existed in a great part of\nthe ancient, and is by no means extinct in the modern European world,\nshould be set aside from time to time in favour of merit. He is aware\nhow deeply the greater part of mankind resent any interference with the\norder of society, and therefore he proposes his novel idea in the form\nof what he himself calls a \u2018monstrous fiction.\u2019 (Compare the ceremony\nof preparation for the two \u2018great waves\u2019 in Book v.) Two principles are\nindicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of ranks dependent\non circumstances prior to the individual: second, that this distinction\nis and ought to be broken through by personal qualities. He adapts\nmythology like the Homeric poems to the wants of the state, making \u2018the\nPhoenician tale\u2019 the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth\nrespecting its own origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale\nof earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is\ntold, and the analogy of Greek tradition, are a sufficient verification\nof the \u2018monstrous falsehood.\u2019 Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and\nsilver and brass and iron age succeeding one another, but Plato\nsupposes these differences in the natures of men to exist together in a\nsingle state. Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be\ntaught (as Protagoras says, \u2018the myth is more interesting\u2019), and also\nenables Plato to touch lightly on new principles without going into\ndetails. In this passage he shadows forth a general truth, but he does\nnot tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is to be effected.\nIndeed throughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks to fade into\nthe distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, and\nwhether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the\ncommunistic regulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there\nany use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words, or from the\nsilence of Plato, or in drawing inferences which were beyond his\nvision. Aristotle, in his criticism on the position of the lower\nclasses, does not perceive that the poetical creation is \u2018like the air,\ninvulnerable,\u2019 and cannot be penetrated by the shafts of his logic\n(Pol.).\n\n6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest\ndegree fanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections,\nare to be found in the third book of the Republic: first, the great\npower of music, so much beyond any influence which is experienced by us\nin modern times, when the art or science has been far more developed,\nand has found the secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly,\nthe indefinite and almost absolute control which the soul is supposed\nto exercise over the body.\n\nIn the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may\nalso observe among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at\nthe present day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few\nonly, there seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence\nfor numbers and numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger.\nIntervals of sound and number are to him sacred things which have a law\nof their own, not dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above\nsense, and become a connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is\nevident that Plato is describing what to him appears to be also a fact.\nThe power of a simple and characteristic melody on the impressible mind\nof the Greek is more than we can easily appreciate. The effect of\nnational airs may bear some comparison with it. And, besides all this,\nthere is a confusion between the harmony of musical notes and the\nharmony of soul and body, which is so potently inspired by them.\n\nThe second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting\nquestions\u2014How far can the mind control the body? Is the relation\nbetween them one of mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they\ntwo or one, and is either of them the cause of the other? May we not at\ntimes drop the opposition between them, and the mode of describing\nthem, which is so familiar to us, and yet hardly conveys any precise\nmeaning, and try to view this composite creature, man, in a more simple\nmanner? Must we not at any rate admit that there is in human nature a\nhigher and a lower principle, divided by no distinct line, which at\ntimes break asunder and take up arms against one another? Or again,\nthey are reconciled and move together, either unconsciously in the\nordinary work of life, or consciously in the pursuit of some noble aim,\nto be attained not without an effort, and for which every thought and\nnerve are strained. And then the body becomes the good friend or ally,\nor servant or instrument of the mind. And the mind has often a\nwonderful and almost superhuman power of banishing disease and weakness\nand calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the\nintellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as\nto form a single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and\nthe identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the\nmost part unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the\nappetites, we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other.\nThere is a tendency in us which says \u2018Drink.\u2019 There is another which\nsays, \u2018Do not drink; it is not good for you.\u2019 And we all of us know\nwhich is the rightful superior. We are also responsible for our health,\nalthough into this sphere there enter some elements of necessity which\nmay be beyond our control. Still even in the management of health, care\nand thought, continued over many years, may make us almost free agents,\nif we do not exact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that\nall human freedom is limited by the laws of nature and of mind.\n\nWe are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation\nwhich he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day,\ndepreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a\ndefinite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is\nafraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not\nrecognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily\ndisorders; and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by\nlittle are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither\ndoes he see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely\ninfluence the body than by the control of eating and drinking; or any\nother action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of\nthe will can be more simple or truly asserted.\n\n7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked.\n\n(1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato\u2019s way of expressing\nthat he is passing lightly over the subject.\n\n(2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he\nproceeds with the construction of the State.\n\n(3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality, and then again\nas a work of imagination only; these are the arts by which he sustains\nthe reader\u2019s interest.\n\n(4) Connecting links, or the preparation for the entire expulsion of\nthe poets in Book X.\n\n(5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the\nvaletudinarian, the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides, the\nmanner in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up\ninto the subject, and the argument from the practice of Asclepius,\nshould not escape notice.\n\nBOOK IV. Adeimantus said: \u2018Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that\nyou make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they\nare the lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men,\nlands and houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and\nare always mounting guard.\u2019 You may add, I replied, that they receive\nno pay but only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or\na mistress. \u2018Well, and what answer do you give?\u2019 My answer is, that our\nguardians may or may not be the happiest of men,\u2014I should not be\nsurprised to find in the long-run that they were,\u2014but this is not the\naim of our constitution, which was designed for the good of the whole\nand not of any one part. If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for\nhaving painted the eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not\npurple but black, he would reply: \u2018The eye must be an eye, and you\nshould look at the statue as a whole.\u2019 \u2018Now I can well imagine a fool\u2019s\nparadise, in which everybody is eating and drinking, clothed in purple\nand fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their wheel at hand,\nthat they may work a little when they please; and cobblers and all the\nother classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And a State\nmay get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into\nboon companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not\ntalking of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man\nis expected to do his own work. The happiness resides not in this or\nthat class, but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to\nmake:\u2014A middle condition is best for artisans; they should have money\nenough to buy tools, and not enough to be independent of business. And\nwill not the same condition be best for our citizens? If they are poor,\nthey will be mean; if rich, luxurious and lazy; and in neither case\ncontented. \u2018But then how will our poor city be able to go to war\nagainst an enemy who has money?\u2019 There may be a difficulty in fighting\nagainst one enemy; against two there will be none. In the first place,\nthe contest will be carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do\ncitizens: and is not a regular athlete an easy match for two stout\nopponents at least? Suppose also, that before engaging we send\nambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, \u2018Silver and gold we have\nnot; do you help us and take our share of the spoil;\u2019\u2014who would fight\nagainst the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in preying\nupon the fatted sheep? \u2018But if many states join their resources, shall\nwe not be in danger?\u2019 I am amused to hear you use the word \u2018state\u2019 of\nany but our own State. They are \u2018states,\u2019 but not \u2018a state\u2019\u2014many in\none. For in every state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor,\nwhich you may set one against the other. But our State, while she\nremains true to her principles, will be in very deed the mightiest of\nHellenic states.\n\nTo the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity;\nit must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter\nof secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was\nintimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there\nimplied was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and\nbe at one with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But\nall these things are secondary, if education, which is the great\nmatter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion,\nthe speed is always increasing; and each generation improves upon the\npreceding, both in physical and moral qualities. The care of the\ngovernors should be directed to preserve music and gymnastic from\ninnovation; alter the songs of a country, Damon says, and you will soon\nend by altering its laws. The change appears innocent at first, and\nbegins in play; but the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly\nupon the characters of individuals, then upon social and commercial\nrelations, and lastly upon the institutions of a state; and there is\nruin and confusion everywhere. But if education remains in the\nestablished form, there will be no danger. A restorative process will\nbe always going on; the spirit of law and order will raise up what has\nfallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for the lesser matters\nof life\u2014rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like invites like for\ngood or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and supply the\npower of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the\nparticulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of education,\nand education will take care of all other things.\n\nBut without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will\nmake no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by\nsome favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of\nliving. If you tell such persons that they must first alter their\nhabits, then they grow angry; they are charming people. \u2018Charming,\u2014nay,\nthe very reverse.\u2019 Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good\ngraces, nor the state which is like them. And such states there are\nwhich first ordain under penalty of death that no one shall alter the\nconstitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out\nof anything; and he who indulges them and fawns upon them, is their\nleader and saviour. \u2018Yes, the men are as bad as the states.\u2019 But do you\nnot admire their cleverness? \u2018Nay, some of them are stupid enough to\nbelieve what the people tell them.\u2019 And when all the world is telling a\nman that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe\nanything else? But don\u2019t get into a passion: to see our statesmen\ntrying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the\nHydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute\nenactments are superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad ones.\n\nAnd now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to\nApollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all\nthings\u2014that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon\nthe centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any\nsense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme\nin our realms...\n\nHere, as Socrates would say, let us \u2018reflect on\u2019 (Greek) what has\npreceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens,\nbut only of the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of\nmen, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them\nhappy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant\nmanner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and\nmodern philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right\nto utility.\n\nFirst duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas.\nThe utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and\nshows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be\nadmitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he\nwho makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest\nand noblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical\nbasis of morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas\ncommonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we\nbelieve, the far-off result of the divine government of the universe.\nThe greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a\nlife of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of\nright than we can be of a divine purpose, that \u2018all mankind should be\nsaved;\u2019 and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness\nof the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the\nordinary sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or\nin a voluntary death. Further, the word \u2018happiness\u2019 has several\nambiguities; it may mean either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness\nsubjective or objective, in this world or in another, of ourselves only\nor of our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the modern founder\nof Utilitarianism the self-regarding and disinterested motives of\naction are included under the same term, although they are commonly\nopposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word happiness has not\nthe definiteness or the sacredness of \u2018truth\u2019 and \u2018right\u2019; it does not\nequally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the\nconscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and\nconveniences of life; too little with \u2018the goods of the soul which we\ndesire for their own sake.\u2019 In a great trial, or danger, or temptation,\nor in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these\nreasons \u2018the greatest happiness\u2019 principle is not the true foundation\nof ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which\nis like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger\npart of human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as\nthey tend to the happiness of mankind (Introd. to Gorgias and\nPhilebus).\n\nThe same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient\nseems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For\nconcerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the\nhappiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term\nexpediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of\nhuman society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as\nwell as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because\nwe cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of\nnations; and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests\nto resist. They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of\npublic policy, as well as in their private dealings; the peace of\nEurope may be said to depend upon them. In the most commercial and\nutilitarian states of society the power of ideas remains. And all the\nhigher class of statesmen have in them something of that idealism which\nPericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They\nrecognise that the true leader of men must be above the motives of\nambition, and that national character is of greater value than material\ncomfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato;\nfirst, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under\nfavourable circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State,\ntheir happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern\nprinciple of utility in politics is sufficiently evident from other\npassages; in which \u2018the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most\nhonourable\u2019, and also \u2018the most sacred\u2019.\n\nWe may note\n\n(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed\nto draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates.\n\n(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of\npolitics and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of\ncriticism, which, under the various names of harmony, symmetry,\nmeasure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to works of\nart.\n\n(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the\ntraditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle,\nthe fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a\nprinciple.\n\n(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the\nlight active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the\n\u2018charming\u2019 patients who are always making themselves worse; or again,\nthe playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave\nirony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six\nfeet high because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is\nto be pardoned for his ignorance\u2014he is too amusing for us to be\nseriously angry with him.\n\n(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over\nwhen provision has been made for two great principles,\u2014first, that\nreligion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods,\nsecondly, that the true national or Hellenic type shall be\nmaintained...\n\nSocrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston,\ntell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother\nand the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. \u2018That won\u2019t\ndo,\u2019 replied Glaucon, \u2018you yourself promised to make the search and\ntalked about the impiety of deserting justice.\u2019 Well, I said, I will\nlead the way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being\nperfect will contain all the four virtues\u2014wisdom, courage, temperance,\njustice. If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be\njustice.\n\nFirst then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will\nbe wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of\nskill,\u2014not the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of\nthe husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of\nthe whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are\na small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them\nis concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class\nhave wisdom, then the whole State will be wise.\n\nOur second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in\nanother class\u2014that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of\nsalvation\u2014the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and\neducation have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which\ndyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple\nor of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no\nsoap or lye will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and\nthe laws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither\nthe soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them\nout. This power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask\nyou to call \u2018courage,\u2019 adding the epithet \u2018political\u2019 or \u2018civilized\u2019 in\norder to distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher\ncourage which may hereafter be discussed.\n\nTwo virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding\nvirtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown\nupon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as\n\u2018master of himself\u2019\u2014which has an absurd sound, because the master is\nalso the servant. The expression really means that the better principle\nin a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes\u2014women,\nslaves and the like\u2014who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the\nbetter; and in our State the former class are held under control by the\nlatter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? \u2018To both\nof them.\u2019 And our State if any will be the abode of temperance; and we\nwere right in describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused\nthrough the whole, making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind,\nand attuning the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of\nan instrument, whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength\nor wealth.\n\nAnd now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and\nwatch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell\nme, if you see the thicket move first. \u2018Nay, I would have you lead.\u2019\nWell then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult;\nbut we must push on. I begin to see a track. \u2018Good news.\u2019 Why, Glaucon,\nour dulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our\neyes into the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as\nbad as people looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have\nyou forgotten our old principle of the division of labour, or of every\nman doing his own business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation\nof the State\u2014what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue\nremaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in\nthe scale of political virtue? For \u2018every one having his own\u2019 is the\ngreat object of government; and the great object of trade is that every\nman should do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a\ncarpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself\ninto a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his\nlast and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single\nindividual is trainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil\nis injustice, or every man doing another\u2019s business. I do not say that\nas yet we are in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the\ndefinition which we believe to hold good in states has still to be\ntested by the individual. Having read the large letters we will now\ncome back to the small. From the two together a brilliant light may be\nstruck out...\n\nSocrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of\nresidues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the\nthree parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State,\nalthough the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony\nthan the first two. If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be\nsought for in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in\nthe State to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for that very\nreason has not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined to\nobject that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but\nthat they run into one another and may be only different aspects or\nnames of the same thing, and such in this instance appears to be the\ncase. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the same as\none of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the\nCharmides, which however is only provisional, and is afterwards\nrejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues\nare eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with\ndifficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a\npart only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of\nthe whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a\nsort of harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems\nto differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas\ntemperance is the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the\nperfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business,\nthe right man in the right place, the division and co-operation of all\nthe citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other\nvirtues, and therefore, from Plato\u2019s point of view, the foundation of\nthem, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them. The\nproposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid\nmonotony.\n\nThere is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of\nPlato (Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), \u2018Whether the virtues are one or\nmany?\u2019 This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are\nfour cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in\nethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like\nAristotle\u2019s conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others,\nbut the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal\nconception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral\nnature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in the\nsecond education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to\nsucceed. Both might be equally described by the terms \u2018law,\u2019 \u2018order,\u2019\n\u2018harmony;\u2019 but while the idea of good embraces \u2018all time and all\nexistence,\u2019 the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.\n\n...Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But\nfirst he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul.\nHis argument is as follows:\u2014Quantity makes no difference in quality.\nThe word \u2018just,\u2019 whether applied to the individual or to the State, has\nthe same meaning. And the term \u2018justice\u2019 implied that the same three\nprinciples in the State and in the individual were doing their own\nbusiness. But are they really three or one? The question is difficult,\nand one which can hardly be solved by the methods which we are now\nusing; but the truer and longer way would take up too much of our time.\n\u2018The shorter will satisfy me.\u2019 Well then, you would admit that the\nqualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose\nthem? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate, our own race\nintellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous, because the\nindividual members of each have such and such a character; the\ndifficulty is to determine whether the several principles are one or\nthree; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature,\ndesire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul\ncomes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires\na very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation\ncannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there is no impossibility\nin a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or in a top which is\nfixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no necessity to\nmention all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally assume that\nopposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And\nto the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire and\navoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises\na new point\u2014thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of\nwarm drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception\nof course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it\nis good. When relative terms have no attributes, their correlatives\nhave no attributes; when they have attributes, their correlatives also\nhave them. For example, the term \u2018greater\u2019 is simply relative to\n\u2018less,\u2019 and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the\nother hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again,\nevery science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object;\nmedicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be\nconfounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us\nreturn to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite\nobject\u2014drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the\nanimal one saying \u2018Drink;\u2019 the rational one, which says \u2018Do not drink.\u2019\nThe two impulses are contradictory; and therefore we may assume that\nthey spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a\nthird principle, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain\nLeontius which throws some light on this question. He was coming up\nfrom the Piraeus outside the north wall, and he passed a spot where\nthere were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He felt a longing\ndesire to see them and also an abhorrence of them; at first he turned\naway and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, he\nsaid,\u2014\u2018Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight.\u2019 Now is there\nnot here a third principle which is often found to come to the\nassistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against\nreason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which\nwe may further convince ourselves by putting the following case:\u2014When a\nman suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant\nat the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his\nindignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him;\nthe spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd,\nthat is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard within. This\nshows that passion is the ally of reason. Is passion then the same with\nreason? No, for the former exists in children and brutes; and Homer\naffords a proof of the distinction between them when he says, \u2018He smote\nhis breast, and thus rebuked his soul.\u2019\n\nAnd now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer\nthat the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For\nwisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom\nand courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of\nthe three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and\neach part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion,\nthe inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and\ngymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will\nact together in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper\nsubjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves\na right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The\nwisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has\nauthority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the\nruling and the subject principles, both in the State and in the\nindividual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the notion already\ngiven of it may be confirmed by common instances. Will the just state\nor the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of\nimpiety to gods and men? \u2018No.\u2019 And is not the reason of this that the\nseveral principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their\nown business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just\nstates. Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there\nshould be one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was\nto follow; and that dream has now been realized in justice, which\nbegins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and then acts\nharmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the\ninsubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul,\nis the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to\nthe soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the\nbody, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the\nhealth and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease\nand weakness and deformity of the soul.\n\nAgain the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the\nmore profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice,\nlike mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to\nthe hill which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of\nvirtue, and the infinite forms of vice, among which are four special\nones, characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state\nwhich corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have\nbeen describing, wherein reason rules under one of two names\u2014monarchy\nand aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and\nof souls...\n\nIn attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties,\nPlato takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And\nthe criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the\nfaculties. The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But\nthe path of early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he\nwill not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads\nhim into a tiresome digression, which is intended to explain the nature\nof contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the same time and\nin the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced\ninto either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is\nexpressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He\nimplies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by\nthe impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this proves\nthat thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct from\nanger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term \u2018thirst\u2019 or\n\u2018desire\u2019 to be modified, and say an \u2018angry thirst,\u2019 or a \u2018revengeful\ndesire,\u2019 then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become\nconfused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there\nremains an exception to the rule in the use of the term \u2018good,\u2019 which\nis always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of\nan age before logic; and any one who is wearied by them should remember\nthat they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first\ndevelopment of the human faculties.\n\nThe psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the\nsoul into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as\nfar as we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by\nAristotle and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this\nearly analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the\nirascible faculty (Greek), which may be variously described under the\nterms righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of\ncourage, which includes in Plato moral courage, the courage of enduring\npain, and of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well as of\nmeeting dangers in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the\nrational: it cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it\nsometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the\nperformance of great actions. It is the \u2018lion heart\u2019 with which the\nreason makes a treaty. On the other hand it is negative rather than\npositive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like\nLove in the Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or\nGood. It is the peremptory military spirit which prevails in the\ngovernment of honour. It differs from anger (Greek), this latter term\nhaving no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle\nhas retained the word, yet we may observe that \u2018passion\u2019 (Greek) has\nwith him lost its affinity to the rational and has become\nindistinguishable from \u2018anger\u2019 (Greek). And to this vernacular use\nPlato himself in the Laws seems to revert, though not always. By modern\nphilosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words\nanger or passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense; there\nis no connotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are\naroused. The feeling of \u2018righteous indignation\u2019 is too partial and\naccidental to admit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit.\nWe are tempted also to doubt whether Plato is right in supposing that\nan offender, however justly condemned, could be expected to acknowledge\nthe justice of his sentence; this is the spirit of a philosopher or\nmartyr rather than of a criminal.\n\nWe may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle\u2019s famous thesis,\nthat \u2018good actions produce good habits.\u2019 The words \u2018as healthy\npractices (Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce\njustice,\u2019 have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note\nalso that an incidental remark in Plato has become a far-reaching\nprinciple in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical\nsystem.\n\nThere is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by \u2018the longer\nway\u2019: he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not\nbe satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the\nsixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given\nus a sketch of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final\nrevelation of the idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that\nhe has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have\nfilled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher\npoint of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some a\npriori method of developing the parts out of the whole; or he might\nhave asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly\nhave stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the \u2018ego\u2019 and the\n\u2018universal.\u2019 Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in\nsome manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers in the\nmathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to\nPlato the universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all\nknowledge or opinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on\nthe opposite pole of induction and experience. The aspirations of\nmetaphysicians have always tended to pass beyond the limits of human\nthought and language: they seem to have reached a height at which they\nare \u2018moving about in worlds unrealized,\u2019 and their conceptions,\nalthough profoundly affecting their own minds, become invisible or\nunintelligible to others. We are not therefore surprized to find that\nPlato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine of ideas; or\nthat his school in a later generation, like his contemporaries Glaucon\nand Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of\nspeculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism which\nmaintained either that there was no such thing as predication, or that\nall might be predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some\nideas combine with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or\ntwo steps forward on this path; he nowhere attains to any connected\nsystem of ideas, or even to a knowledge of the most elementary\nrelations of the sciences to one another.\n\nBOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in\nstates, when Polemarchus\u2014he was sitting a little farther from me than\nAdeimantus\u2014taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said\nsomething in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, \u2018Shall we\nlet him off?\u2019 \u2018Certainly not,\u2019 said Adeimantus, raising his voice.\nWhom, I said, are you not going to let off? \u2018You,\u2019 he said. Why?\n\u2018Because we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting\nwomen and children, of whom you have slily disposed under the general\nformula that friends have all things in common.\u2019 And was I not right?\n\u2018Yes,\u2019 he replied, \u2018but there are many sorts of communism or community,\nand we want to know which of them is right. The company, as you have\njust heard, are resolved to have a further explanation.\u2019 Thrasymachus\nsaid, \u2018Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to\nhear you discourse?\u2019 Yes, I said; but the discourse should be of a\nreasonable length. Glaucon added, \u2018Yes, Socrates, and there is reason\nin spending the whole of life in such discussions; but pray, without\nmore ado, tell us how this community is to be carried out, and how the\ninterval between birth and education is to be filled up.\u2019 Well, I said,\nthe subject has several difficulties\u2014What is possible? is the first\nquestion. What is desirable? is the second. \u2018Fear not,\u2019 he replied,\n\u2018for you are speaking among friends.\u2019 That, I replied, is a sorry\nconsolation; I shall destroy my friends as well as myself. Not that I\nmind a little innocent laughter; but he who kills the truth is a\nmurderer. \u2018Then,\u2019 said Glaucon, laughing, \u2018in case you should murder us\nwe will acquit you beforehand, and you shall be held free from the\nguilt of deceiving us.\u2019\n\nSocrates proceeds:\u2014The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as\nwe have already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes\u2014we do\nnot take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home\nto look after their puppies. They have the same employments\u2014the only\ndifference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other\nweaker. But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must\nhave the same education\u2014they must be taught music and gymnastics, and\nthe art of war. I know that a great joke will be made of their riding\non horseback and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled\nwomen showing their agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a\nvision of beauty, and may be expected to become a famous jest. But we\nmust not mind the wits; there was a time when they might have laughed\nat our present gymnastics. All is habit: people have at last found out\nthat the exposure is better than the concealment of the person, and now\nthey laugh no more. Evil only should be the subject of ridicule.\n\nThe first question is, whether women are able either wholly or\npartially to share in the employments of men. And here we may be\ncharged with inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we\nstarted originally with the division of labour; and the diversity of\nemployments was based on the difference of natures. But is there no\ndifference between men and women? Nay, are they not wholly different?\nTHERE was the difficulty, Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of\nfamily relations. However, when a man is out of his depth, whether in a\npool or in an ocean, he can only swim for his life; and we must try to\nfind a way of escape, if we can.\n\nThe argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the\nnatures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal\nopposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely\nnominal and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are\nopposed in a single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a\nbald man is a cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is\nsuch an inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them\nis partial only, like the difference between a male physician and a\nfemale physician, not running through the whole nature, like the\ndifference between a physician and a carpenter. And if the difference\nof the sexes is only that the one beget and the other bear children,\nthis does not prove that they ought to have distinct educations.\nAdmitting that women differ from men in capacity, do not men equally\ndiffer from one another? Has not nature scattered all the qualities\nwhich our citizens require indifferently up and down among the two\nsexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not women often, though\nin some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough surpassed by them?\nWomen are the same in kind as men, and have the same aptitude or want\nof aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a less degree. One\nwoman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good must be chosen\nto be the colleagues of our guardians. If however their natures are the\nsame, the inference is that their education must also be the same;\nthere is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning\nmusic and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the\nvery best, far superior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very\nbest women, and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than\nthis. Therefore let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in\nthe toils of war and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at\nthem is a fool for his pains.\n\nThe first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men\nand women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is\nrolling in\u2014community of wives and children; is this either expedient or\npossible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the\npossibility. \u2018Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be\nentertained on both points.\u2019 I meant to have escaped the trouble of\nproving the first, but as you have detected the little stratagem I must\neven submit. Only allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his\nwalks, with a dream of what might be, and then I will return to the\nquestion of what can be.\n\nIn the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones\nwhere they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as\nlegislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the\nwomen. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common\nhouses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by\na necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be\nallowed to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which the\nrulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy\nmarriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be in\nproportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask\n(as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not\ntake the greatest care in the mating? \u2018Certainly.\u2019 And there is no\nreason to suppose that less care is required in the marriage of human\nbeings. But then our rulers must be skilful physicians of the State,\nfor they will often need a strong dose of falsehood in order to bring\nabout desirable unions between their subjects. The good must be paired\nwith the good, and the bad with the bad, and the offspring of the one\nmust be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this way the flock will\nbe preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated\nat times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides and\nbridegrooms will meet at them; and by an ingenious system of lots the\nrulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and\nthat those of inferior breed are paired with inferiors\u2014the latter will\nascribe to chance what is really the invention of the rulers. And when\nchildren are born, the offspring of the brave and fair will be carried\nto an enclosure in a certain part of the city, and there attended by\nsuitable nurses; the rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The\nmothers will be brought to the fold and will suckle the children; care\nhowever must be taken that none of them recognise their own offspring;\nand if necessary other nurses may also be hired. The trouble of\nwatching and getting up at night will be transferred to attendants.\n\u2018Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time when they\nare having children.\u2019 And quite right too, I said, that they should.\n\nThe parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be\nreckoned at thirty years\u2014from twenty-five, when he has \u2018passed the\npoint at which the speed of life is greatest,\u2019 to fifty-five; and at\ntwenty years for a woman\u2014from twenty to forty. Any one above or below\nthose ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety;\nalso every one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without\nthe consent of the rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who\nare within the specified ages, after which they may range at will,\nprovided they avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children, or\nof brothers and sisters, which last, however, are not absolutely\nprohibited, if a dispensation be procured. \u2018But how shall we know the\ndegrees of affinity, when all things are common?\u2019 The answer is, that\nbrothers and sisters are all such as are born seven or nine months\nafter the espousals, and their parents those who are then espoused, and\nevery one will have many children and every child many parents.\n\nSocrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous\nand also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a\nState is unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there\nwill be unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or\ninterests\u2014where if one member suffers all the members suffer, if one\ncitizen is touched all are quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the\nlittle finger of the State runs through the whole body and vibrates to\nthe soul. For the true State, like an individual, is injured as a whole\nwhen any part is affected. Every State has subjects and rulers, who in\na democracy are called rulers, and in other States masters: but in our\nState they are called saviours and allies; and the subjects who in\nother States are termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and\npaymasters, and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in other\nplaces, are by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other\nStates members of the same government regard one of their colleagues as\na friend and another as an enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to\nanother; for every citizen is connected with every other by ties of\nblood, and these names and this way of speaking will have a\ncorresponding reality\u2014brother, father, sister, mother, repeated from\ninfancy in the ears of children, will not be mere words. Then again the\ncitizens will have all things in common, in having common property they\nwill have common pleasures and pains.\n\nCan there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or\nlawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which\nthey call their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound to\ndefend himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an\n\u2018antidote\u2019 to the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But\nno younger man will strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from\nlaying hands on his kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the\nfamily may retaliate. Moreover, our citizens will be rid of the lesser\nevils of life; there will be no flattery of the rich, no sordid\nhousehold cares, no borrowing and not paying. Compared with the\ncitizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors, and crowned\nwith blessings greater still\u2014they and their children having a better\nmaintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor has\nthe happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the\nState; our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he\nhas a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any\nconceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself,\nhe must be reminded that \u2018half is better than the whole.\u2019 \u2018I should\ncertainly advise him to stay where he is when he has the promise of\nsuch a brave life.\u2019\n\nBut is such a community possible?\u2014as among the animals, so also among\nmen; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no\ndifficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service.\nParents will take their children to look on at a battle, just as\npotters\u2019 boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel.\nAnd to the parents themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their\nyoung ones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must\nlearn, but they must not run into danger, although a certain degree of\nrisk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures\nshould be placed under the care of experienced veterans, and they\nshould have wings\u2014that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on which\nthey may fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to\nteach a youth to ride.\n\nCowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen;\ngentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented\nto the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall\nbe crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive\nthe right hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is\nany harm in his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall\nhave more wives than others, in order that he may have as many children\nas possible. And at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the\nauthority of Homer for honouring brave men with \u2018long chines,\u2019 which is\nan appropriate compliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing.\nFill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to the brave\u2014may\nthey do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared\nto be of the golden race, and will, as we believe, become one of\nHesiod\u2019s guardian angels. He shall be worshipped after death in the\nmanner prescribed by the oracle; and not only he, but all other\nbenefactors of the State who die in any other way, shall be admitted to\nthe same honours.\n\nThe next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be\nenslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing\nunder the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled?\nCertainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and\nhas been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine\nmalice in making an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the\nowner has fled\u2014like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels\nwith the stones which are thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of\nHellenes should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods; they are\na pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds\nthere should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory\u2014the\nhouses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried\noff. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is\nproperly termed \u2018discord,\u2019 and only the second \u2018war;\u2019 and war between\nHellenes is in reality civil war\u2014a quarrel in a family, which is ever\nto be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted\nwith a view to reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of\nthose who would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against\na whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men, women, and\nchildren, but only against a few guilty persons; when they are punished\npeace will be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war\nagainst one another\u2014and against barbarians, as they war against one\nanother now.\n\n\u2018But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a\nState possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness\nof being one family\u2014fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to\nwar together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal\nState.\u2019 You are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I\nhave hardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the\nthird. When you see the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to\ntake pity. \u2018Not a whit.\u2019\n\nWell, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after\njustice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at\nall the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly\nbeautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any\nreality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully\nrealized; but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a\nmeasure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of\nwhich I dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes\nin the present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single\none\u2014the great wave, as I call it. Until, then, kings are philosophers,\nor philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor\nthe human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being. I know\nthat this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive.\n\u2018Socrates, all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with\nsticks and stones, and therefore I would advise you to prepare an\nanswer.\u2019 You got me into the scrape, I said. \u2018And I was right,\u2019 he\nreplied; \u2018however, I will stand by you as a sort of do-nothing,\nwell-meaning ally.\u2019 Having the help of such a champion, I will do my\nbest to maintain my position. And first, I must explain of whom I speak\nand what sort of natures these are who are to be philosophers and\nrulers. As you are a man of pleasure, you will not have forgotten how\nindiscriminate lovers are in their attachments; they love all, and turn\nblemishes into beauties. The snub-nosed youth is said to have a winning\ngrace; the beak of another has a royal look; the featureless are\nfaultless; the dark are manly, the fair angels; the sickly have a new\nterm of endearment invented expressly for them, which is \u2018honey-pale.\u2019\nLovers of wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of their\naffection in every form. Now here comes the point:\u2014The philosopher too\nis a lover of knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity.\n\u2018But will curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and\nsounds, who let out their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac\nfestivals, to be called philosophers?\u2019 They are not true philosophers,\nbut only an imitation. \u2018Then how are we to describe the true?\u2019\n\nYou would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice,\nbeauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various\ncombinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are\nphilosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, and\nunderstand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or\nwaking vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the\nlight of knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only.\nPerhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify\nhim without revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, if\nhe has knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of\nsomething which is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and\nthere is a third thing, which both is and is not, and is matter of\nopinion only. Opinion and knowledge, then, having distinct objects,\nmust also be distinct faculties. And by faculties I mean powers unseen\nand distinguishable only by the difference in their objects, as opinion\nand knowledge differ, since the one is liable to err, but the other is\nunerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being is the\nobject of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these are the\nextremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than\nthe one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent\nmatter is and is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence\nand of non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend, who denies\nabstract beauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a many\njust, whether everything he sees is not in some point of view\ndifferent\u2014the beautiful ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is\nnot the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative\nterms which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the\nold riddle\u2014\u2018A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a\nbird with a stone and not a stone.\u2019 The mind cannot be fixed on either\nalternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted\nobjects, which have a disorderly movement in the region between being\nand not-being, are the proper matter of opinion, as the immutable\nobjects are the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the\nworld of sense, and has only this uncertain perception of things, is\nnot a philosopher, but a lover of opinion only...\n\nThe fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the\ncommunity of property and of family are first maintained, and the\ntransition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these\nPlato, after his manner, has been preparing in some chance words of\nBook IV, which fall unperceived on the reader\u2019s mind, as they are\nsupposed at first to have fallen on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus.\nThe \u2018paradoxes,\u2019 as Morgenstern terms them, of this book of the\nRepublic will be reserved for another place; a few remarks on the\nstyle, and some explanations of difficulties, may be briefly added.\n\nFirst, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of\nscheme or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third\nand greatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All\nthat can be said of the extravagance of Plato\u2019s proposals is\nanticipated by himself. Nothing is more admirable than the hesitation\nwith which he proposes the solemn text, \u2018Until kings are philosophers,\u2019\netc.; or the reaction from the sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon\ndescribes the manner in which the new truth will be received by\nmankind.\n\nSome defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the\ncommunistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to\nthe lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of\nbeing made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal\nfestival may marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of\nits parents, at another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at\nthe same time he does not wish to bring before us the fact that the\ncity would be divided into families of those born seven and nine months\nafter each hymeneal festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously\nabout such fancies, we might remark that while all the old affinities\nare abolished, the newly prohibited affinity rests not on any natural\nor rational principle, but only upon the accident of children having\nbeen born in the same month and year. Nor does he explain how the lots\ncould be so manipulated by the legislature as to bring together the\nfairest and best. The singular expression which is employed to describe\nthe age of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet.\n\nIn the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature\nof philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of\nGlaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or\nfeelings. They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth.\nThat science is a whole, remains a true principle of inductive as well\nas of metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is\nstill the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in\nancient times.\n\nAt the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent\nmatter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics\nand Theology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first\ntime in the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees\nof knowledge in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the\nobject. With him a word must answer to an idea; and he could not\nconceive of an opinion which was an opinion about nothing. The\ninfluence of analogy led him to invent \u2018parallels and conjugates\u2019 and\nto overlook facts. To us some of his difficulties are puzzling only\nfrom their simplicity: we do not perceive that the answer to them \u2018is\ntumbling out at our feet.\u2019 To the mind of early thinkers, the\nconception of not-being was dark and mysterious; they did not see that\nthis terrible apparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge\nwas only a logical determination. The common term under which, through\nthe accidental use of language, two entirely different ideas were\nincluded was another source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity of\n(Greek) Plato, attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of\nhuman thought, seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to\nhave failed to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the\nTheaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to clear up; in the\nSophist the second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both\nthese dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic.\n\nBOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true\nbeing, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty,\ntruth, and that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask\nwhether they or the many shall be rulers in our State. But who can\ndoubt that philosophers should be chosen, if they have the other\nqualities which are required in a ruler? For they are lovers of the\nknowledge of the eternal and of all truth; they are haters of\nfalsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in the interests of\nknowledge; they are spectators of all time and all existence; and in\nthe magnificence of their contemplation the life of man is as nothing\nto them, nor is death fearful. Also they are of a social, gracious\ndisposition, equally free from cowardice and arrogance. They learn and\nremember easily; they have harmonious, well-regulated minds; truth\nflows to them sweetly by nature. Can the god of Jealousy himself find\nany fault with such an assemblage of good qualities?\n\nHere Adeimantus interposes:\u2014\u2018No man can answer you, Socrates; but every\nman feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is\ndriven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say,\njust as an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by\na more skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right. He may\nknow, in this very instance, that those who make philosophy the\nbusiness of their lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men,\nand fools if they are good. What do you say?\u2019 I should say that he is\nquite right. \u2018Then how is such an admission reconcileable with the\ndoctrine that philosophers should be kings?\u2019\n\nI shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a\nhand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to\ntheir governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must\ntake an illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of\na ship, taller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a\nlittle deaf, a little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman\u2019s art.\nThe sailors want to steer, although they know nothing of the art; and\nthey have a theory that it cannot be learned. If the helm is refused\nthem, they drug the captain\u2019s posset, bind him hand and foot, and take\npossession of the ship. He who joins in the mutiny is termed a good\npilot and what not; they have no conception that the true pilot must\nobserve the winds and the stars, and must be their master, whether they\nlike it or not;\u2014such an one would be called by them fool, prater,\nstar-gazer. This is my parable; which I will beg you to interpret for\nme to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil\nname, and to explain to them that not he, but those who will not use\nhim, are to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not beg\nof mankind to be put in authority over them. The wise man should not\nseek the rich, as the proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or\npoor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has need of him.\nNow the pilot is the philosopher\u2014he whom in the parable they call\nstar-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom\nhe is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of\nphilosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons when\nthey are corrupted by the world. Need I recall the original image of\nthe philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth\nand hated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of\nphenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature to the\ncontemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is\nthe leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were\nobserving, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see that the\npersons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and\nuseless class, are utter rogues.\n\nThe point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption\nin nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our\ndescription of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to\ndestroy these rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a\ncause of evil\u2014health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues\nthemselves, when placed under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the\nanimal or vegetable world the strongest seeds most need the\naccompaniment of good air and soil, so the best of human characters\nturn out the worst when they fall upon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak\nnatures hardly ever do any considerable good or harm; they are not the\nstuff out of which either great criminals or great heroes are made. The\nphilosopher follows the same analogy: he is either the best or the\nworst of all men. Some persons say that the Sophists are the corrupters\nof youth; but is not public opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere\npresent\u2014in those very persons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the\ncamp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the\nsurrounding hills? Will not a young man\u2019s heart leap amid these\ndiscordant sounds? and will any education save him from being carried\naway by the torrent? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to\nopinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What\nprinciple of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an\nunequal contest? Characters there may be more than human, who are\nexceptions\u2014God may save a man, but not his own strength. Further, I\nwould have you consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to\nthe world their own opinions; he is the keeper of the monster, who\nknows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the meaning of his\ninarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he dislikes;\ntruth and beauty are determined only by the taste of the brute. Such is\nthe Sophist\u2019s wisdom, and such is the condition of those who make\npublic opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The\ncurse is laid upon them of being and doing what it approves, and when\nthey attempt first principles the failure is ludicrous. Think of all\nthis and ask yourself whether the world is more likely to be a believer\nin the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity of phenomena. And the\nworld if not a believer in the idea cannot be a philosopher, and must\ntherefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There is another evil:\u2014the\nworld does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so they flatter the\nyoung (Alcibiades) into a magnificent opinion of his own capacity; the\ntall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of kingdoms and\nempires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, \u2018Now the gods\nlighten thee; thou art a great fool\u2019 and must be educated\u2014do you think\nthat he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted\ntowards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and\ncorrupt him? Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no\nless than riches, may divert him? Men of this class (Critias) often\nbecome politicians\u2014they are the authors of great mischief in states,\nand sometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by\nher natural protectors, and others enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar\nlittle minds see the land open and rush from the prisons of the arts\ninto her temple. A clever mechanic having a soul coarse as his body,\nthinks that he will gain caste by becoming her suitor. For philosophy,\neven in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own\u2014and he, like a bald\nlittle blacksmith\u2019s apprentice as he is, having made some money and got\nout of durance, washes and dresses himself as a bridegroom and marries\nhis master\u2019s daughter. What will be the issue of such marriages? Will\nthey not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature? \u2018They will.\u2019\nSmall, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers; there may be a few\nwho are citizens of small states, in which politics are not worth\nthinking of, or who have been detained by Theages\u2019 bridle of ill\nhealth; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost unique, and too\nrare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the\npleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves\nand place of wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from\nthe storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own\ninnocence and to depart in peace. \u2018A great work, too, will have been\naccomplished by them.\u2019 Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a\nsocial being, and can only attain his highest development in the\nsociety which is best suited to him.\n\nEnough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name.\nAnother question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one\nof them; at present she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in a\nstrange soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of\nheavenly growth. \u2018And is her proper state ours or some other?\u2019 Ours in\nall points but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our\nsaying that some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in\nstates. But we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty,\nand now the question recurs and has not grown easier:\u2014How may\nphilosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her into the light of day,\nand make an end of the inquiry.\n\nIn the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the\npresent mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in\nearly youth, and in the intervals of business, but they never master\nthe real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they\noccasionally go to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun\nof philosophy, unlike that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again.\nThis order of education should be reversed; it should begin with\ngymnastics in youth, and as the man strengthens, he should increase the\ngymnastics of his soul. Then, when active life is over, let him finally\nreturn to philosophy. \u2018You are in earnest, Socrates, but the world will\nbe equally earnest in withstanding you\u2014no more than Thrasymachus.\u2019 Do\nnot make a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies\nand are now good friends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him\nand all mankind of the truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for\nthe future when, in another life, we may again take part in similar\ndiscussions. \u2018That will be a long time hence.\u2019 Not long in comparison\nwith eternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for they have\nnever seen the natural unity of ideas, but only artificial\njuxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of\ncontroversy and quips of law;\u2014a perfect man ruling in a perfect state,\neven a single one they have not known. And we foresaw that there was no\nchance of perfection either in states or individuals until a necessity\nwas laid upon philosophers\u2014not the rogues, but those whom we called the\nuseless class\u2014of holding office; or until the sons of kings were\ninspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of\npast time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be\nhereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that\nthere has been, is, and will be such a state whenever the Muse of\nphilosophy rules. Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my\nfriend, do not revile the world! They will soon change their opinion if\nthey are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of the\nphilosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? Or be jealous of one who\nhas no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but\nthe false philosophers\u2014the pretenders who force their way in without\ninvitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles,\nwhich is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher\ndespises earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in\naccordance with which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not\nhimself only, but other men), and is the creator of the virtues private\nas well as public. When mankind see that the happiness of states is\nonly to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for\nattempting to delineate it? \u2018Certainly not. But what will be the\nprocess of delineation?\u2019 The artist will do nothing until he has made a\ntabula rasa; on this he will inscribe the constitution of a state,\nglancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving\nthe godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and\npainting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine\nand human. But perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an\nartist. What will they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth,\nhaving a nature akin to the best?\u2014and if they admit this will they\nstill quarrel with us for making philosophers our kings? \u2018They will be\nless disposed to quarrel.\u2019 Let us assume then that they are pacified.\nStill, a person may hesitate about the probability of the son of a king\nbeing a philosopher. And we do not deny that they are very liable to be\ncorrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages there might be one\nexception\u2014and one is enough. If one son of a king were a philosopher,\nand had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being.\nHence we conclude that our laws are not only the best, but that they\nare also possible, though not free from difficulty.\n\nI gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose\nconcerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that\nwe must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the\neducation of our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers\nof their country, and were to be tested in the refiner\u2019s fire of\npleasures and pains, and those who came forth pure and remained fixed\nin their principles were to have honours and rewards in life and after\ndeath. But at this point, the argument put on her veil and turned into\nanother path. I hesitated to make the assertion which I now\nhazard,\u2014that our guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the\ncontradictory elements, which met in the philosopher\u2014how difficult to\nfind them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit are not often\ncombined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is averse to\nintellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are all necessary,\nand therefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in\npleasures and dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the\nhighest branches of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of\nthe virtues mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied\nto leave unexplored. \u2018Enough seemed to have been said.\u2019 Enough, my\nfriend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men\nthe guardian must not faint in the search after truth; he must be\nprepared to take the longer road, or he will never reach that higher\nregion which is above the four virtues; and of the virtues too he must\nnot only get an outline, but a clear and distinct vision. (Strange that\nwe should be so precise about trifles, so careless about the highest\ntruths!) \u2018And what are the highest?\u2019 You to pretend unconsciousness,\nwhen you have so often heard me speak of the idea of good, about which\nwe know so little, and without which though a man gain the world he has\nno profit of it! Some people imagine that the good is wisdom; but this\ninvolves a circle,\u2014the good, they say, is wisdom, wisdom has to do with\nthe good. According to others the good is pleasure; but then comes the\nabsurdity that good is bad, for there are bad pleasures as well as\ngood. Again, the good must have reality; a man may desire the\nappearance of virtue, but he will not desire the appearance of good.\nOught our guardians then to be ignorant of this supreme principle, of\nwhich every man has a presentiment, and without which no man has any\nreal knowledge of anything? \u2018But, Socrates, what is this supreme\nprinciple, knowledge or pleasure, or what? You may think me\ntroublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always repeating\nthe doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.\u2019 Can I say what\nI do not know? \u2018You may offer an opinion.\u2019 And will the blindness and\ncrookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and\ncertainty of science? \u2018I will only ask you to give such an explanation\nof the good as you have given already of temperance and justice.\u2019 I\nwish that I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to the height\nof the knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal I cannot\nintroduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which I may\ncompare with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account,\nand do not let me give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember\nour old distinction of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the\nparticular and the universal, the objects of sight and the objects of\nthought? Did you ever consider that the objects of sight imply a\nfaculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our senses,\nrequiring not only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is light;\nwithout which the sight will not distinguish between colours and all\nwill be a blank? For light is the noble bond between the perceiving\nfaculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us light is the\nsun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be confounded with the\neye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call the child of the\ngood, standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to\nthe intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the\nintellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that\nwhich is the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause\nof knowledge and truth, yet other and fairer than they are, and\nstanding in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light.\nO inconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above\ntruth! (\u2018You cannot surely mean pleasure,\u2019 he said. Peace, I replied.)\nAnd this idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and\nthe author not of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than\neither in dignity and power. \u2018That is a reach of thought more than\nhuman; but, pray, go on with the image, for I suspect that there is\nmore behind.\u2019 There is, I said; and bearing in mind our two suns or\nprinciples, imagine further their corresponding worlds\u2014one of the\nvisible, the other of the intelligible; you may assist your fancy by\nfiguring the distinction under the image of a line divided into two\nunequal parts, and may again subdivide each part into two lesser\nsegments representative of the stages of knowledge in either sphere.\nThe lower portion of the lower or visible sphere will consist of\nshadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller portion will contain\nreal objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the\nintelligible will also have two divisions,\u2014one of mathematics, in which\nthere is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but\nonly drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with\nfigures and numbers, the images of which are taken not from the\nshadows, but from the objects, although the truth of them is seen only\nwith the mind\u2019s eye; and they are used as hypotheses without being\nanalysed. Whereas in the other division reason uses the hypotheses as\nstages or steps in the ascent to the idea of good, to which she fastens\nthem, and then again descends, walking firmly in the region of ideas,\nand of ideas only, in her ascent as well as descent, and finally\nresting in them. \u2018I partly understand,\u2019 he replied; \u2018you mean that the\nideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical\nconceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to\nbe the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make\nsubjects of pure intellect, because they have no first principle,\nalthough when resting on a first principle, they pass into the higher\nsphere.\u2019 You understand me very well, I said. And now to those four\ndivisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties\u2014pure\nintelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second;\nto the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of shadows\u2014and the\nclearness of the several faculties will be in the same ratio as the\ntruth of the objects to which they are related...\n\nLike Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In\nlanguage which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and\ncountry, he is described as \u2018the spectator of all time and all\nexistence.\u2019 He has the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest\nuse of them. All his desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which\nis the love of truth. None of the graces of a beautiful soul are\nwanting in him; neither can he fear death, or think much of human life.\nThe ideal of modern times hardly retains the simplicity of the antique;\nthere is not the same originality either in truth or error which\ncharacterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in the\nunseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance;\nnor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by\nregular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has\nabated; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive\nreflection upon nature and human life as a whole; more of exact\nobservation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the\naltered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost; and\nthere may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the\nlanguage of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who\nfixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion,\nnot on fragments or pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy;\non the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of\nthe many. He is aware of the importance of \u2018classifying according to\nnature,\u2019 and will try to \u2018separate the limbs of science without\nbreaking them\u2019 (Phaedr.). There is no part of truth, whether great or\nsmall, which he will dishonour; and in the least things he will discern\nthe greatest (Parmen.). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world\npervaded by analogies, but he can also tell \u2018why in some cases a single\ninstance is sufficient for an induction\u2019 (Mill\u2019s Logic), while in other\ncases a thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a\nportion of knowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be\nembraced by a single mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the\ndivisions of science and of their relation to the mind of man than was\npossible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of\nknowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study\nof elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of the working of\nmany minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are\npreliminary to almost every other; at the same time, he will not reduce\nall varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have\na nobility of character, without which genius loses the better half of\ngreatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each\nindividual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not\nthink much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death.\n\nAdeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning,\nthus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method.\nHe brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against\nhim by a modern logician\u2014that he extracts the answer because he knows\nhow to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change\ntheir meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions\ninferred with rather too much certainty or universality; the variation\nat each step may be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes\nconsiderable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or\nalgebraic formulae to logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher and\nmore elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the\nprecision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language\nimpairs the force of an argument which has many steps.\n\nThe objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular\ninstance, may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic\nmode of reasoning. And here, as elsewhere, Plato seems to intimate that\nthe time had come when the negative and interrogative method of\nSocrates must be superseded by a positive and constructive one, of\nwhich examples are given in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus\nfurther argues that the ideal is wholly at variance with facts; for\nexperience proves philosophers to be either useless or rogues. Contrary\nto all expectation Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth of\nthis, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically\ndepreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are\ndistinguished from the professional politicians, and, as elsewhere, are\nspoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of\n\u2018the noble captain who is not very quick in his perceptions.\u2019\n\nThe uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that\nmankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided\nbetween contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and\nknow no other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates\nargues that the best is most liable to corruption; and that the finer\nnature is more likely to suffer from alien conditions. We too observe\nthat there are some kinds of excellence which spring from a peculiar\ndelicacy of constitution; as is evidently true of the poetical and\nimaginative temperament, which often seems to depend on impressions,\nand hence can only breathe or live in a certain atmosphere. The man of\ngenius has greater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and\ngreater weaknesses, and often a greater play of character than is to be\nfound in ordinary men. He can assume the disguise of virtue or\ndisinterestedness without having them, or veil personal enmity in the\nlanguage of patriotism and philosophy,\u2014he can say the word which all\nmen are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into the follies\nand weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a\nNapoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in\nstates, or \u2018of great good, when they are drawn in that direction.\u2019\n\nYet the thesis, \u2018corruptio optimi pessima,\u2019 cannot be maintained\ngenerally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is\ncorrupted. The alien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may\nbe the elements of culture to another. In general a man can only\nreceive his highest development in a congenial state or family, among\nfriends or fellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by\nadverse circumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them\nand reforms them. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract\ngood out of evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society,\nand live on happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger\nnatures may be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences\u2014may become\nmisanthrope and philanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the\nfounders of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some\npeculiarity in themselves or in their age, may break away entirely from\nthe world and from the church, sometimes into great good, sometimes\ninto great evil, sometimes into both. And the same holds in the lesser\nsphere of a convent, a school, a family.\n\nPlato would have us consider how easily the best natures are\noverpowered by public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind\nwill make to get possession of them. The world, the church, their own\nprofession, any political or party organization, are always carrying\nthem off their legs and teaching them to apply high and holy names to\ntheir own prejudices and interests. The \u2018monster\u2019 corporation to which\nthey belong judges right and truth to be the pleasure of the community.\nThe individual becomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world\nis too much for him, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This\nis, perhaps, a one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims\nand practice of mankind when they \u2018sit down together at an assembly,\u2019\neither in ancient or modern times.\n\nWhen the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take\npossession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one\nof those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic\nexpression, \u2018veils herself,\u2019 and which is dropped and reappears at\nintervals. The question is asked,\u2014Why are the citizens of states so\nhostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And\nyet there is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they\nwere taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation\nof philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in\nthem; a (divine) person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the\nfriend of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame\nthe state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling\nrespecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first\nthought is that the people are the enemies of truth and right; the\nsecond, that this only arises out of an accidental error and confusion,\nand that they do not really hate those who love them, if they could be\neducated to know them.\n\nIn the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be\nconsidered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way,\nwhich is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book\nIV; 2nd, the heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation\nof the divisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding\nfaculties of the soul:\n\n1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse.\nNeither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus\nor Sophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would\nprobably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a\nsystem of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole\nrather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised\nby him in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of\nthe soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues\nfrom experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the\nsixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all\nideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a\nconnected whole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is\nthe test of truth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of\nthe process. Like many other thinkers both in ancient and modern times\nhis mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to\nrealize. He supposes the sciences to have a natural order and connexion\nin an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to\nthe \u2018end of the intellectual world\u2019 without even making a beginning of\nthem.\n\nIn modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of\nacquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute\nknowledge. In all science a priori and a posteriori truths mingle in\nvarious proportions. The a priori part is that which is derived from\nthe most universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by\nthem; the a posteriori is that which grows up around the more general\nprinciples and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato\nerroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis,\nand that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining\nsuch a vision of a priori knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at\nleast his meaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts\nof Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern\nphilosophy. Anticipations or divinations, or prophetic glimpses of\ntruths whether concerning man or nature, seem to stand in the same\nrelation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear to modern\ninductive science. These \u2018guesses at truth\u2019 were not made at random;\nthey arose from a superficial impression of uniformities and first\nprinciples in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the\nexpanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor\ncan we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and\nthe human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if\nphilosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience.\n\n2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist\nwill fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid\nup in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with\nwondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the\nomission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form\nwhich experience supplies (Phaedo). Plato represents these ideals in a\nfigure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will\nsometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand\nof the artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a\nsynthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the\nwhole in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind\nand hand will be simultaneous.\n\n3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato\u2019s divisions of knowledge\nare based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and\nintellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which\nis implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the\nuniversal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived\nseemed to require a further distinction;\u2014numbers and figures were\nbeginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard\njustice as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that\nthe abstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind.\nBetween the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the\nPythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle\nremarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led\nto introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the\nscheme of his philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in\neducation; they were the best preparation for higher studies. The\nsubjective relation between them further suggested an objective one;\nalthough the passage from one to the other is really imaginary\n(Metaph.). For metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with\nmathematics; number and figure are the abstractions of time and space,\nnot the expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested\nof metaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right\nand justice than a crooked line with vice. The figurative association\nwas mistaken for a real one; and thus the three latter divisions of the\nPlatonic proportion were constructed.\n\nThere is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first\nterm of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no\nreference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation\nof shadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas.\nProbably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (Timaeus) to make\nfour terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both\ndivisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also\npreparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the\nbeginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the\ntenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and\nis divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each\nlower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four\nfaculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position\n(cp. for the use of the word faith or belief, (Greek), Timaeus),\ncontrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows\n(Greek) and the higher certainty of understanding (Greek) and reason\n(Greek).\n\nThe difference between understanding and mind or reason (Greek) is\nanalogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts\nand the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is\nat rest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this\nself-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed\nto correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is\nincomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the\nsubordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and\nhypotheses\u2014images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because\nthey are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with\nthe idea of good.\n\nThe general meaning of the passage, \u2018Noble, then, is the bond which\nlinks together sight...And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible...\u2019\nso far as the thought contained in it admits of being translated into\nthe terms of modern philosophy, may be described or explained as\nfollows:\u2014There is a truth, one and self-existent, to which by the help\nof a ladder let down from above, the human intelligence may ascend.\nThis unity is like the sun in the heavens, the light by which all\nthings are seen, the being by which they are created and sustained. It\nis the IDEA of good. And the steps of the ladder leading up to this\nhighest or universal existence are the mathematical sciences, which\nalso contain in themselves an element of the universal. These, too, we\nsee in a new manner when we connect them with the idea of good. They\nthen cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential parts of\na higher truth which is at once their first principle and their final\ncause.\n\nWe cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but\nwe may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are\ncommon to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the\nsciences, or rather of science, for in Plato\u2019s time they were not yet\nparted off or distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or\nlife or idea or cause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer\nconceived as in the Timaeus and elsewhere under the form of a person;\n(3) the recognition of the hypothetical and conditional character of\nthe mathematical sciences, and in a measure of every science when\nisolated from the rest; (4) the conviction of a truth which is\ninvisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature, which permeates\nthe intellectual rather than the visible world.\n\nThe method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller\nexplanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the\nseventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance\nof Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject.\nThe allusion to Theages\u2019 bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic\nsign, of Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory;\nthe remark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present\nevil state of the world is due to God only; the reference to a future\nstate of existence, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, and\nin which the discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be\nresumed; the surprise in the answers; the fanciful irony of Socrates,\nwhere he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of the\nphilosopher in a figure of speech; the original observation that the\nSophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders\nof public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the\nshower of sleet under a wall; the figure of \u2018the great beast\u2019 followed\nby the expression of good-will towards the common people who would not\nhave rejected the philosopher if they had known him; the \u2018right noble\nthought\u2019 that the highest truths demand the greatest exactness; the\nhesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of\nthe idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the comparison\nof philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath her\u2014are some of\nthe most interesting characteristics of the sixth book.\n\nYet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft\ndiscussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and\nAdeimantus, would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them,\nwe are dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be\nrevealed to a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined\nto think that neither we nor they could have been led along that path\nto any satisfactory goal. For we have learned that differences of\nquantity cannot pass into differences of quality, and that the\nmathematical sciences can never rise above themselves into the sphere\nof our higher thoughts, although they may sometimes furnish symbols and\nexpressions of them, and may train the mind in habits of abstraction\nand self-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an ancient\nphilosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by\nwhich we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really\nimaginary, may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We\nremark, first, that in all ages, and especially in primitive\nphilosophy, words such as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted an\nextraordinary influence over the minds of men. The meagreness or\nnegativeness of their content has been in an inverse ratio to their\npower. They have become the forms under which all things were\ncomprehended. There was a need or instinct in the human soul which they\nsatisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, and to this new mythology the\nmen of a later generation began to attach the powers and associations\nof the elder deities.\n\nThe idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought,\nwhich were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant\nunity, in which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the\ntruth of all things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and\nbecame evident to intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of\nall things, the power by which they were brought into being. It was the\nuniversal reason divested of a human personality. It was the life as\nwell as the light of the world, all knowledge and all power were\ncomprehended in it. The way to it was through the mathematical\nsciences, and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God was\nthe maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could\nbe conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God\nof the Timaeus is not really at variance with the idea of good; they\nare aspects of the same, differing only as the personal from the\nimpersonal, or the masculine from the neuter, the one being the\nexpression or language of mythology, the other of philosophy.\n\nThis, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as\nconceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may\nalso be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given\nof it goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at\nthe stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is\naiming at, better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what\nhe saw darkly and at a distance. But if he could have been told that\nthis, or some conception of the same kind, but higher than this, was\nthe truth at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to\nsupply, he would gladly have recognized that more was contained in his\nown thoughts than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner\nreticent and tentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We\nshould not approach his meaning more nearly by attempting to define it\nfurther. In translating him into the language of modern thought, we\nmight insensibly lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It is\nremarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first\nprinciple of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings\nexcept in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of\nhis disciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to\nthem. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any\nreference to this or any other passage in his extant writings.\n\nBOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or\nunenlightenment of our nature:\u2014Imagine human beings living in an\nunderground den which is open towards the light; they have been there\nfrom childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see\ninto the den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and\nthe prisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like\nthe screen over which marionette players show their puppets. Behind the\nwall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of\nart, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some\nof the passers-by are talking and others silent. \u2018A strange parable,\u2019\nhe said, \u2018and strange captives.\u2019 They are ourselves, I replied; and\nthey see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the\nwall of the den; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which\nreturns from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to\nproceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round\nand make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the real\nimages; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be\ndazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something\nwhich they are able to behold without blinking? And suppose further,\nthat they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of\nthe sun himself, will not their sight be darkened with the excess of\nlight? Some time will pass before they get the habit of perceiving at\nall; and at first they will be able to perceive only shadows and\nreflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the\nstars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he\nis. Last of all they will conclude:\u2014This is he who gives us the year\nand the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they\nrejoice in passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them will\nseem the honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that\nthey descend into their old habitations;\u2014in that underground dwelling\nthey will not see as well as their fellows, and will not be able to\ncompete with them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there\nwill be many jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and\nlost his eyes, and if they find anybody trying to set free and\nenlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, if they can\ncatch him. Now the cave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the\nsun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the world of\nknowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, but when\nseen is inferred to be the author of good and right\u2014parent of the lord\nof light in this world, and of truth and understanding in the other. He\nwho attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he is\nunwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for\nhis eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they\nbehold in them\u2014he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never\nin their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance.\nBut blindness is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out\nof darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of\nsense will distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both\nof them, but the blindness which arises from fulness of light he will\ndeem blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul\nlooking at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh than the\ninhabitants of the den at those who descend from above. There is a\nfurther lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that\ninstruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the\nfaculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to\nbe turned round towards the light. And this is conversion; other\nvirtues are almost like bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same\nmanner, but intelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible,\nturning either to good or evil according to the direction given. Did\nyou never observe how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes,\nand the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now if you take\nsuch an one, and cut away from him those leaden weights of pleasure and\ndesire which bind his soul to earth, his intelligence will be turned\nround, and he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his\nmeaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers must neither be so\nuneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to\nbe unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the world? We\nmust choose out therefore the natures who are most likely to ascend to\nthe light and knowledge of the good; but we must not allow them to\nremain in the region of light; they must be forced down again among the\ncaptives in the den to partake of their labours and honours. \u2018Will they\nnot think this a hardship?\u2019 You should remember that our purpose in\nframing the State was not that our citizens should do what they like,\nbut that they should serve the State for the common good of all. May we\nnot fairly say to our philosopher,\u2014Friend, we do you no wrong; for in\nother States philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to\nthe gardener, but you have been trained by us to be the rulers and\nkings of our hive, and therefore we must insist on your descending into\nthe den. You must, each of you, take your turn, and become able to use\nyour eyes in the dark, and with a little practice you will see far\nbetter than those who quarrel about the shadows, whose knowledge is a\ndream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It may be that the saint\nor philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least inclined to\nrule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live in the\nheaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. For those\nwho rule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you can\noffer to our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is,\nthere will be a chance that the rich, not only in this world\u2019s goods,\nbut in virtue and wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is\nbetter than the life of political ambition is that of philosophy, which\nis also the best preparation for the government of a State.\n\nThen now comes the question,\u2014How shall we create our rulers; what way\nis there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy;\nit is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a\nsoul from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will\ndraw the soul upwards? Our former education had two branches,\ngymnastic, which was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art,\nwhich infused a natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither\nof these sciences gave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing\nremains to us but that universal or primary science of which all the\narts and sciences are partakers, I mean number or calculation. \u2018Very\ntrue.\u2019 Including the art of war? \u2018Yes, certainly.\u2019 Then there is\nsomething ludicrous about Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and\nsaying that he had invented number, and had counted the ranks and set\nthem in order. For if Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without\nnumber how could he?) he must have been a pretty sort of general\nindeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and indeed he is\nhardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these practical\napplications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be\nregarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what I\nmean by the last expression:\u2014Things sensible are of two kinds; the one\nclass invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind\nacquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest\ncontrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes\nthree fingers\u2014a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger\u2014the sight\nequally recognizes all three fingers, but without number cannot further\ndistinguish them. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great\nand small, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by\nthe sense, but by the mind. And the perception of their contrast or\nrelation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the\nconfused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to\nfind out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number\nreplies that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from\none another. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a\nconfused chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question\narise of their respective natures; we are thus led on to the\ndistinction between the visible and intelligible. That was what I meant\nwhen I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was thinking of the\ncontradictions which arise in perception. The idea of unity, for\nexample, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought unless\ninvolving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also the\nopposite of one, the contradiction gives rise to reflection; an example\nof this is afforded by any object of sight. All number has also an\nelevating effect; it raises the mind out of the foam and flux of\ngeneration to the contemplation of being, having lesser military and\nretail uses also. The retail use is not required by us; but as our\nguardian is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one\nmay be retained. And to our higher purpose no science can be better\nadapted; but it must be pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, not of\na shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible objects, but with\nabstract truth; for numbers are pure abstractions\u2014the true\narithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division.\nWhen you divide, he insists that you are only multiplying; his \u2018one\u2019 is\nnot material or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying and\nabsolute equality; and this proves the purely intellectual character of\nhis study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening\nthe wits; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal test of\ngeneral ability, or equally improving to a stupid person.\n\nLet our second branch of education be geometry. \u2018I can easily see,\u2019\nreplied Glaucon, \u2018that the skill of the general will be doubled by his\nknowledge of geometry.\u2019 That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to\nwhich I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of\nthe idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being,\nand not at generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these\nstudies, as any one who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is\nmean and ridiculous; they are made to look downwards to the arts, and\nnot upwards to eternal existence. The geometer is always talking of\nsquaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in view action; whereas\nknowledge is the real object of the study. It should elevate the soul,\nand create the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what has fallen\ndown, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in\nthe improvement of the faculties.\n\nShall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? \u2018Very\ngood,\u2019 replied Glaucon; \u2018the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at\nonce for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.\u2019 I like your way of\ngiving useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the\nworld. And there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education\nis not only useful information but a purification of the eye of the\nsoul, which is better than the bodily eye, for by this alone is truth\nseen. Now, will you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher?\nor would you prefer to look to yourself only? \u2018Every man is his own\nbest friend.\u2019 Then take a step backward, for we are out of order, and\ninsert the third dimension which is of solids, after the second which\nis of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion. But solid\ngeometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is\nthe use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the\nvotaries of the study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of\nthe pursuit wins upon men, and, if government would lend a little\nassistance, there might be great progress made. \u2018Very true,\u2019 replied\nGlaucon; \u2018but do I understand you now to begin with plane geometry, and\nto place next geometry of solids, and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion\nof solids?\u2019 Yes, I said; my hastiness has only hindered us.\n\n\u2018Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am\nwilling to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the\ncontemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.\u2019 I am an\nexception, then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw\nthe soul not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at\nthe ceiling\u2014no better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water\u2014he\nmay look up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision\nof knowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the\nmind. All the magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a\ncopy which falls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing\nabout the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like\nthe beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great\nartist, which may be used for illustration, but no mathematician would\nseek to obtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical\nrelations. How ridiculous then to look for these in the map of the\nheavens, in which the imperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a\ndisturbing element, marring the symmetry of day and night, of months\nand years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only by problems can\nwe place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the heavens alone,\nand exert the intellect.\n\nStill, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans\nsay, and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion,\nadapted to the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other\napplications also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not\nforgetting that we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the\nrelation of these sciences to the idea of good. The error which\npervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The musicians put their\nears in the place of their minds. \u2018Yes,\u2019 replied Glaucon, \u2018I like to\nsee them laying their ears alongside of their neighbours\u2019 faces\u2014some\nsaying, \u201cThat\u2019s a new note,\u201d others declaring that the two notes are\nthe same.\u2019 Yes, I said; but you mean the empirics who are always\ntwisting and torturing the strings of the lyre, and quarrelling about\nthe tempers of the strings; I am referring rather to the Pythagorean\nharmonists, who are almost equally in error. For they investigate only\nthe numbers of the consonances which are heard, and ascend no\nhigher,\u2014of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is only to\nbe found in problems, they have not even a conception. \u2018That last,\u2019 he\nsaid, \u2018must be a marvellous thing.\u2019 A thing, I replied, which is only\nuseful if pursued with a view to the good.\n\nAll these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if\nthey are regarded in their natural relations to one another. \u2018I dare\nsay, Socrates,\u2019 said Glaucon; \u2018but such a study will be an endless\nbusiness.\u2019 What study do you mean\u2014of the prelude, or what? For all\nthese things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a\nmere mathematician is also a dialectician? \u2018Certainly not. I have\nhardly ever known a mathematician who could reason.\u2019 And yet, Glaucon,\nis not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the\nintellectual world, and which was by us compared to the effort of\nsight, when from beholding the shadows on the wall we arrived at last\nat the images which gave the shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty\nwithdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at the\ncontemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end\nof the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the\nlight, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to\ncontemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an image\nonly\u2014this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by\nthe help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to\nthe contemplation of the highest ideal of being.\n\n\u2018So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed\nto the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the\npaths which lead thither?\u2019 Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here.\nThere can be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not\nbeen disciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science\nof absolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from\nthose now practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are\nrelative to human needs and opinions; and the mathematical sciences are\nbut a dream or hypothesis of true being, and never analyse their own\nprinciples. Dialectic alone rises to the principle which is above\nhypotheses, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of\nthe barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world,\nwith the help of the sciences which we have been describing\u2014sciences,\nas they are often termed, although they require some other name,\nimplying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than\nscience, and this in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we\nget four names\u2014two for intellect, and two for opinion,\u2014reason or mind,\nunderstanding, faith, perception of shadows\u2014which make a proportion\u2014\nbeing:becoming::intellect:opinion\u2014and science:belief::understanding:\nperception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that\nscience which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature,\nwhich distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle\nagainst all opponents in the cause of good. To him who is not a\ndialectician life is but a sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave\nbefore his is well waked up. And would you have the future rulers of\nyour ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts? \u2018Certainly not\nthe latter.\u2019 Then you must train them in dialectic, which will teach\nthem to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of the\nsciences.\n\nI dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and\nthe process of selection may be carried a step further:\u2014As before, they\nmust be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but\nnow they must also have natural ability which education will improve;\nthat is to say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil,\nretentive, solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral\nvirtues; not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and\nindolent in mind, or conversely; not a maimed soul, which hates\nfalsehood and yet unintentionally is always wallowing in the mire of\nignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb,\nand in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind.\nJustice herself can find no fault with natures such as these; and they\nwill be the saviours of our State; disciples of another sort would only\nmake philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my\nenthusiasm; I am becoming excited; but when I see her trampled\nunderfoot, I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. \u2018I did not notice\nthat you were more excited than you ought to have been.\u2019 But I felt\nthat I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the selection of\nour disciples\u2014that they must be young and not old. For Solon is\nmistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning; youth is the\ntime of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and\ndainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to work against the\ngrain. Learning should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural\nbent is detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at\nfirst only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over\nwhich during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily\nexercise, then the education of the soul will become a more serious\nmatter. At twenty years of age, a selection must be made of the more\npromising disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will begin. The\nsciences which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be\nbrought into relation with each other and with true being; for the\npower of combining them is the test of speculative and dialectical\nability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection shall be made of\nthose who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the\nabstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present\nexperience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many\nevils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:\u2014Imagine a\nperson who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of\nflatterers, and who is suddenly informed that he is a supposititious\nson. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the\nflatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is just what happens with\na man\u2019s principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home\nand which exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds\nthat imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and\nasks, \u2018What is the just and good?\u2019 or proves that virtue is vice and\nvice virtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love,\nhonour, and obey them as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the\nlife of pleasure, and becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of\nsuch speculators is very pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years\u2019\nold pupils may not require this pity, let us take every possible care\nthat young persons do not study philosophy too early. For a young man\nis a sort of puppy who only plays with an argument; and is reasoned\ninto and out of his opinions every day; he soon begins to believe\nnothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of\nthirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and not merely\ncontradict, and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his\nconduct. What time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of\nthe soul?\u2014say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body;\nsix, or perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen\nyears let the student go down into the den, and command armies, and\ngain experience of life. At fifty let him return to the end of all\nthings, and have his eyes uplifted to the idea of good, and order his\nlife after that pattern; if necessary, taking his turn at the helm of\nState, and training up others to be his successors. When his time comes\nhe shall depart in peace to the islands of the blest. He shall be\nhonoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship as the Pythian\noracle approves.\n\n\u2018You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our\ngovernors.\u2019 Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in\nall things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a\nmere aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise\nphilosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and\nwill be the servants of justice only. \u2018And how will they begin their\nwork?\u2019 Their first act will be to send away into the country all those\nwho are more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are\nleft...\n\nAt the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his\nexplanation of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an\nallegory, in this, as in other passages, following the order which he\nprescribes in education, and proceeding from the concrete to the\nabstract. At the commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave\nhaving an opening towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light,\nhe returns to view the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly,\nas in a picture, the result which had been hardly won by a great effort\nof thought in the previous discussion; at the same time casting a\nglance onward at the dialectical process, which is represented by the\nway leading from darkness to light. The shadows, the images, the\nreflection of the sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun\nthemselves, severally correspond,\u2014the first, to the realm of fancy and\npoetry,\u2014the second, to the world of sense,\u2014the third, to the\nabstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences\nfurnish the type,\u2014the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when\nseen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and\npower. The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of\nthe real stars, and not mere reflections of them, and ends with the\nrecognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of\nlight but of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the\nstages of education partly answer:\u2014first, there is the early education\nof childhood and youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and\ncustoms of the State;\u2014then there is the training of the body to be a\nwarrior athlete, and a good servant of the mind;\u2014and thirdly, after an\ninterval follows the education of later life, which begins with\nmathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general.\n\nThere seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,\u2014first, to\nrealize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the\ntrue education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a\ncomprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human\nmind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last\nthe particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He\nthen seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from\nsense, not perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis\nbut the common use of language. He never understands that abstractions,\nas Hegel says, are \u2018mere abstractions\u2019\u2014of use when employed in the\narrangement of facts, but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when\npursued apart from them, or with reference to an imaginary idea of\ngood. Still the exercise of the faculty of abstraction apart from facts\nhas enlarged the mind, and played a great part in the education of the\nhuman race. Plato appreciated the value of this faculty, and saw that\nit might be quickened by the study of number and relation. All things\nin which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of\nreflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or\nof mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and\ndistinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first\nsuggests such distinctions. The follow in order the other sciences of\nplain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which\nis astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,\u2014to this is appended the\nsister science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at\nthe possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical\nproportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy,\nsuch as the Pythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and\nPolitics, e.g. his distinction between arithmetical and geometrical\nproportion in the Ethics (Book V), or between numerical and\nproportional equality in the Politics.\n\nThe modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato\u2019s delight\nin the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to\nsay with him:\u2014Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number\nand figure in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their\napplication to the arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of\ngeometry, in which figures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant\nand shadowy way seeming to anticipate the possibility of working\ngeometrical problems by a more general mode of analysis. He will remark\nwith interest on the backward state of solid geometry, which, alas! was\nnot encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato; and he will\nrecognize the grasp of Plato\u2019s mind in his ability to conceive of one\nscience of solids in motion including the earth as well as the\nheavens,\u2014not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has\nbeen already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science of\nsolids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he be\nstruck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time\nwhen these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in\nrelation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle\nof truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise)\nthat in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has\nfallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens a\npriori by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of\nharmony irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The\nillusion was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and\ncertainty of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the\nvariation and complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance\nthat there was some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of\ndistance or time or vibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was\noverlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors\nequally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been very far\nwrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the subject,\nwhen we consider that the greater part of astronomy at the present day\nconsists of abstract dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical\ndiscoveries have been made.\n\nThe metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes\nmathematics as an instrument of education,\u2014which strengthens the power\nof attention, developes the sense of order and the faculty of\nconstruction, and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulae the\nquantitative differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging\ntheir value in education, he sees also that they have no connexion with\nour higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato\nmakes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of ancient\nPythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking\nof the ideal numbers; but he is describing numbers which are pure\nabstractions, to which he assigns a real and separate existence, which,\nas \u2018the teachers of the art\u2019 (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would\nhave affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity\nand every other number are conceived of as absolute. The truth and\ncertainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a\nkind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient philosopher. Nor is it\neasy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness may have had a moral\nand elevating influence on the minds of men, \u2018who,\u2019 in the words of the\nTimaeus, \u2018might learn to regulate their erring lives according to\nthem.\u2019 It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols\nstill exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in\nmodern times see the world pervaded by universal law, may also see an\nanticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic\nidea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet\nonly an abstraction (Philebus).\n\nTwo passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that\nwhich relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage\nmay be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of\nconception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the\nperceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which\naccompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is\nindistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of\nthem. Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the\nvision of objects in the order in which they actually present\nthemselves to the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to\nappear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The\nfirst action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this\nchaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under\nwhich the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises\nthe question, \u2018What is great, what is small?\u2019 and thus begins the\ndistinction of the visible and the intelligible.\n\nThe second difficulty relates to Plato\u2019s conception of harmonics. Three\nclasses of harmonists are distinguished by him:\u2014first, the\nPythagoreans, whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion\non music he was to consult Damon\u2014they are acknowledged to be masters in\nthe art, but are altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher\nimport and relation to the good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom\nGlaucon appears to confuse with them, and whom both he and Socrates\nludicrously describe as experimenting by mere auscultation on the\nintervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different degrees of\nthe Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely\nabstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part\nof universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.\n\nThe allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The\nden or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (compare\nthe description of the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus), and\nthe light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing\ninfluence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In\nother words, their principles are too wide for practical application;\nthey are looking far away into the past and future, when their business\nis with the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions\nof actual life, and may often be at variance with them. And at first,\nthose who return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den\nin the measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by\nthem; but after a while they see the things below in far truer\nproportions than those who have never ascended into the upper world.\nThe difference between the politician turned into a philosopher and the\nphilosopher turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of\ndisordered eyesight, the one which is experienced by the captive who is\ntransferred from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger\nwho voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men descends into the den.\nIn what way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the\nlower world, or how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle\nof politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and\ndivisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be\ninformed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation could not be\ngiven except to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Symposium.)\n\nMany illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern\nPolitics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been\ntwo sorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become\ndisordered in two different ways. First, there have been great men who,\nin the language of Burke, \u2018have been too much given to general maxims,\u2019\nwho, like J.S. Mill or Burke himself, have been theorists or\nphilosophers before they were politicians, or who, having been students\nof history, have allowed some great historical parallel, such as the\nEnglish Revolution of 1688, or possibly Athenian democracy or Roman\nImperialism, to be the medium through which they viewed contemporary\nevents. Or perhaps the long projecting shadow of some existing\ninstitution may have darkened their vision. The Church of the future,\nthe Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the future, have so\nabsorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their true\nproportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with\ngreat ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer\ncare to consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or\nharmonized with the conditions of human life. They are full of light,\nbut the light to them has become only a sort of luminous mist or\nblindness. Almost every one has known some enthusiastic half-educated\nperson, who sees everything at false distances, and in erroneous\nproportions.\n\nWith this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another\u2014of those who\nsee not far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been\nengaged all their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to\na set or sect of their own. Men of this kind have no universal except\ntheir own interests or the interests of their class, no principle but\nthe opinion of persons like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond\nwhat they pick up in the streets or at their club. Suppose them to be\nsent into a larger world, to undertake some higher calling, from being\ntradesmen to turn generals or politicians, from being schoolmasters to\nbecome philosophers:\u2014or imagine them on a sudden to receive an inward\nlight which reveals to them for the first time in their lives a higher\nidea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by this sudden\nconversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset; and on\nthe other hand will not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses\nstill adhere to them long after they have begun to take a more\ncomprehensive view of human things? From familiar examples like these\nwe may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to two\nkinds of disorders.\n\nNor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young\nAthenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new\nideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject\nof a similar \u2018aufkl\u00e4rung.\u2019 We too observe that when young men begin to\ncriticise customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human\nnature, they are apt to lose hold of solid principle (\u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03af\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9). They are like trees which have been frequently\ntransplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they have no roots\nreaching far into the soil. They \u2018light upon every flower,\u2019 following\ntheir own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They catch\nopinions, as diseases are caught\u2014when they are in the air. Borne hither\nand thither, \u2018they speedily fall into beliefs\u2019 the opposite of those in\nwhich they were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of right\nand wrong; they seem to think one thing as good as another. They\nsuppose themselves to be searching after truth when they are playing\nthe game of \u2018follow my leader.\u2019 They fall in love \u2018at first sight\u2019 with\nparadoxes respecting morality, some fancy about art, some novelty or\neccentricity in religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed for a\ntime in their new notion that they can think of nothing else. The\nresolution of some philosophical or theological question seems to them\nmore interesting and important than any substantial knowledge of\nliterature or science or even than a good life. Like the youth in the\nPhilebus, they are ready to discourse to any one about a new\nphilosophy. They are generally the disciples of some eminent professor\nor sophist, whom they rather imitate than understand. They may be\ncounted happy if in later years they retain some of the simple truths\nwhich they acquired in early education, and which they may, perhaps,\nfind to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws\nand which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers\nwhich beset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are fading\naway and the new are not yet firmly established. Their condition is\ningeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son, who has\nmade the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and,\nin consequence, they have lost their authority over him.\n\nThe distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also\nnoticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the\nmathematician is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense\nwhich recognizes and combines first principles. The contempt which he\nexpresses for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary\nfalsehood, the apology which Socrates makes for his earnestness of\nspeech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of\nthought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number\nAgamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made\nto believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity\nwith which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State,\nnamely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of\nage, in order to expedite the business of education by a generation,\nare also truly Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end\nof the third book, in which he expects the lie about the earthborn men\nto be believed in the second generation.)\n\nBOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the\nperfect State wives and children are to be in common; and the education\nand pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common,\nand kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the\nState are to live together, having all things in common; and they are\nto be warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the\nother citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed.\n\u2018That is easily done,\u2019 he replied: \u2018You were speaking of the State\nwhich you had constructed, and of the individual who answered to this,\nboth of whom you affirmed to be good; and you said that of inferior\nStates there were four forms and four individuals corresponding to\nthem, which although deficient in various degrees, were all of them\nworth inspecting with a view to determining the relative happiness or\nmisery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus\ninterrupted you, and this led to another argument,\u2014and so here we are.\u2019\nSuppose that we put ourselves again in the same position, and do you\nrepeat your question. \u2018I should like to know of what constitutions you\nwere speaking?\u2019 Besides the perfect State there are only four of any\nnote in Hellas:\u2014first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth;\nsecondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly, democracy, which\nfollows next in order; fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death\nof all government. Now, States are not made of \u2018oak and rock,\u2019 but of\nflesh and blood; and therefore as there are five States there must be\nfive human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And first,\nthere is the ambitious nature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian\nState; secondly, the oligarchical nature; thirdly, the democratical;\nand fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with\nthe perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the\nhappier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of\nThrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began\nwith the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with\ntimocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to\nthe other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.\n\nBut how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all\nchanges of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came\ndivision? \u2018Sing, heavenly Muses,\u2019 as Homer says;\u2014let them condescend to\nanswer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in\njest. \u2018And what will they say?\u2019 They will say that human things are\nfated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this\nlaw of destiny, when \u2018the wheel comes full circle\u2019 in a period short or\nlong. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which\nthe intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable\nthem to ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas\ndivine creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation\nis in a number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and\nthree intervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating,\ndissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base\nof the number with a fourth added (or which is 3:4), multiplied by five\nand cubed, gives two harmonies:\u2014the first a square number, which is a\nhundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an\noblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure\nthe side of which is five, subtracting one from each square or two\nperfect squares from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This\nentire number is geometrical and contains the rule or law of\ngeneration. When this law is neglected marriages will be unpropitious;\nthe inferior offspring who are then born will in time become the\nrulers; the State will decline, and education fall into decay;\ngymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver and brass\nand iron will form a chaotic mass\u2014thus division will arise. Such is the\nMuses\u2019 answer to our question. \u2018And a true answer, of course:\u2014but what\nmore have they to say?\u2019 They say that the two races, the iron and\nbrass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways;\u2014the\none will take to trade and moneymaking, and the others, having the true\nriches and not caring for money, will resist them: the contest will end\nin a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and will\nenslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and\nnurturers. But they will retain their warlike character, and will be\nchiefly occupied in fighting and exercising rule. Thus arises\ntimocracy, which is intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy.\n\nThe new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers\nand contempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion to\nwarlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into\nphilosophy, and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is\nnow looked for only in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail\nover arts of peace; the ruler is no longer a philosopher; as in\noligarchies, there springs up among them an extravagant love of\ngain\u2014get another man\u2019s and save your own, is their principle; and they\nhave dark places in which they hoard their gold and silver, for the use\nof their women and others; they take their pleasures by stealth, like\nboys who are running away from their father\u2014the law; and their\neducation is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of\npower. The leading characteristic of this State is party spirit and\nambition.\n\nAnd what manner of man answers to such a State? \u2018In love of\ncontention,\u2019 replied Adeimantus, \u2018he will be like our friend Glaucon.\u2019\nIn that respect, perhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and\nill-educated, yet fond of literature, although not himself a\nspeaker,\u2014fierce with slaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power\nand honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms,\u2014fond, too, of\ngymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he grows avaricious,\nfor he has lost philosophy, which is the only saviour and guardian of\nmen. His origin is as follows:\u2014His father is a good man dwelling in an\nill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in order that he may\nlead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of precedence among\nother women; she is disgusted at her husband\u2019s selfishness, and she\nexpatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father.\nThe old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth:\u2014\u2018When\nyou grow up you must be more of a man than your father.\u2019 All the world\nare agreed that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while a\nbusybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this\nspirit with his father\u2019s words and ways, and as he is naturally well\ndisposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a\nmiddle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour.\n\nAnd now let us set another city over against another man. The next form\nof government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor\nis it difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with\nthe possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are\ninvented; one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches\noutweigh virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour;\nmisers of politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined\nby law to the rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect\ntheir purposes.\n\nThus much of the origin,\u2014let us next consider the evils of oligarchy.\nWould a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because\nhe was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the\nanalogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils:\ntwo nations are struggling together in one\u2014the rich and the poor; and\nthe rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are\nunwilling to pay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not\nalready condemned that State in which the same persons are warriors as\nwell as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell\nhis property and have no place in the State; while there is one class\nwhich has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe\nthat these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature\nin them when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were\nmiserable spendthrifts always. They are the drones of the hive; only\nwhereas the actual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the\ntwo-legged things whom we call drones are some of them without stings\nand some of them have dreadful stings; in other words, there are\npaupers and there are rogues. These are never far apart; and in\noligarchical cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a\nruler, you will find abundance of both. And this evil state of society\noriginates in bad education and bad government.\n\nLike State, like man,\u2014the change in the latter begins with the\nrepresentative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his\nfather, who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and\npresently he sees him \u2018fallen from his high estate,\u2019 the victim of\ninformers, dying in prison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner.\nThe lesson which he thus receives, makes him cautious; he leaves\npolitics, represses his pride, and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as\nhis bosom\u2019s lord, and assumes the style of the Great King; the rational\nand spirited elements sit humbly on the ground at either side, the one\nimmersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration of\nwealth. The love of honour turns to love of money; the conversion is\ninstantaneous. The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one\npassion which is the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of\nthe State? He has had no education, or he would never have allowed the\nblind god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being uneducated\nhe will have many slavish desires, some beggarly, some knavish,\nbreeding in his soul. If he is the trustee of an orphan, and has the\npower to defraud, he will soon prove that he is not without the will,\nand that his passions are only restrained by fear and not by reason.\nHence he leads a divided existence; in which the better desires mostly\nprevail. But when he is contending for prizes and other distinctions,\nhe is afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren\nhonour; in time of war he fights with a small part of his resources,\nand usually keeps his money and loses the victory.\n\nNext comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the\noligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an\noligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may\ngain by the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose\ntheir property or rights of citizenship; but they remain in the city,\nfull of hatred against the new owners of their estates and ripe for\nrevolution. The usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; he\npasses by, and leaves his sting\u2014that is, his money\u2014in some other\nvictim; and many a man has to pay the parent or principal sum\nmultiplied into a family of children, and is reduced into a state of\ndronage by him. The only way of diminishing the evil is either to limit\na man in his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at\nhis own risk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care only\nfor money, and are as careless of virtue as the poorest of the\ncitizens. Now there are occasions on which the governors and the\ngoverned meet together,\u2014at festivals, on a journey, voyaging or\nfighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in the hour of danger he is not\ndespised; he sees the rich man puffing and panting, and draws the\nconclusion which he privately imparts to his companions,\u2014\u2018that our\npeople are not good for much;\u2019 and as a sickly frame is made ill by a\nmere touch from without, or sometimes without external impulse is ready\nto fall to pieces of itself, so from the least cause, or with none at\nall, the city falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. And\ndemocracy comes into power when the poor are the victors, killing some\nand exiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the\nrest.\n\nThe manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is\nfreedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in\nhis own eyes, and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various\ndevelopments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of\nwhich the colours and figures are the manners of men, and there are\nmany who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real beauty\nand excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which\nyou can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like;\nyou may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and\nmake peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody\nelse. When you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same; a\ngentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets\nlike a hero; and nobody sees him or cares for him. Observe, too, how\ngrandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine theories of\neducation,\u2014how little she cares for the training of her statesmen! The\nonly qualification which she demands is the profession of patriotism.\nSuch is democracy;\u2014a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government,\ndistributing equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\nLet us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case\nof the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly\noligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of\nunnecessary pleasures. Perhaps I ought to explain this latter\nterm:\u2014Necessary pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot\ndo without; unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of\nwhich the desire might be eradicated by early training. For example,\nthe pleasures of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a\ncertain point; beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and\nmind, and the excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be\nrightly called expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones.\nAnd the drone, as we called him, is the slave of these unnecessary\npleasures and desires, whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to\nthe necessary.\n\nThe oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:\u2014The\nyouth who has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone\u2019s\nhoney; he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new\npleasure. As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on\nboth sides, temptations from without and passions from within; there is\nreason also and external influences of parents and friends in alliance\nwith the oligarchical principle; and the two factions are in violent\nconflict with one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but\nthen again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of\npassions gets possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul,\nwhich they find void and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods\nand illusions ascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into\nthe country of the Lotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if\nany offer of alliance or parley of individual elders comes from home,\nthe false spirits shut the gates of the castle and permit no one to\nenter,\u2014there is a battle, and they gain the victory; and straightway\nmaking alliance with the desires, they banish modesty, which they call\nfolly, and send temperance over the border. When the house has been\nswept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and, crowning them\nwith garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they call\ngood breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage.\nSuch is the process by which the youth passes from the necessary\npleasures to the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time\nimpartially between them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the\nviolence of passion has abated, he restores some of the exiles and\nlives in a sort of equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure and then\nanother; and if reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good\nand honourable, and others bad and vile, he shakes his head and says\nthat he can make no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the\nfancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns\nabstainer; he practises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all;\nthen again he would be a philosopher or a politician; or again, he\nwould be a warrior or a man of business; he is\n\n\u2018Every thing by starts and nothing long.\u2019\n\n\nThere remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all\nStates\u2014tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as\ndemocracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess; the one from\nexcess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. \u2018The great natural\ngood of life,\u2019 says the democrat, \u2018is freedom.\u2019 And this exclusive love\nof freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the\nchange from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of\nfreedom, and unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes\nand insults them; equality and fraternity of governors and governed is\nthe approved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but\nof private houses, and extends even to the animals. Father and son,\ncitizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a\nlevel; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom\nof the young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the\njaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being thought\nmorose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and\nthere is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in\na democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The\nshe-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses\nmarch along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes\nin their way. \u2018That has often been my experience.\u2019 At last the citizens\nbecome so sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written\nor unwritten; they would have no man call himself their master. Such is\nthe glorious beginning of things out of which tyranny springs.\n\u2018Glorious, indeed; but what is to follow?\u2019 The ruin of oligarchy is the\nruin of democracy; for there is a law of contraries; the excess of\nfreedom passes into the excess of slavery, and the greater the freedom\nthe greater the slavery. You will remember that in the oligarchy were\nfound two classes\u2014rogues and paupers, whom we compared to drones with\nand without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm and\nbile are to the human body; and the State-physician, or legislator,\nmust get rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of\nthe hive. Now in a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are more\nnumerous and more dangerous than in the oligarchy; there they are inert\nand unpractised, here they are full of life and animation; and the\nkeener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and\nprevent their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in\ndemocratic States, of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be\nsqueezed when the drones have need of their possessions; there is\nmoreover a third class, who are the labourers and the artisans, and\nthey make up the mass of the people. When the people meet, they are\nomnipotent, but they cannot be brought together unless they are\nattracted by a little honey; and the rich are made to supply the honey,\nof which the demagogues keep the greater part themselves, giving a\ntaste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to resist; they are driven\nmad by the stings of the drones, and so become downright oligarchs in\nself-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for treason. The\npeople have some protector whom they nurse into greatness, and from\nthis root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is\nindicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, which tells\nhow he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims\nwill turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human blood,\nand slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at\nabolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish or become\na wolf\u2014that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes\nback from exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by\nlawful means, they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the\npeople makes his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which\nthey readily grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own.\nNow let the rich man make to himself wings, for he will never run away\nagain if he does not do so then. And the Great Protector, having\ncrushed all his rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a\nfull-blown tyrant: Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness.\n\nIn the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he\nis not a \u2018dominus,\u2019 no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt\nand the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes\nhimself necessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus\nenabled to depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work;\nand he can get rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy.\nThen comes unpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to\noppose him. The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the\nState; but, unlike the physician who purges away the bad, he must get\nrid of the high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has no\nchoice between death and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more\nhated he is, the more he will require trusty guards; but how will he\nobtain them? \u2018They will come flocking like birds\u2014for pay.\u2019 Will he not\nrather obtain them on the spot? He will take the slaves from their\nowners and make them his body-guard; these are his trusted friends, who\nadmire and look up to him. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify\nand exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise by association with the\nwise? And are not their praises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason\nwhy we should exclude them from our State? They may go to other cities,\nand gather the mob about them with fine words, and change commonwealths\ninto tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and rewards for their\nservices; but the higher they and their friends ascend constitution\nhill, the more their honour will fail and become \u2018too asthmatic to\nmount.\u2019 To return to the tyrant\u2014How will he support that rare army of\nhis? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which will\nenable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father\u2019s\nproperty, and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his\nfather is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great\nhulking son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and bids him and\nhis riotous crew begone, then will the parent know what a monster he\nhas been nurturing, and that the son whom he would fain expel is too\nstrong for him. \u2018You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?\u2019\nYes, he will, after having taken away his arms. \u2018Then he is a parricide\nand a cruel, unnatural son.\u2019 And the people have jumped from the fear\nof slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty,\nwhen out of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of\nservitude...\n\nIn the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he\nreturns to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly\ntouched at the end of Book IV. These he describes in a succession of\nparallels between the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of\neither in the State or individual which has preceded them. He begins by\nasking the point at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to\nrecapitulate the substance of the three former books, which also\ncontain a parallel of the philosopher and the State.\n\nOf the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not\nhave liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal\nState, which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism\nor the natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws\na veil of mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes\nto ignorance of the law of population. Of this law the famous\ngeometrical figure or number is the expression. Like the ancients in\ngeneral, he had no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of the\neducation of the human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the\ncourse of ages, but was to spring in full armour from the head of the\nlegislator. When good laws had been given, he thought only of the\nmanner in which they were likely to be corrupted, or of how they might\nbe filled up in detail or restored in accordance with their original\nspirit. He appears not to have reflected upon the full meaning of his\nown words, \u2018In the brief space of human life, nothing great can be\naccomplished\u2019; or again, as he afterwards says in the Laws, \u2018Infinite\ntime is the maker of cities.\u2019 The order of constitutions which is\nadopted by him represents an order of thought rather than a succession\nof time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame a\nphilosophy of history.\n\nThe first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of\nsoldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this\nis a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the\nMuses, but imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of\norganization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the\nlove of truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester\nnature, rules in his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has\nsome noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like\nthe Spartan, a lover of literature; and although he is a harsh master\nto his servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character\nis based upon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who\nin a troubled city has retired from politics; and his mother, who is\ndissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him towards the life\nof political ambition. Such a character may have had this origin, and\nindeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a feminine jealousy of a\nsimilar kind. But there is obviously no connection between the manner\nin which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere\naccident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.\n\nThe two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less\nhistorical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a\npolity like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth,\nor of the oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of\nhistory appears to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is\nthe royal or patriarchal form of government, which a century or two\nlater was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and\nin which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary possession of\nland and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a\ngovernment based upon a qualification of property, which, according to\nAristotle\u2019s mode of using words, would have been called a timocracy;\nand this in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to\ndemocracy. But such was not the necessary order of succession in\nStates; nor, indeed, can any order be discerned in the endless\nfluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in the Euripus), except,\nperhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy to aristocracy in\nthe earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a similar\ninversion in the last step of the Platonic succession; for tyranny,\ninstead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history\nappears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the reign of\nPeisistratus and his sons is an episode which comes between the\nlegislation of Solon and the constitution of Cleisthenes; and some\nsecret cause common to them all seems to have led the greater part of\nHellas at her first appearance in the dawn of history, e.g. Athens,\nArgos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the exception of\nSparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either in\noligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is\ndescribing rather the contemporary governments of the Sicilian States,\nwhich alternated between democracy and tyranny, than the ancient\nhistory of Athens or Corinth.\n\nThe portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek\ndelighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives\nof mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one\nwere attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was\nno enormity which the Greek was not today to believe of them; the\ntyrant was the negation of government and law; his assassination was\nglorious; there was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with\nprobability be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the\ncommon thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated\nwith all the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that he\ndrew from life; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a\npersonal acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of\nthem would rather tend to render doubtful his ever having \u2018consorted\u2019\nwith them, or entertained the schemes, which are attributed to him in\nthe Epistles, of regenerating Sicily by their help.\n\nPlato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of\ndemocracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy\nis a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing\nwhat is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit\nof liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the\nleading idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems\nto think. But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a\nlover of tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved\nfor the tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness,\nand who in his utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an\nalmost impossible existence, without that remnant of good which, in\nPlato\u2019s opinion, was required to give power to evil (Book I). This\nideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of that\nother portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour,\nwhich first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had\ndrawn, and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the\ngood of his subjects.\n\nEach of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical\ngradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not\nextinguishing but harmonizing the passions, and training them in\nvirtue; in the timocracy and the timocratic man the constitution,\nwhether of the State or of the individual, is based, first, upon\ncourage, and secondly, upon the love of honour; this latter virtue,\nwhich is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has superseded all the rest.\nIn the second stage of decline the virtues have altogether disappeared,\nand the love of gain has succeeded to them; in the third stage, or\ndemocracy, the various passions are allowed to have free play, and the\nvirtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this freedom, which\nleads to many curious extravagances of character, is in reality only a\nstate of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes\npossession of the whole nature of man\u2014this is tyranny. In all of them\nexcess\u2014the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the element\nof decay.\n\nThe eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and\nfanciful allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a\ngreater extent than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark,\n\n(1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and\nmore divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps\nalso in our own;\n\n(2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula\nas equality among unequals;\n\n(3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are\ncharacteristic of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal\nmistrust are of the tyrant;\n\n(4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a\nspeculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in\nmodern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern\nlegislation. Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the\nancient lawgiver: in modern times we may be said to have almost, if not\nquite, solved the first of these difficulties, but hardly the second.\n\nStill more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals:\nthere is the family picture of the father and mother and the old\nservant of the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and\ninherent meanness of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and\nfreedom of the democrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be\ndepicted, doing right or wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the\nprodigal, goes into a far country (note here the play of language by\nwhich the democratic man is himself represented under the image of a\nState having a citadel and receiving embassies); and there is the\nwild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about\nthe tyrant being a parricide; the representation of the tyrant\u2019s life\nas an obscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of a more miserable than\nthe most miserable of men in Book IX; the hint to the poets that if\nthey are the friends of tyrants there is no place for them in a\nconstitutional State, and that they are too clever not to see the\npropriety of their own expulsion; the continuous image of the drones\nwho are of two kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having\nwings (Book IX),\u2014are among Plato\u2019s happiest touches.\n\nThere remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the\nRepublic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as\ngreat as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though\napparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of\nobscurity (Ep. ad Att.). And some have imagined that there is no answer\nto the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But\nsuch a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which\nAristotle speaks of the number (Pol.), and would have been ridiculous\nto any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek\nmathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato\nintentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our\nwant of familiarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself\nindicates that he is not altogether serious, and in describing his\nnumber as a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply some degree\nof satire on the symbolical use of number. (Compare Cratylus; Protag.)\n\nOur hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an\naccurate study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is\nthrown by the parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the\nallusion in Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter\npart of the passage (Greek) describes a solid figure. (Pol.\u2014\u2018He only\nsays that nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain\ncycle; and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are\nin the ratio of 4:3; and this when combined with a figure of five gives\ntwo harmonies; he means when the number of this figure becomes solid.\u2019)\nSome further clue may be gathered from the appearance of the\nPythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in\nwhich, as in every right-angled triangle, the squares of the two lesser\nsides equal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25).\n\nPlato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (Tim.), i.e. a\nnumber in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the\ndivine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are\ncomplete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four\nterms and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another\nin certain proportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in\nthem when they have been raised to the third power certain elements of\nnumber, which give two \u2018harmonies,\u2019 the one square, the other oblong;\nbut he does not say that the square number answers to the divine, or\nthe oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any intimation given that\nthe first or divine number represents the period of the world, the\nsecond the period of the state, or of the human race as Zeller\nsupposes; nor is the divine number afterwards mentioned (Arist.). The\nsecond is the number of generations or births, and presides over them\nin the same mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or\nin which, according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice,\nmarriage, are represented by some number or figure. This is probably\nthe number 216.\n\nThe explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up\nthe number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from\nthe circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan\ncitizens (Herod.), and would be what Plato might have called \u2018a number\nwhich nearly concerns the population of a city\u2019; the mysterious\ndisappearance of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to\nhim the first cause of his decline of States. The lesser or square\n\u2018harmony,\u2019 of 400, might be a symbol of the guardians,\u2014the larger or\noblong \u2018harmony,\u2019 of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer\nrespectively to the three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the\nfour virtues, the five forms of government. The harmony of the musical\nscale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of the harmony of the state,\nis also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which represent the sides\nof the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of the scale.\n\nThe terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as\nfollows. A perfect number (Greek), as already stated, is one which is\nequal to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or\ncyclical number, = 1 + 2 + 3. The words (Greek), \u2018terms\u2019 or \u2018notes,\u2019\nand (Greek), \u2018intervals,\u2019 are applicable to music as well as to number\nand figure. (Greek) is the \u2018base\u2019 on which the whole calculation\ndepends, or the \u2018lowest term\u2019 from which it can be worked out. The\nwords (Greek) have been variously translated\u2014\u2018squared and cubed\u2019\n(Donaldson), \u2018equalling and equalled in power\u2019 (Weber), \u2018by involution\nand evolution,\u2019 i.e. by raising the power and extracting the root (as\nin the translation). Numbers are called \u2018like and unlike\u2019 (Greek) when\nthe factors or the sides of the planes and cubes which they represent\nare or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and 27 = 2 cubed and 3 cubed;\nand conversely. \u2018Waxing\u2019 (Greek) numbers, called also \u2018increasing\u2019\n(Greek), are those which are exceeded by the sum of their divisors:\ne.g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and 21. \u2018Waning\u2019 (Greek) numbers,\ncalled also \u2018decreasing\u2019 (Greek) are those which succeed the sum of\ntheir divisors: e.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated\n\u2018commensurable and agreeable to one another\u2019 (Greek) seem to be\ndifferent ways of describing the same relation, with more or less\nprecision. They are equivalent to \u2018expressible in terms having the same\nrelation to one another,\u2019 like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which\nnumbers is in the relation of (1 and 1/2) to the preceding. The \u2018base,\u2019\nor \u2018fundamental number, which has 1/3 added to it\u2019 (1 and 1/3) = 4/3 or\na musical fourth. (Greek) is a \u2018proportion\u2019 of numbers as of musical\nnotes, applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to\nthe relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a \u2018square\u2019\nnumber (Greek); the second harmony is an \u2018oblong\u2019 number (Greek), i.e.\na number representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are\nequal. (Greek) = \u2018numbers squared from\u2019 or \u2018upon diameters\u2019; (Greek) =\n\u2018rational,\u2019 i.e. omitting fractions, (Greek), \u2018irrational,\u2019 i.e.\nincluding fractions; e.g. 49 is a square of the rational diameter of a\nfigure the side of which = 5: 50, of an irrational diameter of the\nsame. For several of the explanations here given and for a good deal\nbesides I am indebted to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by\nDr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society).\n\nThe conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as\nfollows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle\nis the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the\nnumber of the state, he proceeds: \u2018The period of the world is defined\nby the perfect number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number\nor 216, which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic\nTetractys (a series of seven terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27); and if we\ntake this as the basis of our computation, we shall have two cube\nnumbers (Greek), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals between\nthese, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, and\nthese terms and intervals stand related to one another in the\nsesqui-altera ratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as 3/2. Now if\nwe remember that the number 216 = 8 x 27 = 3 cubed + 4 cubed + 5 cubed,\nand 3 squared + 4 squared = 5 squared, we must admit that this number\nimplies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians attach so much\nimportance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3 with the number 5, or\nmultiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first\nsquaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio\nof the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former\nmultiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the\nsum of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.\u2019\nThe two (Greek) he elsewhere explains as follows: \u2018The first (Greek) is\n(Greek), in other words (4/3 x 5) all squared = 100 x 2 squared over 3\nsquared. The second (Greek), a cube of the same root, is described as\n100 multiplied (alpha) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished by\nunity, i.e., as shown above, 48: (beta) by two incommensurable\ndiameters, i.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and (gamma) by\nthe cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x 2 cubed.\nThis second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former\nharmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of 3.\nIn other words, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first\nharmony, 400/9: (2), for the second harmony, 8000/27.\u2019\n\nThe reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also\nwith Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of\nbirths are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number\ngiven in the first part of the passage (Greek...): (2) that the number\n216 with its permutations would have been familiar to a Greek\nmathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of 6,\nand also the sum of 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, the numbers 3, 4, 5\nrepresenting the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when squared\nequal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25): (4) that it is also\nthe period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate\nterms or bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third,\nfourth, fifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the\nproduct of the cubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in the\nPlatonic Tetractys: (7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by\nPlutarch (de Is. et Osir.), Proclus (super prima Eucl.), and Quintilian\n(de Musica) to be contained in this passage, so that the tradition of\nthe school seems to point in the same direction: (8) that the\nPythagorean triangle is called also the figure of marriage (Greek).\n\nBut though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for\nsupposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world,\nthe human or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof\nthat the second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that (Greek) can mean\n\u2018two incommensurables,\u2019 which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but\nrather, as the preceding clause implies, (Greek), i.e. two square\nnumbers based upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which\nis 5 = 50 x 2.\n\nThe greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the\nwords (Greek), \u2018a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by\n5.\u2019 In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the\nnumbers of the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the\nnumbers which follow are in favour of the explanation. The first\nharmony of 400, as has been already remarked, probably represents the\nrulers; the second and oblong harmony of 7600, the people.\n\nAnd here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle\nwould be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The\npoint of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and\nthat so much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him.\nHis general meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is\nrepresented or presided over by a perfect or cyclical number; human\ngeneration is imperfect, and represented or presided over by an\nimperfect number or series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the\nnumber of the citizens in the Laws, is expressly based by him on\nutilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of the number for\ndivision; it is also made up of the first seven digits multiplied by\none another. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect number may have\nbeen easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, which were made\nfirst by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the latter is said to have\nbeen a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of exactness to\nbe attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book IX (729\n= 365 x 2), and the slight correction of the error in the number\n5040/12 (Laws), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in\nthe circumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and\nhad found order in number, should have imagined one to give law to the\nother. Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could see\nrealized in the world around him, and he knows the great influence\nwhich \u2018the little matter of 1, 2, 3\u2019 exercises upon education. He may\neven be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of\nQuetelet and others, that numbers depend upon numbers; e.g.\u2014in\npopulation, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of\nchildren born of either sex, on the respective ages of parents, i.e. on\nother numbers.\n\nBOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to\nenquire, Whence is he, and how does he live\u2014in happiness or in misery?\nThere is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the\nappetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are\nunlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various\ndegrees by the power of reason and law. \u2018What appetites do you mean?\u2019 I\nmean those which are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which\nget up and walk about naked without any self-respect or shame; and\nthere is no conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of\nwhich, in imagination, they may not be guilty. \u2018True,\u2019 he said; \u2018very\ntrue.\u2019 But when a man\u2019s pulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a\nfeast of reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to\nrest, and has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their\nperturbing his reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is\nfree from quarrel and heat,\u2014the visions which he has on his bed are\nleast irregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is such an\nirregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.\n\nTo return:\u2014You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the\nson of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and\nrepressed the ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got\ninto fine company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father\u2019s\nnarrow ways; and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth,\nhe came to a mean, and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion,\nbut of regular and successive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth\nhas become a father, and has a son who is exposed to the same\ntemptations, and has companions who lead him into every sort of\niniquity, and parents and friends who try to keep him right. The\ncounsellors of evil find that their only chance of retaining him is to\nimplant in his soul a monster drone, or love; while other desires buzz\naround him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this monster\nlove takes possession of him, and puts an end to every true or modest\nthought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny; and\nthe tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a\ndrinking, lusting, furious sort of animal.\n\nAnd how does such an one live? \u2018Nay, that you must tell me.\u2019 Well then,\nI fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will\nbe the lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money,\nand so he spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has\nnothing the young ravens are still in the nest in which they were\nhatched, crying for food. Love urges them on; and they must be\ngratified by force or fraud, or if not, they become painful and\ntroublesome; and as the new pleasures succeed the old ones, so will the\nson take possession of the goods of his parents; if they show signs of\nrefusing, he will defraud and deceive them; and if they openly resist,\nwhat then? \u2018I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their\nplace.\u2019 But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled\nand unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother, best\nand dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour!\nTruly a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother! When\nthere is no more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket,\nor robs a temple. Love overmasters the thoughts of his youth, and he\nbecomes in sober reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep. He\nwaxes strong in all violence and lawlessness; and is ready for any deed\nof daring that will supply the wants of his rabble-rout. In a\nwell-ordered State there are only a few such, and these in time of war\ngo out and become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace\nthey stay at home and do mischief; they are the thieves, footpads,\ncut-purses, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to\nspeak, they turn false-witnesses and informers. \u2018No small catalogue of\ncrimes truly, even if the perpetrators are few.\u2019 Yes, I said; but small\nand great are relative terms, and no crimes which are committed by them\napproach those of the tyrant, whom this class, growing strong and\nnumerous, create out of themselves. If the people yield, well and good,\nbut, if they resist, then, as before he beat his father and mother, so\nnow he beats his fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries\nover them. Such men in their early days live with flatterers, and they\nthemselves flatter others, in order to gain their ends; but they soon\ndiscard their followers when they have no longer any need of them; they\nare always either masters or servants,\u2014the joys of friendship are\nunknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the\nnature of justice be at all understood by us. They realize our dream;\nand he who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a\ntyrant for the longest time, will be the worst of them, and being the\nworst of them, will also be the most miserable.\n\nLike man, like State,\u2014the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which\nis the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the\nother the worst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the\ntyrant may appear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid\nto go in and ask; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the\nhappiest, and the tyrannical the most miserable of States. And may we\nnot ask the same question about the men themselves, requesting some one\nto look into them who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and\nwill not be panic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose\nthat he is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in family life,\nor perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.\n\nAssuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek,\nlet us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of\nall, whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved\u2014Will there not\nbe a little freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of\nthe bad, and the slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as\nwell as to the State; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and\nthe better part is enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would,\nand his mind is full of confusion; he is the very reverse of a freeman.\nThe State will be poor and full of misery and sorrow; and the man\u2019s\nsoul will also be poor and full of sorrows, and he will be the most\nmiserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more\nmiserable. \u2018Who is that?\u2019 The tyrannical man who has the misfortune\nalso to become a public tyrant. \u2018There I suspect that you are right.\u2019\nSay rather, \u2018I am sure;\u2019 conjecture is out of place in an enquiry of\nthis nature. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of\nthem than any private individual. You will say, \u2018The owners of slaves\nare not generally in any fear of them.\u2019 But why? Because the whole city\nis in a league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one\nof these owners and his household is carried off by a god into a\nwilderness, where there are no freemen to help him\u2014will he not be in an\nagony of terror?\u2014will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to\npromise them many things sore against his will? And suppose the same\ngod who carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who\ndeclare that no man ought to have slaves, and that the owners of them\nshould be punished with death. \u2018Still worse and worse! He will be in\nthe midst of his enemies.\u2019 And is not our tyrant such a captive soul,\nwho is tormented by a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge; living\nindoors always like a woman, and jealous of those who can go out and\nsee the world?\n\nHaving so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more\nmiserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master\nof himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the\nmeanest of slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all\nthings, and never able to satisfy his desires; always in fear and\ndistraction, like the State of which he is the representative. His\njealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more\nand more faithless, envious, unrighteous,\u2014the most wretched of men, a\nmisery to himself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and\nproclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result?\n\u2018Made the proclamation yourself.\u2019 The son of Ariston (the best) is of\nopinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that\nthis is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust\nman is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I\nadd further\u2014\u2018seen or unseen by gods or men.\u2019\n\nThis is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of\npleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul\u2014reason,\npassion, desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as\nsensual appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love\nof reputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of\ntruth, and careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the\ndifference of men\u2019s natures, one of these three principles is in the\nascendant, and they have their several pleasures corresponding to them.\nInterrogate now the three natures, and each one will be found praising\nhis own pleasures and depreciating those of others. The money-maker\nwill contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages of\nwealth. The ambitious man will despise knowledge which brings no\nhonour; whereas the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth,\nand will call other pleasures necessary rather than good. Now, how\nshall we decide between them? Is there any better criterion than\nexperience and knowledge? And which of the three has the truest\nknowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth makes the\nphilosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious\nand the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom.\nHonour he has equally with them; they are \u2018judged of him,\u2019 but he is\n\u2018not judged of them,\u2019 for they never attain to the knowledge of true\nbeing. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only\nwealth and honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be\nthe truest. And so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the\nrational part of the soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the\npleasantest. He who has a right to judge judges thus. Next comes the\nlife of ambition, and, in the third place, that of money-making.\n\nTwice has the just man overthrown the unjust\u2014once more, as in an\nOlympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let\nhim try a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the\nwise are true and pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine\nthis: Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state\nwhich is neither? When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him\nthan health. But this he never found out while he was well. In pain he\ndesires only to cease from pain; on the other hand, when he is in an\necstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is\nboth pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both?\nAgain, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest;\nbut if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other? Thus we\nare led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance only, and\nwitchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for there\nare others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not the\nabsence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure; although most\nof the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are reliefs of\npain, and have not only their reactions when they depart, but their\nanticipations before they come. They can be best described in a simile.\nThere is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who\npasses from the lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is\nalready in the upper world; and if he were taken back again would\nthink, and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out of\nhis ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like\nconfusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things.\nThe man who compares grey with black, calls grey white; and the man who\ncompares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure.\nAgain, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and\nfolly of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge\nof the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction\u2014that of eating and\ndrinking, or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The\nsatisfaction of that which has more existence is truer than of that\nwhich has less. The invariable and immortal has a more real existence\nthan the variable and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of\nknowledge and truth. The soul, again, has more existence and truth and\nknowledge than the body, and is therefore more really satisfied and has\na more natural pleasure. Those who feast only on earthly food, are\nalways going at random up to the middle and down again; but they never\npass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true pleasure. They\nare like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and sensuality, and ready to\nkill one another by reason of their insatiable lust; for they are not\nfilled with true being, and their vessel is leaky (Gorgias). Their\npleasures are mere shadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and\nintensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go\nfighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about\nthe shadow of Helen at Troy, because they know not the truth.\n\nThe same may be said of the passionate element:\u2014the desires of the\nambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior\nsatisfaction. Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the\nother principles do their own business or attain the pleasure which is\nnatural to them. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the\nsoul to pursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more\ndistant they are from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will\nbe from law and order, and the more illusive will be their pleasures.\nThe desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of\nthe king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two\nspurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the latter; he has run away\naltogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority\nbe told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the\noligarch, and has therefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the\nshadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from\nthe king, and thus we get the formula 3 x 3, which is the number of a\nsurface, representing the shadow which is the tyrant\u2019s pleasure, and if\nyou like to cube this \u2018number of the beast,\u2019 you will find that the\nmeasure of the difference amounts to 729; the king is 729 times more\nhappy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is NEARLY equal to\nthe number of days and nights in a year (365 x 2 = 730); and is\ntherefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a\ngood and bad man in happiness only: what must be the difference between\nthem in comeliness of life and virtue!\n\nPerhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our\ndiscussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of\njustice. Now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us\nmake an image of the soul, which will personify his words. First of\nall, fashion a multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all\nmanner of animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change them\nat pleasure. Suppose now another form of a lion, and another of a man;\nthe second smaller than the first, the third than the second; join them\ntogether and cover them with a human skin, in which they are completely\nconcealed. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter of\ninjustice that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man. The\nmaintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the\nman; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an\nalliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down\nthe many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and\nwith themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to\npleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust\nwrong.\n\nBut now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in\nerror. Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or\nrather to the God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to\nthe beast? And if so, who would receive gold on condition that he was\nto degrade the noblest part of himself under the worst?\u2014who would sell\nhis son or daughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any\namount of money? And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part\nwithout any compunction to the most godless and foul? Would he not be\nworse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband\u2019s life for a necklace? And\nintemperance is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and pride\nand sullenness are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent\nelement, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great\nrelaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the\nspirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to\nbecome a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those\nwho are engaged in them have to flatter, instead of mastering their\ndesires; therefore we say that they should be placed under the control\nof the better principle in another because they have none in\nthemselves; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the\nsubjects, but for their good. And our intention in educating the young,\nis to give them self-control; the law desires to nurse up in them a\nhigher principle, and when they have acquired this, they may go their\nways.\n\n\u2018What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world\u2019 and become\nmore and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if\nthe concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the\nbrute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element\nliberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in\nhis soul\u2014a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The\nman of understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place\nhe will keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and\nstrength, but in order to attain the most perfect harmony of body and\nsoul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and\nharmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he\nwill fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of\nhis own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as\nwill make him a better man; any others he will decline. \u2018In that case,\u2019\nsaid he, \u2018he will never be a politician.\u2019 Yes, but he will, in his own\ncity; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine\naccident. \u2018You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which\nhas no place upon earth.\u2019 But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern\nof such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image.\nWhether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act\naccording to that pattern and no other...\n\nThe most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:\u2014(1) the\naccount of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the\nking from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.\n\n1. Plato\u2019s account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in\nthis respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which\nare attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics,\nopposed to all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of\nthe soul shall have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the\nEpicureans in describing pleasure as something more than the absence of\npain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which\nhave no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the Philebus), such as\nthe pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and\nanticipation. In the previous book he had made the distinction between\nnecessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and\nhe now observes that there are a further class of \u2018wild beast\u2019\npleasures, corresponding to Aristotle\u2019s (Greek). He dwells upon the\nrelative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion\nwhich arises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the\nsuperiority of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the\nfleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal\npleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of\nthe lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul are\nincapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of\npleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is \u2018sawn\nup into quantities\u2019 by Aristotle; the analysis which was originally\nmade by him became in the next generation the foundation of further\ntechnical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the\nillusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of\npleasure as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding the permanence\nof the intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the\nknowledge from which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that\nthe pleasures of knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting\nthan other pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents\nof our bodily state (Introduction to Philebus).\n\n2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant,\nand royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato\ncharacteristically designates as a number concerned with human life,\nbecause NEARLY equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year.\nHe is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is\nimmeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea.\nThose who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring\n(Prot.), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the\nfigure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the\npleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern\ntimes we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a\nphilosophical formula. \u2018It is not easy to estimate the loss of the\ntyrant, except perhaps in this way,\u2019 says Plato. So we might say, that\nalthough the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad\nman, yet you may measure the difference between them by valuing one\nminute of the one at an hour of the other (\u2018One day in thy courts is\nbetter than a thousand\u2019), or you might say that \u2018there is an infinite\ndifference.\u2019 But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, \u2018They\nare a thousand miles asunder.\u2019 And accordingly Plato finds the natural\nvehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical\nformula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in\nthe number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth\nof his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure;\njust as persons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is\nverified when it has been only thrown into an abstract form. In\nspeaking of the number 729 as proper to human life, he probably\nintended to intimate that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the\nroyal life.\n\nThe simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is\neffected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the\nmathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some\ndifficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained;\nthe oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and\naristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the\noligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square\nand to count the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning them not as = 5\nbut as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step\ntowards the cube.\n\n3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more\nconvinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of\nthe 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city\nof philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and\nsubstance at his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet\nthis distant kingdom is also the rule of man\u2019s life. (\u2018Say not lo!\nhere, or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.\u2019) Thus a note\nis struck which prepares for the revelation of a future life in the\nfollowing Book. But the future life is present still; the ideal of\npolitics is to be realized in the individual.\n\nBOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there was\nnothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The\ndivision of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation.\nI do not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage\non the understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge\nwhich heals error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even\nnow he appears to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much\nas I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out:\nand first of all, will you explain what is imitation, for really I do\nnot understand? \u2018How likely then that I should understand!\u2019 That might\nvery well be, for the duller often sees better than the keener eye.\n\u2018True, but in your presence I can hardly venture to say what I think.\u2019\nThen suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the doctrine of\nuniversals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables. There is\none idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his\nmind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables,\nbut he made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a\nmaker of the works of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but\nplants and animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven\nand under the earth? He makes the Gods also. \u2018He must be a wizard\nindeed!\u2019 But do you not see that there is a sense in which you could do\nthe same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the reflection of\nthe sun, and the earth, or anything else\u2014there now you have made them.\n\u2018Yes, but only in appearance.\u2019 Exactly so; and the painter is such a\ncreator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the\ncarpenter; although neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be\nsupposed to make the absolute bed. \u2018Not if philosophers may be\nbelieved.\u2019 Nor need we wonder that his bed has but an imperfect\nrelation to the truth. Reflect:\u2014Here are three beds; one in nature,\nwhich is made by God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and the\nthird, by the painter. God only made one, nor could he have made more\nthan one; for if there had been two, there would always have been a\nthird\u2014more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would\nhave been included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural\nmaker of the bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker;\nbut the painter is rather the imitator of what the other two make; he\nhas to do with a creation which is thrice removed from reality. And the\ntragic poet is an imitator, and, like every other imitator, is thrice\nremoved from the king and from the truth. The painter imitates not the\noriginal bed, but the bed made by the carpenter. And this, without\nbeing really different, appears to be different, and has many points of\nview, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents\neverything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece\nan image. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows nothing\nof their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or\nsimple people. Suppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he\nhad met a man who knew all that everybody knows, and better than\nanybody:\u2014should we not infer him to be a simpleton who, having no\ndiscernment of truth and falsehood, had met with a wizard or enchanter,\nwhom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying that\nHomer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must we\nnot infer that they are under a similar delusion? they do not see that\nthe poets are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations.\n\u2018Very true.\u2019 But if a person could create as well as imitate, he would\nrather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he would\nrather be the receiver than the giver of praise? \u2018Yes, for then he\nwould have more honour and advantage.\u2019\n\nLet us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him,\nI am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your\npoems incidentally refer, but about their main subjects\u2014war, military\ntactics, politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from\nthe truth\u2014not an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what\ngood you have ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes\nto have received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from\nCharondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever\ncarried on by your counsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as\nthere is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or is there any Homeric way of life,\nsuch as the Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is\ncalled after you? \u2018No, indeed; and Creophylus (Flesh-child) was even\nmore unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as\ntradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and his other\nfriends to starve.\u2019 Yes, but could this ever have happened if Homer had\nreally been the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many devoted\nfollowers? If Protagoras and Prodicus can persuade their contemporaries\nthat no one can manage house or State without them, is it likely that\nHomer and Hesiod would have been allowed to go about as beggars\u2014I mean\nif they had really been able to do the world any good?\u2014would not men\nhave compelled them to stay where they were, or have followed them\nabout in order to get education? But they did not; and therefore we may\ninfer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators, who do but\nimitate the appearances of things. For as a painter by a knowledge of\nfigure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in cobbling,\nso the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and give\nharmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know\nhow mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a\nface which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once\nmore, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance.\nThe painter paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but\nneither understands the use of them\u2014the knowledge of this is confined\nto the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one\nof use, another of invention, a third of imitation; and the user\nfurnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will know the\ngood and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but the\nimitator will neither know nor have faith\u2014neither science nor true\nopinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of\nknowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic\npoets are imitators in the highest degree.\n\nAnd now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to\nimitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen\nwhen in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a\ndistance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to\nimpose upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating\ncomes in to save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance;\nfor, as we were saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the\nsame and at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of\nthem is true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is\nallied to the better faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are\nto the worse. And the same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of\npoetry as well as painting. The imitation is of actions voluntary or\ninvoluntary, in which there is an expectation of a good or bad result,\nand present experience of pleasure and pain. But is a man in harmony\nwith himself when he is the subject of these conflicting influences? Is\nthere not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether he\nis more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in\ncompany. \u2018In the latter case.\u2019 Feeling would lead him to indulge his\nsorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he\ncannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing\nis of any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to\ngood counsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make\nan uproar; we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not\nraising a lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is\nready to follow reason, while the irrational principle is full of\nsorrow and distraction at the recollection of our troubles.\nUnfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials of\nthe imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily\nbe displayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of\nher. Thus the poet is like the painter in two ways: first he paints an\ninferior degree of truth, and secondly, he is concerned with an\ninferior part of the soul. He indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles\nthe reason; and we refuse to allow him to have authority over the mind\nof man; for he has no measure of greater and less, and is a maker of\nimages and very far gone from truth.\n\nBut we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment\u2014the\npower which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we\nhear some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious\nlength, you know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and\nyet in our own sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as\neffeminate and unmanly (Ion). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in\nseeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself? Is he not\ngiving way to a sentiment which in his own case he would control?\u2014he is\noff his guard because the sorrow is another\u2019s; and he thinks that he\nmay indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be the gainer by\nthe pleasure. But the inevitable consequence is that he who begins by\nweeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The\nsame is true of comedy,\u2014you may often laugh at buffoonery which you\nwould be ashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the\nstage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and\nwaters the passions and desires; she lets them rule instead of ruling\nthem. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer affirming\nthat he is the educator of Hellas, and that all life should be\nregulated by his precepts, we may allow the excellence of their\nintentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and\ntragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes\nbeyond hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and\npain, but law and reason shall rule in our State.\n\nThese are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge\nus with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind\nher that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of\nwhich there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the\nsaying of \u2018the she-dog, yelping at her mistress,\u2019 and \u2018the philosophers\nwho are ready to circumvent Zeus,\u2019 and \u2018the philosophers who are\npaupers.\u2019 Nevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow\nher to return upon condition that she makes a defence of herself in\nverse; and her supporters who are not poets may speak in prose. We\nconfess her charms; but if she cannot show that she is useful as well\nas delightful, like rational lovers, we must renounce our love, though\nendeared to us by early associations. Having come to years of\ndiscretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man should be\ncareful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he\nhimself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake\u2014no less than the good\nor evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice\nand virtue for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of\nhonour or wealth. \u2018I agree with you.\u2019\n\nAnd yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described.\n\u2018And can we conceive things greater still?\u2019 Not, perhaps, in this brief\nspan of life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of\neternity? \u2018I do not understand what you mean?\u2019 Do you not know that the\nsoul is immortal? \u2018Surely you are not prepared to prove that?\u2019 Indeed I\nam. \u2018Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.\u2019\n\nYou would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In\nall things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy\nthem, nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting\nprinciples, which are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like.\nBut none of these destroy the soul in the same sense that disease\ndestroys the body. The soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not,\nby reason of them, brought any nearer to death. Nothing which was not\ndestroyed from within ever perished by external affection of evil. The\nbody, which is one thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is\nanother, unless the badness of the food is communicated to the body.\nNeither can the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the body,\nwhich is another, unless she herself is infected. And as no bodily evil\ncan infect the soul, neither can any bodily evil, whether disease or\nviolence, or any other destroy the soul, unless it can be shown to\nrender her unholy and unjust. But no one will ever prove that the souls\nof men become more unjust when they die. If a person has the audacity\nto say the contrary, the answer is\u2014Then why do criminals require the\nhand of the executioner, and not die of themselves? \u2018Truly,\u2019 he said,\n\u2018injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a cessation of\nevil; but I rather believe that the injustice which murders others may\ntend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.\u2019 You are quite\nright. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot destroy\nthe soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul which\ncannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be\nimmortal and everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist\nin the same number. They cannot diminish, because they cannot be\ndestroyed; nor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come\nfrom something mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is\nthe soul variable and diverse; for that which is immortal must be of\nthe fairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive her truly,\nand so behold justice and injustice in their own nature, she must be\nviewed by the light of reason pure as at birth, or as she is reflected\nin philosophy when holding converse with the divine and immortal and\neternal. In her present condition we see her only like the sea-god\nGlaucus, bruised and maimed in the sea which is the world, and covered\nwith shells and stones which are incrusted upon her from the\nentertainments of earth.\n\nThus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards\nand honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented\nourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in\nherself, even if a man should put on a Gyges\u2019 ring and have the helmet\nof Hades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will\nenumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted,\nfor the sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might perhaps\nescape the knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really\nimpossible. And since I have shown that justice has reality, you must\ngrant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the first place,\nthe just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of\nthe Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, always\nexcepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All\nthings end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what\nappears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be\nin their likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the\nbest policy? The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks\ndown before he reaches the goal, and slinks away in dishonour; whereas\nthe true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you\nmust allow me to repeat all the blessings which you attributed to the\nfortunate unjust\u2014they bear rule in the city, they marry and give in\nmarriage to whom they will; and the evils which you attributed to the\nunfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as\nyou implied, their sufferings are better veiled in silence.\n\nBut all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared\nwith those which await good men after death. \u2018I should like to hear\nabout them.\u2019 Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son\nof Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but\nten days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent\nhome for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre\nand there he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world\nbelow. He said that his soul went with a great company to a place, in\nwhich there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two\ncorresponding chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting\nin the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way\non the right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them\nbefore, while the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to\ndescend by the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen,\nas he was to be their messenger to men from the world below. And he\nbeheld and saw the souls departing after judgment at either chasm; some\nwho came from earth, were worn and travel-stained; others, who came\nfrom heaven, were clean and bright. They seemed glad to meet and rest\nawhile in the meadow; here they discoursed with one another of what\nthey had seen in the other world. Those who came from earth wept at the\nremembrance of their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of\nglorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed\nthey were punished tenfold\u2014now the journey was of a thousand years\u2019\nduration, because the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years\u2014and\nthe rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He added something\nhardly worth repeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were\nborn. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still more\nterrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits asked\u2014Where\nis Ardiaeus the Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had\nmurdered his father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.)\nAnother spirit answered, \u2018He comes not hither, and will never come. And\nI myself,\u2019 he added, \u2018actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance\nof the chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some\nother sinners\u2014most of whom had been tyrants, but not all\u2014and just as\nthey fancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar,\nand then wild, fiery-looking men who knew the meaning of the sound,\nseized him and several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw\nthem down, and dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating\nthem and carding them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that\nthey were going to be cast into hell.\u2019 The greatest terror of the\npilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there\nwas silence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings\nthere were corresponding delights.\n\nOn the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and\nin four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of\nlight, in colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day\nmore brought them to the place, and they saw that this was the column\nof light which binds together the whole universe. The ends of the\ncolumn were fastened to heaven, and from them hung the distaff of\nNecessity, on which all the heavenly bodies turned\u2014the hook and spindle\nwere of adamant, and the whorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in\nform like a number of boxes fitting into one another with their edges\nturned upwards, making together a single whorl which was pierced by the\nspindle. The outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner whorls were\nsmaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (the\nfixed stars) was spangled\u2014the seventh (the sun) was brightest\u2014the\neighth (the moon) shone by the light of the seventh\u2014the second and\nfifth (Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and yellower than\nthe eighth\u2014the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light\u2014the fourth (Mars)\nwas red\u2014the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The whole had one\nmotion, but while this was revolving in one direction the seven inner\ncircles were moving in the opposite, with various degrees of swiftness\nand slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a Siren\nstood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos,\nthe daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing\nof past, present, and future, responsive to the music of the Sirens;\nClotho from time to time guiding the outer circle with a touch of her\nright hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner\ncircles; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand from time to time to\nguide both of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and\nthere was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her knees\nlots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: \u2018Mortal\nsouls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new\nperiod of mortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you\nplease; the responsibility of choosing is with you\u2014God is blameless.\u2019\nAfter speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up\nthe lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before them\nthe samples of lives, many more than the souls present; and there were\nall sorts of lives, of men and of animals. There were tyrannies ending\nin misery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their\ndifferent qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and\npoverty, sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of human\nlife, and therefore the whole of education should be directed to the\nacquisition of such a knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil\nand choose the good. He should know all the combinations which occur in\nlife\u2014of beauty with poverty or with wealth,\u2014of knowledge with external\ngoods,\u2014and at last choose with reference to the nature of the soul,\nregarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and\nleaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense of truth\nand right into the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled\nby wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the\nextremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the\ninterpreter to have said, is the true happiness of man; and any one, as\nhe proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot,\neven though he come last. \u2018Let not the first be careless in his choice,\nnor the last despair.\u2019 He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had\ndrawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated\nto devour his own children\u2014and when he discovered his mistake, he wept\nand beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather\nthan himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his\nprevious life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had\nonly habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice,\nbecause he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth\nand had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man\nhad followed philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately\nfortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his\npilgrimage both from and to this world would be smooth and heavenly.\nNothing was more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad\nand laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid\ntheir own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of Orpheus\nchanging into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was\nThamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing\nto be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the\nlife of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which\nwas done to him in the judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like\nenmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the\nsoul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her\nEpeus taking the nature of a workwoman; among the last was Thersites,\nwho was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came\nOdysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay neglected and\ndespised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said that if\nhe had been first instead of last, his choice would have been the same.\nMen, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame animals\nchanging into one another.\n\nWhen all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each\nof them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all\nbrought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the\nrevolution of the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were\ncarried to Atropos, who made the threads irreversible; whence, without\nturning round, they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when\nthey had all passed, they moved on in scorching heat to the plain of\nForgetfulness and rested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water\ncould not be retained in any vessel; of this they had all to drink a\ncertain quantity\u2014some of them drank more than was required, and he who\ndrank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. When\nthey had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were\nthunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers\nways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the\nbody, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found\nhimself lying on the pyre.\n\nThus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if\nwe believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way\nof Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of\nForgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a\ncrown of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the\nmillennial pilgrimage of the other.\n\nThe Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions:\nfirst, resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates\nassails the poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been\nanalyzed, are seen to be very far gone from the truth; and secondly,\nhaving shown the reality of the happiness of the just, he demands that\nappearance shall be restored to him, and then proceeds to prove the\nimmortality of the soul. The argument, as in the Phaedo and Gorgias, is\nsupplemented by the vision of a future life.\n\nWhy Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and\ndramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and\nespecially to the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that\ntruth may be embodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are\nsome indefinable lights and shadows of human life which can only be\nexpressed in poetry\u2014some elements of imagination which always entwine\nwith reason; why he should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably\nassociated with the impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he\nshould try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of\nutility,\u2014are questions which have always been debated amongst students\nof Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may\nshow\u2014first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of\nhis age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error\nwhich is contained in them.\n\nHe is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own\nlifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws, had taken the\nplace of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last\nphase of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and\napologist of tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was\nalmost extinct; the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry,\nlike every other branch of Greek literature, was falling under the\npower of rhetoric. There was no \u2018second or third\u2019 to Aeschylus and\nSophocles in the generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one\nof his later comedies (Frogs), speaks of \u2018thousands of tragedy-making\nprattlers,\u2019 whose attempts at poetry he compares to the chirping of\nswallows; \u2018their garrulity went far beyond Euripides,\u2019\u2014\u2018they appeared\nonce upon the stage, and there was an end of them.\u2019 To a man of genius\nwho had a real appreciation of the godlike Aeschylus and the noble and\ngentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their\n\u2018theology\u2019 (Rep.), these \u2018minor poets\u2019 must have been contemptible and\nintolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato\nthan a sense of the decline and decay both in literature and in\npolitics which marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to\nlook with favour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his\ncareer, who had begun by satirizing Socrates in the Clouds, and in a\nsimilar spirit forty years afterwards had satirized the founders of\nideal commonwealths in his Eccleziazusae, or Female Parliament (Laws).\n\nThere were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The\nprofession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human\nnature, for \u2018one man in his life\u2019 cannot \u2018play many parts;\u2019 the\ncharacters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character,\nand to leave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any\nman live his life and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not\nthe master of it. Taking this view Plato is more decided in his\nexpulsion of the dramatic than of the epic poets, though he must have\nknown that the Greek tragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of\nvirtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer can be compared. But\ngreat dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly consistent with\nfirmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally\nassociated with a weak or dissolute character.\n\nIn the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First,\nhe says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third\ndegree removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and\nmeasure; they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that\nart is not merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in\nforms of sense. Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his\nargument derives a colour, we should maintain that the artist may\nennoble the bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the\nfeeling of home which he introduces; and there have been modern\npainters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith\u2019s or\na carpenter\u2019s shop. The eye or mind which feels as well as sees can\ngive dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built shed\n(Rembrandt), to the hull of a vessel \u2018going to its last home\u2019 (Turner).\nStill more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem to\nbe the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether\nthe Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only,\nwould he not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be\nfound in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of\nproportion to which they conformed was \u2018higher far than any geometry or\narithmetic could express?\u2019 (Statesman.)\n\nAgain, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the\nemotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not\nadmit Aristotle\u2019s theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are\na purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only\nto afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge\nthat we may sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to\nthem; and that they often gain strength when pent up within our own\nbreast. It is not every indulgence of the feelings which is to be\ncondemned. For there may be a gratification of the higher as well as of\nthe lower\u2014thoughts which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by\nourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets. Every one would\nacknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and\nelevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture or by\nthe peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in the earlier\npart of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of\nharmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he\nregards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only \u2018What good\nhave they done?\u2019 and is not satisfied with the reply, that \u2018They have\ngiven innocent pleasure to mankind.\u2019\n\nHe tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he\nhas found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the\ninferior faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to\ndo with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are\non a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and\nPlato; and he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a\nrule of life by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical\nuse of them is in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that\nthe poets were not critics\u2014as he says in the Apology, \u2018Any one was a\nbetter interpreter of their writings than they were themselves. He\nhimself ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates;\nthough, as he tells us of Solon, \u2018he might have been one of the\ngreatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits\u2019 (Tim.)\nThus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato and\nthe poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between\nphilosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras, were\nthe Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one class is\nreflected on the other. He regards them both as the enemies of\nreasoning and abstraction, though in the case of Euripides more with\nreference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and the like. For\nPlato is the prophet who \u2018came into the world to convince men\u2019\u2014first of\nthe fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of the reality of\nabstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern times in\nopposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many\nelements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of\npoetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought\nand abstraction. Unfortunately the very word \u2018idea,\u2019 which to Plato is\nexpressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds\nwith an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how\nhe differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than history,\nfor the opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not\nlike history, with particulars (Poet).\n\nThe things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which\nare unseen\u2014they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas.\nTo him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense;\nthey have a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in\nseeing that this is an illusion; for there is no more error or\nvariation in an individual man, horse, bed, etc., than in the class\nman, horse, bed, etc.; nor is the truth which is displayed in\nindividual instances less certain than that which is conveyed through\nthe medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real\nimportance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them\nan essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be\noften false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear\nconception of the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal\nand the particular; or had he been able to distinguish between opinion\nand sensation, which the ambiguity of the words (Greek) and the like,\ntended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of\nsense.\n\nBut the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in\nall departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and\nrhetoricians of the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests,\nfalse prophets, lying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is\nanother count put into the indictment against them by Plato, that they\nare the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his\npatronage. Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of false ideas\nand false teachers at its service\u2014in the history of Modern Europe as\nwell as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends solely\nupon force; without some corruption of literature and morals\u2014some\nappeal to the imagination of the masses\u2014some pretence to the favour of\nheaven\u2014some element of good giving power to evil, tyranny, even for a\nshort time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible\nto the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic\nfeeling; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were\nnot devoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the\nfirst instance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or\nArchelaus: and the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their\nprostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his\nprophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers of other ages\nwho are the creatures of the government under which they live. He\ncompares the corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a\nperfect society, and gathers up into one mass of evil the evils and\nerrors of mankind; to him they are personified in the rhetoricians,\nsophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.\n\nA further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts\nis that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be\ndisposed to introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him.\nFor the emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not\nmost likely to be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by\nthe moderate indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present\nthought in the form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of\nreason, to inspire even for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to\nsuggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which mere language\nis incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age\nof art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the\nvoluptuous image of a Corinthian courtezan. But this only shows that\nart, like other outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil,\nand is not more closely connected with the higher than with the lower\npart of the soul. All imitative art is subject to certain limitations,\nand therefore necessarily partakes of the nature of a compromise.\nSomething of ideal truth is sacrificed for the sake of the\nrepresentation, and something in the exactness of the representation is\nsacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent element;\nthey idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the intermediates\nbetween sense and ideas.\n\nIn the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of\nfiction may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine\nthe existence of an age in which a severer conception of truth has\neither banished or transformed them. At any rate we must admit that\nthey hold a different place at different periods of the world\u2019s\nhistory. In the infancy of mankind, poetry, with the exception of\nproverbs, is the whole of literature, and the only instrument of\nintellectual culture; in modern times she is the shadow or echo of her\nformer self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton in his\nday doubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the same\ntime we must remember, that what Plato would have called the charms of\npoetry have been partly transferred to prose; he himself (Statesman)\nadmits rhetoric to be the handmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find\nin the strain of law (Laws) a substitute for the old poets. Among\nourselves the creative power seems often to be growing weaker, and\nscientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering to the mind than\nformerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called love, has\nhitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance, and\nhas exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the\nworld. But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some\nday exhausted? The modern English novel which is the most popular of\nall forms of reading is not more than a century or two old: will the\ntale of love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations\nof the same theme, be still received with unabated interest?\n\nArt cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may\noften corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which\nall artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect\nexpression, either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical\nideal. The fairest forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as\nis proved by the fact that the Mahometans, and many sects of\nChristians, have renounced the use of pictures and images. The\nbeginning of a great religion, whether Christian or Gentile, has not\nbeen \u2018wood or stone,\u2019 but a spirit moving in the hearts of men. The\ndisciples have met in a large upper room or in \u2018holes and caves of the\nearth\u2019; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques,\ntemples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions,\nlike the first revelation of them, has come from within and has\ngenerally disregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.\n\nBut poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and\nthe purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite\nviews\u2014when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be\nbrought up amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he\nbanishes the poets from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which\nsome of us almost deify, have fallen short of their higher aim, we must\nadmit on the other hand that to banish imagination wholly would be\nsuicidal as well as impossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a\nbreath of the fresh air or a single glance at the varying landscape\nwould in an instant revive and reillumine the extinguished spark of\npoetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of civilization\nimagination more than reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to\nbanish art would be to banish thought, to banish language, to banish\nthe expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external\nforms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and images\nhas a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and\nbeautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought\nare not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can\nexecute. And the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us,\nare always tending to pass into the form of feeling.\n\nPlato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society.\nBut he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting\nagainst the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest\nagainst the want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the\nunseemliness or extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, against\nthe time-serving of preachers or public writers, against the\nregardlessness of truth which to the eye of the philosopher seems to\ncharacterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to\ncomplain that our poets and novelists \u2018paint inferior truth\u2019 and \u2018are\nconcerned with the inferior part of the soul\u2019; that the readers of them\nbecome what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look\nin vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,\u2014\u2018the beauty\nwhich meets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the soul,\neven in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.\u2019\n\nFor there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine\nperfection, the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which\nshould renew the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which\nthe poet was man\u2019s only teacher and best friend,\u2014which would find\nmaterials in the living present as well as in the romance of the past,\nand might subdue to the fairest forms of speech and verse the\nintractable materials of modern civilisation,\u2014which might elicit the\nsimple principles, or, as Plato would have called them, the essential\nforms, of truth and justice out of the variety of opinion and the\ncomplexity of modern society,\u2014which would preserve all the good of each\ngeneration and leave the bad unsung,\u2014which should be based not on vain\nlongings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of\nman. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in\none, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man;\nand feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts and\nheroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of\nmanly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the\nordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems\n(Laws), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have\nbeen heard among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, whom\nPlato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep\nand serious approval,\u2014in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in\npassages of other English poets,\u2014first and above all in the Hebrew\nprophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should\nspeak and act; he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth;\nhe has ennobled the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep.), he \u2018has left no\nway of life.\u2019 The next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is\nconcerned with \u2018a lower degree of truth\u2019; he paints the world as a\nstage on which \u2018all the men and women are merely players\u2019; he\ncultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth and\naction. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his\nfancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry.\nPossibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his\nadversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking,\n\u2018How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?\u2019\n\nReturning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and\nerror appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the\nabsurdity of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just\nas in the Phaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology\nupon rational principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his\nown age, which he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument\nthat Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth\nknowing, would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a\nrhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato (Rep.).\nIt may be compared with those other paradoxes of the Gorgias, that \u2018No\nstatesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he was\nthe head\u2019; and that \u2018No Sophist was ever defrauded by his pupils\u2019\n(Gorg.)...\n\nThe argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of\nsoul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force\nwhich is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if\nshe cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other.\nYet Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the\nincrustations of earth as to lose her original form; and in the Timaeus\nhe recognizes more strongly than in the Republic the influence which\nthe body has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human\nactions, on the ground that they proceed from physical states (Tim.).\nIn the Republic, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul\nwhich has to be restored, and the character which is developed by\ntraining and education...\n\nThe vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who\nis said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has\ncertainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the\npilgrimages of the soul in the Zend Avesta (Haug, Avesta). But no trace\nof acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato\u2019s writings,\nand there is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian.\nThe philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from\nZoroaster, and still less the myths of Plato.\n\nThe local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the\nPhaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology;\nthe great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a\ncylinder or box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the\nfixed stars; this is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on\nthe knees of Necessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained\nin the cylinder are guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion\nproduces the music of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of\nthese, which is the moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful\nwhether this is the continuation of the column of light, from which the\npilgrims contemplate the heavens; the words of Plato imply that they\nare connected, but not the same. The column itself is clearly not of\nadamant. The spindle (which is of adamant) is fastened to the ends of\nthe chains which extend to the middle of the column of light\u2014this\ncolumn is said to hold together the heaven; but whether it hangs from\nthe spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not explained. The\ncylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol\nas the figure of Necessity turning the spindle;\u2014for the outermost rim\nis the sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the\nintervals of space which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens.\nThe description is both a picture and an orrery, and therefore is\nnecessarily inconsistent with itself. The column of light is not the\nMilky Way\u2014which is neither straight, nor like a rainbow\u2014but the\nimaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the rainbow in respect\nnot of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of a trireme,\nbut to the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the\nundergirders meet.\n\nThe orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in\nits mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the\nother in the Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from\nthe planets, and they move in orbits without them, although in an\nopposite direction: in the Republic as in the Timaeus they are all\nmoving round the axis of the world. But we are not certain that in the\nformer they are moving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in\nthe Republic of the circles of the same and other; although both in the\nTimaeus and in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed\nto coincide with the motion of the whole. The relative thickness of the\nrims is perhaps designed to express the relative distances of the\nplanets. Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from which Er\nand his companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but\nwhether or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the\nrevolution of the axis, is uncertain (Timaeus). The spectator may be\nsupposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below.\nThe earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the\nPhaedrus, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at\nthe stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction\nbetween the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to\nimagine that the planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed\nstars, in order to account for their appearances in the heavens. In the\ndescription of the meadow, and the retribution of the good and evil\nafter death, there are traces of Homer.\n\nThe description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as\nforming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the\nmotions of the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web,\nor weaving of the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them,\nand the making of them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three\nFates\u2014Lachesis, Clotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their\nnames. The element of chance in human life is indicated by the order of\nthe lots. But chance, however adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of\nman, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man\nthan chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately fortunate in\nthe number of the lot\u2014even the very last comer\u2014might have a good life\nif he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an\nassertion which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few\nsentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But\nthe virtue which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man\nto choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly\nwhen placed in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good\nhabits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, \u2018Common\nsense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,\u2019 so Plato would\nhave said, \u2018Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.\u2019\n\nThe freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is\ndistinctly asserted. \u2018Virtue is free, and as a man honours or\ndishonours her he will have more or less of her.\u2019 The life of man is\n\u2018rounded\u2019 by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which\naffect him (Pol.). But within the walls of necessity there is an open\nspace in which he is his own master, and can study for himself the\neffects which the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have\nupon the soul, and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first\nchoice in everything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if they\nchoose wisely and will live diligently.\n\nThe verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand\nyears, by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years\nbefore; the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after\nhe was supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the\npilgrims passed in the meadow, and the four days during which they\njourneyed to the column of light; the precision with which the soul is\nmentioned who chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there\nwas no definite character among the souls, and that the souls which had\nchosen ill blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the\nsouls drank more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness,\nwhile Er himself was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to\nrest at last, unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the\nfeigned ignorance of how Er returned to the body, when the other souls\nwent shooting like stars to their birth,\u2014add greatly to the probability\nof the narrative. They are such touches of nature as the art of Defoe\nmight have introduced when he wished to win credibility for marvels and\napparitions.\n\n\nThere still remain to be considered some points which have been\nintentionally reserved to the end: (1) the Janus-like character of the\nRepublic, which presents two faces\u2014one an Hellenic state, the other a\nkingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects\nare (2) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by\nMorgenstern: (a) the community of property; (b) of families; (c) the\nrule of philosophers; (d) the analogy of the individual and the State,\nwhich, like some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far.\nWe may then proceed to consider (3) the subject of education as\nconceived by Plato, bringing together in a general view the education\nof youth and the education of after-life; (4) we may note further some\nessential differences between ancient and modern politics which are\nsuggested by the Republic; (5) we may compare the Politicus and the\nLaws; (6) we may observe the influence exercised by Plato on his\nimitators; and (7) take occasion to consider the nature and value of\npolitical, and (8) of religious ideals.\n\n1. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State\n(Book V). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such\nas the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the\nmilitary training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women.\nThe life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws), enforced even more\nrigidly in time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like\nPlato\u2019s, were forbidden to trade\u2014they were to be soldiers and not\nshopkeepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely\nsubjected to the State; the time when he was to marry, the education of\nhis children, the clothes which he was to wear, the food which he was\nto eat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the\nRepublic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, and\nsome of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are\nborrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships\nbetween men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording\nincentives to bravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer approach\nwas made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes, and to\ncommunity of property; and while there was probably less of\nlicentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was\nregarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The \u2018suprema lex\u2019 was\nthe preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The\ncoarse strength of a military government was not favourable to purity\nand refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems\nto have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most\naccessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them might be\ndescribed in the words of Plato as having a \u2018fierce secret longing\nafter gold and silver.\u2019 Though not in the strict sense communists, the\nprinciple of communism was maintained among them in their division of\nlands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of\none another\u2019s goods. Marriage was a public institution: and the women\nwere educated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men.\n\nMany traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the\nmagistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as\nin the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled.\nHymns to the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the\nideal State, were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The\nSpartans, though an unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of\npoetry; they had been stirred by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they\nhad crowded around Hippias to hear his recitals of Homer; but in this\nthey resembled the citizens of the timocratic rather than of the ideal\nState. The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan\ngerousia; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about\nmatters of detail agrees with what we are told of that institution.\nOnce more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms\nat the temples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the\nimportance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens; the use\nof warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression\u2014are\nfeatures probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta.\n\nTo the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and\nthe character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan\ncitizen. The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon,\nbut was shared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to\nfind a principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The (Greek)\nof the Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of\ntheir laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed.\nFascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would imitate the\nLacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the\ncontemporaries of Plato as \u2018the persons who had their ears bruised,\u2019\nlike the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church or\ncountry when seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary\nsimplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which never\nhas been, or of a future which never will be,\u2014these are aspirations of\nthe human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet\nwith a response in the Republic of Plato.\n\nBut there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example,\nthe literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of\nlife, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his\ncitizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian\ndiscipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in\ntheory he is a lover of Sparta; and he is something more than either\u2014he\nhas also a true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars\nof Hellenes against one another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God\nis the grand hereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of\nharmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole State is to\nhave an external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within. But\nhe has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in\nthe Laws\u2014that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one\nmind, than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other\nHellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really an\nupper class; for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower\nclasses are allowed to fade away into the distance, and are represented\nin the individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of a social\nState in which all classes are harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas\nor the world in which different nations or States have a place. His\ncity is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to\nbe justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of\nthe earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of\nHellas, and the allusion to the four ages of the world is also\nsanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that\nthe Republic is partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek polis,\npartly on the actual circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like\nthe old painters, retains the traditional form, and like them he has\nalso a vision of a city in the clouds.\n\nThere is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the\nwork; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean\nleague. The \u2018way of life\u2019 which was connected with the name of\nPythagoras, like the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which\nthe mind of an individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and\nmay have naturally suggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such\n\u2018mediaeval institutions.\u2019 The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule\nof life and a moral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed\nto music, which to us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature;\nit is not to be regarded as representing the real influence of music in\nthe Greek world. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the\nPythagorean league of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For\nonce in the history of mankind the philosophy of order or (Greek),\nexpressing and consequently enlisting on its side the combined\nendeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of\npublic affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time (until\nabout B.C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian\ninstitutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like\nPlato\u2019s (Greek), were required to submit to a severe training in order\nto prepare the way for the education of the other members of the\ncommunity. Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent\nPythagoreans, such as Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political\ninfluence over the cities of Magna Graecia. There was much here that\nwas suggestive to the kindred spirit of Plato, who had doubtless\nmeditated deeply on the \u2018way of life of Pythagoras\u2019 (Rep.) and his\nfollowers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are to be found in the\nmystical number of the State, in the number which expresses the\ninterval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of\ntransmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great\nthough secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education.\n\nBut as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far\nbeyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible,\nwhich is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of\nphilosophy, analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been\nthe dream of Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of\nEurope with the kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the\nworld at all resembles Plato\u2019s ideal State; nor does he himself imagine\nthat such a State is possible. This he repeats again and again; e.g. in\nthe Republic, or in the Laws where, casting a glance back on the\nRepublic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy\nwas impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a\npattern. The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he\nargues in the Republic that ideals are none the worse because they\ncannot be realized in fact, and in the chorus of laughter, which like a\nbreaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet the mention of his\nproposals; though like other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to\ngive reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can\ncome into being, he answers ironically, \u2018When one son of a king becomes\na philosopher\u2019; he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as \u2018a\nnoble lie\u2019; and when the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells\nyou that his Republic is a vision only, which in some sense may have\nreality, but not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon\nearth. It has been said that Plato flies as well as walks, but this\nfalls short of the truth; for he flies and walks at the same time, and\nis in the air and on firm ground in successive instants.\n\nNiebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in\nthis place\u2014Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal\nto Athenian institutions?\u2014he can hardly be said to be the friend of\ndemocracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of\ngovernment; all of them he regarded as \u2018states of faction\u2019 (Laws); none\nattained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects,\nwhich seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other;\nand the worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has\nhardly any meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings\nare not meant for a particular age and country, but for all time and\nall mankind. The decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive\nwhich led Plato to frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be\nregarded as reflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As well might we\ncomplain of St. Augustine, whose great work \u2018The City of God\u2019\noriginated in a similar motive, for not being loyal to the Roman\nEmpire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded by the first\nChristians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens\nbecause, though \u2018subject to the higher powers,\u2019 they were looking\nforward to a city which is in heaven.\n\n2. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of\naccording to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age\nhave been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the\nparadoxes of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to\nhis contemporaries. The modern world has either sneered at them as\nabsurd, or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; men have been\npleased to find in Aristotle\u2019s criticisms of them the anticipation of\ntheir own good sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have disliked\nand also dreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the\nfailure of efforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the\nthoughts of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who\nhad done most to elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a\nbetter treatment at our hands. We may have to address the public, as\nPlato does poetry, and assure them that we mean no harm to existing\ninstitutions. There are serious errors which have a side of truth and\nwhich therefore may fairly demand a careful consideration: there are\ntruths mixed with error of which we may indeed say, \u2018The half is better\nthan the whole.\u2019 Yet \u2018the half\u2019 may be an important contribution to the\nstudy of human nature.\n\n(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned\nslightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle\nobserves, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of\nthe other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance,\nand probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the\nwriter from entering into details.\n\nAristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of\nmodern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing\naway with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to\nconsider the subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled\nby the common opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the\nsacredness of property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in\nancient times. The world has grown older, and is therefore more\nconservative. Primitive society offered many examples of land held in\ncommon, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably have\nbeen the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had\ninvented various modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land\namong the citizens; according to Aristotle there were nations who held\nthe land in common and divided the produce, and there were others who\ndivided the land and stored the produce in common. The evils of debt\nand the inequality of property were far greater in ancient than in\nmodern times, and the accidents to which property was subject from war,\nor revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference, were\nalso greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and\nsacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held their\nproperty in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of\nChrist himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in\nalmost all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of\nmodern enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age\nof religious excitement notions like Wycliffe\u2019s \u2018inheritance of grace\u2019\nhave tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent,\nhas appeared in politics. \u2018The preparation of the Gospel of peace\u2019 soon\nbecomes the red flag of Republicanism.\n\nWe can hardly judge what effect Plato\u2019s views would have upon his own\ncontemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an\nexaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would\nacknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency,\nand may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good.\nAny other mode of vesting property which was found to be more\nadvantageous, would in time acquire the same basis of right; \u2018the most\nuseful,\u2019 in Plato\u2019s words, \u2018would be the most sacred.\u2019 The lawyers and\necclesiastics of former ages would have spoken of property as a sacred\ninstitution. But they only meant by such language to oppose the\ngreatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the rights of\nindividuals and of the Church.\n\nWhen we consider the question, without any fear of immediate\napplication to practice, in the spirit of Plato\u2019s Republic, are we\nquite sure that the received notions of property are the best? Is the\ndistribution of wealth which is customary in civilized countries the\nmost favourable that can be conceived for the education and development\nof the mass of mankind? Can \u2018the spectator of all time and all\nexistence\u2019 be quite convinced that one or two thousand years hence,\ngreat changes will not have taken place in the rights of property, or\neven that the very notion of property, beyond what is necessary for\npersonal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was a distinction\nfamiliar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among ourselves.\nSuch a change would not be greater than some other changes through\nwhich the world has passed in the transition from ancient to modern\nsociety, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the\nabolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and not so great\nas the difference which separates the Eastern village community from\nthe Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in the course of a\nfew centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has\nactually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom\nof Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five\nor six hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished\namong ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have\npassed away; and the most untenable propositions respecting the right\nof bequests or entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the\nmost moderate. Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society\ncan be final in which the interests of thousands are perilled on the\nlife or character of a single person. And many will indulge the hope\nthat our present condition may, after all, be only transitional, and\nmay conduct to a higher, in which property, besides ministering to the\nenjoyment of the few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture\nto all, and will be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also\nmore under the control of public authority. There may come a time when\nthe saying, \u2018Have I not a right to do what I will with my own?\u2019 will\nappear to be a barbarous relic of individualism;\u2014when the possession of\na part may be a greater blessing to each and all than the possession of\nthe whole is now to any one.\n\nSuch reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical\nstatesman, but they are within the range of possibility to the\nphilosopher. He can imagine that in some distant age or clime, and\nthrough the influence of some individual, the notion of common property\nmay or might have sunk as deep into the heart of a race, and have\nbecome as fixed to them, as private property is to ourselves. He knows\nthat this latter institution is not more than four or five thousand\nyears old: may not the end revert to the beginning? In our own age even\nUtopias affect the spirit of legislation, and an abstract idea may\nexercise a great influence on practical politics.\n\nThe objections that would be generally urged against Plato\u2019s community\nof property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion\nwould be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was\ndependent upon all. Every man would produce as little and consume as\nmuch as he liked. The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been\nadverse to Socialism. The effort is too great for human nature; men try\nto live in common, but the personal feeling is always breaking in. On\nthe other hand it may be doubted whether our present notions of\nproperty are not conventional, for they differ in different countries\nand in different states of society. We boast of an individualism which\nis not freedom, but rather an artificial result of the industrial state\nof modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he is also\npowerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic\nnecessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become\ndisinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization\nwhich fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces\nwhich have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a\nsimilar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And\nif we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives\nworking in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that\nthe mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the\nhigher possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is\nattainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few,\nmay pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency\nwhich mankind have hitherto never seen.\n\nNow that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held\nfast under the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has\npierced the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the\npresent,\u2014the progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater\nand swifter than heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the\npoint at which we may arrive in two or three generations is beyond the\npower of imagination to foresee. There are forces in the world which\nwork, not in an arithmetical, but in a geometrical ratio of increase.\nEducation, to use the expression of Plato, moves like a wheel with an\never-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say how great may be its\ninfluence, when it becomes universal,\u2014when it has been inherited by\nmany generations,\u2014when it is freed from the trammels of superstition\nand rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different classes of\nmen and women. Neither do we know how much more the co-operation of\nminds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether in labour or\nin study. The resources of the natural sciences are not half-developed\nas yet; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, may\nbecome many times more fertile than hitherto; the uses of machinery far\ngreater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of\nphysiology may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its\ninnermost recesses. The standard of health may be raised and the lives\nof men prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace,\nthere may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds.\nThe ever-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth.\nThere may be mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only\nat great crises of history. The East and the West may meet together,\nand all nations may contribute their thoughts and their experience to\nthe common stock of humanity. Many other elements enter into a\nspeculation of this kind. But it is better to make an end of them. For\nsuch reflections appear to the majority far-fetched, and to men of\nscience, commonplace.\n\n(b) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of\ncommunity of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to\nbe the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the\ncommunity of wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another\nproposal, that the occupations of men and women shall be the same, and\nthat to this end they shall have a common training and education. Male\nand female animals have the same pursuits\u2014why not also the two sexes of\nman?\n\nBut have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying\nthat different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men\nand women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our\nnotion of the division of labour?\u2014These objections are no sooner raised\nthan answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference\nbetween men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and\nwomen bear children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he\ncontends that all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among\nboth sexes, though there may be a superiority of degree on the part of\nthe men. The objection on the score of decency to their taking part in\nthe same gymnastic exercises, is met by Plato\u2019s assertion that the\nexisting feeling is a matter of habit.\n\nThat Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own\ncountry and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful\nindependence of mind. He is conscious that women are half the human\nrace, in some respects the more important half (Laws); and for the sake\nboth of men and women he desires to raise the woman to a higher level\nof existence. He brings, not sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a\nquestion which both in ancient and modern times has been chiefly\nregarded in the light of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble\nconceptions of womanhood in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in\nthe heroines Antigone and Andromache. But these ideals had no\ncounterpart in actual life. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal\nof her husband; she was not the entertainer of his guests or the\nmistress of his house, but only his housekeeper and the mother of his\nchildren. She took no part in military or political matters; nor is\nthere any instance in the later ages of Greece of a woman becoming\nfamous in literature. \u2018Hers is the greatest glory who has the least\nrenown among men,\u2019 is the historian\u2019s conception of feminine\nexcellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by Plato to\nthe world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share with him\nin the toils of war and in the cares of government. She is to be\nsimilarly trained both in bodily and mental exercises. She is to lose\nas far as possible the incidents of maternity and the characteristics\nof the female sex.\n\nThe modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the\ndifferences between men and women are not confined to the single point\nurged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities\nof women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked\nfor in men. And the criticism is just: the differences affect the whole\nnature, and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But\nneither can we say how far these differences are due to education and\nthe opinions of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and\nopinions of former generations. Women have been always taught, not\nexactly that they are slaves, but that they are in an inferior\nposition, which is also supposed to have compensating advantages; and\nto this position they have conformed. It is also true that the physical\nform may easily change in the course of generations through the mode of\nlife; and the weakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion,\nmay become a physical fact. The characteristics of sex vary greatly in\ndifferent countries and ranks of society, and at different ages in the\nsame individuals. Plato may have been right in denying that there was\nany ultimate difference in the sexes of man other than that which\nexists in animals, because all other differences may be conceived to\ndisappear in other states of society, or under different circumstances\nof life and training.\n\nThe first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second\u2014community\nof wives and children. \u2018Is it possible? Is it desirable?\u2019 For as\nGlaucon intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, \u2018Great doubts\nmay be entertained about both these points.\u2019 Any free discussion of the\nquestion is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing\nthe ultimate bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely\nenquire into the things which nature hides, any more than we can\ndissect our own bodies. Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his\nconclusions should be considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked,\nis a wonderful thing, that one of the wisest and best of men should\nhave entertained ideas of morality which are wholly at variance with\nour own. And if we would do Plato justice, we must examine carefully\nthe character of his proposals. First, we may observe that the\nrelations of the sexes supposed by him are the reverse of licentious:\nhe seems rather to aim at an impossible strictness. Secondly, he\nconceives the family to be the natural enemy of the state; and he\nentertains the serious hope that an universal brotherhood may take the\nplace of private interests\u2014an aspiration which, although not justified\nby experience, has possessed many noble minds. On the other hand, there\nis no sentiment or imagination in the connections which men and women\nare supposed by him to form; human beings return to the level of the\nanimals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural\ninstincts. All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love\nhas called forth in modern literature and romance would have been\nbanished by Plato. The arrangements of marriage in the Republic are\ndirected to one object\u2014the improvement of the race. In successive\ngenerations a great development both of bodily and mental qualities\nmight be possible. The analogy of animals tends to show that mankind\ncan within certain limits receive a change of nature. And as in animals\nwe should commonly choose the best for breeding, and destroy the\nothers, so there must be a selection made of the human beings whose\nlives are worthy to be preserved.\n\nWe start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first,\nthat the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed\nout; secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we\nshould be poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss\nof the best things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and\nmeanest of human beings\u2014the infant, the criminal, the insane, the\nidiot, truly seems to us one of the noblest results of Christianity. We\nhave learned, though as yet imperfectly, that the individual man has an\nendless value in the sight of God, and that we honour Him when we\nhonour the darkened and disfigured image of Him (Laws). This is the\nlesson which Christ taught in a parable when He said, \u2018Their angels do\nalways behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.\u2019 Such lessons\nare only partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of\nPlato, as they have very different degrees of strength in different\ncountries or ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a\nreligious and customary institution binding the members together by a\ntie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and having a less\nsolemn and sacred sound than that of country. The relationship which\nexisted on the lower level of custom, Plato imagined that he was\nraising to the higher level of nature and reason; while from the modern\nand Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning murder and\ndestroying the first principles of morality.\n\nThe great error in these and similar speculations is that the\ndifference between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human\nbeing is regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier, or at best of\na slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder\nof animals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at\ncourage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the\ngreat desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for\ntheir superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts.\nNeither does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the\nincrease of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of\nthe mind. Hence there must be \u2018a marriage of true minds\u2019 as well as of\nbodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts.\nMen and women without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes;\nyet Plato takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their place,\nnot even the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know\ntheir own children. The most important transaction of social life, he\nwho is the idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the\npair are to have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal\nfestival; their children are not theirs, but the state\u2019s; nor is any\ntie of affection to unite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals\nmight have saved Plato from a gigantic error, if he had \u2018not lost sight\nof his own illustration.\u2019 For the \u2018nobler sort of birds and beasts\u2019\nnourish and protect their offspring and are faithful to one another.\n\nAn eminent physiologist thinks it worth while \u2018to try and place life on\na physical basis.\u2019 But should not life rest on the moral rather than\nupon the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the\nhuman and rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely\ndivided; and in times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they\nseem to be only different aspects of a common human nature which\nincludes them both. Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but\nthe expansion and enlargement of it,\u2014the highest form which the\nphysical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not\ntake care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the mind takes\ncare of both. In all human action not that which is common to man and\nthe animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes\nhim from them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all\nvirtue into health of body \u2018la facon que notre sang circule,\u2019 still on\nmerely physical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and\nduty and conscience, under these or other names, are always\nreappearing. There cannot be health of body without health of mind; nor\nhealth of mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (Charm).\n\nThat the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations\nabout marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind,\ndoes indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato\nshould have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are\nrevolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent\nwhich is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of\nidealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift\nof reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject about which he\nhad better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The\ngeneral sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old\npoets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for\nthe family, on which much of their religion was based. But the example\nof Sparta, and perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public\nopinion, seems to have misled him. He will make one family out of all\nthe families of the state. He will select the finest specimens of men\nand women and breed from these only.\n\nYet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of\nhuman nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of\nphilosophy as well as of poetry), and also because any departure from\nestablished morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be\nunsettling, it may be worth while to draw out a little more at length\nthe objections to the Platonic marriage. In the first place, history\nshows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed the race has\ndeteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly\nall the civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of\nwritten records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken\nhas never been retraced. The exceptions occurring among Brahmins or\nMahometans or the ancient Persians, are of that sort which may be said\nto prove the rule. The connexions formed between superior and inferior\nraces hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because they are\nlicentious; and because the children in such cases usually despise the\nmother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed of them.\nBarbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die\nout; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other\ncountries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies\nwhich have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and\ndegenerated in stature; \u2018mariages de convenance\u2019 leave their enfeebling\nstamp on the offspring of them (King Lear). The marriage of near\nrelations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends\nconstantly to weakness or idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming\nthe form as they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common\nprostitute rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is\nthe authority of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes: and\nso many more elements enter into this \u2018mystery\u2019 than are dreamed of by\nPlato and some other philosophers.\n\nRecent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among\nprimitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and\nthat the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any\nman was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such\ncustoms among some of the lower races of man, and the survival of\npeculiar ceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are\nthought to furnish a proof of similar institutions having been once\nuniversal. There can be no question that the study of anthropology has\nconsiderably changed our views respecting the first appearance of man\nupon the earth. We know more about the aborigines of the world than\nformerly, but our increasing knowledge shows above all things how\nlittle we know. With all the helps which written monuments afford, we\ndo but faintly realize the condition of man two thousand or three\nthousand years ago. Of what his condition was when removed to a\ndistance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of mankind were\nlower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon the\nearth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (Laws) and Aristotle\n(Metaph.) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that\nsome forms of civilisation were discovered and lost several times over.\nIf we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization,\nneither can we set any limits to the depth of degradation to which the\nhuman race may sink through war, disease, or isolation. And if we are\nto draw inferences about the origin of marriage from the practice of\nbarbarous nations, we should also consider the remoter analogy of the\nanimals. Many birds and animals, especially the carnivorous, have only\none mate, and the love and care of offspring which seems to be natural\nis inconsistent with the primitive theory of marriage. If we go back to\nan imaginary state in which men were almost animals and the companions\nof them, we have as much right to argue from what is animal to what is\nhuman as from the barbarous to the civilized man. The record of animal\nlife on the globe is fragmentary,\u2014the connecting links are wanting and\ncannot be supplied; the record of social life is still more fragmentary\nand precarious. Even if we admit that our first ancestors had no such\ninstitution as marriage, still the stages by which men passed from\nouter barbarism to the comparative civilization of China, Assyria, and\nGreece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly unknown to us.\n\nSuch speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show\nthat an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven,\nis only the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin\nof marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after\nmany wars and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness\nof barbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive\nnakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest\naccount of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we may\ntruly say that every step in human progress has been in the same\ndirection, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of\nthe family has been more and more defined and consecrated. The\ncivilized East is immeasurably in advance of any savage tribes; the\nGreeks and Romans have improved upon the East; the Christian nations\nhave been stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of\nthe ancients. In this as in so many other things, instead of looking\nback with regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the\nfuture. We must consecrate that which we believe to be the most holy,\nand that \u2018which is the most holy will be the most useful.\u2019 There is\nmore reason for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, when we\nsee the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious horror\nabout the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when\nestablished beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the\npassage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral\nprinciple, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in\nthe uncertainty of knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there\nare many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the study of\nanthropology, and fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the\nlanguage of fear, others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time\nwill come when through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious\nspirit of children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force\nof outward circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or\ngreatly relaxed. They point to societies in America and elsewhere which\ntend to show that the destruction of the family need not necessarily\ninvolve the overthrow of all morality. Wherever we may think of such\nspeculations, we can hardly deny that they have been more rife in this\ngeneration than in any other; and whither they are tending, who can\npredict?\n\nTo the doubts and queries raised by these \u2018social reformers\u2019 respecting\nthe relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a\nsufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us\nis really one of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy\nhim to be, but we are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal\npart of his nature; we regard him as a creature having many sides, or\naspects, moving between good and evil, striving to rise above himself\nand to become \u2018a little lower than the angels.\u2019 We also, to use a\nPlatonic formula, are not ignorant of the dissatisfactions and\nincompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of trade, of the\nflatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments which\nthe family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we are\nconscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater\nstill, which are not appreciated, because they are either concealed or\nsuppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in which human\npassions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in which\nthere was no shame or decency, no higher affection overcoming or\nsanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a rule of health! Is it\nfor this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the\ngrowth of ages?\n\nFor strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there\nare the more important considerations of mind and character and soul.\nWe know how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by\nartificial means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The\nproblem is a complex one, for if we go back only four steps (and these\nat least enter into the composition of a child), there are commonly\nthirty progenitors to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely\nadmitting of proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of disease\nor character from a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical\nresemblances of parents and children in the same family\u2014\n\n\u2018Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat\u2019;\n\nbut scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both\nfrom their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental\npeculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the\nanimals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a\ndifficulty in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or\nother qualities, and what is mere imitation or the result of similar\ncircumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had great fathers\nand mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of their\nbirth or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of\nthe last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant\nremains,\u2014none have ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden\nher secret, and so ridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained\nby some that we might in time by suitable marriage arrangements or, as\nPlato would have said, \u2018by an ingenious system of lots,\u2019 produce a\nShakespeare or a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed men having\nthe tenacity of bulldogs, or, like the Spartans, \u2018lacking the wit to\nrun away in battle,\u2019 would the world be any the better? Many of the\nnoblest specimens of the human race have been among the weakest\nphysically. Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been\nexposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and strongest men and women\nhave been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of\nuniting the strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of\nsentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of combining\ndissimilar natures (Statesman), have mankind gradually passed from the\nbrutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage\nChristian and civilized.\n\nFew persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of\nmental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or\nthrough them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race,\nthirdly from the general condition of mankind into which we are born.\nNothing is commoner than the remark, that \u2018So and so is like his father\nor his uncle\u2019; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a\nresemblance in a youth to a long-forgotten ancestor, observing that\n\u2018Nature sometimes skips a generation.\u2019 It may be true also, that if we\nknew more about our ancestors, these similarities would be even more\nstriking to us. Admitting the facts which are thus described in a\npopular way, we may however remark that there is no method of\ndifference by which they can be defined or estimated, and that they\nconstitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of\nheredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own\nlives, but it is the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to\nus. For what we have received from our ancestors is only a fraction of\nwhat we are, or may become. The knowledge that drunkenness or insanity\nhas been prevalent in a family may be the best safeguard against their\nrecurrence in a future generation. The parent will be most awake to the\nvices or diseases in his child of which he is most sensible within\nhimself. The whole of life may be directed to their prevention or cure.\nThe traces of consumption may become fainter, or be wholly effaced: the\ninherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated. And so heredity,\nfrom being a curse, may become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the\nmatter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there are previous\ncircumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of circumstances\nor within this wall of necessity, we have still the power of creating a\nlife for ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.\n\nThere is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a\nstranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never\noccurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal\nexperience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in\nfamilies. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child\nwhich cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by \u2018strong nurses one or\nmore\u2019 (Laws). If Plato\u2019s \u2018pen\u2019 was as fatal as the Creches of Paris, or\nthe foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children\nwould have perished. There would have been no need to expose or put out\nof the way the weaklier children, for they would have died of\nthemselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction\nof the family.\n\nWhat Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken\nway to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the\nSpartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other\nGreeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws\nand customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire\nof a noble offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their\nphysical superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their\nmarriage customs, but to their temperance and training. He did not\nreflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence of the relaxation of\nmorality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle\nstronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least of all did\nhe observe that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of\nthe Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the\nlove of liberty\u2014all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were\nwanting among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or\nAeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not\nallowed to appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no\nbusiness to alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities\nand nations arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the\nworld we know not how, and from causes over which we have no control?\nSomething too much may have been said in modern times of the value of\nindividuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which,\ninstead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and\ncharacter, tends to smother and extinguish them.\n\nStill, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither\nChristianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto\nbeen able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that\nthe side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away.\nPopulation is the most untameable force in the political and social\nworld. Do we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest\nhindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in\nmarriage?\u2014a small fault truly, if not involving endless consequences.\nThere are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland,\nin which a right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the\nfoundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many people\non a given space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a\nsickly and half-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of\ntheir existence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life to\ntheir descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the\n\u2018mightiest passions of mankind\u2019 (Laws), especially when they have been\nlicensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of\neducation, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in\nthese matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard\nwhispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of\nmankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the principle of\nutility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the most\nneed of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this\nquestion are chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education,\nemigration, improvements in agriculture and manufactures, may have\nprovided the solution. The state physician hardly likes to probe the\nwound: it is beyond his art; a matter which he cannot safely let alone,\nbut which he dare not touch:\n\n\u2018We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.\u2019\n\nWhen again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping\ninto the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents\nperhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day\ntwenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices,\namid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and\nbridegroom joined hands with one another? In making such a reflection\nwe are not opposing physical considerations to moral, but moral to\nphysical; we are seeking to make the voice of reason heard, which\ndrives us back from the extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense.\nThe late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the\ntemptation to marriage, because he knew that he was subject to\nhereditary consumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius,\na friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his\nwrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of\ninsanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses of affection: he\ndied unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts suggest the\nreflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of duty what\nthe rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances, if\nthey had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were\nabout to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages\nwithout any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and\nthe prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a \u2018horror\nnaturalis\u2019 similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries,\nhas prevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would\nhave been the happier, if some things which are now allowed had from\nthe beginning been denied to them; if the sanction of religion could\nhave prohibited practices inimical to health; if sanitary principles\ncould in early ages have been invested with a superstitious awe. But,\nliving as we do far on in the world\u2019s history, we are no longer able to\nstamp at once with the impress of religion a new prohibition. A free\nagent cannot have his fancies regulated by law; and the execution of\nthe law would be rendered impossible, owing to the uncertainty of the\ncases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who can weigh virtue, or\neven fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities against\nbodily? Who can measure probabilities against certainties? There has\nbeen some good as well as evil in the discipline of suffering; and\nthere are diseases, such as consumption, which have exercised a\nrefining and softening influence on the character. Youth is too\ninexperienced to balance such nice considerations; parents do not often\nthink of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance and\nmay probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the\ninterests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason\nwhen their minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably\nlinked together. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages\nare to any great extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which\nseem unable to make any head against the irresistible impulse of\nindividual attachment.\n\nLastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions\nin youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the\nwhole mind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is\ngiven to them by the imagination, without feeling that there is\nsomething unsatisfactory in our method of treating them. That the most\nimportant influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or\nshrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood,\nshould be required to conform only to an external standard of\npropriety\u2014cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or\nsatisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the\ncharge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the\nmanliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by\ngeneral admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate\nthis terrible evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts\nthe moral sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there\nmore need of reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest\nhe who would be the counsellor of another should reveal the secret\nprematurely, lest he should get another too much into his power; or fix\nthe passing impression of evil by demanding the confession of it.\n\nNor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere\nwith higher aims. If there have been some who \u2018to party gave up what\nwas meant for mankind,\u2019 there have certainly been others who to family\ngave up what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of\nchildren, the necessity of procuring money for their support, the\nflatteries of the rich by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the\npride of birth or wealth, the tendency of family life to divert men\nfrom the pursuit of the ideal or the heroic, are as lowering in our own\nage as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to look at the gentle\ninfluences of home, the development of the affections, the amenities of\nsociety, the devotion of one member of a family for the good of the\nothers, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with\nhim, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having\npresented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on\ngrounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world\nwhich has not unnaturally led him into error.\n\nWe hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all\nother abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State\nseems to be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the\nframework in which family and social life is contained. But to Plato in\nhis present mood of mind the family is only a disturbing influence\nwhich, instead of filling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of\nthe State. No organization is needed except a political, which,\nregarded from another point of view, is a military one. The State is\nall-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the Church in\nlater ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war\nthe thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against\nthe world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war\nand their duties to the State, which are also their duties to one\nanother, take up their whole life and time. The only other interest\nwhich is allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of\nphilosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire\nfrom active life and to have a second novitiate of study and\ncontemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato\u2019s\ncommunism. If he could have done without children, he might have\nconverted his Republic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws,\nwhen the daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract\nhis error. In the state of which he would be the founder, there is no\nmarrying or giving in marriage: but because of the infirmity of\nmankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature to prevail.\n\n(c) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater\nparadox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, \u2018Until kings\nare philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease\nfrom ill.\u2019 And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who\nare capable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the\nattainment of this higher knowledge the second education is directed.\nThrough a process of training which has already made them good citizens\nthey are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise\n(not unlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage\ndescribes the hearers of Plato\u2019s lectures as experiencing, when they\nwent to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to be instructed in\nmoral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and\nmathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his future\nlegislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but only\nof abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract\nconception of good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man\nknowing the idea of good, if he does not know what is good for this\nindividual, this state, this condition of society? We cannot understand\nhow Plato\u2019s legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of\nstatesmen by the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly\nsearch in Plato\u2019s own writings for any explanation of this seeming\nabsurdity.\n\nThe discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the\nmind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of\nestimating its value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly\ncriticised his own speculations; in his own judgment they have been\nabove criticism; nor has he understood that what to him seemed to be\nabsolute truth may reappear in the next generation as a form of logic\nor an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally\nmisapprehended the real value of his speculations. They appear to them\nto have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The IDEA\nof good is apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning\nabstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for\nuse, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions of knowledge.\nWhen mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to law, the\nintroduction of the mere conception of law or design or final cause,\nand the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great\nsteps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things\nleads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect\ntheir conception of human life and of politics, and also their own\nconduct and character (Tim). We can imagine how a great mind like that\nof Pericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras\n(Phaedr.). To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable\nconception is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest\nsatisfied in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier,\nwhich have sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost\nsight of at a later period. How rarely can we say of any modern\nenquirer in the magnificent language of Plato, that \u2018He is the\nspectator of all time and of all existence!\u2019\n\nNor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast\nmetaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first\nenthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply\nthem in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the\nexperience of ages is required to enable them to fill up \u2018the\nintermediate axioms.\u2019 Plato himself seems to have imagined that the\ntruths of psychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be\narrived at by a process of deduction, and that the method which he has\npursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the\nuse of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But when, after\nhaving arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science of\ndialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions\nof the science? He refuses to answer, as if intending by the refusal to\nintimate that the state of knowledge which then existed was not such as\nwould allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous\nsciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to be\nstudied till the end of time, although in a sense different from any\nwhich Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is\naware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the\ncontemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing,\nbut he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith\nin God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher\nimagined that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There\nis as much to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one\nmode of conception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek.\nBoth find a repose in a divine perfection, which, whether in a more\npersonal or impersonal form, exists without them and independently of\nthem, as well as within them.\n\nThere is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the\ndivine Creator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led\nto ask in what relation they stand to one another. Is God above or\nbelow the idea of good? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of\nconceiving God? The latter appears to be the truer answer. To the Greek\nphilosopher the perfection and unity of God was a far higher conception\nthan his personality, which he hardly found a word to express, and\nwhich to him would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To the\nChristian, on the other hand, or to the modern thinker in general, it\nis difficult, if not impossible, to attach reality to what he terms\nmere abstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest\nand most real of all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of\nthought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation of his own mind\nonly. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of good by the\nwords \u2018intelligent principle of law and order in the universe,\nembracing equally man and nature,\u2019 we begin to find a meeting-point\nbetween him and ourselves.\n\nThe question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is\none that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of\nEurope and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has\ntruly united the power of command with the power of thought and\nreflection, as there have been also many false combinations of these\nqualities. Some kind of speculative power is necessary both in\npractical and political life; like the rhetorician in the Phaedrus, men\nrequire to have a conception of the varieties of human character, and\nto be raised on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary\nlife. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular\nwith the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into\nhis confidence or make them understand the motives from which he acts;\nand also because they are jealous of a power which they do not\nunderstand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect step by\nstep in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year\nor life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may\ndisregard the common feelings of humanity, he is too apt to be looking\ninto the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see\nactions or events which, to use an expression of Plato\u2019s \u2018are tumbling\nout at his feet.\u2019 Besides, as Plato would say, there are other\ncorruptions of these philosophical statesmen. Either \u2018the native hue of\nresolution is sicklied o\u2019er with the pale cast of thought,\u2019 and at the\nmoment when action above all things is required he is undecided, or\ngeneral principles are enunciated by him in order to cover some change\nof policy; or his ignorance of the world has made him more easily fall\na prey to the arts of others; or in some cases he has been converted\ninto a courtier, who enjoys the luxury of holding liberal opinions, but\nwas never known to perform a liberal action. No wonder that mankind\nhave been in the habit of calling statesmen of this class pedants,\nsophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be allowed to\nsay, a little parodying the words of Plato, \u2018they have seen bad\nimitations of the philosopher-statesman.\u2019 But a man in whom the power\nof thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present,\nreaching forward to the future, \u2018such a one,\u2019 ruling in a\nconstitutional state, \u2018they have never seen.\u2019\n\nBut as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life,\nso the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises.\nWhen the face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard\nin the distance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave\nof his inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the\ntimes; instead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and\nforgets nothing; with \u2018wise saws and modern instances\u2019 he would stem\nthe rising tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle\nof his own party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems\nto be the reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure\nwhen confronted with the new, why churches can never reform, why most\npolitical changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises\nin the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical\npositiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which have\nlost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary\nstatesman may be compared to madness; they grow upon him, and he\nbecomes possessed by them; no judgement of others is ever admitted by\nhim to be weighed in the balance against his own.\n\n(d) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have\nbeen a confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and\nfails to distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of\na state which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the\ngreatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is\npartly fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation\nis really the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which\nare limited by the condition of having to act in common. The movement\nof a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single\nman; the freedom of the individual, which is always limited, becomes\nstill more straitened when transferred to a nation. The powers of\naction and feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced when they\nare diffused through a community; whence arises the often discussed\nquestion, \u2018Can a nation, like an individual, have a conscience?\u2019 We\nhesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than\nthe sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because\nthere may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another. A\nwhole nation may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be animated by\nsome common opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected\nthe mind of a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader of\ngenius to perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have\nanalysed the complications which arise out of the collective action of\nmankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though\nspecious as arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of\ndistinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present to the\nmind, and what is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who\nis comparatively seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot\ndisentangle the arts from the virtues\u2014at least he is always arguing\nfrom one to the other. His notion of music is transferred from harmony\nof sounds to harmony of life: in this he is assisted by the ambiguities\nof language as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And\nhaving once assimilated the state to the individual, he imagines that\nhe will find the succession of states paralleled in the lives of\nindividuals.\n\nStill, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is\nattained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to\nthe mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the\narts; for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an\ninward principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the\nharmonies of the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a\nsplendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy.\nIn the same way the identification of ethics with politics has a\ntendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and\nennoble men\u2019s notions of the aims of government and of the duties of\ncitizens; for ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an\nidealized law and politics; and politics, as ethics reduced to the\nconditions of human society. There have been evils which have arisen\nout of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the separation\nor antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern political\nwriters. But we may likewise feel that something has been lost in their\nseparation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral\nand intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of nations\nand individuals second, may have a salutary influence on the\nspeculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a\nreaction against an opposite error; and when the errors against which\nthey were directed have passed away, they in turn become errors.\n\n3. Plato\u2019s views of education are in several respects remarkable; like\nthe rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal,\nbeginning with the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and\nextending to after-life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly says\nthat education is to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a\npreparation for another in which education begins again. This is the\ncontinuous thread which runs through the Republic, and which more than\nany other of his ideas admits of an application to modern life.\n\nHe has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is\ndisposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are\none and not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into\nhis scheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the\ninvoluntariness of vice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus,\nSophist, and Laws (Protag., Apol., Gorg.). Nor do the so-called\nPlatonic ideas recovered from a former state of existence affect his\ntheory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of\nthe old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from\nwithin, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense.\nEducation, as he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which\nis better than ten thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one,\nand the kindred notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely\nrenounced; the first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the\nrest; the second in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the\nintellectual, and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the\nidea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated and identified\nwith opinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true. In the\nRepublic he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises\nchiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude are\nhardly to be deemed responsible for what they do. A faint allusion to\nthe doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book; but Plato\u2019s\nviews of education have no more real connection with a previous state\nof existence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind\nthat which is there already. Education is represented by him, not as\nthe filling of a vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards\nthe light.\n\nHe treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and\nfalse, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he\ntakes no notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the\nnursing of children and the management of the mothers, and would have\nan education which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he\nbegins with the age at which the child is capable of receiving ideas,\nand boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to modern\nears, that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true.\nThe modern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed about truth\nand falsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact,\nthe other with ideas. This is the difference between ourselves and\nPlato, which is, however, partly a difference of words. For we too\nshould admit that a child must receive many lessons which he\nimperfectly understands; he must be taught some things in a figure\nonly, some too which he can hardly be expected to believe when he grows\nolder; but we should limit the use of fiction by the necessity of the\ncase. Plato would draw the line differently; according to him the aim\nof early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a\nmatter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious\ntruths, and then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the\nlesson of good manners and good taste. He would make an entire\nreformation of the old mythology; like Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is\nsensible of the deep chasm which separates his own age from Homer and\nHesiod, whom he quotes and invests with an imaginary authority, but\nonly for his own purposes. The lusts and treacheries of the gods are to\nbe banished; the terrors of the world below are to be dispelled; the\nmisbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model for youth. But\nthere is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our youth\nendurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple\npractice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be\nbased are two only: first, that God is true; secondly, that he is good.\nModern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these; they can\nhardly be said to have gone beyond them.\n\nThe young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of\nsights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste.\nThey are to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be\nwafting to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an\neducation be realized, or if our modern religious education could be\nbound up with truth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that\nwould be the best hope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is\nlooking forward to changes in the moral and religious world, and is\npreparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young men\u2019s\nminds by sudden changes of laws and principles, by destroying the\nsacredness of one set of ideas when there is nothing else to take their\nplace. He is afraid too of the influence of the drama, on the ground\nthat it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he would not have his\nchildren taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect on the\nspectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education\nis that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the\nlessons of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develope in\nequal proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and\nnature is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human life.\n\nThe second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period\nof muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in\nmusic is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the\nbody may be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily\nexercise may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt\nto give men a headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on\nphilosophy, and this they attribute not to the true cause, but to the\nnature of the subject. Two points are noticeable in Plato\u2019s treatment\nof gymnastic:\u2014First, that the time of training is entirely separated\nfrom the time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two\nthings of an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the\nsame time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may judge by\nexperience, the effect of spending three years between the ages of\nfourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from\nimproving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and\ngymnastic are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the\none for the cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that\nthey are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The\nbody, in his view, is the servant of the mind; the subjection of the\nlower to the higher is for the advantage of both. And doubtless the\nmind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the body,\nif exerted not at particular moments and by fits and starts, but\ncontinuously, in making preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek\nwriters saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol;\nThuc.). But only Plato recognized the fundamental error on which the\npractice was based.\n\nThe subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine,\nwhich he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern\ndisbelief in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of\nknowledge, to a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming\naware that they often make diseases \u2018greater and more complicated\u2019 by\ntheir treatment of them (Rep.). In two thousand years their art has\nmade but slender progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the\nparts is in a great degree lost by their feebler conception of the\nhuman frame as a whole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases\nthan to the conditions of health; and the improvements in medicine have\nbeen more than counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until\nlately they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of\nwhich was well understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, \u2018Air\nand water, being the elements which we most use, have the greatest\neffect upon health\u2019 (Polit.). For ages physicians have been under the\ndominion of prejudices which have only recently given way; and now\nthere are as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal\ndegree of scepticism and some want of toleration about both. Plato has\nseveral good notions about medicine; according to him, \u2018the eye cannot\nbe cured without the rest of the body, nor the body without the mind\u2019\n(Charm.). No man of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would take physic;\nand we heartily sympathize with him in the Laws when he declares that\n\u2018the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from\nwarm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor.\u2019 But\nwe can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer,\nhe depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would\nget rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does\nnot seem to have considered that the \u2018bridle of Theages\u2019 might be\naccompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than\nthe health or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care\nof the helpless might be an important element of education in a State.\nThe physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation)\nshould not be a man in robust health; he should have, in modern\nphraseology, a nervous temperament; he should have experience of\ndisease in his own person, in order that his powers of observation may\nbe quickened in the case of others.\n\nThe perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in\nwhich, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of\nsimplicity. Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or\nby the oracle of Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary\nregulation of the citizens themselves. Plato is aware that laissez\nfaire is an important element of government. The diseases of a State\nare like the heads of a hydra; they multiply when they are cut off. The\ntrue remedy for them is not extirpation but prevention. And the way to\nprevent them is to take care of education, and education will take care\nof all the rest. So in modern times men have often felt that the only\npolitical measure worth having\u2014the only one which would produce any\ncertain or lasting effect, was a measure of national education. And in\nour own more than in any previous age the necessity has been recognized\nof restoring the ever-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and\ncommon sense.\n\nWhen the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows\nthe first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to\nbegin again from a new point of view. In the interval between the\nFourth and Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and\nhave thence been led to form a higher conception of what was required\nof us. For true knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and\nhas to do, not with particulars or individuals, but with universals\nonly; not with the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of\nphilosophy. And the great aim of education is the cultivation of the\nhabit of abstraction. This is to be acquired through the study of the\nmathematical sciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas of\nrelation, and of arousing the dormant energies of thought.\n\nMathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that\nwhich is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion\nto the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought\nwhich the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by\nwhich the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The\nfaculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or\nimaginative; and hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for\nabstractions and trying to get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly\nthe whole of education is contained in them. They seemed to have an\ninexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not\nyet understood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate; though\nnot aware that number and figure are mere abstractions of sense, he\nrecognizes that the forms used by geometry are borrowed from the\nsensible world. He seeks to find the ultimate ground of mathematical\nideas in the idea of good, though he does not satisfactorily explain\nthe connexion between them; and in his conception of the relation of\nideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness\nattributed to him by Aristotle (Met.). But if he fails to recognize the\ntrue limits of mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them; in his\nview, ideas of number become secondary to a higher conception of\nknowledge. The dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the\nmathematician is above the ordinary man. The one, the self-proving, the\ngood which is the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to\nwhich all things ascend, and in which they finally repose.\n\nThis self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no\ndistinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage\nin Greek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals\nare comprehended, a whole which has no parts (Arist., Nic. Eth.). The\nvacancy of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato.\nNor did he recognize that in the dialectical process are included two\nor more methods of investigation which are at variance with each other.\nHe did not see that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no\nadvance could be made in this way. And yet such visions often have an\nimmense effect; for although the method of science cannot anticipate\nscience, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in the\nfuture, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge\nwe are always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false\nconception of knowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may\nlead men astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may\ndraw all their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a great\ndifference whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this\nindefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound judgment. For\nmankind may often entertain a true conception of what knowledge ought\nto be when they have but a slender experience of facts. The correlation\nof the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of\nclassification, the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop\nshort of certainty or to confound probability with truth, are important\nprinciples of the higher education. Although Plato could tell us\nnothing, and perhaps knew that he could tell us nothing, of the\nabsolute truth, he has exercised an influence on the human mind which\neven at the present day is not exhausted; and political and social\nquestions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato may be read anew\nand receive a fresh meaning.\n\nThe Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are\ntraces of it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an\nidea, and from this point of view may be compared with the creator of\nthe Timaeus, who out of his goodness created all things. It corresponds\nto a certain extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or\nof a final cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be\nconnected with the measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It is\nrepresented in the Symposium under the aspect of beauty, and is\nsupposed to be attained there by stages of initiation, as here by\nregular gradations of knowledge. Viewed subjectively, it is the process\nor science of dialectic. This is the science which, according to the\nPhaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric, which alone is able to\ndistinguish the natures and classes of men and things; which divides a\nwhole into the natural parts, and reunites the scattered parts into a\nnatural or organized whole; which defines the abstract essences or\nuniversal ideas of all things, and connects them; which pierces the\nveil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first principle of\nall; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of good. This\nideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be described\nas the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with eternal\ntruth and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question and\nanswer\u2014the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of Plato\nare themselves examples of the nature and method of dialectic. Viewed\nobjectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes the world\nwithout us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without us\nis still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is\nanother department of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only\nprobable conclusions (Timaeus).\n\nIf we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half\nexplains to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is\nthat in his mind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any\nmore than the subjective and objective aspects of the world and of man,\nwhich German philosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined\nwhether his science of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned\nwith the contemplation of absolute being, or with a process of\ndevelopment and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be described as the\nscience of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought;\nmodern logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian\nforms, may be defined as the science of method. The germ of both of\nthem is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have\nsomething in common with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived\nsomething from the method of Plato. The nearest approach in modern\nphilosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be found in the\nHegelian \u2018succession of moments in the unity of the idea.\u2019 Plato and\nHegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the correlation of\nabstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood one another\nbetter than any of their commentators understand them (Swift\u2019s Voyage\nto Laputa. \u2018Having a desire to see those ancients who were most\nrenowned for wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I\nproposed that Homer and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their\ncommentators; but these were so numerous that some hundreds were forced\nto attend in the court and outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and\ncould distinguish these two heroes, at first sight, not only from the\ncrowd, but from each other. Homer was the taller and comelier person of\nthe two, walked very erect for one of his age, and his eyes were the\nmost quick and piercing I ever beheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made\nuse of a staff. His visage was meagre, his hair lank and thin, and his\nvoice hollow. I soon discovered that both of them were perfect\nstrangers to the rest of the company, and had never seen or heard of\nthem before. And I had a whisper from a ghost, who shall be nameless,\n\u201cThat these commentators always kept in the most distant quarters from\ntheir principals, in the lower world, through a consciousness of shame\nand guilt, because they had so horribly misrepresented the meaning of\nthese authors to posterity.\u201d I introduced Didymus and Eustathius to\nHomer, and prevailed on him to treat them better than perhaps they\ndeserved, for he soon found they wanted a genius to enter into the\nspirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all patience with the\naccount I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented them to him; and\nhe asked them \u201cwhether the rest of the tribe were as great dunces as\nthemselves?\u201d\u2019). There is, however, a difference between them: for\nwhereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which\ndevelopes the stages of the idea in different countries or at different\ntimes in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded\nonly as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had\nnot yet dawned upon him.\n\nMany criticisms may be made on Plato\u2019s theory of education. While in\nsome respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others\nhe is in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which\nprevailed in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered\nnew ones. He does not see that education is relative to the characters\nof individuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state\non the minds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of\nliterature on the formation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that\nof mathematics. His aim is above all things to train the reasoning\nfaculties; to implant in the mind the spirit and power of abstraction;\nto explain and define general notions, and, if possible, to connect\nthem. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual knowledge his followers,\nand at times even he himself, should have fallen away from the doctrine\nof ideas, and have returned to that branch of knowledge in which alone\nthe relation of the one and many can be truly seen\u2014the science of\nnumber. In his views both of teaching and training he might be styled,\nin modern language, a doctrinaire; after the Spartan fashion he would\nhave his citizens cast in one mould; he does not seem to consider that\nsome degree of freedom, \u2018a little wholesome neglect,\u2019 is necessary to\nstrengthen and develope the character and to give play to the\nindividual nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge\nwhich in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from\ntheir experience of evil.\n\nOn the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and\ntheologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through\nlife and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of\nsome kind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of\nSolon, \u2018I grow old learning many things,\u2019 cannot be applied literally.\nHimself ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and\ndelighting in solid geometry (Rep.), he has no difficulty in imagining\nthat a lifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know\nhow many more men of business there are in the world than real students\nor thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes\nfor his citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of\ngenius, interrupted, but only for a time, by practical duties,\u2014a life\nnot for the many, but for the few.\n\nYet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to\nour own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be\nrealized, it may have a great effect in elevating the characters of\nmankind, and raising them above the routine of their ordinary\noccupation or profession. It is the best form under which we can\nconceive the whole of life. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not\neasily put into practice. For the education of after life is\nnecessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men and women\ncannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or fifty\nyears of age; and if they could the result would be disappointing. The\ndestination of most men is what Plato would call \u2018the Den\u2019 for the\nwhole of life, and with that they are content. Neither have they\nteachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel in riper years.\nThere is no \u2018schoolmaster abroad\u2019 who will tell them of their faults,\nor inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the ambition of\na true success in life; no Socrates who will convict them of ignorance;\nno Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin. Hence\nthey have a difficulty in receiving the first element of improvement,\nwhich is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them; they\nrather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who have\ncome across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and\nmorality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a\ncandle from the fire of their genius.\n\nThe want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons\ncontinue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not\nknow the way. They \u2018never try an experiment,\u2019 or look up a point of\ninterest for themselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of\nknowledge; their minds, like their bodies, at a certain age become\nfixed. Genius has been defined as \u2018the power of taking pains\u2019; but\nhardly any one keeps up his interest in knowledge throughout a whole\nlife. The troubles of a family, the business of making money, the\ndemands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the mind. The waxen\ntablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving \u2018true thoughts\nand clear impressions\u2019 becomes hard and crowded; there is not room for\nthe accumulations of a long life (Theaet.). The student, as years\nadvance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his stores.\nThere is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or\nHistory or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is\nenough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer\nto any one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists\nin a thousand things, commonplace in themselves,\u2014in adding to what we\nare by nature something of what we are not; in learning to see\nourselves as others see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the\nevidence of facts; in seeking out the society of superior minds; in a\nstudy of lives and writings of great men; in observation of the world\nand character; in receiving kindly the natural influence of different\ntimes of life; in any act or thought which is raised above the practice\nor opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some new or original enquiry;\nin any effort of mind which calls forth some latent power.\n\nIf any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education\nof after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to\nhim:\u2014That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind\nmost distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight,\neither one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or,\nperhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the\nspeculative side the profession or business in which he is practically\nengaged. He may make Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the\nfriends and companions of his life. He may find opportunities of\nhearing the living voice of a great teacher. He may select for enquiry\nsome point of history or some unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour\na day passed in such scientific or literary pursuits will furnish as\nmany facts as the memory can retain, and will give him \u2018a pleasure not\nto be repented of\u2019 (Timaeus). Only let him beware of being the slave of\ncrotchets, or of running after a Will o\u2019 the Wisp in his ignorance, or\nin his vanity of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or assuming\nthe air of a philosopher. He should know the limits of his own powers.\nBetter to build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from\none thing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests\nin knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are never destined to be\nrealized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, \u2018This is part of another\nsubject\u2019 (Tim.); though we may also defend our digression by his\nexample (Theaet.).\n\n4. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural\ngrowth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political\nphilosophy seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato\nand Aristotle. The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human\naffairs; they could moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of\nempires (Plato, Statesman, and Sulpicius\u2019 Letter to Cicero); by them\nfate and chance were deemed to be real powers, almost persons, and to\nhave had a great share in political events. The wiser of them like\nThucydides believed that \u2018what had been would be again,\u2019 and that a\ntolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the past. Also they\nhad dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time and might\nstill exist in some unknown land, or might return again in the remote\nfuture. But the regular growth of a state enlightened by experience,\nprogressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the citizens\nwere educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears never to\nhave come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a state\nhad never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them.\nTheir experience (Aristot. Metaph.; Plato, Laws) led them to conclude\nthat there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been\ndiscovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and\nrebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural\nconvulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of\nmany destructions of mankind and of the preservation of a remnant. The\nworld began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of the\nfragments of itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown\nantiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian; but they had never seen them\ngrow, and could not imagine, any more than we can, the state of man\nwhich preceded them. They were puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian\nmonuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but\nliterally, were ten thousand years old (Laws), and they contrasted the\nantiquity of Egypt with their own short memories.\n\nThe early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later\nhistory: they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is\nconcealed from view; there is no road or path which leads from one to\nthe other. At the beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the\ntemple, is seen standing first of all the figure of the legislator,\nhimself the interpreter and servant of the God. The fundamental laws\nwhich he gives are not supposed to change with time and circumstances.\nThe salvation of the state is held rather to depend on the inviolable\nmaintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the authority of heaven,\nand it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to maintain them\nunaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very\nsurprising to us\u2014the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in\nreligion or politics (Laws); although with a happy inconsistency he is\nalso willing that the laws of other countries should be studied and\nimprovements in legislation privately communicated to the Nocturnal\nCouncil (Laws). The additions which were made to them in later ages in\norder to meet the increasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed\nby a fiction to the original legislator; and the words of such\nenactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the words\nof Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the\nmind of the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the\nlines which he has laid down for them. He would not harass them with\nminute regulations, he would have allowed some changes in the laws: but\nnot changes which would affect the fundamental institutions of the\nstate, such for example as would convert an aristocracy into a\ntimocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of government.\n\nPassing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been\nthe exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we\nare not surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather\nthan of ancient date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is\nnot more than a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the\nimpression left on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and\nof the Christian Church, and to be due to the political and social\nimprovements which they introduced into the world; and still more in\nour own century to the idealism of the first French Revolution and the\ntriumph of American Independence; and in a yet greater degree to the\nvast material prosperity and growth of population in England and her\ncolonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a measure to the\ngreater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist temperament of\nsome great writers has assisted the creation of it, while the opposite\ncharacter has led a few to regard the future of the world as dark. The\n\u2018spectator of all time and of all existence\u2019 sees more of \u2018the\nincreasing purpose which through the ages ran\u2019 than formerly: but to\nthe inhabitant of a small state of Hellas the vision was necessarily\nlimited like the valley in which he dwelt. There was no remote past on\nwhich his eye could rest, nor any future from which the veil was partly\nlifted up by the analogy of history. The narrowness of view, which to\nourselves appears so singular, was to him natural, if not unavoidable.\n\n5. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and\nthe two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the\nIntroductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may\nbe touched upon in this place.\n\nAnd first of the Laws.\n\n(1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking\ngenerally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be\nreasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato\u2019s life: the Laws are\ncertainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at\nany rate seem to have been written in extreme old age.\n\n(2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the\nstamp of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which\nreceived the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly\nexecuted, and apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty\nof youth: the other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the\nseverity and knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age.\n\n(3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic\npower, whereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and\noppositions of character.\n\n(4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the\nRepublic of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more\nintellectual.\n\n(5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the\ngovernment of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; the\nimmortality of the soul is first mentioned in xii; the person of\nSocrates has altogether disappeared. The community of women and\nchildren is renounced; the institution of common or public meals for\nwomen (Laws) is for the first time introduced (Ar. Pol.).\n\n(6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets, who are\nironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are\nperemptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit\ntheir poems to the censorship of the magistrates (Rep.).\n\n(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few\npassages in the Laws, such as the honour due to the soul, the evils of\nlicentious or unnatural love, the whole of Book x. (religion), the\ndishonesty of retail trade, and bequests, which come more home to us,\nand contain more of what may be termed the modern element in Plato than\nalmost anything in the Republic.\n\nThe relation of the two works to one another is very well given:\n\n(1) by Aristotle in the Politics from the side of the Laws:\u2014\n\n\u2018The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato\u2019s later work,\nthe Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution\nwhich is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely\nsettled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and\nchildren, the community of property, and the constitution of the state.\nThe population is divided into two classes\u2014one of husbandmen, and the\nother of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of\ncounsellors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined\nwhether the husbandmen and artists are to have a share in the\ngovernment, and whether they too are to carry arms and share in\nmilitary service or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to\nshare in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side.\nThe remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the\nmain subject, and with discussions about the education of the\nguardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is\nsaid about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more\nof the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal\nform. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he\nsupposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the\nsame education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile\noccupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only\ndifference is that in the Laws the common meals are extended to women,\nand the warriors number about 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.\u2019\n\n(2) by Plato in the Laws (Book v.), from the side of the Republic:\u2014\n\n\u2018The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of\nthe law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying\nthat \u201cFriends have all things in common.\u201d Whether there is now, or ever\nwill be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which\nthe private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things\nwhich are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have\nbecome common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and\nsorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the\nutmost,\u2014whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting\nupon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in\nvirtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited\nby Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and\ntherefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to\ncling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like\nthis. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be\nnearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by\nthe grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by\nspeaking of the nature and origin of the second.\u2019\n\nThe comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its\nstyle and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it\nrather resembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various\nindications of language and thought, it must be later than the one and\nof course earlier than the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a\nclose connection is maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the\nStatesman, enquiries into the principles of Method are interspersed\nwith discussions about Politics. The comparative advantages of the rule\nof law and of a person are considered, and the decision given in favour\nof a person (Arist. Pol.). But much may be said on the other side, nor\nis the opposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law may\nbe so applied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the\nRepublic, there is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a\nformer existence of mankind. The question is asked, \u2018Whether the state\nof innocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own\nwhich possesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is\nthe preferable condition of man.\u2019 To this question of the comparative\nhappiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed\nin the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman,\nthough less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range,\nmay justly be regarded as one of the greatest of Plato\u2019s dialogues.\n\n6. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the\nvehicle of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which\nwent beyond their own age. The classical writing which approaches most\nnearly to the Republic of Plato is the \u2018De Republica\u2019 of Cicero; but\nneither in this nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art\nof Plato. The manners are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the\nrhetorician is apparent at every turn. Yet noble sentiments are\nconstantly recurring: the true note of Roman patriotism\u2014\u2018We Romans are\na great people\u2019\u2014resounds through the whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero\nturns away from the phenomena of the heavens to civil and political\nlife. He would rather not discuss the \u2018two Suns\u2019 of which all Rome was\ntalking, when he can converse about \u2018the two nations in one\u2019 which had\ndivided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. Like Socrates again,\nspeaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he should assume\ntoo much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal who is\ndiscussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would confine\nthe terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he will\nnot concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But\nunder the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the\nnatural superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to\nthe soul ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of\ngovernment to any single one. The two portraits of the just and the\nunjust, which occur in the second book of the Republic, are transferred\nto the state\u2014Philus, one of the interlocutors, maintaining against his\nwill the necessity of injustice as a principle of government, while the\nother, Laelius, supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and\nnumber are derived from Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also\ndeclares that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no\ntime to read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by\nhim word for word, though he had hardly shown himself able to \u2018carry\nthe jest\u2019 of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous\nfancy about the animals, who \u2018are so imbued with the spirit of\ndemocracy that they make the passers-by get out of their way.\u2019 His\ndescription of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior.\nThe second book is historical, and claims for the Roman constitution\n(which is to him the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably\nintended to have given to the Republic in the Critias. His most\nremarkable imitation of Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er,\nwhich is converted by Cicero into the \u2018Somnium Scipionis\u2019; he has\n\u2018romanized\u2019 the myth of the Republic, adding an argument for the\nimmortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus, and some other touches\nderived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a beautiful tale and\ncontaining splendid passages, the \u2018Somnium Scipionis; is very inferior\nto the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly allows the reader\nto suppose that the writer believes in his own creation. Whether his\ndialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of Aristotle,\nas he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many\nsuperficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not\nconversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the\nintractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue.\nBut if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek\nin matter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves upon our\nminds the impression of an original thinker.\n\nPlato\u2019s Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such\nan ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian\nworld, and is embodied in St. Augustine\u2019s \u2018De Civitate Dei,\u2019 which is\nsuggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same\nmanner in which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been\ninfluenced by the decline of Greek politics in the writer\u2019s own age.\nThe difference is that in the time of Plato the degeneracy, though\ncertain, was gradual and insensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the\nGoths stirred like an earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men were\ninclined to believe that the overthrow of the city was to be ascribed\nto the anger felt by the old Roman deities at the neglect of their\nworship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he argues that\nthe destruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of\nChristianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman\nhistory, and over Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere\ncrime, impiety and falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the\nGentile religions with the best elements of the faith of Christ. He\nshows nothing of the spirit which led others of the early Christian\nFathers to recognize in the writings of the Greek philosophers the\npower of the divine truth. He traces the parallel of the kingdom of\nGod, that is, the history of the Jews, contained in their scriptures,\nand of the kingdoms of the world, which are found in gentile writers,\nand pursues them both into an ideal future. It need hardly be remarked\nthat his use both of Greek and of Roman historians and of the sacred\nwritings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen mythology, the\nSybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the dreams of Neo-Platonists are\nequally regarded by him as matter of fact. He must be acknowledged to\nbe a strictly polemical or controversial writer who makes the best of\neverything on one side and the worst of everything on the other. He has\nno sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life, nor\nhas he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of\nthe ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the defects of the\nChristian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan\nshall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of\nGod shall appear...The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of\nantiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian\nethics, but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge\nof the Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a\nnoble character, yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding\nanything external to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers\nhe is most attracted by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted\nwith his writings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of creation\nin the Timaeus is derived from the narrative in Genesis; and he is\nstrangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato\u2019s saying that \u2018the\nphilosopher is the lover of God,\u2019 and the words of the Book of Exodus\nin which God reveals himself to Moses (Exod.) He dwells at length on\nmiracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is regarded by\nhim as irresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of the\nbeauty and utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives\nto afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of\nthe body. The book is not really what to most persons the title of it\nwould imply, and belongs to an age which has passed away. But it\ncontains many fine passages and thoughts which are for all time.\n\nThe short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable\nof mediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom\nItaly and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of\nan Universal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary\ngovernment of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the\nPapacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not \u2018the ghost of the dead Roman\nEmpire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof,\u2019 but the legitimate heir\nand successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and\nthe beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the\nworld is also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknowledged\nby St. Paul when he appealed to Caesar, and even more emphatically by\nChrist Himself, Who could not have made atonement for the sins of men\nif He had not been condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. The\nnecessity for the establishment of an Universal Empire is proved partly\nby a priori arguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the\nfamily or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture and history, by\nfalse analogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the classics,\nand by odd scraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by\nno means exact knowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a\nmore convincing argument still is the miserable state of the world,\nwhich he touchingly describes. He sees no hope of happiness or peace\nfor mankind until all nations of the earth are comprehended in a single\nempire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the idea of the Roman\nEmpire was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much argument\nwas needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own\ncontemporaries seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather\npreaches, from the point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the\nlayman, although, as a good Catholic, he is willing to acknowledge that\nin certain respects the Empire must submit to the Church. The beginning\nand end of all his noble reflections and of his arguments, good and\nbad, is the aspiration \u2018that in this little plot of earth belonging to\nmortal man life may pass in freedom and peace.\u2019 So inextricably is his\nvision of the future bound up with the beliefs and circumstances of his\nown age.\n\nThe \u2018Utopia\u2019 of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius,\nand shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book\nwas written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the\ngenerous sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon\nthe miserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars\nof the Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is\nindignant at the corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the\nnobility and gentry, at the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities\ncaused by war. To the eye of More the whole world was in dissolution\nand decay; and side by side with the misery and oppression which he has\ndescribed in the First Book of the Utopia, he places in the Second Book\nthe ideal state which by the help of Plato he had constructed. The\ntimes were full of stir and intellectual interest. The distant murmur\nof the Reformation was beginning to be heard. To minds like More\u2019s,\nGreek literature was a revelation: there had arisen an art of\ninterpretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be understood as\nit had never been before, and has not often been since, in its natural\nsense. The life there depicted appeared to him wholly unlike that of\nChristian commonwealths, in which \u2018he saw nothing but a certain\nconspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name\nand title of the Commonwealth.\u2019 He thought that Christ, like Plato,\n\u2018instituted all things common,\u2019 for which reason, he tells us, the\ncitizens of Utopia were the more willing to receive his doctrines\n(\u2018Howbeit, I think this was no small help and furtherance in the\nmatter, that they heard us say that Christ instituted among his, all\nthings common, and that the same community doth yet remain in the\nrightest Christian communities\u2019 (Utopia).). The community of property\nis a fixed idea with him, though he is aware of the arguments which may\nbe urged on the other side (\u2018These things (I say), when I consider with\nmyself, I hold well with Plato, and do nothing marvel that he would\nmake no laws for them that refused those laws, whereby all men should\nhave and enjoy equal portions of riches and commodities. For the wise\nmen did easily foresee this to be the one and only way to the wealth of\na community, if equality of all things should be brought in and\nestablished\u2019 (Utopia).). We wonder how in the reign of Henry VIII,\nthough veiled in another language and published in a foreign country,\nsuch speculations could have been endured.\n\nHe is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who\nsucceeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he\nis a worthy disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion\nof fact, he founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the\nLatin narrative of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise\nabout dates and facts, and has the power of making us believe that the\nnarrator of the tale must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly\npuzzled by his manner of mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy\nJohn Clement and Peter Giles, citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes\nabout the precise words which are supposed to have been used by the\n(imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael Hythloday. \u2018I have the more\ncause,\u2019 says Hythloday, \u2018to fear that my words shall not be believed,\nfor that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself would have believed\nanother man telling the same, if I had not myself seen it with mine own\neyes.\u2019 Or again: \u2018If you had been with me in Utopia, and had presently\nseen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five years and\nmore, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new land\nknown here,\u2019 etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask Hythloday\nin what part of the world Utopia is situated; he \u2018would have spent no\nsmall sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,\u2019 and he begs\nPeter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to\nthe question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor\nof Divinity (perhaps \u2018a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,\u2019 as the\ntranslator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by\nthe High Bishop, \u2018yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of\nUtopia, nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit;\nand he counteth that a godly suit which proceedeth not of the desire of\nhonour or lucre, but only of a godly zeal.\u2019 The design may have failed\nthrough the disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have \u2018very\nuncertain news\u2019 after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that\nhe had told More and Giles the exact situation of the island, but\nunfortunately at the same moment More\u2019s attention, as he is reminded in\na letter from Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of the company\nfrom a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles\nfrom hearing. And \u2018the secret has perished\u2019 with him; to this day the\nplace of Utopia remains unknown.\n\nThe words of Phaedrus, \u2018O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or\nanything,\u2019 are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction.\nYet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the\noriginality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of\nhis age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who\nbelieves not in the immortality of the soul to share in the\nadministration of the state (Laws), \u2018howbeit they put him to no\npunishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man\u2019s power to\nbelieve what he list\u2019; and \u2018no man is to be blamed for reasoning in\nsupport of his own religion (\u2018One of our company in my presence was\nsharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, against our\nwills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of Christ\u2019s\nreligion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only\nprefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn\nall other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and\ndevilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus\nlong reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and\ncondemned him into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a\nseditious person and a raiser up of dissension among the people\u2019).\u2019 In\nthe public services \u2018no prayers be used, but such as every man may\nboldly pronounce without giving offence to any sect.\u2019 He says\nsignificantly, \u2018There be that give worship to a man that was once of\nexcellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the\nchiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting\nall these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far\nabove the capacity and reach of man\u2019s wit, dispersed throughout all the\nworld, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the\nFather of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the\nincreasings, the proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things.\nNeither give they any divine honours to any other than him.\u2019 So far was\nMore from sharing the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he\nreminds us that he does not in all respects agree with the customs and\nopinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have\nthe benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil\nbehind which he has been pleased to conceal himself.\n\nNor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral\nspeculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he\nwould set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including\nin the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and \u2018sturdy and\nvaliant beggars,\u2019 that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a\nday. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation\nof offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers (Compare his\nsatirical observation: \u2018They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding\nholiness, and therefore very few.); his remark that \u2018although every one\nmay hear of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not\neasy to find states that are well and wisely governed,\u2019 are curiously\nat variance with the notions of his age and indeed with his own life.\nThere are many points in which he shows a modern feeling and a\nprophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he maintains\nthat civilized states have a right to the soil of waste countries; he\nis inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous\npleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other\nphilosophers who define virtue to be a life according to nature. He\nextends the idea of happiness so as to include the happiness of others;\nand he argues ingeniously, \u2018All men agree that we ought to make others\nhappy; but if others, how much more ourselves!\u2019 And still he thinks\nthat there may be a more excellent way, but to this no man\u2019s reason can\nattain unless heaven should inspire him with a higher truth. His\nceremonies before marriage; his humane proposal that war should be\ncarried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared\nto some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy, like the\naffinities of Greeks and barbarians in the Timaeus, that the Utopians\nlearnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness because they\nwere originally of the same race with them. He is penetrated with the\nspirit of Plato, and quotes or adapts many thoughts both from the\nRepublic and from the Timaeus. He prefers public duties to private, and\nis somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His citizens\nhave no silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to pay them\nto their mercenaries. There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous\nthan the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and\ndiamonds and pearls for children\u2019s necklaces (When the ambassadors came\narrayed in gold and peacocks\u2019 feathers \u2018to the eyes of all the Utopians\nexcept very few, which had been in other countries for some reasonable\ncause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and\nreproachful. In so much that they most reverently saluted the vilest\nand most abject of them for lords\u2014passing over the ambassadors\nthemselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of golden\nchains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had cast\naway their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking\nupon the ambassadors\u2019 caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides,\nsaying thus to them\u2014\u201cLook, though he were a little child still.\u201d But\nthe mother; yea and that also in good earnest: \u201cPeace, son,\u201d saith she,\n\u201cI think he be some of the ambassadors\u2019 fools.\u201d\u2019)\n\nLike Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and\nprinces; on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his\ndiscourse (Hythloday) is very unwilling to become a minister of state,\nconsidering that he would lose his independence and his advice would\nnever be heeded (Compare an exquisite passage, of which the conclusion\nis as follows: \u2018And verily it is naturally given...suppressed and\nended.\u2019) He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could\nnever be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions (\u2018For\nthey have not devised one of all those rules of restrictions,\namplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in the small\nLogicals, which here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore,\nthey were never yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch\nthat none of them all could ever see man himself in common, as they\ncall him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant,\nyea, and pointed to of us even with our finger.\u2019) He is very severe on\nthe sports of the gentry; the Utopians count \u2018hunting the lowest, the\nvilest, and the most abject part of butchery.\u2019 He quotes the words of\nthe Republic in which the philosopher is described \u2018standing out of the\nway under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be\noverpast,\u2019 which admit of a singular application to More\u2019s own fate;\nalthough, writing twenty years before (about the year 1514), he can\nhardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire\nwhich strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the greater part of the\nprecepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of ordinary\nChristians than the discourse of Utopia (\u2018And yet the most part of them\nis more dissident from the manners of the world now a days, than my\ncommunication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your\ncounsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame their\nmanners to Christ\u2019s rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine,\nand, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men\u2019s manners, that by\nsome means at the least way, they might agree together.\u2019)\n\nThe \u2018New Atlantis\u2019 is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the\n\u2018Utopia.\u2019 The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy,\nand by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In\nsome places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas\nMore, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the\ngovernor of Solomon\u2019s House, whose dress he minutely describes, while\nto Sir Thomas More such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after\nthis programme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, \u2018that he had a\nlook as though he pitied men.\u2019 Several things are borrowed by him from\nthe Timaeus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts\nand passages which are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures.\n\nThe \u2018City of the Sun\u2019 written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican\nfriar, several years after the \u2018New Atlantis\u2019 of Bacon, has many\nresemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and\nchildren in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and\nare arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not,\nhowever, adopt his system of lots, but bring together the best natures,\nmale and female, \u2018according to philosophical rules.\u2019 The infants until\ntwo years of age are brought up by their mothers in public temples; and\nsince individuals for the most part educate their children badly, at\nthe beginning of their third year they are committed to the care of the\nState, and are taught at first, not out of books, but from paintings of\nall kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls of the city. The city has\nsix interior circuits of walls, and an outer wall which is the seventh.\nOn this outer wall are painted the figures of legislators and\nphilosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms of\nsome one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most\npart, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they\nhave two special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the\nboys soothe and relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them\nwith embraces and pleasant words. Some elements of the Christian or\nCatholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is\ngreatly admired by this people because they had all things in common;\nand the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in their\nworship. It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and\ntherefore the whole people make secret confession of them to the\nmagistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort of Rector\nMetaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is\ngoing on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted\nto the citizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There\nalso exists among them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a\nsuccession of priests, who change every hour. Their religion is a\nworship of God in Trinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, but\nwithout any distinction of persons. They behold in the sun the\nreflection of His glory; mere graven images they reject, refusing to\nfall under the \u2018tyranny\u2019 of idolatry.\n\nMany details are given about their customs of eating and drinking,\nabout their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella\nlooks forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of\nnature, and not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste\ntheir time in the consideration of what he calls \u2018the dead signs of\nthings.\u2019 He remarks that he who knows one science only, does not really\nknow that one any more than the rest, and insists strongly on the\nnecessity of a variety of knowledge. More scholars are turned out in\nthe City of the Sun in one year than by contemporary methods in ten or\nfifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon, that henceforward natural\nscience will play a great part in education, a hope which seems hardly\nto have been realized, either in our own or in any former age; at any\nrate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred.\n\nThere is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work,\nand a most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no\ncharm of style, and falls very far short of the \u2018New Atlantis\u2019 of\nBacon, and still more of the \u2018Utopia\u2019 of Sir Thomas More. It is full of\ninconsistencies, and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a\nsuperficial acquaintance with his writings. It is a work such as one\nmight expect to have been written by a philosopher and man of genius\nwho was also a friar, and who had spent twenty-seven years of his life\nin a prison of the Inquisition. The most interesting feature of the\nbook, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is the deep feeling which is\nshown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance prevailing among the\nlower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note of Aristotle\u2019s\nanswer to Plato\u2019s community of property, that in a society where all\nthings are common, no individual would have any motive to work (Arist.\nPol.): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in\nthemselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have\ngreater regard for their fellows than exists among men at present. He\nthinks, like Plato, that if he abolishes private feelings and\ninterests, a great public feeling will take their place.\n\nOther writings on ideal states, such as the \u2018Oceana\u2019 of Harrington, in\nwhich the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was,\nbut as he ought to have been; or the \u2018Argenis\u2019 of Barclay, which is an\nhistorical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth\nmentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more\nPlatonic in style and thought, is Sir John Eliot\u2019s \u2018Monarchy of Man,\u2019\nin which the prisoner of the Tower, no longer able \u2018to be a politician\nin the land of his birth,\u2019 turns away from politics to view \u2018that other\ncity which is within him,\u2019 and finds on the very threshold of the grave\nthat the secret of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change\nof government in the time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking\nabout first principles, and gave rise to many works of this class...The\ngreat original genius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any\ntrace in the conversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any\nacquaintance with his writings. He probably would have refuted Plato\nwithout reading him, in the same fashion in which he supposed himself\nto have refuted Bishop Berkeley\u2019s theory of the non-existence of\nmatter. If we except the so-called English Platonists, or rather\nNeo-Platonists, who never understood their master, and the writings of\nColeridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit, Plato has left no\npermanent impression on English literature.\n\n7. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that\nthey are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor\nthe other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue\nflowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common\nroutine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere\ninterests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the\nideals of art they are partly framed by the omission of particulars;\nthey require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade\naway if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary\ndistinctness when embodied in a State or in a system of philosophy, but\nthey still remain the visions of \u2018a world unrealized.\u2019 More striking\nand obvious to the ordinary mind are the examples of great men, who\nhave served their own generation and are remembered in another. Even in\nour own family circle there may have been some one, a woman, or even a\nchild, in whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. The\nideal then approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The\nideal of the past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of\nsociety, has a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we\nlearn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of\nthem may have a humanizing influence on other times. But the\nabstractions of philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they\ngive light without warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens\nwhen there are no stars appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone;\nthe world of sense is always breaking in upon them. They are for the\nmost part confined to a corner of earth, and see but a little way\nbeyond their own home or place of abode; they \u2018do not lift up their\neyes to the hills\u2019; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But in\nPlato we have reached a height from which a man may look into the\ndistance and behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The\nideal of the State and of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an\neducation continuing through life and extending equally to both sexes;\nthe ideal of the unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good\nand immortality\u2014are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking\nto fix the eye of mankind.\n\n8. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek\nPhilosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more\nclearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought\nus nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree\nretiring from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them,\nbut still remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the\nheart of man. The first ideal is the future of the human race in this\nworld; the second the future of the individual in another. The first is\nthe more perfect realization of our own present life; the second, the\nabnegation of it: the one, limited by experience, the other,\ntranscending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of\naction; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all\nearthly interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first\nsight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual\nexistence the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when men have\nlearned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or for\nthe world into the will of God\u2014\u2018not my will but Thine,\u2019 the difference\nbetween them falls away; and they may be allowed to make either of them\nthe basis of their lives, according to their own individual character\nor temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to work for\nan unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it\ninconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another\ngeneration, or to another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or\nthat living always in the presence of God, he may realize another world\nas vividly as he does this.\n\nThe greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under\nsimilitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the\nJewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe\nthe nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a\npositive meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher\ntruths either of philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one\nform of expression for another, lest through the necessities of\nlanguage we should become the slaves of mere words.\n\nThere is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a\nplace in the home and heart of every believer in the religion of\nChrist, and in which men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth,\nthe Divine man, the Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the\nfirst-born and head of the whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom\nthe Divine and human, that which is without and that which is within\nthe range of our earthly faculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is\nthis divine form of goodness wholly separable from the ideal of the\nChristian Church, which is said in the New Testament to be \u2018His body,\u2019\nor at variance with those other images of good which Plato sets before\nus. We see Him in a figure only, and of figures of speech we select but\na few, and those the simplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold\nHim in a picture, but He is not there. We gather up the fragments of\nHis discourses, but neither do they represent Him as He truly was. His\ndwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in the heart of man. This\nis that image which Plato saw dimly in the distance, which, when\nexisting among men, he called, in the language of Homer, \u2018the likeness\nof God,\u2019 the likeness of a nature which in all ages men have felt to be\ngreater and better than themselves, and which in endless forms, whether\nderived from Scripture or nature, from the witness of history or from\nthe human heart, regarded as a person or not as a person, with or\nwithout parts or passions, existing in space or not in space, is and\nwill always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good.\n\n\n\n\n THE REPUBLIC.\n\n\n\n\n PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.\n\n\nSocrates, who is the narrator.\n\nGlaucon.\n\nAdeimantus.\n\nPolemarchus.\n\nCephalus.\n\nThrasymachus.\n\nCleitophon.\n\nAnd others who are mute auditors.\n\nThe scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the\nwhole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took\nplace to Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are\nintroduced in the Timaeus.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK I.\n\n\nI went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston,\nthat I might offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian\nArtemis.); and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would\ncelebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the\nprocession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally,\nif not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the\nspectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant\nPolemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a\ndistance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to\nrun and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak\nbehind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.\n\nI turned round, and asked him where his master was.\n\nThere he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.\n\nCertainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus\nappeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon\u2019s brother, Niceratus the son\nof Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.\n\nPolemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your\ncompanion are already on your way to the city.\n\nYou are not far wrong, I said.\n\nBut do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to\nremain where you are.\n\nMay there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to\nlet us go?\n\nBut can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.\n\nCertainly not, replied Glaucon.\n\nThen we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.\n\nAdeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in\nhonour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?\n\nWith horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches\nand pass them one to another during the race?\n\nYes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be\ncelebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon\nafter supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young\nmen, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.\n\nGlaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.\n\nVery good, I replied.\n\nAccordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found\nhis brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the\nChalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of\nAristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I\nhad not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was\nseated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had\nbeen sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the\nroom arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He\nsaluted me eagerly, and then he said:\u2014\n\nYou don\u2019t come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were\nstill able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at\nmy age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come\noftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the\npleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and\ncharm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house\nyour resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends,\nand you will be quite at home with us.\n\nI replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus,\nthan conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have\ngone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to\nenquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult.\nAnd this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have\narrived at that time which the poets call the \u2018threshold of old age\u2019\u2014Is\nlife harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?\n\nI will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my\nage flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says;\nand at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is\u2014I cannot\neat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away:\nthere was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer\nlife. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by\nrelations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age\nis the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that\nwhich is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too\nbeing old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But\nthis is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known.\nHow well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the\nquestion, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,\u2014are you still the man\nyou were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of\nwhich you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious\nmaster. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem\nas good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly\nold age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax\ntheir hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of\none mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these\nregrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed\nto the same cause, which is not old age, but men\u2019s characters and\ntempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the\npressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and\nage are equally a burden.\n\nI listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go\non\u2014Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general\nare not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age\nsits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but\nbecause you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.\n\nYou are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is\nsomething in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I\nmight answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was\nabusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but\nbecause he was an Athenian: \u2018If you had been a native of my country or\nI of yours, neither of us would have been famous.\u2019 And to those who are\nnot rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for\nto the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad\nrich man ever have peace with himself.\n\nMay I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part\ninherited or acquired by you?\n\nAcquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art\nof making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather:\nfor my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of\nhis patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now;\nbut my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at\npresent: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less\nbut a little more than I received.\n\nThat was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that\nyou are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of\nthose who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired\nthem; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation\nof their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems,\nor of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for\nthe sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And\nhence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but\nthe praises of wealth.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\nYes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?\u2014What do you\nconsider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your\nwealth?\n\nOne, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others.\nFor let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be\nnear death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had\nbefore; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted\nthere of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he\nis tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the\nweakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other\nplace, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms\ncrowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what\nwrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his\ntransgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in\nhis sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him\nwho is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is\nthe kind nurse of his age:\n\n\u2018Hope,\u2019 he says, \u2018cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and\nholiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his\njourney;\u2014hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.\u2019\n\nHow admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not\nsay to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to\ndeceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally;\nand when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension\nabout offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to\nthis peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and\ntherefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many\nadvantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my\nopinion the greatest.\n\nWell said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is\nit?\u2014to speak the truth and to pay your debts\u2014no more than this? And\neven to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in\nhis right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he\nis not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one\nwould say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more\nthan they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who\nis in his condition.\n\nYou are quite right, he replied.\n\nBut then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a\ncorrect definition of justice.\n\nQuite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said\nPolemarchus interposing.\n\nI fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the\nsacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the\ncompany.\n\nIs not Polemarchus your heir? I said.\n\nTo be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.\n\nTell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and\naccording to you truly say, about justice?\n\nHe said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he\nappears to me to be right.\n\nI should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man,\nbut his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear\nto me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that\nI ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks\nfor it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be\ndenied to be a debt.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no\nmeans to make the return?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nWhen Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did\nnot mean to include that case?\n\nCertainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a\nfriend and never evil.\n\nYou mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of\nthe receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a\ndebt,\u2014that is what you would imagine him to say?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?\n\nTo be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an\nenemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to\nhim\u2014that is to say, evil.\n\nSimonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken\ndarkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that\njustice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he\ntermed a debt.\n\nThat must have been his meaning, he said.\n\nBy heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is\ngiven by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would\nmake to us?\n\nHe would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to\nhuman bodies.\n\nAnd what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?\n\nSeasoning to food.\n\nAnd what is that which justice gives, and to whom?\n\nIf, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the\npreceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to\nfriends and evil to enemies.\n\nThat is his meaning then?\n\nI think so.\n\nAnd who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies\nin time of sickness?\n\nThe physician.\n\nOr when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?\n\nThe pilot.\n\nAnd in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just\nman most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?\n\nIn going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.\n\nBut when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a\nphysician?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?\n\nNo.\n\nThen in time of peace justice will be of no use?\n\nI am very far from thinking so.\n\nYou think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?\n\nYes.\n\nLike husbandry for the acquisition of corn?\n\nYes.\n\nOr like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,\u2014that is what you mean?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of\npeace?\n\nIn contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.\n\nAnd by contracts you mean partnerships?\n\nExactly.\n\nBut is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better\npartner at a game of draughts?\n\nThe skilful player.\n\nAnd in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or\nbetter partner than the builder?\n\nQuite the reverse.\n\nThen in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than\nthe harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a\nbetter partner than the just man?\n\nIn a money partnership.\n\nYes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not\nwant a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a\nhorse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that,\nwould he not?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be\nbetter?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is\nto be preferred?\n\nWhen you want a deposit to be kept safely.\n\nYou mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?\n\nPrecisely.\n\nThat is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nAnd when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful\nto the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then\nthe art of the vine-dresser?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you\nwould say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then\nthe art of the soldier or of the musician?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd so of all other things;\u2014justice is useful when they are useless,\nand useless when they are useful?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nThen justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further\npoint: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any\nkind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is\nbest able to create one?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march\nupon the enemy?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?\n\nThat, I suppose, is to be inferred.\n\nThen if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing\nit.\n\nThat is implied in the argument.\n\nThen after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a\nlesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he,\nspeaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a\nfavourite of his, affirms that\n\n\u2018He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.\u2019\n\nAnd so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art\nof theft; to be practised however \u2018for the good of friends and for the\nharm of enemies,\u2019\u2014that was what you were saying?\n\nNo, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I\nstill stand by the latter words.\n\nWell, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean\nthose who are so really, or only in seeming?\n\nSurely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks\ngood, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.\n\nYes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not\ngood seem to be so, and conversely?\n\nThat is true.\n\nThen to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their\nfriends? True.\n\nAnd in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil\nto the good?\n\nClearly.\n\nBut the good are just and would not do an injustice?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no\nwrong?\n\nNay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.\n\nThen I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the\nunjust?\n\nI like that better.\n\nBut see the consequence:\u2014Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has\nfriends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to\nthem; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we\nshall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the\nmeaning of Simonides.\n\nVery true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error\ninto which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words \u2018friend\u2019 and\n\u2018enemy.\u2019\n\nWhat was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.\n\nWe assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.\n\nAnd how is the error to be corrected?\n\nWe should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems,\ngood; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and\nis not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.\n\nYou would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do\ngood to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It\nis just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our\nenemies when they are evil?\n\nYes, that appears to me to be the truth.\n\nBut ought the just to injure any one at all?\n\nUndoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his\nenemies.\n\nWhen horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?\n\nThe latter.\n\nDeteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of\ndogs?\n\nYes, of horses.\n\nAnd dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of\nhorses?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the\nproper virtue of man?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that human virtue is justice?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThen men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?\n\nThat is the result.\n\nBut can the musician by his art make men unmusical?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can\nthe good by virtue make them bad?\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nAny more than heat can produce cold?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nOr drought moisture?\n\nClearly not.\n\nNor can the good harm any one?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the just is the good?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man,\nbut of the opposite, who is the unjust?\n\nI think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.\n\nThen if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and\nthat good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil\nthe debt which he owes to his enemies,\u2014to say this is not wise; for it\nis not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can\nbe in no case just.\n\nI agree with you, said Polemarchus.\n\nThen you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who\nattributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other\nwise man or seer?\n\nI am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.\n\nShall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?\n\nWhose?\n\nI believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban,\nor some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own\npower, was the first to say that justice is \u2018doing good to your friends\nand harm to your enemies.\u2019\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nYes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what\nother can be offered?\n\nSeveral times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an\nattempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down\nby the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when\nPolemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no\nlonger hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a\nwild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the\nsight of him.\n\nHe roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken\npossession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one\nanother? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you\nshould not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to\nyourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer;\nfor there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will\nnot have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or\ninterest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have\nclearness and accuracy.\n\nI was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without\ntrembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I\nshould have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked\nat him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.\n\nThrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don\u2019t be hard upon us. Polemarchus\nand I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I\ncan assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking\nfor a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were \u2018knocking under\nto one another,\u2019 and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when\nwe are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of\ngold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not\ndoing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most\nwilling and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if\nso, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with\nus.\n\nHow characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;\u2014that\u2019s\nyour ironical style! Did I not foresee\u2014have I not already told you,\nthat whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or\nany other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?\n\nYou are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if\nyou ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit\nhim whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six\ntimes two, or four times three, \u2018for this sort of nonsense will not do\nfor me,\u2019\u2014then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question,\nno one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort,\n\u2018Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you\ninterdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some\nother number which is not the right one?\u2014is that your meaning?\u2019\u2014How\nwould you answer him?\n\nJust as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.\n\nWhy should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only\nappear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he\nthinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?\n\nI presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted\nanswers?\n\nI dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I\napprove of any of them.\n\nBut what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he\nsaid, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?\n\nDone to me!\u2014as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise\u2014that is\nwhat I deserve to have done to me.\n\nWhat, and no payment! a pleasant notion!\n\nI will pay when I have the money, I replied.\n\nBut you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be\nunder no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for\nSocrates.\n\nYes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does\u2014refuse to\nanswer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one\nelse.\n\nWhy, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says\nthat he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions\nof his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The\nnatural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who\nprofesses to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly\nanswer, for the edification of the company and of myself?\n\nGlaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and\nThrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for\nhe thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish\nhimself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length\nhe consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he\nrefuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he\nnever even says Thank you.\n\nThat I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am\nungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in\npraise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who\nappears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you\nanswer; for I expect that you will answer well.\n\nListen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the\ninterest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of\ncourse you won\u2019t.\n\nLet me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the\ninterest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this?\nYou cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is\nstronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his\nbodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who\nare weaker than he is, and right and just for us?\n\nThat\u2019s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense\nwhich is most damaging to the argument.\n\nNot at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I\nwish that you would be a little clearer.\n\nWell, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ;\nthere are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are\naristocracies?\n\nYes, I know.\n\nAnd the government is the ruling power in each state?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the different forms of government make laws democratical,\naristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and\nthese laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the\njustice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses\nthem they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what\nI mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of\njustice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government\nmust be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that\neverywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of\nthe stronger.\n\nNow I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will\ntry to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have\nyourself used the word \u2018interest\u2019 which you forbade me to use. It is\ntrue, however, that in your definition the words \u2018of the stronger\u2019 are\nadded.\n\nA small addition, you must allow, he said.\n\nGreat or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether\nwhat you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice\nis interest of some sort, but you go on to say \u2018of the stronger\u2019; about\nthis addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.\n\nProceed.\n\nI will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to\nobey their rulers?\n\nI do.\n\nBut are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they\nsometimes liable to err?\n\nTo be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.\n\nThen in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and\nsometimes not?\n\nTrue.\n\nWhen they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their\ninterest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit\nthat?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,\u2014and that\nis what you call justice?\n\nDoubtless.\n\nThen justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the\ninterest of the stronger but the reverse?\n\nWhat is that you are saying? he asked.\n\nI am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us\nconsider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about\ntheir own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is\njustice? Has not that been admitted?\n\nYes.\n\nThen you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest\nof the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be\ndone which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the\nobedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O\nwisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker\nare commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the\ninjury of the stronger?\n\nNothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.\n\nYes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his\nwitness.\n\nBut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus\nhimself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for\ntheir own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.\n\nYes, Polemarchus,\u2014Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was\ncommanded by their rulers is just.\n\nYes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the\nstronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further\nacknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his\nsubjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that\njustice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.\n\nBut, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the\nstronger thought to be his interest,\u2014this was what the weaker had to\ndo; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.\n\nThose were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.\n\nNever mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his\nstatement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what\nthe stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?\n\nCertainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken\nthe stronger at the time when he is mistaken?\n\nYes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that\nthe ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.\n\nYou argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he\nwho is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken?\nor that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or\ngrammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the\nmistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian\nhas made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is\nthat neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a\nmistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err\nunless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled\nartists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what\nhis name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the\ncommon mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are\nsuch a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he\nis a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that\nwhich is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute\nhis commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice\nis the interest of the stronger.\n\nIndeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an\ninformer?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAnd do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of\ninjuring you in the argument?\n\nNay, he replied, \u2018suppose\u2019 is not the word\u2014I know it; but you will be\nfound out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.\n\nI shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any\nmisunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what\nsense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were\nsaying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should\nexecute\u2014is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the\nterm?\n\nIn the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the\ninformer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will\nbe able, never.\n\nAnd do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and\ncheat, Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.\n\nWhy, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.\n\nEnough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should\nask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of\nwhich you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And\nremember that I am now speaking of the true physician.\n\nA healer of the sick, he replied.\n\nAnd the pilot\u2014that is to say, the true pilot\u2014is he a captain of sailors\nor a mere sailor?\n\nA captain of sailors.\n\nThe circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into\naccount; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which\nhe is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant\nof his skill and of his authority over the sailors.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNow, I said, every art has an interest?\n\nCertainly.\n\nFor which the art has to consider and provide?\n\nYes, that is the aim of art.\n\nAnd the interest of any art is the perfection of it\u2014this and nothing\nelse?\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body.\nSuppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has\nwants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may\nbe ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which\nthe art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of\nmedicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?\n\nQuite right, he replied.\n\nBut is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any\nquality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the\near fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for\nthe interests of seeing and hearing\u2014has art in itself, I say, any\nsimilar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require\nanother supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that\nanother and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after\ntheir own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of\nanother?\u2014having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct\nthem, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they\nhave only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every\nart remains pure and faultless while remaining true\u2014that is to say,\nwhile perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and\ntell me whether I am not right.\n\nYes, clearly.\n\nThen medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the\ninterest of the body?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nNor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of\nhorsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts\ncare for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that\nwhich is the subject of their art?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nBut surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of\ntheir own subjects?\n\nTo this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.\n\nThen, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of\nthe stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and\nweaker?\n\nHe made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally\nacquiesced.\n\nThen, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician,\nconsiders his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his\npatient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body\nas a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of\nsailors and not a mere sailor?\n\nThat has been admitted.\n\nAnd such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest\nof the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler\u2019s\ninterest?\n\nHe gave a reluctant \u2018Yes.\u2019\n\nThen, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far\nas he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest,\nbut always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his\nart; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which\nhe says and does.\n\nWhen we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that\nthe definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus,\ninstead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a\nnurse?\n\nWhy do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be\nanswering?\n\nBecause she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has\nnot even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.\n\nWhat makes you say that? I replied.\n\nBecause you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the\nsheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of\nhimself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of\nstates, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as\nsheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and\nnight. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the\njust and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in\nreality another\u2019s good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and\nstronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the\nopposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is\nthe stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and\nminister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own.\nConsider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a\nloser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private\ncontracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find\nthat, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more\nand the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when\nthere is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less\non the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received\nthe one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens\nwhen they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs\nand perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the\npublic, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and\nacquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this\nis reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of\ninjustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most\napparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that\nhighest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men,\nand the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most\nmiserable\u2014that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away\nthe property of others, not little by little but wholesale;\ncomprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and\npublic; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any\none of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace\u2014they\nwho do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples,\nand man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man\nbesides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them,\nthen, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and\nblessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having\nachieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice,\nfearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink\nfrom committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice,\nwhen on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery\nthan justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the\nstronger, whereas injustice is a man\u2019s own profit and interest.\n\nThrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged\nour ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would\nnot let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his\nposition; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not\nleave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive\nare your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly\ntaught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to\ndetermine the way of man\u2019s life so small a matter in your eyes\u2014to\ndetermine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest\nadvantage?\n\nAnd do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?\n\nYou appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us,\nThrasymachus\u2014whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you\nsay you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do\nnot keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any\nbenefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own\npart I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not\nbelieve injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled\nand allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an\nunjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force,\nstill this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice,\nand there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself.\nPerhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us\nthat we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.\n\nAnd how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced\nby what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me\nput the proof bodily into your souls?\n\nHeaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if\nyou change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must\nremark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that\nalthough you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense,\nyou did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you\nthought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view\nto their own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to\nthe pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the\nmarket, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is\nconcerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide\nthe best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured\nwhenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I\nwas saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the\nruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life,\ncould only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem\nto think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers,\nlike being in authority.\n\nThink! Nay, I am sure of it.\n\nThen why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly\nwithout payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the\nadvantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question:\nAre not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a\nseparate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you\nthink, that we may make a little progress.\n\nYes, that is the difference, he replied.\n\nAnd each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general\none\u2014medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea,\nand so on?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we\ndo not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot\nis to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the\npilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to\nsay, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we\nare to adopt your exact use of language?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not\nsay that the art of payment is medicine?\n\nI should not.\n\nNor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a\nman takes fees when he is engaged in healing?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially\nconfined to the art?\n\nYes.\n\nThen, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to\nbe attributed to something of which they all have the common use?\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nAnd when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is\ngained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art\nprofessed by him?\n\nHe gave a reluctant assent to this.\n\nThen the pay is not derived by the several artists from their\nrespective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives\nhealth, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends\nthem which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own\nbusiness and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the\nartist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nBut does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?\n\nCertainly, he confers a benefit.\n\nThen now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts\nnor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before\nsaying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who\nare the weaker and not the stronger\u2014to their good they attend and not\nto the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear\nThrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to\ngovern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils\nwhich are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution\nof his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does\nnot regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and\ntherefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be\npaid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty\nfor refusing.\n\nWhat do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of\npayment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not\nunderstand, or how a penalty can be a payment.\n\nYou mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to\nthe best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that\nambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for\nthem; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing\nand so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves\nout of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being\nambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be\nlaid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of\npunishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness\nto take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed\ndishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who\nrefuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself.\nAnd the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office,\nnot because they would, but because they cannot help\u2014not under the idea\nthat they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as\na necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling\nto any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there\nis reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men,\nthen to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to\nobtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the\ntrue ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that\nof his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to\nreceive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring\none. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the\ninterest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further\ndiscussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the\nunjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement\nappears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has\nspoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?\n\nI for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he\nanswered.\n\nDid you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was\nrehearsing?\n\nYes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.\n\nThen shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that\nhe is saying what is not true?\n\nMost certainly, he replied.\n\nIf, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all\nthe advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must\nbe a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either\nside, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed\nin our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another,\nwe shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nAnd which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.\n\nThat which you propose.\n\nWell, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning\nand answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than\nperfect justice?\n\nYes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.\n\nAnd what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and\nthe other vice?\n\nCertainly.\n\nI suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?\n\nWhat a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice\nto be profitable and justice not.\n\nWhat else then would you say?\n\nThe opposite, he replied.\n\nAnd would you call justice vice?\n\nNo, I would rather say sublime simplicity.\n\nThen would you call injustice malignity?\n\nNo; I would rather say discretion.\n\nAnd do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?\n\nYes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly\nunjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but\nperhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession\nif undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with\nthose of which I was just now speaking.\n\nI do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I\nreplied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class\ninjustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.\n\nCertainly I do so class them.\n\nNow, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable\nground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be\nprofitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and\ndeformity, an answer might have been given to you on received\nprinciples; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable\nand strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities\nwhich were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not\nhesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.\n\nYou have guessed most infallibly, he replied.\n\nThen I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the\nargument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are\nspeaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest\nand are not amusing yourself at our expense.\n\nI may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?\u2014to refute the\nargument is your business.\n\nVery true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good\nas answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any\nadvantage over the just?\n\nFar otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature\nwhich he is.\n\nAnd would he try to go beyond just action?\n\nHe would not.\n\nAnd how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the\nunjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?\n\nHe would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he\nwould not be able.\n\nWhether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My\nquestion is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than\nanother just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?\n\nYes, he would.\n\nAnd what of the unjust\u2014does he claim to have more than the just man and\nto do more than is just?\n\nOf course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.\n\nAnd the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the\nunjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?\n\nTrue.\n\nWe may put the matter thus, I said\u2014the just does not desire more than\nhis like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than\nboth his like and his unlike?\n\nNothing, he said, can be better than that statement.\n\nAnd the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?\n\nGood again, he said.\n\nAnd is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?\n\nOf course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who\nare of a certain nature; he who is not, not.\n\nEach of them, I said, is such as his like is?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nVery good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts:\nyou would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd which is wise and which is foolish?\n\nClearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.\n\nAnd he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is\nfoolish?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts\nthe lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the\ntightening and loosening the strings?\n\nI do not think that he would.\n\nBut he would claim to exceed the non-musician?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and\ndrinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the\npractice of medicine?\n\nHe would not.\n\nBut he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think\nthat any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of\nsaying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not\nrather say or do the same as his like in the same case?\n\nThat, I suppose, can hardly be denied.\n\nAnd what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either\nthe knowing or the ignorant?\n\nI dare say.\n\nAnd the knowing is wise?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the wise is good?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but\nmore than his unlike and opposite?\n\nI suppose so.\n\nWhereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?\n\nYes.\n\nBut did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his\nlike and unlike? Were not these your words?\n\nThey were.\n\nAnd you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his\nunlike?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil\nand ignorant?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nAnd each of them is such as his like is?\n\nThat was admitted.\n\nThen the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil\nand ignorant.\n\nThrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them,\nbut with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer\u2019s day, and the\nperspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had\nnever seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that\njustice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I\nproceeded to another point:\n\nWell, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not\nalso saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?\n\nYes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you\nare saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be\nquite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to\nhave my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer\n\u2018Very good,\u2019 as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod \u2018Yes\u2019\nand \u2018No.\u2019\n\nCertainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.\n\nYes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak.\nWhat else would you have?\n\nNothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and\nyou shall answer.\n\nProceed.\n\nThen I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our\nexamination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be\ncarried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger\nand more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified\nwith wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice,\nif injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one.\nBut I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You\nwould not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly\nattempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them,\nand may be holding many of them in subjection?\n\nTrue, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly\nunjust state will be most likely to do so.\n\nI know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further\nconsider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior\nstate can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.\n\nIf you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with\njustice; but if I am right, then without justice.\n\nI am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and\ndissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.\n\nThat is out of civility to you, he replied.\n\nYou are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to\ninform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of\nrobbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all\nif they injured one another?\n\nNo indeed, he said, they could not.\n\nBut if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act\ntogether better?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and\nfighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true,\nThrasymachus?\n\nI agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.\n\nHow good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether\ninjustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing,\namong slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and\nset them at variance and render them incapable of common action?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and\nfight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?\n\nThey will.\n\nAnd suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say\nthat she loses or that she retains her natural power?\n\nLet us assume that she retains her power.\n\nYet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that\nwherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a\nfamily, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered\nincapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and\ndoes it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes\nit, and with the just? Is not this the case?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nAnd is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in\nthe first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at\nunity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to\nhimself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?\n\nGranted that they are.\n\nBut if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will\nbe their friend?\n\nFeast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not\noppose you, lest I should displease the company.\n\nWell then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of\nmy repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser\nand better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable\nof common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil\nacting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if\nthey had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one\nanother; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of\njustice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been\nthey would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were\nbut half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole\nvillains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of\naction. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what\nyou said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life\nthan the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to\nconsider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have\ngiven; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter\nis at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.\n\nProceed.\n\nI will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has\nsome end?\n\nI should.\n\nAnd the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could\nnot be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\n\nI do not understand, he said.\n\nLet me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr hear, except with the ear?\n\nNo.\n\nThese then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?\n\nThey may.\n\nBut you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and\nin many other ways?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?\n\nTrue.\n\nMay we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?\n\nWe may.\n\nThen now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my\nmeaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be\nthat which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by\nany other thing?\n\nI understand your meaning, he said, and assent.\n\nAnd that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I\nask again whether the eye has an end?\n\nIt has.\n\nAnd has not the eye an excellence?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the ear has an end and an excellence also?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end\nand a special excellence?\n\nThat is so.\n\nWell, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their\nown proper excellence and have a defect instead?\n\nHow can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?\n\nYou mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is\nsight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the\nquestion more generally, and only enquire whether the things which\nfulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail\nof fulfilling them by their own defect?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nI might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper\nexcellence they cannot fulfil their end?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same observation will apply to all other things?\n\nI agree.\n\nWell; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for\nexample, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are\nnot these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be\nassigned to any other?\n\nTo no other.\n\nAnd is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?\n\nAssuredly, he said.\n\nAnd has not the soul an excellence also?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that\nexcellence?\n\nShe cannot.\n\nThen an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent,\nand the good soul a good ruler?\n\nYes, necessarily.\n\nAnd we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and\ninjustice the defect of the soul?\n\nThat has been admitted.\n\nThen the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man\nwill live ill?\n\nThat is what your argument proves.\n\nAnd he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the\nreverse of happy?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?\n\nSo be it.\n\nBut happiness and not misery is profitable.\n\nOf course.\n\nThen, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable\nthan justice.\n\nLet this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.\n\nFor which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle\ntowards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been\nwell entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an\nepicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to\ntable, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so\nhave I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what\nI sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and\nturned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil\nand folly; and when there arose a further question about the\ncomparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain\nfrom passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has\nbeen that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and\ntherefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor\ncan I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK II.\n\n\nWith these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the\ndiscussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For\nGlaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at\nThrasymachus\u2019 retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said\nto me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to\nhave persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?\n\nI should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.\n\nThen you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:\u2014How would\nyou arrange goods\u2014are there not some which we welcome for their own\nsakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example,\nharmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time,\nalthough nothing follows from them?\n\nI agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.\n\nIs there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight,\nhealth, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their\nresults?\n\nCertainly, I said.\n\nAnd would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the\ncare of the sick, and the physician\u2019s art; also the various ways of\nmoney-making\u2014these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and\nno one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of\nsome reward or result which flows from them?\n\nThere is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?\n\nBecause I want to know in which of the three classes you would place\njustice?\n\nIn the highest class, I replied,\u2014among those goods which he who would\nbe happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their\nresults.\n\nThen the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be\nreckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued\nfor the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are\ndisagreeable and rather to be avoided.\n\nI know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this\nwas the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he\ncensured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be\nconvinced by him.\n\nI wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I\nshall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a\nsnake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have\nbeen; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet\nbeen made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to\nknow what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the\nsoul. If you, please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus.\nAnd first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to\nthe common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who\npractise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a\ngood. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for\nthe life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the\njust\u2014if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their\nopinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the\nvoices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and,\non the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to\ninjustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear\njustice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and\nyou are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear\nthis; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my\npower, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I\ndesire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will\nyou say whether you approve of my proposal?\n\nIndeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense\nwould oftener wish to converse.\n\nI am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by\nspeaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.\n\nThey say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,\nevil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have\nboth done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not\nbeing able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they\nhad better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise\nlaws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed\nby them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature\nof justice;\u2014it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which\nis to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is\nto suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice,\nbeing at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good,\nbut as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men\nto do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever\nsubmit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad\nif he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and\norigin of justice.\n\nNow that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because\nthey have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine\nsomething of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust\npower to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will\nlead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust\nman to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest,\nwhich all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the\npath of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing\nmay be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is\nsaid to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the\nLydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service\nof the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made\nan opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock.\nAmazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other\nmarvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he\nstooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him,\nmore than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took\nfrom the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met\ntogether, according to custom, that they might send their monthly\nreport about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having\nthe ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to\nturn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became\ninvisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as\nif he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again\ntouching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made\nseveral trials of the ring, and always with the same result\u2014when he\nturned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he\nreappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers\nwho were sent to the court; whereas soon as he arrived he seduced the\nqueen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and\ntook the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and\nthe just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be\nimagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in\njustice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he\ncould safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses\nand lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison\nwhom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the\nactions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would\nboth come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be\na great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks\nthat justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for\nwherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is\nunjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more\nprofitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have\nbeen supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any\none obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any\nwrong or touching what was another\u2019s, he would be thought by the\nlookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him\nto one another\u2019s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a\nfear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.\n\nNow, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and\nunjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the\nisolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely\nunjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away\nfrom either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the\nwork of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other\ndistinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician,\nwho knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and\nwho, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the\nunjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he\nmeans to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:)\nfor the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are\nnot. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume\nthe most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must\nallow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the\ngreatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must\nbe able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect,\nif any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where\nforce is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and\nfriends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and\nsimplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good.\nThere must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured\nand rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the\nsake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let\nhim be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must\nbe imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be\nthe best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have\nbeen put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by\nthe fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to\nthe hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have\nreached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of\ninjustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the\ntwo.\n\nHeavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up\nfor the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two\nstatues.\n\nI do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is\nno difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of\nthem. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the\ndescription a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that\nthe words which follow are not mine.\u2014Let me put them into the mouths of\nthe eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is\nthought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound\u2014will have his eyes burnt\nout; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be\nimpaled: Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to\nbe, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust\nthan of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not\nlive with a view to appearances\u2014he wants to be really unjust and not to\nseem only:\u2014\n\n\u2018His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent\ncounsels.\u2019\n\nIn the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the\ncity; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will;\nalso he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own\nadvantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every\ncontest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his\nantagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his\ngains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he\ncan offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and\nmagnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to\nhonour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely\nto be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and\nmen are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the\nlife of the just.\n\nI was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his\nbrother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there\nis nothing more to be urged?\n\nWhy, what else is there? I answered.\n\nThe strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.\n\nWell, then, according to the proverb, \u2018Let brother help brother\u2019\u2014if he\nfails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that\nGlaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take\nfrom me the power of helping justice.\n\nNonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another\nside to Glaucon\u2019s argument about the praise and censure of justice and\ninjustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I\nbelieve to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their\nsons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the\nsake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the\nhope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices,\nmarriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the\nadvantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More,\nhowever, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the\nothers; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell\nyou of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon\nthe pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and\nHomer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just\u2014\n\n \u2018To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;\nAnd the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,\u2019\n\n\nand many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And\nHomer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is\u2014\n\n\u2018As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice;\nto whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are\nbowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives\nhim fish.\u2019\n\nStill grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son\nvouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where\nthey have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk,\ncrowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of\ndrunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards\nyet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall\nsurvive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which\nthey praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they\nbury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve;\nalso while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict\nupon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the\njust who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention\nsupply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the\nother.\n\nOnce more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking\nabout justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is\nfound in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always\ndeclaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and\ntoilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of\nattainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also\nthat honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and\nthey are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both\nin public and private when they are rich or in any other way\ninfluential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and\npoor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But\nmost extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and\nthe gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many\ngood men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets\ngo to rich men\u2019s doors and persuade them that they have a power\ncommitted to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man\u2019s own or\nhis ancestor\u2019s sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and\nfeasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a\nsmall cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they\nsay, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom\nthey appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod;\u2014\n\n\u2018Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and\nher dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,\u2019\n\nand a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the\ngods may be influenced by men; for he also says:\u2014\n\n\u2018The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them\nand avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by\nlibations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and\ntransgressed.\u2019\n\nAnd they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who\nwere children of the Moon and the Muses\u2014that is what they say\u2014according\nto which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals,\nbut whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by\nsacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at\nthe service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call\nmysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect\nthem no one knows what awaits us.\n\nHe proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue\nand vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their\nminds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,\u2014those of them, I mean,\nwho are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower,\nand from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what\nmanner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if\nthey would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to\nhimself in the words of Pindar\u2014\n\n\u2018Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower\nwhich may be a fortress to me all my days?\u2019\n\nFor what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought\njust profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are\nunmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of\njustice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers\nprove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to\nappearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture\nand shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house;\nbehind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest\nof sages, recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the\nconcealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer,\nNothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we\nwould be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a\nview to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political\nclubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of\npersuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and\npartly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still\nI hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can\nthey be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to\nhave no care of human things\u2014why in either case should we mind about\nconcealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet\nwe know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets;\nand these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and\nturned by \u2018sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.\u2019 Let us\nbe consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak\ntruly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of\ninjustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of\nheaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we\nshall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and\nsinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished.\n\u2018But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will\nsuffer for our unjust deeds.\u2019 Yes, my friend, will be the reflection,\nbut there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great\npower. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the\ngods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.\n\nOn what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than\nthe worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful\nregard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and\nmen, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest\nauthorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has\nany superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to\nhonour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears\njustice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to\ndisprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is\nbest, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to\nforgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own\nfree will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity\nwithin him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has\nattained knowledge of the truth\u2014but no other man. He only blames\ninjustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the\npower of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he\nobtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.\n\nThe cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning\nof the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were\nto find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice\u2014beginning\nwith the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us,\nand ending with the men of our own time\u2014no one has ever blamed\ninjustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories,\nhonours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately\ndescribed either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either\nof them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye;\nor shown that of all the things of a man\u2019s soul which he has within\nhim, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had\nthis been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this\nfrom our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep\none another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own\nwatchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the\ngreatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would\nseriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and\nwords even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as\nI conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement\nmanner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from\nyou the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the\nsuperiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have\non the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other\nan evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude\nreputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true\nreputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise\njustice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only\nexhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with\nThrasymachus in thinking that justice is another\u2019s good and the\ninterest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man\u2019s own profit and\ninterest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that\njustice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed\nfor their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes\u2014like\nsight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural\nand not merely conventional good\u2014I would ask you in your praise of\njustice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil\nwhich justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others\npraise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and\nhonours of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing\nwhich, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have\nspent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I\nhear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And\ntherefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than\ninjustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of\nthem, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether\nseen or unseen by gods and men.\n\nI had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on\nhearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an\nillustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses\nwhich the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had\ndistinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:\u2014\n\n\u2018Sons of Ariston,\u2019 he sang, \u2018divine offspring of an illustrious hero.\u2019\n\nThe epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in\nbeing able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice,\nand remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that\nyou are not convinced\u2014this I infer from your general character, for had\nI judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now,\nthe greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in\nknowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand\nI feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home\nto me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I\nmade to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which\njustice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while\nbreath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an\nimpiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting\nup a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I\ncan.\n\nGlaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question\ndrop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the\ntruth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly,\nabout their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought,\nthat the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very\ngood eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that\nwe had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that\na short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters\nfrom a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be\nfound in another place which was larger and in which the letters were\nlarger\u2014if they were the same and he could read the larger letters\nfirst, and then proceed to the lesser\u2014this would have been thought a\nrare piece of good fortune.\n\nVery true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our\nenquiry?\n\nI will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our\nenquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an\nindividual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nAnd is not a State larger than an individual?\n\nIt is.\n\nThen in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and\nmore easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the\nnature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and\nsecondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser\nand comparing them.\n\nThat, he said, is an excellent proposal.\n\nAnd if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the\njustice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.\n\nI dare say.\n\nWhen the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our\nsearch will be more easily discovered.\n\nYes, far more easily.\n\nBut ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am\ninclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.\n\nI have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should\nproceed.\n\nA State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no\none is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other\norigin of a State be imagined?\n\nThere can be no other.\n\nThen, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply\nthem, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and\nwhen these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation\nthe body of inhabitants is termed a State.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another\nreceives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true\ncreator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.\n\nOf course, he replied.\n\nNow the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the\ncondition of life and existence.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThe second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great\ndemand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder,\nsome one else a weaver\u2014shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps\nsome other purveyor to our bodily wants?\n\nQuite right.\n\nThe barest notion of a State must include four or five men.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours\ninto a common stock?\u2014the individual husbandman, for example, producing\nfor four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in\nthe provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself;\nor will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of\nproducing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food\nin a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time\nbe employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no\npartnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?\n\nAdeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at\nproducing everything.\n\nProbably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you\nsay this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are\ndiversities of natures among us which are adapted to different\noccupations.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd will you have a work better done when the workman has many\noccupations, or when he has only one?\n\nWhen he has only one.\n\nFurther, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at\nthe right time?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nFor business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is\nat leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the\nbusiness his first object.\n\nHe must.\n\nAnd if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully\nand easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is\nnatural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nThen more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will\nnot make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture,\nif they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his\ntools\u2014and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and\nshoemaker.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers\nin our little State, which is already beginning to grow?\n\nTrue.\n\nYet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order\nthat our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well\nas husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces\nand hides,\u2014still our State will not be very large.\n\nThat is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains\nall these.\n\nThen, again, there is the situation of the city\u2014to find a place where\nnothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen there must be another class of citizens who will bring the\nrequired supply from another city?\n\nThere must.\n\nBut if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require\nwho would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.\n\nThat is certain.\n\nAnd therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for\nthemselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate\nthose from whom their wants are supplied.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?\n\nThey will.\n\nNot to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?\n\nYes.\n\nThen we shall want merchants?\n\nWe shall.\n\nAnd if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will\nalso be needed, and in considerable numbers?\n\nYes, in considerable numbers.\n\nThen, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions?\nTo secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our\nprincipal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a\nState.\n\nClearly they will buy and sell.\n\nThen they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of\nexchange.\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to\nmarket, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with\nhim,\u2014is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?\n\nNot at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake\nthe office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those\nwho are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for\nany other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money\nin exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money\nfrom those who desire to buy.\n\nThis want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not\n\u2018retailer\u2019 the term which is applied to those who sit in the\nmarket-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from\none city to another are called merchants?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly\non the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily\nstrength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I\ndo not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the\nprice of their labour.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen hirelings will help to make up our population?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?\n\nI think so.\n\nWhere, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of\nthe State did they spring up?\n\nProbably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot\nimagine that they are more likely to be found any where else.\n\nI dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better\nthink the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.\n\nLet us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now\nthat we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and\nwine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when\nthey are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and\nbarefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed\non barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making\nnoble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or\non clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with\nyew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the\nwine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning\nthe praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they\nwill take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an\neye to poverty or war.\n\nBut, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to\ntheir meal.\n\nTrue, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a\nrelish\u2014salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs\nsuch as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs,\nand peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at\nthe fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be\nexpected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a\nsimilar life to their children after them.\n\nYes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs,\nhow else would you feed the beasts?\n\nBut what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.\n\nWhy, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life.\nPeople who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and\ndine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern\nstyle.\n\nYes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me\nconsider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is\ncreated; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we\nshall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my\nopinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which\nI have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I\nhave no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with\nthe simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and\nother furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and\ncourtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every\nvariety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first\nspeaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the\npainter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and\nivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no\nlonger sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a\nmultitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such\nas the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have\nto do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of\nmusic\u2014poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers,\ncontractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women\u2019s\ndresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in\nrequest, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as\nconfectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and\ntherefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are\nneeded now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of\nmany other kinds, if people eat them.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians\nthan before?\n\nMuch greater.\n\nAnd the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants\nwill be too small now, and not enough?\n\nQuite true.\n\nThen a slice of our neighbours\u2019 land will be wanted by us for pasture\nand tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves,\nthey exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the\nunlimited accumulation of wealth?\n\nThat, Socrates, will be inevitable.\n\nAnd so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?\n\nMost certainly, he replied.\n\nThen without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus\nmuch we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from\ncauses which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States,\nprivate as well as public.\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement\nwill be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and\nfight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things\nand persons whom we were describing above.\n\nWhy? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?\n\nNo, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was\nacknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the\nprinciple, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many\narts with success.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut is not war an art?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a\nweaver, or a builder\u2014in order that we might have our shoes well made;\nbut to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he\nwas by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his\nlife long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and\nthen he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important\nthan that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art\nso easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a\nhusbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the\nworld would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the\ngame as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted\nhimself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled\nworkman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not\nlearned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon\nthem. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war\nbecome a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any\nother kind of troops?\n\nYes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be\nbeyond price.\n\nAnd the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and\nskill, and art, and application will be needed by him?\n\nNo doubt, he replied.\n\nWill he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted\nfor the task of guarding the city?\n\nIt will.\n\nAnd the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave\nand do our best.\n\nWe must.\n\nIs not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding\nand watching?\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to\novertake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have\ncaught him, they have to fight with him.\n\nAll these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.\n\nWell, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or\nany other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and\nunconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of\nany creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?\n\nI have.\n\nThen now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are\nrequired in the guardian.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?\n\nYes.\n\nBut are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another,\nand with everybody else?\n\nA difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.\n\nWhereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and\ngentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without\nwaiting for their enemies to destroy them.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nWhat is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature\nwhich has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the\nother?\n\nTrue.\n\nHe will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two\nqualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible;\nand hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.\n\nI am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.\n\nHere feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.\u2014My\nfriend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost\nsight of the image which we had before us.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite\nqualities.\n\nAnd where do you find them?\n\nMany animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog\nis a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle\nto their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.\n\nYes, I know.\n\nThen there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our\nfinding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nWould not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited\nnature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?\n\nI do not apprehend your meaning.\n\nThe trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the\ndog, and is remarkable in the animal.\n\nWhat trait?\n\nWhy, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an\nacquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any\nharm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?\n\nThe matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of\nyour remark.\n\nAnd surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;\u2014your dog is a\ntrue philosopher.\n\nWhy?\n\nWhy, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only\nby the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be\na lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the\ntest of knowledge and ignorance?\n\nMost assuredly.\n\nAnd is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is\nphilosophy?\n\nThey are the same, he replied.\n\nAnd may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be\ngentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of\nwisdom and knowledge?\n\nThat we may safely affirm.\n\nThen he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will\nrequire to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and\nstrength?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nThen we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found\nthem, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry\nwhich may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is\nour final end\u2014How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do\nnot want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the\nargument to an inconvenient length.\n\nAdeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.\n\nThen, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if\nsomewhat long.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nCome then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our\nstory shall be the education of our heroes.\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the\ntraditional sort?\u2014and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body,\nand music for the soul.\n\nTrue.\n\nShall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?\n\nI do.\n\nAnd literature may be either true or false?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the\nfalse?\n\nI do not understand your meaning, he said.\n\nYou know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which,\nthough not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and\nthese stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn\ngymnastics.\n\nVery true.\n\nThat was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before\ngymnastics.\n\nQuite right, he said.\n\nYou know also that the beginning is the most important part of any\nwork, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is\nthe time at which the character is being formed and the desired\nimpression is more readily taken.\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales\nwhich may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds\nideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish\nthem to have when they are grown up?\n\nWe cannot.\n\nThen the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers\nof fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is\ngood, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell\ntheir children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with\nsuch tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands;\nbut most of those which are now in use must be discarded.\n\nOf what tales are you speaking? he said.\n\nYou may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are\nnecessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of\nthem.\n\nVery likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term\nthe greater.\n\nThose, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of\nthe poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.\n\nBut which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with\nthem?\n\nA fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and,\nwhat is more, a bad lie.\n\nBut when is this fault committed?\n\nWhenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and\nheroes,\u2014as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a\nlikeness to the original.\n\nYes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what\nare the stories which you mean?\n\nFirst of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high\nplaces, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie\ntoo,\u2014I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated\non him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son\ninflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be\nlightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had\nbetter be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for\ntheir mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they\nshould sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig, but some huge and\nunprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very\nfew indeed.\n\nWhy, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.\n\nYes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the\nyoung man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he\nis far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises\nhis father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be\nfollowing the example of the first and greatest among the gods.\n\nI entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are\nquite unfit to be repeated.\n\nNeither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of\nquarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any\nword be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and\nfightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No,\nwe shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be\nembroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable\nother quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If\nthey would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is\nunholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel\nbetween citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by\ntelling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told\nto compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of\nHephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus\nsent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all\nthe battles of the gods in Homer\u2014these tales must not be admitted into\nour State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or\nnot. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is\nliteral; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely\nto become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important\nthat the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous\nthoughts.\n\nThere you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such\nmodels to be found and of what tales are you speaking\u2014how shall we\nanswer him?\n\nI said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but\nfounders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the\ngeneral forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits\nwhich must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their\nbusiness.\n\nVery true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you\nmean?\n\nSomething of this kind, I replied:\u2014God is always to be represented as\nhe truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in\nwhich the representation is given.\n\nRight.\n\nAnd is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd no good thing is hurtful?\n\nNo, indeed.\n\nAnd that which is not hurtful hurts not?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd that which hurts not does no evil?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the good is advantageous?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd therefore the cause of well-being?\n\nYes.\n\nIt follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but\nof the good only?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nThen God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many\nassert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most\nthings that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many\nare the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the\nevils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.\n\nThat appears to me to be most true, he said.\n\nThen we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of\nthe folly of saying that two casks\n\n\u2018Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of\nevil lots,\u2019\n\nand that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two\n\n\u2018Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;\u2019\n\nbut that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,\n\n\u2018Him wild hunger drives o\u2019er the beauteous earth.\u2019\n\nAnd again\u2014\n\n\u2018Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.\u2019\n\nAnd if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which\nwas really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus,\nor that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis\nand Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our\nyoung men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that\n\n\u2018God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a\nhouse.\u2019\n\nAnd if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe\u2014the subject of the\ntragedy in which these iambic verses occur\u2014or of the house of Pelops,\nor of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit\nhim to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he\nmust devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must\nsay that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for\nbeing punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that\nGod is the author of their misery\u2014the poet is not to be permitted to\nsay; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they\nrequire to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from\nGod; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be\nstrenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or\nprose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth.\nSuch a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.\n\nI agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the\nlaw.\n\nLet this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods,\nto which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,\u2014that God\nis not the author of all things, but of good only.\n\nThat will do, he said.\n\nAnd what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether\nGod is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one\nshape, and now in another\u2014sometimes himself changing and passing into\nmany forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such\ntransformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own\nproper image?\n\nI cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.\n\nWell, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must\nbe effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?\n\nMost certainly.\n\nAnd things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered\nor discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human\nframe is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant\nwhich is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the\nheat of the sun or any similar causes.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged\nby any external influence?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite\nthings\u2014furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are\nleast altered by time and circumstances.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both,\nis least liable to suffer change from without?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?\n\nOf course they are.\n\nThen he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many\nshapes?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nBut may he not change and transform himself?\n\nClearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.\n\nAnd will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the\nworse and more unsightly?\n\nIf he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot\nsuppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.\n\nVery true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man,\ndesire to make himself worse?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being,\nas is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God\nremains absolutely and for ever in his own form.\n\nThat necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.\n\nThen, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that\n\n\u2018The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up\nand down cities in all sorts of forms;\u2019\n\nand let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either\nin tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in\nthe likeness of a priestess asking an alms\n\n\u2018For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;\u2019\n\n\u2014let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers\nunder the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad\nversion of these myths\u2014telling how certain gods, as they say, \u2018Go about\nby night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;\u2019 but\nlet them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the\nsame time speak blasphemy against the gods.\n\nHeaven forbid, he said.\n\nBut although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft\nand deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?\n\nPerhaps, he replied.\n\nWell, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in\nword or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?\n\nI cannot say, he replied.\n\nDo you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may\nbe allowed, is hated of gods and men?\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest\nand highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters;\nthere, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.\n\nStill, he said, I do not comprehend you.\n\nThe reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to\nmy words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or\nuninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of\nthemselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to\nhold the lie, is what mankind least like;\u2014that, I say, is what they\nutterly detest.\n\nThere is nothing more hateful to them.\n\nAnd, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who\nis deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a\nkind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the\nsoul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?\n\nPerfectly right.\n\nThe true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?\n\nYes.\n\nWhereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in\ndealing with enemies\u2014that would be an instance; or again, when those\nwhom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to\ndo some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or\npreventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now\nspeaking\u2014because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make\nfalsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is\nignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?\n\nThat would be ridiculous, he said.\n\nThen the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?\n\nI should say not.\n\nOr perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?\n\nThat is inconceivable.\n\nBut he may have friends who are senseless or mad?\n\nBut no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.\n\nThen no motive can be imagined why God should lie?\n\nNone whatever.\n\nThen the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?\n\nYes.\n\nThen is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes\nnot; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking\nvision.\n\nYour thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.\n\nYou agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in\nwhich we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not\nmagicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in\nany way.\n\nI grant that.\n\nThen, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying\ndream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses\nof Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials\n\n\u2018Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long,\nand to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all\nthings blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my\nsoul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of\nprophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he\nwho was present at the banquet, and who said this\u2014he it is who has\nslain my son.\u2019\n\nThese are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our\nanger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall\nwe allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young,\nmeaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be\ntrue worshippers of the gods and like them.\n\nI entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make\nthem my laws.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK III.\n\n\nSuch then, I said, are our principles of theology\u2014some tales are to be\ntold, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth\nupwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to\nvalue friendship with one another.\n\nYes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.\n\nBut if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons\nbesides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of\ndeath? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nAnd can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle\nrather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real\nand terrible?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales\nas well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but\nrather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their\ndescriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.\n\nThat will be our duty, he said.\n\nThen, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages,\nbeginning with the verses,\n\n\u2018I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man\nthan rule over all the dead who have come to nought.\u2019\n\nWe must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,\n\n\u2018Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen\nboth of mortals and immortals.\u2019\n\nAnd again:\u2014\n\n\u2018O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form\nbut no mind at all!\u2019\n\nAgain of Tiresias:\u2014\n\n\u2018(To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,) that he alone\nshould be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.\u2019\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u2018The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate,\nleaving manhood and youth.\u2019\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u2018And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the\nearth.\u2019\n\nAnd,\u2014\n\n\u2018As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped\nout of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to\none another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they\nmoved.\u2019\n\nAnd we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike\nout these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or\nunattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical\ncharm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who\nare meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAlso we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which\ndescribe the world below\u2014Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and\nsapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes\na shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do\nnot say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind;\nbut there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered\ntoo excitable and effeminate by them.\n\nThere is a real danger, he said.\n\nThen we must have no more of them.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnother and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous\nmen?\n\nThey will go with the rest.\n\nBut shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is\nthat the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good\nman who is his comrade.\n\nYes; that is our principle.\n\nAnd therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he\nhad suffered anything terrible?\n\nHe will not.\n\nSuch an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his\nown happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of\nfortune, is to him of all men least terrible.\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the\ngreatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.\n\nYes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.\n\nThen we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous\nmen, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good\nfor anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being\neducated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the\nlike.\n\nThat will be very right.\n\nThen we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict\nAchilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on\nhis back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a\nfrenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes\nin both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and\nwailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he\ndescribe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,\n\n\u2018Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.\u2019\n\nStill more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce\nthe gods lamenting and saying,\n\n\u2018Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.\u2019\n\nBut if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so\ncompletely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him\nsay\u2014\n\n\u2018O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased\nround and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.\u2019\n\nOr again:\u2014\n\nWoe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me,\nsubdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.\u2019\n\nFor if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such\nunworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as\nthey ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a\nman, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any\ninclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And\ninstead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining\nand lamenting on slight occasions.\n\nYes, he said, that is most true.\n\nYes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the\nargument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until\nit is disproved by a better.\n\nIt ought not to be.\n\nNeither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of\nlaughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a\nviolent reaction.\n\nSo I believe.\n\nThen persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented\nas overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of\nthe gods be allowed.\n\nStill less of the gods, as you say, he replied.\n\nThen we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods\nas that of Homer when he describes how\n\n\u2018Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw\nHephaestus bustling about the mansion.\u2019\n\nOn your views, we must not admit them.\n\nOn my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit\nthem is certain.\n\nAgain, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is\nuseless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use\nof such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private\nindividuals have no business with them.\n\nClearly not, he said.\n\nThen if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of\nthe State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either\nwith enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the\npublic good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind;\nand although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie\nto them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the\npatient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his\nown bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a\nsailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the\nrest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow\nsailors.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nIf, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,\n\n\u2018Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,\u2019\n\nhe will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally\nsubversive and destructive of ship or State.\n\nMost certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.\n\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAre not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience\nto commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,\n\n\u2018Friend, sit still and obey my word,\u2019\n\nand the verses which follow,\n\n\u2018The Greeks marched breathing prowess, ...in silent awe of their\nleaders,\u2019\n\nand other sentiments of the same kind.\n\nWe shall.\n\nWhat of this line,\n\n\u2018O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a\nstag,\u2019\n\nand of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar\nimpertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to\ntheir rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?\n\nThey are ill spoken.\n\nThey may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce\nto temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young\nmen\u2014you would agree with me there?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his\nopinion is more glorious than\n\n\u2018When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries\nround wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups,\u2019\n\nis it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such\nwords? Or the verse\n\n\u2018The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?\u2019\n\nWhat would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and\nmen were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but\nforgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely\novercome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut,\nbut wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never\nbeen in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one\nanother\n\n\u2018Without the knowledge of their parents;\u2019\n\nor that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on,\ncast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?\n\nIndeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear\nthat sort of thing.\n\nBut any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these\nthey ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the\nverses,\n\n\u2018He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart;\nfar worse hast thou endured!\u2019\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nIn the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers\nof money.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nNeither must we sing to them of\n\n\u2018Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.\u2019\n\nNeither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to\nhave given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take\nthe gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he\nshould not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge\nAchilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took\nAgamemnon\u2019s gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the\ndead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do\nso.\n\nUndoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.\n\nLoving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these\nfeelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to\nhim, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the\nnarrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,\n\n\u2018Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily\nI would be even with thee, if I had only the power;\u2019\n\nor his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready\nto lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair,\nwhich had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius,\nand that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector\nround the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre;\nof all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can\nallow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron\u2019s pupil, the\nson of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in\ndescent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time\nthe slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not\nuntainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and\nmen.\n\nYou are quite right, he replied.\n\nAnd let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale\nof Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth\nas they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of\na god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely\nascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to\ndeclare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were\nnot the sons of gods;\u2014both in the same breath they shall not be\npermitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth\nthat the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better\nthan men\u2014sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor\ntrue, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nAnd further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear\nthem; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is\nconvinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by\u2014\n\n\u2018The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar,\nthe altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,\u2019\n\nand who have\n\n\u2018the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.\u2019\n\nAnd therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender\nlaxity of morals among the young.\n\nBy all means, he replied.\n\nBut now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not\nto be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The\nmanner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should\nbe treated has been already laid down.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion\nof our subject.\n\nClearly so.\n\nBut we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my\nfriend.\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men\npoets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements\nwhen they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good\nmiserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that\njustice is a man\u2019s own loss and another\u2019s gain\u2014these things we shall\nforbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.\n\nTo be sure we shall, he replied.\n\nBut if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that\nyou have implied the principle for which we have been all along\ncontending.\n\nI grant the truth of your inference.\n\nThat such things are or are not to be said about men is a question\nwhich we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and\nhow naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just\nor not.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nEnough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and\nwhen this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been\ncompletely treated.\n\nI do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.\n\nThen I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible\nif I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all\nmythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or\nto come?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAnd narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union\nof the two?\n\nThat again, he said, I do not quite understand.\n\nI fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much\ndifficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore,\nI will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in\nillustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in\nwhich the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his\ndaughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon\nChryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against\nthe Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,\n\n\u2018And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus,\nthe chiefs of the people,\u2019\n\nthe poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose\nthat he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of\nChryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the\nspeaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double\nform he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at\nTroy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites\nfrom time to time and in the intermediate passages?\n\nQuite true.\n\nBut when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that\nhe assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you,\nis going to speak?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice\nor gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by\nway of imitation?\n\nVery true.\n\nOr, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then\nagain the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple\nnarration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear,\nand that you may no more say, \u2018I don\u2019t understand,\u2019 I will show how the\nchange might be effected. If Homer had said, \u2018The priest came, having\nhis daughter\u2019s ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and\nabove all the kings;\u2019 and then if, instead of speaking in the person of\nChryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been,\nnot imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as\nfollows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre), \u2018The priest\ncame and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might\ncapture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give\nhim back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and\nrespect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest\nand assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come\nagain, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to\nhim\u2014the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said\u2014she should\ngrow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to\nprovoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went\naway in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called\nupon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had\ndone pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering\nsacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him,\nand that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the\ngod,\u2019\u2014and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.\n\nI understand, he said.\n\nOr you may suppose the opposite case\u2014that the intermediate passages are\nomitted, and the dialogue only left.\n\nThat also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.\n\nYou have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you\nfailed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and\nmythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative\u2014instances of this are\nsupplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style,\nin which the poet is the only speaker\u2014of this the dithyramb affords the\nbest example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in\nseveral other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?\n\nYes, he said; I see now what you meant.\n\nI will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had\ndone with the subject and might proceed to the style.\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nIn saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an\nunderstanding about the mimetic art,\u2014whether the poets, in narrating\ntheir stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether\nin whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all\nimitation be prohibited?\n\nYou mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be\nadmitted into our State?\n\nYes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do\nnot know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.\n\nAnd go we will, he said.\n\nThen, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be\nimitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule\nalready laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not\nmany; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining\nmuch reputation in any?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many\nthings as well as he would imitate a single one?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nThen the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in\nlife, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other\nparts as well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly\nallied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the\nwriters of tragedy and comedy\u2014did you not just now call them\nimitations?\n\nYes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot\nsucceed in both.\n\nAny more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?\n\nTrue.\n\nNeither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are\nbut imitations.\n\nThey are so.\n\nAnd human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet\nsmaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well,\nas of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.\n\nQuite true, he replied.\n\nIf then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our\nguardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate\nthemselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making\nthis their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this\nend, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they\nimitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those\ncharacters which are suitable to their profession\u2014the courageous,\ntemperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be\nskilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from\nimitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never\nobserve how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far\ninto life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature,\naffecting body, voice, and mind?\n\nYes, certainly, he said.\n\nThen, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of\nwhom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether\nyoung or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting\nagainst the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in\naffliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in\nsickness, love, or labour.\n\nVery right, he said.\n\nNeither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the\noffices of slaves?\n\nThey must not.\n\nAnd surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the\nreverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or\nrevile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner\nsin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the\nmanner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action\nor speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice,\nis to be known but not to be practised or imitated.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nNeither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or\nboatswains, or the like?\n\nHow can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds\nto the callings of any of these?\n\nNor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls,\nthe murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort\nof thing?\n\nNay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the\nbehaviour of madmen.\n\nYou mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of\nnarrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has\nanything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an\nopposite character and education.\n\nAnd which are these two sorts? he asked.\n\nSuppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a\nnarration comes on some saying or action of another good man,\u2014I should\nimagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of\nthis sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the\ngood man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he\nis overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other\ndisaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he\nwill not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will\nassume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing\nsome good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part\nwhich he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame\nhimself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art,\nunless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.\n\nSo I should expect, he replied.\n\nThen he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out\nof Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and\nnarrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great\ndeal of the latter. Do you agree?\n\nCertainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must\nnecessarily take.\n\nBut there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and,\nthe worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too\nbad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke,\nbut in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just\nnow saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise\nof wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the\nvarious sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of\ninstruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like\na cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture,\nand there will be very little narration.\n\nThat, he said, will be his mode of speaking.\n\nThese, then, are the two kinds of style?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and\nhas but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen\nfor their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks\ncorrectly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep\nwithin the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great),\nand in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nWhereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of\nrhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the\nstyle has all sorts of changes.\n\nThat is also perfectly true, he replied.\n\nAnd do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all\npoetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything\nexcept in one or other of them or in both together.\n\nThey include all, he said.\n\nAnd shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only\nof the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?\n\nI should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.\n\nYes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and\nindeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you,\nis the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with\nthe world in general.\n\nI do not deny it.\n\nBut I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our\nState, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man\nplays one part only?\n\nYes; quite unsuitable.\n\nAnd this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we\nshall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a\nhusbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a\nsoldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so\nclever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a\nproposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and\nworship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also\ninform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the\nlaw will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh,\nand set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to\nanother city. For we mean to employ for our souls\u2019 health the rougher\nand severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the\nvirtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at\nfirst when we began the education of our soldiers.\n\nWe certainly will, he said, if we have the power.\n\nThen now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education\nwhich relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished;\nfor the matter and manner have both been discussed.\n\nI think so too, he said.\n\nNext in order will follow melody and song.\n\nThat is obvious.\n\nEvery one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to\nbe consistent with ourselves.\n\nI fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word \u2018every one\u2019 hardly\nincludes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though\nI may guess.\n\nAt any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts\u2014the words,\nthe melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?\n\nYes, he said; so much as that you may.\n\nAnd as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words\nwhich are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same\nlaws, and these have been already determined by us?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWe were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no\nneed of lamentation and strains of sorrow?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and\ncan tell me.\n\nThe harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the\nfull-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.\n\nThese then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a\ncharacter to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.\n\nCertainly.\n\nIn the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly\nunbecoming the character of our guardians.\n\nUtterly unbecoming.\n\nAnd which are the soft or drinking harmonies?\n\nThe Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed \u2018relaxed.\u2019\n\nWell, and are these of any military use?\n\nQuite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian\nare the only ones which you have left.\n\nI answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one\nwarlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the\nhour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he\nis going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at\nevery such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a\ndetermination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of\npeace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity,\nand he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and\nadmonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness\nto yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents\nhim when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away\nby his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the\ncircumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask\nyou to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the\nstrain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain\nof courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.\n\nAnd these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I\nwas just now speaking.\n\nThen, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and\nmelodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic\nscale?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nThen we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners\nand complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed\ncuriously-harmonised instruments?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBut what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit\nthem into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of\nharmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put\ntogether; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThere remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and\nthe shepherds may have a pipe in the country.\n\nThat is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.\n\nThe preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his\ninstruments is not at all strange, I said.\n\nNot at all, he replied.\n\nAnd so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the\nState, which not long ago we termed luxurious.\n\nAnd we have done wisely, he replied.\n\nThen let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to\nharmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to\nthe same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre,\nor metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the\nexpressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found\nthem, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like\nspirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms\nare will be your duty\u2014you must teach me them, as you have already\ntaught me the harmonies.\n\nBut, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are\nsome three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are\nframed, just as in sounds there are four notes (i.e. the four notes of\nthe tetrachord.) out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is\nan observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are\nseverally the imitations I am unable to say.\n\nThen, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us\nwhat rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or\nother unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of\nopposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection\nof his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic,\nand he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand,\nmaking the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and\nshort alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as\nwell as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long\nquantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the\nmovement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a\ncombination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These\nmatters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon\nhimself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?\n(Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed\nignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the\nsentence he appears to be speaking of paeonic rhythms which are in the\nratio of 3/2; in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms,\nwhich are in the ratio of 1/1; in the last clause, of iambic and\ntrochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/2 or 2/1.)\n\nRather so, I should say.\n\nBut there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace\nis an effect of good or bad rhythm.\n\nNone at all.\n\nAnd also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and\nbad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style;\nfor our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the\nwords, and not the words by them.\n\nJust so, he said, they should follow the words.\n\nAnd will not the words and the character of the style depend on the\ntemper of the soul?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd everything else on the style?\n\nYes.\n\nThen beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on\nsimplicity,\u2014I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered\nmind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an\neuphemism for folly?\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these\ngraces and harmonies their perpetual aim?\n\nThey must.\n\nAnd surely the art of the painter and every other creative and\nconstructive art are full of them,\u2014weaving, embroidery, architecture,\nand every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,\u2014in\nall of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and\ndiscord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill\nnature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and\nvirtue and bear their likeness.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nBut shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to\nbe required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on\npain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the\nsame control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be\nprohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance\nand meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other\ncreative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be\nprevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our\ncitizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up\namid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there\nbrowse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little\nby little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in\ntheir own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to\ndiscern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our\nyouth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and\nreceive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair\nworks, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze\nfrom a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years\ninto likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.\n\nThere can be no nobler training than that, he replied.\n\nAnd therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent\ninstrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way\ninto the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten,\nimparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated\ngraceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he\nwho has received this true education of the inner being will most\nshrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a\ntrue taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his\nsoul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and\nhate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to\nknow the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute\nthe friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.\n\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should\nbe trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.\n\nJust as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the\nletters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring\nsizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they\noccupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out;\nand not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we\nrecognise them wherever they are found:\n\nTrue\u2014\n\nOr, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a\nmirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and\nstudy giving us the knowledge of both:\n\nExactly\u2014\n\nEven so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to\neducate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential\nforms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their\nkindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and\ncan recognise them and their images wherever they are found, not\nslighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all\nto be within the sphere of one art and study.\n\nMost assuredly.\n\nAnd when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two\nare cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who\nhas an eye to see it?\n\nThe fairest indeed.\n\nAnd the fairest is also the loveliest?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nAnd the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the\nloveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?\n\nThat is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if\nthere be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it,\nand will love all the same.\n\nI perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort,\nand I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of\npleasure any affinity to temperance?\n\nHow can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his\nfaculties quite as much as pain.\n\nOr any affinity to virtue in general?\n\nNone whatever.\n\nAny affinity to wantonness and intemperance?\n\nYes, the greatest.\n\nAnd is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?\n\nNo, nor a madder.\n\nWhereas true love is a love of beauty and order\u2014temperate and\nharmonious?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nThen no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true\nlove?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the\nlover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their\nlove is of the right sort?\n\nNo, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.\n\nThen I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a\nlaw to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his\nlove than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble\npurpose, and he must first have the other\u2019s consent; and this rule is\nto limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going\nfurther, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and\nbad taste.\n\nI quite agree, he said.\n\nThus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the\nend of music if not the love of beauty?\n\nI agree, he said.\n\nAfter music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.\n\nCertainly.\n\nGymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in\nit should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief\nis,\u2014and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion\nin confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,\u2014not that the good body\nby any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that\nthe good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this\nmay be possible. What do you say?\n\nYes, I agree.\n\nThen, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing\nover the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid\nprolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.\n\nVery good.\n\nThat they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by\nus; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and\nnot know where in the world he is.\n\nYes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take\ncare of him is ridiculous indeed.\n\nBut next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training\nfor the great contest of all\u2014are they not?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?\n\nWhy not?\n\nI am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a\nsleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe\nthat these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most\ndangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from\ntheir customary regimen?\n\nYes, I do.\n\nThen, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior\nathletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the\nutmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of\nsummer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a\ncampaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.\n\nThat is my view.\n\nThe really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music\nwhich we were just now describing.\n\nHow so?\n\nWhy, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is\nsimple and good; and especially the military gymnastic.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nMy meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at\ntheir feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers\u2019 fare; they have\nno fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they\nare not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most\nconvenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire,\nand not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere\nmentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular;\nall professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in\ngood condition should take nothing of the kind.\n\nYes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking\nthem.\n\nThen you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of\nSicilian cookery?\n\nI think not.\n\nNor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a\nCorinthian girl as his fair friend?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nNeither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of\nAthenian confectionary?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAll such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and\nsong composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.\n\nExactly.\n\nThere complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas\nsimplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and\nsimplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nBut when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of\njustice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the\ndoctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the\ninterest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about\nthem.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state\nof education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of\npeople need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also\nthose who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not\ndisgraceful, and a great sign of want of good-breeding, that a man\nshould have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of\nhis own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of\nother men whom he makes lords and judges over him?\n\nOf all things, he said, the most disgraceful.\n\nWould you say \u2018most,\u2019 I replied, when you consider that there is a\nfurther stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long\nlitigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or\ndefendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his\nlitigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to\ntake every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole,\nbending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for\nwhat?\u2014in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not\nknowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping\njudge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more\ndisgraceful?\n\nYes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.\n\nWell, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has\nto be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by\nindolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill\nthemselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh,\ncompelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for\ndiseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?\n\nYes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names\nto diseases.\n\nYes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in\nthe days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the\nhero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of\nPramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese,\nwhich are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who\nwere at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink,\nor rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.\n\nWell, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a\nperson in his condition.\n\nNot so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former\ndays, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of\nAsclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be\nsaid to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself\nof a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring\nfound out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly\nthe rest of the world.\n\nHow was that? he said.\n\nBy the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which\nhe perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he\npassed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but\nattend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he\ndeparted in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the\nhelp of science he struggled on to old age.\n\nA rare reward of his skill!\n\nYes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never\nunderstood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in\nvaletudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or\ninexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in\nall well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he\nmust attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being\nill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously\nenough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.\n\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough\nand ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,\u2014these\nare his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of\ndietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and\nall that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be\nill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his\ndisease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore\nbidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary\nhabits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if\nhis constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.\n\nYes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art\nof medicine thus far only.\n\nHas he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in\nhis life if he were deprived of his occupation?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nBut with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he\nhas any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would\nlive.\n\nHe is generally supposed to have nothing to do.\n\nThen you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man\nhas a livelihood he should practise virtue?\n\nNay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.\n\nLet us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask\nourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can\nhe live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a\nfurther question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an\nimpediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the\nmechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of\nPhocylides?\n\nOf that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the\nbody, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to\nthe practice of virtue.\n\nYes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of\na house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of\nall, irreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or\nself-reflection\u2014there is a constant suspicion that headache and\ngiddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or\nmaking trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a\nman is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant\nanxiety about the state of his body.\n\nYes, likely enough.\n\nAnd therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited\nthe power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy\nconstitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these\nhe cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein\nconsulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had\npenetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by\ngradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to\nlengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting\nweaker sons;\u2014if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had\nno business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use\neither to himself, or to the State.\n\nThen, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.\n\nClearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note\nthat they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of\nwhich I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when\nPandarus wounded Menelaus, they\n\n\u2018Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,\u2019\n\nbut they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or\ndrink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus;\nthe remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before\nhe was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though\nhe did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all\nthe same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and\nintemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves\nor others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and\nthough they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have\ndeclined to attend them.\n\nThey were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.\n\nNaturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar\ndisobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was\nthe son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man\nwho was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by\nlightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by\nus, will not believe them when they tell us both;\u2014if he was the son of\na god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was\navaricious, he was not the son of a god.\n\nAll that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question\nto you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not\nthe best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions\ngood and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are\nacquainted with all sorts of moral natures?\n\nYes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do\nyou know whom I think good?\n\nWill you tell me?\n\nI will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you\njoin two things which are not the same.\n\nHow so? he asked.\n\nWhy, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful\nphysicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with\nthe knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had\nbetter not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of\ndiseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the\ninstrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not\nallow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body\nwith the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure\nnothing.\n\nThat is very true, he said.\n\nBut with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he\nought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to\nhave associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through\nthe whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer\nthe crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own\nself-consciousness; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy\njudgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits\nwhen young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear\nto be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because\nthey have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.\n\nYes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.\n\nTherefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have\nlearned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long\nobservation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his\nguide, not personal experience.\n\nYes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.\n\nYes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your\nquestion); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and\nsuspicious nature of which we spoke,\u2014he who has committed many crimes,\nand fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst\nhis fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he\njudges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of\nvirtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again,\nowing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognise an honest\nman, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time,\nas the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them\noftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise\nthan foolish.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nThen the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but\nthe other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature,\neducated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the\nvirtuous, and not the vicious, man has wisdom\u2014in my opinion.\n\nAnd in mine also.\n\nThis is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you\nwill sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures,\ngiving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in\ntheir bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable\nsouls they will put an end to themselves.\n\nThat is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.\n\nAnd thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music\nwhich, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to\npractise the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine\nunless in some extreme case.\n\nThat I quite believe.\n\nThe very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to\nstimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his\nstrength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen\nto develope his muscles.\n\nVery right, he said.\n\nNeither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is\noften supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the\ntraining of the body.\n\nWhat then is the real object of them?\n\nI believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the\nimprovement of the soul.\n\nHow can that be? he asked.\n\nDid you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of\nexclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive\ndevotion to music?\n\nIn what way shown? he said.\n\nThe one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of\nsoftness and effeminacy, I replied.\n\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much\nof a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond\nwhat is good for him.\n\nYet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if\nrightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is\nliable to become hard and brutal.\n\nThat I quite think.\n\nOn the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness.\nAnd this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if\neducated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd both should be in harmony?\n\nBeyond question.\n\nAnd the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul\nthrough the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs\nof which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in\nwarbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process\nthe passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made\nuseful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the\nsoftening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and\nwaste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of\nhis soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.\n\nVery true.\n\nIf the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is\nspeedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of\nmusic weakening the spirit renders him excitable;\u2014on the least\nprovocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead\nof having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite\nimpracticable.\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great\nfeeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at\nfirst the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit,\nand he becomes twice the man that he was.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the\nMuses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him,\nhaving no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or\nculture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or\nreceiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using\nthe weapon of persuasion,\u2014he is like a wild beast, all violence and\nfierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all\nignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nAnd as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and\nthe other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given\nmankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and\nbody), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an\ninstrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly\nharmonized.\n\nThat appears to be the intention.\n\nAnd he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and\nbest attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true\nmusician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the\nstrings.\n\nYou are quite right, Socrates.\n\nAnd such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the\ngovernment is to last.\n\nYes, he will be absolutely necessary.\n\nSuch, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be\nthe use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens,\nor about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian\ncontests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found\nthat, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.\n\nI dare say that there will be no difficulty.\n\nVery good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who\nare to be rulers and who subjects?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd that the best of these must rule.\n\nThat is also clear.\n\nNow, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to\nhusbandry?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not\nbe those who have most the character of guardians?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a\nspecial care of the State?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the\nsame interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune\nis supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nThen there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those\nwho in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for\nthe good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is\nagainst her interests.\n\nThose are the right men.\n\nAnd they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see\nwhether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence\neither of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty\nto the State.\n\nHow cast off? he said.\n\nI will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man\u2019s\nmind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he\ngets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he\nis deprived of a truth.\n\nI understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of\nthe unwilling I have yet to learn.\n\nWhy, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good,\nand willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to\npossess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things\nas they are is to possess the truth?\n\nYes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived\nof truth against their will.\n\nAnd is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or\nforce, or enchantment?\n\nStill, he replied, I do not understand you.\n\nI fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I\nonly mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others\nforget; argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the\nother; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?\n\nYes.\n\nThose again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or\ngrief compels to change their opinion.\n\nI understand, he said, and you are quite right.\n\nAnd you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change\ntheir minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the\nsterner influence of fear?\n\nYes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.\n\nTherefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best\nguardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of\nthe State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from\ntheir youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are\nmost likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is\nnot deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be\nrejected. That will be the way?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for\nthem, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same\nqualities.\n\nVery right, he replied.\n\nAnd then, I said, we must try them with enchantments\u2014that is the third\nsort of test\u2014and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take\ncolts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so\nmust we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them\ninto pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in\nthe furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all\nenchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of\nthemselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining\nunder all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as\nwill be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who\nat every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the\ntrial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of\nthe State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive\nsepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to\ngive. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that\nthis is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be\nchosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to\nexactness.\n\nAnd, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.\n\nAnd perhaps the word \u2018guardian\u2019 in the fullest sense ought to be\napplied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign\nenemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may\nnot have the will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men\nwhom we before called guardians may be more properly designated\nauxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.\n\nI agree with you, he said.\n\nHow then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we\nlately spoke\u2014just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that\nbe possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?\n\nWhat sort of lie? he said.\n\nNothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale (Laws) of what has\noften occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have\nmade the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know\nwhether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be\nmade probable, if it did.\n\nHow your words seem to hesitate on your lips!\n\nYou will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.\n\nSpeak, he said, and fear not.\n\nWell then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in\nthe face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I\npropose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the\nsoldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their\nyouth was a dream, and the education and training which they received\nfrom us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were\nbeing formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves\nand their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were\ncompleted, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country\nbeing their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for\nher good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are\nto regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.\n\nYou had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were\ngoing to tell.\n\nTrue, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half.\nCitizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God\nhas framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and\nin the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they\nhave the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be\nauxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has\ncomposed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved\nin the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden\nparent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden\nson. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above\nall else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard,\nor of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the\nrace. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for\nif the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and\niron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the\nruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend\nin the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be\nsons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are\nraised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle\nsays that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be\ndestroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our\ncitizens believe in it?\n\nNot in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of\naccomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale,\nand their sons\u2019 sons, and posterity after them.\n\nI see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief\nwill make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough,\nhowever, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of\nrumour, while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under\nthe command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot\nwhence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory\nwithin, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may\ncome down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when\nthey have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare\ntheir dwellings.\n\nJust so, he said.\n\nAnd their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold\nof winter and the heat of summer.\n\nI suppose that you mean houses, he replied.\n\nYes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of\nshop-keepers.\n\nWhat is the difference? he said.\n\nThat I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who,\nfrom want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would\nturn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but\nwolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?\n\nTruly monstrous, he said.\n\nAnd therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being\nstronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and\nbecome savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?\n\nYes, great care should be taken.\n\nAnd would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?\n\nBut they are well-educated already, he replied.\n\nI cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more\ncertain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that\nmay be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them\nin their relations to one another, and to those who are under their\nprotection.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd not only their education, but their habitations, and all that\nbelongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as\nguardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of\nsense must acknowledge that.\n\nHe must.\n\nThen now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to\nrealize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have\nany property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither\nshould they have a private house or store closed against any one who\nhas a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are\nrequired by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage;\nthey should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay,\nenough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go\nto mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we\nwill tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within\nthem, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current\namong men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly\nadmixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy\ndeeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens\nmay not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with\nthem, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their\nsalvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they\never acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become\nhousekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants\ninstead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated,\nplotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in\nmuch greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour\nof ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at\nhand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be\nordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for\nguardians concerning their houses and all other matters?\n\nYes, said Glaucon.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK IV.\n\n\nHere Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates,\nsaid he, if a person were to say that you are making these people\nmiserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the\ncity in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it;\nwhereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses,\nand have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the\ngods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you\nwere saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual\namong the favourites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better\nthan mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting\nguard?\n\nYes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in\naddition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if\nthey would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on\na mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is\nthought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature\nmight be added.\n\nBut, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.\n\nYou mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?\n\nYes.\n\nIf we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall\nfind the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our\nguardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in\nfounding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one\nclass, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a\nState which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should\nbe most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice:\nand, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the\nhappier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not\npiecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a\nwhole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of\nState. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to\nus and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most\nbeautiful parts of the body\u2014the eyes ought to be purple, but you have\nmade them black\u2014to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not\nsurely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no\nlonger eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other\nfeatures their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I\nsay to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of\nhappiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can\nclothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their\nheads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more.\nOur potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by\nthe fireside, passing round the winecup, while their wheel is\nconveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like;\nin this way we might make every class happy\u2014and then, as you imagine,\nthe whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our\nheads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a\nhusbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have\nthe character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of\nmuch consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be\nwhat you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of\nthe laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians,\nthen see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand\nthey alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State.\nWe mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the\nState, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who\nare enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their\nduty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is\nspeaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must\nconsider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their\ngreatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness\ndoes not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be\nthe truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally\nwith them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the\nbest way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and\nthe several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which\nnature assigns to them.\n\nI think that you are quite right.\n\nI wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.\n\nWhat may that be?\n\nThere seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.\n\nWhat are they?\n\nWealth, I said, and poverty.\n\nHow do they act?\n\nThe process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think\nyou, any longer take the same pains with his art?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nHe will grow more and more indolent and careless?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?\n\nYes; he greatly deteriorates.\n\nBut, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself\nwith tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor\nwill he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and\ntheir work are equally liable to degenerate?\n\nThat is evident.\n\nHere, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the\nguardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city\nunobserved.\n\nWhat evils?\n\nWealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and\nindolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of\ndiscontent.\n\nThat is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know,\nSocrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an\nenemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.\n\nThere would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with\none such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.\n\nHow so? he asked.\n\nIn the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be\ntrained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\nAnd do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect\nin his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do\ngentlemen who were not boxers?\n\nHardly, if they came upon him at once.\n\nWhat, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike\nat the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several\ntimes under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert,\noverturn more than one stout personage?\n\nCertainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.\n\nAnd yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and\npractise of boxing than they have in military qualities.\n\nLikely enough.\n\nThen we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or\nthree times their own number?\n\nI agree with you, for I think you right.\n\nAnd suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one\nof the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we\nneither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore\ncome and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on\nhearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs,\nrather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?\n\nThat is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State\nif the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.\n\nBut how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!\n\nWhy so?\n\nYou ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of\nthem is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed\nany city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of\nthe poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and\nin either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether\nbeside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you\ndeal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the\none to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not\nmany enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been\nprescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States,\nI do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and\ntruth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single\nState which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or\nbarbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times\ngreater.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when\nthey are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory\nwhich they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?\n\nWhat limit would you propose?\n\nI would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity;\nthat, I think, is the proper limit.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nHere then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to\nour guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but\none and self-sufficing.\n\nAnd surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose\nupon them.\n\nAnd the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter\nstill,\u2014I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when\ninferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of\nthe lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in\nthe case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to\nthe use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every\nman would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the\nwhole city would be one and not many.\n\nYes, he said; that is not so difficult.\n\nThe regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not,\nas might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if\ncare be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,\u2014a thing,\nhowever, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our\npurpose.\n\nWhat may that be? he asked.\n\nEducation, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and\ngrow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all\nthese, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as\nmarriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children,\nwhich will all follow the general principle that friends have all\nthings in common, as the proverb says.\n\nThat will be the best way of settling them.\n\nAlso, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating\nforce like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good\nconstitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good\neducation improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed\nin man as in other animals.\n\nVery possibly, he said.\n\nThen to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of\nour rulers should be directed,\u2014that music and gymnastic be preserved in\ntheir original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost\nto maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard\n\n\u2018The newest song which the singers have,\u2019\n\nthey will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new\nkind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the\nmeaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to\nthe whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I\ncan quite believe him;\u2014he says that when modes of music change, the\nfundamental laws of the State always change with them.\n\nYes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon\u2019s and your\nown.\n\nThen, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress\nin music?\n\nYes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.\n\nYes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears\nharmless.\n\nWhy, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by\nlittle this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates\ninto manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it\ninvades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to\nlaws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last,\nSocrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.\n\nIs that true? I said.\n\nThat is my belief, he replied.\n\nThen, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a\nstricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths\nthemselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted\nand virtuous citizens.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of\nmusic have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in\na manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them\nin all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there\nbe any fallen places in the State will raise them up again.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nThus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which\ntheir predecessors have altogether neglected.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean such things as these:\u2014when the young are to be silent before\ntheir elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and\nmaking them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes\nare to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners\nin general. You would agree with me?\n\nYes.\n\nBut there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such\nmatters,\u2014I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written\nenactments about them likely to be lasting.\n\nImpossible.\n\nIt would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts\na man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract\nlike?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nUntil some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and\nmay be the reverse of good?\n\nThat is not to be denied.\n\nAnd for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further\nabout them.\n\nNaturally enough, he replied.\n\nWell, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings\nbetween man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about\ninsult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment\nof juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any\nimpositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be\nrequired, and in general about the regulations of markets, police,\nharbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to\nlegislate on any of these particulars?\n\nI think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on\ngood men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough\nfor themselves.\n\nYes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws\nwhich we have given them.\n\nAnd without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever\nmaking and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining\nperfection.\n\nYou would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no\nself-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?\n\nExactly.\n\nYes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always\ndoctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always\nfancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises\nthem to try.\n\nSuch cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.\n\nYes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their\nworst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they\ngive up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor\ncautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.\n\nCharming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion\nwith a man who tells you what is right.\n\nThese gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nNor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men\nwhom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in\nwhich the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the\nconstitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under\nthis regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in\nanticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and\ngood statesman\u2014do not these States resemble the persons whom I was\ndescribing?\n\nYes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from\npraising them.\n\nBut do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these\nready ministers of political corruption?\n\nYes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the\napplause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are\nreally statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.\n\nWhat do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a\nman cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare\nthat he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?\n\nNay, he said, certainly not in that case.\n\nWell, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a\nplay, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing;\nthey are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of\nfrauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning,\nnot knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?\n\nYes, he said; that is just what they are doing.\n\nI conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself\nwith this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the\nconstitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for\nin the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be\nno difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow\nout of our previous regulations.\n\nWhat, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of\nlegislation?\n\nNothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there\nremains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of\nall.\n\nWhich are they? he said.\n\nThe institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of\ngods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of\nthe dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would\npropitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of\nwhich we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be\nunwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He\nis the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is\nthe interpreter of religion to all mankind.\n\nYou are right, and we will do as you propose.\n\nBut where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where.\nNow that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search,\nand get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to\nhelp, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where\ninjustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them\nthe man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or\nunseen by gods and men.\n\nNonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying\nthat for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?\n\nI do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good\nas my word; but you must join.\n\nWe will, he replied.\n\nWell, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin\nwith the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.\n\nThat is most certain.\n\nAnd being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and\njust.\n\nThat is likewise clear.\n\nAnd whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is\nnot found will be the residue?\n\nVery good.\n\nIf there were four things, and we were searching for one of them,\nwherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the\nfirst, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the\nother three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are\nalso four in number?\n\nClearly.\n\nFirst among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and\nin this I detect a certain peculiarity.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being\ngood in counsel?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance,\nbut by knowledge, do men counsel well?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?\n\nOf course.\n\nThere is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of\nknowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?\n\nCertainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in\ncarpentering.\n\nThen a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge\nwhich counsels for the best about wooden implements?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nNor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said,\nnor as possessing any other similar knowledge?\n\nNot by reason of any of them, he said.\n\nNor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would\ngive the city the name of agricultural?\n\nYes.\n\nWell, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State\namong any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing\nin the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best\ndeal with itself and with other States?\n\nThere certainly is.\n\nAnd what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.\n\nIt is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among\nthose whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.\n\nAnd what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this\nsort of knowledge?\n\nThe name of good in counsel and truly wise.\n\nAnd will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more\nsmiths?\n\nThe smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.\n\nWill not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a\nname from the profession of some kind of knowledge?\n\nMuch the smallest.\n\nAnd so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge\nwhich resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole\nState, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and\nthis, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been\nordained by nature to be of all classes the least.\n\nMost true.\n\nThus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the\nfour virtues has somehow or other been discovered.\n\nAnd, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.\n\nAgain, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage,\nand in what part that quality resides which gives the name of\ncourageous to the State.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nWhy, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will\nbe thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State\u2019s\nbehalf.\n\nNo one, he replied, would ever think of any other.\n\nThe rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but\ntheir courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of\nmaking the city either the one or the other.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThe city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which\npreserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of\nthings to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator\neducated them; and this is what you term courage.\n\nI should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think\nthat I perfectly understand you.\n\nI mean that courage is a kind of salvation.\n\nSalvation of what?\n\nOf the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of\nwhat nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by\nthe words \u2018under all circumstances\u2019 to intimate that in pleasure or in\npain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and\ndoes not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?\n\nIf you please.\n\nYou know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the\ntrue sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they\nprepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white\nground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then\nproceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour,\nand no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the\nbloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have\nnoticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour.\n\nYes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous\nappearance.\n\nThen now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting\nour soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were\ncontriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the\nlaws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and\nof every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and\ntraining, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as\npleasure\u2014mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye;\nor by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents.\nAnd this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity\nwith law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be\ncourage, unless you disagree.\n\nBut I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere\nuninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave\u2014this,\nin your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to\nhave another name.\n\nMost certainly.\n\nThen I may infer courage to be such as you describe?\n\nWhy, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words \u2018of a citizen,\u2019 you\nwill not be far wrong;\u2014hereafter, if you like, we will carry the\nexamination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but\njustice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.\n\nYou are right, he replied.\n\nTwo virtues remain to be discovered in the State\u2014first, temperance, and\nthen justice which is the end of our search.\n\nVery true.\n\nNow, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?\n\nI do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire\nthat justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of;\nand therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering\ntemperance first.\n\nCertainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your\nrequest.\n\nThen consider, he said.\n\nYes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue\nof temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the\npreceding.\n\nHow so? he asked.\n\nTemperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain\npleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying\nof \u2018a man being his own master;\u2019 and other traces of the same notion\nmay be found in language.\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\nThere is something ridiculous in the expression \u2018master of himself;\u2019\nfor the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in\nall these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThe meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and\nalso a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under\ncontrol, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term\nof praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better\nprinciple, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater\nmass of the worse\u2014in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of\nself and unprincipled.\n\nYes, there is reason in that.\n\nAnd now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will\nfind one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will\nacknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words\n\u2018temperance\u2019 and \u2018self-mastery\u2019 truly express the rule of the better\npart over the worse.\n\nYes, he said, I see that what you say is true.\n\nLet me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires\nand pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and\nin the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nWhereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are\nunder the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a\nfew, and those the best born and best educated.\n\nVery true.\n\nThese two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the\nmeaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and\nwisdom of the few.\n\nThat I perceive, he said.\n\nThen if there be any city which may be described as master of its own\npleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a\ndesignation?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nIt may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed\nas to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class\nwill temperance be found\u2014in the rulers or in the subjects?\n\nIn both, as I should imagine, he replied.\n\nDo you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance\nwas a sort of harmony?\n\nWhy so?\n\nWhy, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which\nresides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other\nvaliant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs\nthrough all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the\nweaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them\nto be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or\nanything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the\nagreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to\nrule of either, both in states and individuals.\n\nI entirely agree with you.\n\nAnd so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have\nbeen discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a\nstate virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.\n\nThe inference is obvious.\n\nThe time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should\nsurround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away,\nand pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is\nsomewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight\nof her, and if you see her first, let me know.\n\nWould that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who\nhas just eyes enough to see what you show him\u2014that is about as much as\nI am good for.\n\nOffer up a prayer with me and follow.\n\nI will, but you must show me the way.\n\nHere is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we\nmust push on.\n\nLet us push on.\n\nHere I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and\nI believe that the quarry will not escape.\n\nGood news, he said.\n\nTruly, I said, we are stupid fellows.\n\nWhy so?\n\nWhy, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was\njustice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could\nbe more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have\nin their hands\u2014that was the way with us\u2014we looked not at what we were\nseeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I\nsuppose, we missed her.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking\nof justice, and have failed to recognise her.\n\nI grow impatient at the length of your exordium.\n\nWell then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the\noriginal principle which we were always laying down at the foundation\nof the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to\nwhich his nature was best adapted;\u2014now justice is this principle or a\npart of it.\n\nYes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.\n\nFurther, we affirmed that justice was doing one\u2019s own business, and not\nbeing a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said\nthe same to us.\n\nYes, we said so.\n\nThen to do one\u2019s own business in a certain way may be assumed to be\njustice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?\n\nI cannot, but I should like to be told.\n\nBecause I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State\nwhen the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are\nabstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the\nexistence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their\npreservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by\nus, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.\n\nThat follows of necessity.\n\nIf we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its\npresence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the\nagreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers\nof the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers,\nor wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I\nam mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and\nfreeman, artisan, ruler, subject,\u2014the quality, I mean, of every one\ndoing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm\u2014the\nquestion is not so easily answered.\n\nCertainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.\n\nThen the power of each individual in the State to do his own work\nappears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom,\ntemperance, courage.\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?\n\nExactly.\n\nLet us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the\nrulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of\ndetermining suits at law?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither\ntake what is another\u2019s, nor be deprived of what is his own?\n\nYes; that is their principle.\n\nWhich is a just principle?\n\nYes.\n\nThen on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and\ndoing what is a man\u2019s own, and belongs to him?\n\nVery true.\n\nThink, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a\ncarpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a\ncarpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their\nduties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be\nthe change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?\n\nNot much.\n\nBut when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a\ntrader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number\nof his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into\nthe class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and\nguardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements\nor the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and\nwarrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that\nthis interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of\nthe State.\n\nMost true.\n\nSeeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any\nmeddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the\ngreatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?\n\nPrecisely.\n\nAnd the greatest degree of evil-doing to one\u2019s own city would be termed\nby you injustice?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThis then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the\nauxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is\njustice, and will make the city just.\n\nI agree with you.\n\nWe will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this\nconception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the\nState, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not\nverified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old\ninvestigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression\nthat, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there\nwould be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That\nlarger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed\nas good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice\nwould be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the\nindividual\u2014if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a\ndifference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have\nanother trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed\ntogether may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth,\nand the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.\n\nThat will be in regular course; let us do as you say.\n\nI proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by\nthe same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the\nsame?\n\nLike, he replied.\n\nThe just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like\nthe just State?\n\nHe will.\n\nAnd a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the\nState severally did their own business; and also thought to be\ntemperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections\nand qualities of these same classes?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three\nprinciples in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be\nrightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same\nmanner?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nOnce more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy\nquestion\u2014whether the soul has these three principles or not?\n\nAn easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is\nthe good.\n\nVery true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are\nemploying is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question;\nthe true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a\nsolution not below the level of the previous enquiry.\n\nMay we not be satisfied with that? he said;\u2014under the circumstances, I\nam quite content.\n\nI too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.\n\nThen faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.\n\nMust we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same\nprinciples and habits which there are in the State; and that from the\nindividual they pass into the State?\u2014how else can they come there? Take\nthe quality of passion or spirit;\u2014it would be ridiculous to imagine\nthat this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the\nindividuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians,\nScythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be\nsaid of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of\nour part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal\ntruth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.\n\nExactly so, he said.\n\nThere is no difficulty in understanding this.\n\nNone whatever.\n\nBut the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether\nthese principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn\nwith one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third\npart desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the\nwhole soul comes into play in each sort of action\u2014to determine that is\nthe difficulty.\n\nYes, he said; there lies the difficulty.\n\nThen let us now try and determine whether they are the same or\ndifferent.\n\nHow can we? he asked.\n\nI replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted\nupon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same\ntime, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction\noccurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not\nthe same, but different.\n\nGood.\n\nFor example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the\nsame time in the same part?\n\nImpossible.\n\nStill, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we\nshould hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is\nstanding and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person\nto say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the\nsame moment\u2014to such a mode of speech we should object, and should\nrather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice\ndistinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin\nround with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at\nthe same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in\nthe same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in\nsuch cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of\nthemselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a\ncircumference, and that the axis stands still, for there is no\ndeviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes\nround. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right\nor left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at\nrest.\n\nThat is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.\n\nThen none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe\nthat the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation\nto the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.\n\nCertainly not, according to my way of thinking.\n\nYet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such\nobjections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume\ntheir absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if\nthis assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which\nfollow shall be withdrawn.\n\nYes, he said, that will be the best way.\n\nWell, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and\naversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether\nthey are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in\nthe fact of their opposition)?\n\nYes, he said, they are opposites.\n\nWell, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and\nagain willing and wishing,\u2014all these you would refer to the classes\nalready mentioned. You would say\u2014would you not?\u2014that the soul of him\nwho desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is\ndrawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when\na person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the\nrealization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of\nassent, as if he had been asked a question?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of\ndesire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion\nand rejection?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAdmitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a\nparticular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and\nthirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?\n\nLet us take that class, he said.\n\nThe object of one is food, and of the other drink?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has\nof drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else;\nfor example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of\nany particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the\ndesire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm\ndrink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired\nwill be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be\nsmall: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple,\nwhich is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?\n\nYes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the\nsimple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.\n\nBut here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an\nopponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but\ngood drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal\nobject of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst\nafter good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.\n\nYes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.\n\nNevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a\nquality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and\nhave their correlatives simple.\n\nI do not know what you mean.\n\nWell, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the much greater to the much less?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is\nto be to the less that is to be?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the\ndouble and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter\nand the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;\u2014is not\nthis true of all of them?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of\nscience is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the\nobject of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I\nmean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of\nknowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is\ntherefore termed architecture.\n\nCertainly.\n\nBecause it has a particular quality which no other has?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd it has this particular quality because it has an object of a\nparticular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?\n\nYes.\n\nNow, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original\nmeaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one\nterm of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one\nterm is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say\nthat relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is\nhealthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of\ngood and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term\nscience is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which\nin this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined,\nand is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.\n\nI quite understand, and I think as you do.\n\nWould you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative\nterms, having clearly a relation\u2014\n\nYes, thirst is relative to drink.\n\nAnd a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink;\nbut thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor\nbad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires\nonly drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?\n\nThat is plain.\n\nAnd if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from\ndrink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws\nhim like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing\ncannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary\nways about the same.\n\nImpossible.\n\nNo more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the\nbow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the\nother pulls.\n\nExactly so, he replied.\n\nAnd might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?\n\nYes, he said, it constantly happens.\n\nAnd in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was\nsomething in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else\nforbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which\nbids him?\n\nI should say so.\n\nAnd the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which\nbids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?\n\nClearly.\n\nThen we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from\none another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational\nprinciple of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and\nthirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed\nthe irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and\nsatisfactions?\n\nYes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.\n\nThen let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in\nthe soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one\nof the preceding?\n\nI should be inclined to say\u2014akin to desire.\n\nWell, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in\nwhich I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion,\ncoming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the\noutside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of\nexecution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and\nabhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but\nat length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he\nran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of\nthe fair sight.\n\nI have heard the story myself, he said.\n\nThe moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire,\nas though they were two distinct things.\n\nYes; that is the meaning, he said.\n\nAnd are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a\nman\u2019s desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself,\nand is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle,\nwhich is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the\nside of his reason;\u2014but for the passionate or spirited element to take\npart with the desires when reason decides that she should not be\nopposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed\noccurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nSuppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he\nis the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as\nhunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict\nupon him\u2014these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to\nbe excited by them.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nBut when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils\nand chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and\nbecause he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more\ndetermined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be\nquelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice\nof the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.\n\nThe illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were\nsaying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the\nrulers, who are their shepherds.\n\nI perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a\nfurther point which I wish you to consider.\n\nWhat point?\n\nYou remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a\nkind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the\nconflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational\nprinciple.\n\nMost assuredly.\n\nBut a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also,\nor only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three\nprinciples in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the\nconcupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes,\ntraders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the\nindividual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when\nnot corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?\n\nYes, he said, there must be a third.\n\nYes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be\ndifferent from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.\n\nBut that is easily proved:\u2014We may observe even in young children that\nthey are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some\nof them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them\nlate enough.\n\nExcellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals,\nwhich is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we\nmay once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already\nquoted by us,\n\n\u2018He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,\u2019\n\nfor in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons\nabout the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger\nwhich is rebuked by it.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed\nthat the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the\nindividual, and that they are three in number.\n\nExactly.\n\nMust we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and\nin virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAlso that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State\nconstitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the\nindividual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same\nway in which the State is just?\n\nThat follows, of course.\n\nWe cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each\nof the three classes doing the work of its own class?\n\nWe are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.\n\nWe must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of\nhis nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?\n\nYes, he said, we must remember that too.\n\nAnd ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care\nof the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to\nbe the subject and ally?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic\nwill bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with\nnoble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the\nwildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nAnd these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to\nknow their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in\neach of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most\ninsatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great\nand strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed,\nthe concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should\nattempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born\nsubjects, and overturn the whole life of man?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBoth together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and\nthe whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and\nthe other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his\ncommands and counsels?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and\nin pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to\nfear?\n\nRight, he replied.\n\nAnd him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and\nwhich proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a\nknowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of\nthe whole?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements\nin friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and\nthe two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that\nreason ought to rule, and do not rebel?\n\nCertainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in\nthe State or individual.\n\nAnd surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue\nof what quality a man will be just.\n\nThat is very certain.\n\nAnd is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or\nis she the same which we found her to be in the State?\n\nThere is no difference in my opinion, he said.\n\nBecause, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few\ncommonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.\n\nWhat sort of instances do you mean?\n\nIf the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the\nman who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less\nlikely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver?\nWould any one deny this?\n\nNo one, he replied.\n\nWill the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or\ntreachery either to his friends or to his country?\n\nNever.\n\nNeither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or\nagreements?\n\nImpossible.\n\nNo one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his\nfather and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?\n\nNo one.\n\nAnd the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business,\nwhether in ruling or being ruled?\n\nExactly so.\n\nAre you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such\nstates is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?\n\nNot I, indeed.\n\nThen our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we\nentertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some\ndivine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has\nnow been verified?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nAnd the division of labour which required the carpenter and the\nshoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own\nbusiness, and not another\u2019s, was a shadow of justice, and for that\nreason it was of use?\n\nClearly.\n\nBut in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned\nhowever, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the\ntrue self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the\nseveral elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of\nthem to do the work of others,\u2014he sets in order his own inner life, and\nis his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when\nhe has bound together the three principles within him, which may be\ncompared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the\nintermediate intervals\u2014when he has bound all these together, and is no\nlonger many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly\nadjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in\na matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some\naffair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling\nthat which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition,\njust and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom,\nand that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust\naction, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.\n\nYou have said the exact truth, Socrates.\n\nVery good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man\nand the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we\nshould not be telling a falsehood?\n\nMost certainly not.\n\nMay we say so, then?\n\nLet us say so.\n\nAnd now, I said, injustice has to be considered.\n\nClearly.\n\nMust not injustice be a strife which arises among the three\nprinciples\u2014a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part\nof the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority,\nwhich is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he\nis the natural vassal,\u2014what is all this confusion and delusion but\ninjustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form\nof vice?\n\nExactly so.\n\nAnd if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning\nof acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will\nalso be perfectly clear?\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nWhy, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just\nwhat disease and health are in the body.\n\nHow so? he said.\n\nWhy, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is\nunhealthy causes disease.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nAnd the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and\ngovernment of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation\nof disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this\nnatural order?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order\nand government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the\ncreation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance\nwith the natural order?\n\nExactly so, he said.\n\nThen virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and\nvice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nStill our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and\ninjustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be\njust and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods\nand men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and\nunreformed?\n\nIn my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We\nknow that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer\nendurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and\nhaving all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the\nvery essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life\nis still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he\nlikes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and\nvirtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be\nsuch as we have described?\n\nYes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are\nnear the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with\nour own eyes, let us not faint by the way.\n\nCertainly not, he replied.\n\nCome up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of\nthem, I mean, which are worth looking at.\n\nI am following you, he replied: proceed.\n\nI said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from\nsome tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is\none, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four\nspecial ones which are deserving of note.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as\nthere are distinct forms of the State.\n\nHow many?\n\nThere are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.\n\nWhat are they?\n\nThe first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may\nbe said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as\nrule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nBut I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the\ngovernment is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been\ntrained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of\nthe State will be maintained.\n\nThat is true, he replied.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK V.\n\n\nSuch is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is\nof the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the\nevil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also\nthe regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.\n\nWhat are they? he said.\n\nI was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms\nappeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was\nsitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to\nhim: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his\ncoat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself\nso as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I\nonly caught the words, \u2018Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?\u2019\n\nCertainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.\n\nWho is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?\n\nYou, he said.\n\nI repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?\n\nWhy, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a\nwhole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you\nfancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it\nwere self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and\nchildren \u2018friends have all things in common.\u2019\n\nAnd was I not right, Adeimantus?\n\nYes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like\neverything else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many\nkinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We\nhave been long expecting that you would tell us something about the\nfamily life of your citizens\u2014how they will bring children into the\nworld, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is\nthe nature of this community of women and children\u2014for we are of\nopinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a\ngreat and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And\nnow, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in\nhand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go\nuntil you give an account of all this.\n\nTo that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.\n\nAnd without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be\nequally agreed.\n\nI said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an\nargument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had\nfinished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep,\nand was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I\nthen said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant\nof what a hornet\u2019s nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this\ngathering trouble, and avoided it.\n\nFor what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said\nThrasymachus,\u2014to look for gold, or to hear discourse?\n\nYes, but discourse should have a limit.\n\nYes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit\nwhich wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind\nabout us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way:\nWhat sort of community of women and children is this which is to\nprevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between\nbirth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us\nhow these things will be.\n\nYes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more\ndoubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the\npracticability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another\npoint of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for\nthe best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the\nsubject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a\ndream only.\n\nFear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they\nare not sceptical or hostile.\n\nI said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by\nthese words.\n\nYes, he said.\n\nThen let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the\nencouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I\nmyself believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the\ntruth about matters of high interest which a man honours and loves\namong wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his\nmind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a\nhesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery\nthing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the\nfear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have\nmost need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my\nfall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am\ngoing to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary\nhomicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness\nor justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would\nrather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well\nto encourage me.\n\nGlaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your\nargument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of\nthe homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then\nand speak.\n\nWell, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from\nguilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.\n\nThen why should you mind?\n\nWell, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I\nperhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the\nmen has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the\nwomen. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am\ninvited by you.\n\nFor men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my\nopinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use\nof women and children is to follow the path on which we originally\nstarted, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and\nwatchdogs of the herd.\n\nTrue.\n\nLet us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be\nsubject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see\nwhether the result accords with our design.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nWhat I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs\ndivided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and\nin keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to\nthe males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave\nthe females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their\npuppies is labour enough for them?\n\nNo, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that\nthe males are stronger and the females weaker.\n\nBut can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are\nbred and fed in the same way?\n\nYou cannot.\n\nThen, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the\nsame nurture and education?\n\nYes.\n\nThe education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.\n\nYes.\n\nThen women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war,\nwhich they must practise like the men?\n\nThat is the inference, I suppose.\n\nI should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they\nare carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.\n\nNo doubt of it.\n\nYes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women\nnaked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they\nare no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any\nmore than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and\nugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.\n\nYes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would\nbe thought ridiculous.\n\nBut then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not\nfear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of\ninnovation; how they will talk of women\u2019s attainments both in music and\ngymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon\nhorseback!\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nYet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at\nthe same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be\nserious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of\nthe opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians,\nthat the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when\nfirst the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom,\nthe wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.\n\nNo doubt.\n\nBut when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far\nbetter than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward\neye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then\nthe man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his\nridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously\ninclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the\ngood.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nFirst, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest,\nlet us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she\ncapable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or\nnot at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or\ncan not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and\nwill probably lead to the fairest conclusion.\n\nThat will be much the best way.\n\nShall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against\nourselves; in this manner the adversary\u2019s position will not be\nundefended.\n\nWhy not? he said.\n\nThen let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will\nsay: \u2018Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you\nyourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the\nprinciple that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own\nnature.\u2019 And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was\nmade by us. \u2018And do not the natures of men and women differ very much\nindeed?\u2019 And we shall reply: Of course they do. Then we shall be asked,\n\u2018Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be\ndifferent, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?\u2019\nCertainly they should. \u2018But if so, have you not fallen into a serious\ninconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so\nentirely different, ought to perform the same actions?\u2019\u2014What defence\nwill you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these\nobjections?\n\nThat is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall\nand I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.\n\nThese are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like\nkind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to\ntake in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and\nchildren.\n\nBy Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.\n\nWhy yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth,\nwhether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he\nhas to swim all the same.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that\nArion\u2019s dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?\n\nI suppose so, he said.\n\nWell then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We\nacknowledged\u2014did we not? that different natures ought to have different\npursuits, and that men\u2019s and women\u2019s natures are different. And now\nwhat are we saying?\u2014that different natures ought to have the same\npursuits,\u2014this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.\n\nPrecisely.\n\nVerily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of\ncontradiction!\n\nWhy do you say so?\n\nBecause I think that many a man falls into the practice against his\nwill. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just\nbecause he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is\nspeaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit\nof contention and not of fair discussion.\n\nYes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do\nwith us and our argument?\n\nA great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting\nunintentionally into a verbal opposition.\n\nIn what way?\n\nWhy we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that\ndifferent natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never\nconsidered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of\nnature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different\npursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.\n\nWhy, no, he said, that was never considered by us.\n\nI said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question\nwhether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy\nmen; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we\nshould forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?\n\nThat would be a jest, he said.\n\nYes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we\nconstructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to\nevery difference, but only to those differences which affected the\npursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for\nexample, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be\nsaid to have the same nature.\n\nTrue.\n\nWhereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their\nfitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art\nought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference\nconsists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does\nnot amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the\nsort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue\nto maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same\npursuits.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNext, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the\npursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that\nof a man?\n\nThat will be quite fair.\n\nAnd perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient\nanswer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there\nis no difficulty.\n\nYes, perhaps.\n\nSuppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and\nthen we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the\nconstitution of women which would affect them in the administration of\nthe State.\n\nBy all means.\n\nLet us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:\u2014when you\nspoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to\nsay that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty;\na little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas\nthe other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he\nforgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a\ngood servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to\nhim?\u2014would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the\nman gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?\n\nNo one will deny that.\n\nAnd can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has\nnot all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female?\nNeed I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management\nof pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be\ngreat, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the\nmost absurd?\n\nYou are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority\nof the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to\nmany men, yet on the whole what you say is true.\n\nAnd if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of\nadministration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or\nwhich a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike\ndiffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women\nalso, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on\nwomen?\n\nThat will never do.\n\nOne woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and\nanother has no music in her nature?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and\nanother is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy;\none has spirit, and another is without spirit?\n\nThat is also true.\n\nThen one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was\nnot the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of\nthis sort?\n\nYes.\n\nMen and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they\ndiffer only in their comparative strength or weakness.\n\nObviously.\n\nAnd those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the\ncompanions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom\nthey resemble in capacity and in character?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?\n\nThey ought.\n\nThen, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning\nmusic and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians\u2014to that point we come\nround again.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThe law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore\nnot an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice,\nwhich prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.\n\nThat appears to be true.\n\nWe had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and\nsecondly whether they were the most beneficial?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the possibility has been acknowledged?\n\nYes.\n\nThe very great benefit has next to be established?\n\nQuite so.\n\nYou will admit that the same education which makes a man a good\nguardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature\nis the same?\n\nYes.\n\nI should like to ask you a question.\n\nWhat is it?\n\nWould you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man\nbetter than another?\n\nThe latter.\n\nAnd in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the\nguardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more\nperfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?\n\nWhat a ridiculous question!\n\nYou have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that\nour guardians are the best of our citizens?\n\nBy far the best.\n\nAnd will not their wives be the best women?\n\nYes, by far the best.\n\nAnd can there be anything better for the interests of the State than\nthat the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?\n\nThere can be nothing better.\n\nAnd this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such\nmanner as we have described, will accomplish?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest\ndegree beneficial to the State?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be\ntheir robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of\ntheir country; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to\nbe assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other\nrespects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs\nat naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his\nlaughter he is plucking\n\n\u2018A fruit of unripe wisdom,\u2019\n\nand he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is\nabout;\u2014for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the\nuseful is the noble and the hurtful is the base.\n\nVery true.\n\nHere, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say\nthat we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for\nenacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their\npursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this\narrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.\n\nYes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.\n\nYes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this\nwhen you see the next.\n\nGo on; let me see.\n\nThe law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has\npreceded, is to the following effect,\u2014\u2018that the wives of our guardians\nare to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is\nto know his own child, nor any child his parent.\u2019\n\nYes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the\npossibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more\nquestionable.\n\nI do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very\ngreat utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility\nis quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.\n\nI think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.\n\nYou imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I\nmeant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought,\nI should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the\npossibility.\n\nBut that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to\ngive a defence of both.\n\nWell, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me\nfeast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of\nfeasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have\ndiscovered any means of effecting their wishes\u2014that is a matter which\nnever troubles them\u2014they would rather not tire themselves by thinking\nabout possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already\ngranted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing\nwhat they mean to do when their wish has come true\u2014that is a way which\nthey have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for\nmuch. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with\nyour permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present.\nAssuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed\nto enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I\nshall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest\nbenefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you\nhave no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the\nadvantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.\n\nI have no objection; proceed.\n\nFirst, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be\nworthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey\nin the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must\nthemselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them\nin any details which are entrusted to their care.\n\nThat is right, he said.\n\nYou, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will\nnow select the women and give them to them;\u2014they must be as far as\npossible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses\nand meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his\nor her own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and\nwill associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a\nnecessity of their natures to have intercourse with each\nother\u2014necessity is not too strong a word, I think?\n\nYes, he said;\u2014necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity\nwhich lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to\nthe mass of mankind.\n\nTrue, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after\nan orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an\nunholy thing which the rulers will forbid.\n\nYes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.\n\nThen clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the\nhighest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd how can marriages be made most beneficial?\u2014that is a question which\nI put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the\nnobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have\nyou ever attended to their pairing and breeding?\n\nIn what particulars?\n\nWhy, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not\nsome better than others?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to\nbreed from the best only?\n\nFrom the best.\n\nAnd do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?\n\nI choose only those of ripe age.\n\nAnd if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would\ngreatly deteriorate?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the same of horses and animals in general?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nGood heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our\nrulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!\n\nCertainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any\nparticular skill?\n\nBecause, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body\ncorporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not\nrequire medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the\ninferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when\nmedicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.\n\nThat is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?\n\nI mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of\nfalsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were\nsaying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be\nof advantage.\n\nAnd we were very right.\n\nAnd this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the\nregulations of marriages and births.\n\nHow so?\n\nWhy, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of\neither sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior\nwith the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the\noffspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock\nis to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must\nbe a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further\ndanger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into\nrebellion.\n\nVery true.\n\nHad we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring\ntogether the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and\nsuitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings\nis a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose\naim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other\nthings which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars\nand diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is\npossible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too\nsmall.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nWe shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less\nworthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and\nthen they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.\n\nTo be sure, he said.\n\nAnd I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other\nhonours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with\nwomen given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers\nought to have as many sons as possible.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices\nare to be held by women as well as by men\u2014\n\nYes\u2014\n\nThe proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the\npen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who\ndwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of\nthe better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some\nmysterious, unknown place, as they should be.\n\nYes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be\nkept pure.\n\nThey will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the\nfold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that\nno mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged\nif more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of\nsuckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no\ngetting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort\nof thing to the nurses and attendants.\n\nYou suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it\nwhen they are having children.\n\nWhy, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our\nscheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of\nabout twenty years in a woman\u2019s life, and thirty in a man\u2019s?\n\nWhich years do you mean to include?\n\nA woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to\nthe State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at\nfive-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of\nlife beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be\nfifty-five.\n\nCertainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of\nphysical as well as of intellectual vigour.\n\nAny one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public\nhymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing;\nthe child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have\nbeen conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers,\nwhich at each hymeneal priestesses and priest and the whole city will\noffer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their\ngood and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of\ndarkness and strange lust.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed\nage who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without\nthe sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a\nbastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nThis applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age:\nafter that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not\nmarry his daughter or his daughter\u2019s daughter, or his mother or his\nmother\u2019s mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from\nmarrying their sons or fathers, or son\u2019s son or father\u2019s father, and so\non in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the\npermission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into\nbeing from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the\nparents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be\nmaintained, and arrange accordingly.\n\nThat also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know\nwho are fathers and daughters, and so on?\n\nThey will never know. The way will be this:\u2014dating from the day of the\nhymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male\nchildren who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his\nsons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him\nfather, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they\nwill call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who\nwere begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together\nwill be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying,\nwill be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is not to be\nunderstood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and\nsisters; if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the\nPythian oracle, the law will allow them.\n\nQuite right, he replied.\n\nSuch is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our\nState are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would\nhave the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest\nof our polity, and also that nothing can be better\u2014would you not?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nShall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought\nto be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the\norganization of a State,\u2014what is the greatest good, and what is the\ngreatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has\nthe stamp of the good or of the evil?\n\nBy all means.\n\nCan there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and\nplurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond\nof unity?\n\nThere cannot.\n\nAnd there is unity where there is community of pleasures and\npains\u2014where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions\nof joy and sorrow?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nYes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is\ndisorganized\u2014when you have one half of the world triumphing and the\nother plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the\ncitizens?\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuch differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of\nthe terms \u2018mine\u2019 and \u2018not mine,\u2019 \u2018his\u2019 and \u2018not his.\u2019\n\nExactly so.\n\nAnd is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of\npersons apply the terms \u2018mine\u2019 and \u2018not mine\u2019 in the same way to the\nsame thing?\n\nQuite true.\n\nOr that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the\nindividual\u2014as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the\nwhole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom\nunder the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all\ntogether with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in\nhis finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the\nbody, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the\nalleviation of suffering.\n\nVery true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered\nState there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you\ndescribe.\n\nThen when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the\nwhole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or\nsorrow with him?\n\nYes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.\n\nIt will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see\nwhether this or some other form is most in accordance with these\nfundamental principles.\n\nVery good.\n\nOur State like every other has rulers and subjects?\n\nTrue.\n\nAll of whom will call one another citizens?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut is there not another name which people give to their rulers in\nother States?\n\nGenerally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply\ncall them rulers.\n\nAnd in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people\ngive the rulers?\n\nThey are called saviours and helpers, he replied.\n\nAnd what do the rulers call the people?\n\nTheir maintainers and foster-fathers.\n\nAnd what do they call them in other States?\n\nSlaves.\n\nAnd what do the rulers call one another in other States?\n\nFellow-rulers.\n\nAnd what in ours?\n\nFellow-guardians.\n\nDid you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would\nspeak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not\nbeing his friend?\n\nYes, very often.\n\nAnd the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an\ninterest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?\n\nExactly.\n\nBut would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as\na stranger?\n\nCertainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded\nby them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or\ndaughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected\nwith him.\n\nCapital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family\nin name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name?\nFor example, in the use of the word \u2018father,\u2019 would the care of a\nfather be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to\nhim which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be\nregarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to\nreceive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be\nor not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their\nears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be\ntheir parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?\n\nThese, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than\nfor them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not\nto act in the spirit of them?\n\nThen in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often\nheard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is\nwell or ill, the universal word will be \u2018with me it is well\u2019 or \u2018it is\nill.\u2019\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying\nthat they will have their pleasures and pains in common?\n\nYes, and so they will.\n\nAnd they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will\nalike call \u2018my own,\u2019 and having this common interest they will have a\ncommon feeling of pleasure and pain?\n\nYes, far more so than in other States.\n\nAnd the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the\nState, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and\nchildren?\n\nThat will be the chief reason.\n\nAnd this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was\nimplied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation\nof the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?\n\nThat we acknowledged, and very rightly.\n\nThen the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly\nthe source of the greatest good to the State?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,\u2014that\nthe guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property;\ntheir pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the\nother citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we\nintended them to preserve their true character of guardians.\n\nRight, he replied.\n\nBoth the community of property and the community of families, as I am\nsaying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the\ncity in pieces by differing about \u2018mine\u2019 and \u2018not mine;\u2019 each man\ndragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his\nown, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures\nand pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same\npleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is\nnear and dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards a common\nend.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAnd as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their\nown, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will\nbe delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or\nrelations are the occasion.\n\nOf course they will.\n\nNeither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among\nthem. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall\nmaintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of\nthe person a matter of necessity.\n\nThat is good, he said.\n\nYes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a\nquarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and\nnot proceed to more dangerous lengths.\n\nCertainly.\n\nTo the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the\nyounger.\n\nClearly.\n\nNor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any\nother violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor\nwill he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and\nfear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying\nhands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that\nthe injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers,\nsons, fathers.\n\nThat is true, he replied.\n\nThen in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace\nwith one another?\n\nYes, there will be no want of peace.\n\nAnd as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be\nno danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or\nagainst one another.\n\nNone whatever.\n\nI hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will\nbe rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery\nof the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men\nexperience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy\nnecessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating,\ngetting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and\nslaves to keep\u2014the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in\nthis way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.\n\nYes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.\n\nAnd from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be\nblessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.\n\nHow so?\n\nThe Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of\nthe blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more\nglorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public\ncost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole\nState; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is\nthe fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands\nof their country while living, and after death have an honourable\nburial.\n\nYes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.\n\nDo you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion\nsome one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians\nunhappy\u2014they had nothing and might have possessed all things\u2014to whom we\nreplied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter\nconsider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make\nour guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State\nwith a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but\nof the whole?\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nAnd what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to\nbe far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors\u2014is the life of\nshoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared\nwith it?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAt the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere,\nthat if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner\nthat he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe\nand harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best,\nbut infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into\nhis head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he\nwill have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, \u2018half is more\nthan the whole.\u2019\n\nIf he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when\nyou have the offer of such a life.\n\nYou agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of\nlife such as we have described\u2014common education, common children; and\nthey are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the\ncity or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt\ntogether like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are\nable, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do\nwhat is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation\nof the sexes.\n\nI agree with you, he replied.\n\nThe enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community be\nfound possible\u2014as among other animals, so also among men\u2014and if\npossible, in what way possible?\n\nYou have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.\n\nThere is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by\nthem.\n\nHow?\n\nWhy, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with\nthem any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the\nmanner of the artisan\u2019s child, they may look on at the work which they\nwill have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they\nwill have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers\nand mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters\u2019 boys\nlook on and help, long before they touch the wheel?\n\nYes, I have.\n\nAnd shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in\ngiving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than\nour guardians will be?\n\nThe idea is ridiculous, he said.\n\nThere is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other\nanimals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest\nincentive to valour.\n\nThat is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may\noften happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost\nas well as their parents, and the State will never recover.\n\nTrue, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?\n\nI am far from saying that.\n\nWell, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some\noccasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?\n\nClearly.\n\nWhether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their\nyouth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may\nfairly be incurred.\n\nYes, very important.\n\nThis then must be our first step,\u2014to make our children spectators of\nwar; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against\ndanger; then all will be well.\n\nTrue.\n\nTheir parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but\nto know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and\nwhat dangerous?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nAnd they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about\nthe dangerous ones?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who\nwill be their leaders and teachers?\n\nVery properly.\n\nStill, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good\ndeal of chance about them?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen against such chances the children must be at once furnished with\nwings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and\nwhen they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the\nhorses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet\nthe swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent\nview of what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is\ndanger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.\n\nI believe that you are right, he said.\n\nNext, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one\nanother and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the\nsoldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of\nany other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a\nhusbandman or artisan. What do you think?\n\nBy all means, I should say.\n\nAnd he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a\npresent of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do\nwhat they like with him.\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him?\nIn the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his\nyouthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him.\nWhat do you say?\n\nI approve.\n\nAnd what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?\n\nTo that too, I agree.\n\nBut you will hardly agree to my next proposal.\n\nWhat is your proposal?\n\nThat he should kiss and be kissed by them.\n\nMost certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no\none whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the\nexpedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his\nlove be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of\nvalour.\n\nCapital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others\nhas been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such\nmatters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as\npossible?\n\nAgreed.\n\nAgain, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave\nyouths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had\ndistinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which\nseems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his\nage, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening\nthing.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nThen in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at\nsacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according\nto the measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and\nthose other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with\n\n\u2018seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;\u2019\n\nand in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.\n\nThat, he replied, is excellent.\n\nYes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in\nthe first place, that he is of the golden race?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nNay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they\nare dead\n\n\u2018They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of\nevil, the guardians of speech-gifted men\u2019?\n\nYes; and we accept his authority.\n\nWe must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine\nand heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and\nwe must do as he bids?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their\nsepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who\nare deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any\nother way, shall be admitted to the same honours.\n\nThat is very right, he said.\n\nNext, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?\n\nIn what respect do you mean?\n\nFirst of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes\nshould enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if\nthey can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering\nthe danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under\nthe yoke of the barbarians?\n\nTo spare them is infinitely better.\n\nThen no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule\nwhich they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.\n\nCertainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the\nbarbarians and will keep their hands off one another.\n\nNext as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything\nbut their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford\nan excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead,\npretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now\nhas been lost from this love of plunder.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also\na degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead\nbody when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear\nbehind him,\u2014is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his\nassailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?\n\nVery like a dog, he said.\n\nThen we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?\n\nYes, he replied, we most certainly must.\n\nNeither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all\nthe arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other\nHellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of\nspoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the\ngod himself?\n\nVery true.\n\nAgain, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of\nhouses, what is to be the practice?\n\nMay I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?\n\nBoth should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual\nproduce and no more. Shall I tell you why?\n\nPray do.\n\nWhy, you see, there is a difference in the names \u2018discord\u2019 and \u2018war,\u2019\nand I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one\nis expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is\nexternal and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and\nonly the second, war.\n\nThat is a very proper distinction, he replied.\n\nAnd may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is\nall united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and\nstrange to the barbarians?\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nAnd therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with\nHellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight,\nand by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called\nwar; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas\nis then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature\nfriends; and such enmity is to be called discord.\n\nI agree.\n\nConsider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be\ndiscord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the\nlands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife\nappear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in\npieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror\ndepriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the\nidea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for\never.\n\nYes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.\n\nAnd will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?\n\nIt ought to be, he replied.\n\nThen will not the citizens be good and civilized?\n\nYes, very civilized.\n\nAnd will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own\nland, and share in the common temples?\n\nMost certainly.\n\nAnd any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as\ndiscord only\u2014a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThey will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy\ntheir opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?\n\nJust so.\n\nAnd as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor\nwill they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a\ncity\u2014men, women, and children\u2014are equally their enemies, for they know\nthat the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the\nmany are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be\nunwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to\nthem will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled\nthe guilty few to give satisfaction?\n\nI agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their\nHellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one\nanother.\n\nThen let us enact this law also for our guardians:\u2014that they are\nneither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.\n\nAgreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our\nprevious enactments, are very good.\n\nBut still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in\nthis way you will entirely forget the other question which at the\ncommencement of this discussion you thrust aside:\u2014Is such an order of\nthings possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to\nacknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do\nall sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that\nyour citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave\ntheir ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the\nother father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their\narmies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to\nthe enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will\nthen be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages\nwhich might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but,\nas I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only\nthis State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more\nabout them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn\nto the question of possibility and ways and means\u2014the rest may be left.\n\nIf I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said,\nand have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves,\nand you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the\nthird, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard\nthe third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will\nacknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a\nproposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and\ninvestigate.\n\nThe more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more\ndetermined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible:\nspeak out and at once.\n\nLet me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the\nsearch after justice and injustice.\n\nTrue, he replied; but what of that?\n\nI was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to\nrequire that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice;\nor may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him\nof a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?\n\nThe approximation will be enough.\n\nWe were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the\ncharacter of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly\nunjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order\nthat we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to\nthe standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled\nthem, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nWould a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with\nconsummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to\nshow that any such man could ever have existed?\n\nHe would be none the worse.\n\nWell, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the\npossibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?\n\nSurely not, he replied.\n\nThat is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and\nshow how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must\nask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.\n\nWhat admissions?\n\nI want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does\nnot the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual,\nwhatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short\nof the truth? What do you say?\n\nI agree.\n\nThen you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in\nevery respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover\nhow a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that\nwe have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be\ncontented. I am sure that I should be contented\u2014will not you?\n\nYes, I will.\n\nLet me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the\ncause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change\nwhich will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the\nchange, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any\nrate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nI think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one\nchange were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible\none.\n\nWhat is it? he said.\n\nNow then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of\nthe waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and\ndrown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.\n\nProceed.\n\nI said: \u2018Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this\nworld have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness\nand wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to\nthe exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will\nnever have rest from their evils,\u2014nor the human race, as I believe,\u2014and\nthen only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the\nlight of day.\u2019 Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would\nfain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be\nconvinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or\npublic is indeed a hard thing.\n\nSocrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word\nwhich you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very\nrespectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a\nmoment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you\nmight and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven\nknows what; and if you don\u2019t prepare an answer, and put yourself in\nmotion, you will be \u2018pared by their fine wits,\u2019 and no mistake.\n\nYou got me into the scrape, I said.\n\nAnd I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of\nit; but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I\nmay be able to fit answers to your questions better than another\u2014that\nis all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to\nshow the unbelievers that you are right.\n\nI ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance.\nAnd I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must\nexplain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule\nin the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be\ndiscovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be\nleaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers,\nand are meant to be followers rather than leaders.\n\nThen now for a definition, he said.\n\nFollow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able\nto give you a satisfactory explanation.\n\nProceed.\n\nI dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that\na lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to\nsome one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.\n\nI really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my\nmemory.\n\nAnother person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of\npleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of\nyouth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover\u2019s breast,\nand are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not\nthis a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you\npraise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a\nroyal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of\nregularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the\ngods; and as to the sweet \u2018honey pale,\u2019 as they are called, what is the\nvery name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is\nnot averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word,\nthere is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will\nnot say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the\nspring-time of youth.\n\nIf you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the\nargument, I assent.\n\nAnd what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the\nsame? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.\n\nVery good.\n\nAnd the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army,\nthey are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by\nreally great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by\nlesser and meaner people,\u2014but honour of some kind they must have.\n\nExactly.\n\nOnce more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire\nthe whole class or a part only?\n\nThe whole.\n\nAnd may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part\nof wisdom only, but of the whole?\n\nYes, of the whole.\n\nAnd he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power\nof judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to\nbe a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his\nfood is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a\ngood one?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nWhereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is\ncurious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a\nphilosopher? Am I not right?\n\nGlaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a\nstrange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights\nhave a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical\namateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers,\nfor they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything\nlike a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run\nabout at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to\nhear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country\u2014that\nmakes no difference\u2014they are there. Now are we to maintain that all\nthese and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of\nquite minor arts, are philosophers?\n\nCertainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.\n\nHe said: Who then are the true philosophers?\n\nThose, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.\n\nThat is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?\n\nTo another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I\nam sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.\n\nWhat is the proposition?\n\nThat since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?\n\nTrue again.\n\nAnd of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the\nsame remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the\nvarious combinations of them with actions and things and with one\nanother, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving,\nart-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who\nare alone worthy of the name of philosophers.\n\nHow do you distinguish them? he said.\n\nThe lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of\nfine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that\nare made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving\nabsolute beauty.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nFew are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute\nbeauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is\nunable to follow\u2014of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only?\nReflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens\ndissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?\n\nI should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.\n\nBut take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of\nabsolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects\nwhich participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place\nof the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects\u2014is he a dreamer,\nor is he awake?\n\nHe is wide awake.\n\nAnd may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge,\nand that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our\nstatement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him,\nwithout revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?\n\nWe must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.\n\nCome, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin\nby assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have,\nand that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask\nhim a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing?\n(You must answer for him.)\n\nI answer that he knows something.\n\nSomething that is or is not?\n\nSomething that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?\n\nAnd are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of\nview, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the\nutterly non-existent is utterly unknown?\n\nNothing can be more certain.\n\nGood. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and\nnot to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and\nthe absolute negation of being?\n\nYes, between them.\n\nAnd, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to\nnot-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has\nto be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and\nknowledge, if there be such?\n\nCertainly.\n\nDo we admit the existence of opinion?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAs being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?\n\nAnother faculty.\n\nThen opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter\ncorresponding to this difference of faculties?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I\nproceed further I will make a division.\n\nWhat division?\n\nI will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are\npowers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight\nand hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly\nexplained the class which I mean?\n\nYes, I quite understand.\n\nThen let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and\ntherefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which\nenable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to\nthem. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its\nresult; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call\nthe same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result\nI call different. Would that be your way of speaking?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you\nsay that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?\n\nCertainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.\n\nAnd is opinion also a faculty?\n\nCertainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form\nan opinion.\n\nAnd yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not\nthe same as opinion?\n\nWhy, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that\nwhich is infallible with that which errs?\n\nAn excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a\ndistinction between them.\n\nYes.\n\nThen knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct\nspheres or subject-matters?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nBeing is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to\nknow the nature of being?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd opinion is to have an opinion?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the\nsame as the subject-matter of knowledge?\n\nNay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in\nfaculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as\nwe were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the\nsphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.\n\nThen if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must\nbe the subject-matter of opinion?\n\nYes, something else.\n\nWell then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how\ncan there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has\nan opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an\nopinion which is an opinion about nothing?\n\nImpossible.\n\nHe who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?\n\nTrue.\n\nOf not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of\nbeing, knowledge?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?\n\nNot with either.\n\nAnd can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?\n\nThat seems to be true.\n\nBut is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a\ngreater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than\nignorance?\n\nIn neither.\n\nThen I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge,\nbut lighter than ignorance?\n\nBoth; and in no small degree.\n\nAnd also to be within and between them?\n\nYes.\n\nThen you would infer that opinion is intermediate?\n\nNo question.\n\nBut were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a\nsort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would\nappear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute\nnot-being; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor\nignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd in that interval there has now been discovered something which we\ncall opinion?\n\nThere has.\n\nThen what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally\nof the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed\neither, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may\ntruly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper\nfaculty,\u2014the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to\nthe faculty of the mean.\n\nTrue.\n\nThis being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that\nthere is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty\u2014in whose opinion\nthe beautiful is the manifold\u2014he, I say, your lover of beautiful\nsights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the\njust is one, or that anything is one\u2014to him I would appeal, saying,\nWill you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these\nbeautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the\njust, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not\nalso be unholy?\n\nNo, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly;\nand the same is true of the rest.\n\nAnd may not the many which are doubles be also halves?\u2014doubles, that\nis, of one thing, and halves of another?\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will\nnot be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?\n\nTrue; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of\nthem.\n\nAnd can any one of those many things which are called by particular\nnames be said to be this rather than not to be this?\n\nHe replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts\nor the children\u2019s puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what\nhe hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was\nsitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a\nriddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind,\neither as being or not-being, or both, or neither.\n\nThen what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place\nthan between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater\ndarkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and\nexistence than being.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nThus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the\nmultitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are\ntossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and\npure not-being?\n\nWe have.\n\nYes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might\nfind was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of\nknowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by\nthe intermediate faculty.\n\nQuite true.\n\nThen those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute\nbeauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see\nthe many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,\u2014such persons may\nbe said to have opinion but not knowledge?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nBut those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to\nknow, and not to have opinion only?\n\nNeither can that be denied.\n\nThe one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of\nopinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who\nlistened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not\ntolerate the existence of absolute beauty.\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nShall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of\nopinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with\nus for thus describing them?\n\nI shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is\ntrue.\n\nBut those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of\nwisdom and not lovers of opinion.\n\nAssuredly.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK VI.\n\n\nAnd thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true\nand the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.\n\nI do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.\n\nI suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a\nbetter view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined\nto this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting\nus, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just\ndiffers from that of the unjust must consider.\n\nAnd what is the next question? he asked.\n\nSurely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as\nphilosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and\nthose who wander in the region of the many and variable are not\nphilosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the\nrulers of our State?\n\nAnd how can we rightly answer that question?\n\nWhichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions\nof our State\u2014let them be our guardians.\n\nVery good.\n\nNeither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to\nkeep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?\n\nThere can be no question of that.\n\nAnd are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of\nthe true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear\npattern, and are unable as with a painter\u2019s eye to look at the absolute\ntruth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the\nother world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this,\nif not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them\u2014are\nnot such persons, I ask, simply blind?\n\nTruly, he replied, they are much in that condition.\n\nAnd shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides\nbeing their equals in experience and falling short of them in no\nparticular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?\n\nThere can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this\ngreatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place\nunless they fail in some other respect.\n\nSuppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and\nthe other excellences.\n\nBy all means.\n\nIn the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the\nphilosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding\nabout him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we\nshall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and\nthat those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in\nthe State.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nLet us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort\nwhich shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and\ncorruption.\n\nAgreed.\n\nAnd further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true\nbeing; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less\nhonourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of\nthe lover and the man of ambition.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another\nquality which they should also possess?\n\nWhat quality?\n\nTruthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind\nfalsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.\n\nYes, that may be safely affirmed of them.\n\n\u2018May be,\u2019 my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather \u2018must be\naffirmed:\u2019 for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help\nloving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.\n\nRight, he said.\n\nAnd is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?\n\nHow can there be?\n\nCan the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?\n\nNever.\n\nThe true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as\nin him lies, desire all truth?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nBut then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong\nin one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a\nstream which has been drawn off into another channel.\n\nTrue.\n\nHe whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be\nabsorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily\npleasure\u2014I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.\n\nThat is most certain.\n\nSuch an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for\nthe motives which make another man desirous of having and spending,\nhave no place in his character.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnother criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be\nconsidered.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThere should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more\nantagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the\nwhole of things both divine and human.\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\nThen how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of\nall time and all existence, think much of human life?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nOr can such an one account death fearful?\n\nNo indeed.\n\nThen the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous\nor mean, or a boaster, or a coward\u2014can he, I say, ever be unjust or\nhard in his dealings?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude\nand unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the\nphilosophical nature from the unphilosophical.\n\nTrue.\n\nThere is another point which should be remarked.\n\nWhat point?\n\nWhether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love\nthat which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little\nprogress.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns,\nwill he not be an empty vessel?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nLabouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless\noccupation? Yes.\n\nThen a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic\nnatures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to\ndisproportion?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?\n\nTo proportion.\n\nThen, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally\nwell-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously\ntowards the true being of everything.\n\nCertainly.\n\nWell, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating,\ngo together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which\nis to have a full and perfect participation of being?\n\nThey are absolutely necessary, he replied.\n\nAnd must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has\nthe gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,\u2014noble, gracious, the\nfriend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?\n\nThe god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a\nstudy.\n\nAnd to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and\nto these only you will entrust the State.\n\nHere Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no\none can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling\npasses over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led\nastray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want\nof skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate,\nand at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a\nmighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned\nupside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up\nby their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they\ntoo find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in\nthis new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time\nthey are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is\nnow occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he\nis not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact\nthat the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only\nin youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer\nyears, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues,\nand that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless\nto the world by the very study which you extol.\n\nWell, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?\n\nI cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your\nopinion.\n\nHear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.\n\nThen how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from\nevil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are\nacknowledged by us to be of no use to them?\n\nYou ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a\nparable.\n\nYes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at\nall accustomed, I suppose.\n\nI perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me\ninto such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you\nwill be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the\nmanner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so\ngrievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and\ntherefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to\nfiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the\nfabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine\nthen a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and\nstronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a\nsimilar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much\nbetter. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the\nsteering\u2014every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though\nhe has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught\nhim or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be\ntaught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the\ncontrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to\ncommit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but\nothers are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them\noverboard, and having first chained up the noble captain\u2019s senses with\ndrink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the\nship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they\nproceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them.\nHim who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for\ngetting the ship out of the captain\u2019s hands into their own whether by\nforce or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot,\nable seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a\ngood-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the\nyear and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs\nto his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a\nship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people\nlike or not\u2014the possibility of this union of authority with the\nsteerer\u2019s art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been\nmade part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of\nmutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be\nregarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a\ngood-for-nothing?\n\nOf course, said Adeimantus.\n\nThen you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the\nfigure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the\nState; for you understand already.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is\nsurprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities;\nexplain it to him and try to convince him that their having honour\nwould be far more extraordinary.\n\nI will.\n\nSay to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be\nuseless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to\nattribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use\nthem, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the\nsailors to be commanded by him\u2014that is not the order of nature; neither\nare \u2018the wise to go to the doors of the rich\u2019\u2014the ingenious author of\nthis saying told a lie\u2014but the truth is, that, when a man is ill,\nwhether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who\nwants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is\ngood for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him;\nalthough the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp;\nthey may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true\nhelmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and\nstar-gazers.\n\nPrecisely so, he said.\n\nFor these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest\npursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the\nopposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done\nto her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same\nof whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them\nare arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is\nalso unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of\nphilosophy any more than the other?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description\nof the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his\nleader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he\nwas an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.\n\nYes, that was said.\n\nWell, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at\nvariance with present notions of him?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of\nknowledge is always striving after being\u2014that is his nature; he will\nnot rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance\nonly, but will go on\u2014the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force\nof his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true\nnature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul,\nand by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate\nwith very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge\nand will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he\ncease from his travail.\n\nNothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.\n\nAnd will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher\u2019s nature? Will\nhe not utterly hate a lie?\n\nHe will.\n\nAnd when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band\nwhich he leads?\n\nImpossible.\n\nJustice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will\nfollow after?\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nNeither is there any reason why I should again set in array the\nphilosopher\u2019s virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage,\nmagnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you\nobjected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if\nyou leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described\nare some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly\ndepraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these\naccusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the\nmajority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the\nexamination and definition of the true philosopher.\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature,\nwhy so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling\u2014I am speaking of\nthose who were said to be useless but not wicked\u2014and, when we have done\nwith them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of\nmen are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of\nwhich they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies,\nbring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal\nreprobation of which we speak.\n\nWhat are these corruptions? he said.\n\nI will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a\nnature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a\nphilosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.\n\nRare indeed.\n\nAnd what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare\nnatures!\n\nWhat causes?\n\nIn the first place there are their own virtues, their courage,\ntemperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy\nqualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and\ndistracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.\n\nThat is very singular, he replied.\n\nThen there are all the ordinary goods of life\u2014beauty, wealth, strength,\nrank, and great connections in the State\u2014you understand the sort of\nthings\u2014these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.\n\nI understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean\nabout them.\n\nGrasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then\nhave no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will\nno longer appear strange to you.\n\nAnd how am I to do so? he asked.\n\nWhy, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or\nanimal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or\nsoil, in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the\nwant of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is\ngood than to what is not.\n\nVery true.\n\nThere is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien\nconditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast\nis greater.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they\nare ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the\nspirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by\neducation rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are\nscarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?\n\nThere I think that you are right.\n\nAnd our philosopher follows the same analogy\u2014he is like a plant which,\nhaving proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all\nvirtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most\nnoxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do\nyou really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted\nby Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any\ndegree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the\ngreatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young\nand old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?\n\nWhen is this accomplished? he said.\n\nWhen they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in\na court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular\nresort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which\nare being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating\nboth, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and\nthe place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise\nor blame\u2014at such a time will not a young man\u2019s heart, as they say, leap\nwithin him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against\nthe overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away\nby the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the\npublic in general have\u2014he will do as they do, and as they are, such\nwill he be?\n\nYes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.\n\nAnd yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been\nmentioned.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you\nare aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply\nwhen their words are powerless.\n\nIndeed they do; and in right good earnest.\n\nNow what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be\nexpected to overcome in such an unequal contest?\n\nNone, he replied.\n\nNo, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly;\nthere neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different\ntype of character which has had no other training in virtue but that\nwhich is supplied by public opinion\u2014I speak, my friend, of human virtue\nonly; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included:\nfor I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of\ngovernments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power\nof God, as we may truly say.\n\nI quite assent, he replied.\n\nThen let me crave your assent also to a further observation.\n\nWhat are you going to say?\n\nWhy, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists\nand whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing\nbut the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their\nassemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who\nshould study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is\nfed by him\u2014he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what\ntimes and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is\nthe meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another\nutters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further,\nthat when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in\nall this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or\nart, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what\nhe means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but\ncalls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just\nor unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great\nbrute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and\nevil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of\nthem except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never\nhimself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of\neither, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven,\nwould not such an one be a rare educator?\n\nIndeed he would.\n\nAnd in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of\nthe tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or\nmusic, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been\ndescribing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them\nhis poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the\nState, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called\nnecessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise.\nAnd yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in\nconfirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did\nyou ever hear any of them which were not?\n\nNo, nor am I likely to hear.\n\nYou recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you\nto consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe\nin the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful,\nor of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of\nthe world?\n\nThey must.\n\nAnd of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?\n\nThat is evident.\n\nThen, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in\nhis calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that\nhe was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence\u2014these\nwere admitted by us to be the true philosopher\u2019s gifts.\n\nYes.\n\nWill not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first\namong all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental\nones?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets\nolder for their own purposes?\n\nNo question.\n\nFalling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour\nand flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the\npower which he will one day possess.\n\nThat often happens, he said.\n\nAnd what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such\ncircumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and\nnoble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless\naspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes\nand of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he\nnot dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and\nsenseless pride?\n\nTo be sure he will.\n\nNow, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him\nand tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can\nonly be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse\ncircumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?\n\nFar otherwise.\n\nAnd even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural\nreasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and\ntaken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they\nthink that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping\nto reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to\nprevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his\nteacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as\npublic prosecutions?\n\nThere can be no doubt of it.\n\nAnd how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which\nmake a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from\nphilosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other\nso-called goods of life?\n\nWe were quite right.\n\nThus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure\nwhich I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of\nall pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any\ntime; this being the class out of which come the men who are the\nauthors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the\ngreatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small\nman never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to\nStates.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete:\nfor her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are\nleading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing\nthat she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour\nher; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her\nreprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for\nnothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.\n\nThat is certainly what people say.\n\nYes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny\ncreatures who, seeing this land open to them\u2014a land well stocked with\nfair names and showy titles\u2014like prisoners running out of prison into a\nsanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who\ndo so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts?\nFor, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a\ndignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are\nthus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are\nmaimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their\ntrades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?\n\nYes.\n\nAre they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of\ndurance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new\ncoat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master\u2019s\ndaughter, who is left poor and desolate?\n\nA most exact parallel.\n\nWhat will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and\nbastard?\n\nThere can be no question of it.\n\nAnd when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and\nmake an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of\nideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be\nsophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or\nworthy of or akin to true wisdom?\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\nThen, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be\nbut a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person,\ndetained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting\ninfluences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean\ncity, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be\na gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to\nher;\u2014or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend\nTheages\u2019 bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to\ndivert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics.\nMy own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for\nrarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those\nwho belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a\npossession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of\nthe multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there\nany champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such\nan one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts\u2014he\nwill not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able\nsingly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he\nwould be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that\nhe would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to\nhimself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like\none who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries\nalong, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of\nmankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own\nlife and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and\ngood-will, with bright hopes.\n\nYes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.\n\nA great work\u2014yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable\nto him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger\ngrowth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.\n\nThe causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been\nsufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has\nbeen shown\u2014is there anything more which you wish to say?\n\nNothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know\nwhich of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one\nadapted to her.\n\nNot any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I\nbring against them\u2014not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature,\nand hence that nature is warped and estranged;\u2014as the exotic seed which\nis sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be\noverpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of\nphilosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another\ncharacter. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection\nwhich she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine,\nand that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are\nbut human;\u2014and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State\nis:\n\nNo, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another\nquestion\u2014whether it is the State of which we are the founders and\ninventors, or some other?\n\nYes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying\nbefore, that some living authority would always be required in the\nState having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as\nlegislator you were laying down the laws.\n\nThat was said, he replied.\n\nYes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing\nobjections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long\nand difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.\n\nWhat is there remaining?\n\nThe question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be\nthe ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; \u2018hard\nis the good,\u2019 as men say.\n\nStill, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then\nbe complete.\n\nI shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all,\nby a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to\nremark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I\ndeclare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but\nin a different spirit.\n\nIn what manner?\n\nAt present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young;\nbeginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the\ntime saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even\nthose of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit,\nwhen they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I\nmean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some\none else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they\nmake much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their\nproper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are\nextinguished more truly than Heracleitus\u2019 sun, inasmuch as they never\nlight up again. (Heraclitus said that the sun was extinguished every\nevening and relighted every morning.)\n\nBut what ought to be their course?\n\nJust the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what\nphilosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during\nthis period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and\nspecial care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to\nuse in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect\nbegins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but\nwhen the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military\nduties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as\nwe intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a\nsimilar happiness in another.\n\nHow truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and\nyet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still\nmore earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced;\nThrasymachus least of all.\n\nDo not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have\nrecently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I\nshall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other\nmen, or do something which may profit them against the day when they\nlive again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.\n\nYou are speaking of a time which is not very near.\n\nRather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with\neternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to\nbelieve; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking\nrealized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy,\nconsisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of\nours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is\nperfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and\nlikeness of virtue\u2014such a man ruling in a city which bears the same\nimage, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them\u2014do you\nthink that they ever did?\n\nNo indeed.\n\nNo, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble\nsentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every\nmeans in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge,\nwhile they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the\nend is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of\nlaw or in society.\n\nThey are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.\n\nAnd this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced\nus to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor\nStates nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small\nclass of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are\nprovidentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the\nState, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or\nuntil kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are\ndivinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or\nboth of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm:\nif they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and\nvisionaries. Am I not right?\n\nQuite right.\n\nIf then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in\nsome foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected\nphilosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a\nsuperior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert\nto the death, that this our constitution has been, and is\u2014yea, and will\nbe whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility\nin all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.\n\nMy opinion agrees with yours, he said.\n\nBut do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?\n\nI should imagine not, he replied.\n\nO my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change\ntheir minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the\nview of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you\nshow them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were\njust now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will\nsee that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed\u2014if\nthey view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion\nof him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who\nloves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be\njealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for\nyou, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the\nmajority of mankind.\n\nI quite agree with you, he said.\n\nAnd do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the\nmany entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who\nrush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with\nthem, who make persons instead of things the theme of their\nconversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than\nthis.\n\nIt is most unbecoming.\n\nFor he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no\ntime to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with\nmalice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed\ntowards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor\ninjured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason;\nthese he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform\nhimself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential\nconverse?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes\norderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every\none else, he will suffer from detraction.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself,\nbut human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that\nwhich he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful\nartificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?\n\nAnything but unskilful.\n\nAnd if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the\ntruth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us,\nwhen we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by\nartists who imitate the heavenly pattern?\n\nThey will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they\ndraw out the plan of which you are speaking?\n\nThey will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which,\nas from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean\nsurface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie\nthe difference between them and every other legislator,\u2014they will have\nnothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no\nlaws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean\nsurface.\n\nThey will be very right, he said.\n\nHaving effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the\nconstitution?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nAnd when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often\nturn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look\nat absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human\ncopy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the\nimage of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other\nimage, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and\nlikeness of God.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until\nthey have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the\nways of God?\n\nIndeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.\n\nAnd now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described\nas rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions\nis such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant\nbecause to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a\nlittle calmer at what they have just heard?\n\nMuch calmer, if there is any sense in them.\n\nWhy, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they\ndoubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?\n\nThey would not be so unreasonable.\n\nOr that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the\nhighest good?\n\nNeither can they doubt this.\n\nBut again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under\nfavourable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any\never was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?\n\nSurely not.\n\nThen will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers\nbear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will\nthis our imaginary State ever be realized?\n\nI think that they will be less angry.\n\nShall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and\nthat they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other\nreason, cannot refuse to come to terms?\n\nBy all means, he said.\n\nThen let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any\none deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes\nwho are by nature philosophers?\n\nSurely no man, he said.\n\nAnd when they have come into being will any one say that they must of\nnecessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied\neven by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them\ncan escape\u2014who will venture to affirm this?\n\nWho indeed!\n\nBut, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city\nobedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal\npolity about which the world is so incredulous.\n\nYes, one is enough.\n\nThe ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been\ndescribing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or\nimpossibility?\n\nI think not.\n\nBut we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if\nonly possible, is assuredly for the best.\n\nWe have.\n\nAnd now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would\nbe for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult,\nis not impossible.\n\nVery good.\n\nAnd so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but\nmore remains to be discussed;\u2014how and by what studies and pursuits will\nthe saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they\nto apply themselves to their several studies?\n\nCertainly.\n\nI omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the\nprocreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I\nknew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was\ndifficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much\nservice to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and\nchildren are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must\nbe investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will\nremember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the\ntest of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers,\nnor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism\u2014he was\nto be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold\ntried in the refiner\u2019s fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive\nhonours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing\nwhich was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her\nface; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.\n\nI perfectly remember, he said.\n\nYes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word;\nbut now let me dare to say\u2014that the perfect guardian must be a\nphilosopher.\n\nYes, he said, let that be affirmed.\n\nAnd do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which\nwere deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly\nfound in shreds and patches.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nYou are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity,\ncleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that\npersons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and\nmagnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in\na peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their\nimpulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nOn the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended\nupon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are\nequally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always\nin a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any\nintellectual toil.\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to\nwhom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in\nany office or command.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd will they be a class which is rarely found?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\nThen the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers\nand pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of\nprobation which we did not mention\u2014he must be exercised also in many\nkinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the\nhighest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and\nexercises.\n\nYes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean\nby the highest of all knowledge?\n\nYou may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts;\nand distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage,\nand wisdom?\n\nIndeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.\n\nAnd do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion\nof them?\n\nTo what do you refer?\n\nWe were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in\ntheir perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the\nend of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular\nexposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded.\nAnd you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so\nthe enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate\nmanner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.\n\nYes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair\nmeasure of truth.\n\nBut, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree\nfalls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing\nimperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to\nbe contented and think that they need search no further.\n\nNot an uncommon case when people are indolent.\n\nYes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the\nState and of the laws.\n\nTrue.\n\nThe guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit,\nand toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach\nthe highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his\nproper calling.\n\nWhat, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this\u2014higher than\njustice and the other virtues?\n\nYes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the\noutline merely, as at present\u2014nothing short of the most finished\npicture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an\ninfinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty\nand utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the\nhighest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!\n\nA right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from\nasking you what is this highest knowledge?\n\nNay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the\nanswer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I\nrather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often\nbeen told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all\nother things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this.\nYou can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak,\nconcerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little;\nand, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will\nprofit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things\nis of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all\nother things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nYou are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good,\nbut the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by\nknowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?\n\nHow ridiculous!\n\nYes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our\nignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it\u2014for the\ngood they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood\nthem when they use the term \u2018good\u2019\u2014this is of course ridiculous.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nAnd those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for\nthey are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as\ngood.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?\n\nTrue.\n\nThere can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this\nquestion is involved.\n\nThere can be none.\n\nFurther, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to\nseem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one\nis satisfied with the appearance of good\u2014the reality is what they seek;\nin the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nOf this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all\nhis actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet\nhesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same\nassurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever\ngood there is in other things,\u2014of a principle such and so great as this\nought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be\nin the darkness of ignorance?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nI am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the\njust are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I\nsuspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true\nknowledge of them.\n\nThat, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.\n\nAnd if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be\nperfectly ordered?\n\nOf course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you\nconceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or\npleasure, or different from either?\n\nAye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you\nwould not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these\nmatters.\n\nTrue, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a\nlifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the\nopinions of others, and never telling his own.\n\nWell, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?\n\nNot, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right\nto do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.\n\nAnd do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the\nbest of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true\nnotion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way\nalong the road?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when\nothers will tell you of brightness and beauty?\n\nStill, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away\njust as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an\nexplanation of the good as you have already given of justice and\ntemperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.\n\nYes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot\nhelp fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring\nridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the\nactual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts\nwould be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who\nis likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished\nto hear\u2014otherwise, not.\n\nBy all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in\nour debt for the account of the parent.\n\nI do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the\naccount of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take,\nhowever, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a\ncare that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention\nof deceiving you.\n\nYes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.\n\nYes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and\nremind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion,\nand at many other times.\n\nWhat?\n\nThe old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so\nof other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term\n\u2018many\u2019 is applied.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other\nthings to which the term \u2018many\u2019 is applied there is an absolute; for\nthey may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of\neach.\n\nVery true.\n\nThe many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known\nbut not seen.\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd what is the organ with which we see the visible things?\n\nThe sight, he said.\n\nAnd with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses\nperceive the other objects of sense?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex\npiece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?\n\nNo, I never have, he said.\n\nThen reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional\nnature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be\nheard?\n\nNothing of the sort.\n\nNo, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the\nother senses\u2014you would not say that any of them requires such an\naddition?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBut you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no\nseeing or being seen?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nSight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to\nsee; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third\nnature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see\nnothing and the colours will be invisible.\n\nOf what nature are you speaking?\n\nOf that which you term light, I replied.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nNoble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and\ngreat beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is\ntheir bond, and light is no ignoble thing?\n\nNay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.\n\nAnd which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of\nthis element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly\nand the visible to appear?\n\nYou mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.\n\nMay not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?\n\nHow?\n\nNeither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?\n\nNo.\n\nYet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?\n\nBy far the most like.\n\nAnd the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is\ndispensed from the sun?\n\nExactly.\n\nThen the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by\nsight?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat\nin his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight\nand the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in\nrelation to mind and the things of mind:\n\nWill you be a little more explicit? he said.\n\nWhy, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them\ntowards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the\nmoon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have\nno clearness of vision in them?\n\nVery true.\n\nBut when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines,\nthey see clearly and there is sight in them?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and\nbeing shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with\nintelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and\nperishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is\nfirst of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no\nintelligence?\n\nJust so.\n\nNow, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to\nthe knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you\nwill deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the\nlatter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both\ntruth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature\nas more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light\nand sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the\nsun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be\nlike the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet\nhigher.\n\nWhat a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of\nscience and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely\ncannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?\n\nGod forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in\nanother point of view?\n\nIn what point of view?\n\nYou would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of\nvisibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and\ngrowth, though he himself is not generation?\n\nCertainly.\n\nIn like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of\nknowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet\nthe good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.\n\nGlaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how\namazing!\n\nYes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made\nme utter my fancies.\n\nAnd pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is\nanything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.\n\nYes, I said, there is a great deal more.\n\nThen omit nothing, however slight.\n\nI will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will\nhave to be omitted.\n\nI hope not, he said.\n\nYou have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that\none of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the\nvisible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing\nupon the name (\u2018ourhanoz, orhatoz\u2019). May I suppose that you have this\ndistinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?\n\nI have.\n\nNow take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide\neach of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main\ndivisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the\nintelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their\nclearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first\nsection in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images\nI mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place,\nreflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the\nlike: Do you understand?\n\nYes, I understand.\n\nImagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance,\nto include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is\nmade.\n\nVery good.\n\nWould you not admit that both the sections of this division have\ndifferent degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the\nsphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?\n\nMost undoubtedly.\n\nNext proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the\nintellectual is to be divided.\n\nIn what manner?\n\nThus:\u2014There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses\nthe figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can\nonly be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle\ndescends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes\nout of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above\nhypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but\nproceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.\n\nI do not quite understand your meaning, he said.\n\nThen I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made\nsome preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry,\narithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and\nthe figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several\nbranches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every\nbody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any\naccount of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with\nthem, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner,\nat their conclusion?\n\nYes, he said, I know.\n\nAnd do you not know also that although they make use of the visible\nforms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the\nideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of\nthe absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on\u2014the forms\nwhich they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in\nwater of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are\nreally seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen\nwith the eye of the mind?\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search\nafter it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a\nfirst principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of\nhypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are\nresemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the\nshadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a\nhigher value.\n\nI understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of\ngeometry and the sister arts.\n\nAnd when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will\nunderstand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason\nherself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as\nfirst principles, but only as hypotheses\u2014that is to say, as steps and\npoints of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order\nthat she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and\nclinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive\nsteps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from\nideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.\n\nI understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be\ndescribing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I\nunderstand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of\ndialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as\nthey are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also\ncontemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because\nthey start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who\ncontemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon\nthem, although when a first principle is added to them they are\ncognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with\ngeometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term\nunderstanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and\nreason.\n\nYou have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to\nthese four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul\u2014reason\nanswering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or\nconviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last\u2014and let\nthere be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties\nhave clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.\n\nI understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your\narrangement.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK VII.\n\n\nAnd now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is\nenlightened or unenlightened:\u2014Behold! human beings living in a\nunderground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching\nall along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have\ntheir legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see\nbefore them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their\nheads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and\nbetween the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will\nsee, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which\nmarionette players have in front of them, over which they show the\npuppets.\n\nI see.\n\nAnd do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts\nof vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone\nand various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are\ntalking, others silent.\n\nYou have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.\n\nLike ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the\nshadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of\nthe cave?\n\nTrue, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were\nnever allowed to move their heads?\n\nAnd of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would\nonly see the shadows?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd if they were able to converse with one another, would they not\nsuppose that they were naming what was actually before them?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the\nother side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by\nspoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?\n\nNo question, he replied.\n\nTo them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows\nof the images.\n\nThat is certain.\n\nAnd now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners\nare released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them\nis liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round\nand walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the\nglare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of\nwhich in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive\nsome one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but\nthat now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned\ntowards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,\u2014what will be his\nreply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to\nthe objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,\u2014will he not be\nperplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are\ntruer than the objects which are now shown to him?\n\nFar truer.\n\nAnd if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have\na pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the\nobjects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in\nreality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and\nrugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of\nthe sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he\napproaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able\nto see anything at all of what are now called realities.\n\nNot all in a moment, he said.\n\nHe will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And\nfirst he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and\nother objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he\nwill gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled\nheaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the\nsun or the light of the sun by day?\n\nCertainly.\n\nLast of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of\nhim in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not\nin another; and he will contemplate him as he is.\n\nCertainly.\n\nHe will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and\nthe years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and\nin a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have\nbeen accustomed to behold?\n\nClearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.\n\nAnd when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den\nand his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate\nhimself on the change, and pity them?\n\nCertainly, he would.\n\nAnd if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on\nthose who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark\nwhich of them went before, and which followed after, and which were\ntogether; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to\nthe future, do you think that he would care for such honours and\nglories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,\n\n\u2018Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,\u2019\n\nand to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after\ntheir manner?\n\nYes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than\nentertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.\n\nImagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun\nto be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have\nhis eyes full of darkness?\n\nTo be sure, he said.\n\nAnd if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the\nshadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while\nhis sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and\nthe time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might\nbe very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him\nthat up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was\nbetter not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose\nanother and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender,\nand they would put him to death.\n\nNo question, he said.\n\nThis entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the\nprevious argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of\nthe fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret\nthe journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual\nworld according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have\nexpressed\u2014whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or\nfalse, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good\nappears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen,\nis also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and\nright, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world,\nand the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and\nthat this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in\npublic or private life must have his eye fixed.\n\nI agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.\n\nMoreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this\nbeatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their\nsouls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to\ndwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be\ntrusted.\n\nYes, very natural.\n\nAnd is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine\ncontemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a\nridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has\nbecome accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight\nin courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows\nof images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of\nthose who have never yet seen absolute justice?\n\nAnything but surprising, he replied.\n\nAny one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of\nthe eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from\ncoming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of\nthe mind\u2019s eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who\nremembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak,\nwill not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of\nman has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because\nunaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is\ndazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his\ncondition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he\nhave a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light,\nthere will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him\nwho returns from above out of the light into the den.\n\nThat, he said, is a very just distinction.\n\nBut then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong\nwhen they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not\nthere before, like sight into blind eyes.\n\nThey undoubtedly say this, he replied.\n\nWhereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning\nexists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn\nfrom darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of\nknowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the\nworld of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure\nthe sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other\nwords, of the good.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the\neasiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for\nthat exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is\nlooking away from the truth?\n\nYes, he said, such an art may be presumed.\n\nAnd whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to\nbodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can\nbe implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more\nthan anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and\nby this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other\nhand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow\nintelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue\u2014how eager he\nis, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the\nreverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of\nevil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days\nof their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures,\nsuch as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached\nto them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of\ntheir souls upon the things that are below\u2014if, I say, they had been\nreleased from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction,\nthe very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as\nthey see what their eyes are turned to now.\n\nVery likely.\n\nYes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a\nnecessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated\nand uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of\ntheir education, will be able ministers of State; not the former,\nbecause they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their\nactions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will\nnot act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already\ndwelling apart in the islands of the blest.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nThen, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will\nbe to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have\nalready shown to be the greatest of all\u2014they must continue to ascend\nuntil they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen\nenough we must not allow them to do as they do now.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be\nallowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the\nden, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth\nhaving or not.\n\nBut is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life,\nwhen they might have a better?\n\nYou have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the\nlegislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy\nabove the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held\nthe citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them\nbenefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to\nthis end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his\ninstruments in binding up the State.\n\nTrue, he said, I had forgotten.\n\nObserve, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our\nphilosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain\nto them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to\nshare in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow\nup at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have\nthem. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude\nfor a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you\ninto the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the\nother citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly\nthan they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the\ndouble duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down\nto the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the\ndark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times\nbetter than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the\nseveral images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the\nbeautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which\nis also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be\nadministered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men\nfight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the\nstruggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the\ntruth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to\ngovern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in\nwhich they are most eager, the worst.\n\nQuite true, he replied.\n\nAnd will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at\nthe toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of\ntheir time with one another in the heavenly light?\n\nImpossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which\nwe impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of\nthem will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion\nof our present rulers of State.\n\nYes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for\nyour future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and\nthen you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which\noffers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold,\nbut in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas\nif they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering\nafter their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to\nsnatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be\nfighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus\narise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\nAnd the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition\nis that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?\n\nIndeed, I do not, he said.\n\nAnd those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they\nare, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.\n\nNo question.\n\nWho then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they\nwill be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the\nState is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours\nand another and a better life than that of politics?\n\nThey are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.\n\nAnd now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced,\nand how they are to be brought from darkness to light,\u2014as some are said\nto have ascended from the world below to the gods?\n\nBy all means, he replied.\n\nThe process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell (In\nallusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an\noyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light\nside uppermost.), but the turning round of a soul passing from a day\nwhich is little better than night to the true day of being, that is,\nthe ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?\n\nQuite so.\n\nAnd should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of\neffecting such a change?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWhat sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming\nto being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will\nremember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?\n\nYes, that was said.\n\nThen this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?\n\nWhat quality?\n\nUsefulness in war.\n\nYes, if possible.\n\nThere were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?\n\nJust so.\n\nThere was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the\nbody, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and\ncorruption?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?\n\nNo.\n\nBut what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent\ninto our former scheme?\n\nMusic, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic,\nand trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making\nthem harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and\nthe words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of\nrhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended\nto that good which you are now seeking.\n\nYou are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there\ncertainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is\nthere, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the\nuseful arts were reckoned mean by us?\n\nUndoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts\nare also excluded, what remains?\n\nWell, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and\nthen we shall have to take something which is not special, but of\nuniversal application.\n\nWhat may that be?\n\nA something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in\ncommon, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of\neducation.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three\u2014in a word,\nnumber and calculation:\u2014do not all arts and sciences necessarily\npartake of them?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the art of war partakes of them?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThen Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon\nridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he\ndeclares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and\nset in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had\nnever been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to\nhave been incapable of counting his own feet\u2014how could he if he was\nignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he\nhave been?\n\nI should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.\n\nCan we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?\n\nCertainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of\nmilitary tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man\nat all.\n\nI should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of\nthis study?\n\nWhat is your notion?\n\nIt appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and\nwhich leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly\nused; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.\n\nWill you explain your meaning? he said.\n\nI will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and\nsay \u2018yes\u2019 or \u2018no\u2019 when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what\nbranches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may\nhave clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.\n\nExplain, he said.\n\nI mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do\nnot invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them;\nwhile in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that\nfurther enquiry is imperatively demanded.\n\nYou are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses\nare imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.\n\nNo, I said, that is not at all my meaning.\n\nThen what is your meaning?\n\nWhen speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass\nfrom one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which\ndo; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a\ndistance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular\nthan of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning\nclearer:\u2014here are three fingers\u2014a little finger, a second finger, and a\nmiddle finger.\n\nVery good.\n\nYou may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the\npoint.\n\nWhat is it?\n\nEach of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at\nthe extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin\u2014it makes no\ndifference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is\nnot compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the\nsight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which\ninvites or excites intelligence.\n\nThere is not, he said.\n\nBut is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers?\nCan sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the\ncircumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at\nthe extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive\nthe qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so\nof the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters?\nIs not their mode of operation on this wise\u2014the sense which is\nconcerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also\nwith the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the\nsame thing is felt to be both hard and soft?\n\nYou are quite right, he said.\n\nAnd must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense\ngives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of\nlight and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which\nis heavy, light?\n\nYes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very\ncurious and require to be explained.\n\nYes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to\nher aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the\nseveral objects announced to her are one or two.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a\nstate of division, for if there were undivided they could only be\nconceived of as one?\n\nTrue.\n\nThe eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused\nmanner; they were not distinguished.\n\nYes.\n\nWhereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was\ncompelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as\nseparate and not confused.\n\nVery true.\n\nWas not this the beginning of the enquiry \u2018What is great?\u2019 and \u2018What is\nsmall?\u2019\n\nExactly so.\n\nAnd thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.\n\nMost true.\n\nThis was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the\nintellect, or the reverse\u2014those which are simultaneous with opposite\nimpressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.\n\nI understand, he said, and agree with you.\n\nAnd to which class do unity and number belong?\n\nI do not know, he replied.\n\nThink a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the\nanswer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight\nor by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the\nfinger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there\nis some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and\ninvolves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused\nwithin us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision\nasks \u2018What is absolute unity?\u2019 This is the way in which the study of\nthe one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the\ncontemplation of true being.\n\nAnd surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see\nthe same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?\n\nYes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all\nnumber?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd they appear to lead the mind towards truth?\n\nYes, in a very remarkable manner.\n\nThen this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a\ndouble use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn\nthe art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the\nphilosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and\nlay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe;\nand we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men\nof our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must\ncarry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind\nonly; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to\nbuying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the\nsoul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass\nfrom becoming to truth and being.\n\nThat is excellent, he said.\n\nYes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the\nscience is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if\npursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating\neffect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and\nrebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into\nthe argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and\nridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is\ncalculating, and if you divide, they multiply (Meaning either (1) that\nthey integrate the number because they deny the possibility of\nfractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of\nmultiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units.), taking\ncare that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.\n\nThat is very true.\n\nNow, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these\nwonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say,\nthere is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal,\ninvariable, indivisible,\u2014what would they answer?\n\nThey would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of\nthose numbers which can only be realized in thought.\n\nThen you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary,\nnecessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in\nthe attainment of pure truth?\n\nYes; that is a marked characteristic of it.\n\nAnd have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for\ncalculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and\neven the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they\nmay derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than\nthey would otherwise have been.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not\nmany as difficult.\n\nYou will not.\n\nAnd, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which\nthe best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.\n\nI agree.\n\nLet this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall\nwe enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?\n\nYou mean geometry?\n\nExactly so.\n\nClearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which\nrelates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or\nclosing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military\nmanoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the\ndifference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.\n\nYes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or\ncalculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater\nand more advanced part of geometry\u2014whether that tends in any degree to\nmake more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was\nsaying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards\nthat place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by\nall means, to behold.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming\nonly, it does not concern us?\n\nYes, that is what we assert.\n\nYet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny\nthat such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the\nordinary language of geometricians.\n\nHow so?\n\nThey have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow\nand ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the\nlike\u2014they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life;\nwhereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nThen must not a further admission be made?\n\nWhat admission?\n\nThat the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal,\nand not of aught perishing and transient.\n\nThat, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.\n\nThen, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and\ncreate the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now\nunhappily allowed to fall down.\n\nNothing will be more likely to have such an effect.\n\nThen nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants\nof your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the\nscience has indirect effects, which are not small.\n\nOf what kind? he said.\n\nThere are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in\nall departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has\nstudied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has\nnot.\n\nYes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.\n\nThen shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our\nyouth will study?\n\nLet us do so, he replied.\n\nAnd suppose we make astronomy the third\u2014what do you say?\n\nI am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons\nand of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the\nfarmer or sailor.\n\nI am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard\nagainst the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite\nadmit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of\nthe soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these\npurified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand\nbodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes\nof persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take\nyour words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly\nunmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they\nsee no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore\nyou had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing\nto argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief\naim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same\ntime you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.\n\nI think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own\nbehalf.\n\nThen take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the\nsciences.\n\nWhat was the mistake? he said.\n\nAfter plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in\nrevolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the\nsecond dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and\ndimensions of depth, ought to have followed.\n\nThat is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about\nthese subjects.\n\nWhy, yes, I said, and for two reasons:\u2014in the first place, no\ngovernment patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the\npursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students\ncannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can\nhardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the\nstudents, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That,\nhowever, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of\nthese studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to\ncome, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries\nwould be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world,\nand maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their\nvotaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way\nby their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the\nState, they would some day emerge into light.\n\nYes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly\nunderstand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of\nplane surfaces?\n\nYes, I said.\n\nAnd you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?\n\nYes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid\ngeometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass\nover this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if\nencouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be\nfourth.\n\nThe right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the\nvulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be\ngiven in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that\nastronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world\nto another.\n\nEvery one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but\nnot to me.\n\nAnd what then would you say?\n\nI should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy\nappear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.\n\nWhat do you mean? he asked.\n\nYou, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our\nknowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to\nthrow his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still\nthink that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are\nvery likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that\nknowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul\nlook upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the\nground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he\ncan learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is\nlooking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by\nwater or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.\n\nI acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should\nlike to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more\nconducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?\n\nI will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought\nupon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most\nperfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to\nthe true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are\nrelative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in\nthem, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be\napprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nThe spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to\nthat higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or\npictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other\ngreat artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw\nthem would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he\nwould never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal\nor the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.\n\nNo, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.\n\nAnd will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at\nthe movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the\nthings in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect\nmanner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and\nday, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the\nstars to these and to one another, and any other things that are\nmaterial and visible can also be eternal and subject to no\ndeviation\u2014that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so\nmuch pains in investigating their exact truth.\n\nI quite agree, though I never thought of this before.\n\nThen, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems,\nand let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right\nway and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.\n\nThat, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.\n\nYes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a\nsimilar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any\nvalue. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?\n\nNo, he said, not without thinking.\n\nMotion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are\nobvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others,\nas I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.\n\nBut where are the two?\n\nThere is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already\nnamed.\n\nAnd what may that be?\n\nThe second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the\nfirst is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to\nlook up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and\nthese are sister sciences\u2014as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon,\nagree with them?\n\nYes, he replied.\n\nBut this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go\nand learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other\napplications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose\nsight of our own higher object.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThere is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our\npupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying\nthat they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you\nprobably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare\nthe sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like\nthat of the astronomers, is in vain.\n\nYes, by heaven! he said; and \u2019tis as good as a play to hear them\ntalking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their\nears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from\ntheir neighbour\u2019s wall\u2014one set of them declaring that they distinguish\nan intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be\nthe unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have\npassed into the same\u2014either party setting their ears before their\nunderstanding.\n\nYou mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and\nrack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor\nand speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and\nmake accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and\nforwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will\nonly say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the\nPythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about\nharmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they\ninvestigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they\nnever attain to problems\u2014that is to say, they never reach the natural\nharmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and\nothers not.\n\nThat, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.\n\nA thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if\nsought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in\nany other spirit, useless.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNow, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and\nconnection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual\naffinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them\nhave a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.\n\nI suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.\n\nWhat do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all\nthis is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn?\nFor you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a\ndialectician?\n\nAssuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who\nwas capable of reasoning.\n\nBut do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason\nwill have the knowledge which we require of them?\n\nNeither can this be supposed.\n\nAnd so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of\ndialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but\nwhich the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for\nsight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold\nthe real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so\nwith dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute\nby the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and\nperseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of\nthe absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the\nintellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.\n\nExactly, he said.\n\nThen this is the progress which you call dialectic?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation\nfrom the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from\nthe underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly\ntrying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are\nable to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water\n(which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows\nof images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only\nan image)\u2014this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to\nthe contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may\ncompare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body\nto the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible\nworld\u2014this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and\npursuit of the arts which has been described.\n\nI agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to\nbelieve, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny.\nThis, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but\nwill have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our\nconclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at\nonce from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain (A play upon the\nGreek word, which means both \u2018law\u2019 and \u2018strain.\u2019), and describe that in\nlike manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions\nof dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these\npaths will also lead to our final rest.\n\nDear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I\nwould do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the\nabsolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would\nor would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would\nhave seen something like reality; of that I am confident.\n\nDoubtless, he replied.\n\nBut I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can\nreveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous\nsciences.\n\nOf that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.\n\nAnd assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of\ncomprehending by any regular process all true existence or of\nascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in\ngeneral are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are\ncultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the\npreservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the\nmathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension\nof true being\u2014geometry and the like\u2014they only dream about being, but\nnever can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the\nhypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account\nof them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the\nconclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows\nnot what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever\nbecome science?\n\nImpossible, he said.\n\nThen dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first\nprinciple and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in\norder to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is\nliterally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted\nupwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of\nconversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms\nthem sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater\nclearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in\nour previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we\ndispute about names when we have realities of such importance to\nconsider?\n\nWhy indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought\nof the mind with clearness?\n\nAt any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two\nfor intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division\nscience, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth\nperception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and\nintellect with being; and so to make a proportion:\u2014\n\nAs being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as\nintellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to\nthe perception of shadows.\n\nBut let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the\nsubjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry,\nmany times longer than this has been.\n\nAs far as I understand, he said, I agree.\n\nAnd do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one\nwho attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does\nnot possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in\nwhatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in\nintelligence? Will you admit so much?\n\nYes, he said; how can I deny it?\n\nAnd you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the\nperson is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and\nunless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to\ndisprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never\nfaltering at any step of the argument\u2014unless he can do all this, you\nwould say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he\napprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion\nand not by science;\u2014dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is\nwell awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final\nquietus.\n\nIn all that I should most certainly agree with you.\n\nAnd surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom\nyou are nurturing and educating\u2014if the ideal ever becomes a reality\u2014you\nwould not allow the future rulers to be like posts (Literally \u2018lines,\u2019\nprobably the starting-point of a race-course.), having no reason in\nthem, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will\nenable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering\nquestions?\n\nYes, he said, you and I together will make it.\n\nDialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the\nsciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed\nhigher\u2014the nature of knowledge can no further go?\n\nI agree, he said.\n\nBut to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to\nbe assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.\n\nYes, clearly.\n\nYou remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nThe same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given\nto the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and,\nhaving noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural\ngifts which will facilitate their education.\n\nAnd what are these?\n\nSuch gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind\nmore often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of\ngymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind\u2019s own, and is not shared\nwith the body.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nFurther, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be\nan unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will\nnever be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go\nthrough all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of\nhim.\n\nCertainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.\n\nThe mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no\nvocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has\nfallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and\nnot bastards.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nIn the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting\nindustry\u2014I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle:\nas, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and\nall other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the\nlabour of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to\nwhich he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have\nthe other sort of lameness.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and\nlame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at\nherself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary\nfalsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire\nof ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every\nother virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son\nand the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities\nstates and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler,\nand the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part\nof virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.\n\nThat is very true, he said.\n\nAll these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and\nif only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and\ntraining are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing\nto say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and\nof the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse\nwill happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on\nphilosophy than she has to endure at present.\n\nThat would not be creditable.\n\nCertainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into\nearnest I am equally ridiculous.\n\nIn what respect?\n\nI had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too\nmuch excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled\nunder foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the\nauthors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.\n\nIndeed! I was listening, and did not think so.\n\nBut I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you\nthat, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do\nso in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he\ngrows old may learn many things\u2014for he can no more learn much than he\ncan run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of\ninstruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented\nto the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our\nsystem of education.\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of\nknowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm\nto the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains\nno hold on the mind.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early\neducation be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find\nout the natural bent.\n\nThat is a very rational notion, he said.\n\nDo you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the\nbattle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be\nbrought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given\nthem?\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nThe same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things\u2014labours,\nlessons, dangers\u2014and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be\nenrolled in a select number.\n\nAt what age?\n\nAt the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether\nof two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless\nfor any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to\nlearning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one\nof the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAfter that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years\nold will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they\nlearned without any order in their early education will now be brought\ntogether, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them\nto one another and to true being.\n\nYes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting\nroot.\n\nYes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion\nof dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the\ndialectical.\n\nI agree with you, he said.\n\nThese, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who\nhave most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their\nlearning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they\nhave arrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the\nselect class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove\nthem by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able\nto give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with\ntruth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is\nrequired.\n\nWhy great caution?\n\nDo you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has\nintroduced?\n\nWhat evil? he said.\n\nThe students of the art are filled with lawlessness.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nDo you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in\ntheir case? or will you make allowance for them?\n\nIn what way make allowance?\n\nI want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son\nwho is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous\nfamily, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns\nthat his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is\nunable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave\ntowards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during\nthe period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again\nwhen he knows? Or shall I guess for you?\n\nIf you please.\n\nThen I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be\nlikely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations\nmore than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when\nin need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less\nwilling to disobey them in any important matter.\n\nHe will.\n\nBut when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would\ndiminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted\nto the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he\nwould now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and,\nunless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble\nhimself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.\n\nWell, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the\ndisciples of philosophy?\n\nIn this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice\nand honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental\nauthority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.\n\nThat is true.\n\nThere are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and\nattract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense\nof right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their\nfathers.\n\nTrue.\n\nNow, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what\nis fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him,\nand then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is\ndriven into believing that nothing is honourable any more than\ndishonourable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of\nall the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still\nhonour and obey them as before?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore,\nand he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any\nlife other than that which flatters his desires?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nAnd from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of\nit?\n\nUnquestionably.\n\nNow all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have\ndescribed, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.\n\nYes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.\n\nTherefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our\ncitizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in\nintroducing them to dialectic.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThere is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early;\nfor youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste\nin their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and\nrefuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs,\nthey rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.\n\nYes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.\n\nAnd when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the\nhands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not\nbelieving anything which they believed before, and hence, not only\nthey, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad\nname with the rest of the world.\n\nToo true, he said.\n\nBut when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such\ninsanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth,\nand not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement;\nand the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of\ndiminishing the honour of the pursuit.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the\ndisciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now,\nany chance aspirant or intruder?\n\nVery true.\n\nSuppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of\ngymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively\nfor twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise\u2014will\nthat be enough?\n\nWould you say six or four years? he asked.\n\nSay five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent\ndown again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other\noffice which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get\ntheir experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying\nwhether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they\nwill stand firm or flinch.\n\nAnd how long is this stage of their lives to last?\n\nFifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of\nage, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves\nin every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at\nlast to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must\nraise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all\nthings, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according\nto which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and\nthe remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief\npursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and\nruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some\nheroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have\nbrought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in\ntheir place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the\nIslands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them\npublic memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle\nconsent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.\n\nYou are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors\nfaultless in beauty.\n\nYes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not\nsuppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to\nwomen as far as their natures can go.\n\nThere you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all\nthings like the men.\n\nWell, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been\nsaid about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and\nalthough difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which\nhas been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are\nborn in a State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this\npresent world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all\nthings right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding\njustice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose\nministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when\nthey set in order their own city?\n\nHow will they proceed?\n\nThey will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of\nthe city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of\ntheir children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents;\nthese they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws\nwhich we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of\nwhich we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness,\nand the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.\n\nYes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have\nvery well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into\nbeing.\n\nEnough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its\nimage\u2014there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.\n\nThere is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking\nthat nothing more need be said.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK VIII.\n\n\nAnd so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect\nState wives and children are to be in common; and that all education\nand the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best\nphilosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?\n\nThat, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.\n\nYes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when\nappointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses\nsuch as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain\nnothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember\nwhat we agreed?\n\nYes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions\nof mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving\nfrom the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their\nmaintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole\nState.\n\nTrue, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let\nus find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the\nold path.\n\nThere is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you\nhad finished the description of the State: you said that such a State\nwas good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as\nnow appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and\nman. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the\nothers were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember,\nthat there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the\ndefects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining.\nWhen we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was\nthe best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the\nbest was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I\nasked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke,\nand then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began\nagain, and have found your way to the point at which we have now\narrived.\n\nYour recollection, I said, is most exact.\n\nThen, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the\nsame position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me\nthe same answer which you were about to give me then.\n\nYes, if I can, I will, I said.\n\nI shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of\nwhich you were speaking.\n\nThat question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of\nwhich I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of\nCrete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed\noligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of\ngovernment which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally\nfollows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny,\ngreat and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and\nworst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other\nconstitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are\nlordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other\nintermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be\nfound equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.\n\nYes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government\nwhich exist among them.\n\nDo you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men\nvary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the\nother? For we cannot suppose that States are made of \u2018oak and rock,\u2019\nand not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a\nfigure turn the scale and draw other things after them?\n\nYes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human\ncharacters.\n\nThen if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of\nindividual minds will also be five?\n\nCertainly.\n\nHim who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good,\nwe have already described.\n\nWe have.\n\nThen let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being\nthe contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also\nthe oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most\njust by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be\nable to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads\na life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be\ncompleted. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as\nThrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the\nargument to prefer justice.\n\nCertainly, he replied, we must do as you say.\n\nShall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to\nclearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the\nindividual, and begin with the government of honour?\u2014I know of no name\nfor such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We\nwill compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after\nthat, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we\nwill turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and\nlastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a\nlook into the tyrant\u2019s soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory\ndecision.\n\nThat way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.\n\nFirst, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of\nhonour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best).\nClearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual\ngoverning power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be\nmoved.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nIn what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the\ntwo classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with\none another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to\ntell us \u2018how discord first arose\u2019? Shall we imagine them in solemn\nmockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to\naddress us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?\n\nHow would they address us?\n\nAfter this manner:\u2014A city which is thus constituted can hardly be\nshaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an\nend, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will\nin time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution:\u2014In plants that grow\nin the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth\u2019s surface,\nfertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences\nof the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences\npass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But\nto the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and\neducation of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them\nwill not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense,\nbut will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when\nthey ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is\ncontained in a perfect number (i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which\nis equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or\ntime represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations\nrepresented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.), but the period of human\nbirth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by\ninvolution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three\nintervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers,\nmake all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another.\n(Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides\nof the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5\ncubed, which together = 6 cubed = 216.) The base of these (3) with a\nthird added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third\npower furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred\ntimes as great (400 = 4 x 100) (Or the first a square which is 100 x\n100 = 10,000. The whole number will then be 17,500 = a square of 100,\nand an oblong of 100 by 75.), and the other a figure having one side\nequal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers\nsquared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions),\nthe side of which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being\nless by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc.\n50) or less by (Or, \u2018consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational\ndiameters,\u2019 etc. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see\nIntroduction.) two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square\nthe side of which is five = 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of\nthree (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents\na geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of\nbirths. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and\nunite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be\ngoodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed\nby their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their\nfathers\u2019 places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will\nsoon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by\nunder-valuing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and\nhence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the\nsucceeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the\nguardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which,\nlike Hesiod\u2019s, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron\nwill be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will\narise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and\nin all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be\nthe stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is\ntheir answer to us.\n\nYes, and we may assume that they answer truly.\n\nWhy, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak\nfalsely?\n\nAnd what do the Muses say next?\n\nWhen discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the\niron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and\nsilver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the\ntrue riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the\nancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last\nthey agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual\nowners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had\nformerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them\nsubjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in\nkeeping a watch against them.\n\nI believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.\n\nAnd the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate\nbetween oligarchy and aristocracy?\n\nVery true.\n\nSuch will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will\nthey proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy\nand the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and\nwill also have some peculiarities.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nIn the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class\nfrom agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution\nof common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military\ntraining\u2014in all these respects this State will resemble the former.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no\nlonger to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements;\nand in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who\nare by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by\nthem upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of\neverlasting wars\u2014this State will be for the most part peculiar.\n\nYes.\n\nYes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like\nthose who live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing\nafter gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having\nmagazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment\nof them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which\nthey will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they\nplease.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the\nmoney which they prize; they will spend that which is another man\u2019s on\nthe gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and\nrunning away like children from the law, their father: they have been\nschooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected\nher who is the true Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and\nhave honoured gymnastic more than music.\n\nUndoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a\nmixture of good and evil.\n\nWhy, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is\npredominantly seen,\u2014the spirit of contention and ambition; and these\nare due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.\n\nAssuredly, he said.\n\nSuch is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been\ndescribed in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required,\nfor a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and\nmost perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the\ncharacters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable\nlabour.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nNow what man answers to this form of government-how did he come into\nbeing, and what is he like?\n\nI think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which\ncharacterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.\n\nPerhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are\nother respects in which he is very different.\n\nIn what respects?\n\nHe should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a\nfriend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker.\nSuch a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man,\nwho is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen,\nand remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a\nlover of honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or\non any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has\nperformed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and\nof the chase.\n\nYes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.\n\nSuch an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets\nolder he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a\npiece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards\nvirtue, having lost his best guardian.\n\nWho was that? said Adeimantus.\n\nPhilosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her\nabode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.\n\nGood, he said.\n\nSuch, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the\ntimocratical State.\n\nExactly.\n\nHis origin is as follows:\u2014He is often the young son of a brave father,\nwho dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours\nand offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but\nis ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.\n\nAnd how does the son come into being?\n\nThe character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother\ncomplaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which\nthe consequence is that she has no precedence among other women.\nFurther, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and\ninstead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking\nwhatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his\nthoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very\nconsiderable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his\nfather is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other\ncomplaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of\nrehearsing.\n\nYes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints\nare so like themselves.\n\nAnd you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to\nbe attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same\nstrain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his\nfather, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them,\nthey tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people\nof this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk\nabroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their\nown business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem,\nwhile the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that\nthe young man, hearing and seeing all these things\u2014hearing, too, the\nwords of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and\nmaking comparisons of him and others\u2014is drawn opposite ways: while his\nfather is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul,\nthe others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being\nnot originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last\nbrought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the\nkingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness\nand passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.\n\nYou seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.\n\nThen we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second\ntype of character?\n\nWe have.\n\nNext, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,\n\n\u2018Is set over against another State;\u2019\n\nor rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.\n\nBy all means.\n\nI believe that oligarchy follows next in order.\n\nAnd what manner of government do you term oligarchy?\n\nA government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have\npower and the poor man is deprived of it.\n\nI understand, he replied.\n\nOught I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to\noligarchy arises?\n\nYes.\n\nWell, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes\ninto the other.\n\nHow?\n\nThe accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the\nruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what\ndo they or their wives care about the law?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\nAnd then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus\nthe great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.\n\nLikely enough.\n\nAnd so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a\nfortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are\nplaced together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as\nthe other falls.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State,\nvirtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is\nneglected.\n\nThat is obvious.\n\nAnd so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become\nlovers of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and\nmake a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.\n\nThey do so.\n\nThey next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the\nqualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower\nin another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow\nno one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in\nthe government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force\nof arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is\nestablished.\n\nYes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of\ngovernment, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?\n\nFirst of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just\nthink what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their\nproperty, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though\nhe were a better pilot?\n\nYou mean that they would shipwreck?\n\nYes; and is not this true of the government of anything?\n\nI should imagine so.\n\nExcept a city?\u2014or would you include a city?\n\nNay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as\nthe rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.\n\nThis, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd here is another defect which is quite as bad.\n\nWhat defect?\n\nThe inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the\none of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same\nspot and always conspiring against one another.\n\nThat, surely, is at least as bad.\n\nAnother discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are\nincapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and\nthen they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not\ncall them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to\nfight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for\nmoney makes them unwilling to pay taxes.\n\nHow discreditable!\n\nAnd, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have\ntoo many callings\u2014they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one.\nDoes that look well?\n\nAnything but well.\n\nThere is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to\nwhich this State first begins to be liable.\n\nWhat evil?\n\nA man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property;\nyet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a\npart, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but\nonly a poor, helpless creature.\n\nYes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.\n\nThe evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both\nthe extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money,\nwas a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes\nof citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body,\nalthough in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a\nspendthrift?\n\nAs you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.\n\nMay we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the\ndrone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as\nthe other is of the hive?\n\nJust so, Socrates.\n\nAnd God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings,\nwhereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but\nothers have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in\ntheir old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal\nclass, as they are termed.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nClearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that\nneighborhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers\nof temples, and all sorts of malefactors.\n\nClearly.\n\nWell, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?\n\nYes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.\n\nAnd may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals\nto be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities\nare careful to restrain by force?\n\nCertainly, we may be so bold.\n\nThe existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education,\nill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?\n\nTrue.\n\nSuch, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there\nmay be many other evils.\n\nVery likely.\n\nThen oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are\nelected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to\nconsider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this\nState.\n\nBy all means.\n\nDoes not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this\nwise?\n\nHow?\n\nA time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first\nhe begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but\npresently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon\na sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a\ngeneral or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a\nprejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or\ndeprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken\nfrom him.\n\nNothing more likely.\n\nAnd the son has seen and known all this\u2014he is a ruined man, and his\nfear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his\nbosom\u2019s throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean\nand miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such\nan one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the\nvacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt\nwith tiara and chain and scimitar?\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\nAnd when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground\nobediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know\ntheir place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be\nturned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and\nadmire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything\nso much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.\n\nOf all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the\nconversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.\n\nAnd the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?\n\nYes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like\nthe State out of which oligarchy came.\n\nLet us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.\n\nVery good.\n\nFirst, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon\nwealth?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAlso in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only\nsatisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to\nthem; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are\nunprofitable.\n\nTrue.\n\nHe is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes\na purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar\napplaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?\n\nHe appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as\nwell as by the State.\n\nYou see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.\n\nI imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a\nblind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour.\n\nExcellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing\nto this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike\ndesires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his\ngeneral habit of life?\n\nTrue.\n\nDo you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his\nrogueries?\n\nWhere must I look?\n\nYou should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting\ndishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.\n\nAye.\n\nIt will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give\nhim a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced\nvirtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by\nreason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he\ntrembles for his possessions.\n\nTo be sure.\n\nYes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires\nof the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to\nspend what is not his own.\n\nYes, and they will be strong in him too.\n\nThe man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not\none; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over\nhis inferior ones.\n\nTrue.\n\nFor these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most\npeople; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will\nflee far away and never come near him.\n\nI should expect so.\n\nAnd surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a\nState for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition;\nhe will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he\nof awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join\nin the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small\npart only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses\nthe prize and saves his money.\n\nVery true.\n\nCan we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers\nto the oligarchical State?\n\nThere can be no doubt.\n\nNext comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be\nconsidered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the\ndemocratic man, and bring him up for judgment.\n\nThat, he said, is our method.\n\nWell, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy\narise? Is it not on this wise?\u2014The good at which such a State aims is\nto become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?\n\nWhat then?\n\nThe rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth,\nrefuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth\nbecause they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy\nup their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of\nmoderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any\nconsiderable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.\n\nThat is tolerably clear.\n\nAnd in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and\nextravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?\n\nYes, often.\n\nAnd still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and\nfully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their\ncitizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and\nconspire against those who have got their property, and against\neverybody else, and are eager for revolution.\n\nThat is true.\n\nOn the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and\npretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert\ntheir sting\u2014that is, their money\u2014into some one else who is not on his\nguard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over\nmultiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper\nto abound in the State.\n\nYes, he said, there are plenty of them\u2014that is certain.\n\nThe evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either\nby restricting a man\u2019s use of his own property, or by another remedy:\n\nWhat other?\n\nOne which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the\ncitizens to look to their characters:\u2014Let there be a general rule that\nevery one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and\nthere will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of\nwhich we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.\n\nYes, they will be greatly lessened.\n\nAt present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named,\ntreat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially\nthe young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of\nluxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are\nincapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.\n\nVery true.\n\nThey themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as\nthe pauper to the cultivation of virtue.\n\nYes, quite as indifferent.\n\nSuch is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often\nrulers and their subjects may come in one another\u2019s way, whether on a\njourney or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a\nmarch, as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe\nthe behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger\u2014for where\ndanger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the\nrich\u2014and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle\nat the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and\nhas plenty of superfluous flesh\u2014when he sees such an one puffing and at\nhis wits\u2019-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like\nhim are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And\nwhen they meet in private will not people be saying to one another \u2018Our\nwarriors are not good for much\u2019?\n\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.\n\nAnd, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from\nwithout may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no\nexternal provocation a commotion may arise within\u2014in the same way\nwherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be\nillness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party\nintroducing from without their oligarchical, the other their\ndemocratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with\nherself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external\ncause.\n\nYes, surely.\n\nAnd then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their\nopponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder\nthey give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of\ngovernment in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.\n\nYes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution\nhas been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite\nparty to withdraw.\n\nAnd now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government\nhave they? for as the government is, such will be the man.\n\nClearly, he said.\n\nIn the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of\nfreedom and frankness\u2014a man may say and do what he likes?\n\n\u2019Tis said so, he replied.\n\nAnd where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for\nhimself his own life as he pleases?\n\nClearly.\n\nThen in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human\nnatures?\n\nThere will.\n\nThis, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an\nembroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just\nas women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things\nmost charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is\nspangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be\nthe fairest of States.\n\nYes.\n\nYes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a\ngovernment.\n\nWhy?\n\nBecause of the liberty which reigns there\u2014they have a complete\nassortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a\nState, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a\nbazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him;\nthen, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.\n\nHe will be sure to have patterns enough.\n\nAnd there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State,\neven if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or\ngo to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at\npeace, unless you are so disposed\u2014there being no necessity also,\nbecause some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you\nshould not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy\u2014is not this\na way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?\n\nFor the moment, yes.\n\nAnd is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite\ncharming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons,\nalthough they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where\nthey are and walk about the world\u2014the gentleman parades like a hero,\nand nobody sees or cares?\n\nYes, he replied, many and many a one.\n\nSee too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the \u2018don\u2019t\ncare\u2019 about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine\nprinciples which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city\u2014as\nwhen we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature,\nthere never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used\nto play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study\u2014how\ngrandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet,\nnever giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and\npromoting to honour any one who professes to be the people\u2019s friend.\n\nYes, she is of a noble spirit.\n\nThese and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which\nis a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and\ndispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\nWe know her well.\n\nConsider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather\nconsider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nIs not this the way\u2014he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical\nfather who has trained him in his own habits?\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are\nof the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are\ncalled unnecessary?\n\nObviously.\n\nWould you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the\nnecessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?\n\nI should.\n\nAre not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of\nwhich the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called\nso, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial\nand what is necessary, and cannot help it.\n\nTrue.\n\nWe are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?\n\nWe are not.\n\nAnd the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his\nyouth upwards\u2014of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in\nsome cases the reverse of good\u2014shall we not be right in saying that all\nthese are unnecessary?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nSuppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have\na general notion of them?\n\nVery good.\n\nWill not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments,\nin so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the\nnecessary class?\n\nThat is what I should suppose.\n\nThe pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it\nis essential to the continuance of life?\n\nYes.\n\nBut the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for\nhealth?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other\nluxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and\ntrained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul\nin the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?\n\nVery true.\n\nMay we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money\nbecause they conduce to production?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds\ngood?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures\nand desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires,\nwhereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and\noligarchical?\n\nVery true.\n\nAgain, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the\noligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.\n\nWhat is the process?\n\nWhen a young man who has been brought up as we were just now\ndescribing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones\u2019 honey and\nhas come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to\nprovide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of\npleasure\u2014then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the\noligarchical principle within him into the democratical?\n\nInevitably.\n\nAnd as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected\nby an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so\ntoo the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without\nto assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again\nhelping that which is akin and alike?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within\nhim, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or\nrebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite\nfaction, and he goes to war with himself.\n\nIt must be so.\n\nAnd there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the\noligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a\nspirit of reverence enters into the young man\u2019s soul and order is\nrestored.\n\nYes, he said, that sometimes happens.\n\nAnd then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones\nspring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not\nknow how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.\n\nYes, he said, that is apt to be the way.\n\nThey draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse\nwith them, breed and multiply in him.\n\nVery true.\n\nAt length they seize upon the citadel of the young man\u2019s soul, which\nthey perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and\ntrue words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to\nthe gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.\n\nNone better.\n\nFalse and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their\nplace.\n\nThey are certain to do so.\n\nAnd so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and\ntakes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be\nsent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain\nconceits shut the gate of the king\u2019s fastness; and they will neither\nallow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the\nfatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them.\nThere is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they\ncall silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and\ntemperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire\nand cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly\nexpenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble\nof evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.\n\nYes, with a will.\n\nAnd when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now\nin their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries,\nthe next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy\nand waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads,\nand a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them\nby sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and\nwaste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes\nout of his original nature, which was trained in the school of\nnecessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary\npleasures.\n\nYes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.\n\nAfter this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on\nunnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be\nfortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have\nelapsed, and the heyday of passion is over\u2014supposing that he then\nre-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not\nwholly give himself up to their successors\u2014in that case he balances his\npleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of\nhimself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn;\nand when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he\ndespises none of them but encourages them all equally.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNeither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of\nadvice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the\nsatisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires,\nand that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the\nothers\u2014whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says\nthat they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.\n\nYes, he said; that is the way with him.\n\nYes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the\nhour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute;\nthen he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a\nturn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then\nonce more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with\npolitics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into\nhis head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is\nin that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life\nhas neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy\nand bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.\n\nYes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.\n\nYes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the\nlives of many;\u2014he answers to the State which we described as fair and\nspangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their\npattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is\ncontained in him.\n\nJust so.\n\nLet him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the\ndemocratic man.\n\nLet that be his place, he said.\n\nLast of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike,\ntyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nSay then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?\u2014that it has a\ndemocratic origin is evident.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as\ndemocracy from oligarchy\u2014I mean, after a sort?\n\nHow?\n\nThe good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it\nwas maintained was excess of wealth\u2014am I not right?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things\nfor the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings\nher to dissolution?\n\nWhat good?\n\nFreedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the\nglory of the State\u2014and that therefore in a democracy alone will the\nfreeman of nature deign to dwell.\n\nYes; the saying is in every body\u2019s mouth.\n\nI was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the\nneglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which\noccasions a demand for tyranny.\n\nHow so?\n\nWhen a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers\npresiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine\nof freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a\nplentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and\nsays that they are cursed oligarchs.\n\nYes, he replied, a very common occurrence.\n\nYes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves\nwho hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are\nlike rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her\nown heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public.\nNow, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBy degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by\ngetting among the animals and infecting them.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his\nsons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he\nhaving no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is\nhis freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen\nwith the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.\n\nYes, he said, that is the way.\n\nAnd these are not the only evils, I said\u2014there are several lesser ones:\nIn such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars,\nand the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are\nall alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready\nto compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the\nyoung and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be\nthought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners\nof the young.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nThe last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with\nmoney, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser;\nnor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes\nin relation to each other.\n\nWhy not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?\n\nThat is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does\nnot know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the\nanimals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in\nany other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as\ngood as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of\nmarching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they\nwill run at any body who comes in their way if he does not leave the\nroad clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with\nliberty.\n\nWhen I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you\ndescribe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.\n\nAnd above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the\ncitizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of\nauthority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the\nlaws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.\n\nYes, he said, I know it too well.\n\nSuch, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of\nwhich springs tyranny.\n\nGlorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?\n\nThe ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease\nmagnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy\u2014the truth\nbeing that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction\nin the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons\nand in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.\n\nTrue.\n\nThe excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to\npass into excess of slavery.\n\nYes, the natural order.\n\nAnd so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most\naggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of\nliberty?\n\nAs we might expect.\n\nThat, however, was not, as I believe, your question\u2014you rather desired\nto know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and\ndemocracy, and is the ruin of both?\n\nJust so, he replied.\n\nWell, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of\nwhom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the\nfollowers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless,\nand others having stings.\n\nA very just comparison.\n\nThese two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are\ngenerated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good\nphysician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to\nkeep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in;\nand if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and\ntheir cells cut out as speedily as possible.\n\nYes, by all means, he said.\n\nThen, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us\nimagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes;\nfor in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the\ndemocratic than there were in the oligarchical State.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.\n\nHow so?\n\nBecause in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from\noffice, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in\na democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the\nkeener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do\nnot suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies\nalmost everything is managed by the drones.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nThen there is another class which is always being severed from the\nmass.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThey are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be\nthe richest.\n\nNaturally so.\n\nThey are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of\nhoney to the drones.\n\nWhy, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have\nlittle.\n\nAnd this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.\n\nThat is pretty much the case, he said.\n\nThe people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their\nown hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon.\nThis, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a\ndemocracy.\n\nTrue, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate\nunless they get a little honey.\n\nAnd do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of\ntheir estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time\ntaking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?\n\nWhy, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.\n\nAnd the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to\ndefend themselves before the people as they best can?\n\nWhat else can they do?\n\nAnd then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge\nthem with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord,\nbut through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers,\nseeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become\noligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the\ndrones torments them and breeds revolution in them.\n\nThat is exactly the truth.\n\nThen come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.\n\nTrue.\n\nThe people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse\ninto greatness.\n\nYes, that is their way.\n\nThis and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he\nfirst appears above ground he is a protector.\n\nYes, that is quite clear.\n\nHow then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when\nhe does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple\nof Lycaean Zeus.\n\nWhat tale?\n\nThe tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human\nvictim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to\nbecome a wolf. Did you never hear it?\n\nOh, yes.\n\nAnd the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at\nhis disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen;\nby the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court\nand murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy\ntongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills\nand others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of\ndebts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny?\nMust he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a\nman become a wolf\u2014that is, a tyrant?\n\nInevitably.\n\nThis, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?\n\nThe same.\n\nAfter a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his\nenemies, a tyrant full grown.\n\nThat is clear.\n\nAnd if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death\nby a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.\n\nYes, he said, that is their usual way.\n\nThen comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of\nall those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career\u2014\u2018Let not the\npeople\u2019s friend,\u2019 as they say, \u2018be lost to them.\u2019\n\nExactly.\n\nThe people readily assent; all their fears are for him\u2014they have none\nfor themselves.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of\nthe people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,\n\n\u2018By pebbly Hermus\u2019 shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to\nbe a coward.\u2019\n\nAnd quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed\nagain.\n\nBut if he is caught he dies.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not \u2018larding the\nplain\u2019 with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up\nin the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer\nprotector, but tyrant absolute.\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\nAnd now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State\nin which a creature like him is generated.\n\nYes, he said, let us consider that.\n\nAt first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he\nsalutes every one whom he meets;\u2014he to be called a tyrant, who is\nmaking promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and\ndistributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so\nkind and good to every one!\n\nOf course, he said.\n\nBut when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and\nthere is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some\nwar or other, in order that the people may require a leader.\n\nTo be sure.\n\nHas he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished\nby payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their\ndaily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom,\nand of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for\ndestroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all\nthese reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.\n\nHe must.\n\nNow he begins to grow unpopular.\n\nA necessary result.\n\nThen some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power,\nspeak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of\nthem cast in his teeth what is being done.\n\nYes, that may be expected.\n\nAnd the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot\nstop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.\n\nHe cannot.\n\nAnd therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is\nhigh-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of\nthem all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no,\nuntil he has made a purgation of the State.\n\nYes, he said, and a rare purgation.\n\nYes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the\nbody; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he\ndoes the reverse.\n\nIf he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.\n\nWhat a blessed alternative, I said:\u2014to be compelled to dwell only with\nthe many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!\n\nYes, that is the alternative.\n\nAnd the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more\nsatellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?\n\nThey will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.\n\nBy the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every\nland.\n\nYes, he said, there are.\n\nBut will he not desire to get them on the spot?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nHe will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free\nand enrol them in his body-guard.\n\nTo be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.\n\nWhat a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to\ndeath the others and has these for his trusted friends.\n\nYes, he said; they are quite of his sort.\n\nYes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into\nexistence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate\nand avoid him.\n\nOf course.\n\nVerily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.\n\nWhy so?\n\nWhy, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,\n\n\u2018Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;\u2019\n\nand he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant\nmakes his companions.\n\nYes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other\nthings of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.\n\nAnd therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us\nand any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into\nour State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.\n\nYes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.\n\nBut they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire\nvoices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to\ntyrannies and democracies.\n\nVery true.\n\nMoreover, they are paid for this and receive honour\u2014the greatest\nhonour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from\ndemocracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more\ntheir reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to\nproceed further.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and\nenquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various\nand ever-changing army of his.\n\nIf, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate\nand spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may\nsuffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise\nhave to impose upon the people.\n\nAnd when these fail?\n\nWhy, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or\nfemale, will be maintained out of his father\u2019s estate.\n\nYou mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being,\nwill maintain him and his companions?\n\nYes, he said; they cannot help themselves.\n\nBut what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son\nought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be\nsupported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or\nsettle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should\nhimself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and\nhis rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect\nhim, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government\nof the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him\nand his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of\nthe house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.\n\nBy heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has\nbeen fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he\nwill find that he is weak and his son strong.\n\nWhy, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What!\nbeat his father if he opposes him?\n\nYes, he will, having first disarmed him.\n\nThen he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and\nthis is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as\nthe saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the\nslavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of\nslaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into\nthe harshest and bitterest form of slavery.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nVery well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently\ndiscussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from\ndemocracy to tyranny?\n\nYes, quite enough, he said.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK IX.\n\n\nLast of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to\nask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in\nhappiness or in misery?\n\nYes, he said, he is the only one remaining.\n\nThere is, however, I said, a previous question which remains\nunanswered.\n\nWhat question?\n\nI do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number\nof the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will\nalways be confused.\n\nWell, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.\n\nVery true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand:\nCertain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be\nunlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are\ncontrolled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail\nover them\u2014either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak;\nwhile in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of\nthem.\n\nWhich appetites do you mean?\n\nI mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling\npower is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or\ndrink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his\ndesires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime\u2014not excepting\nincest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of\nforbidden food\u2014which at such a time, when he has parted company with\nall shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nBut when a man\u2019s pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going\nto sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble\nthoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having\nfirst indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just\nenough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and\npains from interfering with the higher principle\u2014which he leaves in the\nsolitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the\nknowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when\nagain he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel\nagainst any one\u2014I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational\nprinciples, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes\nhis rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least\nlikely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.\n\nI quite agree.\n\nIn saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point\nwhich I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is\na lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider\nwhether I am right, and you agree with me.\n\nYes, I agree.\n\nAnd now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic\nman. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under\na miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but\ndiscountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and\nornament?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of\npeople, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite\nextreme from an abhorrence of his father\u2019s meanness. At last, being a\nbetter man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until\nhe halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but\nof what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this\nmanner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?\n\nYes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.\n\nAnd now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive\nthis man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his\nfather\u2019s principles.\n\nI can imagine him.\n\nThen you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which\nhas already happened to the father:\u2014he is drawn into a perfectly\nlawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his\nfather and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the\nopposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire\nmagicians and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on\nhim, they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over\nhis idle and spendthrift lusts\u2014a sort of monstrous winged drone\u2014that is\nthe only image which will adequately describe him.\n\nYes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.\n\nAnd when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and\ngarlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let\nloose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of\ndesire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this\nlord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks\nout into a frenzy: and if he finds in himself any good opinions or\nappetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of\nshame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts\nthem forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness\nto the full.\n\nYes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.\n\nAnd is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?\n\nI should not wonder.\n\nFurther, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?\n\nHe has.\n\nAnd you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will\nfancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the\ngods?\n\nThat he will.\n\nAnd the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being\nwhen, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he\nbecomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nSuch is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?\n\nSuppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.\n\nI imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be\nfeasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort\nof thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the\nconcerns of his soul.\n\nThat is certain.\n\nYes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable,\nand their demands are many.\n\nThey are indeed, he said.\n\nHis revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen comes debt and the cutting down of his property.\n\nOf course.\n\nWhen he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest\nlike young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them,\nand especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them,\nis in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil\nof his property, in order that he may gratify them?\n\nYes, that is sure to be the case.\n\nHe must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and\npangs.\n\nHe must.\n\nAnd as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got\nthe better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger\nwill claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has\nspent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.\n\nNo doubt he will.\n\nAnd if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to\ncheat and deceive them.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.\n\nYes, probably.\n\nAnd if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend?\nWill the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?\n\nNay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.\n\nBut, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a\nharlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe\nthat he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary\nto his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the\nother, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under\nlike circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father,\nfirst and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some\nnewly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?\n\nYes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.\n\nTruly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and\nmother.\n\nHe is indeed, he replied.\n\nHe first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are\nbeginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a\nhouse, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he\nproceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had\nwhen a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are\noverthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are\nnow the body-guard of love and share his empire. These in his\ndemocratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his\nfather, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is\nunder the dominion of love, he becomes always and in waking reality\nwhat he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the\nfoulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid\nact. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and\nbeing himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the\nperformance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and\nthe rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications\nhave brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to\nbreak loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself.\nHave we not here a picture of his way of life?\n\nYes, indeed, he said.\n\nAnd if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the\npeople are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or\nmercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for\na war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little\npieces of mischief in the city.\n\nWhat sort of mischief?\n\nFor example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads,\nrobbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able\nto speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.\n\nA small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in\nnumber.\n\nYes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these\nthings, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not\ncome within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and\ntheir followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength,\nassisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among\nthemselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him\nthey create their tyrant.\n\nYes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.\n\nIf the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began\nby beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he\nbeats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the\nCretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has\nintroduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his\npassions and desires.\n\nExactly.\n\nWhen such men are only private individuals and before they get power,\nthis is their character; they associate entirely with their own\nflatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they\nin their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess\nevery sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point\nthey know them no more.\n\nYes, truly.\n\nThey are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of\nanybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd may we not rightly call such men treacherous?\n\nNo question.\n\nAlso they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of\njustice?\n\nYes, he said, and we were perfectly right.\n\nLet us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man:\nhe is the waking reality of what we dreamed.\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the\nlonger he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.\n\nThat is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.\n\nAnd will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the\nmost miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most\ncontinually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion\nof men in general?\n\nYes, he said, inevitably.\n\nAnd must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the\ndemocratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the\nothers?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation\nto man?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThen comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city\nwhich is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?\n\nThey are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and\nthe other is the very worst.\n\nThere can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I\nwill at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision\nabout their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow\nourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is\nonly a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us\ngo as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and\nthen we will give our opinion.\n\nA fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a\ntyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king\nthe happiest.\n\nAnd in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request,\nthat I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through\nhuman nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and\nis dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to\nthe beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose\nthat the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able\nto judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at\nhis dally life and known him in his family relations, where he may be\nseen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public\ndanger\u2014he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant\nwhen compared with other men?\n\nThat again, he said, is a very fair proposal.\n\nShall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and\nhave before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who\nwill answer our enquiries.\n\nBy all means.\n\nLet me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the\nState; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other\nof them, will you tell me their respective conditions?\n\nWhat do you mean? he asked.\n\nBeginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is\ngoverned by a tyrant is free or enslaved?\n\nNo city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.\n\nAnd yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a\nState?\n\nYes, he said, I see that there are\u2014a few; but the people, speaking\ngenerally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.\n\nThen if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule\nprevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity\u2014the best elements\nin him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also\nthe worst and maddest.\n\nInevitably.\n\nAnd would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a\nfreeman, or of a slave?\n\nHe has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.\n\nAnd the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of\nacting voluntarily?\n\nUtterly incapable.\n\nAnd also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul\ntaken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is\na gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?\n\nPoor.\n\nAnd the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\nIs there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and\nsorrow and groaning and pain?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery\nthan in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?\n\nImpossible.\n\nReflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State\nto be the most miserable of States?\n\nAnd I was right, he said.\n\nCertainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical\nman, what do you say of him?\n\nI say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.\n\nThere, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.\n\nThen who is more miserable?\n\nOne of whom I am about to speak.\n\nWho is that?\n\nHe who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life\nhas been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.\n\nFrom what has been said, I gather that you are right.\n\nYes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more\ncertain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this\nrespecting good and evil is the greatest.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nLet me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a\nlight upon this subject.\n\nWhat is your illustration?\n\nThe case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from\nthem you may form an idea of the tyrant\u2019s condition, for they both have\nslaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.\n\nYes, that is the difference.\n\nYou know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from\ntheir servants?\n\nWhat should they fear?\n\nNothing. But do you observe the reason of this?\n\nYes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the\nprotection of each individual.\n\nVery true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of\nsome fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves,\ncarried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to\nhelp him\u2014will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and\nchildren should be put to death by his slaves?\n\nYes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.\n\nThe time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his\nslaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things,\nmuch against his will\u2014he will have to cajole his own servants.\n\nYes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.\n\nAnd suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with\nneighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and\nwho, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?\n\nHis case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere\nsurrounded and watched by enemies.\n\nAnd is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound\u2014he\nwho being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of\nfears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all\nmen in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the\nthings which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like\na woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who\ngoes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own\nperson\u2014the tyrannical man, I mean\u2014whom you just now decided to be the\nmost miserable of all\u2014will not he be yet more miserable when, instead\nof leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public\ntyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself:\nhe is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his\nlife, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.\n\nYes, he said, the similitude is most exact.\n\nIs not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead\na worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?\n\nCertainly.\n\nHe who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave,\nand is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to\nbe the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is\nutterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is\ntruly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his\nlife long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and\ndistractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the\nresemblance holds?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nMoreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power:\nhe becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more\nunjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the\npurveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is\nthat he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as\nmiserable as himself.\n\nNo man of any sense will dispute your words.\n\nCome then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests\nproclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first\nin the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others\nfollow: there are five of them in all\u2014they are the royal, timocratical,\noligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.\n\nThe decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses\ncoming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they\nenter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.\n\nNeed we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston\n(the best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest,\nand that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself;\nand that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and\nthat this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the\ngreatest tyrant of his State?\n\nMake the proclamation yourself, he said.\n\nAnd shall I add, \u2018whether seen or unseen by gods and men\u2019?\n\nLet the words be added.\n\nThen this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which\nmay also have some weight.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that\nthe individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three\nprinciples, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.\n\nOf what nature?\n\nIt seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures\ncorrespond; also three desires and governing powers.\n\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\nThere is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns,\nanother with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no\nspecial name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the\nextraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and\ndrinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of\nit; also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by\nthe help of money.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\nIf we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were\nconcerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single\nnotion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul\nas loving gain or money.\n\nI agree with you.\n\nAgain, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and\nconquering and getting fame?\n\nTrue.\n\nSuppose we call it the contentious or ambitious\u2014would the term be\nsuitable?\n\nExtremely suitable.\n\nOn the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is\nwholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others\nfor gain or fame.\n\nFar less.\n\n\u2018Lover of wisdom,\u2019 \u2018lover of knowledge,\u2019 are titles which we may fitly\napply to that part of the soul?\n\nCertainly.\n\nOne principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in\nothers, as may happen?\n\nYes.\n\nThen we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of\nmen\u2014lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?\n\nVery true.\n\nNow, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn\nwhich of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his\nown and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the\nvanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid\nadvantages of gold and silver?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd the lover of honour\u2014what will be his opinion? Will he not think\nthat the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning,\nif it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on\nother pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth,\nand in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the\nheaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary,\nunder the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would\nrather not have them?\n\nThere can be no doubt of that, he replied.\n\nSince, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in\ndispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable,\nor better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless\u2014how\nshall we know who speaks truly?\n\nI cannot myself tell, he said.\n\nWell, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience\nand wisdom and reason?\n\nThere cannot be a better, he said.\n\nThen, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest\nexperience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of\ngain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of\nthe pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of\ngain?\n\nThe philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of\nnecessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his\nchildhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not\nof necessity tasted\u2014or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could\nhardly have tasted\u2014the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.\n\nThen the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain,\nfor he has a double experience?\n\nYes, very great.\n\nAgain, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the\nlover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?\n\nNay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their\nobject; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have\ntheir crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have\nexperience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be\nfound in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.\n\nHis experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?\n\nFar better.\n\nAnd he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?\n\nCertainly.\n\nFurther, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not\npossessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the\nphilosopher?\n\nWhat faculty?\n\nReason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?\n\nCertainly.\n\nIf wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the\nlover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nOr if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the\nambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?\n\nClearly.\n\nBut since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges\u2014\n\nThe only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are\napproved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.\n\nAnd so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent\npart of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in\nwhom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.\n\nUnquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he\napproves of his own life.\n\nAnd what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the\npleasure which is next?\n\nClearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to\nhimself than the money-maker.\n\nLast comes the lover of gain?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nTwice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in\nthis conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to\nOlympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure\nexcept that of the wise is quite true and pure\u2014all others are a shadow\nonly; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of\nfalls?\n\nYes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?\n\nI will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.\n\nProceed.\n\nSay, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?\n\nThere is.\n\nA state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about\neither\u2014that is what you mean?\n\nYes.\n\nYou remember what people say when they are sick?\n\nWhat do they say?\n\nThat after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never\nknew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.\n\nYes, I know, he said.\n\nAnd when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard\nthem say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their\npain?\n\nI have.\n\nAnd there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and\ncessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them\nas the greatest pleasure?\n\nYes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at\nrest.\n\nAgain, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be\npainful?\n\nDoubtless, he said.\n\nThen the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be\npain?\n\nSo it would seem.\n\nBut can that which is neither become both?\n\nI should say not.\n\nAnd both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?\n\nYes.\n\nBut that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion,\nand in a mean between them?\n\nYes.\n\nHow, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is\npleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThis then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the\nrest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful,\nand painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these\nrepresentations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real\nbut a sort of imposition?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nLook at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and\nyou will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that\npleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.\n\nWhat are they, he said, and where shall I find them?\n\nThere are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell,\nwhich are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a\nmoment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nLet us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the\ncessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.\n\nNo.\n\nStill, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul\nthrough the body are generally of this sort\u2014they are reliefs of pain.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like\nnature?\n\nYes.\n\nShall I give you an illustration of them?\n\nLet me hear.\n\nYou would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and\nmiddle region?\n\nI should.\n\nAnd if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would\nhe not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the\nmiddle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in\nthe upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?\n\nTo be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?\n\nBut if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine,\nthat he was descending?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nAll that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle\nand lower regions?\n\nYes.\n\nThen can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as\nthey have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong\nideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when\nthey are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think\nthe pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when\ndrawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly\nbelieve that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they,\nnot knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain,\nwhich is like contrasting black with grey instead of white\u2014can you\nwonder, I say, at this?\n\nNo, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.\n\nLook at the matter thus:\u2014Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions\nof the bodily state?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that\nwhich has more existence the truer?\n\nClearly, from that which has more.\n\nWhat classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your\njudgment\u2014those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of\nsustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and\nknowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the\nquestion in this way:\u2014Which has a more pure being\u2014that which is\nconcerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of\nsuch a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned\nwith and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and\nmortal?\n\nFar purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the\ninvariable.\n\nAnd does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same\ndegree as of essence?\n\nYes, of knowledge in the same degree.\n\nAnd of truth in the same degree?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of\nessence?\n\nNecessarily.\n\nThen, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the\nbody have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service\nof the soul?\n\nFar less.\n\nAnd has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?\n\nYes.\n\nWhat is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real\nexistence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less\nreal existence and is less real?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according\nto nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will\nmore really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which\nparticipates in less real being will be less truly and surely\nsatisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?\n\nUnquestionably.\n\nThose then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with\ngluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and\nin this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass\ninto the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever\nfind their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do\nthey taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes\nalways looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to\nthe dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their\nexcessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another\nwith horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another\nby reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that\nwhich is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is\nalso unsubstantial and incontinent.\n\nVerily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like\nan oracle.\n\nTheir pleasures are mixed with pains\u2014how can they be otherwise? For\nthey are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by\ncontrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant\nin the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought\nabout as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of\nHelen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.\n\nSomething of that sort must inevitably happen.\n\nAnd must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of\nthe soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into\naction, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or\nviolent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to\nattain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without\nreason or sense?\n\nYes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.\n\nThen may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour,\nwhen they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of\nreason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which\nwisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest\ndegree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and\nthey will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which\nis best for each one is also most natural to him?\n\nYes, certainly; the best is the most natural.\n\nAnd when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there\nis no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their\nown business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of\nwhich they are capable?\n\nExactly.\n\nBut when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in\nattaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a\npleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and\nreason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance\nfrom law and order?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest\ndistance? Yes.\n\nAnd the royal and orderly desires are nearest?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural\npleasure, and the king at the least?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most\npleasantly?\n\nInevitably.\n\nWould you know the measure of the interval which separates them?\n\nWill you tell me?\n\nThere appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now\nthe transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he\nhas run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode\nwith certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure\nof his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the\noligarch; the democrat was in the middle?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an\nimage of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure\nof the oligarch?\n\nHe will.\n\nAnd the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal\nand aristocratical?\n\nYes, he is third.\n\nThen the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number\nwhich is three times three?\n\nManifestly.\n\nThe shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of\nlength will be a plane figure.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no\ndifficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is\nparted from the king.\n\nYes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.\n\nOr if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by\nwhich the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will\nfind him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more\npleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.\n\nWhat a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which\nseparates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!\n\nYet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns\nhuman life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and\nmonths and years. (729 NEARLY equals the number of days and nights in\nthe year.)\n\nYes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.\n\nThen if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil\nand unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of\nlife and in beauty and virtue?\n\nImmeasurably greater.\n\nWell, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we\nmay revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one\nsaying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was\nreputed to be just?\n\nYes, that was said.\n\nNow then, having determined the power and quality of justice and\ninjustice, let us have a little conversation with him.\n\nWhat shall we say to him?\n\nLet us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words\npresented before his eyes.\n\nOf what sort?\n\nAn ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient\nmythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are\nmany others in which two or more different natures are said to grow\ninto one.\n\nThere are said of have been such unions.\n\nThen do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster,\nhaving a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he\nis able to generate and metamorphose at will.\n\nYou suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more\npliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as\nyou propose.\n\nSuppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a\nman, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the\nsecond.\n\nThat, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.\n\nAnd now join them, and let the three grow into one.\n\nThat has been accomplished.\n\nNext fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so\nthat he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull,\nmay believe the beast to be a single human creature.\n\nI have done so, he said.\n\nAnd now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human\ncreature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that,\nif he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the\nmultitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like\nqualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable\nto be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is\nnot to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another\u2014he\nought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.\n\nCertainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.\n\nTo him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so\nspeak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the\nmost complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch\nover the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and\ncultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from\ngrowing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common\ncare of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another\nand with himself.\n\nYes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say.\n\nAnd so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or\nadvantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and\nthe disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?\n\nYes, from every point of view.\n\nCome, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not\nintentionally in error. \u2018Sweet Sir,\u2019 we will say to him, \u2018what think\nyou of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which\nsubjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the\nignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?\u2019 He can hardly avoid\nsaying Yes\u2014can he now?\n\nNot if he has any regard for my opinion.\n\nBut, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question:\n\u2018Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the\ncondition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst?\nWho can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery\nfor money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil\nmen, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he\nreceived? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who\nremorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless\nand detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her\nhusband\u2019s life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse\nruin.\u2019\n\nYes, said Glaucon, far worse\u2014I will answer for him.\n\nHas not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge\nmultiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent\nelement in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this\nsame creature, and make a coward of him?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates\nthe spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money,\nof which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his\nyouth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a\nmonkey?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because\nthey imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual\nis unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them,\nand his great study is how to flatter them.\n\nSuch appears to be the reason.\n\nAnd therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of\nthe best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom\nthe Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the\nservant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom\ndwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external\nauthority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the\nsame government, friends and equals.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the\nally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we\nexercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we\nhave established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a\nstate, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their\nhearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they\nmay go their ways.\n\nYes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.\n\nFrom what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man\nis profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will\nmake him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his\nwickedness?\n\nFrom no point of view at all.\n\nWhat shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He\nwho is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and\npunished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the\ngentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected\nand ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom,\nmore than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and\nhealth, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nTo this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the\nenergies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies\nwhich impress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others?\n\nClearly, he said.\n\nIn the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and\nso far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures,\nthat he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first\nobject will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is\nlikely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to\nattemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?\n\nCertainly he will, if he has true music in him.\n\nAnd in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and\nharmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be\ndazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his\nown infinite harm?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nHe will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no\ndisorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or\nfrom want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and\ngain or spend according to his means.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours\nas he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private\nor public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?\n\nThen, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.\n\nBy the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly\nwill, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a\ndivine call.\n\nI understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we\nare the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe\nthat there is such an one anywhere on earth?\n\nIn heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which\nhe who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in\norder. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is\nno matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having\nnothing to do with any other.\n\nI think so, he said.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK X.\n\n\nOf the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State,\nthere is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule\nabout poetry.\n\nTo what do you refer?\n\nTo the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be\nreceived; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have\nbeen distinguished.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nSpeaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated\nto the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe\u2014but I do not mind\nsaying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the\nunderstanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true\nnature is the only antidote to them.\n\nExplain the purport of your remark.\n\nWell, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth\nhad an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on\nmy lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that\ncharming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than\nthe truth, and therefore I will speak out.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nListen to me then, or rather, answer me.\n\nPut your question.\n\nCan you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.\n\nA likely thing, then, that I should know.\n\nWhy not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the\nkeener.\n\nVery true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint\nnotion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire\nyourself?\n\nWell then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a\nnumber of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a\ncorresponding idea or form:\u2014do you understand me?\n\nI do.\n\nLet us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the\nworld\u2014plenty of them, are there not?\n\nYes.\n\nBut there are only two ideas or forms of them\u2014one the idea of a bed,\nthe other of a table.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our\nuse, in accordance with the idea\u2014that is our way of speaking in this\nand similar instances\u2014but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how\ncould he?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd there is another artist,\u2014I should like to know what you would say\nof him.\n\nWho is he?\n\nOne who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.\n\nWhat an extraordinary man!\n\nWait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For\nthis is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but\nplants and animals, himself and all other things\u2014the earth and heaven,\nand the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the\ngods also.\n\nHe must be a wizard and no mistake.\n\nOh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such\nmaker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all\nthese things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in\nwhich you could make them all yourself?\n\nWhat way?\n\nAn easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat\nmight be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of\nturning a mirror round and round\u2014you would soon enough make the sun and\nthe heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants,\nand all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the\nmirror.\n\nYes, he said; but they would be appearances only.\n\nVery good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too\nis, as I conceive, just such another\u2014a creator of appearances, is he\nnot?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet\nthere is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?\n\nYes, he said, but not a real bed.\n\nAnd what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too\nmakes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the\nbed, but only a particular bed?\n\nYes, I did.\n\nThen if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true\nexistence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to\nsay that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has\nreal existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.\n\nAt any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not\nspeaking the truth.\n\nNo wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of\ntruth.\n\nNo wonder.\n\nSuppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire\nwho this imitator is?\n\nIf you please.\n\nWell then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made\nby God, as I think that we may say\u2014for no one else can be the maker?\n\nNo.\n\nThere is another which is the work of the carpenter?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the work of the painter is a third?\n\nYes.\n\nBeds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who\nsuperintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?\n\nYes, there are three of them.\n\nGod, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and\none only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever\nwill be made by God.\n\nWhy is that?\n\nBecause even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind\nthem which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be\nthe ideal bed and not the two others.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nGod knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a\nparticular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed\nwhich is essentially and by nature one only.\n\nSo we believe.\n\nShall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?\n\nYes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is\nthe author of this and of all other things.\n\nAnd what shall we say of the carpenter\u2014is not he also the maker of the\nbed?\n\nYes.\n\nBut would you call the painter a creator and maker?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nYet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?\n\nI think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of\nthat which the others make.\n\nGood, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature\nan imitator?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other\nimitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?\n\nThat appears to be so.\n\nThen about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?\u2014I\nwould like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which\noriginally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?\n\nThe latter.\n\nAs they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view,\nobliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will\nappear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same\nof all things.\n\nYes, he said, the difference is only apparent.\n\nNow let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting\ndesigned to be\u2014an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear\u2014of\nappearance or of reality?\n\nOf appearance.\n\nThen the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all\nthings because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that\npart an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter,\nor any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he\nis a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he\nshows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will\nfancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all\nthe arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single\nthing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man\u2014whoever tells\nus this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature\nwho is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he\nmet, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to\nanalyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who\nis at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as\nwell as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot\ncompose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this\nknowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also\nthere may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across\nimitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when\nthey saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from\nthe truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth,\nbecause they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all,\nthey may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about\nwhich they seem to the many to speak so well?\n\nThe question, he said, should by all means be considered.\n\nNow do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as\nwell as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the\nimage-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling\nprinciple of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?\n\nI should say not.\n\nThe real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in\nrealities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials\nof himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of\nencomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.\n\nYes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and\nprofit.\n\nThen, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or\nany of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not\ngoing to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like\nAsclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the\nAsclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts\nat second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military\ntactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest\nsubjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. \u2018Friend\nHomer,\u2019 then we say to him, \u2018if you are only in the second remove from\ntruth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third\u2014not an image\nmaker or imitator\u2014and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men\nbetter or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever\nbetter governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to\nLycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly\nbenefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator\nto them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of\nCharondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city\nhas anything to say about you?\u2019 Is there any city which he might name?\n\nI think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend\nthat he was a legislator.\n\nWell, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully\nby him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?\n\nThere is not.\n\nOr is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human\nlife, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other\ningenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?\n\nThere is absolutely nothing of the kind.\n\nBut, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or\nteacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate\nwith him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such\nas was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his\nwisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the\norder which was named after him?\n\nNothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates,\nCreophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name\nalways makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his\nstupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and\nothers in his own day when he was alive?\n\nYes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon,\nthat if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind\u2014if he\nhad possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator\u2014can you imagine, I\nsay, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and\nloved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host\nof others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries: \u2018You will\nnever be able to manage either your own house or your own State until\nyou appoint us to be your ministers of education\u2019\u2014and this ingenious\ndevice of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their\ncompanions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it\nconceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would\nhave allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had\nreally been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as\nunwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to\nstay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the\ndisciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got\neducation enough?\n\nYes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.\n\nThen must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning\nwith Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the\nlike, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who,\nas we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though\nhe understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for\nthose who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and\nfigures.\n\nQuite so.\n\nIn like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay\non the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature\nonly enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as\nhe is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of\ncobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and\nharmony and rhythm, he speaks very well\u2014such is the sweet influence\nwhich melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have\nobserved again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make\nwhen stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in\nsimple prose.\n\nYes, he said.\n\nThey are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only\nblooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?\n\nExactly.\n\nHere is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing\nof true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?\n\nYes.\n\nThen let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half\nan explanation.\n\nProceed.\n\nOf the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a\nbit?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the worker in leather and brass will make them?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay,\nhardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the\nhorseman who knows how to use them\u2014he knows their right form.\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd may we not say the same of all things?\n\nWhat?\n\nThat there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one\nwhich uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or\ninanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which\nnature or the artist has intended them.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he\nmust indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop\nthemselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the\nflute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he\nwill tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to\nhis instructions?\n\nOf course.\n\nThe one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness\nand badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what\nhe is told by him?\n\nTrue.\n\nThe instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it\nthe maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain\nfrom him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what\nhe has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no\nhis drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from\nbeing compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him\ninstructions about what he should draw?\n\nNeither.\n\nThen he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge\nabout the goodness or badness of his imitations?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nThe imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about\nhis own creations?\n\nNay, very much the reverse.\n\nAnd still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing\ngood or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which\nappears to be good to the ignorant multitude?\n\nJust so.\n\nThus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no\nknowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a\nkind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in\nIambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to\nbe concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small\nwhen seen at a distance?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water,\nand crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to\nthe illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every\nsort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of\nthe human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light\nand shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon\nus like magic.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue\nof the human understanding\u2014there is the beauty of them\u2014and the apparent\ngreater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over\nus, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational\nprinciple in the soul?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd when this principle measures and certifies that some things are\nequal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an\napparent contradiction?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible\u2014the same\nfaculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same\nthing?\n\nVery true.\n\nThen that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is\nnot the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to\nmeasure and calculation?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of\nthe soul?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nThis was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said\nthat painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their\nown proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and\nfriends and associates of a principle within us which is equally\nremoved from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.\n\nExactly.\n\nThe imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has\ninferior offspring.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the\nhearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?\n\nProbably the same would be true of poetry.\n\nDo not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of\npainting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with\nwhich poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.\n\nBy all means.\n\nWe may state the question thus:\u2014Imitation imitates the actions of men,\nwhether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or\nbad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there\nanything more?\n\nNo, there is nothing else.\n\nBut in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with\nhimself\u2014or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and\nopposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there\nnot strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise\nthe question again, for I remember that all this has been already\nadmitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these\nand ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?\n\nAnd we were right, he said.\n\nYes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which\nmust now be supplied.\n\nWhat was the omission?\n\nWere we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his\nson or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with\nmore equanimity than another?\n\nYes.\n\nBut will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot\nhelp sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?\n\nThe latter, he said, is the truer statement.\n\nTell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his\nsorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?\n\nIt will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.\n\nWhen he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things\nwhich he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?\n\nTrue.\n\nThere is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as\nwell as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his\nsorrow?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the\nsame object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct\nprinciples in him?\n\nCertainly.\n\nOne of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nThe law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that\nwe should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether\nsuch things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience;\nalso, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands\nin the way of that which at the moment is most required.\n\nWhat is most required? he asked.\n\nThat we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice\nhave been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best;\nnot, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck\nand wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul\nforthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and\nfallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.\n\nYes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.\n\nYes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this\nsuggestion of reason?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our\ntroubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may\ncall irrational, useless, and cowardly?\n\nIndeed, we may.\n\nAnd does not the latter\u2014I mean the rebellious principle\u2014furnish a great\nvariety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm\ntemperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to\nappreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a\npromiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling\nrepresented is one to which they are strangers.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature\nmade, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational\nprinciple in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful\ntemper, which is easily imitated?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the\npainter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his\ncreations have an inferior degree of truth\u2014in this, I say, he is like\nhim; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part\nof the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him\ninto a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and\nstrengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the\nevil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the\nway, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants\nan evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has\nno discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one\ntime great and at another small\u2014he is a manufacturer of images and is\nvery far removed from the truth.\n\nExactly.\n\nBut we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our\naccusation:\u2014the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and\nthere are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?\n\nYes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.\n\nHear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a\npassage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some\npitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or\nweeping, and smiting his breast\u2014the best of us, you know, delight in\ngiving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the\npoet who stirs our feelings most.\n\nYes, of course I know.\n\nBut when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that\nwe pride ourselves on the opposite quality\u2014we would fain be quiet and\npatient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in\nthe recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNow can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that\nwhich any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own\nperson?\n\nNo, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.\n\nNay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.\n\nWhat point of view?\n\nIf you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural\nhunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and\nthat this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is\nsatisfied and delighted by the poets;\u2014the better nature in each of us,\nnot having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the\nsympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another\u2019s; and\nthe spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in\npraising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he\nis, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure\nis a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem\ntoo? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil\nof other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so\nthe feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the\nmisfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.\n\nHow very true!\n\nAnd does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests\nwhich you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic\nstage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused\nby them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;\u2014the case\nof pity is repeated;\u2014there is a principle in human nature which is\ndisposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by\nreason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let\nout again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre,\nyou are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet\nat home.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nAnd the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other\naffections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be\ninseparable from every action\u2014in all of them poetry feeds and waters\nthe passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although\nthey ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in\nhappiness and virtue.\n\nI cannot deny it.\n\nTherefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists\nof Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he\nis profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and\nthat you should take him up again and again and get to know him and\nregulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those\nwho say these things\u2014they are excellent people, as far as their lights\nextend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of\npoets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our\nconviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the\nonly poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go\nbeyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or\nlyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent\nhave ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in\nour State.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our\ndefence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in\nsending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we\nhave described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute\nto us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there\nis an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are\nmany proofs, such as the saying of \u2018the yelping hound howling at her\nlord,\u2019 or of one \u2018mighty in the vain talk of fools,\u2019 and \u2018the mob of\nsages circumventing Zeus,\u2019 and the \u2018subtle thinkers who are beggars\nafter all\u2019; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity\nbetween them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and\nthe sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to\nexist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her\u2014we\nare very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray\nthe truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as\nI am, especially when she appears in Homer?\n\nYes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.\n\nShall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but\nupon this condition only\u2014that she make a defence of herself in lyrical\nor some other metre?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of\npoetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her\nbehalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to\nStates and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if\nthis can be proved we shall surely be the gainers\u2014I mean, if there is a\nuse in poetry as well as a delight?\n\nCertainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.\n\nIf her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are\nenamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they\nthink their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we\nafter the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle.\nWe too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble\nStates has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at\nher best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her\ndefence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will\nrepeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not\nfall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At\nall events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have\ndescribed is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth;\nand he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is\nwithin him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our\nwords his law.\n\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you.\n\nYes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater\nthan appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one\nbe profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or\nunder the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?\n\nYes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that\nany one else would have been.\n\nAnd yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards\nwhich await virtue.\n\nWhat, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an\ninconceivable greatness.\n\nWhy, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of\nthree score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison\nwith eternity?\n\nSay rather \u2018nothing,\u2019 he replied.\n\nAnd should an immortal being seriously think of this little space\nrather than of the whole?\n\nOf the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?\n\nAre you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and\nimperishable?\n\nHe looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you\nreally prepared to maintain this?\n\nYes, I said, I ought to be, and you too\u2014there is no difficulty in\nproving it.\n\nI see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this\nargument of which you make so light.\n\nListen then.\n\nI am attending.\n\nThere is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?\n\nYes, he replied.\n\nWould you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying\nelement is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as\nophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as\nmildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in\neverything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and\ndisease?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and\nat last wholly dissolves and dies?\n\nTrue.\n\nThe vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each;\nand if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for\ngood certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither\ngood nor evil.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nIf, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption\ncannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a\nnature there is no destruction?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nWell, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?\n\nYes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in\nreview: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.\n\nBut does any of these dissolve or destroy her?\u2014and here do not let us\nfall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when\nhe is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of\nthe soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a\ndisease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the\nthings of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through\ntheir own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so\ndestroying them. Is not this true?\n\nYes.\n\nConsider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil\nwhich exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to\nthe soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so\nseparate her from the body?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish\nfrom without through affection of external evil which could not be\ndestroyed from within by a corruption of its own?\n\nIt is, he replied.\n\nConsider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether\nstaleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to\nthe actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the\nbadness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say\nthat the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is\ndisease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be\ndestroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not\nengender any natural infection\u2014this we shall absolutely deny?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil\nof the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can\nbe dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?\n\nYes, he said, there is reason in that.\n\nEither, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains\nunrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the\nknife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into\nthe minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved\nto become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things\nbeing done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not\ndestroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is\nnot to be affirmed by any man.\n\nAnd surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men\nbecome more unjust in consequence of death.\n\nBut if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul\nboldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil\nand unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that\ninjustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and\nthat those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of\ndestruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but\nin quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive\ndeath at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?\n\nNay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not\nbe so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I\nrather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which,\nif it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive\u2014aye,\nand well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a\nhouse of death.\n\nTrue, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is\nunable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to\nbe the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else\nexcept that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.\n\nYes, that can hardly be.\n\nBut the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or\nexternal, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be\nimmortal?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThat is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the\nsouls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not\ndiminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the\nimmortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would\nthus end in immortality.\n\nVery true.\n\nBut this we cannot believe\u2014reason will not allow us\u2014any more than we\ncan believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and\ndifference and dissimilarity.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nThe soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the\nfairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nHer immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are\nmany other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now\nbehold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you\nmust contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity;\nand then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all\nthe things which we have described will be manifested more clearly.\nThus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at\npresent, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a\ncondition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose\noriginal image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are\nbroken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways,\nand incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and\nstones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own\nnatural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition,\ndisfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must\nwe look.\n\nWhere then?\n\nAt her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society\nand converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal\nand eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly\nfollowing this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of\nthe ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and\nshells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up\naround her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good\nthings of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she\nis, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her\nnature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this\npresent life I think that we have now said enough.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nAnd thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we\nhave not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you\nwere saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her\nown nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature.\nLet a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not,\nand even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of\nHades.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many\nand how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues\nprocure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nWill you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?\n\nWhat did I borrow?\n\nThe assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust\njust: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case\ncould not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this\nadmission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that\npure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?\n\nI should be much to blame if I had forgotten.\n\nThen, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the\nestimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we\nacknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since\nshe has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who\ntruly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that\nso she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which\nshe gives to her own.\n\nThe demand, he said, is just.\n\nIn the first place, I said\u2014and this is the first thing which you will\nhave to give back\u2014the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known\nto the gods.\n\nGranted.\n\nAnd if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the\nother the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all\nthings at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary\nconsequence of former sins?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in\npoverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will\nin the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the\ngods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be\nlike God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit\nof virtue?\n\nYes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.\n\nAnd of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuch, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?\n\nThat is my conviction.\n\nAnd what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and\nyou will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run\nwell from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the\ngoal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish,\nslinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without\na crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize\nand is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to\nthe end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good\nreport and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you\nwere attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you\nwere saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers\nin their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and\ngive in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I\nnow say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the\ngreater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out\nat last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come\nto be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they\nare beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you\ntruly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as\nyou were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder\nof your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting\nthem, that these things are true?\n\nCertainly, he said, what you say is true.\n\nThese, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed\nupon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the\nother good things which justice of herself provides.\n\nYes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.\n\nAnd yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness\nin comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and\nunjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and\nunjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the\nargument owes to them.\n\nSpeak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.\n\nWell, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which\nOdysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero,\nEr the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle,\nand ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up\nalready in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by\ndecay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as\nhe was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them\nwhat he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left\nthe body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came\nto a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth;\nthey were near together, and over against them were two other openings\nin the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges\nseated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them\nand had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the\nheavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were\nbidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also\nbore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew\nnear, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry\nthe report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see\nall that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw\non one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth\nwhen sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings\nother souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with\ntravel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving\never and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they\nwent forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a\nfestival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the\nsouls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above,\nand the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they\ntold one another of what had happened by the way, those from below\nweeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had\nendured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey\nlasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing\nheavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story,\nGlaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:\u2014He said\nthat for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered\ntenfold; or once in a hundred years\u2014such being reckoned to be the\nlength of man\u2019s life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a\nthousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause\nof many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been\nguilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences\nthey received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence\nand justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly\nrepeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as\nthey were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of\nmurderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he\ndescribed. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits\nasked another, \u2018Where is Ardiaeus the Great?\u2019 (Now this Ardiaeus lived\na thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some\ncity of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder\nbrother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.)\nThe answer of the other spirit was: \u2018He comes not hither and will never\ncome. And this,\u2019 said he, \u2018was one of the dreadful sights which we\nourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having\ncompleted all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden\nArdiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and\nthere were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been\ngreat criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into\nthe upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar,\nwhenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been\nsufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery\naspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried\nthem off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand,\nand threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them\nalong the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and\ndeclaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were\nbeing taken away to be cast into hell.\u2019 And of all the many terrors\nwhich they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror\nwhich each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the\nvoice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with\nexceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and\nthere were blessings as great.\n\nNow when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days,\non the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on\nthe fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they\ncould see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending\nright through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour\nresembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day\u2019s journey\nbrought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they\nsaw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this\nlight is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the\nuniverse, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is\nextended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn.\nThe shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is\nmade partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl\nis in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it\nimplied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped\nout, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and\nanother, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit\ninto one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on\ntheir lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is\npierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the\neighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the\nseven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions\u2014the sixth\nis next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes\nthe eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is\nseventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars)\nis spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or\nmoon) coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and\nfifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like one another, and yellower\nthan the preceding; the third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth\n(Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the\nwhole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one\ndirection, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of\nthese the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh,\nsixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to\nmove according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third\nappeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of\nNecessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes\nround with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form\none harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another\nband, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the\nFates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have\nchaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who\naccompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens\u2014Lachesis singing\nof the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from\ntime to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of\nthe outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left\nhand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of\neither in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.\n\nWhen Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to\nLachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in\norder; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of\nlives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: \u2018Hear the\nword of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new\ncycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you,\nbut you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot\nhave the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his\ndestiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will\nhave more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser\u2014God is\njustified.\u2019 When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots\nindifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which\nfell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he\ntook his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the\nInterpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and\nthere were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all\nsorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition.\nAnd there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant\u2019s\nlife, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in\npoverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some\nwho were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength\nand success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of\ntheir ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the\nopposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any\ndefinite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life,\nmust of necessity become different. But there was every other quality,\nand the all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth\nand poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also.\nAnd here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and\ntherefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave\nevery other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if\nperadventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will\nmake him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to\nchoose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He\nshould consider the bearing of all these things which have been\nmentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what\nthe effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a\nparticular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble\nand humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and\nweakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and\nacquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined;\nhe will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration\nof all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better\nand which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil\nto the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life\nwhich will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we\nhave seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after\ndeath. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine\nfaith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the\ndesire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon\ntyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others\nand suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean\nand avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in\nthis life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of\nhappiness.\n\nAnd according to the report of the messenger from the other world this\nwas what the prophet said at the time: \u2018Even for the last comer, if he\nchooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and\nnot undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless,\nand let not the last despair.\u2019 And when he had spoken, he who had the\nfirst choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny;\nhis mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not\nthought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first\nsight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own\nchildren. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot,\nhe began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the\nproclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his\nmisfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything\nrather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and\nin a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was\na matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of\nothers who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them\ncame from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial,\nwhereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and\nseen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this\ninexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of\nthe souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good.\nFor if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself\nfrom the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate\nin the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy\nhere, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead\nof being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most\ncurious, he said, was the spectacle\u2014sad and laughable and strange; for\nthe choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of\na previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus\nchoosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating\nto be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld\nalso the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on\nthe other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men.\nThe soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and\nthis was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man,\nremembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the\narms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because,\nlike Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the\nmiddle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an\nathlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there\nfollowed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature\nof a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose,\nthe soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey.\nThere came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and\nhis lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of\nformer toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a\nconsiderable time in search of the life of a private man who had no\ncares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about\nand had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said\nthat he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of\nlast, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass\ninto animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and\nwild who changed into one another and into corresponding human\nnatures\u2014the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all\nsorts of combinations.\n\nAll the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of\ntheir choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had\nseverally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller\nof the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them\nwithin the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus\nratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to\nthis, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them\nirreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the\nthrone of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a\nscorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste\ndestitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped\nby the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this\nthey were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were\nnot saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he\ndrank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the\nmiddle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then\nin an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their\nbirth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the\nwater. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he\ncould not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself\nlying on the pyre.\n\nAnd thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and\nwill save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass\nsafely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be\ndefiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the\nheavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering\nthat the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and\nevery sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the\ngods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games\nwho go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be\nwell with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand\nyears which we have been describing.","title":"The Republic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":216285}